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Vernon Parker Oration

Basing of RAN Assets and the Force Posture Review

Australia's Future Submarine Capability; An Integrated Plan for Success

JP Stevenson: Justice denied – a career unfairly cut short

Australia's Future Submarine Capability – Research and Development Implications

Explaining the failings in US strategy for the Afghanistan war

PWO SM – A Broader Future for the 'Deep' Specialist

JOURNAL OF THE

Australian Naval Institute



The background of the slide is a deep blue underwater scene. Sunlight rays penetrate the water from the surface, creating a dramatic, ethereal effect. The rays are bright and fan out across the frame, illuminating the water's texture.

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Letter to the Editor

'BLACKBERRY LEADERSHIP' - THE POSITIVES AND THE PITFALLS

POSITIVES

Management processes have changed rapidly in a few short years. 24/7 email connectivity, remote access to corporate databases and tools... and possession of the notorious BlackBerry/iPhone/gadget which is becoming as common as car keys in a leaders pocket.

The pace of news, whether corporate information or public information management, has increased to real time. Daily and hourly updates are required to avoid the 'how come I didn't know before they did' knowledge demand that has perpetuated its way through corporate and public society. Defence is not immune from this phenomenon. Now that momentum has started, and grasped by Prime Ministers and Presidents down, it can't be stopped.

Daily Orders, once gestetnered out for noticeboards (and the purple ink stained hands), have been replaced with emailed information directly to monitors, desktop and laptop computers, phones and mounted on webpages; even at sea.

Face to face discussions are being replaced by video teleconferencing and 'email hockey'.

Automated receipt messages have taken away the excuse of 'I didn't see that'. Signal reading logs have moved to online message distribution. The immediacy of the news and information cycle is at a hectic pace. Is it going to increase further? Can it?

PITFALLS

Classified military systems permit deliberation, consideration and control of sensitive and important information. Unclassified instant systems open the door for knee jerk reaction and one-upmanship - tempting even the wisest leader to transmit instead of receive.

Command and control becomes blurred, and truth against speculation becomes difficult to assess. Security classification can become selective when speed overrides sensitivity.

Senior leaders remaining in touch while out of the office, and even on leave, can void any delegation to the 2IC, removing an important level of leadership grooming. If the 2IC knows they're being watched, he or she is missing a key independence and responsibility in the necessary opportunity to grow as the next leader. Accountability never sleeps it seems.

I'm not trying to suggest that 'BlackBerry leadership' devolve back to the 1990s and hand-written memos, but rather raise issues so that we can be prepared for potential consequences of reaching in, when sometimes the best course of action is to let the situation work its way through the 'system'. That's why we have the 'system'.

I'm no Luddite. Embrace the gadgets and the opportunities I say, and the synergies that technology brings. Embrace it - or get left behind. Ironically (or perhaps not!), this 'letter' was written and submitted on a BlackBerry.

Ashley Papp

Contents

<i>Vernon Parker Oration</i>	4
<i>Basing of RAN Assets and the Force Posture Review</i>	14
<i>Australia's Future Submarine Capability; An Integrated Plan for Success</i>	22
<i>It's Preparedness, Stupid.</i>	27
<i>JP Stevenson: Justice denied - a career unfairly cut short</i>	31
<i>Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond: Visionary or Heretic?</i>	37
<i>Royal Moroccan Navy commissions first SIGMA</i>	42
<i>Australia's Future Submarine Capability – Research and Development Implications</i>	45
<i>Where to Britain?</i>	52
<i>Records Management – the backbone of an efficient organisation</i>	53
<i>HRH Prince Phillip</i>	56
<i>Explaining the failings in US strategy for the Afghanistan war</i>	58
<i>PWO SM – A Broader Future for the 'Deep' Specialist</i>	64
<i>Book Reviews</i>	70
<i>Visions from the Vault</i>	79
<i>Style Notes for Headmark</i>	81
<i>ANI Membership Application Form</i>	83

*Front page photograph:
Royal Australian
Navy Sea King
helicopters from 817
Squadron making
their final flight before
decommissioning. A
formation of 3 Sea
Kings from the Naval
Air Station at HMAS
Albatross, Nowra,
proceeded up the
NSW coast to Sydney,
flying over Sydney
Harbour then turn
south to Canberra, over
Lake Burley Griffin
and the Australian
War Memorial before
heading east to the
coast back to the Naval
Air Station*

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VERNON PARKER ORATION AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE 4 AUGUST 2011

FROM REAR ADMIRAL JAMES GOLDRICK, RAN

Let me start with two caveats. The first is that some of the arguments and ideas which I will propose are 'works in progress'. The second is that I will speak here specifically about the Navy – after all, if I cannot do so here, where can I? – but many of my comments do have applicability to the other Services and to the ADF as a whole.

The story of the Australian Navy is one that reflects the continuing strategic challenges faced by our nation as it has evolved towards full independence and a greater understanding of its place in the world. And as I consider, from the basis of studies that I have done over the years on our carrier acquisition program, our DDG acquisition and, most recently, the history of our various submarine programs¹, I perceive a recurrent theme. It is one of critical mass and a struggle to sustain a level of effort which will be truly effective in relation to the resources that we devote to it.

There are two aspects to this problem. The first is that of force structure – what I term the 'fleet unit' question, whereby Australia has repeatedly sought to create a force capable of meeting our strategic demands, but has often found it more expensive and difficult to sustain than the nation was willing to accept. I

should explain that when I talk of a 'fleet unit', I am not describing a task group or task force as such, but a range of capabilities which together provide a coherent construct that meets our maritime strategic requirements. And, while I will talk here only about the navy, the truth is that a 'fleet unit' also encompasses air and land capabilities when they have maritime application.

It is clear that part of the issue over force structure has been partly due to a difficulty in achieving national acceptance of the full span of our maritime strategic requirements, which have always included both surety of the local and regional environment *and* protection of the maritime networks upon which Australia's economy depends. Perhaps there should be little conflict between these two, but there has been a tendency, despite our dependence upon seaborne trade, to ignore its absolutely fundamental importance – and the navy has not always been good at either fully

understanding how that seaborne trade operates or explaining just why as well as how it should be protected. In doctrinal terms, I could describe much of the debate in Australia as oscillating historically between a focus on denial – the cliché of 'fortress Australia' – and on projection – the cliché of 'deployed forces in distant lands' – while missing much of the necessary link between these two of control, which remains an abiding requirement for a sea dependent nation like ours. Just what constitutes an effective 'fleet unit' may be change as a result of changes in the relative priorities for denial, control and projection, but in the Australian situation there will always need to be some mix of all three.

The second aspect relates to the national commitment, human and material, required to maintain the desired force structure. It is an empirical observation, but I believe that we sit in Australia at a point at which the relationship between

The Australian destroyer HMAS Brisbane (DDG 41) and the US Navy destroyer USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) cruise side by side in Australian waters during Operation Exercise Tandem Thrust 2001 (Courtesy RAN)



¹ See the author's 'Carriers for the Commonwealth' in T.R. Frame, J.V.P. Goldrick & P.D. Jones (Eds) *Reflections on the Royal Australian Navy* Kangaroo Press, Kenthurst, 1991; J.V.P. Goldrick & P.D. Jones *Struggling for a Solution: The RAN and the Acquisition of a Surface to Air Missile Capability* RAN Sea Power Centre Working Paper No. 2, January 2000; James Goldrick 'From Submersibles to SWUP: The First Seventy Five Years of Submarines in Australian Defence and Naval Policy' 2011 Creswell Oration.

the investment required to sustain our desired force structure and the actual combat capability realised is at its most unfavourable. I emphasise here that I am not talking just about the resources required to *maintain* ships and systems in service but those needed to experiment, to innovate, to develop doctrine and to push both technological and operational boundaries. These are the really difficult things, these are the things which involve risk and, quite frequently, failure. Indeed, the problem of critical mass relates not just to sustained funding – although that remains critical – but to the difficulty, given the complexity of our defence requirements, of generating sufficient intellectual capital to have a navy which is completely self reliant. In other words, while we need multiple capabilities in our order of battle, it is very hard to manage the conundrum of generating them effectively from a national base that is too small to be ideal.

In 2011 this remains a fundamental challenge and, as I go on to discuss the last century, I'd ask you to bear this in mind, because I believe many of the difficulties in our history have derived at least partly from a simplistic understanding of just what is required not only to *maintain* a navy but to *develop* it and that this naiveté has stemmed at least in part from our early experiences. If I have a bumper sticker for the RAN – perhaps for the ADF as whole – it would be 'self awareness, not self reliance' and I do not think that our journey to full self awareness is yet complete.

The First Fleet Unit

The first years of Federation were marked by debate over the form of a national defence effort. In part this remained theoretical because the new



Government had no money and would not until greater control of tax revenues passed to the Commonwealth after ten years. Nevertheless, many issues were identified in what was a complex problem. The record of small navies was not good, while many in Britain viewed with dismay the prospect of local services which they felt would contribute little to the British Empire's global security. Others, however, were coming to understand that the only way to get the new dominions to contribute significantly was to allow them ownership of their own forces. On the locals' part, the more that a navy was thought about, the more formidable the commitment seemed to be. Australians wanted to control their own naval destiny, but they were becoming increasingly aware that they would have a hard time achieving that destiny without help. Conversely, with the naval arms race with Germany in full swing, there was also a desire by many Australians to support Great Britain. It was in this spirit that, during the naval crisis of 1908, Australia offered to cover the cost of a new

capital ship for the Royal Navy.

But a 'one off', however generous, was not the same thing as an Australian navy and others prevailed who had a more sophisticated understanding of the threats to its shared sea dependent interests that the British empire faced. The Fleet Unit concept which was announced by the famous 'Jacky' Fisher, at the Imperial Defence Conference of 1909 provided a remarkable solution because it satisfied both nationalist sentiment and – at least partly – the concerns of Whitehall. The heavily armed, fast and long ranged battle cruiser (and its long range was a key factor) and the supporting force of light cruisers, destroyers and submarines was capable of both offensive and defensive action for denial, control and projection in the ways that our situation demanded. It is no exaggeration to say that the battle cruiser *Australia* was the most effective single strategic investment ever made by this country – paying its dividend within eleven months of entering Sydney Harbour.

Though its execution proved very

*CAPT Dechaineux,
RADM Collins, CMDR
Rayment on bridge
HMAS Australia 1944*

different for countries such as Canada, the Fleet Unit concept provided the model for a successful creation of naval services that has continued almost to this day. I have elsewhere termed the process of creation as being one of cloning. However, refining the analogy, I now think it more accurate to describe it as 'genetic modification', because even from the outset none of the new Services was anything like identical to the Royal Navy and each steadily developed in its own way.

The GM process had significant consequences. I have termed one the 'fleet, not a navy' syndrome in that the provision of external support by Britain, even if when was paid for, meant that the smaller nations did not have to invest to the degree which would have been otherwise required for the level of combat capability that they sought.² More to the point, they did not need to think about or set up to deal with these matters as much as they ought. In other words, the Dominions acquired fleets, but they did not for many years operate complete navies. Undoubtedly, in 1913 and for many years afterwards, it was an excellent bargain because a formidable capability was acquired without the need to invest in the full range of overheads. It would also remain a much more efficient force than otherwise possible because of the continuing ability to benefit from all the Royal Navy could provide in the way of expertise and the latest technology.

However, although substantial efforts were made to create an indigenous naval shipbuilding and repair industry, the way in which the new Service was grown also meant that many of the inherent risks were not fully understood by the government,

² James Goldrick 'A fleet not a navy: some thoughts on the themes' David Stevens & John Reeve (Eds) *Southern Trident: Strategy, history and the rise of Australian naval power* Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2001, p. 292.



by the electorate or by industry. In particular, Australia had little or no exposure to just how difficult it is to identify the right technologies and get them into service. The British did the job and carried the risks and all Australia had to do was acquire and adapt in very limited ways to meet our needs.

There was also the question of resources. A sustained in-country shipbuilding effort was just possible, but only if money was consistently committed. Unfortunately, although matters got off to a reasonable, albeit expensive start in 1911, post-war economies would soon slow and then halt new warship construction, initiating a series of stops and starts that punctuated the remainder of the century. It would always be a dilemma for governments to make the choice between expensive and protracted local construction, with the significant set-up costs involved but with real benefits for national development or purchasing off others' building lines and enjoying the economies of scale and reduced risks.

However, notwithstanding the high

cost of Australian workers (who did generally produce very high quality work), many governments funded naval shipbuilding at levels so low that they caused building schedules to become unduly protracted and their products even more expensive than they should have been. This was true for the cruiser *HMAS Adelaide*, known as *HMAS 'Long Delayed'* in the early 1920s and true for the destroyer and frigate programs in the 1950s. Here we can see a direct relationship between the size of the fleet unit that the nation was willing to support and the ability for that unit to be generated efficiently and at reasonable cost within Australia.

There were other, more subtle problems. The new Service was sometimes viewed by outsiders as uncritically reflecting British views when in fact its people were demonstrating a naval outlook, particularly an outlook that appreciated that national security was more than the simple defence of national territory. This should not have been surprising, particularly as some in the RAN failed to make the distinction between the United Kingdom and the


Significant capital ships within the RAN; David Martin being "rowed ashore" from the aircraft carrier Melbourne at the end of his command (Tom Lewis Collection)

navy themselves and were occasionally 'captured' by the ethos of Britain to a degree that made it difficult for them to operate comfortably in the Australian national environment¹, but it also tended to make it very hard for them to argue a naval case amongst national defence policy makers.

The focus on professional training rather than education inherent in the Royal Navy's culture also did not help, in that the understanding of the roles of the Navy was essentially emotional rather than rational. 'There is nothing the Navy cannot do' was deeply ingrained but why it should do it was rarely analysed². I believe that this was one of the key factors in a too-slow growth of critical consciousness on naval matters within the RAN itself and indirectly within the nation as whole.

Other navies, however, particularly the RN, never saw Australian personnel or ships as anything other than proud and distinctive representatives of their nation. 'Three cheers for Wallaby Land' was the cry from a member of the crew of the *Australia* at her commissioning in Portsmouth in 1913 and when the Australian destroyers passed through the Dardanelles in 1918 after the Armistice with Turkey, the Australian national flag was prominent at their mastheads.

As an aside, I am convinced that for many years the RAN's professional standards were maintained at the levels they were substantially because of the expertise gained through being able to operate in much more complex and sophisticated environments than was ever possible around Australia. All this opened the professional and personal horizons of those concerned and also created a competitive attitude amongst the members of the new services, who were determined to prove that they were as good as – and better than the British.³ The young officers who were the products of our national naval



college were viewed with respect by the British from the very first⁴ – a respect sustained by their performance in the years that followed in their professional courses and at sea.⁵

But the system of officer development caused other difficulties. Given the internecine disputes amongst senior officers that occurred in both the Australian Army and the RAAF in the 1930s and 1940s, the RAN's avoidance of them at this time must have some connection with its ability to judge and promote to external standards.⁶ However, the career profile of the RN became increasingly difficult to impose upon the RAN as officers became more senior. The fact was and is that smaller navies require diversification of the professional skill base into policy and administrative

matters rather earlier than do much larger services.⁷ The question would be the extent to which the RAN might have to accept – or at least risk – a reduction in individual seagoing and war fighting skills to achieve such earlier diversification and how to draw the right balance.

It would be also a question of how much was enough in terms of shore and staff infrastructure because a smaller navy faces much greater relative challenges in generating sufficient experts than a larger one. The USN, for example, may be 25 times the size of the RAN, but it does not have 25 times the number of different problems. Australian slowness in the creation of national staff capability also did not help – in 1932, admittedly at a low point, the Australian CNS had

Significant capital ships within the RAN; HMAS Australia after a kamikaze strike

a grand total of 10 naval personnel working for him on the naval staff itself – to cover plans, operations, engineering, communications and ordnance. Independent and creative thought is fairly difficult in such circumstances.

Nevertheless, the operations of what I term the ‘first Fleet Unit’ triumphantly proved the worth of the RAN. Von Spee did not bring his cruisers anywhere near Australia – achievement of denial. The German possessions in the South West Pacific were rapidly brought under control in Australia’s first joint and multinational operations – achievement of projection. The troop convoys were safely escorted to the Middle East, with the destruction of the cruiser *Emden* by the *Sydney* in November 1914 confirming both the efficiency of the new Navy in the sea control function and the value of investing in ‘high end’ capability – the *Emden*’s guns were no match for *Sydney*’s much heavier 6 inchers. Australia had cause to celebrate its navy.

Yet, November 1914 marked the end of the RAN’s primacy in the public eye. The submarine *AE 2* successfully penetrated the Dardanelles, but its sortie was only a counterpoint to the landings at Gallipoli. Australian ships played a significant role in many theatres until 1918 but they did so as minor elements of a global naval effort that had little or no glamour attached to it and whose work went largely unremarked, except when it appeared to have failed.

The RAN enjoyed a brief renaissance in the immediate aftermath of the war, but there was trouble ahead. By the early 1920s, the first fleet unit had become unsustainable. Technological development had rendered obsolete its core asset – the *Australia* - and, in any case, there was insufficient money. The Australian

government had other concerns and welcomed the treaties that placed limits on naval strength despite the fact that those treaties, counting Australia’s navy as an integral element of Britain’s for arms limitation purposes, did not properly recognise Australian independence. The agreements sealed the *Australia*’s fate and she was scuttled off Sydney Heads in 1924.

The Second Fleet Unit

A very different second fleet unit concept was embarked upon in 1923, with a combination of heavy cruisers and a submarine flotilla. This scheme came as part of the Admiralty planning for the expansion of the naval forces in the Far East against the threat of Japan, an expansion in which it was expected that the Australian navy would have a significant role. However, events combined to end the submarine project within a few years. One would be a lack of money, but there was another factor at play – the RAN’s first experience of prototypes. The new submarines *Oxley* and *Otway* were two of the first three of the new patrol submarines which were effectively the first British post-war design. They were not ready for operational service and their delivery voyage a debacle. The resultant controversy soured the image of the capability. It is difficult to avoid the impression that the British had been so eager to take advantage of the Australian commitment to a renewed naval effort that they (and the RAN) had not stopped to think through the problems of operating brand new, highly complex systems half a world away from their builder. It was not until more than two years later that the RN itself deployed the class to the Far East and then it was done in company with a brand new, built for the purpose depot ship.

The RAN was hard hit by the

Great Depression, its very existence threatened and much of its offensive capability, notably its submarine force, abandoned. By 1932, only a handful of surface ships survived in commission. The absence of the submarines – and no less than six had been intended to supplement a British force in East Asia that later peaked at sixteen operational boats - left the RAN with no serious capability to contribute to the defensive campaign against a Japanese offensive which the British planned to buy the necessary time to get their main fleet out from European waters. The absence of the submarines meant that the Navy was shorn of the offensive capability which would give it strategic weight. We paid a heavy price for this in the Second World War because, even having focused on surface forces, the RAN never possessed the necessary range of units to operate independently in the Second World War for offensive operations – in the South West Pacific our cruisers and destroyers had always to be supplemented by at least equal numbers of US ships to create a sufficiently capable task force and, lacking large scale organic air, even that force could only operate in essentially supporting roles. In short, we did not have at this time a coherent ‘fleet unit’.

Nevertheless, rearmament and expansion, albeit too late and too limited, did result in a relatively modern force in 1939, as well as the renewal of a substantial local shipbuilding program and the RAN was by far the most combat ready of the Services at that time. It went to war on the first day of conflict and stayed there until the last. The grievous losses it suffered are too often listed only in ships – but it was the people who counted and those losses were not only terrible in their own right, but created continuing gaps in the RAN’s trained strength and talent for many years ahead.

The Navy played its part globally, protecting both local waters and trade and helping hold the line against Germany and Italy until late 1941 when its units were recalled to deal with the crisis in South East Asia. The successes of the early months of the war, notably the triumph of the *Sydney* over the Italian *Bartolomeo Colleoni* were followed by a series of heavy blows. *Sydney's* disappearance was succeeded by the Japanese onslaught which saw in rapid succession the destruction of the *Perth*, *Yarra* and *Vampire* and in later operations that of *Voyager* in East Timor and the cruiser *Canberra* in the Solomons.

But some points may be made. In an era in which Joint operations are so key to our effectiveness as a Defence Force, it should be noted that not only the majority of the losses listed above had some direct connection with land operations, but so did those of the RAN in the Mediterranean – the *Perth*, *Napier* and *Nizam* were all damaged evacuating troops from Crete, while the *Waterhen* and the *Parramatta* were both sunk supporting the besieged Australian and Allied troops in Tobruk. Many more of our operations and our successes – and Australian units were responsible for the destruction of at least seven enemy submarines, as well as other many units, and the capture or destruction of over 150,000 tons of shipping – were directly related to the protection of the global trade system and cutting the enemy's access to it. Control and denial again.

The last months of the war provided a significant fillip to a Navy which had felt for some time unknown to the public. The heroism of the cruiser *Australia's* crew under the kamikaze onslaught gained much coverage at a time when Australia's land forces were largely unemployed. Furthermore, the combination of the arrival of the British Pacific Fleet and

the breathtaking effectiveness of the American naval advance across the Pacific also provided demonstration of the benefits of the combination of sea with air power. The war also saw the development of a much more effective local shipbuilding, repair and naval weapons industry. Forced into such national effort by the inability of Britain to provide the support which the RAN had hitherto enjoyed, Australia began to come of age. Most notable were two initiatives. The first was that, when the Admiralty were slow to give priority to Australian intentions to build destroyers in country, the RAN went directly to the British shipbuilders to get the plans and specifications. The second was the highly successful class of 60 Australian minesweepers – the famous *Bathurst* class corvettes – which were a local effort that very clearly demonstrated that good enough can sometimes be the successful enemy of the best. Had we been more ambitious in the capabilities of these ships, we would never have got them out in time or in sufficient numbers.

The Third Fleet Unit

The post-war plan for the RAN which the Labor Government endorsed in 1947 was effectively the third Fleet Unit. Centred around two light fleet carriers and their embarked squadrons, the future navy was intended to have both a capacity for sustained independent operations and to be able to make a significant contribution to the global effort to protect sea communications. Once again, the concept was straitened by limits on resources and the pressures of continuing technological change. Australia only briefly operated two operational carriers at once – the *Sydney* and the loan carrier *Vengeance* – and the costs of adapting the *Melbourne* for jet aircraft were such



that a planned refit for the *Sydney* never happened. These and a whole range of other problems served to limit other areas of the RAN's expansion.

Yet the Navy staged a remarkable recovery. Despite the heavy losses of personnel and the almost complete lack of recruiting for the permanent service during the conflict, the practically moribund fleet of 1947 was soon the effective force of the early 1950s that saw the RAN not only operationally deploy the *Sydney* to Korea in late 1951, but allowed the continual rotation of destroyers and frigates there and an increasing commitment to South East Asia. Perhaps much of this success was enabled by a continuing flow of

Significant capital ships within the RAN; HMAS Melbourne

officers and men from the Royal Navy as well as its more formal support but, in an era in which immigration was a central plank for national development, this was not inappropriate. The Navy also began to develop its own scientific research capability, which initially focused – and with great success – on the anti-submarine warfare problems which were at the heart of the challenge that the Soviet bloc was perceived to represent at sea.

There were pressures. The fixed wing naval arm always suffered from the problem of inadequate resources, not only for itself, but because it drew away funding from other elements of the fleet. Furthermore, the increasing capabilities of precision guided weapons provided challenges the RAN had yet to meet. Matters came to a crisis with the Government's decision to abandon the fixed wing capability in 1959, but this step – traumatic as it was – provided a much clearer way ahead for the Navy because, in compensation, the Government was willing to invest in a whole range of areas. The Navy was able to commission its replenishment ship. A submarine force was set up, the core of a new offensive capability and the beginning of what I term the 'fourth fleet unit'. A modern mine countermeasure squadron was acquired and brand new missile destroyers ordered from the United States.

The Fourth Fleet Unit

The Australian Navy's first major purchases from the US, the *Charles F Adams* class were also the forerunners of a turn towards America that reflected not only changing strategic realities but also where the leading edge of naval technological development now lay. Naval aviation won a reprieve, helped by a deteriorating strategic situation in which not only

Indo-China but Indonesia seemed at risk. After ASW helicopters were provided for the *Melbourne*, she was modernised to take new jet fighters and anti-submarine aircraft. This expansion and modernisation were well timed as the mid-1960s saw the RAN operationally engaged in both the defence of Malaysia and in support of the American –led conflict in Vietnam. The *Adams* class particularly proved their worth in operations as part of the American Seventh Fleet.

I am particularly interested in this period because it was one in which we did not at first try to be a parent navy for complete systems or ships, but rather – and with some success – adapted particular systems to particular platforms. The British designed *River* class frigates, for example, were modified to take Dutch radars and fire control systems. The *Ikara* anti-submarine missile was successfully developed in an Australian led venture and then installed in both the *River* class and the DDGs where it proved itself to be the most effective shipborne ASW weapon system in the world. This selective approach seems to me, whether it was conscious or not, to have been much more realistic than a wholesale effort at being a parent navy.


The 1970s provided a whole new range of challenges for the RAN, as they did for Australia's strategic outlook. The Cold War remained and, although Indonesia was no longer the immediate concern, a weary United States was much more likely to require its partners to look after themselves. There was also little enthusiasm for defence spending on anything like the scale of the 1960s and therefore increasing pressure to reduce overheads. For the next decade and a half, debate raged as to the appropriate form and functions of an Australian defence force. As I consider that debate, my belief is that the aversion to further

overseas commitments on land which underlay much of the discussion also hindered proper examination of the continuing need for commitment to protection of the global maritime system.

For the Navy, the eventual victim was the aircraft carrier. In a time of continuing budgetary restraint, the large sums involved in finding a replacement for *Melbourne* were always going to be difficult to secure. A window opened by the sudden availability of the British light carrier *Invincible* was soon closed in the wake of the Falklands War of 1982, ironically a conflict that demonstrated both the flexibility and reach of seaborne forces. The new Labor Government of 1983 mandated the end of fixed wing aviation, a decision from which this time there would be no return. But the RAN did not become moribund. The submarine force was advancing rapidly with new sensors, new torpedoes and, particularly significant, anti-ship missiles in an Australian led modernisation program that stands as one of the most significant technological and industrial successes in our naval history and perhaps the ultimate expression of the selective approach that I have already described.

