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Vernon Parker Oration

***Darwin's Importance to
US Asia-Pacific Strategy***

***Action, Reaction: are Vietnam's growing
maritime forces postured toward
countering China?***

***The Role of the Royal Australian Naval
Reserve: today and the future***

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Alternative Straits?***

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Chief of Navy, Royal New Zealand Navy***

***Operation Chromite and the Merits
of Maritime Manoeuvre***

Navy Trivia - On the Beach

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Hamming it up in the 40's

1940s sailors hamming it up for the camera. Leading Seaman Stoker Francis Pipe (centre) pictured with mates from HMAS Sydney, probably leaving or joining the ship. Pipe was posted off before the Sydney's last voyage. (Photo courtesy Steven Pipe)



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 HMAS Newcastle (left)
 and HMAS Warramunga
 at Pelorus Sound, New
 Zealand, as part of the
 Long Navigation Course

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VERNON PARKER ORATION AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE 4 AUGUST 2011

FROM REAR ADMIRAL JAMES GOLDRICK, RAN

THIS ARTICLE WAS PUBLISHED IN THE MARCH 2012 EDITION, BUT WITH SOME TEXT MISSING AS THE RESULT OF A PRODUCTION ERROR. THIS ARTICLE CONTAINS THE FULL TEXT.

Let me start with two caveats. The first is that some of the arguments and ideas which I will propose are 'works in progress.' The second is that I will speak here specifically about the Navy – after all, if I cannot do so here, where can I? – but many of my comments do have applicability to the other Services and to the ADF as a whole.

The story of the Australian Navy is one that reflects the continuing strategic challenges faced by our nation as it has evolved towards full independence and a greater understanding of its place in the world. And as I consider, from the basis of studies that I have done over the years on our carrier acquisition program, our DDG acquisition and, most recently, the history of our various submarine programs¹, I perceive a recurrent theme. It is one of critical mass and a struggle to sustain a level of effort which will be truly effective in relation to the resources that we devote to it.

There are two aspects to this problem. The first is that of force structure – what I term the 'fleet unit' question, whereby Australia has repeatedly sought to create a force capable of meeting our strategic demands, but has often found it more expensive and difficult to sustain than the nation was willing to accept. I

should explain that when I talk of a 'fleet unit', I am not describing a task group or task force as such, but a range of capabilities which together provide a coherent construct that meets our maritime strategic requirements. And, while I will talk here only about the navy, the truth is that a 'fleet unit' also encompasses air and land capabilities when they have maritime application.

It is clear that part of the issue over force structure has been partly due to a difficulty in achieving national acceptance of the full span of our maritime strategic requirements, which have always included both surety of the local and regional environment *and* protection of the maritime networks upon which Australia's economy depends. Perhaps there should be little conflict between these two, but there has been a tendency, despite our dependence upon seaborne trade, to ignore its absolutely fundamental importance – and the navy has not always been good at either fully

understanding how that seaborne trade operates or explaining just why as well as how it should be protected. In doctrinal terms, I could describe much of the debate in Australia as oscillating historically between a focus on denial – the cliché of 'fortress Australia' – and on projection – the cliché of 'deployed forces in distant lands' – while missing much of the necessary link between these two of control, which remains an abiding requirement for a sea dependent nation like ours. Just what constitutes an effective 'fleet unit' may be change as a result of changes in the relative priorities for denial, control and projection, but in the Australian situation there will always need to be some mix of all three.

The second aspect relates to the national commitment, human and material, required to maintain the desired force structure. It is an empirical observation, but I believe that we sit in Australia at a point at which the relationship between

The Australian destroyer HMAS Brisbane (DDG 41) and the US Navy destroyer USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) cruise side by side in Australian waters during Operation Exercise Tandem Thrust 2001 (Courtesy RAN)



¹ See the author's 'Carriers for the Commonwealth' in T.R. Frame, J.V.P. Goldrick & P.D. Jones (Eds) *Reflections on the Royal Australian Navy* Kangaroo Press, Kenthurst, 1991; J.V.P. Goldrick & P.D. Jones *Struggling for a Solution: The RAN and the Acquisition of a Surface to Air Missile Capability* RAN Sea Power Centre Working Paper No. 2, January 2000; James Goldrick 'From Submersibles to SWUP: The First Seventy Five Years of Submarines in Australian Defence and Naval Policy' 2011 Creswell Oration.

the investment required to sustain our desired force structure and the actual combat capability realised is at its most unfavourable. I emphasise here that I am not talking just about the resources required to *maintain* ships and systems in service but those needed to experiment, to innovate, to develop doctrine and to push both technological and operational boundaries. These are the really difficult things, these are the things which involve risk and, quite frequently, failure. Indeed, the problem of critical mass relates not just to sustained funding – although that remains critical – but to the difficulty, given the complexity of our defence requirements, of generating sufficient intellectual capital to have a navy which is completely self reliant. In other words, while we need multiple capabilities in our order of battle, it is very hard to manage the conundrum of generating them effectively from a national base that is too small to be ideal.

In 2011 this remains a fundamental challenge and, as I go on to discuss the last century, I'd ask you to bear this in mind, because I believe many of the difficulties in our history have derived at least partly from a simplistic understanding of just what is required not only to *maintain* a navy but to *develop* it and that this naiveté has stemmed at least in part from our early experiences. If I have a bumper sticker for the RAN – perhaps for the ADF as whole – it would be 'self awareness, not self reliance' and I do not think that our journey to full self awareness is yet complete.

The First Fleet Unit

The first years of Federation were marked by debate over the form of a national defence effort. In part this remained theoretical because the new



Government had no money and would not until greater control of tax revenues passed to the Commonwealth after ten years. Nevertheless, many issues were identified in what was a complex problem. The record of small navies was not good, while many in Britain viewed with dismay the prospect of local services which they felt would contribute little to the British Empire's global security. Others, however, were coming to understand that the only way to get the new dominions to contribute significantly was to allow them ownership of their own forces. On the locals' part, the more that a navy was thought about, the more formidable the commitment seemed to be. Australians wanted to control their own naval destiny, but they were becoming increasingly aware that they would have a hard time achieving that destiny without help. Conversely, with the naval arms race with Germany in full swing, there was also a desire by many Australians to support Great Britain. It was in this spirit that, during the naval crisis of 1908, Australia offered to cover the cost of a new

capital ship for the Royal Navy.

But a 'one off', however generous, was not the same thing as an Australian navy and others prevailed who had a more sophisticated understanding of the threats to its shared sea dependent interests that the British empire faced. The Fleet Unit concept which was announced by the famous 'Jacky' Fisher, at the Imperial Defence Conference of 1909 provided a remarkable solution because it satisfied both nationalist sentiment and – at least partly – the concerns of Whitehall. The heavily armed, fast and long ranged battle cruiser (and its long range was a key factor) and the supporting force of light cruisers, destroyers and submarines was capable of both offensive and defensive action for denial, control and projection in the ways that our situation demanded. It is no exaggeration to say that the battle cruiser *Australia* was the most effective single strategic investment ever made by this country – paying its dividend within eleven months of entering Sydney Harbour.

Though its execution proved very

*CAPT Dechaineux,
RADM Collins, CMDR
Rayment on bridge
HMAS Australia 1944*



different for countries such as Canada, the Fleet Unit concept provided the model for a successful creation of naval services that has continued almost to this day. I have elsewhere termed the process of creation as being one of cloning. However, refining the analogy, I now think it more accurate to describe it as 'genetic modification', because even from the outset none of the new Services was anything like identical to the Royal Navy and each steadily developed in its own way.

The GM process had significant consequences. I have termed one the 'fleet, not a navy' syndrome in that the provision of external support by Britain, even if when was paid for, meant that the smaller nations did not have to invest to the degree which would have been otherwise required for the level of combat capability that they sought.² More to the point, they did not need to think about or set up to deal with these matters as much as they ought. In other words, the Dominions acquired fleets, but they did not for many years operate complete navies. Undoubtedly, in 1913 and for many years afterwards, it was an excellent bargain because a formidable capability was acquired without the need to invest in the full range of overheads. It would also remain a much more efficient force than otherwise possible because of the continuing ability to benefit from all the Royal Navy could provide in the way of expertise and the latest technology.

However, although substantial efforts were made to create an indigenous naval shipbuilding and repair industry, the way in which the new Service was grown also meant that many of the inherent risks were not fully understood by the government,

² James Goldrick 'A fleet not a navy: some thoughts on the themes' David Stevens & John Reeve (Eds) *Southern Trident: Strategy, history and the rise of Australian naval power* Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2001, p. 292.



by the electorate or by industry. In particular, Australia had little or no exposure to just how difficult it is to identify the right technologies and get them into service. The British did the job and carried the risks and all Australia had to do was acquire and adapt in very limited ways to meet our needs.

There was also the question of resources. A sustained in-country shipbuilding effort was just possible, but only if money was consistently committed. Unfortunately, although matters got off to a reasonable, albeit expensive start in 1911, post-war economies would soon slow and then halt new warship construction, initiating a series of stops and starts that punctuated the remainder of the century. It would always be a dilemma for governments to make the choice between expensive and protracted local construction, with the significant set-up costs involved but with real benefits for national development or purchasing off others' building lines and enjoying the economies of scale and reduced risks.

However, notwithstanding the high

cost of Australian workers (who did generally produce very high quality work), many governments funded naval shipbuilding at levels so low that they caused building schedules to become unduly protracted and their products even more expensive than they should have been. This was true for the cruiser *HMAS Adelaide*, known as *HMAS 'Long Delayed'* in the early 1920s and true for the destroyer and frigate programs in the 1950s. Here we can see a direct relationship between the size of the fleet unit that the nation was willing to support and the ability for that unit to be generated efficiently and at reasonable cost within Australia.

There were other, more subtle problems. The new Service was sometimes viewed by outsiders as uncritically reflecting British views when in fact its people were demonstrating a naval outlook, particularly an outlook that appreciated that national security was more than the simple defence of national territory. This should not have been surprising, particularly as some in the RAN failed to make the distinction between the United Kingdom and the


Significant capital ships within the RAN; David Martin being "rowed ashore" from the aircraft carrier Melbourne at the end of his command (Tom Lewis Collection)

navy themselves and were occasionally 'captured' by the ethos of Britain to a degree that made it difficult for them to operate comfortably in the Australian national environment¹, but it also tended to make it very hard for them to argue a naval case amongst national defence policy makers.

The focus on professional training rather than education inherent in the Royal Navy's culture also did not help, in that the understanding of the roles of the Navy was essentially emotional rather than rational. 'There is nothing the Navy cannot do' was deeply ingrained but why it should do it was rarely analysed². I believe that this was one of the key factors in a too-slow growth of critical consciousness on naval matters within the RAN itself and indirectly within the nation as whole.

Other navies, however, particularly the RN, never saw Australian personnel or ships as anything other than proud and distinctive representatives of their nation. 'Three cheers for Wallaby Land' was the cry from a member of the crew of the *Australia* at her commissioning in Portsmouth in 1913 and when the Australian destroyers passed through the Dardanelles in 1918 after the Armistice with Turkey, the Australian national flag was prominent at their mastheads.

As an aside, I am convinced that for many years the RAN's professional standards were maintained at the levels they were substantially because of the expertise gained through being able to operate in much more complex and sophisticated environments than was ever possible around Australia. All this opened the professional and personal horizons of those concerned and also created a competitive attitude amongst the members of the new services, who were determined to prove that they were as good as – and better than the British.³ The young officers who were the products of our national naval



college were viewed with respect by the British from the very first⁴ – a respect sustained by their performance in the years that followed in their professional courses and at sea.⁵

But the system of officer development caused other difficulties. Given the internecine disputes amongst senior officers that occurred in both the Australian Army and the RAAF in the 1930s and 1940s, the RAN's avoidance of them at this time must have some connection with its ability to judge and promote to external standards.⁶ However, the career profile of the RN became increasingly difficult to impose upon the RAN as officers became more senior. The fact was and is that smaller navies require diversification of the professional skill base into policy and administrative

matters rather earlier than do much larger services.⁷ The question would be the extent to which the RAN might have to accept – or at least risk – a reduction in individual seagoing and war fighting skills to achieve such earlier diversification and how to draw the right balance.

It would be also a question of how much was enough in terms of shore and staff infrastructure because a smaller navy faces much greater relative challenges in generating sufficient experts than a larger one. The USN, for example, may be 25 times the size of the RAN, but it does not have 25 times the number of different problems. Australian slowness in the creation of national staff capability also did not help – in 1932, admittedly at a low point, the Australian CNS had

Significant capital ships within the RAN; HMAS Australia after a kamikaze strike



a grand total of 10 naval personnel working for him on the naval staff itself – to cover plans, operations, engineering, communications and ordnance. Independent and creative thought is fairly difficult in such circumstances.

Nevertheless, the operations of what I term the ‘first Fleet Unit’ triumphantly proved the worth of the RAN. Von Spee did not bring his cruisers anywhere near Australia – achievement of denial. The German possessions in the South West Pacific were rapidly brought under control in Australia’s first joint and multinational operations – achievement of projection. The troop convoys were safely escorted to the Middle East, with the destruction of the cruiser *Emden* by the *Sydney* in November 1914 confirming both the efficiency of the new Navy in the sea control function and the value of investing in ‘high end’ capability – the *Emden*’s guns were no match for *Sydney*’s much heavier 6 inchers. Australia had cause to celebrate its navy.

Yet, November 1914 marked the end of the RAN’s primacy in the public eye. The submarine *AE 2* successfully penetrated the Dardanelles, but its sortie was only a counterpoint to the landings at Gallipoli. Australian ships played a significant role in many theatres until 1918 but they did so as minor elements of a global naval effort that had little or no glamour attached to it and whose work went largely unremarked, except when it appeared to have failed.

The RAN enjoyed a brief renaissance in the immediate aftermath of the war, but there was trouble ahead. By the early 1920s, the first fleet unit had become unsustainable. Technological development had rendered obsolete its core asset – the *Australia* - and, in any case, there was insufficient money. The Australian

government had other concerns and welcomed the treaties that placed limits on naval strength despite the fact that those treaties, counting Australia’s navy as an integral element of Britain’s for arms limitation purposes, did not properly recognise Australian independence. The agreements sealed the *Australia*’s fate and she was scuttled off Sydney Heads in 1924.

The Second Fleet Unit

A very different second fleet unit concept was embarked upon in 1923, with a combination of heavy cruisers and a submarine flotilla. This scheme came as part of the Admiralty planning for the expansion of the naval forces in the Far East against the threat of Japan, an expansion in which it was expected that the Australian navy would have a significant role. However, events combined to end the submarine project within a few years. One would be a lack of money, but there was another factor at play – the RAN’s first experience of prototypes. The new submarines *Oxley* and *Otway* were two of the first three of the new patrol submarines which were effectively the first British post-war design. They were not ready for operational service and their delivery voyage a debacle. The resultant controversy soured the image of the capability. It is difficult to avoid the impression that the British had been so eager to take advantage of the Australian commitment to a renewed naval effort that they (and the RAN) had not stopped to think through the problems of operating brand new, highly complex systems half a world away from their builder. It was not until more than two years later that the RN itself deployed the class to the Far East and then it was done in company with a brand new, built for the purpose depot ship.

The RAN was hard hit by the

Great Depression, its very existence threatened and much of its offensive capability, notably its submarine force, abandoned. By 1932, only a handful of surface ships survived in commission. The absence of the submarines – and no less than six had been intended to supplement a British force in East Asia that later peaked at sixteen operational boats - left the RAN with no serious capability to contribute to the defensive campaign against a Japanese offensive which the British planned to buy the necessary time to get their main fleet out from European waters. The absence of the submarines meant that the Navy was shorn of the offensive capability which would give it strategic weight. We paid a heavy price for this in the Second World War because, even having focused on surface forces, the RAN never possessed the necessary range of units to operate independently in the Second World War for offensive operations – in the South West Pacific our cruisers and destroyers had always to be supplemented by at least equal numbers of US ships to create a sufficiently capable task force and, lacking large scale organic air, even that force could only operate in essentially supporting roles. In short, we did not have at this time a coherent ‘fleet unit’.

Nevertheless, rearmament and expansion, albeit too late and too limited, did result in a relatively modern force in 1939, as well as the renewal of a substantial local shipbuilding program and the RAN was by far the most combat ready of the Services at that time. It went to war on the first day of conflict and stayed there until the last. The grievous losses it suffered are too often listed only in ships – but it was the people who counted and those losses were not only terrible in their own right, but created continuing gaps in the RAN’s trained strength and talent for many years ahead.

The Navy played its part globally, protecting both local waters and trade and helping hold the line against Germany and Italy until late 1941 when its units were recalled to deal with the crisis in South East Asia. The successes of the early months of the war, notably the triumph of the *Sydney* over the Italian *Bartolomeo Colleoni* were followed by a series of heavy blows. *Sydney's* disappearance was succeeded by the Japanese onslaught which saw in rapid succession the destruction of the *Perth*, *Yarra* and *Vampire* and in later operations that of *Voyager* in East Timor and the cruiser *Canberra* in the Solomons.

But some points may be made. In an era in which Joint operations are so key to our effectiveness as a Defence Force, it should be noted that not only the majority of the losses listed above had some direct connection with land operations, but so did those of the RAN in the Mediterranean – the *Perth*, *Napier* and *Nizam* were all damaged evacuating troops from Crete, while the *Waterhen* and the *Parramatta* were both sunk supporting the besieged Australian and Allied troops in Tobruk. Many more of our operations and our successes – and Australian units were responsible for the destruction of at least seven enemy submarines, as well as other many units, and the capture or destruction of over 150,000 tons of shipping – were directly related to the protection of the global trade system and cutting the enemy's access to it. Control and denial again.

The last months of the war provided a significant fillip to a Navy which had felt for some time unknown to the public. The heroism of the cruiser *Australia's* crew under the kamikaze onslaught gained much coverage at a time when Australia's land forces were largely unemployed. Furthermore, the combination of the arrival of the British Pacific Fleet and

the breathtaking effectiveness of the American naval advance across the Pacific also provided demonstration of the benefits of the combination of sea with air power. The war also saw the development of a much more effective local shipbuilding, repair and naval weapons industry. Forced into such national effort by the inability of Britain to provide the support which the RAN had hitherto enjoyed, Australia began to come of age. Most notable were two initiatives. The first was that, when the Admiralty were slow to give priority to Australian intentions to build destroyers in country, the RAN went directly to the British shipbuilders to get the plans and specifications. The second was the highly successful class of 60 Australian minesweepers – the famous *Bathurst* class corvettes – which were a local effort that very clearly demonstrated that good enough can sometimes be the successful enemy of the best. Had we been more ambitious in the capabilities of these ships, we would never have got them out in time or in sufficient numbers.

The Third Fleet Unit

The post-war plan for the RAN which the Labor Government endorsed in 1947 was effectively the third Fleet Unit. Centred around two light fleet carriers and their embarked squadrons, the future navy was intended to have both a capacity for sustained independent operations and to be able to make a significant contribution to the global effort to protect sea communications. Once again, the concept was straitened by limits on resources and the pressures of continuing technological change. Australia only briefly operated two operational carriers at once – the *Sydney* and the loan carrier *Vengeance* – and the costs of adapting the *Melbourne* for jet aircraft were such



that a planned refit for the *Sydney* never happened. These and a whole range of other problems served to limit other areas of the RAN's expansion.

Yet the Navy staged a remarkable recovery. Despite the heavy losses of personnel and the almost complete lack of recruiting for the permanent service during the conflict, the practically moribund fleet of 1947 was soon the effective force of the early 1950s that saw the RAN not only operationally deploy the *Sydney* to Korea in late 1951, but allowed the continual rotation of destroyers and frigates there and an increasing commitment to South East Asia. Perhaps much of this success was enabled by a continuing flow of

Significant capital ships within the RAN; HMAS Melbourne



officers and men from the Royal Navy as well as its more formal support but, in an era in which immigration was a central plank for national development, this was not inappropriate. The Navy also began to develop its own scientific research capability, which initially focused – and with great success – on the anti-submarine warfare problems which were at the heart of the challenge that the Soviet bloc was perceived to represent at sea.

There were pressures. The fixed wing naval arm always suffered from the problem of inadequate resources, not only for itself, but because it drew away funding from other elements of the fleet. Furthermore, the increasing capabilities of precision guided weapons provided challenges the RAN had yet to meet. Matters came to a crisis with the Government's decision to abandon the fixed wing capability in 1959, but this step – traumatic as it was – provided a much clearer way ahead for the Navy because, in compensation, the Government was willing to invest in a whole range of areas. The Navy was able to commission its replenishment ship. A submarine force was set up, the core of a new offensive capability and the beginning of what I term the 'fourth fleet unit'. A modern mine countermeasure squadron was acquired and brand new missile destroyers ordered from the United States.

The Fourth Fleet Unit

The Australian Navy's first major purchases from the US, the *Charles F Adams* class were also the forerunners of a turn towards America that reflected not only changing strategic realities but also where the leading edge of naval technological development now lay. Naval aviation won a reprieve, helped by a deteriorating strategic situation in which not only

Indo-China but Indonesia seemed at risk. After ASW helicopters were provided for the *Melbourne*, she was modernised to take new jet fighters and anti-submarine aircraft. This expansion and modernisation were well timed as the mid-1960s saw the RAN operationally engaged in both the defence of Malaysia and in support of the American –led conflict in Vietnam. The *Adams* class particularly proved their worth in operations as part of the American Seventh Fleet.

I am particularly interested in this period because it was one in which we did not at first try to be a parent navy for complete systems or ships, but rather – and with some success – adapted particular systems to particular platforms. The British designed *River* class frigates, for example, were modified to take Dutch radars and fire control systems. The *Ikara* anti-submarine missile was successfully developed in an Australian led venture and then installed in both the *River* class and the DDGs where it proved itself to be the most effective shipborne ASW weapon system in the world. This selective approach seems to me, whether it was conscious or not, to have been much more realistic than a wholesale effort at being a parent navy.


The 1970s provided a whole new range of challenges for the RAN, as they did for Australia's strategic outlook. The Cold War remained and, although Indonesia was no longer the immediate concern, a weary United States was much more likely to require its partners to look after themselves. There was also little enthusiasm for defence spending on anything like the scale of the 1960s and therefore increasing pressure to reduce overheads. For the next decade and a half, debate raged as to the appropriate form and functions of an Australian defence force. As I consider that debate, my belief is that the aversion to further

overseas commitments on land which underlay much of the discussion also hindered proper examination of the continuing need for commitment to protection of the global maritime system.

For the Navy, the eventual victim was the aircraft carrier. In a time of continuing budgetary restraint, the large sums involved in finding a replacement for *Melbourne* were always going to be difficult to secure. A window opened by the sudden availability of the British light carrier *Invincible* was soon closed in the wake of the Falklands War of 1982, ironically a conflict that demonstrated both the flexibility and reach of seaborne forces. The new Labor Government of 1983 mandated the end of fixed wing aviation, a decision from which this time there would be no return. But the RAN did not become moribund. The submarine force was advancing rapidly with new sensors, new torpedoes and, particularly significant, anti-ship missiles in an Australian led modernisation program that stands as one of the most significant technological and industrial successes in our naval history and perhaps the ultimate expression of the selective approach that I have already described.

Maritime forces received further support in the review by Paul Dibb in 1986 and the White Paper of 1987 which followed. Both Dibb and the White Paper appreciated that Australia was a maritime nation and, if there was too much on the 'sea air gap' and too little on Australia's dependence on the global and regional maritime system, there was nevertheless recognition that an island nation requires defence at sea. Spurred by an enthusiastic Defence Minister in Kim Beazley, the 1987 White Paper helped set in train the submarine and frigate projects which have come to define much of the Navy's force structure in the new

HMAS Australia



Graphic by Peter Ingman

century and which have provided an updated version of the 'fourth fleet unit'. Of the two major projects, that for the eight Australian and two New Zealand *Anzac* class frigates was the more obviously successful. One hard fought battle, to fit the ships with a 5 inch gun, was triumphantly vindicated during the 2003 Gulf War when the *Anzac* herself provided critical gunfire support to the amphibious assault on the Al Faw peninsula.

The submarine project was more complex. It is not appropriate for me to discuss here the current state of the class, but I do want to make some observations about the project in retrospect, because they bear upon the sophistication of our national understanding of the task of operating a navy. Two key mistakes were made in what was a much more successful project than many recognise. The first was that the contingency funding was inadequate, which meant that many of the problems inevitable in any complex prototype were not fixed as they arose, but left to fester. The second, and it is associated with the first, is that the issues of risk and complexity in a brand new design were never really explained properly to the electorate, so that when problems arose the nation was ill-prepared to understand or accept them.

There were other problems as the RAN took on many other responsibilities in terms of sustainment, training and doctrine that had been left largely to the RN or

the USN. Looking back, I think that there was insufficient attention paid to the costs and, in particular, the demands on our expertise in trying to be independent to the extent that we did, largely because so many of them had hitherto been largely invisible to us – and perhaps because they were so difficult. The challenges of being a 'parent navy' inherent in the acquisition of unique ships and systems have received the most attention in both internal and public examinations of the pitfalls and problems that we experienced in this period, but there were other issues which have received less notice. For example, in patriating so much training and reducing our exchange programs to the extent that we did, I am unsure that we provided adequate substitutes for the continuous injection of intense professional experience that had hitherto been maintained by these means. Similarly, there were hidden costs, not all well understood, in the necessary redistribution of our ships to bases in Western Australia and in Queensland and the Northern Territory in transport, training and people, as well as the sheer difficulty of assembling sufficient numbers of units in one spot to create a realistic maritime training environment.

There was an additional theme in the 'fourth fleet unit' and this was the need to protect the maritime domain. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea saw the extension of territorial seas and the creation of

exclusive economic zones and other additions to national authority over maritime areas. This legal regime only reflected the greater exploitation of fisheries and of offshore resources that marked the later decades of the last century and its demands brought about a steady increase in the RAN's patrol and response capacity – and its commitment to the task. This has involved difficult, unrelenting and sometimes unpleasant work but it has also kept the Navy, even in an increasingly inter-agency environment, very firmly in the public eye in a way that I believe has benefited the Service.

The Fifth Fleet Unit

Other operational deployments mounted. While the 1980s had seen the Navy focused on regional engagement, the first Gulf war of 1991 was the beginning of a commitment to the Middle East that would surge in the wake of 911 and into the second Gulf War and which would continue to this day, albeit with much of our effort now transferred to anti-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean. There have been other commitments, such as the interventions in East Timor and the Solomons which have emphasised effective Joint operations.

Given all these demands, it is not surprising that the 'Force 2030' construct should have been devised, or that it includes such a wide range of capabilities. Recognition of the continuing need for an ability to



project power around the region has come in the acquisition of the big new amphibious ships *Canberra* and *Adelaide* and the newly purchased *Choules*. And recognition of the need for an effective control capability has come in the project for the new Air Warfare Destroyers. The White Paper of 2009 has provided a final element – for the moment – of the newest ‘fifth fleet unit’ concept for the RAN with plans for a much expanded submarine force which will provide the core of the denial element and contribute in other ways.

Conclusion

In 2011 the Australian Navy can look back with some pride on 110 years of life as a national organisation and a century of existence as a modern fighting force. It has had its share of failures, but they have been outweighed by its successes. If there has been a recurring element to many of the problems it has experienced, it has to be said that many of the challenges that it faces are endemic to a Service which has such wide responsibilities – perhaps the greatest relative to *any* navy – in a vast, maritime-dependent nation with a small population and relatively limited resources. And, as it has moved from being a unique but closely bound element of the global organisation led by the Royal Navy into a fully national service which still contributes to the security of the global maritime system, it is fair to say that the journey has not been from dependency to self reliance, but from unconscious operation to self awareness.

The challenge for the Navy in the years ahead will come in meeting all the needs of the new capabilities in terms of people and infrastructure and I think that the nature of those challenges will be very familiar to any student of the RAN’s history. We are certainly aware

of them as never before. Nevertheless, I believe that the key problem of the mismatch between the expertise that we can generate and sustain ourselves and the wide range of capabilities that we need to operate means, as part of that self awareness, we need to consider how we can go about squaring the circle. I will therefore close by suggesting that at least part of the solution may be a revival of some of the shared approaches by which the original fleet unit concept prospered. For there are many like-minded navies, culturally and organizationally similar to ours, who are faced with similar problems – the Canadians and Dutch and, to an increasing degree, the fast reducing British – and this is just a start. Given that it is the intellectual aspect of capability management which presents us all with such challenges, could it not be possible to go even further than our current cooperative efforts and formally divide up responsibilities for experimentation, doctrine development and training between the various services, with a lead navy as a centre of excellence for a particular area of warfare? ✶



Rear Admiral James Goldrick AM, CSC, RAN joined the RAN in 1974. He has commanded many warships; lectured in naval history and contemporary naval affairs at many institutions; published several books, and served in a variety of command positions ashore.

