

appointment led to Nave developing a code breaking capability which resulted in an invitation to permanently transfer to the RN. Nave's subsequent career saw him undertaking code breaking duties at the Government Code and Cypher School in the United Kingdom and appointments to communications interception stations in Hong Kong and Singapore. In 1940, Nave returned to Australia to recuperate after his health deteriorated as a result of extended tropical service. As a skilled Japanese linguist and cryptanalyst, having had years of experience working to break Japanese diplomatic and naval codes, Nave was a uniquely qualified individual. DNI Long enthusiastically co-opted him to establish a cryptologic unit to work against Japanese codes using the RAN's intercept and direction-finding stations. Nave spent the war working with the Central Bureau, an allied signals intelligence section, set up as part of GHQ SWPA to intercept and crypto-analyse Japanese intelligence.²¹

While it may have been expected that Nave's cryptologic code-breaking experience was unique in Australia, his Japanese language skills were equally rare. This was largely because the Australian military forces saw little need for linguists pre-war. A small number of Duntroon army officer cadets had been given elementary Japanese language instruction from 1916; however, the army decided that continued tuition in this language was 'of little cultural value' and terminated the limited program in 1937. The following year the Minister of Defence instituted a review on language training policy and a sub-committee, which included DNI Long as a member, reported in 1940. The sub-committee recommended the training of 75 Japanese linguists, and a further 150 with 'some knowledge of the language'; however, the report was not acted upon

Wartime exigencies, particularly in 'miscellaneous' lists such as the Sp. branch saw many unusual postings.

because of the war in Europe.²²

The onset of the war in the Pacific immediately raised a requirement for Japanese linguists and a School of Languages, under the RAAF Training Directorate, began at the Coogee Bay Hotel, Sydney, in 1944 and transferred to Melbourne in 1945.²³ No RAN personnel qualified as Japanese linguists before the end of the war.

Wartime exigencies, particularly in 'miscellaneous' lists such as the Sp. branch saw many unusual postings. Apart from general intelligence duties in forward areas, in intelligence staffs in headquarters and 'irregular organisations', some individual Sp. officers enjoyed unique experiences. One such officer was Lieutenant Alister Satchell RANVR, a coding and cypher officer at Naval Headquarters, Melbourne, who, in March 1943, was appointed to a shore base at Oro Bay, New Guinea. However, a signal from the Admiralty requesting two cypher officers be appointed to the troop transports *Aquitania* and *Queen Mary*, then in Sydney Harbour, resulted in Satchell joining *Aquitania* in a 'pier head jump' as one of two cypher officers – the other was Lieutenant Alex Milne RANR. *Aquitania* was one of five large British liners which were routed independently of convoys, carrying large numbers of troops and relying on their high speeds to avoid submarine attack. As such they were of strategic importance because they carried up to 15,000 troops in one voyage. Until Satchell's and Milne's appointments the *Aquitania* had not carried cypher officers and the captain relied on naval escorts (where available) to pass such operational signals to the troopship as the warships considered appropriate. Because of the importance of these ships it was decided to appoint cypher officers to provide the troopship captains with full operational information.

Originally intended to sail in *Aquitania* for the return voyage to the United Kingdom only, Satchell remained with the ship for the remainder of the war, undertaking over 50 voyages, mainly across the Atlantic. During that period he received no communications or instructions from the RAN, and at the conclusion of the war he found he had been 'forgotten' by the RAN and, according to RAN records, had been 'appointed to Kuttatubal additional cyphering duties H.M.T. 2'.²⁴

The attractions of working on board a trans-Atlantic liner, although converted to trooping duties, and periods of leave in New York and other ports, contrasted with the dangers faced by the crews and troops on board these independently-routed ships. Despite their high speed and the zig-zag courses followed to confuse enemy submarines, the risk of a successful attack resulting in the loss of one of these large ships with thousands of troops would have been a major set-back for the allied war effort. Satchell's unique wartime experience showed the range of Sp. branch officer employment.

POSTWAR RESERVE INTELLIGENCE

In accordance with the temporary nature of RANVR engagements, all officers and ratings were demobilised at the end of the war. In May 1947 a submission to the Second Naval Member outlined the proposed framework of a postwar RAN reserve force. The submission commented on the deficiencies in the training of the naval reserve officers and ratings who had been mobilised in 1939. The reason for this was not through any lack of the reservists' keenness and dedication, but resulted from the absence of sea training opportunities and the inadequacy of instructors and facilities. The postwar submission

A HISTORY OF THE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE RESERVE

provided a framework of training establishments and schemes of complement for seaman, supply and engineering branches. Reserve officers and instructors with recent wartime experience were to be used to conduct continuation and new entry training.²⁵

The major difference between 1939 and 1947 was the large number of naval ships which had been built during the war and which had been subsequently paid off into reserve. The availability of relatively modern ships, which could be reactivated in an emergency, required trained ships' companies and supporting staffs and the postwar reorganisation of the reserve, which included the Sp. branch, was based on this requirement

The Sp. branch was presumably spared the criticism of prewar ill-preparedness, probably because the branch did not exist at that time; however, provision were made in the proposed scheme of complement for 217 officers, of which 15 were for 'naval intelligence' and 29 for 'communications, codes and cyphers'.²⁶

Despite these reforms, the reserve component of NID began a 40 year period of relative inactivity. The 15 intelligence officers were spread across establishments at Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne and Adelaide, and, as 'attached' officers, had a training requirement. Reference to representative Navy Lists showed billets for three reserve officers on the DNI staff – in October 1955 there were two lieutenant commanders Sp. and one lieutenant Sp. billets, in September 1966 there were three lieutenant commander reserve positions, and in September 1972 there were one lieutenant commander and two lieutenants.

The Navy Lists continued to reflect relatively large numbers of former wartime Sp. officers, most of whom were inactive. For example the

The major difference between 1939 and 1947 was the large number of naval ships which had been built during the war and which had been subsequently paid off into reserve.

September 1966 Navy List showed 38 Sp. officers with seniorities from 1941 to 1949.²⁷ The only active billets were those on DNI staff and these are presumed to have been filled on either a part-time basis or on annual continuous training (ACT) of two weeks duration. Apart from service training, new entry intelligence reserve officers were largely confined to studying intelligence product from organisations such as the Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO) and developing periodic presentations for unit briefings. Because of the lack of a dedicated naval intelligence branch, such as existed in the army and air force, naval intelligence was largely confined to a few permanent naval force (PNF) officers posted to DNI staff, and the intelligence reserve groups whose main role was training for mobilisation. As the years passed, opportunities arose to undertake ACT in JIO and the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD); however, because of the relatively short time reservists were able to spend in these organisations, and their general lack of specialist expertise, the value of these attachments was problematic.

The wartime coastwatching organisation based in the Pacific Islands underwent a limited postwar reinvigoration based on a perceived threat from an expanded Soviet Pacific Fleet which included large numbers of submarines. A RANVR lieutenant commander was recruited to oversee the delivery and maintenance of teleradios to selected civilian officials and island residents and occasional liaison visits were made to the coastwatchers using RAN New-Guinea-based patrol craft.²⁸ The Australian-based coastwatcher network was also irregularly visited by mainly reserve intelligence officers on ACT.

Because there was very little

interaction between the PNF and the reserve NID, the latter tended to remain isolated within the reserve establishment of the Port Divisions, into which the wider RANR was organised. Owing to the structure of the reserve, there were relatively few ex-PNF officers and sailors in the Port Divisions, and this was particularly true of the NID. The RAN had little use for the NID and by the 1980s the branch had atrophied through lack of an operational role. With the 1991 decision to reorganise the RANR along an 'all of one company' basis, and with the creation of an Australian Theatre Joint Intelligence Centre (ASTJIC) around the same time, the Naval Intelligence Reserve (NIR) as it was now known, had the opportunity to return to an operational intelligence role it had forfeited in 1945.

The realignment of the RANR required the disbanding of the Port Divisions, which caused many reservists, including long serving NIR members, to resign; however, it provided opportunities for others to undertake postings to ASTJIC and the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO), and to serve as deployed intelligence officers (N2) at sea. Professional intelligence courses were made available to RANR personnel such as the Introduction to Defence Intelligence Course and the Defence Intelligence Research and Analysis Course, together with newly introduced navy-specific courses such as the Ship's Intelligence Officer and Advanced Naval Intelligence Officers' Courses. Because PNF officers and senior sailors were also undertaking these courses, both reserve and permanent navy members were now undertaking common intelligence training. With appropriate security clearances and their availability for navy service, there is no theoretical difference between NIR and PNF

members when employed in intelligence centres ashore, or deployed as N2s.

