A Common Platform for a New AO, AOR & Sealift Support Ship

Submarine Command Course – SANITISING THE NEAR FIELD, LOOKING INTO THE DEEP FIELD

Beyond the Principal Warfare Officer

The Indian Ocean through the Ages

Gulf Deployment – THROUGH AN ARTIST’S EYES

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### Letters to the Editor

Dear Editor,

I enjoyed the article in Issue 138 December 2010 by Midshipman Claire Hodge on RAN Helicopter Flight Vietnam but must correct her Note 2, where she states that SEA DRAGON was the RAN’s principal commitment during the Vietnam War, and the ships involved were HMA Ships Hobart, Vendetta and Brisbane. SEA DRAGON was the interdiction of supply routes and logistic craft along the coast of North Vietnam from the DMZ to the Red River Delta (near Hanoi). On those operations ships came under fire from shore batteries and there was the threat of North Vietnamese air and torpedo-boat attack – they were suspended on 1 November 1968, during Perth’s second deployment. Hobart and Perth were the only RAN ships involved. After November 1968 the latter deployments of those two ships, plus Brisbane and Vendetta, all involved Naval Gunfire Support or other activities off the coast of South Vietnam.

Yours sincerely,
Ian Knox AC, VADM (RAN Ret)

As a member of the Naval Historical Advisory Committee responsible for overseeing the selection process for the names of future RAN ships I was very interested to read the article written by LCDR Paul Garai, RAN, which appears in Headmark Issue 138, concerning giving more meaningful names to the two new LHD’s.

When viewing the article I was surprised to read that the RAN had previously named a destroyer Gallipoli. This is a misleading comment. No RAN destroyer, or any other commissioned RAN warship, has ever carried the name Gallipoli, although three RAN ships have been named Anzac giving much broader recognition to the deeds of the Australian and New Zealand soldiers who fought at Gallipoli, and elsewhere, during World War I.

The names Canberra and Adelaide were selected for the two LHDs by the then-incumbent Chief of Navy in 2005 following a lengthy and consultative process. Both names were considered highly suitable and subsequently approved by the Governor General and announced by the then Minister for Defence on 20 January 2006. It is most unlikely that any consideration will be given to changing them now.

John Perryman, CSM
Senior Naval Historical Officer
Sea Power Centre - Australia

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Front page photograph: Hundreds of family and friends welcomed the 230 crew of HMAS Melbourne home to Sydney after a six month deployment in the Middle East. (ABIS Sarah Williams, Navy Imagery Unit - East).

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The Royal Australian Navy has a long history of operational success that is based upon the professionalism of our people and the capabilities of our equipment. This success has been, for the most part, as a result of the capacity of the RAN to deploy into distant theatres and support our forces while they are there. As we look into the future, this need to be deployable is not going to change. However, the costs, both in financial terms and in human resources, are going to become increasingly more difficult to support. One way to reduce rising costs might be to adopt a policy of commonality wherever possible. Recent discussions concerning this approach have focussed on the proposed Offshore Combatant Vessels.

It is suggested that a similar approach to commonality could be adopted for the RAN’s fleet of amphibious and logistic support ships. Specifically, it is suggested that the adoption of a hull form; engineering configuration; and command, control & communications (C3) system for the new AO, AOR and Sealift Support Ship common to those of the Canberra Class LPD would offer substantial advantages over a fleet comprising three or four completely different ship types.

It is not suggested that we should acquire five LPDs, but rather that all five ships, that are likely to comprise the RAN’s amphibious and afloat support fleet, be designed and built upon a common hull and engineering layout. This is not to say that all five hulls would (or should) be identical. Superstructure and internal configuration are bound to change to meet the operational requirements of each ship’s specific role, but the capacity and capability that the basic hull provides will meet the RAN’s requirements for all five ships.

**Recent RAN History**

Across the span of the RAN’s history we have been required to deploy ships far from our shores. To do this we have needed ships specifically designed to support those deployments. Without exception, these essential ships have been more different than they have been alike. One only has to look at the current disparate group of ships providing the critical, often high-profile, support to operations both at sea and ashore to recognise the challenges to training and crewing that they represent.

The most obvious example of these challenges is provided by HMAS Success where, as a result of her completely unique engineering plant and the commensurately unique training and experience required to operate that plant, it is possible (and more efficient for the organisation) for an engineer to progress through an entire technical career and never go to sea in any other ship.

The problems with this are obvious: the sailor in question develops professionally without the benefit of experiencing different systems and different ways of life; problem solving approaches become entrenched; and personnel management skills focus on “the way it has always been done here.” On the corporate side of the question, the sailor can only be effectively employed in one platform without substantial additional training and experience; drastically limiting posting options.

**The Opportunity**

Recently, the decision was taken to acquire the two ships of the Canberra Class. These are state-of-the-art ships...
with modern propulsion plants and C3 suites that offer great potential to be upgraded as required to meet changing fleet requirements, while retaining an essential fleet-wide commonality. The size and layout of these ships, taken in concert with the fundamental flexibility offered by their modern systems, provides the RAN with an opportunity to adopt, over the course of the normal platform acquisition cycle, a common hull, engineering configuration and C3 suite across the entire amphibious and afloat support fleet. If this opportunity were to be sacrificed on the altar of short-term reductions, the enduring detriment to the whole Navy would affect us for an entire generation as we continued to struggle with the financial and personnel costs of supporting an unnecessarily diverse fleet.

Advantages

The benefits of having a single hull and engineering configuration common to all five ships would be enormous and encompass four essential elements:

- training of marine engineers, electrical engineers and operations specialists;
- postings and career progression;
- maintenance and support; and
- whole-ship DC training.

An excellent example of using this design philosophy to great advantage is provided by the US Navy through the decision to build Ticonderoga Class cruisers on the basic hull and engineering layout of the Spruance Class destroyer.

**Training of marine engineers, electrical engineers and operations specialists**

The fundamentals of any trade can be, and are, taught as part of the normal training and education of sailors at shore establishments across Australia. However, the specifics of operating and maintaining the systems peculiar to a particular ship must be done either in a dedicated simulator or onboard the platform itself. Within the amphibious and afloat support elements of today’s RAN either approach is difficult and expensive to achieve simply because there are, with some exceptions, four discrete ship-sets of equipment fitted in five different platforms. For example, there is very little in common between the training of an engineering watch keeper for HMAS Success when compared to HMAS Sirius.

Additionally, while simulators are recognised as a cost effective method of providing training, the RAN would need four separate ship simulators just to train the personnel posted to the five ships under discussion. Juxtapose this with the situation we have the opportunity to realise where all five ships’ companies could be trained on one set of simulators. Suddenly, there are real financial benefits to be had.

Similarly, training provided onboard to the vast majority of sailors in the marine engineering, electrical engineering and operations branches would be equally applicable to any one of the other four common platforms in the fleet.

**Postings and career progression**

Beyond the obvious financial benefits of all of this common training, emerging both from simple economies...
of scale and from the commonality discussed above, there are also massive improvements that emerge in the realm of human resource management. Posting options for career management agencies increase by a factor of at least five, more if one allows for the permanent manning of a simulator facility, as the fleet of common platform grows to its full potential. Equally, career options for individual sailors increase by the same factor. Additionally, divisional staff would have options for dealing with a broad range of personal issues for which there are, today, no viable choices available that allow sailors to continue to progress professionally.

**Maintenance and support**

Economies of scale will offer a significant reduction in the costs to maintain and support all of the systems in a group of five similar ships versus four ship types that are completely different. The reductions in the number of individual line items within the stores system, across the entire spectrum from circuit cards to oil filters, will help to simplify RAN logistics. The number of maintenance manuals required would be on the order of a quarter of that needed today. Furthermore, as one considers the life cycle maintenance and support costs associated with a homogenous fleet of five 25,000 ton ships, the overall financial savings are likely to be tremendous.

**Whole-ship DC Training**

This particular element of training has been separated out from that discussed above because it speaks not to economics but to combat survivability. Inevitably, when a ship goes through a posting cycle, there is a period of reduced effectiveness as the new crew members get to know their ship. With common systems and ship layout, to go with the common procedures that we already teach, new crew members will be much more combat ready much more quickly, meaning work-ups should be able to progress more quickly and less expensively.

More importantly, however, when (if) these ships ever do find themselves in action, crews trained and experienced in successive postings to common platforms would be far better positioned to deal with the unexpected results of combat damage and the stresses of battle in a more familiar environment.

**Disadvantages**

It is acknowledged that the process of directing the hull form, engineering configuration and C3 could dictate the selection of the current shipbuilder in contravention of aspects of the competitive shipbuilder selection of the current shipbuilder Acquisitions, along lines similar to the process employed when Australia built the ANZAC class to a MEKO design. It should also be acknowledged that acquisition only represents a fraction of the overall lifetime costs of a warship and that the savings discussed above will, in the long run, outweigh any short-term increases.

In conclusion, the RAN is at a crossroads. If we carry on acquiring ships as we have done in the past, we will continue to have to deal with the issue of “orphan” ships and all of the training, logistic and human resource management baggage that comes along with it. Alternatively, if we take the long view, and deliberately embark upon a programme to acquire an amphibious and afloat support fleet based upon a common platform, we will over the course of the next ten to fifteen years gradually arrive at an end-state where common training, experience, maintenance and support will realise substantial cost savings along with an overall increase in operational effectiveness. The choice would, on the face of it, appear to be an easy one to make. 

Commander Gavin Baker, CD, RAN, served for 22 years in the Canadian Armed Forces before joining the RAN. Seagoing service included Operations Officer in HMCS Kootenay; Weapons Officer for Destroyer Squadron Two, and as Operations Officer in HMAS Canberra. He commanded HMNS Gawler from 2004 to 2006.

Shore postings have included the Directorate of Naval Officers Postings, and as Operations Officer for Border Protection Command, and as a Watch Commander in the Joint Control Centre. At the time of writing he was Commanding Officer of HMAS Penguin.

(Endnotes)
1 RAN Doctrine 1, pp. 48, 142, 165
2 Semaphore Issue 04, May 2010
Submarine Command Course – Sanitising the near field, Looking into the deep field

BY ‘MOPS’

The Submarine Command Course (SMCC), colloquially known as ‘Perisher’, is suffering a crisis of confidence in the senior echelons of Navy. Mixed success in the last few years has placed extreme pressure on the Australian Submarine Force. The idea to repatriate the course, which is currently conducted by the Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN), back to Australia is once again coming into consideration, and the idea of having officers attend the course prior to being posted as Executive Officer of an Australian submarine is also going around the buoy.

After the 2009 White Paper, we know that in the near future that we will have double the number of submarines to find Commanding Officers for, so it is timely to ask – “Where next for our prospective Perishers?”

The first Australian students attended the Royal Netherlands Navy Submarine Command Course in 1995, in response to the Royal Navy decommissioning all their diesel-electric submarines and running an entirely-nuclear submarine force. Prior to 1995, Australia had sent its prospective submarine captains to the United Kingdom for assessment on the world-renowned Commanding Officer’s Qualifying Course (COQC).

In its current form, Perisher lasts for approximately five months, and includes a dedicated week of at-sea periscope safety, and four weeks at sea conducting a tactical phase in the Clyde estuary, Irish Sea and Inner Hebrides that is part of a much larger NATO exercise known as Joint Warrior. There are also several weeks of intense simulator training, visits to relevant operational sites and modules as diverse as Bridge Resource Management.

The course is conducted entirely in English, as a common language amongst the international participants. Along with Dutch and Australian students, the RNLN SMCC has students from South Korea, Brazil, Israel, Denmark, the United States, Canada and South Africa amongst others. The ‘Teacher’ – a Dutch Commander – pushes the students both at sea and ashore as far as it takes to recognise their own limitations. That is the core aim of the course. Whilst it is imperative that all graduates are able to safely operate independently or in company, and a student will be immediately removed if found to be unsafe, the crux of Perisher is for a submarine captain to recognise their own personal limitations in terms of fighting the submarine, and to be able to define ‘clearing bearings’ for their team that stop short of the CO’s personal ‘limiting danger line’.

During the course the students...
operate a Dutch submarine closer to the edge than they have ever done before or are ever likely to do again short of war. In many scenarios the Perisher student has only five metres of water under the submarine as a frigate passes five metres overhead. They conduct precise deep navigation using an echo sounder and stopwatch through shallow and busy shipping routes with up to seven knots of tidal stream, and deploy and recover special forces in high-threat areas. All the while, Teacher increases the workload on each student, so that the students bond as a team as well as developing as individuals.

The students all attend the course knowing that should they commit a cardinal error that jeopardises the safety of the submarine then they will (rightly) be removed immediately – sometimes by helicopter within the hour. It is a harsh learning environment, often reinforced by the helicopter strop that is strategically placed at the back of the Dutch submarine Control Room. But this external pressure is nothing compared to the internal pressure that our officers place themselves under, and coping with pressure is a part of the assessment. This is what they have built themselves up to over 10 years.

Despite the unforgiving nature of Perisher, Australia has had a very good success rate on the Dutch course. Between 1995 and 2010, 30 officers have attended with 23 (77%) succeeding – an average well above even the Dutch. So what is the problem? Unfortunately, of the seven officers who did not pass, four of those attended the course in the last five years. In the same period five officers (56%) did succeed in completing the course (just under the Dutch average). With submariner retention rates over those years resulting in only three hulls currently being manned, one would not think this would be too much of an issue, but as of writing two of our three running submarines are commanded by officers on their second command.

So why are our officers not passing at the historic rate? There are a number of possibilities. Only four of the 30 officers who have attended Perisher since 1995 were Collins-only qualified. The remainder were cross-trained on both Oberon and Collins-class submarines. Of those four who were Collins-only, only two have passed SMCC. This may be in part due to the move of the Submarine Force from Sydney to Western Australia. When the Submarine Force was based in Sydney, submarines could be dived less than 90 minutes after leaving the wharf at Neutral Bay. Surface ships were in abundance at Fleet Base East, and weekly running consisting of multi-ship CASEXs and Inshore Operations were the norm. Submarine watchkeeping officers were very familiar and comfortable with warships being in close company whilst dived.

Once the Submarine Force moved to Fleet Base West, there were fewer ships available (ASWEX 10 is a good example of this) and the transit time from the wharf to the diving position is over four hours. This is a decrease in dived time over a five-day working week of twenty percent. Inshore operations are limited in scope due to the geographic extent of the shallow continental shelf. The decrease in the quality of the dived hours in not measurable, but it is clear by the ongoing paucity of available assets in the West that the days of multi-ship CASEXs occurring on a daily basis are well and truly over. This availability goes two ways – submarines have always been fickle beasts in terms of serviceability, but the Oberon-class submarine was essentially farm machinery, with simple, farm machinery fixes. Collins-class defects obviously range in difficulty, but have been known recently to have taken submarines out of operation for six months or more. The combination of the change in submarine home-port as well as the decreased availability of the Collins-class (through both personnel and materiel causes) over the years has meant a substantial reduction in actual dived time as well as the quality of that time over a 15 year period. This translates to a reduction and narrowing of the experience of those who attend the Submarine Command Course due
to a clear loss of ‘in-contact’ time.

These are not the only reasons our submarine officers have not been quite as successful on SMCC as was previously seen. Another factor has crippled our submarine seaman officers throughout their careers – the continuity of instructors at the Submarine School. With very few submarine officers posted ashore at any given time, the three Seaman Officer instructional positions at TA-SM have long been revolving doors. To give a pertinent example, in the last ten years, there have been more officers posted to the position of Head of Submarine Warfare Training, traditionally the ‘Teacher’ of Submarine Executive Officers Course, than there have been iterations of that course.

Whilst that position has now been renamed, it is still filled by an officer returning from SMCC who is awaiting command, and therefore has no continuity. It has again become vacant at time of writing after being filled for less than a year. The same is true for the junior Seaman Officer positions at TA-SM – the two billets are normally either vacant or filled on a short-term basis. This means that training content has been seldom updated to reflect current tactics and practices. This is no reflection on TA-SM – it is reflective of the parlous manning state of submarine seaman officers. Unfortunately, the few officers that we have are needed at sea, which then hampers the training of new officers and a vicious circle develops where by attempting to increase submarine capability we are actually degrading it.

The activities conducted by an officer during their time as an Executive Officer, that is, the sea time immediately before commencing Perisher, may also be relevant to the likelihood of passing the course. Unless the submarine’s activities in the months leading to Perisher includes manoeuvring at close quarters with multiple warships, as occurs in a Fleet Concentration Period, then the prospective submarine captain is at a disadvantage. If that Executive Officer has spent those crucial months with the submarine operating independently then his ingrained reactions are almost the polar-opposite of the aggressive, fighting stance that is required on the course.

Out of the four officers who have not completed Perisher in the last five years, three have attended the course alone rather than with another Australian. In the past there have been solo Australian officers on the course, but the mutual support of another Australian officer when operating a foreign submarine in unfamiliar waters is invaluable. It appears that we are stacking the deck against our officers by sending them alone.

The review of the Maritime Warfare Officer specialisation also stated that officers could be selected to attend SMCC before doing the Executive Officer job. This has occurred previously (once to the author’s knowledge) and the student was successful. However, as demonstrated above by the fall in the success rate in the last five years, if we are not preparing our officers adequately by the end of their XO job (through whatever reason) then we are certainly not doing them any favours by sending them on SMCC with two years less experience than they currently attend the course with.

The astute reader will note that not once in this article have I said that an officer has “failed” Perisher. To do so would be a misnomer. To get to Perisher is an achievement in itself. Nowhere else in the fleet is command (and therefore promotion) linked to passing a selection course. Anywhere else, and in any role apart from submarine command, these officers are the cream of the crop. Two of the four that we have lost from submarines in the last five years have won the Kelly...
on Perisher results in a potentially fatal decision, then he will leave the course. It is far better to have something like that occur in a controlled environment where it can be ultimately prevented rather than a year down the track when that officer is in command and has no safety net to save his crew.

Secondly, the Submarine Officer Continuation Training week held on HMAS Collins in October 2010 should be an annual event that is supported with the appropriate level of assets. This period is designed to include exercises with warships at close quarters, opposed inshore operations and bottom contour navigation. In an ideal environment, all those officers who are competitive for Perisher selection would be given conduct of the submarine under the watchful eyes of the submarine CO and Commander Sea Training–Submarines. What this exercise is also useful for is to expose junior officers to what they can be expected to do in future years.