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Image: Eye in the Sky

Darwin's Importance to US Asia-Pacific Strategy

BY SERGEI DESILVA-RANASINGHE

FDI SENIOR ANALYST

Key Points

As part of the US realignment to the Asia-Pacific, the US and Australia have agreed to upgrade defence cooperation by deploying US rotational forces to Darwin to strengthen interoperability and engage in joint-training exercises with Australian and Southeast Asian forces.

Darwin's strategic location shall also enable US forces to conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations when required.

Given Darwin's capacity to provide amphibious and shipping access, it will also serve as a useful focal point for US capacity-building assistance to the Australian Army, which is currently in the process of developing amphibious capabilities.

Summary

As part of the US Government's landmark decision late last year to strategically refocus to the Asia-Pacific, Lieutenant General Duane Thiessen, who heads Marine Forces Pacific, or MarForPac, spoke to Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe in mid-December last year, about the re-emergence of Australia in US regional strategic calculations and the intensified US commitment to the ANZUS Treaty and the Asia Pacific.

Commentary

'We have had an alliance for 60 years that is committed to global and regional security,' said General Thiessen.

'The US President and the Australian Prime Minister have both agreed to enhance cooperation. The new arrangement will not negate or substitute the smaller and larger pre-existing military-to-military exercises that we already do on a routine basis with Australia. Those will all continue as I see it,' he said.

'As anyone who has been to the



Northern Territory would know, the training ranges adjacent to Darwin are world class. The Bradshaw Range is a huge field to conduct manoeuvre and conventional training exercises. There aren't many places in the world where we can do that type of training. Darwin is also located in an opportune place as it will also give us the ability to conduct additional training with other Southeast Asian countries.'

The deployment of Marines to Darwin shall commence in mid-2012 and will initially consist of approximately 250 marines. By 2014, however, US forces in Darwin are expected to increase upwards of 1,000 personnel and will ultimately plateau at 2,500 troops by around 2016-2017.

The General further explained: 'The US forces that deploy to Darwin will be a combination of rotational forces from within and from outside MarForPac. In other words we will go there, operate and then leave. Starting with rotational forces the deployment in Darwin will be along a Marine Air Ground Task Force, or MAGTAF, construct. As we phase into this agreement we intend to increase the size and the duration of the deployments to Australia. Eventually, we intend

to deploy a MAGTAF in northern Australia along the lines of a battalion with logistics and rotary wing support.'

Although the presence of large US forces in Darwin will provide enhanced opportunities to engage in regional activities, including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, a key emphasis of the US deployment will focus on joint-training exercises with the Australian military and other allied regional forces.

'The mutual benefit is irrefutable,' affirmed General Thiessen. 'In Darwin we will have two forces going into a common training environment, which will improve our relationship, understanding, techniques and procedures. 'We get to watch each other to see what works, sort out difficult points and harmonise our forces in a more intensive way. Darwin also offers amphibious and shipping access, which is useful as the Australian Army

Darwin has been facing possible northern threats for 100 years. A 9.2-inch gun emplacement at the Darwin Military Museum

Border protector - HMAS Armidale leaves Darwin (Courtesy RAN)



is developing and upgrading its own amphibious capability.'


He added: 'We are now in the process of developing the interoperability arrangements. I am about to deploy a liaison team to Canberra and a coordination team to Darwin to start developing the day-to-day logistics arrangements and the common training objectives. I consider this agreement to be a huge step forward for both the United States and Australia.'

In a policy that has also been referred to as "America's Pacific Century", the US decision to strategically realign significant diplomatic, economic and military resources over the next decade reflects the continued pre-eminence of the Asia-Pacific region in world affairs, particularly with the rise of China.

'The United States has an increased interest in the Asia-Pacific. As we draw down in Afghanistan there is an opportunity for us to refit and reequip and bring more equipment into the Pacific. MarForPac has two Marine Expeditionary Forces, or MEFs, under its purview. We will have more Marines in the Pacific to exercise through 1 MEF and 3 MEF all our engagement and presence responsibilities. The 1 MEF is headquartered in California and 3 MEF is headquartered in Japan.

'In no way has the US Marine Corps left its amphibious roots. The US Marine Corps is light, flexible and amphibious and is a force that can move throughout the region and be effective across a scale of contingencies, including the inherent capability if required to work in a non-combat capacity.

'Not only have we continued our amphibious legacy and capability, we have developed it and are continuing to further do so. The entire time that we have been engaged in both Iraq and Afghanistan, we have deployed the 31st, 11th, 13th and 15th Marine Expeditionary Units, or MEUs, each either operating in, or at least transiting



through, the Pacific.

'MarForPac has continued to engage in amphibious training in a real world construct with our partners throughout Asia such as Australia, Japan, South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines. For instance, we recently completed a joint amphibious landing exercise with the Philippines. There have also been other examples such as the USS Tortuga, which dispatched marines and sailors to Thailand to assist in flood relief.'

In conclusion, General Thiessen emphasised: 'The regional impact of the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea and the Pacific is incredible and plays large in all our calculations when we look at our capabilities to engage and respond.

The Pacific is huge and it is dominated by water, which means that mobility has unique strategic challenges that are both naval and amphibious in character' he said.

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Any opinions or views expressed in this paper are those of the individual author, unless stated to be those of Future Directions International.

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Darwin Harbor combined fixed gun ranges in the later years of WWII. Although the 9.2-inch guns were not completed when the Japanese carrier raids struck in 1942, their presence - and the working 6-inch guns, deterred surface ships (Peter Ingman)

ACTION, REACTION: ARE VIETNAM'S GROWING MARITIME FORCES POSTURED TOWARD COUNTERING CHINA?

BY MIDSHIPMAN NAM KHOA NGUYEN

There are concerns among strategic analysts that Vietnam's build up of maritime forces is inciting further tension in the Sino-Vietnamese maritime boundary dispute in the South China Sea. Will naval conflict develop?

The answer is not a simple 'yes or no'. It would be prudent for the Chinese to monitor Vietnam's military procurements with a close eye, but in the mean time there is little risk of large-scale military conflict developing over the maritime boundary dispute. There is, however, the risk that smaller clashes may develop. This is becoming increasingly likely in the South China Sea as paramilitary forces from both sides add tension to the situation, but the affair is civil in nature and not military. The key factors driving this dispute can be linked back to the sea as a resource and China's desire to make it a region for its dominion. Both countries stand to gain economically and strategically by having exclusive rights in the claimed exclusive economic zone.

I examine here four aspects in the Sino-Vietnamese maritime boundary dispute. These are:

1. Economic significance of the South China Sea;
2. The Chinese perspective;
3. Vietnam's maritime force – is it being postured with a view to counter China; and
4. The steps to finding a peaceful solution or avoiding naval confrontation.

Background

The South China Sea is approximately 648,000 square nautical miles, roughly

twice the size of the Sea of Japan.¹ The claimed territory includes, but is not limited to, the Paracel Islands to the north (currently occupied by China),² the Spratly islands to the south, and Scarborough Shoal to the East. States that are bordered along the South China Sea include Vietnam, China, The Republic of China (Taiwan), Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, and Indonesia.

The disputed territory is an overlapping series of baselines drawn from archipelago chains in the sea. Fig. 1 shows the overlapping claims of each State in the region. Of particular importance is China's claim, as shown by the proverbial '9-dashed line' or 'U-shaped line': China's claim extends to virtually the entire South China Sea, a claim that is based on maps drafted during the early twentieth century before the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was introduced.³ This paper will focus primarily on the Paracel and Spratly Islands, with some references to incidents that have recently occurred between the Philippines and China at Scarborough Shoal.

Apart from Brunei, all of the claimant States have established some form of military presence on one or more of the islands through erecting military features or posting personnel. The installations are not just on islands adjacent to each country's claimed area but as Ji Guoxing, a noted scholar,



describes: 'a jagged, interlocking and crazy-quilt pattern of occupation has been formed'.⁴ Vietnam is believed to occupy around 25 features, including most of the Spratly Islands, and China is believed to occupy at least eight, including the entirety of the Paracel Islands.⁵

Vietnam and China have had an antagonistic relationship ever since Vietnam emerged as a free State from Chinese rule at the turn of the first millennium.⁶ The most recent military engagements between the two States were in 1979 and 1988.⁷ The 1979 campaign was successful for the Vietnamese in repelling a Chinese land invasion, but the 1988 conflict was not: over 60 sailors were killed and three vessels sunk near the Spratly Islands. This history of conflict between them serves to fuel the domestic pressure for governments to remain strong in making claims for exclusive rights and extending maritime boundaries.

The South China Sea as a resource

The South China Sea is abundant with natural resources. It provides approximately 10% of the world's annual fisheries catch and the region is rich in both oil and natural

Figure 1 - South China Sea maritime boundary claims⁸

gas deposits.⁹ The exact figures of how much oil is in the region are unknown, largely due to the difficulty in conducting surveys because of the disputes, but the US Energy Information Administration estimates that there are at least 28 billion barrels worth of oil deposits.¹⁰ As for gas deposits, it is believed that gas is the more abundant hydrocarbon in the region. A survey by Husky Energy, working with the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation, announced a find of proven natural gas reserves of nearly four to six trillion cubic feet of natural gas near the Spratly Islands.¹¹

Vietnam stands to significantly gain from access to the fish stocks and hydrocarbon deposits in the South China Sea. At approximately 17 million tons, crude oil represented 22 % of the value of Vietnam's total exports in 2004.¹² Estimates of Vietnam's current oil reserves indicate the output of oil exports will decline gradually. As for Vietnam's fishing industry, it grew fourfold between 1990 and 2002 after the 'Doi Moi' (new era) economic policy was introduced. Fish exports for the period are estimated to have been valued at more than \$US 2 billion, at approximately 9.1% of total exports in 2004.¹³ Thus, access to the exclusive economic rights of the waters around the Spratly and Paracel archipelagos will give Vietnam a significant increase in economic security.

China will also benefit if it should extend its maritime boundary further into the South China Sea. Chinese officials, from the partly state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation, estimate the country's dependency on foreign oil is now at 55 %.¹⁴ By 2030, 80 % of oil and 50% of gas imports to China will be by sea. By expanding existing maritime boundaries, China would have exclusive rights to more hydrocarbon reserves in the region, thus reducing

its dependency on foreign oil and gas.

The Chinese perspective

The maritime boundary dispute between Vietnam and China is a civil affair over access to resources and exclusive economic rights. Hanoi has stated that it is willing to commit to bilateral pursuits to resolve the dispute with China, but Beijing is unwavering over its claims in the South China Sea. The reasons for this are based on deep-seated nationalism, the Chinese psyche, the failure of multilateral mechanisms and the realities of the status quo. Combined, these factors make it difficult for Vietnam to find an effective resolution to the border dispute.

Beijing's responses to the dispute stem from a view that the region is sovereign Chinese territory, a claim that is popular in a deep-seated nationalist sentiment that can be seen emerging within the domestic political sphere. The Chinese people believe the South China Sea is sovereign Chinese 'blue land' due to hundreds of years of history.¹⁶ Public opinion (amongst a highly educated middle-class) is a double-edged sword for the Chinese central government; on the one hand it gives Beijing a legitimate platform that is popular amongst an educated population but on the other hand the pressure it generates can force the Foreign Ministry into a corner.¹⁷ The Communist Party of China wants to remain in power, that fact is a given, and taking a strong stance in the maritime boundary dispute will serve to solidify its support with the Chinese




Figure 2 - South China Sea oil/gas fields¹⁵

public. Beijing knows that by taking this stance it has shot itself in the foot at having a chance of reaching any resolution that results in China having less territory than what is already claimed. The domestic environment would not be forgiving of the Chinese government if it sacrificed territory that they, the Chinese people, considered sovereign Chinese 'land'.¹⁸

The Chinese psyche extends to the 'victim' mentality. The Chinese believe the rest of the world, in particular the US and its allies, are attempting to rein in China and force an international interpretation onto it, through multilateral mechanisms, in what they consider a 'bullying' approach. This is clearly demonstrated by China's refusal to negotiate with parties not involved in the territorial dispute. Beijing's determination not to participate in multilateral and arbitrary mechanisms is articulated in its Defence white paper. The government refers to these mechanisms as a form of hegemony and power politics, which China stringently opposes.¹⁹

Existing frameworks are not effective in resolving the dispute. The Chinese loosely and often mistakenly apply the Law of the Sea Convention

ACTION, REACTION: ARE VIETNAM'S GROWING MARITIME FORCES POSTURED TOWARD COUNTERING CHINA?

(LOSC) in territorial disputes, not just in the South China Sea. Although China ratified LOSC in 1996, its actions regarding maritime disputes do not align with what is stated in the articles. A recent example of this was in 2009 when five Chinese vessels surrounded a US hydrographic ship. The *USNS Impeccable* was conducting a survey 120 km off the coast when it was 'harassed' by Chinese paramilitary vessels. The United States argued that it was exercising freedom of navigation in the EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) as stipulated under article 58 of LOSC.²⁰ The Chinese, however, responded that their understanding of LOSC is that it requires a State to request a warship's entry into the EEZ.²¹ The 'loose' interpretation of LOSC, when it benefits China, makes it difficult to determine a unified Chinese view.

The status quo adds another layer of complexity in the dispute. The Chinese military currently have installations on Woody Island in the Paracels and Mischief Reef near the Spratly archipelago, as well as on a number of other sites.²² The reality is that China is willing, and able, to patrol and maintain its stronghold in the region in order to enforce its exclusive economic zone. Furthermore, the strategic positioning of installations, such as the airfield on Woody Island, could give China a base out from the mainland and increase its power projection capacity. China could put forward an argument saying that since they have established bases that can sustain life on some islands, the Chinese should continue to maintain sovereignty over those parcels of land, and the extended zones from those islands.

A modern Navy and the paramilitary domain

My analysis so far has focused on the civil and diplomatic aspects behind the dispute, and indeed the dispute is



Figure 3 - A Gepard class frigate of the PVN²⁷

in essence an entirely civil affair. There is, however, no denying that there is a military flavour in the dispute, and there is always a risk of conflict. The question is to what extent is there a risk of naval confrontation between Vietnam and China, and as a consequence, the rest of Southeast Asia. I believe there are three areas that are an alternate way of examining the issue. Firstly, increased spending on military equipment is not an accurate indication of posturing capability around a threat from China. Secondly, the Chinese maritime domain is not a unified front but rather a conglomerate of paramilitary and civilian agencies. Finally, Vietnam's submarine procurement is a new capability, but there is a risk of sensationalising it and over-emphasising the capabilities of both Vietnam and China.

The modernisation of the Vietnamese Navy (PVN) is a natural process of replacing outdated military equipment. Increased military spending is not in itself an adequate indicator of posturing toward a specific threat. There is a misguided belief that Vietnam's latest procurements (aside from the Kilo submarines) are a direct response to China's growing military presence. Figures showing increased spending are not completely accurate as most of the budget (approximately 75-80% of it) goes toward maintaining the current force, including maintenance and salaries.²³ Therefore procurement in an increased defence budget is only a small portion; the figures do not show changes in

salaries, maintenance costs or inflation. This is true in Vietnam's case; between 2010 and 2011 the defence budget increased 25 % from 44.4 trillion dong to 55.5 trillion dong. However, during this period, the inflation rate was almost 19%. Therefore in real terms, growth was only approximately 5.5%.²⁴ The lack of transparency in accounting also makes it difficult to determine how much the Vietnamese military is directing toward expanding its capability.

Vietnam's newest procurements are inherently improvements if an existing capability and not a new one. Examples of the latest platforms include: the Gepard-class frigates as the major surface combatant, the Su-30 flankers for air superiority, and K-300P Bastion missile systems for coastal defence. These systems are technologically advanced, and a leap forward from what the Vietnamese military already operates, but the PVN have long operated these types of platforms.²⁵ Whilst the latest assets may be able to provide some formidable resistance to the Chinese, it would seem the main purpose for the latest purchases is to replace ageing Soviet-era platforms currently being operated by the Vietnamese military. Vietnam's modernisation plan, along with other Southeast Asian countries, appears to be a 'tit-for-tat' response to trend across the region, not specifically aimed toward countering China.²⁶ Most countries in the region are going through a similar process of modernising, replacing or upgrading

their ageing platforms (generally within limited budgets).

Another common mistake in analysing the dispute is assuming that China's maritime authorities are a unified actor. The actions of paramilitary forces and civilian agencies on both sides are not a true representation of the military element of the dispute. Indeed, the majority of clashes since 2009 have been purely civil in nature, as shown by the following list:

1. On 2 February 2010, a Chinese patrol boat stopped and boarded a Vietnamese fishing craft and seized its catch, navigational aids, spare parts and tools.
2. On 22 March 2010, Chinese patrol boats detained a Vietnamese fishing boat and its twelve-member crew who were sheltering near Woody Islands in the Paracels. Chinese authorities demanded payment of a \$10,000 fine. This prompted a protest by Vietnam on 30 March.
3. On 13 April 2010, a Chinese naval patrol seized a second Vietnamese fishing boat and its crew of nine near Da Loi island near the Paracels and demanded payment of a \$10,000 USD fine.
4. On 4 May 2010, Chinese Fishery Administration officials seized a Vietnamese fishing boat in the Paracel archipelago and demanded a fine of \$8,000.
5. On 5 July 2011, crew from a People's Liberation Army – Navy (PLAN) vessel boarded a Vietnamese fishing boat near the Paracel Islands, confiscated its fishing catch and allegedly beat the captain before forcing the boat to leave the area.²⁸

Such Chinese paramilitaries come under the command of different departments in the Chinese government, commonly referred to as 'The Nine Dragons'.²⁹ For example, the Fisheries Law Enforcement Command falls under the Bureau of Fisheries Administration, and the State Oceanic Administration controls China Maritime Surveillance.³⁰ This poses two challenges: how to deal with each agency when they are under separate departments and how to find a viable solution to each agency's interests. Indeed the above list draws attention to the lack of coordination in trying to 'rein in the dragons.' These other actors have their own agenda, their own chain of command, and different rules of engagement than the PLAN. All it takes is for one rogue commanding officer to give a command to open fire upon civilians from the other country and an incident has started.

Vietnam has purchased six Kilo 636 submarines from Russia which can provide a significant strategic capability in both a sea denial and sea control.³¹ At the very least the submarines will give Vietnam another 'sabre to rattle.' Buying a platform, however, is not the same as acquiring a capability; capability comprises the platform itself, the manpower, training, technical support, logistical support, continued funding, and the corporate knowledge of owning and operating the platform.³² Vietnam faces this predicament with its submarine program.

Vietnam has had no experience operating conventional submarines, is not yet fully trained and experienced in operating the platform

in an operational environment, and the expected operating concept of 'two boats in the water, two boats in port, and two in maintenance' cannot be fully realised until delivery of all the Kilo's around 2020.³³ China's aircraft carrier is in a similar situation since it will be a training carrier for some time and does not have a fully capable air wing.³⁴ Secondly, it is an ageing platform that is already over two decades old. Thirdly, China is not yet experienced with operating a carrier group.³⁵ Thus, these capabilities pose no immediate strategic threat.

Steps toward a resolution and the risk of war

The Sino-Vietnamese maritime boundary dispute requires continued effort; there is always a risk of confrontation, albeit at a low level. The PVN can, and has, achieved peaceful cooperation with the PLAN, despite a history of conflict. Hanoi and Beijing are reluctant to use militaries to resolve the dispute because of the greater diplomatic picture. The two navies continue to engage in confidence-building measures. In addition, Vietnam is engaging more and more with the United States, who currently has military superiority over China. Therefore any military action would not be in the interest of either country

Figure 4 - The Chinese carrier, Shi Lang (ex Varyag) on sea trials in the Yellow Sea.³⁶



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and, if conflict were to develop, it would be short.

Hanoi and Beijing have been able to resolve territorial disputes in the past. In 2000, the two governments agreed to divide the boundary in the Gulf of Tonkin along a 50/50 split.³⁷ The two governments have managed to increase cooperation in trying to find a peaceful solution by having their navies conduct joint patrols.³⁸ This action could provide a model by which Hanoi and Beijing could find a peaceful solution to the dispute. Whilst the South China Sea dispute encompasses more complicated boundaries, this example draws attention to the fact that both States can, and have been able, to resolve boundary disputes. Despite not having a dispute resolution mechanism, signing the guidelines for the Declaration on the Conduct of parties in the South China Sea is a step forward in ensuring that no military actions develop over the dispute.³⁹

The two countries also have other forms of confidence-building measures. The purpose of such activities is to increase trust between states, or at a minimum, make it less likely to misinterpret what the other side does.⁴⁰ Confidence building measures include opening diplomatic channels or 'hotlines' to resolve disputes, allowing port visits, implementing agreements and, as mentioned previously, conducting joint operations such as patrols.⁴¹ There have been numerous port visits between the countries since 1991 to open dialogue between navies, while establishing a hotline between Hanoi and Beijing could assist in avoiding military confrontation in the region by allowing the governments a direct line of communication.

The military balance is tipped toward the Chinese in this situation; China has more ships, more aircraft and more experience, albeit with limited background in actual force

projection. If a small-scale military engagement were to develop, Vietnam's modernised fleet would provide some deterrent to China by providing a sea-denial capability, but the PLAN could easily overwhelm Vietnamese defences. That is one reason why Vietnam is increasing its military ties with other countries, such as the United States and India. Vietnam is allowing more access to naval facilities, such as Cam Ranh Bay, in the hopes of trying to increase allies in the region.⁴² Both the US and India would provide a formidable deterrent to the Chinese military. Even if China had the capacity to counter the initial US response, the diplomatic costs would be too high, and China knows this; it would give the US more reason to strengthen its position in the region.⁴³

In conclusion, the South China Sea has the potential to provide a significant boost to claimant states' economy through fish stocks and hydrocarbon deposits, both of which are key sectors in the Vietnamese and Chinese economy. The challenge that Vietnam faces in resolving the dispute with China is trying to understand the domestic pressures on the Chinese Foreign Ministry to not give up claimed Chinese territory. Indeed, Chinese paramilitary forces continue to vehemently enforce those claims at the risk of inciting conflict. It is clear that a solution to appease both Vietnam and China will be difficult to achieve.

Vietnam's naval modernisation is largely a 'natural process' of replacing ageing equipment, just as other Southeast Asian navies are currently doing. This is the principal reason for modernising the navy; keeping up with Asian neighbours and having platforms to meet uncertain future threats is a common goal in the region. Although the new platforms of the PVN are highly technical and modern, most were not chosen with a view to counter



China's military presence although they are capable of deterring China and defending Vietnam's sovereignty.

Figure 5 – USS Chafee enters Tien Sa harbour, Vietnam.⁴⁴

The risk that a conventional naval conflict could develop is highly unlikely; both Vietnam and China understand the territorial gains would not outweigh the diplomatic losses. Any solution to the situation will need to address the diverse range of actors within the Chinese government to ensure a coherent and centralised maritime policy. This will prevent misinterpretation of the other's intent. Both Vietnam and China need to keep the lines of communication open and attempt to resolve the issue through dialogue, not gunfire. 🚢



Midshipman Nam Nguyen, RAN is a second-year Business student at the Australian Defence Force Academy. He has a keen interest in Southeast Asian militaries and is training toward gaining his PQ as a Maritime Warfare Officer.

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Being There Still Matters

BY DR NORMAN FRIEDMAN

In May the British government decided to reverse its previous decision to abandon short- take-off combat aircraft and therefore to relegate the first of the country's two 65,000 ton carriers to helicopter operations while the second was completed with catapults and arresting gear.

That decision was made in light of the fact that the STOVL (short take off/vertical landing) version of the F-35 was proving too expensive. On the assumption that STOVL was dead, the government felt justified in eliminating the existing joint navy-air force Harrier fleet and laying up the three existing light carriers (one has been retained as a helicopter carrier).

The Harriers operated by the joint force were sold off (to the U.S. Marine Corps) to make sure the decision could not easily be reversed. This was the result of an agonizing defense review forced on the government by the fiscal crisis, and Prime Minister David Cameron said that killing—albeit temporarily—the Royal Navy's carrier strike capability was the hardest and most unpleasant decision he made.

Now the British will adopt the STOVL F-35 for which their new carriers had originally been designed. The decision was explained on two grounds. First, it would provide naval-air striking capacity much earlier. Second, analysis had shown that the savings gained in adopting the conventional take off and landing version of the F-35 would be quickly consumed by the cost of developing the necessary catapult and arresting gear. During the design of the British carrier, much was made of "future-proofing," which meant that space and weight had been provided for catapults and arresting gear. However, once the initial decision had been made to go for the



STOVL fighter, there was probably little attempt actually to design the necessary catapults and arresting gear. Conversely, when the STOVL version was dropped, design work had to begin on a fairly rapid basis.

The reality is that the Libyan experience dramatized the consequences of abandoning carrier aviation, even when, on paper, British land-based aircraft were within range of their targets. Libya demonstrated that what matters is loiter time in the target area. The farther an airplane has to fly to get there, the less time it is available to support those on the ground. More or less continuous air support requires airplanes very close by, or else unaffordable numbers at a greater distance. That is aside from pilot-fatigue issues.

Other Customers

The British decision is likely to have considerable consequences for other navies. When the British dropped out of the STOVL program, it was widely suspected that this variant would be particularly vulnerable to budget-

cutters in the United States. The STOVL version is the most expensive of the three F-35 variants, and it has the fewest orders. Programs with international partners are, however, difficult to cancel because of the embarrassment involved.

It happens that several navies have small carriers that would have little future without the F-35 STOVL variant. No one else is building STOVL airplanes right now, and the existing versions of the Harrier are wearing out. The British alone had real alternatives. They might have pushed ahead and converted their new carriers to conventional operation, or they might have opted for a ski-jump solution like the one the Russians and almost certainly the Chinese and the Indians have adopted. Ski-jumps are inefficient, but they work for high-powered aircraft. They do require considerable length however, as the airplane has to build up speed to fly off the ski jump. It seems unlikely that the smaller carriers operated by, for example, Spain and Italy would be fully suited to ski-jump operation using conventional aircraft.

The aircraft carrier USS George Washington is silhouetted as it transits the western Pacific Ocean at sunrise-USN photo

The U.S. Marines are of course particularly thankful, because the STOVL F-35 can directly replace the Harriers they currently operate from large-deck amphibious ships. The Marines see their attack aircraft as absolutely essential supporting artillery. Ironically, it can be argued that they, alone among potential users of the STOVL F-35, might do as well with an unmanned alternative.

The essence of the Marines' artillery air mission is that the airplanes are, in effect, under the control of those they are supporting. They do not have alternative deep-strike or interceptor missions. They are always on call. For example, in Iraq in 1991 the Marines' Harriers were deliberately kept out of the overall Air Tasking Order so that they could deliver strikes on a quick basis, and almost certainly that practice continues. A Marine pilot contributes considerable skill in delivering weapons under tricky conditions, but in most cases he is hitting coordinates chosen by those on the ground. In effect, his airplane is a reusable missile with multiple independently deliverable warheads. So is a UAV.

The F-35 is extremely, perhaps prohibitively, expensive because it compensates for limitations in its performance by offering the pilot remarkable advantages. For example, software merges the images from sensors under the airplane so that the pilot in effect sees through the airplane's body when he looks down through his helmet visor. Other software provides the pilot with unusually complete situational awareness, partly by interpreting the mass of electronic signals the airplane intercepts. The operational software involved is extremely complex and apparently is the main incomplete item in the airplane's development. Very little of this software would be needed if there were no pilot on

board. Moreover, without the software and the sensors feeding it, the F-35 is fairly inexpensive. Its overall performance was limited to achieve exactly that.

Pilots Are Vital

The question, then, is really whether the pilot is essential. If he is not, then something like a stripped-down F-35 may be quite adequate. It may not even need an off-board pilot; many modern UAVs fly themselves from waypoint to waypoint, the operator handling several of them, and intervening (if at all) only when they get into trouble. If there are no pilots, there is no proficiency training, and no training pipeline of aircraft. The airplanes fly only when they are needed – the way missiles fly, except that they are recoverable.

Human pilots provide judgment and creativity. It is often pointed out, too, that a pilot can continue to function even when the link back to the base or the command has been cut. For example, no one would want to bet on an automaton in a delicate situation such as the approach of an unknown aircraft to a naval formation. People may fail, too, but they are responsible, and they can deal with novel situations.

