Captain Patrick Griffin, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, and Lieutenant Taija Griffin, U.S. Navy warn of the dangers of China’s use of fishing and commercial vessels as part of its military maritime forces. (From US Naval Naval Institute News.)
The first threads of sunlight dance along the horizon. Belowdecks, sailors sleep peacefully in their racks, before the impending call of reveille. Suddenly, the hushed stillness of the pilothouse is interrupted by urgent reports of electromagnetic jamming crackling over the radio from the combat information center.
Danger is approaching. Bridge watchstanders scan the sea but see nothing—except the gentle bob of fishing vessels. This is how war starts.
Retired Navy Admiral James Stavridis’s novel 2034—about a future conflict between the United States and China—follows a similar beat. His scenario includes an unconventional vision: The next Pacific war begins with an attack from unassuming fishing vessels instead of the long-awaited over-the-horizon missile fight. Stavridis predicts U.S. Navy ship captains, despite years of rigorous training, would be ill-equipped to detect the potential threats of malignant civilian commercial vessels sailing in proximity.
Five years prior to penning 2034, Stavridis published an article in Proceedingswarning the U.S. Navy, “Maritime Hybrid Warfare Is Coming.” He wrote about a shift from the “gray hulls” traditionally employed in high-seas offensive maneuvers, to the covert use of “white hulls”—unsuspecting civilian vessels such as tankers or tramp steamers—operating in the littorals.1 This idea raises questions about the strategic readiness of the Navy, as traditional tactics may not be sufficient to counter the evolving nature of unconventional threats.
For more than a decade, the United States has oriented its defense posture toward deterring a rising China. This era of strategic competition often focuses on modern, hard-point weapons such as China’s DF-26B “carrier killer” antiship missiles or J-20 fifth-generation stealth fighters. These high-speed threats are what warfighters across the U.S. fleet are preparing to face—and that is precisely what China is betting on.
Arguably, however, the most successful naval flotilla in Chinese history was the pirate fleet of Zheng Yi Sao (c. 1775–1844). With a vast, decentralized fleet of small ships, Zheng Yi defeated the Chinese Imperial, British, and Portuguese navies off China’s shores.2 She carefully chose her battles, overwhelming opponents with sheer numbers. Zheng Yi used the same tactics as Napoleon—dividing forces into smaller units, then converging when a suitable target appeared. This is how Zheng Yi’s pirate force remained undefeated in the South China Sea. While not a perfect reflection of China’s current maritime strategy, Zheng Yi’s story does have some striking similarities.
China’s Third Sea Force
While the U.S. Navy focuses on deterring or preparing to fight the rapidly modernizing People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), another fleet looms beyond its immediate focus: China’s “Third Sea Force,” officially known as the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). For decades, China has operated a government-backed, paramilitary fishing fleet with mixed crews that combine former PLA personnel and civilian fishermen. The militia has two specializations: an elite core, trained for complex joint operations as a hybrid force, and a larger, less professional auxiliary support force. These vessels function as an unofficial extension of the PLA’s command.3
The PAFMM’s primary role is to support China’s expanding maritime sovereignty claims through security, reconnaissance, and logistic functions. The PAFMM regularly integrates with the China Coast Guard and the PLAN. Together, these services form a layered strategic approach for China’s Indo-Pacific objectives.4 The PLAN is building a Mahanian navy fit to challenge U.S. hegemony in a conventional fight.5 Meanwhile, China’s maritime militia is more aligned with the irregular strategy of Zheng Yi Sao. To win, U.S. and allied forces must prepare to confront both.
The PAFMM was born out of China’s reduced naval capacity after its civil war, and its role was as a placeholder until a stronger conventional naval power could be developed. Since as early as 1973, China has been using fishing vessels to assert territorial claims in the South China Sea—notably during its 1974 seizure of the Paracel Islands. Policy followed action with enactment of the Military Service Law in 1984.6 The law solidified the PAFMM’s role within the broader strategic maritime context by giving civilian mariners the ability to serve in the militia during preparations for war and homeland defense.
