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Letter to the Editor

Dear Readers,

Headmark is going through some changes. It will henceforth be published constantly online, and in print twice a year, for June and December.

Publishing online will mean a steady stream of articles reaching the website, which you can access at:

www.navalinstitute.com.au

ANI members will have access to everything on the site. Members of the public will have less access or delayed access to parts of the site. ANI members will have to login and generate a new password to the new site.

Articles for consideration in both formats of the Journal should still be sent to me as Editor at:

talewis@bigpond.com

As before, we require you to conform to the Style Notes and other guidelines printed at the back of the paper edition, and also to be found on the website.

The changes will bring more immediacy, and less costs to the ANI. Publishing world-wide is going through changes, and we are also altering ourselves to best fit the new world. Be assured we are still after your opinions, information, complaints and suggestions for the maritime and naval world ahead.

Regards,

Dr Tom Lewis OAM
Editor



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Australian Submarines from 1914

BY PETER SMITH

When the Royal Australian Navy was formed in 1911 it was envisaged that the Navy would have at least three sea-going submarines. An order was placed with Vickers Limited at Barrow-in-Furness, England for two of the new improved "E" class, a development of the "D" class submarine. They were larger, better armed and had a greater radius of action. The keel of HMAS AE1 was laid down on 3 November 1911 and HMAS AE2 on 10 February 1912. The submarines were commissioned into the RAN at Portsmouth on 28 February 1914 and arrived in Sydney on May 24 of the same year.

AE2 as built by Cutting Edge Models

AE1 and AE2

Both boats had a displacement of 725 tons surfaced and 810 submerged. Statistically they were 181 feet overall in length and carried 1,600 hp diesels for surface cruising and 840 hp electric motors when submerged. They had an average speed of 15 knots surfaced and 10 submerged with a range of 3,000 miles at 10 knots on the surface. The E-class carried four torpedo tubes, one in the bow, one in the stern and two in the beam with a total of eight torpedoes carried.

Outbreak of World War I

After the arrival of the Navy's two new boats, both were docked at Cockatoo Island Dockyard, Sydney, to make good the defects which became evident on their delivery voyage. With the outbreak of war on 4 August 1914, *AE1* under the command of Lieutenant Commander TF Besant RN and *AE2* under the Command of HHGD Stoker RN, were rushed through their refitting and joined the second convoy to leave Sydney consisting of the light cruiser *HMAS Protector* and the requisitioned steamer *HMAS Upola* which acted as tenders to the submarines. The convoy left Sydney on 2 September, to join the Australian Fleet in New Guinea waters in operations against the German Pacific Colonies.

Operations in New Guinea waters and loss of AE1

At 1530 hours on September 14, *AE1* was seen patrolling to the south west of the Duke of York Island by the officers and crew of the destroyer *HMAS Parramatta* and it was assumed the submarine was returning to harbour at Kokopo on the island of New Britain for the evening. At 2000 hours *AE1* had not returned.

During the night and all next day searches were made along the coasts of New Ireland, and New Britain and neighbouring waters. No trace of the submarine was found, not even escaping oil. The fate of *AE1*, the first Allied submarine to be lost in World War I, with its 3 officers and 32 men is still unknown.

Deployment of AE2 to Europe

In December 1914, the Australian Government offered the Royal Navy the service of *AE2* in European waters. The offer was accepted and the submarine joined the second ANZAC convoy and was towed by the requisitioned armed merchant cruiser *HMAS Berrima.* The convoy left Albany, Western Australia on 31 December and arrived in the Mediterranean early February 1915. *AE2* joined the Royal Navy's submarine flotilla and shared in the duties of the Dardanelles Patrol, of keeping the Turkish warships bottled in the Straits and Sea of Marmora.

ANZAC Day 1915 and AE2's glorious action

At 0300 hours on Sunday, 25 April, *AE2* entered the Dardanelles Strait, dived off the mouth of the Suandere River and continued up the Strait, passing under five lines of mines. Having passed the town of Chanak, Lieutenant Commander Stoker ran into difficulties when *AE2* grounded twice in the Narrows and was almost rammed by Turkish warships. Moving out of the Narrows, Stoker spotted a gunboat, a target too good to miss! With care Stoker lined his boat up for a torpedo shot. Within minutes Stoker brought the Australian participation in the war to the other side of the Gallipoli Peninsula, when the torpedo hit and again made the Turks aware that their rear was still vulnerable.

In the early hours of Monday

Collins-class and Seahawk - traditional enemies (RAN photo)

morning *AE2* entered the Sea of Marmora. With the forcing of the Dardanelles, Stoker sent a signal detailing his success to Rear Admiral C. Thursby RN aboard the dreadnought *HMS Queen Elizabeth.*

Being the only submarine in the Sea, Stoker decided to harry the Turkish shipping by re-entering the Dardanelles submerged and coming to the surface to give the impression that more than one submarine was in the area. He continued the harassment of shipping until a second submarine *HMS E14* under the command of Lieutenant Commander EC Boyle RN arrived. Boyle being the senior officer suggested that they meet the following day, April 30, in the same area. Unfortunately for Stoker and the crew of *AE2*, they were surprised on the surface at the rendezvous point by the torpedo boat *Sultan Hissar* which proceeded to attack. Stoker dived the boat but had difficulties with the trim. The boat began going down fast by the bow past the safety limit. With the motors running full speed astern *AE2's* stern broke the surface, shells fired from the destroyer began to pierce the submarine and land in the engine room. With the watertight integrity of the submarine impinged, Lieutenant Commander Stoker had no option but to abandon ship and scuttle the boat. The officers and crew were interned in Prisoner of War camps for the duration of the war.

In his book *Smoke on the Horizon*, Vice Admiral CV Usborne RN wrote, "The effect of this gallant effort cannot be measured by the vessels Stoker had sunk. He had led the way into the Marmora and started the paralysis which was soon to sweep over the Turkish communications and his exploit must rank high in the annals of naval achievement."

Post World War I and the J-boats

On 25 March 1919, six "J" class submarines were transferred to the RAN from the Royal Navy. Built at HM Dockyard in Portsmouth and completed mid-1916, the submarines saw limited wartime action based with the Eleventh Flotilla at Blyth. The "J" class had a displacement of 1,210 tons surfaced and 1,820 tons submerged, except *J7* which had a submerged tonnage of 1,760. All boats had a length of 274.9 feet and were fitted with Vickers solid injection diesel engines which gave a speed of 19.5 knots surfaced and 9.5 submerged with a range of 5,000 miles at 12 knots. Armament consisted of six 18 inch torpedoes tubes, four in the bow and two beam tubes, with 12 torpedoes carried plus one 3 inch gun mounted forward of the conning tower.

The "J" class boats arrived in Sydney on Tuesday morning 15 July 1919, accompanied by the submarine tender *HMAS Platypus* under the command of Captain EC Boyle VC RN (the commanding officer of the submarine flotilla). The submarines went into immediate refit at Cockatoo Island before being based in Geelong, Victoria. During the refit a decision was made to remove the beam torpedo tubes from all six boats.

The submarines saw limited service other than a trip to Hobart for the Regatta and some exercises. By June 1922 all six were laid up. *J1, J2, J4* and *J5* were sold in February 1924 and were eventually scuttled in Bass Straight off Barwon Point, Victoria. *J3* was sold in 1926 and J7, after spending her time supplying power to the Flinders Naval Base (now *HMAS Cerberus*) at Western Port was sold in June 1929. Unlike their sisters, *J3* and *J7* ended their days in Port Phillip Bay, Both were used as breakwaters.

1924 decision to acquire *Oxley*-class submarines

In June 1924, a decision was made to strengthen the Navy with new ships and submarines. On the 27th an order

Australian Submarines from 1914

was placed at Vickers Limited for two submarines of the "Oberon" class. Both boats were designated "Oxley" class patrol submarines and were laid down on 24 August 1924. *HMAS Oxley* was launched on 29 June 1926 and *HMAS Otway* three months later on September 7.

The "Oxley" class had a displacement of 1,354 tons surfaced and 1,835 submerged. A length of 275 feet and carried two shaft diesel electric motors with 2,950 shaft hp surfaced and 1,350 battery hp submerged with a range of 8,500 miles at 10 knots.

The armament the "Oxley" class carried while in service of the RAN were eight torpedo tubes, six in the bow and two in the stern, with a total complement of 16 torpedoes. The boats were also fitted with a 4 inch gun and two machine guns.

HMAS Oxley was commissioned on 15 April 1927 and *HMAS Otway* two months later on June 15. The boats left Portsmouth for Australia on 8 February 1928, but by the time the submarines arrived at Malta it was discovered there was damage to the engine columns due to design faults. Both boats were laid up for nine months while Vickers made good the defects. They were to leave Malta on 15 November 1928 and made a grand entrance into Sydney Harbour on 14 February 1929.

Washington treaty reductions in naval forces

Australia, being a signatory to the Paris Peace Conference of 1919/20, was obliged to recognise the Washington Treaty when a directive from the Royal Navy stressed that Australia's new submarines came under their tonnage and the Australian Navy was committed to paying off the submarines into immediate reserve on 10 May 1930.

Due to restrictive monitory problems of the depression, the Navy found it could not maintain the cost of keeping the boats in reserve, and in April 1931 the Australian Government gave the submarines as a gift to the British Government. On April 10, the submarines were recommissioned into the Royal Navy as *HMS Oxley* and *Otway* and left Sydney to join the First Submarine Flotilla in the Mediterranean. It would be another 36 years before Australia would own another submarine.

HMAS Otway in Holbrook - photo by Tim Ormiston

World War II submarines

HMS Oxley has the unenviable distinction of being the first Allied submarine to be lost in the Second World War when she was mistaken for a German U-Boat and torpedoed off the south west coast of Norway by *HMS Triton* on 10 September 1939. *Otway* saw most of the war out participating in anti-submarine training and was scrapped on 24 August 1945.

Dutch submarine K9 in Australia

During the Second World War the RAN was given the use of a Dutch submarine *KIX* for Anti-Submarine Training. Built in 1922 as one of three "K VIII" class submarines by K.M. De Shelde for the Royal Netherlands Navy, *KIX* had a displacement of 521 tons on the surface and 712 when submerged. With a length of 210 feet 3 inches, she carried two Shelde-Sulzer diesels which were capable of 15 knots surfaced and 9.5 knots submerged. *KIX* was armed with four 17.7 inch torpedo tubes, two in the bow and two in the stern, and a single 3.5 inch gun.

Built as a colonial boat, hence the prefix 'K', *KIX* saw most of her service in the Dutch East Indies and with the imminent capture of Surabaya by the Japanese in February of 1942 the commanding officer, Lieutenant Commander T Brunsting RNN, escaped with the submarine to Fremantle, Western Australia.

After her arrival in Fremantle, *KIX* was sent in May 1942 to Sydney and in November 1942 was entrusted to the Royal Australian Navy for the duration of the war. Due to the submarine's age and size it was considered by the Royal Navy as unsuitable for fleet activities and saw limited use as a training boat due to damage it sustained from a torpedo blast during a Japanese midget attack in Sydney Harbour on the night of 31May-1 June 1942. The torpedo intended for the "Augusta" class

cruiser *USS Chicago*, passed under *KIX* which was moored alongside the requisitioned harbour ferry *HMAS Kuttabul* and detonated against the sea wall at Garden Island, the concussion sinking the accommodation ferry and creating shock waves which rolled the submarine onto her beam ends, lifting her diesel engines off their beds and damaging the batteries.

KIX was commissioned into the RAN as *HMAS K9* on 22 June 1943 and placed under the command of Lieutenant FM Piggott RNR, with a complement of 31 made up of RAN and RN sailors.

While in the Australian Navy's commission, *HMAS K9* spent more time in refit than in service. On 22 January 1944, one of her batteries exploded as she was changing moorings at Garden Island. It was decided to pay off the submarine on 31 March 1944 and hand it back to the Royal Netherlands Navy. *K9* was converted to an oil lighter and in this capacity was being towed north to New Guinea on 7 June 1945 by the RNN mine sweeper *Abraham Crijnssen* when the lighter broke her tow and was driven ashore and wrecked on Tiona Beach, Seal Rocks on the central coast of New South Wales. The wreck was sold by the Commonwealth Disposals Commission on 20 July 1945 for scrap iron.

Post war decisions on submarines

In 1947 the Australian Naval Board did not consider submarines in the restructure of the post war fleet, but did identify a requirement for anti-submarine training for the RAN and RAAF. After negotiations with the British Government, an agreement was formulated whereby several submarines would be permanently based in Sydney to work with Australian and New Zealand Forces.

The Royal Navy established the Fourth Submarine Division under the command of Commander IL McGeoch RN at *HMAS Penguin,* Sydney, in November 1949. *Telemachus* and *Thorough* were the first two of 10 "T" and "A" class submarines to be periodically based in Australia until *HMS Trump* left for Great Britain on 10 January 1969.

In 1961 the British Government advised the Australia Government it could not maintain its submarines in Australia after 1968. The news created intense debate within both the Navy Office and the Defence Department over whether the Navy should acquire its own submarines.

Australia decides to acquire submarines (again)

By 1963 the Government, having set up a submarine department within the Navy Office, had considered nuclear propulsion but opted to buy diesel electric submarines and chose the British "Oberon" class, an improved version of the "Porpoise" class. Tenders were called to supply the RAN with eight submarines to be built in two batches. In June 1964, after successful tendering, orders were placed with Scotts Shipbuilding, Greenock in Scotland to build four submarines for the RAN with yearly deliveries from 1967 at a cost of $9 million each.

LEUT Davis takes a small visitor through one of his old homes, the Oberon submarine Onslow (Editor photo)

The first submarine was laid down on 2 July 1964. The Australian "Oberons" had a displacement of 2,070 tonnes with a length of 89.9 metres, a beam of 8.1 metres and a draught of 6 metres. The submarines had two Admiralty standard range diesel generators giving a submerged speed of more than 15 knots. The armament consisted of six torpedo tubes forward and two in the stern capable of firing torpedoes, missiles and launching mines. When not undergoing training the "Oberons" carried a ship's company of 63.

Oxley was the first ship to fly the new Australian ensign in British waters at her commissioning on 27 March 1967. The commanding officer

Collins-class weapons loading

was Lieutenant Commander DH Lorrimer RAN who had transferred from the Royal Navy. After a successful work up in the Clyde, *Oxley* sailed for Sydney via the Panama Canal.

A crowded Sydney skyline, featuring Daring-class destroyer HMAS Vampire and Oberon-class submarine HMAS Onslow, both now features of the Australian Maritime Museum (Tony Woodland)

New Australian submarine base *HMAS Platypus*

In Australia, a submarine base was under construction in Neutral Bay, Sydney. The base comprised of administration building, stores, workshops, the facility for quiet charging of submarine batteries and, later, a school for submarine training. After several delays the base was commissioned as *HMAS Platypus* on 18 August 1967, under the command of Commander WL Owen RAN. Several minutes after the commissioning, the arrival of *HMAS Oxley* gave birth to the fourth Australian Submarine Squadron.

The second submarine *Otway* was laid down on 29 June 1965 and was commissioned on 22 April 1968, under the command of Lieutenant Commander GR Dalrymple RAN. *Otway* sailed to Australia via the Cape of Good Hope and arrived in Sydney in October 1968. The third submarine *Ovens*, had its keel laid on 17 June 1965 and was commissioned on 22 April 1969, under the command of Lieutenant Commander B Nobes RAN. *Ovens* sailed from England via South America and arrived to join the Squadron in October 1969.

The fourth and last boat of the first order of submarines, *Onslow*, was laid down on 26 May 1967 and commissioned on 22 December 1969 under the command of Lieutenant Commander CAB Nixon-Eckersall RN. After a successful work up she left England to sail to Australia by the Panama Canal and arrived in Sydney in July 1970.

In 1969, the Naval Board initiated the ordering of the second group of four submarines. A decision was made in 1970 before the contract was awarded to reduce the requirement to two submarines. In 1971 the contract was awarded to Scott-Lithgow to build the submarines with a delivery planned for 1975 and 1976 and at a fixed price of $24 million for each boat.

The fifth submarine *Orion* was laid down on 6 October 1972 and commissioned on 15 June 1977 under the command of Lieutenant Commander RH Woolrych RAN. *Orion* was the first submarine to be fitted with Micro Puffs, a new sonar system unique to the RAN. She sailed for Australia via the Suez Canal and arrived in Sydney in July 1978.

The sixth and final submarine had its keel laid down on 28 May 1973 and commissioned as *Otama* on 27 April 1978 under the command of Lieutenant Commander FVR Wolfe RAN. She sailed via the Panama Canal to join the Squadron in December 1978.

Submarine refits and modernisations

Over the intervening years Australia's submarines have completed successful cycles of refits and modernisation. By 1985 all six submarines had been updated in a $150 million defence project SWUP, the Submarine Weapon-system Update Program. During this time the two stern torpedo tubes where removed from the six boats.

With the opening of the shore simulator, known as the Submarine Warfare Systems Centre at *HMAS Watson,* the commissioning of *HMAS Stirling* on Garden Island in Western Australia, which has facilities for home porting submarines and the opening in

1988 of the Submarine Escape Training Facility, the first of its kind in the Southern Hemisphere, the Australian Navy has been able to move away from the reliance on the Royal Navy for expensive submarine training.

Basing in Western Australia at *HMAS Stirling*

On 20 September 1987, *Oxley* was the first submarine to be home-ported in Western Australia. On 13 February 1992 she was decommissioned for the last time at *Stirling*. Lieutenant Commander N Wallace RAN was appointed the task of being *Oxley's* last commanding Officer. The paying off ceremony was attended by the first executive officer of *HMAS Oxley,* Vice Admiral IDG MacDougall AC RAN the-then Chief of Naval Staff. The boat was sold for scrap metal.

The second submarine to be home-ported at Stirling was the aptly nicknamed "West Coast Warrior", *Orion*, whichleft *HMAS Platypus* on 5 June 1992 under the command of Commander R Shalders RAN.

The next generation of Australian submarines

Back in 1983, the RAN announced it was seeking tenders for a submarine design and combat system. After fierce lobbying from international navies and companies, submissions were accepted from both Europe and the United States of America.

A final decision was made in 1987 that the Swedish Kockums 471 design submarine employing the combat system proposed by Rockwell International be selected, with proviso that they be built in Australia using Australian sub-contractors. The project was launched as the Australian Submarine Corporation. An agreement was reached with the Corporation to build six submarines to be known as the "Collins" class. Assembly facilities were built in Adelaide opening in November 1989.

In February 1990 the keel of *NUSHIP Collins* was laid and the submarine was commissioned on 27 July 1996. The keel of *Farncomb* was laid on 1 March 1991 and she commissioned as *HMAS Farncomb* on 31 January 1998.

This was followed with the commissioning of *Waller* on 10 July 1999, *Dechaineux* on 23 February 2001; the first ever ship/submarine to be named after a sailor *Sheean* also on 23 February 2001 and the last, *Rankin* on 29 March 2003.

Disposal of the Oberons

Of the other Oberons, *Otway* was decommissioned for the last time in Sydney on 17 February 1994. The submarine was to continue to serve the Squadron as a classroom for hands-on training for Part Three trainees while waiting a sea-going billet. *Otway* was eventually cannibalised for spare parts for her sister submarines before being sold and broken up at Garden Island, Sydney in 1995. The conning tower and casing, along with other fittings can be seen on display in a park in Holbrook, NSW.

Ovens replaced *Oxley* in Western Australia and when she was paid off on 1 December 1995 she was handed over to the Western Australian Maritime Museum as a display item, open to tourists.

The next boat *Onslow* was still working out of Sydney and was decommissioned on Monday 29 March 1999 and handed over to the Australian National Maritime Museum where she can be seen at Darling Harbour, Sydney. *Orion* was decommissioned and put into reserve in 1996; eventually sold for scrap and broken up in Western Australia. *Otama* was decommissioned on 15 December 2000 and towed to Victoria to be used as a tourist attraction at Hastings, but at this time the fate of the boat is not clear and it is currently moored at Crib Point.

The now most-capable Collins-class (Courtesy RAN)



A steel deck barbeque on Oxley

Closing of submarine base *HMAS Platypus*

In 1965 when it was announced that the Navy were to build the submarine base *Platypus* in Neutral Bay, there was a large protest. The Editor of *The Sun* newspaper was one of the greatest critics against the base, at one stage writing in his editorial "That all bases east of the harbour bridge be uprooted and moved west." He finally got his wish, for on 14 May 1999 the submarine base decommissioned. The fate of the site is still being considered by the federal government and the Sydney Harbour Federation Trust. If the Editor is still alive today, we did hear you, we could not get more west than Garden Island,

Australian Submarines from 1914

Western Australia.

Shortly it is expected that the Australian Government will announce a replacement of the Collins class, which in some quarters, is believed will be an update of the current class of submarine, the first expected to replace *HMAS Collins* around 2020.



Based on the talk given by Peter Smith, Australian submarine historian, to the Naval Historical Society of Australia at the Australian National Maritime Museum on 19th February 2014

For further reading the following are recommended:

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An Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile is launched from HMAS Perth in the Australian Eastern Exercise Area off Jervis Bay, NSW (RAN Photo)

Africa's Indian Ocean Navies: *Naval evolution in a complex and volatile region*

BY SERGEI DESILVA-RANASINGHE

Africa's mostly under-developed Indian Ocean navies and coastguards are now receiving increasing attention and resources to combat the rise of asymmetrical threats. The modernisation is indicative of the international community's expanding maritime security awareness and the willingness of African Indian Ocean states to move away from a traditional land-centric focus. This is welcome news in a region that endures perhaps the most complex and challenging maritime security environment in the world.

Africa's Indian Ocean Littoral

The African Indian Ocean littoral stretches from as far north as Egypt in the Red Sea, to the western Indian Ocean states of Seychelles and Mauritius, and as far south as the Mozambique Channel and to Cape of Good Hope in South Africa. Comprising 12 nations, the region encompasses the Red Sea states of Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea; the East African nations of Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Seychelles and the Comoros; and finally, the southwest Indian Ocean countries of South Africa, Mozambique, Madagascar and Mauritius.

This vast region contains the world's most strategic maritime arterials which facilitates seaborne trade in energy and commodities to the economies of Europe, Asia and North America. The region is therefore replete with maritime traffic. In fact, around 70% of Africa is made up of littoral states, and 90% of the continent's trade is seaborne. For example, it is estimated that over 21,000 vessels transit the Suez Canal annually and around 23,000 cargo vessels annually traverse the Bab-el Mandab Strait, including 8% of the world's seaborne trade in oil. Similarly, around 28,000 vessels annually transit through the Mozambique Channel, and up to 30% of the world's annual seaborne trade in oil circumnavigates the Cape of Good Hope heading into the Atlantic Ocean.

Although the region is coveted for its natural resources, Africa's Indian Ocean states are among the poorest in the world, and are plagued by political instability and formidable regional security challenges. The Horn of Africa is a case in point and is perhaps the most unstable zone in the world. The persistent nature of Somalia's instability, especially with the advent of piracy, has seriously eroded the security of the western and southwest Indian Ocean. As a result, the traditionally land-centric African Indian Ocean states have been forced to develop their naval forces as their economic interests, specifically in seaborne trade, offshore oil and gas exploration projects and tourism are threatened by piracy, terrorism and maritime crime.

