The second paper reproduced from the ANI seminar “Maritime Power and its Place in the New World Order” held at HMAS Watson on 16 May 1991 is Maritime Operations in the Gulf War. It was given by the RAN Task Group Commander, Commodore (later Rear Admiral) Chris Oxenbould. It was first published in the May 1991 edition of the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute.
Maritime Operations in the Gulf War
As the Gulf Crisis deepened and conflict became more likely, the role of the RAN task group expanded to include direct involvement in military operations to remove Iraq from Kuwait. Operation Damask eventually resulted in Australian participation in the largest grouping of warships since World war II and arguably the most powerful and complex naval force ever assembled. At the height of the conflict the allied maritime forces in the area comprised six aircraft carriers, two battleships, 15 cruisers, 67 destroyers and frigates and over 100 logistics amphibious and smaller craft.
These ships together deployed more than 800 fixed and rotary winged aircraft. The fleet was assembled from 15 nations and participated in coordinated air and sea operations in a most complex environment with a remarkably high degree of integration. Together the force’s firepower was awesome and its main role was to establish sea and air control of the Arabian Gulf and Red Sea area while providing strike support for the allied effort ashore. Pitted against this massive multinational force were the Iraqi air force, with about 1300 aircraft and a comprehensive array of antiship missiles and a small missile armed navy. The clever use of mines by the Iraqis, the possible use of chemical weapons and Silkworm missile shore batteries also added to the threat.
By any measure of effectiveness maritime operations in the Gulf War were highly successful. All military objectives were achieved for a remarkably small loss of life among the coalition forces. For those involved the war provided the most significant operational experience in their careers. With the short time available this morning I will only be able to skirt over a brief narrative, highlighting the Australian task groups involvement. However, I will conclude with a few personal observations that may provoke questions or further conversations over lunch or during the remaining coffee break.
The guided missile destroyer Brisbane and the guided missile frigate Sydney formed as a task unit and commenced workup in mid October last year. The additional warning time that was available before the deployment was used to complete a series of important enhancements, primarily in the areas of communications, anti-ship missile defence and surveillance sensors. On 17 November the ships sailed from Sydney and continued an intense workup period during the three week passage to the Gulf, which incorporated the many valuable lessons learned from the first deployment of Adelaide and Darwin. Brisbane and Sydney met Darwin, Adelaide and Success on the outer edge of the Area of Operations (AO) early on the morning of 3 December. On completion of a handover the new arrivals and Successcontinued into the Gulf of Oman (GOO). Entry into the AO was marked by an extension of the Australian operating limit to include the Arabian Gulf and an announcement by the Prime Minister that Australian units would be used to support United Nations Security Council Resolution 678, which authorised the use of all available means against Iraq unless it withdrew from Kuwait by January 15.
As explained by Captain Shalders, maritime interception operations (MIO) of Iraq and Kuwait bound merchant traffic had all but halted by this time and the first few days in the area were taken up with operational briefs and exercises with USN ships and a short visit to Muscat. Calls were also conducted on senior US officers from these calls and the other briefs it was obvious that the coalitions blockade was very successful and that no goods were able to enter Iraq from sea and that only limited amounts were smuggled over land or by air. Although the sanctions seriously weakened Iraq and may have eventually destroyed the economy they were not forcing Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait and estimates were that this could take about 12 months.
Of significant note during this period, and often overlooked, is the fact that the level of sea control established by the multinational forces permitted the unhindered reinforcement and resupply of Saudi Arabia in preparation for the allied air and ground offensives.
Another conclusion drawn from these early intelligence briefs was that Saddam Hussein was not going to withdraw. He was simply too well dug in and prepared, to be posturing. At this stage the only two passible outcomes appeared to be war or a backdown by the coalition forces. This conclusion added significant impetus to the need for change from MIO to preparations for hostilities.
