



ISSUE 141

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September 2011

Punching above your weight

The De-Radicalisation of the Modern Extremist

Visiting BRNC Dartmouth – Commodore Harry Adams Essay Prize

How Many Submariners Does It Take To...?

The Gallipoli Campaign and AE2's last signal

The Australasian Naval Force (ANF)

Exclusive Interview with General Peter Cosgrove

Military Education: The Place of Ideals

Security: Present and Future Challenges

Effectiveness of the Individual Performance Appraisal within the RAN

JOURNAL OF THE

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Letters to the Editor

The decommissioning of a UK FAA capability by a UK Government is invariably followed in short order by a national maritime task arising for which the cancelled capability was specifically designed. The decommissioning of *Eagle* and *Ark Royal* in the late 70's under Labour was followed by the Falklands invasion and may have been a significant factor in precipitating it. The decision to announce the withdraw of the Ice Patrol Ship *HMS Endurance* in 1982, when her political significance in the South Atlantic was obvious to all except the accountants in Whitehall, was the final green light for the Argentinean Junta.

The decision to decommission the Sea Harrier capability by the Tories in November 2010 was followed in March 2011 by the requirement for the UK to engage first in the evacuation of non combatants from Tunis, using a frigate, and then to play a major role in providing a no fly zone over a Mediterranean state. The RAF is

now flying 3,000ks from Marham to do a mission that could have been done from the sea with relative ease and with a response time measured in minutes by two Invincible Class and an embarked Air Group. Purely on a cost effectiveness basis flying Typhoons and Tornados and refuelling them in mid-air makes no sense.

Collective amnesia in Whitehall is cyclical and predictable and once the decisions based on it are demonstrated to be gross errors of understanding and judgement they are never apologised for. David Cameron said ruefully a few weeks ago that his decision to leave a decade-long gap in fixed wing flying at sea was his hardest decision so far as PM. It was hard because it so clearly risky and manifestly wrong for the UK and for NATO.

Now the air is once again black with chickens coming home to roost – but no Harriers !

LCDR Des Woods, RAN.

Contents

<i>Punching above your weight</i>	4
<i>The De-Radicalisation of the Modern Extremist</i>	9
<i>Visiting BRNC Dartmouth – Commodore Harry Adams Essay Prize</i>	12
<i>Washington and Arlington</i>	14
<i>First 214 Class Submarine for Hellenic Navy</i>	16
<i>How Many Submariners Does It Take To...?</i>	19
<i>The Gallipoli Campaign and AE2's last signal</i>	25
<i>The Australasian Naval Forces (ANF)</i>	33
<i>Sea lines under strain: Report of the 16th International SLOC Group Conference</i>	36
<i>Exclusive Interview with General Peter Cosgrove</i>	39
<i>Military Education: The Place of Ideals</i>	42
<i>Security: Present and Future Challenges</i>	45
<i>Effectiveness of the Individual Performance Appraisal within the RAN</i>	51
<i>Studies in Leadership – Fearless Leader: Rear Admiral Harold Bruce Farncomb, CB, DSO, MVO, RAN</i>	58
<i>A Large Acquisition for the Navy</i>	68
<i>Book Reviews</i>	73
<i>Short Cut Reviews with Tom Lewis</i>	76
<i>Visions from the Vault</i>	79
<i>Style Notes for Headmark</i>	81
<i>ANI Membership Application Form</i>	83



Front page photograph: HMAS Ararat, on patrol during the Australia–Indonesia Coordinated Patrol (AUSINDO CORPAT) 2011, sails into calm seas as the sun rises over the Arafura Sea.

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Issue Number 141

Printed by
 Everbest Printing
 Company

ISSN 1833-6531

Design & DTP by
 Diane Bricknell
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PUNCHING ABOVE YOUR WEIGHT

BY LIEUTENANT MARTIN BURTON

The Australian Defence Force is on the verge of introducing in to service the largest ships ever built for the Royal Australian Navy. The two Canberra Class Amphibious Assault Ships designated Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD), will give the ADF a keenly sought enhanced amphibious capability. This capability will be a truly joint capability with the introduction into service impacting on RAN, ARA and the RAAF.

With the quantum leap in capability that these 27,800 tonne vessels will bring, comes with its own set of new challenges that will require thoughtful planning and solutions. This is to avoid it becoming a nemesis in attempting to over commit the ships and their ships' companies beyond the original concept of operations; in particular the positive speculation and media comment as to the ADF adopting an organic Close Air Support (CAS) fixed wing capability which would be operated from, and integrated in to the LHD class.

The CAS role, if introduced, would be required to be undertaken by fixed wing Short Takeoff Vertical Landing (STOVL) aircraft like the future F35B Joint Strike¹ Fighter, or the current AV8B Harrier operated from the

LHD to provide offensive air support capability for troops landed ashore in an amphibious force.

This issue of providing CAS with fixed wing assets from embarked platforms, in close range to any location ashore where troops have been landed, is not a new concept in that the requirement has been known since the early part of World War II.² This issue was graphically recorded in the Falklands War, where it was quickly learnt of the critical need to provide air assets that could not only strive for air superiority over the landing zones but also be available quickly, constantly, well briefed and suitably armed to protect the land force.

I will discuss some of the Defence related management issues that will require to be addressed, and solutions sought prior to any decision being made to commit embarked organic CAS operations to be undertaken from the LHDs. The issues that are raised will be crucial to the successful introduction of this new capability. I will not attempt to address the perceived requirement of operating fixed wing aircraft from the LHDs or the possible aircraft and who may operate those aircraft. The

article determines and highlights the challenges that may eventuate in an attempt to operate STOVL aircraft from the Canberra Class LHDs. It includes a critical but constructive evaluation along with recommendations of how this possible capability can be introduced.

BACKGROUND

The required skill base to operate a ship the type and size of the Canberra Class LHDs can be put into context, in the words of the United States Navy Chief of Naval Operations. It should be also noted that the USN carrier fleet operations has evolved over a 75 year period.

Carrier fleet operations are highly complex and take years to master. It's very, very complex, it's not something like you get an aircraft carrier and an airplane then you are effective. From the day an aircraft and a carrier is delivered to when it becomes effective will take quite some time. Admiral Roughead CNO, USN³

The ADF has not conducted fixed wing embarked operations since the late 1970s with *HMAS Melbourne*



Helicopters on the flight deck
(Courtesy RAN)

operating A4G Sky Hawk fighter-bomber aircraft and the S2-E/G Tracker anti-submarine aircraft. Consequently the corporate knowledge of operating fixed wing aircraft at sea has been relinquished as the post carrier period has been concentrated on single spot helicopter operations, by predominately frigate based embarked flights, and more recently in the last decade a move to multi helicopter and dual spot operations from the *Kanimbla* class Landing Platform Amphibious (LPA) and the *Tobruk* class Landing Ship Heavy (LSH).

The operations of an LHD flight deck in many ways could be described and classed as more complicated than that of a strike carrier. To introduce a fixed wing element to an already complex and potentially highly dangerous flight deck environment would require superior Command and Control along with the requirement that all levels of management involved in the joint environment to work very closely together to reach a common goal. There will be a requirement that all levels of management understand and comprehend the capability as well as the limitations of the elements that make up the whole capability. In particular the intrinsic value of detailed planning, timing and rehearsals to ensure that every element that makes up the capability can play its part when required or order to reach the desired mission outcome.

There are six key sub-systems that are brought together within the concept of operations of the class that require comment: Aviation, Watercraft, Joint Fires, Command and Control, Embarked Forces, Logistics and Health Support. I will discuss each of these in turn.

AVIATION. The LHD will have an integrated aviation department whose role will be to "operate the airport". This includes the management of the

flightdeck and how it is used; the movement and storage of aircraft to and from the hanger.⁴ The safe movement of embarked force troops along with their combat equipment from their respective mess or storage area to the aircraft; and then via an air assault deploy them ashore. This must be managed simultaneously whilst conducting fuelling operations, and continuing aircraft maintenance to insure that the maximum numbers of aircraft are available for ongoing tasking.

To add multiple fixed wing aircraft to this mix will require specific planning in the areas of space allocation, as the hanger and vehicle deck are shared multi-use areas. At any one time when undertaking amphibious operations space in these critical areas will be at a premium. It will require detailed planning at the joint level to ensure the space can still operate and function as it was designed to do.

Organic helicopter operations will also require detailed planning and an element of flexibility to ensure that the correct load is delivered on time, at the correct

location ashore and if required back loads are also accommodated in to the plan. Due to the very nature of CAS fixed wing operations they will not always be able to be planned and may require the aircraft ranged on deck awaiting tasking. This may inhibit and restrict the efficient flow of troops and cargo to and from the flight deck and hence possibly delay onwards movement to the beach. Organic helicopter operations will be required to be conducted both day and night in all types of weather conditions. This may include the recovery of battle damaged aircraft that would be operating in a degraded mode and require significantly more flight deck then normal to ensure a safe recovery. Additionally the aircraft may be damaged requiring rigging of specific rescue equipment, hindering the normal use of the flight deck.

Perhaps the prudent solution to



RAN aircraft in San Diego, USA in 1967



Navantia LHD-carrier (Courtesy Navantia)

PUNCHING ABOVE YOUR WEIGHT

this problem may be to operate one type, be it fixed wing or rotary from one platform or a mutually compatible group together to further assist the smooth flow of operations required. And finally there may be potential to also conduct Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) operations in the future as well, adding yet another layer of complexity to this already multifaceted balancing act.

WATERCRAFT. The introduction of fixed wing aircraft on to the LHD platforms may indirectly affect the launch and recovery of the watercraft due to the requirement to have the ship operating a higher speed. In order to gain sufficient wind across the deck to safely launch possibly heavily armed and fuelled CAS aircraft. Additionally the recovery pattern of both fixed wing aircraft, and watercraft, with the former flying over the later on final approach would be distracting to both, resulting in a potentially dangerous situation.

With the very nature of fixed wing operations requiring constant wind across the flight deck as apposed to rotary wing operations that can be conducted with little or no relative wind, the ship will be required to manoeuvre constantly to provide the flight envelope to launch and recover STOVL jets. This will greatly influence the distance that each landing craft will have to cover between the ship and the shore or vice versa. Also the ships will be limited in their ability to manoeuvre whilst the stern door is open and watercraft are entering or exiting the well deck.

JOINT FIRES. As the Joint Fires area is a complicated and classified area of operation this paper will only discuss the minimal amount of information in that is needed to be covered. Firstly, the additional firepower that an embarked fixed wing element would bring would greatly enhance any latent capabilities,

but it must be integrated and its operation must be smooth and concise so as not to affect the other on going applications of fire.

COMMAND AND CONTROL. With any new additional element as would be the case if fixed wing CAS aircraft where embarked, would come an additional requirement of another level of command and control which would need to be embedded into the already complex operating environment of the LHD. Also the additional accommodation requirements and operating spaces of this element would place significant stress on an already stretched compliment.

Coordination of the ships airspace and any adjoining airspace and its overall management will be a major challenge. As will the mixing of fixed wing high speed jets and helicopters which is often complex and high risk. This will again require additional personnel to be embarked to cater for the increased risk involved with dissimilar operations, and the sequencing of aircraft to meet their individual missions. Also there will be the intention to reduce the foot print⁵ ashore by having the headquarters remaining afloat initially to reduce the manpower to protect it.

EMBARKED FORCES. Whilst on transit to the area of operations, or

if forced to hold on route the day to day activities of the embarked forces will directly impact on the ships' operation. Embarked Forces will be required to conduct physical training, combined technical training and rehearsals for the airborne and water borne assault. This will require the embarked forces to enter or pass through areas that are being utilised for aviation operations and maintenance activities; this will require constant supervision to protect the required high level of flight safety.

As with any deployment there are many additional units which may bring specialist or unique capabilities to the force element group and are force assigned at short notice. This leaves the ship in an unenviable position of not knowing how many personnel they are required to accommodate until the day of sailing which can lead to significant difficulties when being the "First to go and the last to now."

LOGISTICS. The operation of fixed wing aircraft from shore based facilities requires a great deal of support to provide and maintain stores, ground support equipment, and maintenance to keep the assets in the air. To try to replicate that onboard an LHD would be difficult if not impossible. Therefore the operational logistical package of how to support fixed wing aircraft afloat would need to be rationalised to ensure for example the appropriate number of spares could be embarked within the confines of the storage areas available. This would also be the case for weapon systems and ammunitions which would also have to be prioritised on ship and embarked rotary elements holdings.

With the requirement for the logistical support for the land forces to come from the LHDs, any break down in that supply chain will then present the Land Forces Commander with additional liability of perhaps delaying his forward advance. This may lead to losing tactile advantage that may have been gained.

With 1403 bunks available on each ship and with a



A view of Wollomoolloo Bay in 1982 features the aircraft carrier Melbourne around the time the decision was made to get out of the aircraft carrier business-photo by Tony Woodland

requirement of approximately 400 for the ships company and the additional other force assigned elements, the remaining 1000 bunks will rapidly be filled. Any requirement to feed and accommodate an additional number of personnel will place further strain on the ship's company, and exact numbers will need to be refined down the bare minimum to operate the aircraft. This could be offset by the Aviation Branch Sailors on board being cross trained to ground handle the aircraft and other generic tasks.

HEALTH SUPPORT. As any combat operations progress there will also be the possibility of casualties requiring Aero Medical Evacuation (AME). This will again require significant planning and coordination and the use of scarce helicopter assets. Additionally the responsibility of undertaking the Primary Casualty Receiving Facility (PCRF) duties will require additional specialist personnel and equipment to be embarked on to the LHDs.

This article has attempted to outline some of the possible challenges that may be faced if the introduction of fixed wing STOVL operations is undertaken from the Canberra Class LHDs. Some of those challenges include but are not limited to space availability, concept of operations, command and control, and the aim to reduce the footprint ashore. It would be negligent to ignore or delay an appropriate analysis of concept, to introduce and conduct CAS operations from an LHD. With the introduction into military service of this high-end capability it would be remiss to over commit and perhaps misplace the intended initial capability in an attempt to achieve additional capability too rapidly.

Recommendations

The Canberra class ships are fully accepted in to service prior to any

amendment to their concept of operations or any of the Standard Operational Procedures (SOP).

- a. That no Fixed Wing operations are attempted until the full First of Class Flight Trials and Ships' Helicopter Operating Limits are completed;
- b. A full needs analysis is undertaken prior to any decision to modify the ships fit out; and
- c. That the ships be used in one mode of operation at any one time eg, Helicopter Amphibious Assault or Fixed Wing Operations, if fixed wing embarked operations are to be conducted. ➔



Lieutenant Martin "Dexta" Burton, RAN joined the Navy in 1981 as a Junior Recruit where he initially served as Air Technical Aircraft Sailor (ATA) and then later gained selection as Aircrewman. He was promoted to Lieutenant in Oct 2009 and assigned to his current position as Ships Aviation Officer (SAVO) HMAS Kanimbla.

Notes

(Endnotes)

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THE DE-RADICALISATION OF THE MODERN EXTREMIST

BY LIEUTENANT DAVID SMITH

Imagine the news headlines:

'Bin Laden's Successor's new Fatwa Prohibits Attacks Against the West' or 'Bin Laden Successor Denounces Terrorism.'

Too preposterous?

Terrorist Attack and Religious Fundamentalism have emerged violently in the modern world in recent years. Since the attacks on September 11, the western world has scrambled to defend themselves from this emergent global phenomenon and to develop protective combat strategies. Many analysts believe that the current climate is developing into the new social norm for the planet – that more so than ever we can no longer contemplate a world without extremist violence as a part of everyday life.

But is this the case? Has the world become too concerned with a perceived global implosion? Or as Jihadist and Radicalisation expert Omar Ashour believes, that the series of processes that we have now come to call 'de-radicalisation' suggest otherwise?

Let's Get Radical

In order to know for sure one way or the other, an examination of the modern day radical is required, including how someone develops radical tendencies. Where there is radicalisation there is also the more heartening phenomenon of de-radicalisation as evidenced in several examples of the decline of Jihadist movements.

Jihadism experts, including Omar Ashour, Raff Pantucci and former British Islamic Radical Ed Husain, indicate that the Jihadist movement of the late 20th and early 21st century



A radical teaching school (Middle East Org)

is based on a radicalisation of Islamist youth. Leader of the Israeli Opposition Her Excellency Tzipi Livni indicated this is not confined to the traditional 'troubled areas' of the globe. Most of this radicalisation has occurred in western nations: the US, UK and other nations in Western Europe.

Why is this? The majority of literature today point to eight major pillars or arguments of Jihadists and Jihadism:

- a. Al-hakimmiyya – God's Exclusive right to legislate;
- b. Al-riddah – Apostasy – of a ruling regime;
- c. Al-jihad/qital – fighting for the Islamist state;
- d. Jihad al-daf – A defensive jihad;
- e. Ahkam al-diyar – rules of conduct in the 'abode of Islam';
- f. Methods for socio-political change;
- g. The inevitability of confrontation; and

- h. 'Neo-Crusader' arguments.

The first five of these deal with the theological side of Jihadist politics, and rest on the premise that God's will, and literal orders from God, supersede any rational calculations or material interests.

In 99% of radicalised Islamic youth reports indicate they had become disenchanted with leadership, (either political or religious) and perceived an inability to act in accordance with their religious beliefs and a desire to return to an Islamist State. These issues coupled with the final "three pillars" combine to create a radicalisation environment that served to sow the seed of Jihadist violence.

It seems clear that there is a direct correlation between social deprivation and radicalisation. That said Pantucci concludes that this correlation is only correct from the perspective that social deprivation is a constant in communities where radicalisation is

THE DE-RADICALISATION OF THE MODERN EXTREMIST

prevalent.

There have been five identified motivators for the radicalisation of youth:

1. Financial – many groups offer monetary benefits, with families well taken care of;
2. Revenge – civilian casualties often ‘fuel’ fundamentalism;
3. Lack of governance;
4. Madrassas – brainwashing in religious schools; and
5. Ideology – Jihadist belief system which demands confrontation with the west.

Whilst we have focused so far on Islam as the main protagonist in the history of extremism, it would be wrong and indeed misleading to pretend it is only Islam that has ever caused young men to become radical for religious reasons.

Perhaps the most radical and extremist period in history occurred in the 11th, 12th and 13th centuries and was perpetrated by the warriors and zealots of the Christian religion. The Crusades, the period in history when Christians attempted to reclaim the Holy Land of Jerusalem from the Muslims, saw some of the most bloodthirsty fighting in human history. Indeed the word crusade can be used as a byword for barbarism and aggression.

For centuries young men would flock to the banner of Kings of Europe, men who had “Taken the Cross” at the behest of the Pope, in order to impose their own religion on others they saw as inferior and in direct threat to the western way of life. Christians who participated in a Crusade took religious vows, wore religious insignia and were granted penance for past sin from the Pope which was said to expedite their passage into Heaven. Rewards in Heaven for violent acts on Earth.... sound familiar?



In the modern day society, it can be very easy to forget that Islam is not the only religious proponent of violence that we can see. If we look at recent Ireland we see once again the evidence of religious violence in the extremely volatile battle between Unionists and the Irish Republican Army (IRA). It is true that this fight is over nationalist freedom for Northern Ireland; however it is still drawn along religious lines. It is not even between separate religions, it is between different factions of Christianity. Despite this conflict not spilling out onto a global scale, its combatants are by no means less extremist or radical.

The Enemy of Yesterday is the Friend of Today

So how does one combat such radicalisation? Is a combative approach the best? The continued Global War on Terror would seem to indicate that Western Governments believe this to be the case. The name alone “Global War on Terror” indicates a concerted and unified military and combative stance when attempting to solve the terrorism problem.

Or conversely is trying to establish a dialogue with the accused perpetrators and architects how governments should proceed? The Northern Ireland

example of the fragile peace between Unionists and the IRA would seem to demonstrate that this approach is successful.

Do both these approaches however, fall short of the ideal solution? Do they both simply turn impressionable youth towards radical and fundamental ideals?

I submit a process of de-radicalisation – essentially changing the minds of would be Jihadists – is the most effective way to combat the increase of fundamentalism in the world.

Ed Husain describes in his book *The Islamist*, how, at the tender age of 16, he became a fundamentalist. He infers that after reading and accepting the writings of Abul Ala Mawdudi (Islamic Ideologue and founder of the radical Islamist group Jamat-e-Islami) he felt empowered, that he was not a mere Muslim, but better, superior to his religious brothers.

“While most boys my age were smuggling pornography into their rooms to read by torchlight at night, my pornography was Religious Ideology. I would hide them from my father as one might hide the latest edition of *Playboy*” Husain said.

Just as total acceptance of extremist doctrine was a process that took time,

*The controversial
Crusades (Gutenberg
Press)*

so too rejection of said doctrine and distancing himself from this doctrine took time and effort.

Husain came to the slow realisation that his own values for life were at odds to those of his peers in extremism. He came to the conclusion that Jihadism and extremism were truly contrary to his own belief in Islam. Ironically he states that extremism and Jihadism only served to weaken his faith in God and the prophet.

His conclusions also pose the inevitable question “How long Western Governments will continue to tolerate the hypocrisy of people enjoying the benefits of western life while calling for its destruction?”

De-radicalisation is a process of relative change. Its premise is simply to reverse a violently radical group's behaviour and ideology. Sound difficult? On the surface, yes it certainly does... but evidence suggests that it is possible. By de-legitimising the use of violence to achieve social, political and religious goals, these changes are possible – even from within a violent and fundamentalist group. Notable Jihadist defectors Noman Bentoman and Abdullah Anas continually state that in order to truly destroy extremism and the violence associated with it, the ideological roots of Jihadism must be dismantled.

Repentance from Heresy

The example of Libya as a de-radicalisation leader in the world does not immediately spring to mind, yet many examples of de-radicalisation practice are evident in their struggle against the influence of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG).

The LIFG, established in 1990, was secretive, elitist, paramilitary and aiming for decisive action to topple the Libyan regime. During its activities, the LIFG was responsible for no less than three assassination attempts on

Colonel Muammar Qaddafi.

Libyan officials targeted the LIFG hierarchy with a de-radicalisation program, in a concerted effort to win over the charismatic leaders of the organisation, encouraging them to interact with non-Jihadists and update their views on world issues. This process coupled with the military losses inflicted on the LIFG, forced the LIFG leadership to rethink their political strategy and ultimately abandon politically motivated violence.

Ed Husain recounts reasons why he became disillusioned with extremism and fundamentalism when he lived and worked in Saudi Arabia (the supposed home of Islam).

“Racism was an integral part of Saudi society. My students often used the word “nigger” to describe black people. Even dark-skinned Arabs were considered inferior to their lighter-skinned cousins. I was living in the world's most avowedly Muslim country, yet I found it anything but. I was appalled by the imposition of Wahhabism (*the predominant form of Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia – preaching strict adherence to the Quran as the only authoritative text*) in the public realm, something I had implicitly sought as an Islamist.”

This disparity served to erode his zealous beliefs. He states that he finally severs his ties with extremism by “rediscovering classical, traditional Islam.”

In conclusion, without doubt Islam is emerging in the world of today. Yet extremist elements of all religions pose a clear threat to the stability of the Globe in the modern age. I submit that deradicalisation is the only permanent and lasting counter to extremism. The reasons for this are because it is the only method where the individual commences and follows though with the change of their own accord.

Regarding Islamic Jihadism and Extremism, it remains to be seen whether the extremist or harmonious side of Islam that ultimately determines what legacy is bequeathed to future generations.

The future has not been written – it is being written now. 🌟



Lieutenant David Smith RAN graduated from the Australian Defence Force Academy in 2000 and gained his Primary Qualification as a Seaman Officer in HMAS Adelaide (FFG) in 2003. Career highlights have included Operational Deployments to the Solomon Islands and the Middle East, Executive Officer of MHC Crew Hunter Two, Divisional Staff at the Royal Australian Naval College and as Aide-de-Camp to Her Excellency the Governor General of the Commonwealth of Australia.

Lieutenant Smith is currently serving as the MAROPS MHP Force Planner and Force Protection Officer at Maritime Operations located at Headquarters Joint Operations Command.

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Visiting BRNC Dartmouth

– COMMODORE HARRY ADAMS ESSAY PRIZE

BY LIEUTENANT DAVID MIDSON

As the winner of the 2010 Commodore Henry Adams essay prize, I was given the opportunity to visit the Britannia Royal Naval College (BRNC) in Dartmouth, UK. I travelled to the BRNC in December for a week, during which I managed to get snowed in both in Dartmouth and Heathrow airport. However, despite the chilly weather BRNC was a welcoming place and provided a truly unique experience. While at BRNC, two things stood out to me, firstly their generous hospitality and secondly the shared experience of the RAN and RN, both in the past and into the future.

Firstly to the hospitality, the timing of the competition announcement and of the Christmas leave period meant that BRNC were notified of my arrival at short notice. Despite the lack of notice they welcomed me with open arms, and made a great effort to show me life at the College. I was given the chance to participate in a



Boating on the River Dart, near BRNC

wide range of activities, including; cruising down the River Dart, clay pigeon shooting, the winter Graduation Parade and the Graduation Ball. The Graduation Parade and Ball were definite highlights. The Parade had both a fast jet fly past, and a helicopter

carrying the RN ensign. The Ball was very appropriately organised around a winter wonderland theme, matching well with the snow that was falling outside.

The Cadets managed to involve me in the life of the college, even in their

Graduation parade





Graduation parade

busiest week. The welcome I received says a great deal about the relationship between the RN and RAN. We share a common history interest and humour, all that makes for great relationships on the personal and organisational level. The only downside was that unfortunately those at BRNC had a very keen interest in cricket while I was there, and I was never without a reminder of the Ashes score.

The connection between the RN and RAN reaches into both our past and future. The history was highlighted in the tour of BRNC, which is not much older than our own college at *HMAS Creswell*. Along the way the Guide pointed out memorabilia of RN officers who had served in Australia, and RAN officers who had trained at the College. But it was not the history that most reminded me of the similarities between our navies, it was the shared challenges we face. As I sat in the crowd at the Graduation Parade I heard VADM Ibbotson, RN, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, speak to the cadets. The speech he gave reminded me of what I had heard CDF say when I graduated from Creswell.

Both told a story of fiscal pressure and tightening budgets, and both advised the cadets not to worry because it is an exciting time to be in the military and the navy. Both leaders talked of

the great opportunities in the future as new capabilities came online, and that the military was ready to respond to budget pressures.

The RAN and RN both face challenges in the current budget environment, and both are making decisions about the capability that we can operate now and into the future and in both it is an exciting time to be serving.

The fact that we have such a rich history of shared challenges, and a future which will involve similar pressures, serves to remind us that the navy can be a bigger family than just the RAN. In fact as a member of the RAN we can find friends with which we share a history and understanding on the other side of the world. 🇺🇸



Britannia Royal Naval College under a blanket of snow



Lieutenant David Midson RAN joined the Navy in 2008 as a Legal Officer. He is currently working in the HQJOC Legal Office. In 2010 he won the Commodore Harry Adams essay competition with an essay on Climate Change and the RAN, published in a previous issue of Headmark.