Maritime forces received further support in the review by Paul Dibb in 1986 and the White Paper of 1987 which followed. Both Dibb and the White Paper appreciated that Australia was a maritime nation and, if there was too much on the 'sea air gap' and too little on Australia's dependence on the global and regional maritime system, there was nevertheless recognition that an island nation requires defence at sea. Spurred by an enthusiastic Defence Minister in Kim Beazley, the 1987 White Paper helped set in train the submarine and frigate projects which have come to define much of the Navy's force structure in the new

HMAS Australia



Graphic by Peter Ingman

century and which have provided an updated version of the 'fourth fleet unit'. Of the two major projects, that for the eight Australian and two New Zealand *Anzac* class frigates was the more obviously successful. One hard fought battle, to fit the ships with a 5 inch gun, was triumphantly vindicated during the 2003 Gulf War when the *Anzac* herself provided critical gunfire support to the amphibious assault on the Al Faw peninsula.

The submarine project was more complex. It is not appropriate for me to discuss here the current state of the class, but I do want to make some observations about the project in retrospect, because they bear upon the sophistication of our national understanding of the task of operating a navy. Two key mistakes were made in what was a much more successful project than many recognise. The first was that the contingency funding was inadequate, which meant that many of the problems inevitable in any complex prototype were not fixed as they arose, but left to fester. The second, and it is associated with the first, is that the issues of risk and complexity in a brand new design were never really explained properly to the electorate, so that when problems arose the nation was ill-prepared to understand or accept them.

There were other problems as the RAN took on many other responsibilities in terms of sustainment, training and doctrine that had been left largely to the RN or

the USN. Looking back, I think that there was insufficient attention paid to the costs and, in particular, the demands on our expertise in trying to be independent to the extent that we did, largely because so many of them had hitherto been largely invisible to us – and perhaps because they were so difficult. The challenges of being a 'parent navy' inherent in the acquisition of unique ships and systems have received the most attention in both internal and public examinations of the pitfalls and problems that we experienced in this period, but there were other issues which have received less notice. For example, in patriating so much training and reducing our exchange programs to the extent that we did, I am unsure that we provided adequate substitutes for the continuous injection of intense professional experience that had hitherto been maintained by these means. Similarly, there were hidden costs, not all well understood, in the necessary redistribution of our ships to bases in Western Australia and in Queensland and the Northern Territory in transport, training and people, as well as the sheer difficulty of assembling sufficient numbers of units in one spot to create a realistic maritime training environment.

There was an additional theme in the 'fourth fleet unit' and this was the need to protect the maritime domain. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea saw the extension of territorial seas and the creation of

exclusive economic zones and other additions to national authority over maritime areas. This legal regime only reflected the greater exploitation of fisheries and of offshore resources that marked the later decades of the last century and its demands brought about a steady increase in the RAN's patrol and response capacity – and its commitment to the task. This has involved difficult, unremitting and sometimes unpleasant work but it has also kept the Navy, even in an increasingly inter-agency environment, very firmly in the public eye in a way that I believe has benefited the Service.

The Fifth Fleet Unit

Other operational deployments mounted. While the 1980s had seen the Navy focused on regional engagement, the first Gulf war of 1991 was the beginning of a commitment to the Middle East that would surge in the wake of 911 and into the second Gulf War and which would continue to this day, albeit with much of our effort now transferred to anti-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean. There have been other commitments, such as the interventions in East Timor and the Solomons which have emphasised effective Joint operations.

Given all these demands, it is not surprising that the 'Force 2030' construct should have been devised, or that it includes such a wide range of capabilities. Recognition of the continuing need for an ability to

project power around the region has come in the acquisition of the big new amphibious ships *Canberra* and *Adelaide* and the newly purchased *Choules*. And recognition of the need for an effective control capability has come in the project for the new Air Warfare Destroyers. The White Paper of 2009 has provided a final element – for the moment – of the newest ‘fifth fleet unit’ concept for the RAN with plans for a much expanded submarine force which will provide the core of the denial element and contribute in other ways.

Conclusion

In 2011 the Australian Navy can look back with some pride on 110 years of life as a national organisation and a century of existence as a modern fighting force. It has had its share of failures, but they have been outweighed by its successes. If there has been a recurring element to many of the problems it has experienced, it has to be said that many of the challenges that it faces are endemic to a Service which has such wide responsibilities – perhaps the greatest relative to *any* navy – in a vast, maritime-dependent nation with a small population and relatively limited resources. And, as it has moved from being a unique but closely bound element of the global organisation led by the Royal Navy into a fully national service which still contributes to the security of the global maritime system, it is fair to say that the journey has not been from dependency to self reliance, but from unconscious operation to self awareness.

The challenge for the Navy in the years ahead will come in meeting all the needs of the new capabilities in terms of people and infrastructure and I think that the nature of those challenges will be very familiar to any student of the RAN’s history. We are certainly aware

of them as never before. Nevertheless, I believe that the key problem of the mismatch between the expertise that we can generate and sustain ourselves and the wide range of capabilities that we need to operate means, as part of that self awareness, we need to consider how we can go about squaring the circle. I will therefore close by suggesting that at least part of the solution may be a revival of some of the shared approaches by which the original fleet unit concept prospered. For there are many like-minded navies, culturally and organizationally similar to ours, who are faced with similar problems – the Canadians and Dutch and, to an increasing degree, the fast reducing British – and this is just a start. Given that it is the intellectual aspect of capability management which presents us all with such challenges, could it not be possible to go even further than our current cooperative efforts and formally divide up responsibilities for experimentation, doctrine development and training between the various services, with a lead navy as a centre of excellence for a particular area of warfare? ✱



Rear Admiral James Goldrick AM, CSC, RAN joined the RAN in 1974. He has commanded warships in peace and war; lectured in naval history and contemporary naval affairs at many institutions; published several books, and served in a variety of command positions ashore.

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Basing of RAN Assets and the Force Posture Review

BY LIEUTENANT COMMANDER GRANT WHITE

Overwhelmingly, Australia's strategic interests are lying in and around our northern waters. Australia is set to develop the second largest reserve of LNG in the world in northwest Australia, and currently has \$273.5 billion in new resource commodity projects identified for development¹, with the majority of new projects taking place within Australia's northern areas. Capital expenditure for 2011 alone for new resource commodity projects is forecasted to be \$33.6 billion.² What is startling is that over the next ten years, Defence is set to acquire significant capital equipment, mostly in the form of AWDs, LHDs, new frigates and a new submarine fleet costing almost the same amount spent in developing and exporting our resources over the next decade.

How does our current Defence

posture provide security for the new oil, gas and iron ore developments?

In particular, are there sufficient security measures in place to counter threats or developing threats against infrastructure along our coastline in our northern areas?

State and non-state organisations know that to affect the economic stability of any nation, an attack on infrastructure is a good prospect. Not only would such an attack make an enormous public proclamation of the effectiveness of the aggressor and to the impotence of the defence, it also affects national psyche and the nation's bottom line. In short, damaging infrastructure can negatively affect a country in many ways. Our ability to defend and respond against an attack on infrastructure, investments and trade contributing seven percent of our GDP will be paramount to the mission

of the Navy 'to fight and win in the maritime environment'.

The Defence Minister announced on 22 June 2011 the Force Posture Review in response to rising visions that the ADF and more particular the Navy needs to be appropriately distributed to meet Australia's strategic interests. The vastness of Australia's northern areas and the unique operating environment makes this a difficult task. The Defence Minister, the Hon. Stephen Smith, stated that 'the need for a Force Posture Review is driven by our strategic circumstances' and that 'Australia's strategic interests are overwhelmingly positioned to our north, north west and north east'.³ This provided the catalyst for the strategic review of the geographic positioning of ADF assets.

Whilst aligning the force posture of the ADF to meet our strategic aims

USS Shoup sails into the Port of Albany to come alongside with HMA Ships Darwin and Sirius for the Great White Fleet 100th Anniversary (RAN photo)



and demands, Australia's north offers little in terms of existing infrastructure, transport and industrial complex. Maintenance and logistical support for ADF platforms is problematic without access to such complexes. In such an environment, consideration also needs to be given to supporting Defence families and their ability to cope in less populated areas. Ultimately, a fly-in fly-out routine similar to businesses operating in Australia's northern areas will perhaps provide the most cost and socially effective posting cycle.

This paper will have a maritime focus and explore current basing arrangements and how they may be better positioned to meet a developing threat to Australia's north. The options of mobile and forward basing of naval platforms will be considered in this paper and a look at existing arrangements with Australia's Port Authorities in utilising shore side infrastructure.

The Changing Regional Strategic Environment and Australia's Involvement


The rise and re-role of the PLA-N from brown water interests to blue water operations and increasing Chinese interests in securing energy transport routes has arguably led to a shifting focus from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean. China is capitalising upon the forward basing concept through close ties with Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and African states to secure port infrastructure and logistical arrangements for its ships.⁴ As China continues to forge closer ties along its trade routes, the US is also 'intensifying its activities across the region with nations including Japan, South Korea, Thailand, The Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam and Cambodia'.⁵

India remains watchful over the development of Chinese strategic

interests within the Indian Ocean. Her bilateral arrangements and ties with near states within the region will be an important lever for India in the years ahead. Its expanding naval capabilities see India being positioned as a 'net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and beyond'.⁶

Australia's commodities trade remains pivotal to the regional boom and is intricately linked to the developing strategic situation in the Indian Ocean. The LNG and iron ore trade with China alone accounted for nearly \$40 billion in trade for 2011⁷ and will remain important markets in providing resources and energy for the region well into this century and into the next. The significant investment in infrastructure and development of the resources trade in Australia's northern areas is a key enabler for the region's economic expansion. The possibility of an attack on this infrastructure from regional powers or even a more daunting prospect of a terrorist attack is hopefully unthinkable, but perhaps a possibility in the event of hostilities or if the opportunity presents⁸. If a regional power declares hostilities, Australia would have to seek alternative markets and established protection mechanisms for infrastructure that is considered important to continue trading.

There are a number of known catalysts for potential conflict within the region and as wealth becomes more readily available to regional countries, investment into sophisticated maritime defence and attack capabilities will continue as will the potential for conflict. As China continues to demonstrate willingness to contest its growing interests, particularly within the first island chain, more incidents that potentially provide the provoking catalyst for conflict such as the USNS *Impeccable* incident in 2009 will continue to occur⁹. Diplomatic agreements and regimes will continue



to remain a vital corridor for Australia and regional states to pursue in defusing situations and potential conflict points. Discussions between Naval Officers who understand how these incidents may lead to conflict are also important within the context of such apparatus as 'Rules of the Road' on the high seas¹⁰.

In summing up Australia's strategic position, Australia no longer holds a technological edge as one of its force enablers within the region and faces a region that is growing in naval capabilities and reach. Australia is situated within a region that is witnessing the development of two potential superpowers on its doorstep. Both India and China, but particularly China, have shown intent on expanding its influences within the region by accessing new resources and trade and orchestrating a complex web of bilateral arrangements within

Figure 1: Australian Iron Ore Exports by Destination and LNG Export Capacity (source: <http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2011/mar/1.html>)

Basing of RAN Assets and the Force Posture Review

the region, as well as developing a significant military capability.

Current Shore Base and Platform Response Arrangements

The Navy has four major bases that would support ships and submarines deployed in Australia's northern approaches. These are Fleet Base West (FBW) – *HMAS Stirling* covering the Indian Ocean areas and approaches, Fleet Base East (FBE) – *HMAS Kuttabul* covering the Pacific Ocean and its approaches, *HMAS Cairns* and *HMAS Coonawarra* which both support the majority of small craft and vessels employed for surveillance patrols, fisheries and immigration taskings, hydrographical work, amphibious taskings and a multitude of constabulary work that is conducted in co-ordination with Headquarters Northern Command (HQNORCOM) based in Darwin.

Re-development proposals for *HMAS Coonawarra* have explored the possibility of permanent limited shore facilities for the new AWDs and the use of port infrastructure at the East Arm port facility in Darwin to embark equipment and troops for the LHDs. Redevelopment plans at FBW aim to facilitate the arrival of the LHDs and AWDs by providing long term logistical support.

To support high end warfighting on sustained operations, access to logistical support including ammunition, fuel, victuals, technical support and parts, docking and maintenance yards, personnel support and training is a complex undertaking and requires access to local industrial complex infrastructure and systems. Trained personnel needed to undertake the support for different class of ships the RAN operates now and into the future will need to be carefully structured and positioned.

The speed at which a threat may

develop in Australia's north against existing infrastructure and the responses needed and time to deploy is also a key consideration within the Force Posture Review. It takes days for a submarine to deploy on operations within Australia's northern approaches. The opportunity to conduct such missions would lie around the choke points within the archipelagic approaches. It takes days or perhaps longer for a Task Group to prepare and deploy on operations from existing Fleet Bases. Frigates can be dispatched at short notice, but their extended time within

the Area of Operations (AO) would require sustainment. A sophisticated surveillance network already exists within Australia's northern areas and supporting platforms engaged with providing support to vessels operating within this surveillance and response network potentially explores a cost and operationally effective solution to extended operations; even to dispatched frigates and submarines. In conflict, this extends to providing sustained logistical and maintenance support in defence of key infrastructure such as offshore gas platforms.

New Definitions of Basing – Not so old

There are two broad concepts being proposed in this paper: mobile and forward basing. The concept of mobile basing is not new. During WWII, submarine tenders provided a means of submarine support on operations. Submarines were able to berth outboard, fuelled and victualled and provided messing facilities for the

crew. Up until the decommissioning of *HMAS Stalwart* in 1990, the RAN held a dedicated mobile basing and maintenance platform. She was commissioned in 1964 to 'greatly increase the Navy's self-sufficiency and its scope for afloat support [and] enable warships to operate for long periods away from their homeports'¹¹. Dedicated AO and AOR platforms provided this capability, but the capability for maintenance and support to Minor War Vessels (MWVs) and frigates was lost.

Forward basing is a concept that can already lean on existing arrangements and infrastructure located within Australia's north. The premise of forward basing involves stockpiling and is based on limited shore support, maintenance and logistical arrangements.

Mobile Basing

Existing platforms after modification or newly acquired platforms could achieve the task of mobile platform



Figure 2: First and Second Island Chains (source: <http://media.economist.com/images/na/2009w17/CAS940.gif>)

maintenance and support. *HMAS Sirius* is one such platform that already holds existing capabilities that can support sustained operations through Refuelling-at-Sea (RAS) or through rafting up vessels outboard. Equipped with side fuel hose reels and fendering arrangements, *Sirius* has already proven her capability to fuel ACPBs and MHCs alongside.

With some modifications and pneumatic cylindrical submarine fendering, the prospect of berthing a submarine outboard is a prospect worth exploring. Embarked or nearby tug or barge support to assist in rafting operations would be needed to assist. With embarked accommodation and maintenance modules on the container deck of *Sirius*, it remains feasible for onboard crew support facilities for submariners. Spare parts, oils and lubricants and victuals could also be accommodated onboard *Sirius*. The concept of tendering submarines under a mobile basing concept will allow flexibility in surveillance and

patrol missions while ensuring that the operation remains sustainable.

Maintaining *Sirius* on station for a prolonged period is feasible within current bunkering tank arrangements and through the regular change-out of personnel. Servicing and maintenance facilities would be limited to mobile workshops that are able to be embarked onboard and more complex engineering tasks would require vessels to return to Fleet Base. It would also be worth investigating the capabilities that *HMAS Success* provides in matching *Sirius* if dedicated to support submarine, ACPB and MHC operations. The recently acquired *HMAS Choules* also holds two 30 tonne cranes, large deck and internal spaces to facilitate maintenance and logistical support arrangements.

The 2009 Defence White Paper identified the need to acquire amphibious strategic lift support vessels to 'provide ongoing sustainment support for deployed forces' and to replace *HMAS Success*¹². The White

Paper recognises that 'the size of area over which our maritime forces may have to operate, and the extended periods they may be required to remain at sea, means that resupplying our deployed ships is an essential capability'¹³. Project SEA1654 has identified platforms to replace *HMAS Success*¹⁴ and coupled with the new strategic lift vessel identified as a requirement in the 2009 Defence White Paper, the changing strategic dynamics within the Asian region and the interest in more focused operations within Australia's northern region presents an opportunity to impose additional capabilities to these platforms to fulfil a mobile basing concept. If these capabilities cannot be met within existing or future AO/AOR platforms or even the LHDs, consideration to the mobile basing concept should identify a dedicated platform for this capability. This platform would have to be large enough to accommodate up to 130 personnel in addition to the crew with

Figure 3: *HMAS Sirius*
(source: Department of Defence)



Basing of RAN Assets and the Force Posture Review

support and recreational facilities, administration and warehouse facilities, hold space for dedicated workshops and maintenance facilities, hold sufficient fuel capacity to support submarines, future offshore combatant and MWVs on extended missions and the capability to deliver different types of fuels and lubricants, ability to store various types of ammunition and training facilities such as simulators and classrooms. It would be able to provide a one stop shop to support vessels on extended operations.

The capability possibilities of basing a dedicated support vessel operating within Australia's north are endless, particularly within the north-west region. Support could also extend towards other government departments by providing a platform for regional oceanographic and weather monitoring, marine mammal and conservation management support, oil spill response and emergency co-ordination, fisheries surveillance and response platform, Search and Rescue (SAR) response, offshore platform (GOPLAT) surveillance and monitoring, shipping monitoring through Vessel Tracking Services (VTS), Automatic Identification System (AIS) and Long Range Identification Tracking (LRIT), disaster response and co-ordination, Maritime Security Operations (MSO), casualty evacuation and the simple measure of providing a continued presence in the region that is set to expand in shipping congestion.

Support Facilities for the Mobile Basing Platforms and Forward Basing

Defence has numerous sites throughout Australia's north in support of a deployed platforms operating within Australia's northern approaches. These ports offer basic support such as fuel, victuals and respite. Point Murat

provides a suitable wharf for such support on Australia's north-west. Located in Exmouth, Point Murat provides suitable short term berthing arrangements for most types of vessels if added fendering arrangements are made to the wharf. The pre-positioning of fendering at the nearby *Harold E Holt* facility will provide the flexibility of RAN vessels (including submarines) to berth at the facility in suitable sea conditions. Point Murat wharf is in an exposed location to wind and tide and these needs to be carefully factored into planning with short programmed periods alongside. The strategic positioning of fuel reserves and other logistical needs would make Point Murat ideal as a destination to meet general logistical requirements and a holding site for stores and ammunition for a dedicated mobile basing platform.

The general cargo wharf at Dampier also provides another facility for RAN vessels to gain access to fuel, victuals and respite. Local airports also provide the flexibility to provide fresh victuals and facilitate personnel movements on the mobile basing platform and on the platforms on operations. This could allow routine personnel change outs and facilitate multi-crewing arrangements whilst on operations. Other facilities to various levels already exist within Australia's northern areas that can act as a logistical staging area for mobile basing platforms include Broome, Darwin, Gove, Thursday Island and Cairns.

The concept of forward basing is proposed to utilise existing port infrastructure already located within Australia's north. This requires careful and on-going consultation and relationship building with port authorities and state governments to facilitate the use of existing infrastructure when and where needed to meet ADF strategic aims. The ADF holds an MOU with Ports Australia

that facilitates mutual cooperation and understanding whilst ships and submarines utilise port facilities and infrastructure. Despite the good intent of the arrangement, commercial priorities remain overriding to ADF access to port facilities and in providing sustained security presence and operations, access to these facilities at short notice, particularly to the mobile basing vessel will be paramount.


For capital ships and submarines, maintenance and technical expertise in support of these platforms is expensive and difficult to sustain. Access to the larger Fleet Bases and into nearby industrial complexes is an important facet in sustaining and supporting capital ships and submarines. Despite a long synchronisation of support, with a new type of support vessel to support mobile basing, many more options are made available.

Access to Training, Exercise and Patrol Areas in Australia's North

Australia already holds access to training and exercise areas ashore and at sea. The North-West Australian Exercise Area (NWXA) lies off the North West Cape near Exmouth which is situated close to the North-West Shelf development areas. More routine exercises of a shallow water nature can be conducted by Major Fleet Units (MFU) in this area instead of the Western Australian Exercise Area off Perth may be a small undertaking and additional cost in fuel but a large offset in providing a security presence in the area.

Defence Force Posture Review

In announcing the Defence Force Posture review, the Defence Minister announced that the catalyst for the review is the changing strategic environment within the Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean area. He referred to the need for Australia to be in a



position to respond to a range of contingencies including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. He also referred to the need to complement the US Global Force Posture review.¹⁵

Whilst the Force Posture Review will affect the whole of the ADF, its focus will lie in reviewing the ADF's ability to respond to a developing threat closing the air-sea gap to Australia's north or deploy at short notice to respond to a developing regional threat. Coupled with the Force Posture Review, the recent US announcement of greater involvement on our shores provides a 'pivot point' to align with the US.¹⁶

The US President's recent visit to Australia on 16 November and the joint announcement with Australia's Prime Minister in the eventual stationing of 2500 US Marines commencing with an immediate contingent of 250 troops complements the US recognition of the growing importance in the region and possible attack on existing US

bases within the Asian region in Japan, Philippines, Guam and South Korea. The shift of US troops within the region begins a process of dispersing the US military footprint.¹⁷

In conclusion, the recent Force Posture Review announcement and the US shift in troop dispersal throughout the South Asian region under the US Global Force Posture review both provide the ADF the opportunity to review managing our presence within Australia's north and in particular Australia's north western approaches. This will enable the ADF to provide security to the burgeoning resource trade in Australia's north and provide protection to infrastructure from fast developing threats such as a terrorist attack, sabotage or enemy strike on these facilities. The amount of capital invested in resource development projects in Australia's north needs to be commensurate with a level of security protection. The speed at which threats can develop requires careful insight

into response and deployment times of existing ADF platforms and people to respond. Navy is not the only Service involved in countering such threats.

Sustainment of prolonged activities within Australia's north requires a layered approach to cover the tyranny of distance. This paper proposes the use of mobile basing as a technique in providing maintenance and logistical support to platforms on prolonged operations within Australia's northern areas. The ideal platform for mobile basing would be a dedicated design platform, but there exists within the RAN present inventory a smaller but proven capability to sustain platforms on operations through the mobile basing concept. The positioning of mobile basing allows flexibility in maintenance, logistical support and extension of Navy's capability into other areas of government activity.

The mobile basing vessel would require short notice access to local commercial port and airport facilities.

Figure 4: Australia's north-west Region
(source: <http://www.environment.gov.au/coasts/mhp/north-west/publications/images/northwest-draft-plan-figure23.jpg>)

Basing of RAN Assets and the Force Posture Review

These facilities (including existing Defence facilities) can provide a forward base for the mobile basing platform and provide more in depth access to maintenance facilities and logistical support. Greater liaison and co-operation with port authorities can only better these arrangements. Mutual understanding and support can only provide added security to port and offshore infrastructure whilst allowing platforms to remain on station longer.

Access to industrial complexes, docking facilities and on-site technical support provides the final layer of maintenance and logistical support to RAN platforms. The position of Fleet Bases already facilitate these regimes.

The opportunity to sustain longer patrol, surveillance, security presence to improve the ability for the ADF to be in an advantageous position to defend against attacks on infrastructure in Australia's north would be enhanced through the support of a mobile basing vessel. 🚢



Lieutenant Commander Grant White, RAN joined the Navy in 1996. After graduating from ADFA he specialised as a Navigating Officer and served onboard Fremantle Class Patrol Boats, FFG, FFH and HMAS Sirius. LCDR White served ashore as the Port Services Manager – Fleet Base West before joining HMAS Warramunga as the Executive Officer in 2010. The author thanks CAPT Brett Wolski ADC, RAN (Commanding Officer – HMAS Stirling) for assistance in developing the paper.

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Image: Eye in the Sky

AUSTRALIA'S FUTURE SUBMARINE CAPABILITY; AN INTEGRATED PLAN FOR SUCCESS

BY COMMANDER GLEN MILES

Australia's Future Submarine Capability – An Integrated Plan for Success

The 2009 Defence White Paper has laid a roadmap for the development of Australia's submarine force. A force comprised of twelve submarines, slightly larger and with longer endurance than our current *Collins*-class has been decided by the government as adequate to address a need to be "more potent in certain areas, particularly in undersea warfare and anti-submarine warfare (ASW)...strategic strike, special forces, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance"¹. In the White Paper, the government has attempted to tailor a force to deal with future strategic threats emerging from "the beginning of the end of the...uni-polar moment"² – that is the ascendancy of China and India to be militarily and economically competitive with the United States, the Global Financial Crisis, and continual instability in both our region and the Middle East.

The next 30 years are likely to bring about a greater chance of conflict in the region than a lesser one. Ice-free summers are expected in the Arctic within the period covered by the White Paper. This will mean a massive effort to tap energy resources that were previously unrecoverable and a potential shift in world trade routes with a resulting polarization of markets unseen since the openings of the Suez and Panama canals. More nations will acquire both nuclear power and nuclear weapons, including more in our own region.

The Government's 2009 commitment to expand Australia's submarine numbers was far-sighted and reflective of the position that the modern submarine is a force-multiplier. The delay in turning words

into action will have a significant effect on the introduction of this capability, and likely reduce our choices of platform. The stated reason – that the *Collins*-class issues must be remedied before SEA1000 will commence – is not consistent with logic associated with other government-initiated major projects such as the National Broadband Network, commenced when significant issues still remain with telecommunications across the nation. Submarines provide a deterrent by their mere existence and give a power-projection capability far beyond the net explosive quantity of their munitions. It is only with submarines can we truly take the fight to the enemy, real or potential, and achieve total surprise. This is a capability that will serve our nation superbly as the world powerbase shifts.

We have some major decisions to make in the immediate future, involving the largest industrial project in Australia's history. We must do this right. Australia's future submarine will be the linchpin of our strategic power and deserves a total package that underpins its importance. That means formulating a plan that will ensure that we can crew, train, support, evolve, sustain and employ our submarines so that not only does the Commonwealth get a sound return for the investment, but so that our potential adversaries

think hard before acting against Australia, and so our allies recognise the Australian Submarine Force as a formidable partner. A successful submarine future for Australia is reliant on an integrated submarine strategic plan.

An integrated plan would see all shore support come under the direct control of the Commander of the Submarine Force. For what will be Australia's only strategic platform, it is appropriate that this command be elevated to 2-star level. The Commander would be responsible for individual and collective Training, Escape and Rescue, Tactical Development, Logistics, Finance and Administration, Sustainment, Engineering, Ordnance, Futures, Operations and Personnel. This would then bring all areas related to submarines, some of which currently report elsewhere, consolidated under the direct responsibility of the



Collins-class trio running on the surface (RAN photo)

Commander. In short, the Commander of the Submarine Force would be responsible for all aspects of Australia's future submarine with the exception of acquisition, where he would be a joint stakeholder with the DMO. This would ensure the lines of accountability and responsibility were clear – certainly a desirable outcome.