To achieve early assimilation into the Arabian Gulf anti-air warfare operations (AAW), the Task Group (TG) entered the Arabian Gulf on 16 December. After a day in the southern Gulf, Brisbane and Sydney moved to the central Gulf where continuous AAW surveillance and interception patrols were being conducted by the multinational fences. To add to the tension, Iraqi drifting mines were being discovered in the area, including one as far south as the entrance channel to Bahrain, further command briefs for Brisbane and Sydney were conducted on board USS Bunker Hill, an AEGIS cruiser which was the anti-air warfare commander and stationed as a picket closest to the threat. A quickly established rapport with the Bunker Hill and other USN ships greatly assisted the smooth and rapid integration of the Australian units into a very active and complicated AAW picture.
To complete area familiarisation, Brisbane and Sydney arrived at Bahrain 21 December where further briefings look place on board USS Blue Ridge, the flagship of the USN Central Commander, Vice Admiral Arthur and in USS La Salle, the flagship of Commander Middle East Forces, Rear Admiral Fogarty. During the visit to Bahrain tight security precautions for ships and individuals ashore were enforced in response to the assessed terrorist threat and made the visit somewhat uncomfortable. Success meanwhile had departed the Gulf on 17 December for passage to the Seychelles for a well earned Christmas break.
Recommencing operations, Sydney sailed from Bahrain 23 December for patrol duties the central Gulf, guarding against the possibility of an Iraqi pre-emptive strike at Christmas. While the area was outwardly quiet the increased level of coalition air activity during this period highlighted the evolving change in emphasis from interception to AAW operations.
However, the requirement to support the UN sanctions was still present and for some time a close watch was being maintained on the Iraqi “peace ship” Ibn Khaldoon, that was a Libyan sponsored attempt to discredit the coalition. This vessel had been loaded with food and medicine and stated its intention to break the UN trade sanctions. Aiming to maximise propaganda value, over 240 women, children and journalists had also been embarked in the vessel. To maintain an international flavour, Rear Admiral Fogarty requested assistance from other nations in the interception of Ibn Khaldoon. Sydney was given this task and made a high speed passage out of the Gulf and down the coast of Oman to meet US ships Oldendorf, Fife, Curts, Trenton and Shrevport on Christmas morning. A rehearsal was held later that day and the actual interception occurred on Boxing Day in the vicinity of Al Masirah Island. HMS Brazen also joined the team and Sydney acted as the lead intercept and challenge unit.
Evolving boarding techniques had now reached a very refined stage with the insertion of Marines by helicopter being particularly impressive and effective. The boarding was difficult and struggles occurred with passengers trying to seize the weapons of the boarding party. Shots were fired in the air and stun grenades were also used to regain control of the situation. Iraq later claimed that excessive force was used and several passengers reported miscarriages and heart attacks. Examination by USN doctors determined that the injuries were either feigned or unrelated to the actions of the boarding party, who had in fact shown admirable restraint.
As a result of the search Ibn Khaldoon was confirmed to be carrying prohibited goods and was held in custody pending the identification of a diversion port and offloading of this cargo.
While the lbn Khaldoon event was continuing, another Iraqi vessel, their tanker Ain Zalah was reported underway and returning to Iraq from Aden with crew members from Iraqi ships laying idle at Aden. I was embarked in Sydney and given the duty of On Scene Commander for the Ain Zalah boarding as well as tactical control of US ships Guam, Trenton, Fife and three marine and seal units. HMS London also participated. On 29 December Sydney detached from Ibn Khaldoon to act as the primary interception ship and an 18 hour surveillance operation with the Seahawk commenced soon after. The following morning the Visit and Search look place at sunrise with the US Seals seizing control and stopping the ship in less than 12 minutes, and within 30 minutes of the initial challenge. After a three-hour incident free operation Ain Zalah was cleared and allowed to proceed to Basrah and Sydney detached for passage to Dubai to see in the New Year.
Meanwhile Brisbane had sailed from Bahrain 27 December to continue operations with the Midway battle group in the central Gulf. The deadline for an Iraqi withdrawal was running out and the need to be fully prepared for our most likely employment in hostilities was now very pressing. At the time Midway had only two escorts and the RAN presence was thus particularly welcome. Tensions were continuing to rise and on 30 December two Iraqi Mirage F1 aircraft entered the Gulf and approached within visual range of the on station combat air patrol (CAP) before turning away.