Most users of the naval STOVL F-35 are looking for general-purpose aircraft, which may function as fighters or bombers. They might be needed for deep strikes against well-defined targets (that a missile could handle), but they may also be needed in ambiguous situations in which judgment is vital. The more distant the



target, moreover, the better the chance that a link may fail at a crucial moment – and that a human in the cockpit may be able to think his way past that failure.

Moreover, to make unmanned strike the rule rather than the exception requires some corresponding mechanism to find the targets. The United States deploys clouds of UAVs plus other reconnaissance devices (such as satellites). The mass of information they collect can, at least in theory, provide sufficient support for unmanned strikes, even at a considerable distance. It is arguable that this mass of information might justify abandoning manned strike aircraft.

Other countries lack any comparable dense reconnaissance.

*F-35 JSF STOVL
with Lift-Fan open
(Defence Industries)*



Being There Still Matters

Their pilots are an inescapable necessity: they must find the targets they will hit. The United States enjoys perhaps a unique advantage in that targets can be located remotely. It follows that our allies are unlikely to welcome any proposal to replace pilots with robots instructed to deliver bombs to particular addresses.

When our allies imagine replacing manned with unmanned aircraft, they necessarily envisage moving the pilot out of the airplane – but retaining him. In that case much depends on how reliable the link between operator and airplane is, and the threat of jamming (or perhaps cyber-warfare) must loom large. We also often imagine simply moving the pilot out of the airplane, but our massive reconnaissance capability gives us the alternative of moving the target-finding function out of the airplane altogether. That brings the airplane much closer to the status of a reusable missile. In this sense the truest current example of an armed UAV may not be the Predators and their ilk, which are used against al Qaeda and its friends, but Tactical Tomahawk, with its ability to change targets on command.

The Marines' situation is strikingly different from that of our allies. The Marines are interested in direct support for troops engaged on the ground, in a situation that is probably impossible to disentangle from high overhead. The environment is changing, perhaps rapidly, so any kind of pre-briefing is unlikely to be very useful (there are of course exceptions). The pilot delivering ordnance is responding to orders from the ground, and if the link along which those orders come should fail, he is neutralized. Certainly the pilot's skill can be crucial, as when bombs have to be delivered against masked targets. However, such cases are likely to be exceptions.

The Marines need something that



can fly from large-deck amphibious ships and can reliably deliver considerable loads of ordnance in the face of serious opposition. That something has to be a STOVL aircraft, because the Marines' ships lack catapults and arresting gear. It has to be somewhat stealthy, to get around new-generation surface-to-air missiles, and it needs high performance. The interesting question may be whether the Marines' best bet would be an unmanned STOVL operating more like a reusable missile than a traditional airplane. 🚢



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Brazilian Navy aircraft carrier BNS Sao Paulo (A12), foreground, comes alongside USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) as the ship transits around South America to its new homeport of San Diego. US Navy photo by Photographer's Mate 1st Class John Lill



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The Role of the Royal Australian Naval Reserve: today and the future

BY CAPTAIN JOSEPH LUKAITIS RFD, RANR

The purpose of this paper is to examine the status and role of the RANR in 2011 following the limiting and downsizing of the Naval Reserve that took place in 2010. The paper describes a new 'way ahead' for Reserves to contribute to Australia's maritime defence capability by proposing better management of Naval Reservists and better planning for their utilisation.

The paper concludes that rather than limiting and downsizing the Naval Reserve there are strong imperatives to do the opposite not least of which are:

- Navy's coming Force 2030 Fleet
- the persistent and enduring challenges of retention and recruiting (the right people)
- the expectations of the Australian community
- Government direction, and
- the efficient use of Defence expenditure

The Naval Reserve currently comprises around 8,500 listed personnel of whom only about 2,000 are undertaking any Navy work. It is important to note that to be deemed 'efficient' and attract service conditions, a Navy Reservist MUST complete a minimum of 20 days work each year. Yet, of the 2,000 personnel undertaking work just 1,165 managed to get funding for the minimum requirement of 20 days.

Many more Reservists seek to be efficient but are unable to contribute because of present Navy restrictions on the use of Reservists and lack of planning to employ Naval Reservists in expanded roles in the future.

The Reserve pool of manpower comprises a rich repository of potential capability which has had enormous resource invested in it during previous PN and Reserve service. This voluntary

manpower pool will disengage given current RAN practices, namely lack of communication with Reservists and inadequate monitoring and engagement of Reservists. The truly capable, committed and community minded volunteers in the Naval Reserve will seek other outlets for their volunteerism.

With a relatively small investment, which could be funded from within anticipated NR salary 'underspends', a bespoke agency headed by a Rear Admiral should be formed to plan and implement the monitoring, managing and engaging of Naval Reservists.

Monitoring, managing and engaging Naval Reservists will serve to create a group of enthusiastic personnel who will be predisposed to make a greater contribution to planned Navy capability output and to meet future contingencies. Failure to do so may well prejudice Navy's ability to meet future operational requirements at critical times.

BACKGROUND

The Royal Australian Naval Reserve has filled various roles in the maritime defence of Australia as part of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) over the last 100 years. Born of the Volunteer Citizen Colonial Reserve Naval Brigades, the Naval Reserve was the backbone of the RAN expeditionary brigades to German New Guinea (Australian Naval and Military Expedition Force) and Gallipoli and the Suez Canal (Royal Australian Navy Bridging Train) in World War I.

At the start of World War II the Naval Reserve, which had waxed and waned organisationally and numerically between the wars was quickly mobilised for sea going duties with the RAN and the Royal Navy, and filled a particular role in Australia for port defence and the examination and inspection of commercial shipping. The huge expansion of RAN manpower in WWII was achieved through a Naval Reserve Volunteer entry system that enabled a speedy demobilisation of Naval personnel after the war.

The role of the Naval Reserve during the Cold War, and during Australia's involvement in the Korean and Vietnam Wars focused very much on the ability to supply a reserve operational surge capability for the RAN. This was maintained by seven Reserve Port Divisions one in each capital city of Australia and reached a peak by 1991 when the Naval Reserve provided seven Reserve Patrol Boat Crews and two Landing Craft Heavy crews which manned various vessels attached to each Port Division.

The last 20 years since the closure of the Port Divisions has seen the Naval Reserve evolve into a pool of personnel supplying part-time members to the RAN fulfilling the day-to-day work of the RAN alongside Permanent Navy (PN) members. The current and principal role of the RANR is now as



Reserve capability peaked in 1991 at 7 Reserve patrol boat crews and 2 LCH crews.

a part-time component of a Totally Integrated Work Force supplying part-time personnel to contribute to the RAN's everyday workload, both at sea and ashore. This exclusive role is not found in the current Australian Army Reserve and only partly in the Royal Australian Air Force Reserve.

The RANR also provides a significant number of members serving on Continuous Full-Time Service (CFTS) – currently over 330.

This present Naval Reserve role is described by many as the 'Drake Overload Model' because the Reserve Workforce can be increased or decreased quickly, providing great flexibility at minimum expense to Navy as an employer. This model is based on the assumption that a sufficient number of Reservists will always be available as and when needed. Unlike the conditions of service entitlements PN members enjoy, NR members receive no commitment to employment from Navy beyond 12 months. NR CFTS agreements are negotiated and are mostly short-term being less than two years.

ROLES FOR RESERVE FORCES

A military Reserve force can fill a wide range of roles for the force it supports and it is the purpose of this paper to examine options that might contribute to Australia's maritime defence capability especially through the better management of Naval Reservists and better planning for their utilization.

THE PEOPLE CAPABILITY

The Fundamental Input to Capability (FIC) provided by the Naval Reserve is People.


The importance of this input is consistently highlighted in Australian Naval and Defence doctrine. People are critical to the performance of all

other FICs and are the cornerstone of current and future Naval capability – The Navy Strategy 2007, p. 7.

The other FICs are Collective Training, Organization, Command and Management, Facilities, Major Systems, Support and Supplies.

It is not simply technology which gives the RAN its capability but rather the way that this technology is employed. It is therefore Navy people who generate the real capabilities that surface ships, submarines, aircraft and support organizations represent. People, both uniformed and civilian, full time and part-time, are thus the most important factor for maintaining naval effectiveness. The RAN has a long history of operational achievement and excellence which provides a firm foundation for its current activities and future progress, but this foundation is one that can rapidly be eroded if we do not give priority to the entire naval family – Australian Maritime Doctrine – RAN Doctrine 1 2010, p. 9.

Naval Reservists reside in either of two lists: the Active Reserve and the Standby Reserve. In order to understand these lists it should be noted that PN members upon discharge from the RAN are compulsorily placed in the Reserve Standby List for a period of five years. The Active List is filled with Reservists who have made an election to make themselves available for service whether as an ex-PN Reservist or a direct entry Navy Reservist. The current number of Reservists in the Active List belies the label 'active' because they fall into two groups 'active' and 'inactive'. There are Active Reservists undertaking some employed



activity in the RAN or wider ADF and there are Active Reservists Awaiting Employment (ARAE). The ARAE is not an official Navy Reserve List but it is a reality of life for over 2500 Reservists who are currently doing 'nothing', but are reported as Active, implying incorrectly by any use of the word that they are doing 'something'.

This piece of misinformation sits unhappily beside another which is the description given when Reservists are working and said to be undertaking 'training days'. This is a nonsense of the first order. Active Reservists working in the RAN today are no more undertaking training than Chief of Navy in his role.

NICHE, COMPLEMENTARY, SUPPLEMENTARY, SURGE AND SPECIAL ROLES IN THE RAN

At present and in the Australian setting, Reserves are considered as an option to fulfill various roles. Roles for Reserves vary in the Australian Army, Navy and Air Force.

Niche Roles.

- Today the NR provides the Maritime Trade Operations (MTO) capability for the RAN. There has been a long history going back to WWI of

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Reservists specialising in this Primary Qualification (PQ), which is presently only open to Reservists. The MTO Branch has recently been reviewed, re-structured and re-directed to have its focus centered in Border Protection Command whilst retaining its traditional roles in Fleet Headquarters and Joint Operational Command. Border protection is an agency outside the RAN but commanded by a senior naval officer.

- Public Relations (PREL) officers are a second important area where Reservists fill a niche role for Navy. They also work in the tri-service environment. The PN has no equivalent PQ open to PN members so it is the NR's responsibility to provide this specialised support which is in increasing demand.
- A new PQ open to Reservists was established in 2008. Operational Logistics (OPLOG) is in its early stages of development and is also a Niche Role in the RAN within the Supply community. OPLOG officers will provide expertise on how to plan, support and execute logistic requirements during ship visits, exercises and operations at a tactical level including port services management and support for materiel and personnel movements.
- The RAN's Geo-spatial Intelligence Library (GSIL) Personnel are supplied by Naval Reservists located within the Hydrography Branch and is yet another niche function that Reservists provide to the PN. There work is a small but critical component of amphibious operations.

Recruiting for Niche Roles. There is a slow trickle of civilian *ab initio* ("from the beginning") or direct entry recruiting into these niche roles. The current RAN Recruiting Directive notes a total of 10 (4 x MTO; 4 x OPLOG; 2 x PREL) annual targets. The total number of Active Reservists engaged in these Niche Roles is less than 150 Australia wide. Last year, the NR recruited a total of six into these workgroups. While there are some additional Niche Role Reservists in the Standby List, there is limited ability to quickly expand these capabilities.

Overall Niche Roles are filled very efficiently by an enthusiastic cohort of Reservists at low cost to Navy.

Complementary Roles. The NR also contributes capability to areas where the PN has inadequate personnel or where the PN does not normally hold skills or maintain them in sufficient numbers or at appropriate skill levels that may be required.

Medical, Dental, Psychologist, Chaplain, Legal and Intelligence Branch Naval Reservists regularly make valuable contributions to Navy. Complementary Reservists deploy regularly, particularly in Health roles. At present, excluding Senior Officers (06 and above), there are 71 Active Reserve Medical Officers; 17 Dentists; 35 Psychologists; 31 Chaplains; 127 Legal Officers; and 92 Intelligence Officers.

Recruiting for Complementary Roles.

Last year, a total of only 20 personnel were added to these ranks via *ab initio* direct entry civilian recruiting. The number of sailors entering the NR via the *ab initio* route is much less with five only recorded last year who had no prior service.

Recruiting of officers to health roles remains challenging especially for specialist doctors.

Supplementary Role. The majority of Active working Naval Reservists supplement shortfalls in the Permanent Navy workforce working part-time or on CFTS in the Supply, Engineering, Aviation and Seaman categories across all ranks and sub-specialisations. This includes Naval Reserve Divers and Musicians who work in small state based units (See Note 1).

This supplementation role is a first priority to ensure that the RAN can fulfill its mission which is 'to fight and win in the maritime environment'.

The experience over the last decade has been that this would not have been possible without the contribution of Reservists both at sea and ashore. To date, the NR supply of personnel has generally met increasing PN demand; however, this may not be the case in the future. Various factors will impact upon the number and availability of Reservists to work part-time under casual conditions of service.

These include:

- The ebb and flow of the Australian economy and the unemployment rate
- The run down of DFRDB pension recipients (See Note 2)
- Levels of ongoing engagement with non-working Reservists
- Reserve conditions of service compared with PN conditions of service including the absence of superannuation entitlements for Naval Reservists
- The maintenance of morale within the Reserve community
- The changing experience level of Reservists as the length of service periods in the PN generally decrease and personnel enter the Reserve lists with relatively less experience compared to their predecessors
- The changing operational levels of the RAN and the demand for Reservists The results of "ab initio"

direct entry civilian recruiting efforts

- Career management input to Reservists
- The competency and effectiveness of Permanent Navy Human Resource Managers
- The budget available for Reservists to travel to work
- Budget funding available for Reserve salaries

During the last decade the NR has supplied Navy's demand for part-time personnel and has done so at increasing levels each year until June 2010 when Naval Reserve positions were cut by 35% (900 positions reduced to 604) and Reserve work days for most positions were cut back by 25% to 50%. This was done allegedly to contain the overall workforce Navy budget due to the very large number of PN sailors and officers under training.

Until June 2010 the NR contribution in the supplementary role overall had increased steadily in the preceding decade peaking at 10.5% of the RAN workforce.

The Naval Reserve Whole of Work Force Capability Review (NRWOWCR), however, cut Reserve salary funding by approximately 35% and subsequently the number of Active Reservists working in the Navy for more than 20 days a year has reduced from 1,577 in 2,010 to 1,165 in 2011 being a decrease of 26% whilst days worked by Reservists fell by 41% (See table right).

The management, communication and implementation of the NRWOWCR, which cut Active Reserve positions by 35% was executed 'overnight' and without any notice or explanation given to many individuals. The consequences for Navy is that many Reservists became disenfranchised and demoralized. The review process was conducted

in a short time frame and lacked transparency and fulsome consultation.

It is my contention that these cut backs were fiscally driven only and were tactical in nature; they did not take into account any long-term strategic view of the whole of Navy workforce and the impacts such cuts would have on the NR People Capability.

The real impact of these very severe cuts followed throughout fiscal year 2010 - 2011 by a previously unknown level of disengagement by the PN with non working Reservists is yet to be felt.

It may be that in the future the NR will be unable to respond with an adequate supply of willing volunteers due to a loss of goodwill amongst Reservists who perceive that the 2010 cuts were not well managed or communicated. This negative perception may continue to be exacerbated if the present level of almost negligible engagement and communication with non-working Naval Reservists continues.

The present isolation of individual Reservists presently prevents mentoring, the development and maintenance of morale, camaraderie and an 'esprit de corps'. Continued isolation will prevent the development of peer motivation and education and will degrade the level of engagement with Navy culture and the Navy family. The existing low level of recruiting outcome for Niche and Complementary Role NR positions may only add to this predicted problem.

NAVAL RESERVE CAPABILITY ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM 2006

A model for delivering a definitive ongoing

capability input by Navy Reservists in Niche, Complementary and Supplementary Roles was introduced in 2006 by the Naval Reserve Capability Enhancement Program (NRCEP). This program provided funded training, the maintenance of currency and funded travel for Reservists in Funded Reserve Commitment (FRC) positions that were established to provide operational and seagoing capability input to the RAN fleet. It also introduced a fully 'integrated' management system for the reservists in these new positions within the then Navy Force Element Groups (FEGs).

Five years on the program has been partly successful. It has seen the creation of 106 new FRC positions attached to the then various Force Element Groups and has flourished in the Patrol Boat Group but has had mixed results in other areas. Experience has shown that there has been a direct correlation between successful implementation of this program and the quality of leadership and management within the FEGs.

The Program is designed to enable a Reservist to maintain a class of ship currency over a number of years and, importantly, to have a career path in parallel with growing experience. In short, NRCEP Reservists provide a pool of available personnel for sea going relief and operational

Navy Reserve Participation

Year	Active Reservists working required 20+ days	Active Reservists working < 20 days	Total Active Reservists working	Days worked
2008	1391	838	1859	107,717
2009	1605	747	2352	122,635
2010	1577	560	2137	137,319
2011	1165 -26%	838	2003	80,626 -41.3%

It is important to note that, to be deemed 'efficient' and attract service conditions, a Navy Reservist **MUST** complete a minimum of 20 days work each year

Source: Directorate of Workforce Modeling, Forecasting and Analysis - Navy

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supplementation.

The NR review and cut backs in 2010 removed the guaranteed budget lines for NRCEP training, travel and currency expenses. This has diluted one of the original and critical strengths of the program; notably the provision of a surge component in its structure.

THE WHITE PAPER 2009

“The Navy will continue its workforce integration program, which focuses on discrete capability outputs. The Navy Reserve Capability Enhancement Program, currently in its third year, will continue the participation of trained reservists in providing surge capacity for all Navy force elements. The Navy will continue to assess the optimal workforce size and mix, including part-time service, in the transition phase to the new amphibious capability to be provided by the LHDs from 2011 and beyond.” *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030 – Defence White Paper 2009, ch. 10.18.*

Although the 2009 White Paper assessed the NRCEP as integral to the way ahead for the NR it is not clear what the future of the program will be following the cutbacks to the 2010 Reserve budget and the slashing of positions and a low level of Naval Reserve Capability planning.

The Supplementary Role of the Naval Reserve could be better developed with closer capability alignment using an expanded NRCEP model. The model was carefully designed to be capability driven, responsive to Reservists needs and importantly, to provide a reliable pool of Reservists. The architects of the NRCEP carefully analysed personnel soft spots and set up Naval Reserve positions to supplement and support them.

The NRCEP model, given the

Patrol Boat Group experience, could be used very appropriately in the LHD (Landing Helicopter Dock) context. Given the very large range of skills and competencies that these vessels will require in their crews, there is still enough lead time to achieve a significant level of contribution from the Naval Reserve before the first LHD (*HMAS Canberra*) commissions in 2014.

An attractive function of the NRCEP model is that the program is designed to achieve longevity and stability of Reserve involvement whilst providing work satisfaction and career progression for individual Reservists. This compares to the often ad hoc appointment of Reservists to FRC and Short Term Reserve Positions (STRP) on an annual basis without certainty of tenure and the ability to plan careers.

It is my strong contention that the Naval Reserve guidance in the White Paper should be embraced rather than cast off.

THE SURGE ROLE

There is no articulated plan within the RAN at the present time for the RANR to provide surge capacity in the event of a rapidly escalating or changing operational tempo. Events which may lead to a surge requirement are numerous and accordingly any plan needs to incorporate a range of options for various contingencies and the spectrum of operations the RAN may be directed to undertake by government.

Navy's expectation is that surge personnel comprising non-working Active Reservists and Standby List Reservists will materialise into effective personnel if and when called upon. It is assumed that in the present strategic context there will be a reasonable lead time to mobilise Reservists. This thinking is flawed for many reasons.

In particular, no detailed monitoring and assessment of non-working Reservists' level of training, availability, currency, willingness to serve, age, medical category, health or fitness is being or has been undertaken. To illustrate this point, there are continuing examples of contact being made towards Standby Reservists who have passed away.

The diagram above right seeks to illustrate the complexity of Naval Capability planning and the many possible permutations that may involve different levels of Reserve participation noting that the RAN fleet is ever-changing as is the operational dynamic. The diagram illustrates the potential danger of disengaging with the non-working Naval Reserve if future contingencies are to be adequately addressed.

Various levels of surge capacity could be planned for different levels of operational tempo up to the point of full-scale war. This planning, which could commence at low levels and at small cost, will all depend on the planning and management of individual Reservists including:

- the gathering of current data about all non-working Reservists
- an analysis of that data
- ongoing engagement and the ability to communicate with individual Reservists
- the recognition for the need for ongoing training and familiarisation and currency
- other activities as deemed appropriate and will require consideration of Government strategic guidance and the formulation and articulation of RAN capability surge demands for the NR. (See Note 3).

Planning for the utilisation of Naval Reservists in a complex strategic environment is in our national interest.

The critical factor in examining the surge role for the NR is that at present there is limited useful data about non-working Naval Reservists and hence the 'surgeability' of the NR is based more on guess work and hope rather than hard, reliable evidence

The trend in western defence forces is to use Reservists more rather than less. This trend (UK and USA especially) is driven by current economic conditions and the high cost of Regular Defence forces as against the cost of Reserve forces. It is my contention that the RAN will not escape this trend in the future and the lack of planning for it will be deeply regretted.

SPECIAL ROLES

There has been no major contribution by the Naval Reserve to disaster relief or civil emergencies in Australia in the last 20 years. This has caused great frustration to many individual Reservists who have wanted to help in such civil emergencies and is in stark contrast to the various and significant contributions of the Army Reserve in the Victorian Bushfires and the Queensland Floods. This highlights the absence of an articulated plan for the Naval Reserve to mobilise for national emergencies and/or disaster relief as part of the Defence Assistance to the Civil Community mechanism (DACC), or as Defence Force Aid to the Civilian Authority under the Defence Act, 1903.

One negative outcome of the Totally Integrated Work Force is that it has resulted in a disintegrated Naval Reserve organisation lacking any ability to be swiftly mobilised for a civil emergency or disaster relief at a local state level as there is no separate organized capability structure.

In particular, there may be a role for Naval Reserve diving teams, which are presently located in each state, and it is

of relevance to note that all Naval Personnel are trained firefighters.

Consideration may be given to combining state based Naval Reserves with Army and Air Force Reserves for these types of emergencies under tri service administration within the DACC framework.

A WAY AHEAD


Enhanced Supplementation & Escalated Supplementation

The NR could quickly and easily move to a next level of capability input by means of an 'Enhanced Supplementation Structure'. An incremental increase in the monitoring, management and engagement of Reservists has the potential to pay immediate dividends and then prepare the way for a second stage of supplementation that might be termed 'Escalated Supplementation'.

As I remarked earlier the RAN has no management process or any active communication plan for Naval Reservists unless they are currently working part-time. If those non-working Reservists presently disengaged from Navy (2, 577 in the Active Reserve and 3, 968 in the Standby List) were monitored, managed and engaged, a potent people capability input could be identified and the best or better people might become available for selection to fill FRC, STRP and CFTS positions and any emerging demand for extra supplementation.

These monitoring, engagement and management processes for Naval Reservists align closely with New Generation Navy Cultural Change People signature behaviours.

Analysis, evaluation and assessment



of Reservists should be undertaken in relation to category or Primary Qualification, experience, rank, currency of training, currency of skills, health and medical category and, most importantly, availability and desire to serve. This will enable an overall assessment of what capability can reasonably be provided and in what roles and for what periods.

Banding and classifying Reservists in relation to availability and lead times for operational deployment and/or shore based employment would be a feature of this monitoring. This is presently undertaken to some extent in the Air Force Reserve.

There is also a need to evaluate and correlate Reserve civilian skills as they may be of use to Navy in a range of special circumstances and it is noted that initial work to do this is taking place.

Monitoring non-working Reservists as a first step would help answer, for example such questions as:

- 'What is the Reserve supply of engineering relief and project personnel noting the findings of the Rizzo Review?' 'Plan to Reform Ship Repair and Management Practices, Paul J Rizzo, July 2011'. (See note 4).
- 'What opportunities are there to use Reservists to man minor war

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vessels and in particular the LCHs and/or their replacements?’

- ‘Can Reservists deploy in rotations as Aviation Handlers and in other roles on the LHDs?’
- ‘Can Reservists supplement engineering positions within Navy at higher levels etc?’
- ‘How many Reservists can deploy in Surface Combatants on one month’s notice?’

These type of questions are presently answered by ‘Russell Hill’ experts, usually in the negative based on subjective and anecdotal information, without any statistical basis or real feedback from Reservists.

The use of evidence to develop good policy appears to be non-existent even though such evidence is readily available from a variety of sources.

Regular and good communication should be undertaken with all Reservists but particularly those not working. The present lack of communication with Reservists by Navy is a puzzling development and no explanation has been offered for it. In the past there have been well-developed business plans for communicating with Reservists.

Communication should be active and encouraging using a range of media from meetings, musterings, magazines, training, interviews, service magazines, telephone, letters and internet. Communication should engage the whole pool of Reservists and provide full and fair information to all Reservists especially about work opportunities.

This engagement process should also be commenced as part of the re-settlement process provided to PN members as they leave the Navy so that they have a good understanding of opportunities in the Naval Reserve.

The Naval Reservist is a civilian volunteer subject to compulsory

call out in specific circumstances. Reservists have agreed to put themselves in harm’s way for their country. As such it is only a right on the other side of the social contract that they have entered into that they have a properly managed career. Competent career management highlights and exposes their capacity and availability for future contribution. (See Note 5).

This means maintaining appropriate training and currency for each individual, understanding and counselling Reservists about career and promotion expectations, proper and timely officer and sailor reporting, organising the provision of mentoring and setting realistic goals for individuals. Management also includes ensuring that conditions of service are provided appropriately and employer issues are dealt with by the responsible agencies (Defence Reserve Support Committees and the Office of Reserve Protection etc).

It is through good management of the individual Reservists that the potential of the Naval Reserve can be assessed and developed to meet the demands placed upon it by Navy and the wider ADE.

IMPLEMENTING ‘ENHANCED SUPPLEMENTATION’ AND ESTABLISHING A HEAD NAVAL RESERVE PEOPLE CAPABILITY

*Failing to plan is
planning to fail*

The work of enhancing the present Naval Reserve can in my view only be

Navy Organisation 2011



carried out by an agency dedicated exclusively to that task.

Experience clearly shows that the Permanent Navy is not very successful at managing Naval Reservists even when adequate resources are provided. Success is the exception in this area – a common excuse is that PN managers are already overworked and do not have the time to put in the effort needed to manage additional part-time personnel. Other factors involved are the short posting cycle of PN members, lack of awareness of Reserve idiosyncracies, inadequate or no human resources training and in some rare cases, an overtly anti-Reserve attitude.

There are no reasonable grounds to expect this will change. It may get worse.

Proposed Navy Organisation



For serious change a Naval Reserve Rear Admiral should be appointed as Head of Naval Reserve People and Capability (HNRPC) to oversee the Monitoring, Management and Engagement of the Active Reserve and to review the Standby Reserve and to contribute to planning for the utilisation of the Naval Reserve.

The organizational structure diagrams below show the existing Navy organisation and the proposed change to implement a new head of Naval Reserve People Capability.

It is only an officer of two star rank with adequate support who will have the status and impact to influence and liaise effectively with senior naval planners on the best way to maintain and utilize the Reserve People Capability. At this rank the position is more likely to be enduring and able to withstand the vagaries of pro and anti Reserve support levels amongst senior permanent officers. Importantly he or she will be able to plan, liaise and resolve issues with Deputy Chief of Navy (DCN) as the head of RAN Capability and with Head of Navy People and Reputation (HNPAR) as head of the supplying authority for the people capability.

The way ahead proposed in this paper establishes a part-time Naval Reserve Rear Admiral in Navy Strategic Command.

NAVAL RESERVE CAPABILITY PROJECTS

The new Rear Admiral might in early work address some of the following after analysing initial results from monitoring the Naval Reserve:

- The hollowness in RAN engineering and how it might be supported by the many hundreds of engineers and technical personnel in the Naval Reserve Lists
- How the NR might bolster the expertise and support for the

whole LHD program both at sea and ashore

- How the Naval Reserve might support new Niche Roles and develop existing ones
- How direct entry recruiting might be increased and in which areas of the complementary Reserve to solve long term deficiencies
- How the NR might support submarine crewing
- The transfer of selected longer lead time capabilities to the Naval Reserve
- The use of civilian skills in industry in developing Reserve Capability

BUDGET AND COST FOR RESERVE REAR ADMIRAL

The proposed appointment of a part time Naval Reserve Rear Admiral and activating a new plan to develop enhanced supplementation would be an incremental change for Navy and is not in overall terms expensive to achieve. Funding could be immediately provided from the NR budget underspend. In the first fiscal year it is understood expenditure might be planned at less than \$500K to cover staff costs, overheads and travel to support such an office and the preparation of a business plan and its initial implementation.