Our missions for Australia's future submarines are largely defined in the White Paper and will be more or less the same as what they are now; ASW, ASuW, Mining, Special Forces, Strategic Strike and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). But our future submarine should not be a 'Jack-of-all-trades' and with dimensions described as only slightly larger than our current *Collins*-class nor will this be possible. Simply put, all submarines should have core warfighting ability, but we should plan on our future submarines being mission-configurable through the use of a changeable payload module. This could be used to house Special Forces equipment, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) or Underwater Vehicles (UUV), a land attack missile launch module, mobile mines, mine countermeasures or any number of other special fits including those associated with oceanographic research.

What we must always keep in mind though is that we cannot build a mini-SSN. The requisite power to size ratio does not increase in a linear manner as the size of the submarine increases, but in an exponential manner. We need to be very careful to be realistic about the expected capabilities of our new submarine for it is by the public's

expectations that the performance of the boat will be measured. Our core warfighting capabilities – that is sinking ships and submarines – must be complemented by the additional defensive capability to destroy fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. All of our future submarines must be capable of conducting sustained, multi-spectrum ISR at any time.

An integrated plan should also be based on a notional operating schedule so that rates of effort for industry support are known and can be priced from the beginning. The future submarine operational cycle should be based on a hybrid of the current Australian and US submarine cycles. All submarines should commence a cycle as is currently done, by individual and team training, followed by safety training. Once safety training is complete then basic warfighting skills including weapons firing evaluations should be completed. At the end of this period, as now, the submarine would be Unit Ready. A period of fleet availability would then occur, so that the submarine and other fleet units could train together in general warfighting exercises. On completion of this phase, the submarine would conduct ISR and payload-related training before deploying. Every submarine would be

expected to deploy as part of its cycle – there would be no "haves" and "have-nots".

The operational period would last approximately two years and include short maintenance periods. Deep Maintenance availabilities of six months duration would be conducted immediately after the two year cycle. Year-long (and greater) refits that cripple our current force availability would be consigned to history. A 2.5 year cycle would mean that with twelve submarines 2-3 would be in deep maintenance at any given time, 2-3 would be deployed, 2-3 would be working up and the remainder would be available for exercises and mission-specific preparations. This is represented at Figure 1, and represents a 5.5 year Usage and Upkeep Cycle. Whilst it may seem unusual to predicate a running cycle of a submarine yet to be built, it is precisely this way that statement of requirements should be written when calling for tenders. We would have an operational requirement of submarine availability that industry would be required to present a total solution to achieve, with an accurate indication of the ongoing industry workforce requirements.

Capability enhancements evolve at differing rates dependant on the




Figure 1 – Proposed Operating Cycle
(does not include introduction into service)

AUSTRALIA'S FUTURE SUBMARINE CAPABILITY; AN INTEGRATED PLAN FOR SUCCESS

technology involved. For example, diesel engine technology evolves at a far slower rate than computer technology. A Futures branch of the Australian Submarine Force should be created and charged with the investigation, development and implementation of new technologies to enhance our future submarine. The evolutionary process that already exists with our BYG-1 combat system and ADCAP torpedo is a good foundation to begin with and the concept must be expanded in scope, but limited in its rate of change. We should not be improving our submarines' capability at such a rate that the training, support and sustainment organizations cannot keep up. This is evident in the US Submarine Force of today, where (as of 2009) there are 26 combinations of combat and sonar systems spread over 70 hulls, and where it creates a training burden for each individual command. A six-month enhancement availability at the end of two running cycles (five years) might be sufficient.

Our future submarines should be chosen from designs that meet or exceed our operational requirements. In this, it is not desirable to specify for example that we are after a diesel electric submarine with air-independent propulsion. When speaking of power and propulsion we should merely state that we are seeking a non-nuclear submarine with a top speed of X knots to be sustained for Y hours, a submerged endurance of A days at B knots, and a range of C miles from home port. This gives industry leeway to examine alternative forms of technology that may not yet be widely available or even widely recognised such as aluminium combustion³, as well as improvements in traditional diesel-electric technology. Our current combat system Advanced Processor Build/Tech Insertion (APB/TI) schedule would fit well into this plan,



and we should continue to plan on combat system upgrades during every second release.

With regards to specific capabilities and equipment, it is certainly in our interest to maintain close interoperability with the US, and to that end to continue leveraging of the vast resources available to our closest ally. BYG-1 and its variants and successors should be a part of our submarine future, as should our investment in the ADCAP torpedo. This is not to say that we should tie ourselves into the sole-sourcing of all our submarine electronics and weaponry from the US and again, besides these two examples we need to express our operational requirements in broad terms.

We should continue to explore alternatives for all our needs, and utilize Australian products where ever they can be demonstrated to be the superior choice, but we should not be limited by this principle. Our masts should generally be non-hull penetrating, and each mast 'silo' should have common interfaces for hoisting mechanics and connecting power/electronics so that we can interchange masts to suit the mission. A minimum of one optical periscope should be retained, although an Optronic/Photonic ability should

be seriously considered in addition. The future submarine should be capable of up/downlink and control of UAS and link-type operations. A full suite of high data rate, discreet and encrypted communications should be available. We must not forget the lesson than we must be able to conduct visual observations, conduct basic communications and receive electronic warning from a single mast to keep our radar cross section low. A dived Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) radar capability is essential.

Our expertise in electronic warfare across the spectrum must not only be maintained but increased and supplemented with a spectrum-denial capability. The obvious need for hull-mounted sonar will persist into the future, as will the usefulness of a reliable and supported towed array, but we should not overlook the contribution that offboard sonar sensors such as UUVs are already providing today. A mine avoidance capability against all types of sea mines is essential. Our future submarine will require discreet, long range underwater voice and data communications. Communications at depth and speed will be essential for operations with surface, air and land forces. Lastly and

*Collins-class ready
for hull work
(Courtesy RAN)*

very importantly, all our sensors and weapons should be of a plug'n'play nature, compatible with a common control system.

In 2011 we stand unable to fulfill our potential as a submarine force because we do not have sufficient numbers of trained and experienced people to fully crew four submarines, let alone fill our vital positions ashore. The problem is recognised and solutions are being implemented, but we are implementing these for a force of six submarines. In the near future we will be required to have crews for twelve submarines. The easiest solution that some will propose is to ensure that the twelve future submarines have complements that are less than the current numbers onboard *Collins*-class submarines. It is important to recognise that the number of crew is predicated on what it takes to effectively fight the submarine during war, not conduct independent peacetime passages. An increased number of mission types would generally indicate that there would be an increased number of specializations/rates. We also must take into account the limitations of human beings – we can only process so much information at a time, and we have physical endurance limits. We should not therefore automatically take for granted that crew numbers can be reduced from what they are now without a corresponding reduction in capability and endurance. Even our highly-automated *Collins*-class submarines now require 60 people to run them as well as generate the force – a significant increase over the originally estimated number of 42.

To ensure that we train our force effectively, positions in the submarine training world need to be filled by hand-picked, superior people. We need to incentivise training positions and cannot afford to get this wrong by filling training positions with the wrong

people for the sake of filling a billet. An integrated plan should address these key aspects of personnel to ensure that Australia's future submarine will be a sound investment.

Boosting our submarine force numbers is not something that can occur overnight – we need to set realistic targets and do what we can to retain the people we have so that we can train the ones we want. Whilst the solution isn't entirely monetary, it must be realised that money will certainly talk in this case. Taking from the experience of the US Navy where nuclear engineers and operators (as of 2009) receive rolling bonuses to remain for either 2, 4 or 5 years, we should be looking at something similar to retain hard-won experience. The US Navy is paying for people it wishes to retain, and retaining them for periods that ensure their force remains viable. The RAN has not done this well. The periods and amounts associated with retention bonuses do not ensure force viability. Australia's future submarine force should be able to offer sign-on, qualification and 5-year retention bonuses based on experience, with tiered levels as submariners reach 5, 10 and 15 years of submarine experience. This would ensure that it would be a very big step to take for a submariner to leave the service, as he or she could be sure that a large portion of their

mortgage would be taken care of every five years. The money should be paid up-front in a lump sum, so that achieving five years would not warrant a pay-off to leave. Again taking from the experience of the US Navy, a submarine career should not mean a life-sentence of 'watch on, stop on.' We must offer shore postings out of branch at intervals that allow both career broadening and respite.

Currently, we are hampered in our efforts to recruit submariners because we can only offer potential a life in Western Australia. As of 2009, according to the Australian Bureau of Statistics, in 2010 the population of Australia was projected to be in the order of 22 million.⁴ Of this 22 million, only 1.6 million reside in Western Australia. Assuming a linear, consistent recruitment rate regardless of state, this means that statistically only 7% of the RAN is likely to come from WA. Therefore 93% of the RAN has their main support network of family and friends elsewhere. This is strong discouragement to many of those contemplating a submarine career. To combat this, some of Australia's future submarines should be East Coast based. This, of course, is not the only reason that submarines should be based on the East Coast. There is certainly a strategic imperative as well as a substantial surface force

Collins-class enters dock. Should their successors be maintained on the east coast? (Courtesy RAN)



AUSTRALIA'S FUTURE SUBMARINE CAPABILITY; AN INTEGRATED PLAN FOR SUCCESS

and Fleet Air Arm ASW capability gain to be realized through regular interaction. Adding a squadron of four-six submarines to an already congested Fleet Base east is a tall order, but there is an alternative that should be considered: Newcastle.

Newcastle is 60nm from Sydney, therefore not so far that ships and submarines would not regularly interact. It has a protected harbour, and major shipbuilding and repair facilities. Although construction of a submarine base would require substantial infrastructure investment, it would be far less expensive than construction of a similar facility in Sydney, and provide an enormous and much needed boost to the Hunter region economy. It would also alleviate the issues sure to be created when the new LHDs are based in Sydney. Our force would be, for the first time, divided into two squadrons. What this would give us is freedom of choice in both sea and shore postings, and an opportunity to increase our recruiting base. Should the choice of platform focus on a Military Off-The-Shelf (MOTS) solution with a reduced range from what is desired, ports in Western Australia such as Exmouth significantly reduce the transit to forward operating areas, and should be considered as a submarine (and surface force) base not only for this reason, but due to the proximity to Australia's major oil and gas development region.

The delivery schedule of our submarines should be such that two should be commissioned as every one *Collins*-class is paid off. This would stagger the delivery so that emerging issues with the new submarines could be rectified in the ones following, but would not halt the increase in our submarine force altogether. It is important that we avoid a repetition of the Defence/Industry conflict that we have previously experienced, and even more so that we avoid the depth

of negative publicity which has plagued our submarine arm in recent years. The future submarine needs to arrive with a bang, and impress from the outset – only a cooperative approach will ensure this.

To conclude, what we have been given by the White Paper and therefore the people of Australia is not just 12 new submarines but a chance to shape the future of Australia's submarine fleet for the next half century. We should seize this opportunity to put in place an Integrated Submarine Strategic Plan that will redefine how we operate.

By restructuring our Submarine Force and consolidating our diaspora under one command we can influence the way ahead like never before. Under the command of a 2-star, submarines will assume a much higher visibility as Australia's sole platform for strategic strike. As such, we must ensure that our plan for the future encompasses a thorough personnel recruiting and retention path with actions outstanding from previous reviews being implemented, and new initiatives such as experienced-based retention bonuses introduced. Perth should be augmented by Exmouth and joined by Newcastle as a home to our submarines – this will increase our recruiting base, provide fleet interaction opportunities and eliminate at least three weeks of wasted transit time for each submarine that currently operates off Sydney.

Our statement of requirements to industry should aim to be as non-specific regarding equipment as possible when formulating the call for tender. The operational need and capability endstate should be what we ask industry to provide. We should pre-determine what the running cycle will be, so that we are not left with inordinate periods of submarines in extended maintenance. The aim should be much less maintenance, not more, and the catch-cry of the new boat

should be "availability". This gives industry options to provide a total solution to our needs, with a workforce package to achieve it. Finally, the future in the region is, as always, an uncertain one. Too many variables exist to predict if and when a major conflict will arise that involves our submarine force but the one thing we can be sure of is that the notice will not be great and our submarine force needs to be ready. A future submarine force that is created from an integrated plan will ensure that. A decision regarding our new submarines needs to be made now, or we run a significant risk of losing the luxury of choice regarding the type of platform, or having a capability gap forced upon us. ✎

This essay has been adapted from one written in 2009 that won the inaugural Submarine Institute of Australia essay prize.



Commander Glen Miles is the current Commanding Officer of HMAS Farncomb. He has served in the Submarine Force for 19 years in both Oberon and Collins-class submarines, and previously commanded HMAS Collins.

(Endnotes)

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It's Preparedness, Stupid.

BY REAR ADMIRAL DAVYD THOMAS

In 1992, Bill Clinton made a statement about the fundamental role of the economy in a nation's success when he said it's the economy stupid. From my experience over the past decade, the same could be said of the link between preparedness and a successful Navy. It's that basic because in many ways it is the linchpin of our success. It is a core task for Navy. Significantly, it gives Government confidence in the Navy, it reinforces the relevance of the Navy and highlights the professionalism of those who serve, and all that entails within and outside Navy. It is all about preparedness!

The 2007 Wilson Review came about as a result of the then imminent co-location of the Joint Operations Command at Bungendore. From February 2007, the three Services were no longer to be enmeshed in the conduct of operations; they now had a clear and distinct role to Raise, Train and Sustain (RTS) their services in order to provide the forces necessary for the conduct of operations. This was actually a fundamental shift, and it has now been in place for almost five years.

Yet this change seems not readily understood by many across the ADO. It's not that some stakeholders in Navy cling to the past era of conducting operations because that's what they always did, it's a lack of understanding by many of what a Service is actually meant to do, what it is to be accountable for. We now have a new mandate and a new mission! This is a cultural and capability issue for Navy and it needs to be addressed to best ensure our warfighting culture is enhanced and Navy is best prepared to undertake operations in support of ADF goals and objectives.

If there was any doubt about Navy's apparent lack of understanding of where readiness and sustainment



impact our Force, let the Amphibious Force lesson of 2010 and 2011 reinforce that we collectively have a responsibility to meet the balance between readiness and sustainment, to provide assets now and into the future. An out of balance readiness and sustainment equation comes to the fore only when the future becomes the present, and various sustainment issues spill over into readiness. When our preparedness directive can't be met, we fail to meet our most basic task.

This goes to the heart of preparedness and is why it is so important. As a Navy, and indeed as a Defence organisation, we have to think in these terms and be aligned as one organization in support of that collective endeavour. Simply put, it's all about preparedness, and this sort of thinking needs to permeate our entire Navy, including those who support us. Only by being an informed and focused customer measuring the right things, can we get readiness and sustainment in balance across all our inputs to capability from equipment to people to organisation, in order to meet

obligations for which we will be held collectively accountable. The Australian community rightly expects their dollars will meet these obligations now – and into the future.

Inculcating Preparedness into Navy

The real issue is how to best inculcate preparedness into our Navy and how to best ensure a ready and sustained force going forward. Remember this is about culture shift and enhancing a warfighting culture. There a number of ways we can address this, which when taken together will focus our Navy on the job at hand and therefore improve our deliverables. First, review the mission. Second educate. Third, focus on sustainment, and finally, get radical.

Review the Mission

Navy's current mission is "to fight and win in the maritime environment". Correctly it's about war fighting. But this mission does not support the revised role of Navy and the advent of JOC within the ADF command chain.

*Multi-role capability
- USS Bonhomme
Richard (Photo by
Michael Nitz)*

It's Preparedness, Stupid.

Navy's role is now about being ready to fight and win and so our mission needs to take this into account. It should read "to be ready to fight and win in the maritime environment". This does not detract from our Navy as a warfighting entity; rather it supports it, because such a mission forces a focus on what it means to be ready. What this change does is remove any doubt that Navy still exists to conduct operations. It reinforces the fact that sustainment is an essential element of readiness, and that a balance between the two is required, in addition to a thorough understanding of what comprises each element. It makes us understand what we should be directing as a Navy, and what we shouldn't.

By way of example, Navy conducts international engagement. Until the revised C2 arrangements were in place, this was conducted internal to Navy as part of the raise, train and sustain function and managed through fleet headquarters through a standing deployment instruction. Things are different now, or at least they should be. International Engagement is a Defence task and Navy should be used to support it as a Phase Zero shaping activity. Navy should not be sending ships offshore on overseas deployments without being part of a standing Operation (in support of Phase Zero, shaping) sanctioned by the ADF's sole operational command headquarters - HJOC.

Not for a moment am I professing Navy does not get training benefit from this international activity, but it should no longer be originated, governed and commanded inside Navy. Simply, Fleet doesn't do operations and this is a spill over from pre-2007 thinking. We must walk the talk, adapt and not fear the change. In addition to providing role clarity, it will also put a cost on International Engagement and drive more focused activity across the



ADF. For some reason Navy has been reluctant to take it on and likewise so has JOC. Until that is done, the C2 changes will be rhetoric and the ADF will not be as effective as it could be. A new mission, more focused on Navy's core role drives this sort of necessary cultural change, and much more.

Education

There is a broad spectrum of knowledge of the subject of preparedness. At one end there are the zealots whose referent positions actually provide guidance or opinion in the absence of policy. At the other end, there are those who see it as a bureaucratic distraction and don't think in these terms. From my dealings there are many more in the latter group, than the former. We need to

educate every stakeholder on what Preparedness actually means and what it comprises at its core. Doctrinally there is documentation on the subject, but there is little on the practice or what preparedness means as an end to end system from a raise, train and sustain perspective. The CN Capability Directive should provide at least some of that guidance, but until all inputs are treated as part of the system we will stay at a low knowledge baseline. Without traction, the drive will not be there to change the culture. That this document is not central to our role as a Navy highlights our cultural thinking

*New technology
- Singapore RSS
Formidable (photo
by Chris Sattler)*

*All types of vessels
provide usefulness
- Indonesian Navy
corvette KD Kedah
(photo by Michael
Nitz)*



on the subject. Regrettably it is left to a select few, yet there is a part for all.

By way of example, when readiness cannot be met, or sustainment is in jeopardy, reporting it through the Preparedness Management System is often seen as an afterthought. The seemingly inordinate time taken to raise a Deficiency Report is testament to my assertion. Preparedness is an afterthought for many because we have not educated our people on it. Yet it can be taught. Stakeholders need to understand the doctrine, the preparedness requirement, the fundamental inputs to capability and where they impact readiness and sustainment, the readiness sustainment balance and accountability, governance, the Defence Preparedness Management (reporting) System and the arrangements in place to manage it within Navy, and our reporting obligations. We cannot rely on osmosis to impart knowledge on this stuff. If we are to change culture we need a plan and educate all stakeholders through a formal training force developed course, so when they become senior leaders it will be a fundamental part of their focus and lexicon.

Focus on Sustainment

Navy's task of providing ready forces in accordance with the covenant with CDF and CJOPS is a core expectation. Indeed failure to meet it understandably gets close CDE, Government and media attention. The pressure this creates often results in the balance being tilted to meet readiness demands over sustainment. Understandable, but there needs to be an organizational – not just Navy – understanding and acceptance of the opportunity cost of meeting readiness at the expense of long term sustainment. There are many examples including having major fleet units



conducting mundane long haul tasks for Operation Resolute, at the expense of sustaining core warfighting skills.

Tasks like this may satisfy today, but at a cost for tomorrow's leaders. The same can be said of Navy's failure to enforce compliance on respite for our Operation Resolute patrol boat crews when this issue could ultimately impact our ability to support future readiness for Operations. The key message is that today's sustainment becomes tomorrow's readiness. The Amphibious example of 2010 and 2011 once again provides us with a classic example of a lack of focus on sustaining forces. For too long maintenance and regulatory compliance has been seen as an overhead, rather than an enabler, and its long term impact is clear for all too see.

The simple question that always needs to be asked is how today sustainment issue could impact tomorrow's readiness.

By all means tilt to readiness but make that decision, within an organisational accountability trail. Unfortunately, finding accountability for sustainment is not an easy task because organizational failure often takes years to manifest. Again, the Amphibious ships provide a classic example, where a generation of stakeholders has contributed in cumulative ways to create the recent train smash. This outcome started with the government decision to purchase secondhand ships and took 15 years to manifest. The same logic applies to Navy People where our engineering qualification shortfalls have been a

Homegrown build capability - newly finished Offshore Patrol vessel HMNZ Otago photographed in Australia by Kevin Dunn-FLEETLINE

HMAS Stuart and friend at the Doha International Maritime Defence Exhibition 2010 (photo by Michael Nitz)



It's Preparedness, Stupid.

known sustainment issue for years and have now impacted readiness. The upshot of this presents a dilemma for Navy. Without ships available for sea there is not enough opportunity for training throughput so resolving the conflict between maintenance and training demand is required for Navy to assure readiness into the future. This highlights the inexorable link between readiness and sustainability.

The solution in this case is a step change in the use of simulation, and not relying on ships to provide all the training. This is what a focus on sustainment achieves - Assured Readiness. And Assured Readiness is the responsibility of all who steward forces. So important is it that it should form part of any future performance appraisal. Reward readiness by all means but focus on and reward sustainment too.

Get Radical

Apart from the impact on the capability edge, ageing ships are more expensive to maintain at the end of life than at the start. This spills over into sustainment and readiness and all that its detrimental impacts entail. Given capability is the ADO's goal, Defence and Government could take a different view of the impact of force structure provisioning on sustainment, and hence readiness. Forces could be disposed of around mid life, rather than at end of their life. At first glance, this may seem expensive but a cost benefit analysis may provide a different answer.

If we look at shipbuilding in Australia and see it as a priority industry, and if we look at disposal as an opportunity (rather than an afterthought) within the capability life cycle, we could sell ships to developing states thus improving our own sustainment, readiness and enhancing our capability edge. The notion that we

need to hold onto our ships until they reach end of life needs to be tested. Significantly, it would better sustain our Navy and ultimately provide Assured Readiness. In this scenario the potential winners are Government, the workforce, defence industry, Navy and the operational commander.

Time for Action

Preparedness is the key to a successful Navy yet it has not been viewed as a system, or holistically, nor have the various inputs been attacked with this in mind. Assured Readiness can only be achieved by a collective, organisational focus on a sustainment framework by all stakeholders, not just the zealots. To achieve this Navy needs to adjust its mission post the 2007 command and control changes, to reflect the notion of Assured Readiness. Likewise there needs to be an education program to reinforce the subject of Preparedness to a generation of stakeholders, and to inculcate preparedness management into Navy's culture. We have had the train smash and it's time to make the change.

In the context of preparedness, consideration should be given to getting radical with the provisioning and disposal of assets, in order to assure readiness into the future. It comes down to a cost benefit analysis. Although the 2010-11 amphibious experience has been a difficult one for Navy, it represents an opportunity to finally address preparedness holistically. Assured Readiness is a complex task requiring careful judgment at many levels and tough decisions and a step change for Navy to inculcate it as core business. We need to think differently and link all the inputs to our new role - preparedness. We can. 🚢



Rear Admiral Davyd Thomas, RANR served in the full time navy until late 2011. Key appointments included Commodore Flotillas, Fleet Commander and Deputy Chief of Navy during periods of great change. He is now a part of the Defence Export Unit in the DMO.

JP Stevenson: Justice denied - A CAREER UNFAIRLY CUT SHORT

BY DAVID FARTHING

Judge Advocate: "It is competent for the Court, whether the accused be an officer or rating, to record a verdict of honourable acquittal, but only in exceptional cases and where the professional conduct or personal honour of the accused is in issue."

*Subsequently:
"This is the Court's finding: the first charge - Honourable Acquittal; the second charge - Honourable Acquittal."*

(EXTRACTS FROM THE COURT MARTIAL OF CAPTAIN J.P. STEVENSON, 25 AUGUST 1969)

John Philip Stevenson comes from a naval family. His father John B. Stevenson joined the Royal Navy as a Cadet in 1890. Stevenson Senior's first connection with the RAN occurred when, having been lent by the Admiralty, he came to Australia as Commander of *HMAS Encounter* in 1911 and then had command of *HMAS Cerberus*, then the naval depot at Williamstown. He served in several RAN cruisers during WWI and was promoted to Captain in 1916. Having transferred to the RAN, he served in Navy Office, as Australian Naval Representative in London from 1924 to 1927, and as Second Naval Member of the Commonwealth Naval Board. He was briefly Acting Chief of Naval Staff. He retired as a consequence of the severe naval reductions of the depression.

RAN COLLEGE

J P Stevenson joined RANC in January 1935 and graduated in December 1938, with prizes in Mathematics, Chemistry and Physics. On Subs' Courses he established an early reputation for excellence with "firsts" in Signals, Gunnery, Navigation and Pilotage, and Torpedo courses. His first ship was *HMS Shropshire* and he relates his first naval "adventure". In 1940 the Admiralty issued an order that all Dutch merchant ships were to be arrested. JPS found himself "as a very nervous Midshipman" climbing up the side of a 5000-ton freighter, with a support party of fifteen sailors, to take the ship into Dakar. After two pleasant weeks in Dakar, he was retrieved by *Shropshire's* Walrus and rejoined his ship in Freetown. *Shropshire* then took part in the hunt for the *Graf Spee* and subsequently in the operation against the *Bismarck*. He was posted as Navigator of *HMAS Nestor* not long before that ship was sunk (bombs and a torpedo) in the Med in 1942. He then joined the sister ship, *HMAS Napier*.

In 1943 Lieutenant Stevenson was posted back to *Shropshire*, then fitting out in the UK for re-commissioning and transfer to the RAN as a replacement for *HMAS Canberra*. On arrival in Australia, *Shropshire* joined Task Force 74 - comprising three USN and three RAN cruisers and five USN and three RAN destroyers - for service in the Solomons and with a support base in Milne Bay. *Shropshire* had the best radar

and thus had the air warning duties for the force. JPS clearly impressed as a radar officer as he was then selected with his good friend "Dusty"

Millar (later Captain Robin A H Millar RAN) to undergo the Radar Officers' course in the UK. He flew by B24 Liberator to San Francisco, travelled by train across the US, with a two week stopover in Washington and then a "very uncomfortable" passage across the Atlantic in *Queen Elizabeth*.

RADAR COURSE

The Admiralty "boffins" declared that the two RAN officers could not possibly complete the course because their academic qualifications were inadequate, but they stuck to their guns and passed the six month course at Eastbourne - undeterred by being directly under the flight path of V1s (many) and a few V2s. After the course, JPS was given high priority to return



Captain Stevenson, with cap, in winter uniform

RANC Class Photo: Flinders Year 1935 entry:

Back row L to R: D H Stevens, P Berry Smith, E R Eddy, R C Savage, R G Watkins.

Front row L to R: J P Stevenson, E P Keatinge, G V Gladstone, Lt Cdr A G Skipwirth, A D Black, D A H Clarke, E H Simmonds.



