The fourteenth article drawn from Davey Jones’s Locker is the joint presentation by Rear Admiral Guy Griffiths and Air Commodore Geoff Michael to the ANI’s Seapower 81 conference. The theme of the event was “Australia’s Maritime Defence and it’s Relation to Industry.” Their presentation was titled, “A View of Australia’s Maritime Defence Needs.”
Presentation by Rear Admiral Guy Griffiths
It is an honour to have been invited by the ANI to offer you my views on Australia’s Maritime Defence needs. I have assumed that really means beyond 1990 – because we are not known for making quick decisions to procure ships or aircraft.
Thirty minutes should surely give me ample time to discuss the simple and straightforward question of our maritime defences – we inhabit an island continent, attractively rich in resources, heavily dependent on seaborne trade to support our economic development and to improve our standard of living generally. There is no doubt we need a maritime defence capability, but just what do we mean be maritime defence? For many I suspect the expression means the coastal surveillance task in peacetime, and in hostilities, the military defence of our extensive sea borders.
Firstly take the need for coastal surveillance. It is easy to understand that patrol boats are required to police the exclusive economic zone, and m co-operation with aircraft to control access to our offshore fishing zones — to prevent unauthorised development of underwater resources — to deter illegal immigration – to prevent smuggling, and so on.
The existence of offshore mining rigs adds to the complexity of offshore protection problems in this zone and it will be necessary to consider whether patrol boat types can fully meet the task, or whether a corvette, with longer endurance and better seakeeping qualities may be required. If so, ships of the type used in the UK, which are adaptions of commercial hulls, may also be suitable for our sea conditions within 200 nm of the coast. Some years ago I understand one of our shipbuilders proposed an adaption of their offshore oil rig supply ships – it could be worth investigating that proposal.
The vast areas of the EEZ make air surveillance essential. At present civilian contractors carry out a beach surveillance role whilst the Air Force covers areas further offshore – also Fleet Air Arm aircraft have been deployed to cover specific tasks.
The present departmental involvement in peacetime surveillance is complex, with a number of interested authorities – particularly the Departments of Immigration, Health, Customs, Transport and Defence. There is also the co-ordination of search and rescue by the Department of Transport. The overall co-ordination of peacetime surveillance activities is planned by a committee, but the question must be asked whether the present peacetime organisations would continue in lime of emergency or war.
There seems little doubt that in an emergency it would be turned over to Defence, with the command and control of ships and aircraft being placed under the maritime defence commander. Therefore, it is difficult to see the logic in continuing the present arrangement – why not give the maritime defence commander command and control of ships and aircraft engaged in offshore surveillance in peacetime. If this produces a problem in the command and control of civilian aircraft, then let me say that I believe this type of surveillance would be more effectively carried out in service manned aircraft.
There is also the question of co-ordinating search and rescue activities – given that this would fall to the maritime defence commander in time of emergency, then it seems logical the same organisation should be responsible in peacetime. Any proposal to form a civilian-manned coastguard is also disturbing from the cost aspect – take the simple fact that a third mate costs some $30,000 for six months work, and compare that to the salary paid to a patrol boat commanding officer.
I am using the words peace or peace time here in their normally accepted Western sense – that is an absence of war I do not use it in the Soviet sense of a continuation of war by all means short of war – it is an important difference – many well meaning people think that when the Soviets profess their desire for peace they mean what their Western listeners want to believe.
For hostilities our maritime defence obviously needs mine warfare forces – mines and minelayers to prevent hostile use of our coastal sea lanes, and mine clearance forces to maintain the use of ports and coastal waters. Historically, mining has only taken place in a declared war environment – but this may not always be so, as in Vietnam. It is good to see that plans are underway lo replace our overage small mine-warfare forces.
We would need suitable escorts for our important coastal trade which carries so many bulk items which are essential to our economy. I do not see a priority need for missile firing patrol boats in peacetime, but our patrol boats should have the growth potential for the installation of such weapons, should strategic developments show that this is necessary.
For many people, that would just about solve all our maritime defence problems – unless we had ideas of what even Stalin saw as an active defence of the sea border – forces which could range further out, submarines, and aircraft armed with air to surface missiles – but how far should they be able to operate from our coasts.