At this stage Midway was conducting familiarisation in the Gulf, operating within its confines for short periods then returning to the relative safety of the GOO. Brisbane remained with the battle group during its passage back out to the GOO on 4 January and remained with the carrier for two days before detaching and making an eventful passage to Dubai which included the rescue of a Pakistani fishing boat and an Iranian goat trader.
Success returned to the area from the Seychelles on January 2 and immediately assumed the role of duty tanker in the southern and central Gulf before entering Dubai on 1 January and acting as the host ship for the Multi-national Force (MNF) CTG’s meeting. This important meeting look place on 9 January and was also attended by the staff of Rear Admiral March, who had been designated as the USN Battle Force Commander. The continuation of MNF operations was a key issue in light of the ever increasing possibility that hostilities would commence shortly. The MNF CTGs were asked to indicate their ability to assign units to the battle force and those who were requested to have their ships take up stations by 12 January in the lead up to the impending deadline.
After the conference Brisbane and Success sailed from Dubai and rejoined Sydney to conduct patrol and replenishment duties in the central Gulf. At the time an Iraqi pre-emptive strike was considered probable and, as if to reinforce this, on 11 January, about nine Iraqi fighters went “feet wet” in the north Arabian Gulf. The aircraft approached to within weapons release range of the coalition units in the most northerly picket stations before turning back and before the CAP could intercept. Several of these feints occurred in the following days.
In the increasing tension the Australian task group set about ensuring everything was in readiness. Orders were given for all personnel to be clean shaven for the fitting of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) protective masks and to commence taking tablets for protection against chemical nerve agents Later, as protection against biological warfare, all personnel were inoculated for plague.
On 11 January the Midway battle group, now retitled Battle Force Zulu, re-entered the Gulf and Brisbane and Sydney took up assigned sectors around the carrier the next morning as part of the carrier’s AAW/ASuW screen. Besides the USN ships, the only other allied units in this screen were the Dutch. The Royal Navy had two type 42 destroyers further north with the USN AAW cruisers and Tomahawk strike force and the Canadian CTG was in charge of the combat logistic force holding area in the southern Gulf. The other MNF ships were assigned as logistic force escorts and had some form of operational limitations imposed. On 13 January tactical control of all Australian units was formally passed to CTF-T54, Rear Admiral March, who was embarked in Midway.
In the last Australian pre-hostilities task, Sydney escorted Success on a delivery boy Northern Arabia Gulf “NAG Swing” to replenish those USN and RN units on patrol in the NAG. The swing commenced on 14 January and was particularly tense with hostilities expected to commence shortly and an ever increasing threat from drilling mines.
In the final naval force expansion prior to hostilities, the USS Ranger battle group entered the Gulf on 15 January, becoming part of Battle Force Zulu and taking up station in the carrier operating area. Later in the day information was received that an Iraqi pre-emptive strike could be expected overnight. This possibility, though always anticipated, added to the tension and apprehension in the ships.
Fortunately the strike did not eventuate. The UN deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait expired at 0800 local time 16 January with no apparent reaction from either side. However, later that day information was received that coalition action would commence shortly and early the next morning hostilities were initiated. TF154 commenced Tomahawk missile and carrier borne aircraft strikes in the early hours of the morning. Iraqi reaction to the coalition offensive was not immediately evident and the expected retaliatory strike did not occur. However, later in the day the first Scud missiles were launched against Saudi Arabia and the following day Iraq launched Scud missiles against Israel in an unsuccessful bid to drag that country into the war and fragment the coalition. Though not a direct threat to the TF, the potential for escalating inherent in the use of Scuds, either against Israel or armed with chemical warheads was always a serious concern.
Brisbane and Sydney remained in the north western portion of the screen around the carriers throughout the first few days of the war, closely observing the awesome display of strike power being unleashed. At times Tomahawk navigational way points were positioned within a mile or two or the Australian ships, causing some interesting moments and providing useful tracking practice if the launches were not promulgated in advance. Success meanwhile, operated with the logistic forces fulfilling the vital replenishment tasks.