Washington and Arlington

BY FLIGHT LIEUTENANT MICHAEL KILHAM

As a result of winning the 2010 Alan 'Rocker' Robertson essay, I was fortunate enough to visit Washington DC in Dec 2010. This was my second visit, the last in 2008; however, this time I was able to take my family to experience the history of the city.

There is much to see in Washington DC; it is rich with history and the capital of the United States of America it is home to the Capitol Building, the White House and many other federal buildings. It boasts 29 Smithsonian facilities, comprising 19 museums, one zoo and nine research facilities. Other museums of interest include the Newseum (a history of news and broadcasting), as well as the Spy and Holocaust museums.

The National Mall, starting from Capitol Hill, runs down through the Washington Monument to the Lincoln Memorial and is the heart of the city. At the western end of the mall are the Korean, Vietnam and World War II memorials. Beyond the memorials is Arlington Cemetery. Arlington is where over 300,000 service personnel, as well as a number of ex-

presidents are laid to rest, and still conducts an average of 29 funerals a day. Washington DC constantly reminds you where America has been and where it wants to go. My family and I visited almost all of the sights mentioned and were left with a much greater appreciation of the American psyche through a greater understanding of their history.

One of the most visible reminders of where the country has been and where they are going is the amount of security around the city. Police, Army and Marines are everywhere. Their presence is not just limited to federal buildings and memorials, they extend to train stations, bus stations and malls. Like the security around the White House, they are both visible and invisible.

On a number of occasions I introduced myself and spoke to members on duty. They were friendly, as we found most Americans to be, and were very open about their presence. "I think we have reached a good balance of deterrence and response", one member told



The National Mall from Lincoln Memorial



One section of Arlington Cemetery


me. At the time I could count about 12 army personnel around the bus station. "We want to make sure we can protect the public and respond instantly" he added. During our visit we encountered about a dozen motorcycle police outside a mall, informing about road safety and personal security. SWAT teams were seen on the street a number of times, exercising 'presence' as they stated, and Army and Marine personnel seemed to be almost everywhere.


You, like me, might ask why. The answer is a complex one, but is perhaps answered by walking the Korean memorial, seeing the bronze cast soldiers, reading the statements made by the families of the dead or missing on why it was so important that they not only made the sacrifice, but that it is never forgotten. Then, at the end of the memorial is a reflection pool and a wall with 'Freedom is Not Free' inscribed in it. Powerful words and a solemn reminder that the nation is at war! It is fighting on both the international and domestic fronts.

As a participant in the coalition action against Iraq since 2002 and latterly the war in Afghanistan, Australia too is heavily committed in international action. It is a little further removed from us; it has yet to come to our home soil, but has come tragically close. As news of yet another soldier being killed in Afghanistan seems to be arriving all too frequently, I am reminded of the wall at the Korean Memorial, 'Freedom is Not Free'. It is easy to forget as we go about our daily tasks that servicemen and women of this and other nations are placing their lives on the line to ensure freedom. The costs, in all respects, are high, but the price of not paying them is higher! 🇺🇸



Wall at the Korean War Memorial





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
FIRST 214 CLASS SUBMARINE FOR HELLENIC NAVY

The Hellenic Navy has commissioned their first 214 Class submarine at Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft GmbH, a company of ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems.

Prior to the commissioning, the Hellenic Navy declared the acceptance of the boat together with an order for two more submarines of the 214 Class.

The new submarine, named HS Papanikolis, has a displacement of 1,700t, is 65m long and is operated by a crew of 27. It is equipped with an air-independent fuel cell propulsion system allowing a significantly longer underwater endurance. In addition to this, the submarine is characterised by considerably reduced acoustic, thermal and magnetic signatures. Thanks to these features, the submarine is extremely difficult to detect. The diving depth of this type has also been optimised.

Papanikolis is the eleventh submarine with fuel cell propulsion in service with the German, Hellenic, Italian, Korean and Portuguese Navies.





Pictures and story by Michael Nitz



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Image: Eye in the Sky

How Many Submariners Does It Take To...?

BY LIEUTENANT COMMANDER PAUL GARAI

Australia is embarking on an ambitious program of developing strategic strike capabilities, announced in the 2009 Defence White Paper. At the core will be 12 new large conventional submarines with land-attack missiles. This lethal strike capability will give Australia a decisive edge in the Asia Pacific as the strategic environment becomes more crowded in the 21st century. But, can the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) manage such exponential growth? Where will the additional personnel come from and how will the RAN generate the highly skilled and sophisticated workforce required when it has been unable to sustain crews for the current six submarines? Also, are problems in the submarine force unique, or indicators of deeper systemic problems which may affect the whole fleet?

The Navy is on the threshold of

introducing new advanced capabilities such as guided missile destroyers and helicopter assault ships.¹ While the Navy wrestles with these capability challenges, there will also be the demand to up-skill for 12 new strike submarines. Can the Navy handle the generational change these new capabilities will impose on the workforce? In only a few short years, the fleet that recruits are now being trained for will change to a vastly different shape. This article will examine the state of the submarine workforce and consider options which will generate the workforce required to effectively and safely operate the new boats².

So, what brought the submarine workforce to collapse? And what needs to be done to position the submarine workforce for exponential expansion?

The Story So Far...

The submarine force has experienced significant disruption and crisis since the 1990s with the introduction of a class of domestically built submarines, spiralling-down to one crew available for the six boats in 2009.³ At this point, the Navy finally admitted to deep structural and cultural problems in the submarine force and publicly committed to a remediation program.⁴ But, is it enough? This is a rare generational opportunity to re-structure and re-align the strategically valuable submarine force in a way that sets it up for an exciting future, discard poor practices from the past and re-position the submarine force from the periphery to the centre of the Navy.

Submarines have long been a secretive and separate part of the Navy. In this new era, submariners will be at the core of the Navy and will influence

Three of the Collins-class submarines on the surface (Courtesy RAN)



How Many Submariners Does It Take To...?

every aspect of the Navy. The Navy will need to bring submariners in from the cold and submariners will need to accept their new mainstream role. The Navy also needs to learn from the fundamental mistakes of Project SEA1114 (*Collins* class submarines) and its almost singular focus on the technical aspects of the transition from the *Oberon* class, leading to serious neglect of the submarine workforce and its eventual collapse to a single functional crew. Personnel planning and transition must be at the core of the new generation submarines.

Submarines have long been a part of the RAN from the very beginning and were included in the first RAN fleet, however, submarines have also proved problematic for technical and personnel reasons. Early submarines were difficult to operate and prone to catastrophic accidents. Due to fluctuating national strategies and finances over the twentieth century, various Australian submarine classes have been retired without replacement which resulted in significant capability gaps. But, navies themselves are complicated institutions which make huge demands on national treasure and industrial resources. Even without submarines, the RAN has seen massive swings in force structure from the lows of the Depression era when barely a ship put to sea, to the highs of World War II and the 1950/60s with the impressive days of multi-carrier task groups and then the painful withdrawal of carrier operations in the 1980s. Yet, the Navy adapted and survived – even rebuilt, if perhaps slowly. This new era of submarine operations is something which has been forecast for decades and reflects the continuing strategic ascendancy of the submarine. Missile submarines have been the capital ships of superpowers for decades. Australia is now stepping-up to the plate. Just as carriers have long held a strategic place, strike submarines hold a similar



value with different capabilities. Their trump card is the ability to strike enemy centres of gravity with surprise and stealth. It should not be underestimated what this decisive new capability will do for Australia's strategic position in the western Pacific.

The current era of Australian submarine operations began in the 1960s with the introduction of six new British-built submarines (*Oberon* class) which were replaced by six Australian-built submarines in the 1990s (*Collins* class). While the submarine force achieved a continuity never realised before, a series of factors resulted in a steady erosion of the submarine capability throughout the 1990s and into the millennium.⁵ The six vessels of the new *Collins* class were the first submarines built in Australia, a significant engineering achievement.⁶ Consequently, a combination of inexperience, ambitious targets and high public interest resulted in intense scrutiny. There was a steady series of negative press articles which lowered public confidence and deterred recruitment. The submarine force had traditionally been based in Sydney with the main fleet, however, the *Collins* submarines were built at a greenfield site in Adelaide which also became the maintenance centre. The RAN moved

the entire submarine force from Sydney to Perth for strategic reasons.

The main cause of the collapse of the submarine workforce was an obsessive focus on the technical aspects of the introduction of the *Collins* class and failure to respond to growing workforce stress indicators, such as burn-out of submariners in an aggressive organisational effort to make the new submarines work. Increasing workforce stress indicators were ignored because of an internal culture obsessed with mission achievement.⁷ The wider Navy was not overly affected by the growing submarine personnel crisis due to the traditional separation of submariners from the mainstream. The submarine force focused obsessively on the technical remediation of the new submarines and getting them to sea for task achievement. The result was classic workforce stress indicators such as burn-out leading to high separation rates amongst qualified personnel and poor recruitment to replace them. The result was a spiral into collapse. The only way qualified submariners could avoid constant urgent transfers to sea to plug competency gaps was to leave the Navy or be rendered medically unfit for sea. By 2009, only one submarine crew could be mustered for six vessels.⁸

The *Collins* project experienced

The ceremonial beginning of HMAS Ovens' first hull section, with Rear Admiral Purves representing the Navy (Courtesy Robert Purves)

significant technical problems throughout the build and commissioning program throughout the 1990s and early millennium. The first boat revealed design flaws which produced unacceptable water flow noise, poor engine performance and the combat system never achieved standard. However, ship handling exceeded criteria and the ship control system was satisfactory.⁹ The final submarine was delivered to the RAN on 18 March 2003. It was the most expensive and complex engineering project yet completed in Australia.¹⁰ As a major government expenditure, SEA114 was always at risk of political interference which grew as the project fell behind schedule. Following a change of government in 1996 and a critical Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) report in 1997¹¹, political pressure mounted to fix the project.¹²

The Minister for Defence commissioned a report in 1999 which was authored by two prominent businessmen in order to provide business-style analysis.¹³ The report was also the first and only indicator that personnel management was failing short until 2009. The team reported that substantial progress had been achieved by 1999 with four of six submarines built. However, it was becoming apparent that personnel competencies were being eroded through the years spent inactive due to extensive technical remediation programs and the retirement of the previous submarines - the first recorded indicator of the looming competency issue. The report led to extensive government action for extra investment in technical fixes of one billion dollars, however, the growing personnel competence issue was not decisively addressed.

The crisis in the submarine workforce accelerated from 2003 as increasing numbers of *Collins*

submarines became operational following the technical remediation program. However, the extended delay between the old and new submarines eroded competence which resulted in a diminished work force remaining to crew the new submarines. Warning signs were not heeded until the crisis was fully apparent and the submarine force was in a parlous state with only one crew available.¹⁴

A personnel remediation program was initiated in 2009 through the Moffitt Review. The Moffitt Report used an impressive body of research through extensive interviews with a broad range of submariners and recent workforce studies. This was the first comprehensive investigation into the submarine force since the start of the transition between classes in 1993. In comparison, three major reports regarding technical issues were compiled and funded with over a billion dollars of investment. While enormous organisational resources were poured into the technical fixes, the submarine workforce was rapidly failing and was not addressed until crisis point was reached. The Moffitt Review drew on a number of internal studies which have not been publicly released. The report identified a toxic culture within the submarine force which placed task achievement above all other considerations.¹⁵ The report's recommendations have been implemented or agreed to in principle.

Submarine service has been traditionally seen as highly risky and secretive, promoting an exclusiveness and aloofness which is also interpreted as 'elite'. The submarine specialist qualification and badge ('dolphins') is awarded only after rigorous examination across a range of technical, safety and emergency competencies and is equal for all ranks. This has fostered a uniquely egalitarian and proud culture. However, the negative side has been an obsession with task achievement at all costs. Submariners also take great pride in their self-identity and see it as a strong source of morale and professionalism. However, there have been strong signs of an insular and closed culture which resists external accountability and engagement.

How Many Submariners Are Needed?

Navy favours a competency-based method in analysing position requirements for which Competency Profiling methodology would be useful.¹⁶ In addition, the Navy operates a large and complex HR system which requires standardisation of roles to produce efficiencies in training and employment for which Functional Job Analysis (FJA)¹⁷ would be beneficial. Therefore, the combination of both should provide a usable methodology. Competency Profiling can be illustrated as follows (Table One):




Table One - Examples of Competency Profiling

How Many Submariners Does It Take To...?

Following competency profiling, FJA could be employed to match competencies to existing organisational synergies or the development of new competency development paths.

The RAN has traditionally used trend analysis to determine future requirements based on historical workforce trends,¹⁸ however, this method takes time to reflect changes within the workforce and is slow to acknowledge changes in the workforce environment. Therefore, organisational tension is generated as HR managers attempt to 'correct' the trends in the face of workforce environmental factors beyond their control. This may result in the organisation assigning increasing resources to maintain a theoretical workplace model based on historical data long after the actual business environment has shifted. In response, Ghosh's Refined Production Function model¹⁹ provides the possibility of including productivity changes and creating an adaptive model responsive to changes in the operating environment. This is particularly relevant to submarines as advanced technology platforms with specific productivity requirements which will evolve as technology and operating techniques develop. Planning labour supply has also been inefficient. By relying internally on a small and exclusive labour pool of specialist submariners the labour supply has been severely handicapped. Growing competency certification demands have also imposed constraints on labour supply and lengthened training pipelines.

Competency-based training (CBT) is a valuable method of identifying, developing and certifying competence. The RAN has a strategic policy of CBT which has led to vast improvements in the workforce. CBT, however, has a significant administrative overhead which has been normally absorbed into the organisation, particularly by

workplace assessors and managers. The growth of CBT in the 1990s coincided with the transition of submarine classes. The aggressive roll-out of CBT across the Navy may have resulted in a confused response in the submarine force as it grappled with its own workforce development issues. This confusion may have contributed to the legacy of poor HR management which resulted from the organisational focus on technical issues instead of personnel. CBT has imposed a significant corporate governance burden in the development, assessment and reporting of competency progression and achievement. The usual practice has been to absorb CBT oversight within existing management structures. However, as these responsibilities grow with ever-increasing competency requirements, additional workloads are assumed by supervisors, possibly at the cost of other responsibilities. Also, the methodical approach required by CBT may slow-down training progression compared to previous eras, along with delivering a better product. As the training through-put may be reduced, a greater number of trainees are required to achieve the same organisational output. This again reinforces the shift to expanding submarine service to all personnel.

Expanding the competency certification pathway may also be achieved through the use of advanced simulators. Aircraft simulators are used to certify a broad range of competencies and to maintain some skill currencies. The use of simulators will provide another avenue of competency management without relying on actual submarines for much training. The simulators will need to be high quality and accessible in bases where crews are located in order to maximise geographical stability, particularly during non-operational

periods or maintenance cycles.

Bring the Submarines In From the Cold

Land-attack submarines will outnumber surface combatants and will be the core national strategic capability throughout the 21st Century. The Navy will need to strategically shift its organisation and culture in order to capably lead and manage this profound change in its organisational DNA and honour this strategic national security responsibility. This is so important that the management of the submarine workforce needs to shift from a small group of submarine specialists to the centre of the RAN. Further, in order to generate the labour supply required for the expansion of the force, submarine service will need to cease being a narrow career path and become a normal part of Naval employment, along with other platforms. All Naval personnel will need to be suitable and eligible for submarine service. These options challenge the core cultural value of the submarine workforce: selected and highly motivated volunteers who endure a rigorous training process to join an exclusive fraternity, founded in adversity and identified by one of the Navy's oldest specialist badges: dolphins. They also receive substantial additional remuneration. The shift to mainstreaming the submarine force will erode this ethos and challenge the identity of serving and retired submariners. This aspect of cultural change is very real and must be managed with honour in order to facilitate a successful transition to a sustainable submarine culture and force.

With the introduction of an open recruitment and management model, individual competency and career development should be managed similar to current general

service practices. Due to the differing equipment fits between platform classes, personnel require specific training for the platform. Navy career managers or individuals may choose to change platforms and be re-trained for the next platform. Submarines become another platform option along the normal Navy career path, removing the constraints of the current closed workforce model. A major strategic shift will be required where the entire Navy HR management system is responsible for submariners, removing them from the current obscurity of their own operations.

Who's a Submariner?

Submarines evolved as a highly specialised force due to the high risks which existed from the early years of submarine operations. Early submarines were mechanically unreliable and highly vulnerable to navigational accidents and combat losses. The high risk nature of submarine service led to requirements such as highly technical training on general submarine systems. Also, the demands created by the technical unreliability and vulnerability of early submarines led to features such as voluntary recruitment from within existing Navy personnel and recognition that the extraordinary circumstances of submarine service place unusual demands on mental and emotional resilience, requiring additional psychological assessment. The traditional view of the exclusiveness of submarine service has continued despite generational improvements in conditions. While submarine service remains unique, it is likely to be far more accessible to a greater number of candidates than was previously the case. The RAN needs to take advantage of this in order to prepare for the approaching strategic shift.

The traditional approach of a small, specialised workforce operating as a closed system within the broader Navy will not be sustainable in the face of exponential expansion. Labour supply needs to be flexible and as broad as possible, therefore, all Navy personnel will need to be available for submarine service. The great divide between submarine and 'skimmer' service needs to be discarded for a new era of seamless naval service where a posting to a submarine is as normal as a frigate. Also, the traditional selection requirements for submarine service require testing and re-development to check for relevance in the modern era and the new submarines should be designed to remove environmental obstacles which may disqualify the majority of recruits from selection.

The greatest obstacle to the full integration of submarines into the Navy will be the attitudes of the submarine service itself. The submarine culture is fiercely independent and insular and attracts personnel that value self-reliance and hardship in the pursuit of excellence. It is a notoriously tough and exclusive group that demands a personal entry fee. And those who have paid the fee jealously guard the entrance gates. Breaking down the barriers while honouring the absolute commitment of those who have gone before will require fine judgement, but come down they must to secure the future of both the submarine service and the Navy.

Basing Review

Finally, the re-location of the submarine force to Perth in the 1990s may have had a negative impact on the recruitment of submariners, along with establishing Adelaide as the submarine maintenance base. It remains an unassessed factor amongst the array of HR issues confronting the submarine force. The crisis in the submarine force

coincided with the move to Adelaide and Perth, which may suggest a broad reluctance to volunteer for submarine service because of the requirement to move to these isolated locations for significant periods. Geographical stability is a well-recognised strategic HR issue across the defence force.²⁰ This becomes more significant amongst experienced personnel with families – the very people the submarine force desperately needs for growth. Providing a choice between locations will promote personal preference and overcome the negative perceptions of long periods in isolated locations. As the submarine force expands, a significant part of the force should be re-located to Sydney in order to provide another location option which supports operational flexibility and personal choice. Returning submarines to Sydney also carries significant infrastructure and operating costs.

Where Do We Go From Here?

SEA1114 was a highly ambitious project, the scale of which was not appreciated by the RAN or ASC. Initial decisions, such as production in Australia and an untried custom-built design dictated the conditions in which the project would operate. Compared to similar international projects, it was a major achievement. The six submarines were delivered with significant design defects which were mostly overcome through effective local solutions or with assistance from the US. The later build submarines benefited from project improvements and have exceeded the expectations of the RAN and have also received high praise internationally for their stealth and potency. Unfortunately, years of re-development of the submarine arm have reduced the numbers of competent crews. This is now the main limitation on the class.

How Many Submariners Does It Take To...?

These outcomes reflect an organisation focused on technical outcomes with poor strategic human resources management. Even when the personnel crisis became apparent, solutions remained within existing paradigms and failed to seize a strategic opportunity. Success lies in radical and innovative adaptation to the changing human resources environment. The current closed and constrained submarine workforce is no longer sustainable. Continuing to recruit from a limited pool of internal and external candidates and re-employment of an even smaller number of qualified submariners, has led the submarine force to a point where the demands of competency certification and limited resources have resulted in the near-loss of the critical mass of expertise required to train and grow out of trouble.

This has been further exacerbated by an institutional culture of treating submarine HR issues as separate and subordinate to the Navy mainstream. This has been demonstrated by the previous inability of Navy strategic HR functions to respond to multiple warning signs from the submarine force that their workforce was experiencing ever increasing levels of stress. The current architecture of the submarine workforce will not deliver the expansion required in the Defence White Paper. A strategic approach is recommended which places the submarine force at the centre of Navy HR and moves the submarine force from the periphery to the core of the organisation. No less is required as the 2009 Defence White Paper doubles the size of the submarine force from six to twelve by 2030, resulting in more submarines than major surface combatants.

So, in answer to the opening question: How many submariners does it take to... make a strategic

difference? An entire Navy's worth! There may be some disadvantages in the adoption of these programs. The shift of the submarine branch from a small and exclusive group with a strong sense of identity, to another part of the mainstream, may be seen as detrimental to morale. Submariners take great professional pride in their rigorous training process and the award of the submarine qualification badge (dolphins). However, it could be argued that the arduous and hazardous conditions that marked submarine service have been significantly reduced and that persisting with this attitude reflects cultural values. The proposed solutions are radical and will require fundamental paradigm shifts in both the mainstream Navy culture and the exclusive submarine culture. They will threaten the traditional ethos of the submarine force and also compel the mainstream Navy to engage more closely with a previously obscure part of its organisation. This confronting course of action is the price that will need to be paid for the Navy to assume responsibility for the decisive strategic capability of the nation - strike submarines. The risks for the Navy and the nation are too high for this to fail. Unless the fundamental structural problems that caused the collapse of the submarine workforce are decisively addressed, the Navy will not be able to rise to the challenge of the 2009 White Paper. 🚢



Lieutenant Commander Paul Garai is currently completing Master's studies in Strategy and Management through UNSW at ADFA and has managed human resources functions in major corporates during a break in Naval service. He is currently the Commanding Officer of Patrol Boat Crew ATTACK FOUR.

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The Gallipoli Campaign and AE2's last signal

BY CAPTAIN RICHARD ARUNDEL

Is there an Australian naval attribution to the ANZAC legend forged at Gallipoli?

It is instructive each Anzac Day to experience contemporary interpretations of sacred and unquestionable parables extolling ethical national virtues. These articles of faith probably originated in our unique landscape but flowered as Australian iconography at Anzac Cove and subsequently. We have come to accept that the legend grew from our early military involvement with Great Britain in WWI and continues to fit seamlessly into our psyche especially when national emergencies occur.

Why address the Dardanelles? Alan Moorehead succinctly put it that German inspired Turkish naval raids on Russian Black Sea ports drew Turkey into the WWI Central Power bloc. This ensured the Bosphorus and

Dardanelles were blockaded against 90% of Russian grain exports and 50% of all other Russian imports and exports. With the port of Archangel frozen over in winter months and the Baltic blockaded Russia's remaining lifeline to the European free world and her allies via the Black Sea was terminated.¹ Economic bankruptcy followed with heavy Russian losses on the Eastern Front, and Lenin inspired civil disorder. Thus it is not fanciful to re-quote that the failure of the Gallipoli Campaign had also contributed to the rise of decades of Soviet Communism.²

The Churchill-inspired WWI Gallipoli strategy to bolster the Czar's beleaguered southern army against their Ottoman enemy, and to free up Russian economic dependency on its trade through the Black Sea, could have been a crowning Allied achievement. Subsequently if the

Allied naval fleet had been successful in 1915 in penetrating past the forts and minefields in the Dardanelles; had entered the Sea of Marmara, and had bombarded Constantinople into submission that strategy might have been arguably successful in shortening the war by months if not years.

This article briefly summarises:

- a little of the recorded history of the ANZAC force on the evening of the first day of the landing at the ANZAC beachhead on the Gallipoli peninsula,
- HMA submarine AE2's successful passage through the Dardanelles at the same time as the main landing on the peninsula and the implications of the submarine's subsequent and very last received signal,

AE2 arrives at Portsmouth to prepare for her voyage to Australia (Courtesy RAN)



The Gallipoli Campaign and AE2's last signal

also sent on that day,

- the little recognized actions of AE2's telegraphist, William Wolseley Falconer,
- lastly, the controversy as to what contribution this signal made to the decision to hold the ANZAC force on its beachhead on the night of 25-26 April 1915 and the subsequent legend that force created.

An array of over 100 authors, many of whom were players in the campaign, have recorded their experience or opinion as to what led to this ultimately disastrous Allied campaign. One Dardanelles admiral had observed that with the advent of wireless-telegraphy the once leisurely and disconnected nature of Army and Navy co-operation in joint operations had changed forever.³

When WWI was declared the German advisers to the Ottoman Empire quickly organized the seeding of 10 lines of fixed mines across the Dardanelles and another string of mines parallel to the southern coast and drifting with the strong current outpouring from the Bosphorus through the narrow Dardanelles at a point where major surface units, if forced to withdraw, would turn through an arc of 180 degrees. This is exactly what happened and the latter mines were to sink three of the Allied battleships attempting to destroy the 12 forts on 18 March 1915.

The forts and hidden field artillery ensured it was impossible for the minesweeping force, then made up of civilian manned fishing trawlers, to clear the minefield. The fleet retired. The surface naval campaign came to an abrupt halt. It was then left to its fledgling submarine component to take the fight to the German supported Ottoman navy. No major surface units

were to penetrate the Dardanelles until a fortnight after an Armistice was signed in Mudros harbour on 30 October 1918.⁴

The strategic assault on Constantinople thus became a military thrust across the western peninsula that takes its name from the port of Gallipoli sitting at the north western entrance to the Sea of Marmara. The French were to land untroubled at Kum Kale, but be withdrawn to bolster the British landing at Cape Helles, ironically in visual sight of historical Troy. The Turks could not understand this withdrawal since they were convinced this was their Achilles heel.

Then the Australian and New Zealand force, the ANZACs, were landed a mile north of their intended beach, now known and which I refer to as Anzac Cove, bound by unexpectedly steep ravines, gullies and crests. This made their task of scaling the heights to the dominant mountain ridge so much more exhausting than expected. Despite later scrambling steeply up from the beachhead into the sun and being pinned down as slow moving targets by tortuous thorn, gorse and thicket there began a series of examples of extraordinary bravery, mettle, mateship, initiative and sheer courage. Nevertheless there were considerable casualties in junior officers and NCO's. In many cases leaderless troops lost their direction, small numbers from the covering force reaching their ridge objectives were forced back or wiped out as the enemy regrouped on the heights and their incessant and unanswered artillery played havoc among the climbing ANZACs.

This was a first major contemporary amphibious landing and command and control was to be tragically exposed. It is recorded that communications between both services were appalling for some days, communications teams were landed separated from their

equipment and procedures though written had not been adequately rehearsed. The naval component of the amphibious landing was promulgated in a 31 page operations order! This scenario was to improve but on the 25th April was the lead act to tragic theatre. At

Anzac Cove naval guns stayed largely silent until late in the day against enemy artillery and troop formations, when with better communications they could have provided critical support. By evening only 50% of targets were achieved and the heights commanding the Dardanelles were never to be secured.

