ANI at 50: A 1976 Vision of the RAN

Below is the seventh article drawn from ‘Davy Jones’ Locker’. Well before the RAN’s Seapower Conferences at Darling Harbour, the Navy held a largely internally focussed Naval Symposium at the end of each year at HMAS Watson. In November 1976 five officers were tasked to present a vision of the RAN.

The ‘Young Turks,’ as they described themselves, gave a wide-ranging presentation that is of contemporary interest as the RAN undergoes its metamorphosis into a nuclear submarine equipped navy. The Young Turks’ paper was published in the May 1977 edition of the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute.

THE NEEDS OF THE RAN 1985 TO 2000

INTRODUCTION

Our syndicate addresses the needs of the RAN in and for the period 1985 to 2000 that is from nine years to twenty years hence. This timescale provides time for formulation and implementation of policies to fulfil the needs. You will note we have omitted all reference to the Seaborne Air Platform a subject already receiving much attention.

Before describing the likely roles of the RAN in the period under study, the major influences on the functions of the RAN will be discussed.

Firstly, geopolitical influences The likelihood of direct invasion is generally accepted as low, and indeed may well be the lowest possibility of all. Nevertheless, shifts in the power balances anywhere in the area of Australia’s interest have effects that are felt throughout and can include expansion affecting Australia even though not caused bv Australia.

On the other hand major nations, especially Japan, are becoming more and more resource hungry. As the unexplored areas dwindle the competition will become more fierce. The arbitrary interference by governments or trade unions in the trading of raw materials will only amplify this ferocity We have assumed that the 200 km resource zone will be adopted by all countries even if unilaterally – these influences will result in a much greater requirement for offshore surveillance than at present.

Changes in political attitudes in neighbouring countries allied with increasing activism in minority groups within Australia will lead to increasing import of subversive material and ideas. As fishing grounds become depleted the fishing fleets from other nations will range further afield and will take even more liberties with national boundaries.

Greatest of all the influences however will be the ever increasing world trade carried on or over the seas There is every sign that the already interlocking world economy will become more interdependent. Even now the closure of the major straits through the archipelagic countries would have serious consequences for countries like Japan and Australia.

The high level of seaborne trade is itself worthy of closer study-the trends in levels on the various routes and the content of the trade goods carried thereon are just as important as knowledge of military capability.

Secondly, technological factors. Of these we must first address the submarine. We do so because of its overriding influence on seapower. Notwithstanding any other technological innovation, the foreseeable strength of Russian seapower will rest heavily on the vast radius of action and on the invulnerability of submarines. This is one technological area we do not expect to change greatly. No amount of opposing technology, whether increased capability of sonars, vast passive acoustic arrays, laser underwater sensors, nuclear depth bombs or anything else is going to remove the high vulnerability of merchant shipping to attack by submarine. Probably the best defence is to multiply the numbers of hulls (that is less eggs in each basket) – a suggestion quite contrary to present trends for bigger and bigger ships, or to make merchant ships less sinkable. We argue that whatever else may change, the offensive capability of the submarine will continue largely unchanged. However the concentration. until recently, of many of our resources into anti-submarine forces may well be misguided.

The other technological influence on roles is the increasing number of smart weapons. These arms are now increasingly being sold to countries with little or no industrial or technological basis of their own Of more significance however is the decreasing cost, and the increasing reliability, simplicity of operations and comparative invulnerability to countermeasures of these weapons. These are the greatest levellers of all – the tiniest nation can fit them to fishing busts and produce a credible threat at low cost, a threat whose greatest asset is our difficulty of identifying which are the enemy That these forces are vulnerable to air attack is not the point – the cost of the boats and missiles is vastly less than the loss of just one bulk carrier and its cargo.

FUNCTIONS AND ROLES

Functions

We believe the common functions for the Australian armed forces are satisfactory and we consider the single Service functions are adequate with the exception that the RAN single Service function should be re-stated as follows:

‘The conduct of operations at and over the sea for the defence of Australia and Australian interests’

This would not in our opinion degrade the function of the RAAF but would be a realistic statement of the requirement for the RAN to conduct air operations as an integral part of Naval operations. We do not believe that maritime operations can be divided into distinct air and surface segments with both RAN and RAAF holding separate responsibilities. The present functions inadequately recognise the requirements of Naval aviation and tend to reinforce the general inefficiency and difficulties that have occurred in maritime operations for many years. We believe that the present system whereby sea surveillance is largely the prerogative of ‘he RAAF is wrong and that the RAN is the appropriate Service to be the prime mover in this activity.