Thirdly, we must tailor XO postings to submarine activities, and the XO should expect two years in that job. The first year of a submarine XO’s tenure should see the officer posted to a submarine scheduled for independent operations. At the end of the first year, the XO should be moved on to a submarine conducting fleet support activities so that he or she is ‘fresh’ in dealing with multiple ships at close quarters when they start SMCC.

Fourthly there must be recognition that fleet assets are required to produce submarine capability – not just the other way around. Submarines regularly travel to the east coast to support Fleet Concentration Periods and individual surface ship activities, but when was then last time a ship travelled to the west to support a submarine workup?

Lastly, we must pay more than lip service to submarine Seaman Officer shore positions – we must have our training positions filled by officers who are posted long-term, not just those who are temporarily medically unfit for sea, or those in a short holding pattern for their next sea posting. Giving our unsuccessful Perishers a career path with real promotion prospects without having to revert to general service would go a long way to solving this.

So what about the near future? There is quite an obvious temptation to react swiftly to recent events regarding SMCC by calling for the course to be conducted in Australia, so that it meets ‘our’ requirements and our officers are assessed by one of our own. This is not a good idea in the short to medium term, but is inevitable in the deep field. Perisher already meets ‘our’ requirements – how the Dutch operate and how the RAN Submarine Force operates is not dissimilar. In fact many of our current safety and navigation practises originated from ideas garnered whilst on SMCC over the years. The location of the sea phases of SMCC in the Clyde estuary and surrounds present a range of well-
SUBMARINE COMMAND COURSE
– SANITISING THE NEAR FIELD, LOOKING INTO THE DEEP FIELD

There needs to be a shift in naval focus to concentrate on submarines. This means that we need to commit assets to realise this capability.

How do we find these masses of aircraft, ships and submarines? Well, we already have them in part by virtue of our participation in Exercise RIMPAC/TALISMAN SABRE and USN Submarine Command Course (SCC). The concentration of assets at RIMPAC/TALISMAN SABRE provides an ideal opportunity for our prospective submarine captains to demonstrate their prowess in ASW, ASW and Surveillance. Participation in the USN SCC would add a weapon-centric phase. With only deep water surrounding the Hawaiian Islands chain, a separate, inshore phase would also be required annually to ensure that our candidates for command are assessed in navigationally constrained waters. This would mean the annual commitment of a second submarine, two frigates, four helicopters and two MPA for a two week period that would occur either immediately before or immediately after RIMPAC/TALISMAN SABRE. And a shift in focus that recognises the necessity of producing an increasing number of Perishers needs to occur to make this happen.

So why can’t or don’t we do this now? We simply do not have the demand to justify committing these resources (military or financial) to an Australian SMCC at the moment. Stepping down the submarine command ladder a couple of rungs, as it stands the Submarine Force cannot fill all the Warfare Officer positions available on three operational submarines. In two of the currently-running submarines, because of this shortage, the XO keeps watches 12 hours per day. The shortage of Warfare Officers and Executive Officers means that at present we can only supply between one and three candidates for Perisher every two years. It is far more cost effective to conduct the course with the RNLN than it is to conduct in Australia until we can successfully retain enough Seaman Officers at Warfare Officer-level to man five hulls (as well as our shore positions). This is because a full complement of Warfare Officers over five hulls has the flow-on effect of producing a demand for three successful Perishers per year, and with the traditional success rate, that would therefore require four attendees per year. So the simple answer is that we shouldn’t run our own Perisher yet because it is not cost effective until we can fully crew five submarines.

In conclusion, the RNLN submarine command course currently provides what we need in terms of curriculum, environment, assets and standards and is likely to for the next five to ten years. It is our own preparation of prospective students that has been the issue. Asset availability, extended transit times, inadequately manned training positions, a non-structured approach to XO postings and unofficial impediments to the promotion of unsuccessful Perishers all have contributed to a falling success rate in the last few years.

In the long term it is inevitable that we will need to run our own Submarine Command Course if we are to have a sustainable Submarine Force, but this requires a firm commitment of a substantial amount of ADF assets on a yearly basis, and the planning for this needs to begin soon. The importance of Australia’s Submarine Force as the future premier RAN combat force in the maritime domain needs to be recognised early and credence (and budget) given to its development. The Commanding Officer of Australia’s first SEA1000 submarine has joined the Navy this year – we need to support this person (and their relief) in the best way we can. 😊
Beyond the Principal Warfare Officer

BY REAR ADMIRAL JAMES GOLDRICK, RAN

Author’s Note: Earlier drafts of this article have had the benefit of review by a number of practitioners from across the entire thirty eight year range of the ‘PWO experience’ (and even before). With the agreement of the authors, two edited commentaries are attached. I would also particularly like to acknowledge the advice and comments of Lieutenant Commanders David Murphy and Geoffrey McGinley, both currently serving PWOS – one now closely associated with AEGIS and the other with the new ASMD upgrade. Some of their suggestions have been incorporated in the text but I am hoping that they will be able to contribute to the debate at more length in future issues of Headmark.

This article argues that we need to move beyond the current paradigm of the Principal Warfare Officer (PWO) in order to allow the production of a warfare officer development continuum which meets the needs of twenty first century maritime warfare. In particular, the core of expertise in our future warfare officers must be centred much more on the set up and operation of sensor, battle management, weapon and communication systems than in the mastery of pre-planned responses, many of which can best be handled by appropriately directed automated systems.

Why the PWO? The 60s Threat Environment

It is important here to understand some critical assumptions which justified the PWO concept when it was implemented at the beginning of the 1970s. The motivations behind the creation of the PWO derived from an increasing recognition in the mid-1960s that maritime warfare was a 24 hour, seven day a week challenge and that threats could arise with little or no notice from any environment. This situation had in fact been the case since the start of the Second World War and, within the Commonwealth navies, the Principal Control Officer (PCO), delegated authority by the Commanding Officer to fire the ship’s armament had been the result. But the PCO concept in the 1960s was itself felt to be insufficient because it only applied to first contact and immediate engagement, with specialist personnel closing up to take over as soon as possible.

The advent of the anti-ship missile (highlighted by the sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilat in 1967) added a new urgency to the problem because initial responses to even the least sophisticated of such weapons were not simple, while the Soviets and satellite nations were investing heavily in anti-ship missile technology which was evolving rapidly. Furthermore, aircraft carriers were becoming fewer in numbers (and for the Royal Navy an endangered species with the 1966 decision to abandon construction of a conventional take off and landing carrier and phase out the existing force).

It was accepted that warships would have little or no beyond horizon range warning of attack unless they were under the umbrella of aerial early warning aircraft – which were not going to be available in many situations. Similarly, in ASW scenarios, their first indication of an underwater threat was likely to be an attack from a covertly positioned submarine rather than its detection at long range, unless air assets were available. Thus, the personnel on watch would have to respond instantly and correctly to a detection which would come only a few minutes (if that) before weapon impact. British flag officers in the 1960s, most notably the then Vice Admiral (later Admiral of the Fleet Sir) Edward Ashmore¹ became increasingly concerned that the sub-specialist training system (which produced, amongst other categories, specialist ASW, Gunnery, Direction, Communications and Navigating specialists) did not provide the necessary expertise to its graduates in areas other than their own and that the concept of going to action stations to bring in the ‘first eleven’ did not meet the response times required. After representations from the flag officers in the (then) Western and Eastern Fleets a working group was established in the Ministry of Defence to develop a single stream warfare officer model, while the concept was trialled in two Leander class general purpose frigates.

Western navies were also working hard at this time to establish pre-planned responses and procedures which would allow rapid reaction without confusion. (The packages of pre-planned actions against anti-ship missiles were described under and initiated by what became designated the ‘Bingo’ and then ‘Zippo’ codenames.) In developing these procedures, it became apparent that they required a high degree of

Beyond the Principal Warfare Officer Continued...

teamwork and considerable practice to execute effectively, as did equivalent anti-submarine measures, and the PWO concept was viewed as being central to achieving the necessary standards on a 24 hour basis. It was in fact acknowledged at the time that the only area in which real improvement could practically be achieved within a reasonable period was in personnel rather than weapons or sensors, bound as the latter were by increasingly lengthy acquisition cycles. The core of the PWO training program became mastery of the responses, albeit with a highly practical focus in terms of rote memorising of the various actions involved and then, in simulators and at sea, practising and proving the ability to carry them out within the required times and in the correct order.

The PWO Concept at Sea
The PWO concept was viewed, despite some misgivings, as being reasonably successful in service. It has faced only one real test of war since its introduction and that was the Falklands conflict of 1982. While there were some system and tactical failures, these were generally not ascribable to any fundamental deficiencies in PWO training but to wider issues of readiness, intelligence and equipment – and the misjudgements inevitable under the intense pressures of battle. Indeed, the result of the conflict was generally to increase confidence in the various warfare streams into a combat systems operator and manager category in more recent years may have partly undermined the latter effort within the RAN at least. The truth is that the system knowledge of PWOs has never really matched that of their sub-specialist predecessors and it is argued that this has become an increasing problem as the legacy of the old sub-specialisations and deep qualified senior sailors slowly leached out from fleet and training establishments. The Course itself has gone through a number of permutations, with associated or separated sub-specialist modules and additional qualifications (particularly focused on group or force as opposed to single ship warfare officer duties) at different times becoming part of the continuum. In recent times, the RAN has adopted a single common PWO Course with the intent that officers undertake further training after an initial sea posting – a construct not unlike the original RN PWO Course.

The Warfare Problem - Facing the Twenty First Century
In the light of experience, the RAN is now moving back towards equipping its warfare officers at the outset of their PWO careers with more sub-specialist knowledge by combining the initial course with a sub-specialist package and this is all to the good. We need, however, to ask whether we should go further. There is no doubt that an ability – and a readiness – to deal with rapidly emerging threats will remain essential. Surprise has always been and will remain an abiding feature of war at sea. But is thinking that derived from the problems of the 1960s wholly appropriate to the twenty first century?

Three tendencies are apparent in modern maritime operations. The first is that network enabled operation provide units with much greater access to a galaxy of remote sensors as well as the ability to share data (sometimes of targeting quality even in an air environment) to a degree that was only dreamt of fifty years ago. This means that units have a much greater ability to develop a degree of awareness of the battlespace and of the threats that they face than did their predecessors and at much longer ranges. All this suggests that the focus of warfare officers should be first on ensuring that the picture available to them is as comprehensive as possible and then on planning and operating accordingly.

The second is the increasing challenges that modern systems represent, not so much in terms of reliability, but in ensuring that they are appropriately tuned and configured to operate at the highest possible levels within given environments and situations. The SPY radar and the associated AEGIS weapon system require significant effort to ensure that they are properly set up and this set up is continually reassessed as conditions change. In a way, this is a reversion to the situation of the first half of the last century, when sub-specialist officers were highly expert in the engineering and operation of their systems and, gunnery officers in particular, devoted large amounts of time to the alignment and grooming of their systems – and not just when emerging from refit or deep maintenance but as part of the daily operating cycle.

It is arguable that the PWO concept was possible at all because it came at a time when system reliability and tuning became much less difficult to achieve than they had been since the start of the mechanical computer era in the first decade of the twentieth century. The mature solid state systems which began to emerge in the mid-1960s were much easier to set up and maintain, particularly by comparison with the complex valve technology of the 1950s. In 2010, the problem now comes in the software, since increased computing power has allowed for much more sophisticated control systems directing much more capable systems than in the past – in the case of radars, for example, allowing a much greater chance of detection than before possible with an older set of the same power and bandwidth - but only if the settings are absolutely right.

The third effect is that command decision aids as well as the sensor and weapon systems themselves increasingly

2 To indicate the scale of the change. When the Plan Position Indicator display component of the 184 sonar (which had entered RN operational service in the early 1960s) was converted to solid state as part of a modernisation program in the 1980s, several hundred valves were removed in an operation that only affected one third of the overall 184 system.
provide a greater capability to deal with complex and short notice threats than can humans, however expert. Many of the responses which had to be ordered by the PWO must now be managed automatically – and probably managed in a much more effective way and from a better analysis of the threat priority than even the best trained human being could consistently achieve. The RAN has something of a paradigm shift to achieve in this matter.

The Future Warfare Officer
All this is not to reject the idea of common warfare officer training, nor some degree of focus on and preparation for dealing with rapidly arising and unexpected threats. Surprise is and will remain a constant of war at sea and the defence, unlike on land, has no inherent advantage over offence, unless it is constant vigilance. Furthermore, the underlying concept that the PWO is ‘conductor’ of the entire warfare ‘orchestra’ is essential to retain in order to ensure against the stove-piping of information flows and processes. Indeed, it is strongly arguable that the longer range battle, involving the coordination of the force as a whole as well as associated units within what are likely to be complex rules of engagement demands more than ever the exercise of informed and expert human judgement.

But it does suggest that we need to restructure our approach so that our people develop a much deeper understanding of systems capabilities and limitations and of the ways in which those systems can be manipulated and managed to achieve best effect. It is not the expertise of the soldering iron that is required in our warfare officers, but understanding of the software and of its permutations, of the data flows and the factors acting on their rate and consistency and of the environment and its effect on sensor and communication propagation. It is not so much about getting the equipment serviceable or maintaining it in a serviceable state – that remains a maintainer function vital (and challenging) in itself – but in being able to wring every ounce of capability out of the equipment when it is being used by using it in absolutely the right way. In addition, a deep understanding of the remote sources of information now made available to the forces at sea and their strengths and potential weaknesses must be a fundamental part of our warfare officers’ skill sets, because without that no valid appreciation of the wide area picture can be made and no accurate threat evaluation achieved. All this, given the limits on time and resources, will require very great changes in the way that we produce our warfare officers.

This article will not attempt to propose a new training continuum for warfare officers in detail – that task is for others. But it does seek to start the debate about the philosophy that should underlie that continuum. Times have changed since the 1960s – it is time that the PWO changed as well.  


Commentary by Commodore T.H. COX AM, RAN (Rtd)

(RAN GRADUATE OF THE FIRST RN PWO COURSE)

The PWO concept from the outset recognised that there was a diminished system knowledge for PWOs. This was hardly surprising when the previous Long Courses which had a duration of about 10 months were swept up into a single 40 week course which included modules on systems. I believe it did a reasonable job on gunnery (MRS3)\(^1\) and ASW (184 and 170 MM10 and NDB)\(^2\); the weakness was on Radar EW and Comms from my memory of PWO 1 RN. AIO and Ops Room management was well covered but it is important to remember the strength and experience of Senior Sailors in the 1970's in both the RAN and RN. 'PWOmanship' was about team work and the contribution of the skills of all members - not one person knowing everything. The system knowledge weakness was reflected by the introduction of the AWO course in the mid 70’s (about the time of PWO 4 RN if my memory is good).

I think the paper skirts the problem for the RAN circa 2010. There are three significant changes that need to be addressed. Firstly and most importantly is the loss of a Systems Centre namely the old NCDS focused Combat Data Systems Centre (CDSC). From that day forward our PWOs, COs, WEEOs and Senior Sailors have lost the opportunity to really understand systems and doctrine such as we had in FFGs and DDGs. For ANZAC system knowledge we did it on the cheap and the results are extant.

Secondly, I believe that our Senior Sailors are less knowledgeable than their 1970’s equivalents. Thirdly, the demands of a changing society mean that young RAN Officers spend less time at sea and do fewer PWO jobs and, as time passes, XO’s and CO’s are finding their task more challenging. If the PWO course is the basis for future CO’s and Admirals there is a lot to take into account.

I believe that AEGIS brings challenges that most RAN Officers and Senior Sailors will find confronting; you should note the experience of CAPT Rogers in the USS Vincennes to appreciate the importance of Systems and doctrine knowledge in AEGIS capable ships. With the RAN family placing different demands on the system I believe that the Navy needs to adjust to Officers and Sailors in ships having less experience than the personnel who supported the command teams in the past. To maintain the RAN’s fighting edge there is a need for a tool set to compensate for experience. I believe that this should be in the form of an RAN doctrine and systems centre for AEGIS.

Re-vamping PWO training based on AEGIS and area warfare probably has merit. ADQUALS for Amphibious Operations may also be a useful concept. Additionally, I think that the Navy needs to make greater use of its retired community to train the new generation RAN. They would provide experience and knowledge in managing people and systems and offer the continuity that should not be dependent on the posting cycles of the front line teams but is essential to effective Warfare Training and System Centres. This is a concept the RN managed very well circa 1980 in my judgement.

In closing let me just remind you of the RN approach to ADAWS\(^3\) in the 70s where system knowledge was never addressed; too much “Vabology” in my opinion and this lack of systems knowledge was the most significant contributor to shortcomings in the South Atlantic - not the PWO concept. All this notwithstanding, the PWO system is probably due for an overhaul. It must reflect the contemporary standards and expectations of the practitioners – many of whom don’t see 30+ years in the RAN as a desirable or achievable goal.

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1 MRS3: Medium Range System 3: Standard gunnery fire control system fitted to RN (and some RAN) units in the 1960s, associated with the 4.5” Mark VI. 2 184 and 170: UK medium range sonars. The 170 introduced in the 1950s and the 184 in the 1960s. They were the hull mounted ‘search’ sonar and were associated with the 177 sonar which was the attack sonar associated with the triple barrel Mortar Mark 10 (MM10 – known in its early variants as ‘Limbo’). The NDB was the anti-submarine nuclear depth bomb with a variable yield.

2 184 and 170: UK medium range sonars. The 170 introduced in the 1950s and the 184 in the 1960s. They were the hull mounted ‘search’ sonar and were associated with the 177 sonar which was the attack sonar associated with the triple barrel Mortar Mark 10 (MM10 – known in its early variants as ‘Limbo’). The NDB was the anti-submarine nuclear depth bomb with a variable yield.