Now when the Allied landing force was first cobbled together, and some 200 ships began to concentrate the Allied army from Egypt and the UK at Tenedos and Lemnos Islands at the Aegean entrance to the Dardanelles,



*Henry Stoker, from the book *Straws in the Wind*, London, 1925*

AE2 at Cockatoo Island 1914 (RAN photo)



AE2 joined the Eastern Mediterranean Squadron on 5 February 1915. It was their first E Class submarine.

Lieutenant Stoker, her CO, was shortly promoted to Lieutenant Commander and, on patrol, began learning something about the complex local eddies and surface and sub-surface currents off Cape Helles. French intelligence had gained recent access to the minefield locations compromised from a Krupp U-boat specification given to the Greeks to influence their selection of a Dardanelles capable U-boat during their earlier spat with the Turks.⁵ If the extremely high risk submarine penetration of the Dardanelles was now to be attempted it would have to be the newer E class, or a French boat, both with their superior battery power necessary to transit sub-surface the 35 miles through the narrow Dardanelles, against strong currents, into the much wider Sea of Marmara.

Following an accidental grounding off the entrance to Mudros harbour on the Island of Lemnos, *AE2* was sent to Malta for repairs at which time the Australian submarine was overtaken by three E class boats, *E11/14/15*, destined to supplement the Eastern Mediterranean Squadron. It is possible these boats may have inspired Stoker to fit *AE2* with a cable cutter and mine jumping wires to negotiate nets and minefields.⁶ However Stoker had already written a letter to a staff officer to VADM de Robeck, the new naval commander, with a simple plan to attempt the transit of the Dardanelles and his Chief of Staff, CDRE Keyes who reviewed it, was so impressed that he had taken Stoker directly to see the Admiral to discuss the scheme.⁷

Stoker proposed a night surface start dodging between the looms of searchlights until forced to submerge, then to dive to 70 feet beneath the known and estimated unswept



AE2 at her launch in 1913 (RAN photo)

minefields, surfacing for one or two navigational fixes before finally penetrating the one mile wide eddy swept Narrows. In the interregnum between *AE2*'s repairs at Malta and arriving back at Mudros on 21 April de Robeck and Keyes discussed Stoker's plan with the three new arrivals but only *E15*'s CO agreed an attempt was feasible. Thus he got the nod to go first but *E15* was swept ashore and lost on 17 April. The twin brother of *E15*'s Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Commander Charles Brodie, also a submariner, was probably the staff officer on VADM de Robeck's staff to whom Stoker had written. He was actually airborne and witnessed his brother's submarine swept ashore and lost. This event had a demoralising effect on the submarine force following on from the loss of the French submarine *Saphir* on 5 January 1915. By the campaign's end seven of 18 submarines would be lost.

So it was that subsequent to *E15*'s demise the Fleet Commander, on Keyes' advice, next accepted Stoker's high-risk proposal to attempt to force the Dardanelles. *AE2* sailed from Mudros on 24 April, after a test dive and a W/T communications check by the tender's radio staff, with the

following one page typed Sailing Order No.27.⁸ His stark and simple orders were:

- to inform the Dardanelles Division guarding the Straits when he would pass through the patrol,
- to proceed to the vicinity of Gallipoli, attack vessels lying off the port and watch the approaches until further orders,
- to attack any vessel in the vicinity of Chanak (that is Cannakale today),
- that a W/T guard ship would be detailed after 2000 with a strict signaling period of 40 to 50 minutes past the hour on the night the passage was attempted, and
- to signal if his passage plan was successful for other submarines to follow.

Stoker was to have had a reconnaissance flight in the evening together with Lieutenant Commander Brodie. Further, he was to have had a succession of aeroplanes follow *AE2* up the straits to drop bombs on suitable targets as a diversion, but since it was

The Gallipoli Campaign and AE2's last signal

after midnight this would have been unlikely.⁹ There is no record that this occurred.

But when commencing to dive a foremost hydroplane shaft fractured and the first attempt was aborted. The repair was quickly effected and *AE2* was again authorised to attempt, on 25 April 1915, to force the passage of the Straits sealed off to surface vessels. But Stoker now had two additional verbal¹⁰ directions:

- de Robeck stated that “naval aircraft from Tenedos had sighted minelayers at Chanak and since heavy units were to enter the Dardanelles in support of the amphibious landing Stoker was instructed to attack these minelayers”;
- as Stoker departed from the flagship de Robeck’s Chief of Staff, CDRE Keyes, told Stoker “to run amok at Chanak” near the port of Gallipoli to create a diversion that other submarines had broken into the Sea of Marmara and cause havoc with troop reinforcements.

The story of Stoker’s remarkable passage into the Sea of Marmara is well known to naval audiences. With considerable good fortune he eased *AE2* through the minefields and eddies with mine mooring lines scraping and twanging along the hull, and probably whilst surfacing for navigational fixes what must have been the underneath of mines that bounced along the superstructure without exploding. He was twice swept heavily aground, and to the surface, by currents and eddies so close to forts their guns could not be depressed sufficiently to target *AE2*, but the hull and deck fittings were peppered with exploding shrapnel. He attacked and sank what he believed

was a mine dropper at Chanak. Whilst moving slowly past Chanak the submarine was tracked and struck repeatedly by wire and chain snares. He then lay on the bottom until late in the evening when searching craft had ceased their

activity. All told it was a well-planned, lucky, chillingly cool, courageous and meritorious transit.

Stoker, in his book *Straws in the Wind* remarks stoically that “it being Sunday prayers were held before rising from the seabed and charging batteries” in a coastal marsh infested with fishing craft! It was then Stoker’s primary task to signal that he had forced his planned passage, thus the first submarine to penetrate the minefield and reach into the Sea of Marmara since the war began.

The saga shifts to *AE2*’s telegraphist, William Falconer, who had joined the submarine 10 days before it sailed from Sydney, thence Melbourne, for Albany from where *AE2* was then towed by the armed merchant ship *Berrima* to Port Said in a sickening and uncomfortable passage. *AE2* had been the sole naval escort for the Second Troop Convoy intended for the Western Front. Falconer was then aged 20. He was born in Richmond, Victoria, signed on in the RAN in 1912, gave his next of kin as his sister in Melbourne, and joined on a seven year engagement from a Tamworth address. He was made a Telegraphist in *HMAS Cerberus* in 1913. On his Record of Service he joined “Submarines” from *HMAS Australia* on 1 January 1915 which is clearly incorrect since *AE2* was then in tow on its way to the Middle East. His submarine training in wireless telegraphy was spartan and it is likely he was also a hydrophone operator and



control room note taker.

It was only in 1912 that approval was first given to fit Marconi Type 10 morse spark transceivers in some C, all D and E class submarines. The ½ KW Type 10 outfit operated in the medium frequency and low end of the high frequency bands and was fitted in *AE2*. It had a range of between 30 to 100 miles. This new and primitive tactical control system added a significant 2,437 lbs to the submarine’s all up weight.

For the operation W/T orders were issued in a Printed Memorandum No. 17 dated 16 April, 1915 in which the submarine wave guard was “D” wave. *AE2*’s guard ship was the torpedo boat destroyer *HMS Jed*. A copy of *Jed*’s log¹¹ only records her being guard ship on 26 April but this may be simply because the log appears to have been transcribed from a working log into a fresh deck log, perhaps by the navigator, in view of the small destroyer’s open bridge and inclement weather, and on AM 25 April *Jed* was simultaneously also fully occupied shuttling boats and barges.

Falconer had now to transmit in the ordered ten minute period before 2100. Stoker relates the aerial radiated lurid purple and blue sparks, and that despite thorough testing and tuning Falconer and he thought the equipment had failed. This phenomenon is described in the system handbook as “brushing”¹², an earthing effect, and a luminous discharge at night,

AE2 arrival at Portsmouth Feb 17 1914 (RAN photo)

caused by broken aerial strands, a damaged insulator or supporting structure, almost certainly resulting from the morning's fraught passage when either struck by chain snares or when aground and peppered with shrapnel from shore batteries. To eliminate this compromising visual display the handbook advice was to reduce the transmitter output power, and remarks correctly that aerial earthing simultaneously "dampens" the audibility of already normally weak received signals. Thus almost certainly *AE2* was unlikely to have heard from *Jed* that her transmitted signal was being received. In the event *AE2* was not to receive an acknowledgement from the guard ship, whereupon Falconer using his initiative decided to retransmit this significant message continuously for one half hour, before Stoker was obliged to move out of the marsh due to the presence of inquisitive fishing craft.

Neither Falconer nor Stoker were to know fully until they were repatriated from their subsequent brutal incarceration as POW's that *HMS Jed*, stationed 30 miles to the north-west in the Gulf of Saros, had picked up these fluctuating transmissions and reconstructed a more or less coherent message, then passed this message before midnight to *HMS Queen Elizabeth*, the CinC General Hamilton's HQ. There it would have been further checked against *AE2*'s operation orders. Nevertheless Falconer's deliberate action to retransmit continuously beyond the rigid transmission schedule ensured the essential gist of the message got through.

The reconstructed message was passed to Hamilton's staff with a proviso that the message was slightly garbled.¹³ That it took so long to process is indicative of the time taken to check all Falconer's repeated and doubtless "as received" intermittent

transmissions, decode and on forward any coherent alternate versions on another cluttered HQ wave band allocated to the many divisional leaders and special guard ships.

This signal could not be found in any of the London records or senior officers' personal papers. However there is sufficient evidence to construct an approximate plain language version of this iconic signal. More likely than not in WWI 'signalese' it would have looked like this:

MOST IMMEDIATE
DTG 251850Z(-
2) From AE2
To CinC Commander
Eastern Med
Squadron QUEEN
ELIZABETH FLEET
CODE SUCCEEDED PLANNED
TRANSIT / TORPEDOED
GUNBOAT CHANAK /
PROCEEDING GALLIPOLI
252145Z (-2) Rx JED

Or as eminent RN submariner Captain George Hunt DSO* DSC* suggests, observing that Stoker had a sense of theatre, he may simply have said something like: "NEXT PLEASE. SANK MINEDROPPER CHANAK. INTEND RUN AMOK GALLIPOLI!"

Now prior to the receipt of *AE2*'s signal in the flagship the scene at Anzac Cove was chaotic at best. The cryptic comments in the CinC's War Diary by Captain Aspinall, a journalist on Hamilton's staff and who was to become the official British historian of the campaign, accurately described



the logistic as well as communications shambles that prevailed prior to and at the landing. He quoted¹⁴ "... contents of ships, especially in the case of stores and supplies, are not known to the officers on board. This want of knowledge greatly hinders despatch in landing promptly such supplies as are urgently required."

By late in the afternoon the naval beach master, Captain Vyvyan RN, had to deal with the clutter of fighting paraphernalia that piled up with little order on the narrow beachhead. He had to commandeer incoming craft to ship out the clog of wounded amounting to some 1,700 and by evening incoming troop arrivals had to clamber over the sight of about 300 dead. In error and prior to 1800 the first much needed heavy artillery that

Above: *AE2* crew as Prisoners of War on 22 Dec 1915 (RAN photo)

Top: *AE2* crew – Stoker probably front centre (Courtesy RAN)

The Gallipoli Campaign and AE2's last signal

could not be immediately manhandled off the beach had been sent back to their transport! More dramatically a bizarre influence was accumulating at the beachhead, in the soaking late afternoon Mediterranean rain and rising sea.

It took the form of between 600 and 1,000 disoriented and exhausted troops who had either lost contact with their units or were escorting wounded mates, and were straggling back from the lines and resting or falling asleep in full view of the beach headquarters staff officers in their makeshift dugout. The same staff officers were beginning to build up a false picture of the morale and fighting stamina of their troops now in the fiercest fighting for the first time in our federated nation's history.¹⁵

Anticipating a worsening situation with an expected massive counter-attack from the Turks, the beach HQ asked General Birdwood, the ANZAC Force Commander, who had been briefly ashore and was now back at sea, to return urgently ashore.

Clearly the word was out that things were not going well at Anzac Cove and two signals of encouragement ashore from Hamilton in the late evening at 2010 and 2050 also recorded by Aspinall in the War Diary indicate, contrary to popular writing, the situation was indeed serious and known by Hamilton. Aspinall, who later had some difficulty having his version of the ANZAC beachhead accepted by Charles Bean and others who produced the official Australian version, had also diarized at midnight "... reported situation of Australians serious. Genl (sic) Commanding decided to hold position gained throughout night and with help of Navy to ease task of troops in morning by heavy gunfire".¹⁶ I suggest that even Charles Bean, the Australian authority of Anzac, did not emphasise sufficiently in his eminent histories how serious this situation

appeared to the senior military officers on the beachhead, but not so perhaps with the frontline troops who were fighting courageously for their lives and despite some of them hearing unconfirmed withdrawal rumours from the beach.

At about 2200 Birdwood came ashore with RADM Thursby, the naval support commander for the ANZAC force, who immediately signalled for all small craft to be held ready for the beachhead.¹⁷ Birdwood somewhat unsettled by the beach scenes and staff advice, as well as the rounding up of stragglers, signed an urgent message that eventually Thursby took to the *Queen Elizabeth* at about midnight as AE2's signal, having been passed from *Jed*, was being processed:

*Both my Divisional Generals and Brigadiers have represented to me that they fear their men are thoroughly demoralised by shrapnel fire to which they have been subjected all day after exhaustive and gallant work in morning. Numbers have drifted back from firing line and cannot be collected in this difficult country. Even New Zealand Brigade, which has been recently engaged, lost heavily and is to some extent demoralised. If troops are subjected to shell fire tomorrow morning there is likely to be a fiasco, as I have no fresh troops with which to replace those in firing line. I know my representation is most serious, but if we are to re-embark it must be at once.*¹⁸

Now, significantly, on 24 April Aspinall wrote a staff résumé¹⁹ of action in the event that either or both of the landing forces failed to establish themselves on their beachheads i.e., the possibility of withdrawal was in the mind's eye of all military commanders. Campaign authorship seems not to have addressed this salient factor.

With this dramatic message a 'council of war' was convened with Hamilton's senior staff officers. Thursby emphasized he could not now collect sufficient small craft to recover, inside two days, the 15,000 fighting troops then ashore. As Hamilton was in discussion, Lieutenant Commander Brodie, who had just heard a translated enemy propaganda news broadcast that an Allied submarine, meaning AE2, had earlier run aground at Chanak and been captured, was given AE2's recent but slightly garbled signal. Realizing its importance Brodie forced his way into the meeting and gave the message to Keyes.

Keyes, probably unaware of the broadcast, immediately exclaimed somewhat extravagantly "... this is an omen. An Australian submarine has done the finest feat in submarine history, and is going to torpedo all the ships bringing reinforcement, supplies and ammunition into Gallipoli!" After a short interval he came out excitedly to the gathered junior officers beaming "It's done the trick!"²⁰

This is compelling evidence AE2's signal reached Hamilton before a decision was finalized. It is significant that Bean's detailed *Story of Anzac* makes no mention of Keyes' recorded conversation with Hamilton. Thursby's dismal revelation that insufficient small craft were available was compelling enough. Further, when asked by Hamilton, Thursby was the only senior officer to suggest the troops would hold out if it was put to them. But clearly at that moment Hamilton had received the only good news of the day's peninsula fighting and with an explanation by Keyes of its significance had decided to direct Birdwood that the ANZAC force must remain on the beachhead. He stresses the success of AE2 in his fourth sentence knowing that other submarines would follow, enemy reinforcements and

counter attacks would be slowed and a breathing space was now assured for exhausted front line troops at both Anzac Cove and Cape Helles. If it was not important Hamilton would not have mentioned it. Hamilton's message²¹ read:

Your news is indeed serious. But there is nothing for it but to dig yourselves right in and stick it out. It would take at least two days to re-embark you as Admiral Thursby will explain to you. Meanwhile, the Australian submarine has got up through the Narrows and has torpedoed a gun-boat at Chanuk (sic). Hunter-Weston despite his heavy losses will be advancing tomorrow which should divert pressure from you. Make a personal appeal to your men and Godley's to make a supreme effort to hold their ground.

Ian Hamilton.

P.S. You have got through the difficult business, now you have to dig, dig, dig, until you are safe. Ian H."

Thus if AE2's signal had been received whilst or after his order was written he could not have referred to AE2 except perhaps with his postscript afterthought to 'dig in'. As the reference to AE2 is at the beginning of his order, and before mention of the main strike force at Cape Helles, it is more likely than not that AE2's new tactical element followed on from Thursby's compelling argument that not enough small craft were available inside two days, ties the two naval aspects together and emphasises to the ANZAC HQ both as a challenge, and a fillip, the feat of countrymen. As Keyes stated it was as much the signal that 'did the trick' in firming Hamilton's resolve to make his command decision not to withdraw. Lieutenant Commander (later RADM) Brodie's record of the intimate debate

at Hamilton's 'council of war' supports this important interpretation.

There is some dispute whether news of AE2's success reached front line troops. Those who have some experience of command and control between a military headquarters and forward troops in an amphibious assault as at Anzac Cove would know that, in darkness, close co-ordination with front line formations several hundred yards away would have been vital. In the flow of two-way information Hamilton's direction to 'dig in' was the key command order for sheer survival. Thus early in the morning of 26 April 1915 the CinC's famous direction based on both the lack of small craft and the submarine threat to enemy movement in the Sea of Marmara would have been essential for formation commanders and their troops whose survival depended on digging themselves right in with all the encouragement that could be mustered.

The paradox is that it was the senior ANZAC HQ staff officers who had sought advice as to whether they should remain or withdraw and they had been answered unequivocally together with the morale-boosting paradigm of their brothers in arms in AE2. They had been relieved of any responsibility for a withdrawal decision. There was a newfound HQ mettle that built up a renewed spirit. Perhaps non-military analysts may be forgiven for not fully comprehending the dynamics of the day.

This was to be the start point for legends that the disastrous troop losses and ultimate withdrawal never quenched. The ethos, the myth and parables of ANZAC were in full gestation. Despite AE2's loss several days later her very last received signal was pivotal in confirming to the Allied Command that the enemy could be attacked by sea right to his heart

(Constantinople). Properly supported, submarine warfare had more than come of age at a time when surface forces were stalled. The next submarine entered the Sea of Marmara within two days. By the Campaign's end 10 submarines operated in the Sea of Marmara and destroyed 242 enemy ships and transport vessels.

The Commanding Officers of E14 and E11, that followed, were to be awarded Victoria Crosses. Stoker's duly recognized skilful and courageous adventure was to remain unreported, and in obscurity, until his repatriation by which time the Eastern Mediterranean Squadron had either disbanded or moved with their senior reporting officers to other tasks and the Allied nations had lapsed into demobilization mode. Nevertheless it is instructive to read the citation in the *London Gazette* for conspicuous bravery in the case of E14 since it mirrors the passage of AE2.²²

William Wolseley Falconer had also been recommended for a bravery award but the RN disapproved the commendation because the Board of Admiralty "had not proposed to take similar action for their (communications) personnel".²³ This was without any real understanding of the signaling difficulties Falconer had faced, his intuitive initiative or the importance to the Campaign of AE2's successful passage with Stoker's transit signal, and Falconer's skilful contribution to its despatch. For that matter neither had the Australian Naval Board subsequently recognized the full significance of this iconic message.

Falconer was returned overland to the UK from Turkish imprisonment and embarked in *HMAS Melbourne* for his return to Australia. His Record of Service indicates he was paid various Prize Monies and Extra Pay for War Service amounting to some £61.4.3d.

The Gallipoli Campaign and AE2's last signal

It may have been Naval Board policy, but his service then and as a POW for four years, is notated "VG Supr". He was demobilised at his own request in September 1919 from *Cerberus*, worked at Garden Island Dockyard and finally as a senior clerk in the Commonwealth Electoral Office, Sydney. He married and his last known address was East Gosford, NSW. He died aged 75 on 24 April, 1968. Co-incidentally that was an ANZAC eve, the anniversary on which *AE2* also began her last voyage. Falconer is commemorated in the Northern Suburbs Crematorium, Sydney, in Niche QE 63 (24). Ironically the *Queen Elizabeth*, or "QE", was the final recipient of his last transmitted, and Stoker's historic, W/T message.

I submit that William Wolseley Falconer is more than worthy of being honoured as an outstanding, if not legendary, RAN communicator, and a submariner to boot. He was never acknowledged for his contribution to the Anzac epic. Unquestionably Stoker and Falconer deserve to be remembered appropriately in the Australian War Memorial, Canberra, depicted stoically working together in *AE2*'s tense and cramped Wireless Telegraphy Cabinet on the evening of 25 April, 1915.

London Gazette

Admiralty, 21st May, 1915

The KING has been graciously pleased to approve of the grant of the Victoria Cross to Lieutenant-Commander Edward Courtney Boyle, Royal Navy, for the conspicuous act of bravery specified below:--

For most conspicuous bravery, in command of Submarine E.14, when he dived his vessel under the enemy minefields and entered the Sea of Marmara on the 27th April, 1915. In spite of great navigational difficulties from strong currents, of the continual neighbourhood of hostile patrols, and of the hourly danger of attack from the enemy, he continued to operate in the narrow waters of the Straits and succeeded in sinking two Turkish gunboats and one large military transport.

The KING has further been graciously pleased to approve of the award of the Distinguished Service Cross to the undermentioned Officers of Submarine E. 14:--

Lieutenant Edward Geldard Stanley, Royal Navy.
Acting Lieutenant Reginald Wilfred Lawrence, Royal Naval Reserve.

Approval has also been given for the award of the Distinguished Service Medal to each member of the crew of E.14



Captain Richard Arundel RAN (Rtd) joined the RANC as a 13 year entry in 1947 as did his father in 1916. He saw service in Korea, Malaya, Malaysia, and SVN, and specialized in signal communications serving as OIC Communications School, Deputy Director JSC-E and Director of Naval Communications. He contributed to AE-1 and AE-2 and Sydney II signal research after retiring as Defence Attache Paris and Berne. He lives in Brisbane and the south of France.

References

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- (2) Admiral of the Fleet Lord Wester-Wemyss *The Navy in the Dardanelles Campaign*, p282
- (3) Op.cit. p275
- (4) Alan Moorehead *Gallipoli*, p357
- (5) P.Shankland and A.Hunter *Dardanelles Patrol*, p28
- (6) H.G. Stoker *Straws in the Wind*, p9 P. Shankland and A.Hunter *Dardanelles Patrol*, p22
- (7) H.G.Stoker *Straws in the Wind*, p92
- (8) ADM 137 Sailing Order 27 dated 23 April 1915
- (9) ADM 137 Eastern Mediterranean Squadron Commander's letter No 15 23 April 1915
- (10) H.G.Stoker *Straws in the Wind*, pp 105/6 RADM C.G.Brodie *Forlorn Hope 1915* – The submarine passage of the Dardanelles
- (11) ADM 53/45338 Deck Log *HMS Jed*, 26 April 1915
- (12) ADM 186/810 (OU 5155 --- W/T Handbook Type 10 Sets (*Submarines*) Copy now held RAN Seapower Centre - Australia)
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- (14) WO 95/4293 CinC's War Room log, 23 April 1915
- (15) Les Carlyon *Gallipoli*, pp170/171 C.F.Aspinal-Oglander *Military Operations Gallipoli*, p 197
- (16) WO 95/4293 War Room log *HMS Queen Elizabeth*, 25 April 1915
- (17) C.F.Aspinal-Oglander *Military Operations Gallipoli*, p 268
- (18) Sir Ian Hamilton *Gallipoli Diary*, vol 1 p144
- (19) *Military Operations Gallipoli* vol 1 maps and appendices --- 13, by direction of the Historical Section Committee of Imperial Defence
- (20) (RADM) C.G. Brodie *Forlorn Hope 1915* - The submarine passage of the Dardanelles, p67-72
- (21) E.Ashmead-Bartlett *The Uncensored Dardanelles*, ch 2
- (22) ADM 137/1090 p.51 *The London Gazette* 21 May 1915 (attached)
- (23) Aust Naval Rep London letter to Navy Office dated 17 December 1917
- (24) DVA letter - Ph9/1 dated 18 March 2005

ADM 137/1090 p51 *The London Gazette* 21 May 1915

THE AUSTRALASIAN NAVAL FORCES (ANF)

BY GREG SWINDEN

Firstly let me explain that the Australasian Naval Forces (ANF) and the Commonwealth Naval Forces (CNF), and vice versa, are not the same thing. Following Federation in 1901 the various state navies¹ were combined into the Commonwealth Naval Forces, on 1 March 1901, with Captain (later Rear Admiral) William Rooke Creswell in command. This amalgamation didn't happen overnight and it was not until 1904-05 that any semblance of order was achieved.

Whilst Creswell was busy getting the naval affairs of Australia in order, having inherited a rag tag fleet of different vessels and a conglomeration of varied personnel from the state navies, the naval defence of Australia rested very much with the Royal Navy and its squadron of ships based on the Australia Station.² Royal Navy ships had been based in Sydney since the days of the First Fleet and warships were permanently based in Australian waters since the 1820's and remained so until 1913. Even the creation of the various state navies had not lessened this need; as the state naval vessels were considered only suitable for harbour and close coastal defence.

Creswell was supported by some forward-looking politicians including

¹ All states except Western Australia had naval forces consisting of ships and NSW and Victoria possessed naval brigades (naval infantry).

² The Royal Navy ships of the Australian Squadron remained based at Sydney until October 1913 when the first RAN Fleet unit formally arrived in Australian waters. The flagship of the Royal Navy Australian Squadron was the cruiser, *HMS Cambrian*, which saluted the arrival of the Australian Fleet unit on 4 October 1913 and then, nine days later, she and several other British warships departed and returned to England for reassignment or decommissioning. Some ships remained in Australian waters on loan to the RAN such as the cruiser *Encounter*.



prime ministers Deakin and Fisher who supported the concept of an independent Australian Navy. The Government commenced ordering purpose built vessels for the new navy. The first of the CNF's new vessels were the Torpedo Boat Destroyers *Parramatta* and *Yarra* which were built in England; arriving in Australian waters in late 1910. It was the CNF that was subsequently granted the title Royal Australian Navy on 10 July 1911.

Following on from the arrival of the two destroyers was the creation of the Australian Fleet Unit consisting of a Battle Cruiser (*Australia*) and two cruisers (*Melbourne* and *Sydney*) along with four more destroyers and two submarines. A third cruiser (*Brisbane*) was also planned for construction in Australia. Additionally a number of Royal Navy warships such as the cruisers *Encounter*, *Pioneer*, *Psyche* and survey vessel *Fantome* were loaned or transferred to the new navy.

It was, however, not just the acquisition of new ships that occupied the thoughts of our early naval officers and administrators. The personnel to man the new ships were equally important. Some officers and men had been transferred from the old state navies and a number of ex Royal Navy

personnel had also joined the CNF. A modest recruiting program for the CNF had begun and a Boys Training Ship and a Naval College were planned but the reality was that these were several years in the future. As part of the program to train Australians to be naval personnel, and possibly in the future alleviate the shortage of trained men, the ANF was created.