Well the 1976 Defence White Paper talks about defending focal areas and “exercising control in areas of Australia’s maritime jurisdiction” Can that be right? Our area of maritime jurisdiction in 1976 was the three mile limit on territorial waters. Why then do we need long range maritime patrol (LRMP) aircraft, a carrier, ocean going destroyers and submarines? Maybe it was a slip and it means the 200nm EEZ over which we have some internationally recognised legal rights – even so it is not very far is it? If that is what was intended – and the reasons escape me – why should we broadcast the fact that we intend to go no further? So I am left with the conclusion that I have been trying to answer the wrong question.
The words “maritime defence” conjure up a Maginot line concept at sea – with occasional forays by strike forces charging out from the secure fortress to head off the Indians at the pass. Is that all there is to Australia’s maritime defence needs? My answer is no! I believe that what I really need to address is the application of maritime strategy to Australia’s circumstances. In fact, within Australia’s military strategy for the long term uncertain future, how much emphasis should be placed on a maritime strategy (or the obvious reasons of geography and our need to use the sea?
King Alfred the Great has been quoted as saying “there is no advantage of living on an island unless you control the waters that wash its shores.” The technology of modern maritime warfare has extended the distance this island needs to control its adjacent waters – somewhat further than Alfred’s concept. Therefore we must ask ourselves is 200nm enough, or is 2000nm nearer the mark? or 3000nm? or beyond 3000nm? No doubt there are many who would envisage a map of Australia surrounded by a shaded area out to 2000-3000nm. and immediately conclude that the task would be beyond us. But they are thinking in land locked terms. To use Corbett’s definition. “Command of the sea means nothing but the control of maritime communications whether for commercial or military purposes. The object of maritime warfare is the control of communications and not, as in land warfare the conquest of territory.” I believe we should be able to exercise sea control — in strategic jargon, to conduct the sea denial and ‘sea assertion’ missions out to at least 2000-3000nm.
Although we seem to understand the need for ‘sea denial’, that is to prevent an enemy using our adjacent waters to our disadvantage – we appear to be preoccupied with developing a capability to strike surface ships. Why?
Both the Minister and Admiral Synnot have recently discounted the prospects of a conventional amphibious invasion, but it has been part of our folklore for so long that it manifests itself in what we are doing – fitting Harpoon in our LRMP aircraft. Harpoon in our DDGs and FFGs, and Harpoon in our submarines.
After 1990 perhaps we should be more concerned with the availability of relatively cheap submarine launched cruise missiles which could be used against us. For the location of these submarines I suggest we need to expand our underwater detection capabilities – with fixed underwater arrays on the lines of the US Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) system – the technology to do this already exists in Australia.
In addition should we not develop simple ships with towed array sonars – here an adaption of commercial vessels may be useful – given that they have adequate endurance, or alternatively the peacetime surveillance corvette vessels I suggested earlier could do both jobs.
In this anti-submarine kit, the development of the Barra sonobuoy is a noteworthy achievement – but it could not, and should not, be expected to handle the underwater surveillance problem single handed. The LRMP aircraft and the Barra sonobuoy technologies need to be integrated with other effective measures and controlled as a comprehensive ASW underwater surveillance system. At present these ASW forces would consist of the twenty P-3’s based at Edinburgh and the six submarines. Air Commodore Michael will discuss the LRMP capability, but I would like to suggest that the present LRMP force could be better deployed to produce greater effectiveness from the existing assets – that is one squadron to be based at Pearce, the other to the Sydney area if that means duplicating maintenance support so be it Also, I would suggest that the submarine force be increased to nine boats, which should allow about three operational boats to be deployed to both the west and east coasts.
The forces I have just discussed under the sea denial mission obviously have a sea assertion function, and this applies to other capabilities in our maritime forces – very few are so specialised that their capabilities cannot be used in more than one sea power mission. This flexibility is a characteristic of naval forces. Before I leave the ASW area there is one weapon which seems worthy of serious consideration and that is Captor, the anti-submarine encapsulated torpedo. This could be useful in our inventory.