Apart from the carrier air and missile offensive, the first naval actions in the Gulf were conducted by USS Nicholas and the Free Kuwaiti patrol boats. Clearance of Iraqi observation troops from the Dorra oil platforms commenced on the night of 18 January These actions were very successful, preventing the oil platforms being used as bases for anti-aircraft activity and resulting in the first capture of Iraqi prisoners of war.
On 19 January the third carrier to join Battle Force Zulu, USS Theodore Roosevelt and her escorts, arrived in the Arabian Gull after a fast transit from the Red Sea. On the same day Sydney broke free from the screen for 2 days to escort USS Niagra Falls to the NAG. In addition Success’s valuable period in the Gulf was drawing to a close. With the commencement of hostilities the tanker’s time on station was extended by 5 days but she finally departed the Straits of Hormuz on 22 January.
On 24 January USS Curts and Free Kuwait forces were involved in the recapture of Qaruh Island. The capture of the Island had great symbolic significance being the first portion of Kuwaiti territory to be retaken. In addition, useful intelligence on minefield positions was gained from captured documents and Iraqi prisoners, including the first confirmation the mines were being deliberately set adrift.
The Iraqi Air Force had remained fairly quiet in the days of hostilities, riding out the initial air offensive, and seemingly failing to press home attacks on coalition aircraft. However, on 24 January the IAF did venture into the Gulf when at least two Mirage F1 maritime strike and three MIG 23 escorts were detected flying down the Kuwaiti coast apparently approaching the battle force. The air warning was raised to Red and ships assumed higher states of readiness in anticipation of an attack. Coalition air superiority was soon evident as the two F1 aircraft were splashed by Saudi Arabian F-15s and the other Iraqi aircraft turned away soon after.
That evening the air warning was again raised to Red after intercepts of F1 radar and reports of F-18 tanking over Iraq were received. The F1s are Exocet capable and were a primary concern. Thankfully no further activity was identified that night and after an anxious period, the air raid warning reverted to Yellow.
During the afternoon of 25 January various indications of a large air strike being prepared in Iraq resulted in swift reinforcements of the battle force CAP and tanker stations. Although nothing eventuated from this incident the rapid reaction of coalition anti air defences was most impressive. It seems likely that the initial unsuccessful encounters with a well defended and prepared force dissuaded further Iraqi air attacks. On subsequent occasions minor activity was reported over land. However, the IAF did not attempt further incursions into the Gulf.
Further hampering of Iraqi air activity was the start of the coalition air offensive again hardened bunkers. Perhaps in response, reports were received on 26 January that large numbers of Iraqi aircraft had flown into Iran and throughout the remainder of the conflict the number of aircraft seeking sanctuary continued to increase. By the end of hostilities 138, mostly front-line, combat aircraft were reported to be in Iran. Despite Iranian assurances that the aircraft would be impounded until the end of the war, the threat of a minimal warning air attack originating from Iran was a significant planning consideration throughout the conflict and was increased with Iraqi aircraft in Iran.
Westralia entered the AO on Australia Day and proceeded to Muscat to embark stores landed there by Success and complete some radio installation work. Three days later the last Tomahawk firings originating from TF 154 were conducted when USS Princeton tired two salvos of three missiles. A change of coalition strike targets was now evident. As the initial objectives of destroying enemy command and control and air defence structure were achieved, strikes widened to include the attrition of all military targets in Kuwait.
During the earlier days of the war Iraqi naval vessels had made only tentative forays and were usually subjected to timely air attack. On 30 January, however, movement by a large number of combatants was detected from Iraqi ports in an apparent attempt to reach sanctuary in Iran. These units were quickly engaged by a combination of carrier based aircraft and RN Lynx helicopters operating in tandem and under the control of USN SH60Bs. One damaged Osa patrol boat was later reported to have reached Bandar-e Imam Khomeyni but at least ten other combatants were reported destroyed or badly damaged. Attrition of the Iraqi Navy continued for the remainder of the war and a total of some 138 vessels of all types were assessed to have been sunk or rendered non mission-capable.