Following the 1902 Colonial Conference in London it was agreed that Australians, and New Zealanders, would be permitted to enter the Royal Navy for training.³ This would eventually form a core of trained men who could be accessed by the new Australian navy. The ANF was formed and recruiting started in early May 1904 and 15 year old schoolboy John Garfield Clubb⁴ of Balmain, NSW was the first recruit and issued ANF

³ This was linked somewhat to the Australasian Naval Defence Act of 1887 in which the Australian colonies had provided funding for the maintenance and manning of seven warships (five third class cruisers and two torpedo gunboats). Previously manning of the ships in Australia had been purely by Royal Navy ratings recruited in Great Britain although several Australian born individuals did travel to England to enlist directly in the RN.

⁴ John Garfield Clubb. Born Balmain NSW 7 January 1889. Enlisted in ANF 2 May 1904. Served in HM Ships *Mildura*, *Challenger* and *Pyramus*. He was medically discharged as unfit 19 April 1909.

AE1 with HMAS Australia and HMAS Yarra in the background, in September 1914 a few days before her loss-photo courtesy HMAS Stirling naval base

THE AUSTRALASIAN NAVAL FORCES (ANF)

service number 1. Over the next ten years another 1,795 boys and men were enlisted in the ANF from both Australia and New Zealand. These men were effectively Royal Navy ratings who signed on for an initial period of five years service⁵ and served in the Royal Navy ships of the Australian Squadron.

In January/February 1913 the majority of ANF personnel still serving in the Royal Navy (i.e. they still had a portion of their five year engagement to complete) were formally transferred to the RAN and many were allocated as commissioning crews to the newly built ships and submarines of the RAN. These men were allocated service numbers in the RAN Service number 7000 series and approximately 400 men were transferred to the RAN.⁶ For example Able Seaman Harold 'Lofty' Batt (ANF 1344) from Palmerston North, New Zealand was allocated service number 7442 and became commissioning crew of *HMAS Australia*. He had joined the Royal Navy in July 1909 as a Boy 2nd Class at Lyttleton, New Zealand and was allocated to *HMS Pioneer*. He served in the RAN until 1919.⁷

Another example was Ordinary Seaman Erle Boyd (ANF 1646) from Bendigo, Victoria who enlisted in the ANF in March 1911; his first ship was *HMS Psyche*. When he transferred to the RAN he was allocated service number 7353 and joined the new cruiser *HMAS Melbourne*. Boyd served in the RAN until 1933 and attained the rank of Chief Petty Officer. When

⁵ Noting the five years commenced from the time the man turned 18 so any service before this age ('Boys Time') did not count towards the period of service.

⁶ Note that ANF ratings who completed their initial service in the Royal Navy and were discharged prior to 1913, and who later enlisted in the RAN, would be issued service numbers commensurate with their year of enlistment.

⁷ In 1967 Harold Batt published a history of his service in the RN and RAN from 1909-1919 entitled *Pioneers of the Royal Australian Navy*. This is the only known book written by a member of the ANF.

World War II broke out he returned to the RAN, in January 1940, and served at sea throughout the war and was awarded the British Empire Medal (BEM) for his service in *HMAS Manoora*.

Several ANF ratings served in the submarine arm of the fledgling RAN and a number lost their lives when HMA Submarine *AE1* was lost off New Britain in September 1914. These included

Engine Room Artificer 3rd Class John Messenger (ANF 1389/RAN 7291) from Ballarat, Victoria and Stoker Petty Officer John Moloney (ANF 1133/RAN 7299) from Brisbane, Queensland.

Able Seaman Reuben Mitchell (ANF 1448/RAN 7476) also of Ballarat, Victoria enlisted in the ANF in 1910 and later served in the RAN Submarine service and was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal (DSM) for his bravery while serving in the submarine *HMS E14* in the Dardanelles campaign in April/May 1915.

Stoker Petty Officer Henry Kinder (ANF 1334/RAN 7244) of Kogarah, New South Wales was awarded a Mention in Dispatches for his service in *HMAS AE2*; during its penetration of the Dardanelles on 25 April 1915. Kinder later spent several years as a Prisoner of War of the Turks after the



AE2 was sunk on 30 April 1915.

Of course not all ANF ratings were effective sailors. Some were a "Kings Hard Bargain" – a lazy and ineffective sailor and several deserted before their period of service was over. Able Seaman Herman Brazendale of New Norfolk, Tasmania enlisted in the ANF in 1911 (ANF 1612/RAN 7866) and served onboard *HMAS Sydney* when she destroyed the German cruiser *Emden* at Cocos Island on 9 November 1914; but he was a difficult sailor who was frequently in trouble and deserted from the RAN in July 1918.

After the creation of the RAN in 1911, and the Australian Fleet Unit in 1913, the need for the ANF ceased to exist; although RN personnel on loan to the RAN made up nearly 30% of the navy's manpower. As a result enlistment slowed and no Australians

Creswell, later considered to be the "father of the Navy", and who has the training establishment at HMAS Creswell named after him

were recruited after October 1912⁸ although New Zealanders continued to join up until March 1914. Overall, however, the ANF ratings provided a good source of highly trained manpower at a crucial time in the RAN's history. In 1913 when the RAN required well trained personnel to man the newly acquired warships the ex-ANF ratings were able to provide that skill and knowledge and with a

8 The last Australian to join the ANF was Leslie Norman Bartholomaues (born at Broken Hill in 1895). He joined the ANF on 22 October 1912 and was allocated service number 1781. He was transferred to the RAN on 22 February 1913 and allocated service number 7868. He was discharged Services No Longer Required (SNLR) on 5 April 1918 following the *HMAS Fantome* mutiny. The last man to join the ANF was Thomas Henry George Hullah from the Chatham Islands, New Zealand who enlisted on 6 March 1914 and was allocated the last ANF Service Number of 1796.

distinctly Australian flavour.⁹

For those interested in researching the ANF further a good source of information is the ANF Service Records held at the Australian War Memorial (AWM 266). This consists of the individual Attestation Papers for each man who enlisted in the ANF and two large, and rather musty, leather bound ledgers that record the enlistment details and service records of the 1796 Australians and New Zealanders who served in the ANF. 🚢

9 That said at least 25% of all RAN personnel in 1913 were Royal Navy personnel on loan to the RAN and several more were ex-Royal Navy members who had joined the RAN directly.

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SEA LINES UNDER STRAIN: *REPORT OF THE 16TH INTERNATIONAL SLOC GROUP CONFERENCE*

BY NAZERY KHALID

Action expresses priorities

(Gandhi)

DIALOGUE IN DELHI

More than ever, the world's Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) are subject to intense use by multiple actors and face a variety of threats – natural and man-made. If not managed well, these threats can impede safe passage for ships and cause adverse effects to the fragile marine environment, the population residing along the SLOCs and regional stability.

This is especially so for SLOCs in the Asia Pacific region, one of the world's most populous, economically vibrant and strategically important region. Given their location along some of the world's busiest shipping routes, it should not come as a surprise that SLOCs in the region are increasingly reeling under heavy use. SLOCs such as the Straits of Malacca and South China Sea are passageways of enormous importance to the littoral states and the international community owing to their role in facilitating much of global seaborne trade and their strategic value to naval powers.

In recent times, the growing non-conventional threats posed by non-states actors such as pirates and terrorists, and even disasters such as tsunami, has inflicted enormous cost to shipping. They have also exerted enormous pressure on the part of the 'SLOC stakeholders' to mitigate and counter.

Given the trans-boundary and asymmetrical nature of these threats, they can most effectively be neutralized and addressed through multilateral efforts. Protecting and safeguarding Asia Pacific SLOCs calls for cooperation among the SLOC stakeholders – which include Governments, naval forces, shipping industry and coastal communities,

among others - to close ranks and work towards managing, and protecting key maritime arteries. In doing so, they must adhere to international principles and laws, most notably the United Nations Conference on the Laws of the Seas (UNCLOS), and not let narrow interests get the better of common ones.

These messages reverberated loud and clear throughout the 16th International SLOC Group Conference held in New Delhi on 31 January – 1 February 2011. Hosted by Observer Research Foundation (ORF), one of India's most prominent maritime think tanks, the conference was attended by some of the best minds working on strategic maritime issues today. Luminaries in the field gracing the event include ORF's own Cmmdr PK Ghosh, Cdr John Bradford from the US Navy, Andrew Forbes from Sea Power Centre Australia, Dr Stanley Weeks from Washington DC-based SPECTRUM Group, Dr Laurence Lin from National Defence University Taiwan and Lee Seokwoo from South Korea's Inha University Law School.

The International SLOC Group was established in early 1980s with the objective to increase awareness of the strategic importance of SLOCs in facilitating shipping and seaborne trade in enhancing economic development. This objective is achieved by the Group via organizing dialogues and international conferences and by publishing conference proceedings.

Being a track two organization, the Group provides a most useful platform for no-holds-barred dialogues on this most crucial of topics in the maritime field. Counting retired or serving government officials, naval officers and academics as members - all participating in the Group in a personal capacity - the Group is renowned for generating non-partisan, articulate

analysis and discussion on issues relating to SLOCs. Its members, hailing from a dozen Asia Pacific countries, publish prolifically on the subject and are known to be among the foremost experts on SLOCs.

It stands testimony to the commitment of the members to the cause that the Group has, since its inception, grown from strength to strength and has expanded the number and reach of its membership. Today, the Group enjoys a growing global profile and has made significant contribution in expanding the literature on SLOCs and promoting better understanding and appreciation of the importance of regional maritime cooperation in safeguarding the world's SLOCs.

WATER, WATER EVERYWHERE

The growing importance of SLOCs in the Asia Pacific in facilitating trade, economic activities and strategic interests of littoral states and naval powers cannot be overemphasized. The free movement of ships and seaborne trade along SLOCs in the region is a pivotal issue that affects most regional countries and the international community. The persistent piracy attacks on merchant vessels in the Gulf of Aden, growing concern over navigation safety, the ever-present threat of terrorism on maritime interests and maritime disputes that could undermine regional stability demand keen attention by the SLOC stakeholders to ensure that the regional sealanes are safe and secure.

With this in the background, the conference theme of *Re-evaluating the importance of Sea Lines of Communication in the Asia Pacific Region* could not have been more appropriately coined. As the regional SLOCs face a multitude of issues and challenges, decisive measures are

needed to ensure they are well managed and kept open for the benefit of their many users and stakeholders.

The outline of the conference program reflects the growing concern of the SLOC stakeholders on the state of the region's sealanes. The fog and cool weather blanketing New Delhi on the first day of the conference gave little indication of the clarity of the presentations and the animated - and at times heated - discussions to come.

Session I, themed *Global Issues and Challenges* featured speakers from South Korea, India and Indonesia who underscored the plethora of issues faced by the regional SLOCs from various perspectives including legal, regulatory, energy economics and security. This was followed by Session II on *Regional Trends in Trade and Shipping* which heard speakers presenting the trends in seaborne trade and shipping from the North Asian, Indian Ocean, South East Asian and international perspectives. The presentations helped to put into context the enormous importance of SLOCs to global trade, much of which is carried by merchant vessels, and the challenges faced by the sealanes in accommodating growing shipping traffic and growing size of vessels.

The second day kicked off with Session III, succinctly titled *Response Strategies*, which dished out quality presentations on naval cooperation, maritime information sharing and maritime strategy and maritime security. The breadth of national perspectives on offer in this session provided participants with a broad understanding on the value of SLOCs. The speakers also managed to convey to the participants the positions of various naval powers with regard to the regional sealanes.

The three sessions set the stage for the 'battle royale' during the final session themed *Way Ahead*. The session featured a roundtable

discussion involving both the speakers and participants on how to enhance the safety, security and environmental integrity of the SLOCs in Asia Pacific without compromising on the need to keep them open to all users. Among topics that were most hotly debated during the session were the relentless piracy attacks in the Gulf of Aden and the response thereto, China's growing naval might and the dynamics triggered, and the strategic calculations of naval powers in regional seas. Also commanding keen interest was the worrying scenario of what would happen should the protests in Egypt lead to disruption of traffic in the Suez Canal.

THE SEAS UNITE, & UNITED WE STAND

Participants went away from the conference with a better appreciation of the need to have a fresh and inclusive look at issues related to Asia Pacific SLOCs. As more users ply through the vital sealanes offered by the SLOCs, including naval powers that may potentially act in a belligerent fashion in safeguarding their interests, the SLOCs are increasingly coming under tremendous pressure to continue playing their roles of providing unhindered passage to its users.

Given that huge global interest are trained on SLOCs in Asia Pacific, and much stake rides on them, the developments in the years ahead will be crucial in determining the strategic calculations in these sealanes. Questions will be asked whether existing international laws will be able to accommodate traditional concepts like the freedom of the seas amid growing concerns over disputes and aggressive naval posturing in regional SLOCs that may lead to clashes that can impede the smooth flow of shipping.

There is a silver lining amid the dark clouds, in the same manner that the morning fog blanketing New



The conference, attended by renowned scholars and thinkers in maritime security and strategies, featured quality presentations and articulate debate on issues and developments related to Asia Pacific SLOCs

Delhi during the conference gave way to sunshine as the day progressed. Amid the 'rising temperature' in key SLOCs due to conflicting use and interests and due to threats such as piracy, there is much to be optimistic about the prospect of cooperation. We can indeed take comfort in the manner international navies, backed by a UN resolution, are working hand in hand to combat the scourge of piracy in the Gulf of Aden. However, much more initiatives need to be promoted to build confidence and enhance cooperation among SLOC stakeholders before the regional sealanes can be said to be truly open, secure and safe for those who depend on them.

Underscoring this point, Vice Admiral (Retd) KK Nayyar emphasized during his keynote address at the conference that while regional and global cooperation to counter menaces such as piracy are already in place, there are still plenty of challenges ahead to be overcome to safeguard the regional SLOCs. In this regard, he posited that collective and cooperative security mechanisms would likely emerge as the norm rather than exception in protecting the sealanes and to ensure they are open for all.


In expressing his hope for a more closer cooperation among the stakeholders of the regional SLOCs to work together to safeguard the passageways, VAdm KK Nayyar echoed the immortal words of the great Mahatma Gandhi: *Be the change that you want the world to be*. The onus is on the users of the SLOCs not only in Asia Pacific but worldwide to contribute to the upkeep of these sealanes and use them in a sustainable and responsible manner. To paraphrase another famous quote by another famous statesman, the stakeholders must ask what they can do for the SLOCs, not what the SLOCs can do for them. 🇮🇳



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"We should not couple Iraq and Afghanistan as a win or no win criterion."

EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL PETER COSGROVE

WITH SERGEI DESILVA-RANASINGHE

Given the salience of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, General Peter Cosgrove, one of Australia's most well known military personalities who is a veteran of Vietnam, East Timor, and previously involved in the early stages of the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, speaks exclusively to defence analyst Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe about counter-insurgency and the prospects of success in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Recently, in mid-July, Afghan President Hamid Karzai accepted 2014 as the target date for foreign forces to hand over responsibility for security in Afghanistan. However, the handover of the Dutch mission based in Uruzgan Province to US and Australian troops on Sunday, the first NATO country to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan, is a worrying sign of the ongoing problems faced by the US led coalition in obtaining the continued military support of NATO countries over the next few years.

Similarly, with the number of Australian casualties increasing, it remains possible that more casualties could occur in the years ahead, which may cause an increasingly skeptical Australian public to question Australia's presence in Afghanistan.

Since Australia first intervened in Afghanistan in 2001, 17 Australians have died from Taliban attacks and 143 have been injured, some of them severely.

With cross-party support for Australian involvement in Afghanistan, the task of taking the fight to the Taliban while minimising Australian casualties is down to the Australian Army itself, drawing on evolving approaches to counter-insurgency



(COIN in military jargon) which stretch back to Vietnam.

General Peter Cosgrove first cut his teeth in the jungles of that South-East Asian war. His distinguished career also saw him oversee senior command appointments in East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan.

He is realistic about the amount of protection which can be given to Australian troops on patrol in Afghanistan. He is also realistic about the amount of protection you can give troops in the rugged Afghan countryside. In Vietnam the fear was an enemy fighter with a machinegun jumping out from behind a clump of bamboo.

"These days it is the possibility that in the next hundred metres of road a 200 kilo explosion might blow me to kingdom come and all of my comrades."

"In Vietnam, we put it under the heading of 'Mines and Booby Traps.' Basically, the enemy put mines on to roads, but not with the same

proliferation. It was not quite an afterthought weapon against us in Vietnam, it was more a tactic to annoy and make us more cautious, rather than a full-on campaign to achieve a knockout."

"We needed our soldiers to be personally more protected. But if you are highly protected and walking on your two feet, then you're still vulnerable," he says.

"You can protect a soldier from the front with a very heavy flak jacket, and protect the back of his neck and his head with a helmet, and maybe even giving him a very hard visor to protect his face and his sight. All of these are very important things to do for the individual but you can move at a snail's pace for a very short period before you become exhausted."

"Secondly, you're still vulnerable because you have a lot of limbs and can't be totally encased in armour – it's impractical. We had to retain some foot mobility but overall become more mobile and that mobility had to be

*Timor-Leste
Battle Group VI
Commanding Officer,
Lieutenant Colonel
David Smith talks
with retired General
Peter Cosgrove at the
10th Anniversary of
Popular Consultation
awards ceremony
held at the
Presidential Palace in
Dili (ADF photo)*

“We should not couple Iraq and Afghanistan as a win or no win criterion.”

protected.”

One big plus for the troops was the Bushmaster armoured vehicle. Cosgrove said it had saved many lives, Australians and others, in the war zones.

“It’s almost the mark, or the icon, of modern campaigning,” Cosgrove says. “If you were to put a soldier into a deep sleep and wake him up in ten years’ time, asking him for images, he would say, ‘Oh, a Bushmaster’. It is seen often as the armoured vehicle in which soldiers necessarily go from A to B with the expectation that they’ll survive.”

Experience in East Timor also proved invaluable for Australian troops, namely the Special Air Service Regiment (SAS), which were subsequently sent into Afghanistan.

“We sent Special Forces in late 2001 after 9/11 and they were operating primarily in their special operations role, but you might say in a more conventional setting,”

Cosgrove says. “They certainly had a long-range reconnaissance role, they had to be combat capable, combat ready, and in operations like Operation Anaconda, they had to play a very strong fighting role because if you’re the only troops in a particularly brutal area and the need arises, then you must fight, and the SAS were prepared to fight, but it’s not the way they’re organised, to get involved in pitch battles.”

“That did come their way once or twice, and I was very grateful that they’d had the sort of opportunity to establish their operational patterns and their own self-confidence in East Timor, in a less demanding situation.”

“I think it would have been pretty tough to go straight into an ancient battleground like Afghanistan in 2001 against the Taliban, who’d been fighting for years against the soldiers and each other, and here come the Americans, or the Northern Alliance and thus for the

Afghans it was more of the same.”

“They were a very experienced enemy; they weren’t necessarily structured as a conventional force or anything like that. They were just really ferocious. I think our boys would have been behind the eight-ball even as good as they are, without the primary school experience of East Timor.”

But for all the equipment, it is the counterinsurgency strategy and tactics which will determine whether coalition forces can make a graceful exit by 2014. The capricious and petulant Karzai, sneeringly referred to by US officials as the mayor of Kabul, is of little help. His supporters rigged his election, his officials ship aid money out of the country in suitcase loads, and his affiliates are heavily into the opium trade.

It is little wonder that the Taliban, with their own war chest boosted by aid rip-off and drugs money, think victory is within their grasp and have grown to control a third of the country.

Cosgrove won’t buy into the debate over coalition counterinsurgency strategy but says Australia’s experience in Vietnam, East Timor peacekeeping and in Iraq has served us well.

“Iraq would have shown the necessity for buy-in by the population to the set of ideas that the military intervention is supporting, and that is, generally speaking the high desirability of a country running its own obedient and professional and effective security forces.”

“We saw that overall effect in embryo in Southern Iraq, while our task force was there, in that they reached early on an accommodation with the tribal leaders there, so that the local informal security forces were sensitive to not going flying off the handle, and with the Iraqi security forces that our people were training.

“We encouraged them to be themselves sensitive to local leaders

and to be very respectful in their day to day operations out and about. I think you saw that repeated in the troop surge arrangements around Iraq that happened to around the same time. The Iraqis themselves at that time were getting very angry with the wanton ongoing violence, so to some degree Iraq came to that conclusion.

“That’s what we’re trying to do, no doubt, in Afghanistan, to have ordinary Afghans buy in to a future without roadside bombs, executions and oppressive, violent government.”

“The doctrine for urban-based COIN operations is very much of intelligence, overwatch, highly cautious maneuvering, and of doing one’s utmost to avoid creating a new wave of enemies through collateral damage.

“It’s in Afghanistan that this Australian urban COIN doctrine is taking a major step forward, and mostly stemming from the second deployment.”

“In the first deployment there was some of it going on, but it was in its infancy. Now it’s evolved, and our intelligence and surveillance arrangements, our use of discriminating fire to neutralise the enemy but not the innocent person nearby, all of these things have taken a major boost.”

“We started to step forward powerfully in this regard in the second half of 2006.

From my conversations with my senior colleagues who were still in the Army, I came to understand that there’d been a real step forward in what I might call the technical and doctrinal approaches to countering insurgency in this complex terrain.”

“The complex terrain is not necessarily the middle of Kabul. It might be a pseudo-village compound of ten houses inside a mud wall, where the reality was that the people you’re after were in one of the huts and in the



other huts were people you didn't want to hurt."

"I can't stress enough the role of intelligence in that. In some ways, the operations in Iraq, in those what I might call the middle years of insurgency, around Fallujah and the like, were a ghastly insight into the issues of a wholly kinetic approach to the enemy operating in that urban complex environment. Of course I'm focusing in on the terrible impact on the innocent of people slugging it out on your street corner."

As the war in Afghanistan continues to escalate and fashions increasing public doubts as to whether it remains 'winnable', Cosgrove stresses caution and understanding.

"We should not couple Iraq and Afghanistan as a win or no win criterion. Winning seems to be a concept of an outcome judged by clearly understood and agreed 'rules'.

"Who sets the rules for these interventions? Interventions can come about because to not intervene is to witness the most ghastly things. East

Timor was one of those. At what point was there a 'win' in East Timor?" 🐼



Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe is a Senior Analyst at Perth-based strategic think tank Future Directions International. This article is a condensed version of an article first published in Asia Pacific Defence Reporter.

Oil assets outside Iraq...a very different war from Afghanistan (Courtesy RAN)

Military Education: THE PLACE OF IDEALS

BY LIEUTENANT COMMANDER RICHARD ADAMS

Recently, a disagreeable episode at the Australian Defence Force Academy has provoked a series of reviews. These reviews will examine the Academy in detail, pulling apart the minutiae of habit and practice. These reviews are unlikely to investigate the high-minded ideals which are foundational to Australian arms. The earliest years of the Royal Australian Naval College illustrate a valuable type of educational and cultural idealism. This paper recalls those times and offers a brief illustration of the thinking which distinguished the Naval College between 1913 and 1930. Doing so, this paper enables us to reframe judgements of military education.

The Royal Australian Naval College 1913 – 1930: An idealist education

Established alongside the Fleet in 1913, and “based on the British system (at) Dartmouth, where they took boys in and gave them four years’ English public school education,”¹ the Royal Australian Naval College was a British institution,² which educated Australian midshipmen as officers and gentlemen in accord with the public school tradition.’

Reverberant with ideals, the same in Britain as in Australia,³ the Naval College ensured the young man entered the Fleet just as the young man left public school: “a dyed-in-the-wool conservative gentleman, who has never heard of Ibsen, who crosses himself at the mention of Bolshevism and who treats women with unflinching tact and politeness....”⁴

Saturated with chivalric courage, the idea of a gentleman was particularly



significant. The College Magazine reflected that the purpose of the Naval College was to graduate officers who were “masters of civilities, meeting and mixing with inferiors in rank and society...(though) preserving the distinction of rank.”⁵ Resonant with that particular “aloofness (which) set the (Royal Navy) apart from any other body of disciplined men,”⁶ the notion of gentlemanliness permeated the all-encompassing influence of Royal Navy culture.⁷ So, writing in 1925, the College Captain asserted that graduating from the Royal Australian Naval College, midshipmen were “second to none in point of honour, manners and the graces which go to make a gentleman.”⁸

This thinking, claimed Corelli Barnett, “set the boy apart.”⁹ But whereas Barnett suggests upper-crust dandyism, the reality was a long way from foppish. These were “healthy, well-mannered, honest philistines”¹⁰ who “combined authority...Christian kindness and...grit: The rarest of (their) virtues was human sympathy, the rarest of (their) vices cowardice.”¹¹ The attitude was parodied cynically by Walter Le Strange, an Etonian colleague of Cyril

Connolly in the early 1920s:

- (a) White men are better than others.
 - (b) England is everything.
 - (c) A “gentleman” is the thing.
- Also all or mostly all worship Athleticism.¹²

But behind the lampoon, Cyril Alington, Head Master of Eton (1917- 1933) noted genuinely worthy ideals:

Lying won't do, thieving still less: that idleness will get punished: and that if they are cowards, the whole world will be against them: and that if they will have their own way, they must fight for it.¹³

These were standards which, alongside a spirited “readiness to be an officer,”¹⁴ defined the ideal of the gentleman, which informed the Royal Australian Naval College. In its first edition, the College magazine noted:

Courage, tact and loyalty are... the chief qualifications required to make a good Naval Officer. Of these...place before all others that form of bravery called MORAL COURAGE....In (these) qualities... are comprised all that goes to make a true gentleman.¹⁵ (original

The Royal Australian Naval College - based at what was later to become HMAS Creswell - takes on the Duntroon Army cadets in 1916 - and wins

emphasis)

The Magazine captures the “mixture of sport and public service (which) seemed to epitomize the ideal of the English gentleman”.¹⁶ The spirit was redolent with the epics of

Hector and Achilles, Horatio holding the bridge, Arthur and his knights, Roland blowing his horn, Richard Coeur de Lion charging the Saracens, the Black Prince at Crécy, Henry V at Agincourt... Nelson at Trafalgar, Wellington at Waterloo, the Charge of the Light Brigade...Gordon proudly facing the screaming Dervishes, the heroes of Rorke's Drift (and) the gallant little garrison at Mafeking playing cricket in the jaws of the enemy....¹⁷

Such was the corpus of valiant mythology which defined chivalric manliness, and illustrated the neo-Victorian sense of “duty”.¹⁸ The same cultural narrative defined the Royal Australian Naval College, and ensured Royal Australian Navy officers were, “to all intents and purposes, virtually indistinguishable from their RN colleagues”.¹⁹ “Great powers were to be humbled by ‘pluck’ and ‘team spirit’”.²⁰

So it was, that that curricula at Naval College and public school, were metaphors for an ethos focused upon character, rather than scholastic fulfillment:

Many a lad who leaves...public school disgracefully ignorant of the rudiments of useful knowledge...has devoted a great part of his time, and nearly all his thoughts to athletic sports, (and) brings away with him something beyond all price, a manly straight-forward character, a scorn of lying and meanness, habits of obedience and command and fearless courage....²¹

Thus, the public schools and naval college aspired to “the destruction of individuality and...regimentation”.²² The Naval College was adamant, expecting

a “hearty sporting spirit”²³ and defining the “Type of Boy Wanted:

“A bright, smart, cheery boy...with a sense of honest straightforward manliness...a strong-minded boy of good moral courage; capable of ‘taking charge...(of) good physique - this is what is wanted, the ideal type”.²⁴

The College was thus established on safe and predictable foundations, instilling ideas of character by various subtle and explicit modes of indoctrination and exhortation. Times have changed. The age of chivalry has been superseded. No longer will the old ways be best. Yet, we have much to learn from an old idealism.