JP Stevenson: Justice denied - A CAREER UNFAIRLY CUT SHORT

to Australia and ordered to fly home; initially in a Sunderland. Dusty Millar received lower priority, travelled by sea, and beat him home.

WAR'S END

Lieutenant Stevenson finished the war in *HMAS Shropshire* as Fleet Radar Officer and was at the surrender in Tokyo Bay. Shortly after the surrender, he was detached to a joint Allied force tasked with Prisoner of War recovery and restoration of Japanese essential services. A few days later he was flown to Nagasaki in a C47 aircraft. The Japanese had immobilised the airfield runways by digging trenches across them. After searching for some time, the aircraft captain announced that they would have to do a belly landing. JPS says that "this was probably my least enjoyable experience of the war."

The group then went to the coal mines where the POW's had been most harshly treated and were in the greatest need of help. They organized air drops of food and medical supplies and had to deal with serious unrest between national groups, some of whom had been collaborating with their captors. JPS also reported that there was no opposition from the Japanese; they had completely accepted the Emperor's order to surrender.

SHORE POSTING, AND ANOTHER COURSE

Post-war found Lieutenant Stevenson training radar operators at *HMAS Watson*. Infrastructure was basic and they went to the Watsons' Bay pub for meals. After six months at *Watson*, he was informed that he was to be transferred to the Electrical Branch. A polite, but determined "no thank you" resulted in JPS, accompanied by J L W "Red" Merson, travelling in RMS *Strathaird* to UK for long N/D Courses.

On passage he first met Joanne, his future wife, but she disembarked in India and they did not meet again for a further five years.

After his N/D course he joined the frigate *HMS Loch Quoich* as Navigator and served in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. He was briefly CO of the minesweeper *HMS Flying Fish*, which was soon deployed elsewhere, and then joined *HMS Vengeance* as Direction Officer in the Med, before transferring to *HMAS Sydney* which had returned to the UK to collect RN sailors transferring to the RAN.

COMMANDS AND PROMOTIONS

On return to Australia JPS assumed command of *HMAS Barcoo*, then the training ship, followed by a brief period in command of *Hawkesbury*. He commented that "the River class ships were good to handle". Then followed *HMAS Australia* as Fleet D, Navy Office as Director of Plans, Manus Island (*HMAS Tarangau*) "to sort out some irregularities", and a very enjoyable interlude in the Royal Yacht as ADC to the Duke of Edinburgh for the Melbourne Olympic Games. (He had been promoted Commander on 30 June 1954.)

Next he was CO of *Anzac* and the ship was awarded the Gloucester Cup in 1957. Marriage followed and a very agreeable appointment to the US Naval War College. He did not finish this course as another "crash" posting intervened; this time as Naval Attaché in Bangkok. JPS reports that he achieved an "adequate" level of fluency in both spoken and written Thai. After Bangkok he was XO at *Watson* before becoming D10 (as Acting Captain; it would be confirmed 31 December 1960) in *Vendetta*. He was detached briefly from *Vendetta* to act as Naval Adviser to Counsel assisting the Royal

Commission into the *Melbourne/Voyager* collision. Unsurprisingly, Counsel Assisting, Jack Smyth QC, soon decided that he knew all there was to know about naval matters and Stevenson returned to his ship.

COMMAND OF THE FLAGSHIP

Captain Stevenson then had command of *HMAS Sydney*, was Commodore Superintendent of Training at Cerberus (where the writer first met him and learned a great deal about leadership) and had a tour as Naval Attaché in Washington before assuming command of *HMAS Melbourne*.

On the 3 June 1969, Captain J P Stevenson's distinguished and remarkable career came to an abrupt and desperately unjust end.



*Captain J P Stevenson
RAN*

*Aircraft carrier:
HMAS Melbourne*



SEATO EXERCISE SEA SPIRIT

A few days earlier, at the end of May 1969, *HMAS Melbourne* was at anchor in Manila Bay preparing for the SEATO Exercise Sea Spirit, an exercise involving convoy escort from Manila to Sattahip in Thailand. Ships in the *Melbourne* Task Group comprised *HMAS Melbourne*, USS *Larson*, USS *Keyes*, USS *Frank E Evans*, HMS *Cleopatra* and HMNZS *Blackpool*. FOCAF, Rear Admiral G J B Crabb CBE DSC RAN, was task Force Commander; Captain Stevenson was Task Unit Commander.

In Manila, Captain Stevenson entertained the Commodore of the USN Destroyer Squadron and all the exercise Commanding Officers to dinner. In his own words: "The purpose or the dinner was to get to know the Captains, exchange information, tell them what I was going to do, and to build confidence. I said to them all; 'I want you to be particularly vigilant as we are going into a wartime situation, so you have to be on the ball.' " He also said "*Melbourne* had a collision with *Voyager* in 1964 and we do not want to have another. Watch my signals very closely before going to your new position. I do not think that either the RAN or its Government can stand another collision at sea."

He also said words to the effect "If there is to be any close manoeuvring the Captain has to be on the bridge." (For readers unfamiliar with aircraft carrier operations, it must be pointed out that a carrier is severely restricted in its ability to manoeuvre while it is operating aircraft, for reasons of flight safety. For this reason, all escorting vessels — which necessarily are much more

manoeuvrable than the much-larger carrier — are invariably required and obliged to keep out of the way of the carrier at such times.)

DEPARTURE FROM MANILA

The Task Group sailed from Manila on 29 May. On the night of 30/31 May the feared collision was narrowly avoided. USS *Larson* was moving from the screen to planeguard astern of *Melbourne* on a clear, moonlight night with a calm sea. Visibility was excellent. *Larson* initially turned away from *Melbourne*, but then reversed her course and headed directly towards the carrier. Captain Stevenson broadcast in the clear "You are on a collision course"; *Larson* then used hard rudder and passed very close down *Melbourne's* starboard side - one estimate gave the minimum clearance as 100 feet (30.5 metres).

It later transpired that *Larson's* CO was not on the bridge. Rear Admiral Crabb sent for the USN Commodore and pointed out that FOCAF Standing Orders stipulated that destroyers changing station were always to turn


away from the carrier. Commander Rilling, CO of *Larson*, reported that he received a "serious chewing out from the Commodore."

TRAGEDY

Tragically, on the night of 2-3 June an almost identical situation occurred which did not have such a happy ending. Again visibility was excellent; witnesses said "you could see for miles;" again the US destroyer *Frank E Evans* turned towards the carrier; again *Melbourne* broadcast in the clear "You are on a collision course"; again the destroyer CO was not on the bridge. The difference in this situation was that neither of the officers on *Evans's* bridge was fully qualified and there

Jo and Philip Stevenson at HMAS Watson on the day of his court martial

Stern half of destroyer with two other escorts and two helos nearby: USS *Frank E Evans* after the collision with HMAS *Melbourne*; HMS *Cleopatra* and USS *Larson* are in attendance



JP Stevenson: Justice denied - A CAREER UNFAIRLY CUT SHORT

was more time to recover the situation because, after the *Larson* incident, screen spacing had been increased from two thousand to three thousand yards. But even that extra time did not stop what happened.

Shortly after 0300 on the 3 June *Melbourne* and *Frank E Evans* collided. *Evans* was cut in two; her forward end sank immediately and the stern section remained afloat. 74 American crew members lost their lives. (The details of the precise actions leading up to the collision, and its aftermath, have been discussed at length in numerous other places, and will not be addressed here. The accident was unbelievably harrowing, and included many instances of personal heroism and individual tragedy. Of the latter, the worst was certainly the loss of three brothers from one family on board the *Evans*; their father, also on board, survived.)

JOINT BOARD OF INVESTIGATION

Following this disaster, a Joint USN/RAN Board of Investigation was convened. The senior American officer and President of the Board was Rear Admiral Jerome H King Jr USN. Australian members were Rear Admiral H D Stevenson CBE RAN, Captain J Davidson RAN and Captain K W Shands OBE RAN. This article will not explore the details of this Investigation. Many readers will be familiar with at least the broad outline and Joanne Stevenson's excellent book, *In the wake*, provides a good reference point.

FLAWS IN THE CONDUCT OF THE INVESTIGATION

Almost any lay person and especially any mariner, on reading a transcript of the Investigation would recognise the unfairness and injustice of the

process that was followed. For a legal practitioner the abandonment of the basic rules of procedural fairness is horrifying. The hectoring, overbearing approach of Admiral King is disturbing enough, but the passive acceptance by the Australian Board members of the irregularities in the conduct of the Investigation is sickening and incomprehensible.

The writer accepts that the RAN Board members must have received very firm riding instructions of a political nature, laying stress on the importance of the American alliance, but the absence of moral fibre in all the circumstances is hard to understand. The writer cannot accept the suggestion that the alliance was so fragile that the prospect of three Australian officers standing up for Australian rights would have placed the relationship in jeopardy. On the contrary, their unquestioning acquiescence could only have reduced respect for the RAN.

Admiral King should never have been allowed to head the Investigation as the US destroyers were under his operational command. The earlier, very similar incident with *USS Larson*, combined with the *Evans* disaster, may well have pointed to systemic failures within the Destroyer Squadron and, perhaps, in the wider US Navy. Admiral King quite deliberately and forcefully prevented all evidence of that earlier near-disaster from being discussed or reported.

Even under the "dodgy" procedural rules adopted for this Investigation, Captain Stevenson should have been warned early in the proceedings that he was suspected of an offence. He would then have been entitled, as were American witnesses, to decline to give evidence and to be legally represented. The Investigation's findings reported him for contributory negligence without his ever having been warned

previously that he was suspected of doing something or failing to do something.

Tony Vincent, a successful Sydney barrister and an officer in the RAN Legal Reserve Panel, was excluded from

appearing at the investigation on the specious grounds that he may have represented more than one client. The USN legal staff in Subic Bay comprised dozens of lawyers; Vincent was the only Australian Counsel available. The Naval Board apparently thought that Commander H H Glass QC RANR could represent Australian interests, but he was Counsel assisting the Board and had very different responsibilities.

Vincent, now deceased, commented that if he had been allowed to appear, his presence may have boosted the morale of Australian witnesses in the "massively Americanized" atmosphere; and may have given more backbone to the Australian members of the Court (who, despite their undoubted abilities,



Vice Admiral Jerome H King Jr USN. As Rear Admiral, King was President of the Joint USN/RAN Board of Investigation into the collision. He died in 2008

Destroyer carrying number 754: USS Frank E Evans (DD754), in 1963



allowed Admiral King to completely dominate the proceedings). He may also have been able to intervene when the findings of contributory negligence (without the requisite prior warning to Captain Stevenson) were announced.

FROM INVESTIGATION TO COURT MARTIAL

Following this procedural travesty, tailored to suit Admiral King's purpose, consideration was given by the RAN to the Court Martial of J.P. Stevenson. Despite the fact that he had given evidence that Captain Stevenson had done nothing wrong, Admiral Crabb, FOCAF, received orders from Canberra to convene a Court Martial. This placed Crabb in a most difficult situation as the legal advice he was receiving was adamant that there were no grounds for a Court Martial. Gordon Samuels, QC, J P Stevenson's Accused's Friend at the Court Martial (and much later Governor of NSW), wrote "I do not think that ever in my experience as an advocate I have appeared in a proceeding for a defendant in which the prosecution's case was so totally bereft of any possible proof of guilt."

The Court Martial was convened at *HMAS Watson* on 20 August 1969. Captain Stevenson faced two charges:

- (1) That he failed to give a positive direction to USS *Frank E Evans* to correct the collision course; and
- (2) That he failed to back his engines when it was determined that action by *Evans* alone could not have avoided collision.

HONOURABLE ACQUITTAL ON BOTH CHARGES

Throughout the brief proceeding Admiral Crabb reaffirmed his complete support for Captain Stevenson's

actions. On completion of the prosecution's case the Judge Advocate, Commander P L Sharp QC RANR, directed the Court that, as a matter of law, there was no case to answer. He then explained that the Court could return a verdict of "no case to answer" or the alternative of "Honourable Acquittal". After a brief retirement the Board returned with the verdicts of "Honourable Acquittal" on both charges.

A NEW POSTING

So ended two processes, the Investigation and the Court Martial, which were both in some respects farcical. Soon after the Court Martial, Captain Stevenson was informed that he would be sent to a new posting, as Chief Staff Officer to FOICEA: a position that was at the time filled by a junior captain. His new posting would clearly be a substantial reduction in status and responsibility, and could not be regarded as anything other than a demotion. In the circumstances, Stevenson felt that, having been cleared by Court Martial of any wrong-doing, he had no honourable alternative other than to resign.

An editorial published at about that time in *The Canberra Times* said "... in his (Captain Stevenson's) new appointment he may well have leisure for reflection, for he has been made Chief Staff Officer to the Flag Officer In Charge of the Eastern Australia Area. It is a shore job, one which until now has been the preserve of officers at least nine years his junior. He will not be able to take, for some time at least, the courses at the Imperial Defence College. ... If an officer who was one of the RAN's most senior and respected captains, and who was found to have no case to answer at his court martial, must be put ashore and punished, then that in itself is a naval disaster."

OTHER OPINIONS

Perhaps the thoughts of Gordon Samuels QC, as he drove back to the city after the verdicts, constitute the best summary: "I said goodbye to her (Joanne) and to Steve and drove alone back to town. I clearly remember this curiously empty feeling, quite contrary to the elation which counsel would feel after a good win. I think that the reason was that it was quite impossible to regard this court martial as a 'contest'. As Jo Stevenson has made clear, it was more in the nature of a ritual sacrifice. The sacrifice was to be exacted whatever the result of the legal proceedings. And it was."

Even more trenchant were the comments of HRH The Duke of Edinburgh, in a letter written to Captain Stevenson many years after the collision, after he had read Jo Stevenson's book. (JPS had been HRH's ADC in the Royal Yacht during the Melbourne Olympics in 1956.) The Duke's letter has been seen by the writer, and the following two sentences from it are quoted as a sample: "Miscarriages of justice occur from time to time, but not since the middle-ages – except under a military dictatorship – has there been such a blatant and deliberate distortion of justice. I read the account with mounting despair and disbelief."

EPILOGUE

After an initial refusal, J P Stevenson was eventually allowed to retire and his pension was restored; although only in the rank of Captain, despite six years service as a Commodore. He had to appeal over the Permanent Head of the Defence Department to have his name included in the Emergency List. The "argy-bargy" surrounding this period reflects no credit on the Naval Board or the Government.

JP Stevenson: Justice denied - A CAREER UNFAIRLY CUT SHORT

As anyone who knows him would expect, J P Stevenson made a great success of his subsequent career with AGL and then became General Manager of ELGAS. The loser in this whole sorry story was the RAN. The man's experience, leadership and, above all, ability to inspire confidence and loyalty would have been of incalculable value in the higher ranks of the Service. If the injustice that he suffered was the price of the American alliance (and the writer does not accept for one moment that it was) then one can only say that the price was too high. ✎

Commodore DD Farthing DSC RAN (Rtd.) joined RANC in 1955. He became a pilot, receiving his wings in 1963. He initially flew Gannets, then converted to helicopters. He commanded RAN Helicopter Flight Vietnam, for which service he received the DSC, as well as American and Vietnamese decorations. He commanded HMA ships Snipe, Swan and Hobart, and retired in 1989. Having earlier qualified in Law, he was called to the Bar, from which he retired in 2010.

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Author's Note: I became involved in the detail of this matter when, as a member of the Sydney Bar, I was briefed by the Australian Government Solicitor to join Captain Stevenson's defence team. An action in negligence had been brought by a Senior Sailor who had been serving in *HMAS Melbourne* at the time of the *Evans* collision. The plaintiff asserted that he had not received proper care for traumatic stress following the collision 36 years previously. I considered the claim absurd and still do, and was delighted to play a part in convincing the plaintiff's legal team to abandon the proceedings. Inevitably, the action brought renewed stress on J.P.Stevenson and his family, which he dealt with calmly and impressively.

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BECOME A MEMBER TODAY

Australian Naval Institute



Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond: Visionary or Heretic?

BY COMMANDER DAVID GOBLE

At every crossroad on the road that leads to the Future each progressive spirit is opposed by 1,000 men appointed to guard the past.

(Maurice Maeterlinck (1862-1949) Belgian poet and author.)

This paper discusses the life and thoughts of Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond for two reasons. The first is, because as an historical figure, he receives less attention than is his due and the second is that many of the issues he faced while in service are as relevant today as they were in his time. The article will provide the reader with an overview of the career of Admiral Richmond because his experiences did much to shape the views he expressed, which often differed from what was accepted practice at the time. It will then present his thoughts on British maritime and military strategy.

Admiral Richmond was born in 1871 and joined the Royal Navy in 1885 as a Midshipman serving in *HMS Britannia*. He later served in *HMS Nelson* on the Australia station, spent a short time in the Hydrographic Service, and then trained as a torpedo officer at *HMS Vernon*. He was known for his energy, enthusiasm and for his ability as a caricaturist and artist. While serving in the Mediterranean he developed his passion for British naval history, which became the cornerstone of his life. After numerous sea and shore postings he was promoted to Commander in 1903 and was later employed in the Admiralty as assistant to the First Sea Lord, Sir John "Jackie" Fisher, and then the Second Sea Lord. After some high hopes on his part, his relationship with the establishment developed into one of open hostility. He questioned doctrine, he questioned practice, and he questioned training.

While at the Admiralty (perhaps while sidelined) he developed further his love of history and commenced a writing career that would end with his death 39 years later. His first attempt at authorship was an analysis of the Navy in the war of 1739 to 1748 and made up three volumes. It was a masterful work and highlighted Richmond's command for detailed analysis.

Promotion to Captain followed in 1908 and on leaving the Admiralty, he was posted to the staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet and then to the command of *HMS Dreadnought*, a new class of turbine driven battleship that rendered all earlier ships obsolete. This was an important command and should have secured swift advancement; however, this did not occur mainly because, according to many writers, he offered too much advice to his superiors on matters related to training and strategy. This didn't win him friends in high places.

He returned to the Admiralty and watched as war with Germany developed at a time when naval corporate planning was actively discouraged. He made numerous predictions about naval dispositions, especially Rear Admiral Craddock's South America Station forces that proved to be so accurate when it was annihilated by Von Spee at Coronel on 1 Nov 1914. He was vocal about Admiral Jellicoe's inability to achieve a decisive victory at Jutland. He didn't like Jellicoe's leadership and didn't hide this view from Admiral Beatty who took command of the Grand Fleet in 1916 when Jellicoe took up the post of First Sea Lord. Schurman argued that Richmond's vocalisations were mostly motivated by a desire to improve the war making machinery of the



Richmond as an Admiral (Marder, AJ, Portrait of an Admiral)

Admiralty, but it is likely that he was also frustrated at not being able to take part in the planning process as well.¹

More postings followed, and after tenuously clinging to his naval career (often spent in second class ships) he was promoted Rear Admiral and awarded the KCB. He then spent two years as the first Commandant of the New Imperial Defence College, now called the Royal College of Defence Studies, which was founded in 1927. This role gave him the scope to develop his lecturing talents and time to study naval history in more detail.² The position also gave him a platform from which to air his criticisms of Admiralty policy and this really estranged him from his bosses. Even so, he was promoted to full Admiral in 1929, but his airing of his personal views about compositions of navies, which were published in lengthy open letters to *The Times* newspaper; in particular, his support for smaller ships – the functions of a capital ship being discharged by a ship of 10,000 tonnes was a blasphemy in those days – further fuelled the Big versus Small ship debate. This airing saw Richmond

Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond: Visionary or Heretic?

forced to retire from the Navy fully aware that top command positions were outside his reach; although he held rank he had little influential power.³

It should also be noted that Richmond was instrumental in setting up the *Naval Review*, a journal published by the Naval Society that printed articles related to the running and conduct of the RN. It was available only to those who subscribed and provided for anonymity, thus protecting the “Young Turks” who were thus able to express their discontent about the deplorable management of the Navy. The *Review* is still published today.

After leaving the service in 1931, Richmond entered a new phase of his life. He took up life as an academic, delivering lectures on such topics as “officer education”, “Imperial defence”, and “capture at sea”. In 1934 he was offered the position of Vere Harmsworth Professor of Imperial and Naval History at Cambridge – an amazing honour for a sailor without

academic credentials. His writings of the 1739-1748 war, of course, stood him in good stead. This appointment lasted for two years until he turned 65. Richmond is reported to have mellowed at Cambridge. His toughness and reserve as an Admiral was taken over by gentleness, sensitivity, and personal warmth that his closest friends knew lay hidden beneath his tough veneer. When he retired from this appointment, he was elected as the Master of Downing College, Cambridge, where he was to remain until his death in 1946.


Academic life did not silence him. He continued to press for change in the Navy, drawing on history, naturally, and his own experiences to drive home the point. In 1939, for example, he proposed to the British Government that Norway would be a target in a German war. His contemporaries were astonished by the idea that Germany would want to occupy Norway to improve her strategic position against Britain. Shortly after Germany invaded, the Commander-in-Chief Portsmouth,

Admiral Sir William James, had to admit that “Richmond was right, but the [German occupation] seems to have taken most people by surprise.”⁴

Richmond was an intellectual. He had the formidable ability to be able to see the fine detail and to form considered opinion about its meaning. He did not suffer fools gladly and this, at a time when there were many in senior positions in the Admiralty, kept him in the outer. His main weakness was that he did not conceal his contempt for those who did not share his enthusiasm for the study of, and practical benefits derived from, naval history.

It is not completely accurate to define Richmond as a strategist using the common meaning of the term. Richmond espoused methodology and advocated good planning and staff skills rather than undertaking the actual planning itself. A better term for him may be “analyst”, for he analysed history in order to make predictions about naval operations. He was also a career naval officer, unlike Corbett, and

*HMS Nelson (1931)
profile drawing
(Public domain)*





this gave him the singular advantage of personal experience of the Service from which he could express informed opinion. This was the advantage that Corbett did not possess.

It is clear that Richmond held strong views about a number of naval issues, not least being the role of the capital ship. Geoffrey Till, a current commentator on naval strategy, and author on the topic, noted that Richmond urged his colleagues to be aware of the difference between the battleship as a ship and the capital ship as a role. According to Richmond, this confusion in thought meant that there was a tendency to believe that if another weapon could be operated by another service, say aircraft, which might be proven to be superior to the battleship, then the entire structure of naval strategy would crumble. In other words, if one criticised the battleship, one attacked the Navy and this, of course, Richmond did with regularity. Interestingly, and with the power of hindsight, the advent of the aircraft carrier and the role it played

during World War II proved Richmond correct.

Indeed, Richmond advocated smaller, faster, more manoeuvrable, and cheaper ships to fill the capital role. He supported the “fleet in being” strategy by arguing for the use of smaller cruisers to harass the enemy. Schurman noted that he was not a blue water dogmatist and was acutely aware of the restrictive effects of the almost perpetual lack of small vessels for use in probing enemy dispositions.⁵ His strong vocal support for a shift to a more balanced fleet was another virtual blasphemy at the time but is now a view advocated by Navies around the world (note the USN’s *Littoral* ship concept). Richmond could not see the value of focusing on enormous battleships positioning themselves in line ahead in an attempt to broadside the enemy and noted in 1936:

I do not believe that a fleet, however powerfully the capital ships are constructed and armoured, can operate . . . in waters where it [sic] is exposed to attacks by aerial torpedo craft with any

degree of continuity . . . The lesser vessels of the flotilla and the smaller types of cruiser, run no greater danger in such work [exposed to aerial attack] than the greatest armoured ships. This belief necessarily carries with it a denial of the claim that great size is essential in order to provide security against . . . attack.⁶

The loss of *HMS Prince of Wales* and *HMS Repulse* to Japanese air attack in December 1941 proved him correct again.

Although not a strong advocate of the concept of the Decisive Battle, he was disappointed that the Admiralty did not adopt a more aggressive approach in dealing with the German High Seas Fleet in the North Atlantic during WWI. To Richmond, operating from a passive stance in this instance was fruitless. Although the RN can be judged as having performed its wartime service superbly – Germany was effectively blockaded, causing great discomfort to the German people while the British Isles were relatively unhindered – Richmond (and other Young Turks) believed

The first IDC course, held in 1927. Richmond is front centre. On his left is Wing Commander Stanley James Goble, CBE, DSO, DSC, (later AVM). Another Australian is Commander CJ Pope (2nd row 3rd from right) later RADM (Courtesy David Goble)

Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond: Visionary or Heretic?

that a decisive attack on the German High Seas Fleet would have shortened the war considerably. By mounting a pitched battle with the German Fleet, Richmond believed that the ships that were otherwise tied up containing the Germans could have been freed to engage the new submarine menace and perhaps then allow the RN to enter the Baltic in force, thus opening up the possibility of joint operations directed against the German coast.

He also was a strong believer in combined operations. Although most of his contemporaries believed that the war was won by sea power, it would seem that Richmond's assessment of the role of sea power is closer to the truth. He stated that:

Sea power would have been impotent to defend the liberties of Europe unsustained by land-power. Nothing is clearer than the interdependence of the two, nothing more misleading or objectionable than the attribution of success to one or the other separately⁷.

He saw the necessity of rapport between sea and land commanders. Both rely on one another for the achievement of national goals. This is a lesson that some of us still have to learn today.

He also advocated the use of aircraft in support of fleet operations. In the pre-war years, air power, to Richmond, was seen as an auxiliary support for the protection of the Army and Navy. Although he possessed a certain amount of anti-air prejudice, his views of the importance of air power were at variance with many who saw it simply as a way of inflicting terror on an enemy rather than as a means to fulfilling a specific military objective. His more positive views of air power are contrasted with the views of his peers in the early days of naval aviation who saw the aircraft as a noisy nuisance that leaked oil and stained the scrubbed

deck while the young men who flew them were brash arrogant time wasters.

Richmond will be remembered for his views on officer education and strategic training. The First World War convinced him that men tended to become subordinate to their machines, and that strategic thought became subordinated to routine and was then ignored by "mighty wearers of gold braid". He held strong views about the need for a Naval War Staff at the Admiralty and as early as 1907, noted in his personal diary that:

Fisher makes no move . . . we have no one trained to think of the problems of war, the organisation required and the multitudinous details. I know only too well how ignorant we are, not only of modern wars but even wars in History [sic]. Fisher, clever as he is, has not made a study of it, and in reality has no knowledge. He is a genius . . . but his predecessors have not been, nor may his successors be geniuses.⁸

This situation did not remedy itself before the war and perhaps Britain suffered considerably more harm than she needed to by not addressing Richmond's pleas. The materiel was present to fight a war but there was arguably no brain to steer it to its proper end.

