New analysis from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute argues that Russia’s deepening economic and strategic reliance on China and its sizeable Pacific submarine fleet mean Moscow must be factored into allied planning for any future conflict involving Beijing in the Indo-Pacific.
In ‘Russia’s Pacific submarine fleet: Sino-Russian cooperation in a conventional Pacific conflict’, ASPI Research Intern Carl Janz and Senior Resident Fellow Colin Karotam examine an overlooked dimension of the Indo-Pacific strategic balance: the potential role of Russia’s Pacific submarine fleet in a regional conflict involving China.
They find that Moscow’s growing economic and strategic reliance on Beijing gives Russia a significant stake in the outcome of any potential future Indo-Pacific conflict, meaning Australia and its partners need to factor meaningful Russian participation into strategic planning.
“Russia cannot afford China to lose an Indo-Pacific war by, for example, failing to take Taiwan,” the authors state.
“This would upend Sino-Russian attempts to subvert the liberal international order, weaken Russia’s main patron and complicate Russia’s expansionist ambitions.”
Russia also possesses a substantial Pacific-based submarine force that could complicate US and allied operations, particularly around Japan, while freeing Chinese forces to concentrate on operations closer to Taiwan and elsewhere in the region.
In total, Russia’s Pacific Fleet has more submarines than China’s Northern Fleet, giving Moscow particular subsea potency in the northwest Pacific.
Russia’s geography and capabilities also give it particular advantages. Its nuclear-powered submarines operate from the Kamchatka Peninsula outside the First Island Chain, while its conventional submarines are based at Vladivostok with access to the Sea of Japan.
The authors examine three scenarios in which Russian submarines could complicate allied operations, including threatening undersea cables, disrupting critical sea lines of communication, and striking ports and logistics infrastructure supporting allied operations.
“Australia aims to maintain a stable and balanced region by deterring aggression that seeks to upend the regional status quo, along with allies and partners such as the US. The Russian Pacific Fleet, particularly its potent nuclear attack submarine arm, could be used to undermine that stability.”
As well as calling on Australia and its allies to factor meaningful Russian participation into planning for an Indo-Pacific contingency, the authors also identify an opportunity for Australia and European partners to better coordinate deterrence efforts across the European and Indo-Pacific theatres, imposing competing pressures on Russia across both fronts.
