

learnt richly from the experience. One source of preparation for this volatile situation was the observation of a senior colleague, some years previously, handling stressed sailors with what I reckoned to be a peremptory lack of sensitivity. This truly distinguished officer, who rose to very high rank, never developed a natural touch with his people. In walk-about mode, he was uncomfortable and rather bored, whereas I found the benefits enormous from early days in the Navy.

For me, skills in walkabout management developed partly from instinct and partly from the submarine culture. Whilst not lacking elsewhere in the Navy, submariners tend to have walkabout management forced upon them, even very large submarines imposing sardine conditions by any normal working and living standards. Those of us fortunate enough to spend much time also in surface ships brought our relaxed peripatetic habits with us.

In my experience, this is an invaluable approach, and I consolidated its practice in successive sea-going appointments. Early on, no-one expects the boss to know everything. The licence to ask questions whilst exploring every extremity of the ship is thus unlimited; and people love to talk about their jobs and themselves. The habit of asking questions can then simply continue, with due sensitivity of course, even if people might have suspected my purpose had gradually become reversed! It also stimulates the rest of management. Provided it is clear that the process is constructive and not an invasion of departmental turf, most HoDs will accept the challenge cheerfully and simply take care to keep ahead of the boss.

There was a question of universal basic ship knowledge. Imposing my submarine instincts, and reinforced by John Kelly's as an aviator, I insisted - against considerable traditional opposition - that everyone must achieve an accredited standard of whole-ship (as opposed to simply departmental) knowledge. I rounded my own education with a few days at sea in *Intrepid* under the tutelage of Captain Peter Dingemans.

Thus were my personal credentials to command established, and the motivation, competence and integration of the *Fearless* ship's company advanced by me and my colleagues, even in the unpromising environment of South Shields with its fantastic density of pubs per square mile and other distractions. These qualities proved vital in extricating *Fearless* from the valiantly struggling shipyard just about on time, ready to navigate the shifting sandbanks of trials, some failed trials and ever-tauter get-well deadlines. We achieved clearance to move forward to safety and operational 'work-up' with the narrowest of scheduled margins, and a number of tolerable compromises - by which

time the ready extension of *Intrepid* was impracticable.

Working up to full operational effectiveness

We were becoming an operational team during the ship's work-up period at and around Portland in the English Channel during the autumn of 1981. Hard-driven, even if there was much to entertain as well as to test and exasperate, *Fearless* developed a tempered operational proficiency, with resilience to match. During the early days, under the tireless eyes of regulatory inquisitors, ancient Bofors anti-aircraft guns on the bridge wing platforms would respond to the early morning mock attacks by fast jets with sporadic blank fire before jamming. Bang, Bang..... Bang, Bang.....silence..... Woosh (went the jet close overhead)! (Six months later in San Carlos they would fire on and on with relentless efficiency.) Missiles hung-up on launchers. Inexperienced manoeuvring caused dents to landing craft. Internal damage control exercises were a spaghetti of hoses, baulks of timber, bruised elbows, lurid make-up wounds and colourful language. More and more decisions could be left to my departmental heads, with onward downward delegation. More and more was I free to pursue high-level issues. On completion of a compressed programme, we were declared operational, with some formal credit and warm private endorsement. *Fearless* had achieved her first objectives. *Intrepid* adjusted to standby status, from which she was to be re-activated abruptly three months later for the Falklands Campaign with much of her old ship's company.

New Year 1982 saw *Fearless* deploy with a small squadron to the West Indies by the northern great-circle route. This was my decision and a poor one, based on inadequate research. We encountered hurricane conditions mid-Atlantic, not unusual for the time of year, and damaged two helicopters lashed to the flight deck, one terminally and thus not available for the Falklands aircraft inventory.

After some colourful tribulations, the deployment took *Fearless* to the Netherlands island territory of Curacao. The port incorporated an army encampment, Camp Allegro, converted to a recreation centre which proved enormously popular with my sailors and marines, the true nature of which became clear to me subsequently. The padre conceded wanly that it had taken the Camp Allegro to really put the ship's company into foremost fettle! I did not complain. We embarked for a short visit the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse. He enjoyed a traditional ship's company concert held on the vehicle (Ro-Ro) decks, in which five hundred voices nearly lifted the flight deck heavenwards with 'Hearts of Oak' and 'Rule Britannia'. The Admiral turned to me and said,

without conceivable premonition 'What if we were to go to war tomorrow?'

We re-crossed the Atlantic, embarked a major contingent of Royal Marines at Plymouth together with the amphibious maritime and land-force commanders, Michael Clapp and Julian Thompson, and proceeded to north Norway around the Lofoten Islands for major exercises. With the Commodore's encouragement, again without premonition, I experimented in manoeuvring *Fearless* to use huge fjordal land features as protection against line-of-sight attack by fast-jet aircraft. Driven simply by sound strategy, a succession of such decisions, both planned and opportune, advanced the ship's operational readiness and our ability to apply her capabilities in a war theatre.

Meanwhile we were learning to integrate with and support our amphibious staff guests and colleagues. My walkabout habits of leadership and second-level information management continued; a cup of coffee for the Captain in a machinery control room at 0430 continued to reward all parties.

Reflections on command

Command at sea is by its nature a lonely business. It places heavy leadership demands and, if discharged effectively, has a key positive influence on the ship and her company as a whole. In time-honoured naval tradition, a warship Captain lives and mainly works in isolated quarters. Socially, he only enters other living areas (each known in the Navy as a 'Mess') by invitation and then infrequently. This may surprise current management gurus, but it does stand out as one great strength of command at sea, proven over many generations - and, when misapplied, of eccentricity or worse! Solitude allows space for reflection and detachment, both essential ingredients in maintaining the big picture, and for ensuring a sound balance between the human and material elements of the business. At sea there is an obvious need for a particularly high level of alertness, unchanged in essentials since Nelson's day, and in current practical terms made the more acute by the short-fuse capabilities of modern weapon systems and their antidotes.

For generations the buck has stopped at the RN Captain's door. There is an important complement to the solitary element of the command profile in the Royal Navy, and that is the custom whereby ship's captains seek out each other's company to discuss command practice at every opportunity - an approach again instituted during the Nelsonic era, possibly by Admiral John Jervis, later Earl St Vincent, and First Lord of the Admiralty and a guiding naval strategist for key periods of the wars against Napoleon.

Whenever two British warships are in company, the junior captain will seek to visit (or 'call upon')

the senior, a custom linked traditionally with entertainment to lunch or dinner. This is not a pompous practice in the least, it is a matter of two commanders conferring. Thus will the captain of an aircraft carrier entertain as a colleague the immensely junior captain of a minesweeper. The latter will be received by the aircraft carrier's second-in-command (also greatly his senior) and be escorted by him to the captain's cabin.

One cardinal and appealing feature of leadership is to be both able and prepared to do competently anything one asks of one's workforce, especially if unpleasant or hazardous or, less glamorously, plain boring. There are obvious practical limits in applying this principle: the correct balance between sharing and example on one hand and plain effectiveness on the other always requires judgement. In Egypt in WWII, General Auchinleck insisted that staff officers share fully the privations of the army's desert camp. His successor General Montgomery, taking command before the Battle of El Alamein, moved them to more comfortable quarters to work better.²

To illustrate both the sharing and hubris dilemmas, here is a cautionary tale. John Kelly expressed his anxiety that I might overdo my enthusiasm for helicopters. It was appropriate to have drawn full flying gear. Once accustomed to its use, no doubt I began to look the part. One day a new mark of helicopter landed on our flight deck in the hands of an eminent test pilot. Would I care for a ride? But of course! Duly clad, I hoisted myself into the left-hand seat like a pro and strapped in. Would I like to take the aircraft off? To me this meant following the pilot through on the controls. It did not occur to me that this paragon might think I could fly, nor to him that I was not a qualified pilot - a prime example of reciprocal flawed recognition-primed decisions, in the guise of mutual assent. Moreover he had inadvertently switched out the automatic stabilisation. During the seconds that followed we, the flight-deck crew and possibly many others were lucky to survive the near disaster of an otherwise exceedingly comic take off. I had been disgracefully irresponsible. I had posed, if artlessly, as a pilot. It is often important for the leader not to wear his heart on his sleeve. He must however take care never to act what he is not. 'Be yourself' is the most valuable command advice I ever received.³

It is of subsidiary interest that I was unstressed by this incident in which I nearly killed myself and many others. It is a quality of preparedness that one can accept close calls with equanimity - for a period at least.

All records broken, and a sombre prospect

The Falklands Campaign had its origins in a dispute

between Britain and Argentina over the sovereignty of the islands, to which the Argentines refer as Los Malvinas, the complexities of which are irreconcilable. Firm leadership by Mrs Thatcher, armed with resolute assurances by the First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Henry Leach that a maritime task force could be assembled to repossess the Falklands, prevailed over many faint-hearted counsels.⁴ The colours of a united kingdom were nailed to the mast.

Fearless sailed from Portsmouth on the Tuesday 6 April with an unprecedented operational load. My people and numerous helpers, including normally rule-bound dockyard workers and the teenage sons of my Deputy Weapons Officer, moved mountains to reassemble and store the ship. Four large helicopters, artillery, ammunition, light tanks, and many lesser vehicles packed into every conceivable corner. False decks were created from a cornucopia of stores. Topping up to the 1,400 people, we broke all previous records. From the round tower at the narrow harbour entrance, crowds, including *Fearless* families, cheered and wept us on our way. We anchored immediately at Spithead and docked-down to embark our four large landing craft. Local television beamed visions of our distressed womenfolk clutching wide-eyed children. It was a sombre moment, presaging deep leadership needs even for a ship fundamentally so ready.

Establishment of command patterns - less than ideal

It is an ancient custom that the Captain of a command (or Flag) ship joins the embarked commander (Commodore or Admiral) for meals - he is in any case Chief of Staff. This I had learnt first-hand from the best of teachers, the then Rear Admiral John Fieldhouse, when I had had a windfall youthful innings as Captain of the magnificent guided missile destroyer HMS *Glamorgan*, then his flagship. But now, in Michael Clapp and Julian Thompson, there were two guest commanders. They would have much to talk about. I was shy of intruding gratuitously and a cautious enquiry indicated they would prefer to remain a *deux*. Hindsight told me I should have been more insistent. This was, I now see, a weak decision, in consequence of which I failed to support my leaders to the limits of my knowledge and experience. Here is an example, interleaved with the enormous importance of getting the command organisation straight.

The senior commander afloat was Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward. The situation was however complicated by a command structure under Admiral Fieldhouse which appointed Sandy Woodward, Michael Clapp and Julian Thomson for periods as co-equal Task Group Commanders, each

Task Group having of course a particular function. Sandy Woodward had degrees of *primus inter pares* status, which varied and were by no means always clear to those concerned. Notwithstanding Admiral Fieldhouse's superb personal leadership of the campaign from his shore headquarters at Northwood, the consequent misunderstandings were serious. Such difficulties apart, it was a shining feature of the Falklands Campaign that overall we proved so ready and so flexible, and that really very few ancient lessons were forgotten.

Having served Sandy Woodward four times, I knew him well with awesome admiration - and deep affection - as an intellectual, keenly astute and a masterful submariner by background. The Rt. Hon Margaret Thatcher in 1992 wrote: 'There were those who considered him the cleverest man in the Navy. ... He was precisely the right man to fight the world's first computer war.'⁵

His agile brain generated bright ideas at an alarming rate. At inception these were generally not ordered, and his hapless staff could readily be run ragged without stern prioritising by a firm deputy - which it had once been my privilege to be. Michael Clapp knew Sandy Woodward only slightly and Julian Thompson not at all.

A meeting of these seagoing principals would almost certainly occur near Ascension Island where the small Carrier Group had assembled before us. Sure enough, as soon as *Fearless* was within range, a helicopter bearing the Admiral approached. The pressures from the Commander-in-Chief's headquarters at Northwood were already acute and there was a residual air of stress aggravated already by the ambiguities in the command structure. Some days before, I had decided to attempt to prepare my leaders for the type of intercourse such a meeting was liable to bring. I was anxious above all that they should recognise the inevitable barrage of Woodward ideas, some projected simply as a cheerful agenda for lateral-thinking debate. They should stand their ground, especially on amphibious principles - on which the Admiral would wish to be educated.

