By Peter Briggs*
The Trump administration’s actions in abandoning long-term alliances with Europe, support for Nato and Ukraine is a wakeup call. The new reality underscores the need for a fundamental review of arrangements to supply Australia’s nuclear-powered submarines. We need a sovereign solution which avoids vulnerability to a change in US and UK priorities and shortfalls in their defence budgets. (The Guardian.)
The new UK-designed submarine, “Aukus-SSN”, is too big and too expensivefor Australia’s geographical and strategic needs. It is also likely to be too late and over budget. The UK’s defence budget is under extreme stress as the country’s priorities swing firmly to Europe.
The proposal to sell us submarines from the US navy’s inventory as a stop gap is a pipe dream. Not only is the mix of different types of SSN logistically impractical for Australia’s small navy but the US will not be able to construct additional submarines in time to meet its own needs and cover the gap between the retirement of the Collins until arrival of Aukus-SSN. As the nominee for head of policy at the Pentagon, Elbridge Colby, has warned, the US faces “a very difficult problem” in meeting its pledge to supply three Virginia-class submarines to Australia.
It is time for plan B: building the smaller, cheaper, easier-to-crew French Suffren-class boat.
Timescale is the first critical criterion. The first of Australia’s Collins-class submarines retires in 2038, having served 40 years. We should aim to commission a replacement submarine no later than 2036, providing two years to achieve an operational capability. Thereafter we should deliver a new submarine every two years, replacing each Collins as they retire. Nuclear propulsion provides higher speed and superior mobility. This makes the nuclear-powered submarine more flexible and survivable, compared with a conventional submarine.
Australia’s submarines must be optimised for anti-submarine and anti-surface ship warfare. Intelligence and surveillance contribute to our understanding and provide warning of developing threats.
Personnel requirements are the second key issue. The Royal Australian Navy is already having difficulty recruiting and retaining personnel; the crew size of the new submarine should be a critical selection criterion.
Against this backdrop, the options for plan B are obvious (and limited). The Suffren-class SSN, now in production for the French Navy, meets these criteria. It would be significantly cheaper to build, own and crew than the Virginia or Aukus-SSN. Suffren’s smaller size and better manoeuvrability makes it more capable in the shallow and confined waters of most interest to us in Australia’s north.
The full article is here.