Roles

First let us consider the single Service function of the conduct of operations at and over the sea for defence of Australia and Australian interests.

We speculate that the maritime situations that could occur may be one or more of the following:

• As a minor ally of a number of non-communist nations, probably including USA, in a struggle for survival with the USSR and Warsaw Pact countries, our commitment probably forced upon us by membership of ANZUS;
• Involvement in a regional war as a result of deliberate actions taken against Australian nationals by a foreign government. A situation where the government is forced to intervene, because public opinion demands intervention to stop the killing of Australians and the less important but nevertheless significant destruction or confiscation of Australian owned assets.

We believe that the prospects for involvement in this type of maritime action is fairly remote but could occur with devastating suddenness:

• Defence of Australian trade carried on the high seas against military sanctions imposed by a nation determined to influence our government policies. Interference with Australian maritime trade could occur at great distances from Australia and could occur separately or as an adjunct to the two maritime situations already mentioned;
• Action to prevent the plundering of national resources by industrial resource-hungry nations;
• Actions to suppress political blackmail or acts of political terrorism. The type and rationale for this activity is limitless and could occur without warning;
• A fish war or similar, resulting from the necessity to enforce the national claim to an economic zone as established by International law but not recognised by a country which does not ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty;
• Participation in peacetime operations designed to save life and/or property;
• Participation in projects for the advancement of knowledge and the good of mankind.

To be able to meet these situations we believe the RAN requires the following roles:

• to organise, train and equip naval forces for sustained combat operations;
• to project sea power in order to deter the aggressor against Australian persons, property or interests at sea;
• to react effectively to meet sudden situations where maritime intervention is desirable to support national interests;
• to maintain tactical superiority in any areas necessary for naval operations including the defence of maritime trade;
• to conduct maritime surveillance;
• to conduct oceanographic and hydrographic surveys to meet national needs and as a contribution to the advancement of knowledge;
• to provide military sea transport to meet national requirements.

We believe the roles we have postulated would meet the Navy’s needs to achieve its proper Service function. Let us now consider the four common functions of the Australian Services. The roles we have suggested should adequately meet the requirement of the following functions:

• to deter aggression, as far as a single nation defence posture will deter the aggressor;
• uphold and protect Australia’s National interests by military means;
• contribute to United Nations supervisory or peacekeeping forces.

However, we are conscious that the fourth function – ‘to ensure the security of Australia and its territories’ – may prove to be beyond the resources of Australia in circumstances where a major aggressor with vast resources of manpower and material could overwhelm the nation. We believe that a navy could not be developed by a nation of our population and resources to meet this eventuality. We would need support from powerful friends.

TECHNOLOGY, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

The critical path in readying the RAN for 1985 will be (he acquisition of hardware, due to the gestation period involved Naturally, purchasing hardware off the shelf reduces the period but this introduces unwanted side-effects, all of which undermine Australia’s strategic self-reliance.

There is a genera) need for Australian research, development and industrial capability to be expanded to match the pace of advance of other national objectives in order to provide that stand-alone factor in providing for national security.

Shipbuilding

In addition to the current need to revitalise the shipbuilding industry in general, there is an urgent requirement to have in Australia the capability to build, to maintain but most of all to design warships in order to provide the independent capability to expand our forces in time of need-a time when our allies may not find it convenient to replace or augment our ship forces. The proper means to achieve both viability of the shipbuilding industry and strategic independence we need is to provide long-term building programmes to the shipyards that include the construction of warships.

Smart Weapons Implications

The major implication of smart weapons we believe is that warships, as presently conceived, present too valuable and attractive a target to hazard in the face of a sampan/SSM threat. At the same time the much increased surveillance requirements demand many more hulls. For both these reasons there is a clear need for many small and powerful units – but with emphasis on the small. Involvement of the Australian shipbuilding industry at this level is an obvious place to start: even better if weaponry such as Harpoon can be built here also. The design capability must be seen as a total package design with a lead contractor coordinating a range of government and private activities.