3 ADAWS (Automated Data and Weapons System). Fitted in different variants in the County class DLGs, and the Sea Dart equipped Bristol and Type 42 destroyers as well as the IKARA equipped variant of the modified Leander class. It was a highly complex system with alpha-numeric keyboard inputs rather than the Variable Action Buttons (VABs) of NCDS.
Commentary by Commander  
J.A.A. McCoy, RN (Rtd)  
(‘DAGGER’ NAVIGATION SUB-SPECIALIST)

In general I like this piece; but have to say that my assessment that the circle continues to turn full round remains unchanged. In this I have to declare a long-standing view – perhaps even a prejudice. When the RN introduced the PWO concept at the very start of the 70s, I was actually serving in Canada, as head of the Navigation Section of their Fleet School. Practically all the heads of sections in the school were headed by RN specialist officers on exchange – the N; the C; the TAS and the G. Only AIO (as an art) was headed by a Canadian – and he had done the RN School of Maritime Operations Long Direction course at HMS Dryad.

The Canadians themselves had of course opted a few years earlier to specialise their seamen as either “Operations” or “Weapons” officers, one of each was supplied to each escort, and in defence watches they did watch-and-watch. They were, in broad terms, trained to a depth about 66% that of the RN long courses in each of the specialisations. When the Canadians saw that we were taking de-specialisation a stage further, and that all would be “PWOs”, produced in about eight or nine months, they fell about laughing. Who was going to teach these jacks-of-all-trades their subjects? Who was going to provide the deep seagoing expertise required to develop doctrine, tactics and equipment? And teach it? It seemed to me at the time that a scheme shaped along these lines could easily be evolved to provide all long course officers with the basics to become truly competent OROs – and thus, in effect PWOs – without either diluting the specialist knowledge and expertise required to keep standards up in peacetime or requiring more than two or perhaps three in each ship. “Evolution not Revolution” was I thought the watchword, and an article for the Naval Review along these lines was laid down on the slips. But of course Admiral Ashmore had made his mind up to destroy the influence of the specialist schools, and had it bruited abroad that any who spoke against his plan should be cast into outer darkness. Additionally, of course, we were perpetually short of officers, and so time saved on Long Courses was manna to the bean-counters. So the article still remains incomplete somewhere in what passes for my filing system.

Why was Ashmore so viscerally opposed to the long courses? I believe it was because he was never long enough in any one rank to understand the benefits of the system; his “C” experience was all either as a Flag Lieutenant, or in the higher intellectual reaches of the Defence Signals network. He never commanded a Fleet Escort as a commander, choosing to spend his commander’s time as captain of the Far East Commander-in-Chief’s “yacht” (a converted frigate), the Alert, rather than the destroyer Battleaxe which he was offered. And as Captain F6 in Blackpool he was almost always broken-down!

The Ashmore edifice started to crumble almost immediately. Very soon after the ‘through deck cruiser’ (light fleet carrier) Invincible was ordered in early 1973, the Captain of Dryad asked a visiting fireman “Who was going to navigate her?” and in short order, I found myself conducting the first PWO (N) sea-time in the frigate Torquay in Summer ’74. The wheel continued to turn, and in short order we had “As”, “Us”, “CEWs”, AWOs and the rest.

Now I am seriously out of date, but it seems to me that, notwithstanding the changes in equipment, the basic arguments remain unchanged. There are two distinct requirements to be met from a single stream of executive, seamen or warfare officers, call them whatever you like:

(a) The ability to exercise effective “control” of a ship’s sensor and weapon systems in a high-level multi threat environment. This (even including exercises) is unlikely to take up more than a tiny percentage of the average officer’s career-span, and most will never do it “for real” at all. But if he/she cannot do it properly, then they are (an army phrase) a waste of rations.

1 Commander McCoy also undertook an exchange posting with the RAN 1975-77 as Master Attendant at Garden Island.

2 For the decade after the Second World War, the British retained two frigates converted with additional accommodation to act as yachts for the Commanders-in-Chief Mediterranean and Far East. They were formally rated as despatch vessels but were largely used to convey the C-in-C concerned on port visits around the region, sometimes with his family.

3 Admiral Ashmore’s autobiography The Battle and the Breeze confirms this career path and Admiral Ashmore’s views on the specialist schools.
It is really what the warfare officer is for... in the aforesaid high tempo, multi-threat environment.

(b) The maintenance of professional standards in the various warfare fields, the design and conduct of training, the analysis of future needs and all the other routine work which he/she will – actually – spend the greater part of their career upon are in times of peace, it seems to me, almost as important.

And he has to be a leader and a seaman as well. And perhaps even a Staff Officer.

The Falklands experience proved the PWO concept – to a certain extent. But even so, it wasn’t quite the scenario the PWO was designed for. Why was Sheffield transmitting on SCOT with her UAA1 ESM switched off at a time of day when the threat was at its highest? Her AAWO obviously didn’t get it. The threat was, actually, limited to a few, well-defined modalities. And, of course it is now 28 years ago – an entire seagoing career-span into the past. Since then what have we had to go on? A couple of fundamentally non-naval scenarios in the Gulf, in which Gloucester did well, Stark and Vincennes did badly.

Where is this all going? Well I think you have put your finger on it when, with weapon system engagements becoming at least semi-automatic; rather less shouting of “Zippo” and blowing of whistles and so on, the key to the PWO or ORO’s job is keeping the whole orchestra in perfect tune, keeping the individual musicians alert and interested and on their toes to react effectively when the “threat” materialises. “Network enablement” and the complexities of RoE are additional factors for which you require a more thinking PWO than an “instinctively” reacting one. I don’t know enough about the SPY1/AEGIS system to add to your comments on it, but do recall that the Vincennes fiasco was not caused by the system, but by the operators’ failure to comprehend what it was telling them.

To my mind this calls for more rather than less training. I think your proposed approach in the current era, to train officers to be a top-whack ORO/PWO capable of fully comprehending not only what their own ship’s systems are telling them but also the information being generated elsewhere – and perhaps more importantly, recognising when this information flow is being degraded for whatever reason is the right way to start. Then, I agree that the warfare officer must delve deeper into a chosen sphere – perhaps not as narrow as the “old” specialisations, but I think there are three: Above-water, Under-water, and C3I (or whatever it’s called these days) which need to be developed in depth.

And so the circle turns. Go back to paragraph three.
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The Indian Ocean through the Ages
By Sergei Desilva-Ranasinghe

As the third largest body of water in the world, the Indian Ocean beholds a mystique and uniqueness all of its own with an extraordinarily diverse and fascinating history. Presently, the Indian Ocean waters cover an estimated 73.5 million square kilometers, incorporating half the world's latitudes, seven of the world's time zones and 48 independent hinterland, littoral and island countries consisting of 2.6 billion people or 39% of the world's population. Throughout the ages, the Indian Ocean has persistently attracted explorers and maritime powers from far and distant lands, eager to project their influence in order to exploit its wealth and resources. In the struggle for supremacy, the Indian Ocean has been the continuing scene of a ‘Great Game’, which has been played out for many centuries and by many different actors making it a critical arena of great power competition.

Early History

The early history of the Indian Ocean, especially with the development of human civilization, is as diverse and rich as any other region on Earth. The vivid historical works that have been written on the Indian Ocean, as seen by historian Stanley Rogers in his fascinating book *The Stanley Rogers, 1932), who stated: “The Indian Ocean’s greatest width is at forty degrees south, between the Cape and the southern extremity of Australia, a distance of 6000 miles.” He further explained, “In a northward direction it gradually becomes narrower, until on a parallel seven or eight degrees above the equator it is divided into two enormous gulfs by the triangular mass of India. The western ‘gulf’ forms the Arabian Sea, and the eastern ‘gulf’ the Bay of Bengal. Its western boundary is formed by Africa and Arabia.” He added: “All the depressions below 3000 fathoms are on the Australian side of the Indian Ocean. While the greatest depths are on the eastern side, the majority of islands are in the western half, and are either of coral or volcanic formation. The two largest islands are Ceylon and Madagascar. Lesser islands are Socotra, in the north, and Mauritius, in the south.”

Prior to the advent of Europeans, for thousands of years much of the commerce, inter-civilization contact in the Indian Ocean was often facilitated by Muslim, Indian and Chinese traders who sailed in Dhows and Junks and populated the bazaars of key port cities. In fact, up until around 1700, the Indian Ocean’s thriving seaborne trade was deemed to be the most significant in the world, which saw the exchange of goods such as silk and porcelain from China, spices from Southeast Asia, pepper, gems, pearls and cotton from India, incense and horses from Arabia and southwest Asia; and gold, ivory and slaves from East Africa. As a result of this extraordinary commercial and cross-cultural interaction, bustling port cities emerged along the Indian Ocean littoral, in places such as Aden in the Red Sea, Hormuz in the Persian Gulf, Kilwa and Mombasa on the East African coast, Calicut on the Western Indian coast, and the seaside port of Malacca astride the Malacca Strait.

Consequently, to secure influence, access or control of the maritime commerce and trade routes, naval powers emerged in the 10th and early 11th centuries, as seen by the Sumatran Buddhist kingdom of Sri Vijaya and the Hindu Chola Tamil kingdom of southern India. During the Ming Dynasty, particularly from 1405-1433, China even sent forth seven large Indian Ocean diplomatic-naval expeditions led by its legendary explorer Admiral Zheng He, who sailed as far as the Persian Gulf, Red Sea and East Africa. Similarly, the Ottomans, Persians and the Mughals also developed navies largely confined to certain regions within the Indian Ocean to protect their respective interests along the East-West trade route.

Era of European Supremacy

Eventually, the search for new markets started to attract European powers, as seen by the voyage of the Portuguese explorer Vasco da Gama in 1497, which rounded South Africa and entered the Indian Ocean. Vasco da Gama’s voyage signaled the dawn of a new era of European encroachment that would eventually see European maritime powers dominate the Indian Ocean for centuries. The superior organization, weapons, technology and shipbuilding capabilities of the Portuguese ensured they won the contest for supremacy off India’s western coastline against the Arab-Islamic navies at the battles of Cochin in 1503 and Diu in 1509. Subsequently, within decades the Portuguese rapidly expanded their influence throughout much of the Indian Ocean littoral by establishing a string of trading posts and fortified coastal hamlets in places like Mozambique, Mombasa, Aden, Muscat, Hormuz, Goa, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), Timor and Malacca, enabling the Portuguese to dominate the lucrative spice trade.

However, it would not be long before other European rivals emerged on the scene to challenge Portuguese hegemony, the first being the Dutch who circumnavigated the Cape of Good Hope in 1595. By 1619 the Dutch established a foothold in Jakarta in the Indonesian Archipelago, which became the capital of the Dutch
East Indies. Similarly, by the mid-17th century, the Dutch expanded their sphere of influence throughout Southeast Asia and had overrun the Portuguese possessions of Malacca in 1641 and Ceylon in 1658, and later in 1662, the Portuguese strongholds of Nagapattinam, Cranganore and Cochin in India. As a consequence, the Dutch supplanted the Portuguese as the dominant power in the northern and eastern Indian Ocean, leaving Portuguese power largely concentrated towards the Western Indian Ocean.

**Anglo-French Rivalry**

The dawn of British and French naval power in the Indian Ocean in the late 16th century signaled the beginning of the eventual decline of Dutch hegemony in the Indian Ocean. By securing a foothold with several trading posts and coastal enclaves in India, the British in Madras, Bombay and Calcutta; and the French in Pondicherry and later, in the early 1700s, Madagascar, Reunion and Mauritius; these outposts served as the basis for the expansion of British and French influence throughout the Indian Ocean. Towards the late 1700s, Dutch power had considerably weakened and the main contest for domination of the Indian Ocean shifted, notably between 1740-1815, to the growing rivalry between Britain and France. This resulted in a series of fierce land and naval campaigns on mainland India and off its coastal waters, which led to a decisive British victory at the Battle of Plassey in 1757, which precipitated the loss of the main French stronghold in India, the coastal port of Pondicherry.

Even though, the French were ousted from India, the struggle for domination of the Indian Ocean continued. The advent of the Napoleonic Wars from 1792-1815, saw further fighting between the belligerents, where the French waged a fierce and costly maritime war against the British from their colonial strongholds of Madagascar, Reunion and Mauritius. In his brilliantly written book *Storm and Conquest: The Battle for the Indian Ocean, 1809*, (published in 2007), historian Stephen Taylor explained: “The trouble was the so-called ‘Gibraltar of the East,’ the twin islands of Ile de France and Bourbon, or, as they are now known, Mauritius and Reunion,” he said. “It is hard today, looking at a map of the Indian Ocean and locating those tiny specks – they lie due east of the vastness of Madagascar like pebbles in the shadow of a mountain – to imagine that at the time they appeared to threaten the East India Company’s control of India, and consequently Britain’s survival as a great power,” he added. However, France’s defeat in Europe during the Napoleonic Wars meant that its colonies and expeditionary forces in the Indian Ocean could not rely on unhindered access to supplies and reinforcements. Eventually, the British overran Mauritius in 1810, which thereafter led to the
decisive decline of French naval power in the Indian Ocean by 1815, turning it into a ‘British Lake.’ The defeat of the French in the Indian Ocean led to the ascendency of Britain to the helm of power, with other European powers retaining insignificant colonies and posing no threat.

**Pax Britannica**

After Britain emerged victorious in the Anglo-French contest for hegemony in the Indian Ocean, its maritime supremacy remained virtually unchallenged for another 100 years, until the First World War against Germany, where the Indian Ocean bore witness to the two German raiders, the *SMS Emden* and *SMS Wolf*, which waged a historically unparalleled naval campaign against British merchant shipping in the Indian Ocean capturing and sinking dozens of ships. Similarly, during the Second World War the Indian Ocean was the scene of a historically unprecedented conflict, the likes of which were never previously seen in its waters.

When mainland Europe fell to the Germans, the land conflict shifted to Russia and North Africa, the latter where a major campaign was waged by the Germans for control of Egypt and the Suez Canal. Due to the extreme risk of using the Mediterranean Sea, Britain and Commonwealth convoys had to travel all the way from Britain, around South Africa to reach Egyptian ports through the Red Sea. Furthermore, Britain’s complete dependence on unfettered access and exploitation of the vast oilfields in Iraq and Iran for the continuation of its war effort, compelled it to invade both countries in 1940 and 1941 respectively, the latter in a joint invasion with Russia.

However, with the Germans threatening to overrun Egypt and southern Russia; the British faced the real prospect of losing Egypt and even potentially its access to the vital oilfields in Iraq and Iran through a southward German thrust from the Caucasus. Equally important was the vital necessity for the Western allies to ensure that its land link to the Soviet Union, the Persian Corridor, remained open to facilitate the transfer of large quantities of weapons, ammunition and equipment, and other logistical requirements supplied through allied convoys to bolster the Russian war effort. The comparative safety of allied convoys traversing through the Indian Ocean made the Persian Corridor a considerably safer route than the more risky allied convoy route which travelled from Britain through the Arctic to reach the northern Russian port of Murmansk.

While Britain primarily focused on fending off the German assault on its homeland and defence of its colonial possessions in North Africa and the Middle East, the entry of Japan into the war in late 1941 was followed by a string of unbroken victories against the US in the Pacific and the British in Southeast Asia, ultimately culminating in the fall
of Singapore in February 1942. The emergence of the Japanese threat posed a critical problem for Britain’s dominance of the Indian Ocean, and indeed its continued survival. The Germans and Japanese were seemingly poised to breakthrough into the Indian Ocean and possibly link up. Britain simply lacked the resources to resist both the Germans and the Japanese simultaneously. Worse still, Britain was reeling from its worst-ever military debacle at Singapore, and the Japanese soon captured Rangoon in Burma, forcing the British Army in Burma to conduct the longest retreat in British military history, leaving British-India critically exposed.

Subsequently, the Japanese Navy followed through with a massive naval-air raid on Eastern India and Ceylon in April 1942 and narrowly missed locating the British Eastern Fleet, but nonetheless caused major damage by sinking nearly 40 British and Commonwealth warships and merchant freighters in the Bay of Bengal and the waters off Ceylon. After the war, Britain’s Prime Minister Winston Churchill referred to the Japanese attack on India and Ceylon as “The most dangerous moment”, where he feared the loss of British Eastern Fleet and the consequent fall of India to the Japanese, Britain’s most prized colony, would have led ended his political career and forced Britain out of the war.

Never in the history of the British Empire in the Indian Ocean had Britain’s hegemony been so seriously challenged, however and fortunately for Britain, the Japanese chose to refocus their attention in the Pacific theatre against the US, and missed a crucial opportunity to deal a potentially decisive blow against the British Empire. By late 1942, through a series of stunning reverses and victories, the Western Allies were able to stabilize their fronts and slowly regain the initiative. Regardless, the Indian Ocean waters remained dangerous to allied maritime traffic with prowling Axis naval forces that included German, Italian, Vichy French and Japanese submarines that scoured its vast expanses in a protracted and bloody campaign that sunk an estimated 1.7 million tons of allied shipping throughout the war. Although Britain significantly contributed to the defeat of the Axis powers, the crippling costs and considerable human and material losses it sustained seriously weakened its prestige and influence, which compelled Britain to grant India its independence in 1947, which was followed by the grant of independence to other colonies along the Indian Ocean littoral. Britain’s receding post-war maritime position in the Indian Ocean was also reflected in its drawdown of naval and military forces ‘East of Suez’.

Cold War

In the wake of World War II from
1945, the void left by the decline in British power, was supplanted by the US and the Soviet Union, which were engaged in a Cold War confrontation. In addition, the emergence of newly independent states along the Indian Ocean littoral in the following decades, inexorably altered the strategic geography of the region. Continued access to crucial sea lines of communication such as the Suez Canal, Red Sea, Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea and the Malacca and Sunda Straits, which facilitated much of the world’s movement of commerce and oil, made the Indian Ocean increasingly important in Cold War strategic calculations. For example, the major focus of US policy during the Cold War was towards safeguarding and strengthening its access to the strategically vital Persian Gulf oilfields, particularly from Soviet encroachment through the Middle East and Central Asia. In the late 1960s, in addition to its military presence in the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Bahrain, the US started construction on a major naval air base on the island of Diego Garcia, which generally reflected upon growing superpower rivalry in the Middle East and West Asia.