The Value of Ideals

The profession calls now for counter-establishment enquiry, for moral and political critique, and for intellectual debate in a way which has hitherto been exceptional. Yet there is much to be learned from reflection upon old ways which were the cornerstones for what Admiral of the Fleet, Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope, described as an “imperishable tradition of Service and self-sacrifice”.²⁵

Comparison which historical example is revealing and significant. Military education, once inspirational, is reduced by the laboured continuance of threadbare and sometimes brutish custom, to the banality of paste crown jewels. Without the obvious yet invisible creed of gentlemanliness, military education is left with little but the timid, prudish quasi-virtues which find expression in unenforceable rules against mythologised offences such as “fraternization”.

Notwithstanding that naive “(notions) of joining up to protect Queen and Country have largely disappeared”,²⁶ without idealism, military education and culture is in irons, caught between academic



A romanticised depiction of an Agincourt Knight

aspiration which typically remains unfulfilled, and traditional standards which seem immaterial and out of place.

Recalling the earliest years of the Royal Australian Naval College, we perceive a lamentable dearth of intellectual curiosity.²⁷ Yet we perceive “True Heartedness”,²⁸ “a high sense of honour, and duty, and readiness, considerable physical endurance, and the ability to subordinate (selfish) interests....”²⁹ This language is resonant with a professional ethic, crucial to conflict defined by ideals. Yet, ideals are not noticeable in professional education focussed on technical training, or the acquisition of formal degrees.

In conclusion, greater attention needs to be paid to thinking which is uncompromising – challenging sensibilities and uncritical assumption. This is not a mode of thought to which the Services are accustomed.

Perhaps for this reason, the chaplain has often been called to deal with the unfamiliar territory of ethics. But, the role is one for which the chaplain is poorly suited. The chaplain reflects a dogmatised Christian rhetoric of right and wrong. His role commits him to this task; to do otherwise in the professional context smacks of hypocrisy. Additionally, Erastian separation of church and state suggests involvement beyond ministry to the faithful is inappropriate.

The chaplain does not have a large role in professional military education. But the philosopher does. He can and must, interrogate and illuminate the idealism foundational to Australian arms. These principles, fundamental in 1913, remain crucial in the volatile ferocious battles for ideas which presently disfigure international affairs. We must rejuvenate and nourish them. 🚩

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Military Education: THE PLACE OF IDEALS

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SECURITY: PRESENT AND FUTURE CHALLENGES

– *ADMIRAL SIR MARK STANHOPE, THE FIRST SEA LORD, AND PROFESSIONAL HEAD OF THE ROYAL NAVY, CONSIDERS THE IMPLICATIONS FOR STATES, NOW AND IN THE FUTURE.*

The inter-relationship between global and national security is a feature of our connected world. Rapid change and uncertainty in the global strategic environment is bringing new security challenges. Emerging powers are morphing into future strategic competitors, competition for resources is increasing, non-state actors are challenging state assumptions about security and the effectiveness of supranational institutions is being questioned. This address was presented in mid-2011.

Ladies and Gentlemen: I really am delighted to have been invited by David Held and Mary Kaldor, on behalf of London School of Economics Global Governance, to contribute to this discussion on present and future security challenges. Budget day and operations in Libya were not on our mind when we set this date 6 months ago. Occasions like this are particularly timely in the light of recent ongoing international events and provide important opportunities to both think afresh about the nature of the security challenges we face, and to debate our responses to them.

I would like to begin by paying tribute to the bravery and professionalism of what the British Armed Forces have accomplished, and are achieving, in support of UN Resolution 1973; established to protect civilians from attack by the Gaddafi regime. From the initial extraction of British Nationals a few weeks ago, to the effective establishment of a No Fly Zone over Libya now,

the Armed Forces – and especially in these particular circumstances the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force – have, as you would expect, acted with appropriate restraint and great courage. For the Royal Navy, the submarine *HMS Triumph* has successfully played a role in the delivery of precision strike, with Tomahawk cruise missiles to write-down Gaddafi's air defences. A perfect illustration of the flexibility of our submarine force. Indeed, the recent events in Libya are a good example of our need to be able to respond flexibly to a dynamic security environment. In this sense, tonight's title – Present and Future Security Challenges – is particularly apposite. As such, I shall return to Libya shortly, and I'm pretty certain you will return to it in questions.

This evening I want to consider how the UK secures its strategic interests in a rapidly evolving global environment. In doing so, I will make the point that flexibility of mind and flexibility of method need to be central to the UK's approach to responding to the future security challenges of our modern world.

So, what does our global security



Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Barry launches a Tomahawk cruise missile to support Joint Task Force Odyssey Dawn, the US Africa Command task force providing operational and tactical command and control of US military forces supporting the international response to the unrest in Libya and enforcement of UN Security Council Resolution 1973. (US Navy photo by Lieutenant (jg) Monika Hess)

SECURITY: PRESENT AND FUTURE CHALLENGES

environment look like? Well, there's no doubt that it's a dynamic one, as – in many ways – it always has been. One only has to look back to when the Cold War – with its veneer of simplicity – dominated a more bi-polar security environment, to see the extent to which the security environment has been transformed into an ever more complex one.

Why? In large part because, as this audience will recognise only too well, the conveyor belts of globalisation are – in all their forms – accelerating us closer and closer together. Today, we are connected globally in many many different ways. In 2000, just 12% of the world's population possessed a mobile phone. UN figures tell us that technological innovation has boosted this figure to more than 60%. In 1995, there were 16 million web users globally. Today it is more than 1.7 billion.

The integration of economies across the world is increasing too. The UN estimates that in 1990, the total amount of global investment overseas was \$2 trillion. In 2008 that figure had risen to around \$18 trillion.

Just as there are fiscal imperatives to build closer ties with more economic powers, so globally there is a requirement to build more bridges as power becomes distributed more widely – as the circle of international decision-making becomes more multi-lateral. Indeed, the international architecture is already responding to an increasingly multi-polar world; the G8 has been replaced by the G20 as the main forum for international economic co-operation; NATO has increased to 28 members; and the EU now consists of 27 countries. Viewed collectively, these examples alone mean that events in one region or country are inevitably having increasingly profound effects elsewhere in the world.

So if the last 30 years really are

anything to go by, it follows that the next 30 years will, propelled by continuous globalisation, be characterised by rapid change and increasing global interdependence.

Analysts and commentators are quick to remind us of other factors that do, and will continue to, shape the future security environment. The UN predicts that the world's population will increase from the current 6.9 billion to about 9.2 billion by the year 2050. And that, by the year 2030, population increase will mean that global demand for food and energy will rise by up to 50% and water by up to 30%. These are staggering figures across a population of 9.2 billion, but it is not just resource scarcity that is likely to increase the prospect of conflict. The consequences of climate change, from which none of us are immune, are likely to have a disproportionate impact on the developing world, adding further stress to already fragile states in particular.

But it's not just these states that present challenges to security and global governance; the same might also hold true of course for the more powerful nations. And the Non-State Actor, perhaps while wearing the trappings of statehood, will also become an increasingly influential player.

So, when viewed from many angles, the global security environment is, and will remain, a dynamic one. One that is complex. One that is multi-dimensional. Recognising this, the UK's recently written National Security Strategy concludes that, 'the risk is likely to become increasingly diverse.' I think events in the last three months underpin that.

Perhaps none of this would matter, if we were in a position to declare a Monroe doctrine of our own, withdrawing from the world and doggedly defending our borders, while policing our water, air and cyber-space.

Some have suggested indeed that this is an approach we should adopt, but it overlooks the strategic realities for the UK.

The UK is – and has long been – an outward looking, democratic country, one which trades globally and which relies on an international, rules-based system to ensure the stability upon which our security and indeed our prosperity depend. We leverage influence through memberships of multinational bodies – I have mentioned some already - the UN, the G20, the EU and NATO, to mention just a few. We have a global perspective matched by international responsibilities. Consequently, we are interdependent and interconnected and, in the words of the foreign secretary, live 'in a networked world.'

Another reality, although it is too often overlooked, and is that the United Kingdom is an island. We are also responsible for the security of 14 Overseas Territories, all of which – with the exception of the Gibraltar peninsula – are islands too. Being an island brings enormous benefits in security terms, but it also brings particular vulnerabilities.

According to the Chamber of Shipping, 95% of UK trade by volume and 90% by value is carried by sea. We cannot feed ourselves, so we import much of the food we consume. Figures from the Department of Energy and Climate Change tell us that the UK became a net importer of energy in 2004 and this dependency ladies and gentlemen we would all agree is unlikely to change. We live in a 'just enough, just in time' economy, one in which many goods, raw materials and other commodities are warehoused at sea, in bulk and container ships. We are already hugely dependent on the free movement of maritime traffic – a dependency that the Chamber of Shipping envisages will only increase.



If that flow of material is interrupted, there are implications across the board, and they are increasingly strategic. This is why the National Security Strategy assesses that a short to medium term disruption to international supplies of resources essential to the UK is a significant priority risk.

Given all these factors, I would contend that the UK has little choice but to engage in the increasingly globalised world if we are to maintain our prosperity and most importantly our way of life.

But that engagement, as it always has done, brings risk and reward in equal measure – indeed our own financial institutions stand testament to that reality. The risks may manifest themselves directly; terrorist attacks in our cities, pandemics, extreme weather, cyber-attacks on our national infrastructure, even direct military threats to our overseas territories or to UK nationals living abroad. They may manifest themselves indirectly, perhaps as the consequence of conflict elsewhere, or as a second order effect of direct threats to others – for example, UK nationals caught up in conflict abroad, interruptions to our energy supplies, the deliberate degradation of our environment, the denial of legitimate access to trade routes or

resources, and so on and so on.

However much we regret it, and however much we would prefer to conceptualise it, conflict is likely to remain a feature of the security environment. As Leon Trotsky put it, ‘you may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you.’ We can debate the relative likelihood of these things coming to pass, just as we can assess their likely impact. However, I hope we can all agree that they do have the potential to affect our security and – because security underpins the global trade and commodity prices upon which our economy depends – to affect our everyday life. Most particularly, they have the potential to impact on our strategic interests; the security of our people, our economic well-being, our freedoms and our values. In sum, the things we take for granted.

While some of these security challenges that I have spoken of have always been with us in one form or another, I would suggest that what is new is the speed at which they can combine to engage our national interests. That can manifest itself in ways we might not expect, because it doesn’t necessarily sit within our familiar frames of reference.

Take recent events in the Maghreb and Levant as an example. It is said that the riots in Tunisia began when

an unemployed graduate set himself on fire after police confiscated his fruit stall in the town of Sidi Bouzid. When he died of his injuries, local demonstrations morphed into national demonstrations, such that the Tunisian Government was ultimately deposed.

That led to the demonstrations and civil unrest in Cairo which fed fears that the Suez Canal could be closed. In response, oil prices – just as they have done in the past – rose, on this occasion to \$120 a barrel. But just try and imagine the economic consequences – to say nothing of the wider regional implications – were events in Libya to deteriorate even further than they have at the moment or additional political stresses arise in Egypt, let alone Bahrain. It is worth reflecting too on just how quickly and widespread demonstrations have reverberated around the Arab world; Tunisia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Algeria, Jordan, Yemen, Albania, Syria, Lebanon and Libya.

The implications of a young Tunisian not having the correct paperwork to run a fruit stall were not foreseen, but they are no less real for that. They illustrate how quickly events can unfold in a way that is difficult to predict and which can affect UK interests in the short term – in this case, by posing a threat

A Qatar Emiri Air Force Dassault Mirage 2000-5 fighter jet takes off on an Odyssey Dawn mission. (US Navy photo by Paul Farley)

SECURITY: PRESENT AND FUTURE CHALLENGES

to our energy security and to the safety of UK nationals living, working and holidaying in the region – and potentially in the long term too. Or, as in Libya, simply impacting on our high standards for the protection of human rights, against an unacceptable brutal oppressive dictator.

Given all that, the principal challenge for the UK is to secure our strategic interests in a global environment that is not just increasingly complex, but one that is characterised by rapid and often unpredictable change. Indeed, the recent events in the Magreb – and Libya in particular – serve as a timely reminder for the UK Government – and I might say even the LSE – that the capacity of world events to surprise even the best prepared of us, should not be underestimated.

For those of us with responsibilities for delivering defence and security, getting to grips with the security environment is a pre-requisite to ensuring the range of outcomes needed to support UK policy and protect UK interests. So, how should we address these challenges?

It's a question which, prompted by the Strategic Defence and Security Review, has been much-aired of late. Indeed, I suspect that in Whitehall it has generated more thought in the last 12 months than in the preceding 12 years.

Throughout my own substantially longer naval career, I have experienced first hand the range of security challenges associated with this shifting strategic environment, and have often been involved in shaping the responses to them. As a submarine commander in the 1980s, for example, my role was dictated by the realities of the Cold War and the deterrent strategy that under-pinned it. In the 1990s, warship command in *HMS Illustrious* exposed me to the practicalities of military

interventionism, which reached its apogee in the year 2000, with the UK's intervention in Sierra Leone.

HMS Illustrious was, along with our Amphibious Task Group and contributions from our sister Services, instrumental in changing the situation on the ground to create a pause in the fighting. The elected Sierra Leone Government, under attack from the Revolutionary United Front, was thereby preserved and we were able to help set the security conditions which allowed the UN to continue its mandate.

The UK's standing was significantly enhanced as a result and this allowed the expectation to flourish in some quarters that military force – precise, limited and supported by a clear mandate – could be the panacea to any number of further ills.

But past operational success is no guarantee of future performance. Indeed, events since then have served to remind us of the limits of military force alone in achieving security outcomes, not least in respect of enduring stabilisation campaigns.

So what has this Admiral got to say now about how the UK should address the security challenges of today and tomorrow?

Whatever the political rhetoric of the past, this country has neither the capacity nor the political appetite to respond to every conceivable threat. No country frankly has. But that is not to say that we shouldn't try and improve our capacity to do so, as far as is possible. A more imaginative, proactive stance on security should be within our means, provided we are prepared to look again at how we deliver it.

This requires us to do two things: to become more flexible in mind and to become more flexible in method. Let me explain.

Flexibility in mind – in our thinking

– is the vital precondition to achieving a more realistic response to the speed and unpredictability of events which characterise the security environments of our modern world.

For example, whilst the 'whole of government' approach to the production of the National Security Strategy published last October is a welcome restatement of strategic principles, and whilst the establishment of the National Security Council to provide prompt, coherent and co-ordinated decision-making on all aspects of national security is a positive step, we need to continue to build on this.

If we are to truly balance resources with commitments, power with interests, I believe that we should be more prepared to employ all the levers of national power – diplomatic, economic, and military – in addressing the security challenges we face; and, if consensus can be achieved, to join with others – state and non-state.

Why? Because, as commentators such as Joseph Nye observe, whilst military power will always have its place, the networked world potentially allows us to achieve outcomes through more subtle use of all the levers of national power.

Whilst this is increasingly well-understood, I think that we should, given the networked context to which I referred earlier, be aiming to go further still. As the author Parag Khanna suggests, when government, business and NGOs work together, real progress can be made. For the networked world has the potential to truly galvanise dot.gov, dot.com and dot.org into generating a more dynamic and innovative response to future security crises. The need for smarter inter-agency planning and delivery – be it humanitarian aid or law enforcement for example – whether nationally or as part of an international effort, is the

consequence of a growing shift towards thinking in much broader terms about what security means and how it can best be delivered. The introduction of the Comprehensive Approach a few years ago is, in my view, definitely worthy of reinvigoration.

To summarise, flexibility of mind means we need to consider the levers of power and other actors as individual melodic lines weaved into a complex counterpoint – where the interplay between the lines is fused into an harmonious whole. Whilst history has yet to determine its verdict, I would suggest that, to date, the UK's response to recent events in the Middle East for example stands testament to an emerging maturity of approach to more intelligently fusing these lines.

This brings me to my second point. We need to achieve flexibility in method - we need to consider more imaginative fusions of both soft and hard power to achieve the desired outcomes and effect we desire.

There is a tendency to understand the UK Armed Forces' activity only in terms of their engagement in conflict. I think that is an inevitable consequence of the focus on the Campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the range of operations undertaken by the component elements of the Armed Forces is actually much, much wider than that.

There is also a tendency to view the deployment of the military as a last resort, but I think that the military can be part of a more nuanced first resort, both in better understanding the security situation and in doing something to contain it. I think that Defence can do more in the coming years to shape our Armed Forces so that they can be used more effectively to help address security risks, earlier on, as part of our commitment to conflict prevention. Upstream engagement to prevent conflict.

In this regard, the role of deterrence – and by that I mean both conventional and nuclear – is of the utmost importance. The value of persistent presence in regions of interest – whether to signal national intent, gather

intelligence and form insights, contribute to capacity building or to reassure others – cannot be underestimated. The need therefore to maintain a credible war fighting capability able to operate and be maintained at range is crucial. Why? Because you cannot deter effectively unless it is understood by those whose behaviours you seek to influence that you can intervene militarily with confidence. Because you cannot keep the peace unless you are physically there, and prepared to be able to stay there.

To aid your understanding of how the Armed Forces can – and in my view should – be optimised to deliver security outcomes, allow me to illustrate the broader, strategic effect of how the military can be used differently to deliver security.

You may not know that the Royal Navy has been operating in the Arabian Gulf, ashore, afloat, in the skies and beneath the waters since 1979. During the Tanker War of the mid-1980s, we were there providing escort protection to tankers laden with oil through the Straits of Hormuz while the Iran-Iraq war was being waged around us.

We were still there for the first Gulf War in 1991, when our ships



Gunships from HMS Ocean ready for action off Libya (RN photo)

and aircraft rapidly defeated the Iraqi Navy. We stayed to enforce the UN's economic sanctions against Saddam Hussein's regime before supplying and landing the amphibious forces that took control of the Al Faw peninsula, the gateway to Basrah, in 2003.

And while you will perhaps have heard about the drawdown of UK Armed Forces from Iraq in 2009, the Royal Navy has remained there, clearing mines, continuing operations to protect the vital offshore energy infrastructure and deterring the illegal and damaging smuggling of weapons and drugs in the region, as well as countering piracy. While we're at it, we have continued to devote resources to passing on our expertise in training the fledgling Iraqi Navy and Marines as well as facilitating détente between Iraq and Kuwait.

Consider how things might have developed had we not, over the last 30 years, been in the position to shape and influence events in the Gulf – to deter, contain and ultimately engage in decisive combat operations against our foe while supporting our friends, all in order to assist the delivery of UK national interests. The fact of our being there, and our wide utility, gave the UK choice in peace-time, and options in

SECURITY: PRESENT AND FUTURE CHALLENGES

crisis. It continues to do so.

Consider these other examples: the operation to evacuate British nationals by sea from Lebanon during the Israeli-Hizbollah conflict in 2006 and, only a few weeks ago, from Benghazi in Libya; the response to the Haiti earthquake at the beginning of last year; the ongoing counter-piracy mission in the Indian Ocean and off the coast of Somalia; the interception of drugs bound for British streets in the Caribbean Sea and Atlantic; the protection of our fish stocks; and the conventional defence of the South Atlantic Islands and their associated resources.

All of these are examples of forces being used flexibly, not fighting wars, but being there doing their business in order that Defence contributes, in harmonious counterpoint with all the levers of national power and other actors, to delivering security for the UK. All are examples of a more elaborate application of both soft and hard power. Whilst I think there is room for more simultaneous activity, genuine flexibility depends on being organised and equipped to offer continuing policy choices to the Government at all stages of engagement with others.

So, for Defence, that means we need flexible forces, able between them to operate successfully across the full range of tasks that might be demanded of them, today and tomorrow: everything from delivering humanitarian relief to winning wars. Flexible forces offer real choices to Government in deciding how to respond to developing situations, but can also provide continuing influence to prevent crises from flaring up in the first place.

I've already underlined the importance of deterrence in the broadest sense but, of course, this also means maintaining the nuclear deterrent. Whilst the strategic nuclear

threat to this country is presently assessed as low, we cannot – as the Strategic Defence and Security Review acknowledges – ‘dismiss the possibility that a major direct nuclear threat to the UK might re-emerge’. Who is to say what the position will be in 20 years time? Recognising this, the Government remains committed to maintaining the nuclear deterrent in order to underpin the security of the UK and support collective security through NATO.

And if we want to be truly flexible, it also means that, whilst the Government understands the risks of taking a gap in the Carrier Strike capability in the near-term, the arguments for Carrier-borne aviation remain entirely sound for the uncertain world that we expect to face in the future. This is why the Government also remains committed to the future Carrier Strike programme.

To conclude. Introducing greater flexibility in our thinking is the first step to truly galvanising dot.gov, dot.com and dot.org in generating a more dynamic response to future security

crises. For Defence, introducing greater flexibility to our forces, their capabilities and structures is a sensible response to the speed and unpredictability which characterise the security environment of not just today, but tomorrow.

Flexibility in mind, flexibility in method. Thank you very much for your attention. 🇬🇧

Speech presented at LSE Global Governance, Wed 23 Mar 11, reproduced with the Admiral's permission

Admiral Stanhope pictured with an Indian Admiral on a recent visit to India (Courtesy Chindits website)



Effectiveness of the Individual Performance Appraisal within the RAN

BY LIEUTENANT VICTORIA JNITOVA

Individual Performance Appraisal (IPA) is a central function of Human Resource Management. IPA is, however, no longer contained within the framework of HRM. Its influence on the strategic business policies of organisations has increased dramatically during the last ten years with more and more credibility and value given to performance appraisal outcomes.

In order to be effective, IPA needs to have clearly established purposes at individual, departmental and organisational levels, be conducted in a standardised and transparent manner, and be supported by both assessors and assessed. Effectiveness of the IPA often relies on the clarity and quality of the assessment criteria, as well as quality of application.

IPA within the RAN is conducted annually. There is no other process within the organisation that is uniform for all ranks and categories, involves every member, and is conducted throughout the entire period of service at regular intervals. This process has the potential of becoming one of the most powerful tools in achieving the organisational goals, effective workforce management and communication. The question remains if the current RAN IPA system is the most effective way of assessing performances of RAN personnel and if opportunities exist for improving the current practices.

Here I outline and critically analyse the IPA approach implemented within the RAN. Feedback from a cross section of RAN personnel on the effectiveness of the existing IPA approach, as well as IPA academic literature, will be utilised to support the research findings. Finally, I make recommendations on how to improve the effectiveness of the RAN IPA.

IPA within the RAN has, until recently, followed a traditional Performance Appraisal Model. The approach consists of three phases: goal setting, midterm review and final (annual) assessment as outlined at ABR6289¹ and ABR 10.² The IPA is conducted by the work place supervisors or divisional officers and is focused primarily on the assessed suitability and competitiveness for promotion.

Individual performance of RAN personnel is appraised using the 'relative judgment method' as outlined at Baldwin, J. article (1998).³ In this method, a standard set of job behaviours and attributes is listed with assessment guidelines provided for each individual assessment area. These guidelines (or descriptors) of behavior are placed on a continuum with six vertical scales, each point denoting different levels of performance in the forms AC 833-11⁴ and AC 833-21.⁵ A word picture of an employee's performance during an assessment period is also provided in support of the scores.

According to Chastetter, W (1986)⁶, there are three possibilities when determining what is appraised: the quality of personal characteristics, the quality of a process and the quality of an outcome. Although the RAN includes all three components in its IPA approach, the emphasis is clearly placed on the assessment of the quality of personal characteristics due to the focus on an individual suitability for



promotion and the RAN being a non-profit organisation.

The Strategic Reform Program (SPR) was implemented within the RAN in Apr 10. A new component, assessment of the 'signature behaviors' (SB) of the RAN personnel⁷, had been added to the RAN IPA. It is planned to incorporate its content into the existent IPA form in 2011.

RAN Personnel Survey Methodology

The RAN personnel survey was constructed using Professional Quest 2007 Software to determine the RAN satisfaction with the current IPA process. Respondents were drawn from the DRN personnel directory. All selected personnel were consulted prior to survey commencement and gave their verbal agreement to participate in the research.

Effectiveness of the Individual Performance Appraisal within the RAN

Trends were identified and respondents' comments utilised to measure and support the issues raised. Relevant quotes from the academic literature, as well as respondents' feedback in the form of free text have been included throughout this article to support the research findings.

Demographics. The survey was completed by 33 respondents, with the majority being in the rank of Lieutenant and Lieutenant Commander (18 personnel). Other ranks ranging from Able Seaman through to Commander were also present (Figure 1):




Figure 1: Respondents by Rank

Respondents came from several RAN specializations and categories, such as TS, WTR, ATV/ATA, ET, CSO, MTE, SU and CISSM. Their RAN service experience ranged from three to more than six years with the majority of participants (24) having completed more than six years in the RAN. Respondents' age and total years of sea service are shown at Figures 2 and 3:




Figure 2: Respondents by Age




Figure 3: Sea Service by Respondents

In terms of exposure to the RAN IPA, all respondents experienced it as having been assessed. The majority of survey participants (73 %) have acted as assessors for the RAN IPA on multiple occasions.

Survey Findings. The respondents expressed various degrees of satisfaction with the IPA system implemented within the RAN and 94% agree the RAN IPA is effective or somewhat effective for their respective workplaces. There were, however, concerns regarding consistency and quality of the IPA implementation. These issues will be discussed further in this paper.

Suitability for Promotion Criteria. Several respondents commented that application of the 'suitability for promotion' criteria is somewhat ambiguous where confusion exists between the 'not yet suitable' and 'likely to become suitable' for promotion criteria. The following comments illustrate this:

"If you tick 'likely to become suitable' this according to the [Naval Officer Performance Appraisal Report] NOPAR means you are not suitable for promotion. It even says in the ABR that you should not put 'likely to become suitable' based on time spent in the RAN. This can be damaging for promotional prospects due to the ambiguity and due to an individual interpretation of the wording"; and

"There seems to be widespread misuse of the "Promotion

Recommendation" box with respect to the correct use of the "Likely to become suitable" option ... I recommend that this option be removed.'

Inconsistency of assessment by different assessors. It was a consensus amongst respondents that different assessors score differently. The reasons for the IPA inconsistencies included the effect of different personalities on the assessment outcomes, avoidance of conflicts and confrontations, traditionally inflated scores to 'bring sailors in line with the majority', and 'recent error effect' (REE). REE as defined in the 'Employee Assessment, Appraisal and Counselling' (1994)⁸ is 'the tendency to rate people on the most easily remembered behaviour, often the most recent one'. The following feedback was selected to illustrate the issue of the IPA application inconsistency:

'I am aware that some assessors are stricter than others, I suspect that some assessors do not like to have difficult conversations with their staff and give reasonably good reports to avoid having those conversations'; and

'I believe SPARs reporting is very over inflated. I have seen personnel SPARs around 98 points which is very close to being a perfect sailor in all respects. I believe people have lost sight of 50 points being for an average sailor. If a sailor gets 50, they are quite upset and annoyed.'