Examples of NIR full-time service deployments included three members who participated in Operation *Stabilise* (East Timor 1999), N2 deployments for Operation *Brancard* in 1998, and to the Persian Gulf from the late 1990s to the present. NIR officers have also served as N2s for routine ship deployments to North-East and South-East Asia, and India in recent years, and in exercises both in Australia and regional countries. During the 1990s, several NIR officers participated in the *Vigilant* series of counter intelligence exercises, both in Hawaii and Australia.²⁹

CONCLUSION

The incremental development of naval intelligence from 1915 to 1940 had no need for reserve augmentation because the collection and reporting of intelligence was elementary and confined to a small PNF staff, and an experienced civilian officer. However, the onset of the war in the Pacific called for a vast expansion in intelligence collection, analysis and reporting, which required the raising and training of a naval intelligence specialisation to serve in operational intelligence centres, headquarters and associated collection and processing organisations. Individuals with local knowledge of strategic Pacific islands and contiguous waters were commissioned as coastwatchers to report on enemy air and maritime movements to allied headquarters – a service which drew high praise from allied commanders and resulted in several successful engagements.

As a result of the Navy's lack of a postwar role for the intelligence component of the Sp. branch, many years passed during which the reserve NID became isolated from mainstream naval intelligence activities. It was not

until the 1991 reorganisation of the RANR, which coincided with new initiatives in the analysis and reporting of operational intelligence, that initiated a full integration of the NIR into the RAN. NIR members have now achieved equal competencies with their PNF colleagues through new training courses, and opportunities to serve in shore-based intelligence centres and at sea.

The NIR expects to provide a significant contribution towards Navy's full-time intelligence capability, and continues to recruit sufficient numbers to fulfill anticipated requirements. With new opportunities to serve, the NIR, in association with its full-time Navy and other services colleagues, is adapting to the challenging operational environment in which the Australian Defence Force will operate in the future. 🚢



LIEUTENANT COMMANDER
TIM COYLE RANR

Lieutenant Commander Coyle has been an active naval reserve intelligence officer for 20 years. In his civilian employment he is an adviser to Government on international arms control issues. In August 2006 he submitted his PhD thesis on the history of air navigation in the RAAF.

APPENDIX 1

NAVAL INTELLIGENCE AND ASSOCIATED DUTIES DISPOSITION – NAVY LIST JANUARY 1945

Adelaide (HMAS *Torrens*)

Intelligence: 1 LEUT Sp.

Brisbane

Allied Headquarters

Intelligence: 1 A/LCDR Sp.

3 LEUT Sp. (1 liaison

with Dutch forces)

1 A/SBLT Sp.

Special Intelligence:

1 CMDR RANEM

2 LCDR (1 RANEM, 1 Sp.)

2 LEUT Sp.

Solomon Islands 9 LEUT Sp.

2 SBLT Sp.

New Hebrides

1 LEUT Sp. Detached duties

14 A/LEUT Sp. 1 SBLT Sp.

Allied Geographical Bureau: 5 LEUT Sp.

Allied Intelligence Bureau:

1 LCDR RANEM

19 LEUT Sp.

1 SBLT Sp.

Allied Translation and

Intelligence Section 1 LCDR RANEM

1 LCDR Paymaster

6 LEUT Sp.

(Author's note: the same List showed only two naval officers qualified as Japanese interpreters. These were CMDR E. A. Nave RN and LCDR W.E. McLaughlin RAN, who qualified in 1923 and 1930 respectively)

Communications: 1 LEUT Sp.

1 SBLT Sp.

Allied Naval Headquarters:

2 LEUT Sp. – Duty with US

7th Fleet

Communications: 5 LEUT Sp.

1 SBLT Sp.

Darwin (HMAS *Melville*)

Intelligence: 4 LEUT Sp.

2 SBLT Sp.

Fremantle (HMAS *Leeuwin*)

Intelligence: 1 LCDR RANEM

2 LEUT Sp.

Melbourne (HMAS *Lonsdale*)

Intelligence Port Melbourne:

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2 LEUT Sp.

Navy Office

Coding and cyphering: 40 LEUT Sp.

12 SBLT Sp.

Intelligence: 1 CMDR RAN (DNI)

3 LCDR RANVR

2 LEUT RANR (S)

12 LEUT Sp.

1 A/LEUT RANVR

Townsville (HMAS Magnetic)

Intelligence: 1 A/LCDR S

1 LEUT Sp.

Merauke

Intelligence: 1 LEUT Sp.

Thursday Island

Intelligence: 1 LEUT Sp.

Port Moresby (HMAS Basilisk)

Intelligence: 3 LEUT Sp.

Milne Bay (HMAS Madang)

Intelligence: 4 LEUT Sp.

2 SBLT Sp.

NOIC Madang staff: 1 LEUT Sp.

(intelligence)

Duty in forward areas:

21 LEUT Sp.

1 SBLT Sp.

Hollandia

COIC (forward deployed):

1 LCDR RANEM

1 A/LCDR Sp.

7 LEUT Sp.

2 SBLT Sp.

(Endnotes)

¹ Australian War Memorial, PR89/037 W. H. Brooksbank, *No Cloak, No Dagger; Memoirs of a Naval Intelligence Officer*, unpublished monograph, p. 4.

² National Archives of Australia (NAA) File Series A9376, Control Symbol 90, Survey of Australian Mandated Territories 1923 – Flying Officer E. A. Mustard DFC. Mustard was mainly concerned with surveying possible landing areas for seaplanes; however, this information was of equal importance to the compilation of intelligence data. Flying Officer A. E. Hempel joined the cruiser *HMAS Brisbane* for a cruise to the Solomon Islands, Rabaul, New Guinea, and the Queensland coast. Sixteen harbours and bays were recorded from on-shore and a further 10 photographed from the ship (NAA File Series A9376, Control Symbol 91, Report by Flying Officer A. E. Hempel on Solomon Islands, Rabaul and Queensland Coast visited by him whilst attached to H.M.A.S. "BRISBANE", during the Royal Australian Navy Winter Cruise 29-6-23 to 3-8-23).

³ Brooksbank, p. 44.

⁴ Long had previously served as Assistant DNI from April 1936. The post of District Intelligence Officer, Sydney, was established in September 1925 and seven incumbents served as such until March 1936, when, with the establishment of A/DNI, the position was renamed to Staff Officer (Operations and Intelligence). Winter, Barbara. *The Intrigue Master; Commander Long and Naval Intelligence in Australia, 1913 – 1945*, Moorooka: Boolarong Press, 1995, Appendix 3, pp. 286 – 287.

⁵ Brooksbank, p. 46.

⁶ Nave was seconded to code breaking duties pre-war because of his Japanese language skills – see later citation.

⁷ RAN Seapower Centre, Navy History Section, File 23F, RAN Recruiting WWII, 'Special Branch R.A.N.V.R.', research completed by Mr Wayne, 9/10/46, p.12, and File 23J, The Citizen Naval Forces. The RN adopted the Sp. branch on 6 February 1941 by Admiralty Fleet Order 523/41, and Navy Order 224/1943 established the RANVR Sp. Branch (File 23J). The 'staff course' was an entry level training course to fit new entry officers for general naval service.

⁸ Three LCDRs RANVR on DNI staff were not shown as Sp. in the Navy List – these individuals were probably 'permanent' RANVR officers who had served in the reserve pre-war. At that time LEUTs had to serve eight years before promotion. Apart from the DNI (CMDR RAN), the other CMDR was RANEM, as were the other four LCDRs in NID.

⁹ Brooksbank, p.154.

¹⁰ Brooksbank, p.207.

¹¹ RAN Seapower Centre, Navy History Section, File 23B, The RAN Reserves, 'Mr McAidle'. This total includes all specialisations of the SP. branch.

¹² Details of the NIO from 'Review of Naval War Effort and Activities to 31 October 1945', Chapter 16: Naval Intelligence Organisation, p.25. File held at Naval Historical Section, RAN Seapower Centre, Canberra. The liaison officers were based at Brunei Bay (Borneo), Balikpapan (Dutch Borneo), Morotai, Mios Wendi (Dutch New Guinea), Manus (New Guinea), Point Cruz (Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands).

Intelligence officers were also stationed at Merauke, Hollandia (Dutch New Guinea), Aitape, Jacquinot Bay, Lae, Langemak (New Guinea), Milne Bay, Port Moresby, and Torokina (Bougainville).

¹³ Ibid, p.25.

¹⁴ Brooksbank, p.100.

¹⁵ 'Review of Naval War Effort and Activities to 31 October 1945', Chapter 16: Naval Intelligence Organisation, p. 26.