At around the same time, the Soviets also sought to upgrade their military and naval presence in places like Berbera in Somalia, Asmara in Ethiopia along the Red Sea, the island of Socotra near South Yemen and the island of Masirah near Oman. The enhanced superpower rivalry in the Indian Ocean precipitated the Indian Ocean Peace Zone concept, most notably throughout the 1970s-1980s, which was strongly and consistently endorsed, particularly by countries associated with the Non-Aligned Movement, namely India. However, in view of rising superpower competition this effort failed to gain traction, and after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the proposal for an Indian Ocean Peace Zone receded into obscurity.

Although throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s the US remained the dominant power in the Middle East and in the Indian Ocean, its influence was seriously contested, notably after the pro-Western Shah of Iran was deposed by the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988), the Tanker War (1984–1988) and the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989), all of which were seen as destabilizing threats to US influence in the Middle East.

Hence, the Indian Ocean became the scene of a major US naval and military buildup which also saw the creation of the US Central Command in 1983, and latterly, in 1995 the US 5th Fleet, headquartered in Bahrain. The dismemberment of the Soviet Union in 1991 left the US as the world’s only superpower leaving it at the apex of the global power order. However, its involvement in the Middle East and Central Asia became intractable with the emergence of Islamist terrorist
groups such as Al Qaeda, which sought to attack US interests worldwide as demonstrated by the devastating 9/11 suicide attacks, which served as the catalyst for US military intervention in both Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003.

**Sino-Indian Rivalry**

Over the last decade, the declining influence of the US has been increasingly supplanted by the growing strategic rivalry between the emerging powerhouses of India and China, which has raised the stakes in the Indian Ocean, in what many commentators refer to as a ‘New Great Game’. Due to the Indian Ocean’s critical significance as a transmission belt for much of the world’s energy supplies, its perennial importance to the world’s major economies strengthens as each year passes. Presently, estimates suggest that 70% of world’s petroleum products and over half the world’s container ships transit the waters of the Indian Ocean. There are three strategically vital choke points in the Indian Ocean, namely the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf, where 90% of India’s oil supply, a third of China’s and 70% of Japan’s oil supplies pass through. Similarly, there are indications that 40% of world seaborne traffic and 80% of China’s oil supplies presently transit through the Malacca Strait. Another critical maritime choke point is the Bab el Mandeb Strait in the Red Sea, which opens into the mouth of the Gulf of Aden, a sea route used by tens of thousands of container ships annually.

Other dominant concerns include the threat of Islamist terrorism and piracy off the horn of Africa, Bay of Bengal and the Malacca Strait, which have taken on serious proportions. In the last decade, the increasing instability that has been witnessed along the Indian Ocean littoral has seen a number of countries deploy warships in a largely combined role to interdict maritime piracy, especially off the Horn of Africa. In 2001, this led to the creation of an international naval task force - Combined Task Force-150 - consisting of 24 nations. Such commitment from so many countries is clear evidence of the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean to all the world’s major powers and economies, which have a common interest in the Indian Ocean, that is, their dependence on strategic sea routes as well as the world’s major oil supplies emanating from the Persian Gulf.

However, as seen in recent times, the threat that is increasingly overriding terrorism and piracy is the escalating India-China rivalry in the Indian Ocean, which has led both powers to move aggressively to secure influence. The growth of India’s influence and presence in the Indian Ocean has led the US to cultivate and leverage India’s emerging power as a counter-weight to the growth of China. The rapid expansion and modernization of the Indian Navy, now the fifth largest in the world, has enabled India to utilize its maritime advantage across the expanses of the Indian Ocean to establish its influence. This has been demonstrated by the establishment of Indian listening stations in the Seychelles, Madagascar and Mauritius to monitor shipping and eavesdrop on communications in the region. In addition, in late 2009, the Indian Navy added Maldives to its naval command, and has plans to reopen an old British air base for reconnaissance and surveillance operations.

The rapid rise of China has also seen it heavily engage in the Indian Ocean, as demonstrated by the construction of port facilities at Gwadar in Pakistan, Sittwe in Burma, and Hambantota in Sri Lanka, all of which are designed to lessen China’s vulnerability and dependence on the passage through the Malacca and Sunda straits. The ports of Gwadar and Sittwe are particularly significant in that Chinese oil and gas tankers and vessels transporting minerals can offload their products directly at these ports and transport them by road, rail or overland pipeline direct to China’s western and southern borders. In addition, the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, which is in the process of being built, will be used as a vital refueling and docking station for Chinese oil and gas tankers. However, these unprecedented inroads by China into the Indian Ocean have been seen by its strategic competitors in the West and India as a strategy designed to encircle India, though at present this appears to be debatable.

Given the prevailing and forecasted activity, it is increasingly evident that the Indian Ocean will be a key arena of great power rivalry for decades to come. Such views have been consistently brought forward as demonstrated by the former Australian Defence Minister and now Ambassador to the US, Kim Beazley, who recently affirmed, “In the long-term, the Indian Ocean is going to be massively more significant in global politics than it has ever been before and that is the function largely of the fact that the Asia-Pacific region is massively more significant.” He added, “The Asia-Pacific region covers both the Pacific and the Indian Ocean littoral’s northern extension. Energy security and resources are absolutely critical. The Indian Ocean region is immensely rich in that all developing societies need access to the new material produced around the Indian Ocean littoral. So these are now becoming vitally strategic trade routes,” he said. What this demonstrates, then, is that the importance of the Indian Ocean will only increase with each passing year, where the massively growing energy needs of India and China will spur greater competition in the developing new game, for the access and exploitation of finite and diminishing natural resources largely based around the Indian Ocean Region.

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QUALITIES OF LEADERSHIP

BY LIEUTENANT COMMANDER TOM LEWIS

His series examines selected traits of leadership to compare Royal Australian Navy leaders against a criteria. The first of the articles took Admiral Lord Nelson, the hero of Trafalgar in 1805, as a model, as well as examining the characteristics of other well-known leaders, both civilian and military.

Seven qualities of leadership measure the subject matter, suggesting a capable naval leader is an achiever; expert in his or her field; inspires others, and takes initiative; impresses by their physical qualities; empathises with others, and is an effective communicator.

ACHIEVEMENT

Did the person under discussion improve their organisation? Did they leave it a better place by being a member? Promotion is recognised as a measure of achievement. With this and other measures which traditionally mark out achievement – education; decorations; amassing of physical wealth perhaps – we gain some beginnings of whether a person is a success.

EXPERT IN ONE’S FIELD

Anyone who aspires to be a leader and an example to others must obviously have expertise in their craft. In naval terms, that translates as being an expert "ship-driver"; an aviator par excellence; an engineer possessing a wealth of theoretical and practical knowledge and so on. Nelson, for example, was a master at strategy – which becomes a commander of fleets – but also of tactics, which behoves a ship captain. He was also an inspired man-manager.

INSPIRATIONAL

This leader inspires others to perform similar deeds. Often this is shown by the leader’s actions in front of their subordinates. Nelson inspired his followers in being resolute, courageous and honourable. It is one measure of the man that so many did: Hardy, who was with him when he died; his fellow admiral Collingwood whose battle line he raced to be first to engage at Trafalgar; ship commander Berry, who followed him from ship to ship, and Captain Hallowell, who after the Battle of the Nile made him a present of a coffin fashioned from the French ship L’Orient’s mainmast – Nelson kept it in his cabin and was indeed buried in it.

INITIATIVE

Sometimes described as “going in where angels fear to tread”, this measure means to use judgement and advance where necessary. The leader is brave in psychological terms and takes the lead where necessary. It does not mean going forward rashly.

Nelson was a man who had the courage of his own convictions, who could often have left off and blamed superiors for failure. Instead, he was a man who chose to use initiative and advance when he knew the defeat of the enemy was attainable and essential. At the Battle of Copenhagen, walking the deck while the guns roared their broadsides, and deadly splinters whistled about his ears, he confided to Colonel Stewart, commander of infantry, who was with him on the quarterdeck, that he would not be «elsewhere for thousands». Whether he was fearful or not – and who would not have been – Nelson led by example. And when his uncertain superior, Admiral Parker, made the signal to leave off the action, Nelson refused to see it, putting his telescope to his blind eye and exclaiming: «I really do not see the signal». The British won the battle with much help from Nelson’s use of initiative.

IMPRESSIVE PHYSICAL QUALITIES

This might be rephrased as “looking the part of a leader”. Would anyone have said that Horatio Nelson achieved this? Yes – and no. A short, thin man not blessed with good looks, he first entered the British navy in 1771 as a midshipman at 12 years and three months.† Despite being prone to sickness: “I have had all the diseases that are”, he once said; he adapted well to the vigorous and often dangerous life that was the Navy.

Nelson was a man of raw physical courage who led by example. He lost an eye when an enemy shell, exploding during the siege of Calvi in Corsica, drove splinters and dust and rock fragments into his face. He suffered most terribly and often from wounds, quite willing to lead from the front. His right arm was amputated after the battle of Santa Cruz in Teneriffe due to his being hit by grapeshot. This is what is meant by “looking the part of a leader”: behaving in such a way that people can be inspired. It means to look resolute and act with resolution – as did Nelson. To lead by example. To not show physical cowardice. It might include «panache»; “the almost untranslatable expression of dash, of valour, the ability to do things with an air of reckless courage and inspiring leadership.”† Finally, we might add that the bearing, carriage and speech of a leader should be of the highest standards.
Empathy
The great soldier of the 18th century, Frederick the Great, had good advice on how to attain the next quality of the leader – Empathy:
...talk with the soldiers, both when you pass their tents or when they are on the march. Sample often to see if the cookpots have something good; find out their small needs and do what you can to satisfy them; spare them unnecessary exertion. But let fall the full vigor of law on the mutinous soldier, the backbiter, the pillager...3

Empathy means to be able to imagine yourself – as leader – in the role of your people, and to show that. It is “the power of understanding and imaginatively entering into another person's feelings.” General Montgomery said to his troops at the Battle of Alamein: “We will stand and fight here. If we can’t stay here alive, then let us stay here dead.”

Montgomery was entering into the feelings of all of his people, who feared that they would die. Churchill’s speech of WWII did the same: “We shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills: we shall never surrender.”

Alexander the Great “shared in the men’s dangers, as the scars of his wounds testified...he ate the same food as they did. He was highly visible...he fought hard himself but he was ever on the watch for any acts of conspicuous courage in the face of danger amongst his men.”4

Such statements say to you that your leader will be with you, no matter what the cost.

Communication
One needs to be understood at all times. Nelson employed in his leadership style something unusual for its day: the art of effective communication. One characteristic was to invite others to contribute their ideas for a campaign, or a battle, or a change of some sort; to educate his men and get them – and him – to know each others’ minds. Nelson embarked upon the Battle of the Nile in 1798 by letting his captains engage in individual fashion. The French fleet, anchored by the bows in a line in shallow coastal water, engaged in ship to ship fashion by five British vessels sailing inside the line and anchoring, and the rest engaging from outside. Thus the French were caught between two forces. At the end of hours of fighting, the French had lost 1,700 men to the British 200; their fleet was largely pounded to pieces, and Napoleon and his army were stranded in Egypt. Nelson had hoisted just two signals through the entire battle.5

For the autocratic manager this would have been disastrous: an authoritarian leader would not trust his subordinates to make momentous decisions and fight on their own. Nelson trusted his individual captains. So too, in the long pursuit of the French, years later in 1805, he had regular meetings with his «Band of Brothers» – the name applied to those who fought under him at the Nile.6 During the long chase the officers would pool their ideas for forthcoming battles; the best use of tactics; what a following ship would do when its fellow was sighted engaged and so on. Consequently even the necessity for signals within the ensuing battle was dispensed with; the captains knew each others’ minds.

Communication means to be able to use words effectively to persuade others. Winston Churchill was a great exponent of this. Eisenhower, then a US General and later President of the United States, experienced the British Prime Minister in action: Churchill was a persuader. Indeed, his skill in the use of words and logic was so great that on several occasions when he and I disagreed on some important matter – even when I was convinced of my own view and when the responsibility was clearly mine – I had a very hard time withstanding his arguments.7

A capable naval leader is an achiever; expert in his or her field; inspires others, and takes initiative; impresses by their physical qualities; empathises with others, and is an effective communicator. We have seen many great leaders who exhibited those traits. This series examines how many of Australia’s naval leaders performed in these fields.

1 Description of Admiral Lord Nelson and his career are drawn from Kenneth Fenwick’s HMS Victory; Christopher Lloyd’s Nelson and Sea Power; Peter Padfield’s Broke and the Shannon and Robert Southey’s The Life of Horatio Lord Nelson.
3 Connolly. (16)
5 Adler (116)
6 Adler (232)
9 Adler (76)
One of the most loved leaders of the Royal Australian Navy, David Martin was a capable performer, but his premier quality was his love of his people. In conversations where Australian naval people discuss their leaders, David Martin’s name shines as an inspirational officer who inspired his people, to give their best for him and the Service, and who sought to serve under him again when they could. He excelled in his naval career, but also beyond that, as an immensely popular Governor of New South Wales, who was sadly taken from us at the peak of his days.

David Martin, an only child, was born on 15 April 1933 and first educated at Glamorgan Primary School in Victoria. His family moved to Sydney in 1940, and the seven-year-old David entered Scots College.

The family traced its roots to the First Fleet, with an ancestor on Martin’s mother’s side being a Royal Marine officer, Major George Johnston, later a Lieutenant Governor of NSW. His father was Commander WH Martin, who had himself been a trainee at the Royal Australian Naval College in 1917. When David was nearly nine, Commander Martin was killed in action in March 1942 while serving in HMAS Perth, when that ship was sunk by overwhelming Japanese forces at the Battle of the Sunda Strait.

Despite that loss, David Martin had aspirations to join the Navy, and his mother encouraged him in his ambition. She enlisted the help of one of his father’s colleagues, POL Owen, nicknamed ‘Polo’, and this officer gave English, with well-developed officer-like qualities. All of his subjects showed good progress, except for Engineering, where it was thought ‘he could have done better’.

Martin proceeded to the UK for further courses on board the training cruiser HMS Devonshire, via the West Indies and Scandinavia. His final report on leaving the ship described him as: A pleasant personality who has been an asset to the ship. Capable and clear-headed and a good leader with plenty of confidence and initiative. Potentially an outstanding officer.

In 1951 he was promoted to Midshipman and saw a little more of the world via a troopship to Japan. There he joined the aircraft carrier HMAS Sydney which was engaged in operations in Korean waters, flying against the Communist forces in the United Nations-led war. Martin was able to gain many useful insights into naval procedures, including the flying of multiple strikes against the North Koreans, and in October 1951, surviving Typhoon Ruth, a storm that generated winds of up to 130 kilometres per hour and seas of eight metres. His Captain in Sydney was DH Harries, who had entered the Naval College in the same year as Martin’s late father.

During 1952 the ship’s company travelled once again to the UK for further courses on board the training HMAS Cerberus, in 1947. His early days saw him meet three other boys whose fathers had served in the RAN and also lost their lives in WW II. They were Mike Rayment, whose father had been killed during a kamikaze attack on HMAS Australia; Eric Johnston, whose father had been lost in Parramatta, and John Waller, the son of the Perth’s commander.

Martin captained the College’s Rugby Union team in his last year, leading the side with a battle-cry of ‘kill ‘em.’ The College magazine later commented that the side ‘must rank alongside the best the College has produced’. Martin also participated in sprinting and rowing. Unfortunately another aspect of his training wasn’t so successful: Martin found he suffered seasickness when his class proceeded on their Training Cruise, and this was an affliction he was to experience for all of his career. He became a Cadet Captain, and graduated from the RANC in 1950. His final report noted pleasing results in French and
criterion: ‘Is he, in general, quick to learn?’

The following year he was lucky enough to be in Britain during the Coronation of Elizabeth II, and he was able to view the parade, which he later described as ‘breathtaking’.11 Notably, Martin appears as an enthusiastic supporter of royalty in his biography.

At the end of 1954, he was returning to Australia on board the liner Orcades, when he met his future wife – Suzanne Millear – on board. A shipboard romance ensued, and, once ashore, the couple wrote to each other, with Suzanne working as a nurse in Melbourne, and David posted to the carrier HMAS Vengeance.12 The carrier was on loan to the RAN while the second carrier Melbourne was being readied for transfer to Australia. Martin joined the new ship for her commissioning voyage in 1956.13 His reports were satisfactory but sometimes blunt: ‘He is not over-endowed with brains and at times is a very slow thinker.’

These two negative comments, from the UK course, and his time on Vengeance, are somewhat isolated in their appearance. However, it does appear that Martin’s best characteristic was his ‘people skills’ – as we say nowadays. James Fahey remembers meeting David Martin in 1955. A sailor who had ‘changed over’, as the Navy puts it, to become an officer, Fahey was an engineer. Working with Martin, and becoming a friend, he was later to observe that his colleague was…caring, fun-loving, a born leader with a great capacity for communicating with people of all ranks. He disliked pretension and was never rude to others; instead, he would simply avoid them if necessary and would not allow anything or anyone to spoil his enjoyment of every minute of every day.14

One of Martin’s senior officers, Bruce Ziegler, remembers of Martin at this time: ‘Even as a Sub-Lieutenant one could see the continued efficiency of this officer…’15 Another officer who knew him for a long time, Commander POL Owen, commented that ‘David has a calmness about him and was never ‘rattled’. He had quite an aura…. He loved his fellow men and women. I never heard him denigrate other people.’16

A short appointment once again to HMAS Sydney followed, and six months later Martin was posted to shore and a position as a Reserve Training Officer in Adelaide. It was noted in his Report that he ‘has revitalised the Reserve by his ability to organise, his capacity for work and his outstanding power of leadership’. Another significant comment which characterised much of Martin’s later career was also made: ‘He has taken an individual interest in each officer and rating, and thereby increased to a marked degree the interest, morale and efficiency of the Reserve as a whole.’

Further UK courses in gunnery followed: the long course at Greenwich and HMAS Excellent - he was rated as ‘satisfactory but not outstanding’, and then six months on the staff of the Gunnery School. He posted to a two-year exchange position on board the destroyer HMS Battleaxe.17 In 1957 Susan Millear and David Martin were married.18

Battleaxe was to be an interesting appointment. Anti-smuggling patrols during the Cyprus emergency, and extremely busy fisheries patrols against Iceland around the Arctic Circle in 1960, were two extremes of service. One of his reports noted that on joining the ship he was ‘inexperienced’ but ‘soon learnt the hard way’, and that overall he was ‘industrious and successful’.