I would now like to deal briefly with the seapower mission of power projection. I do not see Australia in the business of opposed amphibious landings on any great scale. Nevertheless, the present capability being developed with Tobrukand the squadron of LCHs backed up by Jervis Bay is certainly minimal. The LCHs, besides their age, are very limited operationally, and Jervis Bay, being constrained to loading and unloading at specialised port facilities, lacks the flexibility needed in the amphibious business. I suggest a second Tobruk type ship could replace the LCHs and then the two ships would probably provide about the right level of amphibious capability. This would enable us to keep abreast of the techniques of landing soldiers and their equipments across beaches, and would provide self-contained, and self-sustaining headquarters and accommodation, for the deployment of small peace keeping forces or for other appropriate deployments in an emergency.
The naval gunfire support of land forces has been practised for decades and may still be useful in the future – so unless there is some tactical development which supersedes this type of support then this capability and expertise should not be discarded. There could be occasions when the ground support of these deployed land forces would need the assistance of fixed wing ground attack aircraft. In cases where these forces are deployed beyond the range of shore based aircraft this role would be covered by carrier aircraft, but I would not see it as a main role for carrier aircraft.
So far there may be a fair measure of agreement with what I have said. Why then is the naval element of our maritime force structure such a problem to us? Why do we have a 25 year old aircraft carrier at the end of her life? Why do we have so few operational destroyers and those we have presenting us with the problem of block obsolescence in the late 80s? Adelaide was commissioned last November. But why was Adelaide the first destroyer type ship to enter service since Torrens which was laid down as long ago as 1965 and commissioned in 1971? Why do we have such a poor afloat support capability in 1981? Now that something is being done, why is the increase in naval capital equipment expenditure over the last two years causing so much comment?
Let us be honest. Defence planning in the years of our forward defence strategy, and since, has had a hang up on the amount and type of blue water surface navy we need. Navy budgets have been consistently the lowest of the three services for about twenty years – and by considerable margins. As I have suggested earlier, I believe the problem arises from the image created by the words ‘maritime defence’ – that we should face an aggressor a short distance from the coast – the last ditch stand before the hordes come over the beaches.
I also referred to the need to look at the application of a maritime strategy to Australia’s circumstances. What are these? Surely we are a regional power, and have been for some time. We have our own particular areas of strategic interest, our own economic make up, and a special dependence on the surrounding oceans and trade route. Also, for some time the need for self reliance in defence matters has been evolving steadily. Under these conditions the question must surely arise, have we yet recognised the importance of maritime strategy and its position in the country’s total military strategy? I believe we have not, nor is the meaning of seapower fully understood, nor is its application in Australia’s circumstances fully understood.
Surely the ‘business as usual’ approach in the appointment of the defence vote over the last two decades is a clear testimony to this lack of understanding. In fact, we could almost be accused of looking around for every conceivable reason to avoid upsetting the business as usual approach. We have sought justification in unprovable judgements, that no one would dare interfere with our sea lines of communication, and that in any case we are pretty self sufficient.
We sought justification in combat technologies, that ocean surveillance systems (which are only possessed to any degree by Russia and the US), and modern precision guided missiles spelt the end of surface ships. Like the Jeune Ecole of the 1880s, which said that the torpedo boat had doomed the battleship, a new Jeune Ecole is with us in the 1980s. Are those words ‘maritime defence’ totally responsible for our attitudes? It would indeed simplify the problem if they were.
An analysis of the application of seapower in history could well show, that among its main benefits has been its use in peacetime by Governments which have skilfully used its visible instruments of power. This is not to minimise its importance in time of war. I am sure this audience recognises that the majority of international situations, differences of opinion, projections of influence etc. would occur and indeed be settled in situations short of conflict. The possession of appropriate seapower provides the government with a wide range of options to check influences which run counter to our interests, and in addition, provides an excellent means of promoting goodwill and influence consistent with our interests.
Ken Booth, in the Summer 77 Edition of the US Naval War College Review, wrote on the functions of navies. He said the main peacetime functions are the policing role and the diplomatic role. The former covers coastguard type responsibilities and a contribution to nation building, and internal security aspects such as national disasters. For the diplomatic role, he states, “This role is concerned with the use of navies in the support of foreign policy short of the actual employment of force. In this role navies are the handmaidens of diplomats in carrying out international bargaining; warships might have their effects by being kept in the background, or be being brought forward explicitly into the foreground.