¹⁶ Winter, p.172.

¹⁷ Australian War Memorial file 69, 23/81 COIC, 'Research by Mr Norman'. This early intelligence collection against Japan stemmed from communications intelligence collected via telephone taps of Japanese consulate telephones in London and Australia, and the increased use of radio transmitters by Japanese merchant ships which gave rise to suspicions that they were passing intelligence information. Winter, pp. 83-84.

¹⁸ Winter, COIC pp. 84-85, AIB p. 164, AGB p.172.

¹⁹ AWM 69, 23/81.

²⁰ AWM69 23/57 Irregular Organisations, Research by Mr Norman.

²¹ Pfennigwerth, Ian. *A Man of Intelligence; The Life of Captain Eric Nave, Australian Codebreaker Extraordinary*, Sydney: Rosenberg Publishing Pty. Ltd., 2006, p.160 (Nave recruited by Long), p.207 (Central Bureau). After the war Nave joined the newly-formed Australian Security Intelligence Organisation.

²² Pfennigwerth, pp. 162-163.

²³ LANGS Information Page, internet <http://wilis002.defence.gov.au/langs/info2005.htm>, viewed 8 July 2006.

²⁴ Satchell, Alister. *Running the Gauntlet; How Three Giant liners Carried a Million Men to War, 1942 – 1945*, London: Chatham Publishing, 2001, pp. 55 – 57 (appointment to *Aquitania* and duties of cypher officer), p. 229 ('forgotten' status). The RAN, in response to Satchell's 1995 enquiry regarding his war service further advised: 'According to our records the ship referred to as H.M.T. 2 was the *Queen Mary*. Unfortunately we are unable to determine the exact dates that you served on the *Queen Mary* or the *Queen Elizabeth*' (p.229).

²⁵ RAN Seapower Centre, Navy History Section File 23L, RAN Reserves – General Files, Minute, Resumption of Reserve Training, from DRRF (abbreviation unknown) to Second Naval Member, dated 15 May 1947.

²⁶ Ibid, Appendix A. Besides the 44 officers for intelligence and coding the proposed Sp. complement comprised five officers for 'operations', 10 'mercantile movements and naval control of shipping', 15 'transport', 25 'c.b.s and s.p.s' (confidential books and unit security), 107 'armament duties' (mining, armament stores, ordnance, inspection and defensively armed merchant ships), and 11 'civil construction'. Sp. officers for 'fleet air arm' and 'interpreters' were under consideration.

²⁷ Total Sp. branch numbers (without indication as to specialisations) were: October 1946 – 20 A/LCDR, 164 LEUT, 39 SBLT; October 1955: One CMDR, 18 LCDR, 26 LEUT; September 1966: one CMDR, 53 LCDR, 83 LEUT, seven SBLT. In September 1972 there were two lists, RANR and RANVR. The RANR list comprised two CMDR, 13 LCDR, 15 LEUT, one SBLT, and the RANVR list held eight CMDR, 56 LCDR, 94 LEUT and four SBLT. By 1966 the permanent navy DNI staff comprised a CAPT RAN as director, a CMDR as deputy and two LCDR RAN staff officers.

²⁸ Brooksbank, p.160.

²⁹ Details on NIR deployments via CMDR Peter Saxton RANR, Corporate Manager NIR, e-mail 27 June 2006.



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'Naval Networks: The Dominance of Communications in Maritime Operations'

THE 2007 'KING-HALL' NAVAL HISTORY CONFERENCE

'Communications dominate war; broadly considered, they are the most important single element in strategy, political or military.'

- Captain A.T. Mahan, USN, 1900.

'The object of naval warfare is the control of communications, and not, as in land warfare, the conquest of territory.'

- Sir Julian Corbett, 1911.

'Sea communication has opened up the whole world, and has played the greatest of all parts in spreading both knowledge and civilisation.'

- Captain W.H.C.S. Thring, CBE, RAN, 1928.

The fifth biennial 'King-Hall' Navy History Conference will be held in Canberra on 26-27 July 2007. The conference will be organised by the Sea Power Centre – Australia with assistance from the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy. The King-Hall Conference has become a significant event in the national and international sea power communities for its wide-ranging discussion of topical naval historical and maritime strategic issues. The conference is open to the public, and previous events have attracted a wide range of naval historians, academics and retired and serving military personnel, as well as interested lay people from Australia and overseas.

THEME

The broad theme of the 2007 conference is 'The Dominance of Communications in Maritime Operations'. Its aim is to analyse the influence of communications on the application of sea power in the broadest possible sense. The content will thus deal with both information and transport, and encompass issues ranging from the strategic importance of sea lines of communication through to the tactical use of

communications in war and peace.

Maritime historians and strategists have long been conscious of the fundamental links between oceanic communications, naval strength and national achievement. In today's globalised economy the importance of such links is magnified but not always appreciated by policy makers and outside analysts. Practitioners of sea power have likewise been aware that developments in strategy and tactics are closely related to the prevailing state of communications technology. But although navies are routinely at the forefront of the revolution in information management, seamless interoperability remains an elusive goal, and the extent to which force networking may have changed traditional naval roles remains unclear. By examining how the different elements of maritime communications have evolved and why perceptions have changed, this conference will use the past, not only as a subject of interest in itself, but as a guide to the future conduct of planning and operations.

PROGRAM

Various distinguished speakers from Australia and overseas will appear at the conference. The final program is expected to cover the shifting demands facing both national and combined international sea power, together with case studies of command, control,

communications and intelligence taken from the ancient world through to the 21st century. Gathered together, these papers will offer new insights into the future face of maritime strategy, the changing nature of global connections, and the continuing nexus between communications and command at sea.

FORMAT OF PRESENTATIONS

Presentations at the conference are expected to last 30-40 minutes followed by time for questions. A draft of the paper must be provided in electronic form at least one week prior to the event. To be eligible for publication final papers must be submitted by September 2007.

PUBLICATION

Selected papers will be published in a collected volume. The format will be similar to previous productions of the Sea Power Centre-Australia including: *The Face of Naval Battle* (Allen & Unwin, 2003); *The Navy and the Nation* (Allen & Unwin, 2005); and *Sea Power Ashore and in the Air* (forthcoming).

MORE INFORMATION

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Guns for Milne Bay

BY HAL G.P. COLEBATCH

The defence of New Guinea in World War II depended on supply of the Army by sea. But a sorry tale of subterfuge on Australian wharves undermined naval supply efforts. Hal Colebatch presents the story in serialized form.

On 25 August, 1942, the undefeated and apparently invincible Japanese Army began landing 2,400 men, equipped with light tanks and supported by the heavy guns of warships, for a drive on the Papua-New Guinea port of Milne Bay and its airfields.

Fighting was see-sawing back and forth as the Americans clung to a toe-hold in the Solomons, where from Australia's small navy the third cruiser in quick succession, *HMAS Canberra*, had just been sunk with heavy loss of life. The men of the 8th AIF Division, captured in Singapore, were dying and rotting in Japanese prison-camps. In Timor a handful of Australian commandos carried on a guerrilla campaign, and in New Guinea as the hitherto undefeated Imperial Japanese Army advanced on Port Moresby, hastily-trained and poorly-equipped Australian militiamen were going up the Kokoda trail.

Milne Bay's chief attraction for the Japanese planners was its airfields. The Japanese hoped to occupy it and use its airfields to provide air-cover for attacks on Port Moresby, for interdicting allied land and sea operations and supporting their own, and for bombing and perhaps carrying out landings at Northern Australian airfields and population centres. Its position at the extreme east of the New Guinea mainland would also have allowed them to increase their radius of air-activity eastward into the Pacific. It had been similar control of airfields and

resulting air-superiority which had given them victory in the drive down the Malay Peninsula to Singapore.

The Japanese miscalculated. Milne Bay was strongly held by two Australian brigades - the 18th AIF and the 7th CMF (Militia), with some US forces and RAAF air squadrons, a total of nearly 9,000 men, though without heavy artillery or tanks. The Australians were at first pushed back and nearly lost the vital airstrips: at one time nearly all of No. 3 strip was in Japanese hands though a handful of Australians held the rear of it.

The Australians suffered 373 casualties including 161 dead or missing. It was in this fighting that Corporal J. French of the 2/9 battalion was killed winning a Victoria Cross when he advanced and silenced three Japanese machine-gun posts. The Japanese lost about 1,000 dead or missing. Because of the demands of the fighting at Guadalcanal and Kokoda they were not able to reinforce the attacks. Most of the surviving Japanese were taken off by the Japanese navy which bombarded the area continually, though scattered parties of Japanese continued to roam the hills on the north arm of the bay for weeks afterwards.