Everything turned out as predicted, but my attempts to fix the chemistry proved in vain.⁶ My two champions were defensive, and dismayed and offended by Sandy Woodward's breezy and provocatively creative demeanour. This set a pattern of mistrust, almost adversarial, between the offshore Carrier Group and the inshore Amphibious Group - the two principal headquarters groups afloat. They rubbed along together. But it was a sadly raw relationship, fraught with misunderstanding and perceived offence. I did go on trying to moderate these stresses and strains, with some modest success. Max Hastings, in my view, the most outstanding of a strong media corps

present in the South Atlantic, wrote with Simon Jenkins a book which remains one of the most powerful accounts of the campaign amongst a great deal of more-recent literature. It was there with gratitude that I read that: 'Larken was to play an important role in keeping 'combined operations' combined. His great skill in sympathising with other men's points of view contributed enormously to the eventual success of the amphibious operations'.⁷

As a caution to readers, I would only add that a bunker syndrome between command centres under pressure is the rule rather than the exception. Command centres quickly adopt personalities. The analogy of personal relationships to those between command centres, with imperfect communications in stressful, threatened and entrepreneurial circumstances, is therefore a useful guide to their likely behaviour. As a redeeming factor in the Falklands Campaign, this was in some senses a creative tension, and it did not prevent our ultimate success.

Command in war involves a matrix of command centres, great and small, but all with mandates (known variously as 'directives', 'orders' or 'rules of engagement') designed to give maximum independence, within specific (often politically-driven) constraints. This is the crucial key to flexibility, and it applies equally in principle to any organisation well prepared for crisis. Operational flexibility, as long as it is founded upon mutual understanding between well-trained command centres, is a fundamental concept for successful military operations. This is almost completely misunderstood in the civilian world, where 'orders' are interpreted as rigidity, rather than as mandates for integrated independence and initiative - due partly to the habitual film and television caricatures of the armed forces. A consequence is an exaggerated distinction between commercial and military methods of doing business, which in turn conceals sadly many valuable elements of practical experience each sector has to offer the other.

Creating super-togetherness for the big push

Fearless's aim had now changed, from being an instrument ready for her operational role, to the discharge of this role in earnest, as required and directed.

My task in achieving the remaining relatively modest metamorphosis to a war footing was now mainly a matter of human relations, and education in war imperatives and stratagems. To this I devoted all the powers of leadership accumulated over my career, drawing fully upon the fruit of seeds I had taken so much trouble to sow and let flourish in *Fearless*. From a demanding and pushy Captain who, whilst quite approachable, never

seemed satisfied, I found myself a source of strength, dependability and reassurance - and I dare say some inspiration.

As we progressed south, cumulative pressures on my time drew down upon my wandering habits. I replaced these by increased use of the public address (PA) and CCTV systems. The HoDs all became able presenters on these media. As Captain, I had previously used the PA system only when there was news or a message of major import to convey to the whole ship's company. Its use had in any case presented me with something of an ordeal, since I retained the residue of a once serious stammer. As *Fearless* moved towards war as a pawn in a dynamic and complicated diplomatic situation, I quickly discovered that - over and beyond the hourly World Service bulletins - my people thirsted for homespun news and comment. And it was from me, their Captain, that they preferred to hear.

A central leadership task is to promote a clear view of today's reality and expectation in a constructive way. Fast moving circumstances and a deteriorating or increasingly alarming situation can create a reality lag.

We took the morale pulse from day to day. One evening during our three week pause at Ascension Island, the very same Royal Marine band that had unleashed such carefree enthusiasm but two months previously boarded to give a concert. The event was well-attended but subdued. Concerned at first, I concluded correctly that sober stock was being taken of our prospects. We accepted that our likely fate was to sail south to the Falklands, to face hazards new to us all.

I was determined there be no jingoism in my ship. When the Argentine cruiser *General Belgrano* - of comparable size to *Fearless* - was sunk by HMS *Conqueror*, I briefed on PA hour by hour on the number of her ship's company reported saved. Soon HMS *Sheffield* was lost also. Thus, as we now moved inexorably towards the theatre of operations, together we cultivated and nurtured by every available means a waxing, realistic and implacable resolve.

Conquering fear with information

A senior soldier wrote of the air attacks on San Carlos following the landings as follows:

Being on a ship whilst it is being attacked by aircraft was a completely new experience for me. You get a countdown, you can hear the roar of the engines of the jet aircraft, the whoosh of missiles firing and the cackle of small arms and machinegun fire. Then the whole aluminium and steel fabric of the ship - or cell as it seems at that moment - rocks and shakes in combination with the noise of the bombs exploding. You have no understanding of what is going on outside of your immediate area.

The Captain clearly understood how everyone was feeling. He calmly announced to the ship's company over the ship's loudspeaker system what was going on, both in and around the ship and what the Navy was doing about it. He was delightfully unruffled and his voice was gentle. He had an immediate, positive, calming effect on everyone, although no-one said very much. 'Brits' are conditioned to behave in a quiet self-composed manner in situations of extreme danger no matter what they are personally feeling inside".⁸

Max Hastings covering this phase wrote:

All over the ship, more than a thousand men, many of whom never saw the light of natural day, strained to catch his voice over the hum of vents and air conditioners, the roar of machinery and the constant traffic of transmissions, telephones and hurrying figures.⁹In the wardroom of Fearless a scattering of spare pilots and survivors of lost ships clustered round the loudspeaker in their life jackets and respirators.¹⁰

Battle of attrition at San Carlos - operational decisions

The two main islands are separated by Falkland Sound, and San Carlos Water is the inlet just inside the narrows at the north letting into East Falkland. The distance from San Carlos to Port Stanley is about 50 miles over extremely difficult terrain. The level ground is generally passable only to tracked vehicles, but even they are obstructed by many rock runs from the mountains, not shown on this map. Movement on foot with action loads is immensely demanding - a huge tribute to the marines and paras who 'yomped' it.

Space does not permit me to describe the many fascinating considerations governing the final approach of the Amphibious Force to the assault, nor the unfolding of events. My own contributions at this juncture majored in our anti-submarine measures and the crafting of a deceptive approach to the Falkland archipelago from the north-west. The aim of the latter plan was to indicate for as long as possible that we were heading for the east coast somewhere around Port Stanley - unnecessary in the event, since the Amphibious Force was not detected. Michael Clapp delegated to me the tactical handling of the Amphibious Force during the critical final 24-hour transit to San Carlos. To lead, finally, the long line of ships into the Falklands Sound, keeping very close to bluffs of West Falkland Island in total darkness and hence clear of the central channel which was where the Argentines might have laid mines, was certainly amongst the proudest episodes of my life.

Immediately following the landings at San Carlos during the early hours of 21 May 1982, it fell largely to me on Michael Clapp's behalf to organise the stationing of ships in the anchorage. Here the recent Norwegian Fjord experience with camouflage

proved valuable. We anchored ships packed together around the relatively slight major land features in a way that would inconvenience the Argentine fast-jet weapon-launch flight paths. Flaws in my initial calculations led to hits on two logistic ships, the bombs happily failing to explode. Thereafter no strikes on troop- or cargo-carrying ships in the anchorage were achieved. In case Argentine daylight intelligence of this unconventional arrangement might encourage high-level night attacks, I had all ships moved to dispersed positions at nightfall, resuming the compact formation before dawn.

I had also to decide from where to fight *Fearless*. My small 1960-vintage Operations Room was filled entirely by Michael Clapp and his staff. Moreover, my ancient air-defence radars saw nothing beyond the surrounding hills, from amongst which attacking aircraft would emerge some ten seconds from target (eg. *Fearless*). Having endured the first air attack as a frustrated supernumerary without even a radar monitor at my disposal, I decided to migrate to the missile/gun-direction platform at the very top of the ship, a level above the navigational bridge. This was better. From here I could see incoming aircraft as soon as anyone else. I could direct the manoeuvring of the ship to present the least target and best weapon arcs to the Argentines' favourite flight paths. I had first-hand observation of each attack on the anchorage and its results, and could provide a deputy's eyes for my Commodore. I could moreover set a direct example to my people, some fifty of whom were on the upper deck manning weapons from missile launchers to infantry automatic weapons - not to speak of Michael Rose and his SAS team, who emerged from their portacabin during attacks to join the shoot.

Major Ewen Southby-Tailyour wrote:

He was sitting in the Captain's bridge chair obviously resting from air attacks. Modern naval warfare requires ships to be fought by electronics in an operations room and not from first-hand knowledge from the bridge - or, in Jeremy's case, the gun direction platform. But Fearless was not a conventional ship with sophisticated defences¹¹

One attack splattered us with shrapnel, I believe from a shell fired by a friendly frigate. There was a yelp as a sailor beside me was clipped, and louder cries below announced injuries amongst the young Bofors guns' crews on the bridge wings. I looked over to see men leaving their positions to tend the wounded. Having anticipated this comradely reflex, I used all my available decibels to get the guns back into action in time for the next passing predator. Stretcher teams succoured the casualties.

Selection of this command position had its amusing side. It was a new experience to stand unprotected in the path of fast jets bent on one's

destruction. Adrenaline and an imprecise feel for our life expectation carried us through the first day in almost carnival spirits, typical of novices to real war. It gradually became clear that prospects of survival were quite good. With just a few exceptions, we had substantial warning of attacks. I would update the ship's company on PA before moving to my command platform, whereupon the Navigation Officer John Prime took up the commentary from the bridge. My arrival 'up top' signalled further to the weapons-direction teams that action was imminent. As the days went by, I sensed wryly a growing inner tardiness to indulge this routine exposure - although I never failed to appear except for one of the attacks that surprised us!

Command pacing

Certainly the issue was not straight-forward. Almost every night, during some fourteen hours of total darkness, *Fearless* deployed from the anchorage. The aim might be a special forces insertion, the meeting and escorting of the submarine HMS *Onyx* into the anchorage for a pit-stop and out again a few hours later, or the escorting of a convoy outbound, to rendezvous with another to be escorted back. The rule was to be within the relatively safe confines of the defended San Carlos anchorage by the first glimmerings of daylight - even if on two notable and nerve-racking occasions we did not achieve this. The two splendid Johns, Kelly and Prime, took turns at conducting the ship during part of these night-time forays once we were clear of Falkland Sound while I cat-napped on my sea-cabin couch, microphone in hand. Long years had taught me to absorb a question in my sleep and wake to provide considered response. This was an operation of serial marathon dimensions. We not only survived, but sustained our edge. With beguiling delusions of immortality, I felt we could continue indefinitely - wrong of course. We did between us manage the 100 days, with what seemed capacity to spare. I recognised with hindsight that there was a long-term price to pay, manifest within my family.

Night operations - issues of risk

I have selected one operation of particular interest to illustrate some commonplace command problems. The central issue was what I would term 'reverse critical path planning'. Following the loss of the Cunard container ship *Atlantic Conveyor* with much of the force's military helicopter lift, the battle-fit battalions of Commandos and Paratroopers moved forward some 50 miles to invest the northern approaches to Port Stanley mainly by the celebrated and heroic expedient of 'yomping' heavily laden across the appalling

Falklands terrain.¹² Formations of the reinforcement brigade, who were to take the southern flank, were not equally robust in pure fitness terms, and anyway time pressed. It thus became necessary to take them forward by sea round the southern extremities of the islands.

Intrepid took the Scots Guards, launching them by landing craft some considerable distance short of their destination. They survived harrowing hours in very bad weather, amongst other nasty hazards, under Southby-Tailour's redoubtable command. Next day I persuaded Mike Clapp to let *Fearless* take the Welsh Guards that night, notwithstanding the serious disruption to command communications this would cause for some hours. The plan was to take two of my own landing craft (two had to be left in San Carlos), rendezvous at sea with *Intrepid's* four off the entrance to Choiseul Sound, send four of the six forward with the Welsh Guards embarked to Bluff Cove and bring two back to San Carlos. I was determined to get nearer to their destination (Bluff Cove/Port Fitzroy) this time, whilst avoiding the footprint of a land-based Exocet site the Argentines were believed to have established south of Port Stanley. I had to be back at San Carlos by first light. This all involved some nice navigational calculations.

We sailed in nasty bumpy weather and proceeded south through the Falkland Sound and Eagle Passage, then north-east. We reached the rendezvous in good time, calm sea and comparatively docile weather. For reasons I need not recount but then unbeknownst to me, *Intrepid's* landing craft had been unable to sail to meet us.¹³ Against a calculated reverse critical path, I waited longer than I should have dared, finally launching my two landing craft with half the Welsh Guards and legging it for San Carlos. Twilight then full daylight found us still forcing our way back up the Falklands Sound. The Argentine Air Force did not call our bluff.

