Air Power in the Falklands Conflict. By John Shields. Air World, an imprint of Pen & Sword Books Ltd, Barnsley, 2021. ISBN 978 1 39900 752 8.
Reviewed by David Hobbs
John Shields is a serving RAF navigator whose log book contains 2,500 hours in Tornado F3 fighters based both in the UK and the Falkland Islands. He is a qualified weapons instructor and ended his time in fighters by commanding a squadron.
The mini-biography on the dust jacket explains that after flying, his career has focused on professional military education in the UK and USA, both as a student and as an instructor.
A number of books have been written about the 1982 war in the South Atlantic; some describe the whole campaign, others describe it from British or Argentinian perspectives and yet more focus on specific aspects such as air operations. The historiography has also been enriched by many individuals who have written about their personal experiences. Those published more recently have the advantage that their authors were able to access material from the British National Archive that had previously been kept out of the public domain under the Thirty-Year Rule. Shields’ bibliography fills an impressive twenty-six pages and demonstrates the broad range of his primary and secondary sources. The arguments he puts forward are, therefore, both interesting and thought provoking. That said, his focus is more limited than the book’s title or the publisher’s description of it as a ‘comprehensive account of the air campaign’ would suggest. It is almost exclusively centred on air-to-air and strike missions flown by fast jets. The 2,253 hours flown by Sea King ASW helicopters are skipped over in a few sentences on page 102 and the Wasp that hit the Argentine submarine Santa Fe with an AS 12 is not even mentioned. There is virtually no description of helicopters in the assault, logistic or combat rescue roles and little mention of the ‘air bridge’ to Ascension Island. The design and industrial effort expended fitting aviation facilities to ships taken up from trade including helicopter decks on Canberra and Queen Elizabeth 2 and liquid oxygen tanks into Atlantic Conveyor to support potential Sea Harrier operations on the voyage south go entirely un-mentioned.
Within this narrow focus, however, Shields does articulate some arguments that give insight into both belligerent’s operations. I do not agree with every point he makes but it is always interesting to study events from different perspectives in order to understand them more fully. He refers to both sides’ centres of gravity and lists their capabilities, vulnerabilities and requirements. In the British case these evolved from the carrier task group at first, through the amphibious force during the landings on East Falkland and ending with the expeditionary force as it advanced. The Argentinian centre of gravity was always the occupation force holding East Falkland, especially the troops dug in around the high ground west of Stanley. Shields frequently refers to what he describes as the British fascination with strikes on Stanley airfield rather than close air support sorties in concert with troops on the ground.
Rather than listing the number of aircraft sorties launched for specific purposes, Shields bases his arguments on data which reminded me of a weapon effort planning course I did during my own flying career in the Fleet Air Arm. He starts with the number of weapons that planners intended to use against an objective and then pares them down to the number that actually hit their target. For instance, on page 209 there is a graphic showing that Argentine air forces planned to use 1,146 weapons against British targets during the conflict. Of these 1,043 got airborne, 849 reached the Falkland Islands, 648 breached the British defences and 301 were launched against targets but only 39 actually hit them. From these figures he concludes that missions cancelled or aborted due to unserviceability, adverse weather and failure to locate a briefed target caused more weapon delivery failures than kills by Sea Harriers. It is, certainly, one way of looking at strike operations and I would be fascinated to read the author’s application of this perspective to the achievements of RAF Fighter Command in 1940 and Bomber Command in 1942-44 should he ever feel tempted to write about them. I was pleased to read his opinion that the effects claimed to have been achieved by the Vulcan raids on Stanley airfield were largely mythical.
The author makes his points about strike weapon effort planning and air-to-air missile engagement with clear graphics but he also describes them in the text, usually on the same page, both as numbers and percentages and this can get a little trying since each variant makes his point. Rightly, he recognises the fatal gap in British capability caused by the failure to replace the Fairey Gannet as a carrier-borne AEW aircraft but does not adequately explain the reasons why this was the case. The publisher describes the book as ‘demolishing many of the enduring myths’ but the author seems content to let one endure; the myth that the RAF was always enthusiastic about the Hawker P-1127 STOVL aircraft that evolved into the Harrier family. On page 28 he wrote ‘…in contrast to the RAF’s viewpoint, the Fleet Air Arm had little interest in the Harrier capability…during the 1960s…’. His research had evidently not included the minutes of the UK Defence Committee which discussed the P.1127 Harrier prototype on 29 November 1961 with Air Chief Marshall Sir Thomas Pike, Chief of the Air Staff, present. He told the meeting quite emphatically that ‘he did not believe that any European country other than Germany would want the P.1127 as it would be no use for any operational purpose…they would only equip with it if ordered to do so and he doubted whether, when it came to the point, they would in fact buy it’. The Navy had little interest in the P-1127 at the time because the outstanding Buccaneer was entering service and a second, less capable, aircraft was neither affordable nor necessary. Pike was openly hostile rather than disinterested. This is a case where the background needs either to be fully explained or omitted and, if the former policy was adopted, Pike’s opposition to aircraft carriers, their embarked AEW capability and the part they would play in future expeditionary operations must also be mentioned, as should the unfortunate views held by of Admiral Sir Varyl Begg, the First Sea Lord after 1966.
In summary, any new book on the Falklands Conflict has to offer something more than a mere repetition of events that have already been described in detail and, in fairness, Shield’s book meets that criterion. However, those who might be considering purchasing it should be aware that it does not describe air power in the full sense of its actual and potential application to this conflict. Whilst this is disappointing, the book does offer a view of fighter and strike missions that differs from earlier works on the subject. I found it to be an interesting read and believe that others will do so too, even if they disagree with some of the author’s arguments.