Expenditure could be staged and budgeted thereafter regulated by the capability demand and the numbers of Reservists to be engaged at higher levels in either an enhanced pool of Reservists or the escalated pool of Reservists.

Budgeting for this work should be stand alone and ring fenced otherwise the temptation to raid the cookie jar is too much.

CONCLUSION

It is my contention that the existing Naval Reserve model and role greatly

"At the end of the 20th century, as at the beginning, not technology but human interaction with technology proved the critical element in Naval warfare"

Ronald Spector – "At Sea At War", 2001

under utilises a major defence capability which the community has already largely paid for. It is my contention that lack of adequate management and engagement with those who are volunteers for service diminishes morale and erodes goodwill.

The cost of enhancing the NR and developing meaningful long-term careers for its members is small indeed. The potential to unleash and use Naval Reserve Capability in the immediate future and the unknown future may well be critical in the defence of Australia.

Rather than limiting and downsizing the Naval Reserve there are strong imperatives to do the opposite not least of which are:

- Navy's Coming Force 2030 Fleet
- the persistent and enduring challenges of retention and recruiting (the right people)
- the expectations of the Australian community
- Government direction, and
- The efficient use of Defence expenditure

The Naval Reserve currently comprises around 8,500 personnel of whom only about 2,000 are undertaking any Navy work. Many more seek to be engaged but are unable to contribute because of present Navy restrictions on the use of Reservists. This pool of manpower comprises a rich repository of potential capability which, in the main, has had enormous resource invested in it during previous PN and Reserve service. To let the majority of this manpower pool wither on the vine through lack of communication and inadequate monitoring of status represents a neglect of public investment.

With a relatively small investment,

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which could be funded from within anticipated NR salary underspends, a bespoke agency headed by a Rear Admiral could be formed to establish and maintain thorough and reliable data which could be used in conjunction with Demand and Supply imperatives, to ensure the greatest possible value is extracted from this group of individuals.

Increased interaction with non-working Reservists would serve to create a group of engaged and more enthusiastic personnel who would, unless predetermined to have no contact with Navy, be better disposed to make some contribution to Navy. Navy would then enjoy a greater level of reliability from its Reservists in time of need.

To continue only using the Naval Reserve as an ad-hoc mechanism for filling gaps in Navy capability represents a lack of imagination and foresight, poor personnel management and may even prejudice Navy's ability to meet future operational requirements at critical times. 🚢



Captain Joseph Lukaitis RFD, RANR is a Maritime Warfare Officer who spent his first 15 years in the RANR in sea postings mainly on Minor War Vessels as a Navigator and Executive Officer. In the last 13 years he has served part time as a Staff Officer in Navy Headquarters and Navy Strategic Command. He was Director of Naval Reserve Capability 2006 – 2010. In civilian life he is a Solicitor and Notary Public.

NOTE 1

One of the assumptions about the Naval Reserve is that 95% or so of Naval Reservists are ex Permanent Navy. Whilst this may reflect the proportion in the total number of listed Reservists of the 1156 Reservists who are active and efficient in 2011 the proportion of ex Permanent Navy Reservists is estimated to be as low as 65%.

NOTE 2

The Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefit Pension Scheme will eventually phase out fully and be replaced by the Military Superannuation Benefits Scheme. There are still around 900 serving Navy members who are in the DFRDB Scheme.

NOTE 3

"Increasingly in recent years, our Reserves have been absorbed into current operations and commitments, as well as disaster relief, support to the civilian community, filling gaps in our regular forces, and innumerable other tasks. The danger is that we have no Reserve left, our capability being fully absorbed in what we do right now. The Naval

Reserve is a very good example. It is largely, if not wholly, engaged in keeping the Navy at sea. As the White Paper 2000 pointed out, Reserves must not only sustain, they must surge capability when the need arises. Being absorbed into the 'sustain' role, reserves are in danger of losing the capacity to 'surge'. This is an important consideration for force development planners. In addition to making an important contribution to contemporary military operations, Reserve forces must always stand ready to surge when the need arises. When a Reservist moves from part-time to full-time service, an individual surge is provided. It is only the Reserves that can give many parts of the ADF a 24/7 capability, if and when the need arises." Extracted from 'ADF Reserves, Strategic Directions for the Future' by MAJGEN Greg Garde, AO RFD QC in The Australian Reservist October 2010, p. 26.

NOTE 4

'Plan to Reform Ship Repair and Management Practices, Paul J Rizzo, July 2011.'

NOTE 5

All Reserve members are liable to be called-out in time of war, defence emergency, or in other circumstances pursuant to the Defence Act 1903. Call-out under the provisions of the Act is by order of the Governor-General. Depending on the circumstances the Governor-General may elect to 'call-out' Reserves in full or selectively, for continuous fulltime service.

Maritime Highways of Southeast Asia: Alternative Straits?

BY MOHD HAZMI BIN MOHD RUSLI

Synopsis

Growing shipping traffic congestion in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore has led to a search for alternative shipping routes. While the Indonesian archipelagic waters have been identified, how viable are these alternative waterways?

Commentary

A PROJECTED increase of shipping traffic in the next decade has sparked concerns about traffic congestion in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Alternative shipping routes through the Indonesian archipelagic waters have been identified, three in particular being the Sunda Strait, the Lombok and Makassar Straits and the Ombai-Weitar Straits near the island of Timor. While these routes have their advantages, their viability remains moot.

As the largest archipelagic state in the world, Indonesia has many islands separated by interconnecting waterways. These straits are part of Indonesia's archipelagic waters and have been designated by Indonesia as archipelagic sea lanes. Vessels may sail through these interconnecting waters under the international regime of Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage.

Sunda Strait

Currently, the Sunda Strait remains an important waterway for ships travelling by the Cape route to East Asia, as well as for vessels sailing from Australian ports to Southeast or East Asian destinations. The Sunda Strait is quite deep at its western entrance but the depth decreases towards its eastern exit with irregular bottom topography. Unlike the Straits of Malacca and Singapore which is about 1.3 nautical

miles at its narrowest point at the Philips Channel, the Sunda Strait is much broader; about 13 nautical miles wide at its narrowest.

However the Sunda Strait is less convenient than the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as it contains many navigational hazards including strong tidal flows; sandbank formations along the waterway; a live volcano; poor visibility during squalls; and the existence of numerous oil drilling platforms and small islands and reefs which may disrupt safe navigation.

Yearly, about 2,280 ships transit the Sunda Strait carrying in total some 100 million tonnes of cargo valued at US\$5 billion. The ships have to travel from the Indian Ocean through the Java Sea which is linked to the South China Sea. A plan to build a bridge across the Sunda Strait to connect Java and Sumatra is under study.

Chinese Luda class missile destroyer - the first surface warfare vessel designed and built in China, shown in 1997



Maritime Highways of Southeast Asia: Alternative Straits?

A pre-feasibility study conducted by a construction firm found that the 29-kilometre bridge would cost up to Rp 100 trillion which translates to US\$10.8 billion. If this project does take place, it will, directly or indirectly, affect the passage of maritime traffic in the already navigationally difficult Sunda Strait.

Lombok and Makassar Straits

The other alternatives to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are the Lombok and Makassar Straits. The Lombok Strait is wider and deeper than the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. As its depths are greater than 150 metres, it is not draught-limited, and its minimum width is 11.5 miles. It is therefore used by the largest ships of over 100,000 deadweight tonnage (DWT). Tankers of over 230,000 DWT have to use the deeper Lombok-Makassar route because of the under keel clearance limitation of 3.5 metres and the 23-metre depth of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

The Lombok Strait provides a shipping route connecting the Indian Ocean to the Makassar Strait and East Asia via the Sulawesi Sea. The Makassar Strait stretches about 400 nautical miles from its northern gateway to its southern access. While little east-west traffic transits Lombok-Makassar, it is still an important route for Australian north-south shipping. Yearly, 420 ships ply the Lombok and Makassar passageway carrying a total of 36 million tonnes of cargo worth US\$40 billion.

Even though the Lombok-Makassar route is much safer as it is relatively wide and deep and does not pose significant navigational hazards, it is not as navigationally convenient as the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. This is because passage along this route consumes more time: a typical voyage from an Arabian Gulf port, Rastanurah,

to Yokohama, Japan is about 6,600 nautical miles via the Malacca-Singapore route. However the journey by the Lombok-Makassar route would add another 7,500 nautical miles. The route through the Lombok-Makassar Straits would incur an additional shipping cost of between US\$84 billion and US\$250 billion per year. As a result, compared to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore route, both the Sunda and Lombok-Makassar passageways are little used by international traffic.

Ombai-Wetar Straits

The Ombai-Wetar Straits route near Timor is another alternative shipping route situated within Indonesian archipelagic waters. The route is used generally by local shipping including vessels proceeding between Australia and the Java Sea. The Ombai Strait is located between the islands of Alor and Timor, and its counterpart, the Wetar Strait, is located between the northern coast of Timor and the southern coast of Wetar. Ombai-Wetar is not really a preferred alternative to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as this route is longer in distance for West to East traffic.

Nevertheless the extremely deep channels of the Ombai-Wetar Straits provide an undetected access route for submarines between the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, making them collectively, an important waterway for American defence interests.

More complementary than alternative?

Given the geographical inconvenience of the passageways through the Indonesian archipelagic waters, it is reasonable to conclude that these routes through the Indonesian archipelago, though vital for international shipping, are more complementary than alternative routes to the primary maritime highway of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.



Still, these archipelagic straits play a critical role in the flow of the world's shipping. Any disruption of shipping traffic through these straits in the Indonesian archipelagic waters would compromise the well-being of seaborne global trade and the world economy, particularly the Asia-Pacific region. 🚢

By Dr Mohd Hazmi Bin Mohd Rusli, who completed his PhD at the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS), University of Wollongong, is a lecturer at Universiti Sains Islam Malaysia. He contributed this article especially to RSIS Commentaries.

The aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt, background, joins a multinational formation including the People's Republic of China Navy missile destroyer Guangzhou (DDG 168) and the Pakistan Navy frigate PNS Badr (USN photo)

INTERVIEW - REAR ADMIRAL TONY PARR CHIEF OF NAVY, ROYAL NEW ZEALAND NAVY

BY SERGEI DESILVA-RANASINGHE

As a leading small-nation navy consisting of only 12 warships, the Royal New Zealand Navy has set in motion an ambitious development program that has evolved as a result of the 2002 Maritime Forces Review, the 2010 Defence White Paper, and more recently, a New Zealand Defence Force Statement of Intent released mid-last year, all of which have taken into account New Zealand's evolving strategic interests up until 2035. After more than two and a half years in the top job Chief of Navy Rear Admiral Tony Parr says the modernisation and acquisition of new capabilities has enabled greater flexibility for the Navy to confront a new era of challenges.

"We are one of the best small-nation navies in the world," stated Rear Admiral Parr. "Materially, the Navy has grown significantly, though we have only marginally grown in numbers. The most important thing for the Navy is the introduction of the Project Protector fleet, which has almost doubled our size. We commissioned seven new ships to our patrol fleet and gained significant new capabilities."

The seven-warships commissioned between 2006 and 2010 comprised of two Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) to conduct long-range surveillance, one Multi-Role Vessel (MRV) for sealift and amphibious operations and four Inshore Patrol Vessels (IPVs) for littoral operations.

He continued: "The government release of the 2010 Defence White Paper is significant for us as it is a major policy statement and blueprint for the way forward. Essentially the message from the White Paper is that the Government is quite comfortable with the size and the shape of the Navy as it is today. This has given us some distinct and prescriptive policy

direction and it has occupied a lot of our thoughts over the past 12 months as we implement policy into strategy."

"We are going ahead with programs to either replace or enhance those capabilities over the next ten to fifteen years," explained the Rear Admiral.

The cornerstone of the upgrade has fallen on the Navy's principal warships - the two ANZAC-class frigates *Te Kaha* and *Te Mana*.

"The main upgrade to the frigates has been what we call a Platform Systems Upgrade. We practically re-engined the two frigates in the first phase and we expect the second phase to replace the computerised control and monitoring system to get under way in 2012. What we have to address next then is identifying the frigates mission systems - the weapons and sensor systems to take the ships through to the end of their operational lives after which they will be replaced."

"Furthermore, our five SH-2G Seasprite helicopters of No. 6 Squadron will either have to be enhanced, modernised or replaced."

"The amphibious sealift ship *HMNZS Canterbury* was based on a roll-on-roll-off COTS design. As she is a bespoke ship - she is a one off - there is nothing quite like her in the world. As a result there are several design and functionality issues to address and there is a remedial program in place to progress these."

"*HMNZS Resolution*, our hydrographic survey ship, will decommission in June 2012. We will redeploy the military hydrography capability to our OPVs



Chief of Navy
Rear Admiral
Tony Parr

until we have a replacement for both *Resolution* and *HMNZS Manawanui*, the latter being the Navy's diving and mine countermeasures vessel."

"The Navy is also currently searching for a replacement vessel for our fleet oiler - *HMNZS Endeavour* - which is likely to be decommissioned by 2016.

"More recently, we acquired a marine engineering simulator ashore in Devonport. We can train our marine engineers in a simulated environment

HMNZS Wellington is a Protector class offshore patrol vessel of the Royal New Zealand Navy. Built by Tenix, the ship entered service in 2010. (Photo courtesy RNZN)



The background of the slide is an underwater photograph looking up towards the surface. Sunlight rays penetrate the water, creating a dramatic, ethereal effect. The water is a deep blue, and the light rays are bright white and yellow.

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INTERVIEW - REAR ADMIRAL TONY PARR CHIEF OF NAVY, ROYAL NEW ZEALAND NAVY

which means there is less downtime on platforms and we can make people productive far more quickly."

"This simulator complements very well the navy's bridge, damage control and combat system simulators which are delivering significant efficiencies in our training system."

In recent years, the Navy has deployed on a wide array of roles and operations across the world, and has become an increasingly important component of New Zealand's wider diplomatic strategy.

"In Afghanistan, the Navy has provided specialist input to strengthen the New Zealand mission deployed in support of PRT Bamiyan."

"In 2011 we took command of Combined Task Force CTF 151 off the Horn of Africa for a two-month period. As time and resources allow the Navy will set out for more deployments in Southeast Asia and the Middle East."

"The stability in our region – the South Pacific – is important to us. With the acquisition of new and advanced capabilities the frequency of our deployments to the Southeast Pacific will increase. In addition, we will be spending a more time in the Southwest Pacific and Antarctica in the summer months."

"Closer to home, we are well engaged now with other Government departments with the Naval Patrol Force around the New Zealand coast. We went down to Antarctica last year with our OPVs – our first deployment there for 40 years. Similarly, in the aftermath of the devastating Christchurch earthquake the Navy was heavily involved in rescue and salvage operations."

Clearly, New Zealand's enhanced naval capabilities have already given it the ability to be more influential than it was previously in shaping regional geopolitics where its interests are concerned. However, while the



HMNZS TE MANA - photo by Chris Sattler

Defence White Paper provides a long-term outlook, the Navy's attempt to fulfill its objective to strengthen its expeditionary capabilities is likely to remain a major long-term challenge. This is especially the case given budgetary restrictions that could be amplified by ongoing global economic turmoil.

"We anticipate a period of financial constraint and restraint from now up until 2015," said Rear Admiral Parr. "At the moment we number about 2,000 uniforms which is about 150 short of an ideal number. We need to grow to about 2,150 personnel to be optimally manned. This may not seem a lot in comparison to others but in a small navy the contribution of every person in uniform and their civilian support is magnified."

He further emphasised: "Despite the challenges we will continue to be a Navy that strives to deliver excellence across the spectrum of maritime operations that we engage in." ❧



Snowbound - HMNZS Wellington (Photo courtesy RNZN)

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Operation Chromite and the Merits of Maritime Manoeuvre

BY LIEUTENANT P.S. WARING

"We drew up a list of every natural and geographic handicap—and Inchon had 'em all."

Commander Arlie G. Capps, USN

"...the greatest successes in war have been the boldest departures from the normal. But for the most part they have been departures made with open eyes by geniuses who could perceive in the accidents of the case a just reason for the departure,"

Sir Julian S. Corbett

At midnight on the 15th of September 1950 a beacon flickered to life atop the lighthouse on Palmi-Do, an Island along the approaches to Inchon Harbour on Korea's Yellow Sea coast. The beacon's rhythmic flashing was soon marking safe passage for a flotilla of landing craft carrying troops of the US 1st Marine Division toward their crucial objective. The stunning success of what followed remains a paragon of audacious military planning; but as the amphibious landings at Inchon recede further into the grasp of history they edge ever closer to the realm of mythology, now and forever synonymous with the legend of General Douglas MacArthur.

Military historian Max Hastings described Inchon as 'a monument to 'can do', to improvisation and risk-taking on a magnificent scale;¹ hero worship and mythmaking aside, the shadows of Inchon, especially those cast by the timeless glow of 'improvisation and risk-taking', stretch through to the present. The monumental geographic challenges posed by Inchon and the methods employed to overcome them have great



Fig.1 Approaches to Inchon.

relevance to the ADF as it considers its own amphibious future.

Operation Chromite

Following a powerful drive south by the Soviet equipped North Korean forces in the spring of 1950, the US 8th Army and its UN allies were besieged within a slim slice of territory around the coastal city of Pusan. To relieve his trapped forces, MacArthur as Commander in Chief of the Far East, decided upon a daring amphibious assault against the port city of Inchon on Korea's west coast. Inchon lay at the end of the shoal infested and snake like Flying Fish Channel; an astronomical tidal range of approximately 10 metres flowed at up to eight knots and at low water uncovered extensive mud flats barely capable of supporting landing craft. The tidal range, along with a series of high sea-walls, limited amphibious operations to only a few days each

month. Further exasperating the situation was the garrisoned island of Wolmi-Do lying along the approaches to Inchon which would need securing before the main landings could proceed.²

Against the advice of his own staff and even his superiors in Washington, MacArthur remained insistent that the operation proceed. Replying to a pessimistic briefing by Admiral James Doyle, Amphibious Force Commander of the Seventh Fleet, MacArthur gave an impassioned response which displayed all his immense powers of persuasion; he challenged the Navy by declaring that it 'has never let me down in the past and it will not let me down this time.' Following 45 minutes of calm, resonance and confident oratory, the General, in language intended for posterity, proclaimed that, 'We shall land in Inchon, and I shall crush them!'³

With the Commander's intent

clear, the task of overcoming the geographic challenges fell partly to a Navy Lieutenant employed as an intelligence officer on MacArthur's staff. Lieutenant Eugene Clark, USN was inserted near Inchon and given two weeks to collect and disseminate all operationally relevant information. The pre-existing geographic data was appalling, American charts and tide tables differed dramatically from older Japanese surveys and there was no information regarding the landing sites and their approaches. Clark verified the superiority of the Japanese tidal and bathymetric data, he confirmed the channel free of obstructions and conducted night surveys of the mud flats to delineate their extent. The information he gathered on the gradient of the approaches along with the location of shoals and enemy positions was vital in permitting the landing craft operators to move safely toward their objectives. Finally, on the eve of the landings Clark repaired the Palmi-Do beacon thus ensuring safe passage for the hundreds of Marines making headway toward Inchon in the early hours of D-Day.⁴

The Marines landed at Wolmi-Do on the morning tide and secured the garrison before nervously waiting for the main landings to take place on the evening tide. The success of the morning assault was repeated in the evening and within two weeks the Allied troops had recaptured Seoul. In one bold stroke MacArthur had severed the North Korean supply lines right at the logistical and emotional heart of the Korean Peninsula. The allied forces stranded in Pusan, in concert with the landing at Inchon, broke free and pushed northward; soon the entire communist army was retreating as a disorganised rabble back across the 38th parallel.



FROM THE SEA

Inchon was unquestionably a triumph of manoeuvre warfare. MacArthur, trapped in Pusan like a caged tiger and desperate to exploit the elements of freedom and movement, conceived a plan that dramatically altered the course of the war.

As the ADF trips and stumbles along the path toward the conduct of its own amphibious operations, the landings at Inchon should give comfort to those extolling the merits of joint warfare in the littoral. Ostensibly a model for and validation of the concept of Manoeuvre Operations in the Littoral Environment (MOLE), the account of Operation Chromite should nonetheless give contemporary military planners some reason for pause. For although Inchon can serve as historic proof of a contemporary strategic fixation, the vagaries of context and circumstance can tell us much about the challenges ahead.

As the strategic and doctrinal flux of the past decade settles toward equilibrium in the wake of the 2009 Defence White Paper, the conceptual wheel seems to have come to rest upon a broadened understanding of

forward defence, one that includes the expeditionary deployment of Australian forces. When examining the White Paper and the burgeoning bulk of Defence documentation on the conduct of amphibious warfare, it seems clear that the ADF will be fashioned to conduct "maritime manoeuvre" operations. "Maritime" because of the inherent nature of our strategic geography; and "manoeuvre" so as to 'avoid battle on unfavourable terms, apply force in a precise manner, in a way the adversary is not expecting, and seek to overmatch at decisive points in battle.'⁵ A recent *Semaphore* paper nicely applies maritime manoeuvre to Australia's circumstances:

...in our geographic situation the scope for manoeuvre in the land environment is generally limited. Hence our situation favours joint manoeuvre, exploiting the sea by using amphibious operations to bypass and dislocate enemy forces.⁶

Fig.2 Chartlet showing the invasion plan for D-Day.

Fig.3 LSTs and a bulldozer caught on the mud flats of Wolmi-do.



Operation Chromite and the Merits of Maritime Manoeuvre

Although the ADF will no doubt be called upon to conduct humanitarian sea-lift and other low intensity operations, preparing for war will remain a fundamental task. When considering the shape of future capability and the growing prominence of amphibious warfare it seems reasonable to conclude that the training, doctrine and capability of the ADF will be aimed toward conducting expeditionary operations at the higher end of the intensity spectrum.

The White Paper rightly predicts that the ADF's involvement will likely be limited to contributing elements rather than composing the whole force itself, however the emphasis remains firmly on maritime power projection. The government's decision to procure two large amphibious ships represents a significant alteration in Australia's strategic posture and has initiated a frenzied effort to remodel the ADF along amphibious and joint lines. The concepts are not without merit but the "hype" has obscured any thorough discussion of the limitations of such missions.

At the very heart of manoeuvre warfare is the objective of leveraging an adversary's strategic centre of gravity. But noting the substantial advances in anti-access technology it has become increasingly likely that even a modestly capable enemy will easily corral an allied task force away from strategic vulnerabilities. The US Defense Department's *Quadrennial Defense Review*, published in February 2010, devotes an entire section to the significance of anti-access tactics and states that: "Prudence demands that the department prepare for possible future adversaries likely to possess and employ some degree of anti-access capability."⁷

As any loss of momentum can prove devastating to a manoeuvre operation, the employment of relatively



inexpensive weapons such as mines, fast missile boats, land based anti-surface missiles or even those aimed at the electromagnetic spectrum may have a significant, possibly terminal, impact. Tactics to combat these threats and control the complex littoral environment have not yet been fully developed.⁸

Much of the literature on MOLE seems predicated on the assumption that an amphibious task force is capable of deploying force when and where it desires. ADDP 3.2 says that an Amphibious Task Force 'can poise at sea, raid or land on a potentially hostile coast at a "time and place of military choosing."⁹ This is misleading for two reasons. Firstly, if the operation is to of manoeuvre then by its very nature it needs to be directed toward a vital strategic position which the enemy cannot ignore. The deployment of troops ashore is therefore obviously limited to those areas most likely to allow rapid and decisive victory.

The second problem is that it underestimates the capability of any potential adversary and portrays them as inherently reactive. A very pertinent question in this instance is 'does manoeuvre warfare as a style of war

apply when the enemy is skilful and inflicts his style on us?'¹⁰

There is very little operational recourse if an adversary shows surprisingly adroit skills at situating his forces, utilising anti-access weaponry and positioning our now vulnerable task force in a manner that best suits *their* objective. Furthermore, what if the adversary is not a state with a traditional centre of power and readily exploitable weaknesses?

The last decade has seen a growing interest in and awareness of hybrid warfare conducted against insurgent and terrorist groups. In this type of operation the swift and clean combat of manoeuvre warfare gives way to the messy work of counter insurgency. There will be little need to manoeuvre from the sea against a guerrilla force able to inflict damage rapidly before dispersing back into the local population.

By making use of the operational concepts of Ship to Objective Manoeuvre (STOM) and Sea Basing a commander can limit the requirement for establishing logistical elements ashore. But once an amphibious operation has begun support ships and their escorts become locked in

An American built landing ship in South Korean service, date unknown (Headmark Collection)

space until the mission is complete. In the words of retired US Navy Captain Wayne P. Hughes 'just when the Marine Corps is living by manoeuvre, the Navy may be dying for a lack of it'.¹¹ A smaller 'logistical footprint' ashore only increases the necessity of afloat support, thus placing further pressure on sea lines of communication and allowing the adversary greater opportunity to target an increasingly vulnerable task group. If the mission proceeds successfully there may be no concerns but if delays occur the situation may rapidly deteriorate.

Room for Manoeuvre

The use of geospatial information as an enabler of operations is well understood. ADDP 2.3.1 *Rapid Environmental Assessment* (REA) more than adequately encapsulates the role of government and defence geospatial agencies in the preparatory phase of an operation. This article does not purport to lay judgement upon doctrine or specific agencies but is rather an attempt to directly link the importance of geospatial information with the guiding operational principle of manoeuvre. Nor is it the purpose of this article to completely disparage the concept of maritime manoeuvre – but rather highlight its inherent limitations and offer a different perceptual tool as a means of mitigation.

It is wrong to imagine the maritime environment as a realm of unhindered movement, where forces can deploy, withdraw and redeploy whenever and wherever they please. If we accept that the littoral environment is not as easily traversed as some believe then the effective use of geographic information may increase the scope for surprise, manoeuvre and decisiveness in an otherwise inhospitable environment.

In almost all of the literature sea control and air superiority form the

twin enabling pillars of amphibious operations. While such an assertion is difficult to refute, a clear delineation exists between securing space for power projection on the one hand and exploiting that space as a medium of manoeuvre on the other.

The UN forces in Korea enjoyed an almost unprecedented degree of sea control and air superiority yet MacArthur's staff remained deeply opposed to the landings at Inchon. Clearly maritime and air supremacy was not enough. It was geography that presented the greatest challenge at Inchon. Marine General Edwin Simmons said: "the 'anticipated hydrographic conditions were much more frightening than the quality of the expected enemy resistance.'"¹² MacArthur looked at these challenges not as mere problems requiring solutions but as an opportunity to gain advantage over the enemy. As the General himself stated:

The very arguments you have made as to the impracticalities involved will tend to ensure for me the element of surprise. For the enemy commander will reason that no one would be so brash as to make such an attempt.¹³

The efforts of Lieutenant Clark provided MacArthur with adequate intelligence to not only gain awareness of the battlespace but to exploit it for his purpose. The North Korean forces, convinced that geography prohibited amphibious operations at Inchon, were caught completely off-guard. MacArthur used an accurate picture of the sea-shore interface, including tidal data, currents, bathymetry and beach gradients to achieve the manoeuvrist's dream of striking rapidly at a vital vulnerability; in this instance the beating heart of the Korean peninsula: Seoul.

Out Of Their Depth

In November of 2010 the RAN Seaman Officer Primary Qualification was changed to Maritime Warfare Officer (MWO). This name change was accompanied by a transformation of the MWO training continuum to better reflect the integrated, complex littoral operations likely to be conducted in the future. But as yet the hydrographic branch has done little to alter its own training pathway. ADDP 2.3.1 (REA) lists 'relevance' as a key principle of REA, but with little exposure to the complexities of littoral warfare, how can hydrographers adequately assess the relevance of information?¹⁴ It is worth noting that prior to his exploits at Inchon, Lieutenant Clark had commanded a landing craft and served as an intelligence officer.¹⁵ He was not formally trained in geographic data collection but his experience of amphibious warfare allowed him to judge what information was most important.