Richmond urged for tactics and strategy to be taught to younger officers at an age when they were still flexible and inquisitive, before they had settled into a life of mediocrity. He wanted them provided with the opportunity to deal with problems involving abstract thought and reasoning and to read history in order to draw lessons from the past. Even towards the end of WWI, however, when Richmond was posted to a war staff position, it was still the admirals who dealt with strategy. This situation did not begin to resolve itself until many years after war's end.

These few words are not enough

to delve into the life of a man who deserves more credit in British Naval and Military History that he has received. An examination of the shelves in most Defence Force Libraries reveals little or no mention of his name in most texts covering the History of the Royal Navy. This is a great injustice.

To answer the question posed in the title of this paper, "Yes"; to his superiors in the Admiralty, Richmond was a heretic; his opinions were contrary to conventional wisdom in place in Navy circles at the time; however, to those who appreciate the lessons that history can provide and who value the importance of sound planning and guidance, he can only be seen as a visionary for the high status he placed on strategy and training.

The words delivered at Richmond's funeral in 1946 by his wife's brother-in-law, Sir Charles Trevelyan, summarise Richmond's life:

Where goodness and beauty of character . . . are united to great and well disciplined powers of mind, we see to what height in the hierarchy of being a brother man can rise⁹.

It is evident that Richmond was ahead of his time; however, while he did manage to sow seeds where little had grown before he would likely have accomplished much more had he been able to temperate the delivery of his message. Many of his ideas – for example, the use of aircraft, and the practice of joint operations – were *de rigueur* by the end of WWII. It is as an insightful thinker and teacher of the principles of warfare that he should be remembered and he thus deserves to be ranked alongside the likes of Corbett and Mahan. 🚢



Commander David Goble RAN joined the Navy as a Reservist in 1983, training as a Maritime Warfare Officer, before transferring to the PNF. He has been posted to a variety of positions including the RAN Recruit School, HMAS Cerberus and HMAS Creswell. CMDR Goble completed a Master of Educational Psychology at the University of Melbourne; the Canadian

Command and Staff Program at the Canadian Forces College, Toronto, and is a Registered Psychologist. He is currently the Deputy Director Workforce Modelling, Forecasting and Analysis – Navy.

(Endnotes)

1 Schurman, Donald. *The Education of a Navy: The Development of British Naval Strategic Thought, 1867-1914*, London: Cassell, 1965.

2 The author's grandfather (later AVM S.J. Goble and a RAAF Chief of Air Staff) was one of Richmond's first students, being sent to the College by the Australian Government in 1927.

3 For a fuller description of Richmond's career see Chapter 1 of Marder, Arthur J., *Portrait of an Admiral: The Life and Papers of Sir Herbert Richmond*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1952.

4 See Lambert, Andrew. "Seapower 1939-1940: Churchill and the Strategic Origins of the Battle of the Atlantic", in Geoffrey Till (Ed). *Sea Power: Theory and Practice*. Essex: Frank Cass and Co., 1994. (104).

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6 Richmond, Herbert. Comments made and reported in *the Report of the Sub-Committee of the C.I.D. on the Vulnerability of Capital Ships to Air Attack*. Cited in Hunt, B.D. *Sailor-Scholar: Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond 1871-1946*, Ontario, Canada: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1982. (220).

7 Richmond, Richmond. "Consideration of the War at Sea", *Naval Review*, 5, 1917. (8)

8 Richmond, Herbert. Entry in his personal diary (April 1907). Cited in Hunt, B.D. *Sailor-Scholar: Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond 1871-1946*, Ontario, Canada: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1982. (20).

9 Trevelyan, Charles. Cited in SWR's Book review of Marder's *Portrait of an Admiral*; *Naval Review*, 40 (3), 1952. (343).



Minister for Defence Materiel Jason Clare today announced that two more keel blocks had been delivered to Adelaide to construct Australia's first Air Warfare Destroyer. This follows the delivery of the first keel block last month. The blocks were constructed at the Williamstown shipyard in Melbourne. They were loaded on to barges last week and transported to Adelaide over the weekend. Photos Bryan Charlton and the AWD Alliance

Royal Moroccan Navy commissions first SIGMA

SIGMA

The first Royal Moroccan Navy SIGMA-class frigate, *RMoNS Tarik ben Ziyad*, has been handed over, named and commissioned, at Damen Schelde Naval Shipbuilding (DSNS) in Vlissingen (The Netherlands).

The 105 meter long and 2.335 tons displacement frigate has been commissioned by the Commander-in-Chief Royal Moroccan Navy, RADM Mohamed Laghmari.

The frigate left Vlissingen the day after commissioning and headed for the North Sea for safety training the Royal Netherlands Navy.

After completion of the training *RMoNS Tarik ben Ziyad* will start its maiden voyage and sail to its homeport Casablanca naval base.

The ship was delivered by DSNS within four years from the effective date

of contract with all agreed technical specifications and cost met.

Meanwhile the second and third SIGMA-class frigates for the Royal Moroccan Navy are both on track process at the DSNS city shipyard.

All ships will serve in naval patrol EEZ duties, maritime security operations, as well search and rescue tasks. The three SIGMAs are suited to support humanitarian aid operations if needed. A nine ton helicopter can be carried on board.

In contrast to future ships *RMoNS Tarik ben Ziyad* has a 7,2 meter enlarged hull module for housing tactical command facilities to serve as a flagship.

The diesel motor driven frigates can achieve a top speed of more than 26 knots. Endurance at sea is 20 days, with a maximum range of 4.000nm at 18 knots.

Complement consists of 110 people.

The weapon suite of all three Royal Moroccan Navy SIGMAs comprises a 76mm OtoMelara 76/62 SR medium calibre gun forward, two sextuple MBDA VL-MICA sea air missiles and four MBDA MM40 Exocet Block II SSM; two GIAT 20mm guns next to the helicopter hangar as well two triple torpedo tubes for the Eurotorp MU-90.

Ship sensors are the Thales 3D SMART-S Mk2 radar operating in E/F-band. As weapon control system the electro-optic system Thales LIROD Mk2 is carried. Thales TACTICOS has been fitted as combat data system, and Kingclip is fitted as hull-mounted sonar.

Michael Nitz,
correspondent, Vlissingen







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AUSTRALIA'S FUTURE SUBMARINE CAPABILITY – RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IMPLICATIONS

BY PETER BRIGGS

An overwhelming strategic requirement exists to sustain and develop Australia's underwater warfare capability post *Collins*.

Australia's geographic and strategic requirements are particularly demanding - no "off the shelf" solution is likely. FSM will therefore be a developmental project, led and executed by Australia.

Noting the difficulty of accessing submarine IP and the timescales, as the parent Navy Australia will require incentives to develop an indigenous R&D capability in key technologies. University, Industry particularly SME's R&D will make a significant and unique contribution. As a trusted R&D partner, DSTO and the Defence Science Institute it has established will have a critical role in managing the R&D program for FSM.

The Capability Requirement Strategic Setting

The strategic environment 2020 – 2050 will demand a range of ADF capabilities including a high-end underwater warfare capability, centred on a long-range, sophisticated submarine. The capability will be required to deliver an expanded range of strategic effects and undertake a wider range of roles compared with the current *COLLINS* Class submarines.

This growth in capability is appropriately recognised in the Defence White Paper (DWP):

'... the Government has decided to acquire 12 new Future Submarines, to be assembled in South Australia. This will be a major design and construction program spanning three decades, and will be Australia's largest ever single defence project. The Future



Collins-class enters dock (Courtesy RAN)

Submarine will have greater range, longer endurance on patrol, and expanded capabilities compared to the current *Collins* class submarine.'

The Elephant In The Room – No MOTS

Having regard to the anticipated roles, missions, endurance, payloads and the level of capability required, there is currently no military off-the-shelf (MOTS) conventional submarine design (nor is there one expected) that will meet Australia's requirements for Future Submarine (FSM) - a situation similar to that impacting the design development of *COLLINS* in the mid-1980s. I have developed this argument more fully in a recent article in the Australian Naval Institute's journal.

Not only would a MOTS solution not perform the functions required, it would also deny access to technology opportunities that are currently enjoyed through links with DSTO, the USN and trusted industry partners. It would also provide Australia with a platform capability baseline with no advantage over potential adversaries

with the same export platform.

Thus if it is to succeed, the design of FSM will also be unique.

Noting the proliferation of submarines in our region of interest, it will be important that the FSM maintains an underwater warfare technological edge throughout its service life. Exploitation of existing technology, particularly in the areas of command, control and communications, should ensure interoperability with our major allies and other ADF capabilities while reducing both investment and program risk.

A Developmental Program

FSM will therefore be an Australian led, developmental project, quite different to the norm for Defence equipment acquisitions in which generally acquire equipment designed and developed by others. In this case Australia will be the 'parent navy' for the new submarine capability, this is an enduring role for the life of the capability.

The DWP envisages at least 12 submarines. These will be built in 'batches', typically three batches of four submarines, launched at 15-24 month

AUSTRALIA'S FUTURE SUBMARINE CAPABILITY – RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IMPLICATIONS

intervals facilitating upgrades between batches and potentially providing a rolling construction program, without a major gap between FSM number 12 and its successor class of submarine, ie the first batch of the next generation.

What is envisaged is an Australian national capacity to design, build and upgrade submarines.

The closest philosophical starting point for the design process and the submarine with the most experience in operating in our environment is *Collins* (Australia/ASC has been the design authority for *Collins* since 2001).

The Failure of Collins Parenting

The shortcomings in the Defence management of the *Collins* class provide a number of good lessons on how not to manage this capability. In brief:

- a. Significant under investment in sustainment and manning;
- b. Lack of technical and operational submarine policy oversight at the strategic level in Canberra;
- c. A failure to manage the capability holistically as a strategic asset, with a whole of life perspective.

Hopefully the Cole Review now underway will catalogue the issues in greater detail, provide a public/political circuit breaker and set the scene for a structured program to recover the lost capability.

Summary

The DWP correctly sets the strategic scenario and the top-level capability for Australia's future submarine capability. To achieve the capability set out in the DWP, Australia will need to undertake a developmental programme. Developmental projects pose different challenges and require different management, including the leadership of the underpinning R&D effort. Let me now turn to these aspects.

R&D Objectives Technologies

While it is anticipated that some systems from *Collins*, evolved and updated, could be migrated to FSM (eg, the combat system elements, elements of the external communications system and ship control systems) with attendant benefits, the development of FSM will be a significant challenge involving new technologies and elements of risk. Australia has existing R&D relationships in the combat system, torpedo and external communications systems areas, principally with the USA, these are likely to continue and expand.

There are a number of critical technologies for which Australia will have to develop an indigenous R&D capability. Such technologies are central to meeting Australia's unique submarine requirements arising from our geostrategic circumstances, including the requirement to be able to operate in the demanding tropical littoral environment and ensuring that Australia maintains an advantage in submarine capability and operations.

Identified critical technologies include:

- a. Hull and superstructure materials (including composites, steel, welding materials and hull penetrations);
- b. Signature management and reduction in all spectra.
- c. Hydrodynamics and hull forms (these have significant impact on designs, including



Collins-class berthing party (Courtesy RAN)

- d. consideration of stealth, efficiency, manoeuvrability, etc);
- d. Sensors – acoustic, optical, microwave/sub microwave and non-conventional.
- e. Air independent propulsion;
- f. Combat system elements;
- g. Energy generation storage and its use, ie propulsion motors (eg, conventional, permanent magnet or superconducting);
- h. Propulsion technologies and related stealth implications (eg, propellers and main machinery);
- i. The payload system capacity to handle and deploy weapons and other payloads and its flexibility to quickly adapt to meet mission requirements;
- j. Diesel engine development;
- k. Life support systems for the extended period of dived operations for the crew and embarked personnel;
- l. Unmanned underwater, surface and above water vehicles and their interfaces; and
- m. Human factors arising from the small crew, long endurance patrols, impact of habitability on effectiveness and huge volume of information to be analysed, presented and acted upon.

Technology Readiness Levels

It will be important to ensure that technologies are ready for deployment, having been de-risked in shore testing and prototyping. This will be an important function for the land based Platform Test Site now being contemplated by Defence and will probably necessitate an expansion of this facility to a multi-site, virtual organisation, exploiting centres of excellence within Australia's R&D and industry capabilities.

Sensitivities Surrounding Submarine Technologies

Submarine technologies are closely held and jealously guarded. In some cases the leading edge technology will not be available for 'love or money'. In these cases Australia can expect to have to lead the development of its own solutions. A past example of this was the anechoic tiles designed to reduce *Collins*' active sonar signature.

A Viable R&D Partner

In many cases Australia will only be able to access other advanced technologies if it has something to contribute to a joint R&D program. The sensitivity surrounding many submarine technologies will limit the opportunities for joint developments.

Summary

Existing R&D cooperation on submarine systems is likely to expand to meet the requirements of the FSM project. A significant range of new areas of R&D will also be initiated. Sensitivities surrounding some of this technology and the requirement to be a viable contributor to joint projects will demand Australian led R&D in many areas.

Let me now consider how Australia might go about accessing this information.

Accessing Technology USN Support

USN support for the FSM project has been affirmed publicly, most recently by the media release following AUSMIN 2010:

'The United States welcomed Australia's program of capability development outlined in the White Paper, and Australia noted the importance of technology and materiel exchanges in meeting these capability goals.'

Cooperation and technical support for the FSM program appear to have been discussed more directly in the Navy-Navy meetings that preceded AUSMIN as evidenced in the US Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Garry Roughead's remarks as reported in an interview with John Kerin:

'The Chief of Operations with the United States Navy, Admiral Gary Roughead, has urged Australia to press ahead with a formidable generation of new submarines, warning that no country in the Asia-Pacific region can maintain an effective defence without them.'

Indicating that Australia could rely on the US Navy's full technical support, ..'

Admiral Roughead, who held talks in Canberra with Australia's Chief of Navy, Vice-Admiral Russ Crane, said the two had discussed ways to ensure their submarine forces worked more closely together, including co-operation on the new submarines.'

Whilst the

USN has arguably the world's largest and most capable submarine R&D capability; it is focused on nuclear powered submarines – a limitation for many conventional submarine issues (but a significant advantage when considering high speed stealth). USN submarine spokespersons have publicly emphasized that the USN does not have a current capability to design conventional submarines and continues to resist suggestions that it should acquire a force of modern conventional submarines. The USN would therefore probably be keen to ensure that any cooperation did not lend weight to those arguing for acquisition of conventional submarines.

Therefore, whilst Australia could benefit significantly from USN support and oversight of the design process – such support will be a significant political reassurance and risk mitigation measure (that was not available for the *Collins* development), Australia will have to lead and manage the FSM R&D program.

The USN is particularly sensitive about protecting its submarine technology. Any collaboration with a 3rd party will therefore need to be managed to conform with the ground rules for the provision of USN support.

Collins Weapon Compartment
(RAN photo)



AUSTRALIA'S FUTURE SUBMARINE CAPABILITY – RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IMPLICATIONS

Accessing and Protecting Conventional Submarine Design and Systems IP

Access to and control over IP is a key determinant of shipbuilding and repair capability particularly in relation to vessel design and combat systems and their ongoing development and upgrade.

The number of conventional submarine designers and R&D capabilities accessible to Australia is quite limited. All are European and all are keen to protect their IP.

- a. Sweden and France maintain a Government funded submarine R&D capability, albeit the latter is predominately focused on nuclear powered submarines.
- b. Germany has a well-established capability based in universities and industry for development of their designs and systems.
- c. Spain is undertaking its first design activity based on French antecedents.

In developing the design, Australia should make maximum use of proven European and US submarine technologies to reduce risks and achieve the capability required. Australia therefore needs access to both European and US sources of technology.

Given the sensitivity of submarine IP it is likely that accessing foreign IP, technology or joint R&D for FSM will entail Government-Government agreements covering the interaction to provide mutually agreed safeguards for the exchange of information and to ensure the over arching regime for the protection of information is achieved. Within this framework it is envisaged that selected R&D projects could be established with specialist areas and industries.

An Australian R&D base would therefore offer significant advantages and provide the simplest model for

undertaking much of this research.

An R&D program involving both industry and the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) will therefore be a key part of reducing risks and achieving the capability; it will be ongoing throughout the life of FSM to maintain the capability edge Australia seeks.

The design and its supporting R&D program must be undertaken with Australia's operational environment in mind and leverage off the significant experience Australia has gained in operating a large conventional submarine in it. The design and outcomes from the R&D program must be protected; it would be counter-productive to have advances achieved through this process simply exported into the region.

Acquisition Strategy

There is no market place for the design of a large conventional submarine such as we seek. We are dealing with a sole source design situation – as do the USA, UK and all European submarine builders. I agree with Paul Dibb and Geoffrey Barker's recent arguments for sustaining a naval shipbuilding industry for this critical capability.

Measuring and achieving value for money in this situation is discussed in greater detail in the Submarine Institute of Australia's paper setting out the critical issues for the initiation of Australia's next generation submarine project.

In summary, from an R&D perspective, the acquisition strategy will need to take into account:

- a. The need to access both European and USN design elements and associated technologies.
- b. The requirement to protect both European and USN IP throughout all phases of the FSM program (design, construction and in service).



*Collins-class boat on the surface
(Courtesy RAN)*

- c. The USN requirement for Australia to put in place safeguards to protect its sensitive SM technology from third parties.
- d. Government ownership of ASC.
- e. The need to ensure that Australian industry develops a design authority capability for in-service support of FSM.
- f. Early release of FSM performance requirements to Australian industry to exploit its experience and potential innovative technologies.
- g. A concept design and design development process that provides for early involvement of experienced operators and Australian industry with design engineers. (This should avoid the 'operator/engineer divide' that occurred in the *COLLINS* program.)
- h. The need to supplement Defence submarine engineering and operator expertise with "above the line" support.

The Integrated Product Process Development (IPPD) technique using

multi discipline, Integrated Product Teams (IPT) was used throughout the design and production of the *Virginia* Class submarines. It achieved huge gains in efficiency and provides a model for FSM.

- a. The process is aimed at minimising the Cost of Ownership for achieving the desired capability.
- b. Designer, builder, major sub systems/equipment suppliers, maintainers, CCDG, DMO and DSTO in an Integrated Product Team (IPT) from concept development forward.
- c. It is a seamless process, avoids stop start decision making, saving time and \$s.
- d. It avoids issues over 'buildability' and maintainability of design.
- e. The Australian Department of Defence has the benefit of a RAND Study that is believed to advocate a similar process for FSM.

An Australian Design Environment

In summary an Australian design environment is seen as essential to access the offered USN support and uniquely able to combine this support with access to key European conventional submarine technologies. These arrangements should be integrated within an IPPD design, production and through life support model. Some initial thoughts on what this arrangement might look like are captured diagrammatically in figure 1 below; I have termed it 'Team Australia'.

Partnerships For Success DSTO's Central Role

The contribution of DSTO to the *COLLINS* project development, construction, 'get well', and in-service phases was critical to the success of the construction program. The contribution of DSTO continues to

be vital to both industry and Defence providing through life support and capability upgrades.

One of the lessons learnt from the *COLLINS* program - DSTO should have been involved from the outset across the full range of submarine technologies rather than on a niche product basis. This might have avoided or largely mitigated some of the problems experienced later in the program such as hydrodynamic induced flow noise, combat system shortfalls, diesel unreliability, battery performance shortfalls and periscope vibration. Thus DSTO involvement across the spectrum of FSM technologies and capability development activities will be vital to the success of FSM and subsequent through life support.

As noted above, many of the technology issues arise from Australia's requirements for a long range, high endurance conventional submarine, able to carry a large and flexible payload and operate in the tropical littoral environment. The USN has little exposure to the conventional submarine aspects of these issues, neither do they attract the same priority for European designers, DSTO's leadership will therefore be critical in achieving the synergy necessary to achieve a capability edge for Australia.

This role is significantly different in a developmental project compared with the typical DSTO contribution to a project to acquire equipment from an overseas supplier. It is a high risk, high payoff situation and one where the right policy will achieve significant advantages for Australia.

There is clearly a need to plan, coordinate and manage activities associated with the development of technologies required for FSM irrespective of where or who conducts the particular R&D activity on



Australia's behalf. DSTO is clearly the logical organisation to be the focal point, actively manage the R&D program for FSM and to ultimately advise Defence on the risk and readiness of the range of technologies available to support key FSM capabilities.

R&D programmes with the USN and European R&D organisations are generally collaborative; DSTO's access will depend on being able to make a valued contribution.

It is suggested that under the umbrella of DSTO, a number of small expert teams be established across functional areas of underwater technology to evaluate the most promising technologies and create and manage specific R&D programs. The teams should include subject matter specialists from DSTO, DMO and Navy and act as 'expert' advisers to the project (eg development of the User Requirement), participate in relevant conferences and work with industry during the concept and design phases to ensure optimum application of products and technologies. While ultimately Defence will be reliant on industry to deliver FSM capability, the teams will play a vital role in fostering the required technologies, ensuring that Defence fulfils its 'informed customer' role and enabling Defence to be the arbiter of industry performance.

*Future sub concepts
(Courtesy Dynamics
Research)*

AUSTRALIA'S FUTURE SUBMARINE CAPABILITY – RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IMPLICATIONS

The Defence Science Institute's Role

The Defence Science Institute (DSI) has recently been established by DSTO and Melbourne University, supported by the Victorian State Government. Its objective is to establish a cohesive research capability, linking R&D capabilities in Australia's Universities, Industry and defence related research organisations to address long term defence challenges.

Existing and emerging fields of research are supported through the Institute and currently include biochemical systems; intelligent information systems; human performance and neurosciences; energy and propulsion systems; active materials and micro-radar technologies. The Institute's aim captured in its logo is to mobilize Australia's R&D capabilities to provide smarter solutions for a safer Australia.

DSI aims to focus and leverage Australia's R&D capabilities across the country, to the benefit of all participants and the maximum benefit of Australia's defence capability.

FSM R&D Opportunities for Universities and Industry

The FSM project offers a particularly challenging and unique opportunity for the DSI to assist Australia's R&D capabilities across the spectrum to contribute to the achievement and sustainment of this critical capability.

- a. As the illustrative range of technologies above demonstrates, the FSM R&D requirements will add significantly to the existing range of themes being managed by the DSI.
- b. It will bring together new collaborative teams across State and institute boundaries.
- c. Boundaries that hitherto perhaps served to separate and divide Australia's R&D capability as

they competed for limited R&D funding.

- d. FSM R&D funding will be managed via the research team leader (DSTO) and be focused on delivering this project and sustaining a capability edge through life.
- e. The ongoing nature of the FSM R&D task offers a very attractive opportunity for continuity and stability in research.

Major defence industry companies have a well established role in R&D and form an important bridge in transitioning leading edge R&D concepts to commercial products. They will form an important part of the R&D Team. I note that the DSI already has an active relationship with several of the major Defence Industry players and no doubt this will grow as FSM begins to exert its influence.

SME's made a significant and often unique contribution to the *COLLINS* Program by way of development and manufacture of a range of equipments for example, pumps that set a new international bench mark in terms of efficiency and low noise performance, water desalination equipment, batteries, casings and sonar domes. Given early identification of required technologies, Australian SME's with the support of Defence have the potential to exploit their own IP and to make a significant contribution to FSM.

Summary

FSM will invoke a new paradigm for cooperation and place unique demands on our national R&D capabilities. DSTO will play a key role as the R&D Team Leader for FSM, evaluating the risk/readiness of technologies and providing a key linkage to US and European R&D organisations. The requirements for R&D to support FSM will offer new opportunities

for cooperation and long-term programmes. Defence Industry, (both majors and SMEs), will make an important contribution, including providing the important bridge between laboratory and production. The DSI has a role to facilitate and mobilise Australia's wider defence R&D capacity to best effect and in particular, support DSTO in discharging its responsibilities for the FSM capability.

Conclusions

FSM – It's Developmental

The top-level requirements set out in the DWP correctly recognise the need for significant growth in Australia's submarine capability to meet the changing strategic circumstances now unfolding. There is no Military Off The Shelf option, nor is one expected – the closest and lowest risk starting point is a developmental project based on *Collins* antecedents and experience, (good and bad!).

A National Submarine Capability

Twelve submarines provide an opportunity for the continuity of a rolling construction program, offering significant benefits to industry and the underpinning R&D organisations – we are embarking on an Australian capability to design, build and sustain its submarine capability.

R&D – An Essential Enabler

An active, Australian led R&D capability, led by DSTO will be essential to underpin the design environment. Australian led R&D must solve the unique challenges that our requirements and environment pose in order to achieve and sustain the capability for the minimum cost of ownership. It will provide the essential basis for joint development with overseas technology partners.

An Australian Design Environment

The design environment must be able to demonstrably protect third party's IP, leveraging off the support and oversight offered by the USN whilst accessing the best of European conventional submarine technology. An Australian design environment based on the Government owned ASC is uniquely capable of performing this function.

Coordinating and Focussing Australia's R&D Capacity

DSTO will have a critical role to coordinate and lead this effort as the R&D team leader, providing a focus for Australian efforts and exploiting its links with Allies and other R&D organisations. The DSI's role in facilitating and coordinating Industry

and University R&D organisations will be an important enabler for the national effort – 'Team Australia' 🇦🇺



Peter Briggs retired in 2001 after a 39 year career including command of HMAS Otway, Oxley, Platypus, Stirling, Flag Officer Naval Training Command, Head of the Strategic Command Division and Head Submarine Capability Team. As the President of the Submarine Institute of Australia (SIA) he led the SIA's contribution to the DWP.

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WHERE TO BRITAIN?

BY HAL GP COLEBATCH

Prime Minister Cameron has slashed defence spending. So where is all that money going now?

British Prime Minister David Cameron has cut British defence below the minimum level for national security, despite pleadings from service chiefs, much of his own party, and large sections of the public.

Britain's front-line Air Force is now hardly bigger than Belgium's, with only seven squadrons of modern bombers and fighters (Belgium has six). The Falkland Islands are defended by just four aircraft. The Navy does not have a single capital ship. The air operations in Libya have had to be conducted without a single dedicated aircraft-carrier, multiplying their cost and diminishing their effectiveness.

The Army has lost one historic regiment after another, and a succession of coroner's inquests has blamed the deaths of British servicemen in Iraq and Afghanistan on skimpy and inadequate equipment.

Where American troops have armoured vehicles, British troops have been forced to travel in ancient Land Rovers, leaving them vulnerable to improvised roadside explosives.

Servicemen in all three services have been sacked without warning in mid-career, sometimes receiving notice of dismissal while actually in action.

There also seems to be a peculiar decadent passivity. An elderly British couple in a yacht off Somalia were kidnapped by pirates and severely mistreated while a Royal Navy auxiliary ship, the inappropriately named *Wave Knight*, with heavy machine-guns and a contingent of heavily-armed marines aboard, stood by, virtually alongside, and did nothing, lest the pirates' human rights be violated (I am not making this up).