RAN Clearance Diving Team 3 (CDT3) was deployed from Australia at the end of January to assist with the disposal of the very real mine threat. The team had valuable expertise in very shallow water operations which was not shared by the USN forces and would be very important in the event of an amphibious landing. The diving learn deployed to Bahrain on 31 January for training, briefings and to await specific tasking.
By this stage the Iraqi threat had been reduced to the extent that the carrier operating area could be moved some 60 miles closer to Kuwait. This had the dual effect of reducing tanking requirements and increasing the sortie rate for carrier aircraft.
As the carriers moved north, Brisbane and Sydney restationed into the northerly sectors of the screen immediately south of the Zagros mountains gap and within sight of the Iranian coast. The Australian units thus became the first line of defence for both air and surface threats coming from Iran, all CAP aircraft being concentrated on the main threat axis in the direction of Iraq. This tasking demonstrated considerable trust by the USN in RAN capabilities as the threat of short or no warning attack from aircraft in or over Iran, was at the time considered very real. By this stage of the war Brisbane and Sydney were also being allocated duties as CAP and tanker control units, thus providing a further sense of involvement and purpose. On 5 February Westralia entered the Gulf for the first time under escort of the Danish frigate Olfert Fischer and the Norwegian frigate Andenes and proceeded to the central Gulf for a stores transfer with Brisbane and Sydney.
The fourth and last carrier battle group, USS America, entered the Arabian Gulf from the Red Sea on 13 February to add its firepower to that already present. At this point, strike targets were again shifting; from attacks on fuel storage, ammunition dumps, communications facilities and the like, to battle field preparation and the attrition of Iraqi front-line armour and artillery. At the same time, preparation for the commencement of mine countermeasure (MCM) operations were continuing and a combined RN/USN MCM force commenced passage up the Gulf in positions in the NAG. Sweeping operations commenced several days later with the aim of clearing a fire support area to the south of Faylaka Island in support of future amphibious operations.
On 14 February the carrier operating area moved again, this time a further 50 miles north west. Brisbane and Sydney moved concurrently to sectors on the north western edge of the screen, closest to Kuwait and the Iraqi threat. The logistic forces also moved from the Southern Gulf to a box which was to the south and adjacent to the carriers area.
The amphibious task force, TF 156, was at this stage making an overt transit up the Gulf deliberately advertising its presence to Iraqi intelligence. In pre-war planning, target dates of early and then mid-February had been set for a landing on the Kuwait coast but the concept had by now been rejected. A landing seemed likely to result in very heavy casualties and unacceptable damage to Kuwait City, particularly during initial bombardments. However, an amphibious raid on Faylaka Island was still planned and the elimination of threats to MCM and the amphibious force remained a top priority. The overt presence of the amphibious units was designed to focus Iraqi attention on the continuing threat from this direction from postwar analysis, this ploy succeeded and Iraq completely failed to appreciate the direction of the final coalition ground offensive.
Sydney had a break from screening duties from 17 to 21 February when the ship was assigned to the combat search and rescue role with USS Oldendorf in an area just south of the Dona oilfields and some 40 miles off the Kuwaiti coast well within Silkworm missile range. The requirement was to rescue any aircrew that may be forced to eject over the Gulf and the Seahawk helicopter proved well suited to this task. In addition the Seahawk was required to conduct daily reconnaissance of Jaz Kubbar Island only 17 miles off the enemy held coast.
While on patrol overnight 19/20 February. Sydney experienced three very loud explosions in her vicinity. Two were correlated with allied activity but a third, which occurred in the early morning, was later linked to debris with Chinese markings which was found in the vicinity. Though unconfirmed it seems possible that the explosion may have originated from a Silkworm missile or artillery rocket impacting with one of the many oil well heads in the area.
On 18 February first USS Tripoli then USS Princeton struck mines in the NAG causing only minor personnel injuries but significant structural damage to both units. Sydney was some 18 miles to the south of Tripoli at the time of the initial strike, while in the latter incident Sydney’s Seahawk was the first helicopter on the scene and ready to provide medevac support to Princeton if required.
