Warships of the Soviet Fleets 1939-1945 Volume 1: Major Combatants. By Przemyslaw Budzbon, Jan Radziemski and Marek Twardowski.Seaforth Publishing, Barnsley, South Yorkshire 2022.
Reviewed by John Mortimer
This is the first volume by the authors in a set of 3 books. Volumes 2 and 3 cover Escorts and Smaller Fighting Ships, and Naval Auxiliaries, respectively. The text is complemented by extensive photographic coverage and excellent line drawings by Jerzy Lewandowski, Tomasz Grotnik and Jaroslaw Dzierzawski.
Several introductory chapters cover sources used by the authors, the scope of the book and the presentation of data, translation protocols, ship types and classification, the various fleets and flotillas, as well as shipyards and constructors. These chapters are important to understanding the evolution of the Soviet Fleet from 1917 to 1945 and provide a basis for evaluation and analysis in subsequent chapters which address the warship building program 1922-1945, mobilisation of civilian tonnage, the quality of Soviet warships and the performance of the Navy during the war.
The remainder of the book discusses individual ships and classes in considerable detail, including ships which were planned or partially built, but not completed. It includes ships comprising the four major fleets down to riverine flotillas and ranging in size from battleships (though the Soviets classed them as heavy cruisers) through leaders and fleet torpedo boats (destroyers), to submarines, gunboats and torpedo boats. There is often a technical discussion of the merits or otherwise of individual ship classes, especially for the larger ships and submarines. Ship histories for each vessel are detailed, with emphasis on wartime operations.
Included in the discussion of cruisers are several references to plans to build aircraft carriers. In the 1920s the Soviets examined the idea of rebuilding as carriers the uncompleted hulls of the battlecruiser Izmail, the damaged battleship Frunze and the old training ship Komsomolec . These projects only reached the preliminary study phase before being dropped. After the ‘Big Ocean Navy” was announced by Stalin in late 1935 the idea of aircraft carriers resurfaced. In August 1937 construction of two aircraft carriers was proposed, one for the Arctic and one for the Pacific Fleet. In January 1938 requirements were issued by Navy for a Project 71 ship (Chapaev class cruiser) of 13,000 tons capable of carrying 30 bombers and 15 fighters, and armed with 6 to 8 130mm guns. Ultimately, these proposals and others did not proceed because of a lack of building capacity, which was largely consumed with the construction of cruisers and destroyers.
Much of the Soviets interwar planning was made by political direction, rather than being based on input by the naval and industrial professionals that survived the purges following the communist revolution in 1917. Consequently, naval force plans, especially in the early years lacked reality and experienced input from naval, ship design or construction specialists. Much reliance was placed on foreign sources, especially Germany and Italy largely before the Second World War, this was particularly the case with cruiser and submarine developments. After the German invasion of the Soviet Union and with USA and British lend-lease support the Soviets were able to learn from western developments albeit from relatively obsolete ships. These contacts highlighted the parlous state of Soviet industry, technological development, and design and construction capacity, even in areas where it might have been thought that the Soviets should have been at the forefront of development, such as in fast attack craft. The submarine force might have been an exception to this, though the Russians did start late in their evolution. The salvage of the RN submarine L55 and early links to the German submarine community assisted the Soviet’s submarine development. By the time of the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the submarine force comprised some 91 to 95 (sources vary on the exact number of vessels), though about one third were of the smaller coastal type.
Planning of naval forces was complicated by two basic schools of thought within the Navy. This comprised an “old school” who favoured a force based on battleships and cruisers along traditional lines, and the “young school” who sought a force based on submarines, gunboats and torpedo boats. The latter were influenced by the success of the German submarine campaign during the First World War.
On 1 May 1935 the Soviet Naval Forces at the Baltic, Black Sea and the Pacific (Vladivostok) and the Northern Flotilla at the Arctic (Arkhangelsk) were accorded Fleet status.
In 1936 and with experience of the inability to provide adequate naval support for its merchant marine during the Spanish Civil War, and with a desire to have a force which could prevail against an adversary, the Soviets opted for a more broadly based Navy. This included plans to purchase battleships, a strengthened cruiser force, as well as other lighter forces. Nevertheless, the Soviet Navy remained as a secondary service and subservient to the Army. The main tasks of the fleet were defined as:
- To defend the most important administrative and industrial centres against attacks by hostile naval forces and to defend the coast against possible landings by foreign troops; and
- In offensive operations to fight hostile ships, attack bases and military-industrial facilities on the enemy’s coast and support the coastal wing of Soviet land forces.
Discussion of the quality of Soviet warships and the Navies performance is particularly illuminating and critical. In particular, the authors conclude that the Soviet Navy was not well prepared to conduct a modern war in 1939, lagging technical developments in the navies of the major powers. Ship construction and fitting out were very prolonged and the quality of work remained generally poor. Major issues are also addressed in the navy’s employment and effectiveness, especially in the Baltic and Black seas, though they did provide valuable assistance to ground forces in some circumstances. Overall, the Navy did some good work especially inshore in direct support of the Red Army.
A broadening exposure to other navies and drawing on their own experiences, the Soviets appear to have acknowledged many of their major deficiencies. This included limited industrial capacity, ship design and construction, and the lack of current technology of their ships – their weapons and sensors, and inadequate design features, such as damage control and flammable materials used in construction. Access to foreign ships during and after the conflict, and to ex German scientists and technicians enabled the Soviets to evolve a more efficient and robust system of capability planning and delivery post war. This was evidenced in the post war projects which had a more robust design cycle, such as, the Project 50 (Riga class escort ship), Project 56 (Kotlin class destroyer) and the Project 68 bis (Sverdlov class cruiser).
A major strategic restraint that the Soviets faced during the Second World War, and is still relevant to Russia, are the challenges of their enormous land mass, their extended lines of communication and the geographic restraints of the location of their major naval bases. Both the Baltic and Black seas are constrained geographically by the lengthy and often narrow passages to the open sea. The Arctic base is limited by the environment and the prevalence of sea ice, while the Pacific base of Vladivostok has the Japanese islands lying across its approaches. Given these strategic factors it is not surprising that the Army remains to be seen as the primary service and the Navy is mostly seen as supporting land operations or defending the motherland. The major exception to this is the Russian strategic submarine force because of its ability to be more covert in its operation.
This book is extremely valuable, being the first in English to address the Soviet Navy in such detail. It has considerable merit because of the depth of research and analysis provided by writers who, because of their Russian language skills, contacts and access to some official papers, have been able to provide an accurate, balanced and unique view of the Soviet Navy.
The author’s work should not be seen as only relevant to the Soviet Navy. Many of their observations apply with equal validity to Russia’s Navy today. As we are seeing with the current conflict in the Ukraine, naval operations in the Black Sea remain challenging and highlight the vulnerability of ship operations in confined waters. The current conflict also raises issues about the vulnerability of aircraft of all types, as well as tanks and other armoured vehicles. The use of unmanned vehicles and drones in offensive and surveillance operations is also demonstrated, but it is possible we are still only seeing them in the early stages of development, despite much earlier development some 70 or more years ago. For example, the Australian remotely controlled Jindivik pilotless target aircraft first flew in August 1952. Media access to the war in Ukraine has been important in shaping public opinion, but there remains a need to ensure such coverage is balanced and accurate, which is rarely feasible in time of conflict where emotion is involved.