Developing national maritime security policies remain a significant challenge to these impoverished states, which lack expertise, infrastructure and resources. However, in recent years there have been several notable initiatives such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Standing Maritime Committee of the Inter-State Defence and Security Council, the Sea Power for Africa Symposia, and the Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050. These regional

French Navy Horizon-class destroyer FS Forbin (Photo by Michael Nitz)

Africa's Indian Ocean Navies: *Naval evolution in a complex and volatile region*

forums and programmes are much needed measures to confront the complex array of security challenges along Africa's Indian Ocean waters.

For instance, in 2007, according to one South African study, it was estimated that throughout sub-Saharan Africa illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing amounted to a staggering USD1 billion in ocean catch annually. Africa's Indian Ocean littoral is also a major transit point for the drug trafficking between the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, with trafficking in hashish, Afghan heroin and South American cocaine reportedly smuggled to Europe via the Arabian Sea, Red Sea, Suez Canal and the East African seaboard. The scale of the rising problem was emphasised by one report, which claimed that in 2008 alone around 30-35 metric tons of heroin and cocaine was smuggled through East Africa.

The threat of maritime terrorism exemplified by Al Qaeda's suicide-attacks on the destroyer *USS Cole* in 2000, and the oil tanker *MV Limburg* in 2002, both of which occurred in Yemeni waters, emphasised the growing threat presented to the regions seaborne trade. Indeed, regional insecurities were sharpened further in 2004, when Al Qaeda declared its intent to target naval forces and maritime commerce in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

Yet, the prevalence of piracy throughout the western and southwest Indian Ocean has arguably been a greater challenge. In 2012, the Kenyan Shippers Council estimated that piracy had increased the price of imported goods by 10%. Illustrating the southward spread of piracy, as far back as 2006, Mozambique's navy chief, Rear Admiral Patravio Jotamo, confirmed, "The arrogance and the ease with which Mozambican marine resources are plundered shows that the pirates are confident that nothing will happen to them because they operate in an area without the means to detain them," he said. While more recently, Madagascar's Transport Minister, Rolland Ranjatoelina, noted: "They are coming farther and farther south with more attempts on boats."

A staraboard quarter view of the Iranian Navy's second Russian-built Kilo class diesel-powered attack submarine en route to Iran (US Navy)

In January 2012, the chief of the Tanzanian Navy, Major General Said Shaaban Omar, told *Sabahi*: "Since the start of piracy incidents in our territorial waters, there has been considerable reduction of big ships in Tanzanian ports, especially Dar es Salaam," he said. "Only ships with adequate security measures onboard sail to Tanzania, which translates into a decline in the country's imports. In short, this has meant increased prices for our imports. A good example is the doubling of domestic gas prices three months ago, caused by a sharp decline in the number of gas-carrying ships to the Dar es Salaam port."

The General further explained: "This development was a result of an unsuccessful attack on a gas carrying ship destined for the Dar es Salaam port by Somali pirates. In 2006 alone, there were 26 such ships that visited Tanzania. However, the number has since dropped to only two in 2010 and there was none in 2011." He added: "This can all be attributed to increased piracy activity. Other affected areas include foreign investors searching for gas and oil in Tanzania's territorial waters."

As such, the rising incidence of piracy has forced an aggressive response from the international community, through the establishment of the Western-led 29-member nation Combined Maritime Forces: an organisation that oversees Combined Task Forces 150 (maritime security and counter-terrorism), 151 (counter piracy) and 152 (Arabian Gulf security and cooperation). In addition, the European Union established EUNAVFOR, while NATO formed a Standing Maritime Group, both of which have focused on countering piracy and transnational threats in the western Indian Ocean.

More recently, in 2009, a major breakthrough was achieved when the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) implemented the Djibouti Code

of Conduct. The 20 signatory-nations now undertake training coordinated through the Djibouti Regional Training Centre. Furthermore, three regional Information Sharing Centres have since been established at Sana'a in Yemen, Mombasa in Kenya and Dar es Salaam in Tanzania; with each centre reportedly linked to the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) Information Sharing Centre in Singapore. Although many challenges remain, the collective impact of these measures have tangibly improved the maritime security situation in the region. Yet, while transnational threats are of significant concern, so is the intensifying strategic rivalry between the region's major powers.

Presence of Major Power Navies

Geo-political competition is another defining characteristic of Africa's Indian Ocean littoral. The US has long been the dominant naval force in the region and the presence of the US military in Africa, particularly in Djibouti, has grown in recent years after AFRICOM was founded in 2007. Currently there are around 2,000 US military personnel stationed in Djibouti attached to Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, which engages in regional counterterrorism and expeditionary operations. In addition, the US military is also involved in Operation Compass against the Lord's Resistance Army; and Exercise Cutlass, which is a maritime exercise that engages East Africa's naval forces.

France is the second-most powerful navy in the Indian Ocean and has established an Indian Ocean command, FAZSOI: Forces Armées de la Zone Sud de l'Océan Indien, to secure its regional interests. Based in Abu Dhabi, UAE, since 2009, the Indian Ocean command has operated from the Persian Gulf, and has oversight on French military forces stationed in Djibouti, and also the southwest Indian Ocean French territories of Reunion and Mayotte.

Britain also remains a major power in the Indian Ocean. In the Persian Gulf, the Royal Navy has consistently deployed four mine hunters, one LSDA, one tanker, two warships and one submarine. In fact, at any one time over 50% of the Royal Navy's manpower and assets are situated in the Indian Ocean.

The Royal Saudi Navy comprises 12,500 personnel and is the only Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) navy that is capable of seriously challenging Iran's navy. The Navy's Western Fleet is based out of Jeddah, along the Red Sea coast, where its six "Al Riyadh" class (French F3000S) frigates are stationed.

As another regional country, Israel also views the Red Sea as strategically important to its national security and created a dedicated naval command in 1981, the Red Sea Naval Command, based at Israel's southern coastal city of Eilat. Although a Mediterranean-centric force, the Israeli Navy has over the last decade become more involved in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean by regularly deploying its corvettes and submarines. "The activity in this arena is significant for the security, sovereignty, and maritime assets of the State of Israel," said Navy chief Admiral Ram Rothberg, who was quoted by *The Jerusalem Post* in July 2012.

The Iranian Navy is one of the newcomers to the western Indian Ocean and now maintains a naval presence in the Red Sea, a body of water where the US, France, UK, Israeli, Egyptian and Royal Saudi navies have traditionally dominated. Since 2008, Iran's Navy has conducted anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden. Again, in December 2010, an Iranian naval

INS Mumbai of the Indian navy (photo by by Chris Sattler)

Africa's Indian Ocean Navies: *Naval evolution in a complex and volatile region*

Israeli submarine INS Rahav (Michael Nitz)

delegation visited the Red Sea state of Djibouti to facilitate an agreement to provide Iranian warships access to Djibouti's ship repair and maintenance facilities. Similarly, in February 2011, Iran's Navy sent two warships via the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean for the first time since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, and since then, Iran's warships have regularly docked at both Sudan's and Eritrea's ports. While more recently, in December 2012, the Iranian Navy launched Exercise Velayat 91, which was partly conducted in the Gulf of Aden as a means to showcase its expanding naval capabilities.

Although there is much speculation on China's naval build up, the presence of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLA-N) in the Indian Ocean has thus far been limited to conducting regular goodwill visits and training exercises with Indian Ocean littoral navies; and also since 2007, counter-piracy operations involving several warships. More recently, PLA-N crews were granted access to rest and replenishment facilities in the Seychelles, which is symbolic of China's growing profile in the Indian Ocean.

As another newcomer, partly in response to China's naval presence, Japan's Navy established rest and replenishment base in Djibouti in 2009, and has been active in regional engagement programmes as seen in August 2012, when 1,000 Japanese Navy personnel participated in a three-day joint training exercise with the Tanzanian Navy.

Eager to project its influence and also contest China, the Indian Navy has been particularly active. It is ranked as the largest Indian Ocean regional navy and is currently the fifth-largest navy in the world. The Indian Navy has focused heavily on anti-piracy operations, and also in monitoring and patrolling the EEZs of Seychelles, Mozambique and Madagascar: the latter where the Indian Navy in 2007 established a listening and surveillance facility to monitor shipping in the region Similarly, the India's Navy regularly patrols Mauritius archipelago, and there is ongoing speculation that India is intent on leasing the North and South Agalega Islands from Mauritius to establish a permanent naval presence in the southwest Indian Ocean.

In response to the Indian Navy's actions, Pakistan's Navy has also expanded its profile throughout the Indian Ocean. The scope of its foray's have centred around goodwill visits and training exercises in Tanzania in October 2010 and May 2012; Kenya in August 2006 and December 2012; Sudan in November 2012; the Seychelles and South Africa in December 2012.

The heavy presence and interest of so many of the world's major powers is an enduring feature of the western and south-western Indian Ocean, and is substantially responsible for elevating regional maritime security awareness and in spurring the development of the region's navies and nascent coast guards.

Africa's Red Sea Navies

Egypt's Navy is reportedly the largest in continental Africa and the Arab world; and is also only one of two African navies with a submarine capability. The force comprises 8,500 personnel and a fleet of some 220 vessels, made up of frigates, submarines, corvettes, mine hunters, missile boats, coastal patrol boats and a range of ancillary craft. Its main surface combatants include four Oliver Hazard Perry class and two Knox-class guided missile frigates, two Najm el Zapher class anti-submarine warfare frigates, and four aging Chinese/Soviet-built Romeo-class diesel-powered submarines purchased in the 1980s. Although the bulk of Egypt's Navy is deployed in the Mediterranean Sea, it has four navy bases along its Red Sea coast.

In recent years the Egyptian Navy has implemented a modernisation programme. In April 2010, *The Mississippi Press* reported that VT Halter Marine won a USD807 million contract to build four fast missile craft for the Egyptian Navy. Similarly, in December 2011, the Turkish Yonca-Onuk Shipyard delivered the first of six MRTP-20 class fast interceptor craft to the Egyptian Navy, with suggestions

that the remaining five craft would be built at the Alexandria Naval Shipyard under a technology transfer agreement. Finally, in September 2012, the hallmark of Egypt's naval modernisation was a declaration that would purchase two German-made Type 209 diesel-electric submarines. "We have agreed to a deal with Germany to procure two submarines of the latest 209 class," said Egyptian Navy chief, Osama Ahmed, as quoted in the Egyptian daily, *Al-Ahram.*

Sudan's Navy has about 1,800 personnel and comprises a fleet of two coastal patrol craft reportedly gifted by Iran in the 1970s, and 16 inshore patrol craft, two supply vessels and two Casa C-212 aircraft. Over the last decade, Sudan's Navy has developed close ties to both Iran and Pakistan's navies, which continue to provide equipment and training to its navy.

Eritrea's inherited its navy from Ethiopia in 1991, after Eritrean revolutionary forces overran the ports of Asseb and Massawa. Much like in Sudan's case, Eritrea has maintained close ties with Iran's and Pakistan's navies and, as a result, obtains equipment and training. Today, Eritrea's Navy consists of 1,400 personnel and a fleet reportedly made up of six Israeli-built Super Dvora Mk II fast attack craft, five Osa-class missile boats, three LCUs, two LCTs, three Swiftship patrol boats, four locally-built 35-ton patrol boats and other smaller patrol craft.

East African Navies

Kenya's Navy today is the largest and most-capable naval force among East African nations. Over the last decade the Navy has been strengthened with new acquisitions. As such, US funding helped Kenya to modernise its coastal surveillance systems and acquire new patrol boats. For example, in 2006, the US donated ArchAngel class and Defence-class patrol boats to Kenya's navy. Similarly, in June 2009, Kenya received Western assistance to open a new maritime centre of excellence located in Mombasa, which was reportedly the first college of its type in Africa. In August 2011, Kenya's Navy had two patrol boats refurbished by Italian-firm Fincantieri; and one year later, in August 2012, the Navy took delivery of its largest vessel after a lengthy delay. In addition, the year 2012 marked an important year for Kenya's maritime security with the creation of a new coast guard, which signals Kenya's intention to invest more in its maritime security.

As the second-largest navy in East Africa, the rising tide of piracy and transnational threats to east Africa's maritime domain has led Tanzania to invest in its navy. In September 2012, through a jointly-funded donation from the US and the IMO, the Tanzanian Navy inaugurated a new integrated radar and automatic identification system as part of its new coastal surveillance system, all of which are linked to the Maritime Rescue Sub-Centre and the Information Sharing Centre based at Dar es Salaam.

Recognising its volatile maritime security environment and the importance of US assistance; Djibouti's deputy navy chief, Lieutenant Colonel Ahmed Daher Djama, recently confirmed, "Geographically, we are a nation at sea. The centre of gravity of the Djiboutian economy is at sea, so navy capability to protect our nation is critical in safeguarding our common interests of protecting the liberty and the life of Djibouti and America." In 2006, the Navy's small fleet of six 35-ton Swari-class Inshore Patrol boats was augmented by a US donation of five patrol boats. Latterly in April 2013, the US gifted two Metal Shark 28 Defiants high-speed aluminium coastal security boats, after Djibouti implemented its new Regional Maritime Awareness Capability System and Automatic Identification System.

Infamous for the absence of stable government, its enduring lawlessness, Islamist terrorism, piracy and trafficking in arms, narcotics and humans; Somalia is the most unstable region along Africa's Indian Ocean littoral. Although attempts have been made through the Kampala Process in 2010 and the Modadishu Roadmap in 2011 to address Somalia's maritime security problems, progress has been lacking. Since the establishment of Somalia's current Transitional Federal Government, in 2009, Somalia resurrected its navy after commissioning 500 sailors as part of a drive to raise a 5,000-strong force. This initiative represented the first serious attempt by Somalia to develop a maritime security policy since the advent of civil war in 1990s. However, the force only operates a few improvised skiffs and is poorly equipped in nearly every way to patrol Somalia's 3,330 km coastline. The ineffectiveness of Somalia's ill-equipped navy has led autonomous regions like Somaliland and Puntland to raise their own improvised maritime police forces with the establishment of the Somaliland Coast Guard and the Puntland Maritime Police Force.

The **Seychelles Coast Guard** is the maritime arm of the Seychelles People's Defence Force and consists of around eight patrol boats. In November 2011, the UAE-funded base for the Seychelles Coast Guard was formally declared operational, with the UAE also gifting five patrol boats and one helicopter to augment the Coast Guard's maritime security capabilities.

The Comoros has a 500-strong defence force and a tiny navy equipped with two aging Yamayuri class patrol boats commissioned in 1981. In recent years the nation has taken a

Africa's Indian Ocean Navies: *Naval evolution in a complex and volatile region*

deeper interest in maritime affairs as demonstrated in 2010, when the Comoros occupied the chair of the African Union East African Standby Brigade for peacekeeping and intervention missions in the region. Similarly, in April 2011, the Comoros Gendarmerie Maritime was raised and equipped with several launches, including a gifted US ArchAngel patrol boat.

Southwest Indian Ocean Navies

South Africa's 6,200 strong navy is Africa's most modern and powerful regional naval force. Its main fleet assets include four German-built Valour class MEKO A200SAN frigates commissioned in 2004 and 2005; and three new German-manufactured Type 209 1400MOD diesel-electric submarines commissioned between 2005 and 2009. Commencing in January 2011, as part of Operation Copper, the Navy has continued to deploy frigates and submarines on an ongoing basis to bolster maritime security in the Mozambique Channel. The mission represents the Navy's first standing foreign commitment since World War II.

Mozambique's Navy comprises 2,000 personnel and about 25 vessels. In recent years, the force has received extensive foreign assistance to augment its capabilities. Examples include the donation of three naval vessels by the US in 2006, and the gifting of two Namacurra class harbour patrol boats by South Africa. In November 2012, the US donated the Mozambican Navy a maritime automatic identification system. Commenting on the donation, Mozambican defence minister Filipe Nyussi said: "The technical military cooperation between the United States and the Mozambican Navy, is of great importance since it strengthens the capacity of the Mozambican Armed Forces (FADM) by providing the ability for national maritime surveillance." In fact, between 2010 and 2012, numerous Mozambican navy personnel have also received training by the US Army Naval School of Ordnance Disposal's international military student programme, as part of AFRICOM's counter-piracy initiatives.

Mauritius has a 500 strong National Coast Guard with a fleet of around 30 patrol boats and three maritime reconnaissance planes. In 2010, Mauritius acquired one Praga class patrol boat from India, and is scheduled to acquire several more offshore patrol vessels from India by 2014.

Madagascar has a small 500-strong aging navy consisting of about 16 patrol craft, one LCT, one LCA and three amphibious craft. Although located far away from the Horn of Africa in the southwest Indian Ocean, Madagascar has not been spared from the threat of piracy. For example, in March 2011, Madagascar's Navy arrested a dozen pirates and interdicted the Comorian-flagged vessel *MV Zoulfikar*, which the pirates had hijacked. As such, the island nation has relied extensively on the presence of regional and extra-regional navies to help secure its maritime domain.

Implications For The Future

Evidently, the geographic spread of piracy, trafficking in humans, arms and narcotics, and the threat posed by maritime terrorism has spurred the world's major powers to increase their military presence throughout the region, and help to establish regional maritime security architecture along Africa's Indian Ocean frontier. By gifting equipment and assets, and in training naval and coast guard personnel, the world's major powers have been instrumental in modernising the region's naval forces and coast guards, and in the process have substantially contributed to expanding Africa's Indian Ocean maritime consciousness. Although starting from a low base, given the state of the region's naval forces, the growing emphasis by the world's major powers to develop Africa's Indian Ocean navies is a historically significant and necessary initiative. Indeed, in a part of the world that is replete with extensive and widespread security challenges, and which continues to dominate the attention of the world's major powers, such engagement has already had a positive and lasting impact on the region's maritime security.

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The Aussie military history your kids aren't learning

BY DR TOM LEWIS

If you, or one of your family, served in the Vietnam, Korean War, or Boer wars, then the national history curriculum is airbrushing that service out of history. In fact the military story of our country is minimized in our schools.

In the course of writing our new book *Carrier Attack*, co-author Peter Ingman and I surveyed 392 people about their education. No matter when they went to school, the vast majority – about 90% – hadn't learnt that Darwin was attacked on 19 February 1942, killing 235 people. We also found the fact that Australia was raided for two years by Japanese forces in World War II still isn't part of your children's education today.

We were concerned, in researching the myths and legends of the first Darwin raid, to dispel many spurious stories of that attack. One of them was the government of the day had covered up the story of the raid. We found that wasn't true. While it was certainly the case that the initial reporting was minimal, eyewitness accounts were appearing with remarkable detail only a few weeks later. So why, we wondered, had this story persisted?

It was because the Australian people hadn't been told, in the years after the war, that their own country was raided from Exmouth in Western Australia across to Townsville in Queensland; rather, youngsters in schools were learning about William the Conqueror.

Instead of learning that the aircraft of the enemy raided 300 kilometres inland to the town of Katherine in the Northern Territory, Aussie kids were being taught about the First Fleet.

Instead of finding out about the spirited northern defence put up with massive American help from early 1942 onwards, children were memorizing lists of the kings and queens of Britain.

All important facts, but why the lack of learning about our own country's military struggles? And why is it persisting today?

Go to (www.australiancurriculum.edu.au) for a list of subjects in the National Curriculum. Enter "Korean" and you'll get three hits, two of them about mathematics and the other about Chinese involvement in the Cold War. "Gallipoli" brings up an enormous number of hits but high school students we asked say they became 'sick of studying it every Anzac Day' by the time they finished primary school.

The term "Boer" brings up for year 9 students the unexciting possibility they could "place key events in sequence (for example the Boer War, 1899-1902; World War I, 1914-1918), and identify parts of the world that were involved in, or affected by, those events." Supposedly a teacher might be able to contrive a lesson about Australia's involvement in this conflict, which killed 606 of our soldiers. But it's hardly enough.

Similarly for the Vietnam experience: Year 6 students are asked to "identify and develop a timeline of world unrest that contributed to migration in the 1900s (for example the World Wars, the Vietnam War, the war in the former Yugoslavia, the Tiananmen Square massacre, the war in Sudan)." That's it…



Tracks of Sydney Kormoran from interrogators' reports (Tom Lewis Collection)

No detailed study is available until Year 10, by which time some students will have left school, and even then the only possibility is "describing the impact of the Vietnam war on Vietnam and how the communist victory in Vietnam (1975) resulted in the arrival of refugees into Australia."

What about the actions and difficulties experienced by our people there? What about the bravery shown? In fact, a search for the term "Victoria Cross" produces no hits at all. So a student can leave school with no understanding of what the bravest of the brave of our society have done – in wars that were part of our country's narrative even as they were gaining their education. Is this right?

Essential WWII stories, such the sinking of *HMAS Sydney*, with the loss of 645 lives; the fact that outside Darwin today is a Japanese submarine with 80 sailors dead inside, or that *HMAS Armidale* fought heroically to her end, are not mentioned anywhere. It's probably not surprising. The people who



HMAS Sydney (by Peter Ingman)

The Aussie military history your kids aren't learning

wrote the curriculum embracing our nation's story probably never heard of them in their education either.

Students can study one of these Mediterranean societies in depth: Egypt or Greece or Rome. Students can study the transformation of the Roman world and the spread of Christianity and Islam. These are all well and good but are they more important than the loss of our most famous warship in WWII?

The sinking of *HMAS Sydney* touched almost every town and village across Australia. If students don't hear about it in their history education I presume they will never hear of it. Is it not worth hearing about in the opinion of these curriculum writers?

It's not just the sacrifice made by people in our past, although sometimes that sacrifice was of the ultimate sort. It's a fundamental of protecting our future.

The philosopher George Santayana summed this up when he said: "Those who cannot remember the past, are condemned to repeat it."

From the start of our involvement in 1962 in Vietnam around 60,000 Australians served in that theatre. 521 died and over 3,000 were wounded. To quote the War Memorial: "The war was the cause of the greatest social and political dissent in Australia since the conscription referendums of the First World War. Many draft resisters, conscientious objectors, and protesters were fined or gaoled. Many armed forces personnel met a hostile reception on their return home."

But how can we learn from the Vietnam situation unless we study our involvement?

It's not therefore just Vietnam that needs to take its place in our school students' studies. It's Darwin, Broome, Townsville – the entire Top End of Australia. It's the Boer and Korean wars. It's what our people did in conflicts past and present – not just the causes and effects of the most traumatising national collective action there is. If we really say: "We will remember them" we need as a nation to live up to it in deed not just words; in everyday situations and not just conveniently on anniversaries.

A 5.9-inch gun in the Kormoran's forward hold pointing to starboard and aft of the beam (Courtesy Sydney Search)

How is the story being told in our schools? HMAS Sydney II - "A" turret, with its gun housing destroyed and with the foredeck rent back over its twin gun barrels

Dr Tom Lewis OAM is a retired naval officer whose service overseas included a deployment to Baghdad at the height of the Iraq war. He is the author of 12 books, and the editor of Headmark.

Cooperation or Trust: What comes first in the South China Sea?

BY SAM BATEMAN

Two opposing schools of thought are apparent in the South China Sea. One says cooperation will help build trust and the other claims that cooperation is not possible without trust. Must this necessarily be a chicken-and-egg issue?

A 'Chicken and Egg' situation has emerged in the South China Sea. What comes first – cooperation as a Maritime Confidence-Building Measure (MCBM), or strategic trust? This dilemma is largely explained by the reality that the concepts involved means different things to different people.