Amphibious heritage - sailors from the amphibious command ship USS Blue Ridge parade the colours as the ship pulls into port as part of a scheduled port visit to Busan, Republic of (South) Korea (USN photo)



Operation Chromite and the Merits of Maritime Manoeuvre

The shape of the Navy's hydrographic training is driven by the need to maintain international standards for the important national task of nautical charting. Rather than scrap this requirement altogether as some have argued, the H2 Hydrographic Surveying course should be lengthened to incorporate common warfare skills, including task group organisation and amphibious planning. Redevelopment of the core H2 curriculum also seems necessary to better serve the growing need for Military Geospatial Information (MGI) products and the burgeoning areas of automation and remote sensing. Exposure to the world of littoral warfare will enhance operational awareness and assist hydrographers to appreciate the need to sacrifice the rigid quality control measures required for nautical charting when operational necessity demands. At present the task of aligning the hydrographic training continuum with the skills likely to be required in the future has begun to noticeably lag behind the other MWO specialisations.

Following the insertion of forces ashore the naval units of a joint task force will be limited in manoeuvrability by the need to sustain and support the elements ashore. The effective use of geospatial elements can broaden the area safe for navigation, providing larger units with greater sea room to provide Naval Gunfire Support or increase the over-land range of ship borne helicopters. An Offshore Combatant Vessel (OCV) modulated for hydrographic survey may therefore become a vital component of any future task group. Commander Steward Dunne, RAN correctly says in a recent *Headmark* article that the OCV "brings a different capacity and concept of employment to the hydrographic world."¹⁶ These concepts, namely the integration of geospatial elements

into deployed task groups, will need to be incorporated into the training and employment of hydrographic elements. The current limitations of the survey platforms along with the lack of exposure to task group operations may, unless adequately addressed, lead the hydrographic branch toward irrelevance.

To western militaries embroiled in the messy complexity of irregular conflicts such as Afghanistan and Iraq, the landings at Inchon offer a dose of reassurance; a pure model of the warrior's craft. As long as these militaries continue to worship at the altar of 'operational art', MacArthur's masterpiece will take pride of place amongst the greatest works. Few would argue with Wayne Hughes when he states that:

Inchon characterises the very nature of manoeuvre warfare; high risk, high reward. A watchword of manoeuvre warfare is "audacity" a quality that if success is to result, must be accompanied by a high level of experience.¹⁷

MacArthur's island hopping advance northward through the Pacific during World War II provided him with this experience, and his subordinates with the hard-won proficiency at landing troops ashore. The intangible elements of audacity and intuition, so wonderfully demonstrated at Inchon, were not produced in a vacuum nor bestowed by inherent traits of personality; they were forged in the crucible of war.

It was experience that allowed MacArthur to see opportunity where others could see only prohibitive risk. As modern anti-access weaponry advances, and familiarity of amphibious warfare slides from living memory the importance of geographic information as an enabler of manoeuvre will only grow. 🚢



Lieutenant Peter Waring RAN joined the Navy in January of 2006 as an undergraduate seamen officer. Following the completion of his studies he commenced his naval training gaining his BWC in October 2009. He successfully completed the H2 Hydrographic Surveying course in December of 2010 and was subsequently posted to HS Blue Crew.

(Endnotes)

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NAVY TRIVIA – *On the Beach*

BY GREG SWINDEN

Recently while watching the movie *On the Beach* (not the 2000 remake but the much better original 1959 version starring Gregory Peck, Ava Gardner, Fred Astaire and Anthony Perkins), I noted in the credits that there was an RAN Liaison Officer who assisted with the making of the movie. This was a Lieutenant Commander AA Norris-Smith, RAN.

The movie *On the Beach* is based on the post nuclear war apocalyptic book, of the same name, written by Australian author Neville Shute. The book was published in 1957 and is set in Melbourne. Much of the movie was filmed in Australia and also starred the aircraft carrier *HMAS Melbourne* and the submarine *HMS Andrew* (which played the part of the *USS Sawfish*). Additionally there are several sections in the movie showing 'The Navy Department' even though by the late 1950's Navy Office had been moved to Canberra.

Andrew was a British submarine based in Australia as part of the Royal Navy's 4th Submarine Squadron which was located in Sydney at *HMAS Penguin* from 1949 until 1969 (the British subs departed after the arrival of the RAN's own Oberon class submarines began to take effect in the late 1960's). Supposedly *Andrew* was used to represent a US Submarine as the US Navy refused to cooperate in the production of the movie. I will not spoil the story any more by providing too much detail but it's well worth viewing; and a young Anthony Perkins plays the role of an Australian naval lieutenant loaned to the *USS Sawfish* which is commanded by Gregory Peck.

But I thought I would do some quick research to find out who was the mysterious Liaison Officer; Lieutenant Commander AA Norris-Smith.



Anthony Alan Norris-Smith was born at Brighton, Victoria on 8 October 1923 and enlisted in the RAN Reserve on 16 December 1940 as a 17 year old Ordinary Seaman 2nd Class (Communications Branch); allocated official number PM 3211. He served at *HMAS Lonsdale* and *HMAS Cerberus* as a Wireless Telegraphy rating until 19 January 1942 when he joined the cruiser *HMAS AUSTRALIA* in which he served until July of that year. This service included the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942.

In July 1942 Ordinary Seaman Norris-Smith returned to *Cerberus*

for officer training and became a Midshipman, RANR on 8 September 1942. After graduating from his Officer Training Course on 28 September 1942 he went on to serve in a variety of ships, as a Seaman officer, including HMA Ships *Assault*, *Kanimbla*, *Bingera*, *Westralia*, *Manoora* and *Ping Wo* until being demobilised as a Lieutenant, RANR on 23 July 1946. However on 24 February 1947 he was re-mobilised for service in the RAN and joined the frigate *HMAS Quadrant*.

Over the next few years Norris-Smith saw extensive sea service in HMA Ships *Shropshire*, *Australia*,

Bataan and *Cootamundra*. He was promoted to Lieutenant Commander in August 1953 and during the period February 1955–October 1956 he commanded the corvette *HMAS Junee*. From 1956 until 1959 he served at the Melbourne depot *HMAS Lonsdale* and it was here that he became involved as the RAN Liaison Officer for the movie *On the Beach*. What duties he actually performed will perhaps be never fully known but his name does appear in the credits.

Norris-Smith went on to specialise as an Intelligence Officer and served overseas in Singapore, during 1962–64, as the Fleet Intelligence Officer to the Flag Officer Commanding the Far East Fleet. Upon return to Australia he became the Base Intelligence Officer at *HMAS Kuttabul* and was retired from the RAN on 7 October 1968 aged 45 (noting that age 45 was the compulsory retiring age for Lieutenant Commanders at this time). Anthony Norris-Smith and his wife resided in Woollahra after his retirement and he died, on 7 March 1981, at the relatively young age of 58. ✱



Ava Gardner (above), Gregory Peck in scene from 'On the Beach' (below)



O B I T U A R Y

Commodore Rocker Robertson was one of the ANI's fathers. He was a man of great character and breadth of mind born of decades of service in war and peace. He was one of that group of young FND RANC graduates who went straight to war in RN ships. By the time of his retirement in 1979 Australia and the RAN had been transformed by modern communications – the technology in which he had specialised.

Alan Robertson was born in Footscray 1926 and joined the RAN College in 1940, graduating in 1943. He was posted to the United Kingdom and joined his first ship, *HMS Cumberland* in Jan 1944 from which he went to *HMS Paladin*. Both these ships were based in Trincomalee in Ceylon. He then proceeded to India and undertook a minesweeping course in early 1945; on completion of the course he returned to England and joined *HMS Vanquisher* at Sheerness. Later in 1945, he joined *HMS Excellent* for courses before joining *Shropshire* for 18 months.

In mid 1947 he joined *HMAS Australia*, then *Swan* and later *HMAS Lithgow* as part of the 20th Minesweeping Flotilla which was formed to clear the minefields in New Guinea-Solomons area, Torres Strait and the Great Barrier Reef. In mid 1948 he was posted to *HMAS Arunta* for several months and then served ashore in *Cerberus* at the Flinders Naval Depot as a Divisional Officer for the young Officer Cadets of the RAN College.

In 1952 he returned to the United Kingdom and specialised in Communications and, after a period on RN Exchange, joined *HMAS Melbourne* for her commissioning in 1955. As a communicator, he served at *Harman* in 1956/57, *Lonsdale* in 1957, and *Melbourne* in 1958 /59 before he became OIC NAVCOMMSTA Darwin. During his time at Darwin he became the Executive Officer of *HMAS*

VALE - COMMODORE JOHN ALAN “ROCKER” ROBERTSON, RAN (RTD) 11TH SEPTEMBER 1926 - 20TH JUNE 2012



Melville and served there until mid-1961 before proceeding to *Voyager* as the Executive Officer.

After passing the RN Staff course at Greenwich in 1963 he had a further two years exchange Royal Navy service in Singapore as a Joint Planner on the staff of the CINC Far East. Subsequently, he was posted as Executive Officer of *Melbourne* in 1966 and the following year he commanded *Duchess* until 1969. Later in 1969 he became the Director of Naval

Communications and in 1971/72, he commanded *HMAS Hobart*. In February 1975 he commanded *Stalwart* and in August 1977 was promoted to Commodore and appointed as Director of Naval Officers Postings. It was during this period that he with Vernon Parker initiated the ANI and became one of the Australian Naval Institute's founding fathers. He was respected for his innovative thinking both during and after his naval career.

In retirement he wrote for the ANI

Journal and for other publications. He lectured and in 2001 he published a book, *Centre of the Ocean World – Australian Maritime Strategy*. Rocker was Australian Defence Association national president from June 1989 to June 2001 and a much respected elder of the ADA for over three decades.

He enjoyed watching rugby with a glass of good red.

Since his death his online obituary site has been visited by his former sailors paying tribute to their former Skipper.

Fair winds and following seas

President's Appreciation

As President of the ANI I wish to pay tribute to the sterling work done in the early 1970's by Rocker as one of the first to champion the founding of a naval institute in 1975.

We owe a great deal to those visionaries who like Rocker saw that the Navy needed its own independent institute where ideas could be developed and discussed. He saw that the best research and writing needs to be encouraged and published in every generation if we are to remain a creative and forward thinking Navy. The founders also saw that it would be possible for the institute to make the maritime case publically. We continue to be engaged in that founding vision, ensuring our fellow citizens do not forget that Australia is a maritime nation, permanently dependent on the use of the sea for our livelihood and protection.

In recent years the ANI's "Rocker Robertson" essay competition has been a way of linking his name with some of the most creative and intellectually able of our young officers. The

winner usually travels to the United States Naval College at Annapolis in Maryland. Many of these essays are published in *Headmark* and are widely read and discussed.

Rocker's passing is poignant for all who knew and served with him through his busy naval career. It is also of significance to all those of us who did not know him personally but who have been his beneficiaries through the activities of the Institute he helped to found. That is a living legacy of continuing importance which we, and those who come after us, will continue to appreciate.

A.K. du Toit

*From: Rear Admiral Allan Du Toit, AM,
ANI President*

*HMAS Hobart leads
Stuart, Swan and others
in the 1986 Review
(Courtesy RAN)*



QUALITIES OF LEADERSHIP

BY DR TOM LEWIS

This series examines selected traits of leadership to compare Royal Australian Navy leaders against a criteria. The first of the articles took Admiral Lord Nelson, the hero of Trafalgar in 1805, as a model, as well as examining the characteristics of other well-known leaders, both civilian and military.

Seven qualities of leadership measure the subject matter, suggesting a capable naval leader is an achiever; expert in his or her field; inspires others, and takes initiative; impresses by their physical qualities; empathises with others, and is an effective communicator.

Achievement

Did the person under discussion improve their organisation? Did they leave it a better place by being a member? Promotion is recognised as a measure of achievement. With this and other measures which traditionally mark out achievement – education; decorations; amassing of physical wealth perhaps – we gain some beginnings of whether a person is a success.

Expert in one's Field

Anyone who aspires to be a leader and an example to others must obviously have expertise in their craft. In naval terms, that translates as being an expert "ship-driver"; an aviator *par excellence*; an engineer possessing a wealth of theoretical and practical knowledge – and so on. Nelson, for example, was a master at strategy – which becomes a commander of fleets – but also of tactics, which behoves a ship captain. He was also an inspired man-manager.

Inspirational

This leader inspires others to perform similar deeds. Often this is shown by the leader's actions in front of their subordinates. Nelson inspired his followers in being resolute, courageous and honourable. It is one measure of the man that so many did: Hardy, who was with him when he died; his fellow admiral Collingwood whose battle line he raced to be first to engage at Trafalgar; ship commander Berry, who followed him from ship to ship, and Captain Hallowell, who after the Battle of the Nile made him a present of a coffin fashioned from the French ship *L'Orient's* mainmast – Nelson kept it in his cabin and was indeed buried in it.

Initiative

Sometimes described as "going in where angels fear to tread", this measure means to use judgement and advance where necessary. The leader is brave in psychological terms and takes the lead where necessary. It does not mean going forward rashly.

Nelson was a man who had the courage of his own convictions, who could often have left off and blamed superiors for failure. Instead, he was a man who chose to use initiative and advance when he knew the defeat of the enemy was attainable and essential. At the Battle of Copenhagen, walking the deck while the guns roared their broadsides, and deadly splinters whistled about his ears, he confided to Colonel Stewart, commander of infantry, who was with him on the quarterdeck, that he would not be «elsewhere for thousands». Whether he was fearful or not – and who would not have been – Nelson led by example. And when his uncertain superior, Admiral Parker, made the signal to leave off the action, Nelson refused to

see it, putting his telescope to his blind eye and exclaiming: «I really do not see the signal». The British won the battle with much help from Nelson's use of initiative.

Impressive Physical Qualities

This might be rephrased as "looking the part of a leader". Would anyone have said that Horatio Nelson achieved this? Yes – and no. A short, thin man not blessed with good looks, he first entered the British navy in 1771 as a midshipman at 12 years and three months.¹ Despite being prone to sickness: "I have had all the diseases that are", he once said; he adapted well to the vigorous and often dangerous life that was the Navy.

Nelson was a man of raw physical courage who led by example. He lost an eye when an enemy shell, exploding during the siege of Calvi in Corsica, drove splinters and dust and rock fragments into his face. He suffered most terribly and often from wounds, quite willing to lead from the front. His right arm was amputated after the battle of Santa Cruz in Tenerife due to his being hit by grapeshot.

This is what is meant by "looking the part of a leader": behaving in such a way that people can be inspired. It means to look resolute and act with resolution – as did Nelson. To lead by example. To not show physical cowardice. It might include «panache»; "the almost untranslatable expression of dash, of valour, the ability to do things with an air of reckless courage and inspiring leadership".² Finally, we might add that the bearing, carriage and speech of a leader should be of the highest standards.



Empathy

The great soldier of the 18th century, Frederick the Great, had good advice on how to attain the next quality of the leader – Empathy:

...talk with the soldiers, both when you pass their tents or when they are on the march. Sample often to see if the cookpots have something good; find out their small needs and do what you can to satisfy them; spare them unnecessary exertion. But let fall the full vigor of law on the mutinous soldier, the backbiter, the pillager...³

Empathy means to be able to imagine yourself – as leader – in the role of your people, and to show that. It is “the power of understanding and imaginatively entering into another person’s feelings.”⁴ General Montgomery said to his troops at the Battle of Alamein: “We will stand and fight here. If we can’t stay here alive, then let us stay here dead.”⁵ Montgomery was entering into the feelings of all of his people, who feared that they would die. Churchill’s speech of WWII did the same: “We shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills: we shall never surrender.” Alexander the Great “shared in the men’s dangers, as the scars of his wounds testified...he ate the same food as they did. He was highly visible...he fought hard himself but he was ever on the watch for any acts of conspicuous courage in the face of danger amongst his men.”⁶

Such statements say to you that your leader will be with you, no matter what the cost.

Communication

One needs to be understood at all times. Nelson employed in his leadership style something unusual for its day: the art of effective communication. One characteristic was to invite others to contribute their ideas for a campaign, or a battle, or a change of some sort; to educate his men and get them – and him – to know each others’ minds. Nelson embarked upon the Battle of the Nile in 1798 by letting his captains engage in individual fashion. The French fleet, anchored by the bows in a line in shallow coastal water, engaged in ship to ship fashion by five British vessels sailing inside the line and anchoring, and the rest engaging from outside. Thus the French were caught between two forces. At the end of hours of fighting, the French had lost 1,700 men to the British 200; their fleet was largely pounded to pieces, and Napoleon and his army were stranded in Egypt. Nelson had hoisted just two signals through the entire battle.⁷

For the autocratic manager this would have been disastrous: an authoritarian leader would not trust his subordinates to make momentous decisions and fight on their own. Nelson trusted his individual captains. So too, in the long pursuit of the French, years later in 1805, he had regular meetings with his «Band of Brothers» – the name applied to those who fought under him at the Nile.⁸ During the long chase the officers would pool their ideas for forthcoming battles; the best use of tactics; what a following ship would do when its fellow was sighted engaged and so on. Consequently even the necessity for signals within the ensuing battle was dispensed with; the captains knew each others’ minds.

Communication means to be able

to use words effectively to persuade others. Winston Churchill was a great exponent of this. Eisenhower, then a US General and later President of the United States, experienced the British Prime Minister in action:

Churchill was a persuader. Indeed, his skill in the use of words and logic was so great that on several occasions when he and I disagreed on some important matter – even when I was convinced of my own view and when the responsibility was clearly mine – I had a very hard time withstanding his arguments.⁹



A capable naval leader is an achiever; expert in his or her field; inspires others, and takes initiative; impresses by their physical qualities; empathises with others, and is an effective communicator. We have seen many great leaders who exhibited those traits. This series examines how many of Australia’s naval leaders performed in these fields.

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STUDIES IN TRAIT LEADERSHIP – FATHER OF THE FLEET ARM

ADMIRAL SIR VICTOR ALFRED TRUMPER SMITH, AC, KBE, CB, DSC, RAN

Often described as the “father of the Fleet Air Arm”, Admiral Sir Victor Smith had a lengthy and distinguished career in the Royal Australian Navy, and an exciting time too: he was shot down twice and sunk twice and carried out many a hair-raising attack on his country’s enemies. Eventually known in conversation throughout the force as “VAT Smith”, he went into aviation at a time when its future was unclear, but his commitment to the new technology was unswerving and rewarded when he was chosen to play a key role in planning a new direction for the RAN after WWII. He oversaw many changes within the Navy, not least the acquisition of aircraft carriers and the transition from propeller to jet aircraft. One of the first RAN members to be promoted to full Admiral, he was well known for his dedication to those serving with him and for his abilities as a great “man-manager” through his 49 years in uniform.

Victor Alfred Trumper Smith was born on 9 May 1913 in Chatswood, Sydney.¹ By his own account, he had a happy childhood. His parents, George and Una Smith,² were “middle-class” he later described, and his father worked for a pastoral company. “VAT Smith” was a keen member of the local Cub pack; a member of a choir, and a player of tennis and rugby.

Smith’s interest in the navy was sparked by a Lieutenant Commander

who occasionally visited the Cub pack to teach knots and splices and give talks on Navy life. Smith sought further information about the entrance exam for the RAN College at Jervis Bay. After a year of coaching, he passed, joining the intake of 1927.

Smith’s overall time was happy, and he was impressed by the officers and masters, in particular Commander Fogarty Fegen, the Executive Officer. (Fegen won a posthumous VC in WWII, commanding the coincidentally named *Jervis Bay*, taking on the far-superior *Admiral Scheer* in sole defence of a convoy.) Apart from being a pleasant personality who entertained groups of cadets to his wife’s afternoon teas, Fegen coached Smith in rugby.

In his last year at the College, the Jervis Bay site was closed down and officer training to *HMAS Cerberus* on the Mornington Peninsula. Australia was going through the time of the Depression, and cost-cutting drove the closure. VAT Smith graduated at the end of 1930, and was presented with a silver cigarette case in recognition of having become a Cadet-Captain.

The newly graduated midshipmen were posted, for more learning, to one of the ships of the fleet. They were given realistic roles: being placed in charge of a cutter, participating in signal drills, or assisting in the firing of the ship’s weapons systems. Smith was posted to the cruiser *HMAS Canberra*. The ship visited Tasmania, Fiji, New Zealand and many Australian ports. His personal report of this time described him as “...of the stolid, slow type, whose personal bearing and appearance, although not yet up to standard, has improved considerably in the ship”.



VAT Smith as a Lieutenant (Courtesy Lady Smith)

In May 1932 the five midshipmen left of the 1927 entry – the others having had to leave the Service because of Defence cuts – travelled on the liner *Oranto* to the Mediterranean to join *HMS London*, the RN’s first cruiser squadron flagship. This was a wider and more useful experience of Navy life, and it was while attached to *London* that Smith undertook a two week air course on board the carrier *HMS Glorious*. The experience “awakened an interest in me towards the Fleet Air Arm” as he put it, and although soon embarked on board a destroyer for more courses, he began to look at aircraft and ships in a new light.³ In August 1933 he sat his sub-lieutenant’s seamanship board, and passing it, left the midshipman’s white tabs behind.

Further training followed at the Royal Naval College at Greenwich in academic subjects. Smith played Rugby



with enthusiasm, and while finding learning French frustrating, enjoyed the training, the impressive buildings and time off exploring London. He was poor, with expensive uniforms and a sword having to be purchased from his pay.

After a gunnery course, Smith returned to Australia to join *HMAS Canberra* again, this time in a more exalted position as “Sub” of the Gunroom: the senior of the midshipmen’s mess. In early 1936 he joined *HMAS Australia* in the Mediterranean and was promoted to lieutenant. He successfully applied to undertake an Observer’s course. This was held in Britain, with seven months of flying at RAF Lee-on-Solent. The duties of an observer were manifold, and ranged through navigation to radio operation – and later radar – and bomb aiming, all depending on the type of aircraft. Upon successful completion Smith was posted to *Glorious*, the carrier which had awakened his interest in flying. Flying was conducted on the Swordfish biplane, which Smith held in affection – he observed that it could have “several cylinders” of its engine shot out and still be under power. Smith was a busy officer: as well as several ship duties he was also “Fleet water polo officer”. Although these were happy times, Smith remembered there was considerable uneasiness, about the deteriorating international situation.

In August 1939 Smith was posted off *Glorious* to undertake a meteorological course - a fortunate appointment, as the carrier was sunk early in the war in controversial circumstances, and with heavy loss of life.⁴ However by the time he reached Britain in early September the embryonic conflict was changing matters rapidly – he arrived on the day⁵ war was declared – and instead of the course and the planned return to



Class of 1927 with VAT Smith right of rear row (RAN College)

Australia he found himself posted to the carrier *HMS Ark Royal*. The ship was soon at sea in the South Atlantic participating in the search for the *Graf Spee*, the search ending in that ship’s scuttling after the Battle of the River Plate.

Back in Britain 821 Squadron, taking Smith with it, moved to Naval Air Station Hatston in the Orkneys and undertook anti-submarine patrols. Soon information was acquired that the German battlecruiser *Scharnhorst* and an accompanying force of ships were moving south down the Norwegian coast. 821 Squadron was ordered to the attack. Six long range Swordfish were deployed under Smith’s command and after a flight across the North Sea found their target. They carried out torpedo attacks but no hits were recorded, although two of the aircraft were lost. Smith later recorded it as “a frightening experience....you are in some respects a sitting duck” when moving into torpedo aiming range and unable to change course because you were also in the ships’ gun range.⁶ One of his personal reports of the time noted “He has plenty of fighting spirit...” and this was confirmed a while later when, along with the senior pilot, he was awarded a Mention in Despatches for “bravery when attacking

German Battle Cruiser “Scharnhorst”.⁷

In August 1940, after a successful application to join a fighter squadron, Smith was transferred to 807 Squadron near Winchester. After a time aboard *HMS Pegasus*, the Squadron embarked with the two seater fighter Fairey Fulmars aboard *HMS Furious*. They proceeded to Gibraltar, where they transferred to *HMS Ark Royal*. Smith recorded that it was around this time he contracted malaria, which he endured for several years. In May 1941 Smith’s aircraft attacked a flight of enemy bombers and was severely

HMS Ark Royal lists while sinking (Courtesy RN)



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damaged in the process. The aircraft had to be ditched and Smith and pilot Lieutenant Nigel Hallett spent some time in the water. Hallett was badly shocked by the crash and began to lose heart, saying he did not think he could go on for much longer.⁸ Smith rallied him and some time later they were picked up by the destroyer *Cossack*. Smith later noted that the destroyer's sailors mistook them for Italians owing to their suntans, leading to a few moments of potential hostility. Hallett later maintained that Smith had saved his life; typically Smith did not mention this aspect of the crash in his later biography.

This episode was probably enough excitement for Smith for a while, for he does not mention in his biography the hunt for the German battleship *Bismarck* which was taking place at the end of May 1941. He went to sea as part of the hunt on board *Ark Royal*, but later noted that the weather was too rough for the fighter squadrons to operate.⁹ Peter Howson, later an Australian Federal Minister, who served with him at the time, is of the opinion that this incident caused VAT to realise the importance of an air component for the RAN at a time when very few others shared those views. Howson, an RNVR pilot from 1940 until 1946, later emigrated to Australia and transferred to the RAN. He was a Member of Parliament from 1955 to 1972; Minister for Air for four years, and sometimes Acting Minister for the Navy. His maiden speech in Parliament stressed the importance of naval aviation. Throughout his career he kept in touch with VAT, and watched the thoughtful forward thinking that developed on *Ark Royal* transform him into "the expert in airpower in the RAN in the 1950s and 1960s, and certainly an inspiration to the Naval Board to spend money on a Fleet Air Arm."¹⁰

A month later Smith was shot

down a second time, this time after he and pilot Lieutenant Commander Sholto-Douglas were again attacking enemy bombers. Once more the pair were rescued. In November Smith was on board *Ark Royal* when it was torpedoed. Smith recorded that "there was nothing dramatic about leaving the *Ark*, a destroyer came along side and getting aboard was no problem."¹¹ At the end of the year he was awarded a Distinguished Service Cross for service in 807 Squadron; the citation reading "...for outstanding zeal, patience and cheerfulness and for setting an example of wholehearted devotion to duty."¹²

Once back in Britain with the rest of the *Ark Royal* survivors, VAT Smith was invited to become the senior observer of the reformed 825 Squadron, which he had to decline as Australia House had passed along instructions for him to return to Australia. Smith noted later that 13 out of that Squadron's 18 pilots were killed shortly afterwards in an attack on *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau* and *Prinz Eugen*.

Arriving back in Australia in February 1942, Smith was surprised at the conditions and attitudes he found at home. 1941 and the beginnings of 1942 had been a bad year for Australia – the attacks on Pearl Harbor had brought Japan into the war and the war closer; *HMAS Sydney* had been sunk in the duel with *Kormoran*; Singapore had fallen, *HMAS Perth* had been lost in the Battle of the Java Sea, and *HMAS Yarra* shortly afterwards. Yet here were plentiful supplies; no blackout, and an attitude of "business as usual".

Posted to *HMAS Australia*, but from there attached to the cruiser *USS Chicago* as liaison officer, Smith found much to interest him in the way the Americans did business. He was detached from there as observer for *Canberra's* aircraft and experienced the attack on Sydney Harbour by

three Japanese midget submarines at the end of May, with the submarines torpedoing *HMAS Kuttubul* and generally causing a night of mayhem and mistakes.

Canberra was then deployed to the Pacific and was soon in action, culminating in the Battle of Savo Island. This action saw units of the American and Australian navies surprised at night by a Japanese squadron. American radar-equipped "picket" ships did not see the oncoming enemy, and the attack was both a complete surprise and a total victory for the Japanese. Smith's ship was annihilated; as one account put it: "In only two minutes, *Canberra* without firing a shot, had been reduced to a burning hulk."¹³ Although not sinking immediately, the cruiser was a total loss. It was Smith's second sinking but he was reticent about in his later autobiographical account, saying he had "nothing to add to the many accounts which have been written."¹⁴

On 14 September 1942 Smith was appointed to *HMAS Assault* in Port Stephens on the central coast of NSW. This newly commissioned shore establishment was where beach landing techniques were taught: specifically the "commando training" of 120 sailors who were being readied for covert assault techniques in jungle warfare. Smith was not involved with the highly rigorous training; he later commented that he had a "rather idyllic existence" there instead, involved in the administrative side of the establishment.¹⁵

From here he travelled to Britain to become part of the ship's company for *HMAS Shropshire*, the replacement cruiser for *Canberra*. Lieutenant Bryan Castles, later to become an RAN Admiral himself, met Smith for the first time during this appointment, and was struck by his "search for knowledge". This was shown in his willingness to



always listen to others and learn from their experiences. Castles later further commented that: "Al's understanding of and dedication to his fellow officers and men and to the RAN was an outstanding feature, the like of which I never experienced again my service career".¹⁶

Smith's appointment to *Shropshire* was short-lived. The removal of her aircraft facilities meant there was no requirement for an Observer. A request to join the aircraft carrier *HMS Tracker* was successful, and as an Acting Lieutenant Commander, Smith joined her on 21 July 1943 as Operations Officer. The carrier's main role was as an Atlantic convoy escort and Smith flew many patrols from her deck in search of U-boats. Early 1944 saw *Tracker* deployed on the run to Murmansk. Flying conditions were extremely taxing with ice often forming on the flight deck, and indeed on the ship's railings. The ship's company saw little of land ice however: they were not even allowed to disembark for exercise at Murmansk.¹⁷ Nevertheless the aircraft were involved in sinking two U-boats and shooting down six enemy aircraft.¹⁸ VAT Smith was noted during this time as being an effective communicator: "...the door of his office, which he hardly ever left, was always open and he ensured aircrew were kept fully up to date..."¹⁹ His personal report suggested that he was a "...most zealous, conscientious and capable air staff officer. Most loyal and intrepid, he is always a strong influence..."