Over the years, China has refined this approach and continually tested its strength against the Philippines, Vietnam, and the United States.7 The 2009 confrontation with the USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS-23) demonstrated clear coordination between China’s military and civilian maritime component. During that incident, Chinese commercial trawlers swarmed the U.S. surveillance ship and forced her to take emergency anticollision actions. Chinese civilian crew members used grappling hooks to try to damage the Impeccable’s towed acoustic array.8 Such tactics focus on overwhelming an adversary with nonkinetic means to achieve China’s goal: “Win without fighting.”9 More recently, the PAFMM has been known to “routinely menace other countries’ fishermen—boarding or ramming boats, confiscating or stealing catch and equipment, and even going so far as to kidnap crew members for ransom.”10
There is no consensus on the total number of ships participating in the PAFMM, but estimates range from hundreds to thousands.11 Regardless, China has the capacity to pull from a fleet of more than 560,000 fishing vessels—the largest in the world.12 Reporting also demonstrates China’s growing investment in constructing and renovating civilian fishing vessels for militia activity. A Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report identified a network of ten bases located along China’s Guangdong and Hainan provinces that support more than 300 militia vessels assigned to patrol the Spratly Islands daily.13 Owned by nearly 30 companies, this partnership blurs the lines between civilian activity and state control—a distinction of critical importance in wartime.
Rules-Based Order in an Unrestricted Maritime Conflict
The international laws governing naval warfare mandate the protection of fishing vessels from engagement but acknowledge that civilian mariners aiding enemy combatants are legitimate targets.14Distinguishing between genuine civilian craft and militia vessels could be challenging for U.S. crews. As a result, commanders may be forced to exercise extreme caution because of the risk of inadvertently triggering a political crisis by engaging vessels of ambiguous purpose. China’s maritime militia exemplifies this challenge. Designed with reinforced hulls for ramming, these vessels boast water cannons, additional storage for ammunition and weapons, and enhanced communication and navigation capabilities. In essence, they are warships in fishermen’s clothing.
China’s military strategy prioritizes a large quantity of cheap deployable assets. This is a stark contrast to the U.S. approach, which includes an annual Department of Defense budget of more than $800 billion to fund high-dollar, cutting-edge military technology and equipment.15 While some sources put China’s de facto defense spending on par with the United States, use of forces such as the PAFMM helps spread Beijing’s defense budget across a range of high- and low-tech tools.16This gives China an asymmetric advantage by having the highest effects at the lowest cost.
The PAFMM’s strength lies in its ambiguity, allowing it to seamlessly blend in with civilian traffic during hybrid warfare. This deceptive capability might allow it to isolate U.S. forces from regional allies and deny access to crucial ports within the first and second island chains, such as Subic Bay. Swarms of these craft could blockade strategic ports or target unguarded logistics vessels to disrupt U.S. supply and sustainment efforts. This “chokehold” on maritime supply chains, achieved with minimal resources, could force the United States to divert crucial assets from the main effort to protect its logistics network.
Meanwhile, PAFMM vessels present a duality of force for the PLAN. Not only is the PAFMM poised to strangle U.S. logistics chains, but it also could provide fuel and ammunition resupply for PLAN ships in a covert and decentralized manner. Beyond this, properly equipped and crewed militia vessels could undertake surveillance and search-and-rescue missions, freeing dedicated PLAN assets for warfighting. In addition, these vessels might be capable of several versatile missions, including covert minelaying, electronic warfare, antisubmarine warfare, and deploying drones or special forces.
Defeating the Zheng Yi Sao strategy
These internal frictions expose critical vulnerabilities in China’s Third Sea Force. Capitalizing on these weaknesses through targeted actions across tactical, operational, and strategic levels will be crucial for disrupting and destabilizing this force. U.S. and allied naval leaders must develop a multipronged approach that addresses these vulnerabilities at each level.
Bring Back Maritime Civil Affairs
The U.S. Navy used to have a special community that could assist with challenges such as the PAFMM—the maritime civil affairs (MCA) community. The role of MCA officers was to prepare the battlespace prior to conflict by coordinating with local civilian leaders to smooth access for military personnel.19 MCA detachments, working closely with the Department of State and fleet policy and plans (N5) staff, gathered information about the operational environment. This included details on fisheries, food-security concerns, and local civilian networks. However, the prioritization of blue-water operations coupled with budget constraints led the Navy to disestablish the Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Command in 2014.20 This programming gap means today’s forward-deployed crews could struggle to address PAFMM threats in the lead-up to and during wartime.