It was decided that *Fearless* could not again be released on such an extended and tenuous communications tether from the Land Force, and that she was anyway too crucial a command asset for such high-risk exposure. To underline the point, one of the two landing craft then launched, Foxtrot Four, never returned. She was destroyed two days later with six of her crew in a savage and pyrrhic air strike, three of the four Argentine aircraft being themselves destroyed with their pilots by a Sea Harrier counter-attack within one minute - such is the pace of modern warfare.

The next night *Fearless* once more escorted a convoy outbound and collected another inbound from the northern ocean holding areas. Some complications left us with another high-risk late return to San Carlos. There was an assessed threat

from land-based Exocet on Pebble Island to the west as well as air attack, and once again our luck held. Meanwhile the less lucky remainder of the Welsh Guards embarked in the logistic ship *Sir Gallahad*, and moved forward to their tragic destiny.

Victory

A week later it was all over and *Fearless* was anchored in Stanley Harbour. Onboard as my 'guest' was the Argentine late Malvinos Commander, General Mario Menendez. We had some interesting discussions. The General had a final advantage however; he kept 'Spanish' hours with siesta to the local clock, whilst I was working a 20-hour day based on UK time (four hour ahead of the Falklands)! He poured the whiskey, with which I had had his cabinet stocked.

Principal lessons

Successful command and leadership have their foundation in thorough preparation:

- Know and understand your team. Win the trust of your people, and keep faith with them - above all in hard times. Do everything practicable to fulfil their hopes and to assuage their fears.
- Within reason, be prepared to do anything required of your people and demonstrate this from time to time.
- Know your company/equipment/site as intimately as practicable - its capabilities and its weaknesses.
- Set the right strategy and follow it in everything that you do.
- Think through every conceivable credible development; you may still be surprised, but you can then deal with this from a position of well-founded confidence.
- Train and prepare to a high standard - and prepare your team as well as yourself for the unexpected.

Then when it all starts:

- Set your aim and objectives, and review them repeatedly.
- Ensure your resources are sufficient for the task and are applied efficiently.
- Define the mandates of command centres with care; recognise and manage the 'personality' that command centres will develop; whilst giving direction (the 'what'), let them get on with their work (the 'how') with as little interference as possible.
- Win the information high ground, retain it and exploit it. It is essential always to know the present situation and how it is developing. Without accurate and timely processed high-quality information, you are lost.
- Based upon sound strategy, thorough analytic

preparations and exhaustive 'what-iffing', naturalistic ('recognition-primed') decision making can, with discrimination, sensibly be applied beyond the envelope of your previous direct experience. This prepares the ground for creative decision making also, as best may be.

- Lead vigorously without fear or favour, and manage morale; recognise and respond to human needs - fear, anxiety - and do everything necessary to build, sustain and nurture this; be as upbeat as the situation permits.
- Be yourself, but you need to practise the art of acting within this envelope of credibility; develop and use, therefore, all the modulation of delivery and style (demeanour, tone, volume and tempo) that you find useful.
- Guard against the very real dangers of over-confidence and the corrupting effect of power.
- Provide your team with the best information you can, not least as an antidote to fear.
- Be constantly aware of the time-line.
- Pace yourself, conserve stamina, delegate, and prioritise your cadence of command.

¹ Alan Clark, *Diaries*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1994.

² Major General Sir Francis De Guingand, *Operation Victory*, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1947. Field Marshal the Viscount Montgomery, *Memoirs*, Collins, London, 1958.

³ *Conduct of Submarine Operations*, Flag Officer Submarines publication, Gosport, 1961

⁴ Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry Leach, *Endure No Makeshifts - Some Naval Recollections*, Pen and Sword Books Ltd, Barnsley, 1993. Max Hastings & Simon Jenkins, *The Battle for the Falklands*, Michael Joseph, London, 1983.

⁵ Admiral Sir John F (Sandy) Woodward, *One Hundred Days; the memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander*, Harper Collins, London, 1992.

⁶ CDRE Michael Clapp, & LtCol Ewen Southby-Tailyour, *Amphibious Assault Falklands, the Battle of San Carlos Water*, Pen and Sword Books, Barnsley, 1993. Admiral Sir John F (Sandy) Woodward, *One Hundred Days; the memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander*. Major General J H A Thompson, *No Picnic*, 2nd edition, Pen and Sword Books, Barnsley, 1992.

⁷ Max Hastings & Simon Jenkins, *The Battle for the Falklands*, Michael Joseph, London, 1983.

⁸ Brigadier Roderick Macdonald, *The Heart of Leadership*, Defence Fellowship, Ministry of Defence (UK), London, and University of Southern California, 1992.

⁹ Hastings & Jenkins, *The Battle for the Falklands*.

¹⁰ Max Hastings, *Going to the Wars*, Macmillan, London, 2000.

¹¹ Ewan Southby-Tailyour, *Reasons in Writing*, Pen and Sword Books, Barnsley, 1993.

¹² Major General J H A Thompson, *No Picnic*. Major General Nick Vaux, *March to the South Atlantic*, Buchan & Enright, London, 1986.

¹³ Ewan Southby-Tailyour, *Reasons in Writing*.

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Operation Sumatra Assist

Commodore Peter Leschen RAN*

On 26 December 2004, a major earthquake off Sumatra created a tsunami that devastated many of the coastal areas of Northern Sumatra, as well as other nations around the Indian Ocean rim. In Sumatra the tsunami caused massive devastation, loss of life and a major humanitarian disaster. In response, government, non-government and military forces from many countries launched international disaster relief (DR) and humanitarian assistance (HA) efforts.

As part of the Australian assistance to the Government of Indonesia, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) immediately commenced Operation *Sumatra Assist* (the ADF component of the Whole of Government Operation *Tsunami Assist*). On 27 December, Combined Joint Task Force 629 (CJTF 629) was established to provide transport of humanitarian aid, health and engineering support in Northern Sumatra. The Task Force comprised a Headquarters, Maritime, Engineer, Health Support, Air, Joint Force Support and Communications groups.

The Maritime group role was to provide medical support to all CJTF 629 personnel, provide sea transport, resupply and sustainment support to the engineer group, and provide direct support to humanitarian aid operations, including health support to the local population and provision of transport for humanitarian aid stores. To achieve this, the Maritime Group, designated TG 629.1, included:

- the Amphibious Transport (LPA), HMAS *Kanimbla* (Commander Steve Woodall RAN)
- the embarked Primary Casualty Reception Facility (PCRF)
- 2 x LCM8 landing craft
- 2 x SK 50 Sea King helicopters
- a Deployable Geospatial Survey Team (DGST)
- a Clearance Diving Team (CDT) detachment

After recalling most personnel from leave, *Kanimbla* sailed from Sydney for Darwin on 31 December with most of these elements embarked. Enroute to Sumatra, she stopped in Darwin for a hectic 28 hours to embark the 1 CER Engineer Group (1 Bde) and their equipment, and remaining PCRF personnel. Having been farewelled by the Governor-General and Minister for Defence, the ship sailed for Banda Aceh, where she arrived on the morning of 13 January 2005.

Concurrently, a Maritime Component Commander (MCC) and staff was formed, including

myself as MCC and ten Amphibious Task Group and DJFHQ(M) personnel, in order to support the Commander CJTF 629, Brigadier David Chalmers. Some MCC staff embarked in *Kanimbla* to conduct planning with the engineer group, while the remainder deployed to Medan to commence work in the headquarters there.

On 12 January, BRIG Chalmers and I, together with staff, Indonesian Army liaison officers and members of the media, embarked in two Sea King helicopters in Medan to join *Kanimbla*. Arriving off Banda Aceh the next day, the ship went to anchor off the mouth of the Banjir Kanal, and immediately commenced preparations for offloading 1 CER and equipment. The Survey Team and divers found that the proposed landing sites in the canal were too shallow to get an LCM8 up to the shore. This caused some delay, but they conducted surveys closer to the mouth of the Banjir Kanal, and by mid-afternoon they had found a site suitable for LCM8 operations at all states of tide. It did, however, require repairs to the canal banks and roadway to provide access to the town, as the tsunami had washed away portions of the bank.

The beach landing team and equipment were landed to the site to improve it and repair the banks and roadway. This was completed on 14 January, with a first offload of vehicles being landed and driven to the ADF work/accommodation areas in Banda Aceh that afternoon. Additionally, some personnel and stores were flown ashore in the Sea King during the day. The next day, Saturday 15 January, the main offload of vehicles by LCM8 progressed rapidly and, with the exception of two unserviceable vehicles, was completed by that evening.

Once the offload was completed, the focus of Maritime Component operations shifted to establishing routines to support the forces ashore with fuel and water, hot food, laundry, and the opportunity for personnel to rotate through *Kanimbla* for temporary respite from the difficult living and working conditions ashore. Additionally, opportunities to use the Sea Kings for distribution of humanitarian aid, PCRF capabilities to support the ANZAC Field Hospital ashore, and *Kanimbla* working parties ashore were investigated, developed and implemented. During this period, *Kanimbla's* Sea Kings also conducted a lot of utility flying, moving the Commanders and a string of

* Deputy Maritime Commander, previously Surface Task Group Commander

VIPs around, including the Prime Minister, Minister for Defence and Defence Chiefs.

Periodically, *Kanimbla* proceeded to sea to make water, and to fuel and store from United States ships, which were in the area to support the relief operations of the USS *Abraham Lincoln* Carrier Strike Group and the USS *Essex* Expeditionary Strike Group.

By early February, the immediate disaster relief and humanitarian assistance tasks had been met or were being assumed by the United Nations and Non-Government Organisations. Planning for rotation/return to Australia of CJTF 629 forces was progressing. Commander George McGuire took command of *Kanimbla* from Commander Steve Woodall at the end of January and on 7 February I handed over MCC duties to George McGuire and returned to Australia.

After my departure, *Kanimbla* continued operations and participated in the planning to extract ADF elements and return them to Australia. She managed a brief respite visit to Penang in late February, commenced reloading equipment from 8-23 March, and proceeded off station on 24 March to return to Australia via Singapore. Subsequently, of course, a second major earthquake struck Nias, and *Kanimbla* was turned around to provide support. Once again she did a superb job, while also having to cope with the crash of Sea King 02, and the tragic loss of nine lives. She eventually returned home to Sydney on 30 April, after four months away.

Reflections

I first saw conditions on the ground in Banda Aceh and down the west coast of Sumatra on 9 January, and last saw them on 05 February, just before departing the Area of Operations. While the total devastation of some areas was still obvious, the most striking difference over the month was that huge areas that had been badly damaged and almost completely devoid of people were now busy. Formerly deserted roads now had constant traffic, and people were working in large numbers to get badly damaged homes and businesses going again, and to clear away debris.

This was not, of course, solely the result of the ADF effort, which has been small in relation to the enormous scale of the disaster. Nevertheless, in the areas where ADF efforts had been concentrated, major changes had been wrought. The hospital was running and rapidly approaching the point where it could transition back

to Indonesian staff; whereas very few Indonesians had been working around the hospital in early January, there were now many of them working to clean up the remaining mud and debris. The engineers had cleared and reclaimed significant areas, as well as producing much of the clean water that was so essential in preventing the spread of disease. The use of ADF helicopters to transport HA stores was being minimised, both because the requirement had reduced and there were now other means of transport, by road, sea and civil helicopters to meet remaining tasking.

Throughout the operation, the ADF force elements involved performed exceptionally well, and the levels of joint cooperation and support were very good. With respect to the Maritime Component, the initial deployment, loadout in Darwin, and subsequent offload at Banda Aceh was a major success, achieved in the face of considerable challenges caused by the devastation of the coastline at Banda Aceh. Subsequently, *Kanimbla* and embarked elements did a sterling job of supporting the ADF elements ashore, and made a considerable direct contribution to the HADR effort through the provision of work and PCRf parties ashore, and the delivery of HA stores by the Sea Kings. Details of the support provided are available at the defence website at

www.defence.gov.au/optsunamiassist/default.htm

Operation *Sumatra Assist* has been a highly successful operation that achieved its HADR objectives. There is, of course, a massive amount of reconstruction work still to be done in Sumatra, but that is the province of the Indonesian Government and commercial contractors, not foreign military forces. The ADF can look back with great pride on what was achieved, without ever losing sight of the terrible destruction and human tragedy that occurred in Indonesia, and around the Indian Ocean that made the operation necessary, or forgetting the tragic loss of nine of the fine young ADF people who made the operation possible.



