The “Evaluation of India’s Indian Ocean Strategy” report tabled in the Indian parliament in August, deserves more attention globally. Unlike many other countries, India does not issue defence white papers. No maritime doctrine or strategic document has been publicly released by India since “Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy” in 2015. In the absence of updated strategic guidance, this report assumes significance, potentially filling a decade-long gap in charting India’s maritime direction.
The report, tabled by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs, chaired by Shashi Tharoor, gives vital insights into how India’s political system considers its role at sea. Standing Committees in India cut across party lines and place government policy under bipartisan scrutiny. Their reports are the outcomes of cross-party consensus, giving weight and legitimacy to their recommendations.
The Committee devotes considerable attention to India’s maritime self-image: the way it has long defined itself as the “net security provider” in the Indian Ocean.
In its report, the Committee devotes considerable attention to India’s maritime self-image: the way it has long defined itself as the “net security provider” in the Indian Ocean. It acknowledges that India has earned credibility as a first responder, delivering disaster relief, patrolling against piracy, sharing maritime information, and supporting island states with capacity-building. However, the Committee insists that to remain credible, India must also “devote the necessary resources for a greater naval presence” and be more assertive so that the “Indian Ocean remains India’s Ocean”.
The Committee points out India’s competing visions. It notes that SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region), introduced in 2015, was a focused Indian Ocean doctrine aimed at combating terrorism, piracy, and trafficking. MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions), launched in March 2025, extends that ambition to the Global South, embracing Africa, Latin America, and the Pacific Islands. However, the report warns that there is “considerable overlap” between the two, resulting in conceptual confusion. Hence, the Committee urges the Indian government to “undertake a comprehensive review” and deliver a clearer, unified vision. It emphasises the need to sequence ambitions and consolidate the near seas before extending to the far oceans.
The Committee observes that India’s approaches to the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and the Indo-Pacific are interconnected. The challenges in each necessitate cooperative responses to ensure peace, stability, and sustained growth. India recognises the Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific as a contiguous strategic space; security and prosperity in one directly influences the other. While Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue address provides a broad Indo-Pacific framework, the Committee recommends a “cohesive strategic framework” and emphasises the need for a more integrated strategy that consolidates India’s Indian Ocean policy with its broader Indo-Pacific approach.
The Committee also notes that despite the Indian Ocean’s centrality to India’s security, economy, and diplomacy, there is no dedicated mechanism to coordinate the many strands of policy. Given that India’s ocean strategy spans defence, trade, security, environment, and development assistance, it recommends creating a comprehensive Inter-Ministerial Task Force with participation from key ministries. Such a body, it argues, is essential to close coordination gaps, ensure efficient resource utilisation, and accelerate the execution of India’s strategic priorities in the Indian Ocean.
Considering the oceans as a sustainable resource space, the Committee urges the government to champion a “Green MAHASAGAR” that would integrate sustainability into its ocean strategy, addressing climate change, marine pollution, and ecosystem degradation. For many states bordering the Indian Ocean, climate security is existential. Rising seas threaten the Maldives, Seychelles, and low-lying coastal zones, and illegal fishing undermines the livelihoods of people across the Indian Ocean region. The report suggests India should lead regional cooperation on renewable energy, sustainable fisheries, and marine conservation. This could help India carve a distinct identity as the steward of the ocean commons.
By calling for greater clarity, integration, and coordination, the Committee is charting a new identity for India in the Indo-Pacific.
The Committee also expresses “concern regarding the escalating Chinese presence” in the Indian Ocean, noting that China’s PLA Navy is now the world’s largest. Bases and infrastructure stretching from Gwadar to Djibouti reflect China’s “String of Pearls” strategy. India’s response, the Committee argues, must be proactive, bolstering deterrence capabilities, investing in anti-submarine warfare, expanding surveillance, and deepening ties with regional partners.
Noting the Indian government’s “cautious approach towards a security-centric Quad due to its policy of multi-alignment”, the Committee urges exploring a more flexible security role for the Quad, including joint maritime exercises in the Indian Ocean to improve coordination, enhance maritime domain awareness, and strengthen preparedness. Such steps, it argues, would deepen Quad security cooperation without undermining multi-alignment.
These recommendations illustrate a broader theme in the report. By calling for greater clarity, integration, and coordination, the Committee is charting a new identity for India in the Indo-Pacific. For external partners, this report signals that recognition of gaps and contradictions in India’s maritime strategy is no longer confined to think tanks. For middle powers, the report suggests new avenues of collaboration with India on sustainability, capacity-building, and regional institutions. And for major powers, it is a reminder that India’s choices vis-à-vis the Indian Ocean will be filtered through a distinctively Indian lens of multi-alignment and gradual institution-building. Yet, against the backdrop of major power rivalry and the growing turbulence in the maritime domain, how far these recommendations translate into actual policy will ultimately depend on the government’s willingness to adopt them.