One school of thought is that arrangements for functional cooperation on issues such as resources management, marine scientific research and marine environmental protection are MCBMs or trust-building measures. The other school of thought is that this functional cooperation cannot proceed without strategic trust.

China's position

China is at the heart of the problem. Some commentators claim that the Chinese position is that MCBMs are not possible in the South China Sea without first building strategic trust. China is concerned about the US building up its military presence in the region, including in the South China Sea. It sees itself as the target of this build-up and does not trust any assurances by Washington to the contrary.

Thus the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) between the US and China remains ineffective. China views with deep distrust US arms sales to Taiwan and American surveillance and intelligence collection activities proximate to its coast.

However, other commentators have a different view. They believe that when China puts forward proposals such as the ASEAN-China Maritime Cooperation Fund and the establishment of expert committees on marine scientific research, environmental protection, search and rescue and transnational crime, it is actually proposing MCBMs.

This puts the onus back on the ASEAN claimants who, in being slow to embrace the Chinese proposals, appear to be also saying that some form of trust is required before there can be cooperation. In this context, trust might mean some concessions by China with regard to its sovereignty claims in the South China Sea, or at least an unambiguous explanation of just what these claims are.

Reversing the order of cooperation and trust

The reversal of the order of cooperation and trust is evident in the way in which the focus of negotiations on a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea has shifted during the past decade. Article 6 of the 2002 ASEAN–China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) identified the activities now the subject of China's expert committees, as well as the safety of navigation and communication at sea. The DOC requires cooperation pending a comprehensive and durable settlement of the disputes.

The ASEAN-China Joint Working Group on the Implementation of the DOC (ASEAN-China JWG) established in 2004 was tasked with formulating recommendations for developing cooperation. But the Guidelines for Implementing the DOC agreed in 2011 do not refer specifically to cooperation for management of the sea. Rather they identify MCBMs as the initial activities to be undertaken under the ambit of the DOC without actually specifying what form these measures might take.

Now negotiations between the

The Guangzhou, one of China's front line warships, pictured in Leningrad (Public domain)

Cooperation or Trust: What comes first in the South China Sea?

claimants are focused on agreeing a binding Code of Conduct for the South China Sea, the draft of which, according to reports, makes scant reference to the importance of cooperation and does not include any specification of possible MCBMs.

While this "chicken and egg" situation exists, little is being done to protect sensitive marine habitats of the South China Sea, manage its fish stocks, prevent transnational maritime crime, or conduct the research necessary to effectively manage the sea and its resources. The littoral countries to the South China Sea are all parties to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and thus have a clear obligation under Part IX of that treaty to cooperate on these activities.

Way forward: Back to basics?

Cooperation is not just something that is nice to have – it's both an obligation and a necessity. Trust should not be seen as a prerequisite of cooperation. Without cooperation, fisheries are being over-fished, marine habitats are being destroyed, large areas of the South China Sea remain unsurveyed, and the littoral countries lack the scientific knowledge required for the effective exercise of their sovereign rights in adjacent waters.

Maritime cooperation can be hindered by the failure to acknowledge the interconnected nature of uses of the sea, and the qualifications to the exercise of sovereign jurisdiction at sea. In areas of overlapping jurisdiction, the maritime domain and its resources cannot be managed on the basis of national jurisdiction alone. Cooperation between neighbouring states is essential for good order at sea and effective maritime management.

A way forward is evident with getting out of this dilemma. While it is possible that part of the current situation may be due to differences of interpretation and understanding with some subtleties of trust and confidence being 'lost in translation', there is also a pressing need to get back to basics. Maritime cooperation is an MCBM that helps build trust and confidence. Cooperation on managing the South China Sea and its resources should proceed even as disagreements are negotiated at the political level and the sovereignty disputes remain unresolved.

The essential requirement to cooperate in managing the South China Sea and its resources should be separated from military CBMs and strategic trust. We should think differently about maritime cooperation as a MCBM on the one hand, and military measures on the other. We should detach cooperation from operational military MCBMs such as arrangements of the incidents at sea (INCSEA) type.

These two strands of thinking can be taken forward through different forums. The Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) is appropriate for developing modes of maritime cooperation while the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting–Plus (ADMM-Plus) forum can deal with MCBMs related to military activities.

Sam Bateman is a Senior Fellow in the Maritime Security Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is a former Australian naval commodore with research interests in regimes for good order at sea. *Thanks is expressed to RSIS for the publication of this article.*

Israel Navy Dolphin-II class submarine

Israel Navy Dolphin-II class submarine *INS Rahav* is pictured on sea trials. *Rahav* is the second submarine of the second batch of boats built in Germany for the Navy.

The AIP submarine has conducted three day-trips in the Baltic Sea testing her propulsion and navigation systems.

In the next round the shallow water sea trials section will be started, which will be followed by the more extensive deep water sea trials section in waters in the Skagerrak sea area between Norway and Denmark.

Michael Nitz - Naval Press Service

NETHERLANDS-BELGIAN NAVAL SQUADRON


BNS Louise Marie (photo by Michael Nitz)

The NL-BEL-Naval Squadron currently consists the Belgian Navy M-class frigate, BNS Louise Marie, the Netherlands Navy air defence frigates HNLMS Evertsen and HNLMS De Ruyter, and the brand-new Netherlands Navy Holland-class Offshore Patrol Vessel, HNLMS Friesland.

Before visiting Kiel Naval Base (Germany) late last year, the four ship squadron (with more than 600 crew members) exercised in the western and eastern Baltic Sea, the Skagerrak and Kattegat with a demanding naval warfare training program.

During the Baltic Sea deployment the NL-BEL Naval Squadron visited ports in Denmark, Germany, Finland, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden. The visit to Kiel was used for crew recreation purposes after the exercises.

After leaving Kiel three of the NL-BEL-Naval Squadron ships returned via Skagen to their homeports Den Helder (The Netherlands) and Zeebruegge (Belgium), while HNLMS De Ruyter sailed to Gydnia (Poland) to participate in the Joint NATO exercise Steadfast Jazz 2013.

Michael Nitz - Naval Press Service


HNLMS De Ruyte (photo by Michael Nitz)


HNLMS Evertsen (photo by Michael Nitz)


HNLMS Friesland (photo by Michael Nitz)

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World Naval Developments

BY DR NORMAN FRIEDMAN

In March, Russian President Vladimir Putin seized the Crimea from Ukraine, and in the process may have ignited a smaller-scale version of the Cold War. Putin had famously said that the collapse and dissolution of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the Twentieth Century, the implication being that he would make his place in history by reversing it. No one saw his seizure of parts of Georgia in 2008 as an initial step, and many commentators see the seizure of the Crimea as nothing more than a reversal of the relatively recent (1956) transfer of that territory from Russia to Ukraine by Khrushchev.

However, taken together the two seizures suggest a pattern. In each case Putin has used the supposed plight of Russian ethnics in a former Soviet republic as a pretext for military or quasi-military action. As this is written, Putin is simultaneously claiming that he has no further territorial ambitions. There is a further unpleasant possibility. As part of Ukraine, the Crimea depended on energy and water from other parts of that country. Now they have been cut off, and there is no direct connection to the Russian energy or water grids. Making Russian Crimea viable might seem to demand further annexations.

At least some of the governments of the former Soviet republics understand exactly what is happening. The government of Kazakhstan, for example, has cancelled Russian space launches from its territory.

The case of Ukraine should be particularly painful for us. In 1994 the US Government badly wanted to avert the potential threat posed by ex-Soviet nuclear warheads in the hands of weak governments in the successor states. It convinced the Ukrainian government to turn its rather large stockpile over to the Russians in return for 'assurances' (which the Ukrainians read as guarantees) of its borders. The signatories to this Treaty of Budapest were Russia, Ukraine, the United States, and the United Kingdom.

Mr. Putin has in effect dismissed this treaty as a worthless scrap of paper. It seems unlikely that the US or British negotiators ever appreciated that they were committing their countries to military action, and now they have been exposed as hopelessly naive. The lesson to the Ukrainians and to other governments is that giving up real power (nuclear weapons) in return for possibly empty promises is potentially fatal. The United States has a real interest in curbing nuclear proliferation. Mr. Putin's action makes it less believable that a country in jeopardy can bet that the United States will protect it better than its own nuclear weapons might. It seems unlikely that Mr. Putin would have chanced military action against a nuclear-armed Ukraine.

This year is the centenary of the outbreak of World War I, which ushered in the horrors of the last century. Many are asking whether the current globalized world resembles that of 1914, hence is heading for a similar catastrophe. This year is also the seventy-fifth anniversary of the outbreak of World War II, and Mr. Putin's actions are reminiscent of the late 1930s. Hitler's initial aggression was justified on ethnic grounds, first in the Sudetenland (1938) and then against Poland (Danzig, in 1939).

Some of the parallels are frightening. In both cases, we are watching wounded national pride leading to aggression. When the Soviet Union collapsed, there was widespread agreement that there should be no punitive end to the Cold War (like the punitive ending of World War I). Instead, everything possible should be done to welcome the Russians into the world economy. Often that meant ignoring increasingly anti-democratic action by Mr. Putin, who has recently announced further drastic curbs on the Russian Internet. It also meant pointedly ignoring the vicious Russian war against an internal minority in Chechnia. The supposed advantages were Russian assistance in places like Syria. That assistance increasingly seems illusory.

In the 1930s, as Hitler began to move, the Western powers did not resist because they had largely disarmed. They justified non-action on the ground that somehow cooperation would bind Hitler to the international system and thus would solve the problems he supposedly faced. The reality was that there were no great problems Hitler had to resolve peacefully. He wanted war (he is said to have been furious when it was averted at Munich in 1938), and he wanted territory. In effect Mr. Putin's actions in Ukraine demonstrate that at the least he feels free to follow through on his project of recreating the old Soviet Union – and presumably also the Soviet Empire in Central Europe. In effect he rejects the outcome of the Cold War, the liberation of the slave empire in which he grew up.

The main effect of the attempt to bind Russia into the international system is that it is difficult or impossible to impose effective economic sanctions. The countries of Western Europe are far too dependent on trade with Russia. It is not only that they rely on Russian-supplied natural gas, but also that Russia buys much of

what they manufacture. Cutting Putin off will cost jobs, and that is particularly painful in a recession-racked Western Europe. The export-driven German economy undoubtedly relies heavily on sales to Russia, and it should not be surprising that the French intend to deliver the two helicopter carriers they are building for Russia – ships whose main role is probably to further Putin's ambitions against former Soviet republics.

For much the same reason, many in Europe and in the United States prefer not to understand that the same man who dismisses a treaty as a scrap of paper is unlikely to take commercial agreements very seriously (as Putin has already demonstrated by using the supply of natural gas as leverage).

What happens now? Putin will almost certainly keep moving, at least for a while. The next target is likely to be the Eastern Ukraine plus other parts of that country. In each case, Putin is testing to see how far he can go. During the Cold War, this was called 'salami tactics,' and it was never entirely clear how they could be countered. At what point would a massive reaction be justified? At what point will anyone say that Putin had swallowed so much of Ukraine that he was clearly an unjustified aggressor?

Perhaps it is worth thinking about Putin's real weaknesses. His economy depends heavily on gas and oil exports. Anything which depresses energy prices reduces his buying power and makes it more difficult for him to maintain his current military – which is nothing like as powerful as it was in Soviet times. In this sense moves towards American energy independence are also moves towards depressing energy prices worldwide.

Putin has to contend with serious potential minority problems within Russia, exemplified by the Chechen problem. All over southern Russia are Muslims who never identified with the Soviet Union. Reportedly Putin's Russia is trying to seize influence in Afghanistan, now that we are withdrawing. That may not prove to be a particularly good idea for him. The potential connection between Afghans and Muslims in what was then Soviet Central Asia justified the previous Soviet operation in Afghanistan, which ultimately had very unhappy consequences for the Soviet Union. There are also non-Muslim minorities. Under the Czars, Russia was often called the 'prison of nations,' and that is still true. To make matters more interesting, for decades the birth rates of non-Russian ethnics have dwarfed those of Russians.

All over the former Soviet Union there are substantial Russian minorities who moved out of the Russian Federated Republic, and who are more or less stranded in what Russians call the 'near abroad.' If Putin's real project is to reconstitute the Soviet Union, these minorities stand ready to justify it – to the extent that the supposed misery of Russians in Ukraine justifies Russian military action there.

To many of those in the former Soviet republics, the dissolution of the Soviet Union may not have seemed particularly tragic. To a Ukrainian, for example, the great gift offered by the Soviet Union was a massive man-made famine which killed five to seven million Ukrainians in the 1930s. The Ukrainians welcomed the Germans when they invaded in 1941, and after the Germans were defeated many of them continued the fight against the Soviets. Stalin deported many Ukrainians, including Crimean Tartars, to Siberia. They later returned, and they, too, are unlikely to see Putin as a liberator.

Above all, Putin faces China. Right now Siberia is a major potential Chinese energy source, but the Chinese have said that they consider the Russians unreliable suppliers. As more and more Chinese move into Siberia, Putin may have reason to observe that the Chinese have long included Siberia in the list of territories taken from them under humiliating unequal treaties. In the past, the Chinese accepted that they had no current claim on Siberia because no ethnic Chinese still lived there. That is no longer the case. At the very least, the large number of Chinese now living in Siberia are likely to demand a measure of autonomy which Putin cannot afford to grant.

We seem to be facing a prolonged period of hostility. It is not quite the Cold War, because Putin has no ideological weapon comparable to the Communism deployed by the old Soviet Union. That weapon gave the Soviets considerable traction in the West. The traction Putin currently enjoys is weaker, the unwillingness of Western governments to pay an economic (hence political) price for cutting Putin off. To the extent that the West recovers from recession, this traction weakens. Putin's Russia is far less self-sufficient than its Soviet predecessor. The post-Soviet crash badly damaged its defense industry. There is a reason why Russian displays at defense shows seem not to include much that is post-Soviet, let alone truly new. Relative Russian poverty means that it is much more difficult for Putin to expand his military, including nuclear, capabilities than it was for his predecessors.

That matters. Putin finds himself relying far more than the Soviets on nuclear threats. During the build-up to the present crisis, one of his cronies commented that Russia was the only country that could destroy the United States (with nuclear weapons). He omitted to point out that the United States could do the same to Russia. Perhaps it is time to ask whether Putin's antiquated arsenal really still works – and to take our own a lot more seriously.



Norman Friedman author of The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapon Systems

The War of 1812: *What it Means to the United States*

BY DR. CHUCK STEELE[1]

NOTE: the views expressed in this paper are those of its author and do not represent the official policy or position of the United States Air Force Academy, the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

While the opportunity to a celebrate a bicentennial has the United States Navy, and several supporting organizations, reveling in that service's achievements during the War of 1812, these efforts at commemoration are perpetuating a distorted view of the past. The war did produce a series of engagements that remain of inestimable value in establishing the ethos of the American naval profession, however, claims that the war saw the Navy assume the role of guarantor of American freedom of the seas obscures the facts that the United States Navy did not emerge from the war as a force capable of imposing its will on foreign powers, and that its most significant victories occurred far from any ocean.

Despite a remarkable string of victories in ship-to-ship encounters with the Royal Navy early in the conflict, the American Navy was eventually brought to heel on the high seas. Notwithstanding the decline in fortunes in the best-known arena for naval warfare, American sailors would make their chief contributions to the war effort on two lakes. The battles of Lake Erie and Lake Champlain afforded American sailors the opportunity to achieve clear-cut operational and strategic level victories that were vital to staving off disaster for the fledgling republic.

For some, the War of 1812 is seen as a second war of American independence. For them, the war is about a defiant young republic standing up to the world's greatest power and emerging once more as the champion of liberty. At the fore of the popular narrative is a young Navy that acquitted itself well, creating a new pantheon of heroes for the nation. The theme is one that the United States Navy proudly trumpets today. In what might best be termed an advertisement for the naval services, and the bicentennial of the War of 1812, visitors to the OurFlagWasStillThere website will reassuringly hear Richard Dreyfus inform them that the US Navy has been ensuring the freedom of the seas for two centuries. The video details that freedom of the seas was "the core cause of the conflict," and that the war "unleashed an American Navy" that has been "keeping the sea free for more than two hundred years."[2]

The problem with this commemoration is that it is based on a rather egregious exaggeration. Freedom of the seas and "sailors' rights," had been front and center in driving America to declare war on Britain, but these issues were not addressed in the Treaty of Ghent at the war's conclusion. So, while Speaker of the House of Representatives Henry Clay rallied his minions to wage war by decrying British assaults on American honor, and commerce, the performance of American arms would not lead to any change in the greater power's policies.[3] Specifically, the United States did not wring any concession from Britain

Friends as depicted in 2007 - the Royal Navy Invincible-class aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious, and Nimitz-class aircraft carriers USS Harry S Truman and USS Dwight D Eisenhower transit in formation during Operation Bold Step (Courtesy Royal Navy)

on matters concerning the future conduct of the Royal Navy in regard to respecting the inviolability of persons sailing under the flag of the United States. If the *Chesapeake-Leopard* Affair had been an unsettled point of honor that demanded satisfaction, none was to be found as a result of the war.[4]

The mythology of the war, particularly its naval elements, has recently prompted strong rebuttals from across the Atlantic. Foremost among those seeking to salvage the honor of the Royal Navy from the hosts of seemingly pernicious American mythmakers is Andrew Lambert of King's College, London. In his recent tome, *The Challenge*, Lambert labors to put American successes in proper context, while also restoring the image of a peerless Royal Navy. His objective in putting pen to paper is abundantly clear. "Although the war would drag on until 1814, its outcome was decided by the failure of the American army to conquer Canada, the defeat of American attacks on British merchant shipping and a devastating British economic blockade that left America bankrupt and insolvent." As he wryly notes, "the idea that the British 'lost' the war — in which they secured their war aims by compelling the Americans to stop invading Canada, destroyed their capital city and reduced them to insolvency in the process — is one that requires explanation."[5]

Although Lambert's *Challenge* is a well-researched and much needed corrective to traditional American accounts of the war at sea, it is neither a complete appraisal of the naval war, nor a definitive commentary on the relative merits of sailors and officers from both sides of the conflict. Lambert states that he is offering a "British perspective," and that his focus is on the Atlantic coast and sea lanes, what he considers the decisive theaters of the war.[6] While Lambert, in championing the "British perspective" is right in seeing the war as more a success for his homeland than a victory for the United States, and that the war at sea was decisive in delivering to Britain what was necessary to end the conflict, he fails to acknowledge the importance of the battles on the lakes in saving America from a far greater calamity.[7] Equally important, or perhaps of even greater relevance in establishing a distinctive American naval heritage, the battles on the lakes helped to diminish the effects, both real and psychological, of the American defeats at sea after 1812 that Lambert finds so impressive.[8]

In any evaluation of the War of 1812, it must be remembered that it was the United States that declared war on Britain. Nations, as a rule, do not make war merely as an exercise in honour. The young republic fearing British encroachments at sea, and more importantly to Clay and his War Hawk colleagues, their assistance to native tribes on the western frontier, thought it would be possible to end British interference in America's pursuit of prosperity by separating Canada from the mother country - a task the complexity of which the leadership of the United States severely underestimated.[9]

For the Americans Canada was the War's great objective. Strategically, there was no other center of gravity that could realistically be attacked with any hope of success. Despite the fact that the Americans had failed in their efforts to gain Canada in the Revolutionary War, many still believed that taking the last of Britain's continental North American holdings would not entail much difficulty. Indeed, in August of 1812, former President Thomas Jefferson wrote to William Duane, a self-taught soldier, that taking Quebec would merely be a "matter of marching."[10] Unfortunately for the young republic, America's inability to perform at the tactical and operational levels of war, especially on land, would make Jefferson's boast one of the most foolhardy claims in military history.

Having eschewed a professional military establishment built along European lines, the United States remained heavily dependent upon amateurs to wage war. With ad hoc forces being the norm in terms of the composition of both the regular army and the militias, the United States was in no sense prepared to wage offensive war against even a remote outpost of one of the world's great powers. Neither doctrinally, nor logistically were the Americans ready to go campaigning in the summer of 1812.[11] The lack of preparedness rapidly exposed the United States to near disaster. Almost as if it were some karmic act, the pro-war westerners, who were the most ardent supporters of the conflict, failed miserably in their first encounters with the enemy. Within a month of the outbreak of war, it appeared as though America might lose its Northwest Territory to Britain.

Specifically, the American advance on Upper Canada through Michigan was a failure of horrific proportions. General William Hull's attempted invasion of Canada resulted in his retreat to Detroit followed by a brief siege, and Hull's surrender of 2,500 Americans to a force of approximately 1,300 Canadians, British regulars, and Indians commanded by Sir Issac Brock. Hull had feared for the operational sustainability of his forces and had withdrawn to the safe haven of Detroit. Tactically, Hull and his forces could not even offer effective resistance to a numerically inferior force.[12] The loss of Detroit, coupled with the loss of Fort Dearborn and defeat at the battle of Queenston Heights, marked the American military effort of 1812 as a

Were enemies in 1812 but friends from then on - guided-missile destroyer USS Porter sails behind the Royal Navy frigate HMS Argyll while conducting operations off the coast of the United Kingdom

study in inefficiency and ineptitude.

Meanwhile in 1812, the war at sea had been a far more laudable affair for the Americans. The United Sates had bested Britain in three separate frigate-on-frigate encounters, and one sloop-on-sloop engagement. The victories were just the tonic needed after the failure of American land forces. While some fairly view the frigate actions as unequal affairs, in all three frigate victories American ships held the advantage of a greater weight of broadside, the net effect on American morale at the time was unencumbered by such analysis. Indeed, the victories at sea would become the stuff of legends and continue to inspire Americans two centuries later.

Among the more storied vessels of this epoch was the sloop-of-war *Hornet*, shooting to fame in early 1813. *Hornet*, commanded by Master Commandant James Lawrence, had a successful cruise off the Atlantic coast of South America culminating in the destruction of the British sloop *Peacock*. His triumphs in *Hornet*, along with earlier fame won against Tripoli's corsairs, marked Lawrence for public acclaim and greater command. Particularly, Lawrence's reward was to be made captain of the ill-fated frigate *Chesapeake*.

In Lambert's version of the Naval War of 1812, the conflict reaches its apex when the British exact revenge on Lawrence and wreak havoc on the *Chesapeake*. Having command of his frigate for less than two weeks, Lawrence nonetheless was eager to put to sea and rise to the challenge posed by *HMS Shannon* and its captain, Philip Broke. In some regards Lawrence was a victim of his own arrogance, while commanding *Hornet* he had issued a challenge to a British sloop in a manner similar to that presented by Broke.[13] Prepared, or not, Lawrence left Boston on 1 June 1813 and soon ran up against one of the most ably led and crewed frigates in the age of fighting sail. Broke and the *Shannons* made quick work of Lawrence and the *Chesapeake.* The fight lasted a mere quarter of an hour, and when it was done Lawrence was mortally wounded and his ship was in enemy hands.

However, the story of Lawrence and his defeat neither ends with his death, nor does it end in failure. Lawrence would achieve posthumous immortality as a source of inspiration to the young American Navy. As Lawrence was being taken below decks, to slowly succumb to a musket ball wound, he kept repeating the phrase, "Don't give up the ship." While it was little more than a tragic case of wishful thinking at the time, his words survived him to inspire other men engaged in a far more important battle.