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Reflections on 100 days - reconstitution to redefinition

*Rear Admiral Davyd Thomas, AM CSC RAN**

This article is an edited version of a presentation to the Navy Symposium on 12 October 2005.

Chief of Navy (CN) Admiral Shalders, men and women of the Navy. I feel honoured to be given the opportunity to talk at this year's Symposium on this my one hundredth day as Fleet Commander. One hundred days is often used as a milestone for people newly appointed to a position to reflect on their initial impressions and articulate their plan for the future. So, I thank CN for choosing to have the Symposium today and giving me such a neat opening to the presentation. We have about an hour and twenty minutes to cover a wide range of topics today as I reflect on what the fleet has achieved over the last year and on some of the challenges that I have had to grapple with in those first one hundred days in office and more importantly, how we are going to tackle these challenges.

What are we about in the Maritime Command? From where I stand it is pretty clear and, in a world full of ambiguity, it is thankfully unambiguous. We have a straightforward mission, to command and provide mission capable forces in the right place at the right time, to fight and win in the maritime environment. That is not to say that there are not levels of complexity embedded into that mission, there certainly are, but the intent is clear.

Having observed my predecessor from the vantage point of the Commodore Flotillas (COMFLOT) position I felt very comfortable taking over the fleet and taking on the challenge of executing that mission. On that note I would like to publicly thank my predecessor Rear Admiral Rowan Moffitt for his efforts while at the helm. At last year's Symposium Admiral Moffitt described the fleet as being in a period of reconstitution after a fairly demanding three years of operational commitments. In many ways that reconstitution continues, we have a fairly stable set of operational and exercise commitments, which allows us a degree of flexibility that had been lacking in the early part of the decade. We have not however returned to a peacetime footing and nor are we likely to for the duration of the careers of anyone in this room. We operate in parts of the world where the threat of terrorism either alongside or underway remains higher than we would like as was so clearly demonstrated again two weeks ago in Bali. We operate in a domain where we have a vital role in safeguarding our national interests whether they be

close to home or many time zones away. Our broader operating environment was redefined on 9/11.

As you all know, what followed was firstly a period of intense operational activity during which 9000 members of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) served in designated operations; over half of them on active service. This means that 1 in 2 personnel who have served in the RAN since 9/11 have served in operations – a remarkable statistic in an organisation of 13000 people and one that leaves us with considerable corporate knowledge from which we can leverage. Following this period of operational intensity we entered a period of reconstitution. Reconstitution has given way to a period of redefinition. I will provide you with a number of examples of what I mean by redefinition over the course of this presentation, but in short I am talking about entering a period of change within Maritime Command that will require some of the fundamentals of our processes, relationships and governance to be able to more effectively provide, manage and sustain operational capability in today's world. If you are looking for the one word to take away from me, Redefinition is it – yes I know it continues our obsession with R words, but it is the word that best summarises what has been happening over the last 12 months and what needs to occur in the year ahead. On my watch in that year ahead there are known changes, and forces that some of these will unleash, that will redefine the Navy for many years to come. By the next Symposium for example 6 *Armidale* class patrol boats (ACPB) will have been commissioned, 5 *Fremantle* class patrol boats (FCPB) decommissioned, and the patrol boat multi crewing construct will be fully operational within Division 1. HMAS *Adelaide* will have decommissioned and our frigate force peaked at 13 hulls with the commissioning of HMAS *Perth*. HMAS *Westralia* will have been replaced with HMAS *Sirius*; multi crewing in our frigates will be well established. The *Anzac* and FFG upgrades and Sea Sprite helicopter introduction into service will be further advanced. The Electronic Chart Display Information System (ECDIS) will be redefining how we execute our most fundamental of mariner skills and key milestones will have been achieved in both the Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD) and Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) ship projects which will have operational implications for the next 40 years.

* Maritime Commander Australia

Redefinition is about ensuring that we have the fundamentals right to not only accommodate some of this change but to be sure that we are positioned in such a way that we can shape the change and redefine on our terms.

At the outset of my time in this job, I articulated my three tenets of command: Leadership, Operational Risk Management and a Sense of Community. These tenets are the tools that I believe Maritime Command needs to successfully navigate through a period of redefinition.

Leadership is of course not a new subject to any of us – it remains central to the way we operate and who we are. I have long held the view that the combination of our people and the way in which we lead them is the key to our competitive advantage as a Navy. In a period of redefinition leadership is about understanding our common mission, sharing and communicating the required change that needs to occur and leading by example. Leadership is also about accountability – being prepared to be held to account for one's actions is a fundamental component of being a leader – some find that facet of leadership daunting – often that comes from a perception that leaders are not well supported. My aim is to provide leaders at all levels in the fleet with the right climate within which to lead but also one where we are all held to account for our actions. This is not punitive in nature but critical for the proper exercise of the power that our positions engender, critical to foster trust between those who lead and are led and thus critical in making people want to stay and play their role. Leadership occurs at all levels and in many different situations. It requires all of the values that we share as members of the RAN – it is tough but rewarding.

Part of our redefinition is externally driven, changes to our regulatory environment, new tasks, new capabilities and new equipment to help us do things differently to the way we have done them for years. All of these changes, to use a corporate analogy, have the potential to pose varying levels of business risk. Given that operations are our frontline business, it is logical that Operational Risk Management (ORM) should be a fundamental part of how we think and how we manage our business risk. As you know, risk management in operations has been an intuitive part of our thought processes for some time. As we redefine elements of what we do, intuition is not enough. ORM is, I believe, a vital tool in a period of redefinition. It complements redefined processes and relationships by ensuring that unintended risks of second and third order effects from the change remain within acceptable bounds. As important, ORM provides a structured approach that promotes an understanding of risk and the fundamental importance of its management in our core business. I don't push ORM because it is

in vogue but because it represents the best way for us to continue to operate our fleet safely and effectively in a dynamic environment.

This year has shown us how important my third tenet, having a sense of community, is to us. We operate in a common environment and share a common historical heritage as Australians, mariners and members of the RAN. Those three shared heritages shape our collective whole – we need to understand these influences on us and recognise that we form a community. It provides a powerful bond, which allows us to connect with, relate to and understand each other. It gives people a sense of belonging through institutions such as the Divisional system and you only have to look back through our Navy's rich history to see that it is also a telling force multiplier. As we redefine parts of our business, having a sense of community acts as an anchor to remind us who we are and as a supporting mechanism through times of change and particular hardship and challenge.

So they are the tools I believe we need to push forward. While I will return to the redefinition theme, what I want to do now is to look briefly at some of the operational highlights of the last 12 months. This sort of venture is always fraught with risk as I necessarily can only pick out a number of examples. I am lucky that my previous job allowed me to get around the Fleet and observe many of the men and women of the Command. Hopefully it gives me some credibility when I say that the overall level of commitment to preparing for, executing or supporting our operational activity remains first rate and all areas of the fleet are making vital contributions. I am always inspired by the calibre of our people. I recommend all senior officers get out to sea when times get tough – it is truly uplifting.

Globally, the last year has been defined largely by natural disasters and ongoing terrorist activity – the Boxing Day Tsunami, the Nias earthquake, the London bombings and more recently the hurricanes that have battered the shores of the Gulf of Mexico and the second Bali bombings. The Fleet's response to the tsunami and the Nias earthquakes was absolutely outstanding. *Kanimbla* and her Sea King crews, the Deployable Joint Force HQ staff, Clearance Divers, the Deployable Geo-Spatial Team (the old Hydrographic Office Deployable Survey Unit for those yet to catch up with this term) and the Primary Casualty Reception Facility (PCRF) all preformed magnificently in what was one of the most devastating of natural disasters in living memory. The poignancy of what we were doing was brought home to us all with the loss of nine members of the ADF in the *Shark 02* accident. We should not underestimate the impact of the commitment, and tragically, the sacrifice, of our

people's post tsunami efforts on our nation, our neighbours and the broader region. Nor should we underestimate our sense of community, clearly highlighted by the strength of the Navy family through this difficult time.

Our long standing presence in the Middle East Area of Operations (MEAO) has continued with HMA Ships *Adelaide*, *Darwin* and *Newcastle* upholding the high standards that we have come to expect from our ships conducting these operations. This year also saw an Australian Commodore appointed in command of Task Force 58 - over 4000 personnel and responsible for maritime security in the Northern Arabian Gulf. As most of you would know by now, this is the most senior level coalition sea command appointment for an RAN officer since World War II (WW2). Supported by a small team from the Deployable Joint Force Headquarters (Maritime), the TF 58 team further built on the excellent work of our Maritime Interception Operation Commanders in 2002-03 and further cemented the RAN's command reputation. While the primary job was the protection of the Iraqi Oil Platforms, the team was responsible for a number of other lines of operation including the facilitation of regional engagement through the first ever joint naval operation between the Kuwait and Iraqi navies, and the training and effective integration of the Iraqi Navy and Marines into the oil platform protection mission. These sorts of opportunities help us to build our corporate knowledge of group level warfare command and allow us to make highly visible and tangible commitments to coalition efforts. I can tell you from my visits to the region and discussions with United States Navy (USN) and Royal Navy (RN) counterparts that our contribution remains highly regarded. So clearly our collective training and our pre-deployment programs are right! The deployment also proved the robustness and flexibility of the Deployable Joint Force Headquarters (Maritime) (DJFHQ(M)) construct despite it taking place over the period of Exercise *Talisman Sabre*.

Our patrol boats and numerous frigates have maintained a naval presence on our northern maritime borders conducting the ongoing role of Operation *Relax II* while our support to the civil surveillance task under Operation *Cranberry* has continued. Our *Cranberry* operations are an example of redefinition. The establishment of the Joint Offshore Protection Command (JOPC), in essence as an additional component commander, has redefined my Maritime Component Commander role with respect to *Cranberry*. We have taken on far more of a force provider and adviser role than a lead component role traditionally undertaken until recently. The tempo of *Cranberry* has increased markedly with an increase in Foreign Fishing Vessel

(FFV) numbers and a change in tactics. We have started to see the use of passive defences (similar to our experience in the MEAO) to make it more difficult for our boarding parties to get onboard. *Cranberry* is an important sovereignty mission and one that continues to be done extremely well by the men and women involved. We are in the process of learning from these new tactics and adapting to them. The speed and agility with which we can achieve this is certainly one of the strengths of our organisation and one we should foster.

Regional engagement has continued unabated with important exercises like *Kakadu*, *Bersama Lima* and *Croix du Sud* continuing to build on the important international relationships in our region. All of these exercises are based around building or strengthening coalitions or alliances, some are looser than others but again we see redefinition occurring. As a nation we are fully committed to building effective coalitions, the strict bilateral approach of some ASEAN nations is breaking down and we have seen through the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) how effective our coalition building in the Pacific has been. The Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) exercises have come a long way since *Starfish* days, the current *Bersama* series will be further developed and broadened to include significant land forces and become a truly combined joint exercise. There is a need for a roadmap to 2011 by which this is to be achieved. Australia has the lead for 2007 so we have much to do to transfer our experience with the DJFHQ(M) to the wider joint organisation. Then we need to lead! This will inevitably change the make up of our contribution to those exercises over time.

Our major bilateral exercise with the US military, the *Talisman Sabre* series was conducted in June and July in Queensland. For me it provided an important glimpse into the future. The sight of 850 Australian Army personnel and six Blackhawk helicopters embarked in USS *Boxer* was an impressive one and for me underscored two things: the importance of warfare in the littoral and of our efforts to redefine our approach to amphibious warfare. In 5 years we will have an indigenous capability similar to *Boxer*, this of course will bring with it considerable challenge and change. I recently articulated this to the Chief of Army's conference and the need for us all to view amphibious warfare from a systems perspective. While I was gently challenging the Army to shift its thinking in a number of areas, we need to grapple with a range of issues too. We have made some important strides in integrating mine countermeasures (MCM) and Hydrographic and Oceanographic capabilities into the amphibious construct and with the advent of Rapid Environmental Assessment (REA) there is still more to be done. My belief is that the LHD will

become the centre of gravity not only for the Navy but also the ADF – some may disagree but, with an expeditionary posture, I think it is a reasonable view. What that means is there is much groundwork to be laid in this very complex field of warfare. We have started that process so that we can position ourselves to exploit the new capability as early as possible. This is why we need to take as much as we can from the amphibious system as a whole and learn beforehand. When viewed as a system at sea, amphibious work is exciting, challenging and worthy of our close attention.