Nuclear Technology

It is only a matter of time before we are forced into nuclear technology, firstly for ship propulsion because other energy sources will become prohibitively expensive. The size and relative cost of nuclear power packs will fall. The present popular reaction to nuclear powered ships resembles scenes from the beginning of the Industrial Revolution and shows clearly that the Federal Government must lead in educating the population of Australia to live with nuclear power. Further, the Defence Department must lead within government lobbying all other areas to accept the necessity of nuclear power particularly for ship propulsion.

Secondly, the club of nuclear powers is growing steadily. No one has yet postulated a non-nuclear deterrent to nuclear arms. We would probably have to develop a nuclear deterrent on our own. The development time is long (albeit decreasing) and it is too late when a neighbouring country, with outside assistance, detonates their first warhead.

At this moment we should know precisely how many years hence we could have such weapons and this assessment should be updated continuously. Further to this, as the time approaches for their introduction, the Services should begin to practise their use. If the threat level we intend to combat includes nuclear weapons in limited numbers then it follows we should have them too. We should not rely on the USA to equalise the balance, or to provide the nuclear umbrella.

Satellites

The use of space vehicles as an alternative method of accomplishing our maritime surveillance role must be recognised as an option. Systems analysis of the whole surveillance task is needed urgently to determine the proper place of space, air and seaborne vehicles. Such analysis must also take account of the increased effectiveness of all amis of defence due to the availability of more up-to-date intelligence from satellites.

The purchase of launch-vehicles to be operated from Woomera is probably the best means of deployment. However the manufacture of the satellites themselves is surely within Australian capability in 10 years time, even if perhaps the design is not.

Control of Technology

So far we have covered a few very important but very innovative areas of technology. We hasten to correct any impression that ‘only the latest is good enough ‘ by sounding a cautionary note. We have for many years indulged ourselves in purchasing, overseas, hardware embodying the latest in technology. We have also acquired two undesirable attributes of this indulgence. Firstly, the maintenance of such hardware requires ever increasing levels of maintenance expertise with all the attendant costs of further training etc. However, far more disturbingly we have inherited all the logistic problems as well What does it matter if the Mean Time Between Failures of an equipment is hundreds of hours if the replacement spare takes 18 months to obtain from the USA – a not atypical figure. We take too much notice of usage in our stocking of key spares and not enough of lead-times.

Use and Development of Existing R&D Capability

There is existing a large R&D capability in Australia. With forward-thinking policy and guidelines that are maintained throughout the years there is no reason to prevent Australia being at the optimum technological level in 1985. There is a need for greater awareness of the present R&D capability. Far too few of us know of the capabilities of the Weapons research Establishment (WRE) and the Aeronautical Research Laboratory (ARL) for example, let alone the RAN research Laboratory (RANRL). This may be a problem more applicable to the Navy than the other Services.

Realism in R&D

A related feature of R & D is the need for greater realism in its management. We have now conducted enough projects of our own to realise that using optimistic figures in the original estimates is foolhardy. The practice of underestimating R&D costs of a project to get it approved is an overall waste of resources far beyond the direct costs involved because of the impact on other areas.

Enlightened Extension of Role of R&D

Finally we believe the whole field of R&D suffers from a traditional myopia. Broadening the field is desirable and should include such areas as:

• management information systems for command and control;
• behavioural science aspects of service motivation;
• political science studies of the credibility of a deterrent force;
• marketing aspects of maintenance of volunteer forces;
• studies of the construction of merchant shipping and offshore structures to render them less vulnerable to deliberate attack; and
• economic studies of the strategic importance of trade commodities – to name but a few.

OPERATIONS AND TACTICS

We feel that there are changes needed to our present approach to operational and tactical matters. At the coal face we feel our maritime strategy is hidden in documents which are not readily available to the junior members of the Service. The vast majority of the officer corps look forward to service in a fleet but feel the concept of operations is vague. We believe there is a need to spell out in more detail our maritime strategy and our concepts of operation so that all personnel have a greater appreciation of what they are trying to achieve.