The conduit through which Lawrence's unfortunate demise was transformed into everlasting fame was fellow American naval officer, Master Commandant Oliver Hazard Perry. With the British effectively blockading the East Coast, Perry had sought employment on the lakes bordering Canada as a likely arena for glory.[14] As Lawrence's death had proven, by the summer of 1813, the prospects for favorable action at sea were highly unlikely. The lakes, however, were an entirely different matter. The British did not command great fleets

in the inland seas, and the strategic significance of the lakes was as great as ever. Considering the humiliating defeat of Hull at Detroit in 1812, and the possibility of losing Michigan, command of Lake Erie was an absolute necessity if the United States was to avoid a defeat of staggering proportions.

Unlike the war at sea, Britain did not have any great advantage in resources, or experience in dealing with naval operations on the lakes. In many regards, the Battle of Lake Erie was a challenge of equal opportunity. Both sides would have to build naval squadrons from scratch, and find suitable commanders and crews to fight the ships.

Both the British and Americans worked quickly to remedy their weaknesses. Commodore Sir James Yeo, Britain's theatre commander for the border lakes, had detailed Trafalgar veteran Commander Robert Barclay to preside over the accumulation of forces on Lake Erie. In fact, in the race to gain ascendancy on the lake, the British were the first to claim the upper hand. Barclay's task was to maintain his advantage, making sure that the United States did not manage to mount a challenge to Britain's initial control of the lake.[15]

Yeo's American counterpart, Commodore Isaac Chauncey, had sent Perry to Lake Erie to wrest control from the British. Barclay, not remaining entirely vigilant in late July, had made it possible for Perry to combine a collection of small vessels with the two brigs, *Lawrence* and *Niagara*. The Americans went into battle on 10 September 1813 with a crucial advantage in terms of firepower. For the sake of commemoration what is most important about this engagement is how Perry, in securing victory, managed to make his friend Lawrence immortal. Not only did Perry's flagship bear his friends name, but his battle standard for the day recalled Lawrence's dying command, "Don't Give Up The Ship."

Despite advantages in weight of broadsides, the battle was a near run thing. Perry's second-in-command Master Commandant Jesse Elliott, was slow to bring *Niagara* up to engage the British, and the *Lawrence* was pounded into silence. Perry, bringing his battle standard with him, used the one remaining serviceable small craft to transfer his flag to the *Niagara,* where he then reengaged the British, most notably their two largest ships, the brigs *Queen Charlotte* and *Detroit*. In the end it was Perry who prevailed.[16] In a brief note to General William Henry Harrison (the Army commander who would retake Detroit) Perry proclaimed, "we have met the enemy and they are ours." Much to the apparent disappointment of some, Lawrence (and Perry) had achieved ever-lasting renown. Rather than being remembered as the man who lost the *Chesapeake* to Philip Broke, Lawrence is best known as the fighting captain who gave inspiration to his fellow officers, who then went on to beat the British in the most important theater of the war.

So what of all of this death and glory – what did it really yield? As it seems, placing the events of the Naval War of 1812 in context is an ongoing affair. The war at sea had not been a draw, Britannia continued ruling the waves. After early American successes the British restored their supremacy at sea. Additionally, the American capital had been burned, and the US economy was wrecked. The British of course made no concessions to American concerns over sailors' rights or the freedom of the seas. To imagine that the war did anything on that front is without substantiation. However, the Treaty of Ghent did not see the United States punished, or diminished for having tweaked the Lion's beard.

The Navy did not emerge from the war as the champion of freedom of the seas, but more often than not it acquitted itself well, creating a new generation of warrior exemplars. Even if it had not bested the Royal Navy at sea, the American Navy had interrupted the habit of British naval success, even turning Lawrence's debacle in command of the *Chesapeake* into a sort of martyrdom that resonates with American sailors to this day. Most importantly, for its efforts on Lake Erie (and on Lake Champlain a year later), the Navy had prevented Britain from going to the negotiating table with American territory firmly in its clutches. By winning the naval war on the lakes it had saved the nation from resounding defeat and added in no small part to its remarkable reputation as a fighting force.

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(Endnotes)

1 In reviewing my previous article in *Headmark* ("The Influence of History Upon Sea Power" March 2009), I noticed that in changing formats for the article I took quotes that had been blocked and converted them to ordinary single spacing, without setting them off from the rest of the text (specifically, the paragraphs preceding endnotes 4-6 should have been set off with quotation marks).

2 Video appears on the homepage of the website. Accessed April 15, 2013, http://www.ourflagwasstillthere.org/

3 For a discussion of Henry Clay's role in shaping the debate on war see David S. and Jeanne T. Heidler, *Henry Clay The Essential American* (New York: Random House, 2010), 90-98.

4 Transcript of the Treaty of Ghent, http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=20&page=transcript

5 Andrew Lambert, *The Challenge* (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 2012), 3.

6 Lambert, 3.

7 The realization that the United States narrowly averted disaster in the War of 1812 has been a fixture in texts in use, or used recently by cadets and midshipmen at the United States service academies, see E.B. Potter, *Sea Power A Naval History* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1981), 108. See also Robert Doughty and Ira Gruber ed. *Warfare in the Western World Military Operations From 1600-1871* (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1996), 307-308.

8 Tellingly, Lambert closes his account of the War of 1812 by recalling the last days and "undying personal glory," won by his story's hero Philip Broke, the Captain of *HMS Shannon*. Lambert, 457.

9 Theodore J. Crackel, "The Battle of Queenston Heights, 13 October 1812," in *America's First Battles 1776-1965*, ed. Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1986), 33.

10 "Thomas Jefferson to William Duane, 4 August 1812," Founders Online, National Archives (http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-05-02-0231, ver. 2013-06-26). Source: *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, Retirement Series, vol. 5, *1 May 1812 to 10 March 1813*, ed. J. Jefferson Looney. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), pp. 293–294.

11 Crackel, 33-43.

12 Crackle, 43.

13 Lambert, 157.

14 William S. Dudley ed., *The Naval War Of 1812 A Documentary History* (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 1992), p.404.

15 For a good compact account of the struggle for control of Lake Erie, see Thomas and Robert Malcomson's *HMS Detroit the Battle For Lake Erie* (Annapolis: USNI, 1990)

16 For accounts of the battle from the two squadron commanders, see: "Lieutenant Robert H. Barclay, R.N., to Commodore Sir James Lucas Yeo, R.N" and "Captain Oliver H. Perry to Secretary of the Navy Jones" in Dudley, PP.555-559.

Flying the ASEAN Flag

BY LCDR CHRIS WATSON

Since its inception 46 years ago ASEAN has emerged as an influential regional body. Through a spirit of understanding, cooperation and respect it desires to build a strong, mutually supportive Community of Southeast Asian nations. As an Association it neither judges nor interferes with its members' internal or foreign affairs.[1] It says it is determined to create an environment in which the region can benefit economically and socially from operating in a peaceful and secure world.

This article suggests a way in which the ASEAN members' naval forces can be employed to further promote the goal of achieving an ASEAN Community in the first part of a century which has the potential for turmoil, political, economic and military, among the Asia-Pacific nations. The impetus for tangible naval cooperation should perhaps have been the coastal devastation wrought on several member states by the 2004 tsunami. Unfortunately it appears even that unexpected force of nature and the subsequent embarrassing dependency on outsiders for assistance was insufficient to persuade ASEAN members that there exists a need for real naval interoperability.

ASEAN – Infancy to Maturity

In 1967 when the first five members of ASEAN declared their aspiration for regional cultural and economic cooperation, the world and Southeast Asia in particular, was a very different place. Today, in geo-political terms, regional security is more complex than it was 50 years ago. Given the significant economic and political developments in the intervening decades along with a doubling in ASEAN membership to ten regional nations, the ASEAN 'Declaration'[2] was seen by some to be increasingly obsolescent. However, in 2008 a revitalised Association produced the new ASEAN Charter which characterised a mature ASEAN, one that reflected a more worldly-wise and realistic outlook.

Signed in Singapore, the first three purposes of the Charter's very first article were clearly defence and security oriented. They included: 'maintain and enhance peace, security and stability'; 'promoting greater… security… cooperation' and preserving 'Southeast Asia as a Nuclear weapon-free zone and free of all other weapons of mass destruction'.[3] At the same time ASEAN also adopted a legal entity together with the decision to maintain permanent representatives with ambassador status. It is a little ironic that the Charter was signed in Singapore, with its not infrequent United States Navy visitors. ASEAN, perhaps because it is an Association rather than a formal alliance struggles on an almost daily basis with many internal contradictions between members' words and

Participants in the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting - Plus Maritime Security Field Training Exercise (ADMM-Plus MS FTX) taking place in HMAS Creswell and the East Australian Exercise Area between 29 Sep - 01 Oct 2013 (RAN image)

members' actions.

At ASEAN's 2003 Bali Concord II, the future 'ASEAN Community'[4] was announced. Just as a milking stool relies on three equal legs, the successful creation of the ASEAN Community depends for support on three equally important pillars, each pillar itself has a 'community' with specific guidance agreed at the Concord. The first pillar, to which the Defence organisations are integral, is Political and Security Cooperation supported by the appropriate ASEAN Security Community (ASC).

The Plus Debate

The ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) is the highest defence mechanism within ASEAN. One of its objectives since its inception in 2006 is to contribute to the establishment of the ASC. Others include cooperation in defence and security and giving guidance to senior defence officials. The ADMM objectives support ASEAN's broader aims of promoting regional peace and security. In 2010 the first ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting *Plus* (ADMM-Plus) met in Hanoi. For the ADMM-Plus, the ten ASEAN ministers were joined by ASEAN's eight 'Dialogue Partners'[5], namely Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Russia, and the United States. The ADMM-Plus process is a tool to engage ASEAN Dialogue Partners in dialogue and cooperation on defence and security matters and there are similar 'Plus' groupings in other portfolio areas.

There are obviously advantages in ASEAN expanding formal dialogue with other influential and developed nations. Exchanges or importation of expertise is one area ASEAN can benefit from the goodwill of its neighbours and those with a stake in the Indo-Pacific.

In Hanoi it was agreed there were five areas of practical cooperation which could usefully be pursued by ADMM-Plus. They are maritime security; counter-terrorism; disaster management; peacekeeping operations and military medicine. Each is supported by Experts' Working Groups (EWGs). It was agreed the ADMM-Plus countries would meet formally once every two years and the first ADMM-Plus Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR) and Military Medicine Exercise was conducted in Brunei in June 2013, held back-to-back with the 2nd ASEAN Militaries' HADR Exercise. The latter is a very small step on a steep staircase to reach the level required to address the effects of a similar event to the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami.

In September 2013 a Maritime Security Field Training Exercise (FTX) was conducted off Australia's Eastern seaboard. Primarily envisaged as a maritime constabulary confidence building event its location has necessarily more of a naval construct than might otherwise have been.

Although difficult to quantify empirically, it is probable that besides advantages, there are disadvantages involved in the inclusion of external nations in ASEAN forums, especially particularly powerful ones. Although the 'Plus' meetings generally occur the day after members' meetings there will inevitably be an exposure to external influences and competitive interests if only in sidebar discussions. If it is seen to be beneficial these outside influences will rarely hesitate to leverage the many internal disputes, border issues and overlapping claims of various types among ASEAN nations. Such influence may then lead to national decisions delaying the subsequent development of aspects of the ASEAN Community concept.

It may well not be in the interest of a powerful 'dialogue partner' for ASEAN to develop a particular policy stance and regular 'Plus' meetings and activities provide opportunities and potentials for regional competitors. As noted above, these may be overlaid on recognised internal disputes among ASEAN nations. ASEAN, with its noble beginnings and the understandable sensitivities of its many youthful member states still pragmatically feeling their way to a mature and secure sense of nationhood, seems to prefer sweeping difficult diplomatic issues under a rug of inertia. The continuing tension around the South China Sea economic and territorial claims is perhaps the most obvious example and one that invites outside attention for political and economic gain.

The Great Game in Overtime

The United States' Seventh Fleet conducts a series of annual bilateral naval exercises with most ASEAN members' navies under the direction of an overarching Joint Theater Security Cooperation Plan. It is sponsored by the Pacific Command, one of a handful of US military Combatant Commands encompassing the globe. Understandably, these plans are intended to exercise their influence in support of US grand strategy. In August 2013 *The Australian* newspaper reported that the US plans to establish a special naval task force to support the US marines in Darwin which the US Navy said was a "tangible demonstration of the sustained commitment of the United States to the Asia-Pacific region".[6]

The US has not yet said where this new amphibious readiness group will be based from 2018 onwards but from the perspective of speed, time and distance, it is very likely to be an ASEAN member nation. Australia has itself has already been ruled out. US engagement is mirrored to one degree or another by other competing regional

Flying the ASEAN Flag

players, for example the Australian-led annual multi-national Exercise Kakadu off Darwin in the Northern Australian Exercise Area.

Such shaping and influencing efforts are not limited to defence but they include other elements of national power, for example the growing economic involvement of China, encouraging a never before witnessed level of indebtedness among targeted South Pacific Island nations willing to cooperate. Effective naval cooperation has political and diplomatic considerations to take into account. The US would support multilateral participation in its annual series of Exercise Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) to ease the burden on its ships conducting the exercise bilaterally with seven of the nine navies in ASEAN but of course by working with the Seventh Fleet in such a manner, ASEAN would be sending a very different and likely undesirable signal to China than it would if its members just continue with their normal bilateral naval exercises.

ASEAN's navies are capable of working together to train for future humanitarian relief. This is one small but effective way to demonstrate and underscore the positive benefits of the Association and to chip away at the religious stresses sometimes in evidence in the 'Community'. If it is to become the secure political, economic and cultural Community envisaged in its ASEAN Vision for 2020 then in the pillar of Political and Security Cooperation it would definitely benefit from greater internally driven impetus and a little less exposure to competing international powers, some of whom are intent on playing a European style 'Great Game' in the Asian-Pacific region.

Naval Diplomacy – a Velvet Glove

The first aim of the 1967 ASEAN Declaration talked of strengthening 'the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of Southeast Asian Nations'. The second aim was 'to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter'. There is perhaps no more tangible and practical way of retaining the foundations of a peaceful regional community and promoting stability than through the cooperative employment of multinational naval power, preferably 'soft' but if ultimately necessary, 'hard' naval power.

The same year that ASEAN was taking its first steps onto the world stage, in the western hemisphere the focus of national leaders had been alternating between the corrupting influences of free love, ubiquitous drugs and a still very real, very serious Cold War. In 1967 NATO approved the formation of a naval contingency force, a multinational squadron of frigates and destroyers that still exists today only with a wider geographical remit and a different name. It is now the 'Standing NATO Maritime Group One (SNMG1)[7]. In the late 1960s the squadron was established as the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT). For NATO the concept has been an outstanding success, so much so that it has been replicated with a NATO mine counter-measures squadron, the Standing Naval Force Channel and a Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (now SNMG2). It has withstood the tests of time, re-organisations and politics within a large, often unwieldy and now recently expanded political alliance.

While the formation of STANAVFORLANT in the North Atlantic may be considered ground-breaking, naval influence as an element of a nation's power had been well practiced previously at a squadron level in peacetime. The British created the West Africa Squadron in 1808 to combat the slave trade. Indeed the United States Navy contributed vessels to the squadron for over twenty years until it founded its own Africa Squadron. Article Eight of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842 stated that although the British and American Squadrons were independent of one another, the two Governments stipulated they would "nevertheless, to give such orders to the officers commanding their respective forces, as *shall enable them most effectually to act in concert and cooperation, upon mutual consultation, as exigencies may arise*."[8] More recently in 1995, the European Union developed a non-standing maritime force, EUROMARFOR[9]. The size of the force is inherently flexible and may be activated within 5 days. Since its creation it has been activated for a total of 62 months in support of four operations.

NATO's on-call squadron is composed of ships from alliance nations. Some nations permanently allocate an asset while others periodically offer a ship. There are real advantages to be gained for those nations and navies participating. Their ships integrate, operate, train and exercise as a group, providing day-to-day verification of current NATO maritime tactics, procedures, and their effectiveness. Personnel are encouraged to mix during port visits and take part in sporting and cultural events. At sea there are regular personnel exchanges. Today those that routinely contribute to SNMG1 are Canada, Denmark, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and the United States. Ships are usually attached to the force for up to six months, on a rotating basis and units of one nation do not necessarily

RAN clearance divers embark 816 Squadron's Seahawk helicopter from the deck of HMNZS Te Mana (RAN photo)

relieve ships of the same nation.

By appointing the force commander and their staff for up to one year, NATO can achieve continuity and stability in leadership while offering a valuable and respected command position to a rotation of participating nations. NATO's ground forces, to a degree, reflect this approach with their Rapid Deployable Corps' organisations. The present SNMG1 Commander is Norwegian. The squadron commander is normally embarked in his own nation's ship together with a small multi-national staff.

A Time for Trust?

Throughout ASEAN's development the emphasis for the Association has been on cooperation and peaceful coexistence. This is an ideal way forward. Unfortunately, as tensions around claims and counter claims in the South China Sea show no signs of being dispelled, the ASEAN way is proving a little too idealistic. China negotiates bilaterally but not multilaterally, a 'divide and conquer' policy which only serves to emphasise ASEAN's own fault lines. President Obama's 'Pivot to East Asia'[10] strategy has done nothing to lessen Chinese resolve and in a number of ways has increased pressures on ASEAN members. In 1997 when announcing their Vision for 2020 ASEAN declared: "We are now a market of around 500 million people with a combined gross domestic product of US$600 billion"[11]. By highlighting the size of the ASEAN market they were also inadvertently advertising to the major powers that they were a market worth fighting over. Overlaid on such 'big picture' issues are many more subtle influences affecting ASEAN's internal and external relations. Take for example the influence of enfranchised wealthy Chinese communities in all the ASEAN nations who will have a substantial economic interest when it comes to relations with external nations and especially of course, those with China.

ASEAN has survived almost fifty years of suspicion and scepticism by promoting consensus and influencing developing dialogue. It has encouraged multinational fora like the ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN + 3 in order to protect and extend its benevolent aims beyond its immediate region. By developing the 'ASEAN way' it has avoided many of the economic and political pitfalls of the European Community but along the way it seems to have accepted outside interference as a fact of life. The Australian led non-UN peacekeeping mission into East Timor, in which three ASEAN nations contributed troops, provides an excellent example of ASEAN's pragmatism. One of the outcomes of East Timor was to prompt Indonesia to develop the concept of the ASC, only to see its original strong call for an integrated defence and security institution watered down to one of more integrated security cooperation[12]. No ASEAN peacekeeping force is envisioned by 2020 or indeed is likely anytime beyond that.

It is probable that the security offered to Malaysia and Singapore since 1971 under the Five Power Defence Arrangements has contributed to

limiting their impetus in considering ASEAN security cooperation as an essential element of foreign policy. Similarly, US military interests in the Philippines (given the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951 and the 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement) and now Singapore may be interpreted as offering a form of protection that negates the need for ASEAN to develop closer military ties. Add to these the widely perceived US strategic interest in limiting Chinese hegemony in the region. At the August 2013 ADMM-Plus meeting the US Secretary of Defence, Chuck Hagel, underscored Washington's commitment to Southeast Asia's security. He announced that the US has a $90 million budget for "foreign military financing and international military education and training programs in Southeast Asia". This is an increase of 50% on four years ago and includes institutions like the ADMM-Plus.[13]

Ultimately the 'ASEAN way' to a secure future appears to ultimately depend on trust. Trust that the US presence will continue to maintain free trade, safe and secure sea lines of communication and overall peace and stability and remain the principal regional security guarantor. Trust that China will not upset the ASEAN durian cart.

At the ADMM in Phnom Penh in 2012 the ASEAN Defence Ministers had an informal meeting with China's Minister of National Defence. During the meeting, China reassured ASEAN that China would always adhere to the principles of peaceful co-existence with ASEAN, and resolving disputes by peaceful means. China also reassured ASEAN that it was ready to work with ASEAN to advance mutual trust for regional peace and stability.[14] Can China be trusted? Through its actions, or rather inaction, ASEAN either believes so or is prepared for someone else (the USA) to both pay the premium and pay up on any claims on ASEAN's insurance policy if they are wrong. Over the course of the next half century and looking towards the Association's centenary the 'ASEAN way' may prove to be a most successful strategic gamble.

There are so many interwoven dependency threads stretching around and across the Indo-Pacific among scores of interested nations. In a global era of strategic communications when the European Community is opening delegations across the region and Australia has representatives to NATO, newly forged relationships and agreements that cause surprise are very rare indeed. ASEAN may already have been left behind in terms of its pillar for an economic community. It is not only bilateral free trade agreements which compete. When in 2005 Brunei and Singapore joined a Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement with Chile and New Zealand they were to encourage the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement discussions which are in their 19th round and include another eight Pacific nations not least the USA and Japan and from ASEAN, Malaysia and Vietnam.[15] If agreement is reached, those four ASEAN nations will have access to products, services and bigger markets denied to the other members. So to one degree or another ASEAN remains a house divided with fault lines running through each of the three pillars required to bolster its community vision.

An Incomplete Vision

Why then could this be considered a good time for ASEAN to consider a standing naval squadron? There have certainly been more appropriate times, such as in the year following the Tsunami. ASEAN now stands at a crossroads. Grand pronouncements look increasingly unrealistic as 2020 approaches. Writing in 1949, George Orwell probably thought 1984 incredibly far away. Arthur C Clarke penned 2001: A Space Odyssey in the late 1960s. In 1997 ASEAN announced its Vision for 2020. If the Association is to retain sufficient relevance and credibility to continue to be a body of influence it must deliver some measurable output toward its Vision. Words, meetings, conferences and innumerable committees simply will not suffice. Being relatively small and mobile, an advantage of a multinational naval squadron is that it does not need a headquarters or, like ASEAN itself, a permanent secretariat, fixed in one country. This removes any element of competition or compromise. If formed it would be a squadron for peace, for disaster relief, for mutual support in crises. It would not only strengthen that pillar of Political and Security Cooperation but directly benefit the other pillars of Socio-Cultural and Economic Cooperation.

Its success by 2020 would be something to point at, a distraction perhaps from other less positive developments. A recent edition of the Indonesian Strategic Review calls for exercises among ASEAN navies.[16] STANAVFORLANT was the natural progression of years of regular NATO naval exercises. ASEAN has the opportunity to learn from NATO's experience and grasp the nettle now. Forty six years after its creation and only seven remaining before its Vision 2020, creating its own squadron would avoid a decade or so of exercises before reaching the conclusion that an ASEAN squadron is an optimum solution.

Such a squadron could support ADMM principles by permitting occasional participation by ADMM-Plus Dialogue Partners. This would enhance regional peace and security,

expertise and knowledge would increase in operational terms and levels of trust increase. Such additional participation should be on an invitation only basis – if a nation offends ASEAN the invitation may then easily be withdrawn. Such a squadron would encourage more balanced and cooperative naval procurement and professional information exchange. Provoked by the USN's 1000-ship navy concept and the threat of interference by anti-piracy patrols, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand have already proved (in the Strait of Malacca) that cooperative security patrols are achievable among ASEAN members.[17]

ASEAN should be prompted to act by its own failing vision. Navies are excellent ambassadors for peace in a turbulent world and multinational groups even more so. A worthy alternative if much less pragmatic proposal would be a United Nations Peacekeeping Flotilla for the South China Sea. That however that would only serve to emphasise that ASEAN was not itself prepared or capable of assisting its own maritime and coastal communities. Such a formation would inevitably be subject to the influence of those outside Southeast Asia with an interest in shaping and influencing in support of their own national interests.