However, given the unequal strength of the forces involved - 2,500 to 9,000 - the Australian casualties were high. Had the Australians had heavy artillery, Australian casualties would have been lighter. Heavy guns could have destroyed the Japanese force at sea or at long range and probably sunk a number of Japanese warships for good measure - in a land-sea artillery duel a land-gun had an advantage



MacArthur with characteristic corn-cob pipe

because it had a steadier platform, it was a smaller target and its base was unsinkable. Because they had no heavy artillery the Australians could do little to interfere with the Japanese Navy's operations or bombard their rear areas, and were handicapped in the battle in many ways.

The reason the Australians had no heavy artillery was that Townsville watersiders refused to load it. The searchlights attached to the battery, which might also have played a vital part, failed to arrive in time for the same reason. Some 25-pounder field-guns, which would have been invaluable in the closer fighting, and the mountings for anti-aircraft gun barrels also failed to reach the battle in time because of wharf strikes.

The first Australian heavy artillery battery to be equipped with long-range 155-mm "Long Tom" guns had been formed at the request of General MacArthur, who on reaching Australia from the Philippines to become Supreme Allied Commander in the south-west Pacific had asked

Guns for Milne Bay

Washington to send 16 of these guns with searchlights and fire-control equipment to reinforce coastal defence. These guns, on tyred carriages, were highly mobile. They proved to be among the best of their kind in the world and were the mainstay of US heavy field artillery during and long after World War II. They could have taken on any warship engaged in shore bombardment smaller than a battleship, which included all the warships the Japanese had in the area, and would have been deadly against unarmoured troop-transports.

When the Japanese attack on Milne Bay was launched, the first Australian unit with the new guns, the Australian Heavy Battery, known as "A" battery, was stationed at Townsville awaiting movement to the front. It had been training on the guns with American instructors, a Colonel Thompson and a Sergeant Tucker. Mr A. F. Sandwell was an Australian Army Sergeant attached to the battery. He recounted:

"The fight was on at Kokoda and Milne Bay. Each night two or three Japanese destroyers or a couple of cruisers would come into Milne Bay and plaster the Australian and American forces fighting at the front. MacArthur at this point ordered the 155mm guns of the First Heavy Battery and searchlights to be sent to Milne Bay. On 5 September, 1942, the troops were loaded aboard a troopship at approximately 4 p.m..

"I was on the wharf when Major Thomas Butterworth, the officer commanding the battery, asked the wharfies who was going to load the guns. They said: 'We're not, unless we get double pay.'"

"The troopship then pulled out and anchored off Magnetic Island for the night. The next morning the convoy left for Milne Bay, minus the guns. The following morning the American Colonel Thompson came down to the wharf and said to the wharfies: 'Unlock the area with guns so they can be

loaded on the ship.' The wharfies' reply this time was: 'No! We get treble pay or we don't load!'"

"After some lengthy argument the Colonel went away. He returned one hour later with 20 US Army personnel. He asked once again: 'Open the area!' Again the wharfies refused.

"At Colonel Thompson's order the US troops pitched the wharfies into the water, then cut the chains of the enclosure with bolt-cutters."


By this time the convoy was gone. The gunners had sailed on the *Van Heuty* without their guns or searchlights. The only ship left which could take the guns was a slow, elderly tramp-streamer, the *SS West Cactus*. This had no derricks which could handle the guns and it had to be loaded from a wharf-side crane. According to the official report by Australian Army Major Butterworth, the civilian crane-driver then refused to unlock the crane unless, this time, paid quadruple time. The Americans again moved in, smashed the lock on the crane and took it over themselves. Mr Sandwell continued:

"When they had control of the crane, the US personnel then proceeded to load the two 155mm guns, weighing about 5 tons each, onto the West Cactus. The consequence of this was that 'A' Battery landed at Milne Bay with no guns and no searchlights to fight back the enemy, because of those swine of wharfies at Townsville. The guns arrived four days later, all too late.

"The bitterness of the Australian and US troops was never erased. This went on throughout the war. At Darwin and Sydney the wharves had to be manned by Australian Navy personnel, and at Cairns and Brisbane by US Army personnel, who pushed the wharfies out and did this work in 1942-43 themselves."

"The hatred felt by the troops against these strikers knew no bounds."

Japanese landings in Milne Bay, 1942. (Courtesy NationMaster.com)



"Blokes were going away at 18 or 19 to die in battle and they were asking for more money and wouldn't give us the guns to take with us to fight. Later men were dying, men were starving in New Guinea and short of supplies who were never backed up by support from home."

Mr Sandwell's story was confirmed by Major Butterworth, who wrote the official Army report on the incident. Butterworth has concluded that had the 155mm guns got to Milne Bay earlier, they could have destroyed the Japanese landing forces before they got ashore as they would have been within easy range. He wrote independently:

"We languished at Townsville until embarkation for Milne Bay, all the time enquiring and pleading to get away. On a Saturday morning Colonel Thompson said to me: "You are to embark on the convoy now loading and sailing for Milne Bay tomorrow. Although it is an American convoy, an American unit has been taken off to make room for your unit." While loading, the Americans had trouble with the wharfies, so cleared them off the wharf and loaded the stores themselves." (1) Mr Sandwell himself left Townsville for Milne Bay three months later, and again the heavy guns had to be loaded by Americans.

When I published an account of this matter, based on interviews with Mr Sandwell, in the *West Australian* newspaper of 15 April, 1995, there was an interesting sequel. I was contacted by the former Third Engineer of the *West Cactus*, Mr Thomas Welch. Mr Welch joined the *West Cactus* in February, 1943, after the Milne Bay incident, but it was then still being talked of on the ship. After the war he had a distinguished career in the West Australian Public Service and became Chief Engineer of the West Australian Forests Department.

The *West Cactus* was American-owned and had an American captain.

The crew was nominally Australian but in fact comprised many different nationalities. It was of about 8,500 tons and had been built shortly after the First World War. It had very simple machinery.

Mr Welch described numerous strikes of many kinds during the war by the Seamen's Union and Waterside Workers' Union. These both had strong Communist leadership and this was despite the fact the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of Australia were now officially supporting the war-effort. He said watersiders demanded danger-money for loading biscuits for the Army because they had been produced at Defence-industry factories. On one occasion early in 1943 a small RAAF unit had loaded most of its gear onto the *West Cactus* at Townsville. They had been supplied with only one jeep and this had not been loaded. The watersiders walked off because there was a very light rain-shower and the *West Cactus* had to sail without it. American units on board gave the RAAF unit a jeep which was repainted in RAAF colours.

Again and again there were instances of loading equipment for the forces in New Guinea and the islands in which "the wharfies did nothing to help." He continued, painting a picture of on-going and deliberate sabotage resembling resistance warfare against an occupying enemy:

"During the war years they were more concerned to break down the power and earning capacity of the ship-owners ... Both the waterside workers and all the maritime unions were antagonistic to the ships' officers and continually damaged "running" equipment. This had the effect of slowing down operations and causing extra running costs. They attempted to break the resolve of the officers and particularly the Engineers, of whom there was usually only one on "ship-

keeping" duty each night."

"Such activities included cutting the flexible electric cables to the portable floodlights which were lowered over the hold, or the enamel reflector and lamp assembly would be thrown over the side. No-one would admit to this destruction and it also gave them a reason to sit out an hour or so. Another tactic was interfering with fuse-boxes and blowing off fuses to ensure blacking out a section of the work-place, or partly closing down steam valves so as to reduce power and then stand round until the engineer could "break" and correct the "problem."

"One would observe two or three in each gang operating each cargo-hold. this would mean, say, a four or five-hatch ship would be carrying eight to 10 men who idled around wheeling a minimal load, even down to one or two tins of paint of one gallon each ... they would follow in line to the ship's side where a complete lift was being built up to be elevated either in a cargo-net or a pallet"

Mr Welch added:

"More exposure is overdue to enlighten the community of this dark corner of history ... We were always in the midst of local warfare with the wharfies and seaman's union. It was a disgusting experience and it turned me against Labor for life. He believed the strikers' and saboteurs' actions were part of a co-ordinated plan by Communist-dominated unions to demonstrate their power to the Americans." (2) ♣

This is an extract from Hal G.P. Colebatch's unpublished book, Australia's Secret War. The following chapter will be presented in the next edition of Headmark.