Today we have five submarines operational, the most we have ever achieved since the introduction of HMAS *Collins* and a remarkable achievement from a class of six submarines. It has been a busy year for our submariners and has included several successful exercises and deployments with our major anti-submarine warfare (ASW) exercise period coming up next month to finish off the year.

Of course talking about the last 12 months would not be complete if I did not mention the *Northern Trident* deployment of HMAS *Anzac*, I won't depress those who did not go on this deployment with the list of exotic ports that they visited – I suspect most people in the room know exactly where the ship went. What I can say, and this is from first hand experience, is that the ship performed exceptionally well over a sustained period of time and certainly enhanced both the Navy's and Australia's reputation abroad. I was lucky enough to visit the ship in South Africa and saw the positive impact of our first ship visit there for many decades. So what do we achieve with such deployments – why do we commit the time, expense and energy to them? Firstly, there is a retention component to it, not only for those who went but to others who see this as one of the reasons they joined the Service. Secondly, there is the strategic dimension. Supporting events such as the 90th anniversary of the Gallipoli landings and the 200th anniversary of Trafalgar are of national importance. These types of deployments allow us to renew or strengthen relationships of historical significance such as visiting Malta and Crete. HMAS *Canberra*'s visit to China also falls firmly into this category as we continue to build our relationship with the People's Liberation Army-Navy as part of the Government's broader policy of engagement with China. Finally, these types of deployments allow us to benchmark ourselves against similar navies that we simply don't get the opportunity to work with that often. Activities such as the joint maritime courses in the UK provide us with unique benchmarking opportunities, which gives us a good indication as to where we sit, what we are doing well and where we could improve. *Northern Trident* was not the only benchmarking activity this year. Members of our Sea Training

Group and staff of the Royal Navy's Flag Officer Sea Training (FOST) organisation conducted a benchmarking activity and joint sea training exercises during *Bersama Lima* this year, something which has now been embedded into the *Bersama Lima* program as an ongoing activity.

I am going to leave the year in review at that and want to turn now to some of the redefinition we have been doing ashore in the Command. The first thing I want to focus on is the changes that have been made to the force preparation continuum. I am adopting a fairly broad definition of force preparation to include Force Element Group (FEG) management of availabilities as well as the preparation of our ships and aircraft for operations.

The Maritime Command really is a broad parish. Nowhere is this diversity more evident than in our capability management construct and the division of responsibility between FEG Commanders, Commander Combat Support Group (CCSG), COMFLOT and the Maritime Component Joint Operations Command (MC JOC). I think it is fair to say that the FEG construct has been constrained in some ways by some of the organisational legacies that were inevitably inherited when the FEGs were formed. It was natural that there would be a period of adjustment, that there would be overlaps and holes, and constructive friction. Personally I think that this healthy and necessary as we came to grips with the construct we had created. In almost everything else we do we have a cultural desire to work in an unambiguous environment as possible. The FEGs changed that to a certain extent. In the absence of clear authority, influence became the FEGs tool of choice, an effective tool, but one that takes time to take effect. This was complicated in part by the fact that Maritime Headquarters (MHQ) held on to some functions that no longer seemed to fit the model and clear lines of accountability were difficult to draw. The establishment of a Capability Management Continuum (CMC) unlocks many of those issues by creating a more robust governance model which clearly outlines the relationships and responsibilities between the key Maritime Command and broader capability management stakeholders. There are two features of the CMC that are particularly useful. The first is a clearly articulated relationship matrix, which provides clear delineation of responsibility for different phases of the continuum (availability, working up for unit readiness and then, if required, mission readiness and finally operational employment). The second is a series of detailed continuum process maps, which support the redefined relationships. One area where I expect to see greater effectiveness as a result of the CMC is in the conduct of maintenance availabilities where the FEG Commander now has an unambiguously clear role. I believe there is now

greater accountability in this model and the net effect will be more effective management and delivery of maritime capability.

The final phase of force preparation comes under the purview of COMFLOT. One thing that was clear when I had that job was that the sea training continuum was misaligned. We had ships at different levels of readiness without a clear understanding of why, and these varying levels meant different things to different people. We have redefined our levels of training and are placing much more emphasis on the initial period of the process through a considerably expanded Mariner Skills Evaluation. The days of a couple of hours in a SSTP are gone; we acknowledge that it is those first few days when the Commanding Officer (CO) needs external assurance that the ship's procedures and skill sets are robust enough to progress their operational development. When you think about it, it is quite strange that it has taken us this long to implement this type of change - I would like to think that this is a result of starting to embed risk management principles into all that we do. The other area of redefinition in this continuum has been the introduction of competencies that are clearly linked to our strategic guidance via the Joint Operations Command Operational Preparedness Requirements (JOC OPR). Ships are now worked up and assessed based on the competencies and on the operational outcomes that they need to achieve in the JOC OPR. This is useful in articulating to Government how and why our ships are prepared the way they are. It is now possible to clearly show the linkages between each Sea Training Group (STG) exercise through to the operational outcome that is sought right up to the military strategies. The final change in this area was the incorporation of the MCM Sea Training Evaluation into the Major Fleet Unit (MFU) STG. This reflects our focus on the littoral and the important role that MCM plays in littoral operations.

Perhaps the major redefinition task has been the regulation of the conduct of operations. As the Operational Regulatory authority it is my responsibility to assure CN that the residual level of risk associated with operations is as low as possible. Operational Regulation or OPREG is a body of work that is under development under the guidance of CCSG for me to be able to discharge those responsibilities. What I will say is that although our ideas on OPREG are still embryonic, the Naval Technical Regulatory System (NTRS) which most of you would be familiar with, provides an excellent framework to leverage off and one which we will carefully examine. While both systems will be principles based, OPREG will not be a copy of TECHREG, it will have its own flavour and be adapted to suit operational requirements. A central

pillar of OPREG is ORM. There are some misconceptions around as to what ORM is. My 10-second summary of ORM is that it is a systemic process within a climate where consideration and management of risk is second nature. The process leads to the identification, mitigation and acceptance of operational risks that result from a conscious executive decision made after a systematic consideration of the circumstances of the specific situation. Operational Risk Management requires operational rigour, which is derived from training, experience and judgment. In my mind ORM operates at all times, including on operations, on active service and even in combat. It is dangerous to think that the operational context is the only driver for a Commanding Officer when considering whether to accept a certain level of risk. The real trick is to get the right balance in a system so that the ORM process itself does not degrade our ability to do what is required. HMAS *Geelong* provided an excellent example of the real time use of ORM in a recent Level 3 boarding on an FV. The CO conducted a risk assessment of the proposed boarding and the circumstances which he faced which resulted in further risk mitigation measures being developed which were then articulated to the operational commander who approved the ultimately successful boarding of the vessel. Further guidance on ORM will be issued within the next couple of weeks in an attempt to provide a common approach across the fleet and ensure a minimum uniform level of conformance.

The CMC, OPREG and sea training continuum come together in one critical way and that is the introduction into service of new capabilities. There are a number of different types of risks that we have to deal with as new capability comes online. HMAS *Armidale's* entry into service exemplifies this as we deal with a new class of ship, new technology, commercial build specifications, fundamental changes to the scheme of complement, a new crewing construct and a fully contracted support arrangement. I am the first to admit that I have probably underestimated the complexity of introducing *Armidale*. That said, we have learned much, and as I speak, she is preparing for her Mission Readiness Evaluation later this week. This will be a significant milestone for the ship's company given some of the hurdles that they have had to clear. All is looking bright for this wonderful, new, leading edge and envied capability.

New capabilities are not always related to new ships of course and the FFG Upgrade Project (FFGUP) reflects this. HMAS *Sydney's* eagerly anticipated return to sea last month was great to see. We now have a new combat system at sea, a mine and obstacle avoidance sonar (MOAS), new Electronic Warfare (EW) equipment and a much

improved point defence missile capability for the FFG with the introduction of Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (EESM). All of these enhancements will undergo more extensive trials over the coming months before the ship works up next year. It has been a tough road for the ship's company of *Sydney* but they are back at sea and eager to exploit the potential of this more potent FFG. HMAS *Melbourne* is the next ship to enter modernisation and will do so later this year. We need to get this FFGUP done to assure us of SM2 capability later in the decade.

The *Anzac* production line has continued to turn out extremely well finished ships. HMAS *Toowoomba* is the latest to enter service, commissioned in Brisbane only 4 days ago. Her sister ships are also undergoing a quiet but most significant upgrade program, which will stretch over the next 10 years. HMAS *Arunta* is about to rejoin the fleet after an extensive upgrade which has included installation of MOAS, ESSM, Harpoon, the Air Weapons Magazine and a new variant of the ship's combat system. *Anzac* enters availability at the end of this year and by this time next year ESSM will be fitted across the class. These upgrades, which commenced with *Warramunga's* Harpoon installation in 2004 have proceeded very smoothly and augur well for the remainder of the Underwater and Surface Weapons Upgrade Project (USWUP) and the more ambitious ASMD project. Part of the success is due to the strong governance construct brought about by the close relationship between the Surface Combatant FEG and the ANZAC Alliance, an alliance between Tenix, SAAB Systems and the Defence Material Organisation (DMO). This construct has significantly increased the efficiency of delivery of new capability to the *Anzac* class. When the Alliance construct was introduced in late 2001 there was considerable scepticism, but the results with the *Anzac* class has shown us that constructs quite different to what we are used to can work in our favour. Sometimes we are too ready to write off these arrangements before they are given a fair chance.

One final area I want to mention briefly is the Australian Defence Force's Command and Control construct that is currently under review by Major General Wilson. There is no doubt that the result of this review will be a redefinition of the current construct. We were well placed for the move to Bugendore with the changes we made to the MHQ structures in 2000. While the look of the integrated HQ may be a little different from what we expected, I believe we are still well placed. I still don't know what the exact arrangements are but I am hopeful the residual function to manage our Raise, Train and Sustain activities and a maritime battle staff to conduct tactical level task group command will remain in Sydney. No doubt we will all get a much

better feel for the construct in the weeks ahead as the final model is agreed and endorsed in higher committees within Defence.

So I hope that I have given you a taste of what has happened in the Maritime Command over the past year, and that you now understand the significance of this period of redefinition. This is not change for change's sake. This is change so that we are properly positioned to make the most of the many opportunities that present in this very exciting time in our history. I think it is critical if we are to continue to deliver properly managed and prepared maritime capability to Government, which, as I said earlier, that is what we are about.

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Maritime security initiatives post 9/11: costs and implications to the port sector

Nazery Khalid*

This is an edited version of a paper presented at the 'People and the Sea III: New Directions in Coastal and Maritime Studies' conference in Amsterdam, the Netherlands on 7-9 July 2005.

Ports under threat

The discourse of contemporary security frameworks has taken a more chilling undertone since the 9/11 attacks on United States (US) commercial and political interests. Security planners have had to grapple with the immense challenge to neutralise the threats of terror pervading the world since that day that will live in infamy. Of the major security concerns, few are greater than the need to protect ports from potential attacks and the terrorists looking to exploit security loopholes to carry out their evil deeds.

9/11 has spurred the maritime sector to reassess its vulnerabilities against potential acts of terror and sabotage. The aftershocks of death and destruction have urged the industry, along with many others, to focus its energy to mitigate the inherent risks in its operations, systems and procedures. Much effort and resources have gone into making ports more robust security-wise. Many initiatives have been introduced to create a safer environment in ports. A review of these measures and an assessment of their costs and implications to ports provide the central themes to this article.

Maritime security post 9/11

The aftermath of 9/11 has inevitably shifted the term 'security' into a new, more complex and more dangerous dimension. As has been palpable, despite the aerial nature of the incident, concerns about the possible replication of those bold attacks have spread to other transport modes. If commercial airliners could be hijacked and slammed against buildings, who's to say that terrorists would not be emboldened to attempt such attacks via road, rail or sea?

The maritime industry has found itself in the spotlight of concern as authorities initiate moves to shore up defences against the menace of terrorist onslaught. As seaports and the shipping sector act as crucial facilitators to international commerce, any destructive attacks on them would potentially cause massive losses and disruption to global trade and the world economy. For ports especially, where so much equipment and manpower is congregated,

terrorist assaults on the magnitude of the 9/11 strikes would cost tragic human casualties and unfathomable financial losses. 9/11, for better or for worse, has radically changed the entire landscape of maritime security.