As a Service we exist on the fringe of both NATO and the USN, conditioned to looking to these organisations for tactical doctrine. As a result we have tended to lack some original thought in tactical matters and at present we have inadequate manpower or time devoted only to the development of tactics and their testing in realistic exercises. We believe there is a need to analyse carefully the capabilities of potential opponents and to develop viable tactics to counter them. This requires an effective tactical ‘think tank’ realistic tactical exercises and full and rapid analysis of these exercises.

While we rely heavily on NATO and USN tactical publications for our operations we have no access to their preparation. It has therefore become necessary to supplement NATO and USN doctrine with our own resulting in the present large number of procedures. There is a need to rationalise our publications, to reduce their number and to firmly establish what are RAN procedures and tactics and what are not. Once this has been accomplished we require an adequately staffed book writing organisation with access to Navy Office and the fleet staff, backed with adequate typing and printing facilities to meet its needs.

We shall now turn to the fleet, its organisation, and its method of operating. It is our contention that having reached a laudable level of professionalism the RAN in the post-Vietnam period has allowed its professionalism to decline to a point where our present standards in basics such a seamanship are below those taken for granted in the ’50’s and early ’60’s, because the emphasis has shifted elsewhere.

A ship lives a hand-to-mouth existence during its refit period at a time when basic procedures are being established to ensure safety and efficiency in the commission ahead. Its ship’s company tries vainly to cope with a backlog of ship husbandry tasks, while simultaneously providing personnel for courses, exercise staffs, courts martial, boards of inquiry, ship riding duties; in between taking major leave.

The ship enters refit with an apparently inflexible date to be met in the future, knowing full well that any slippage in the refit programme arising from industrial disturbances or any other cause may be counterbalanced by a reduction or general degradation of the forthcoming Ship Qualification Testing (SQT) and workup periods. The ship’s company takes its ship through refit, SQT and workup, striving to achieve the teamwork essential to the management of a modern man-of-war, only to see key personnel posted out just when the light begins to shine at the end of the tunnel. These postings, of course, result from the need to honour the seashore roster.

Ships are organised into squadrons composed of same type units, squadrons which rarely if ever work together and whose commanders apparently have no other function than to act as branch post offices for type correspondence.

Finally, while some ships appear to spend a good proportion of their ‘commissions’ undertaking foreign cruises and participating in multinational exercises, some less fortunate sisters seem banished to the Sydney-Jervis Bay racetrack from where after a trying season of contesting maiden welter events, they are occasionally released for a spell in the agistment paddocks of Newcastle or Port Kembla.

The syndicate understands the problems which confront posters and the planners, the need to retain flexibility; the need to meet routine commitments. But notwithstanding these constraints we feel that there must be a more efficient and satisfying way of running the stable which will ensure that all the entrants will be properly trained before working their way up through the maiden, novice and encourage events, eventually taking a crack at the classics and major handicaps. We acknowledge that fundamental changes will need fundamental policy reversals to support them.

We will place one idea before you without claiming it to be the panacea; an idea which has as its major purpose the stimulation of discussion We concern ourselves solely with a core force of escorts and submarines for 1986 which corresponds to that at present in existence, namely 3 DDGs, 3 DD/FFG, 6 DEs and 6 SS.

The core force is organised into three Task Croups each comprising 1 DDG, 1 DD/FFG, 2 DEs and 2 SS and we feel that the Task Group Commander should also command the DDG. All ships would operate on a three year cycle regardless of type and all postings of officers and sailors to seagoing units would be of three years’ duration. Type postings should continue throughout a sailor’s career particularly for technical and weapons sailors once they have reached the rank of Leading Seaman. We realise that the foregoing constitutes one of the fundamental changes to existing posting policy foreshadowed but it is intrinsic to the success of the scheme.

Year One would see all vessels of a Task Group going into dockyard hands at their type dockyards (DDGs and DD/FFG Garden Island; DEs – Williamstown; SS – Cockatoo Island). Key personnel from the previous commission, having prepared the defect list, would spend one month onboard with the new crew handing over in detail. Where possible new-to-type personnel would ride Year Two and Year Three units for familiarisation. PCT’s for all units should be run separately and specific and detailed attention should be paid to the training of the new commanding officers. By year’s end all units should have satisfactorily completed SATS, shakedowns and SQTs, with SATS carried out mainly in waters adjacent to refit ports.