Operation Overlord claimed VAT Smith early in 1944, and he was busy planning air components of the D-Day landings. He moved ashore into France once the landings had been made and planned Channel shipping protection and off the French beaches. In September he moved back to Britain to begin planning for shore facilities



HMS Tracker underway whilst escorting a convoy, with Avenger torpedo-bombers on the deck aft (RN photo)

required in Australia for the move to the Pacific of RN units. The Normandy appointment was also an opportunity for which Smith recorded he was always thankful - the opportunity to meet, court and marry Miss Nanette Suzanne Harrison, an ex-WAAF member who was now working in a solicitor's office. Upon hearing of an imminent posting to Australia the two were married at five days notice.

In November 1944 Smith returned to Australia via a two-day flight aboard an Air Force Lancaster.²⁰ He was asked to begin plans for a two carrier force for Australia after the war. In late 1945 he was despatched to Britain to fill gaps in the draft plan. He was able to meet up with his new wife once more. The planning in Britain took over a year and resulted in the formation of an air planning staff for Navy Office under the direction of a Captain. Smith formed the fourth member of this office together with officers with Engineering and Supply backgrounds. This was a time of much infighting between the RAAF and the Navy as to which should operate various elements of any maritime aviation. However, VAT Smith was a crucial linchpin: one of his personal reports noted that "...he had a happy knack of persuading the R.A.A.F. and R.A.N to give help freely and willingly".²¹

In late 1947 Smith became Air Staff Officer on the staff of the Naval Liaison Officer in London and in December was promoted to Commander. He carried out work with the Diplomatic

(Red Cross) Conference in Geneva which drew special comment in his personal report as being of note to the Australian Ambassador in Paris.

The commissioning of the aircraft carrier *HMAS Sydney* took place in 1949, and a son - Michael - was born to the Smith family in the same year. On 9 January 1950 VAT Smith joined her as Executive Officer. A little while later the Combat Air Group was landed on board, and the officers all met Smith over an informal drink. Later that day he introduced the entire 35 members of the Group to the Captain, "...virtually name and rank perfect" - an impressive feat of memory that showed what a man-manager he really was.²² However, his personal report of the time noted his lack of experience in the role; an interesting contrast to the report of 18 months later, which commented that he had performed "...the onerous and difficult duties of an Executive Officer of an aircraft carrier with complete success....a thoroughly good seaman with high personal, moral and professional standards".²³

The ship sailed to Britain in the middle of the year to embark her Air Group and in September 1951 proceeded to Korea as part of the United Nations operations there in the war against North Korea and her backers. Three squadrons were embarked on the carrier, which Smith records made her somewhat crowded. "Lofty" Watson, a seaman on board, remembers:

VAT Smith, the best Commander



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under whom I ever shipped.... ran just about everything, except things to do with flight deck operations... being vitally interested in the condition of the ship and anything to do with seamanlike operations. He was not a Commander who wandered about with a telescope under his arm looking important (the normal role of a RN ship's commander). He never yelled at crew members, just suggested things should be done THIS way, and get on with it. His Daily Orders always were, to me, based on commonsense...

He later compared Smith's management abilities on board *Sydney* with later experiences:

...when I was in the commissioning crew for the loan carrier 'Vengeance' I soon realised it WASN'T the 'Sydney', and some further years later when I was Chief Radio Electrician in the commissioning crew for the new carrier 'Melbourne' and did 3 years on her, I knew for sure that having VAT for a ship's Commander had been a privilege.²⁴

Bryan Castles, who had served with Smith in 1942, was teamed up with him again in *Sydney*. He later recalled:

This posting was the opportunity to experience 'Al' at his best (and) his ability to bring this ship to its peak of efficiency and at the same time create a very happy ship's company....He had the extraordinary know-how and outstanding ability to achieve his responsibility.²⁵

Colin Price agreed. Then on board as part of the aircraft maintenance teams, Price had known Smith from time they had served together in the United Kingdom. Although Lady Smith remarks that VAT Smith would never have used the Australian universal greeting in this way, Price relates:

I generally spoke to him if I encountered him on his forays throughout the ship. Some days he replied "G'day Chief", another time it would be "G'day Price", and on rare occasions a grunt. I gauged his degree of stress by his reply. I had great admiration for him.²⁶

While in Korea the aircraft carrier managed to survive Typhoon Ruth, more than just a normal storm. Alan Zammit, on board at the time, recalled that the ship had been ordered to leave harbour along with all other large warships to try to ride out the oncoming storm:

It was a night of terror. ...Once clear of the sheltered harbour, the 19500 ton aircraft carrier began to roll like a pig in mud, in a brown sea with torrential rain beating down on the crew working on the flight deck....By late afternoon the typhoon was getting worse. To prevent damage, speed was reduced to two knots...At this time the wind was circulating in an anti clockwise movement at about 130 kilometres. Visibility was down to the length of the ship. The air was filled with spray and foam and the sea was almost totally white, vaguely resembling steep hills or houses covered with soap suds. At about 1700 hours (5 PM), the "Skimmer", a fast 16 foot motor boat also known as the "Jolly Boat", which was stowed just below flight deck level, 36 feet above the water line, was washed over the side by a wave close on 45 foot high. This was followed 45 minutes later by a fork lift truck also going over the side from the flight deck. An hour later, our starboard 36 foot Cutter, stowed inboard on the weather deck was smashed to pieces by a huge wave...

Down below, in the machinery

spaces the stokers were working in up to one foot of sea water. In the Hangar, a two ton power plant almost broke loose and the Naval Airmen risked their lives in lashing it to the bulkhead... a number of fires broke out caused by sea water getting into the electrical equipment and we heard the pipe - FIRE - FIRE - FIRE - time and time again.... The Executive Officer, Commander "Vat" ... worked for 36 hours without a break, directing damage control, fire and working parties.²⁷

Smith may well have done the ship another service. He apparently mentioned to Captain Harries that some of *Sydney's* bow plating had been damaged in 1950 by steaming directly into heavy seas while deployed off the United Kingdom. Harries consequently took the sea very fine off the starboard bow.²⁸

Upon return to Australia the ship's company – together with those of *Tobruk* and *Murchison* – were accorded a march through Sydney, with Smith leading the parade.²⁹ On 25 April 1952 Smith was appointed to *Albatross II* – in the western suburbs of Sydney - to prepare it to be a naval air station; the establishment soon becoming *HMAS Nirimba*. The CO commented on Smith's performance later: "...entirely to my satisfaction. This officer has considerable knowledge, ability, power of application and capacity for getting things done".³⁰ Smith went on to become Executive Officer of *Nirimba* until 21 July 1953. This period saw the transition of *Nirimba* from ex-airfield, hostel and combined RAAF/RAN establishment to an Aircraft Repair Yard and its commissioning in April 1953 – a very busy period and one that would have seen Smith in the thick of things.³¹ Indeed, he was more than happy to take an active role.



Colin Price, then the Chief Instructor at the School of Aircraft Maintenance, remembered a Gannet aircraft³² which was the centre of some attention as its pilot had retracted its wheels while readying it for a take-off. Price had decided to hoist the aircraft up with a crane and get a tracked salvage platform underneath it when VAT Smith arrived in a car. He got out and walked across and suggested that Price try lowering the undercarriage with the hand pump instead. This worked, and as Price later recorded, Smith "...walked back to his car with a triumphant grin on his face".³³ At the end of the year, on 6 December, the Smiths' second son – Mark – was born.³⁴

With promotion to Captain, the next appointment was as Director of Air Warfare Organisation and Training. A decision was being made at this time to cut the two proposed carrier air groups to one, and to make a number of modifications to the new carrier *Melbourne* before she was commissioned into the RAN: the flight deck was to be angled; a mirror landing system was to be fitted as well as a steam catapult and internal modifications. *Vengeance* was loaned to the RAN in the interim, and *Melbourne* commissioned in 1955. The angled flight deck was Smith's proposal: he wrote a paper which pointed out the savings to be made with the much lower crash rate an angled deck would bring. The Chief of Naval Staff was enthusiastic, and the proposal was approved.³⁵

On appointment to *HMAS Quadrant*, Smith was now Captain (F) of the First Frigate Squadron, known as FOX1. Taking up the post on 28 June 1955, he confessed later to some trepidation at leaving the world of

aviation after sixteen years and taking up ship-handling, anti-submarine warfare and so on after such a long break. This was borne out in criticism contained in one of his reports, with comments noting "My only concern is his poor showing at ship handling... He tends to take unnecessary risks".³⁶ Nevertheless, *Quadrant* was awarded the Duke of Gloucester Cup³⁷ at the end of the year, singling her out as a highly efficient ship. The same year saw the birth of Smith's third son Piers. The Captain transferred to *HMS Queenborough* on 10 April 1956, and that ship too won the same Cup at the end of the year, with Smith later commenting it was "very good fortune".³⁸

It was "very satisfying" in the next appointment to return to *HMAS*

improve morale within the base. Gardening was undertaken by all of the staff, on Friday afternoon after lunch. A goldfish pond was built, and VAT offered fish from the wardroom's pond to stock it – the four donated were subsequently named Victor, Alfred, Trumper and Smith.⁴¹ A visit in 1959 by Rear Admiral DH Harries drew the deserved comment that the establishment was "a shining example of the Service at its best". Another view of "VAT" during this time is one remembered by Commissioner of NSW Fire Brigades ID MacDougall, AC: "...as Captain, NAS Nowra, he took the time to counsel a brash young Acting Sub Lieutenant (me) on some aspect of my performance. The entirely deserved kick was delivered in private and gently. I never forgot his wise words and kindness".⁴²

Bruce Ziegler, later a Commander in the RAN, remembers VAT Smith as "...a gentleman and a scholar – admired by all who served under him, and the rest of others near him".⁴³

The RAN College returned to Jervis Bay in

this period, having been moved to *HMAS Cerberus* in 1930 as a result of the Depression. The buildings of the establishment were being used as a series of profitable hotels, and there was some resentment towards the Navy's return from those employed there. However, by the end of 1957 the move was complete, with Smith noting it was "a happy day for me personally when the College returned to Jervis Bay".⁴⁴

1960 saw Smith enrolled in the Imperial Defence College in the United Kingdom for the one year "staff course". He noted that mixing with other naval officers from many nations made for a "course of excellent value". But even more satisfying was



Albatross, Smith recorded, as he had so much to do with the planning of Nowra as the base for RN aircraft 12 years earlier.³⁹ The feelings Smith had for this part of NSW were made stronger over the next three years, as he was invited frequently to open many and various functions. Some of this concerned heated local politics – the local Shoalhaven Council had been recently dismissed by the NSW Government, and Smith was performing functions that once were the province of local councillors – but Smith and his wife were popular figures in the area, and the Navy was warmly embraced by the local population.⁴⁰

Smith went to some trouble to

VAT Smith featured in a cartoon with his well-known phrase about being "Second to None" (Courtesy RAN College)



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to return to sea in 1961 in command of *HMAS Melbourne*, the aircraft carrier. Although he had only 18 months in command, the short time was tempered by the knowledge he was to be promoted to Rear Admiral. Overseas voyages to Hong Kong and Japan were a challenging part of the appointment, with Smith noting that: "If anyone wants the testing experience of remaining on full alert throughout the entire night, then taking an aircraft carrier at night through the Shimonoseki Strait is worth trying."⁴⁵ Those who served under him on board were complimentary about his operations with the ship: "...according to many aircrew who served with him, 'Captain Smith, and only one or two others, operated *Melbourne* as an aircraft carrier as often as he could'."⁴⁶

On 6 July 1962 Smith was appointed as Second Naval Member of the Australian Naval Board and Chief of Personnel. He was awarded the CBE the following year. The naval brief noted:

...he is reported as being a successful staff officer, an above average leader and an able, intrepid observer...(an) exceptionally strong sense of duty and attributes of leadership, determination, integrity and reliability.⁴⁷

4 February 1964 saw the collision of *Melbourne* and *Voyager*, the biggest peacetime loss of life the RAN has ever suffered. 82 men were killed, and careers wrecked in the ensuing inquiries. Smith was not involved with the investigations, but the incident left an indelible memory in the mind of all Australian naval personnel.

In 1965 VAT Smith was involved in a reshuffle of the Board positions, with the result that he became Fourth Naval Member, and in charge of Supply – in those days conducted through the separate civilian directorates of

Naval and Air Stores, Victualling and Armament Supply. Smith amalgamated them to a degree after some study into organisations that came under one Director General of Supply.

In 1966, on 30 January, Smith was appointed Flag Officer Commanding Her Majesty's Australian Fleet. He was able to go to sea once more, and was soon exercising with an American carrier group off the NSW coast. This was followed by deployment north to Singapore and other ports for exercise. Early in the following year Smith was made Second Naval Member and Deputy Chief of Naval Staff, with an announcement being made in November of that year that he would serve for three years from April 1968 as Vice Admiral and First Naval Member, the equivalent to today's "CN", or Chief of Navy.

Several matters were pressing during Smith's term. The first was the ongoing Vietnam war to which Australia was committed. Smith decided to visit Vietnam personally and was able to view the work of the Naval Helicopter Flight – an unusual role for naval personnel but one they fulfilled to the maxim of their motto: "Get the bloody job done". He also visited the Clearance Diving Teams on operation there and later commented that he felt "proud to be in the same service" as these two unique naval efforts in this difficult war. In 1969 he was made a KBE – a knight commander in the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire, and knighted by the Governor General.⁴⁸

While on Smith's staff during this period, Bryan Castles was in a position "...to witness him at the top level". He remembers that Smith was a "good listener"; possessed the ability to quietly probe for information that he needed from any useful source, and communicated well. During social occasions, however, Smith often felt

not too enamoured of the occasion, and after necessary formalities would quietly disappear, with instructions to his Staff Captain to "carry on."⁴⁹

On 23 November 1970 Smith relinquished command of the Navy to Rear Admiral Peek, and became Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and full Admiral. After 43 years he was no longer concerned directly with the Navy but rather the armed forces as a whole, as the equivalent of what later would be called "CDF" – or Chief of the Defence Force. The new appointment saw much negotiation with overseas forces and governments, in particular those of Britain and the United States.

Rear Admiral Neil McDonald noted that VAT Smith: "...realised that the politicians had to be kept on side... (he) played straight down the line and did his best for those under him."⁵⁰ As an aside, the Smiths had an interesting aspect of one trip to Europe: they had a private audience with the Pope, then Paul VI, when visiting Rome with the then-Minister for Defence, Lance Barnard.⁵¹

The Prime Minister of much of that time, Gough Whitlam, later noted:

Sir Victor had the administrative responsibility for the armed forces of Australia and Papua New Guinea throughout three years of exceptional changes – amalgamation of departments, attractive conditions for an all volunteer Defence Force, development of a uniform code of discipline and review of defence treaties with our neighbours and arrangements for shared bases in Australia. These changes would not have been possible if there had not been complete confidence and trust between the Prime Minister and the defence ministers on one hand and the chairman of the Chief of Staff Committee on the



other....He was a great leader of the Defence Force and a great servant of the Australian people.⁵²

Back at home the 1972 Tange Report saw some changes to the way the Defence forces were structured, and eventually the end to the Vietnam war. Sir Arthur Tange was a formidable public servant, and Smith may have been no match for him.⁵³ The Tange Report led to major changes to the Defence Organisation, including the disestablishment of the separate Service departments and what some perceived as a weakening of the position of senior military officers vis-à-vis their civilian counterparts.

On 2 December 1974 VAT Smith opened the Naval Aviation Museum, as it was then called, at the Naval Air Station, *HMAS Albatross*, near Nowra.⁵⁴ In 1975 he had another honour to add to his knighthood – he was made a Companion in the Military Division of the first list of the new Order of Australia, with the post-nominal of AC.

Upon his retirement on 23 November 1975 Admiral Sir Victor Smith ended 49 years of service with the Royal Australian Navy. He was the first graduate of the RAN College to achieve the rank of full Admiral, and his 49 years of service were unequalled by any other naval member. The accolades on his retirement were impressive: The Minister for Defence, the Honourable Jim Killen, summed up many people's feelings when he said that "All who had the privilege of working with you greatly admire and respect you". The former Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, later noted: "We knew Admiral Smith well. He was a very decent person, competent and shrewd..."⁵⁵

In his retirement the Admiral became patron of the ACT Rugby Union League, continuing an association with the sport he had



Vat Smith meets the Pope (Courtesy Lady Smith)

retained since boyhood.⁵⁶ He played tennis into his 70's.⁵⁷ He was chairman of the ACT Birthright Movement, which supported fatherless families. In 1986, on 5 October, the 75th Anniversary of the formation of the RAN, he opened the Naval Historical Society's Museum in Building 31 of the Garden Island establishment in Sydney.⁵⁸

In 1992, after much persuasion, VAT Smith penned a short version of his life – *A Few Memories of Sir Victor Smith*. In its foreword, General Sir Peter Gratton, AC, OBE, Chief of the Defence Force, summed up the author: "...a man of rare distinction and ability, modest and underspoken, yet with a commanding presence and manner, a warm personality and a keen sense of humour".

Smith suffered a "long and traumatic illness" in the later years of his life.⁵⁹ As a result, he died on 10 July 1998⁶⁰, aged 85. Accolades followed in quantity, and they all mentioned the sterling qualities of VAT Smith. Vice Admiral DB Chalmers, then Chief of the Navy, noted that "Sir Victor personified the true meaning of honour, integrity and virtue, the three traits that continue to be instilled in the men and women of the Royal Australian Navy."⁶¹ Rear Admiral WJ

Rourke commented: "He always set very high standards, for himself first, and for others."⁶² Commander PD Jones, RAN, then writing from the frigate *HMAS Melbourne*, suggested: "...he simply represents an illustration of the finest leader and friend that any person may encounter and cherish.... his legend survives as a model for all who wish to strive for integrity, professional excellence and above all, an accomplished life."⁶³

On 12 May 2002, a memorial plaque to him was dedicated in the chapel of *HMAS Creswell*, in Jervis Bay, and a poster encapsulating his life was displayed within the RAN College's Historical Collection. It includes some of VAT Smith's most-loved quotations, and some of them give a little more insight into one of Australia's most sterling naval leaders:

"Second to None" – as he was affectionately known

"There should be loyalty up and loyalty down"

"Things should be shipshape at all times"

"Manners maketh the Man"

"Punctuality is the Quality of Kings" and

several verses from Kipling's poem "If"⁶⁴



STUDIES IN TRAIT LEADERSHIP – FATHER OF THE FLEET ARM

ADMIRAL SIR VICTOR ALFRED TRUMPER SMITH, AC, KBE, CB, DSC, RAN

VAT Smith was one of the highest achievers within the Royal Australian Navy, in that he saw a vision of a Fleet Air Arm, went after it, and worked steadily until it was achieved. He was a major participant in the introduction of aviation into the Navy. This far-sighted change saw the RAN embrace fixed-wing and rotary-wing aviation, and although, foolishly through political short-sightedness, the former was dispensed with, organic helicopter carriage is part of every major RAN surface platform today. Smith was also distinguished by his qualities of leadership and management, and also by his vision for how navies' capabilities could be advanced by embracing aviation. Where he led, others followed, inspired by his example. In particular, the success he made of his career in the aviation field must have been a major encouragement to other officers.

Within his personal qualities, Smith is rightly remembered by those he served with for his interest in their careers. He was a strong communicator: all of VAT Smith's people knew what he and his organisation needed. It is a testimony to his communicative qualities that his vision of air assets for the RAN was realised so comprehensively. He looked and acted the part of a leader throughout his career. VAT Smith made immense achievements for the Navy in his chosen field of aviation, and in the force overall. He must rate as one of the RAN's leaders of great strategic vision.

In summary, an officer who, like Creswell and Burrell, laid strong foundations of a future Navy. A strong leader, well-liked and respected, VAT Smith also was a man of action and a fine fighting officer. He can truly be called the father of aviation within the Royal Australian Navy. 🚢



Dr Tom Lewis OAM, has served in a variety of PNF and Reserve roles within the Navy. He led US forces on deployment in Baghdad in 2006. He is now the Director of Darwin Military Museum.

(Endnotes)

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- 2 Dadswell, Commodore 'Toz', AM, RANEM. "From Midshipman to Admiral in a flying forty-nine years". *Australia's Navy 1991-92*. Canberra: Government Publishing Service, 1991. (69-74)
- 3 *A Few Memories of Sir Victor Smith*. (19)
- 4 *Glorious* and her two attendant destroyers were sunk very quickly by two German warships in 1940 off Norway. The carrier did not have one aircraft flying in the normal precautionary Combat Air Patrol, and the three ships were surprised and quickly overwhelmed, with the majority of their ships' companies lost - testimony to the *Glorious's* Captain's contemptuous opinion for naval aviation. John Winton's *Carrier Glorious* provides an excellent study into this tragedy.
- 5 Letter from Lady Smith to the author. 11 June 2002.
- 6 *A Few Memories of Sir Victor Smith*. (31)
- 7 Royal Australian Navy. Personal Reports of Victor Alfred Smith. Navy Records, Canberra.
- 8 Winton, John. Obituary of Admiral Sir Victor Smith. *The Daily Telegraph*. (British newspaper) 30 July 1998. (Article was not by-lined, but was noted as being the work of Naval Historian John Winton's in a letter to Lady Smith from Captain Edmund "Splash" Carver, which was forwarded to the author by Lady Smith.)
- 9 Noye, Larry. "The Father of the RAN's Fleet Air Arm". *The Canberra Times*. 24 September 1989. (19)
- 10 Interview with Peter Howson. 10 January 2002.
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- 12 Royal Australian Navy. Personal Reports of Victor Alfred Smith. Navy Records, Canberra.
- 13 Payne, Alan. *HMAS Canberra*. NSW: Naval Historical Society of Australia, 1991. (93)
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- 15 Jones, Ted. RAN veteran and later author. Letter to the author. 11 June 2001.
- 16 Castles, Rear Admiral Bryan J, CBE, RAN (Rtd.) Letter to the author. 10 October 2001.
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- 25 Castles, Rear Admiral Bryan J, CBE, RAN (Rtd.) Letter to the author. 10 October 2001.
- 26 Price, Colin C. RAN member. Manuscript: "A Tiffy's Odyssey: being the recollections of a Royal Australian Naval Artificer 1941-1961." December 1995. (In the author's possession.) (24)
- 27 Zammit, Alan. "HMAS SYDNEY". <http://www.kmike.com/oz/kr/chapter28.htm>



28 The Australian Naval Aviation Museum. *Flying Stations*. NSW: Allen and Unwin, 1998. (93)

29 Jones, Colin. *Wings and the Navy*. NSW: Kangaroo Press, 1997. (94)

30 *A Few Memories of Sir Victor Smith*. (47)

31 Royal Australian Navy. "Welcome Aboard HMAS Nirimba". 1979. Historical Collection, RAN College.

32 Dr Sam Bateman, a retired Commodore of the RAN, advises however that the aircraft was: "...more probably a Firefly. Gannets did not arrive in Australia until with the *Melbourne* in 1956. Although conceivably one might have been shipped out earlier for training purposes, I don't think they were even in operational service in the RN in 1953". Conversation with the author. July 2002.

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45 *A Few Memories of Sir Victor Smith*. (53)

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53 Discussions with a former senior flag officer of the RAN. However, according to Lady Smith, she has been told that her husband was one of the few people not intimidated by Tange. Letter to the author. March 2003.

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
60 Coulthard-Clark, Chris. "A leader in times of war and peace". *The Australian*. 29 July 1998. (10)

61 Chalmers, Vice Admiral DB, Chief of the Navy. Letter to Lady Smith. 15 July 1998. (Courtesy Lady Smith)

62 Rourke, Rear Admiral WJ, RAN. (Rtd.) Letter to Lady Smith. 13 July 1998. (Courtesy Lady Smith)

63 Jones, Commander PD, RAN. *HMAS Melbourne*. Letter to Lady Smith. 17 July 1998. (Courtesy Lady Smith)

64 Poster of Sir Victor Alfred Trumper Smith, courtesy of Lady Smith.



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
HMS Alliance submarine set for £6.5m restoration work

Work has started to save a historic World War II era submarine in Hampshire. *HMS Alliance*, based at the Royal Navy Submarine Museum in Gosport, is set for a £6.5m makeover.

The vessel will be a memorial to 5,300 British submariners who gave their lives in service between 1904 and the present day. The 1940s submarine, which is on display on the quayside outside the museum, had begun to fall into the sea.

The museum said it had been given £3.4m in lottery funding and the rest through funds and pledges. Efforts continue to meet a shortfall of £400,000. Jason Lowe, Saving *HMS Alliance* Project Manager, said: "The first stage of works will involve constructing a permanent hard standing platform underneath *Alliance*.

"This will then allow access to conserve the 1940s' submarine's outer metal casing which has suffered from severe corrosion and also give visitors a whole new view of this important historic vessel."



Inside HMS Alliance (Courtesy Totnes SubAqua Club)

The vessel, which has been at the museum since 1982, was in service for more than 25 years. It is listed in the UK's historic ship's register, alongside the *Cutty Sark*, the *Mary Rose*, and *HMS Victory*. 🚢



Artist's conception of how the completed project will look (Project brochure)



Corrosion damage to the stern of HMS Alliance (Public domain)



Bow damage (Public domain)

HDW reveals new AIP submarine for Israel

On 17 February 2012 the German shipyard Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft, (HDW), rolled out the first Israeli Navy air independent propulsion (AIP) submarine. Harbour test trials for the second generation submarine have started.


The 68 meter Dolphin Batch II submarine is the largest submarine built in Germany from WWII, and is fitted with 10 weapon tubes. The complement is 35 persons.

Story and photo by Michael Nitz





Book Reviews



THE YOMPERS: WITH 45 COMMANDO IN THE FALKLANDS WAR

By Ian Gardiner

Pen and Sword Books UK 2012

Seaforth Publishing

208 pages

Reviewed by LCDR Desmond Woods, RAN

This new book, by retired Brigadier RM, Ian Gardiner, marks the 30th anniversary of the Falklands War. It provides the best account of the Battle for Two Sisters I have read anywhere.

This is not surprising as it is the author's eyewitness description of his rifle company in action in the crucial break in battle designed to seize those rocky twin summits astride the route to Stanley. The details of the night action and the determination and skill at arms of the young marines under his command, fighting their way up into enemy trenches with "butt, boot and bayonet", are vividly described. The stress of stumbling across rock runs in fighting order while carrying Milan missiles to the start line, the grinding hours of attrition battle in darkness, the uncertainty, the exhilaration and the exhaustion are all here vividly told in clear soldierly prose.

The Yompers perfectly complements

and expands on the panoramic *The Battle for the Falklands* by journalists Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, first published in 1983. They dealt with 45 Commando's seizure of Two Sisters in three pages. Ian Gardiner devotes a 37 page chapter to it and it is the climax of the book.

But this book is far more than just an account of that night action. It is also a fine addition to the Falkland's literature on many other levels. Though written 30 years after the events it describes, it is fresh and detailed and funny and thought provoking in equal measure. The late Professor Richard Holmes, the doyen of modern military historians, wrote of Ian Gardiner's previous book, *In the Service of the Sultan*, his account of his service in the Dhofar Campaign, that it was 'one of the best books about soldiering I have ever read'. This high praise from one of our greatest military historians, the author of *Firing Line*, no less, is equally applicable to *The Yompers*, and had he lived another year I am sure Richard Holmes would have given this book the same accolade.