Seapower deployed by the Government provides it with a finely controlled force which can be used as a deterrent to adverse influences in both peace and war situations. To be credible, this deterrent force must possess tactical capabilities which command respect, even if they are deployed in a high capability area. By this, I do not for a moment mean that we should strive to achieve a high tactical, indeed strategic, capability such as that in the US carrier strike forces – but Australia certainly needs more than low level, short range, offshore maritime defence forces, restricted to the sea denial mission.
Australia has a vital interest in its sea communications and that makes it a major strategic interest Australia does not have to provide a sea assertion capability for regional defence over the whole length of its trade routes, but I suggest an independent capability should take us further than 200nm offshore, and 2000-3000 miles is a reasonable working figure.
The tactics of maritime warfare, and the aircraft and missiles available today, turn a considerable part of maritime warfare into an air defence problem. Therefore a surface force commander needs effective control of his airspace out to about 200-300 nm. That requirement calls for a tactical organic air capability which can only be provided by a carrier. In a regional conflict we could be spared the saturation attacks that opposing forces could mount in say the North Atlantic – but we do need to eliminate the shadower which provides targeting information to missile launchers. Land based fighters cannot perform this task and I believe it is high time that we progressed beyond this type of argument.
For the last eight years the country has been led to believe in the core force concept, whereby the present capability in each service. besides being stated as adequate for present day needs. forms the basis for expansion in time of threat. I believe this concept has not been agreed by the military professional for two basic reasons:
- Firstly, history has shown that the rate of the development of and the intention to apply a threat, virtually defies accurate forecasting; and
- Secondly, the lead time involved to procure military hardware, especially naval ships which are long lead items, is unlikely to coincide with a threat development.
Let me ask you to reflect on the number and type of naval ships you could expect to obtain within a forecast threat period of say one, three, live, or seven years. The factor of surprise remains one of the principles of war – who is likely to inform us that we have until say 1990 before a threat emerges?
The fact remains that a maritime capability in being could provide the only options available to the government to cover a considerable number of cold and hot war situations. Therefore I believe, for the provision of major naval ships, a minimum of two carriers are needed as the basis on which to build the naval surface force structure – this includes destroyers and afloat support ships.
The size of the carrier is a major factor affecting the total capability available from a mix of aircraft which can be embarked, and an important part of that tactical air capability should be an air-borne early warning (AEW) system. Future carriers should be capable of operating suitable AEW aircraft.
In the RAN we have always operated a rather variegated group of destroyers – since World War II we have acquired them in penny numbers – two Battles, four Darings, four Rivers, three DDGs, two improved Rivers and four FFGs. We have lacked any indication of endeavour to standardise on ships or weapon systems.
The ill-fated DDL program, cancelled in 1972-73 because it was allegedly too expensive, was an attempt to standardise. The ships were to have been built here, and given a continuous production line, completing one every two years, with a ship life of say 25 years — this would have produced a destroyer force of about twelve ships. The project had developed significant backing by Australian industry – and there were burnt fingers when the project was cancelled.
The recent statement by the Minister that future destroyers would probably be built in Australia I hope is widely welcomed – not only by the workforce at Williamstown Dockyard which has built fine ships in the past – but also by industry. I imagine the prospect of supporting a defence project in-country is more attractive than part participation in an overseas project. Nevertheless, standardisation and industry support will suffer unless there is continuity of construction. Naturally, there would need to be an updating process to ensure that the ships remain tactically effective within the developing operational environment.
How many destroyers? The Defence White Paper says twelve. I understand that over the last two years our destroyer assets have totalled eight operational ships only and this would have included at least one, and at times two, in refit. In about two years time we should be back to a total of twelve. Assuming two carrier task forces with four destroyers each, it would appear that about twelve operational destroyers would be required to provide for these and other activities. Taking into account routine refits and modernisation, a total number of about sixteen would seem more realistic.
Afloat support is an indispensable part of effective seapower. It is essential to sustaining independent operations at any distance from land bases, and its characteristics and value have been amply demonstrated throughout World War II and each year since. In almost any deployment away from home bases in Australia the Navy is faced with endurance problems. The news that Supply will be replaced with a one-stop replenishment ship (AOR) was most welcome, but to achieve full operational effectiveness from a carrier task force of one carrier and four destroyers deployed say 2000 miles from base, two AORs would be needed if the force was required to maintain a presence tor a prolonged period. As you know, the Government has stalled an intention to acquire a second AOR.
