Aerial view of two of the vessels scuttled by the Egyptians in Port Said at the entrance to the Suez Canal in order to prevent any shipping movements. On the right, a British vessel specially equipped for refloating operations.An Australian perspective on Suez By Dr Tim Benbow, Defence Studies Department, King’s College London*
THE Suez conflict provided many salutary lessons for British strategy and defence policy. The majority of these emerged from political, diplomatic and military failings associated with what was by common consensus the worst debacle in British foreign policy between 1945 and, perhaps, the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Essentially, it provided a long list of things not to do, errors to avoid. However, some of the conclusions drawn were more positive, not least for Britain’s naval forces. The Suez crisis occurred at a critical point in an on-going debate over the role and capabilities of the Royal Navy, facilitating the emergence of a viable and important future role. In doing so, it resolved – for a time at least – a bitter and high-stakes dispute over the value of naval power in general and naval aviation in particular.