In the opening chapters the political context from which the conflict erupted is properly dealt with. Due acknowledgement is given to the First Sea Lord, Sir Henry Leach, who gave Mrs Thatcher and her dismayed war cabinet rational grounds for hope that a naval task force could reverse the invasion. Equally, responsibility for the failure of deterrence which caused the invasion is obliquely laid where it deserves to be. Without naming him, prime responsibility is placed on the vacillating shoulders of the ignorant and strategically illiterate Secretary of Defence, Sir John Nott. He confessed years later that in 1982 he hardly knew where the Falklands were, far less what Britain needed to retain in its order of battle in order to defend them from Argentina. His offer to resign should have been accepted by his embattled Prime Minister.

Gardiner makes the point that by 1982 the UK defence establishment's priorities had become NATO and central front centric to the exclusion of any remaining capability in the "Rest of the World." The Royal Navy was being confined to a limited ASW Atlantic role under command from the USN in Norfolk, VA. My recollection is that there was a serious proposal to make the RN an all-submarine force and scrap all the frigates. The two Fleet Carriers, *Eagle* and *Ark Royal* were both gone by 1978. Out of Area and amphibious operations, and the ships and expertise to sustain them, had been slated for disbandment by Whitehall, with far too little resistance from the UK service chiefs.

Gardiner makes the point explicitly that if Galtieri had waited just 12 more months there could have been no platforms from which to mount a task force to recover South Georgia or the imprisoned Falklands islanders. The new carrier *Invincible* would have been flagship of the RAN; *Fearless* and *Intrepid*, the Royal Marines' landing ships, decommissioned and awaiting disposal, and *Hermes* up for sale. Even the new Royal Fleet Auxiliary, *Stromness*, that took Gardiner's 45 Commando to the war was due to be sold to the USN. Gardiner also reveals from research he later did within Whitehall what has been long suspected - that without the Falklands War the Royal Marines would not have survived the mid 1980's planned defence "rationalisations."

Considering the role that 'Royal' has played in every operation since the Falklands, and is still undertaking in Afghanistan, it can be said that not the least important outcome of Galtieri's folly was that this corps of supremely versatile troops was not disbanded by insouciant Whitehall mandarins with no understanding or what they were throwing away. Gardiner draws a very clear line between the British determination to honour their commitments to the Islanders and the subsequent increase in respect and restraint demonstrated by the Soviets. Clearly the British were still capable of responding with force when necessary. This needed to be factored into all Soviet risk calculations relating to the Cold War which in the early 1980's was in a particularly frigid period.

I was briefly an Education officer with 40 Commando in Plymouth in late 1982 and helped to resettle into civilian life Royal Marines who had been too seriously damaged in the Falklands for continued service as commandos. These included amputees. I also saw the tired marines of 45 Commando on their way home from Norway to Scotland board *Hermes* in 1983, fresh from three months in snow caves and bivvies. I went on exercises led by Royal Marines. This book smells to me of wet webbing and saturated sleeping bags, hexamine cooking tablets, old liniment, gunmetal and sweat. It feels like those interminable waits in companionways and

flats lit by red light before leaving a ship in the pre-dawn cold grey light. It feels like cramped movement in wallowing landing craft. It brings back my memories of trying to sleep in two man bivvies laid on cold rock interspersed with patches of Dartmoor bog. I was not in danger of sudden air attack – just cold and wet. Ian Gardiner's describes the exhausting business of, carrying overweight packs and weapons and ammunition and yomping on cold, wet, often blistered feet. Gardiner knows what it was like to be below the roaring forties, with an Antarctic winter approaching, and carrying responsibility for 120 men's health, morale and lives as battle approaches. In war there is no ENDEX to wait for. The war finishes when it is won. That is the stress of command and not surprisingly the details of Gardiner's mental landscape are well imprinted on his memory. Some of the best passages in this book describe these deeper and most secret thoughts which passed through his mind as the scale of what was being asked of him and of his marines became evident.

When eventually the Globe and Laurel green berets yomped into Stanley in June 1982 there was a well-witnessed brief encounter between a Royal Marine Warrant Officer and an Argentinean Major. It took place at the surrender of weapons on the bleak airfield where many Argentine conscripts had been semi-starving without their officers present to care or share their privations. Though it is not in this book this short conversation is a key to understanding the difference between the defenders and the attackers. It explains more than any other single factor why the Argentine Army lost the land battle and the British won. The well nourished, freshly shaved, sleek major, who had commandeered a house in Stanley, mistook a mud covered Warrant Officer for a commissioned officer. He said to him in good English, pointing to his


miserable, half starved, dishevelled troops: "Well of course you won. Look at your fine soldiers and look at the rubbish that my country gave me to fight you with!" To which the Warrant Officer replied: "Excuse me Sir, it isn't a question of the quality of your men; it is a question of the quality of your officers. Look at yourself and look at my officer!" He pointed with pride to a young RM officer who was, like his marines, covered in grime after a month in the field. His insignia of rank had been overlain with mud. His eyes were red from sleepless weeks. The only thing that distinguished him from the men he led was that he was the one carrying a map case.

Brigadier Ian Gardiner is retired and now lectures in leadership. He writes about the subject very well. He must have a fund of material to draw on from those months of Operation Corporate. Training, trust, personal leadership through example at every level, professionalism and sheer determination were what won the campaign. No wonder Mrs Thatcher famously stood outside 10 Downing Street and told the nation to thank God and the Royal Marines!

This is a book about what it is like to be at the spear point of a maritime and amphibious campaign, far from home and support bases with winter approaching and a logistics chain stretched beyond all expectations. It is all about making the most of what you have, rather than dwelling on what you lack. Amphibious operations and supporting troops from the sea is a subject which the ADF re-taught itself, briefly, in 1999 on the unopposed beaches of East Timor and in later operations to clear Indonesian-backed militias. With the arrival of the new Canberra class LHDs and the withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Australian Army and RAN's main game from 2014 on will be amphibious

operations and maritime logistics.

There will need to be a real emphasis on getting back to basics with lessons learned from amphibious doctrine and military history. The Australian Command and Staff Course will need to teach the fundamentals and the theory to a generation of officers who are going to need to become adept at planning and commanding amphibious exercises and operations. When they put the theory textbooks down the ACSC course members would do well to pick up *The Yompers*. It would be every bit as illuminating as the doctrine and a damn sight more entertaining. It is highly recommended to all who care to learn from experience by listening to the voice of one who was at the sharp end and has reflected throughout his military career on what his experiences meant, then and now, personally and professionally. ✎



GERMAN CAPITAL SHIPS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR: THE ULTIMATE PHOTOGRAPH ALBUM

By Siegfried Breyer and Miroslaw Skwiot
 Seaforth Publishing / Pen and Sword Books Ltd
 ISBN 978 1 84832 143 4
 432 Pages. Hardback

Reviewed by LCDR Desmond Woods

The great German capital ships of World War II met their fates alone but their destruction was every bit as Wagnerian as that of the collective sinking of the High Seas Battle Fleet after the Great War. The Kaiser's ships went to a simultaneous watery grave in Scapa Flow in a Gotterdammerung that was shared by them all and meticulously planned by their officers. That twilight of the Gods took only steel and pride, not sailors, to the bottom. The fate of Germany's next fleet of capital ships was to be destroyed one by one, three in surface battle, and the

Book Reviews

rest sunk alongside, or at anchor, by modern airpower.

The ships were designed for an era which ceased to exist almost as soon as the war at sea started in 1939. Like the sirens of the silent era silver screen the glamour and the tragedy of their brief lives in the spotlight are inseparable. Like *HMS Hood* they were destroyed because they were outclassed by better, newer, technology. They were made in turn made obsolete by the evolving ability of the RN and the RAF to reach out and strike them from above and below the surface, as well as in the traditional naval surface gunnery duel.

These ships collectively absorbed vast amounts of German treasure to build, maintain and repair. Much was expected of them by those who never understood the limits of German sea power and Germany's unhelpful geography. They underperformed in the war at sea and disappointed and finally enraged Hitler. They were eventually, like most battleships by the end of the war, reduced to shore bombardment and fire support missions for troops. Helping beleaguered troops resist the Russian advance in the Baltic was their last useful role. In 1944 in an irrational fury Hitler ordered the surviving capital ships to be decommissioned. Though this order was reversed it is apparent that he understood that they had brought to his war effort nothing much apart from expense and humiliation.

This new book, published in the UK by Seaforth, and written by a Polish and a German, both naval historians of note, is a monumental photographic essay with over 100 new photographs illustrating the evolving story of each of the seven ships. The photographs run from birth to death and are accompanied by a precise illustrated explanation of what happened to each ship during the course of its brief career. The ships are *Deutschland*, later renamed *Lutzo*; *Admiral Scheer*;

Admiral Graf Spee, *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, *Bismarck* and *Tirpitz*. The Hipper Class heavy cruisers are not covered in the book but interestingly the never commissioned aircraft carrier *Graf Zeppelin* receives an extensive appendix. The pre-dreadnoughts that were not at Scapa and survived the allied edicts from Versailles to become the elderly German fleet of the 1920's are also pictured. Ironically one of these survived all her younger, bigger sisters into the 1950s, in Soviet hands.

These hundreds of photographs, most published for the first time, have been taken from previously unavailable naval archives. They are the reason why the book is a pleasure to own. The sheer quality of the black and white images remind the reader that it was partly the superb Zeiss lenses that Germany ground that gave her gunnery officers such a decisive advantage over their RN opponents when it came to optical range finding, in both world wars.

The photographs of these seven ships show the combination of hawkish elegance and raw power of the designs that German naval architects perfected in the interwar period. These were beautiful vessels and despite their employment as instruments of Nazi oppression and terror their images remain wickedly magnificent. All were laid down within seven years of each other and they clearly come from the same understanding that form and function are the same whether on the smaller scale of the pocket battleships, the *Panzerschiffs*, *Graf Spee* and *Scheer*, or on the enormous scale of *Bismarck* and *Tirpitz*. These ships were the final expression of Germany's marine engineers' capacity to innovate and improve on what other nations had built. These vessels were the BMWs of the deep, in the late 1930's. Because they had no German successor ships they remain icons of the modern era.

Their appearance does not date in the way that the passenger liners of the interwar era have done. These German capital ships were without issue and therefore remain incomparable.

The photographs include not only the German 'official portraits' of ships under way and firing their main armament, but also the pictures taken aboard of sailors and officers at work. Here also are the wartime shots taken of the ships by low-flying reconnaissance aircraft. There is one, taken by a Spitfire pilot, of *Tirpitz* in her Norwegian lair, which is so clear and detailed, taken from such low level, that one has to assume that the pilot was very bold but may not have survived to become very old!

Here are the well known photos of *Graf Spee*'s self-immolation at sunset, outside Montivedeo. It was after the Battle of the River Plate in December 1939 that Hitler ordered her Captain, Hans Langsdorff, to destroy his trapped ship rather than fight it out with what Berlin was tricked into believing were overwhelming odds waiting for him. Hitler then decided to change *Deutschland*'s name to *Lutzw*. The loss of face inherent in a ship named after the 'Fatherland' also being sunk was too embarrassing for the Fuhrer to contemplate with equanimity! It was one of his many interferences in naval matters he did not understand. This interference in the operational deployment of the Kriegsmarine by a strategic ignoramus made a difficult situation impossible. Grand Admiral Raeder was deprived of the strategic flexibility he needed to use his ships as a potent fleet rather than singly or in pairs.

Whatever else one may say about these warships none of them was lucky for very long. *Graf Spee*'s likely position off South America was correctly guessed by Commodore Henry Harwood who brought her to bay with three cruisers prepared to take on her lethal 11 inch guns. They raced at her like terriers attacking a wild boar and dividing her fire. Three ships were one too many for twin turrets to keep under attack simultaneously.

Bismarck, after destroying *Hood* and giving the Home Fleet the slip, was nearly free and clear when Admiral Lutjens unnecessarily signalled Berlin and gave away her position. Even so she should have been on a home run to Brest and waiting air cover when it was her terrible ill fortune to have her rudder struck by a Fleet Air Arm torpedo which jammed it so that she could only make circles in the Atlantic and await her doom. That a slow semi-obsescent Swordfish biplane should have been her death dealer is one of the more improbable truths in all naval history.

Scharnhorst was considered by her crew to be a lucky ship. Her impressive speed, which in February 1942, had taken her with her sister *Gneisenau* and *Prinz Eugen* on their successful Channel Dash could not save her when her luck


ran out on 25th December 1943. She was convoy hunting off North Cape and believed that the endless Arctic night would keep her safe from prying lookouts. But British 'state of the art' radar directed gunnery from *HMS Duke of York* penetrated the darkness and turned her Christmas into a pagan Walpurgisnacht, with the ship as the bonfire. With her own radar shot away early in the battle she was striking our like a blind heavyweight and taking terrible hits to which she had no answer. Her 'witches sabbath' ended in fire and icy death for her 1900 sailors when 11 torpedoes found their mark and her exploding forward magazine blew her bow off.

It was *Tirpitz's* misfortune that Hitler insisted that she remain available for Arctic convoy attack in northern Norway where she was able to be attacked by Fleet Air Arm torpedo bombers, X-craft midget submarines and finally RAF Lancasters with massive 'Tall Boy' bombs. She never had a chance to show what she could do, but the mistaken belief that she was at sea caused the tragedy of PQ17, when the Admiralty scattered an Arctic convoy, 23 ships of which were then destroyed by U-Boats and the Luftwaffe. A bloodless victory caused by a "fleet in being" consisting of just one ship. It was not until *Tirpitz's* monstrous potential was finally eliminated in 1944 that the RN could safely move a main carrier battle fleet into the Pacific.

All of these events and many more are superbly illustrated in this beautifully detailed book. One does not have to be a naval model maker to appreciate these photographs and plans, though no doubt they would be of great use to such craftsman. The importance of this collection is self-evident. It exists in the fact that other than the wreckage of those on the bottom of the Baltic, the Arctic and

the Atlantic oceans, these rediscovered images are all that preserves the memory of these German battleships into posterity,

These powerful ships were in their time, rightly feared and grudgingly admired by those that fought the regime that they armed and guarded. This book is highly recommended for those who wish to admire seven of the most magnificent warships built anywhere in the twentieth century. We will certainly never see their like again. 🚢



THE END OF GLORY: WAR AND PEACE IN HMS HOOD 1916-1941

By Bruce Taylor
Seaforth Publishing £19.99
Hardback. 256 pages including index, sources and 49 photographs

Reviewed by Commander David Hobbs MBE RN (Rtd)

HMS Hood was the symbol of British sea power in the period between the two world wars. She was as well known in Australia as she was in the rest of the British Empire and, during her world cruise with the Special Service Squadron in 1923/24, Joey the wallaby joined the ship as her new mascot in Fremantle; 486,000 visitors

queued to see the ship in Melbourne and over half a million Australians lined Sydney Harbour to see her arrive there on 9 April 1924. Her loss on Empire Day 1941 had a devastating effect on allied morale.

Bruce Taylor wrote an earlier book about this ship, *The Battlecruiser HMS Hood: An Illustrated Biography 1916-1941* which included a considerable amount of technical detail as well as insight into the men who manned her and details of her operational service. When I received my review copy of *End of Glory* I wondered if it might prove merely to be an abridged version of the earlier work but my concerns were entirely unfounded. Technical descriptions of the ship have been omitted in order to focus on the people that made the ship what she was and this approach adds a significant new dimension to the earlier work. Taylor says in his preface that his aim is "to reaffirm the centrality of the human experience in naval life and naval history" and he succeeds rather well in doing so.

The author has drawn his material from official documents, biographies, verbal accounts and contemporary letters written by more than 150 men who served in *Hood*. The result is a remarkable and very readable book which traces the ship's history from her first commission to her loss. Her availability at sea in support of British foreign policy was considered so important throughout the late 1930s that time could not be found to modernise her and by May 1941 she was an old ship carrying a number of defects that limited her operational capability. The descriptions of her wet, over-crowded mess-decks and the grime accumulated in her relentless war service are quite striking as is the story of a tiny artificer who was retained on board because he was just able to crawl into the condensers to effect repairs in 1940. He wore only bathing trunks to reduce bulk and was sustained for hours on end with sherry and hot drinks while working by his larger mates.


The human dimension tells the *Hood's* story more effectively than a more conventional history and allows the reader to relate closely with the changing conditions in which successive ship's companies found themselves. The accounts of her three survivors are woven together with accounts by others who left the ship on draft only hours before she sailed on her last, fatal, voyage and the known facts to draw a vivid picture of the last minutes of the ship's life. If ever a ship died in action, the *Hood* did, transformed from the largest warship in the Royal Navy firing salvoes at the *Bismarck* into a shattered, sinking wreck in seconds after her magazines exploded.

Four days after her loss, *The Times* published a letter from Admiral of the Fleet Lord Chatfield, First Sea Lord between 1933 and 1938 which remains the most cogent statement

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ever made on the subject of her loss. In it he said that “the *Hood* was destroyed because she had to fight a ship that was 22 years more modern than herself. This was not the fault of the British seamen. It was the direct responsibility of those who opposed the re-building of the British battle fleet until 1937, two years before the second great war started. It is fair to her gallant crew that this should be written”.

This is a remarkable work that complements Bruce Taylor’s earlier work on HMS *Hood* and gives insight into the lives, hopes and aspirations of those who served in her. I can honestly say that there were large passages that I could not put down and have no hesitation in recommending this book strongly to anyone with an interest in naval history in general and a remarkable ship in particular. 🚢



FIGHTING FLOTILLA: RN LAFOREY CLASS DESTROYERS IN WORLD WAR II

(Barnsley, Yorks: Pen and Sword, 2010)
By Peter C Smith

Reviewed by Professor Geoffrey Till


The latest in the author’s prodigious achievement in producing nearly 60 books about the naval side of World

War II, *Fighting Flotilla: RN Laforey Class Destroyers in World War II*, is typical in its focus on the technical and tactical minutiae of surface and air weapons systems.

By far the most interesting chapters are oddly enough not the accounts of the wartime careers of the eight Laforey class destroyers he investigates but the two chapters on the pre and early war debates about design of the ships.

In this, we see a gradual shift in focus away from conventional surface-ship engagement – which seemed to many to call for bigger ships and guns but more expense and so lower numbers – and towards more stress on the need to deal with aircraft and submarines. In the end, as Peter Smith shows in his ‘operational’ chapters, the design worked and the *Laforeys* became one of the RN’s most successful class of destroyer, but the fact that so few of them survived the war shows just how challenging were the circumstances they faced.

There are inevitably a few slips in the book: Admiral Tom Phillip’s name is spelled incorrectly and the Italian tanker *Tanaro* is sunk twice in two pages and given very different displacements; the ship drawings are very hard to make out and the tone sometimes is a bit ‘Boy’s Ownish’ but overall it remains an interesting and enjoyable read, well up to the standards of what has become a veritable library of this author’s work. 🚢



BIG GUN MONITORS: DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION & OPERATIONS 1914-1945

By Ian Buxton

Seaforth Publishing 2012; paperback, 245 pages;
numerous b/w photos, drawings and diagrams.
GBP £19.99

ISBN978-1-84832-124-3

Reviewed by Commander David Hobbs, MBE RN (Rtd)

Over the past century a number of warship types have been used to project power from the sea and influence operations on land. Aircraft carriers, missile firing submarines, big-gun battleships, cruisers and even destroyers have all achieved success in varying degrees, although land attack was not considered to be their primary role when they were built. The USN is procuring two expensive DDG-1000 ‘ZUMWALT’ class multi-mission destroyers with an emphasis on land attack which are to be fitted with two new 155mm guns and tactical Tomahawk missiles. A major reason for fitting 127mm guns in the RAN’s current ANZAC class is to give gunfire support to amphibious forces in the early stages of their deployment ashore, although there are concerns about their slow rate of fire. They also give the capability to fire a ‘warning shot’ in low-intensity conflict. The subject of ships designed to deliver land-attack from the sea is, therefore, of very real and contemporary interest, giving background to a current requirement that has tended not to be given the degree of importance it deserves.

In the first half of the twentieth century the Royal Navy built and operated specialised gun-equipped, land-attack warships; it was the only navy to do so. They were designed to be cheap, quickly built, almost disposable warships that made use of ‘spare’ weapons from other projects and were manned, largely, by ‘hostilities-only’ men serving in the naval reserves. These ships were known in service as ‘monitors’ and this book tells their fascinating story in well-written

detail. Ian Buxton's first work about these unusual warships was published in 1978 with a second revised and expanded edition published in 2008. My review copy came from the third, paperback, edition published in 2012. The RN built 40 monitors in World War I and a further two in World War II; the last of the type, *HMS Roberts*, went to the scrap yard in 1965.

Buxton explains the monitor's origins in the amphibious projects planned by Admiral Fisher and Winston Churchill at the Admiralty in 1914 and gives details of the existing weapons that were incorporated into the design. *Marshal Ney* and *Marshal Soult* were given 15-inch guns and turrets that became available when the orders for *Repulse* and *Renown* were changed from battleships to battlecruisers with three, rather than four turrets. The turret from *Marshal Soult* was eventually removed and fitted into *Roberts* at the beginning of World War II. Her sister-ship *Abercrombie* had a 'spare' 15-inch turret that had been built as 'insurance' in case the 18-inch guns in *Furious* proved to be a failure and which had been stored in Chatham Dockyard for 24 years. *Furious*' 18-inch guns were removed when she was converted into an aircraft carrier and used to equip the monitors *Lord Clive* and *General Wolfe*. They were mounted to fire on the beam with only ten degrees' training and were the longest ranging guns used by any navy in World War I.

The book includes sections on every class, including those requisitioned from Norway and Brazil, every type of gun used including the American 14-inch and the British 18, 15, 9.2, 6 and 4-inch. There are comprehensive histories of every ship and drawings of internal arrangements together with a large number of black and white photographs showing ships under construction, being launched, in action,


and even of the last monitor being scrapped at Inverkeithing.

Buxton's descriptions of the ships, weapons and operations are painstakingly well-researched and incisive but he goes further and analyses their effectiveness as part of the whole war-fighting machine. He notes that these ships played a significant role in both world wars but in the first their manning, construction and shore-based support amounted to only 1.6% of the total RN expenditure. In the second, with fewer ships, their construction and use amounted to only 0.35% of total RN expenditure.

This is a first class book that has a wider canvas than one might think. Monitors fired far more rounds at greater ranges than more conventional warships fitted with the same weapons; thus they contributed in no small measure to the development of gunnery techniques and the technology that kept the weapons serviceable. Monitors were able to remain off the coasts on which allied troops had been landed for extended periods and support them as long as their ammunition lasted, often providing a practical balance with the short-duration close air support missions of land-based aircraft from remote bases.

With the greater focus on amphibious operations that will follow the introduction of the *Canberra* class LHDs, persistent land attack is a very topical subject for the RAN and this new edition brings the work into a lower price range that will appeal to a number of new readers who will wish to understand the historical background. As long as it has no embarked close air support aircraft of its own, land attack from the sea is one of a number of capabilities the ADF will have to demonstrate expertise in the years ahead and, if nothing else, this work will stimulate ideas and discussion. In summary it is an

affordable edition of a classic book which should form part of every naval collection and is highly recommended. It is not only a fascinating read in its own right but will, hopefully, stimulate discussion on how best to achieve similar effects in future. ✴



DESCENT INTO DARKNESS: PEARL HARBOR 1941, A NAVY DIVER'S MEMOIR

By Commander Edward C Raymer USN (Rtd)

Naval Institute Press, US\$18.95

Paperback, 240 pp, 21 photographs, eBook available

Reviewed by Commander David Hobbs MBE RN (Rtd)

My only experience of diving was a demonstration beach survey during an amphibious training exercise in the Persian Gulf when I was serving in a tank landing craft for a short time as a Midshipman. The experience was enough to convince me that I was not cut out to be a diver and I can only applaud the raw courage of the author and his team who entered the total darkness inside the hulls of sunken battleships at Pearl Harbor. They had been on the west coast of the United States on 7 December 1941 but were flown through the night in a Catalina to join the search for survivors in the stricken hulls. Once this task was completed, the author and his team removed anti-aircraft guns from *Nevada* and other ships before helping to prepare the hulls that could be salvaged for raising.

Author Raymer was the senior sailor in the group that worked inside the *West Virginia*, *Nevada* and *California* to block holes and make the hulls watertight so that they could be raised and moved into dry dock for reconstruction. His

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
only break from this work in two and a half years was a spell in the salvage vessel *Seminole* which was sunk in action off Guadalcanal!

This is a frank, honest story which gives insight into a very different aspect of the attack on Pearl Harbor. There was no instruction manual, no-one had ever raised a sunken battleship before, and the divers, dressed in cumbersome hard hats and lead boots and attached to the surface by a lifeline, air hose and telephone cable, had to make their way hundreds of feet into dark hulls. They were guided by their sense of touch, and aided by advice from divers' mates on the surface who had blue-prints for the ship in question. They had to be prepared for falling objects such as damaged fan trunking, floating bodies, loose ammunition including unexploded Japanese bombs and, potentially, sharks. If his lines became entangled there was little hope for the diver, and a second diver was always ready to go to his aid but there were casualties. Many of the dives were on the *Arizona* and it was not clear at first that she could not be raised.

In order to work in such appalling conditions over a protracted period the author and his team inevitably adopted an element of 'black' humour that kept them going but the respect in which they held their dead comrades and especially the bodies that could not be removed from the wrecks is evident throughout the book. The failed attempt to remove bodies from the *Arizona* is told with dignity and shows Raymer to be a thoughtful and diligent professional sailor. He was selected to show a number of VIPs including Eleanor Roosevelt and press representatives around ships that had been raised and it is not surprising to learn that he subsequently gained a commission. His description of some events is moving.

Descent into Darkness was first

published in 1996 and was Raymer's only book. He died in 1997 and the Naval Institute Press is to be congratulated for re-issuing it for a new generation. It offers unique insight into a neglected aspect of events at Pearl Harbor, seen through the eyes of an enlisted sailor. Apart from the big picture it also offers a pen portrait of a contemporary sailor's life and outlook in the USN. I thoroughly recommend it. 🦋



HISTORICAL DREADNOUGHTS: ARTHUR MARDER, STEPHEN ROSKILL AND BATTLES FOR NAVAL HISTORY

By Barry Gough

Seaforth Publishing: <http://www.seaforthpublishing.com/>

Reviewed by Dr Tim Coyle

This book is a study of the two titans of Royal Navy history (the 'Historical Dreadnoughts') Arthur Marder (1910–1980) and Stephen Roskill (1902–1982). It links the high drama of the researching and writing of British naval history with the feud which developed between the two historians and as

such it is both a history of the main characters' works and a study in 'history wars'. The feud occurred during the 1960s and early 70s when the writing of British naval history had a wide institutional interest as many of the participants from the two world wars were active commentators. Readers familiar with the two historians' main works – Marder's five volume *From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow* and Roskill's three volume *The War at Sea 1939–1945* – will probably derive the most benefit from *Historical Dreadnoughts* as the book provides an intimate study of Marder's and Roskill's characters, life and works. The author, Barry Gough, is a Canadian historian whose works include many maritime-related themes, and he masterfully investigates and analyses the professional and academic tensions which resulted in the publication of Marder's and Roskill's works, and the unfortunate feud which subsequently developed between them.

Arthur Marder's early background was an unlikely one for the reputation he subsequently acquired as a historian of late 19th and early 20th century British naval history. Born into a Jewish emigrant family in Boston, his father's payday book gifts to his son engendered a passion for history. Entering Harvard College in 1927, his discovery of British naval history had the flavour of destiny. As told by Marder, in a downstairs rush to keep an appointment in May 1930 he collided with one of his professors. After the initial apologies, a discussion on Marder's academic interests ensued. The professor – William Langer – thought Marder's proposed study of the influence of German generals on pre-war (pre-1914) German foreign policy was 'too diffuse and difficult a subject for a 50–100 page undergraduate thesis.' He suggested instead that Marder write his thesis on the 1912 Haldane Mission to Berlin – in which attempts were made to control the naval armaments race between Britain and Germany – as the relevant British Foreign Office documents had recently been released. Marder took this advice and: 'By that autumn I had found my mission – to study the Royal Navy in all its ramifications from the pre-dreadnought era (the quarter century prior to 1905) through the First World War and its immediate aftermath.'

Marder's initial work *The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era, 1880–1905* – published in 1940 – was a great success, not the least because an American historian, using his novel status and personal charm (as Marder glibly states), gained access to previously unavailable official documents of the era. This access, having been denied resident British academics, raised some ire in those circles. Marder capitalised on these qualities in his future research through befriending Admiralty archivists and retired senior RN

officers alike to achieve his life's aim to chronicle the RN's history to 1919 and beyond.

