By Edward Chan*
Since taking office in 2022, the Albanese government has stabilised Australia-China relations, with Prime Minister Anthony Albanese holding his third formal meeting with Xi Jinping at the G20 Summit. (The Australian Institute of International Affairs.)
According to the post-summit media readout, both states reiterated their commitment to bilateral dialogue. They acknowledged the importance of building understanding on mutual issues, navigating differences wisely, and expanding areas of cooperation.
Australia’s approach to China remains clear: cooperate with China where we can, disagree where we must, and engage in the national interests. Over the past year, while Canberra has signalled interest in collaborating with Beijing on matters beyond economic trade, such as climate change, energy transition, and ministerial exchanges, it has been drawing firm lines regarding its differences from Beijing on regional security and avoiding opportunities to negotiate with China on security-related matters.
In the specific context of maritime security and ocean governance, Canberra has been cautious in engaging China. This has largely stemmed from concerns over Beijing’s assertive actions, such as the interception of Australian aircraft in the South China Sea, the use of sonar in the vicinity of the Australian naval divers and the collision with the Philippines’ coast guard ships. The 2024 Lowy Institute poll found that 71% of Australians continue to think that China is “somewhat likely” or “very likely” to become a military threat to Australia in the next 20 years. This perception is likely driven by China’s activities in the maritime domain, particularly in the South China Sea and around Taiwan. Consequently, Australian governments are hesitant to engage too closely with China on maritime security issues.
This wariness is shared by Australian experts, who cite fundamental differences between Canberra and Beijing on the notion of regional stability and strategic goals. Even Chinese scholars acknowledge these divergences, recognising the difficulty of forging security-related cooperation.
It is appropriate for Australia to exchange our views on geopolitics and highlight our differences with China. However, while national security concerns dominate the narrative, they should not overshadow opportunities for collaboration in ocean governance, an area with significant common ground. Addressing the enforcement of laws, regulations, and policies in our surrounding maritime domain should extend beyond maritime disputes and national defence. Pressing regional challenges such as environmental sustainability, transnational crime, sea lane safety, and climate change make cooperation in these areas more necessary.
The Australian government has been consistent on its approach to maritime security. For example, during the Australia-China Defence Coordination Dialogue in October 2024, Australia did not highlight the concern of territorial disputes. Rather, it emphasised “the importance of adherence to international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”, as well as “all countries acting in a manner that respects sovereignty and upholds regional peace and stability”.
These principles, at least diplomatically, would be largely agreed with by China. They do not necessarily have to focus on maritime disputes, but also on non-conventional security issues, which may open some rooms for engagement between Australia and China.
Still, critics often argue that it is difficult to work with China because it is an unreliable partner—highlighting the ambiguity and inconsistency in China’s approach—as well as the gap between its diplomatic rhetoric and its actions. While concerns over China’s activities are valid, Australia cannot afford to fixate solely on these discrepancies. Instead, it must address a wider range of pressing ocean governance issues that often fly under the radar.
First, maritime governance requires extensive multilateral efforts. Despite differing interests, political systems, and strategic priorities, many countries in the region remain open to working with China on shared maritime challenges. For instance, the China-Southeast Asian Countries Marine Cooperation Forum demonstrates how track-1.5 dialogues can facilitate discussions on non-contentious maritime issues, bypassing territorial disputes.
Second, urgent issues such as climate change, disaster management, and illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, demand greater attention. These challenges are particularly critical for countries in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, affecting them alongside Australia and China. These challenges are less politically sensitive than strategic concerns, which enhances the prospects of cooperation on them.
While Australia has already built strong collaboration with Southeast Asian countries on non-traditional maritime issues, excluding China from these efforts may limit their potential impacts. In fact, Australia has an ongoing dialogue with China on climate change. Greater transparency and clarity are needed to build trust and set a positive tone for bilateral relations. Australia should be more proactive and inclusive in such a dialogue through the promotion of good governance—including responsible resource management—environmental protection, and adherence to international laws.
Focusing on security cooperation with China may not significantly impact Australia’s national security directly, but it enhances Australia’s role as a regional maritime state. Many countries in the region are weary of every issue through the lens of national security and are hesitant to choose sides between the US and China. For them, ocean governance should transcend great power politics and be treated as a shared responsibility for common goods. To garner regional support, Australia would benefit from de-emphasising China’s threat or framing China’s involvement in ocean governance as part of a broader effort to reshape the regional order. This approach aligns with Australia’s national interests while avoiding perceived inconsistencies or exclusivity.
Critics might argue that, as an asymmetric player, it is risky for Australia to engage with China as an untrusted security partner. However, if Australia is genuinely concerned about China’s ambitions to reshape the maritime order and aims to play a more proactive role in coordinating regional security concerns, direct engagement with China is essential, given its status as the largest country in the region.
More importantly, it is becoming increasingly difficult to avoid discussions about deeper security cooperation within one of Australia’s most significant bilateral relationships. From China’s perspective, there is a preference for Australia to emphasise areas of cooperation rather than differences. As bilateral relations improve, Australia can gain a clearer understanding of China’s interests while effectively articulating its own priorities for the maritime order. Clarifying shared policy areas and identifying pathways for cooperative governance in the maritime domain are critical steps toward achieving a desirable outcome.
Ocean governance is far too important to be sidelined by geopolitical rivalries. By focusing on shared maritime interests, Australia can reinforce its role as a regional leader, foster cooperation with China, and build a more inclusive framework for ocean governance.
It is time for Canberra to lead by example—by engaging China where interests align, championing collective efforts for ocean sustainability, and ultimately fostering a more constructive Australia-China relationship.
*Dr Edward Chan is a Postdoctoral Fellow of China Studies at Australian National University and the Associate Editor of The China Journal.
This article is part of the Indo-Pacific Maritime Governance Expanded Network for Innovation and Education (GENIE), with La Trobe Asia and the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies (YCAPS). This program has received funding support from the Australia-ASEAN Council. Views expressed are solely of its author/s and do not represent the Australian government or partner country government.