At the beginning of Year Two all units would carry out individual workups and, once a satisfactory standard has been achieved, all units combine tor squadron command team training (CTT) and a squadron tactical period. We would expect that, after a further period at sea devoted to a coordinated tactical workup, a squadron operational readiness evaluation (ORE), basic training would be completed and for the remainder of the year the Task Group would operate as an entity on what is at present known as the Australia Station, ending the year with a mid-cycle docking and leave period.

Year Three would commence with a short squadron shakedown and workup followed by the Task Group participating in all multinational exercises and undertaking at least one lengthy foreign cruise/deployment.

In addition to the present infrastructure, or in some instances instead of it. we see the need for type cells in RANTAU, type cells in each Dockyard in the form of specialised fleet maintenance units, and type expertise and equipment available in all specialist schools. Personnel for these billet:, should be posted direct from completion of their three year sea cycle.

Finally, we must state that, if the fleet at sea is going to be manned to ensure maximum efficiency, then for officers of Commander’s rank and above there must be a formalised wet and dry list.

INFRASTRUCTURE

Regardless of how efficient individual sea and airborne units become, their optimum employment is largely dependent upon the infrastructure which supports and guides them It is in this particular body hydradic we see the need for considerable change. Oversimplifying, we can regard the infrastructure as a large body supporting the following:

• The head political;
• The head managerial;
• The head logistic.

The Head Political

While appreciating Machiavelli’s dictum that “success in war is determined by the political advantages gained, not victorious battles”, and while sometimes echoing, silently of course. Von Moltke’s wish “The politician should fall silent the moment mobilisation begins, and not resume his precedence until the strategist has informed the King, after the total defeat of the enemy, that he has completed his task”.

The uninformed pragmatist would do well to learn from the late Chairman Mao who said “There are some militarists who say ‘We are not interested in politics but only in the profession of arms’. It is vital that the simple minded militarists be made to realise the relationship which exists between politics and military affairs. Military action is a method used to attain a political, goal. While military affairs and political affairs are not identical, it is impossible to isolate one from the other”.

We agree with the late Chairman Mao and see an urgent and ongoing need for the naval officer to understand the political mind and equally, if not more important, for the politician to understand the naval mind. To achieve this there must be frequent opportunities to talk freely in informal circumstances. While recognising the need for some measure of constraint, we decry the muzzle at present placed upon the tongues of uniformed officers when addressed by politicians. Under the present rules the politician, hearing the same stereotyped evasive answers to his question, must begin to wonder if the military mind is capable of any original thought at all; the naval officer, entrusted with the lives of hundreds of men and millions of dollars worth of equipment, must begin to wonder whether he will ever be trusted to act without rigid guidelines to direct him.

Politicians should be encouraged to visit ships and establishments and to talk freely with their uniformed fellow citizens. Short term (three month?) postings to ministerial staffs and other departments such as Foreign Affairs would do much to dispel any thoughts of mysticism which may dwell within the serviceman’s mind.

The Head Managerial

It is to this head that all middle-ranked officers belong; and to its higher levels we all aspire. It would seem tu us that our training at present is insular and largely by example and experience within the ambit of naval duties, occasionally enriched by staff courses and postings which impinge upon other spheres. But do we keep pace with modern managerial theories and practices? Are we given sufficient responsibility at an early age to fit us for higher managerial tasks? Do we have modern management aids and services to assist us in performing our duties? The syndicate’s answer to all three questions is an unqualified NO.

To overcome these serious deficiencies in our daily lives, we see the need for the following to have been implemented by 1986:

• An active short term exchange system between industry, commerce and government at all levels on the one hand and the service on the other.
• Financial responsibility channelled further down the chain of command.
• Decentralisation of some directorates with cells established in areas such as Sydney and Perth and the North of Australia.
• A maritime operations room established to control the management of all surveillance operations.
• Land-based Task Group offices handling the bulk of the paperwork which at present clogs the lives of seagoing personnel.
• Stenographic facilities readily available to ships alongside in dockyard ports lo handle the paperwork which must come to the ship.
• Modern management aids installed in directorates and establishments, with initial and running costs more than offset by the man-hours saved.
• A vastly improved intra-Australian communications network including such items as secure person-to-person telex, conference telephone links and secure telephones, all leading to considerable savings in man-hours and service costs.