When the pirates attempted to seize a Russian ship, the oddly, but perhaps

more appropriately, named *Moscow University*, the Russian authorities evidently decided it was time for the *Moscow University* to teach them a lesson: they stormed the ship, captured the pirates, and sent them home, but apparently without benefit of their boat. Given they were several miles from shore, and in shark-infested waters, it is perhaps not surprising that they and their colleagues have attacked no more Russian ships.

Meanwhile, Cameron has said Britain's foreign aid expenditure is "ring-fenced" and will not be cut in any circumstances. International Development Secretary Andrew Mitchell claims that lavish foreign aid makes the UK something called a "development superpower" and that voters should take the same pride in it as they do in their armed forces.

Britain has actually decided to increase foreign aid spending by 34 percent to about \$24 billion. Mitchell claims this spending is achieving "brilliant" results and gaining the country admiration around the world.

One wonders if there is not some kind of impulse for national suicide at work in Westminster. Mitchell claims: "My ambition is that over the next four years people will come to think across our country -- in all parts of it -- of Britain's fantastic development work around the poorest parts of the world with the same pride and satisfaction that they see in some of our great institutions like the armed forces and the monarchy. This is brilliant work that Britain is doing."

This includes \$600 million a year to India, which, as Tory MP Phillip Davies pointed out, is spending billions on defence and has its own space program. It has a navy with about twice as many ships as Britain, a booming economy, and probably more nuclear weapons.

This is despite the arguments of LSE

economist Lord Peter Bauer, whose *Dissent on Development* was published in 1972, and others including a growing body of African economists, who believe foreign aid, except for emergency disaster relief (where something like an aircraft-carrier might be useful), is actually counter-productive and hinders rather than helps long-term development.

Now, however, the British *Daily Mail* reports that African countries which persecute homosexuals will have their aid slashed by the government in a bid by David Cameron to take his homosexual rights crusade to the Third World.

Mitchell has already cut aid to Malawi by about \$40 million after two homosexual men were sentenced to prison.

A spokesman for Mitchell said: "The Government is committed to combating violence and discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people in all circumstances, in this country and abroad. We take action where we have concerns." This could be taken as a naked declaration of cultural imperialism.

Meanwhile, Pakistan will continue to receive more than \$400 million a year, but there the victims of persecution are only Christians, who don't count. Hundreds of millions go to such dubious beacons of liberty as the Democratic Republic of Congo and the gulag-police state of Vietnam (try founding an opposition political party there, and see where it gets you!), with no suggestion that aid be tied to ordinary human rights.

While all persecution is worse than deplorable, it seems the British Conservative government considers the rights of homosexuals in Africa worth cutting aid over. Not the case with innumerable other instances of persecution, nor its own national defence. 🇬🇧

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RECORDS MANAGEMENT

– the backbone of an efficient organisation

BY DEB GROOBY

Recent studies in the United Kingdom have shown that managers spend an average of four weeks per year searching for or waiting for missing files that have either been mislabelled, untracked or 'lost'.

The Strategic Reform Program has been established to build a stronger Australian Defence Force and it is being implemented across all areas of Defence to improve the supporting 'backbone' of Defence (*Strategic Reform Program- Delivering Force 2030*). At the System Program Offices we are constantly trying to achieve more with less and we have all been tasked with trying to provide savings without reducing capability. Whilst reform is a positive move in any organisation because we should always be striving to improve our processes, it can be counter-productive if the supporting elements of that reform are not taken into consideration. This is what I believe is happening with Records Management.

Accountability, transparency and cost-effectiveness are just some of the keywords found throughout the Strategic Reform Program. By 2019, savings of approximately \$20 billion are expected to be delivered, with this money then being reinvested to provide stronger military capabilities (*Strategic Reform Program- Delivering Force 2030*). In order to achieve this, the Strategic Reform Program has invested in fifteen separate reform streams, including Information and Communications Technology, which encompasses Records Management. It was announced in March 2011 that Defence would be expanding its information management capability with the rollout of Objective across the Defence organisation.



Objective, or DRMS as it used to be known, Objective being the name of the software with DRMS or Document Records Management System being its actual function, has been in use in parts of Defence since 1999. In 2007, the Defence Inspector-General conducted an audit on the Effectiveness of Defence Recordkeeping. The report findings highlighted deficiencies with recordkeeping and assessed Defence as non-compliant with the Archives Act 1983.

To address this issue and to position Defence as a best-practice recordkeeping agency, the Defence Records Management Committee was established and a program to fix records management across Defence was started. This Committee developed the Defence Records Management Strategy which was endorsed in November 2009 and which captured the scope, current situation, risk and implementation of the work needed to bring Defence recordkeeping up to Australian and international standards for electronic document and records management (Records Management Strategy, 2009).

Records Management in Defence is mandated by the Defence Records Management Policy which in

turn, complies with the Australian Standard, ISO 15489, which outlines recordkeeping responsibilities as being to develop a corporate recordkeeping policy to ensure that the agency's business needs for evidence, accountability and information about its activities are maintained. This policy is then to be adopted and endorsed at the highest decision-making level and to be promulgated throughout the organisation. Specific leadership responsibility and accountability for recordkeeping is to be assigned and recordkeeping responsibilities are to be defined to all employees (Standards Australia, 2002).

The Defence Records Management Policy Manual, POLMAN 3, edition 4 was endorsed by the Secretary and Chief of the Defence Force on 15 July 2010. It contains policy that assists Defence personnel with recognising and adhering to their recordkeeping responsibilities. The manual describes how Defence will manage its records in accordance with legislation as well as to improve business processes and outcomes. The Records Management Policy website has been utilised to distribute this information in conjunction with the release of simple

RECORDS MANAGEMENT

– *the backbone of an efficient organisation*

factsheets and user guides.

The Defence Record Keeping Strategy was endorsed to implement a comprehensive document and records management framework that would enable Defence to comply with legislation, to support efficiency and accountability through the consistent creation, capture, maintenance, access, disposal and preservation of records and to support sound decision-making through the use and management of information. It was also identified that staff needed to have standardised tools to manage records for which they were accountable and to ensure effective and efficient use of resources for the management of records. A key deliverable of the strategy was the upgrade and rollout of the Defence records management system (*Objective name change to set the record straight, 2011*).

The aims of the expansion of Objective are stated as being to achieve the twin goals of significant savings and the increase of the use of Objective across Defence. In my role as a Configuration Baseline Manager at a System Program Office, I use the document and records management system extensively and due to my previous career as a Librarian, I have a vested interest in how these systems are managed.

Accountability is another key element of the Strategic Reform Program and this can only be achieved through effective recordkeeping (McKemmish, 1998). According to AS ISO 15489.1-2002, records are 'information created, received and maintained as evidence and information by an organisation or person, in pursuance of legal obligations or in the transaction of business'. To continue this definition further, records management is then described as 'the field of management responsible for the efficient and systematic control of the

creation, receipt, maintenance, use and disposal of records, including processes for capturing and maintaining evidence of and information about business activities and transactions in the form of records' (Standards Australia, 2002).

What this all means is that records are one of a businesses main assets and the ability to manage records effectively helps to improve the competitiveness of the business. In turn, having a records management policy, supported by everyone in the business to ensure that the correct records are kept, is crucial for the organisation to be able to meet their legal obligations (ISO 15489 – the essentials, 2010). Organisations are only as good as the decisions they make and these decisions should be based on highly accurate records and information. Therefore a well managed recordkeeping department is crucial to an organisations ability to function competitively and effectively and records must never been seen as an optional extra (Pember, 1997).

Records are kept so that the information needed to meet legal requirements and to ensure the competitiveness of the business, is stored in an accurate and reliable way. At the same time, an organisation needs a policy outlining its corporate governance procedure as this is the system by which an organisation is directed, controlled and held accountable. These two concepts are closely related because whilst corporate governance provides the structure through which the organisation's objectives are set and the means by which these objectives are achieved, efficient, accurate recordkeeping provides the means by which the performance of the organisation can be determined (Standards Australia, 2003).

Kahn, in his paper on Records Management and Compliance, advocates Information Management Compliance as a model and

methodology for ensuring that the records manager, the organisation and the employees make the correct decisions that will ensure good corporate governance (Kahn, 2004).

The essential elements of Information Management Compliance include the importance of having good policies and procedures so the employees know what to do and what not to do. It also states that for records management to be seen as important for an organisation, then someone in a position of seniority needs to support it and following on from this, the correct employees then need to be given the appropriate levels of responsibility. As has been noted earlier, recordkeeping is not an optional extra, or something to be picked up by a staff member who has a bit of spare time on their hands. As unlikely as this sounds, this has often been the case. Other critical factors in having a successful records management programme are to have a well developed training plan, an auditing process to be able to pick up any faults in the system and for the organisation to ensure that its directives are followed (Kahn, 2004).

The functional aspect of good recordkeeping should also be considered as accurate records of past decisions or actions can greatly assist the current management team in an organisation and prevent a duplication of efforts and a waste of resources (Pember, 1997). By implementing an efficient records management program based on the guidelines outlined in ISO 15489, an organisation can ensure that all of their records are properly maintained, easily accessible and correctly documented from their creation to their disposal and in doing so will provide cost-effectiveness as mandated by the Strategic Reform Program.

Recent studies in the United Kingdom have shown that managers spend an average of four weeks per year searching for or waiting for missing files that have either been mislabelled, untracked or 'lost'. It is estimated that up to 70% more records than are needed are kept by most organisations and in general office workers can waste up to two hours a day looking for misplaced paperwork. This amounts to almost 63 days each year, which is a lot of lost productivity (Bradley, 2002).

Defence plans to continue to rollout Objective, targeting approximately 30,000 new users over the next three years. It is estimated that upon completion, the system will have over 60,000 users in Australia and overseas (*Objective name change to set the record straight, 2011*). Whilst I was studying for my graduate diploma in Records Management last year, I conducted an evaluation of Objective with another well known records management product and in all respects, Objective is a very powerful tool with the capability to provide Defence with effective and efficient record keeping capabilities.

However, problems of poor recordkeeping will not be solved by just providing users with the correct tool. It has been stated that in an effort to reduce costs, an online training package has been developed for user training instead of the one hour training session currently provided by the Workplace Coordinator. In my experience, the one hour training session was grossly inadequate when trying to explain to users how and why they must use the records management system. This was reinforced by discussions with users at the System Program Office who regarded DRMS as a place for filing documents, but as it would then be impossible to ever find them again, it didn't really matter how they were filed. At least, after completing the training session with the Workgroup Coordinator, a new user would know who to ask if they had any problems, although in my experience this didn't happen very often either.

All of the staff at the System Program Offices are doing their best to manage the records they produce. In a lot of instances they are saving everything 'just in case', and often quite unnecessarily. As it states in ISO 15489, to determine if a piece of correspondence should become a record, the following three questions must be asked. Is it a credible document, will the correspondence lead to further activity, and does the correspondence record a decision or a proposal? If the answer to any of these questions is yes, then the correspondence should be retained.

If the number of users is set to double in the next three years, then with inadequate training, the amount of information stored could soon render the system unworkable due to the time taken for it to retrieve any records.

The fundamental keys to success for a records management system are to provide adequate, ongoing training for

all users, together with a maintenance programme to correct any errors and a file creation system that is managed by qualified records managers. As part of the rollout of Objective, an audit should be conducted to determine current information needs in each area to enable a plan to be formulated that will account for future needs and highlight areas of high priority. A document could then be developed to map the information architecture which would identify business processes and which business systems store records. This would also map the relationship between the different business systems and set standards for metadata and terminology that must be used by all business systems. A qualified records manager should be appointed in each System Program Office to coordinate the training and to establish control as to who can create files and folders.

I am passionate about my job and about doing the best I can for the System Program Office, for the Ship we manage and ultimately for Maritime Systems Division as a whole. I want my organisation to be able to function competitively and effectively and for this to take place a well managed recordkeeping department is crucial and must not be seen as an optional extra. The most frustrating thing is that a cost effective solution would be very easy to achieve, would reap enormous savings for the organisation and would ensure total accountability and transparency of our actions.

We have been given an excellent system to use, which will ensure that Defence is compliant with all relevant legislation but with no infrastructure such as training or maintenance of the records produced to back it up, we are only paying lip service to the requirements. My fear is that the importance of good record keeping will only become apparent when things go wrong. 🐼



After working as a Librarian for seven years, Deb Grooby took a change in career direction by becoming a configuration baseline officer at the ANZAC System Program Office in 2007. She completed a Graduate Diploma in Records Management in 2010 partly to add to her library studies

knowledge, and also to assist with her knowledge of DRMS: the Document and Records Management System. She is currently employed at the Amphibious and Afloat System Program Office in WA.

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HRH PRINCE PHILLIP

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS PRINCE PHILIP, THE DUKE OF EDINBURGH, HAS FORMALLY RECEIVED LETTERS PATENT AS THE HOLDER OF THE TITLE AND OFFICE OF LORD HIGH ADMIRAL.

Her Majesty the Queen conferred the title and office as a gift to the Duke of Edinburgh on his 90th birthday, which keeps alive the tradition of the monarch investing the office as an honour.

The Queen and the Duke of Edinburgh arrived at the Admiralty Board yesterday, Wednesday 23 November 2011, and were met by the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, and the Guard and Band of the Royal Marines provided a Royal Salute (*photograph top right*).

After receiving the Letters Patent and the Lord Admiral's flag, the Duke watched a short performance of the Royal Marines Corps of Drums.

The Duke of Edinburgh has a strong involvement with the Navy, having enrolled at Dartmouth Naval College when he was 18 years old.

He completed his initial training at RNC Dartmouth, where he was awarded the King's Dirk and a prize as the best Cadet of his entry.

In 1940, he joined the battleship *HMS Ramillies* in Colombo as a Midshipman and spent the following six months in the Indian Ocean.

In January 1941 he joined the battleship *HMS Valiant* in Alexandria. During the night action off Cape Matapan, he was in charge of *Valiant's* searchlight control, for which he was mentioned in despatches.

Having qualified for promotion to Sub-Lieutenant, he returned home and, after taking a series of technical courses, was appointed to the destroyer *HMS Wallace* based at

Rosyth for convoy escort duties on the east coast.

He was promoted to Lieutenant on 16 July 1942 and in October he was appointed First Lieutenant of *HMS Wallace* at the unusually early age of 21. In July 1943, Wallace took part in the Allied landings on Sicily.

After further courses, he was appointed as First Lieutenant of the new Fleet Destroyer *HMS Whelp*, which was then being built on the Tyne.

After commissioning, *Whelp* first joined the 27th Destroyer Flotilla and sailed for the Indian Ocean to join the British Pacific Fleet.

Whelp was present in Tokyo Bay when the Japanese signed the surrender. After the Japanese surrender, Prince Philip served continuously onboard *Whelp* throughout the following months. *Whelp* returned home in January 1946.

After instructing in the Petty Officers' School and attending the Naval Staff College at Greenwich,



he was appointed First Lieutenant of *HMS Chequers* in 1949. *Chequers* was Leader of the First Destroyer Flotilla in the Mediterranean Fleet.

He was promoted to Lieutenant-Commander in 1950 and then appointed in command of the Frigate *HMS Magpie*.

In 1952 he was promoted to Commander, but his naval career came to an end on the death of his father-in-law, King George VI.

Although His Royal Highness gave up his active naval career when the Queen succeeded her father, he has remained closely connected to, and



Commander-in-Chief Fleet, Admiral Sir Trevor Soar, briefs Her Majesty The Queen and His Royal Highness The Duke of Edinburgh on naval matters in the Admiralty Board Room at Admiralty House in London, with the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, also in attendance

actively interested in, every branch of Service life.

In 1952 he was appointed Admiral of the Sea Cadet Corps, Colonel-in-Chief of the Army Cadet Force and Air Commodore-in-Chief of the Air Training Corps. The following year he was promoted to Admiral of the Fleet and appointed Captain General of the Royal Marines.

Her Majesty The Queen has held the office of titular head of the Royal

Navy - Lord High Admiral - since the Navy's organisational structure was reviewed in 1964 and the title was reinvested in the sovereign.

The office of the Lord High Admiral dates from the 14th century when the English Navy consolidated into one force. Originally responsible for aspects of Navy policy, the position of Lord High Admiral was held on commission by various peers of the realm.

By 1628, following the death of the Duke of Buckingham, the position became entirely honorary, with the duties of running the Navy delegated to a board of commissioners. Control of the Navy was passed to and from the board and the Lord High Admiral until 1709, when the powers of the Lord High Admiral were finally vested in the board. 🚢



HMS Valliant



HMS Ramillies



HMS Whelp



The royal wedding in 1947



Explaining the failings in US strategy for the Afghanistan war

BY LIEUTENANT MIKE GORDON

As the war in Afghanistan passes its tenth year, military professionals, political commentators and academics are generally united in one view that the United States, along with its NATO and coalition allies, is in deep trouble in Afghanistan. A war that at its outset carried widespread international support, endorsement from the United Nations and genuine hope for the improvement of life in Afghanistan, has descended into a complex, costly counter-insurgency campaign that will surely occupy significant US assets well beyond the current proposed withdrawal date of 2014.

With political, economic and human consequences mounting, it is crucial to assess where this “good war” went bad. This article analyses the failings of US strategy in Afghanistan since 2001 through an examination of the conduct of the war and the repeated failures of the US Strategy, arguing that this failure is derived from three main areas: first, the flawed kinetic methods employed by the US throughout the course of the campaign; second, the burdening rather than intended legitimising role of NATO; and third, a critical failure to understand both the nature of the enemy and the broader geo-political landscape, resulting in a confused and often contradictory strategy.

I conclude that while the US position in Afghanistan is not untenable, significant changes are required in both the policy of the US and Pakistan for the conflict in Afghanistan to achieve any form of success.

The current conflict in Afghanistan was precipitated by Al-Qaeda's terrorist attacks on New York on September



11th, 2001. President Bush, in the clamour to take action, called on the Taliban regime of Afghanistan to produce Al-Qaeda's leadership that had hitherto received shelter. Following Taliban refusal, the US developed a strategy to transform Afghanistan from its position as a haven for terrorists through the removal of the Taliban regime.

To achieve this end the US embarked on an innovative military campaign marked by special force operations, local proxy militias and targeted air strikes. The US claimed defeat of the Taliban and their al Qaeda allies and by early 2002 a national reconciliation government stretching across tribal lines, led by anti-Taliban Pashtun Hamid Karzai, had been established by international coalition forces.

This political outcome was achieved by crafting a political settlement in which local warlords would support Hamid Karzai as president of a

constitutionally centralized, yet weak national government in return for little interference in their control over regional areas. It was during this phase, that the US made what would prove to be an important failure, namely omitting to capitalise on a devastated and reeling Taliban.

One of the key factors in the failure to secure the environment following the swift downfall of the Taliban regime was the light footprint used by US forces upon their entry into Afghanistan. Initial deployment to Afghanistan totalled some 30,000 soldiers, with a reliance on high levels of air and fire support. As a point of comparison, in South Vietnam, a country one-fifth the size of Afghanistan, 500,000 Allied troops failed to attain any semblance US policy goals.

While the initial levels of forces proved sufficient to remove the Taliban, they were woefully inadequate for providing continuing security for

the development of the new Afghan government's capabilities. Diverging foreign policy interests compounded the problems of a light presence in Afghanistan, as precious military and intelligence assets were diverted to Iraq in 2002 and Afghan reconstruction floundered as international aid donors failed to meet their obligations. The effect of too few troops, lagging economic development, rampant corruption and poorly trained security forces led to a resurgence of the Taliban as a part of a broader based Insurgency. As the Insurgency took shape in 2003-04, the US and later NATO began to rely heavily on air power to support its limited troop numbers in their kinetic efforts to defeat the enemy. This contributed to a drastically negative image of western forces within Afghanistan.

From 2005, continued insurgent attacks prompted a greater

commitment of ground forces, increased involvement from NATO and a subsequent focus on taking the fight to the enemy. Crucially, however, much of the damage was already done as a consequence of the lack of a prompt and effective counter-insurgency campaign, the extensive use of air strikes, and the lack of contact with the local population. These failures had the effect of nullifying most of the US military efforts and achievements.

US Army Colonel Charles Pfaff argues that this kinetic approach is not the most effective means of achieving US goals. Operations in Afghanistan illustrate this point, in that killing one insurgent can serve to motivate many others who were otherwise not in the fight to take his place; thus in effect killing that insurgent increases the enemy's combat power. Further, the ethnic composition in southern and

eastern Afghanistan together with the tribal areas of the Pakistan border region has provided an almost an unlimited base for recruitment for the Insurgency, effectively negating the aim of dealing a crushing kinetic blow to the Insurgency.

This idea of the weaknesses of a kinetic approach is beginning to take hold in higher echelons of the US military, as reflected in recent the Army and Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24, CounterInsurgency. This document, largely penned by two of the US's most intelligent military leaders, army General David Petraeus and Marine General James Mattis, argues that attrition alone would not defeat insurgencies. It states that in addition to using lethal force against insurgent forces, the US military would also be required to see to the physical and security needs of the populations where it operated. As a result, US forces

An Antonov 124-100M cargo aircraft delivers an MRI machine to the Role 3 Medical Facility at Camp Bastion, the first of its kind in the country. (Royal Air Force photo by Sergeant Mitch Moore)



Explaining the failings in US strategy for the Afghanistan war

would have to emphasize protecting and caring for the population over combating insurgents.

This view is corroborated by the recent International Security Assistance Force Commander's Guidance, which stated "[t]he intricate familial, clan, and tribal connections of Afghan society turn 'attrition math' on its head. From a conventional standpoint, the killing of two insurgents in a group of ten leaves eight remaining. From the insurgent standpoint, those two killed were likely related to many others who want vengeance." Pfaff argues that United States has previously employed a strategy aimed at imposing its will, when it would be better off employing a strategy aimed at gaining acceptance for its interests through a population-centric strategy. This insightful view provides that unless US strategists shift the emphasis in warfighting from imposing US will to making adversary interests compatible with those of the United States, current military efforts are not likely to yield victory. In broad terms, the US failed to align its operational plans with its strategic end state, allowing its preferred methods of operations to dictate strategy, rather than providing a clear focused strategy and developing the most appropriate means to achieve this. Had a population-centric strategy been developed earlier in the conflict, the dire situation that the US now finds itself in could possibly have been averted.

As US involvement in Afghanistan continued, it eventually called for increased deployment of NATO in order to arrest the deteriorating security situation within the country itself, and to allow access to the military power of the alliance. This was at a time in which the strength of the US itself was being sorely tested by the maintenance of two costly wars



without an end in sight. In Afghanistan NATO is currently involved in ground-combat operations for the first time in its history, far from its normal area of responsibility and against a threat very different from the one it had been created to face.

At first glance the deployment of NATO in Afghanistan was a move with potential and which garnered broad support. Approved by the UN Security Council and involving troops from 40 democracies, in addition to a UN Assistance Mission, it set out to achieve commendable aims of contributing to the development and modernisation of Afghanistan. The alliance's impact on the war, however, has been questionable at best, with it proving to be far from the strong supporting influence the US had hoped. The lack of unity among NATO members with regard to certain operational matters is a striking example of this.

Contributing states have different visions of NATO's role. The most obvious difference is that the United States, Britain and Canada tend to view involvement in Afghanistan, albeit with some minor variations between each country, as encompassing a counter-insurgency operation. Germany, France and many other European nations

on the other hand see operations as a stabilisation mission.

It is important to recognise that these views are not mutually exclusive. The varied nature of the security landscape in Afghanistan means that each view may be appropriate in different provinces of Afghanistan. The situation in Afghanistan can be best described as a peace support operations in the northern and western parts of the country, while at the same time counter-insurgency operations in the eastern and southern parts.

On the ground however, this clash of perspective does not assist cooperation of forces in difficult operations, with conflicting rules of engagement and national policy often preventing effective co-operation between units. NATO, which was intended to be a saving solution, has only contributed to a greater security problem and has called the standing of the Alliance in Afghanistan into serious question. Ponderous, flat-footed, and rank-heavy, the NATO command has often proved disappointingly overbearing and unhelpful. The Alliance's eventual withdrawal from Afghanistan will inevitably bring about difficult questions; particularly how the reputation of the longest

Afghan Article/Work continues as troops from the Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force 1 carry out a works inspection on the progress of the Primary School redevelopment in Tarin Kowt, Afghanistan. (Photo by ADF Corporal Ricky Fuller)

lived military alliance in the world, comprised of states with fundamentally stable political systems, has made itself vulnerable to the outcome of a war in the unpromising surroundings of Afghanistan.

The most significant and damaging single element that has contributed to the continued difficulties being experienced in Afghanistan is a dramatic failure to learn from the country's history. This failure is also combined with a neglect to fully understand the enemy being faced and the social terrain in which this battle is being fought. US Strategy, for a large part of the war, almost completely ignored the population in an attempt to focus on their war against the Insurgency. This failure to focus on the populations exacerbated long standing barriers to US success in Afghanistan. David Loyn, veteran BBC reporter on Afghanistan who has charted the country's turbulent history in great depth, argues that mistakes are being repeated today because of a neglect of the study of history. He charges that the US has failed to understand the extent of resistance in Afghanistan to anything that looks like foreign control. The problems of non-state violence, regional rivalries and the religious element in politics are not new to Afghanistan, but these have all been re-enforced by the current conflict. The legacy of the war against Soviet Union remains one of the most dominant shaping factors in the collective memory of Afghanistan, manifesting itself in the instinctive suspicion of foreign projects and of central government.

This suspicion has been underestimated by the US and capitalised upon by their enemies. The Insurgency has been able to portray the United States as a belligerent occupying force seeking to control and manipulate the Afghan Government

through increasing attacks which are well beyond the ability of the fledgling Afghan security forces ability to handle.

Rory Stuart, veteran of the UK diplomatic service, argues that the Taliban, largely discredited as a backward movement, gains support by portraying itself as fighting for Islam and Afghanistan against a foreign military occupation. Control of the image of the US is thus easily achievable where the alternative is for the Afghan people to believe the unbelievable from their perspective: that foreigners are unselfishly expending blood and treasure to help them. The insurgents, rather than the local authorities, are in the position to control the population around them. This provides a political advantage that is enough to allow a motivated insurgent to overcome all manner of tactical weakness in combat power or skill. Furthermore, as support for government is not always the default position for inhabitants, a strategy of support by the US for these authorities also serve to negate the image it seeks to create.