There are many points which should be covered in this complex and interesting subject of maritime force structure, but before I end let me mention just one or two.
Firstly, the logistic support capability ashore requires the organisation and facilities to integrate the activities of spares procurement from industry, the issue of spares to ships and refitting dockyards, the processing of repairable items, together with control of storage and inventory control – the present facilities could need updating to provide an effective and economical means of meeting this task. Without an effective support system ashore the operational effectiveness of ships deployed could be seriously degraded.
Secondly, I must mention nuclear propulsion. The prognosis for our in-country oil supply remains unattractive, and observing the ocean distances involved for deployments within our areas of interest, there is an urgent need to consider nuclear propulsion in future ships of destroyer size and above. It is difficult to accept that technology is not available to engineer suitable systems for destroyers in the 4,000 ton bracket.
I realise there are many aspects, such as the importance of an adequate hydrographic service, which I have been unable to cover in the time available, but I now turn over to Air Commodore Michael to talk to you on the LRMP aspects of our presentation after which I will conclude.
Presentation by Air Commodore Geoff Michael
In general I agree with the philosophy expounded by Admiral Griffiths We have some differences of opinion on forces and their utilisation. However, these do not in any way affect our presentation.
Recent history has emphasized the lesson that air power is a vital element, indeed I could say the vital element, of any maritime defence situation. My address will deal with those capabilities of air power which I consider necessary for Australia’s maritime defence needs. I will concentrate on broad capabilities, without specifying aircraft types. Also I will not raise the debate on land-based versus carrier-based aircraft, as this question is not relevant unless specific geographic scenarios are considered. Fortunately, time precludes such an examination during this talk.
In the first instance, our maritime defence elements must constitute a viable deterrent. Any potential enemy who may contemplate maritime aggression against us should be aware that we have:
- Firstly, the means to detect and track him well before his maritime forces can enter our area of immediate interest, and
- Secondly, the potential to strike and destroy his forces, to an extent that in any venture against Australia he must expect to suffer prohibitive losses.
To achieve the first objective we must contribute to and be part of an effective maritime intelligence organisation which covers all maritime approaches to our area of interest. Currently, our LRMP aircraft make a meaningful contribution to the achievement of this aim. During peacetime, this capability in co-operation with our Allies, must be developed and nurtured. Furthermore we must utilize modern technology and strive for a real time intelligence picture which will enable us to detect and track targets under, on, and above the ocean. To this end we must pursue the development of over the horizon radar (OHR), advanced long range fixed arrays and eventually satellite surveillance. In the employment of any of these systems, the fixed wing aircraft remains a vital-integral part. In terms of capability, the aircraft should have the ability to covertly or overtly detect, classify and track any potential target. In the future I predict that target classification could prove to be the main role for the aircraft in the military surveillance role. It certainly presents the predominant problem area to our surveillance forces today, and I will discuss this problem further in the context of our capabilities in a hostile environment.
The LRMP force conducts surveillance primarily to keep watch on activities in the Australian area of interest and to some extent to ‘show the flag.’ More importantly, these missions have the potential for the collection of intelligence material necessary for the conduct of military action, should ever the need arise.
The procurement of the Harpoon missile has given the Australian defence force a quantum jump in its anti-shipping weaponry, but without the availability of appropriate electronic and acoustic tactical intelligence, from which potential targets can be identified, it is difficult to see how such weapons can be employed successfully without tragic results to friendly and neutral shipping. Either strike or LRMP aircraft can serve as the vehicle for this most effective weapon in the air to surface mode. However, the LRMP aircraft have the additional advantage of being able to classify surface targets, given basic intelligence, whilst remaining covertly outside the range of surface weapons. An aircraft is the only vehicle which is capable of exploiting the full potential of the Harpoon.
I would like to divert slightly to discuss the problems of target classification, the current means at our disposal and the areas where technology can further the cause. Basically, a surface vessel target can be classified by any one of the following means:
- Visually,
- Electronically
- Acoustically, or
Visual identification, which is the most reliable means, presents the most problems in that normally if you can see an enemy ship, the ship can also see you. Worse still it can fire at you with a very good chance of ruining your day.