Correspondence stowage problems alleviated by computer stowage in ships and shore establishments and simple information retrieval services.

The Head Logistic

Even with the politician and the Serviceman understanding each other and our management modernised in thinking and assisted by modern aids, the body hydradic will cease to function unless supported by a well oiled logistic machine, adequately primed and refuelled.

In this regard we see the centralisation of stores in the Sydney area under the control of the Flag Officer Commanding Eastern Australia (FOCEA) as the first in a series of significant steps, leading to the formation of a Support Command controlling not only stores but also military transport. As a natural extension of this concept we see increased use of military transport for leave and duty travel and the rapid movement of stores and equipment.

The stores demand and supply system, although greatly streamlined over the past decade, needs further streamlining in order to expedite the movement of articles from store to user. Here we feel that the potential available in modern computers has been barely tapped.

We see the need for the establishment of new bases, particularly in the North and North West of Australia. Floating docks should be deployed and utilised in peacetime. When assistance is needed and no base exists, Mobile Technical Units should be available to deploy rapidly for trouble shooting.

Finally we see the need for all civilians employed by the Department of Defence to be amalgamated into one Defence Support Union.

PERSONNEL

We now examine the needs of the officers who will man the Navy of the future.

Identity

Although a generalisation, it is true to say that naval officers adopt a low profile in the community Continuity of civic activity is inhibited by posting turbulence, and the constraints on wearing uniform in public places breeds an attitude of anonymity. Both syndromes are less pronounced in isolated communities but do prevail in the large cities.

Peacetime incidents which involve the Navy are generally pitched in matter of fact terms devoid of human interest. By comparison, other professions enjoy large media exposure albeit often coloured by fictional plots.

We feel that there is a need for a radical overhaul of our attitudes to projecting our image to the public. As one of the first steps a budgetary allocation should be made for the professional production of a series of semi-documentary television dramas featuring the Navy’s past. current and possible future services, laced with human interest.

Recruiting

If we are to compete with the other professions for our share of school leavers we need to project in forceful terms the purpose and rewards of service as an officer in the RAN. Infrequent quarter page newspaper spreads and kaleidoscopic television commercials lack sufficient substance and inducement to compete with the magnets of civilian professions.

We see a need for the acquisition of civilian expertise in the marketing and advertising fields in order to modernise our approach to projecting our product.

Education

There is an ever increasing mutual interdependence of uniformed and civilian officers in the Navy. Increases in the cost of military hardware are rapid, and this highlights a critical need for close co-operation and concerted endeavour between the research, design, production, user and analyser inputs if procurement is to be cost effective and totally suited to its intended tasks.

The Australian Defence Force Academy will not ensure that sufficient naval officers are adequately equipped academically until about the turn of the century. In the meantime essential user experience will be inserted in the equation but not necessarily collated by disciplined thought process.

We see a need to commence now a programme in which a number of selected officers in the ranks of senior Lieutenant, Lieutenant Commander, and junior Commander are allocated for full time tertiary or post graduate study in order to cover the academic gap. If this means a temporary under-bearing at the coal face, the sacrifice is warranted in the short term for the long term advantages.

One of our greatest potential forums for the debate of defence matters is the Universities. If it can be established in those institutions, the incumbents will spread it to the Australian public at large. Currently the one place where our advertising and search for publicity is not directed is into the universities.

The spin off in this regard from the education programme I described above would enable the Navy to project:

• the importance of strong maritime forces for Australia, and
• the professionalism of the Navy’s personnel.

We do not see ADFA in the long term as a total answer. In order to satisfy the needs of the service and the individual we envisage an educational pattern which meets the following criteria:

• a sound basic education to the level required by the community for an important profession i.e. ADFA;
• further studies at career break points in order to meet personal needs for advanced education unhindered by trying to conduct two jobs simultaneously;
• training in the community to fit officers for postings in the higher echelon of the defence force;
• manpower levels to cope with the allocation of appropriately qualified officers not only to in-service hardware orientated billets but also to research and development.