In conclusion, an ASEAN Naval Squadron would be politically controversial, perhaps most crucially among its own member nations. It would inevitably send signals externally and internally to the global community, some welcome and some unwelcome. Among the twelve points contained in the ASC, one subscribes to the principle of comprehensive security as having broad political, economic, social and cultural aspects in consonance with the ASEAN Vision rather than to a defence pact, military alliance or a joint foreign policy. However, the twelfth (and last) point is that ASEAN 'shall explore innovative ways to increase its security and establish modalities for the ASEAN Security Community'. This paper has suggested one way to do exactly that.

We exist in an age when India and China are building their own aircraft carriers. The ASEAN way still has an opportunity, despite the differences between its members and with a spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation, to provide a reasonable alternative to the direct involvement of powerful maritime powers operating in its own backyard. ASEAN itself began with a laudable vision of peace and prosperity for the people of Southeast Asia. If it is ever to be achieved it is a vision that requires defining actions not only noble ideals and honourable intentions.

The views expressed in this paper are the personal views of the author and are not the official view of any government or other authority.

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Centenary of ANZAC (Navy)

BY LIEUTENANT COMMANDER DESMOND WOODS

The last half of 1914 and the first half of 2015 were very busy months for the young RAN and the same period a century on will be filled with Centenary of Anzac (Navy) commemorative activities. These events will remind Australians of those key naval and maritime events in which the RAN took part both in the Pacific, the Indian Ocean and in the Dardanelles.

German Pacific Colonies: August–September 1914

The decision made in the first weeks of the war by both the British and Australian governments to prioritise the capture of the German colonies in the Pacific, ahead of seeking to bring the German East Asia Squadron to battle, is one that naval historians have been debating for a century. The seizure of German wireless telegraphy and cable stations seemed to be important as they provided the means by which Berlin could theoretically stay in touch with its far-flung colonies and direct its warships ships. In retrospect these isolated telegraphy stations were not as significant as contemporaries thought they were likely to be.

The German colony in Samoa and its WT station was taken without loss of life by a New Zealand force supported by *HMAS Australia*. The taking of the WT station on New Britain, near Rabaul, was resisted by regular and irregular German troops and four members of the RAN and one medical officer of the RAAMC lost their lives in a day of fighting at Bita Paka.

The question arises as to why was this attack was led by the Navy rather than by the Army militia units that were left in support. The explanation is that at the outbreak of the war the RAN's Reserve naval brigades contained well trained, experienced and disciplined officers and sailors who it was widely recognised were needed to provide a cutting edge for the 1500 largely raw recruits of the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force (ANMEF).

The attack at Bita Paka: 11 September 2014

This confidence in the naval reservists, led by their RN and RAN officers, meant that on 11 September 1914, in the attack up the jungle track leading to the defended WT station, the Navy led the way and incurred five of the ANMEF's six fatalities.

Lieutenant Commander Charles Elwell, RN, was fatally wounded, sword in hand, leading his sailors in a bayonet charge into a German trench. Able Seamen Robert Moffatt, Henry Street, William Williams and John Courtney all died later from their wounds. Army Medical Officer Captain Brian Pockley was shot because after treating Williams he left with him his protective Red Cross arm brassard to ensure that he was not fired on again. This selfless act cost Pockley his life as he was fatally wounded while advancing to assist others. Without his Red Cross brassard showing him to be a medical officer, and therefore protected from direct fire, he appeared to be an advancing combatant.

The loss of AE1: 14 September 2014

Only three days later, on 14 September *HMAS AE1,* patrolling from Rabaul, failed to return from a dive and is still missing. Entombed within her are her Captain, Lieutenant Commander Thomas Besant, RN, and his 34 men, half RAN and half RN. The RAN's effort to find *AE1* will continue. The cause of her loss remains a mystery but Besant had experienced difficulties in controlling her trim on many occasions on her delivery voyage from Portsmouth and it is possible that this was the cause of her loss.

AE2 at Cockatoo Island 1914 (RAN photo)

AE2 crew as Prisoners of War on 22 Dec 1915 (RAN photo)

Commemorative Events – Bita Paka and Rabaul: 11–14 September 2014

The five ANMEF lives lost will be remembered on their centenary at the

Bita Paka cemetery where the Office of Australian War Graves is building a new memorial wall. This will gather a number of older memorial plaques into one place and provide a new focus for commemoration.

It is anticipated that a service to remember the crew of *AE1* will occur in Rabaul and at sea in her last known location. There will also be a simultaneous service at the *AE1* and *AE2* memorials at the Naval Heritage precinct at Garden Island Fleet Base East in Sydney on 14 September which will be attended by members of the serving and retired submarine community and by *AE1* descendants.

Albany Convoy Commemorative Event (ACCE): 31 October–3 November 2014

The City of Albany has much history to remember in 2014 and it will be the host for the first national Centenary of Anzac commemoration service. Albany was where the Australian and News Zealand troops who were to win enduring fame and suffer so terribly in action were first brought together. The name ANZAC was yet to be used but this was where the men who were to call themselves by that name first saw each other. Troops were not granted leave but trained in the hills around Albany as they prepared physically for the long confinement of the voyage and for whatever fate had in store for them. Most men expected that they were going to Aldershot military camp, the UK's largest army depot, and then on to France and Belgium, to the Western Front. The names 'Gallipoli' and 'the Dardanelles' would have meant nothing to them in 1914. RAN sailors marched with them through the streets of Albany as they were farewelled by the townspeople. They too were preparing for war, and in the case of *HMAS Sydney*'s sailors they would be engaged in battle much sooner than they knew.

The Anzacs sailed in 37 troopships from St George's Sound in from Albany and Fremantle on 1 November 1914, escorted by the RN, (*HMS Minotaur*), the RAN, (*Sydney* and *HMAS Melbourne*) and by the Japanese heavy cruiser *IJN Ibuki.* They sailed into history and for many thousands of men this rugged West Australian coastline was to be the last they ever saw of their homeland. Four years of war lay ahead and only the seriously wounded who were repatriated and the very fortunate would survive.

Commemorations in Albany 31 October – 2 November 2014

On the evening of Friday 31 October an RAN guard and band will perform Beat to Quarters and Ceremonial Sunset in the Anzac Peace Park. On the morning of Saturday, 1 November one hundred Australian Army troops and a smaller contingent from the New Zealand Army, with RAN, RAAF and international platoons, will march up York Street to be joined by a large group of veterans and cadets at the top. The parade will march down York Street saluting the reviewing officer and the cenotaph. This parade will be followed by an Anzac commemorative service in the Peace Park.

On Saturday afternoon the newly built National Anzac Centre (NAC) will be opened on the high bluff looking out over King George's Sound,



Right elevation and plan of the Ibuki-class cruisers from Brassey's Naval Annual 1915; the shaded areas represent armour



Plan of the Emden-Sydney battle from Franz Joseph's book Emden

where the ships anchored in 1914. The NAC will contain a permanent exhibition which will tell the story of the convoy assembling at Albany and its departure for war. The international fleet of warships which will anchor in the Sound for the commemorations will sail past the NAC, salute, and symbolically re-enact the departure of the convoy.

Ships Open Day: Sunday 2 November

On Sunday 2 November RAN and international ships will be open to the public. Unlike their ANZAC ancestors the ADF will be given leave to go into Albany to play sport against local teams and to join in the weekend activities as the City of Albany transforms Stirling Terrace into a pedestrian precinct with live music and food stalls. An Anzac concert, led by the RAN Band, will be held in the Albany Entertainment Centre with contributions from Australia and New Zealand and proceeds to service charities.

More information is available online at: http://www.anzacalbany.com.au/

The Battle of Cocos Island: 9 November 1914

In October 1914 the Australian and New Zealand Governments and the British Admiralty were well aware of the disaster that could overwhelm an unescorted convoy or single troopships as they sailed to war. They took no risks with soldiers lives. An escorting naval force was needed because SMS *Emden* was known to be at large in the Indian Ocean, sinking merchant ships at will and evading all attempts to bring her raiding career to a close.

Nine days after the convoy sailed into the Indian Ocean the wireless telegraphists on Direction Island, at the entrance to Cocos lagoon, alerted any ship within range that: *'an unknown warship is entering the harbour'.* This was followed by '*Emden is here*' which was repeatedly tapped out until the German shore party closed the station by smashing the transmitter and felling the radio mast. By then the message had been heard and *Emden*'s fate was sealed. Nemesis, in the shape of the more heavily armed and armoured *HMAS Sydney* caught the German light cruiser off Direction Island and shelled her until the 'Swan of the East' was a fiery wreck aground on Keeling Island with 137 of her crew dead and many more wounded. *Sydney* lost four men dead and would have lost many more if every German shell which hit her had exploded.

When taken prisoner *Emden*'s Captain Karl von Muller was asked by *Sydney*'s Captain John Glossop what he would have done if he had known that the troop convoy was so close to *Emden*'s position. He replied: "I would have shadowed by night and attacked at dawn with guns and torpedoes until I was out of ammunition or sunk."

On Direction Island, which is now uninhabited and has returned to native coconut palms, an interpretive walk and a commemorative Gazebo will be opened which explain the history of the WT Station and the tragic events of 9 November 1914.

Sydney-Emden 100 Commemoration

On 9 November 2014, a century on from the Battle of Cocos Island, a new *Sydney-Emden* 100 Memorial Mast will be unveiled on West Island at an RAN-led commemorative service. From its yard will hang replicas of *Sydney* and *Emden*'s ships' bells. Descendants of both captains and from the ships' companies will be in attendance. Eleven members of the '*Emden* Familie' are expected. The plinth of the new memorial will carry in English and German, the words: 'Friends Today, Friends Tomorrow, Friends Forever.' This was the signal flown by the RN as the two navies parted after Kiel week in July1914, after the sailors had played sport and hosted each other in their messes. The same friendly sporting rivalry and social activity occurred at Hong Kong that month. Within a month they were at war across the world.

Another significant anniversary to come...USS Shoup sails into the Port of Albany to come alongside with HMA Ships Darwin and Sirius for the Great White Fleet 100th Anniversary (RAN photo)

HMAS AE2 Commemorative Service – Sea of Marmora 2015

AE2 was not the most successful submarine to prosecute the underwater campaign against the Turkish shipping supplying troops on the Gallipoli peninsular in 1915, but *AE2* was the first to run the gauntlet of the guns, mines, destroyers and searchlights that defended the Dardanelles. LCDR Henry Hugh Gordon Dacre Stoker, RN, and his mixed RAN and RN crew of 35 showed the Sea of Marmora could be reached. Most memorably he signalled that *AE2* was through on 25 April 1915. Stoker's efforts to sink Turkish ships were limited by the vigilance of the Turks and the limitations of the *AE2* and her torpedoes. Her buoyancy control was also inadequate causing her to surface without warning and dive below her safe depth – perhaps the same design fault which may have doomed her sister *AE1*.

Fortunately when *AE2* was disabled on the surface by Turkish naval gunfire Stoker was able to save every life onboard before ensuring that *AE2* plunged to the bottom.

AE2 - Silent Anzac Project 2014-15

AE2 was rediscovered in 1998 by Turkish marine archaeologist and diver, Selcuk Kolay. She lies 73 metres below the surface. In June 2014 divers from Project Silent Anzac (PSA) will make a detailed survey inside and outside of her hull. The *AE2* Commemorative Foundation's PSA, supported by the Australian Government, will provide the first video imagery of the interior of the vessel. Before leaving divers will replace and secure a new hatch and will protect her hull through cathodic treatment to prevent corrosion which would destroy her over time. The wreck site will be marked with buoys to prevent damage from fishing nets.

First Convoy Departure 1914

Commemorative Service – AE2 April 2015

The RAN will have a ship in the Sea of Marmora and a commemorative ceremony will be held over the wreck of *AE2* on 22 April 2014. Though none of her crew was lost with their submarine four of her men did not survive their time as Turkish prisoners of war. Chief Stoker Charles Varcoe, Petty Officer Stephen Gilbert, Able Seaman Albert Knaggs and Stoker Michael Williams died of illness in captivity in 1916. They deserve to be remembered.

Stoker wrote of his crew: 'Men living together in closely confined quarters, sharing in absolute equality the hazards of every danger, each one holding the lives of all in their hands.... comradeship comes firmly and with depth of meaning to such men.'

Anzac Cove - April 25 2015

The RAN will have ships off Anzac Cove at dawn on the morning of the 25 April 2015. They will be there to salute and remember all those Australians who stormed ashore on that first Anzac Day and those that followed them. The RAN will remember particularly those who lost their lives on the Gallipoli peninsular a century ago.

November 1918 – Scapa Flow Orkney Islands

The RAN continued to serve across the oceans of the world and blockade Germany in the years after the Gallipoli campaign was over. In 1918 *HMAS Australia* was given the honour of leading the RN's Battle Cruiser Squadron which escorted the surrendered German Battle Fleet into captivity in the fleet anchorage at Scapa Flow. The young RAN had been tested in global war and not been found wanting.

Lieutenant Commander Desmond Woods, RAN is the Staff Officer Centenary of Anzac (Navy)

The Far Flank of the Indo-Pacific: India and China in the South-West Pacific

BY SALONI SALIL - Future Directions International Visiting Fellow

Key Points

- ASEAN is the top flank of the Indo-Pacific and the South-West Pacific forms its lower flank. Both are critical to the wider Indo-Pacific region.
- India and China are the two giants of Asia, each with populations of over one billion people, growth-driven strategies, inherent identity differences, colliding core interests and acute demand for supplies of energy and raw materials. These features have led them down a competitive path.
- China has been engaged in the South-West Pacific for a long time now. In the long run, however, its activities may lead to political, social and economic undercurrents.
- Future Assessments by the Indian strategic community indicate that increasing engagement in the South-West Pacific will require a fresh Pacific Policy. India has a lot to offer and this is now being recognised by the Pacific Island countries.
- India does not hold any strategic ambitions in the South Pacific. Consequently, its engagement there might become an area of co-operation, rather than competition, between India and China. The question remains, however, whether India would entrust its regional interests to a traditional competitor.

Summary

Traditionally, the South Pacific islands have been considered strategically insignificant. However, the need for resources, and the geopolitical shift towards Asia-Pacific have prompted nations to realise that these small island states control large resource-rich ocean areas and are increasingly geostrategic.[1] While ASEAN is the top flank of the Indo-Pacific region, the South-West Pacific forms the lower flank. Both are critical to the wider region, a globally important network of maritime markets and resources that underpins the future of global growth and stability. From the perspective of India, both flanks also need to be well connected and amenable to India's interests. Whereas ASEAN is the centrepiece of India's "Look East" policy, the South-West Pacific is the other major part of that equation. It must be addressed appropriately, if not equally, if India's geostrategic interests are to be secured.

With their growth-driven strategies, inherent identity differences, potentially colliding core interests and acute demands for energy supplies and raw materials, India and China, Asia's two demographic giants, are seemingly set on a path of competition for access to resources and markets in various parts of the globe. There is, accordingly, a growing need for India to devise a Pacific Policy consistent with this reality, including a revision of the existing "Look East" policy, to manage India's geo-strategic and geo-economic imperatives.

This article also analyses China's seemingly comprehensive geo-economic presence and its extensive activities in the South-West Pacific, which could prove a major obstacle for India in this emerging, high-value geopolitical region. Nevertheless, the pressing need for India is to have a fresh reformulation of its existing ties to this region, as the global system continues in its state of flux.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen U.S. Navy greets Tongan Honor Guard soldiers during a visit to the kingdom (US Navy)

China's Pacific Policy

For a long time, the rivalry between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) was one of the driving forces for Beijing's engagement with the South Pacific Island countries. China's gradual but steady move towards the South Pacific

has been further determined by its diplomatic and strategic needs. By creating a sphere of influence in this region, China is possibly attempting to buy votes. Regardless of their size, the Pacific Island countries have equal voting rights in international fora, meaning that China could, potentially, tilt their votes in its favour to help meet its own national interests and aid in projecting its global power. One commentator said: 'China aims at seeking military access in the South Pacific, most importantly for signal intelligence. For example, China built a satellite tracking station in Kiribati in 1997, which was subsequently dismantled after Kiribati switched diplomatic recognition to Taiwan. China is also seeking naval access to the region's ports and exclusive economic zones, [and] engages in military assistance programmes.'[2]

In 2006, the coup in Fiji, which was condemned by Australia and New Zealand in particular, and Fiji's subsequent expulsion from the Commonwealth of Nations, gave China an opportunity to forge closer ties with Fiji, taking advantage of Suva's "Look North" policy. China's robust Pacific policy may sooner or later pose challenges to Indian interests: 'Chinese diplomacy, aid, economic interactions and manifestations of soft power have increased the country's influence in the South Pacific region. By some accounts, China's influence is already approaching that of traditional stakeholders Australia and New Zealand.'[3]

Despite this trend, the unregulated nature of China's foreign aid and business investments, although attractive to many Pacific Island states, may mean that its Pacific Policy produces political and social effects that affect the region's peace and stability.[4] On the other hand, the implications of increasing Chinese aid and trade in the region, as well as the perceived security challenges arising from them, have increased in importance.[5]

India's Pacific Policy

Former Indian External Affairs Minister SM Krishna has said: 'The "Look North" policy of the Pacific countries and the "Look East" Policy of India will dovetail to create new synergies, as Pacific Island countries are rich in natural resources and there is vast potential for co-operation in diverse spheres.'[6]

India could take advantage of China's declining image and use it to positively enhance its relations with the Pacific Island countries and be a contributor in maintaining stability, security and peace in this region. Thus, India is looking to augment relations with the Pacific Island countries in the spirit of South-South Co-operation.[7] Indeed, in addition to Australia and New Zealand, India has already been collaborating with many of Pacific countries, including Tonga, Fiji and Papua New Guinea.

In keeping with its "Look East Policy" and economic liberalisation, India has engaged with regional groupings, such as the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); also, at the 33rd annual Summit of the Pacific Islands Forum held in Suva in 2012, India was included as a Dialogue Partner. Such engagement is testimony to the fact that India is ready to look beyond its traditional foreign policy parameters. It is a move that has great potential for both India and the region.

India has a lot to offer, which is now being recognised by the Pacific Island countries and its diplomatic network is establishing more relationships in the South Pacific. 'The level of engagement between India and Tonga and some other South Pacific countries, has escalated in recent years. India has been providing a platform for diplomatic and military training programmes for these countries (only four Pacific countries have military forces), as well as supplying development aid.'[8]

India's relations with the Kingdom of Tonga have gone from strength to

Maritime forces from India, Japan and the US underway during Malabar 2009, a trilateral training exercise led by the Indian Navy

The Far Flank of the Indo-Pacific: India and China in the South-West Pacific

strength, especially after the re-opening of the Indian High Commission in Suva, Fiji. India has provided defence training to the officer corps of the Tongan military and this programme should be expanded in scope to other ranks and also to include equipment transfer, especially for use in disaster relief and search and rescue operations. Although the two countries do not yet share significant trade and investment ties, India has provided critical infrastructure development aid.

Both India and Fiji are developing countries that share cultural and historical linkages. According to the Fijian High Commission in New Delhi:

> In an increasingly inter-connected global environment, coupled with the rise of India as a global player, the broadening of bilateral relations is advantageous to Fiji, both in terms of Fiji's international profile (engagement and partnership with a powerful global player) and Fiji's economic prosperity. If Fiji can lay the foundations of a strong relationship with India, it will be in a favourable position to reap the benefits of India's present and projected phenomenal growth.[9]

In the case of the Solomon Islands, 'India has been offering 15 scholarships to Solomon Islands under the Indian Technical and Economic Co-operation programme (ITEC). As part of Government of India's Regional Assistance Initiatives for Pacific Island countries, grants-in-aid in 2008, 2009 and 2010 totalling to US$350,000 had been offered to Solomon Islands for the supply of equipment and materials for social programmes.'[10]

An obvious feature of India's relations with the countries in this area of the Indo-Pacific is the negligible amount of trade and commerce. This needs to be improved, especially in view of India's profile as a fast-growing economy and its sustained development. Development of a network of manageable small markets and trade relations over this vast strategic region is now crucial for India.

Implications for Australia

Most of the bilateral relations that India previously forged with the island states of the South-West Pacific was subject to, and motivated by, the Cold War. But an emerging new epoch of global relations – the so-called Asian century – will demand a new approach. For India, failure to take the appropriate steps to expand its ties on this flank of the Indo-Pacific risks a loss of support in one of the biggest geographical spaces on the planet, one that is home to numerous small nations. This has a bearing on India's role as a global power and its ability to respond and contribute solutions to challenges affecting security and development at home and abroad. Shoring up support in this part of the Indo-Pacific is as critical to India's interests as the East African flank.

The other major power in this Asian century, China, has emerged from a continental focus to deploy a concerted diplomatic and strategic push among the island states of the South-West Pacific; initially as part of its efforts to secure diplomatic recognition at the expense of Taiwan (of the 21 countries that recognise Taiwan, six are located in the Pacific).

Australia has expressed some reservations about an assertive China in the South Pacific. China's approaches in finance, investments and trade have caused concerns and have even been seen as challenges to Australia's engagement in the region. In contrast, India's enhanced diplomacy in the region does not seem to pose any further risks. India is the world's largest democracy and has experience in letting open, democratic values guide its development. With these assets and the success of its efforts in alleviating poverty, India has a lot to offer. Greater engagement by India would share the burden of security and development in the South-West Pacific, leaving more opportunity for Australia to address its own challenges; India would very much complement and supplement Australia's efforts.

In conclusion, assessments by the Indian strategic community make strong recommendations for further engagement in the South Pacific, which would call for a fresh Pacific – if not Indo-Pacific – Policy. The issue,

The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer JDS Kurama leads the guided-missile destroyer USS Fitzgerald, flying their battle flag, and the Indian Navy guided-missile destroyer INS Ranvir

however, is still under discussion and deliberation. Some might be concerned about China's reaction, since Beijing has been extremely wary of India's growing involvement in the Asia-Pacific region; even more so now with the United States focussing on India's emerging global strategic role. 'Asia-Pacific is now the Indo-Pacific, a term underlining the centrality of India in the new calculus of regional power. The 2010 US Quadrennial Defence Review talked of India's positive role as a "net security provider in the Indian Ocean and beyond." India's "Look East" policy, which envisions high-level engagement with "China-wary" nations, dovetails with the US policy of establishing closer ties with countries beyond traditional partners to maintain US predominance."[11]

Both Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his former Chinese counterpart, Wen Jiabao, have said they believe that there is enough space in the world for both countries to grow.[12] Their convergence on issues such as climate change has produced positive outcomes in international fora and working together could only prove beneficial for both countries. If India does not hold any strategic ambitions in the South Pacific quadrant of the Indo-Pacific, then its engagement with the region might become an area of co-operation, rather than competition. The question remains, however, whether India would entrust its interests in the region to a traditional competitor. Both the Indian and Chinese Diasporas in this region will be instrumental in determining the relationship between their home countries.

As for India, it needs to extend its diplomatic presence as a step towards augmenting its relations. Currently, it only has diplomatic posts in Australia, New Zealand, Fiji and Papua New Guinea. Areas of convergence between India and the Pacific Island countries include climate change and security; India could also help to stabilise the situation within these countries, as some of them face internal challenges. While the Pacific Island countries lack economic volume and depth, more trade with India would provide a good platform for building economic ties and creating more numerous strategic partners. It might even blunt any potential future Chinese attempt at leverage against India.