Consider this scenario: depleted uranium being smuggled ashore via a shipping container for a terrorist purpose. A working plot for the next *Die Hard* movie sequel? Guess again - it was an actual incident staged by journalists from ABC News in the US in September 2003 to expose weaknesses in American ports. They managed to smuggle into the Port of Los Angeles from Jakarta, Indonesia about 15 pounds of depleted uranium, a harmless substance that is legal to import into the US, in a steel pipe with a lead lining placed in a suitcase.¹ Although the container was selected for screening, it remained unopened and the consignment was delivered with the original container still intact. While this might be dismissed by some as a publicity stunt by headline-hunting, crusading journalists, the incident exposed a serious lapse in port security which could potentially cause unimaginable consequences. The incident incurred the wrath of Tom Cochran, a nuclear physicist at the US Natural Resources Defense Council who remarked 'If they can't detect that, then they can't detect the real thing'.²

The maritime community has been subjected to many security initiatives intended to prevent this kind of threat in the years that have passed since the 9/11 attacks. The new context that 9/11 has given to the dialogue on 'security' an added dimension beyond the boundaries of traditional maritime security issues such as piracy, robbery, collision, grounding, pollution, stowaways and the like. Ports, specifically, have come into sharper focus as threat perception in the maritime sector underwent dramatic changes since the 2001 attacks.

Granted, shippers have been exposed to security threats since man first set sail across the oceans, but the inclusion of the threat of terror has markedly changed the maritime security realm. Before 9/11, terrorism on cargo ships didn't even figure much on the radar of maritime security analysts. Such incidents that occurred at sea were generally intended against cruise or passenger ships, the most notable ones being the attacks on the *Achille Lauro* in 1985 and the *City of Poros* in 1989.³ But the attack on the *MV Limburg*, a merchant ship, off the coast of

* Fellow, Center for Economic Studies & Ocean Industries, Maritime Institute of Malaysia

Yemen in 2002 by an explosive-laden boat, highlighted the vulnerability of cargo ships to terrorist attack.⁴ The strike confirmed the worries of maritime security experts that it wouldn't be beyond the capabilities of terrorists to carry out assaults on other maritime interests such as ports and their associated infrastructure.

The major initiatives introduced since the 9/11 attacks to boost maritime security include:

International Ship and Port Facility Security Code

In the wake of 9/11, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) introduced in 2002 comprehensive regulations outlining security standards for ships and port facilities in maritime trade. The principal objectives of these guidelines, known as the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, were to strengthen maritime security and prevent and suppress acts of terrorism against shipping.⁵ Given the crucial role of the maritime sector in facilitating global trade, the implementation of this Code not only marks a milestone in the development of the maritime sector but is of crucial significance to the world economy as a whole.

In essence, the ISPS Code adopts the philosophy of viewing the security of ships and port facilities as a risk management activity. Based on this approach, an assessment of the risks must be made on a case-by-case basis to determine the appropriate security measures. The Code provides a standardised, consistent framework for evaluating risk, enabling governments to offset changes in threat with changes in vulnerability for ships and port facilities. Functional security requirements spelled out by the ISPS Code require a port to put in place security plans, security officers and certain security equipment. The Code also requires ports to monitor and control access and the activities of people and cargo, and to ensure that security communications are readily available.⁶

While there were the usual teething problems in the course of implementing a system of such magnitude, the ISPS Code deadline for implementation by 1 July 2004 was achieved without too much hindrance.⁷ This was perhaps testimony to the adaptable and dynamic nature of the maritime sector, and also an acknowledgement of the urgent need to neutralise the clear and present threats posed to the industry. More than raising the level of alertness and preparedness of ports and the shipping sector, the ISPS Code has noticeably changed the perception previously surrounding port security, from a reactive orientation to a more anticipatory posture.

The ISPS Code has achieved the effect of enhancing security in participating ports in leaps and bounds compared to the pre 9/11 days. Ports

aspiring to attain ISPS-compliant status must meet important international requirements by IMO to perform self-assessment on their security facilities. This evaluation includes internal audits of port areas, the conduct of drills and exercises, and port area security committee meetings.⁸ With these in place, it is beyond doubt that the overall security awareness among ports personnel has improved tremendously since 9/11.

Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism

Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT) is an initiative introduced by US Customs in collaboration with carriers, brokers and warehouse operators to improve security of ports.⁹ It contains guidelines to enhance the maritime supply chain and to improve its performance while mitigating the risk of loss, damage, theft and the introduction of potentially dangerous elements into the supply chain.¹⁰ C-TPAT has brought in many US importers and their suppliers worldwide and is aimed at covering the whole supply chain of American importers.

C-TPAT offers its partners the opportunity to play an active role in the war against terrorism. By participating in this first-of-its-kind global supply chain security initiative, companies will ensure a more secure supply chain for their employees, suppliers and customers.¹¹ The parties to C-TPAT stand to gain from having the processing of their cargoes expedited, but importers not involved in the initiative may find their cargoes subjected to more meticulous scrutiny, thus lengthening the processing times of their shipments.

Container Security Initiative

The fear created by 9/11 prompted US Customs to implement the Container Security Initiative (CSI) in 2002 to protect cargo shipped in containers from the threat of terrorism. The measure was founded on the philosophy of extending the US zone of security outward so that American borders are the last line of defence instead of the first.¹²

CSI is a strategic program aimed at securing what is believed to be the most vulnerable link in the global supply chain: the ocean-going container.¹³ It entails inspection of high-risk containers by US Customs officials at foreign ports before they are shipped into US ports and contains four basic elements:¹⁴

- using intelligence and automated information to identify and target containers that pose a risk for terrorism
- pre-screening those containers that pose a risk at the port of departure before they arrive at US ports
- employing detection technology to quickly pre-screen containers that pose a risk

- using smarter, tamper-evident containers

A huge percentage of international maritime trade passes through several of the world's largest superports. A quarter of global containers are handled by the world's five busiest ports – Hong Kong, Singapore, Pusan, Kaohsiung and Rotterdam.¹⁵ These ports are crucial in facilitating international maritime cargo transportation and global trade. The CSI is aimed at detecting illicit materials intended for the purpose of terror at these ports and other choke points of international maritime transportation.

In addition to the IMO-initiated security measures covering ports and ships, the World Customs Organization (WCO) is working on adding another leg to the overall maritime security framework covering cargo.¹⁶ This Framework of Standards seeks to strengthen the overall security of the supply chain to secure and facilitate global trade, much of which is seaborne.¹⁷

Having unilaterally introduced many anti-terrorist measures that have since been adopted internationally, sometimes reluctantly, US-based agencies are poised to be in the driver's seat in steering the direction of cargo and freight transport security developments. Recently, the US National Cargo Security Council (NCSC), an agency of the US Department of Transport, changed its name to the International Cargo Security Council (ICSC) and announced plans to establish a worldwide network to combat cargo crime and terrorism.¹⁸ Another initiative by the US called the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), announced by President Bush in 2003, aims to create an international framework that would allow the US and its allies to search vessels on the high seas carrying cargoes of suspect nature and seize weapons of mass destruction or missile technologies.¹⁹ The US Coast Guard has also introduced the International Port Security Program in 2004, engaging it and US trading partners worldwide to evaluate and align their ports' security to comply with ISPS Code and other international maritime security standards.²⁰

Costs/implications to ports of maritime security measures

The maritime security initiatives discussed have been conceived out of fear of potential terrorist acts. Despite criticisms that they were unilaterally and almost hastily introduced and hence not always agreed upon by all, they have quite successfully helped push the agenda of securing the maritime links throughout the previously fractious maritime sector. Resistance to change and early reservations of industry players have taken a backseat to the urgent need of deterring terrorist attacks along the maritime transport supply chain, and to the realisation that long-overdue security measures

must be put in place to prevent the maritime equivalent of 9/11. The measures have inadvertently directed the maritime community to agree upon and rally behind internationally accepted security measures.

For many ports, requirements to comply with post 9/11 security initiatives have led them to undertake actions to tackle previously ignored security problems in their premises and pay better attention to security issues in their operating environment. Although several port operators complain of the inconvenience and high costs involved in complying with the many security requirements, it is hard to deny that they are better off with the improved security features. Improved security, while costly, arguably adds to the attractiveness of ports. As ports expand, their security profiles are raised, and those with excellent security features attract shippers due to the secure environment they provide, hence enhancing their growth prospects. Naturally, in these security-conscious times, ports reputed for their security measures, such as those taken in line with the requirements of the ISPS Code, would lure more shipping lines than ports with poor security features or that are perceived as unsafe. Thus there is a clear correlation between security features of ports and their competitiveness.

Improvements in security measures have no doubt created a safer environment in ports, but the costs of compliance with such initiatives have also been a bane to terminal operators and other parties. While stakeholders in ports and shipping generally appreciate the need to enhance maritime security, the task of doing so has created tension and conflict amongst them. To compensate for their expenses on security – such as for personnel, training, systems and equipment – some port operators have charged a security levy on shippers on the pretext of implementing new security measures. Not surprisingly, the two sides fail to see eye to eye on this contentious issue. Ports think the charges are justified as they provide better security to shippers, but shippers think security should be integral to every terminal operator's list of services to their customers.²¹ Shippers in Hong Kong, home of the biggest container port, were critical of plans by terminal operators to impose a security levy on each import and export container.²² They argued it was unfair for ports to pass the security costs to them as they already had to bear the brunt of such measures through inconveniences such as cargo delays. Australian shippers have also cried foul over the lack of transparency in container terminal security fees and ocean carriers' ISPS Code ship fees. They demanded assurance from terminal operators that the charges were not a component of a revenue-enhancement strategy of the ports and carriers.²³

The cost of financing the implementation of CSI in a fair, equitable and sustainable manner looks set to be hotly debated by players in maritime transport and logistics.²⁴

Another clear implication of enhanced security at ports is congestion. More stringent security measures have led to prolonged inspection of containers, hence delaying clearance and straining the supply chain. The way the maritime transport supply chain is linked, any delays at port, at the forefront of this chain, will cause bottlenecks elsewhere along the network. Delays in cargo processing could be detrimental to ports' throughput, therefore impacting their competitiveness. Port congestion can also affect shipping lines, manufacturers, distributors, freight forwarders, warehouses, consumers and everyone else along the supply chain. In the integrated and internationalised environment ports operate in, congestion in one port will cause overcrowding in other ports. Projected on a more extreme scale, the problem of port congestion could cause chain-reactions to the economic competitiveness of trade-dependent nations. Given the gravity of the issue, balancing security requirements and business imperatives will pose a persistent challenge for terminal operators and port authorities in the years to come.

Assessing the effectiveness of post 9/11 port security measures

Ports are but a component of the long link in the maritime transportation chain, providing a focal point in the movement of cargoes. This chain involves many players, agencies and activities which are dependent and reliant on the efficiency of one another. As such, port security should not be viewed too narrowly but rather from a multidimensional perspective.

The taxing conundrum of maintaining a balance between port security and port competitiveness begs that the discussion on port security be shifted from the current confines of port perimeters to the broader framework of maritime supply chain. This necessitates it be based on the concept of the integration of the logistics and supply chain, in line with the trend of a more integrated approach in modern supply chain management.

Beyond ports, other players in maritime transport and logistics must play their part to facilitate uninterrupted, efficient, reliable and smooth flow of cargoes along the supply chain. To improve port security, the whole supply chain network must also be secured, and every single party and stopover in the chain must be made accountable for the security of cargoes moving along it. The democratisation of security responsibility would call for accountability and the

contribution of resources from all involved, from the point of origin of goods to the point of destination. Such an approach would enhance security standards and practices not only in port premises but all along the maritime supply chain.²⁵ It would help to minimise the conflict emanating from prioritising the security agenda of one party along the supply chain at the expense of others, the kind exemplified by the tension between terminal operators and shippers over a security levy.

Despite the introduction of several maritime security schemes after 9/11, the jury is still out on whether the initiatives are effective and successful. Recent reports by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the investigative arm of the US Congress, took to task post 9/11 programs, namely C-TPAT and CSI, and revealed several security gaps within them.²⁶ While giving limited approval to the contribution of these procedures in boosting maritime security, the GAO assessed that the US Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) vetting process of cargoes was not thorough enough. The GAO further pointed to worrying statistics exposing security loopholes, suggesting that the relevant authorities still have their work cut out for them to beef up security in ports. 28% of cargoes inspected by US Customs officers in 36 ports worldwide were not checked by the host countries, and 35% of shipments from those ports were not subjected to inspection.²⁷ These findings prompted the GAO to pass a damning indictment that the US Customs' strategy was found wanting in the areas of criticality, vulnerability and risk assessments necessary to determine risks and the type of responses required to allay them.²⁸

Perhaps the security loopholes exposed by the GAO are a manifestation of the inevitable strains caused by the unevenness in aggregating responsibility for maintenance of security at ports. The complex task, made even more burdensome by the changing security matrix and threat perception post 9/11, is too much for ports or governments alone to bear. Ambitions and aspirations are limitless, but resources and abilities are limited. The dispute over security charges and congestion at ports are telltale symptoms that the burden of providing and maintaining port security should not be dumped on a single party to bear, nor distributed unequally among those benefiting from a secure port environment.