The discovery of these minefields and reports of Silkworm missile targeting delayed mine clearance operations and they were not completed in time to allow the Faylaka Island raid to occur before the end of hostilities. However, adequate levels of mine clearance were achieved to allow battleship gunfire support to commence on 23 February.
On completion of dunes in the NAG, Sydney proceeded down the Gulf to Dubai arriving there 22 February after 47 consecutive days at sea. Westralia joined Sydney in Dubai on the 23rd to allow the transfer of stores brought from Australia and unable to be transferred at sea in an operational environment. 23 February also marked the expiry of the latest US ultimatum for Iraq to commence the withdrawal of forces from Kuwait. G-Day, the start of the ground offensive, was initiated the following day. At the start of the offensive all four carriers were brought on line providing round the clock flying while shifting strike tasking from battlefield interdiction to close air support. Brisbane experienced its busiest air control activity during this final stage and on the day of the offensive had control of four tankers on two tanker lines and six CAP aircraft.
Coalition ground forces made rapid advances into Iraq and Kuwait but other threats remained. In particular the threat from Silkworm missiles along the coast was very real and a great deal of effort had gone into eliminating these sites with air-strikes. The portable nature and the relatively small size of the launchers, along with the presence of decoys, made certain destruction difficult and on 25 February several Silkworm missiles were fired at a naval gunfire support (NGS) group consisting of Missouri, Jarret and HMS Gloucester. Most fell into the sea shortly after launch, but one Silkworm posed a threat and Gloucester fired two Sea Dart missiles and destroyed it.
Sydney sailed from Dubai for AAW duties in the north western sector of the carrier screen on 25 February and remained there until the ceasefire. Brisbane, after also completing 47 days at sea arrived in Dubai on 27 February in time to hear that the coalition forces had entered Kuwait City and to witness the jubilation of the many Kuwaitis exiled in Dubai. That night President Bush announced that Iraq had been beaten and that a ceasefire would commence at 0800 local the following morning. Just after the start of the ceasefire Westralia sailed from Dubai to continue replenishment duties.
With the requirement for the carriers to be so close to the Kuwaiti coast removed and to reduce the mine threat. the carrier operating area was shifted about 60 miles south-east back towards the central Gulf. The battle force now assumed a defensive posture. However, naval operations in the Gulf had not yet ceased and Brisbane sailed from Dubai on 2 March for escort duties with the replenishment ships Pasumpsic and Niagra Falls, operating in the NAG until 4 March. During this swing the threat from free floating mines was still very high. Three mines were discovered along the replenishment track including one that passed some 50 yards from Niagra Falls, this mine was kept in sight by Brisbane until a USN heliborne EOD team arrived to destroy it.
CDT 3 was meanwhile tasked in assist in the clearance of Kuwaiti ports. During a reconnaissance for this task on 2 March the OIC of CDT3 Lieutenant Commander Griffith. made the only direct contact by an Australian with the enemy when he captured an Iraqi soldier who was hiding in a warehouse in Ash Shuwaikh, the Kuwait City port precinct. CDT3 commenced deploying to Ash Shuaybah the next day and began diving and ordnance disposal operations soon after. Combined operations by USN/RN and RAN teams, in the most difficult conditions, allowed the official opening of Ash Shuaybah on 12 March and RAN efforts were then moved to the Kuwaiti naval base at Ras Al Qulayah before moving on to Ash Shuwaikh. The team performed extremely well and received much praise for its work.
The wind down of USN forces in the Gulf began almost immediately with the USS America being the first in depart the Gulf on 4 March to relieve the John F Kennedy and Saratoga battle groups in the Red Sea. The Midway battle group departed the Gulf on 10 March for the GOO and then continued passage to Japan three days later. Sydney acted as Midway’s shotgun from 5-9 March, returning to the carrier screen on completion.