Poor Implementation. The RAN IPA process can only be effective if implemented thoroughly and consistently. Respondents indicated it is often not the case. Respondents commented that there were occurrences during their careers when the goals setting and midterm review stages of the IPA process were shortened significantly or ignored. The following comments are selected to

illustrate this feedback:

'It is imperative that all personnel have the opportunity to sit a midterm... Unfortunately in recent times the use of a performance appraisal tool has become quite cumbersome due to the quantity of paperwork that needs to be completed. As a result, personnel have come to not value the report'; and

'There needs to be some sort of check and balance that supervisors are in fact, goal setting and performing at least one midterm review. If supervisors fail to do this, there should be some sort of flagging in PMKeyS Self Service to alert that person that they have work to undertake.'

Quality of Feedback. With regards to provision of individual performance feedback, there was no consistency amongst the survey responses. Whilst some respondents experienced support and guidance from their assessors, others were expected to self-drive their personal and professional development. Almost half (48%) of respondents indicated, however, that they received quality performance feedback 'rarely' or 'sometimes'. The following comments were provided on the issue:

'The yearly appraisal system does not provide a good platform for this [quality feedback]. Two mandatory sessions do not constitute regular feedback';

'I have only had one completed appraisal not under training. My supervisor at the time was not overly supportive in enabling me to progress my career. While I received a good NOPAR, I do not feel I was given great opportunities to develop'; and

'As a Senior Sailor, I was expected to manage my own career, including goals. Assessors do not



have time for divisional issues.'

RAN Workplace constraints. The RAN is a unique workplace with the following IPA challenges highlighted by respondents:

- a. personnel regularly posted to different positions;
- b. contractors and navy personnel often share the same workplace with different IPA processes;
- c. workplace supervisors and assessors are occasionally two different personnel; and
- d. personnel with different professional qualifications often work on the same project leading to assessors have no expertise of the assessed job role.

The following amplifying comments were selected to illustrate the issue of RAN workplace constraints:

'I have not always had the opportunity for a midterm as the supervisor had only been posted to the position for less than six months';

'My supervisor and assessor were two different people and thus confused the reporting in my view. With categories in Navy, your supervisor is quite likely to not be of the same category as you. This being

the case, they know little of your job roles, but are still required to assess your performance'; and

'My assessor only wrote the report because no one else fit the role. He had hardly viewed my work and was not in a good position to report or assess my abilities...'

Signature Behaviour Assessment.

The idea of assessing SB of RAN personnel as part of the annual IPA reporting process was supported by the vast majority of respondents. Several concerns were raised, however, with regards to the SB initiative. These concerns are listed below:

- a. Criteria ambiguity:

'I believe it is good for personnel to be forced to comply with the values in order to achieve CN's vision of NGN. However, I believe the criteria are not thought out well and are extremely subjective to assess. As such, they become somewhat meaningless for reporting purposes. They have the ability to provide good feedback to the sailor, and may help to align their attitudes/actions with NGN better but are not robust enough to be reportable for promotion purposes'; and

Effectiveness of the Individual Performance Appraisal within the RAN

'I think the signature behaviours are a step in the right direction, however they are difficult to measure. Eg. How do you measure proficiency and integrity?'; and

- b. Overlap with the existent system: *'Signature Behaviours is a duplication of the PAR and is not required. It would have been better to review the wording on the PAR'; and*
- 'Signature behaviours are nothing new and to a degree have always been considered when completing a subordinate's performance appraisal... This effort and peoples' time could be used more effectively in engaging their staff rather than writing about them'.*

One respondent suggested using SB as a feedback mechanism:

'SB assessment is better suited as a feedback mechanism at the midterm level rather than annual assessment.'

Training in IPA. The majority of respondents (61%) indicated they had received RAN training in IPA conduct. They listed various RAN leadership courses, as well as On Job Training (OJT). When asked if the received IPA training was effective for an assessor role, more than 30% of surveyed personnel selected the 'ineffective' option; 28% stated the training was somewhat effective; with only 18% selecting 'effective' option. Remaining 24% opted not to respond to the question. The consensus amongst the respondents was that the training was not sufficient, often untimely and lacking practice opportunities such as scenario based assessment sessions. More guidance on writing IPA reports and scoring was requested. The following amplifying comments were selected to illustrate the issues raised:

'During JOLC in 2003 we were provided some guidance on it however I had already been an

assessor in 2002 and would have appreciated some earlier guidance';

'...It [training] may be required due to the bastardisation of the outcomes and issues of inflated scores. Average scores are seen as low scores now';

'Training was just about how to fill up the forms. There was no scenario based training'; and

'The training was some time ago but I seem to recall that it was process based, and for a performance report to be truly valuable it needs to be written so it has meaning etc which is a bit more than process...'

The vast majority of respondents (94%) received neither follow up training in the RAN IPA, nor participated in any group sessions aimed at ensuring consistency of assessments. The following difficulties were outlined in one of the comments:

'In my work, usually I am the only supervisor overseeing the work of the individual, so have limited options for asking others whether my assessments are accurate. Further, the community in which I work is so small that the staff in confidence nature of the reporting process might be compromised should I try to achieve consistency in assessment. One other thing, by policy we are not supposed to compare individuals to others, so I cannot make assessment scorings on anything like a bell curve.'

Several respondents provided feedback about group discussions and follow up training implemented within their respective units. An illustrative comment is provided below:

'Immediate supervisor discussions and DO discussions to confirm consistency across a large



department [are conducted].

The majority of survey respondents agreed that more training in the IPA conduct would be beneficial to them. The following comments are selected to support this conclusion:

'Educate supervisors and assessors on the correct process to be followed...'; and

'More training needs to be provided to appraisers to get accuracy and fairness across the RAN.'

Baldwin, J⁹ emphasises the importance of assessor training undertaken in a systematic manner. IPA training for assessors should be integrated into an overall training for managers. It could be conducted in the form of workshops or seminars covering such issues as factors that affect individual performance and job performance; setting performance standards and goals; handling of appraisal interviews; and provision of regular quality feedback.

Study Limitations. The findings of this study need to be interpreted with the following study limitations in mind. First, the sample size used in the present study is relatively small with almost half (49%) being personnel from the Training Systems Category. Second, the survey questions used in this study may not have fully captured the various

dimensions of the IPA system. Further work toward understanding the dimensionality of this process as well as validation of the selected variables is required. Finally, it would be beneficial to identify new variables that could assist in determining the relationship between individual performances and organisational outcomes.

In conclusion, the RAN IPA is an effective and comprehensive approach to performance management within the RAN organisation. There are, however, concerns regarding consistency and quality of the IPA implementation. There are inconsistencies in scores provided by different assessors, the application of the midterm review stages, and provision of performance feedback.

Lack of training provided to RAN assessors, as well as limited guidance on scores consistency across the board and consistency of the IPA process application could potentially result in subjective IPA outcomes. As the main purpose of the RAN IPA is to determine personnel suitability and competitiveness for promotion, any subjectivity in the matter could unfairly advantage or disadvantage a member in question.

Currently, there is no formal quality assurance process of the assessment outcomes. It relies solely on the assessor's diligence and experience, as well as the departmental culture. Implementing a mechanism of ensuring assessor's accountability for procedurally sound IPA conduct could potentially mitigate the issue of assessment's subjectivity and significantly improve quality and consistency of the RAN IPA.

Addition of the SB component to the annual IPA reporting process has a positive effect on the overall IPA. The new approach, however, lacks clarity of assessment criteria and overlaps with an existing system. SB approach will be

incorporated into an existent annual IPA form in the near future which will address an issue of overlapping with the existing system.

'Likely to become suitable for promotion' option within the IPA form is rarely used and has a similar interpretation as 'not yet suitable'.

It is recommended that annual IPA training is introduced across the RAN in the form of workshops or seminars covering the following areas:

- a. factors that affect individual performance and job performance,
- b. setting performance standards and goals,
- c. handling of appraisal interviews,
- d. provision of regular quality feedback,
- e. awareness and effective mitigation of RAN workplace constraints, and
- f. assessment consistency.

Implementing a mechanism of ensuring assessor's accountability for procedurally sound IPA conduct is recommended.

Removal of 'likely to become suitable for promotion' option from the AC833-11 and AC833-21 forms is also recommended.

Using the Signature Behaviours approach as a midterm review feedback mechanism should be considered; a review of SB assessment criteria to ensure they are measurable and achievable is recommended. 🐾



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QUALITIES OF LEADERSHIP

BY LIEUTENANT COMMANDER TOM LEWIS

T*his series examines selected traits of leadership to compare Royal Australian Navy leaders against a criteria. The first of the articles took Admiral Lord Nelson, the hero of Trafalgar in 1805, as a model, as well as examining the characteristics of other well-known leaders, both civilian and military.*

Seven qualities of leadership measure the subject matter, suggesting a capable naval leader is an achiever; expert in his or her field; inspires others, and takes initiative; impresses by their physical qualities; empathises with others, and is an effective communicator.

ACHIEVEMENT

Did the person under discussion improve their organisation? Did they leave it a better place by being a member? Promotion is recognised as a measure of achievement. With this and other measures which traditionally mark out achievement – education; decorations; amassing of physical wealth perhaps – we gain some beginnings of whether a person is a success.

EXPERT IN ONE'S FIELD

Anyone who aspires to be a leader and an example to others must obviously have expertise in their craft. In naval terms, that translates as being an expert “ship-driver”; an aviator *par excellence*; an engineer possessing a wealth of theoretical and practical knowledge – and so on. Nelson, for example, was a master at strategy – which becomes a commander of fleets – but also of tactics, which behoves a ship captain. He was also an inspired man-manager.

INSPIRATIONAL

This leader inspires others to perform similar deeds. Often this is shown by the leader's actions in front of their subordinates. Nelson inspired his followers in being resolute, courageous and honourable. It is one measure of the man that so many did: Hardy, who was with him when he died; his fellow admiral Collingwood whose battle line he raced to be first to engage at Trafalgar; ship commander Berry, who followed him from ship to ship, and Captain Hallowell, who after the Battle of the Nile made him a present of a coffin fashioned from the French ship *L'Orient*'s mainmast – Nelson kept it in his cabin and was indeed buried in it.

INITIATIVE

Sometimes described as “going in where angels fear to tread”, this measure means to use judgement and advance where necessary. The leader is brave in psychological terms and takes the lead where necessary. It does not mean going forward rashly.

Nelson was a man who had the courage of his own convictions, who could often have left off and blamed superiors for failure. Instead, he was a man who chose to use initiative and advance when he knew the defeat of the enemy was attainable and essential. At the Battle of Copenhagen, walking the deck while the guns roared their broadsides, and deadly splinters whistled about his ears, he confided to Colonel Stewart, commander of infantry, who was with him on the quarterdeck, that he would not be «elsewhere for thousands». Whether he was fearful or not – and who would not have been – Nelson led by example. And when his uncertain superior, Admiral Parker, made the signal to leave off the action, Nelson refused to

see it, putting his telescope to his blind eye and exclaiming: «I really do not see the signal». The British won the battle with much help from Nelson's use of initiative.

IMPRESSIVE PHYSICAL QUALITIES

This might be rephrased as “looking the part of a leader”. Would anyone have said that Horatio Nelson achieved this? Yes – and no. A short, thin man not blessed with good looks, he first entered the British navy in 1771 as a midshipman at 12 years and three months.¹ Despite being prone to sickness: “I have had all the diseases that are”, he once said; he adapted well to the vigorous and often dangerous life that was the Navy.

Nelson was a man of raw physical courage who led by example. He lost an eye when an enemy shell, exploding during the siege of Calvi in Corsica, drove splinters and dust and rock fragments into his face. He suffered most terribly and often from wounds, quite willing to lead from the front. His right arm was amputated after the battle of Santa Cruz in Tenerife due to his being hit by grapeshot.

This is what is meant by “looking the part of a leader”: behaving in such a way that people can be inspired. It means to look resolute and act with resolution – as did Nelson. To lead by example. To not show physical cowardice. It might include «panache»; “the almost untranslatable expression of dash, of valour, the ability to do things with an air of reckless courage and inspiring leadership”.² Finally, we might add that the bearing, carriage and speech of a leader should be of the highest standards.



EMPATHY

The great soldier of the 18th century, Frederick the Great, had good advice on how to attain the next quality of the leader – Empathy:

*...talk with the soldiers, both when you pass their tents or when they are on the march. Sample often to see if the cookpots have something good; find out their small needs and do what you can to satisfy them; spare them unnecessary exertion. But let fall the full vigor of law on the mutinous soldier, the backbiter, the pillager...*³

Empathy means to be able to imagine yourself – as leader – in the role of your people, and to show that. It is “the power of understanding and imaginatively entering into another person’s feelings.”⁴ General Montgomery said to his troops at the Battle of Alamein: “We will stand and fight here. If we can’t stay here alive, then let us stay here dead.”⁵ Montgomery was entering into the feelings of all of his people, who feared that they would die. Churchill’s speech of WWII did the same: “We shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills: we shall never surrender.” Alexander the Great “shared in the men’s dangers, as the scars of his wounds testified...he ate the same food as they did. He was highly visible...he fought hard himself but he was ever on the watch for any acts of conspicuous courage in the face of danger amongst his men.”⁶

Such statements say to you that your leader will be with you, no matter what the cost.

COMMUNICATION

One needs to be understood at all times. Nelson employed in his leadership style something unusual for its day: the art of effective communication. One characteristic was to invite others to contribute their ideas for a campaign, or a battle, or a change of some sort; to educate his men and get them – and him – to know each others’ minds. Nelson embarked upon the Battle of the Nile in 1798 by letting his captains engage in individual fashion. The French fleet, anchored by the bows in a line in shallow coastal water, engaged in ship to ship fashion by five British vessels sailing inside the line and anchoring, and the rest engaging from outside. Thus the French were caught between two forces. At the end of hours of fighting, the French had lost 1,700 men to the British 200; their fleet was largely pounded to pieces, and Napoleon and his army were stranded in Egypt. Nelson had hoisted just two signals through the entire battle.⁷

For the autocratic manager this would have been disastrous: an authoritarian leader would not trust his subordinates to make momentous decisions and fight on their own. Nelson trusted his individual captains. So too, in the long pursuit of the French, years later in 1805, he had regular meetings with his «Band of Brothers» – the name applied to those who fought under him at the Nile.⁸ During the long chase the officers would pool their ideas for forthcoming battles; the best use of tactics; what a following ship would do when its fellow was sighted engaged and so on. Consequently even the necessity for signals within the ensuing battle was dispensed with; the captains knew each others’ minds.

Communication means to be able

to use words effectively to persuade others. Winston Churchill was a great exponent of this. Eisenhower, then a US General and later President of the United States, experienced the British Prime Minister in action:

Churchill was a persuader. Indeed, his skill in the use of words and logic was so great that on several occasions when he and I disagreed on some important matter – even when I was convinced of my own view and when the responsibility was clearly mine – I had a very hard time withstanding his arguments.⁹



A capable naval leader is an achiever; expert in his or her field; inspires others, and takes initiative; impresses by their physical qualities; empathises with others, and is an effective communicator. We have seen many great leaders who exhibited those traits. This series examines how many of Australia’s naval leaders performed in these fields.

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STUDIES IN TRAIT LEADERSHIP – FEARLESS LEADER

“FEARLESS FRANK”

– REAR ADMIRAL HAROLD BRUCE FARNCOMB, CB, DSO, MVO, RAN

BY LIEUTENANT COMMANDER TOM LEWIS

Rear Admiral Harold Bruce Farncomb was born in Sydney in 1899, and entered the RAN College in the first intake. After graduation as a midshipman he served in HMS Royal Sovereign from mid-1917 until the end of World War I. A variety of appointments both ashore and afloat followed. He was promoted commander in the early thirties – the first of his class to attain the rank – and this rise was reflected in his promotion to Captain in 1937 – again the first of his class. During WWII he was the Commanding Officer of HMAS Perth, then Commanding Officer of HMA Ships Canberra and Australia, and HMS Attacker. He was made Commodore Commanding Australian Squadron in December 1944, and Rear Admiral Commanding Australian Squadron from January 1947 to January 1949. Farncomb was the first graduate of the RAN College to be promoted to the rank of Admiral, and spent all of WWII at sea, where he was known as “Fearless Frank” to the men of the Navy. He briefly became Head of the Australian Joint Service Staff in USA, and retired from the Royal Australian Navy in 1951.

Harold Bruce Farncomb was born at Sydney, NSW, on 28 February 1899, the son of a British-born accountant – Frank Farncomb – and his wife Helen. Living in Gordon, near Sydney, Harold was the middle child of three; his sister was the eldest of the children, and he had a younger brother, Ronald. Harold attended Gordon State and Sydney High Schools¹, and in 1913 entered the RAN College in the first intake.

Farncomb performed well there, and distinguished himself on the cricket field as a bowler. The 1914 College magazine was of the opinion: ‘H.B.Farncomb has a very nice style and should develop in to a really good bat. Rather inclined to ‘slog’. A fair bowler, but poor in the field. Obtained cap.’ The magazine also depicts him in an amusing photograph in his role during a dramatic festival, complete with check trousers, top hat, a very large bow tie and a big false moustache. In that year he also managed – the College kept proud statistics – to increase his weight by 18 pounds and his chest measurement by three inches. He also performed with some distinction in the College Chess Tournament.

A physical description of Farncomb in later years gives us a picture of the man:

...of medium height, five foot ten inches to five foot eleven inches, and fairly solidly built. Not what you would call an athletic figure but trim as opposed to paunchy. He was always dressed well, both in uniform and civilian clothes. His voice was unique and unforgettable – rather high pitched with precise short clipped sentences spoken rapidly. When reprimanding one it was a looking down his nose at you sort of voice. Never loud but when he was angry with you – he was, often, with us midshipmen – he accentuated the abruptness raising his voice only slightly. He seldom swore, being too intelligent for that. Although a little quick tempered, he never lost control of it. He was assertive. He never hesitated in his decisions, not in acting on them with an air of authority which brooked no questioning. There was never any doubt as to who was in command.²

Farncomb left the College on 31 December 1916, and proceeded to London for sea time in *HMS Royal Sovereign*, in which ship he remained until the Armistice which ended the war was signed. Promoted to Sub-Lieutenant³ on 1 September 1918, he went to *HMS Excellent* on Whale



Farncomb (left) in later life on board a warship

Island for Gunnery Courses, and was promoted to Lieutenant on 1 October 1919.

Back in Australia, Farncomb was posted to the destroyer *Stalwart*, and then served on the staff of the Commodore Commanding the Australian Squadron. A report of 9 October 1922, while posted to *HMAS Melbourne*, noted his General Officer-Like Qualities were ‘Excellent’, and that he was a ‘very zealous and capable officer’.

After several appointments as a Staff officer in both the areas of Operations and Intelligence, Farncomb was promoted to Lieutenant Commander on 1 October 1927. In the same year he married Jean Nott, an Australian girl he had met on commercial passage to Britain.⁴ Posted as liaison officer



in the battleship *USS California*, he earned a 'Special Notation in Record' in 'appreciation of (his) efficient and intelligent efforts' from Admiral Robinson, USN.

He served in the battlecruiser *HMS Repulse*, necessitating travelling to Britain, which saw some financial hardship for the newly-wed couple. As AW Grazebrook has noted, the RAN's generosity did not extend to paying Mrs Farncomb's passage to Britain. Jean's parents assisted in finding and paying for accommodation for her while Farncomb was overseas.

In 1930 Farncomb attended the Imperial Defence College 12-month course, the second RAN officer ever to attend; the first Lieutenant Commander;⁵ and posted there as a junior officer by comparison with others attending. His report noted:

Has mental ability considerably above the average even of students here. Broad-minded, well read, shrewd and clear and incisive in debate. He has character and good judgement and his good work has been not only valuable to himself but to everyone else here. I regard Lieutenant Commander Farncomb, who is still young, as very promising and likely to develop into an extremely valuable officer who, as he gains experience, will be fit for the most important work on the staff.

The comments are highly significant, for Farncomb's course included Captain (later Admiral of the Fleet Sir) John Somerville; future Field Marshal Earl Alexander of Tunis, General Sir Philip Neame and Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton. For Farncomb to shine in such company is testimony indeed to his calibre.

Return to Australia followed, with Farncomb posted to Navy Office, where his 'social qualifications' were

noted as 'beyond criticism'. A report of May 1932 rated him as all 'nines' with two 'sevens' for 'Judgement' and 'Initiative': a high set of scores by comparison with the average. He was promoted to Commander on 30 June 1932, on his 'second chance' out of eight possibilities over four years within the zone of promotion. He was the first of his class to achieve this rank.

Now posted to *HMAS Australia* as the Commander for two years, Farncomb achieved a reputation within the ship as being an exceptional second in command. With the midshipmen carried on board the ship there was no slackening in discipline. One noted:

It turned out that my departure from *Australia* was just in time to avoid Commander Farncomb's periodical blitz on the Midshipmen. When I returned there a few days later to collect the last of my belongings the Mids told me that all of them had had their leave stopped for a week because the brasswork on their chests had not been polished to his satisfaction, nor did he consider their hammocks to be as clean and tidy as they should have been.⁶

Although Farncomb was a hard but fair taskmaster, he was also a kind man. A later RAN Captain, LM Hinchcliffe, DSC, recalled many years later that he had been the Commander's 'doggie' at the time – his personal messenger on a watch system, usually for a day. With *Australia* at Malta, Hinchcliffe had been asked by a British Admiral what he thought of the place, and had replied that he hadn't been ashore because he was 'not interested in the place.' Farncomb heard of this, summoned the midshipman, and told him he was going to 'write the history of Malta' for such a reply. Hinchcliffe confessed the real reason he hadn't been ashore – he was penniless. At this Farncomb

gave him ten shillings and told him to proceed to inspect the island.⁷

Another midshipman remembers Farncomb as a welcome change to his predecessor, who had been '...a typical R.N. martinet of the 'fire-eating' sort.' By contrast:

Harold was a welcome change. He was assiduous in his duties, but managed to combine this with a real understanding of his men. He was strict, but scrupulously honest and fair with his 'requestmen and defaulters.' He built into *Australia* a morale which was unequalled.⁸

Australia carried the Duke of Gloucester to Britain in 1935, with Farncomb receiving an MVO⁹ for his services during the passage. Farncomb was now posted to Britain into an Intelligence position. Already proficient in French, he applied to the Navy to study German but was initially turned down. However, Farncomb persisted, got his way, and was rewarded when he scored 95% in his examination. He was promoted to Captain on 30 June 1937, the first graduate of the RAN College to reach this rank.

His next appointment was to a seagoing billet: command of the sloop *HMAS Yarra*. This was small ship, but Farncomb had not had command experience at sea. According to his reports, he performed well, with a report in 1938 rating him as all 'sevens' with a solitary six for ship-handling.

Farncomb was posted on 29 June 1939 to take command of the newly-commissioned light cruiser *HMAS Perth* and bring her from Britain to Australia. A re-naming ceremony was held at Portsmouth – the ship was originally *HMS Amphion* – with the formalities being performed by HRH the Duchess of Kent, for whom Farncomb called for 'three cheers'.¹⁰ The ship sailed on 26 July for Kingston, and then arrived in New York, where



STUDIES IN TRAIT LEADERSHIP – FEARLESS LEADER

REAR ADMIRAL HAROLD BRUCE FARNCOMB, CB, DSO, MVO, RAN

she was received with gunfire salutes, to represent Australia at the World Fair, on 4 August.¹¹ Twelve days of American hospitality included reduced-price fairground rides for the ship's company on such attractions as the Bobsled, Drive-a-Drome and the Stratoship, with shows including Glass Blowers of the World, Nature's Mistakes and Seminole Village. The program for Farncomb and the other ship's officers was probably less fun, with many lists of official calls and functions contained within the 18 pages of the program.

Instances arose on board *Perth* in New York which tested Farncomb's leadership.¹² There have been suggestions of abnormally high numbers of desertions. Complaints were made by many about aspects of the ship's routine. These included Farncomb being autocratic; sailors having to stand to pay respects to officers, even if sleeping; arguments about white uniforms giving way to blue at 1800 – even for sailors already ashore on leave in uniform – and a final gathering of the aggrieved which was nearly a mutinous occasion. All of these stories however, are sourced in the book which gives them prominence – *Mutiny!* – from the diary of one man, who himself seems to admit being somewhat of a 'sea lawyer'.

One history of the ship, with several first-hand sources to draw on, puts an alternative view worth quoting in full, and suggests that a small matter arose which was quickly solved by diplomatic management:

..an unfortunate incident occurred. It was described by Yeoman of Signals R.G. Roberts: 'One of the several newspapers here caused a mild sensation when published that night. Poster headings: 'Aussie Mutiny, British officers too British'. It wasn't a very nice article to make screaming headlines, even if it

had been true in any way at all.... It was founded on a lot of lies and loose talk and we did our best to live it down. The bare facts of the 'mutiny' are described in a seaman's diary: '1200 Clear Lower Deck, everybody aft but majority of ship's company went and sat down on the forecastle. Complained about having to wear whites ashore. 12.25 Hands fell in on the Quarter Deck and matter settled.'¹³

Grazebrook also makes reference to these incidents, but notes they may well have been caused by *Perth's* Commander, WLG Adams, a Royal Navy officer who may have been too tough on the Australian sailors.¹⁴

Farncomb received news of the outbreak of war at 5.30 a.m. on 3 September, when *Perth* was off Willemstad Harbour in Curacao. His reaction was underplayed in the Farncomb style:

Captain Farncomb was ever a man of few words and this was all he had to say: 'We have just received a signal from Admiralty which reads: 'Total. Germany total. We are now at war with Germany. Three cheers for His Majesty the King!'¹⁵

On 6 September he assumed command of the Oil Fuel Protective Force and a small collection of ships including the French submarine *Surcouf*. In mid-October *Perth* rode out the 'first hurricane since 1926' – according to the local paper – which lashed Bermuda and surrounding waters. The ship's damage included smashed fittings and boats, and five depth charges washed overboard.¹⁶

For two to three days in mid-December, while patrolling the Yucatan Channel in the hope of intercepting the German *Columbus* if that ship broke from Vera Cruz, *Perth* was closely shadowed by US ships *Vincennes*,

Evans, and *Twiggs*. The US warships persistently asked for the *Perth's* identity by signal and received the equally persistent reply 'British warship' from Farncomb, who recorded his views as 'Queer ideas, of 'neutrality' these Americans have!'¹⁷

Christmas saw major celebrations on board *Perth*, and it is clear that the ship was indeed a happy one under Farncomb's leadership:

..*Perth* was in Kingston from the 23rd to the 26th. Christmas Day was heralded in very appropriately by 'Christians Awake' instead of the usual bugle call of 'Reveille'. A church service was held in the forenoon and from then onwards Christmas was celebrated with a real Christmas spirit. Christmas dinner consisted of soup, roast turkey, York ham with French beans, green peas, roast and boiled potatoes, Christmas pudding and brandy sauce, fresh fruit and nuts.... It was a very happy occasion and a very welcome break from patrolling. Some old *Perth* sailors swear that the man in cells was let out for the day on condition that he was back in for Commander's rounds at 9 p.m. and he was! Exchange visits were paid to the Canadian destroyer *Assiniboine* and there was a general go as you please... After a most hilarious Christmas, *Perth* left on the morning of the 28th....¹⁸



Farncomb as a Captain (Courtesy Seapower Centre Australia)



This is hardly the picture of a disillusioned ship's company who were on the point of mutiny. Rather, Farncomb was a firm, sometimes tough – although a somewhat detached – captain. As Bill Cook, one of his watchkeeping Lieutenants at the time, says: 'There never was any doubt who was in command' and that '...Farncomb was a strict disciplinarian, but fair'.¹⁹

The work in the East Indies was mainly concerned with blockading German ships in neutral ports. Farncomb acted as senior officer for a mixed group of Allied ships; the work unremarkable and often tedious. Nevertheless, under Farncomb's command, it was carried out expeditiously. On 29 February *Perth* departed from Kingston for Australia.