The time in Britain saw the Martins begin their family with the birth of two girls: Sandra, in 1958, and Joanna in 1959.19 At the end of 1961, Martin was posted to the position of Establishment Gunnery Office in Sydney. While there he reactivated the rifle club, and apparently was involved in ‘controversial ceremonial matters’, where he performed well. One of his numerical scores for a report was an ‘eight’, and it was noted that he was a ‘good advertisement for the Service’.20 Rear Admiral Neil McDonald remembers him as ‘…a cheerful person with a little of the common touch. He could deal with anyone with the greatest of ease…’21

In August 1962 Martin joined the destroyer HMAS Voyager and served in her until late 1963.22 His duties included the usual Officer of the Watch duties, but he was also Forecastle Officer, Wardroom Mess Treasurer, Gunnery Officer and Training Officer. His reports were most positive: ‘absolutely outstanding in the performance of his duties’, commented one, and also noted that he ‘has a fierce pride in the RAN and its future’.

In December 1963 Suzanne Martin
Studies in Trait Leadership - Loved Leader

Rear Admiral Sir David Martin, KCMG, AO, RAN

gave birth to the couple’s son William. This happy occasion was followed by one of the saddest the Royal Australian Navy has known: the sinking of Voyager when she was rammed and sunk by the aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne off Jervis Bay in February 1964. Martin was involved in the second subsequent inquiry when he was called to give evidence into the claim that the Voyager’s Captain Stevens had health problems, perhaps relating to alcohol abuse. Martin’s later biographer Maria Stenmark notes that this was ‘a great test of character for him, and led subsequently to a loss of confidence in Naval authority. In the process, a few enemies were made’.

The customs of 1964 were very different to today. This was a time when alcohol was not perceived with the attitudes of later years: random breath testing of drivers was unthought of; health aspects were not as realised, and consumption of performance-reducing drinks was the norm, even at work: drinking at lunchtime was common, for example. The British essayist William Hazlitt once said: ‘The true barbarian is he who thinks everything barbarous but his own tastes and prejudices.’ It is a mistake to judge the people of the past by later standards.

Nevertheless, the Voyager incident imparted lessons for the Navy: today’s seamen officers do not drink at sea, for example, and the processes of counselling people following stressful incidents is very much a part of today’s force.

An overseas appointment followed, in the position of Staff Officer (Warfare) to the Australian Naval Representative, United Kingdom, liaising with defence authorities and contractors in Britain and Holland. Martin’s reports were glowing: recommending early promotion, commenting on the assistance given to him by his ‘charming young wife’, and commenting that he should not be allowed to ‘stagnate in routine gunnery jobs’.

In 1966 Martin was posted to the Royal Navy Staff College at Greenwich. His report there described him as ‘a natural leader.’ He went out of his way to make friends with the foreigners attending the course, discussing their work with them and also entertaining them at home.

He went as a Lieutenant Commander to the destroyer HMAS Vampire, where he served as Executive Officer and First Lieutenant. Martin then served in Jervis Bay as the Executive Officer of the RAN College and HMAS Creswell, where his report described him as a ‘first rate executive officer’ who in ‘bearing and manner sets a fine example to the cadets.’

On 15 February 1969 he assumed command of the anti-submarine frigate HMAS Queenborough. He brought his people-friendly attitude with him. His steward at the time, Petty Officer Leo Duffy, remembers that ‘it was always ‘we’ rather than ‘you’ when a problem had to be corrected. Duffy also noted: ‘He became like a father to me – I looked up to him and respected him.’

Martin’s relationship with his Admiral of the time, however, was not so positive. In his first report it was suggested that he was of a ‘nervous disposition’ and that even though everything seemed well with his ship ‘...he would say this even if it were not’. Furthermore, his immediate supervisor thought he ‘...could appear to be cold and a little difficult for juniors to understand.’ This certainly seems to be the only time in Martin’s history that a superior perceived him as being 180 degrees opposed to the reality of how others perceived him.

It may have been during his time on Queenborough that a later Chief of the Navy, Vice Admiral Shackleton, felt Martin’s quiet style of leadership at work. Shackleton was Officer of the Watch during a night at sea, and changed the course of the ship. The next morning he was sent for by Martin, and asked if he had manoeuvred the ship during the night. Shackleton remembered with a feeling of impending doom what he should have done, which was to inform the ship’s captain that he intended to change course. He confessed his guilt, and Martin said to him quietly: ‘You won’t do that again, will you?’ Shackleton, later relating the anecdote, observed that although he himself was ‘six foot three inches tall, I felt about three foot, and it was driven into my brain what it meant to be accountable.’

The first of July 1970 saw Martin posted to the position of Fleet Operations Officer. The new job meant some involvement with industrial relations problems that were besetting...
the Navy at the time. Martin’s usual tact and diplomacy served him well here, and he also was adept at encouraging the Navy’s own sailors in the admittedly crowded and inadequate conditions some were experiencing at sea. His three reports while in the position gained steadily in their average numerical mark.31

The combined PX-44 exercise carried out during this time saw the Rear Admiral of the United States component, George R Muse, write to the Australian Chief of Naval Staff, then Vice Admiral Sir Richard Peek, and comment on the ‘performance and expertise’ of Commanders Eric Johnston and David Martin. Rear Admiral Muse noted: ‘I commend both these officers to you for their obvious high caliber overall capabilities.’ Coincidentally, both of these officers were to be united in another fashion in later years in that both of them achieved Vice-Regal distinction: Johnston as the Administrator of the Northern Territory, and Martin as the Governor of New South Wales. The well-known Rear Admiral William Dovers also commented that Martin was ‘an extremely able and very hardworking officer who has carried out all his duties with marked ability, confidence and cheerfulness’.32

During the latter half of 1972, Martin attended the Joint Services Staff College and completed the six-month staff course. His course report was of the opinion that he had a ‘sound, logical approach to problems’ and was able to express himself clearly when speaking ‘but is somewhat less fluent on paper’.33

From December 1972, promoted to Captain, he was Director General of Naval Reserves.34 There he ‘revived the sense of purpose for the RANR,’ with the numerical scores of his report all sixes and sevens. His reporting officer commented that ‘It is apparent that this officer has a bright future in the Royal Australian Navy’.35

From 4 February 1974 through to 21 January 1975 Martin was Commanding Officer of HMAS Torrens and Commander of the Third Destroyer Squadron.36 When he had been on board for a month, the ship was visited by Queen Elizabeth II. Martin did not know everyone’s names by then, and apparently (he may have telling a facetious tale against himself) told the ship’s company in an assembly beforehand that therefore, if he was introducing one of them to the Queen and made a mistake with the man’s name, they would have to keep it for the day. Anyone who corrected him would be in serious trouble.37

During Martin’s command of the Squadron the ships were scattered in their geographical deployment, thus not allowing him the time to work with them as a squadron for as much as he and his superiors might have wished. Interestingly, his friendly manner which often stood him in good stead was criticised in his reports. One report suggested that he was a ‘boyish Captain with a pleasing personality and plenty of bubbling enthusiasm. He has good ideas which he is not backward in presenting; but some of them fizzle out through lack of practicality and lack of follow up.’ The same report also mentioned ‘over lenient attitudes.’

From 1 February 1975 to 21 October 1977 Martin was the Director, Capability Review for the Force Development Branch of the Defence Department. One of his reports here concluded that ‘…his chances of selection for flag rank are almost certain.’38

Lieutenant Errol Hunt, who served in several postings with David Martin, noted that he always had a time for the ship’s company members, and took a genuine (maybe learned, but still there) interest in his people. After not serving with him for several years, Errol, then a sailor, recalls that on joining Martin’s ship he encouraged his old shipmate to ‘Come in; sit down; tell me what you’ve been doing with yourself. He did not change with rank’.39 Lieutenant Commander Mike Larsen has similar memories: he recalls Martin once attending Sunday Divisions at the RAN College. ‘He stopped at every person in the division – and not with just a standard question – but questions to get information out of them. After a bit he realised he was running out of time and sped up, but also apologised to us for taking too much time. When he asked you what you were doing it wasn’t a rhetorical question.’40

For a period of seven months in 1978 Martin became Acting Chief of Naval Materiel, based at HMAS Harman in Canberra. His last report describes this time as ‘in difficult circumstances’ but notes that he made a ‘positive contribution’ and ‘has the potential for higher rank’.41 An earlier report was glowing: ‘...in my view one of the Service’s most promising young captains. He leads by example, whilst giving clear and concise directions when necessary. His sense of compassion is more highly developed than in many of his contemporaries.

From July 1978 he was Commanding Officer of HMAS Supply. The big replenishment ship was a daunting proposition, and Martin’s handling of her was ‘slow but safe’, according to his immediate supervisor. As usual, his handling of his men was his hallmark, with his personal report noting that ‘He takes a keen interest in the welfare and training of his officers and ship’s company.’42 He posted off the ship in January 1979.43

Promoted to Commodore44 with effect from 5 March 1979, the next appointment was the Commanding Officer’s position in the flagship HMAS...
The carrier was in the last years of her life with the RAN, but was performing well, and a replacement was expected. Tony Mills-Thom recalled his time as a midshipman in Melbourne, when David Martin was in command for the first time. As the ship proceeded out of Sydney Harbour for her ‘shakedown cruise’ a very large white letter ‘L’ – for Learner – adorned the back of the carrier’s island. It was one of Martin’s ideas, recalls Mills-Thom, and typical of the man, who was a ‘thoroughly nice bloke’. Peter Kelly, also a midshipman at that time, recalled one aspect, however, in which Martin was out of favour, although he didn’t know it. The male midshipmen were exasperated with and envious of their Commanding Officer’s attractiveness to the female midshipmen on board. ‘There we were, trying to charm these women’, remembers Kelly, ‘and all they could talk about were his eyes, and his great smile’.

Able Seaman Paul Denneny remembers that Melbourne and her escort Brisbane were deployed to RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) exercises. When arriving in Pearl Harbor, the Australian carrier passed alongside the USN carrier Enterprise. The difference in size between the two ships was most apparent, and there was some laughter from some of the American sailors. Martin saw this, and gave orders for the beer issue for the day to be given out on the flight deck, in full view of the US sailors. ‘That will stop their laughter’, he announced, to some of the ship’s company, and the sight of the Aussies enjoying their relaxation in full view of the ‘dry’ American ship, did just that.

During his time in command of Melbourne Martin made a decision that resulted in the loss of an aircraft. According to his biographer, he overrode a request to tie down a jet fighter before making a course change in developing heavy weather. The aircraft went over the side with a sailor, who was fortunately recovered extremely quickly by an escorting destroyer. According to the biographer, Martin turned the event into a Public Relations success: realising the story would get out he had footage made of the weather and the ships dealing with it, and the story and footage was released to the media, who covered it as a good attempt at averting disaster. It is a significant example of how Martin not only saw the positive side in everything, but also how he was capable of taking opportunities to ‘sell himself’. However, that does not diminish the fact that he had made a mistake, and his Service Record or ‘bluejacket’ carries the official ‘displeasure’ incurred from senior command.

Martin showed good abilities to keep morale on board at a very high level, particularly by identifying himself closely with sporting activities and encouraging the ship’s teams. This even extended to Martin himself running to ‘work’ if Melbourne was alongside, where he would summon the duty midshipman and point out housekeeping matters, such as the presence of ‘Irish pennants’ – Navy slang for stray bits of rope yarn caught around something. Although this was a reprimand, it was delivered in a positive way. All on board worked hard for the ship: Lieutenant Commander Don Sewell recalled of his time with David Martin: ‘He loved the sailors, and they loved him’.

During 1980 Martin attended the Royal College of Defence Studies in London. This included a study tour of northern Europe and the completion of a thesis. Martin’s chosen topic was ‘The Development of the shape and size of the Armed Forces’. His personal report at the end of the course noted that he was ‘A very sound officer with a good mind’.

He became Director General of Manpower. The period was marked by several difficulties, in particular in the field of civilian manpower management. His personal report of this period noted: ‘He is very good with people and gets very willing cooperation with an interested and
In 1982 the Martins’ daughter Sandy was married, to a naval officer, Vince di Pietro; later their son William entered the Navy as a midshipman.55

Martin was promoted to the (Acting) rank of Rear Admiral with effect on 5 April 1982, with the advancement becoming permanent on 4 July. From April 1982 to January 1984 Martin was Chief of Personnel in what his report described as ‘a very difficult period’ which included inter-Service problems as well as complicated matters within the Navy itself. He was noted as being ‘...a leader who is good with people’. At this time his report noted that he had difficulty with emphysema and breathlessness after exertion. This was perhaps the beginning of his later problems that would eventually cause his death at a comparatively early age.

Commander Don Forbes remembers David Martin at HMAS Watson, where Forbes was working programming training courses. Martin had a rule about members not travelling to work ‘in rig’ – that is, in the uniform of the day, when they could be seen by the public. One day when Forbes was car-pooling, the two members in the car – with Forbes in uniform – were unexpectedly asked for a lift by their superior officer. He made no comment on the uniform transgression, and the next day made a special point of thanking both of the members for the favour. Forbes’ point about the incident was that Martin was the sort of person who wouldn’t stoop to mentioning a minor matter which would have done no harm and would not have normally been detected.57

Commodore Sam Bateman remembers that one quality that David Martin didn’t have which may have been useful in the cut and thrust of Canberra politics was the ability to tell untruths if necessary: ‘He was a thoroughly nice man, but incapable of telling a lie’.58

From 1984 to 1987 he was Naval Support Commander.59 His personal report noted he had a ‘consensus approach to problems which ensures support at all levels from his staff’. However, one comment must have hurt a little: ‘...he is very good with people but he tends to be a little flippant and shallow in his staff work.’60 On Australia Day 1985 he was made an Officer in the Order of Australia.61

Although the new position in itself was a busy job, it was dominated by the need to plan the 75th Anniversary celebrations of the RAN, approaching in 1986. The most public aspect of this was a Fleet Review. Martin sought out a Navy Reservist friend, Commander Ken Swain, who he knew as having a capable and forthright approach to his management and organisational work. Swain was more than the right man for the job: he brought new and innovative methods to the position, such as the seeking out of sponsorship from corporations.

During his time as Support Commander Martin took time to support more closely an organisation of which he had been a member since the 1970s: the Naval Historical Society. He made Tresco, his official Naval residence, available for their meetings, and himself delivered an address on naval gunnery.62 He was deliberate in his approach to maintaining contact across all levels of the Navy; often dropping into ‘Harry’s Café de Wheels’, the famous caravan just outside the gates at the end of Garden Island’s pier, where he was able to purchase a pie and have a talk with any of the many Navy sailors who also patronised the outlet.63 John Waller believes that in his time as a Rear Admiral, David Martin ‘...was the only admiral to attend a RANEL barbeque!’ This was at the shore base of HMAS Rushcutter, and the barbeque in question was for Navy Emergency List members; not a category of people for whom busy admirals would have had much time to spare. But such attendance was a typical Martin touch.64

The Review involved Martin more closely as it approached. It assumed mammoth proportions, involving 66 ships and 23,000 sailors. Martin was at the fore with the publicity for the great event, but one mistake saw him generate attention of the wrong sort. Interviewed on Channel Nine’s Today show, he was asked about the possibility of some of the ships carrying nuclear weapons. Unused to television interviews early in the morning, and meaning to say ‘It is not inevitable’, he left out the ‘not’. The furore was immense, but Martin simply admitted he had made a mistake, which led to headlines such as ‘An Honest Admiral’.65

The Review itself went very well. The Royal Navy sent the aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious and her battle group; the USN the giant battleship Missouri, complete with her 16’ guns, and the unforgettable memory that on her decks Japan had surrendered in WWII. Prince Phillip was the Reviewing Officer, and the weather was perfect. 1,700 shells were fired; thousands queued for ship visits, and the Navy received immense amounts of positive publicity. At their home in Tresco, the Martins entertained the visiting First Sea Lord of the Royal Navy’s Admiralty, Admiral Sir William Staveley.66

Although offered the post of Head of the Australian Defence Force Staff in Washington, Martin decided now to retire from full-time service in the Navy by transferring to the Reserves. He perhaps had not reached his desired position in the RAN: in 1984 he had submitted a ‘dream sheet’ to...
the Directorate of Naval Officers’ Postings, for the attention of the Chief of Naval Staff. In this he mentioned that: ‘One of my ambitions continues to be command of the Fleet’. This was not offered however, and so he chose retirement instead. In parentheses we might note that his service record carries the notation that as of 16 February 1987 he was ‘unfit for sea duty’, so that may have carried some weight in the decision being made.

David Martin’s last day of service in the Permanent Naval Force was on 5 February 1988, and he was farewelled in two large and splendid ceremonies attended by over two thousand naval personnel. It was perhaps fitting that his final day saw him in contact with so many Navy personnel: his personal report of the time noted: ‘David Martin will be sorely missed by the Navy. He is a ‘people’ person who has not hesitated to represent the concerns of others and he has been at the forefront of trying to improve conditions of service’.

Offers of new employment – Martin was only 55 – came thick and fast. One of them was to become the Governor of NSW in 1988. Martin consulted his family and accepted. He was the first RAN officer to hold the position, and co-incidentally, the last RAN officer to be knighted, receiving the KCMG. Over a thousand letters of congratulation from all aspects of Australian society were received at Government House, and characteristically, Martin answered all of them by hand.

His first speech on his first day as Governor: I said to the Governor, ‘You can count on our support’, meaning support for him in his very responsible position as Governor. He looked me in the eye and said, ‘I hope I can count on your prayers as well’. I had not expected that response from him. I realised then that we had a unique man serving this State as Governor.

The role of Governor, with Martin’s unique perspective, was changed to become a ‘governor of the people’. He was able to expand on his personal philosophy of what the Vice-Regal role entailed in a number of speeches. In summary, he saw the role as three-fold: constitutional, ceremonial and community, with the community aspect being mainly addressed through the involvement of members of the public at ceremonies. This saw children’s Christmas parties being held at Government House; the Martins visiting every area of NSW, and community events embraced en masse.