Identification by electronic signature, i.e. The use of electronic search measures, or ESM, allows identification of radio/radar types which when combined with other intelligence provides a covert and reliable means of classification. As ESM provides a covert detection and classification capability, our aircraft should be fitted with the best such equipment which modern technology can provide. The computerized ESM of the P-3C weapon system has improved our capabilities in this field, however, even this system possesses shortfalls which should be addressed by our research and development resources.
The Barra sonobuoy supported by the AQS 901 processor, has enhanced our potential to covertly detect and classify both surface and underwater targets acoustically. Again, these acoustic signatures can be identified well beyond the radar or visual detection ranges of surface ships. The acoustic detection equipment fitted to our P-3Cs is as good as any operational equipment in service today. Acoustic identification can be used in conjunction, not only with intelligence and ESM. but also with radar.
Imagery, or more specifically in the case of the P-3C. The infra-red detection system permits covert visual classification at night. This capability poses a particular problem to the electronically silent ship which, if it denies the aircraft ESM detection and classification, can itself be classified and attacked by the aircraft without warning.
There is a bleak side of course and I stress that all means of classification can be subject to counter measures of various kinds. Therefore, our research and development resources must strive to ensure that our technology and intelligence, especially in the areas of ESM and acoustics, are maintained at a level compatible with military equipment employed by any potential enemy.
The importance of ASW seems to have diminished in recent years; probably because of the high costs involved in establishing and maintaining a capability and secondly, because of the ever-increasing difficulty of the task. However, we must continually remind ourselves of lessons of past conflicts and recognize the very real threat submarines can pose to this country. A relatively small force of submarines could maintain one unit on-station on both our east and west coasts. This could effectively tie up our ASW assets and throw our sea lines of communication into disarray.
In 1951 Admiral Radford stated, “The submarine problem will be licked in a couple of years”. Unfortunately, the submarine still retains its supremacy over all ASW forces. Even though we continue to make significant progress with sonobuoy and processor capability such as the Barra system, we have experienced in real terms about a 60% loss of ASW capability over the last two decades. There is no indication that this trend will stabilize, let alone be reversed.
The P-3C with its Barra fit represents the best ASW aircraft platform in the world – an aircraft we can be proud of. On the other hand, the P-3B with its early 60s technology, requires an urgent modernization or replacement, if the total P-3 force is to achieve an adequate state of ASW readiness.
Mining is yet another role which appears to have slid into the backwaters. Fortunately for Australia we have some of the best aircraft mining platforms that are available. The F-111 is especially suited to the offensive mining role – it has a large mine carrying capacity, accurate navigation and a superb low-level operating capability. Also, the P-3 possesses all the attributes to meet the demands of defensive mining. However, there are some who believe that mining is a very simple task and that the planning and delivery expertise can be achieved at very short notice. I can assure those who think this, that it is not true. Mining is a very demanding role if it is to be conducted successfully, i.e. if the mine field is to be usable by our forces. If anybody doubts this, they should look closely at the intensity of the USN mining training and inspection programmes and the priority given this role by that Service.
In the final analysis, the viability of our maritime defences will hinge on the strike potential of our forces. The air element of our maritime strike force will consist of the F-111 element, the P-3 element and the tactical fighter force. The first two elements fitted with Harpoon and guided bombs are a credible concept. The new tactical fighter, especially if augmented by in-flight refuelling and fitted with appropriate weapons, will provide a deterrent capacity against any likely hostile maritime power. It would be disastrous, in my opinion, if a new tactical fighter were selected which is not capable of an anti-shipping role. Our limited assets must dictate that we strive to have a multi-role capability for all our fighting platforms. The viability of the actual size of the air component can only be assessed in a particular scenario. For example, elements of the strike force could be required primarily for land strike; the new tactical lighter may be confronted with an air defence problem, and the LRMP force could face a submarine threat well in excess of the capabilities of the existing number of aircraft. An examination of aircraft numbers is beyond the scope of my talk, however, regardless of the scenario, and given current lead times for new equipment, the size of the LRMP force, i.e. twenty aircraft, seems inadequate for an island continent the size of Australia. I base this statement not only on the geographical scale of any maritime defence problem which could confront Australia, but also on the flexibility of roles currently inherent in the LRMP force. We could not expect the current force to cope with more than two detachments and probably two roles simultaneously and still maintain its training role. Also, if more P-3 aircraft were to be obtained, we must ensure that all aircraft have the same capability so as to meet the demands of all roles to provide the required operation planning flexibility. A modernized P-3B could have, in the main, identical sensors to the P-3C, but, there would still be considerable differences in software and ordnance systems which would dictate production of new training syllabus, operating procedures and doctrine. Essentially a new LRMP platform would have to be developed. This would take time and would be at considerable cost. The P-3Bs have already been in RAAF service for fourteen years and could be twenty years old by the time an update was completed and they became operational with the new fit.