The US failure to understand the social terrain in which it operates is compounded by a failure to fully comprehend the nature of the enemy faced. The relatively slow commencement of the Insurgency meant that the gravity of the risks it posed was not appreciated for some time. Its common label, the 'Taliban Insurgency', is illustrative of this as it fails to take into account the wide base of support the Insurgency has enjoyed as the war has progressed. As the war in Afghanistan developed, the US recognised that they were facing not just a resurgent Taliban, but a much more complex and deeply rooted Insurgency.

The term 'terrorist syndicate' used by US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates in 2008 is a more appropriate



descriptor for part of the Insurgency as it considers the numerous 'players' involved: the Taliban, al-Qaeda, the Haqqani Tribal Network, Hezb-islami Gulbiddin and various drug and criminal motivated organisations. The US's initial view of the Insurgency as a solely Afghan phenomenon prevented an effective strategy from being developed to counter it. This view was exacerbated by a dominant mindset of Western map-making in US strategy which emphasised the importance of sovereign state borders that do not much matter at the local level. The effect of a lack of understanding of the enemy has been a neglect to focus on the key strengths of the Insurgency, including several thousand dedicated cadres, significant funding from the drug trade, and the luxury of an unimpeded sanctuary in a neighbouring country, Pakistan.

The failure to take into account the insurgents' relationship with Pakistan is the most crucial element of the inability of US strategy to combat the Insurgency, and has contributed most to Afghanistan's ongoing divisions. The links between the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan stretch back to the resistance against Soviet occupation in the 1980s when Mujahideen were supported by the CIA and ISI in Pakistan. Then from 1994 onwards there was extensive Pakistani official support for the Taliban movement in Afghanistan. The

RAAF C130J in Afghanistan (ADF photo)

Explaining the failings in US strategy for the Afghanistan war

importance of this relationship cannot be overstated. Ahmed Rashid describes the situation succinctly in stating that:

[t]he United States and NATO have failed to understand that the Taliban belong to neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan, but are a lumpen population, the product of refugee camps, militarised madrassas, and the lack of opportunities in the borderland of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

By treating the Insurgency as an Afghan problem and implementing strategies and operations to combat this view, the US and NATO have in effect only dealt with half the problem. In early stages of the war there existed an almost unwillingness to deal with the Pakistani connection in fear of disrupting the delicate political balance of Pakistan. The subordination of US interests to those of Pakistan reached an absurd point during the Afghan war when US forces ceased attacks on the Taliban in Kunduz to permit the withdrawal of thousands of Pakistani ISI and military personnel who had

been assisting the Islamists. This Pakistani retreat, moreover, was not well supervised by U.S. forces and may have permitted the escape of key Taliban commanders.

The Obama administration has in recent times acknowledged the importance of the Pakistan connection, which has resulted in increased drone strikes in Pakistani territory and a greater emphasis being placed on the role of Islamabad in combating the Insurgency. However US policy towards Pakistan still lacks strategic coherence. The fact that Washington considers the Pakistani authorities unreliable, with certain elements willing to pass on intelligence to US enemies, means that any efforts to deal with the Insurgency problem within Pakistan cannot be based on close military co-operation.

This situation was perfectly illustrated by the operation that located and killed Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden, found to be hiding almost in plain sight in a town less than an hour from the Pakistani capital. The assault that led to his death was carried out

by US Special Forces deep in Pakistani territory without the foreknowledge or consent of the Pakistani Government for fear that plans would be leaked which did not bode well for US-Pakistan relations. The unattractive truth however, is that Pakistan is a far larger, more powerful and generally more strategically important country than Afghanistan. If the price of saving Afghanistan were to be the destabilisation of Pakistan, this is one that is too great to pay and would have greater consequences for US and regional security.

This policy shift to focus on Pakistan may have come too late to salvage the situation within Afghanistan. Support for the Afghan war is dropping in almost all nations involved, with many having set dates for withdrawal. From the outset of the Obama Administration it was clear that the US was looking for an exit strategy. President Obama made this clear to the participants in the 2009 policy review, stating 'I'm not doing 10 years. I'm not doing a long-term nation building effort. I'm not spending a trillion

Oil assets outside Iraq...a very different war from Afghanistan (Courtesy RAN)



dollars.' The failure of the US, and its NATO allies, in preventing the creation of a social and security situation that allowed the Insurgency to gain traction has resulted in a long, costly and now seemingly pointless war. The failure to utilise the correct strategy and effective tactics, the involvement of NATO and the crucial failure to understand the environment in which they are operating and the enemy they are facing will result in, at best, a stale mate in Afghanistan. At worst, US credibility will have been dealt a major blow and the standing of NATO will be greatly diminished. Paired with this outcome, and often forgotten, is the plight of ordinary Afghans who have already endured almost 30 years of constant war and who look set to find no peace in the near future. ✎



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HMAS Bundaberg, crewed by Ardent Four and Commanded by Lieutenant Commander David Ince, sails under the Sydney Harbour Bridge during a port visit to HMAS Waterhen, Sydney

PWO SM – A Broader Future for the ‘Deep’ Specialist

BY COMMANDER MATT BUCKLEY

This article identifies the significant benefits the RAN can gain through incorporating Submarine Warfare Officer Course (SMWOC) students into key elements of future Principle Warfare Officer training to create a ‘PWO SM’.

This proposal goes beyond suggesting that Submarine (SM) students simply complete all ‘common’ phases of the new PWO course or fine-tuning a separate common warfare package. In essence this article is suggesting that SM students conduct those elements of the new PWO course which develop important skills for every specialist Maritime Warfare Officer (MWO)¹, while still completing the necessary specialist training to serve as a Submarine Warfare Officer at sea.

Far from providing a ‘watered down’ or soft path towards a PWO qualification, this combination of training would almost certainly incorporate a similar quantity of high intensity simulation and sea assessment periods as exist for the surface specialisations.

The important product of this ‘course’ is that a student graduates as a PWO SM. Far from being at odds with the future Maritime Warfare continuum, this proposal is sympathetic to the general concept of the ‘deep specialist’ who still has the necessary common maritime warfare knowledge to perform a range of non-platform or functional duties.

The example I will use here is that the specialist skills required of a PWO Air Warfare in an AWD will be notably different to those of a PWO Amphib in an LHD, and that the concept of a ‘general duties’ PWO will no longer apply within our new force

structure. The PWO title is considered important. Common use of this highly regarded qualification appropriately acknowledges skills beyond core MWO roles and would serve to break down some of the artificial barriers which currently exist between Submarine and Surface Warfare Officers.

The current SMWOC comprises approximately five months of:

- maritime warfare theory including Common Warfare Training (CWAR),
- specialist theory,
- weapons and systems courses,
- and practical assessment in the simulator and at sea.

The course has traditionally been run annually with an ideal number of six students, which allows all key ‘Officer Positions’ in the simulator to be filled by students and provides a reasonable rotation for sea assessment. A successful graduate is able to ‘fight the submarine’ in a two-watch system, serve as the Principle Sensor Coordinator in an action stations environment, and conduct the planning requirements of a SMWO at sea and ashore.



CPL Devlin and LAC Leedham from 11SQN loading Sonar Buoys into the AP-3C Orion for Exercise PWO SAW

Enduring challenges for conduct of the course are the provision of ideal student numbers, availability of the right concentration of assets for sea phases, and continuity of instructors. These challenges are primarily induced by the relatively small size of the Submarine Force and the Submarine Training Authority. A number of recent initiatives are however expected to alleviate some of these issues over the next two to three years; namely directed specialisation² and application of the Fleet Operating Concept³. These initiatives should respectively address

² This initiative ensures all junior warfare officers are streamed as specialists at a relatively early stage in their career

³ This concept ensures the Fleet is regularly ‘concentrated’ to achieve quality training days underway

¹ Previously Seaman Officer

the key issues of student numbers and asset concentration for underway training.

Additionally Junior SM Officers now have a series of clear milestones which they are required to achieve prior to SMWOC with the principle requirement being the award of an 'Officer of the Watch Dived' qualification. The implementation of these guidelines, which incorporates a quantitative number of dived hours on watch, ensures SM Officers are well prepared for SMWOC and assists career managers to identify when candidates are likely to be ready for course.

Noting that SMWOC is likely to benefit from an increase in candidates and a higher concentration of assets in coming years, it is important to detail precisely why the PWO SM path should be pursued when the SMWOC solution may suffice. Fundamentally the key reason for proposing the introduction of the PWO SM is that a significant increase in capability can be achieved without a marked increase in cost or overall training liability.

Specifically the introduction of the PWO SM will serve to:

- Create a baseline for Maritime Warfare Officer specialists.
- Account for increased 'integration' of submarines into the networked force.
- Streamline training resources and maximise the concentration of assets.
- Increase cross pollination of ideas amongst maritime warfare specialists.
- Develop flexibility in career and posting options for submariners.

DEVELOPING A BASELINE FOR MARITIME WARFARE OFFICER SPECIALISTS

One of the key reasons for pursuing the PWO SM concept is that it serves to provide a broader baseline for specialised Maritime Warfare Officers. Recent changes introduced under the MWO continuum have incorporated a wide number of disciplines into the PWO qualification, while at the same

time providing an increased focus on the deep specialist knowledge required in our future force.

While the exact nature of the baseline is still in the process of being developed, it is apparent that common PWO phases are less likely to reflect what we currently view as 'console PWO' requirements and will focus more on the requirements necessary for all specialised Maritime Warfare Officers.

The inclusion of submariners into the mix of specialists expected to complete the future PWO course not only acknowledges that submarines are a crucial element in our maritime force but also ensures these Officers have the same important baseline knowledge as other specialists. In addition to the more traditional PWO 'Air' and 'Surface Warfare' expected to complete the Future PWO course, Navigators, Mine Warfare and Amphibious specialists will also contribute to a genuinely broad phase of common training.

The addition of key elements of the current Force Warfare Officer



FLT LT Kev Mulgrew of 92WG and FLT LT John Humphreys of the Australian Joint Acoustic Analysis Centre work together testing the acoustic station on board the AP-3C prior to taking off

PWO SM – A Broader Future for the ‘Deep’ Specialist

Course (FWOC) to the future PWO continuum also provides a baseline amongst Maritime Warfare Specialists which enables employment of these individuals in range of operational and task group roles aside from single unit specific functions. Failure to include Submarine Warfare Officers into this training continuum may reduce the ability to employ these officers in non submarine seagoing roles, including in submarine specific ‘Headquarters’ functions.

The counter argument to including SMWOC students into the PWO continuum for baseline warfare purposes is that these Officers could continue to complete Common Warfare Course (CWAR) as a supplement to SMWOC and Force Warfare Officers Course (FWOC) as required to meet follow on posting requirements. There are a number of reasons why these courses do not provide the best solution.

Firstly, with Future PWO course capturing the majority of maritime warfare specialisations into the common phases, submariners are likely to find they are conducting legacy CWAR and FWOC training with a majority of non MWO specialists, ranging from ‘application course’ Intelligence PQ Officers and Aviation Warfare Officers to other service Officers expected to work in the maritime domain.

While cross pollination amongst these groups is not a bad thing, it is important to understand that SMWO students, like their PWO brethren are tactical and operational practitioners who already have seagoing experience. They not only have the same MWO origins as their surface force peers but would benefit most from direct exposure to them. CWAR by necessity needs to cover a broad spectrum of candidates and impart a generalist level of maritime warfare knowledge quite

distinct from the more advanced level of tailored training delivered in PWO course. The SMWO would not only benefit considerably from exposure to this higher level of training but would also be able to make valuable contributions to the general discussion and provide another perspective to the class.

The second important element to consider is that FWOC in the present form incorporates subject matter which is relevant to the SMWO, particularly when employed outside of submarine seagoing positions. Despite this very few SMWO have actually completed FWO training although several have been employed in a range of roles where this course would have greatly enhanced their capability. This is mainly due to the difficulty in these Officers being released for a non-mandatory course once they are already SMWO qualified. The integration of the core components of FWOC into the future PWO course strengthens the case for the submarine students to pursue a PWO SM stream.

THE INCREASED INTEGRATION OF SUBMARINES INTO A NETWORKED FORCE

The integration of Australian Submarines into the future networked task group is expected to increase significantly over the coming decades. This will occur as the task groups themselves form around new capabilities such as the LHD and as projects to increase the connectivity of Collins Class Submarines take effect.

The way in which submarines will be integrated into a battle group construct is expected to vary from the more traditional ‘support’ roles where the submarine is generally operating in the same tactical region as other units of the Task Group. With advances in communications and networked information, submarines may be

operating at the extremities of theatre, such as deep within a ‘non permissive’ littoral, but still directly supporting the objectives of the battle group or force. The level of integration is expected to increase in a connectivity sense, where submarines previously operating ‘independently’ and managed directly through the SUBOPATH will soon be connected into the vast network of information through which the battle is managed.

While many of the traditional roles of the submarine will remain, this integration into the battle group will require an increased awareness on the part of the Submarine Warfare Officer of the processes through which the Common Operating Picture and Commander’s Priorities are managed. These skills will be fundamentally addressed in the future PWO course and as long as there is an expectation that Australian Submarines will be networked contributors to future Task Group and Task Force Operations, it is important that Submarine Warfare Officers receive this training.

STREAMLINING RESOURCES AND MAXIMISING CONCENTRATION OF ASSETS

One of the key concerns raised when identifying a concept such as the PWO SM, is that the training overhead and cost of achieving this outcome will increase beyond the existing SMWOC requirement. If this paper were proposing that SM candidates simply completed the ‘first six months’ of PWO course before conducting a further five months of the current SMWOC, this may be a valid argument.

As stated earlier however, this proposal is seeking to reach beyond this solution to ensure that students are only exposed to what they actually need and that minimal duplication occurs between common and specialist

phases. Provided this can be achieved, there is a genuine opportunity for cost savings, as the delivery of common training to a larger group reduces overheads previously borne by the individual training delivery points.

To use a current example, radar and acoustic theoretical training delivered to the current SMWOC and PWOC are surprisingly similar but are delivered separately by external providers through different Training Authorities. Much of the warfare theory delivered by uniformed instructors for both courses is also similar and while the cost is less apparent in this case, in terms of a reduction in instructor hours, the net effect is the same.

SMWO students would under the proposed model be completing a broader level of common warfare training probably over more training hours than is currently the case, however through the rationalisation of resources, these additional requirements should be largely offset. Additionally the overheads of extra courses such as FWO and CWAR would be eliminated under a common delivery model.

Assuming that the common elements of PWO SM training are viewed as a netsum gain, the true value in terms of efficiency in this proposal comes with the unification of Sea Assessment Weeks (SAW) and potentially elements of practical simulation phases. Without conducting deep analysis of the numbers, the frequency of SAW required to meet PWO A/SW student requirements should be appropriate to meet the proposed PWO SM demands.

With this in mind, conducting a SAW with 'PWO' students embarked in both ships and submarines depending on specialisation, presents a unique opportunity to maximise scant resources for underway training.



While there have been efforts in the past to match SMWOC and PWO sea weeks, without a genuine common purpose these plans have sometimes been changed to meet other pressing imperatives. The delivery of a SAW which incorporates submarine and surface requirements (along with aviation training) not only combines the necessary assets, but effectively creates a period which is 'too big to fail' and appropriately focuses the Fleet on achieving this as a key force generation outcome.

At the time of writing Training Authority Submarines (TA-SM), is pursuing options to link the Collins Class tactical Simulator in the West with the Warship Simulator models at *Watson*. Assuming this is achievable, there is scope to conduct linked tactical level operations for PWO Surface and Submarine students during practical

simulator phases of the course, again increasing the level of integration and maximising shared resources.

It is worthy of note in this section that streamlining of assets also needs to include directing staff. PWO course is one of the premier courses run by Training Authority Maritime Warfare (TA-MW) while the smaller TA-SM runs the SMWOC. There are a range of overheads which naturally go into course development, operations phase planning and administration. For the PWO SM model to be truly effective, it makes sense that the lead authority would be TA-MW supported by TA-SM. This is not only important because TA-MW 'owns' the PWO qualification but also because this much larger organisation has the momentum to support the course, keep it current and facilitate the SAW.

While this may appear to

*HMAS Melbourne
Command Team
Training conducted
in the FFG-up
Operations Room
Simulator at HMAS
Watson in 2011
(Courtesy George
Deakin)*

PWO SM – A Broader Future for the ‘Deep’ Specialist

undermine the key role of TA-SM, in a course with a large specialist element, this organisation could focus purely on the delivering high quality specialist training to which they are perfectly suited. In terms of the additional burden on TA-MW, this could be offset by the addition of qualified SMWO on staff, who would not only focus on PWO SM student requirements but who would also increase the breadth of warfare knowledge within the training authority.

INCREASE CROSS POLLINATION OF IDEAS AMONGST MARITIME WARFARE SPECIALISTS

Perhaps the most apparent benefit of a PWO-SM model is the significant increase in cross pollination of ideas that would naturally occur across the spectrum of PWO candidates. The inclusion of the submariners into the course proper would reduce any ‘interloper’ type tag which may be associated by simply adding SMWOC students to various components of the course.

Increasing the mix of specialists on PWO course will achieve positive interaction for all students which will considerably enhance relationships between Fleet Warfare Officers. The addition of submarine specialists into the PWO fold is considered more pressing now with the advent of directed specialisation. The most common path for submarine specialists under the new MWO model is directly from completion of Phase IV shore⁴, which achieves a steady flow of candidates into the submarine stream and ensures Officers achieve specialisation aims earlier in their careers.

The side effect of this change however is that these Officers are now less likely to have gained broader

⁴ The final stage of application course training for the MWO before proceeding to sea to achieve a Bridge Warfare Certificate

exposure to major surface combatants than their predecessors and as a result are more likely to have a reduced understanding of the conduct of both surface and maritime aviation operations.

The introduction of these Officers into PWO course is a timely opportunity for them to re-connect with the greater Fleet and to develop a necessary understanding of the broader aspects of maritime warfare. From the perspective of the surface specialists, addition of the submariners to the course enables them to gain unique exposure to submarine warfare, this is particularly relevant for those Officers who may have only had limited exposure to submarine specialists during their pre PWO careers.

DEVELOP FLEXIBILITY IN CAREER AND POSTING OPTIONS FOR SUBMARINERS

The development of the PWO SM will also provide a broader scope of employment options for the warfare qualified submariner which will improve flexibility for both the individual and the organisation. The development of a career path for professional submariners which incorporates a balance of sea and shore roles, particularly for LEUT/LCDR rank, can be enhanced by increasing opportunities across the full spectrum of warfare postings rather than the limited number of positions which require submarine warfare specialists. This will not only provide incentive for Officers who require respite from submarine specific roles but also ensure there are geographic options outside of WA and Canberra where nearly all LEUT/LCDR SM positions exist.

The provision of a PWO SM qualification will provide submarine officers with the range of skills necessary to serve in a number of

PWO positions ashore and in deployed or afloat headquarters without an additional training burden. The common baseline may also provide options for other PWO specialists to fill some of those positions currently identified for SMWO's increasing posting options for these individuals particularly in WA.

The other important benefit of the PWO SM is that those Officers who do not progress to a SM Command (SM+) qualification, have a significantly reduced training overhead to re-specialise in another PWO field, increasing their employability and future career prospects. Finally the important force warfare elements of the new PWO course will provide SM+ with significant additional skills which they can directly apply both during their Sea Command and in a number of post Command roles where a solid baseline knowledge of broader maritime and force warfare matters is highly desirable.

THE PROPOSAL

In essence this article is recommending the inclusion of submariners into the future PWO course, with the ultimate objective being the formation of a PWO SM qualification⁵. This proposal may seem quite radical at first glance but when considered against the overall changes to the way in which the common elements of PWO training are being considered. But it is in fact in line with the broader intention to provide both baseline and deep specialist warfare training to all MWO's.

While this paper has not addressed the specific components of exactly what a PWO SM continuum would look like, consultation with those developing the new PWO course


⁵ There have been a number of Submariners that have successfully completed PWO training in the RAN at least three of these in the last two decades have achieved SM Sea Command.


and knowledge of existing SMWOC specialist requirements indicates a 3-4 month common phase at WATSON would most likely be followed by 2-3 months of deep specialist training incorporating simulator and sea assessment phases. While this does extend the overall time on course when compared to the current five month SMWOC, this needs to be balanced against the additional skills gained, cross pollination of ideas, rationalisation of resources and maximisation of assets which would be the products of this proposal.

A detailed analysis of this proposal may recommend a solution which falls short of the full PWO SM model. However there is considerable evidence to support at a minimum the rationalisation of key elements of SMWOC and PWOC. Ultimately as the RAN moves towards a more integrated and focussed force, it is important that maritime warfare professionals across all dimensions break down artificial stovepipes and create a genuine baseline from which deep specialist knowledge can be launched. The addition of submariners into the PWO model is considered a vehicle for genuinely broadening the horizons of our 'deep' specialists and increasing the overall capability of all of our Warfare Officers. 🚢

Commander Matt Buckley RAN is currently serving as the Executive Officer of HMAS Watson. Prior to this he served as Commander Sea Training Submarines, Commanding Officer HMAS Collins and the Head of Submarine Warfare Training at TA-SM. Matt has served in both Australian and Canadian Oberon Class Submarines in addition to the Collins class.

The author would like to acknowledge the valuable contributions and candid advice received from a large number of PWO and SM specialists in formulating this submission.





SMARTER AND SAFER


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Book Reviews



CLYDEBANK BATTLECRUISERS: FORGOTTEN PHOTOGRAPHS FROM JOHN BROWN'S SHIPYARD

By Ian Johnston

Seaforth Publishing/Naval Institute Press; £30

Reviewed by David Hobbs

This fascinating book delivers exactly what it says on the cover. The author has gained access to and published a large number of photographs held by the National Records of Scotland that show the battlecruisers *Inflexible*, *Australia*, *Tiger*, *Repulse* and *Hood* under construction in John Brown's shipyard at Clydebank. Most of them were taken originally as glass-plate negatives and are of pin-sharp quality; all are in black and white. Most show construction from the launch and fitting out stage but the author has added images from his own archive to show *Hood* from the keel-laying onwards.

Cameras were still a novelty in the first two decades of the twentieth century and the author rightly draws attention to the reaction of the workmen and sailors to the cameramen in their midst with their tripods and other paraphernalia.

The photographs are extensively captioned and each vessel has a chapter

of explanatory text which goes into details such as the design, component costs and the manpower allocated to each stage of construction. There is also a small section on the 'G3' battlecruisers that were cancelled as part of the Washington Naval Treaty, one of which was to have been built at Clydebank. Appendices give comparative dimensions of the five ships, construction timelines and summaries of managers' monthly reports that were originally used to chart progress at monthly meetings.

The ships and the shipyard have all gone now but the 150 ton crane seen in many of the photographs next to the fitting-out berth is similar to the one at Garden Island in Sydney; it survives as a visitor attraction and remains a familiar part of the Glasgow skyline.

Most Australian readers will be interested in the chapter on *HMAS Australia* which contains, in addition to the photographs, details about the contract agreed for her construction on 1 April 1910. It included the cost to the yard, prices charged to the RAN, and thus profit agreed on every item, and we learn from it that the hull was priced at £475,015 and the Babcock & Wilcox boilers at £120,700.

The inclusion of the ships built before and after *Australia* allows the reader to study the development of the type and to compare the Australian flagship with other vessels that formed part of the Battlecruiser Fleet in World War I and with the later *Hood*.

I found this to be an attractively presented book that is worth the cover price for the unique photographs alone; they show aspects of the ships that are not usually seen by anyone outside a shipyard. The well-researched data and details about the design and construction of Australia's first capital ship add significantly to earlier works on battlecruisers, balancing the images nicely. I recommend this book highly. 🌟



BRITISH NAVAL AVIATION, THE FIRST 100 YEARS

Edited by Tim Benbow; Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies

Published by Ashgate Publishing, Farnham and Burlington, 2011

pp: 226 pages plus index and footnotes

Reviewed by Commander David Hobbs MBE RN (ret'd)

This important new work is the sixth in a series on maritime policy published in both the UK and USA by Ashgate for the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies. It contains nine Papers, each taking an academic look at a different aspect of the subject and then considering its impact on the Royal Navy. Sources, indicating much primary research, are indicated by footnotes on almost every page but there is no bibliography.

The authors include Eric Grove, Geoffrey Till, Ben Jones, Jon Robb-Webb, Ian Speller, Edward Hampshire, Lee Willett and Tim Benbow himself. Two papers analyse operational matters in the Mediterranean and Pacific during World War II and a third covers operations from the Korean War to

the Falklands Conflict. Whilst these draw out the successful impact of naval aviation from global warfare to deterrence in periods of relative peace, it is a pity that a further paper was not commissioned to study operations in the Atlantic where the initial failure of Coastal Command led to it being placed under Admiralty control. It would have made an interesting study and given a more rounded approach to conflict in the different oceans.

The first two papers cover the beginnings of naval aviation and the development of the RNAS.

Papers covering the period after 1918 illustrate the fact that naval aircraft operating within a task force under naval command have represented not only an effective but in many cases the only option available to the British Government in a number of crises and examples are quoted of deterrence as well as war-fighting. However, notwithstanding these successes and the Royal Navy's pioneering development of naval aviation throughout much of the period in question, it has had to fight for its very existence in a series of peacetime 'battles' in Whitehall. It is in this area that the work excels and its analysis of the political intrigues that have sought, and still seek, to limit the Royal Navy's ability to deploy aircraft can genuinely be called groundbreaking.

By simultaneously addressing historical and current issues, *British Naval Aviation* reveals the continuing themes that run through them and exposes many of the fallacious arguments that have been deployed against aircraft carriers as shallow and self-interested. Similar arguments were deployed in Australia when the RAN attempted to replace the aircraft carrier *Melbourne* in the late 1970s and early 1980s and they will sound familiar to the book's Australian readership.

Inevitably there are some small

factual errors that have slipped through the editorial 'net'. On page 13 George Colmore is described as a naval officer who obtained a Royal Aero Club pilot's certificate at his own expense before the first four pilots trained officially at Eastchurch. A study of contemporary Navy Lists, however, shows that he did not join the RNAS until some years after gaining his certificate and was a civilian when he obtained it.

On page 120, the author fails to put the British Admiral's choice of the battleship *King George V* as his flagship into context by pointing out that Admiral Halsey USN, Commander of the Third Fleet and himself an aviator, chose to fly his flag in the battleship *Missouri* rather than an aircraft carrier. Also, he does not make clear that the practice of handing tactical command to the carrier admiral during flying operations was copied from the USN, not a 'legacy' RN procedure.

On page 158 the Westland Wyverns embarked in *Eagle* for Operation 'MUSKETEE' are described as 'piston-engined'. The original prototypes in 1946 were piston-engined but by 1956 the Wyvern S4 was a much-developed turbo-prop version powered the Armstrong Siddeley Python ASP 3. These are minor flaws, however, in a book that is otherwise well researched and authoritative.