On arrival at home the ship's company paraded through the streets of *Sydney*, where Governor-General Lord Gowrie took the salute.²⁰ On 6 June 1940 Farncomb assumed command of the heavy cruiser *HMAS Canberra*. The duties in which the ship was employed were much the same as that *Perth* had been engaged in: patrol work off the West Australian coast.²¹

On 20 November, *Canberra* was in Fremantle, when a distress signal was received from the British steamer *Maimoa*.¹ She was under attack, 800 miles north of *Perth*, from the German raider *Pinguin*. The cruiser sailed to search for the raider, and another distress signal was received, this time from the *Port Brisbane*, approximately 500 miles south-east of *Canberra*. *Canberra* raced for the position at 26 knots.

Close to the position where *Port Brisbane* was sunk, *Canberra* sighted her three lifeboats under sail,

1 The *Maimoa* was caught and sunk by the *Pinguin* the next day, her captured crew eventually being interned in France. (Gill, 272-273)

containing 27 survivors. They were picked up and those men recovered told Farncomb that *Pinguin* had made off to the north west after torpedoing their ship. (Farncomb provided the Second Officer with some clothes, for which he was later thanked in writing.)²² The search was continued, but *Pinguin*, alerted by an irresponsible radio news broadcast from the Australian Broadcasting Commission, knew that the hunt was on and made good her escape.²³

Canberra's aircraft was deployed, and soon reported two ships, shortly amplifying this to an armed raider with a tanker in company carrying out refuelling. The cruiser's aircraft was sent to attack the second vessel, by now moving off southwards, while the other ship began to run north. Farncomb concentrated on the supposed-*Pinguin* – in fact another German vessel, the *Coburg*, who disregarded a warning salvo, and *Canberra* opened fire on her at a range of about 21,000 yards. Bearing in mind the armament of the supposed *Pinguin*, Farncomb manoeuvred to keep the range over 19,000 yards, which would suit his ship and disadvantage the raider.

Meanwhile, the *Canberra's* aircraft had caught up with the other vessel, a tanker captured by the Germans, the *Kitty Brovig*. By the time bombing commenced the supposed-*Pinguin* was taking hits, and soon the lookouts on *Canberra* reported both ships as taking scuttling action and being abandoned by their crews. Farncomb however, was 'suspicious of a 'booby trap' in the merchant ship in the shape of a couple of torpedoes' and held off the ship thought to be *Pinguin*, which was now on fire.

Canberra's aircraft landed near the *Kitty Brovig*, but despite the cruiser drawing near and attempts being made to save her, she was sinking fast, as was *Coburg*. Although the action

was a success Farncomb later received some criticism for it for his caution which necessitated the expenditure of too much ammunition – 215 rounds of 8". Of interest, as Wesley Olson has pointed out, was that some of the criticism came from Captain Burnett, who later that year lost *Sydney* in action against the Germans raider *Kormoran*²⁴ – by perhaps closing too far towards a shamming raider which was in fact ready for decisive and deadly action.

At the end of December 1941 Farncomb was posted in command of *HMAS Australia*, and Chief Staff Officer to the Rear Admiral Commanding Australian Squadron, or RACAS, as the position was known. Farncomb was to serve in this appointment until March 1944.

Farncomb's immediate concern was with morale on board. The ship had not been in action except against enemy aircraft since 1940, and she had been engaged in monotonous convoy work in tropical waters. With Singapore falling and Darwin under attack, the ship's company had good reason to feel left out of the action and frustrated.²⁵ One measure taken to raise morale was to take the opportunity to engage occasionally in rowing races against other ships.²⁶

In March 1942 a major concern to all on board the Flagship and Farncomb in particular was the (eventually notorious) court-martial of two of *Australia's* stokers at Noumea on 15-18 April 1942. The charge concerned the murder of one Stoker John Joseph Riley.

Flying the flag of RADM JG Crace, *Australia* had been supplying long-range air cover for US aircraft flying missions against Japanese ships at Salamaua and Lae. An incident took place at night while the ship was anchored in a darkened state. Three stokers were seen struggling together by witnesses, with one crying out for



STUDIES IN TRAIT LEADERSHIP – FEARLESS LEADER

REAR ADMIRAL HAROLD BRUCE FARNCOMB, CB, DSO, MVO, RAN

help. One seaman later died from knife wounds, and the other two involved were arrested.

A court-martial was soon convened and Farncomb, as was usual as the ship's captain, was appointed prosecutor, versus Lieutenant Trevor Rapke, a legal officer brought from Darwin. Farncomb performed the job well:

Captain Farncomb, who acted as prosecutor, would little have expected his efforts to be scrutinised minutely later by four Justices of the High Court, and then by another Judge conducting a secret inquiry into the conduct of the proceedings. Fortunately, for the Navy's reputation, he performed the task with fairness and dignity.²⁷

However, he was criticised for one action during the proceedings, as Chris Coulthard-Clark has pointed out.²⁸ Farncomb declared at one stage '...his own firm personal view that the men were guilty,' an opinion which, as prosecutor, was later used as ammunition by those who considered a miscarriage of justice had taken place. It is characteristic of Farncomb's occasionally brusque manner that he expressed himself in this way, but also a mark of the man that he went to some lengths to point out extenuating circumstances which needed to be taken into account in the matter. These concerned the living conditions in which all three men had been working: high temperatures, oppressive humidity, limited ventilation, long periods at sea away from anyone else but Navy members, and war itself.

The court-martial found the men guilty of murder, and much prevarication ensued as to their sentence: capital punishment was pronounced, and even practised for, according to one officer on board,

Dacre Smyth.²⁹ This was later reduced to a prison sentence, which itself was eventually commuted in 1946.² Farncomb moved on, with action looming in the Pacific. But he referred to the legal proceedings again in later years, and some insight into his character can be discerned from his comments:

Some years later, after Farncomb had been promoted to Rear Admiral and was in command of the Australian Fleet, a conversation took place on the quarterdeck of the Flagship, at which Trevor Rapke was holding forth on the inadequacies of naval court-martial procedure, compared with those in a civil court. Admiral Farncomb turned to him and said, 'The trouble with you, Rapke, is that you don't understand that in the Navy we administer justice, not the Law.'³⁰

Nevertheless, a firm friendship had been formed between the pair, and Rapke was post-trial asked by Farncomb to become his secretary, the offer being accepted.³¹ It is a telling point – Farncomb was a formidable opponent, but one of honour and integrity. The trial must have been a great test of the man's skills in many areas, but at the end the aim had been achieved – justice had been done, and *Australia* remained a capable fighting unit, testimony to her captain's many-faceted abilities.

In May 1942 Farncomb was in command of *Australia* during the Battle of the Coral Sea. This battle – unique in that it was the first time in history that the opposing ships (of the

Japanese and American-Australian fleets) did not sight each other – was one of the first checks of Japanese expansion throughout the Pacific. The ships were attacked by the aircraft of the opposing side's aircraft carriers. Rear Admiral Jack Crace, RN, who was in command of the Allied support group, was on board his flagship *Australia* as torpedoes from the incoming bombers streaked towards the ship:

The day was calm and sunny and the sea very blue so that the tracks were very easily seen. How those torpedoes were avoided beats me and I could have laid very long odds that two on the starboard side must hit. They can only have missed by a matter of feet. Farncomb handled the ship extremely well and it was entirely due to him and a great deal of luck that the *Australia* was not hit.³²

This, and other similar examples of inspired ship-handling in the same battle may indeed have given rise to Farncomb's nickname during the war, for he was '...known to the lower deck as Fearless Frank,' a label Neil McDonald (later Rear Admiral) confirms.³³ He saw Farncomb as a 'somewhat dour character who inspired others by his ability and knowledge.'³

The later Vice Admiral Sir Richard Peek, then a Lieutenant, recalls Farncomb 'accepted advice' when necessary, and remembers him as a 'splendid captain of *Australia*', in which

2 Goldrick points out that the two seamen convicted were released in September 1950, after much argument which reached senior government levels as to whether the two were in fact guilty. See Goldrick, JVP. 'The AUSTRALIA Court Martial of 1942.' Master of Letters Dissertation. University of New England, 1983.

3 McDonald, Neil, Rear Admiral, RAN (Rtd.) Letter to the author, November 2001. Another RAN member who served with Farncomb reports the nickname was acquired earlier, when *Perth* was escorting a convoy in 1940, and signalled to its Commodore that if an enemy approached he would close with main armament firing until in torpedo range, and if those were not sufficient, he would ram. (See Zammit, Alan. 'Rear Admiral Farncomb 1899-1971.' *Naval Historical Review*. Date unknown. RAN College Historical Collection file B.00018 (39))



ship he served.³⁴ Peek found him 'remote in a way, but with a firm grip on the affections of the sailors' and a 'distaste for bureaucracy'.

Australia moved on to further operations in the Pacific. It was a time of tremendous strain on all of the different ship companies within the Fleet. Japan might have been checked at the Battle of the Coral Sea, but these were still dark times. Farncomb noted in a Report of Proceedings:

The prolonged periods spent at action stations, day and night, with very little rest coupled with a mental strain, first, during the approach, when the reception we were likely to meet could not be gauged, and subsequently, during the periods of waiting for enemy air attacks and submarine and surface ship attacks, were calculated at times to produce a feeling of lassitude, both mental and physical. Of this I can give personal testimony.... I feel that in operations of this sort, some relief must be given from the continuous state of alertness required, either by providing extra complement to enable key officers and ratings to be in watches during periods of a high degree of readiness, or by relieving ships temporarily after a couple of days...the often-forgotten adage that 'Men fight, not ships,' should not, once more, be forgotten.³⁵

Early mid-July 1942 a fleet of 45 ships began assembling for the invasion of the Solomon Islands – the beginning of a fight back against the Japanese. Leaving Brisbane, Farncomb in *Australia* was soon joined by old classmates from Jervis Bay: Captain FE Getting – in command of the cruiser *Canberra* – and Captain Harry Showers, in command of the cruiser *Hobart*. They were under the command of Rear Admiral Victor



Crutchley, VC, DSC, RN, flying his flag in *Australia*, who also commanded five American cruisers. Other ships joined with the main assault force of 16,000 US Marines and the whole fleet was assembled in the vicinity of the Fiji islands. Three carrier groups joined to provide air cover and support. Divided into two squadrons – X and Y – the ships and men would attack the heavily-defended islands of Guadalcanal and Tulagi respectively in a surprise move that would be preceded by long distance bombing.³⁶

As 7 August began in the middle of the night the attack went in. The ships' companies were in the first degree of readiness, which meant the guns' crews slept on the decks beside their weapons. Eventually, at 0245 Farncomb ordered the bugle call to wake everyone. Cocoa was distributed, and 'Mae West' life jackets and steel helmets put on. CH Nichols, the signal boatswain, was amused to see those on the bridge conversing in whispers, even though the enemy was still 20 miles off.

Just after 0600 the assault commenced with 84 attacking aircraft from the carriers sweeping in over the invading force's ships. 18 Japanese seaplanes were destroyed on the water

in that first strike, and simultaneously it was joined by naval gunfire support from the incoming warships. *Australia* fired three salvos from her 8' guns as her initial bombardment. At 0653 the first landing boats were in the water, with the warships now forming a double arc of protection from both submarine and aircraft around them. The first wave of landing craft went in just after nine o'clock and the beachhead was established, although the islands would take many months to subdue.

It was shortly after this that *Australia* and Farncomb were involved in the Battle of Savo Island. On the morning of the 8th Allied shipping was attacked by 40 heavy bombers, with 23 torpedo-carrying aircraft being spotted first by the cruiser, and immediately met with concentrated 4' and 8' fire. The Japanese later admitted to losing 17 of their planes, although the Allies had one ship hit hard and another sunk. But that night, the six cruisers and 15 destroyers of Admiral Crutchley's force were struck by a strong Japanese force not sighted by two guarding radar-equipped destroyers. Steaming at 10-12 knots in patrolling formations, the ships

The Collins-class submarine HMAS Farncomb running on the surface-photo by Chris Sattler



STUDIES IN TRAIT LEADERSHIP – FEARLESS LEADER

REAR ADMIRAL HAROLD BRUCE FARNCOMB, CB, DSO, MVO, RAN

were in a modified degree of readiness, with half of the weary men resting. Although aircraft were heard overhead, they were thought friendly, but they were actually the scouts from Admiral Mikawa's Japanese forces.

At 0140, racing in at 30 knots, the incoming Japanese ships attacked. They had thirty-four 8" guns ready to fire, and 60 torpedo tubes, and the Allied ships were suddenly lit up with parachute flares. *Canberra* was quickly hit by at least 24 shells, which killed or wounded one in six of her complement. The cruiser *USS Astoria* was hit by heavy salvoes, and then *USS Quincy*, savaged by the enemy guns, was the first to sink, although she fought fiercely. Another cruiser, *Vincennes*, followed her, struck by many 8' and 5' shells and at least two torpedoes. Admiral Crutchley, on board *Australia* away from the group of ships under attack, was out of the action, and he later spoke of his regret at not having had the ship and her extremely experienced people involved, where he felt '...she would have given a good account of herself'.³⁷ It was a terrible defeat for the Allies: for the loss of 35 men killed and 51 wounded the Japanese had sunk four cruisers.

The Pacific war, in all its savage intensity, moved further to the north-west, taking Farncomb with it. He must have been sorely tested to maintain morale in the ship after Savo Island. On 3 November 1942 his skills were recognised when he was awarded a Mention in Despatches, with the citation reading: 'For bravery when *HMAS Australia* was attacked by Japanese aircraft.' By now *Australia* was deployed on various duties with the Allied forces as they moved north-west through the Pacific. These included escorting the aircraft carrier *USS Saratoga*. Escorting a carrier is a hard enough business in peacetime, with a myriad of duties to be carried

out by the ships of her group. In wartime, with the possibility of attack by submarine, aircraft and surface ship on this valuable capital ship, it would be doubly strenuous – and even more so for the commander of an important escort ship such as the *Australia*. As a measure of his success in these Pacific Operations, on 9 February 1943 Farncomb was awarded the Distinguished Service Order, with the citation reading: 'For skill, resolution and coolness during operations in the Solomon Islands.' In June 1943 Farncomb again presided over a court-martial: this time against several sailors who had refused orders in the corvette *HMAS Pirie*; several sailors were found guilty.³⁸

On 5 March 1944, after her initial operations in the Admiralties, Captain Dechaineux relinquished command of *Warramunga* and proceeded to *Sydney* to assume command of *Australia* from Captain Farncomb. At this time Farncomb was being considered for higher command with the end of Rear Admiral Crutchley's two-year appointment as RACAS and the next appointment of the Chief of Naval Staff. Movements such as these saw Farncomb singled out to succeed Collins in the Squadron and in the meantime obtain some 'battleship experience'.

In May Farncomb was appointed to command the aircraft carrier *HMS Attacker*, an 11,000 ton British (but US-built) three-year-old escort carrier with 20 aircraft embarked. Courses to learn further skills to operate such a ship were necessitated, and Farncomb travelled to Britain for this distinctive appointment, for it was the first command of an RN carrier by an Australian.

Beginning on 9 July 1944 Operation Dragoon commenced, a massive invasion of French towns and beyond following up the D-Day landings.

More than 800 ships took part from eight navies. Amongst the 300 ships of the Royal Navy were the nine escort carriers of Task Force 88, commanded by Rear Admiral Troubridge, with Farncomb the senior officer of the five captains of the group.³⁹ The LCDR (Air) of *Attacker*, AG Leatham, RN later wrote of Farncomb:

By any measure, Farncomb did very well in command...He took great trouble to know about Fleet Air Arm matters. He insisted on flying over the battlefield and seeing it at first hand. [*Attacker*] was a demanding posting, being his first to a carrier and being in command of an RN ship. He easily overcame these problems. As a ship handler he was first class – the ship was bulky and underpowered.⁴⁰

In September 1944 the carrier carried out operations against enemy forces in Greece and Rhodes. Her aircraft provided air cover, bombed enemy positions, and undertook reconnaissance. *Attacker* also refuelled nine ships with 1635 tons of fuel. Somehow during this month Farncomb found time to visit Jerusalem and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, duly receiving a certificate to attest to his pilgrimage.⁴¹ The following year saw testimony to his services in the invasion: he was awarded another Mention in Despatches, this time 'For distinguished service and gallantry during the invasion of the south of France.' On 14 August 1945 Farncomb was awarded a third MID, this time 'For distinguished service, efficiency and zeal while serving in *HMS Attacker* in the clearance of the Aegean Sea and the relief of Greece during period 1944/45.'

In October Farncomb operated as Senior Officer Northern Aegean, working with *Sirius*, *Teazer* and the Greek destroyer *Navarinon*. *Attacker's* aircraft bombed Kos and the area



around the Gulf of Salonika. She intercepted the German hospital ship *Gradisca* and the Swedish relief ship *Vasaholm* which was carrying German wounded. Later she provided air cover and ground support in the Piskopsi area.

Farncomb attracted a negative comment in one of his reports at this time. He was still in command of *Attacker* in the north Atlantic, when Rear Admiral Thomas H. Troubridge, RN wrote:

This officer suffers from one failing, namely a tendency to fortify himself with liquor prior to facing the ordeal of an important social occasion. I am informed that normally he does not over indulge and this is borne out by the efficient manner in which his ship and her aircraft are handled and commanded.

Interestingly, the report's numerical scores were all positive sixes and sevens.

With Commodore Collins seriously injured in a kamikaze attack on *HMAS Australia*, Farncomb was soon on his way back to Pacific waters. At Manus on 9 December 1944 he hoisted his pendant as Commodore Commanding the Australian Squadron and Commander Task Group 74.1.⁴² The American forces had triumphed at the Battle of Leyte Gulf in October, and now the invasion of Japan's empire was on in earnest. Flying his pendant in *Australia*, with *Shropshire*, *Arunta* and *Warramunga* in attendance, Farncomb led his ships on through the islands.

The Australian ships had been pushed hard, but were responding well. *Arunta* reported⁴³ one case of scurvy, but the Christmas dinner of 1944 was surprisingly good. Over the next month the ships participated in the American-led invasion of local areas. The invasion plan required the

US 6th Army to land on the beaches of Lingayen Gulf and then establish a beachhead on the plain of Luzon. The Japanese defenders fought well, with particularly effective kamikaze attacks. On 5 January, for example, 11 American and Australian ships were hit and damaged.⁴⁴ The period of 5-8 January was particularly traumatic for all aboard *Australia*, when she was struck four times by suicide aircraft in this short period. The final attack was ferocious enough that many were killed and *Australia* had to be withdrawn to the dockyards of home for repair. Farncomb was wounded in the leg: Grazebrook notes that it was said he refused to let himself be treated until others had been seen to, and as a result his wound became 'infected and tiresome'.⁴⁵ Upon *Australia's* departure Farncomb transferred his pendant temporarily to *Arunta*, and then on her return on 22 January to *Shropshire*.⁴⁶ He was kept busy with Australian ships scattered near and far, but commented on the ships' presence and actions at the end of the Lingayen operation:

I consider it an honour that H.M.A. Ships *Australia*, *Shropshire*, *Arunta* and *Warramunga* should have formed part of the vanguard...I saw *Gascoyne* and *Warrego* only occasionally as their duties were with the Minesweeping and Hydrographic Group, but was glad to see that they were also in the forefront.⁴⁷

On the down side, Farncomb was much concerned about the non-receipt of mail within the Australian ships. It was a sure way for morale to plummet, and he was active at this time in trying to get the situation remedied. On his return with *Arunta* before transfer to *Shropshire* he had gone to some effort to secure 42 bags of mail which he brought with him.⁴⁸ Over the next month Farncomb was



Farncomb, photographed as a Rear Admiral

in charge of *Shropshire* (then Flag) and the Australian and American ships *Portland*, *Minneapolis*, and the destroyers *Conway*, *Eaton*, *Braine*, *Frazier*, *Arunta* and *Warramunga*. They were assigned covering and defence force duties within the Lingayen area.

The Commander of Battleship Division Two, Vice Admiral JB Oldendorf, commented on his subordinate Farncomb's performance at this time:

He showed himself to be courageous capable and highly cooperative officer where ships [sic] could always be counted on to their full share of all assignments and to do them well. He imbued his command with confidence. I have been pleased with his performance and will be glad to have him with me again.

On 15 February, Rear Admiral Berkey, USN, called on the additional support of Commodore Farncomb and his task force for the assault on Corregidor within the Philippines. The main opposition within this area from the Japanese was in the form of mines and shore guns, which were putting up a spirited resistance. The warships' days were filled with naval gunfire support



STUDIES IN TRAIT LEADERSHIP – FEARLESS LEADER

REAR ADMIRAL HAROLD BRUCE FARNCOMB, CB, DSO, MVO, RAN

duties, while overhead US aircraft swept in to strafe and bomb the shore positions. These were followed by paratroop and amphibious assault landings.⁴⁹ The Japanese fought until the end of February, and lost around 4,500 men in Corregidor's defence.

On 7 March Farncomb struck his broad pendant from *Shropshire* and moved to *Hobart*.⁵⁰ On 1 May 1945 he was awarded the CB, 'for most distinguished service in the command of HMA ships *Australia*, *Shropshire*, *Arunta* and *Warramunga*, which took part in the assault landing in Lingayen Gulf, Luzon Island.'

On 18 June Farncomb was ashore on Labuan Island to confer with the General Officer Commanding the 9th Australian Division, General Wootten. The next day he transferred his pendant briefly to *Arunta* for some of the bombardment. 400 out of the 550 Japanese of the garrison there were killed.⁵¹ Farncomb and his ships then moved on to Wewak and Balikpapan for similar operations. By this time British ships had begun operating in the Pacific – the cruiser *HMS Newfoundland* was under his command – and with Germany falling the war was solely against the Japanese. On 22 July 1945 Collins relieved Farncomb, and he returned to Sydney by air.⁵²

From 1 October 1945 Farncomb was posted as Commodore Superintendent of Training at *HMAS Cerberus*, with duties including the post of Commanding Officer of the RAN College. It was his first shore appointment since joining *Yarra*, eight years before. Now located at *HMAS Cerberus*, as opposed to Jervis Bay from where Farncomb had graduated, the College's new location was not exactly cheery. *Cerberus* is located inside an inlet, rather muddy and without sea views, and Farncomb probably would have missed the beautiful bay he had

known as a boy. He served in the position until 7 November 1946.⁵³

He became CCAS – Commodore Commanding the Australian Squadron – from 9 November 1946. Late that month, on board *Shropshire* once more, and with *Arunta* as consort, he travelled to Yokohama as part of the occupying force. Diplomatic duties occupied much of Farncomb's time before the ships proceeded to Kobe, and the Kure for a program of exercises. In the new year Farncomb was able to visit Hiroshima, the site of one of the atom bomb attacks. Transferring his pendant to *Bataan* on 7 January he sailed for Hong Kong and Australia.⁵⁴

On 8 January 1947 Farncomb was made FOCAS: Flag Officer Commanding the Australian Squadron. On 19 March he was able to inspect divisions on *Shropshire* for the last time before she was placed in reserve.⁵⁵ Later that year, on 8 June, he was promoted to Rear Admiral, as was John Collins. Both men were promoted on the same day, but Farncomb, by being mentioned first on the signal due to his extra six months of seniority as a Captain, was therefore⁵⁶ the senior of the two, and therefore 'first to a flag', as AW Grazebrook later put it. For two years, he reformed the Australian fleet, and saw the introduction of airpower to the Royal Australian Navy in the shape of *HMAS Sydney*, a Majestic class carrier brought out from Britain. It was an exciting time for the Navy, and a difficult one too: the RAN was contracting, yet reforming to meet new demands: the needs of aviation; changes in technology and methods of handling personnel, and competing demands for budgets from the RAAF and the Army.

January 1948 saw a pleasant honour for Farncomb. With the visit of an American squadron to Australia for exercises, it was arranged for the

American Admiral Harold Martin to come aboard *HMAS Australia*, where he presented Farncomb with the US Navy Cross for his activities in 1945 during the invasion of the Philippines.⁵⁷

His next position was overseas, to Washington DC, America, as head of the Australian Defence Liaison Staff and Naval Attache.⁵⁸ This position took in liaison with American armed forces – in particular the USN. Naval attaches also advise ambassadorial staff on naval matters. Farncomb held the position for only 11 months, and returned to Australia prematurely: the reasons for this are not clear, but he took 'early retirement owing to his private affairs', as the official announcement put it on 23 February 1951.⁵⁹

In civilian life Farncomb studied for the Bar, and qualified as a barrister on 6 June 1958.⁶⁰ He practiced out of chambers in Phillip St, Sydney, until 1962, and in 1963 was admitted as a solicitor of the Supreme Court of NSW. He practiced successfully in this role until August 1969.⁶¹ He died on 12 February 1971, and was buried at sea from the aircraft carrier *HMAS Sydney*.⁶²

In the years following his death he has been hailed on a number of occasions as a leader of renown in the Navy. Admiral Sir Victor Alfred Trumper Smith noted in 1989 that while:

...his outstanding war service and other matters are well known, what may be lesser known were his high qualities of leadership including his great ability in decision making. What should never be forgotten was the respect and affection in which 'Uncle Hal' Farncomb was held by many in the R.A.N.⁶³

His early promotions to Commander, Captain, service as a Commodore, and as 'first to a Flag' mark him as achieving

the ultimate ambition of many naval officers. As a warship captain, Farncomb earned and deserved his nickname of 'Fearless Frank'. As a leader, he was more than capable, but perhaps on occasion too brusque. However, his subordinates knew they were capably led. By his abilities in his chosen field he would have served as an inspiration to many. Especially in his command of *Perth*, Farncomb showed his qualities of making difficult decisions on a number of occasions.