If the LRMP element is to be updated, and I firmly believe it should be as a matter of urgency, then more P-3Cs should be acquired to replace the P-3Bs on a one for one basis. This would be by far the most cost effective option.
One critical area related to maritime defence, indeed to any defence situation, is the availability of weapons. If we have the sophisticated weapons required for modern maritime warfare – and I refer not only to stand-off weapons but also to aerial torpedoes and mines – is there a stockpile of these weapons to maintain a sustained maritime battle, even of limited duration? We will always be confronted with the problem of lead time and end of production line problems with any high technology weapons we acquire for our inventory. I suggest that an ability to manufacture high technology weapons within Australia is most desirable. In practice I am aware that the number of weapons we need and their costs would make an Australian production line to meet our own defence requirements prohibitively costly. However, the production of these weapons for sale overseas as an offset arrangement to a major defence overseas buy could be an avenue worthy of investigation.
Some other areas available for future industrial participation include:
- Software development. Computers are now used extensively in both the operation and support of P3C aircraft. The software support of these equipments is provided by Computer Sciences of Australia (CSA) and is beyond the capability of the RAAF (in terms of trained manpower) and is likely to remain so I see a long term and ever increasing industrial participation in this field.
- Aircraft modernization. If we are to keep abreast of the latest maritime techniques and maintain the maximum lighting capability, we will need to conduct regular aircraft/system modernization programs. There is considerable potential for industrial participation and initiatives in this area.
- Weapons maintenance. Various maritime weapons are maintained by defence civilian personnel. Civilian personnel can be expected to continue in this field and increase as more sophisticated weaponry is procured and serviced in Australia.
- Participation by other than military personnel in the direct support of the defence force can be reason for concern (industrial disputes etc). However, we must remember that overall community support is essential for the successful prosecution of any conflict.
There is probably much more that could be said and should be said However, time does not permit so I will hand it back to Admiral Griffiths to conclude our presentation.
Conclusion by Rear Admiral Griffiths
Ladies and Gentlemen, in closing we both realise the complexity of the subject and the many factors involved, and the fact that some have not been covered in the time available. But the important point we both wish to emphasise is that urgent action be taken to formulate a much more realistic maritime strategy than we have employed in the past. This maritime strategy should be given priority in our national military strategy in the future.
When this has been done, it should be possible to provide the population with a sound understanding of the importance of developing an adequate maritime force structure to support that maritime strategy.
The Authors
Rear Admiral Guy Griffiths AO DSO DSC RAN (Retired) served in the RAN for 41 years. During World War II he survived the sinking of the battle cruiser HMS Repulse and served in HMAS Shropshire during the Philippines Campaign. He later served in the Korean War and was commissioning commanding officer of the frigate HMAS Parramatta and later HMAS Hobart. He commanded Hobart during her first deployment in the Vietnam War. Guy Griffiths subsequently commanded the aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne. His final posting was Flag Officer Naval Support Command. Among his post-Navy positions, Guy Griffiths was a long-serving President of the Australian Veterans and Defence Service Council. He died in 2024 aged 101 years. His biography Guy Griffiths: The life and times of an Australian Admiral was published in 2021.
Air Commodore Geoff Michael AO OBE AFC RAAF joined the RAAF in 1942 and had an operational tour as a pilot in Lancaster bombers during World War II. In 1952 he commenced service in LRMP aircraft and would go on to command 10 Squadron (SP-2H Neptune) and undertake exchange service with the RAF and the US Navy. He also served as Officer Commanding RAAF Base Richmond. His senior postings included Director General of Operational Requirements – Air Force. He retired from the RAAF in 1979. After his RAAF service Geoff Michael held, at different times, President of the RAAF Association, Vice President of the Australian Veterans and Defence Service Council and Shire President of the Hawkesbury Council. Air Commodore Michael died in 2015.