Sir David became involved in a number of charities: the Muscular Dystrophy Association, the Royal Australian Life Saving Society, and the Variety Club of Australia. In 1988 he was named Father of the Year, with some suggestion that this was merited chiefly by ‘…the care he gave to hundreds of young naval ratings under his command in various postings’. His contact with the Navy remained strong. Lieutenant Commander Mike Larsen remembers being on duty as the Guard officer at the Sydney Royal Easter Show, when David Martin had three months left to live. ‘He came up to me and said ‘How are you Michael’ – he remembered my name after many years. He then said ‘Look I can’t stay here – I’m not well’, and apologised to us all for his inability to properly take time to talk to us. The ability to remember names, a quality for which Martin was well-known, is perhaps the best aspect of one of his best leadership qualities – that of empathy. This is something that will endear any leader to their people: the legendary “Bobs” – Lord Roberts VC of the British Army, was also well known for it.

On 3 September 1989 Martin made a speech at Tumbalong Park, Sydney, on the subject of the Australian Flag. He noted its proud history, and encouraged Australians to support it and raise it even higher, to celebrate ‘…our joy in being Australian’.

In April 1990, Governor Sir David Martin organised a Prayer Breakfast. This saw some 1500 men and women meet at the Convention Centre at Darling Harbour. He appealed to his audience to ‘Give a lead; to declare our beliefs, to care for our fellow Australians when the going gets rough for them’. The Archbishop of Sydney described the meeting as ‘not a plug for religion, or even a plug for God. It was a plug for the needy throughout our country…’

This enthusiastic and generous schedule came to an end after two years. In 1990 Sir David Martin was diagnosed with mesothelioma, a lung disease caused by his exposure to asbestos during his naval career. On 7 August he relinquished his governor’s position. In his last days he was

1. Later Earl Frederick Roberts of Kandahar, Pretoria and Waterford, (1832-1914), “Bobs” was a sterling soldier of considerable skill both as a tactical and strategic leader, and was much beloved by his troops for the concerns he showed for them. For an example, see Abbott, J. H. M. Tommy Cornstalk. 1902. (pp: 190-208)
busy founding the Sir David Martin Foundation for homeless and underprivileged youth. In adversity he did not surrender, saying: ‘The next task is to overcome this illness of mine; then I shall be looking for a new career’.

However, on 10 August, three days after he had retired, Rear Admiral Sir David Martin died at St Vincent’s Hospital. A state funeral was held, with 1200 mourners attending, amongst them the Governor-General, State Governors, and a host of distinguished retired servicemen and women. After the funeral at St Andrew’s Cathedral, Sydney, the coffin was placed on a gun carriage and pulled along George Street by sailors from HMAS Nirimba. A Royal Australian Navy band played Rod Stewart’s ‘Sailing’ and many thousands of people paid their respects to ‘the People’s Governor’ for the last time.78

Martin’s legacy was a lengthy and considerate one. On the day of his death the Sir David Martin Foundation came into being and continues its work today. Lady Martin has spoken at numerous events in its support, and continues to visit the Triple Care Farm at Robertson, in the NSW highlands, to inspect its progress. A charity golf day raises money for the Foundation: in November 1998, for example, $11,000 was raised in this fashion.79 Lady Martin is also co-patron of the HMAS Melbourne Association. A Sydney ferry is named after him: the ‘Sir David Martin’ is a 35 metre catamaran passenger ferry, and can be regularly seen on the Harbour waters.80

Martin’s Vice-Regal successor was also a naval officer: Rear Admiral Peter Sinclair. He followed in his predecessor’s footsteps by also making the officer of Governor one that embraced the people. For the first time, Government House was opened to the public.81

How can we summarise Martin’s leadership characteristics, given the opinions of others throughout his career?

To begin as a cadet midshipman and end as an Admiral must always be a sign of mighty achievement. However, Martin achieved all of that and more: the respect, admiration and love of those who served with him and under him. He was a very capable seaman officer who commanded a variety of ships, but his unique gift of leadership was in understanding others’ situations. Martin had a gift of talking to those of lesser rank that made them feel, for that moment, an equal, and that this superior officer understood them and cared for them. To many of those who came into contact with Martin, he must have touched them with a notion of how they too could emulate his personable style of leadership. He showed initiative in simply the way he handled his people. His gift of getting others to follow him is enviable and worthy of emulation.

By sometimes simple actions - the ‘L’ for learner on Melbourne, for example - Martin reached out and spoke to his people in a unique way. Sometimes he spoke to people in a way such as they would never forget what he had said, as witnessed by the incident with the later Chief of Navy David Shackleton. Not only by his appearance - he looked the quintessential naval officer - but by his bearing, Martin was impressive.82

In summary, one of the most loved leaders of the Navy, a fine officer and Governor, and one who was taken too soon from his life of service. 

Lieutenant Commander Tom Lewis
PhD, OAM, RAN has served in a variety of PNF and reserve roles within the Navy. He led US forces on deployment in Baghdad in 2006.
Studies in Trait Leadership - Loved Leader

Rear Admiral Sir David Martin, KCMG, AO, RAN

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The introduction into service of the MRH90 aircraft represents new and exciting challenges for the Australian Defence Force. This aircraft will be operated by both the Australian Army and the Royal Australian Navy in support of Air Mobile Operations, Special Operations and Maritime Support. The RAN will take delivery of six MRH90 aircraft over the next two years to operate from 808 Squadron at HMAS Albatross. These aircraft will embark on RAN Ships and provide Maritime Support to the fleet previously provided by the Sea King aircraft.

The MRH90 aircraft has been procured as part of the AIR 9000 Program with a focus on Australian industry involvement. This has led to the through life support of the aircraft being provided by a contracted agency. These contracted services in the past have been provided by ADF organisation employing traditional management models. The introduction of contracted services will require a revised management model to be developed. In addition to the contracted services the joint operations will require a new command and control arrangement to be employed that will be further complicated by a shared logistic pipeline and rotatable pool Deeper Maintenance philosophy.

This article provides background to the introduction of the MRH90 and the unique nature in which it is to be supported. It will discuss the 808 Squadron Shopfront concept and the new command and control arrangements that will be implemented to ensure the requirements of both Navy and Army are met. Recommendations will be provided as to the best solutions to ensure the overall effective operation and management of the MRH90 Fleet. I will not consider the impact of JP2048 ‘Canberra Class Landing Helicopter Dock’ ships or the way in which Army is to be supported.

The Sea King aircraft has been a stalwart of the Royal Australian Navy since its introduction into service in 1976. Operated by 817 Squadron, the role of the Sea King has changed over time from an Anti-Submarine Warfare platform to primarily being employed in a Maritime Support Helicopter Role (MSH). However, due to the age of the airframe, and increasing supportability cost, the feasibility and operational reliability of this platform requires it to either undergo a complex upgrade program or to be replaced.

In the 2000 Defence White Paper it was identified that Army would acquire “an additional squadron (about 12 aircraft) of troop-lift helicopters to provide extra mobility for forces on operations.” Coupled with other projects within the Defence Material Organisation the AIR 9000 Program was established to provide the ADF with the most appropriate force mix of helicopters. In order to achieve this mix the AIR 9000 Multi Role Helicopter (MRH) program was established as a sub-program amalgamating Phases Two (additional Troop-Lift Helicopters), Four (Black Hawk Replacement) and Six (Sea King Replacement).

The six MRH90 aircraft to be delivered under the AIR 9000 MRH Program will not be supported by the Navy Aviation System Program Office (NASPO) as is the case with all other NAS Squadrons. This represents a fundamental paradigm shift for 808 Squadron support arrangements. Instead, the traditional System Program Office (SPO) arrangement has been contracted out to industry requiring contemporary arrangements to be established to support operations.

Agencies - Overview

The MRH90 aircraft is supported by a number of organisations including both Commonwealth and contracted. From a command perspective 808 Squadron will be under the control of the Headquarters Fleet Air Arm (HQFAA) who is responsible directly to the Commander Australian Fleet (COMAUSFLT). The principal
Commonwealth organisation for sustainment is the MRH Logistic Management Unit (LMU) who has a Sustainment contract with Australian Aerospace for the provision of engineering and logistic services.

MRH Logistic Management Unit

The MRH LMU is part of the Helicopter System Division within DMO and is the Commonwealth agency responsible for the in-service sustainment of the MRH90 aircraft and Sustainment contract. The primary roles of the MRH LMU is to provide contract governance and interface management that is spread across three units, as illustrated in figure 1 with each focusing on their respective area of expertise. The Sustainment contract aims to provide optimised cost of ownership over the life of type of the aircraft and capability availability.

![Figure 1: MRH LMU Organisation](image)

The MRH LMU Engineering Management Unit (EMU) is the sponsor for the AA Authorised Engineering Organisation and provides the Design Acceptance process for designs developed by the AA AEO. In addition to Design Acceptance is a Compliance Assurance role to ensure that the processes and products being delivered are of a standard that will meet or exceed the requirements defined in the ADF Technical Airworthiness Management Manual.

The MRH LMU Materiel Management Unit provides a Compliance Assurance role in a similar manner to the EMU however, it is concerned with the logistic support aspects and ensuring those parts that are procured are of a quality fit for use in the aviation environment. This unit provides a Logistic Management role to ensure that the Supply chain is functioning efficiently and effectively.

Whilst the MRH LMU does not have a daily interaction with 808 Squadron, it is a key support organisation as it is the Sustainment contract authority and as such provides the means in which contract changes may be processed and approved should the support being provided by the contractor not meet Squadron needs.

**Australian Aerospace**

AA is the prime contractor for the AIR 9000 MRH Program for the delivery of the MRH90 into service and through life support. AA is contracted under a performance based Sustainment contract to provide an initial 10 years with options to extend through until the aircraft life of type. In essence AA is operating in what is traditionally referred to as the SPO and providing the engineering and logistic services commonly expected of an ADF organisation. In addition to its SPO function AA is also responsible for all Deeper Maintenance activities.

**Engineering.** Under the Sustainment contract, AA is required to obtain and maintain AEO status for Airframe, Avionics, Software, Support and Test Equipment (S&TE) and Simulator services up to and including Design Approval. AA is also responsible for providing configuration management activities, publication management, maintenance requirement and determination, and Aircraft Structural Integrity and Engine Structural Integrity Plans and management.

**Maintenance.** AA is required to obtain and maintain Approved Maintenance Organisation (AMO) status for the duration of the contract and is responsible for providing DM servicings for the entire MRH90 Fleet. This is to be provided on a rotational pool basis, meaning that Navy and Army are operating a shared fleet and the aircraft returned for DM will not be the aircraft received back.

**Logistics.** AA is required to provide all repairable items and spares inventory management of those items that are specific to the MRH90 aircraft.

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1 An AEO is an organisation that has been certified (awarded an Engineering Authority Certificate) by the Technical Airworthiness Regulator (TAR) to provide design or engineering management services to the ADF.

2 An AMO is an organisation that has been approved by the TAR to conduct maintenance of State Aircraft and/or Aeronautical Product.
808 Squadron Support Arrangements to Meet Navy MRH90 Operations

Headquarters Fleet Air Arm

The Headquarters Fleet Air Arm is the responsible for the provision of the aviation capabilities required to fight and win at sea and contribute to military support. In this function Commander Fleet Air Arm assumes the role of Operational Airworthiness Authority Representative (OAAR) and acts as the Sponsor for NAS AMOs. In the OAAR role COMFAA is responsible to the COMAUSFLT as the Operational Airworthiness Authority (OAA) to provide advice regarding the operational airworthiness of particular aviation systems, and to exercise management responsibilities as delegated by the OAA. As the Sponsor of NAS AMOs, COMFAA is responsible for ensuring only organisations approved by the TAR are used to conduct maintenance and advising the Technical Airworthiness Regulator of any adverse maintenance issues that could affect technical airworthiness.

The HQFAA is also the representative of the RAN and in particular, 808 Squadron at meetings between Navy and DMO to provide direction on future capability requirements. In this capacity the HQFAA is one of the most important support agencies as it should drive the RAN’s aviation maritime requirements.

The Shopfront Concept

In 2005 a Joint Helicopter Management Study was commissioned by the Chief Capability Development Group and Defence Capability and Investment Committee to report on a joint structure that would enable an effective and efficient joint management of the MRH90. A recommendation of this report was that the “SPO should provide specialist engineering support to the sub-unit locations via Shopfronts.” This Shopfront concept has carried through to Plan Pegasus as a requirement by Navy to provide a direct Commonwealth interface to those external agencies and provide effective support to be provided to the Squadron.

The Sustainment Contract allows for the establishment of Members Required in Uniform positions embedded within the contractor organisation which may be utilised to establish a MSH Liaison Officer as one of the two Engineering Officer positions. The structure, to be based out of NAS, which would provide those Navy specific support functions detailed in Plan Pegasus.

The HQFAA Shopfront model does not make the most effective use of personnel as the proposed roles of some personnel are captured within the contract. Further it does not include the AA Product Support Engineer (PSE) who provides a direct interface back to AA and will be embedded within the Squadron (in a similar role to the OEMR). Whilst this structure does provide an interface between the Squadron and its external agencies its influence in managing issues on the Squadron behalf will be limited by locality and accountability to those agencies. Figure 3 outlines a proposed concept that would utilise embedded RAN personnel within those external agencies that will have direct influence and an established line of accountability that will enable effective support to be provided to the Squadron.
As a RAN member he/she would gain valuable experience into the contractor procedures and processes and also provide key design input about MSH operations for design solutions. This position would provide a strong basis for growth of future Squadron Deputy Aerospace Engineering Officers. Currently there is the requirement for Navy to provide a uniformed person to support maintenance management operations embedded within the MRH LMU. It is proposed that this position could be modified to become the MRH LMU MSH Support Officer. This position would be a post Charge Qualification job that would be able to provide specific Navy Strategic and MSH operational direction to the future contracting changes to ensure that the requirements of Navy are satisfied. It would also provide an indirect communication line for the AA MSH Liaison Officer. 

As embedded personnel these positions have a vested interest in Navy and are ideally placed to ensure both routine tasking and future requirements are appropriately captured and actioned. Both of these RAN positions can be sourced from positions currently allocated to the Sea King Platform within NASPO.

Operational Command and Control

The MRH90 aircraft is to be jointly operated by Navy and Army who will both be supported by AA and the MRH LMU. This has the potential to create a conflict of resources as each service vies to meet its needs. For example, the Army has a MRH90 operating in East Timor whilst Navy has an embarked flight operating in the Arabian Gulf, both aircraft are unserviceable and require the same item to return to flying and support its respective operation. Who receives the item?

In consideration of this issue the JHMS recommended “a Joint Helicopter Fleet management cell should be created within Headquarters 16 Brigade (Aviation) to provide airworthiness oversight whilst efficiently managing and allocating joint resources to the roles in accordance with ADF priorities. This should be enshrined in an ADF-wide MOU for the Joint Fleet capability”. This recommendation has been endorsed and the Joint Helicopter Management Agency (JHMA) will be established following completion of MRH90 Acceptance into Operational Service (AIOS). Chief of Army has directed the Directorate of Aviation Capability-Army to manage the MRH90 through to AIOS.

This arrangement leaves a significant period where both services will be operating aircraft with no formal agreement in place and subject to the command and control of an Army organisation with minimal Navy representation. The development of a Service Level Agreement (SLA) is vital to the effective management of the MRH90 aircraft. The SLA is the working level agreement between Force Commands and their key enablers (i.e. Headquarters 16 Brigade/HQFAA and MRH LMU). This document would detail:

- the responsibilities of each agency and the inputs they are required to provide;
- the priority system to be employed, not just for routine tasks but also the allocation of resources through a defined set of business rules; and
- key performance indicators for monitoring deliverables.

It is this document that is key to this transition period as not only will it define key individual and joint responsibilities of organisations it also provides a framework for managing the capability against which the operators can provide feedback on the performance of the Sustainment contract. Without this agreement in place the management of MRH90 fleet could be significantly compromised from a RAN perspective.

In conclusion, the AIR 9000 MRH Program represents the changing way in which the ADF is managing its capability. The use of a contracted organisation in an effort to reduce cost of ownership over the life of type has and will continue to present new challenges to the operational unit. They key to effectiveness is ensuring that we are not bound by traditionally thinking and allow the change in support arrangements to be matched by a change in management arrangements.

The MRH Program has personified the AIR 9000 Program philosophy of efficiently managing the ADF’s helicopter fleets for the rationalisation of types. The JHMA represents a pragmatic solution that will provide effective operational management however, until this point risks Navy being drastically under represented. Without formal agreements in place the ability of the Navy to meet operational commitments may be compromised by lack of control.

Finally, I recommend the HQFAA concept of a Shopfront needs to be revised to ensure the effective
808 Squadron Support Arrangements to meet Navy MRH90 Operations

utilisation of personnel, and HQFAA review its role in the transition command and control arrangement through until AIOS to ensure it is placed to meet its operational commitments.

Lieutenant Andrew Newman RAN joined the Royal Australian Navy in January 2002, graduating from the Australian Defence Force Academy in 2006 with a Bachelor of Aerospace Engineering. Since this time he has completed a two year posting to the Navy Aviation System Program Office and is currently posted to the NUSQN 808.

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BY LCDR DESMOND WOODS

“...You can lose escorts, they are replaceable, they are expendable, which is not a comfortable thought if you happen to be the manager of one, but you know it, - you shouldn't have joined if you can't take a joke ! But carriers are not replaceable. Lose a carrier and you are done for. If you lose the air the operation is over, you may as well all go home.”

Rear Admiral ‘Sandy’ Woodward - 1983

“The removal from service of this country’s only operational all weather interceptor, the Sea Harrier, makes deployment of a naval expeditionary force against any but the most basic opposition, with no aircraft of its own, the worst kind of joke yet dreamed up by an incompetent government.”

Admiral Sir John Woodward - 2005

Twenty nine years ago, in 1981, an announcement was made by the UK’s then Secretary of State for Defence, Sir John Nott, that major cuts were to be made to the surface fleet and that the RN was to become only an Anti Submarine Warfare navy concentrating principally on its nuclear hunter killer submarine fleet designed to destroy Soviet ICBM and attack submarines. That role was all that the Pentagon asked of the RN and all that Sir John Nott could imagine being needed.