Sailors chock and chain an Indian Navy Chetak helicopter to the flight deck of the guided-missile destroyer USS Fitzgerald as amphibious command ship USS Blue Ridge passes behind (USN photo)

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

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Confrontation at Sea: The Midshipman Who Almost Shot 'The General'

BY IAN PFENNIGWERTH

General Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief Southwest Pacific Area, had little knowledge of or regard for the Royal Australian Navy, one of the forces under his command. He once dismissed it as 'having neither battleships nor aircraft carriers', which was true, but 'The General' as he was referred to by all and sundry failed to observe that the RAN did have motor launches. This was nearly his undoing as the following tale relates.

To set the scene, the Motor Launches (ML) of the RAN – with numbers instead of names – were built to a British 'Fairmile' B-Type design either in Britain, the USA or in two shipyards in Sydney and Brisbane between 1942 and 1943. Of wooden construction, they were powered by petrol engines. They displaced around 100 tonnes were little more than 33m long and had a beam of five metres. Top speed was 20 knots. They had a range at cruising speed of 1,000 nautical miles and with a shallow draft of less than 1.5m were ideally suited for shallow, uncharted waters of Papua and New Guinea. The crew of 18 men, who were recognised as having to be 'courageous and tough', were crammed into these small craft in tropical conditions of heat and humidity and little by the way of creature comforts or even provision of adequate cooking, washing or messing facilities. Designed for British use where bases were always close and deployments always short, this was not the case in the Southwest Pacific Area.

They were originally conceived for RAN service as antisubmarine vessels:

> The main function of these Asdic-fitted boats is to work with similar non-Asdic-fitted boats, and provide anti-submarine protection to ports and their immediate approaches; in ports where loops [cables laid on the bottom to detect the passage of steel vessels by the changes in magnetic field] are established, the boats will also work in conjunction with an in support of the loops… It is essential there must also be some boats which have the necessary speed to overtake a submarine on the surface should she attempt to make good their escape in that manner. It will be seen from the armament of these boats… that in addition to their ability to provide antisubmarine protection, they are also well equipped to attack small surface craft such as torpedo carrying motorboats and other special craft, and low-flying aircraft.

This loose specification enabled almost any mix of armament and sensors to be fitted to the vessels, and their employment in a range of tasks, many with nothing to do with antisubmarine warfare. And so it proved: in RAN service ML's were fitted with sonars and depth charges and did a considerable amount of convoy work, but also participated in hydrographic surveys, minesweeping, seaward defence of ports, provision of pilotage services, harassment of Japanese shore positions, interdiction of Japanese barge traffic, clandestine operations, and antisubmarine sweeps. One even shot down a Japanese Zero.

The original armament for these vessels was a single-shot 2-pound gun forward, two 20mm Oerlikon guns and two twin gas-operated Vickers .303 guns: in addition they carried 20 depth charges. In operational service the two-pound gun was found to be useless. For the boats operating in New Guinea the bureaucratic round to replace the weapons was taking too long, so local

MacArthur

'arrangements', generally involving the exchange of liquor with a compliant US authority, were made and most sported the more powerful 40mm Bofors gun by the end of 1944. Other additions included replacement of the Vickers with American Brownings and fitting of the high-definition surface radar 'Sugar George'. While these changes did not convert an ML into a battleship, it did make it a very formidable adversary.

However, our story takes place in the early days of ML operations. *ML 817*, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Athol Townley, was given the task of shepherding a large number of small craft involved in the assault on Lae into their correct order. The ML had embarked the naval officer in charge at Milne Bay and his staff officer, Lieutenant Asher Joel RANVR, meaning that the small ship was now carrying 22 – four over its designed complement. *ML 817* sailed to the harbour at Morobe in preparation for her task and secured alongside the survey corvette *HMAS Shepparton*, where the NOIC went on board to

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discuss the details of the operation. While there, a single aircraft was seen approaching the harbour and turning away but *ML 817* was reassured that it was a 'friendly'.

Midshipman David Price, who was acting First Lieutenant, was not entirely convinced by this explanation and, sure enough, shortly afterwards a formation of nine Japanese Betty bombers and 27 Zero fighters pattern-bombed the harbour and strafed the shipping at anchor. *Shepparton* and *ML 817* were near-missed, but the ML was quickly underway, chopping the lines securing her to the corvette with axes and opening fire on the Japanese aircraft. The NOIC managed to scramble back onboard at the last minute. The Japanese aircraft were driven off by the combined fire of ship and shore guns and when they departed it was discovered that there were more than 40 holes in the port side of the ML caused by bomb splinters, and her back had been broken by the blast of the near misses. Despite this, she managed to proceed under her own power and to take part in the invasion of Lae.

The NOIC submitted his own report of this action, which is worth quoting from:

> I was much impressed by the efficiency and morale in *ML 817*. Lieutenant Commander Townley got his ship underway in a matter of seconds, although the blast had thrown him on his face on the quarterdeck. Midshipman Price had an extremely lucky escape in that he suffered a scalp wound over the left eye, which, but for a fraction of time, might well have killed him. So quickly did *ML 817* react to the situation that by the time I had boarded from *Shepparton* lines had been let go, the guns crews closed up, and the Midshipman, his face covered in blood, was at his action station prepared to direct the gunfire… This was the first and only controlled gunfire that I saw in Morobe that morning.

WWII Fairmile Western Lady IV alongside in modern times at Brixham UK (Courtesy Save the Western Ladies campaign)

So, now the reader has met Midshipman David Price RANR. Born in Bowral New South Wales in 1923, David joined the naval reserve in February 1942 as an Ordinary Seaman. During courses at *HMAS Cerberus* he was selected as an officer candidate and in October 1942 promoted midshipman and sent for ML training at the shore base *HMAS Rushcutter* in Sydney. In March 1943 he joined *ML 817*. In September 1943 he transferred to *ML 424* as First Lieutenant as the bombing damage done in at Morobe took *ML 817* out of service. Price was promoted Acting Sub-Lieutenant in October that year. He was to spend the whole of his war service in the MLs.

This seems an unlikely scenario for bringing the young Australian naval officer into direct confrontation with General Douglas MacArthur, but the determination he had shown during the Morobe air attack had already been demonstrated during an earlier incident at sea between Milne Bay and Oro Bay just south of Buna. *ML 817* was on patrol off the Papuan coast and had received a message indicating that the General might be traversing the area in a US Navy PT boat. The PT boats and the ML's had a friendly and cooperative relationship, and would sometimes be tasked to operate on antisubmarine sweeps together.

Japanese submarines were being used extensively to resupply their garrisons along the Papuan and New Guinea coasts which were being isolated by Allied sea and air action. They needed to approach their delivery points on the surface, which made them vulnerable to detection by sonar, radar, and by the noise of their diesel exhausts. With the MLs' sonar and

RN Fairmile A-models fitted as minelayers. Loaded with nine Mk XIX moored contact mines (left) and six A Mk 1:IV ground mines (right) (Courtesy Royal Navy)

depth charges complementing the PT boat's higher speed and torpedo armament, the twosome was an ideal counter to a submarine that could neither evade with speed nor escape by diving.

However, as any surface contact in these waters at that time could be unfriendly, on sighting another craft in her vicinity *ML-817* went to actions stations. As the vessels closed it was recognised as a PT boat and hence, in all likelihood, friendly. Nevertheless, Price ordered his signalman to issue the challenge of the day. This was a simple arrangement of letters, used by Allied ships to ensure that the vessel being challenged was not an enemy, but to his surprise and puzzlement there was no response. It was possible that the strange vessel had not received the codes for that day, or might be confused about the correct date, so Price tried to get a response to the challenge for the day before and the day after, but still without reply.

The approved action to be taken in these circumstances was to fire a shot across the bows of the stranger, both to alert him to the fact he was considered potentially unfriendly, and perhaps to wake up the signalman. However, although *ML 817*'s shell exploded in the air near the PT boat, there was still no reaction. The next step was to fire close ahead of the unknown ship. Townley agreed to this but stressed that ML should not hit the other vessel, and Price himself laid the gun on the correct bearing. The shell hit the water about 30 m ahead of the PT boat which stopped. With guns still trained on the target, the ML then closed to investigate.

By this time Townley must have worked out what was going on because he disappeared below, leaving the deck to Price. When the two vessels closed to hailing distance Price recognised the tall figure standing in the cockpit of the PT boat, corn-cob pipe in mouth, and fixedly staring straight ahead. Price also noticed that the PT boat had a Commander in command – a very unusual rank for such a small ship. The story continues in Price's own words:

> The US Navy Commander in the boat said, 'Don't you know who this is!'
>
> [With the self-assurance that only a 20-year-old Midshipman can possess], he replied, 'If it is who I think it is he would live longer if he replied to challenges'.
>
> The American said, 'But surely you must have known this was a PT boat?'
>
> I said; 'Yes, of course, but the Japanese have captured so much of our gear, we had to be sure who owned it. I'm sure the General would be the first congratulate us for our actions. Anyway thanks for stopping and good luck'.
>
> General MacArthur had not moved. Not once did he glance in our direction but remained looking straight ahead pipe in mouth, with an even more stony look on his face…I have little doubt that the PT boat commander was ordered to ignore our challenge, which may have accounted for his slight grin before he turned back to General MacArthur.
>
> The CO returned to our bridge, having already witnessed the affair from the wardroom, and said, 'Everything under control No. 1?'
>
> I said, 'Everything under control sir'. We continued on our way and heard nothing further about the incident.

Whether or not the vigilance and determination of Midshipman Price impressed itself on General MacArthur is not known, but it is to be hoped that he continued on his voyage reflecting that it isn't the battleships or aircraft carriers that count so much as the spirit of those who man whatever ships they are given to fight in.

Midshipman David Lee Price served on as well. Born in Bowral New South Wales, he had joined the RANR as an Ordinary Seaman in February 1942 and trained in *Cerberus* and *Rushcutter* at the ML School. Promoted Acting Sub-Lieutenant in October 1943 and Sub-Lieutenant in April 1944, he continued his service in the New Guinea, New Britain and Bougainville areas and was demobilised in December 1945. He studied law and was admitted as a solicitor of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in 1951: in 1956 he was admitted as a solicitor to the High Court of Australia.

Price became a director of many prominent Australian companies and of the Institute of Company Directors: in 1990 he was awarded its Silver Medal for service to the Institute and made a life member. He served on the New South Wales Government's Ethics Committee. He also developed an interest in medical research, providing legal and other services to a number of societies operating in this field, and in the same year was honoured by the Australian Society for Medical Research for his 'contribution to the advancement of medical research in Australia'. On Australia Day 1995 he was made a Member of the Order of Australia for his service to the community, recognising these activities.

However, as often been remarked, one can leave the Navy but the Navy never really leaves you. David Price continued his association with the RAN. He joined the Anti-Submarine Warfare Officers' Association and served on its Committee and two terms as its President. In 2012 he was made an honorary life member of its successor, the Naval Warfare Officers' Association, and of the *Watson* Wardroom Mess. He was a

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trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Rushcutters Bay Maritime Reserve Trust which preserved and restored the site of *HMAS Rushcutter* and had the memorial plaque erected in 1995 to honour the memory of the many thousands of Navy people who had passed through its doors since it started as a depot for the New South Wales naval Brigade in 1981.

The most prominent contribution which David Price made to the RAN is, however, the Naval Chapel at *Watson*, dedicated in 1961 to replace a leaky old Nissen hut from the war years. Let David describe the genesis of this project in his own words:

> I was talking to the then Captain of *Watson*, George Oldham, when Chaplain James Trainer approached and said 'Sir, I really do think we need new chapel.' The Chaplin suggested putting a bulldozer through the current building and replacing it with something more substantial that didn't leak. Captain Oldham said 'Don't be silly Bish. If we are going to have a new chapel we will have a jolly good one. Let's walk around and find the best site.' We walked around the base and selected the present site. We then made plans for financing the new chapel (no monies were available from the Government).
> I discussed with Captain Oldham the best way to set it up. We wanted the chapel to be non-denominational and free to be used by all members of the Christian faith. We incorporated an independent trust comprising both service and civilian members, independent of the Navy, but ensuring that serving officers at *Watson* had a majority vote. This protected the Trust from the whims of the Naval Board and anti-Service civilians (who had plans for the site).

As he had some 20 years previously in the encounter with General MacArthur, David Price stuck to his guns, serving as a trustee and Honorary Solicitor of the Trust for 40 years and as its President from 1975. The Roman Catholic Bishop of the Forces at the time, Archbishop Mannix, was a powerful opponent of the non-denominational concept, but David didn't blink and found a way around the embargo on Catholics using the chapel. There were challenges to the authority of the Trust to control the chapel but these too were repelled. The Trust even obtained a licence from the Commonwealth Government for the use of the land.

The foundation stone was laid in April 1960 by a Legatee, son of an RAN sailor killed three months before he was born, and the beautiful building on its marvellous site was officially dedicated on 4 March 1961 'As a place of worship for all.' It had been funded by donations from all around the world. By prudent investment of its funds, the Trust maintains the building and in 1990 it was able to add a Vestry and to re-roof the main building. In 1987 David's service to the RAN, particularly to the *HMAS Watson* Memorial Chapel Trust was recognised with a Medal of the Order of Australia.

'Don't you know who this is? The skipper of MacArthur's PT boat had asked Midshipman Price in 1942. I hope that readers will now recognise the calibre and determination of the young man he was addressing the question to.

Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Ray Griggs, AO, CSC, RAN speaks to the family members of the late Commander Tony Bennett RANR (Rtd) during his ashes handover ceremony at the Naval Memorial Chapel on Garden Island, Fleet Base East, Sydney (Photo Navy)



Following 35 years in the RAN, Captain Ian Pfennigwerth was awarded his PhD in 2005 and has since researched and written on Australia's naval history. With eight books published, another, on the campaign fought against the Germans by the RAN in 1914-15, is due for release in September.

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

A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY ROYAL NAVY: VOLUME 1 ADMIRALS OF THE FLEET AND ADMIRALS

By Alastair Wilson

Seaforth Publishing, Barnsley, UK, 2013. GBP30.

Reviewed by CDR Denis Fairfax RNZN (Rtd)

I must declare a particular interest in biographical works as in my time I have contributed naval entries to the *Australian Dictionary of Biography* (*ADB*) and to its trans-Tasman mate the *Dictionary of New Zealand Biography.* The many volumes of both series together with the bulky William O'Byrne's 1849 *A Naval Biographical Dictionary* are on shelves near me as I write this review.

If Alastair Wilson's *Biographical Dictionary* is the way of the future, historians' shelves will no longer bulge with such tomes. Wilson's work, of which this is the first instalment, is planned as a collection of compact discs accompanied by a slim book containing explanatory notes. It's the CD, attached to the inside rear cover, that holds the biographical information on these very senior flag officers. (One might quibble about how many of them there are – page vi of the book states that there are '355 individuals' while the rear of the dust jacket gives '336' – I have not attempted to count them!)

The 88 pages of 'Introduction' and 'Background to the Biographical Entries' in the book between them very fully cover such topics as officer rank structure; promotion; the subtleties of half pay and unemployed pay; the various schemes of junior officer entry; the history of branch/specialisation/sub-specialisation; career patterns; and honours and awards etc. The Admirals of the Fleet and Admirals are also listed (giving a handy reference without opening the CD) and there is a useful collection of abbreviations and acronyms.

In the CD the core of each biographical record is a comprehensive service history of the individual officer. It appears that no ship or appointment in each distinguished career has been overlooked. In many cases under 'Appointment' there is illuminating comment by the author on the importance of the job or some other noteworthy feature. In the sample records examined dates of birth and death are given but no locations for these events, nor is there any mention of place of burial or of a memorial. Parentage is not given but this lack is remedied in part by mention of naval forebears and relations under 'General Remarks'. This latter section usually includes the name of the spouse and the number and sex of children. An assessment of the officer's significance in his later career, especially when fighting the Royal Navy's corner in Whitehall battles, is an interesting addition to many of the records. Post-career retirement activities are also outlined.

The CD is easy to operate (instructions are on page vi of the book) with ship names, persons and dates searchable. More careful proofreading would have improved the CD text – a misspelt 'Honorary' in the heading of the alphabetical list is not a good start.

The pages of the book are attractively set out and easy to read with a sensibly-sized type- face. However, the plastic sleeve containing the CD is very lightweight and I doubt that it would survive repeated use.

It has taken the author nearly a decade to complete this volume and the amount of detailed research that has gone into compiling it from official records is truly impressive. Five further compilations are projected, taking the series from Vice-Admirals down to selected officers of and below the rank of Lieutenant Commander.

This first volume does seem rather expensive and this may make it a luxury for the private library. The omission of information about parents and places of birth and death will make the work less useful for the amateur genealogist, contrary to the author's expressed hope. However, the series will undoubtedly be the definitive Royal Navy biographical reference for some considerable time and as such will appeal to the dedicated naval researcher.



BRITAIN'S FUTURE NAVY

Author: Nick Childs

Publisher: Pen and Sword, 2012.
ISBN: 9781848842915

Reviewed by Jack Aubrey

There are some interesting thoughts to be had for any Australian reading *Britain's Future Navy*. Both island nations, Britain and Australia have tremendously important naval pasts, but both publics seem to know now nothing much about it, or even to be much concerned about how we should spend the billions allocated to defence. Maybe it was ever thus. And for navies, as opposed to armies and airforces, it is even more difficult to advocate their cause, as their exploits are necessarily well out of the public gaze.

This worthy book is by well-qualified author Nick Childs, who has a most suitable background, not just as a BBC world affairs correspondent, but as a reporter from many conflict zones and as a frequent writer on defence matters. With an interesting foreword by Admiral Sir Jock Slater, the RN's First Sea Lord; Chief of the Naval staff 1995-98 and Vice Chief of the British Defence Staff 1992-95, the work gets off to a strong start.

The book has 13 chapters which argue the points for and against what types of conflict the Royal Navy may find itself in, and whether they are suitably equipped for this. The controversial British pair of supercarriers now building come in for discussion of course. For many – this reviewer included – it seems incredibly short-sighted to not have carriers, in the wake of the Falklands crisis, and given the many and varied solutions carriers have been able to provide over many decades; bringing their firepower – or even not, as deterrence – to bear in a way no other naval asset can do. But in a Britain, and in an Australia, populated by people who don't discuss world affairs as a whole, it is hardly surprising their politicians pander to their short-term wishes – politicians are survivors by species…

There are chapter on the nuclear submarine force (both hunter-killer and nuclear attack) that Britain has retained; her surface combatant fleet, and some comparisons with emerging and strengthening naval forces, such as India and China.

This is a thought-provoking and timely book, and heartily recommended from an old salt who would personally like to take copies and distribute them to politicians who need to read it…



PLANNING ARMAGEDDON: BRITISH ECONOMIC WARFARE AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR

By Nicholas A. Lambert,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 2012

Reviewed by Dr Gregory P. Gilbert

The preservation of commercial and financial interests constitutes now a political consideration of the first importance, making for peace and deterring for war.

Alfred Thayer Mahan, 1902

The upcoming centenary of World War I has led to a plethora of new books on that war fighting for the attention of readers of political and military history, many books tending to regurgitate early 19th century narratives of questionable historical substance. It is often difficult to find works of robust and authoritative history that challenge the perceived WWI wisdom. Nicholas Lambert's *Planning Armageddon: British Economic Warfare and the First World War* is one offering new interpretations of Britain in the First

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World War. If you only have time to read one book that will challenge your views of WWI, you must read *Planning Armageddon*.

The book offers 'a radical reinterpretation of the nature and significance of the relationship between economics and sea power before and during the First World War.' However the work is much more than that. It challenges the pre-war British strategic preparations and rather than emphasising the Continental Commitment, Lambert demonstrates convincingly that the British political leaders approved an economic warfare strategy as early as 1912. The Admiralty was pre-delegated authority to act immediately upon the commencement of hostilities – which it did as soon as war was declared in August 1914.

The first section of the book, The Pre-War, 1901-1914, describes the emergence, envisioning, exposition and endorsement of the British concept and plans for economic warfare. This was much more than a naval (or even maritime) strategy involving a blockade of Germany. Rather economic warfare was designed to capitalise upon the global commercial system which was evolving rapidly in areas such as communications (cable and wireless), transportation (size and dependability of steam propulsion), and financial services ('The City' of London as a world financial clearing house, credit markets, just-in-time ordering, and shipping insurance to name a few). The uninterrupted flow of maritime trade upheld industrialised nations and it is not surprising that most governments well understood this economic dependency. In 1912 the British planned to use economic warfare as the basis of their strategic action to defeat Germany. Swift offensive action against Germany's trade – financial, diplomatic as well as naval action – would lead to an economic crisis in Germany (and elsewhere) that would generate a potential social collapse within Germany. This would inevitably lead to a short war.

Although the British Empire implemented its economic warfare plans on 5 August 1914, the resistance from within Britain was substantial and decisive. Members of the Cabinet who were not party to the economic warfare strategic discussions objected due to complaints from their party members and constituents. The Foreign Office objected to the effect that full scale economic warfare would have upon neutral countries (especially the United States but also the Northern European neutral nations). The Board of Trade objected to the loss of British revenue due to stoppages of business with Germany and its adjacent neutrals. The world financial markets collapsed and (although London's market was in the safest position of all the industrialised nations) the British Cabinet was pressured to restabilise peacetime trade. So within weeks, the economic warfare strategy was undermined. The Royal Navy continued to blockade Germany but much of the required trade made its way to Germany through neutral ports, on neutral ships. The amount of British trade on British ships that was suspected of being moved through Holland or Sweden on to Germany actually increased during the first year of the war. It is impossible to summarise the numerous new approaches to the war that are discussed by Nicholas Lambert.

The difficulties of implementing an economic warfare strategy by the democratically elected British government were quite extreme. As it became clearer that the Great War would be a Long War, the British Cabinet and the various Departments of State were forced to work together in an effort to correct the glaring deficiencies in the blockade and the associated economic warfare strategy. Lambert's book finishes the story in early 1916 when a new Ministry of Blockade was established to oversee the effort for the rest of the war. From 1916 the success of British economic warfare was achieved gradually, piece by piece, and with it the underlying idea that naval blockades take a long time to produce decisive results found its way into the lessons learnt from WWI. Examples from *Planning for Armageddon* suggest the lesson is that when one undertakes an economic warfare strategy it requires a whole of government approach and, perhaps most importantly, solid political backing from a well-informed and stable government.

Planning Armageddon is thick – it is over 500 pages, not including the almost 150 pages of notes. Some of the economic detail and legal discussion is dry and complex however Lambert has pared it back to the bare minimum and has made sure that it is clearly explained in writing for the non-expert. These possible drawbacks are absolutely necessary for this book because it challenges a number of well-travelled assumptions concerning British war strategy and execution between 1901 and 1916. Without such detailed endnotes Lambert's challenge to WWI orthodoxy would not be sustainable, however Planning Armageddon not only presents a unique reassessment but also provides a comprehensive and insurmountable body of evidence that supports the need for many readers to revisit some of the basic assumptions underlying our understanding of WWI.

This absorbing book should be read by political leaders, members of the armed forces and public servants who wish to better understand how maritime strategy works within its national strategic context. *Planning Armageddon* would also be an excellent text for university courses on WWI.