For me the papers that stand out are those that describe the failed experiment of 'dual-control' in the inter-war years; the 'Radical Review' of 1953-55; the 'battle' for CVA-01 and the background to the present *Queen Elizabeth* class carriers. It seems that as long as an air branch forming an integral part of the Royal Navy has existed, there has been a cadre of opponents determined to remove what has proved to be the Service's most effective weapons system and to replace it with other less-capable and

often more expensive options that are not under naval control.

The Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies states on the back cover that this book is sure to stimulate further discussion. It will certainly do that and this book has contemporary relevance in Australia. The two new *Canberra*-Class LHDs will give Australia an impressive expeditionary capability but one in which the deployed ships and military forces and their helicopters will rely in the initial stages on fighters operating from a remote and vulnerable land base if they are opposed by a credible enemy equipped with its own close-support fighter aircraft.

The decision as to whether this is a good idea or not will be the result of exactly the sort of arguments that are described in this book. Arguments about the viability of an independent air force that does not share the operational views of its deployed expeditionary forces are not unique and although this book focuses on the UK, the arguments are equally relevant in Australia and the USA. They are probably far from over and those who take an intelligent interest in defence matters will find this book fascinating as will those who wonder why the Royal Navy is in the state it is today. I recommend it highly. 🚢

Book Reviews



KIT MUSTER: UNIFORMS, BADGES AND CATEGORIES OF THE AUSTRALIAN NAVY 1865-1953

By John Perryman, CSM - Sea Power Centre

Hardback. 305 pages.

Reviewed by LCDR Desmond Woods

This beautifully illustrated book is a long overdue encyclopaedia of what the sailors and officers of the Australian Navy have been wearing since the inception of the colonial naval services through until the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II. John Perryman has put together a definitive source for all those who are keen to understand what was worn and why, over the first years of the Australian Navy. As the senior naval historical officer at the Sea Power Centre—Australia the author has been ideally placed to access the illustrations and photographs which, combined with his clear narrative, make this book so enjoyable to read and useful to refer to. He has also made good use of records and uniform illustrations from the UK. This reflects the fact that appearance of the sailors and officers of the Australian Navy was almost indistinguishable from that of the RN, the parent service, until the exigencies

of war in the Pacific began a process of slow differentiation in uniforms which has gathered pace in recent decades.

This book does not deal only with the regular naval forces of the Australian colonies and later the Commonwealth. It has a chapter on the Australian Naval Reserves and Auxiliary Forces, the Women's Services – both the WRANS and RAN Nurses; Navy Bands and the Naval Dockyard Police.

Uniforms tell us much about attitudes and beliefs of our professional forebears. The elaborate ceremonial uniforms and fine points of rank distinction of the commissioned and warrant officers contrasted with the austere and simple rigs with which sailors were issued. As frock coats and bullion disappeared this distinction diminished, and now we view with some amazement the sheer richness of the dress uniforms of officers in the period before World War II. Fore and aft cocked hats, and elaborately decorated sword belts, were required for formal events. In 1929 it was decided that RAN officers appointed for duty in the United Kingdom, or on loan to the RN, were to provide themselves with this full dress uniform. Considering that officers were required to buy all their uniform items out of their modest pay this instruction must have entailed considerable borrowing from family or from the tailors and outfitters. It is hardly surprising that many young officers took years to pay off their gold bullion epaulettes alone! The purchase of a sword was another major expenditure for young officers and it was not until 1943 that Masters at Arms, the most senior of non-commissioned sailors, were permitted to draw a sword on loan, on an "as required" basis from the armoury instead of being required to buy their own.

The photographs in the book make

it very clear that there never was a golden age of perfect uniformity when sailors wore their uniform strictly as it was intended. The casual Australian approach to formality meant that "Jack" was usually not keen to be seen to conform closely to what the Naval Board intended him to look like. Here there are photographs of sailors with their caps worn "flat aback" with a tangle of hair showing in front. Sailors illegally modified their best uniform by making the jacket very tight and the bell bottoms wider than regulation. Clearly "Jack the sailor" wanted to look like "Jack the Lad" when he was going ashore and was reluctant to let Navy dress regulations cramp his style, or his chance of attracting admiring glances. In 1923 the Naval Board issued the first of several rebukes to ratings over their departure from dress standards.

It has been brought to the attention of the Naval Board that there is a marked tendency to depart in small details from the authorised pattern of various articles of uniform. The attention of Commanding officers is drawn to this wrong practice and it is desired that the necessary steps be taken forthwith to cause all such articles of apparel to be strictly in accordance with the approved pattern.

One can imagine the general apathy and disregard with which such "harrumphing" by British trained admirals would have been received on the lower deck of Australian warships.

Every generation of sailors has gone into battle wearing what was believed to be most appropriate for their circumstances. In the tropics that often meant very little. Topless gunners are not exactly compliant with our modern OH&S regulations but photos show that they were common enough in the waters off New Guinea in 1942. Even overalls were once a novelty. Until the

1930's stokers worked in a wide variety of pieces of naval uniform in the steamy heat of boiler and engine rooms. The wearing of the civilian pattern duffel coat and a tin hat has become familiar from WWII films like *The Cruel Sea* along with mugs of cocoa served at all hours to exhausted watchkeepers. What officers and their sailors wore at sea on long wartime patrols depended not so much on uniform regulations as on what was available and practical given the climate.

Wartime RANVR officers wore their "wavy navy" sleeve stripes with pride, but their insignia indicated that they were volunteers, borne for "hostilities only", unlike their straight-laced RAN shipmates. In the modern navy we seek to avoid making such external distinctions between permanent Navy and the Reserves. In the past such external distinctions were seen, however unfairly, as being the dividing line between the amateur and the professional officer.

Materials which we take for granted were once novel and expensive. For example rubber soles for boots and shoes were not generally available until rationing of rubber stopped in 1952. Prior to that leather soles must have been lethally slippery on wet ladders and decks. In 1934 stokers were issued with wooden-soled stokehold clogs, presumably to diffuse the heat from the engine room plates. It is easy to imagine the general response by stokers to their appearance!

The requirement to dress women seems to have taken the Naval Board completely by surprise in 1942 when the WRANS were instituted. The first women wireless telegraphists at *HMAS Harman* had no naval uniforms to start work in; all they were issued with was a WRANS armband and even they were in short supply. The Inspector of naval recruiting sought to remedy this by sending a signal to the Board drawing


their attention to the women's lack of anything to wear. It read: "To all intents and purposes WRANS here in the nude for life. Please expedite delivery of armbands."

John Perryman has filled this book with snippets of information like this and captions which bring to life the uniform items depicted. As a collector of militaria himself he understands that the significance of an item of uniform is in its provenance not in its face value. Uniforms are every bit as much a part of the Navy's history as the guns mounted outside our shore establishments and the paintings hanging on the walls of naval museums and wardroom. Uniforms define the officer and sailor and though much has changed it is also remarkable how much has survived essentially unaltered. For example, the basic pattern of the summer and winter uniforms worn today are unchanged in over a century. Blue Action Working Dress (AWD) survived from 1945 until very recently. Pride in appearance is only possible because uniform makes it possible for a ship's company to feel "all of one company." That has not changed and nor will it.

One often sees naval uniform worn by actors in films made by directors and their assistants who clearly have little idea about what exactly was worn in a particular period at sea and ashore. A minor but irritating example is officers' shoulder boards "going astern". These are commonplace. Now there are no more excuses for the wardrobe department of a film or TV production getting uniform details wrong. In this book John Perryman has nailed the questions, what was worn, when and by whom? In doing so he has provided a book which should be widely popular with the serving, ex-serving and the "never-served" population alike. It will appeal to anyone interested in what Australia's naval officers and "men,

(and women), dressed as seamen" wore during the formative decades when the nation and the Navy were both still young.

Single copies of *Kit Muster* may be obtained from the SPC-A by e-mailing the Centre, Attention: Publications Distribution Officer. E-mail: seapower.centre@defence.gov.au There is no charge and the print run is limited to 1000 unless there is an overwhelming requirement to produce a second edition. 📧



NAVY DIVERS

By Gregor Salmon

Random House (Ebury) ISBN
781741666571

Reviewed by LCDR Desmond Woods

The more secretive and specialized a military unit is the more intriguing and interesting it is to discover the truth about its history. All special forces like to cultivate an aura of elite exceptionalism in which to cloak their operations. The RAN's Clearance Divers Branch retains a mystique which helps ensure that its members are recognised as being second to none. But the reputation of an elite unit

Book Reviews

needs to be firmly based on a history of operational success. That history is what this new book by Gregor Salmon provides very well indeed.

Many of us are aware that during WWII the RAN's most highly decorated men were those who served with the RN, clearing German mines that were dropped onto British cities, estuaries and in 1944 into French and Dutch ports. *HMS Vernon* in Portsmouth was the cradle of this new breed of mine disposal expert. These men had to combine patience, courage, meticulous attention to detail, rapid ability to learn, skill with primitive hand tools, decisiveness if they were to survive. A capacity for an explosive sprint away from a mine was also essential. A rare breed indeed! Four Australian officers Lieutenant Commander John Stuart Mould, Lieutenant Commander Leon Goldsworthy, Lieutenant Hugh Syme and Lieutenant George Gosse were universally admired for their repeated demonstrations of their technical skill and ability to learn and teach life saving lessons to others. Their deeds laid the bedrock for the post war Australian Navy diving branch.

Salmon takes the reader through each of these men's careers and explains why the odds against their survival never got any better as the Germans laid more technically complex mines with new booby traps for those who had learned how to defuse the previous ones. This is gripping page-turning writing and explains why the George Crosses and George Medals which these Australians received from the King were so well earned.

They demonstrated exceptional valour, not in the face of the enemy, but in the face of the enemy's most ingenious and talented explosives engineers.

The author next takes the reader

into the "Heart of Darkness" that was the riverine war on the Mekong and at Vung Tau during the Vietnam War. The author gives vivid descriptions of the hair's breadth escapes that all the divers experienced as they became the "go to guys" for any ordnance issues that were too dangerous for simple destruction and needed to be rendered inert.

The CD Team 3 divers were up against Soviet-trained North Vietnamese special operations units that waged a determined campaign to destroy shipping, ammunition dumps, foot patrols. They targeted the specialists able to deal with their mines and bombs. This EOD work was every bit as dangerous as that done by those who defused German mines, but in the disillusionment of the post-Vietnam war period, due recognition of this heroism was never granted by an ungrateful nation. Only in the last few years has this changed and a unit citation sent by the US for the divers has been finally presented decades after they were sent. According to Salmon, the citation was left languishing in a filing cabinet in Russell for 30 years!

Salmon goes on to describe the long running experiment of putting the Navy's Divers through the SAS Cadre courses. This was an experiment in cultural integration which was never tested on operations. It had some serious teething problems some of which were resolved in a famous fist fight. When the decision was made to end the partnership both units had a profound respect for what the other was capable of.


Salmon moves smoothly into the modern counterterrorism era and gives a fine explanation of the work done to clear Umm Qasr so that relief ships could dock after the invasion of Iraq. Australian divers were the acknowledged experts in clearance diving throughout this campaign. For

the last five years the Navy's divers have been clearing the roads and buildings of Afghanistan from Taliban IEDs so that troops and civilians can keep moving. Frequently the diver at work on an IED knows that he is being watched as he clears it by the Taliban technician who planted it. This is a very personal war. Failure to detect and disarm means lives will be lost. But that fact has been true for the whole history of the Diver Branch back to 1939.

Salmon includes in the book an account of the shark attack which took a hand and most of one leg from diver Paul de Gelder and his extraordinary determination to survive, recover and return to duty. That is a story every bit as inspirational and courageous as those of the heroes who defused underwater mines using touch alone.

This fine book will be particularly welcomed as a clear narrative history of this specialist unit by those who are members or former members of the diver branch. It should also be enjoyed by a much wider readership.

Too little is known by most members of the ADF and the wider Australian public about ordinary men performing extraordinary service and who have been saving lives at the risk of their own for more than 60 years. They must surely deserve the accolade "the bravest of the brave." 🦋



DARWIN'S AIR WAR

By Bob Alford

ISBN 978-0-9807713-0-5

Reviewed by LCDR Tom Lewis

Bob Alford's first edition of *Darwin's Air War* was a most timely and useful publication when it was released in the 1990s. The original book was a slim A4 hardback edition, of 80 pages. The new edition of the work, still A4, is more than three times the size at 260 pages. There looks to be well over 100% more photos, and they are well reproduced to assist the text and tell a story themselves. And most welcome is the delivery of a huge quantity of further information concerning enemy air activities over the Top End in World War II.

The first work featured a chronological build-up of the air defences of the Northern Territory in WWII, followed by an outline of the first raids, and the fight back with strengthening units which first took a deterrence role, and then progressed to taking the war further afield from the Australian airfields. Spitfires replaced Kittyhawks; four-engined bombers replaced light twins, and radar came in to give early warning. It was a hard-fought war, lasting two years. Then the

enemy retreated north, and slowly the Allied aircraft followed them, leaving over 40 airfields behind them; facilities and wreckage galore – and a great need to fill in the pages of history to catalogue such momentous events in Australia's history. Author Bob Alford was a local historian – he now lives overseas – and he charted the way with meticulous attention to detail.

Darwin's Air War's second edition expands on this with much more detail. Thirteen chapters replace eight, and the author has also given the reader more strategic analysis with chapters such as "A Show of Force; the Japanese a Fading Threat?" A chapter of seven "pilot profiles" remains, but more reference detail is presented in the shape of five appendices as opposed to three.

Alford has not been afraid to disassemble his old analysis and revise it where new facts come to hand. For example, he now notes 107 incursions over the northern land border, which resulted in 64 raids. Such revelations open up the air story for Australia's north even more than previously.


An extremely welcome addition is the expanded index that will make this the definitive reference work for WWII air battles in this region. Over 30 pages long, the index is presented in several different ways, enabling squadrons, personnel, aircraft, general subjects and more to be the key of choice for the researcher.

In presentation terms, as before, this is both an easy and a fascinating read. Almost every page has an illustration, and there are several pages of colour photographs. All serve to bring to life the individual and squadron stories of the aircraft, pilots and the most valuable ground crew who kept the whole show on the road. The photos also give an insight into the tough conditions of the Territory: heat, dust, and a harsh terrain that took as few prisoners as the enemy. The grim

numbers of those who died in the defence of northern Australia climbs steadily through the story – there is a testimony to their efforts in these pages that will ensure they are not forgotten. For that reason alone the second edition of this book will doubtless be sought out by the family members of those who served in the air war.

The only problem for any reader who possesses the first edition of this admirable work is what to do with the original book. Personally, I have passed my first copy of *Darwin's Air War* on to "a southerner" who wanted to know more about the Top End conflict, now gaining more deserved recognition as the 70th anniversary of the first raids arrives. Doubtless once his appetite is whetted he will be back for more with this 2011 book. This second edition is at once timely, valuable, and a most impressive work in its own right. Bob Alford is to be congratulated for bringing his excellent revised book into history's service. 🍷

Book Reviews



SAVING PRIVATE SARBI

By Sandra Lee

Allen and Unwin, 2011. 315 pages; soft cover; illustrated.

Reviewed by Kaylene Anderson

Australian journalist Sandra Lee has put together in *Saving Private Sarbi* a readable but lengthy story concerning a work dog employed by the Australian Army. A black Labrador-cross, Sarbi detected explosives in Afghanistan. Then she went missing in action following a battle between the Taliban and elements of the Special Air Service.

In 2008, some months later, Sarbi was found near a local village. She had survived injuries and a cold winter. Reunited with her handler, she is now helping to train new dogs for their essential work in detecting bombs, improvised weapons, and buried ammunition in the inhospitable terrain of Afghanistan.


I found this an often sad, but usually gripping story of man's best friend in action. *Saving Private Sarbi* will be read easily by those who don't have a dog of their own in their lives, but for those who do this book presents a further challenge. The bond of the working

dog with its handler is unique, and both grow to understand each other in a most intense way. On patrol, if a dog's ear goes up, or their hair flattens: such indicators mean something, and the message is mostly essential.

The book is quite heartbreaking when dogs are described dying, as they do. The dogs have rank, and if their handler dies they are buried alongside their human master. Sarbi, like all armed forces' dogs, was selected for her keenness and in her particular case, an obsession with selecting tennis balls.

This book is both unusual and fascinating. It has a series of photographs which help the story along, and overall, *Saving Private Sarbi* was an excellent read. Highly recommended. 🐾

Quick Review by LCDR Tom Lewis



WHAT IT IS LIKE TO GO TO WAR

This is a most curious book. It mixes reminiscences from the author's time as a platoon commander in Vietnam, with his reflections on veterans' places in society – both what is it is, and what it should be. Writer Karl Marlantes has

previously written what the cover tells us is a bestseller – *Matterhorn* – which this reviewer hasn't read. That was a novel, a fictionalised version of the south-east Asian war. This new book is reality, and also a work of questioning and reasoning.

Marlantes ventures into difficult territory. A United States Marine, he is honest in that he and his fellows sometimes obtained exultation from their experiences – the ultimate adrenaline high. This will instantly repulse some readers. But then the author presents them with the hypocrisy of what they ask – they belong to societies which ask some of their people to go into combat.

The author's Vietnam stories are usually singular, and followed by a piece of commentary in which he argues the points of a mixture of ethics, sociological ponderings, and philosophy. There are questions raised such as how should warriors behave; how should they be trained, and tasked, and honoured. It's an absorbing and well-written account. There are personal anecdotes about Marlantes' successes and failures following his combat experience: it seems he was well-decorated but somewhat of a bad boy for some time before he left the US military. Altogether it's an easy read despite the somewhat strange alleyways the author has travelled through in the decades since that most divisive war.

The fate of the book is going to be curious. I would not be surprised to see it taken up within military training across any country – for which it would be well suited. Whether it will succeed in changing the minds of those who criticise the military for what they do remains to be seen. I expect many would dismiss *What it is Like to Go to War* without reading it, simply because of its author's background. That would be a pity, for this is a work that deserves to be read. 🐾



***The Royal Brunei Armed Forces has officially accepted two Darussalam Class Patrol Vessels:
KDB Darussalam & KDB Darulehsan***

The handing over ceremony took place at Lürssen Shipyard, Germany. The vessels have a length of 80 metres and 13 metres breadth; are propelled by diesels and have an endurance of 21 days at sea. The ships are equipped with surface to surface missile and a medium calibre gun. The Darussalam class replace the Missile Gun Boat Waspada class which have been in service with the Royal Brunei Navy for more than 30 years.



Photos by Michael Nitz



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Visions from the Vault

SUPPORTING THE ONTARIO BARRAGE — A MAJOR NAVAL UNDERTAKING



The torpedo boat destroyers, HMA Ships *Huon* and *Parramatta*, two of the six members of the RAN's Destroyer Flotilla, pictured late in World War I. From August 1917 the flotilla began patrol operations in the mouth of the Adriatic Sea from a base at Brindisi on the

Italian coast. Much of their work was in support of the Otranto Barrage, a major undertaking involving heavy nets, surface ships and aircraft, and designed to prevent enemy submarines escaping into the Mediterranean. The Australian destroyers were fitted with hydrophones as an aid

to submarine detection and *Huon* and *Parramatta* also operated captive observation balloons. The primary anti-submarine weapon consisted of hand-launched depth charges, which can be seen here mounted on the sterns of both vessels. ⚓

ANI ON-LINE: A GUIDE TO THE NEW WEBSITE.

Our new website is now on-line! In addition to the features available on the previous site, the new site also features a library of past journals, a discussion forum, a news section and member list. This short guide is designed to help you take full advantage of the new features.




Figure 1

OBTAINING AN ACCOUNT

In order to access the new features of the site you must have a user account for the website. If you have a current subscription to the ANI, navigate to the website www.navalinstitute.com.au using your web browser (figure 1), click the "Members Login" menu item (figure 2), then click the link to download an application form. Fill in the form, then fax or post it to the ANI Business Manager. Once your account has been created, you will receive an email that outlines your member ID and password.



Figure 2



Figure 3

LOGGING IN TO YOUR ACCOUNT

Once you have your account details, you are ready to login and access the new features of the site. In order to login, navigate to the website (figure 1) and click the "Members Login" item (figure 2). Enter your member ID and password as they were provided to you, then click the "Login" button. The case of the member ID and password are important: i.e. "CaSe" and "case" are considered entirely different words by the authentication system. Each letter of the password will appear as a single "*" to prevent others from seeing your password as you type. If you have entered your details correctly, you will be presented with the news page. The grey status bar at the top notifies you of the account you are using (figure 4). You are now able to access all of the new features of the site.




Figure 4

LOGGING OUT OF YOUR ACCOUNT

In order to protect your identity and to prevent malicious use of your account by others, you must log out of the site when you are finished browsing. This is especially important on public computers. In order to log out, click the "Logout" link in the grey status bar (figure 4).




Figure 5




Figure 6

CHANGING YOUR DETAILS

When your account is created, only your member ID and password are stored in the system for privacy reasons. However, you may provide other details that are visible to other ANI members. In order to change your details, login and click the "Change Your Details" menu item (figure 5). Then select the "change" link (figure 6) next to either your personal details or password. Change the text appropriately and click the "save" button (figure 7).

The personal information that you provide will be visible to other members of the ANI but will be hidden from members of the general public. You may provide as much or as little detail as you wish but none of the fields are compulsory. However, you may not change your member ID as it is the link between the on-line database and our off-line records.



Figure 7




Figure 8

PARTICIPATING IN THE FORUM

In order to post topics and replies in the discussion forum, first login and click the "Forum" menu item (figure 8). Then select a forum that you would like to view by clicking its "View Topics" button (figure 9). Select a topic that you would like to read by clicking its "View this topic" link (figure 10). If you are not interested in any particular topic, you may add your own by clicking the "Add New Topic" button (figure 10). Similarly, once you are viewing a topic, you may post a reply by clicking "Add New Post". Fill in the heading and body of your reply and click the "Submit" button to add your reply to the topic. If you change your mind while writing your reply, you may click the "Cancel" button and your reply will not be added to the topic.




Figure 9




Figure 10

FURTHER QUESTIONS

If you have specific questions regarding website features or even a feature request, post a topic in the "Website Questions" forum and a site administrator will reply. Otherwise, happy browsing!

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Separate paragraphs by one line. Single spacing only. Use one space only after stops and colons.

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Use numbers for 10 and above, words below. Ship names use italics in title case; prefixes such as HMAS in capitals and italics. Book and Journal titles use italics.

Use single quotation marks for quotations. Do not use hyphens for any rank except Sub-Lieutenant.

CITATIONS:

Endnotes rather than footnotes. Use footnotes to explain any points you want the reader to notice immediately. Book titles follow Author surname, first name, title if any. Title. Place of publication: publisher, year of that edition.

So:

Adkin, Mark. *Goose Green*. London: Leo Cooper, 1992.

Adler, Bill (Ed.) *Letters from Vietnam*. New York: EP Dutton and Co., 1967.

Articles use quotation marks around their title, which is not in italics.

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Australian Associated Press. "Army admits mistakes in SAS investigation". 17 February, 2004. <http://www.asia-pacific-action.org/southseast asia/easttimor/netnews/2004/end_02v3.htm#Army%20admits%20mistakes%20in%0SAS%20investigation>

So, web site name. Article title. Full date of accessing the site. Full URL.

BYLINES:

Supply your everyday title for use at the beginning of the title, so: Lieutenant Commander Bill Crabbe, or Jack Aubrey, or Reverend James Moodie. At

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ILLUSTRATIONS:

Do not embed graphs or figures in your text without sending a separate file as well. If supplying photographs use a minimum of 300 dpi. We are keen on colour images but will use greyscale if necessary. We are able to scan prints if necessary, but request a self-addressed stamped envelope for return – please insure adequately if necessary.

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Articles should ideally range in size from 3000-7000 words, but smaller articles will be considered, as will the occasional larger piece of work. Submissions should be sent to the Editor in the first instance.

Email: a_n_i@bigpond.com and mark

attention Editorial Board.

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THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE

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Australian Naval Institute



MEMBERSHIP SUBSCRIPTION RATES (AUSTRALIAN DOLLARS)

PLEASE CIRCLE THE AMOUNT YOU WISH TO PAY	AUSTRALIA/NEW ZEALAND*		ASIA PACIFIC REGION†		REST OF WORLD†	
	individual or institutional member	individual concession	individual or institutional member	individual concession	individual or institutional member	individual concession
FOR 1 YEAR	\$60.00	\$40.00	\$75.00	\$55.00	\$82.00	\$62.00
FOR 2 YEARS	\$115.00	\$77.50	\$145.00	\$107.50	\$159.00	\$121.50
FOR 3 YEARS	\$167.50	\$112.50	\$212.50	\$157.50	\$233.50	\$178.50

Prices are shown in Australian Dollars.

*No GST is payable in relation to ANI membership.

†Includes air mail postage.

Concession available to students, persons of the rank of Lieutenant or below, and those who are fully retired.

MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION



EITHER: Join & pay through the "Join the ANI" page of the ANI website at www.navalinstitute.com.au using your PayPal account or credit card

OR: Complete the details below & return this form to the address shown above

Rank/Title: Initials:

Surname & Postnominals:

Address:

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WEBSITE USERNAME PREFERENCES: *Please use only characters (a-z) or numbers (0-9)*

1. 2. 3.

PAYMENT DETAILS *Please select one.*

A. ☐ Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) **using your surname as the reference:**

Account Name: **AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE** BSB: 062 919 a/c No.: 0091 4309

B. ☐ Credit card by completing these details: Mastercard ☐ Visa ☐

Card No.

Name of cardholder (PLEASE PRINT):

Signature: Expiry date:

C. ☐ Cheque payable to AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE.

Australian Dollars only please. Foreign currency cheques cannot be accepted.

Australian Naval Institute



I agree to abide by the Constitution and by-laws of the Australian Naval Institute.

Signature: Date:



The Royal Australian Navy's newest ship HMAS Choules arrived at its homeport at Fleet Base East in Sydney for the first time after being formally commissioned into service in Fremantle on 13 December 2011. Family and friends lined the wharf to welcome the Navy's latest amphibious ship and her crew of 158. Commander of Australian Fleet, Rear Admiral Steve Gilmore AM, CSC, RAN joined HMAS Choules for her maiden voyage through Sydney Heads, before officially handing over the weight of command to the new Commander Australian Fleet, Rear Admiral Tim Barrett AM, CSC RAN. The acquisition of HMAS Choules will ensure that the Royal Australian Navy has the amphibious capability it needs for operations and humanitarian support in our region in the period leading up to the arrival of the Royal Australian Navy's Landing Helicopter Dock Ships in 2014 and 2015 (Photos courtesy RAN)