Hal G.P. Colebatch has an MA in History/Politics and a PhD in Political Science and is the author of several books as well as many articles in The Australian, Quadrant, The American Spectator etc. His book Blair's Britain was chosen as a Book of the Year in the London Spectator. His latest book is Steadfast Knight: a life of Sir Hal Colebatch (Fremantle Arts Centre Press, WA). This is an extract from his unpublished book Australia's Secret War.

Notes:

(1) Interviews, April, 1995.

(2) Letter and interviews, June, 1995.

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Leadership: Power and Moral Example

BY WARRANT OFFICER DARREN JEFFS, CSC (COMMAND WARRANT OFFICER NAVY SYSTEMS COMMAND)

WITH DR RICHARD ADAMS

... in our brief span of service... were we truly men of courage..., were we truly men of integrity...?

John F. Kennedy

INTRODUCTION

Commenting upon the character of service to the state; Kennedy, distinguished as a naval officer before memorable service as United States President, informs the profound character demanded of military leadership. Though industry may abide managers adept in the appalling art of bossism and fluent in the language of fiscal efficiency, the military leader must be a moral man of character; because unlike industry, war - more than a physical fight or a mere slaughter - is a moral idea. War is about right and wrong.

Discussing war, our language is laced with moral meaning. Words like faithfulness, devotion, betrayal, atrocity, honour and shame, impose moral judgement and expose the centuries of moral argument, which have been an entailment of war.¹ In consequence, the model of military leadership is saturated with expectations of character.

Regrettably however, militaries often lack the courage requisite of their ideals. Military leadership, in consequence, is suffused not with moral principle but with hard-edged notions of power, command and control - amazingly detached from any concept of character or example. Thus, modern military leadership strives typically not to inspire commitment or followership, but to coerce unquestioning obedience. Rooted in mindless *de rigueur* convention and inflexible hierarchy; this is authoritarianism,² the public face of

the discipline-and-obedience culture which defined the Victorian and Edwardian Navy, and which remains discernible.³

Authoritarianism is found upon conceited unreal belief in the commissioned class.

Once an officer is established, in his own view, as a member of a superior and order-giving class, he never loses this sense; but he can and often does, lose all awareness of the moral basis of this superiority and all the qualities which constitute this basis. He just becomes superior, as it were, *in vacuo*...he has...sloughed off his sense of moral obligation; but has retained an unassailable sense of his own superiority...and absolute right to give orders.⁴

Oblivious to chivalric notions of mutual respect, that honourable creed which elevated military service, the authoritarian genuflects and stoops subserviently before dogma. Coercive and anti-chivalric; dogma misrepresents the elaborate courtesy of a chivalric epitome, to preserve the unthinking thraldom of modern military servitude.⁵

Hostile to new ideas, anti-intellectual, without moral gravitas, the authoritarian is dedicated to defence of the *status quo*. Power to the authoritarian, is command power, vested by rank, hard-hearted bossism without call for moral courage.

This article explores leadership beyond bossism; a pettifogging simplistic reading, which demeans



As typed above:
HMS Broke pictured coming alongside cruiser Sheffield to embark troops for Algiers, Nov 7th 42. Broke was badly damaged as she forced her way in and 9 ratings were killed. She was taken in tow by HMS Zetland, but unfortunately sank following day.

leadership and elevates decree. This article argues that; as an engine of military leadership, power must become "soft," merging with moral strength so as to encourage, rather than to impose.

The frail, the unconfident, the cynical, the incapable and the ineffectual will be inclined to perceive power exclusively in the "hard" terms of command, direction or control. This ignorant misconception fails to comprehend that one cannot extort admiration, and to command is not inevitably to command respect. In a way the oppressor cannot understand, the leader leverages "soft power," realising outcomes without resort to force or threat.

The notion of soft power, conceived and applied initially by Joseph Nye to international relations,⁶ thus enlarges the discourse of military leadership.

The soft power practitioner aspires to co-opt, rather than to coerce, to convince rather than to enforce. Quite distinct from "political power"; which Robert Greene interprets as scheming, shrewd manipulative advantage,⁷ soft power derives from moral courage, and underpins ethical leadership. Soft power leverages implicit values and moral integrity to exert compelling

Leadership: Power and Moral Example

albeit diffuse effect. Thus, soft power establishes general influence; and is in consequence, less conspicuous than the abrupt specific exchange, which marks hard power.

LEADERSHIP

Oblivious to the "post heroic" thesis,⁸ advanced by John Keegan in a seminal text, *The Mask of Command*; discussion of military leadership tends to fixate upon emblematic heroic dicta, "seek and accept responsibility," "provide direction," and, notoriously, "lead by example," whilst restating pragmatic definitions which amplify the will to control, the understanding to define and the power to achieve a task.

Overshadowed by stiff command imperatives of task accomplishment, the moral undertone of "soft power" has remained unobserved in the background of Australian leadership doctrine. Though generations have echoed the mantra; "know yourself and seek self-improvement,"⁹ few have dwelt upon the profound meaning of the principle, which Adkins illuminates as *arête* or "individual excellence," and which stands amongst the most powerful words of commendation used of a man.¹⁰ More than functional capacity, *arête* describes the moral strength, which underpins leadership by example. The *Iliad* illustrates the point:

(Sarpedon) spoke in address to Glaukos, son of Hippolochos:/ 'Glaukos, why is it you and I are honoured before others/ with pride of place, the choice meats and the filled wine cups...'¹¹

Sarpedon calls Glaukos to account, urging him to greater energy in battle - observing that by his present indolence he has cast off his sense of moral obligation; and is thus not worthy of the honour, which he enjoys.

Such moral strength, virtue or integrity is thus made out as an engine of the self-knowledge and self-discipline urged by Australian doctrine, and the unseen cornerstone soft power, which is obscured by over-prominent "hard" power.

POWER

Inevitably, leadership depends upon power of some sort - whether this be moral, physical, financial or positional. Authority and power vest leaders with psychological stature - elevation above subordinates. But there is more to leadership than power.

Besides the hard edge of power; associated with authority, command and control, this article argues that as an engine of military leadership, power must encompass moral strength, leveraging principled example, so as to encourage, rather than to impose.

Where the hard-edge of command power is overstated; subordinates may acquire an exaggerated dependent or submissive mien, becoming over-eager to accede to the proposals and suggestions of a leader. Such a situation is undesirable because subordinates become degenerate; "yes men," whose timidity denies the leader benefit of broad perspective and clear-sighted opinion. Equally in reaction against over-prominent hard power; subordinates may be anti-dependent, obstructive, stubborn or resentful of bullish, overbearing, direction.

The most fruitful relationship - one of interdependence - reflects the steady influence of power's softer expression. Soft power generates composed, confident, empathetic leadership which, derived from moral example and truly strong, is neither merely superior *in vacuo*, nor merely forceful. Interdependence built upon soft power, is the mark of a leader who does not rely upon positional authority, and



Hec Waller, in one of the last photographs taken before HMAS Perth was sunk in action under his command

who does not seek to exaggerate intra-group stature in relation to others.

"Power," "command," and "authority," are serviceable shorthand, but real-world translations of leadership demand more. More than

undiscerning authority, real-world leadership demands intelligence, tact, empathy and foresight. The insightful leader will understand the cards, which provide a secure foundation, and play those cards *wisely*. Such astute judgement will reflect an appreciation of soft and hard power.

Hard power is easy; oblivious to subtlety, the hard power pragmatist flexes muscle and wields sticks in the inexorable pursuit of goals.

The softer face of power inspires; encouraging emulation by example and moral substance. This is not power which seeks to coerce - rather, the softer face of power co-opts, attracting others to follow willingly.

Soft power, more than imposed authority, reveals resilient leadership example. Not dependent upon dogma or enforced rules, soft power *attracts* followership because a leader strong on soft power is rich in the indefinable influence of moral substance.

Power's hard edges; positional authority, personal intimidation, arbitrariness, inflexibility, strictness, intolerance, restraint, austerity and the undercurrent of victimisation *do* exert influence. However, such influence is less attractive and, more importantly, less sustainable than the persuasive impulse of soft power, from which is derived *esprit*, morale and fighting will.¹² Leadership, which is convincing as opposed to coercive, will engender dedication and discipline in response to

shared values.

Authoritarian hard power is not leadership it is vulgarian - relative position, physical stature or command presence. Predictably, such an unsophisticated depiction encounters problems; such as the paradox of powerful positions, which are overwhelmed, powerful people who are overcome, ostensible leaders who are forsaken.