Consequently, he slated for disposal by the end of 1982 the last of post war carriers still in commission, Hermes. She had been expensively refitted in 1981 as a “Harrier Carrier” with a new ski jump bow for the Sea Harriers of the Fleet Air Arm. Nott also announced that the first of the new “through deck cruisers” the light fleet carrier, Invincible, due to be ready for RN service in 1982, would be sold to Australia as a replacement for the aging carrier Melbourne. He had no use for her and therefore neither did the United Kingdom.

The End of the Strike Carriers

The last of Britain’s true strike carriers Eagle and Ark Royal, capable of providing the fleet with Airborne Early Warning, had been decommissioned in the 1970s, with decades of useful service left in them. Their replacements, the strike carriers of the Queen Elizabeth class had been cancelled a decade earlier in the mid 1960s as a cost saving measure by the Labour Government’s Secretary of Defence, Denis Healy. As the last of the major African colonies gained independence he was convinced that aircraft carriers would never be needed again by the UK. The RAF convinced him that its aircraft could provide cover over the sea from shore bases in friendly countries if ever this was needed. Two of these were Australia and South Africa which the RAF moved closer to each other on the charts they showed the MoD to win their argument. New carriers would never be needed and therefore the first ship, whose keel was laid, was broken up again in the builders yard – with incalculable consequences for the future.

Also up for disposal by the end of 1982, as part of the UK Defence Review were the landing ships Fearless and Intrepid. These ships, which the Royal Marine Commandos depended on for their inshore amphibious landing and logistics capability, were seen as

Nothing replaces carriers - the Royal Navy Invincible-class aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious, and Nimitz-class aircraft carriers USS Harry S Truman and USS Dwight D Eisenhower transit in formation during Operation Bold Step (Courtesy Royal Navy)
outmoded and unnecessary” by the MoD, but not by the Royal Marines for whom they were essential operational platforms.

All the wrong signals being hoisted

The folly implicit in these announcements was compounded by Sir John Nott when he announced that the RN’s only Antarctic ice patrol ship, *Endurance*, would cease making her summer pilgrimage to the British Antarctic Dependency Territories of South Georgia, the South Sandwich Islands and the Falkland Islands at the end of the 1982 season and would be disposed of. The reason for her withdrawal, he announced, was that she cost two million pounds per annum, and was therefore too expensive and not considered value for money. The decision to dispose of *Endurance* was immediately opposed by Sir John Nott’s senior cabinet colleague, the Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, who warned him in a succession of notes that this decision would be interpreted in Buenos Aires as a clear sign of Britain’s reduced commitment to maintaining her sovereignty over the Falklands. It was an obvious inference from the point of view of the Argentine government.

An exercise in non-communication

This decision was so clearly, short sighted, politically naive and strategically provocative that *Endurance’s* Commanding Officer, Captain Nick Barker, bravely broke with the apolitical tradition of the ‘silent service’ by publicly warning the Thatcher government that Whitehall was giving all the wrong signals to the newly installed President Leopoldo Galtieri of Argentina. Galtieri and his Chief of Navy, Admiral Anaya, were itching to carve their names in Argentinean history by seizing the long lost “Malvinas” which they claimed as the successor power to Spain, their former colonial power. This would be a popular and, as they thought, risk free national triumph which would save his failing Junta from the political consequences of its own widespread dirty war against its own dissidents, general repressive brutality and economic failure. Later, after they had been defeated, a senior Argentine officer made this point explicitly when he said: ‘We simply never dreamed for one minute that you would, or could, send a naval task force. Had we known then what we know now, the skeptics in the Junta would have had powerful evidence to counter Anaya’s proposals for invasion’. In an age of virtually instant communication the responsible officials in London and Buenos Aires mutually failed to send clear advance signals as to their likely responses to the each others’ actions. The UK and Argentina blundered into a preventable war which neither side sought or anticipated.

Unheeded warnings

Lord Carrington’s and Captain Barker’s warnings in 1981 went equally unheeded by Sir John Nott, a merchant banker by training, who made no connection between the withdrawal of a research ship from naval service and the volatile state of relations between the UK and the Argentinean Junta. He was apparently unaware, despite years of stalled negotiations over the sovereignty of the Falklands, that he was unintentionally sending a ‘green light’ message to a neo fascist military regime that was watching for just such a sign of Britain’s weakening resolve to remain in the South Atlantic. The Prime Minister, a former Minister of Education and Science, was unversed in strategic analysis. Her attention was elsewhere. She lacked personal rapport with John Nott and failed to over rule his decision, as she could and should, have done. She must therefore share some of John Nott’s responsibility for the catastrophic consequences of his myopic, purblind decisionmaking and refusal to take the advice of his First Sea Lord and other strategic experts.

The simultaneous announcement of the withdrawal of *Endurance* and the slating for disposal of the three key ships with amphibious capability, *Hermes, Fearless and Intrepid*, which alone in the RN order of battle could provide the nucleus of a recovery task force, understandably convinced the Junta in Buenos Aires that forcible occupation would be swift and simple. It could not be met with anything other than outrage, bluster and protest in London and at the United Nations. Galtieri reasoned that the decision to dispose of the most powerful ships in the fleet and the withdrawal of *Endurance* could only mean that there were no circumstances in which force would be met with force. He was very nearly right. If it had not been for the Argentinean scrap metal merchants on South Georgia, who through their patriotic folly in hoisting...
the Argentinean flag, precipitated a British reaction and consequently the premature invasion of Port Stanley in April 1982, instead of January 1983 as planned, Galtieri would have been ‘home free’. For by then the RN would have been shorn of its amphibious support ships and 

Hermes critical flight deck. Mrs Thatcher’s steely determination would have lacked the means to become British resolve to recover the lost territory. Her position as PM would have been untenable and her forced resignation would have been followed by electoral defeat for the Conservative party as British voters castigated her and her cabinet for the national disgrace they had suffered.

**Consequences – if the Falkland’s invasion had been in 1983 not 1982**

The consequence of 

Hermes being decommissioned at the end of 1982 and 

Invincible being sold to Australia would have been international humiliation for Britain in 1983 and for the rest of the decade. The irrecoverable Falklands would have become in international law ‘occupied territory’ and pointless and protracted negotiations in the UN would have achieved no change to that ambiguous status. Possession would have been ten tenths of the law. The captive Falkland Islanders would have been flown from their homes, via Argentina, to resettlement centres in UK. Their demands for compensation would, no doubt, still be grinding through the courts of the UK and Argentina. Argentina would today be in possession of the oil deposits, minerals and fish stocks of the Malvinas. The newly popular Galtieri led Junta might have survived in office as a brutal Pinochet style dictatorship for perhaps a decade or more after the triumph of 1983. Argentina’s transition to a modern democracy would have been indefinitely delayed. The rule of law in the international community of nations would have been dealt a serious blow by this well rewarded act of international piracy.

**Admission of ignorance**

All that prevented that set of outcomes was the fortunate fact that 

Hermes, Intrepid and Fearless were not yet decommissioned on 2 April 1982 when Galtieri unwisely launched his premature invasion of Port Stanley. Lord Carrington, the British Foreign Secretary, resigned when the news of the invasion reached London. Sir John Nott offered to resign too but was protected by the PM from the opprobrium which the House of Commons, the British press and public believed he richly deserved. Perhaps she realized that she bore a good deal of the responsibility for allowing all the wrong signals to be sent. In retrospect it can be seen that the decisions jointly taken regarding the future RN fleet were those of amateur politicians unschooled in the strategic

realities of sea power and the enduring requirement for the United Kingdom, like all other medium naval powers, to be capable of exercising sea control and sea denial wherever in the world it has interests, independently of the global super power. In his autobiography, Here today Gone tomorrow, John Nott wrote with revealing candour:

‘I must confess that I wasn’t much aware of the Falkland Islands before the invasion. Of course I knew that we had some Royal Marines there, but I had to remind myself as to where the Falkland Islands were when the scrap merchants landed on South Georgia.

I had a huge great globe in my room in the Ministry of Defence and I went over to it to rediscover the geographical position of the Falklands. I was a bit horrified to see how far away they were…… When I was alone with Margaret Thatcher I expressed my scepticism about the possibility of such an exercise. It was 8,000 miles away and we didn’t have proper land- based air cover.

Nott’s phrase ‘proper land based air cover’ epitomizes his ignorance of the possibility and advantages of carrier based aviation. Presumably a Secretary of State for Defence who did not know where the Falklands were could hardly be expected to understand the utility of the ships he had just decided to scrap either. His ignorance of the facts of maritime life and decisions he made, despite being warned of his folly, were expensive - they indirectly cost 340 British lives and over 1000 Argentinean ones.

Unlearned Lessons in Whitehall

The recent shelling of South Korean territory by Pyongyang in Nov 2011 and the relative impotence of the West to provide a joint maritime response is reminiscent of a similar event earlier this decade. In October 2006, following the North Korean testing of a nuclear device, the UK Government announced that in the event of the USN enforcing a maritime quarantine of North Korean ports the UK would provide an RN presence in North Asia. This sudden announcement was met with anger and dismay by serving and retired members of the RN who had been protesting at the starvation diet that the RN had been on since the arrival in office of the Blair government.

In the event the US has stayed its hand and has not attempted such a blockade of shipping heading for North Korea but the revealing episode perfectly illustrates that not enough has changed in Whitehall since 1982. The same thoughtless assumption that a naval capability can be created and sustained instantaneously still dominates those civil servants in Whitehall who choose not to learn their lessons. Operational capability at sea is a plant that is developed, trained slowly and carefully nurtured. It cannot be continually pruned and yet still expected to produce useful fruit. Nor can it be pulled out by the roots every couple of decades. UK politicians who are “hard wired” to the five year electoral cycle are apparently oblivious to this “inconvenient truth.”

Back to the Future

The 2010 decision to retire the entire UK Harrier force and yet to continue to build the two Queen Elizabeth class carriers is a classic example of standing logic on its head. The decision to make the first carrier finished, Queen Elizabeth, into a giant 70,000 ton temporary helicopter carrier before selling or mothballing it, provides a new low for the MoD even on the “Sir John Nott scale” of stupidity. The intellectual bankruptcy of the whole purchasing and acquisition policy has been laid bare by the decision by the UK PM and Defence Secretary to ask the French President for an agreement to jointly deploy the Charles de Gaulle – a carrier that rarely leaves port without having to return due to technical problems – in the event of a requirement by the UK to project power across the world’s oceans. Since when did Paris consider British interests as being more important than French sailors safety? Is it possible to imagine that the Charles de Gaulle will deploy to the South Atlantic, or anywhere else at the behest of perfidious Albion? As the ship’s namesake was so fond of declaring when faced with any request from UK, the answer must surely be, mais non !

The problem is that a capability which is undeployable is also incapable of being a deterrent. That was one of the lessons of 1982. The Charles de Gaulle is a giant nuclear powered fig leaf intended but failing to hide the nakedness and impotence of the future Royal Navy. No one has yet explained how Frances, with a comparable economy to the UK, has been able to maintain fixed wing flying from carriers when the British, who invented wings over the sea, have given that capability away in a generation.

Meanwhile the cuts to the surface fleet and its manpower begun under
the review entitled Galaxy 06 by successive PMs Blair and Brown continue apace. The final number of Type 45 Daring class air warfare destroyers is half what was intended and needed. Relatively new frigates and destroyers are being mothballed or scrapped every year without replacement. Officer promotions to commander and above will be frozen till 2012 or beyond as a cost cutting measure. This decision will be so destructive to morale that it guarantees that the officers who might be needed to take ships out of mothballs in an emergency will never be available as they will have left the Navy long before the crisis which demands their presence arrives. Another fifteen hundred sailor redundancies are also likely once ships are mothballed. The Reserve manpower pool is to be cut by a further 20%. The closure of one naval base is always being contemplated or threatened as a necessary cost saving measure. These decisions, if implemented as described, will turn the RN into an anorexic Navy which lacks the strength to carry out sustainable blue water fleet operations except on an occasional surge basis. The most concerning parallel with John Nott’s 1981 announcement that he intended to sell off the surface fleet is that these reckless cuts will once again invoke the “law of unintended consequences.”

**Fighting Drug runners at sea – the logical way – under threat from the cuts**

One immediate consequence is likely to be a threat to the RN’s Caribbean patrol, which has an unmatched record of successful interception of drug runners. This patrol will be made at best intermittent or at worst terminated as being unsustainable. The satisfaction in Colombia at this news among the drug cartel operators can only be imagined. The RN frigate on station in the Caribbean has for decades been a serious impediment to the drug cartels swamping the North American and European markets with unlimited quantities of cocaine. In recent decades very significant quantities of hard drugs and amphetamines have been seized at sea by the RN. On just one patrol HMS Cumberland with RFA Wave Knight seized in three arrests a total of 11 tonnes of cocaine.

Unlike war and warlike operations these ongoing naval patrols to curtail drug trafficking attract little attention from the UK press or public. Nevertheless the RN working with the USN and the US Coastguard has played a disproportionate part in protecting the young, the addicted and the vulnerable in Western society from the fatal consequences of using hard drugs. The minimal amount of cash saved by pulling an RN frigate patrol from the Caribbean will no doubt have to be spent many times over by the UK National Health Service, the Police and the Prison Service in dealing with the consequences of uninterrupted drug flows arriving in the UK. As the availability of drugs rises inexorably in Western cities no immediate cause and effect will be ‘sheeted home’ to the absence of a patrolling RN frigate by the US or the European public. Only the Colombian drug dealers will know for sure what a difference the absence of a frigate in the Caribbean has made to their profitability.

The unintended consequence of the reduction of the RN surface fleet will be that the drug barons will have once again have the freedom of the seas for their “unlawful occasions.” The congratulations of UK Secretaries of Defence will cease along with the drug seizures which they celebrated.

**Evacuation by sea of endangered citizens – Beirut 2006**

The UK, like all western societies has large expatriate populations scattered across the world. This became obvious in 2006 in the Middle East when a multi-national force had to lift expatriate populations from the seashore at Beirut while Israeli bombs were devastating whole city blocks of the city behind them. If the time comes when Whitehall is forced by public opinion to attempt a “hot extraction” of these potential hostages, while under fire, by sea it will be the absence of ships capable of defending themselves that will be sorely felt. Expecting friends and allies to carry one’s citizens to safety would diminish Britain into a third rate power. The world is not, contrary to complacent Western opinion becoming a safer place. Every power is a hostage to fortune if it cannot defend its global interest, including its citizens, from terrorism and/or warfare.

**The Legacy of Empire – residual responsibilities for law enforcement**

It may be an unpalatable fact for a generation of UK citizens taught to believe that Britain should be indiscriminately ashamed of its colonial history in Africa, regardless of the injustice of this idée fixe, but the reality is that there are still situations and circumstances where the former colonial power has the only force available to step in, briefly, to support the lawful government and prevent genocidal catastrophe. France has done this repeatedly. The African Union has its not very strong hands full in Congo. Britain is not exempt from its humanitarian responsibilities just because it has run down its capacity for intervention. The last time that the British were called upon was by the government of Sierra Leone earlier this decade. Without amphibious support from the sea by the RN the British operation to stabilize the country, in the face of violent militia rampages, would have been impossible and Sierra Leone would have continued to hemorrhage while the world watched. This would have had serious consequences for the whole of West Africa. It was UK maritime capacity that made this joint operation practical and underwrote its eventual success.

**Why have successive UK governments become sea-blind?**

Leaving aside the question of cost, which is always a matter of choice and priorities, what has happened to the British establishment which has made it so heedless of its need for maritime power? There must be many reasons for this failure to think through the likely consequences of diminished sea power. One explanation is that historically
illiterate populist junior politicians and non specialist senior civil servants in Whitehall cannot imagine the circumstances under which modern surface ships might be needed and therefore dismiss the maintenance of a credible surface fleet as being “surplus to UK requirement at this time.” This over confidence and under spending is not new. Defence Secretary Denis Healy went so far as to predict in 1965, when he cancelled the two new fleet carriers, that the UK would, ‘never again be involved in any form of amphibious operations without the United States.’

In addition to this lack of strategic imagination the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have been continuing at a low tempo for a decade absorbing UK’s defence budget and intellectual energy. Before these counter insurgency wars there were the costly blue helmet stabilization operations in the Balkans dating back to the early 1990’s, followed by the Kosovo intervention from the air. War, even low intensity operations, is expensive and provides no victories, no reasons to ring village church bells, only the slow, but regular procession of inexplicable body bags coming home to an uncomprehending public. The UK has been trying on an unsustainably small percentage of its still considerable GDP, and with under resourced and shrunken forces, to punch above its weight. It has become obvious that the cuts made by the John Major Conservative government at the end of the Cold War, which were intended to provide a “peace dividend” for the nation, in fact largely destroyed the compact but powerful and balanced joint force that was able to deploy for Gulf War One in 1990 by land, sea and air. It no longer exists.

Hard power and soft power – tandem diminution

Consequently, the diminished forces that the UK has been able to deploy have been failing to impress the Pentagon and US State Department for the last fifteen years. Britain’s soft power and influence has been receding along with her hard power. The diplomatic skies are black with chickens coming home to roost. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton on hearing of the scale of the damage about to be inflicted on the UK’s armed forces by the 2010 Strategic Review expressed her deep concern publically. This unusual frankness is an undiplomatic reflection of the Obama administration’s dismay at seeing a further whittling away of the remaining military and naval capability of its principal NATO ally.

Power deferred is power denied

Under the terms of the 2010 Strategic Review it will be 2020 at the very earliest before Prince of Wales will be ready to deploy with strike aircraft. In the meantime, without those “four acres of floating steel,” the UK will be unable to project airpower from the sea in any part of the globe for the next decade. The RAF’s claim that it can and will use bases in Oman for intervention in the Middle East is a comical reprise of the folly of the 1960’s. Oman is not going to let the UK bomb nuclear armed Iran from its bases and then depart. This is fantasy and the fact that it has been seriously suggested by the proponents of the RAF’s anywhere anytime capability shows a worrying disjuncture between operational planners and strategic reality.