Farncomb cannot be seen as excelling in gaining empathy from his men, nor for excelling at communicating with them. Sometimes by his actions one might be excused for thinking that he had forgotten his own feelings and actions in the same position years before. Nevertheless, he was capable of reaching out and making a link whenever necessary: witness his gathering back to orderly folds *Perth's* people at the beginning of WWII. No-one was ever in doubt as to what was required if led by Farncomb. He always looked – and behaved – as a leader.

In summary; an extremely capable fighting commander, and more than worthy of the flag-rank distinction conferred on him. 🇺🇸



Lieutenant Commander Tom Lewis
PhD, OAM, RAN has served in a variety of PNF and reserve roles within the Navy. He led US forces on deployment in Baghdad in 2006.

(Endnotes)

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A Large Acquisition for the Navy


Largs Bay towers over a Type 42 destroyer as she sails from Portsmouth on 18 April to begin a refit.



On 6 April 2011 Defence Minister Stephen Smith and Minister for Defence Materiel Jason Clare jointly announced that Australia had been successful in its bid to acquire the Royal Fleet Auxiliary's amphibious ship Largs Bay. One of four members of the Bay Class, Largs Bay is designed to operate over the horizon using helicopters and landing craft through a floodable stern dock to get personnel and equipment ashore.

*L*args Bay commissioned in 2006 and played a significant part in the Royal Navy's contribution to Haiti relief operations in 2010. She has a displacement of 16,000 tons, a length of 176 metres, a beam of 26 metres and a Chinook capable flight deck. She is being acquired to ensure the RAN has the amphibious capability it needs for operations and humanitarian support in our region in the period leading up to the arrival of the even larger amphibious ships, *Canberra* and *Adelaide*. The following photos were taken soon after the announcement of *Largs Bay*'s acquisition, just before the ship underwent its final UK refit and prior to her maiden voyage to Australia.

(Thanks to Dr David Stevens for obtaining these photographs)



The bridge extends over the full width of the ship and has excellent visibility.



The vehicle deck is approx 1200 linear metres. The total cargo capacity is equivalent to the entire existing RAN amphibious fleet.



The dock can be flooded and vehicles loaded or unloaded into landing craft directly over the steel beach in the foreground.


A Large Acquisition for the Navy

RFA Largs Bay at Portsmouth. The Bay Class have the highest bridge in the UK fleet.



(Right) The Largs Bay's Sick Bay. Much of the existing equipment will be remaining on board.

(Bottom right) Accommodation for the Embarked Military Force. The ships can carry 356 troops, although this can be increased to 500 using undesignated space.



The passageways are well marked and are wide enough to allow two fully kitted up soldiers to pass unobstructed.





The galley of Largs Bay.



Main Dining Space. The ship normally carries a complement of 60 civilian personnel plus a similar number of Royal Navy and RN Marines depending on the task. At the time of going to press, the proposed RAN complement was unknown to Headmark.



The Largs Bay's gym. The Bay Class are particularly spacious and well fitted out.



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


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Book Reviews



EMPOWERING OUR MILITARY CONSCIENCE: TRANSFORMING JUST WAR THEORY AND MILITARY MORAL EDUCATION

R. Wertheimer (ed). Ashgate:
Farnham, Surrey and Burlington,
Vermont, 2010

ISBN: 978-0-7546-7992-9

Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander
Richard Adams, RAN

This volume presents a compelling and accessible exploration of just war theory. This doctrine argues that resort to armed force (*jus ad bellum*) is justified under only certain conditions, and that force in war (*jus in bello*) should be limited and controlled. Just war thinking, coalesced as a coherent doctrine in the Middle Ages, continues to reflect the early influence of St. Augustine (354–430) and St. Thomas Aquinas (1266–1273).

This book, being the published papers of a lecture series given by distinguished visiting academics to the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis, is a work of distinguished provenance. That these were all invited talks at the United States

Naval Academy makes publication particularly noteworthy. These papers are not merely philosophically compelling. As a record of deliberate effort by the Academy and the Navy to sharpen and strengthen the moral perspective and judgement of naval officers, these papers are historically significant.

The book is divided logically into three parts. The first three chapters, concern *jus ad bellum* - the adjectival justice of war. Discussion is focused on past events. Yet the depth of analysis ensures continued relevance. Concerning adverbial ideas of *jus in bello*, the narrative is directed toward ideas of legitimate military targets, the doctrine of double effect and the ideas of the limited combatant responsibility. The concluding chapters, speak to the moral singularity of the profession of arms and the ethical ideas which must be its foundation.

Each of the papers presented is significant and accessible. Of particular merit is a commentary by George Lucas on the idea of preventative war. Acknowledging the strain imposed upon the Westphalian paradigm by contemporary politics, this narrative is well directed and relevant. Equally impressive is investigation into the ideas of invincible ignorance and professional obligation. This paper interrogates long established presumptions that soldiers are *ipso facto* guilty of no wrong if, in an unjust war, they adhere strictly to the rules of armed conflict.

The cornerstone of the volume is the sustained scrutiny of just war theory by Michael Walzer. In this significant paper, Walzer explains how ideas of “just war” matured to enable Christian pacifist to fight in “just” causes for a better peace. Augustine argued such fighting should be with a downcast demeanour and without anger or lust. This reasoning underlines the theory

as a philosophical account which enables war to be justified, not glorified. People were not then, and are not now, expected to fight eagerly. Augustine also insisted upon conspicuous limitations, such as that men refuse to fight wars of conquest, and abstain from the rape and pillage which were traditional postscripts to conflict. This thinking continues to resonate.

Noting the Christian foundation of just war theory, Walzer observes that military force against unbelievers was never subject to serious questioning. This was the case from the eleventh century Crusades, to the religious wars of the sixteenth century Reformation. Set against this background, the argument of Francisco de Vittoria that the sole justification for waging war is when harm has been committed, can be recognised as innovative and momentous. More conspicuously, de Vittoria argued that difference of religion cannot be a justification for war.

Ironically, the reasoning of De Vittoria, a Dominican, underlines the worldly evolution of just war theory. Just war doctrine, proposed by theologians, has taken secular form to counter the extremes of militarism and pacificism. Accepting this logic, Walzer explains how politics and conflict have come to be informed by the just war language of peace and justice.

Walzer describes how, thanks to Grotius and Pufendorf, the doctrines of just war came to exert considerable effect upon theories of international law. Thus, and significantly, the idealism of just war doctrine mediates dominant realist political dicta that *inter arma silent leges* – in time of the war the law is silent. Walzer explores this philosophical standoff, observing how just war theory, though marginal to political enterprises, is used to pardon the excesses of states.

Political realism, explained

Book Reviews

decisively by University of Chicago institution Hans Morgenthau, exerts a prevailing hand upon the discourse of international relations. Much inhumanity is disguised and forgiven by hackneyed reference to “the national interest”. This is all about results through calculated application of force. But, explains Walzer, there are clear reasons of state for fighting justly.

Underlining this point, Walzer recalls George Bush Sr. “sounding like a just war theorist,” despite confusing the ideas of just war with those of the crusade. In the first Gulf War, President Bush made just war concepts of restraint demotic. Since that time, the idea that non-combatants should be shielded from the activities of armies has become colloquial. Targeting decisions no longer reflect the unrestrained realism which informed Korea or Vietnam.

We now emphasise the restraint with which battles are fought. We acknowledge the importance of proportionate targeting. Strategy now accounts for the philosophy of justice. Moral theory has been incorporated into war making as a real constraint on when and how wars are fought.

But this, the triumph of just war theory, entails inevitable antipathy. The first counter-argument is insubstantial. Walzer identifies it as the implausible rant of the post-modern left, which argues just war doctrine is not even hypocritical since hypocrisy implies standards. Leftist post-modernist reasoning holds that politicians and generals who use just war language are deluding themselves. Advanced technology may make strict proportionality possible, but this is irrelevant since no argument about justice, guilt or innocence is possible. The argument of the post-modernist left is resonant in the catchphrase that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”. But, argues Walzer,


this is unbelievable since it presupposes we can neither recognize nor condemn the murder of innocent people.

Just war doctrine faces a more serious challenge. Walzer identifies this as the pacifism which has emerged from the heart of just war argument. Announced by an emblematic slogan; “stop the bombing,” reasoning is simple and powerful – war kills innocent people. But, it is flawed and naive, since war is sometimes necessary. Walzer explains that whilst argument for peace sustains the principles of just of just war theory, it does not acknowledge the critical role of just war thinking which is *internal* to the practice of war, and which requires close attention to what soldiers do and what they try not to do.

Walzer’s paper interprets just war theory as the doctrine of those who have the realistic expectation that wars will be fought – and who have the resolve and high principle to fight wars responsibly, and with concern for the innocent who are inevitably caught in evens. Just wars are fought with a mind to a better peace, not merely as a political exercise.

This excellent paper is the cornerstone of a volume which explores and explains significant ideas of the just war tradition. The work is a meaningful and accessible addition to the professional library of those who have to understand the strategies, technologies and policies of a new age.

Old ideas do not fit emerging reality. The war against terrorism – to take the most present example - requires a kind of international cooperation that is radically undeveloped in terms of theory. Military practitioners who understand theoretical argument about just war will make better doctrine and better decisions. They will make better professionals. ✎



BLIGH, MASTER MARINER

by Rob Mundle, Hachette Australia, Sydney, 2010, 368 pp. Published December 2010

Reviewed by John Dunmore

William Bligh, often referred to as ‘Captain Bligh’, is one of the best-known figures in maritime history, largely through the three films which have dramatised the so-called ‘mutiny on the *Bounty*’

In fact his rank was lieutenant when he commanded the expedition to Tahiti. The purpose of this expedition was the gathering of breadfruit plants, which he was then to take to the West Indies in order to provide cheap food for the large population of slave workers on the sugar plantations.

The expedition was a total failure. The *Bounty* was forced to stay some five months in Tahiti as the breadfruit plants were not ready for transplanting. This delay was caused by the Admiralty which sent Bligh too late in the season. The crew enjoyed their time on the island, developing close links with the Tahitians, and not surprisingly hated the thought of having to sail away under the command of the stern and often ill-tempered William Bligh who was capable of denigrating his officers

publically.

When the target of Bligh's insults was the proud and sensitive Fletcher Christian it resulted in the famous mutiny, with Bligh being cast adrift in an open longboat with 18 of those who chose not to mutiny. Christian may have anticipated that Bligh would make a short voyage to the nearest inhabited islands and wait for eventual rescue. If so he underestimated Bligh, whose determination to return to London and explain the circumstances of the mutiny was the motivation which drove him to undertake the hazards of a journey out of the Pacific through the Torres Strait and back to civilization. The mutineers, led by Christian, sailed back to Tahiti, picked up their women and a small group of males then sailed on to the remote and wrongly charted Pitcairn Island where they burnt the *Bounty*. As for the breadfruit, which a later expedition commanded by Bligh successfully transported to the West Indies, it was found to be unpalatable by the West Indians and discarded.

What deserves great credit, and indeed our admiration, is Bligh's navigation of his frail longboat from the waters near Samoa all the way to Timor in the Dutch East Indies, with a meagre stock of food and almost no navigational instruments. It was a great navigational feat, and demonstrated Bligh at his best. He maintained discipline and acted with resolute fairness towards the men under his command who all accepted his authority and his plan to sail them beyond.

We are grateful to Rob Mundle for the detailed account he provides in this biography. A skilled yachtsman and a best-selling author of accounts of voyages and yacht races, he is well qualified to describe with precision what is undeniably William Bligh's greatest claim to fame.

However, it is difficult to accept

Mundle's claim that Bligh should be regarded as "a very modern hero". The picture he presents is of a difficult, at times arrogant, commander who lacked personal skills and lacked consistency in his behaviour towards his men. Though he made less use of the lash than many of his contemporaries, including Cook, it was his vituperative tongue-lashing which caused deep offence. This was particularly evident in his deteriorating relationship with his former protégé Fletcher Christian. The narrative that flows on through Bligh's long career is battered by narrations of disputes, threats and occasional court-martials with Bligh as the accused or as a witness. Clashes with a number of his men, sometimes with fellow officers, roll on through the years rather like heavy waves on a troubled ocean. He was praised and thanked by Nelson for his part in the Battle of Copenhagen. When Bligh served in the North Sea, he was inevitably affected by the Nore Mutiny; when he was sent to New South Wales he took on the corrupt officers of the NSW Regiment and was once again, deposed from his command.

The reader would appreciate it if the biography were set in a broader historical frame. Bligh lived in troubled times. After decades of philosophical arguments and social dissensions, the French Revolution had broken out, the autocratic Ancient Régime had been overthrown, Louis XVI had been executed, and a succession of new governments, democratic in theory but autocratic in practice, had been set up. All this had affected much of Europe, and influenced the thinking and activities of the middle and lower classes, including the sailors who had been so often ill-treated, poorly paid and in many cases press-ganged into the service. A "modern hero" would have been more attuned to these changes and had a better understanding

of what was facing him.


But the author lays no claim to being a historian. In a modest Author's Note, he stresses that he has simply written the biography of a sailor, a man whose navigational ability he rightly admires, and says, disarmingly, "I dips m'lid to Captain Bligh". That he is not a historian is shown by a number of errors or misspellings. We are told, for instance, that Tahiti was discovered by a certain 'Samuel Wallace'; that Captain Charles Clerke had been imprisoned in 'the fleet debtor's prison,' which suggests some naval institution rather than the famous Fleet Prison of Farrington Road in London, and that Quiros was faced with a mutiny and forced to sail home to Spain immediately after reaching Espiritu Santo, whereas his stay there lasted several weeks. Even in connection with naval matters, the reader can become confused, as in the case of the mention of Bligh's promotion to midshipman in February 1771, followed on the next page by the announcement of his formal promotion to midshipman in 1775.

Stylistically, the author has his peculiarities. Although *Bligh, Master Mariner* includes a substantial number of extracts from journals and correspondence, Mundle gives no references for any of them. There is no formal list of sources; no bibliography.

In spite of its weaknesses, this biography of William Bligh is a welcome addition to the growing corpus of works on the man and his travels. 🦋

(Reviews Ed: Professor John Dunmore's main field of history is the exploration of the Pacific, particularly by French navigators. He has done more than anyone to bring attention to the achievements of eighteenth and nineteenth century French explorers of the Pacific. His work is highly regarded by scholars as well as by the public.)

Short Cut Reviews *with Tom Lewis*



THE MAN WHO BROKE INTO AUSCHWITZ

By Denis Avey with Rob Broomby

Hodder and Stoughton, \$35

Denis Avey served with the British Army in North Africa in WWII. His exploits with Bren Gun Carriers and various operations fill the first half of this rather strange but compelling book. Avey was captured and detained in a German Prisoner of War camp, where he was made to perform manual labour on a daily basis: common practise for captured troops as opposed to officers.

One of Avey's camps was near the Auschwitz camp, which became notorious after the war for its elimination of Jews and other "non-desirables" despised by the Nazis. These camp inmates were literally worked to death, surviving if they did for a while on starvation rations. Avey – who admits he was of a strange temperament – became curious about his fellow workers, and bribed his way with one of them for a swap for a night. His intention seemed to be to bear witness against the prison's captors post-war, but this never eventuated after freedom at the end of hostilities, generally because his story was submerged in greater events, his own traumas, and of course, people wishing to put the grim events of those days behind them.

Avey has been presented recently with a special medal by the British then-Prime Minister Gordon Brown. His co-author, Rob Broomby, deserves congratulations for relating this fascinating story, as does Avey for finally telling it. Recommended. 🐼




THE GURKHAS

By Chris Bellamy

Hodder and Stoughton, \$35

The Gurkhas have recently been in the news in Britain because of an initial refusal by the British Government to let men of the regiment and their families settle in the country. This decision was eventually overturned, and so it should have been, if this history is anything to go by. For nearly 200 years this Nepal tribe have fought loyally for their original colonists. Not just with allegiance, but also with ferocious courage and admirable ability, all of which author Chris Bellamy charts in this weighty tome of over 400 pages.

I don't know how much of the Gurkhas' history has been charted, but this book may well be the definitive article. Substantial endnotes to each chapter; an excellent list of sources, and a lengthy index complement the book, as does two collections of photos. Highly recommended. 🐼




AREA 51

by Annie Jacobsen

Published by Orion. Paperback, \$35

Area 51 purports to be a history of the well-known test area, located in the USA deserts, for American military equipment. The trouble is that journalist/author Annie Jacobsen hasn't worked out whether the book is actually a history or just a collection of every weird tale to ever be even loosely associated with the area. There are some nice stories of various aircraft tests, but *Area 51* veers into having the serious military history reader throw it at the wall when it enters the kooky fields.

Fake moon landings even get a mention, and according to one interviewee "the moon sets are still there", (p.321), and this will get an intruder dead if attempting entry. Far cheaper, methinks, to just destroy the sets – think of the wages saved. And if it's true that scores of witnesses have given their story – and the place is still operational, super-secret, AND "the government" is super-powerful, then why aren't the witnesses locked up? Along with this author? Overall, an Area worth avoiding. 🐼



CROSSING THE WIRE

By David Coombes

*Big Sky Publications;
Hardback; \$34.99*

Crossing the Wire is an excellent achievement by Tasmanian author David Coombes. The work concentrates on one Brigade, the 4th Infantry, from its formation before Gallipoli through its experiences on the Western front in World War I. The writer has used diaries and letters heavily but selectively, and once he has established the scene, he takes us "behind the wire" to the experiences of those who were captured.

Crossing the Wire is unusual but fascinating. We don't see many books such as this: concentrating not on the second World War, but the first; and concentrating on those who spent time in captivity in Europe, rather than in the Japanese POW camps which have established themselves in an important way into the Australian psyche.

Well illustrated with around 50 photographs, and several maps, *Crossing the Wire* is handsome hardback publication which deserves space on your military bookshelf. 🚩

Book Reviews *continued...*



CHINA, THE UNITED STATES AND 21ST CENTURY SEA POWER: DEFINING A MARITIME SECURITY PARTNERSHIP

*Edited by Andrew S. Erickson,
Lyle J. Goldstein and Nan Li,*

*Naval Institute Press,
Annapolis MD, 2010*

*Reviewed by Dr Gregory P. Gilbert -
Air Power Development Centre*

Each year there is one book that stands out from the pack. *China, the United States and 21st Century Sea Power* is a book that needs to be read by every member of the Australian Naval Institute, not only because it provides a blue-print for naval policy in the Asia-Pacific Century but also because it is one of the few authoritative works that discusses a cooperative alternative to the sensationalist threat driven responses to the rise of China.

The collection of papers contained within *China, the United States and 21st Century Sea Power* are derived from the US Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute's third annual conference, 'Defining a Maritime Partnership with China', held in Newport, Rhode Island on 5-6 December 2007. Most of the papers were updated after the conference and a few additional chapters were added

to round out the book. The result is a remarkably insightful work that should set the conceptual agenda for maritime engagement between China and the United States (US) for years to come.

The book, although well written, is a little complex and somewhat dry in parts. This style is not accidental, it is the result of carefully selected sentences and words. Each chapter is prepared by a subject matter expert writing authoritatively, thoroughly and precisely, even though the language itself often has subtle differences in meaning between the equivalent English and Chinese translations. The editors have allowed each chapter to speak for itself, retaining cultural nuances which add considerably to the overall work. The result is a volume that discusses the advantages and limitations of US-China maritime cooperation, which should help policymakers of both nations to chart a course for 'peaceful development' for this century.

Overall, the book makes clear that the US and China now have a great opportunity to increase naval cooperation, particularly with maritime security and humanitarian assistance. The release of *A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century Seapower*, by the US sea services in 2007, has been received positively as a step towards future cooperation, even though that cooperation may be bilateral when dealing with China. A Global Maritime Partnership (GMP) which includes

Book Reviews

China is still some way off - as is evident from the Chinese decisions to opt out of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and not to join CTF 150 when conducting anti-piracy patrols off the Somali coast.

Although it is not possible to discuss every chapter of the book in this review, a few highlights will illustrate the scope of *China, the United States and 21st Century Sea Power*. The first chapter by Zhuang Jianzhong effectively sets the scene. He is convinced that US-China cooperation in maritime issues should be in line with China's overall 'peaceful development strategy', as both nations aim to 'build harmonious oceans and a harmonious world'. Yu Wanli, after summarising the evolution of Chinese naval strategy, states that 'few scholars publicly declare that the development of the Chinese navy aims to challenge US supremacy at sea.' He discusses China's 2004 national defence white paper and its concept of 'safeguarding national development interests', and recognises 'that China's "peaceful development" is realized by participating in the existing international system and economic globalization.' Such statements are reassuring, but as other chapters point out, the Chinese language of hedging is not always reflected by actions. Transparency and reciprocity issues are raised a number of times in the book, but even here Eric McVadon points out that much of the US concern may be due more to their not liking what they see from China than to a lack of transparency. It may also be appropriate to reflect upon how hedging language in Australia's recent Defence White Paper is interpreted overseas, particularly in China.

Chapters dealing with maritime commercial partnerships, search and rescue cooperation as well as humanitarian and disaster relief operations, highlight just how

far US-China maritime security cooperation has come in recent years. In an especially informative chapter, Andrew Erickson examines views on America's new maritime strategy as published in China. After describing areas of growing cooperation, he lists some of the obstacles to enhanced cooperation between China and the US; the Taiwan situation, the US use of military power projection, non-transparency, and recent incidents/crises. 'Despite the long-term strategic importance of cooperation, perceptions and misconceptions will continue to wield great influence over its success.' That said, Erickson also believes that China's rhetoric is hedging, while actual maritime cooperation proceeds quietly. Again the reader is left feeling cautiously positive about the future.

Some of the major differences between China and the US involve maritime legal issues, especially over the interpretation of maritime zones under the Law of the Sea Convention. The chapters by Julia Xue and Peter Dutton analyse areas of common ground as well as the major differences. The large number of disputed maritime claims, made by China, remain potential sources for international conflict, although the Chinese policy of shelving such disputes is a pragmatic, albeit short-term, solution. The chapters by Wu Shicun and Zhu Huayou describe the opportunities for regional security cooperation in the South China Sea, an area which is of great strategic importance to most Asian nations, but particularly to ASEAN and Australia. James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara also provide a good synopsis of the strategic relationship between the US, China and India in the Indian Ocean.

Some defence analysts continue to see the rise of China in this century, as a modern version of the Anglo-German rivalry of the early 20th Century.

Germany's economic prosperity helped to fund an expanded Imperial German Navy with a global outlook. The British, as the only global sea power, felt threatened by Germany and became involved in a naval arms race that many historians believe was one of the causes of World War I. One would hope that today we would not wish to repeat such a nightmare scenario in the Pacific. It is a little surprising that the other example of naval rivalry during the early 20th Century is often overlooked. From the late 1890s, a rising United States competed with the British Empire for global markets. The US Navy grew rapidly in size and ability, in cooperation with the Royal Navy during 1917-18, and eventually the US replaced Britain as the maritime hegemon. Using Gabriel Collins's step-wise diagram of maritime security cooperation (p. 33), which ranges from ceremonial visits to full interoperability, we note that the Royal Navy was at the bottom step even though it conducted ceremonial visits with the Imperial German Navy right up to the start of World War I. By the end of that war the US Navy battlefleet was operating as a fully interoperable component of the British Grand Fleet, and thus the US Navy/Royal Navy engagement was at the top step of Collins's diagram. Today these likely alternatives are at the extreme ends of the spectrum when considering the future relationship between the US Navy and the PLA Navy, but they are certainly worth considering.

China, the United States and 21st Century Sea Power is a positive, balanced, thought provoking, and timely study which will no doubt impact upon the relationship between China and the United States over the next twenty years. One thing is certain, that relationship will also directly affect Australia and Australians. This book is highly recommended. 🚢

Visions from the Vault

HMAS VOYAGER BOARDING PARTY

29 JUNE 1961



From 1955 the RAN began regular deployments in support of the defence of Malaya and Singapore under the banner of the Far East Strategic Reserve. Regular exercises were held not only with Commonwealth partners, but increasingly with the members of the South East Asian

Treaty Organisation. This photo was taken on 29 June 1961. Under the headline 'Sailors in Battle Dress', the original caption reads: *'Australian sailors aboard the destroyer, HMAS Voyager, prepare for action ashore during international exercises in South East Asia.* The landing party comprises

left to right, Brian Jackson of Brisbane; Douglas Bain, West Footscray, Victoria; Reginald Stevenson, Petersham, Sydney; Ronald Williams, Yagoona; Edward Martschenko, Homebush; and Walter Priddle, Bell Park, Geelong.' 🚢

ANI ON-LINE: A GUIDE TO THE NEW WEBSITE.

Our new website is now on-line! In addition to the features available on the previous site, the new site also features a library of past journals, a discussion forum, a news section and member list. This short guide is designed to help you take full advantage of the new features.




Figure 1

OBTAINING AN ACCOUNT

In order to access the new features of the site you must have a user account for the website. If you have a current subscription to the ANI, navigate to the website www.navalinstitute.com.au using your web browser (figure 1), click the "Members Login" menu item (figure 2), then click the link to download an application form. Fill in the form, then fax or post it to the ANI Business Manager. Once your account has been created, you will receive an email that outlines your member ID and password.



Figure 2



Figure 3

LOGGING IN TO YOUR ACCOUNT

Once you have your account details, you are ready to login and access the new features of the site. In order to login, navigate to the website (figure 1) and click the "Members Login" item (figure 2). Enter your member ID and password as they were provided to you, then click the "Login" button. The case of the member ID and password are important: i.e. "CaSe" and "case" are considered entirely different words by the authentication system. Each letter of the password will appear as a single "*" to prevent others from seeing your password as you type. If you have entered your details correctly, you will be presented with the news page. The grey status bar at the top notifies you of the account you are using (figure 4). You are now able to access all of the new features of the site.




Figure 4

LOGGING OUT OF YOUR ACCOUNT

In order to protect your identity and to prevent malicious use of your account by others, you must log out of the site when you are finished browsing. This is especially important on public computers. In order to log out, click the "Logout" link in the grey status bar (figure 4).




Figure 5



Figure 6

CHANGING YOUR DETAILS

When your account is created, only your member ID and password are stored in the system for privacy reasons. However, you may provide other details that are visible to other ANI members. In order to change your details, login and click the "Change Your Details" menu item (figure 5). Then select the "change" link (figure 6) next to either your personal details or password. Change the text appropriately and click the "save" button (figure 7).

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


Figure 7




Figure 8

PARTICIPATING IN THE FORUM

In order to post topics and replies in the discussion forum, first login and click the "Forum" menu item (figure 8). Then select a forum that you would like to view by clicking its "View Topics" button (figure 9). Select a topic that you would like to read by clicking its "View this topic" link (figure 10). If you are not interested in any particular topic, you may add your own by clicking the "Add New Topic" button (figure 10). Similarly, once you are viewing a topic, you may post a reply by clicking "Add New Post". Fill in the heading and body of your reply and click the "Submit" button to add your reply to the topic. If you change your mind while writing your reply, you may click the "Cancel" button and your reply will not be added to the topic.



Figure 9




Figure 10

FURTHER QUESTIONS

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