A more realistic maritime security roadmap would be to engage burden-sharing amongst all parties involved in the maritime supply chain – from producers to shippers to ports to end users – instead of burden-passing. In an environment like maritime transport and logistics where everyone depends on the efficiency and reliability of others, compromise and understanding should be a central

tenet instead of playing passing-the-buck and the blame-game. Ports, shipping lines and other players must realise their survival hinges upon teamwork. Maintaining security should be a priority of all involved, and as such needs to be planned and carried out collectively without undermining the interest of one another, in a manner that would facilitate smooth movement of goods along the maritime transport supply chain. Port security should therefore be everybody's responsibility, not just the sole obligation of port authorities or terminal operators.

Towards a more secure port environment

Despite the many security initiatives in place, the challenge remains to come up with a universally agreed method to measure the effectiveness of security at ports. At best, the assessment of threats is an imprecise science. At worst, fear of the unknown can cloud rational thinking and impair sensible planning. No one can say with certainty if current security measures are enough and effective to deter terrorist attacks on ports. The extraordinary nature of the 9/11 strikes – so novel in their unexpectedness, destructiveness and effects – has revealed that the task of anticipating similar threats should not be approached using rigid templates and outdated security orientation. Particularly so in planning security at ports, a strategic component of tremendous importance that literally makes the world trading system and economy tick.

The architecture of maritime transport was designed in such a way that efficiency and speed were of the essence. Security was at the fringe of this design, not central to it. After 9/11, security has taken centre-stage, so much so that some parties, burdened and inconvenienced by the weight of new security requirements, have questioned the wisdom of placing so much importance on the issue. There is no doubting that 9/11 has exposed many weaknesses in the way ports are run, and many initiatives have been implemented to improve their security. The question remains if the continued obsession with security will eventually be detrimental to the holy grail of the international maritime transport system – efficiency and speed. As mentioned, signs are already emerging that the current obsession with security has caused strains among port operators and users, reverberating simmering tension that could be further exacerbated if not addressed. This could potentially undermine these efforts to provide them with a secure operating environment.

It is suggested from this that the pressing need to ensure optimal security at ports should take into account considerations of a big-picture nature instead of being viewed from a limited perspective. As ports involve so many stakeholders with

sometimes conflicting objectives and viewpoints, it is essential that their differing perspectives converge in the issue of maintaining security at ports. The interests of a single entity or a few parties should not be at the expense of the interests of many. A port, despite hosting the presence of so many parties, is too important a place to be a battleground of competing interests. The internationalised nature of ports and the shipping sector, the globalisation of world maritime trade, together with the integration of maritime logistics industry demands that the issue of port security be approached from a broad base, involving the perspectives of all parties concerned. When harmonised, enhanced security measures implemented since 9/11 as well as improved supply chain flow will alleviate the risk of sabotage and security threats to ports.

This belief is derived from an assessment that the security measures in place at ports will fit into a cost-benefit analysis and risk management perspective. Security measures at ports should be – and, thus far, seem to have been – implemented proportionate to the potential risk and probability of the threats materialising. The fact that no terrorist attack has occurred at ports since 9/11, despite repeated warnings of its likelihood, vindicates the security measures undertaken. Still, questions remain as to whether the introduction of more security initiatives will be necessary, implementable or sustainable. Are security planners going overboard, blurring the line between paranoia and genuine concern? How much more will ports have to spend to secure their premises? What will be the impacts of these measures in the long run to ports' budgets and supply chain efficiency? What will be a realistic financing model to maintain security that will involve all the players in maritime transport and logistics? Further comprehensive evaluation should be conducted to address these issues and quantify the economic and financial effects of the security measures on ports. The findings would help ports to plan and allocate their resources effectively in balancing commercial needs and security compliance requirements.

Measures to minimise threats at ports, to inspect containers and to secure the supply chain should be viewed in the context of an overall security framework to prevent and deter the threats of terrorism, rather than to merely react to attacks. A comprehensive approach is needed to tie the various initiatives together into a blueprint based on a proactive rather than reactive security. The measures already in place to improve port security are well and good, but the next stage of maritime security planning should encompass allocation of resources to improve training, capacity building, procedures, systems and response capabilities. These should be aimed not only at protecting ports

but also fighting terrorists beyond the port premises. The findings of the US GAO on security weaknesses at US ports highlight the need to respond to this critical task.

Port security doesn't begin or end at its gates – it should be part of a larger effort to secure an overall supply chain network and the international trade system as a whole. Port operators should not be made to bear all the costs and absorb all the consequences of maintaining security. The challenge is to help them achieve this without sacrificing the maritime transport system's need for speed and its dependency on efficiency, via a path of least resistance that doesn't aggrieve too many parties too much. It is an enormously daunting but certainly achievable task of balancing various perceptions and realities, needs and resources, and aspirations and limitations to fortify ports from the threat of terrorism.

¹ 'ABC News Smuggles Depleted Uranium Into the US' by Michael Williams.

www.mwilliams.info/archives/003446.php (accessed on 9 June 2005).

² Power, 'Counting the Cost of ISPS', *Lloyd's Shipping Economist*, April 2004, pp. 23-25.

³ Office of the Secretary of State / Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 'Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1992', 30 April 1993.

⁴ 'Craft 'Rammed' Yemen Oil Tanker'. BBC News - World Edition. 6 October 2002, www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2303363.stm (accessed on 10 June 2005).

⁵ 'International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code'. Signals Special, NE P&I, Issue 8, January 2003, pp. 2-3.

⁶ From www.imo.org (accessed on 9 June 2005).

⁷ 'Security'. BIMCO/Sohmen Forum notes, Centenary General Meeting – Global Outlook, *BIMCO Bulletin*, Vol 100, No 2, 2005, p. 8.

⁸ Ali, 'Send Self-Assessment of Security Plan by July 1', *Star Maritime*, 9 May 2005.

⁹ 'Supply Chain Response to Terrorism – Planning for the Unexpected', MIT Center for Transportation of Logistics, Cambridge, MA. 5 December 2002, p. 14.

¹⁰ 'Container Security: Major Initiatives and Related International Developments', Comments received from the United States Government on US Container Security Initiatives, UNCTAD, 28 April 2004, p. 4.

¹¹ www.customs.gov/xp/cgov/import/commercial_enforcement/ctpat/fact_sheet.xml (accessed on 13 June 2005).

¹² www.customs.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/international_activities/csi/csi_in_brief.xml (accessed on 10 June 2005).

¹³ Banomyong, 'The Impact of Port and Trade Security Initiatives on Maritime Supply-Chain Management' *Maritime Policy Management*, Vol 32, No 1, January-March 2005, pp. 3-13.

¹⁴ US Customs Fact Sheet 8, 8 August 2002.

¹⁵ 'Container Security Report', Stanford Study Group, January 2003, p. 5.

¹⁶ The WCO is a forum of 165-strong membership consisting of intergovernmental custom administrators worldwide. See www.wcoomd.org for further details.

¹⁷ 'WCO Working on Framework of Standards', *BIMCO Bulletin*, Vol 100, No 2. 2005, The proposed Framework of Standards covers four main elements: (i) Harmonizing manifests (ii) Introducing consistent risk management to address security threats (ii) Providing security-related pre-shipment inspections of cargos, and (iv) Providing benefits to businesses in compliance with minimal security standards and best practices.

¹⁸ Hastings, 'Fresh Security Initiatives to Thwart Terrorists', *Cargonews Asia*, Vol 29, No 7, 25 April 2005, p. 12.

¹⁹ www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/psi.htm (accessed on 13 June 2005).

²⁰ www.uscg.mil (accessed on 14 June 2005).

²¹ Knowler, 'Kill Security Surcharge – Hong Kong Shippers'. *Cargonews Asia*, Vol 29, No 7, 25 April 2005, p. 1.

²² 'Security Charge Not Justifiable', Says HK Shippers' Council, *Lloyd's FTB Asia*, April 2005, p. 5.

²³ 'ISPS Charges Back in the Spotlight', *Containerisation International*, March 2005, p. 25.

²⁴ Possible sources of financing for CSI include: (i) Payment by users via a tax or a fee levied by relevant authorities, either *ad-valorem* or specific. This fee can be collected to fund the process, assets and technology used in implementing CSI (ii) Public sources (ii) International source such as in the form of grants from importing countries. See Banomyong pp. 11-12 for further discussion on the subject.

²⁵ Bichou, 'The ISPS Code and the Cost of Port Compliance: An Initial Logistics and Supply Chain Framework for Port Security Assessment and Management', *Maritime Economics & Logistics*, Vol 6, No 4, December 2004, pp. 322-348.

²⁶ 'GAO: Flaws in US Port Security', *Business Times*, 30 May 2005.

²⁷ *ibid.*

²⁸ 'Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Target Security Inspections of Cargo Containers', Statement of Richard M Stana, Director, Homeland Security and Justice. Testimony before the Sub-Committee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives. US General Accounting Office. December 2003.

BOOK REVIEWS

Transition to Eminence: The Indian Navy 1976-1990
Vice Admiral G.M. Hiranandani

Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy) in association with Lancer Publishers, New Delhi, 2005
xxxvi + 432 pp, end charts + 24 text charts, ill, index,

This handsomely produced A4 volume is the fourth in the series of official histories of the Indian Navy (IN) and the second written by Vice Admiral Hiranandani. Its immediate predecessor, *Transition to Triumph*, dealt with the period 1965 to 1976 and was published in 2000. The first three volumes were marked by an increasingly comprehensive and forthright treatment of the IN's history and *Transition to Eminence* continues in that spirit. The edition reviewed here is the complete book, intended for scholars and those with a particular interest in naval development. A second, abridged edition intended for a wider audience, has also been produced. The illustrations are well chosen and reproduced, as are the charts. Progressive improvement in the quality of the paper and overall production standards has been apparent at each stage of the publication of this series and *Transition to Eminence* is a credit to its publishers.

It is perhaps indicative of the IN's growing self confidence that it should have produced a study of this nature, dealing with events as recent as 1990. The author writes in his foreword about the need for candour and the history reflects that approach. *Transition to Eminence* provides a background on events before 1976, in order to allow the text to stand alone if necessary, but concentrates on the fifteen years to 1990. This was a period of mixed fortunes for the IN, but one in which it very much came into its own. The IN first had to recover from the effects of the 1973 oil shock before beginning substantial expansion in the mid-1980s but, from 1987 onwards, suffered badly as India itself experienced a succession of economic crises, exacerbated in the IN's case by the collapse of the Soviet Union, and with it, most of the system under which it had been able to get access to Soviet technology and material. Other medium navies struggling to deal with the challenges of limited resources and substantial operational commitments will find much of relevance in the IN's experience, whether it be in the vexed question of providing adequate junior officer training when there are all too few bunks at sea, maintaining an appropriate career structure for logistics specialists, or in the lessons to be learned from the 1990 sinking of the poorly maintained corvette *Andaman* – an event that seems to have had the same significance for the IN as the HMAS *Westralia* fire did for the RAN. What

is clear from the text is that the IN has had to find a balance between operating within limited means and going too far down the path of economy in order to maintain numbers.

There are many other such insights in a work which covers the full range of Indian naval activity, both operational and organisational. From the development of the hybrid Type 16 frigate *Godavari*, an expanded *Leander* class hull with both Soviet and Western weapons and sensors, to the problems of operating Soviet submarines designed for cold climates, to the challenges of operating Sea Harriers, there is a wealth of information on the realities of going it largely alone in a naval context. There are certain areas of understandable circumspection, such as the lease of the nuclear powered submarine *Chakra* from the Soviet Union between 1988 and 1991, but the general approach is both thorough and open. Controversies such as difficulties with senior officer promotions – largely through attempts to exert external influence – and the long running scandal over the German Type 209 submarine project of the early 1980s are dealt with at some length. The IN is sure that it has much of which to be proud, but this is a 'warts and all' history and it is the better for that. Like other Services in a similar situation, it has not always got it right, but *Transition to Eminence* is clearly a story of innovation and achievement.