A reconstituted MCA community could provide a cost-effective solution that would not require a large, independent command structure. It could shift from its original broad focus and instead become a specialized capability dedicated to hybrid warfare, with a core competency in countering the PAFMM and similar emerging challenges. By employing existing naval officers with additional collateral duty training, the revised MCA program could develop a cadre of experts equipped to manage and advise on PAFMM interactions.
These MCA officers would attend Marine Corps civil affairs and civil-military operations planning courses, as well as coordinate with the Coast Guard as part of its global engagement strategy.21 Once trained, MCA-qualified officers could be the primary shipboard leaders for monitoring PAFMM activity, analyzing threats, and recommending effective responses to the captain. This would ensure commanders deployed in the Indo-Pacific have access to specialized expertise during time-sensitive operational decision-making. The presence of MCA specialists also would bolster the confidence of units operating in isolated, communication-degraded environments.
At the operational level, trained MCA officers could conduct port visits and liaise with local fishing communities. Through these port assessments, the Navy could build a clearer picture of the PAFMM’s operational footprint across foreign ports. While not intended to replace traditional intelligence, these rapport-building tactics would establish patterns of life and build awareness of local community concerns regarding the PAFMM within the local community.
This approach mirrors the strategy employed by the U.S. Coast Guard’s international affairs engagement teams, promoting information-sharing at the unit level. In addition, by fostering positive civil-military relations with local leaders, the Navy could develop a network that could restrict PAFMM access to these ports in the future. This shared resource would improve maritime domain awareness for the Navy, allowing ships to distinguish potential threats from civilian traffic operating in the region. The database not only would increase transparency, but also would allow governments to hold China accountable for the PAFMM’s disruptive behavior.
At the strategic level, a two-pronged approach is necessary to address the PAFMM threat. First, Navy leaders, communicators, and foreign area officers must continue to publicly classify the PAFMM as a de facto maritime arm of the PLA. The next Pacific war will begin in the information domain long before it reaches the littorals. Fleet campaigns and preplanned messaging books will be critical to controlling the narrative as escalations begin. In doing so, global partners must not only be made aware of this unsuspecting threat, but also be encouraged to hold the same public stance on deterring the PAFMM.
Second, the Navy must establish rules of engagement (ROE) for encounters with these hybrid vessels so the fleet can effectively respond to and deter aggression. In addition, China must be informed of the serious repercussions that would follow any provocative PAFMM actions. The Department of Defense should begin seeking congressional ROE approval for potential contingencies involving the PAFMM, well before any crisis erupts.
A final point for consideration is improving fleetwide education on hybrid maritime warfare. Continual education, starting with foundational courses such as the Advanced Deck Officers Course and Basic Division Officer Course, and continuing through midcareer programs such as joint professional military education, is crucial. These courses should incorporate case studies examining the PAFMM, its tactics, and its role within China’s “total fleet” strategy. In addition, wargaming and simulations must integrate the PAFMM as a factor to ensure realistic training scenarios. Finally, hosting annual international symposiums focused on the PAFMM and highlighting its illegal activity would foster collaboration and knowledge-sharing would further strengthen the collective response.
There is no scenario in which a conflict with China does not involve the PAFMM. China integrates these vessels into PLAN and China Coast Guard operations to act as force multipliers while confusing opposing forces. For decades, China has committed to a strategy of unrestricted maritime warfare. Preparing now for this unrestricted fight is the only way the United States can deter or win the next Pacific war.
1. ADM James Stavridis, USN (Ret), “Maritime Hybrid Warfare Is Coming,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 142, no. 12 (December 2016).
2. Mark Cartwright, “Zheng Yi Sao,” World History Encyclopedia, 15 November 2021.
3. Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s Third Sea Force, the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia; Tethered to the PLA,” China Maritime Report no. 1, China Maritime Studies Institute, March 2017; and “Philippines Deploys Vessels to Monitor ‘Illegal’ Presence of Chinese Boats in South China Sea,” Reuters, 3 December 2024.