That said, I will not be holding my breath for I may have to wait a long time before this book overturns or indeed challenges the understanding of the Great War within this country.

Nicholas Lambert's *Planning Armageddon* is also a must-read for naval strategists, historians and other members of the Australian Naval Institute.



FROM KABUL TO BAGHDAD AND BACK: THE US AT WAR IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ

By John R. Ballard, David W. Lamm, and John K. Wood,

Naval Institute Press, Annapolis MD, 2012

Reviewed by Dr Gregory P. Gilbert

Australia's longest war is ending, not with victory, not with defeat, but with, we hope, an Afghanistan that's better for our presence here.

Prime Minister Tony Abbott, 28 Oct 2013

At the end of October 2013 the Chief of the Defence Force, General David Hurley, congratulated the more than 26,500 Australian Defence personnel who have served on operations in the Middle East. By the end of 2013 the Australian Defence Force draw down from Afghanistan was complete and our nation ended its longest war. Australia's commitment to the war in Iraq 2003-2009 ended with less publicity and was little recognised.

Overall very few Australians have attempted to examine our recent involvement within its multinational and national strategic context. *From Kabul to Baghdad and Back* helps to fill that gap. This book is a rarity – it provides a clear and concise examination of the evolving strategic and operational direction of the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns.

The three authors, John Ballard, from the United States National War College, David Lamm and John Wood, both from the US National Defense University in Washington DC, have all brought together their prolific knowledge of joint operations to produce a definitive analysis of the US at war in Afghanistan and Iraq. They have systematically extracted relevant information from all available sources to develop a candid narrative of these wars.

While carefully avoiding political bias, the authors address the successes and weaknesses of the conceptual approaches, strategic rationales, and the related decisions made by the succession of American leadership teams. For example they document some of the weaknesses identified when the US operates within a NATO-led coalition. These also have repercussions on how Australian forces are perceived when working within US-led coalitions. The authors' views make insightful reading for aspiring future strategic leaders.

From Kabul to Baghdad and Back explains the key strategic and operational actions that marked the decade long, US-led campaign in Afghanistan, while simultaneously describing the impacts of the parallel campaign in Iraq. It assesses the ability of the US to conduct two nearly simultaneous campaigns in two distinct theatres of operations, as well as examining how US national command authorities planned and executed these campaigns.

Unlike other analysts Ballard, Lamm and Wood manage to continue their narrative of the war in Afghanistan to its anticipated ending. They analyse the post-2005 experience in Afghanistan drawing out the major lessons at both the strategic and operational levels of war. Interestingly one of these was that many of the strategic lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq during the period 2001-08 had not be adequately captured, disseminated or acted upon. As a result a study team set up by the Obama Administration prepared a sober assessment of US collective efforts to stabilise Afghanistan. They observed that 'there were multiple, disparate campaigns, each answering to its own chain of command and all operating with slightly different objectives and on different time lines,' (p. 219). At the time there were nine or ten separate 'wars' being conducted across Afghanistan.

Some of my colleagues might suggest that the US experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has little to offer the Australian Defence Force. It is true that for much of the last decade, Australians were often deployed to the Middle East Area of Operations (MEAO) in tactical 'penny-packets' operating within a US-led strategic construct. Only a relatively small number of Australians contributed to these US-led campaigns at the strategic or operational level. This should not distract us, however, from the importance of understanding how and why the ADF did what it

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did and achieved what it achieved, within the multinational, and national strategic context. We need to be able to explain why Australians served in the MEAO and to be able to recognise those who have served for what they have accomplished. The media-hype of our fighting in someone else's war fails as an explanation. I hope that the Australian Government appoints a team to write the official histories of Australia's involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq sooner rather than later.

My one criticism of *From Kabul to Baghdad and Back* is that it does not provide enough information on the maritime and air contributions to the joint campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. Indeed one could argue that the authors' underlying hypothesis that running two parallel wars over-extended the US military strategy is not truly a joint perspective. It is more a land viewpoint with little, if any, insight from the theatre-wide maritime or air perspectives.

Of course, one should not be too harsh on the authors for concentrating on the ground campaigns, as this reflects the US strategic approach to both wars. Some may even argue that land forces are key to success in irregular warfare – although this is debatable. In fact, apart from the opening gambit during 2001-02, the Afghanistan and Iraq joint campaigns were indeed very much land-centric in their planning and execution.

This is an excellent book. It is highly recommended for anyone who has served in the Middle East, for those who know someone who has served in the Middle East, as well as for anyone who wishes to understand the strategy behind what the coalition armed forces did in the Middle East. In other words *From Kabul to Baghdad and Back* is required reading for civilian and military Defence professionals.



LOCH CLASS FRIGATES

by Patrick Boniface

ISBN 978-1-904-45954-5
Maritime Books
www.navybooks.com
242 pages plus appendices. Well illustrated with black & white photographs.
Reviewed by David Hobbs

The Loch class frigates were designed during World War II as specialised anti-submarine vessels. They were assembled from prefabricated sections built in dispersed sites across the UK which were taken to shipyards by rail for final assembly in a programme that was advanced for its time and which even twenty-first century engineers assisted by computer-aided design would be proud of. The completed vessels came into service from 1944 and proved to be good anti-submarine platforms, earning the respect they gained in escort groups, and a number of them went on to see extensive post-war service.

Originally 110 ships were projected but 20 were modified into specialised anti-aircraft units and re-named as the Bay class; others were modified for use as survey ships, despatch vessels and minesweeper support ships. Fifty-seven were cancelled after the end of hostilities, not all had been laid down.

This book describes the design and operational histories of the 25ships that were completed to the original design and served with the Royal Navy, Royal Canadian Navy and Royal New Zealand Navy plus a further three completed for the South African Navy.

This is the latest in Maritime Books' series of class histories, following earlier titles on cruisers, destroyers and corvettes and using a well-tried format. It is a handsome, well-illustrated book containing individual ship histories, each of which forms a dedicated chapter. Like the earlier books, it is important to realise that it was not intended to be a history of the conflicts in which the ships took part but it does contribute to a wider understanding of them through the parts played by individual vessels.

The first chapter covers the evolution of the design from that of earlier corvettes, sloops and frigates. Each ship then has its own narrative history, a chronology of important events and a list of its Battle Honours. These are supported by well-chosen black and white photographs from a number of collections, many of which have not previously been published.

Its only negative feature is that it lacks an index and although the ship chapters are listed on the Contents page, the RNZN vessels are listed under their original RN names and the reader has to turn through the pages to find them. Conversely the South African ships appear on the Contents page under their new names and their original RN names have to be found in the text. For casual readers, this shortcoming is inconsequential but for more serious researchers I can imagine it would be frustrating. Creating a personal ship name index would be a simple but useful starting point for anyone who buys this book and it would not take long to do.

That said, this book is the first to describe an important group of

warships that has long deserved greater recognition. Appendices include technical specifications, armament and equipment and list the hulls completed as both Loch and Bay classes together with others completed for a variety of other uses, and a complete list of the cancelled vessels including their pennant number when one was allocated. There will be many in Australia who remember the RNZN ships and those of the RN that served in the Far East Fleet and Persian Gulf Station into the 1960s. The book has many positive features and I am happy to recommend it.



PUTTING IT WRIGHT BY CAPTAIN WG WRIGHT, RAN (RTD)

Reviewed by Tom Frame

There are many reasons for producing an autobiography. Some are self-serving while others serve more laudable purposes. Captain Walter Graham Wright RAN Rtd, known to his family and colleagues as "Graham", waited until his 94th year to publish the story of his life and times. He has naturally written for family and friends but he seeks also to enhance the historical record by 'putting right' several fallacies and falsities in what we know of the RAN in the mid-twentieth century.

This memoir's sweep is substantial. Graham was born in 1920 and is the last surviving member of the RAN College intake of 1934. He knew those who founded the Australian navy, and continues to take a close interest in maritime affairs. He was an accomplished navigator, a gifted sportsman and later an esteemed civil servant. But is his life worthy of a book? In reality, most people's lives are of no greater interest to others than the obvious personal concern expressed by family and friends. The SBS might tell us there are 'six billion stories and counting' but the vast majority don't concern us in the slightest. They are not un-important just un-interesting. But Graham's life is important for four reasons in addition, of course, to its enduring significance for his family and friends.

First, *Putting it Wright* is a chronicle of one man's journey through the best part of the twentieth century – one hundred years of enormous change. Graham has seen many 'wars and rumours of wars' as St Matthew's Gospel puts it. As a young man he witnessed the rise of the great competing ideological stories of the modern era – capitalism, communism and fascism. Graham was personally involved in several events that have not been, in his view, accurately portrayed in the extant historical record. He wants to put the record right by offering his own account of what occurred, particularly the highly secret mission by Sir Walter Citrine to Russia in 1941 when a negotiated settlement with Hitler was in prospect despite subsequent denials that anything other than unconditional surrender was ever contemplated by the British PM, Sir Winston Churchill. Graham has lived a rich life with experiences of the kind that that are no longer on offer. Graham's naval career ended 11 days after I was born in early October 1962 and yet it is instructive and illuminating for me as I ponder my own 15 years of service as a member of the second last class of cadet midshipman to have joined the Naval College.

Second, this book is an account of the Royal Australian Navy in the years that it was transformed from the 'Royal Navy in Australia' to the 'Royal Australian Navy'. When I started researching and writing naval history about 25 years ago, there were few biographies and even fewer autobiographies of Australian naval personnel. Those that did exist by retired admirals like Galfrey Gatacre and Henry Burrell were travelogues – I came, I saw and I was promoted. It is not that they were self-seeking or even sanitised versions of Australian naval history, they just failed to illuminate what they purported to describe. More than twenty years ago when I was researching the loss of *HMAS Voyager* in 1964 and working as the Research Officer to the Chief of Naval Staff (the late Admiral Mike Hudson), I tried to encourage that crop of admirals to write about their experiences because there were so few personal accounts available. Few responded positively (or at all) to my urgings, thinking that they either had little to contribute or that the activity was beneath them. Perhaps they feared such works were likely to attract the charge of classmates that they were self-important or narcissistic. Sadly, the flag officer to whom I was personally closest, Mike Hudson, suggested the task of detailing his years as professional head of the Navy would probably fall to me. He wanted to have his version recorded but was disinclined to record it. This is a tragedy and one repeated each time someone has an attack of false modesty or mock humility. It is a mistaken judgment

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to think that official records can be relied upon solely to provide historians with the raw material for the articles and monographs that will inform and enlighten the generation of naval officers who will come after them.

Third, *Putting it Wright* is an attempt to come to terms with professional disappointment and personal disillusionment. I am not sure that Graham decided to write for any therapeutic purpose but I hope it has been cathartic. Graham explains that he wanted to get on in the Navy and that, by a series of objective measures, found that he had the aptitude and the ability to do so. He contends that his ambitions were thwarted by lesser men – some of whom were easily threatened because they were insecure – and others by a deficient humanity because they were mean-spirited. Graham did not achieve the professional goals he set himself when a young man but not by any lack of energy or application. As someone who has at times lacked tact and been lulled into thinking that bluntness and plain-speaking equates to honesty and candour, I would suggest that Graham does seem to have been a poor advocate of his own cause more than once. But in committing to perpetuity this account of his life, readers will hope that Graham does not leave this life a bitter man and that any ill-will he might harbour towards those who dealt with him unfairly and unkindly can now be transformed into forgiveness and lost in forgetfulness.

Fourth, this memoir is one man's commentary on institutions and how they ought to be regarded. My life has been spent in three different kinds of institutions – the Navy, the Church and the University. Each has helped me to find my identity and to clarify my life's purpose but they have also been the source of resentment and the cause of hurt. Institutions are not what the law or philosophy might call 'natural persons'. They cannot act like sane and sensible people because they are an amalgam of individuals and exhibit the mindset of a mob from time to time. Institutions don't always, and can't sometimes, make the right or best decisions about priorities or people. Graham advises us to be sanguine about the institutions to which we belong but to prize professional friendships and the enduring companionship of classmates. These things abide and they are what most people cherish of their own naval service.

Students of naval history will be glad that this book has appeared and that the presentation is so attractive. It looks inviting and the writing is engaging. The Graham Wright that emerges from this book is more complex than he is complicated. Reading about a man's life and then hearing him analyse its course and then assess its outcomes is a fascinating activity. But I am not sure that this book bears the most apt title. Yes, Graham wants to put things right – principally the historical record. But I am more persuaded that his deepest fear is not being understood, or worse, being misunderstood. Much of what I read is Graham attempting to be understood and to respond to misunderstandings rather than an unhealthy obsession with being right. He doesn't want to be wrong and is certainly willing to be corrected. I hope this entertaining work will prompt others with significant naval careers to share what they have seen and heard, and to put right whatever we historians might have got wrong in our chronicles of the Navy.

Tom Frame served in the RAN from 1979 to 1992 and is currently Adjunct Professor at the University of New South Wales (Canberra).











Australia's War: A Review Essay of Some Recent Books

By Geoffrey Till

Alan Converse

ARMIES OF EMPIRE: THE 9TH AUSTRALIAN AND 50TH BRITISH DIVISIONS IN BATTLE 1939-1945

(Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2011). pp 347, index, photos, maps, NP

Peter Dean (Ed)

AUSTRALIA 1943: THE LIBERATION OF NEW GUINEA

(Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2014). pp 309, index, photos, maps, NP

Peter Ewer

THE LONG ROAD TO CHANGI: AUSTRALIA'S GREATEST MILITARY DEFEAT AND HOW IT BROKE THE BONDS OF EMPIRE

(Sydney: ABC Books, 2013). pp 328, index, photos, maps, $Sing 35.00.

Lawrence James

CHURCHILL AND EMPIRE: PORTRAIT OF AN IMPERIALIST

(London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 2013). pp 453, index, photos, £25.00

Bob Wurth

THE BATTLE FOR AUSTRALIA: A NATION AND ITS LEADERS UNDER SIEGE

(Sydney: Macmillan, 2013). pp 508, index, photos, maps, A$32.99 (PB)

World War II continues to fascinate and the flood of books that analyse and re-analyse its various campaigns shows absolutely no sign of abating. One of the reasons for this is that the past, and perhaps especially the military past, helps mould our conceptions of what we are, what we stand for and of our national identity.

Inevitably, this means evocations of the past can be highly sensitive and intensely political. As the Indian professor KN Pannikar recently put it in a book *not* reviewed here, history has to be seen as 'a site of struggle' – so much so that sometimes it may seem to have precious little to do with the actual past. Our present and future can partly depend on how we *interpret* the past, rather than simply on what the past actually was. For Australians, the campaigns and battles of 1941-5 in Southeast Asia, starting with their role in the catastrophic fall of Singapore in 1942, are second only to the Dardnelles campaign and the 'Digger Myth' in shaping Australia's conception of itself. Hence the continuing flood of books.

So what does an outsider make of these five works and the varied way in which they tackle these issues. They are of course, very different. One is written by a British university academic, Lawrence James; two, by Peter Ewer and Bob Wurth are the kind of paperbacks you can buy in an airport departure lounge. They handle serious issues but are informally written and easy reading. The last two by Peter Dean and Alan Converse are much more academic in style, with detailed references. They are both produced for the Australian Army History series, and 'presenting …contemporary perspectives and authoritative accounts of the key issues of the Army's past' they are intended to contribute to the 'Army's learning cycle', as well as 'promote our country's proud military heritage.'

In *The Long Road to Changi*, Peter Ewer sets much of the agenda. Ewer's book is very readable for he writes well, although his informal style sometimes hovers on the edge of bar-room point-scoring. He seems to be an advocate of the 'guilty men' school of history, and there are plenty of them around – and mainly British. Angered at the way the way his countrymen have been portrayed, and in some quarters he

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thinks blamed for the final collapse of the defence of Singapore, he mounts a spirited defence of the fighting prowess of the Australian army and the un-wisdom of relying on the British under Churchill.

Broadly, the argument runs, Australia should have adopted a defence policy based on national not Imperial lines and kept the bulk of their forces at home against the Japanese threat. Instead, Australia's leaders were hoodwinked by the British into believing that a strategy based on the maintenance of the Singapore navy base would deter the Japanese from aggressive action in their part of the world. If by any chance this strategy looked like failing, they were specifically re-assured by London that Britain and the rest of the Empire would rapidly come to the rescue. On that basis the Australian government loyally sent the best part of their Army and Air Force to the European theatre. None of London's promises were kept. The badly led and managed Malayan campaign failed, despite the best efforts of the Australians deployed there. And yet, when Singapore island finally fell, it was the Australians who became the scapegoats, portrayed (by the British) as a demoralised and disorganised rabble who simply collapsed in face of the Japanese advance. As a result of all this, Australia itself came into mortal danger.

This last issue is taken forward by Bob Wurth in the rather more measured *The Battle for Australia*. Here the strategic contest between Prime Ministers Churchill and Curtin takes centre stage. Before the Pacific war started, Churchill considered Southeast Asia as at best a secondary theatre and starved Malaya of tanks and modern aircraft in favour of the Mediterranean and Russian theatres. Churchill consistently under-estimated the threat to the Australian mainland before and after the fall of Singapore and virtually ignored Prime Minister Curtin's anguished appeals for help, came near to abandoning Australia to its fate and consistently denied the country's leaders either the truth or the representation in Imperial strategy-making circles that their contribution to the overall war-effort merited.

In *Churchill and Empire,* though, Lawrence James paints a much more sympathetic portrait of Churchill as war leader, though with warts and all. He argues that Churchill likened himself to the Admiral of a fleet, with the Dominion prime ministers all acting as his loyal Captains. He certainly resented their independence of view when it clashed with his own. What emerges, implicitly, in James is the tension between Churchill as imperialist and Churchill as strategist. In the former role, Churchill from the 1920s saw the Australians as kith and kin who had to be protected, but who also had every incentive to help defend the Empire from which he believed they benefitted and who moreover could produce the first-rate soldiers that later as war leader, he needed so much.

But as strategist, things looked rather different to him. These days few historians with the advantages of the hind-sight which Curtin could not have, doubt that Churchill's stress on a Hitler-first grand strategy, his concerns about keeping the Russians going and the Americans on-side was absolutely correct. In the late 1930s and in the early years of the war, moreover, the danger facing Britain as the centre of the Empire was immediate and proximate in terms of time and of geography – and far more serious than the threat of Japan to Australia. The notion explored by Wurth and Ewer that this emphasis was strategically wrong fails to convince.

However, it is true that, again from the 1920s, when as Chancellor of the Exchequer Churchill resisted the Royal Navy's urgent pleas for a budget that would allow them to handle what they considered the long-term Japanese threat. From then on, Churchill consistently under-rated the eventual scale of that threat, and was clearly impatient with Curtin's continual pleas for help. Right up to the Japanese attack, and despite their occupation of Indo-China in July 1941 (which made Singapore much more vulnerable than it had seemed to British planners in the inter-war period) Churchill thought the idea that they might make war against the Chinese, the Americans, the British Empire, the Dutch and maybe even the Russians *at the same time* strategically preposterous – as indeed events showed it was. Accordingly, he thought, the Americans sitting on the side-lines would serve as the main deterrent against a Japanese assault on Singapore, the Dutch East Indies and Australia until the British were confident enough about the 'main' European theatre to 'go East' in a major way.

Ewer in his attack on Churchill's strategic priorities makes no mention of this, the assumed American deterrent, which was Churchill's major policy assumption. Churchill's basic point was that, in essence, the course of events in Southeast Asia would be decided elsewhere. In Peter Dean's *Australia 1943: The Liberation of New Guinea,* Ian Pfennigwerth, one of the contributors, deals with the naval contribution to the eventual success of this campaign and makes the crucial point that what was possible here, depended absolutely on the outcome of events elsewhere in the naval war – Churchill's strategic point exactly.

But, all the same in forecasting the imminence of war in the Far East and a consequent threat to Australia, Churchill was wrong, and Curtin right. Like many others, Churchill badly under-estimated the sheer strategic irrationality and incoherence of the

Japanese war machine. Like almost every other Western observer, he also under-estimated their fighting prowess and their operational skill. Both as a strategist and as an imperialist Churchill was angered and wounded by the accusation that his policy amounted to an 'inexcusable betrayal' of Australia. But afterwards, as the danger receded, there was a degree of reconciliation between the two leaders. Curtin in fact shared many of Churchill's Imperial proclivities and later in the war discovered that Australia's immediate interests could diverge from America's too. MacArthur had his own agenda and it was not necessarily the same as Curtin's. This also becomes clear in Peter Dean's *Australia 1943: The Liberation of New Guinea.* As the Americans became the stronger and stronger partner, there were increasing recriminations between the two allies. Churchill himself once famously made the essential point: 'the trouble with allies, he said,' is that they sometimes have opinions of their own.'

But at the time of the greatest apparent threat, it is hardly surprising that Curtin who emerges in *The Battle for Australia* as a deeply flawed national leader, strained, prone to drink (not that Churchill would have had much difficulty with that!) and desperately concerned about Australia's national unreadiness, should have considerably exaggerated the scale of the Japanese threat to Australia after Singapore fell. In explaining the rationale for this, Wurth paints a depressing picture of Australia's inter-war reluctance to devote resources to the country's defence and reliance instead on British promises that looked more and more dubious as the 1930s wore on. The problem was exacerbated by the political discord that surrounded the Australian premier and worst of all perhaps the pervasive industrial unrest and strikes that continuously undermined the Australian war effort even after the raids on Darwin.

Even so, Churchill thought the threat to Australia, *was* exaggerated, and this time, he was right. While the Japanese navy certainly had plans for the 'major' invasion of Australia that Churchill had always said, and continued to say, would justify Britain's complete abandonment of the Mediterranean theatre in an effort to come to Australia's help, this was never in prospect. The Japanese army, intent on its own campaign to access the oil riches of the Dutch East Indies and in Burma to cut their stubborn adversaries in China off from outside help, firmly stamped on any such idea. The result was a compromise. Together the Japanese army and navy agreed a much more modest plan to cut Australian connections with America so the country could not be used as a base for an allied counter-attack.

But in Churchill's mind neither the prospect of this, nor the occasional air-raid on Darwin nor 'cruisers firing a few shells at Australian ports,' would justify anything as strategically catastrophic as a British abandonment of the Mediterranean. Aware of intelligence reports on Japanese troop movements as early as mid March 1942 , he thought a full-scale invasion 'very unlikely.' Britain, he sometimes reminded Curtin, after all had by now lost many thousands of civilians in air raids that had levelled parts of most of its main cities, it had ceded sovereign territory to the Germans (the Channel islands) and was facing the prospect of starvation in the battle of the Atlantic. Against these metrics the threat to Australia seemed modest indeed. And yet despite all these imminent threats to the British isles, Churchill still clung on to the Mediterranean theatre, so important did he think it was! In the meantime, he had already arranged with Roosevelt that America would take on the burden of keeping its links to Australia open.

Descending from the level of grand strategy to the tactical and operational failures of the Malayan campaign, the criticisms of Peter Ewer come into play. Like many before him, Ewer paints a depressing picture of systemic tactical and operational incompetence in Britain's attempted defence of Singapore. It is hard not to feel that the British should have done better, and maybe would have done had Churchill released to the Far East just some of the first class fighters and tanks he was sending to Russia in the autumn of 1941. 'We have so many men in Singapore, ' Churchill said, as it fell, to Harold Nicholson,' so many men – they should have done better.' This is a familiar story and Ewer tells it well.