Recommended.

Reviewed by Commodore James Goldrick, AM CSC RAN

Horatio Lord Nelson

Brian Lavery

New York University Press, 2003

144 pp, illustrations, maps, chronology, glossary, further reading, index.

US\$21.95 (hard cover)

For any student of the world of Nelson's navy there might be two essential books on the shelf: *The Wooden World* by NAM Rodger, and *Nelson's Navy* by Brian Lavery. Both are classic and authoritative works of impressive research, and give the technical and social background to the world of sailing battle, that world brought with equal skill to life in the fictional works of Patrick O'Brian and CS Forester. There is a renewed interest in the world of fighting sail; the film *Master and Commander* has been responsible for some of that, and the 200th anniversary of the decisive battle of Trafalgar this year brings more attention. Lavery's *Horatio Lord Nelson* will therefore be a welcome read for many.

Of course, there have been previous biographies of Nelson - Lavery has penned two minor variations - and it is instructive to pick up the works of Robert Southey and Geoffrey Callender, both written nearly 100 years ago, by way of comparison. Brian Lavery writes in a much more direct style, which is well-suited, perhaps, to the majority of readers, although those who love Patrick O'Brian's prose, so reminiscent of Jane Austen, might find it too straightforward. Indeed, Lavery plunges in where many might fear to tread, and there are expert comments on Nelson. For example, he acknowledges that the general public today might well not approve of the abandonment of Nelson's wife for Lady Hamilton in the same way that many, at least of the mob, did nearly 200 years ago.

So this is a modern work written with today's reader in mind, and it is certainly deserving of attention, for hopefully as the 200th anniversary is realised so too may well be the legacy of Nelson. Lavery provides a series of precise vignettes, which take us from the early days of peacetime with a practical education for the young naval officer, to the days of combat in the War of the American Revolution. Then it is on to the conflicts with Spain and France, which would dominate - and end - Nelson's life many years later. The essential battles of St Vincent, the Nile and Copenhagen are well treated, so too the essentials of seaboard life, as well as Nelson's personal battles, including the shocking injuries which these days - losing an arm and an eye - would see him pensioned off from a modern force. The illustrations - almost one on every opening - are comprehensive and enhance the text, with a mixture of paintings, graphics and sketches.

Overall, there is nothing new here, but that is not the aim of such a work as this. Rather, for one who has an interest in the great man Nelson and his achievements, and who does not wish to tackle the major modern biographies by Edgar Vincent or Andrew Lambert; or the earlier biographies of Southey or Callender, this would be a very good encapsulation of the special blend of strategist, tactician and man-manager that this best of naval officers epitomised. And yet Brian Lavery has also achieved in *Horatio Lord Nelson* a work that will appeal to those who do not require too much depth, but who are curious about a very special warrior who will soon enjoy further deserved publicity. This is indeed the right book for the right time.

Highly recommended.

(This review originally appeared in the *Military History Mailing List H-War* @ h-war.net.msu.edu (December 2004))

Reviewed by Lieutenant Tom Lewis, OAM RAN

No Pleasure Cruise: The Story of the Royal Australian Navy

Tom Frame

Allen & Unwin, 2004

336pp, illustrations, index

RRP AUD\$35.00

This is a book that has the confidence to open with a clear, positive agenda. It is a manifesto for a more 'naval' view of Australia's past, present and future - in which a better understanding of the past demonstrates the case. Bishop Frame presents his subject as a high quality, thoroughly professional navy, one equal to the Royal Navy from which it developed, and the contemporary United States Navy, with which it has tended to operate in the modern world. Furthermore the treatment does not shy away from the big issues, dealing not just with the successes, but also the failures and tragedies that are part and parcel of any successful seafaring organisation, as well as with national issues of identity and origin, which have tended to be overlooked by naval history. This is the first book to stress just how significant the naval question was in both the foundation of the original colonies, and in the Federation of Australia. These passages might appear a trifle wordy, especially for those outside Australia, but that would be to mistake their purpose. By applying the appropriate scale, weight and method, Frame ensures the naval issue is thrust into the national debate. Only here will it succeed in changing opinions. Every legislator in the country should read this book, perhaps on pain of excommunication!

As a synthesis some aspects of the book have a familiar ring, which is hardly surprising, since Bishop Frame has written more on the Royal Australian Navy's history than anyone else, so his own words will recur in any survey. This is especially evident in his treatment of those old warhorses the disappearance of HMAS *Sydney* II and the *Voyager* disaster. These two events have, most unfairly, come to be standard images of the RAN, which Frame is anxious to dispel. Unfortunately the combination of conspiracy theorists in the first case, and the bitter legacy of the second, make his task difficult. If this book does not settle these issues once and for all then nothing will. Sadly, recent events suggest that the latter is the likely outcome. It seems that bad news will always be more interesting.

The book has a well-developed theme that examines the shift from an essentially British-based navy to one increasingly in tune with American equipment and operational methods. The culture clash this prompted in Korea, where Australians found American command overly prescriptive and inflexible, in contrast with the more familiar and

relaxed British practice, is particularly revealing. British practice is certainly more closely attuned to the Australian way of war, which even the British considered overly informal. The problems that arose in the aftermath of the sinking of the USS *Frank E Evans* provide a timely warning that even the best of allies may not be prepared to face the truth. That the two accidents involving HMAS *Melbourne* arose out of failures by those commanding the sunken vessels should have been obvious to anyone able to read the track charts and signal records, and all the more so given the peculiar ship-handling requirements of aircraft carriers. That both incidents resulted in highly damaging public relations disasters suggests lack of confidence, and even more so of political judgement. The more recent political fall out from the refugee issue suggests that this lesson has yet to be fully hoisted in.

Those familiar with the author's work will not need reminding that it is written with an economical and pleasing style, exactly what is required if it is to reach the necessary audience. Along the way there are a handful of errors of fact and research when making connections with the naval history of friends and allies. The treatment of the nineteenth century Royal Navy is rather outdated, a fact revealed by the citation of Geoffrey Callender as an authority. The American cruiser that hit a mine in the Gulf in 1991 was the *Princeton*, not the lead ship of the class the *Ticonderoga*. However, such minor matters can be addressed in the inevitable second edition.

Overall this is ringing endorsement of a first class professional fighting service with a track record of which Australia can be very proud. Australia's renewed ability to see itself as an island, dependent upon sea communications for prosperity, security and the ability to influence world affairs, may be a product of the end of the Cold War, but this sea-sense is critical to the long-term future of the RAN. Only nations who see the sea - and accept the cost of remaining in the first division - will deserve a navy in which they can take pride.

Reviewed by Professor Andrew Lambert, King's College, London

The Navy and the Nation: The Influence of the Navy on Modern Australia

edited by David Stevens and John Reeve

Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 2005

xxvi, 438 pages, illustrations, index

RRP AUD\$39.95 paperback

It is only too apparent to those of us with even a passing interest in maritime affairs that Australia, as an island nation, lacks the affinity with the sea that one might expect. When Australians speak of their

history and of what it means to be Australian, you might hear stories of the early inland explorers, of bushrangers and gold rushes, and certainly of the exploits of the Anzacs at Gallipoli. Rarely would you hear tales of the first HMAS *Australia* making her proud arrival at Sydney with the new Australian Fleet, or of the exploits of ships such as HMAS *Adelaide* (I) at Noumea in 1940, or even of the founding of New South Wales by the Royal Navy. When it comes to Australian mythology, we as Australians seem to look inward, away from our maritime heritage, or in some cases even over the sea, as if it didn't exist. Yet Australia's history is the history of a maritime nation, of a nation bound to the sea by geographic reality, with all the consequent social, political, economic and strategic realities that brings. For some years now the Sea Power Centre-Australia has been attempting to promote Australia's naval heritage, to encourage Australians to view the sea as the highway which it is, rather than the barrier many believe it to be. The 2003 King-Hall Naval History Conference *The Navy and the Nation* was one way of promoting this message, and the resulting book is a case study of some of the ways in which the navy and the maritime community in general has shaped, and been shaped by, Australia and its society.

For this task the conference organisers assembled a wide variety of authors, including some of the world's leading naval and diplomatic historians, experts in cultural studies, science and technology, shipbuilding, medicine and the media, each furnishing their own case study of the ubiquitous link between the Navy and the Nation.

The renowned American strategist and historian George Baer sets the groundwork for discussion. He makes the important point that American maritime strategy has generally marketed itself to, and been understood by, the American government and people. Something from which the Royal Australian Navy could certainly learn. The equally renowned Geoffrey Till provides a discourse on the history of British naval power in the Pacific and outlines the inherent links between navies, mercantilism, trade and political freedom.

Jan Ruger explains the early 20th century 'cult of the Navy' and illustrates how the outward linkages between the Navy and the Nation have changed over the years. Tom Frame probes the reasons why New South Wales, so distant from Britain, was chosen for colonisation. How much did the geo-strategy of the late 18th century play a part? Robert Crawford illustrates the different ways naval imagery has been represented in the national press, providing some very interesting and humorous examples from the past.

In one of the highlights of the book Peter Edwards goes into some detail on the subject of

naval diplomacy and its lack of understanding and recognition amongst Australian politicians and the Australian public. Professor Edwards cites the achievements of HMAS *Adelaide* (I) at Noumea during the Second World War, and explains the various options and advantages provided by naval diplomacy. In one of the themes of the book he also comments on the RAN's own inability to adequately market itself, and the lack of any prominent Australian naval hero or leader, in the image of a Peter Cosgrove for example.

David Stevens describes the effect on a young country of the arrival and service of the battlecruiser HMAS *Australia* (I), and what it meant to Australians in terms of national identity. Can a warship ever have such a profound effect again? While David Hobbs, in another of my favourite chapters, describes the achievements of the aircraft carrier HMAS *Sydney* (III) and what an aircraft carrier capability means for a nation, both strategically and in terms of national sentiment.

Neil Westphalen discusses the contribution of naval medicine to the founding of Australia, and Colin Jones outlines some of the achievements of naval hydrography in the Great Barrier Reef. David Wyllie and Geoff Cannon discuss some of the contributions of Australian defence science and industry, while John Jeremy, writing in his particular area of interest, discusses Australian shipbuilding of World War II.

In the final section of the book, relating to naval people and the nation, Bob Nicholls considers the contributions of sailors to the Australian community up to World War One; Judith Harley, in what was a fine conference presentation, discusses her grandfather, Alfred Deakin, and his understanding of and contribution to Australian seapower; Chris Clark outlines the life and contribution of Engineer Vice Admiral Sir William Clarkson; James Goldrick examines the career of Admiral Sir Francis Hyde; and Ian Pfennigwerth, in an original study, investigates the contributions of ex-Navy people in the community.

These somewhat disparate studies are effectively tied together and summarised by John Reeve's superb final chapter. In it, Reeve brings together the main topics covered in the volume, and provides further comment on what it means to be a maritime nation, telling the story of the 'lucky league' – that network of nations linked by a maritime heritage and, not co-incidentally, sharing the values of democracy, political self-determination and economic freedom. Reeve also comments on the lack of socio-maritime historical studies, and the need for more interest and more work in this field. His explanation of how the navy is directly and indirectly bound-up in the very fibre of our society makes this chapter another of the book's highlights,

indeed one of those pieces of writing you wish were mandatory for all naval officers.

As a whole, because the theme is very broad and because the chapters themselves look at differing subjects, and with differing perspectives, the flow of the book is not always maintained, a difficult task in this type of study; while at times, one or two of the papers seem to lose focus, leaving one wondering what exactly is being addressed. Overall, though, the book is enjoyable to read, and the publication quality is excellent. While not all the contributions will appeal to all readers, everyone with an interest in naval and maritime affairs will find a subject of relevance in this book. But regardless of whether the reader finds the individual contributions to his or her liking, the resounding implications arising from this book are clear: our navy has played and continues to play a fundamental role in the birth and life of our nation, a role which is little understood by the Australian community or by our political leaders. This role remains as vital now as ever, and is to be neglected at our own peril. It is up to those of us with an interest in Australia's maritime future to take these lessons into the wider community. Perhaps this book will prove a wake-up call to a part of our society too long neglected.

Reviewed by Sub-Lieutenant Sam Fairall-Lee, RAN

The Australian Naval Institute

ABN: 45 988 480 239

www.navalinstitute.com.au

PO Box 29, Red Hill ACT 2603, AUSTRALIA

Phone: +61 2 6295 0056, Fax: +61 2 6295 3367, email: an_i@bigpond.com

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