Underlining this point, the Spartan, Brasidas, dismissed Arrhabaeus's Illyrians; whom his army faced, as the coerced creatures of oppressive despotism. Ferocious though they seemed, the Illyrians were a merely angry mob without proper leadership, thus lacking any sense of honour and shame and thus lacking order, commitment and fighting will.¹³ Brasidas understood the forceful face of military command, and he understood that ultimately, military leadership was very much more. Steadying his outnumbered Spartans for a fighting retreat, Brasidas empathised with his men, he understood their fear made them "down-hearted," but he did not force them, he led them. By character and moral example, Brasidas illuminated for his men "courage which was their birthright," the "shame of giving up a position under pressure," and the "honour of fighting in order". In revealing comment upon the nature of leadership, Brasidas argued the Illyrian show of strength was really weak. Soon after, Brasidas himself, with his men, stood firm against the Illyrian main force.¹⁴

Brasidas embodied the ideal of military leadership; he did not misconstrue *service* for servitude, and he held in high regard, the commitment to shared values which distinguish Western arms.¹⁵ Brasidas was successful because his leadership was based squarely upon respect of his men and their service, and upon shared

ideals which framed Spartan honour and shame. Lacking hegemony beyond oppression, leadership which overplays hard power, fails to engender the loyal discipline for which the Spartans were renowned.

Hanson underlines the point, recalling that, at Rorke's Drift it was obedient "Zulus - who could be executed on a nod from their king - not the British, (who) ran away". The illustration is telling; because the Zulus, who charged on command, and courageously "grasped the red-hot barrels of Martini-Henry rifles on the north rampart at Rorke's Drift were as brave as the Englishmen who calmly blew them to pieces seconds later with .45 calibre rifle slugs".¹⁶ But the Zulus were in serfdom to tyranny. Zulu leadership, treating men as a commodity, gave no expression to values which defined honour and shame. Held in military servitude, there was no ideal for the Zulu to die for, or indeed to live for. In contrast, the Redcoats who defended Rorke's Drift exemplified disciplined resolve found upon leadership, which gave expression to values shared among the officers and men.

Just as language laced with moral meaning saturates discussion of war; so ideal military leadership is fortified with moral fibre. Regrettably however, the hard-edged accepted wisdom of command and control often overshadows integrity and ethical strength, which inspires but does not oppress.

INTEGRITY

Integrity; "an unimpaired adherence to a code of moral values,"¹⁷ is the backbone of "character," which is a moral term insofar as it understood to be "the greatest of man's virtues".¹⁸

Integrity therefore, is the safeguard of military leadership, which is

imperilled equally by the enticement as by the menace of unrestrained hard power. Concluding both his memoir and a consummate military career, Colonel General Heinz Guderian, who "rose to his greatest heights of patriotism and courage by daily opposing Hitler's outrageous decisions,"¹⁹ illustrates this profound point. He recalled a maxim:

Nothing can alter my inner soul: I shall pursue my own straight course and shall do what believe to be right and honourable.²⁰

Integrity entails attentiveness and responsiveness to moral principles, which must be protected at all costs. Military leadership must be morally unimpeachable, in order to ensure that servicemen, "given a mandate by their society to take lives, take only certain lives, in certain ways, at certain times and for certain reasons, otherwise servicemen become indistinguishable from murderers and will find themselves condemned by the very societies they serve".²¹ Military leadership not military law thus defines and stands for an inexplicit code; the military ideal which elevates military honour, which distinguishes worthy from discreditable acts, and which defines the gulf separating murder from killing by disciplined military force in a "fair fight".²²

Integrity in a leader instils mutual respect, honour, a sense of duty, *esprit* and fighting will in a team. However; though integrity co-opts by the soft power of moral example, the hard edge of command retains enduring relevance. Soft power lacks the brute strength to exert *immediate* influence - for this, the machine power of command is essential. Yet fidelity, fundamental to military service, is consumed by arrogation of command. Thus, leadership demands professional balance and disciplined study; theory may inform practice.

Despite this fact, acquaintance with leadership theory will not guarantee leadership success. Leaders must live up to ideals; displaying honour, acting honestly, exhibiting physical and moral courage, acting with integrity and remembering that loyalty is reciprocal; not an obligation imposed upon junior members for the enlargement of senior members. Where once a junior sees a senior acting prejudicial to principle, then that senior will lose credibility, and authority.

This article considered power and moral example, as engines of leadership. But, it was not hard-edged coercive command power, which was observed to be essential. Rather, soft and inexplicit authority, an entailment of moral example, was considered crucial. This was because, more than bossism, leadership demands character, upon which rests the courage to make ethical decisions.²³

Such was the character, which distinguished Hec Waller, who won a DSO for "courage enterprise and devotion to duty," and a Bar for "bravery and enterprise,"

Leadership: Power and Moral Example

being mentioned in despatches "for courage skill and devotion to duty" and "gallantry and resolution".²⁴

Unsurprisingly, Waller was assessed in 1924 as "a good type".²⁵ In 1928, aboard *HMS Broke*, he was noted auspiciously to be:

Thoroughly reliable and full of grit. Keen and self reliant. He is always ready for anything and makes light of difficulties. Understands and handles men well and has considerable qualities of leadership. He has a thoroughly good influence and though he speaks his mind, has plenty of tact...Physically as hard as nails.²⁶

Such is the sense of leadership, which more than bossism, should define leadership for the Royal Australian Navy, as Brasidas defined Spartan courage and verve for Thucydides. ✎

Can you lead your people

Without seeking to control?

Can you open and close the gates

In harmony with nature

Can you be understanding

Without trying to be wise?

Can you create without possessiveness

Accomplish without taking credit

Lead without ego?

This is the highest power.

Lao-tzu



WO Darren Jeffs joined the Royal Australian Navy as a Junior Recruit. He has had

postings to HMA Ships Stuart, Adelaide, Sydney, Melbourne, Albatross, Cerberus and Creswell; additionally he was Fleet Gunnery Assistant at Sea Training Group, post September 11. In 2004, Darren was appointed as the Command Warrant Officer Navy Systems Command, and in that same year he was inaugural WO on the Navy Single Service Component of the Command Staff Course at the Australian Command and Staff College. He holds a Masters of Maritime Studies from the University of Wollongong.

Acknowledgement:

I wish to thank Richard Adams for his all encouragement, counsel, work and academic tilt to this paper . . . he truly is a great friend, possessing the very best in moral courage and integrity.

(Endnotes)

¹ Walzer, M. (2000) *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument*, Basic Books: New York. P. 3

² Dixon, N. (1994) *On the Psychology of Military Incompetence*, Pimlico: London. p. 256.

³ Gordon, A. (2002) *The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command*, John Murray: London. In his forward, Admiral Woodward holds that Gordon offers a view, which any service in peacetime should consider carefully.

⁴ Dixon, N. (1994) *On the Psychology of Military Incompetence*, Pimlico: London. p. 232. Dixon cites Raven, S. (1959) "Perish by the Sword," *Encounter*, May, XII pp. 37-49 at p.48.

⁵ Walzer, M. (2000) *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument*, Basic Books: New York. P. 34-6.

⁶ Nye, J.S. (2004) *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, Perseus: United States. Nye was Dean of the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard.

⁷ Greene, R. (1998) *The 48 Laws of Power*, Penguin: New York.

⁸ Keegan, J. (1988) *The Mask of Command*, Penguin: United States. Keegan, (p. 312) observes the imperative of virtue, in military leadership.

⁹ Australian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine, LWD 02; Leadership, Headquarters, Training Command – Army (2002) Annex B, Ch. 1. Section 2, "Principles of Leadership Behaviour", pp. 64-70.

Australian Federation Guard Handbook, (2006) para. 8; "appreciate your own strengths and weaknesses and pursue self-improvement".

¹⁰ Adkins, A.W.H. (1975) *Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values*, University of Chicago Press: Chicago. pp. 31, 229, 230, 285.

¹¹ Bowra, C.M. (1959) *The Greek Experience*, Weidenfeld and Nicholson: London. p. 199. Bowra observes *arête* reflects the full development of the individual, when a man has turned his special gifts to good purpose.

¹² Lattimore, R. (tr 1961) *The Iliad of Homer*, University of Chicago Press: Chicago. p. 266. *Iliad*. xii:310.

¹³ Van Creveld, M. (1982) *Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939 – 1945*, Greenwood Press: Connecticut. Van Creveld describes fighting will; the essence of the Wehrmacht which, "was outnumbered three, five even seven to one. Yet, it did not run, it did not disintegrate it doggedly fought on for years after the last hope of victory had gone. Units, even when down to twenty per cent of their original size, continued to exist and to resist – an unrivalled achievement for any army". (p. 5, several sentences combined) Australian Federation Guard Handbook (2006) para. 1; "A unit that is well-led, trained and motivated can overcome any adversity".