Training

Training is considered separately from education and is examined in the context of an educational process or acquisition of skills for short term benefits. The Navy tends towards a philosophy that no officer is experienced until he has gained practical experience in a wide range of billets. In point of fact a significant proportion of the tasks in each succeeding billet are repetitious.

We consider that the level and nature of professional skills necessary for an officer to perform the tasks required of him at each stage of his career should be clearly defined. Any training superfluous to the requirement should be deleted. Inevitably this will produce more specialised but also more professional officers

To make our Navy one where lack of resources is counterbalanced by superior performance we must be prepared to invest a higher percentage of our manpower and monev to improve training- not the administration of training but the training itself. To this end we consider a need:

• for a manpower level to allow personnel to be borne in the training and educational environment without detriment to operational commitments;
• for facilities to enable meaningful training in the shore environment in order to reduce as far as possible the need for operational units to conduct basic training on board;
• to train personnel in our national industries in what we need in terms of equipment and expose them to our problem areas.

Employment

The small specialised arms of the Navy such as Aviation, Submarines and Hydrography seem able to offer a more measured tread to officers’ careers than general service As a result an officer within these arms derives:

• encouragement from an easily recognisable career pattern and progression;
• motivation to master the clearly defined skills required at each stage; and
• stability in his personal life because of the planning he can pursue with knowledge of his career patterns.

As impartial observers often assess the level of performance within the specialised arms as very professional, we consider that the reasons should be identified and adopted where practicable in general service.

Industry recognises with concern a syndrome called ‘mid career crisis’ in which many middle level managers in their late 30s realise that they have reached their final level of the pyramid. A significant proportion opt out for the challenge of a second career. The resultant loss of expertise to the original career is a waste. Whether we realise it or not the same situation arises in the Navy but currently it is too easily camouflaged by the supposed attractions of a commuted pension

Flattening the pyramid’s peak is no solution for either industry or the Navy but we cannot afford any unnecessarily premature loss of expertise. This syndicate does not see a need for the Navy, like industry, to pursue urgently a means of coping with the crisis.

We do however, consider that insufficient attention is given to management of officers in whom large investments in terms of finance and training are made. One means of improving this situation would be increased accessibility of DNOP staff officers to those officers not within convenient striking distance of head offices. This is now done occasionally.

Motivation

Despite the nebulous nature of preparation for a non-identifiable military threat, some of the aspects of military service which motivate are job satisfaction, participation and ambition.

Industry is able to measure productivity and, in so doing, motivate their people to achieve targets or results. The Navy’s product cannot of course be easily quantified but we feel that the Service could work harder at developing methods of measuring and promulgating the results of endeavour.

In order to ensure that a suitable officer applicant, once properly educated, trained and retrained as appropriate to his career level, has sufficient motivation we see the need for:

• accentuated measurement techniques for the promulgation of job performance hence satisfaction for the individual stemming from the knowledge that results and goals are being achieved. Conversely protection for the system when poor performance is recognised and can be corrected;
• greater emphasis on the satisfaction of successful group activity. Too often officers at all levels who have participated in an exercise have little or no awareness of whether the aims were achieved and what contribution their own unit made.

Officers must feel that their job is worthwhile, interesting and itself giving them status. When serving at sea they must be involved in operational tasks and not continuously training for trainings sake. This problem was addressed in the operational segment of this paper.

The ‘Young Turks’ were:

• Captain Eric Eugene ‘Big E’ Johnston AM OBE RAN then Commanding Officer HMAS Perth. He was later a commodore and after the Navy a notable Administrator of the Northern Territory;
• Captain Mike Rayment RAN, then the Fleet Operations Officer and later a Commodore;
• Commander Ian MacDougall RAN then Officer-in-Charge, Submarine Command Team Trainer and later Vice Admiral and the 23^rd Chief of Naval Staff;
• Commander Nigel Stoker RAN, then Officer-in-Charge RAN Tactical School and later Commodore; and
• Lieutenant Commander Chris Skinner, then Combat Systems Engineer Officer, HMAS Perth and later Captain.