He is at his most challenging, however, when dealing with what he calls the conventional (British) wisdom on the alleged collapse of the 8th Australian Division in the face of the Japanese attack on the island of Singapore itself. He does not so much claim that the collapse did not happen; rather that the disorder that followed was exaggerated by British observers (and historians) who have used it to camouflage their own failings in those dark days. The Australians, in other words, have become the scapegoats. Such behaviour, were it true, clearly conflicts with the 'Digger Myth' which Allan Converse in *Armies of Empire* examines and describes. The Australian army's style, the proposition goes, is 'democracy in action', freer, less hierarchical more 'playful' and informal than the more stilted, rigid, class-ridden British. Leadership and discipline are alike consensual. The ultimate hero is the 'larrikin,' the undisciplined soldier always in trouble, but who always invariably performs heroically in action, doing so much better than anyone else. Hence their flexibility, originality

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and tactical proficiency in some of the earlier stages of the campaign. So how could such a Division that had earlier fought well possibly have collapsed so ignominiously?

The first temptation, of course, is to say that it didn't – or at least did not to any greater extent than the British and Indian forces also present on the island. The infamous report on Australian behaviour by Captain Frederick Secker Bell RN is held up by Ewer as a classic example of British scapegoating. Bell's generalisations about Australian soldiers in general do not stand up to scrutiny in other theatres of war, but that doesn't mean that they were untrue for this one. But Bell needs to be contextualised. Ewer does not mention the fact that Bell was the ferociously courageous Captain of *HMS Exeter* in the battle of the River Plate who sought to ram *Graf Spee* (!) and whose standards and expectations were, by this stage of the campaign, probably just a tad high. Nor that Bell had served with the Australian Navy in *HMAS Australia* in the early 1930s and that his wife was Australian. Nor was Bell alone in his view. The sheer quantity of such adverse reporting by other observers, in fact, makes total denial very difficult to sustain.

But it also misses the real point, which Allan Converse focuses on. In his detailed, indeed exhaustive comparison of the Australian 9th and the British 51st divisions (neither of which were in the Malayan campaign of course) Converse shows that the Digger Myth was exactly that – a myth. Morale and fighting performance was *not* a simple consequence of the nationality of a particular unit. It was instead a matter of training, the product of leadership within and above the unit, strength and equipment, the degree of organisational turbulence, the quality logistics support, battle fatigue and so on.

There was, he argues, no real difference between the two Divisions, Australian and British. Their performances, measured by such things as off-duty rioting behaviour, courts martial, desertion rates, psychological break-downs and unit fighting prowess varied enormously over time as these things changed. Both Divisions had their good times and their bad times. Just like everyone else Australians (even the Japanese, recall the faltering of the Imperial Guards at the battle nearer the causeway) could collapse when things went badly. The same was true for the Air Force. The heroism of so many Australian and New Zealand pilots facing such formidable odds in the sky over Malaya, contrasts strongly with the apparent scuttle away from Kota Bahru and Kuantan airfields in the north (a not insignificant factor in the sinking of the *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse*, incidentally). As Bob Wurth shows, indeed, Australian forces in early '42, did much the same thing in Port Moresby and Rabaul, where circumstances were similar, and even in Darwin. Nor was it only the British who criticised the Australians. In one instance cited in Richard Dean's book, for example, General Richard Sutherland MacArthur's Chief of Staff claimed that 'the Australians were about as undisciplined, untrained, over advertised, and generally useless as the Air Force.' In the strains and confusions of war, wild generalisations like this seem inevitable, when things don't go well.

And yet elsewhere and in later campaigns in Southeast Asia, even Sutherland had to admit that Australian forces could fight superlatively. This is the burden of Peter Dean's edited book *Australia 1943: The Liberation of New Guinea.* This campaign which figured the 9th Division that Converse examines, was Australia's main effort in World War II. It was conducted with great success, most of the time, alongside General MacArthur's forces and in the most difficult of conditions.

Overall, then, real explanations of military success and failure have to be sought in the precise circumstances prevailing. And there is no doubt, returning to Singapore, that the 8th Division was in a very difficult position indeed. General Percival had expected the Japanese to attack in the Northeast of the island not the Northwest and in a decision that reveals the fundamental weakness of the forces he now commanded, he had deployed what he thought was his strongest, freshest force there, the newly arrived and totally inexperienced British 18th Division, much of whose essential equipment was yet to arrive.

The Australian pickets in the north-west, thinly spread through the mangrove swamps were already tired after their prolonged fighting retreat down the peninsular. Communications were bad (the shortage of telegraph wire was a major problem throughout the campaign). General Gordon Bennett, whom Ewer understandably castigates, had not sorted out the traditional problem of defenders facing an invasion, namely the balance to be struck between defending what passed as 'the beaches' or maintaining a strong defensive line further back to take on invaders who had got through the first line. But in those mangrove conditions there was – and could not be – a 'front line' especially at night, so of course the determined Japanese got through, of course the outflanked defenders had to withdraw in some confusion – but the problem was that they had little to fall back on and so many of them drifted back to Singapore city. Much less forgiveable, perhaps, are the instances where demoralised soldiers forced their way onto ships at gunpoint leaving as Singapore finally fell. Most didn't, but some undoubtedly did.

To balance this there were many

undoubted acts of devotion to duty in the face of awful conditions. It was the same story for the inexperienced British 18th Division swung back at the last moment from the defence of the north-east to take their place in the last line to defend the city. There were many heroic acts of stubborn defence, such as the only recently studied action fought by the 1st Battalion of the Cambridgeshires sturdily defending the Adam Park area of the city almost until the island's surrender. But other British soldiers also too found it all too much and fell back in confusion onto the city and the relief of alcohol, sleep and relative safety from an implacable and terrifyingly successful foe. The same would be true of Indian Army forces, so maligned by Bennett. Much of the popular discourse here is about those Indian soldiers who went over to the Japanese, rather than the majority who fought throughout as well as their circumstances allowed and who at the end chose instead to follow their 'colonial oppressors' into brutal Japanese captivity.

Of course it is good for morale and *esprit de corps* for military units to have a particularly good view of themselves. But myths are dangerous, especially when adopted nationally, if they obscure the real causes of success and failure and the consequent need to do things that make the first more likely and the second less. It is surely one major function, even the duty, of history to explore such myths. In their own way all five of the very varied but connected books reviewed here do this and are well worth reading even if sometimes less for the conclusions they come to, more for the questions they ask.



THE ROMAN NAVY: SHIPS, MEN AND WARFARE 350BC–AD475

By Michael Pitassi

Seaforth Publishing, Barnsley South Yorkshire, 2012

Reviewed by Dr Greg Gilbert

... they [the Romans] have the sea in their power; they immediately take control of every land they reach. Whatever they ask for, they can gain by force.
Livy, XXXIII.21 (translation by Henry Bettenson, 1976)

Most histories of the ancient world describe in considerable detail the role of armies and soldiers in the rise and fall of great empires. Despite evidence of the importance of sea power in the ancient sources, however, very few contemporary histories examine the role of navies and sailors during these times. Although there are a number of books on ancient Greek navies, there is almost nothing available on the Roman Navy. That is until now: Michael Pitassi's *The Roman Navy: Ships, Men and Warfare 350BC-AD475* is the first book to detail the Roman Navy from its inception to its decline.

The book is methodically broken down into main subject areas: a brief history of the Roman Navy, the ships, command structure, the crews, service life, seamanship, operations, and tactics. As the Roman Navy changed considerably over the period covered by this book, there are convenient sections dealing with Republican and Imperial times. Additional sections dealing with Rome's allied navies and enemy navies also provide information that helps to set the activities of the Roman Navy in context. The use of break-out boxes, such as the chronology of naval affairs (pp. 18-21) and the list of principal Roman naval actions (p. 132), and illustrations are well thought out and useful.

It is interesting to note that over a period of almost 800 years, the Roman Navy fought 31 principal naval actions – seven in the First Punic War alone. This confirms that the vast majority of work undertaken by the ships and men of the Roman Navy was the day to day drudgery of routine patrols, maintenance and overhaul, and naval constabulary type tasks (including minor actions). Not all that much has really changed over the last 2000 years or so.

Pitassi recognises that the surviving evidence on the Roman Navy is 'sparse and fragmentary' but he is also correct in identifying that considerable evidence lies, albeit somewhat hidden, in the archaeological remains of ancient Rome. Some of these are self-explanatory – such as the altar of Valerius Valens, prefect of the fleet at Misenum – however, many of the inscriptions, pottery paintings, statuary, literary references, and monumental sites are much harder to interpret in their specific contexts.

At times Pitassi seems to over-reach somewhat when he extrapolates

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his historical narrative from the few facts available. For example the *periplous* and *diekplous* tactics are open to various interpretations and there is even doubt whether they were actually used by the Roman Navy in battle. That said, Pitassi has comprehensively identified source material on the Roman Navy that is not readily available elsewhere. As long as the reader takes care and checks each source they will avoid mistaking the author's own reconstructions as historical truths.

The Roman Navy is an excellent collection of facts and interpretations on naval warfare during the ancient Roman period. It is an essential starting point for anyone wishing to gain insight into this naval force and the events that underpinned some of the earliest maritime strategies.



THE UNSEEN WAR: ALLIED AIR POWER AND THE TAKEDOWN OF SADDAM HUSSEIN

By Benjamin S. Lambeth,

Naval Institute Press, Annapolis MD, 2013
Reviewed by Dr Gregory P. Gilbert

... there can be no denying that the allied combatants in all services who prosecuted the campaign at the operational and tactical levels, thanks in considerable part to the enabling contributions of CENTCOM's air component ..., performed in an exemplary way when it came to the execution of Iraqi Freedom's major combat phase in March and April 2003.
Ben Lambeth, p. 310

For many reasons few books have tried to record the joint and combined military operations of the 2003 Iraq War, and Ben Lambeth is right in his statement that the air side of that war has been largely ignored. *The Unseen War* helps to fill this gap in the historical record by providing a detailed assessment of the allied air power contribution.

With 1801 coalition aircraft, 863 of which were provided by the United States Air Force (USAF), the CENCOM commanders were able to take down Saddam Hussein's regime. General "Buzz" Moseley led the US Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) during the war, dispatching USAF, USN, USMC, RAF and RAAF aircraft on 20,733 strike sorties in just three weeks. Approximately 70% of all munitions expended were precision-guided weapons. It was a campaign characterised by a 'concurrent and synergistic application of air and ground power.' This is, of course, the language of Lambeth, who as one of the master advocates of air power, can be expected to enthusiastically support US air power.

After 37 years with the RAND Corporation Benjamin Lambeth is certainly an expert in the field. He has written extensively on international affairs and air warfare and is rightly acknowledged as a subject matter expert on recent US air power operations. He is able to use his extensive background knowledge and contacts to obtain source material that would be difficult for others to uncover. His ability to interact at the strategic, operational and tactical levels with pilots, other aircrew, groundcrew and aerospace industry participants enables Lambeth to conceptualise the inner workings of USAF planning, execution and after-action activities. The only down side is that while the jargon packed, acronym-centred, fast-paced, technology-centric, and statistically overloaded writing style may sit well with many air force officers, it tends to detract for the general reader. For the naval reader the style can at times be distracting but it is worth persevering with.

It has been argued elsewhere that the conduct of warfare has changed considerably since the early 1990s, (for instance see John Olsen's *A History of Air Warfare*). Shortly after the 1990-

91 Gulf War air power alone was proclaimed by some as the arbiter of modern wars however history has shown that recent conflicts have remained inherently joint and that the air component is but one of a number of environmental components (naval, land and perhaps special forces) that are applied together to achieve military strategic objectives. Lambeth explains how the 2003 Iraq War was conducted as a joint campaign but he goes on to explain how the 'allied ground troops did the fixing and CENTCOM's air component did the majority of the killing of enemy ground forces rather than the other way around, as had hitherto been the norm for joint warfare against mechanized opponents.'

Although somewhat controversial, Lambeth's assessment is supported by the vast amount of material provided within *The Unseen War*. Even if you disagree it is necessary to understand how the conduct of the 2003 Iraq War air operations can be interpreted in this way.

Lambeth describes how the Iraq War evolved including discussions on strategy, planning, command and control, and the build-up to war. The importance of Operation *Southern Focus* in overcoming the Iraqi air defences is highlighted by Lambeth, especially as Operation *Iraqi Freedom* commenced with near simultaneous land and air offensives. A chapter detailing the CENTCOM air offensive reveals much about how high-intensity warfare is now conducted. Lambeth then identifies the key accomplishments of the air offensive before examining many of the problems encountered. The last chapter adds to the debate on whether the 2003 Iraq War is further evidence of a 'new era of warfare.'

The Unseen War explains how the decisive combination of air and land power was fundamental to the moral and physical dismemberment of the Iraqi military and Saddam's regime. Although combat operations in support of land operations conducted by aircraft from the US Navy carriers are discussed, I wish Lambeth had also discussed the role of air operations in the maritime environment. For instance, the competing priorities for the allocation of the limited number of maritime patrol aircraft in support of maritime versus land operations is not examined.

The Unseen War also includes a chapter dealing with the allied contribution to CENTCOM's air offensive. British and Australian personnel were involved in the initial planning of the air operations by CENTAF and they made sure that their specific national interests were considered throughout the war. For the Australians, air component command arrangements were established in the Middle East Area of Operations, the deployed RAAF aircraft were placed under CENTAF control, and Australian air staff were attached to the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC). In addition this chapter contains many details about the Australian involvement in the air operations over Iraq, which are difficult or impossible to find elsewhere.

The Unseen War makes a valuable contribution to the literature on war in the 21st Century. It is much more than required reading for anyone interested in the 2003 Iraq War, this book should be read by those who wish to better understand modern conflict.



THE ROYAL NAVY 1914-1918: A PHOTOGRAPHIC RECORD

By Adrian Vicary

ISBN 978-1-904459-56-9
Maritime Books www.navybooks.com
164 pages plus index and an appendix. 142 black and white photographs.

Reviewed by David Hobbs

As the centenary of the outbreak of World War I draws near, a growing number of books have been published that describe the conflict on the Western Front but too few have focused on the pivotal role played by the ships of the British Empire's naval forces. Adrian Vicary's book helps to fill this gap using part of his father's extensive photograph archive to illustrate 136 warships ranging in size from the battleship *Queen Elizabeth* to small wooden motor launches and everything in between. He has carefully chosen a cross-section of technically interesting and famous ships that give variety as well as insight into the fleet's composition and operations.

Many of the images have never, previously been published and among the more unusual are a photograph

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of the submarine M1 firing its 12-inch gun on page 129 and a Type 'M' kite balloon operating from the minesweeper *Pentstemon* on page 121. Most ships are given a full page, some two, with a standardised format that includes a photograph, technical details and a brief narrative history that makes this book more than just a collection of pictures. Several RAN ships are included, among them the cruisers *Sydney* and *Melbourne*, the submarines *AE2* and *J5* and the oil tanker *Kurumba* adding to the book's interest and breadth of coverage.

The photographs are well reproduced and succeed in giving a very good idea of what the ships looked like and, from a variety of different angles, what they did. There is a monitor on the beach at Zanzibar having its bottom cleaned, an Inverness drifter taken up from trade on patrol with an anti-submarine net fitted with explosive charges and the world's first aircraft carrier anchored off Rosyth.

Some of the ships may be new to Australian readers; for example Dummy Battleship number 3 on page 23 was converted from the mercantile *Montezuma* to look like *Iron Duke*. Most of the superstructure and 'armament' was made of wood and, from the distance at which the photograph was taken, it looks quite convincing.

The photograph of *Erebus* bombarding the enemy from a position off Ostend with a motor launch laying a smoke screen around it on page 124 is an interesting action shot. This book has potential interest for readers who want an introduction to the Great War at sea or to know more about the sheer variety of ships that fought in it and what they looked like in operation. I enjoyed reading it and I thoroughly recommend it.

WORLD WAR ONE AIRCRAFT CARRIER PIONEER – THE STORY AND DIARIES OF JACK MCCLEERY RNAS/RAF

by Guy Warner

ISBN 978 1 84884 255 7

Pen & Sword Aviation www.pen-and-sword.co.uk

284 pages plus bibliography and index. Well illustrated with rare black & white photographs from McCleery's personal album.

Reviewed by David Hobbs

Jack McCleery joined the RNAS in 1916 and, after qualifying as a pilot he joined the embryonic aircraft carrier *Furious* to fly Short Type 184 seaplanes at first and then Sopwith One-and-a-Half Strutters. He served with some of great names of the RNAS including Bell-Davies VC, Dunning and Rutland and witnessed both the first successful landing on a carrier in 1917 and the launch of the successful strike against Tondern in 1918. He took part in more than a dozen sweeps into the eastern North Sea by elements of the Grand Fleet and was on board when German aircraft attacked the ship in the first air/sea battle in June 1918. He watched the German High Seas Fleet surrender from *Furious*'s deck.

This fascinating book contains extracts from Jack's diaries and a selection of his letters edited by the author to give insight into naval air operations with the Grand Fleet in the last two years of World War I. Guy Warner edits the diaries with a light touch, providing explanatory details of people, places, ships and aircraft that might not be familiar to a modern reader. He has also provided an introduction and conclusion but the greater part of the book has the intimate feel of a first-hand account of events which took place as aviation became a fundamental aspect of fleet operations.

Perhaps because he was trained as a reconnaissance pilot, Jack was a keen photographer and the images chosen to illustrate this book all come from his owns albums. They have a unique quality and in many years studying the RNAS I have never come across the majority of them before and, arguably, these images alone are worth the purchase price of the book. The photographs of Jack's ditched One-and-a-Half Strutter being recovered by the destroyer *Wessex* give a better idea of an evolution that had become commonplace in 1918 but has not, adequately, been described before in a published work. Fortunately Jack's son John has treasured his father's papers and photographs, with the result that they were not thrown away like so many others; Guy Warner is to be congratulated on bringing the material to light and, with the full support of the McCleery family, publishing it.

The book is well indexed and has a bibliography which starts, as one would hope, with *HMS Furious*'s logs which are contained in the UK National

Archive at Kew, File ADM53. There are several interesting appendices that complement the text. They include the rank structure of the RNAS, seaplane and aircraft carriers commissioned during the war, instructions about precautions to be taken in the event of being captured by the enemy, a translation of a contemporary German account of the air attack on *Furious* and hints for Flight Sub Lieutenants RNAS.

Overall, I found *World War One Aircraft Carrier Pioneer* to be a delightful, well-edited book that will appeal to those interested in the development of the Grand Fleet as well as those interested in the early development of naval aviation. It has taken a valued place in my library and I thoroughly recommend it.

Thales personnel conduct surface preparation work on HMAS Sirius in the dry dock at Garden Island, Sydney NSW (RAN Photo)

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Visions from the Vault

HMAS Una in Singapore 1915



Between 1915 and 1917, Australia maintained up to half a dozen of its warships on the China Station.

The deployment was in response to German plans to foment revolt in the Far East through the smuggling of arms and men from sympathetic groups in neutral Siam, China and the Philippines through to the growing nationalist movements in India and Burma.

HMAS Una, seen here in Singapore at the end of 1915, was one of the ships involved, taking part in patrols and boardings off the Netherlands East Indies and Malaya. Usually there was little to show for these efforts, but the work remained essential, not only because of the occasional discovery of infringements, but also as a means to demonstrate the British Empire's continued authority. The patrols also achieved their main function of preventing the communication or travel of enemy agents.

Una, herself, had been captured from the Germans in New Guinea in 1914.

ANI On-line: A guide to the new website.

Our new website is now on-line! In addition to the features available on the previous site, the new site also features a library of past journals, a discussion forum, a news section and member list. This short guide is designed to help you take full advantage of the new features.

Figure 1

Obtaining an account

In order to access the new features of the site you must have a user account for the website. If you have a current subscription to the ANI, navigate to the website www.navalinstitute.com.au using your web browser (figure 1), click the "Members Login" menu item (figure 2), then click the link to download an application form. Fill in the form, then fax or post it to the ANI Business Manager. Once your account has been created, you will receive an email that outlines your member ID and password.

Figure 2

Figure 3

Logging in to your account

Once you have your account details, you are ready to login and access the new features of the site. In order to login, navigate to the website (figure 1) and click the "Members Login" item (figure 2). Enter your member ID and password as they were provided to you, then click the "Login" button. The case of the member ID and password are important: i.e. "CaSe" and "case" are considered entirely different words by the authentication system. Each letter of the password will appear as a single "*" to prevent others from seeing your password as you type. If you have entered your details correctly, you will be presented with the news page. The grey status bar at the top notifies you of the account you are using (figure 4). You are now able to access all of the new features of the site.

Figure 4

Logging out of your account

In order to protect your identity and to prevent malicious use of your account by others, you must log out of the site when you are finished browsing. This is especially important on public computers. In order to log out, click the "Logout" link in the grey status bar (figure 4).

Figure 5

Figure 6

Changing your details

When your account is created, only your member ID and password are stored in the system for privacy reasons. However, you may provide other details that are visible to other ANI members. In order to change your details, login and click the "Change Your Details" menu item (figure 5). Then select the "change" link (figure 6) next to either your personal details or password. Change the text appropriately and click the "save" button (figure 7).

The personal information that you provide will be visible to other members of the ANI but will be hidden from members of the general public. You may provide as much or as little detail as you wish but none of the fields are compulsory. However, you may not change your member ID as it is the link between the on-line database and our off-line records.

Figure 7



Figure 8

Participating in the forum

In order to post topics and replies in the discussion forum, first login and click the "Forum" menu item (figure 8). Then select a forum that you would like to view by clicking its "View Topics" button (figure 9). Select a topic that you would like to read by clicking its "View this topic" link (figure 10). If you are not interested in any particular topic, you may add your own by clicking the "Add New Topic" button (figure 10). Similarly, once you are viewing a topic, you may post a reply by clicking "Add New Post". Fill in the heading and body of your reply and click the "Submit" button to add your reply to the topic. If you change your mind while writing your reply, you may click the "Cancel" button and your reply will not be added to the topic.

Figure 9

Figure 10

Further questions

If you have specific questions regarding website features or even a feature request, post a topic in the "Website Questions" forum and a site administrator will reply. Otherwise, happy browsing!

Thinking of Making a Contribution?

Style Notes for Headmark

In general, please present your work with the minimum of formatting.

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Don't indent, and leave left justified. Separate paragraphs by one line. Single spacing only. Use one space only after stops and colons.

Conventions:

Use numbers for 10 and above, words below. Ship names use italics in title case; prefixes such as HMAS in capitals and italics. Book and Journal titles use italics.

Use single quotation marks for quotations. Do not use hyphens for any rank except Sub-Lieutenant.

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Adkin, Mark. *Goose Green*. London: Leo Cooper, 1992.

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Supply your everyday title for use at the beginning of the title, so: Lieutenant Commander Bill Crabbe, or Jack Aubrey, or Reverend James Moodie. At the end of the article, please supply full honours - Lieutenant Commander Bill Crabbe, CSC, RAN - unless you would prefer not to use them. Then please supply a paragraph on yourself, to a maximum of 50 words, including any qualifications you would like listed, and any interesting biographical aspects. **If possible please supply a colour or greyscale head and shoulders e-photo of yourself** for use alongside the article title.

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Please send to the Editor on <talewis@bigpond.com>

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HMAS Sirius in the graving dock at Garden Island, Sydney NSW (RAN Photo)

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(RAN Photo)