¹⁴ Warner, R. (tr) (1972) *Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War*, Penguin: London. (4.125,126) p. 341.

¹⁵ Warner, R. (tr) (1972) *Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War*, Penguin: London. (4.125,126, 127) pp. 341-342.

¹⁶ Hanson, V.D. (2000) *The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece*, University of California Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles. Hanson, explaining the Hellenic traditions of western arms, describes shared values in the foundational sense of *aporthetos*; the perception in the mind of hoplites that ancestral land should remain inviolate.

¹⁷ Hanson, V.D. (2002) *Why the West has Won*, Faber and Faber: London, pp. 324, 325

¹⁸ Montor, K. (ed) (1996) *Ethics for the Junior Officer*, Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, p. 271, citing Admiral Arleigh Burke, "Integrity," *Proceedings*, October, 1985. (abridged) The sense of "adherence" to a code is quite a deal more stringent than the lax sense of "display," published on the RAN website, where integrity is "the display of truth, honesty and fairness that gains respect and trust from others." One code requires moral courage, the other mere credible masquerade.

¹⁹ Montor, K. (1998) *Naval Leadership: Voices of Experience*, Naval Institute Press: Annapolis. p. 2. Montor cites General. L. Shepherd, Commandant of the United States Marine Corps.

²⁰ Macksey, K. (1996) Forward to Guderian, H. (2002) *Panzer Leader*, Da Capo Press: Cambridge. p.xi

²¹ Guderian, H. (2002) *Panzer Leader*, Da Capo Press: Cambridge. p. 466.

²² French, S. (2003) *The Code of the Warrior*, Rowman & Littlefield: Maryland. p. 3 (several sentences combined)

²³ Osiel, M. J. (2002) *Obedying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline & the law of War*, Transaction: New Jersey. pp. 32, 33."Martial honour is more effective motivating compliance with ethical norms than formal legal sanction. Virtue of this sort becomes its own reward". (Much abridged, several sentences combined)

²⁴ Montor, K. (1998) *Naval Leadership: Voices of Experience*, Naval Institute Press: Annapolis. p. 521

²⁵ Australian War Memorial; File RAN N/101.

²⁶ Australian National Archives; File A3978/15.

²⁷ Australian National Archives; File A3978/15.

INDIAN NAVY SEA POWER 2020

MANOJ GUPTA –UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES AT THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE ACADEMY, CANBERRA



I.N.S. Tarangini
By Chris Sattler

Is the Indian Navy (IN) to be a world-class navy that not only is capable of safeguarding India's security but becomes an important security provider in the Indian Ocean region?

To answer the question, this paper sizes up the fifth largest navy in the world and reflects on its 'vision for transformation'¹ to investigate what changes in operational concepts and organisational outlook must accompany naval modernisation, currently underway. There are important lessons for other medium power navies, where by combat ready navies need to adapt to the 'new ocean regime' that promotes cooperation and not competition. Looking beyond the possibility of confrontation with Pakistan and the long term threat from China's rise, the ability of the IN to cope with the sizeable security agenda for homeland and regional security will determine New Delhi's position in the calculus of great powers. The main argument is that in this era of strategic uncertainty a transformational effect in India's sea power capability can alter

the Indian Ocean regional (in)security dynamics contributing to world peace and advantage India in the power play of international relations.

In February 2006, the world's fifth largest navy was reviewed by its Supreme Commander APJ Kalam the President of India, on India's Eastern seaboard heralding a turning point in Indian naval history. The spectacular naval fire power display was a clear demonstration of overcoming the fixation of Pakistan and a strong affirmation of taking on regional responsibilities. The IN is the best foreign policy instrument for India to assert itself as a force for regional (global) stability on the road to becoming a great power. The Presidential Fleet Review showcased a well balanced three dimensional force of over 50 ships and submarines and nearly 45 aircraft. Programmed to enter Space, the fourth dimension, the network centric navy, by 2015 - 20 shall be operating a two carrier battle group with a force structure of 140 - 145 vessels complemented by

conventional and nuclear submarines and aviation assets.² Built on relationships of trust with the Indian Ocean littorals the IN can and must provide the much needed strategic stability for the Indian Ocean region.

History demonstrates the necessity for India to possess a world-class navy. The Russian aircraft carrier *Gorshkov* now *INS Vikramaditya* challenges the conventional

continental mindset and will supplant this with a new sea power doctrine when it enters service in 2008. The two names of the aircraft carrier by themselves speak the story. Admiral of the fleet Sergei Gorshkov, one of the foremost strategists and architect of the Soviet Navy, constantly emphasised that continental Russia is a maritime nation and its destiny depends on the seas. The symbolical inheritance of the Gorshkov doctrine by the IN has been supplemented at sea by the "Sun of Power" (*Vikramaditya*) who was the most illustrious emperor of ancient India. *Vikramaditya's* rule epitomizes the zenith of India's prosperity and opulence. *Vikramaditya*, a synonym for sovereign of tremendous power and wealth, gained political pre-eminence by pragmatism, judicious (marriage) alliances, and military strength. Clearly, *Vikramaditya* shows the way forward for India "to be supreme at sea", so as "to be secure on land."

The Indian Navy in 'thinking out of the box' has promulgated a series of documents that detail the navy's



I.N.S. Betwa
By Chris Sattler

vision, road map to transformation and strategy for the 'Freedom of the Seas'.³ A good beginning but somewhat flawed in relevance to a 21st century navy. The vision statement⁴ enunciates a "willingness to transform by adopting change," and what is needed is a change in mindsets. For one, the IN as a "force capable of safeguarding our (India's) maritime interests on the high seas" needs to be more emphatic in acknowledging in its vision statement the overwhelming extent of national maritime interests in areas of ocean space other than the High Seas.⁵ More so, focussed on military roles the vision statement appears to be bereft of the constabulary and diplomatic roles barring a weak statement on humanitarian and benign tasks. The question is "should the transformation of the navy be built on the guiding principle of "we will deter war through strength?" The principle leaves the reader with a feeling that it encourages an arms race and competition in the region, an oxymoron to the guiding principle of maritime cooperation, mistakenly construed as a 'task' rather than a 'norm'.⁶ If events elsewhere in the world are any indication, then 'can war be deterred through strength?' Moreover, as a nuclear weapon state where deterrence fails the answer appears to be "we must strive to

achieve victory over the adversary by our reach and fire power," leaves an impression of internal conflict between promoting "an environment of peace and tranquillity in the IOR (Indian Ocean Region)" and the desire to project a combat ready navy. Where as, in reality the inherent combat readiness of a navy is implied as against the necessity to state the constabulary and diplomatic missions. After all, meaningful economic and diplomatic objectives cannot be achieved by going to war. More so, by going to war to achieve political and military objectives the IN cannot possibly promote an environment of peace and tranquillity in the IOR. In the unlikely event of war, the Indian Navy's sole mission would be to defend the sovereignty of the nation at all costs, just as is true for any other navy or defence force in the world.

As for the strategy, the title "Freedom of the Seas: India's maritime strategy" suggests a classified document reminiscent of Hugo Grotius's 'Freedom of the High Seas' concept, questionable for its continued relevance in the 21st century. Given the classified nature of the document, one can only reflect on the title of this document. The oceans fished and navigated for millennia are now governed by a 'new ocean regime'

– a regime of control and regulation. No longer can fishermen fish just anywhere in the ocean. Who better than India knows this to be true? Indian fishermen are being constantly arrested by neighbouring states and vice versa for illegally fishing in ocean areas outside national jurisdictions of each state. The 'freedom of navigation' concept is subject to a legal regime that actually spells out what does innocent passage imply. Monitoring, Control, and Surveillance systems track every movement of the ship to the extent that authorities are made aware of even when a ship has pumped out its bilges into the sea. Literally, where then is the 'Freedom of the seas.' The reality for the 21st century is one of 'control and regulation' and rightly so for the sustainable use of ocean resources, protection of the marine environment, and maintenance of security in the oceans. The IN is not alone and many more navies continue to hold fast to the 'Freedom of the Seas' concept even though they speak and act in a manner of 'control and regulation'.

Continuing with the strategy document, 'India's Maritime Strategy' represents naval thinking not national thinking. It is yet another case of a single organisation using a macro phrase but meaning a micro organisational objective of the IN's



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maritime security strategy. The other organisation to do something similar was the Ministry of Shipping on stating a 'Comprehensive Maritime Policy'⁷ but actually limited to a port, shipping and waterways development policy. The good thing is that individual organisations in land-centric India are beginning to think maritime and then applying it nationally giving a definite maritime character to India as a nation. Sadly, India is far from getting individual organisations to come together and enunciate a truly 'National Maritime Policy' or 'India's Maritime Strategy'. The endless turf battles are certainly not in the 'national interest'

claimed by organisations as a 'guiding principle' in their policy documents.