4. Zach Cooper, “Thinking Clearly About China’s Layered Indo-Pacific Strategy,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 73, no. 5 (August 2017).
5. Ralph D. Sawyer, James R. Holmes, and Toshi Yoshihara, “Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to Mahan,” Naval War College Review 61, no. 2 (Spring 2008).
6. Nguyen Hong Thao and Ton Nu Thanh Binh, “Maritime Militias in the South China Sea,” Maritime Awareness Project, 13 June 2019.
7. Zhuang Pinghui, “Chinese Coastguard Uses Water Cannon, Blocks Philippine Vessels Near Scarborough Shoal,” South China Morning Post, 4 December 2024; Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “From Frontier to Frontline: Tanmen Maritime Militia’s Leading Role Pt. 2,” CIMSEC, 17 May 2016; and Dzirhan Mahadzir, “China Masses Militia Ships in Spratlys, Transit of USS Gabrielle Giffords Irks Beijing,” USNI News, 4 December 2023.
8. Jonathan G. Odom, “The True ‘Lies’ of the Impeccable Incident: What Really Happened, Who Disregarded International Law, and Why Every Nation (Outside of China) Should Be Concerned,” Michigan State Journal of International Law 18, no. 3 (2010).
9. Derek Grossman and Logan Ma, “A Short History of China’s Fishing Militia and What It May Tell Us,” RAND, 6 April 2020.
10. Hunter Stires, “The South China Sea Needs a ‘COIN’ Toss,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings145, no. 5 (May 2019).
11. Grossman and Ma, “A Short History of China’s Fishing Militia”; Parth Satam, “Chinese ‘Fishing Militias’ Emerge Biggest Threat to U.S. Navy Warships Operating In South China Sea,” Eurasian Times, 23 August 2023; and David Crom (@CRNICASMILITAR1), “‘Fishing boats’ used and financed by Beijing to intimidate countries and reinforce its territorial ambitions, as well as to devastate and plunder the seas and oceans. It is estimated that they could have a deep-water fleet of more than 3,000 vessels,” 18 August 2023, 12:29 pm.
12. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2022: Towards Blue Transformation (Rome: FAO, 2022).
13. Gregory B. Poling, Harrison Prétat, Tabitha Grace Mallory, and Center for Advanced Defense Studies, “Pulling Back the Curtain on China’s Maritime Militia,” CSIS, 18 November 2021.
14. James Kraska, “China’s Maritime Militia Upends Rules on Naval Warfare,” The Diplomat, 10 August 2015.
15. U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Summary of the Fiscal Year 2024 National Defense Authorization Act,” 11 March 2024.
16. Mackenzie Eaglen, “The U.S. Navy Is Falling Behind China, and the Pentagon Knows It,” AEI, 31 October 2023; and William D. Hartung, “Reality Check: Chinese Military Spending in Context,” Watson Institute for International & Public Affairs, 5 December 2023.
17. Andrew S. Erickson, “Shining a Spotlight: Revealing China’s Maritime Militia to Deter Its Use,” The National Interest, 26 November 2018.
18. Shuxian Luo and Jonathan G. Panter, “China’s Maritime Militia and Fishing Fleets: A Primer for Operational Staffs and Tactical Leaders,” Military Review (January–February 2021).
19. Paul W. Taylor, “Maritime Civil Affairs,” Small Wars Journal, 8 March 2017.
20. PO2 Matthew Daniels, USN, “Navy Disestablishes MCAST,” DVIDS, 16 May 2014.
21. CDR Kevin Duffy, USCG (Ret.), “Getting Real About the ‘Global Coast Guard,’” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 141, no. 10 (October 2023).
Captain Griffin is a graduate student at Harvard Extension School working toward a master’s degree in international relations. He holds an undergraduate degree in international affairs, and his work has been published by the U.S. Naval Institute, the Modern War Institute at West Point, and Task & Purpose.
Lieutenant Griffin is a public affairs officer and is pursuing a master’s degree in mass communication and media studies at San Diego State University. She holds a bachelor’s degree in public relations. Her most recent assignment was at U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Africa, where she supported several joint maritime security operations. She also has deployed to the western Pacific, both as a public affairs officer and surface warfare officer.