CTF 154 relinquished tactical control of all MNF on 9 March and Commander Middle East Forces assumed coordination duties for all units continuing to enforce UN resolutions. Also on 9 March Brisbane commenced her final escort role for replenishment units USS Platte and USS Niagra Falls on another NAG swing. After recent heavy weather the threat of drifting mines was thought to have increased; fortunately none were found. The escort duty continued until 14 March.
On the afternoon of 14 March the three Australian ships left the carrier operating area for the last time and made passage to Dubai awaiting a government decision on future Australian operations in the Middle East. Six days later it was announced that Brisbane and Sydney were to depart the Arabian Gulf on 22 March. Westralia and CDT 3 were to remain in the Gulf on MNF duties awaiting a further government decision.
So that is a very brief synopsis of maritime operations in the Gulf War. Undoubtedly the applicability of the war to Australia’s strategic situation will be argued at length.
Nevertheless there are many lessons to be learnt from commiting ships to combat for the first time in 20 years. Some are far reaching and expensive and will require close consideration in the overall ADF program, while others are relatively minor and only require a little bit of fine tuning. From the overall experience of Operation Damask, I think the ADF, and the RAN in particular, can be heartened.
All RAN ships and units drew considerable and genuine praise from the allied commanders for their performance. In some very tense and demanding circumstances, the performance of all personnel was professional and purposeful and for my part it was a pleasure to serve with such an expert team. The quick reaction in deploying Darwin, Adelaide and Success was also most impressive.
Furthermore the ships were supported by an excellent logistic chain which, with support from the RAAF transport, kept us well supplied. When the ships entered harbour after 47 days at sea they were without any defects which effected their operational ability and possibly in the best material state of their lives.
Together these indicators reflect well on the Navy’s personnel and its standards of training, recruiting and readiness. The package of enhancements which was put together and installed in a commendably quick time also worked well and allowed full integration with the American battle groups. However, the extent of enhancements required in Tier I surface combatants raises some questions with regard to the ‘fitted for but not with’ policy. In addition, and as found by other navies (such as the USN), the inner layers of anti-ship missile defence still require strengthening and helicopters need to be equipped more comprehensively for the surface surveillance and strike role.
On the broader operational side, there were many strong points. The most noteworthy was the success of the overall allied strike warfare plan and the very valuable contribution made by the carrier based air wings, Tomahawk missiles and precision guided munitions. By the ceasefire, approximately 14,000 of the overall coalition total of 110,000 sorties had been flown by the four Gulf carriers and one dropped over 300,000 lbs of ordnance in a single day and averaged over 200,000 lbs a day. The integration of the allied forces was also impressive as was the control of such a massive force with very few real problems and it reflected the considerable benefit of large multinational exercises such as RIMPAC. Overall there were far more positives than negatives.
Operation Damask and the Gulf War provided a unique experience where the RAN provided a very visible and active participation that allowed Australia to demonstrate its very clear resolve to support the United Nations security council and Kuwait.
The challenge is now to heed the lessons of this experience.
About the Author
Rear Admiral Chris Oxenbould AO RAN was born in 1946 in Sydney and joined the Royal Australian Naval College as junior entry cadet midshipman in 1962. His early sea service included serving in the Chilean sail training ship Esmerelda, destroyer HMAS Duchess and the destroyer escort HMAS Torrens. Chris Oxenbould specialised in navigation and served as navigating officer of the destroyer HMAS Hobart and the tanker HMAS Supply. His sea commands were the frigate HMAS Canberra and the destroyer HMAS Perth. On 28 September 1990 he relinquished command of Perth in Singapore to be promoted to commodore and assume command of the second Gulf task group.
For his service in the Middle East Commodore Oxenbould was appointed as an Officer of the Order of Australia (AO) “for distinguished service as the Commander of the RAN Task Group both during and after the Gulf War.” He was also awarded a US Bronze Star medal and the Saudi Arabian Order of King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz (3rd Class).
His subsequent shore appointments were Director-General Naval Policy and Warfare in Navy Office and the Director-General Joint Operations and Plans within the Department of Defence. As a rear admiral he served as the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Personnel), the Maritime Commander and finally as Deputy Chief of Navy. He retired from the RAN in 1999.