Taking into account that India is a great 'maritime' power to be, the naval and political leadership has to move toward an Indian Ocean maritime security strategy that recognises the 'new ocean regime' of the 21st century governed by the United Nations Law of the Sea and a series of intertwined international legal regimes. Developing on Thomas Barnett's 12 step program for the IN, the paper draws heavily from Stephen Covey's inspirational personal improvement bible *The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People*.⁸ A parallel can be drawn between

the seven habits of highly effective people and those that apply to a highly effective Indian Navy. It all comes down to changing mindsets. In effect, what *The Seven Steps to a Highly Effective Indian Navy* portends is that the IN needs to:

1. BE PROACTIVE TO TAKE CONTROL OF ONE'S INDIAN OCEAN OPERATING ENVIRONMENT, RATHER THAN HAVE THE INDIAN ARMY AND INDIAN AIR FORCE OR PAKISTAN AND CHINA TAKE CONTROL, AS HAS OFTEN BEEN THE CASE. No longer is it sufficient for the IN to remain a fleet-in-being to be used in the event of war. The IN must assume the 'responsibility and initiative' to make things happen; where responsibility is do with the ability to choose its response and initiative is recognising its responsibility to make things happen. Proactive powerful leadership must constantly monitor environmental change and provide the force necessary to organise resources in the right direction. The IN must be proactive to seek political mandate of its operating environment beyond the rhetoric by the Indian Army and

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alongside the TU 142 and retrofitted IL 38SD continues. Lockheed Martin is reported to have offered the P3C Orions. In Jan 2006, the navy commissioned the first Asian UAV squadron in the Indian Ocean region.¹¹

The inventory is impressive but the challenges are daunting. All things are created twice – mental or first creation and a physical or second creation. Based on principals of personal leadership the IN must start with an understanding of its destination. The initial challenge for the IN is defining future force structure to match requirements. Keeping the end in mind, naval modernisation requirements include the varied and at times competing requirements of combat operations; coastal security; protection of SLOCs; humanitarian assistance; peacekeeping operations; and showing the flag. Presently, between the IN and Indian Coast Guard, outside combat operations there exists an overlap in roles and therefore force requirements. If there is no course correction in the duality of maritime forces now, fiscal responsibility, in the future will severely affect building and maintaining the required maritime force levels. Building the force structure is yet another challenge. For this limitations of indigenous capacity and national infrastructure need to be overcome rapidly. In sum, for the IN of tomorrow that possess lethal war fighting capabilities and serves as an international security provider, there is need to first work out the calculus of IN and Indian Coast Guard force sizing; IN and not just the Indian Coast Guard policing the Indian Ocean must be visible to the Indian taxpayer; and India must rapidly invest in building national maritime infrastructure and industrial capacity.

3. PUT FIRST THINGS FIRST BY IMPLEMENTING ORGANISATIONAL CHANGES IN LINE WITH THE AIM OF A STABLE, SAFE AND SECURE INDIAN OCEAN REGION. The challenge of organisational innovation is central to a highly effective IN that adapts to the new and emerging maritime security challenges. The IN coloured by its doctrinal 'spectrum of conflict' perspective will fail if it simply lets the Indian Coast Guard be the security provider against global maritime insecurities. The end aim of a stable, safe and secure Indian Ocean will require greater creative thinking than imaginary lines at sea in a division of responsibilities between the two maritime forces. For the IN to be seen as a 'force for good' the IN has to deliver peace, tranquillity and stability in the IOR. Of course, the IN will need traditional war fighting capabilities, given the unresolved boundary disputes with Pakistan and China, but given the maritime security challenges, the IN sea power has to do much, much more than just "acquire war fighting capabilities to operate across the full spectrum of conflict."¹² Putting first things first IN must address the lack of organisational change so evident in the bitter intra-service rivalry.

The East-West divide stemming from operational disparity between the Western and Eastern Fleets because of the focus on Pakistan could in one way give way to a strong four-tier (High Seas: beyond 200 nm; Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): 200 nm; Contiguous Zone: 24 nm; and Territorial Sea: 12 nm) layered defence with five fleets built around a Strike Fleet, Support Fleet, Rapid Action Force, and two Maritime Defence Fleets. The outermost layer located beyond 200nm would automatically be occupied by the 'Strike Fleet' a forward deployable rotational Carrier Battle Group of one or two carriers

supported by a mix of special forces, conventional and nuclear submarines and aviation assets. Overseen by a new 'strike command' at Karwar the 'Strike Fleet' in peace-time cooperates with international navies to create an international security force on the High Seas¹³ in the Indian Ocean to deal with aspects of humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, disaster response, proliferation, terrorism, hijacking, and when called upon crime at sea. The 'support command' at Kochi marshals the 'Support Fleet' in providing sufficient lift, sustainability, combat logistics, and amphibious ships to support 'Combat Fleet' operations. The tri-service Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) is structured to train, equip, and maintain an amphibious capable Rapid Action Force in support of Strike Fleet operations in peace and in war. ANC would also maintain sufficient naval forces for protecting the maritime infrastructure and resources in the Andaman and Nicobar EEZ in situations other than war. Finally, the two 'Maritime Defence Fleets' operating from Vishakapatnam/ proposed new naval base and Mumbai must assume responsibility of the remaining three tiers (Exclusive Economic Zone: 200nm; Contiguous Waters: 24nm; and Territorial Sea: 12nm) for maritime defence of the East and West coast of India. Monitoring, Control, and Surveillance capabilities to deal with a wide range of threats must include anti-submarine warfare; mine countermeasures; seaward defence from clandestine operations, missile, and air strikes; coastal security against terrorist attacks, criminal, smuggling, and hostile acts; fisheries and environmental protection; and protection of critical infrastructure – military facilities, nuclear power plants, offshore oil platforms, oil refineries, pipelines, submarine cables, ports and harbours. The strike fleet together with

its integral components of the support fleet and the Rapid Action Force integrates with the two defence fleets to form a composite single maritime force for the defence and security of the nation.

4. THINK WIN-WIN TO FOLLOW A COOPERATIVE APPROACH THAN THE CONFRONTATION OF WIN-OR-LOSE TO PRESENT A SINGLE COMPOSITE MARITIME FORCE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE. Presently, the IN and Indian Coast Guard both under the Ministry of Defence maintain responsibility for monitoring, control, and surveillance of the 200 nm EEZ.¹⁴ By 2009, the reach of INCG is likely to extend up to 350 nm.¹⁵ Current force levels include 56 ships and 44 aircraft.¹⁶ The 2004-05 report of the 'Standing Committee on Defence' envisages inducting 71 ships and 12 aircraft under the 2002-07 development plan.¹⁷ Mission statements provide for offshore security, coastal security, marine environmental security, marine

safety, fisheries protection, scientific assistance and national defence.¹⁸ As many as 73 coastal police stations are proposed to be established under the coastal security scheme to augment the Coast Guard coastal security network along the 7516 km coastline.¹⁹ As the National Search and Rescue Coordinator it is the Coast Guard that is responsible for marine safety in the Indian Search and Rescue Region (ISRR).²¹ Towards pollution response, the Coast Guard also functions as the central coordinating authority for the National Oil spill Disaster Contingency plan.²² With India having ratified the 16 nation Regional Cooperation Agreement on combating piracy, the Coast Guard will be the focal point for the agreement.²³ Regular joint exercises and visits to Indian Ocean littorals have been expanded to include the Pacific Ocean Japanese Coast Guard.²⁴ If budgetary allocations are forthcoming, the Indian Coast Guard will emerge as the third largest Coast Guard after the US and Japan.

The question is will fiscal reality

in the future provide funding for the fifth largest navy and the third largest Coast Guard in the world. In addition, there are numerous operating issues of coordination and assigning of forces. The IN and Indian Coast Guard maintain independent maritime operation rooms, whilst both are regularly patrolling the Indian maritime zones for offshore and coastal security. Both the IN and Indian Coast Guard have their individual representatives on the boards of major ports for port security. The IN provides offshore security to state operated oil platforms under the ambit of the Flag Officer Defence Advisory Group and the Advisor Offshore Security and Defence to the Government of India.²⁵ While, the Director General Coast Guard is the chairman of the Offshore Security Coordination Committee under the aegis of the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas.²⁶ The IN is engaged in joint patrolling with many of the neighbouring navies to counter transnational crimes such as terrorism, gun running, drug smuggling and

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