In the mid-1930s, while Marder was setting out on his lifelong fascination with the Royal Navy, Stephen Roskill was a part of it as a gunnery specialist. Born into a barrister's family, he became imbued with the ethos of empire through his early schooling and his headmaster's enthusiasm for imperial and naval aggrandisements. It was as a cadet at the Royal Naval College, Osborne, where he first met a whiff of anti-Semitism because of his Jewish connections on his father's side. A senior master's remark – within earshot of his fellow cadets – that he did not like Roskill '...because he is a Jew boy' was Roskill's '... first, though not my last taste of the anti-Semitism which was so marked a feature of the British upper class...' Roskill and Marder both experienced such discrimination: the latter found some academic posts closed to him in his early career because of his Jewish origins. If anything, these taunts buttressed Roskill's strength of purpose as he progressed through various gunnery-related appointments in the 1930s.

His sound academic record at Dartmouth – in the face of an 'extraordinarily ill-conceived' training regimen – provided the foundation for his strong interest in history and strategic analysis. Appointed to cruisers in the Far East, he was able to study the increasing influence and strength of the Imperial Japanese Navy. His gunnery training and appointments to important fleet units – instructor at Whale Island gunnery school and gunnery officer in four battleships – were indicative of a highly motivated officer with a brilliant future. However, his strong and upright views were tested when – as gunnery officer of the battleship *HMS*

Warspite – he refused to sign off work done in his department during the ship's extensive upgrade. This resulted in furious rows between the Roskill and the dockyard. Subsequent morale and work-up problems in the ship saw Roskill appointed as *Warspite's* first lieutenant as well as gunnery officer, which did much to resolve these issues, and his promotion to commander.

Roskill's next appointment was to the Admiralty where his reputation for irascibility followed him. There he 'again made himself unpopular by insisting on the Admiralty buying Swiss Oerlikon 20 mm guns in preference to the inferior British design, by opposing Professor Frederick Lindemann's pet idea of replacing anti-aircraft guns with rockets, and later by demanding that each big gun turret in a battleship should have its own fire-control radar.' As an indication of the Admiralty's obtuse assessment of Roskill, his next appointment, in September 1941, was to the Royal New Zealand Navy's cruiser *HMNZS Leander*, which Roskill regarded as a career-inhibiting move: 'The Admiralty constantly appointed officers who had blotted their copybooks or had proved "difficult" to distant stations – to get them out of the way; and I certainly did make some enemies on staff...' Finding *Leander* in a poor material and morale state (the captain was a similar exile), Roskill worked the ship up to a high state of efficiency, so that when *Leander* was torpedoed in the Battle of Kolombangara in the Guadalcanal 'slot', it was the high standard of damage control – instilled by Roskill – that saved the ship and resulted in the award to him of a Distinguished Service Cross. Appointed acting captain, Roskill took *Leander* to Boston for repair and then joined the RN's Washington mission in May 1944 as head of 'administration and weapons'.

Roskill's Washington years saw many disputes with the US Navy over the supply of lend-lease equipment to the RN; however he enjoyed good relations with ordnance and experimental agencies which led to his last appointment as senior observer of the British delegation to the Bikini Atoll atomic tests. The RN recognised his expertise in this new field; however, he was deteriorating physically due to war injuries and deafness attributed to his exposure to years of heavy caliber gun firings. With no prospect of further command at sea to qualify him for promotion, he discharged from the navy in 1949. However, his reputation as the 'atomic secrets man', his knowledge of ordnance, experiences of working with the US and his forceful writing style were remembered by some at the Admiralty, who judged him to be the man to write the official history of the war at sea.

Marder's war service was rather opaque. He drifted in and out of intelligence assessment roles with government agencies, learnt Japanese for six months and – in 1943 – attempted to join the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve Special Branch (Intelligence). In this he was unsuccessful, partly because of some health deficiencies, but in reality the door was closed as the RN stated that there were no vacancies in this category. A similar approach to the Royal Canadian Navy was also rebuffed. This must have been a great disappointment to Marder as, by now, he was firmly 'wedded' to the RN through his historical research.

By April 1944 Marder was ensconced in an associate professorship at the University of Hawaii. Details of the background for this appointment are not given and the author supposes that it may have been related to intelligence work for which the post may have been a cover. Nonetheless, Marder remained at the University of Hawaii until 1964, teaching European history while continuing his RN research with annual visits to Britain.

Marder's first postwar visit to Britain in 1946 confirmed the Admiralty's closed door policy for access to its records for Marder's dream of writing the RN's history from the commissioning of the Dreadnought to the First World War. Over the next 15 years he used his persuasive powers to gain access to the diaries of Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, a naval thinker, strategist and '*bete noir*' to the RN establishment of the World War I era and its retired officer community. Meeting Richmond shortly before his death, Marder negotiated access to Richmond's 1909-1920 diaries which criticised the RN's organisation, training, strategy and war-fighting capabilities during the war. The publishing in 1952 of the diaries as *Portrait of an Admiral: The Life and Papers of Sir Herbert Richmond* unleashed a storm of criticism in the literary review columns to which Marder

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robustly responded. The author provides an incisive commentary on these exchanges, showing the depth of establishment feeling so long after the events, the resentment of Marder as an outsider, and Marder's sensitivity to these reactions. He also comments on the more ready acceptance of Richmond's views by a later generation of historians. Marder's next work, the three volume *Fear God and Dread Nought: The Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone* – published 1952–1959 – was overwhelmingly well-received and by now, Marder's reputation had been fully established and he was ready to embark on his major work, if only he could access the Admiralty records.

Marder hit the 'mother lode' (as he termed it) of Admiralty records in May 1955 when he was introduced to a RN admiral who was visiting Pearl Harbor. At the conclusion of an amicable meeting, the admiral – in parting – said to Marder: 'Let me know if there is anything I can do for you.' Marder takes up the story:

'(I regarded this as the usual sort of polite gesture, nothing more. But I had an inspiration..."Yes, Admiral there **is** something you can do for me!" "Why", he said when I had told him of my difficulties with the Whitehall bureaucracy, "you've come to the right man. I know the officer at Whitehall who usually has the last word in such matters. I'll see what I can do". Marder surmised that 'the officer' was the First Sea Lord and 12 months later he received approval for access to the Admiralty records covering World War I.

From here on *Historical Dreadnoughts* examines Marder's and Roskill's challenges and triumphs as they worked on *From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow* and *The War at Sea*. Despite both historians having access to the respective records, they found

difficulties in clearing their drafts through Admiralty and Colonial Office officials and the retired senior officer community. Winston Churchill was a particular major obstacle for Roskill to circumvent. The author provides a fine grain narrative and assessment of the challenges faced by the historians and it is this material which gives the reader of *Historical Dreadnoughts* an appreciation how the great events of RN wartime history were jealously guarded by the participants and government officials alike to preserve reputations and minimise controversies. This analysis provides a valuable background to serious readers of RN history which is not apparent in the published histories. The narrative also describes the great stresses the historians experienced in working at a frenetic pace which particularly affected Roskill's war injuries.

Both *From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow* and *The War at Sea* were great successes, securing both historians as giants in their field. However, the feud which ensued bemused some observers, distressed others and detrimentally affected both antagonists. The second half of *Historical Dreadnoughts* provides a detailed discussion of the feud and also various controversies which hovered over the major tragedies and losses of the RN during World War II.

With both of the historians' major works achieving a wide acclamation, Roskill began to suspect that Marder might extend his interests beyond 1918, the 'demarcation' between Marder's and Roskill's historical 'patches'. Marder did this in his last – the 5th – volume of *From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow*; 1918–1919: *Victory and Aftermath*. In 1969, Marder – as he routinely did – asked Roskill to review the draft. Marder had used references from the Secretary of the Committee for Imperial Defence

– Lieutenant Colonel Maurice Hankey's – diaries as to who was responsible for the 1917 decision to commence convoying of merchant ships in the face of the debilitating losses to U-boats. Controversy had raged over whether it was Prime Minister Lloyd George – in a peremptory visit to the Admiralty – or whether it was First Sea Lord Admiral Jellicoe. In Volume Four of *From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow*, Marder had referenced the Prime Minister's Admiralty meeting as 'Note by the Prime Minister of his Conference at the Admiralty, April 30th 1917, written by Hankey immediately after the conference.' At precisely the time that Roskill was reviewing Volume 5, he had been invited by Hankey's son to write his father's biography, which included exclusive access to Hankey's diaries. Roskill rounded on the Marder references, claiming that the diaries were closed and that: '...how you got at unpublished parts of his diary I don't know and I think it better not to ask...' From this the feud erupted with Marder responding robustly, with the whole affair degenerating into a hair-splitting thrust and counter-thrust. Readers will follow this narrative with possible dismay but perhaps with a realisation that 'celebrity' historians engaged in history wars can give a background behind their writings which is as valid in the understanding of the historical analysis process as the works themselves.

The respective involvements of Prime Minister Winston Churchill, First Sea Lord Admiral Dudley Pound, Lord Louis Mountbatten and others in their respective roles in the loss of the aircraft carrier *HMS Glorious* during the 1940 Norwegian campaign, the scattering of convoy PQ17 and the aftermath, the losses of HM ships *Repulse* and *Prince of Wales* in December 1941 provide the reader with a lively background to the historical writing and the battles that Roskill fought while writing *The War at Sea*.

The intricacies of the naval 'history wars' interleave with academic joustings, which in themselves provide an intimate picture of 1960s history faculties in US and UK universities. The reader of *Historical Dreadnoughts* will feel the presence of towering egos – not just between the historians Marder and Roskill, but will also share the presence of the great sea officers and politicians who fought the campaigns then fought the aftermath to preserve reputations.

Historical Dreadnoughts is a unique record of the recording of the two great maritime wars of the 20th century. The book is recommended to the reader who seeks a different light on the great actors and events of the wars at sea. 🌊



A STEADY HAND GOVERNOR HUNTER & HIS FIRST FLEET SKETCHBOOK

By Linda Groom

National Library of Australia 2012

ISBN 9780642277077

HARDBACK 229 Pages

<http://bookshop.nla.gov.au>

Reviewed by LCDR Desmond Woods

A Steady Hand is a truly beautiful book, a real collector's item. It is also a scholarly biography which has been very carefully researched. Most scholarly books are not beautiful and most beautiful books are not scholarly. This one is both.

Linda Groom was the Curator of Pictures at the National Library from 1998 till 2010. One of the treasures in her care was the personal sketchbook of Captain John Hunter, Captain of *HMS Sirius*, the Flagship of the First Fleet, and the second Governor of New South Wales. The sketchbook was bought at auction in 1953 by the bibliophile Sir Rex Nan Kivell and presented to the Library in 1959. It is reproduced here in glowing full-page

colour illustrations. These reveal Hunter as a careful draftsman and fine artist and a keen observer of the birds, fish, animals and plants that surrounded him in Sydney Cove and on Norfolk Island. Five of the birds he drew and painted are now extinct and his watercolours may be the best scientific evidence remaining as to their plumage.

His sketchbook survived its owner being castaway when *HMS Sirius* was wrecked on Norfolk Island's iron-bound coast. Hunter added to it during his period of five months of involuntary exile on the island. Ironically the birds that Hunter was sketching were being eaten into extinction by the ravenous convicts and his ship's company. Hunter, who never married, bequeathed the sketchbook to his sister's family. It is quite extraordinary that this rich visual journal should have survived intact and is now, being published nearly 200 years after Hunter died.

A Steady Hand would be worth owning for the portfolio of images from the sketchbook alone, but in addition it provides an excellent account of the long and adventurous life of this talented and self-trained naval officer. Like Cook he was an autodidact mathematician and

navigator. Like Cook he served with distinction as one of the RN's trusted operational cartographers on the American station. Cook charted the St Lawrence seaway during the Seven Years War and was rewarded with command of *Endeavour*. Hunter charted the Delaware River in 1777 for Admiral Howe during the War of Independence, but despite this signal service it took five more years for him to be commissioned as a Third Lieutenant in 1782. His obvious competence as a seaman and navigator, and the support of Lord Howe, made his rise to post captain swift thereafter.

In 1788 he was an obvious choice to command *Sirius* and to hold a dormant commission which authorised him to be the Governor of NSW in the event of Phillip's death or incapacity – a not unlikely event given the hazards they were all faced with. The safe navigation of the 11 ships of the First Fleet across the globe into Botany Bay was Hunter's responsibility. All ships arrived within hours of each other; a tribute to Hunter's skill at herding cats! The decision to explore northward from the dangerous and waterless Botany Bay in open boats, in the hope of finding a better anchorage and fresh water, was Phillip's to make, but it was Hunter who charted the magnificent new harbour, Port Jackson. Phillip stated without exaggeration that it could hold all the ships in England.

When the Admiralty's relief store ship, *HMS Guardian*, struck an iceberg on her way to Sydney and failed to arrive, food rationing was tightened yet again. Phillip realised that he was only months away from losing control of the convict settlement to a food riot, followed by probable mayhem and murder. His authority had been unable to prevent mass fornication when the fleet first landed. What hope would he have of quelling hungry men breaking down the doors of his flour store or tearing lids off the last salt beef barrels? Already the Royal Marines, charged with protecting the Government food store, were pilfering from it. He hanged two of them for this offence. A dramatic rescue from this prospect of a descent fuelled by hunger into a hellish Hobbesian anarchical 'state of nature' was urgent.

Comes the moment comes the man. It was Hunter that Phillip naturally turned to as the officer whose navigation, courage and steady hand could yet save the whole British experiment in Sydney from ignominious failure and the horror of mass starvation. In Spring of 1788 Hunter offloaded *Sirius*'s heavy guns and all other surplus gear to clear space for stores and headed out of Port Jackson to circumnavigate the world via the Southern Ocean. Not since Cook had first gone south looking for evidence of Terra Australis Incognita had any vessel ventured into these high and icy latitudes. Against Phillip's instructions Hunter wisely chose to go east to Cape Town, across the Pacific,

Book Reviews

under Cape Horn and across the South Atlantic. This southerly course shortened the distance sailed, but the risks were fearful. Hunter and his men endured the terrible cold of Antarctic waters in inadequate clothing. Drinking water kept on deck in butts froze solid, as did the running rigging and, most dangerously, the blocks and tackle by which the ship was manoeuvred. *Sirius* was leaking badly throughout the voyage and exhausted half frozen men needed to pump her out continually. Icebergs threatened to destroy the ship by holing or crushing her. Hunter had no choice but to sail through the hours of darkness. Time was critical. Most of the ship's company was stricken with scurvy as they sailed into Cape Town to pick up the salt meat, potatoes and flour Phillip needed so urgently.

As soon as he was loaded and his men fit for duty again Hunter continued this epic voyage. Adding to his burdens one of his watch officers had become insane and dangerous and needed to be restrained below decks. Bass Strait was as yet unknown and uncharted so *Sirius* was bound to sail south around Van Diemen's land to return to Sydney. In April 1789, without sun sights to check his longitude for three days, due to a raging gale, Hunter found himself embayed on a lee shore and fighting to keep from being blown ashore. He knew *Sirius* was carrying the hopes of survival, not only of his men, but of all those who depended on him getting his ship back to the closely rationed and hungry colony. At this perilous moment, in the teeth of a full gale, Hunter ordered more sail set to increase his power to drive *Sirius* westward out of the bay. It was his only hope, but it depended on the strength of old masts and worn frail canvas. At the height of the gale, looking up at the straining yards and drum hard

sails Hunter was heard to bellow, '*She must carry it or we are all lost !*' In the midst of this clamour and peril he calmly calculated the angle of course necessary to tack *Sirius* across the bay and just clear the entrance point. His trained seaman's eye was as perfect as his draftsman's hand and *Sirius*, sailing on a reach, clawed her way back out of the trap she was in, into the gale and clear water, beyond the headland.

Hunter's ship handling was without doubt the single most critical demonstration of sailing skill in the history of Australia. It was a feat of seamanship to match Cook's saving of *Endeavour* after she struck the Barrier Reef and just as significant for the future of British colonisation of this continent.

Hunter's pivotal role in the survival of the Sydney colony is scarcely known by the Australian public, or much recognised by historians. But it is self-evident that if *Sirius* had been dashed ashore in Van Diemen's land the consequences of that remote shipwreck in 1789 might still be known to all Australians. Had there been a failed first attempt to maintain a law abiding colony in Sydney Cove and at Parramatta would a second attempt have been made by Britain? If the authorities at Sydney Cove had been overwhelmed and murdered, and the last of the government food eaten by the strongest convicts, would London have reinforced failure and tried again to settle NSW with more criminals? Politically it might have been impossible in the face of the no doubt vitriolic criticism that would have flowed from the naysayers, who had always claimed that the idea of settling New Holland was a foolish extravagance and impractical due to the distance from Britain.

A Steady Hand reproduces Midshipman's George Raper's detailed ink and watercolour drawing of his

ship just weathering Tasman's head. This was not a later fanciful reconstruction of events but a seaman's eyewitness illustration and Raper shows just how finely his captain judged his sea room - and by inference how close Sydney came to starvation. When *Sirius* limped into Sydney Cove, leaking and storm damaged, Hunter brought the food to allow Phillip to hold on to his authority for another six months, which turned out to be long enough. The voyage's nutritional and therefore political significance was obvious to all, but no one, not even Phillip, fully understood the scale of Hunter's maritime accomplishment.

Hunter's later loss of *Sirius* on the shore of the harbourless Norfolk Island and his return to Britain are particularly well told in this book. Effectively Hunter took responsibility for the navigation of the *Waaksamheyd*, the ship in which he and the *Sirius*'s crew took passage home. He took the opportunity to chart and name many of the Solomon Islands and made a very significant contribution to the knowledge of the islands of the western Pacific, including that modern tourist magnet the Isles of Pines, in New Caledonia. Typically, despite the danger in which the ship was placed due to lack of accurate charts, Hunter not only mapped the Isle but did a delicate watercolour of it as well, to help future navigators recognise it, showing its forest of mast high pines. The ship's captain, Detmer Smith, was an incompetent who nearly caused all their deaths though his bungling of relationships with a well armed Malay native ruler and though lack of basic seamanship. It was Hunter who had the personal skills, both diplomatic and professional, to repeatedly save the situation.

On his return to London, and after being cleared by an Admiralty court martial of blame for the loss of *Sirius*, Hunter sought and was granted the Governorship of New South Wales. By now the Royal Marines had handed over their duties as prison warders to the New South Wales Corps which was officered by men on the make, who sought only their own advancement and profit. Hunter tried to work with the officers he was given and narrowly avoided the mutiny that befell Bligh, his successor, when he tried to curtail the corruption and profiteering that was ingrained in the corp's culture. Both Bligh and Hunter failed to check the avaricious profiteering of Captain John Macarthur and his fellow military gangsters. It was not until Governor Lachlan Macquarie brought his own Highland Regiment with him in 1810 that civil government would be firmly established. Hunter's time in Government House may not have been a success politically but he built five granaries, a hospital, a barracks, a church, a stone gaol, workshops, bridges and a clock tower. Most crucially he built two windmills to grind grain. During his governorship, in 1794, the colony

became self-sufficient in locally grown wheat and ground flour. Never again would a ship's captain be placed in the impossible situation that he and his men had so narrowly survived in order to resupply the colony with the staff of life.

Hunter loved exploration and went beyond the edge of his 1789 charts of Broken Bay up the beautiful Hawkesbury River. He discovered the colony's lost herd of cattle that was happily grazing, untended, on lush grasslands to the south of Botany Bay beside the Nepean River. The author's prose is delightful: *'A bull attacked the party, and they were obliged to shoot him in his tracks. Fortunately, there existed a younger bull with a dormant commission who took command of the herd and ensured its continuing safety.'*

Hunter was unjustly and without reasonable grounds dismissed from his office and recalled by the Duke of Portland, a man of singularly narrow understanding of the scale of difficulties that Hunter and all NSW governors faced so far from administrative and logistical support. Perhaps Hunter was fortunate to leave Sydney before the uncontrolled importation of spirits by the NSW Corps and the accusations of the half mad John Macarthur, brought about his complete ruin, as it was shortly to destroy Bligh's governorship.

Hunter was badly treated on his return from NSW. Portland would not see him and his entitlement to a pension was initially denied. He was reduced to living on a Captain's half pay, so he published a leaflet putting forward his explanation of the situation in which he found himself in NSW. Portland relented and claimed he had not agreed to the pension because he was planning to make Hunter Governor of Bermuda. That position did not eventuate but a pension of 300 pounds a year was

granted.

Hunter's last command *HMS Venerable* was lost through no fault of his during a gale in Torbay. He saved his ship's company by sending them off in boats. With waves covering the deck Hunter remained on board till midnight, imperturbable as seas swept the deck. One of his junior officers later wrote of him: *never in my life did I witness such disregard for death and danger. Not the least alteration took place in his look, words or manner, from the moment the ship struck, until at our joint and earnest importunity, after all the Crew were safe, he left the ship.* Hunter's steady hand and nerve were still in evidence in this grave extremity, his last trial by storm and shipwreck.

The Navy cleared Hunter of blame for the loss of *Venerable* and employed him ashore. He was promoted to Rear Admiral of the Blue in 1807 and finally promoted him to Vice Admiral of the Red in 1814. He had progressed from being the son of a ship's master in Leith through youthful shipwreck to being a captain's servant. He moved very slowly from the lower deck to the wardroom and from there, via war in the New World to Port Jackson. His greatest service to Australia took him north of the Antarctic and below Van Diemen's Land. He was both castaway and governor on Norfolk Island. His career took him through New South Wales Government House, where he was beset by venal officers and an uncomprehending colonial secretary, and finally to elevation to flag rank. This was a remarkable career in an age of brilliant naval officers serving at sea in the Nelsonic age of fighting sail.

Hunter remained a life long advocate for Australia and its future prosperity, and worked to release the new colony from being, *'a foreign public gaol.'* He introduced the platypus and the wombat to British

naturalists through their skins. He also caused to be delivered to Joseph Banks the first live emus ever to travel to Britain. They caused consternation at the Customs House we are told!

A Steady Hand is a very special publication which will become a treasured possession. Linda Groom and the National Library are to be congratulated on revealing to the reading public what an extraordinary man New South Wales' second governor was. Hunter made no attempt to publish his sketchbook. His First Fleet journal, first published in London in 1793, is one of the earliest and most authoritative records of the beginnings of European settlement in Australia, but he did not write a memoir of his life. He was generous, gregarious, diplomatic, shrewd, observant, morally courageous and physically brave. He was a professional naval officer, not a self publicist and consequently his reputation has been overshadowed in the national memory by those other two great naval officers Cook and Phillip. It is true to say that he continued the work of Pacific exploration of the former and made possible the success of the latter. It is high time his shade stepped out of their shadows, and this is just the book to allow him to do it. His record of public service and his fine art both deserve recognition as being second to none in the story of the settlement of Australia. This excellent new book provides both. Its purchase is highly recommended. 🦘



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Visions from the Vault

OPERATION TROCHUS 75



Following a big jump the previous year in the number of sightings of Indonesian fishing boats, and the signing of an Australian-Indonesian agreement on 'traditional fishermen', in 1975 the RAN began a new concept in fisheries patrolling.

Commanded by Captain Eric Johnston, then Naval Officer Commanding North Australia, Operation TROCHUS 75 was described by him as 'Intensification': 'Instead of visiting the area on a fairly haphazard basis, the aim this year is to have Naval aircraft and a patrol boat there on a permanent basis during the fishing season.'

From 4 March one of three Darwin-based patrol boats and a Broome-based detachment of three Grumman Tracker aircraft kept up a constant sea-air watch on the north-western coastline and Australia's offshore reefs and islets. Although Indonesian fishermen were banned from taking turtles and certain undersized shellfish, Australia's main concern was not so much the amount of fish caught, but rather any animals or animal products carried by the fishermen that might introduce livestock diseases.

For this reason, much of a boarding party's work consisted of explaining to the fishermen which areas within the

12-mile declared fishing zone they were allowed to fish, and how they were not allowed to approach within 12 miles of the mainland. As its boarding party moved from fishing boat to fishing boat, the patrol boat would cruise up and down about 20 metres away to leave the fishermen with a friendly but firm impression. Vessels found illegally fishing were apprehended and prosecuted.

The photograph shows a boarding party from *HMAS Advance* leaving a fleet of 30 Madurese boats to have a look at Sandy Islet in Scott Reef. 🚢

Photograph Courtesy SeaPower Centre.

ANI ON-LINE: A GUIDE TO THE NEW WEBSITE.

Our new website is now on-line! In addition to the features available on the previous site, the new site also features a library of past journals, a discussion forum, a news section and member list. This short guide is designed to help you take full advantage of the new features.




Figure 1

OBTAINING AN ACCOUNT

In order to access the new features of the site you must have a user account for the website. If you have a current subscription to the ANI, navigate to the website www.navalinstitute.com.au using your web browser (figure 1), click the "Members Login" menu item (figure 2), then click the link to download an application form. Fill in the form, then fax or post it to the ANI Business Manager. Once your account has been created, you will receive an email that outlines your member ID and password.



Figure 2



Figure 3

LOGGING IN TO YOUR ACCOUNT

Once you have your account details, you are ready to login and access the new features of the site. In order to login, navigate to the website (figure 1) and click the "Members Login" item (figure 2). Enter your member ID and password as they were provided to you, then click the "Login" button. The case of the member ID and password are important: i.e. "CaSe" and "case" are considered entirely different words by the authentication system. Each letter of the password will appear as a single "*" to prevent others from seeing your password as you type. If you have entered your details correctly, you will be presented with the news page. The grey status bar at the top notifies you of the account you are using (figure 4). You are now able to access all of the new features of the site.




Figure 4

LOGGING OUT OF YOUR ACCOUNT

In order to protect your identity and to prevent malicious use of your account by others, you must log out of the site when you are finished browsing. This is especially important on public computers. In order to log out, click the "Logout" link in the grey status bar (figure 4).




Figure 5




Figure 6

CHANGING YOUR DETAILS

When your account is created, only your member ID and password are stored in the system for privacy reasons. However, you may provide other details that are visible to other ANI members. In order to change your details, login and click the "Change Your Details" menu item (figure 5). Then select the "change" link (figure 6) next to either your personal details or password. Change the text appropriately and click the "save" button (figure 7).

The personal information that you provide will be visible to other members of the ANI but will be hidden from members of the general public. You may provide as much or as little detail as you wish but none of the fields are compulsory. However, you may not change your member ID as it is the link between the on-line database and our off-line records.




Figure 7




Figure 8

PARTICIPATING IN THE FORUM

In order to post topics and replies in the discussion forum, first login and click the "Forum" menu item (figure 8). Then select a forum that you would like to view by clicking its "View Topics" button (figure 9). Select a topic that you would like to read by clicking its "View this topic" link (figure 10). If you are not interested in any particular topic, you may add your own by clicking the "Add New Topic" button (figure 10). Similarly, once you are viewing a topic, you may post a reply by clicking "Add New Post". Fill in the heading and body of your reply and click the "Submit" button to add your reply to the topic. If you change your mind while writing your reply, you may click the "Cancel" button and your reply will not be added to the topic.



Figure 9




Figure 10

FURTHER QUESTIONS

If you have specific questions regarding website features or even a feature request, post a topic in the "Website Questions" forum and a site administrator will reply. Otherwise, happy browsing!

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Separate paragraphs by one line. Single spacing only. Use one space only after stops and colons.

CONVENTIONS:

Use numbers for 10 and above, words below. Ship names use italics in title case; prefixes such as HMAS in capitals and italics. Book and Journal titles use italics.

Use single quotation marks for quotations. Do not use hyphens for any rank except Sub-Lieutenant.

CITATIONS:

Endnotes rather than footnotes. Use footnotes to explain any points you want the reader to notice immediately. Book titles follow Author surname, first name, title if any. Title. Place of publication: publisher, year of that edition.

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Adkin, Mark. *Goose Green*. London: Leo Cooper, 1992.

Adler, Bill (Ed.) *Letters from Vietnam*. New York: EP Dutton and Co., 1967.

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Supply your everyday title for use at the beginning of the title, so: Lieutenant Commander Bill Crabbe, or Jack Aubrey, or Reverend James Moodie. At

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ILLUSTRATIONS:

Do not embed graphs or figures in your text without sending a separate file as well. If supplying photographs use a minimum of 300 dpi. We are keen on colour images but will use greyscale if necessary. We are able to scan prints if necessary, but request a self-addressed stamped envelope for return – please insure adequately if necessary.

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