The decision not to maintain two carriers, one operational and one in refit, means that it will be pure chance if the carrier is out of maintenance and available when the inevitable crisis comes which requires her presence. Two carriers with one full sized air group is the minimum necessary for a nation to claim with confidence that it has a strike carrier capability. That is what the Navy asked for, planned for and needs if it is to be expected to provide a strike capability or a combat air patrol over a beach head. This lost decade when the RN is in a state of forced hibernation has serious implications for the whole position of the Western Alliance at sea. The vacuum left by the RN will be filled eventually by others or advantage will be taken of its absence.

Why does the decimation of the RN matter internationally?

The Royal Navy is not just an ornamental or heritage navy left over from a past age of Empire and hegemonic war, with no long term significance or role in the twenty first century. On the contrary, it has, despite the salami slicing down the decades, maintained a record for consistent intervention and operational effectiveness unmatched among other European medium navies. The rest of Europe traditionally looks north across the channel for naval leadership to the UK. However for the next decade at least the RN will be smaller than the French navy and as small as the Dutch and Italian. The European trident will perforce be passed to Paris. Without its strike carriers the RN will swiftly be stripped of its capability to undertake an operational or influential role in the world. This will be a serious loss not just to the UK and Europe but also to friends of freedom of the seas and defenders of the Law of the Sea everywhere.

‘Command of the Sea’ should not be vested in only the USN

The complacent assumption in Western capitals, including Canberra, that the Western Alliance’s Command of the Sea will endure indefinitely without challenge is misplaced. In particular the belief that the USN is so powerful and all pervasive that no other navy will ever be needed to police this planet’s oceans and littoral waters is a pernicious and perilous assumption. There are realistic scenarios in which the US government may choose not to act, or is constrained from doing so, but which nevertheless require intervention, stabilization or force projection from the sea. Constabulary tasks such as mass evacuation of foreign nationals from a hot war zone by sea, as occurred in Lebanon in 2006, may become more common, particularly in the Middle East. These may not be unopposed as they were in Beirut in 2006. Conflict for remaining maritime resources and the requirement for protection of diminishing oilfields are more likely than not. The capability for maritime intervention can
only be provided from ships capable of protecting themselves, those in company with them and also providing combat air patrols, helicopter airlift and seaborne landings of troops. Frigates, escorts and ships taken up from trade cannot provide that capability on their own. Navies and nations with large responsibilities need a few large ships and many smaller ones with long reach to protect them.

The South Atlantic re-visited?

The three light fleet carriers of the RN’s Invincible class have more or less provided this capability since the UK’s last true full sized fleet carriers were scrapped. Now Invincible is available for scrap and her sisters Illustrious and Ark Royal are both being finally and irrevocably decommissioned. The last Sea Harrier landed on Ark Royal for the last time in November 2010. With the Sea Harriers the UK has lost its only all weather seaborne strike fighter capability. Consequently as Admiral Woodward has pointed out publically the RN now has less capability for either blue water or littoral operations than it had in 1982. A handful of RAF Tornados on the runway at Port Stanley, and the RN’s attack submarines are all the UK deterrent has left if the Argentine government reverses that capability. Consequently as Admiral Woodward has pointed out publically the RN now has less capability for either blue water or littoral operations than it had in 1982. A handful of RAF Tornados on the runway at Port Stanley, and the RN’s attack submarines are all the UK deterrent has left if the Argentine government reverses its policy of using diplomacy, not force, to recover the Falklands.

An antipodean perspective on the cuts to the RN

What do these draconian cuts to the RN and its manpower mean to and for Australia and the RAN in particular? Clearly the operational contact between the RN and the RAN in the Gulf may over time be affected, though in the medium term the UK is likely to prioritize the Gulf patrols in order to be seen to be playing its part, with the US and other NATO partners, in keeping the volatile Persian Gulf secure. The UK/US ‘special relationship’ depends, in part, on this ability to fly the Union Jack in the Gulf at sea.

The most immediate effect on the RAN of continuing cuts has already been noticed in the numbers of trained and experienced mid career RN officers and senior sailors who like their ships, have been “up for disposal” over the last decade and hence seeking a continuing naval career in the RAN.

Throughout its history the RN has continued to supply a very useful augmentation of trained senior sailor and officer ranks into the RAN. This has been a most cost effective trickle of trained talent, all paid for by the UK taxpayer and available for immediate service with a minimum of cross training required. This recruitment of RN officers and senior sailors was once a cause for concern among those RAN members who worried that it might impact on their promotion prospects. This concern is not well founded. In practice RN transferees, both senior sailors and officers, are constrained by the rank granted them, (often a demotion), and/or their seniority within that rank, from being immediately competitive with RAN personnel. In the longer run they quite properly rise to the rank commensurate with their talent, drive and expertise.

The proverb that, “it is an ill wind that does not blow someone some good,” would appear to be true, for due to it the RAN has a “once in a generation” opportunity to fill its shortage categories with RN officers who have come to the end of their ability to stay in a fleet which is again under attack from Whitehall. The aircraft handlers made redundant from the decks of Ark Royal and her sisters would be a most logical target for recruitment given that the RAN’s LHD’s are taking shape in Spain and will need specialist upper deck skills that the RAN has not trained sailors for in over a generation.

Collective amnesia in Whitehall – again

The often expressed mess deck remark that, “the British Navy can defeat any enemy as long as it is not the British Ministry of Defence” is once again proving prophetic. The ‘smaller but better Navy’ that the MoD is proposing will quickly turn into a smaller and bitter navy as the operational tempo remains and the ships and people to undertake them wear out. Twenty nine years on from Sir John Nott’s egregious errors of judgment and the preventable and painful war for the recovery of the Falkland Islands, collective amnesia and misplaced frugality seems to have set in once again in Whitehall.

One can only hope that the price for this latest attack on the RN’s operational capability will be paid for only in cash, not, as it was in 1982 in the South Atlantic, in the blood of young pilots, soldiers, marines and sailors.

Lieutenant Commander Desmond Woods RAN has served in the Royal New Zealand Navy; the Royal Navy, the British Army, and the Royal Australian Navy. He is currently serving in Canberra.
Between August and December 2010, I was privileged to be seconded to the Lowy Institute as Navy Fellow. This was the first time that Navy had a visiting fellow placed at the Lowy Institute. The army has had a Chief of Army Fellow since the early days of the Lowy Institute’s existence. It was an interesting, informative, enlightening and broadening experience. My aim is to impart to the reader some of that experience.

The Lowy Institute is an independent international policy think tank based in Sydney. Its objective is to generate new ideas and dialogue on international developments and Australia’s role in the world. Its mandate is broad. It ranges across all the dimensions of international policy debate in Australia – economic, political and strategic – and it is not limited to a particular geographic region.

The Institute has two core tasks:
1. To produce distinctive research and fresh policy options for Australia’s international policy; and
2. To promote wide discussion of Australia’s role in the world.

With these tasks in mind, the Lowy Institute seeks to throw fresh light on issues of relevance to Australia through rigorous research, and then to generate workable policy ideas. The Institute also seeks to contribute to wider international debate. The Institute provides an accessible and high quality forum for discussion of Australian foreign policy and international relations, through debates, seminars, lectures, dialogues and conferences.

The Lowy Institute was established in April 2003 as the result of a gift by Mr Frank Lowy AC, one of Australia’s leading businessmen, to mark the 50th anniversary of his arrival in Australia.

The Institute is non-partisan and is home to a range of policy ideas. Its staff and fellows speak with individual voices. The quality of output is derived from the insights and experience of policy practitioners, academic experts and business people. It also seeks to bring new voices and external viewpoints into the Australian debate, for example through an active program of internships for young people and the involvement of members of the Australian diaspora.

My personal involvement with the Lowy Institute started in 2006 when I became a regular attendee at the Lowy’s ‘Wednesday Lunch at the Lowy’ (WLL) series of lunchtime presentations. The first WLL I attended was given by Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, a Senior Fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London and well known commentator on Indian affairs. At the time, I was Commander Plans in Fleet Headquarters and the RAN was enhancing its relationship with the Indian Navy. Thus, it was very topical. Before long, I was a regular attendee at Lowy events when opportunity permitted.

In 2008, as a speaker at the RAN Sea Power Conference, I was invited to attend a Lowy Institute convened closed door roundtable with Vice Admiral Anup Singh, Indian Navy Deputy Chief of Naval Staff. This kicked off what became a regular invitation to attend other closed door events hosted by the Lowy Institute from time to time. Another occurred in late 2008 to commemorate the Great White Fleet visits. Yet another, in 2009, was convened to examine the maritime implications of the Defence White Paper. By the time of this latter event, I was in command of HMAS Newcastle and, looking for a potential job for the period June – December 2010, hit upon the idea of a short attachment with the Lowy Institute. The rest, as they say, is...
history. My tenure at the Lowy Institute was not necessarily the beginning of a brand new posting opportunity for Commanders. However, I do feel that there is potential for further attachments by naval officers. More on that later.

So how was I employed and what did I achieve while working at the Lowy Institute? I was taken on primarily to assist as the maritime adviser to the Lowy Institute MacArthur Foundation Asia Security Project. Now in its second year, the Asia Security Project (ASP) aims to formulate a practical agenda for security cooperation, taking as its starting point the realities of relations among the region’s powers. The region referred to is the Asia Pacific and is defined as encompassing the area from the western Indian Ocean through to the Western Pacific. The ASP is funded by a significant grant from the MacArthur Foundation.

While the ASP emphasises the promotion of cooperative relations among the major powers involved in East Asia, it also aims to incorporate the views of other regional actors. The opening phase of the project charted the enduring constraints to security cooperation in the Asia Pacific, while the second and third phases will identify, and then promote, the most promising institutional and less formal arrangements for cooperation and confidence building. These are often referred to as second track dialogue or initiatives.

The initial phase of the ASP completed in mid-2010 with the publication of Power and Choice: Asian Security Futures. For the remainder of 2010, the Lowy Institute’s ‘MacArthur team’ coordinated the roll out of a series of ‘Strategic Snapshots’, written by various internal and foreign experts. I was honoured to be asked to write one of these, pertaining to AirSea Battle. AirSea Battle is an operational concept published in mid-2010 by the Washington think tank, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

I was also invited to co-author the major maritime centric paper for the project. The paper, untitled at the time of writing, was launched by the Chief of Navy at a joint Naval War College and Lowy Institute conference in February. Additionally, I co-wrote and published a short paper on naval diplomacy and engagement, with Rory Medcalf, the Program Director for International Security and a former diplomat himself.

On the side, the Lowy Institute was my introduction into the world of blogging and also the use of Twitter. I was invited to contribute to the Lowy’s reputable and prominent blog The Interpreter (www.lowyinterpreter.org). Although tentative initially, I soon warmed to the idea of contributing to debate online and had some interaction with other commentators through ‘Reader Ripostes’. I had thought early on that my posts were somewhat anodyne. However, it was pointed out that what may seem dull to me might be quite interesting for the blog followers without much maritime knowledge or experience. Indeed, the feedback from Lowy staff at all levels and from external contributors was positive and confidence boosting. This led me into the next social networking field – Twitter.

I had noticed that a number of my colleagues were actively using Twitter for professional purposes. In fact, my wife was using Twitter similarly in the education industry for professional development, with much success. Having signed on and registered, within three days I was following 150 people and had 40 followers. The real benefit lay in the constant stream of information flowing into either the computer or my Blackberry. In terms of blogging, I had been surfing the vast array of defence, defence industry and defence pundit’s websites and blogs in order to gain a sense of what was going on around the traps in the defence and navy/maritime world to inform my own blogging. It was a painstaking process, even using RSS feeds. Twitter obviated that need. Tweets come direct with pithy commentary and a link where appropriate. This medium makes it easy to sort the interesting and relevant from the uninteresting and irrelevant.

When North Korea started shelling Yeongpyong Island, the ‘Twitterverse’ lit up. Through ‘re-tweeting’ of ‘re-tweeting’, it was clear that some information was coming out from on the ground sources. I’m sure intelligence officers and analysts are all over this. From the think tank’s perspective, it makes for a rich source of information from which to draw on and contribute analysis and commentary in various forms.

How was I able to participate in all of this, as a serving naval officer? My only caveat was to comply with DI(G) ADMIN 08-01 relating to public comment. I did that throughout. The sources and information I used were all public. Where topics strayed close to sensitive issues I either drew it to someone else’s attention to blog about or discuss, or put the information out without any comment or analysis. Moreover, I did not delve into areas that common sense dictated keeping well clear of. As with all publications and comment from the Lowy Institute, written and verbal product from staff does not represent the view of the organisation. Under the terms of the Defence Instruction, so it was for me too.

The final aspect to highlight...

Adrift in a Think Tank: Insights from the Lowy Institute

from my secondment is the ongoing program of visits by notable officials and academics to the Lowy Institute. In the short period of my tenure, I sat in on closed door discussions with: representatives from the US National Intelligence Council; US Under Secretary for Defence for Nuclear Deterrence; Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd; Professors David Shambaugh and Robert Sutter from Georgetown University; Professor Aileen Baveira from the Philippines; Dr Yoshihide Soeya from Japan; Dr Matthew Levitt from the Washington Institute; and Linda Jakobson from SIPRI’s Beijing office, amongst others. Along the way, the WLL program included speakers ranging from Professor Hugh White, to Alan Joyce, CEO of Qantas, to Ambassador Dan Kuertzer from the US, to Dr Simon Longstaff from the St James Ethics Centre. It remains an eclectic, interesting and informative program.

From day to day, though, I was able to interact with people of sharp intellect and diverse experiences. Michael Wesley, the Executive Director of the institute, is well known in foreign policy and academic circles. He co-hosted one of the streams at the 2020 summit. Martine Letts, Deputy Director, is a former Ambassador to Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay and adviser to Minister for Foreign Affairs Gareth Evans. Andrew Shearer, the Director of Studies, was John Howard’s foreign policy adviser. Rory Medcalf, Program Director for International Security and my immediate boss during my tenure, is a former journalist, ONA analyst and diplomat. These people, amongst many, bring rich knowledge, experience and insight to the Lowy Institute. I hope some of it brushed off!

The fellowship was a remarkable opportunity. The Lowy Institute is unlikely to re-introduce a permanent service related fellow given the recent demise of the Chief of Army Fellow position. However, I feel that periodic, targeted and short tenure fellowships from the Navy could be realised into the future. These ideally would be undertaken by staff course qualified, post command Commanders who hold appropriate postgraduate credentials. It is a potential win-win for the Navy and for the Lowy Institute.

My short tenure at the Lowy Institute was a positive experience. I feel privileged to have worked with very high calibre people in a completely different context and environment to Navy. I know that I was able to lend a different perspective to some matters, to provide an actual practitioner’s appraisal of academic postulation and to ‘stick my head above the parapet’ of public commentary and have a go. For the Navy, I have gained an appreciation for how policy is shaped and influenced by think tanks, and also from the bureaucracy. I was forced to sharpen my writing skills to match the distinctive think tank style. I also vastly increased the network of experience from which I can draw in the future. Ultimately, my efforts at the Lowy Institute complemented the aims and objectives of the Sea Power Centre. I believe that I was able to raise the already high level of naval and maritime debate amongst my colleagues. ✹

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Dear Mum and Father,

As we are due in port tomorrow I will write this letter now and post it by Air Mail as soon as we get in. I hope there is one waiting for me when we arrive or I'll be very disappointed.

We have had a very exciting trip this time. One day last week I was on the forecastle (top deck in front) having some rifle practice when 'Action Stations' was sounded. You should have seen the sailors move. In 3 minutes every man was at his post with all guns loaded and ready and in 10 minutes we had the plane ready to take off. We clapped on speed and raced to where the look out had sighted a ship but to our disappointment it was only a friendly ship, so back we went to bed to get what sleep we could before our usual 'hour before dawn action stations' which we always have in case a ship has trailed us during the night and is waiting for daylight before attacking.

That night as it was very hot we all slept on the deck and were soundly asleep when at ¼ past 1 'Action Stations' was sounded again. It was a pitch black night but everybody hopped to it and in about 10 minutes we were ready to go again. Suddenly our searchlights were switched on and outlined in the beam some hundreds of yards away was another ship. While we were signalling to each other our ship was slowly cruising around the other one in ever narrowing circles and all guns trained and it was just like a cat playing with a mouse.

I have often wondered how I would feel if we went into action and whether I would be scared or not, but I was very excited and feeling disappointed because if we did fight, as it was night time and I would not be able to get any photographs. However it turned out to be another false alarm as it was also a friendly ship, so back we went to bed to get what sleep we could before our usual 'hour before dawn action stations' which we always have in case a ship has trailed us during the night and is waiting for daylight before attacking.

That same day about 4 we had another alarm and as this was the third within 24 hours we all thought that at last we were going to have a fight. What we had sighted though turned out to be a gannery target, and we sent a sea boat off to pick it up. From the markings on it the officers assumed that it was from an enemy raider. They had apparently put it out for shooting practice, then spotted us coming and went for their lives without waiting to pick it up. As the target had only been in the water for about 3 hours and we knew an enemy raider was somewhere in the vicinity it looks as if that was the case. Like all the rest of the boys I was very disappointed, especially as we had apparently missed it by such a short time. However we might have better luck on our next trip and run into it.

Sometime ago I took some photographs of a convoy and the Captain sent word that he would like to see proofs of the ones I had taken. He liked them so much that I had to get special paper and print him two 15 x 12 enlargements which he had framed and hung in his cabin. He complimented me on them and said they were particularly fine, then asked me to come up to the bridge the following day and take his photograph. I was certainly nervous but I took 4 of him and luckily for me they all turned out good ones. I did proofs of them today and sent them up to him and when he sends them back I will have some more enlargements to do I suppose. As long as he is satisfied that is the main thing anyway.

We have had some very hot weather on this trip and I have mostly lived in shorts and sandshoes. I am enclosing a photograph that Dick took of me in the plane the other day. I look kinda lean don’t I, but am feeling pretty good considering, and not feeling the loss of weight and scrap. I am getting funny racing through the ship all wet and only a pair of shorts on. On day man was all lathered up with soap and he raced out just as he was in his birthday suit. Believe me when that alarm goes you drop everything and go for your life.

I forgot to mention that when ‘Action Stations’ went on the second day I was having a bath. I must have looked damn funny racing through the ship all wet and only a pair of shorts on. On day man was all lathered up with soap and he raced out just as he was in his birthday suit. Believe me when that alarm goes you drop everything and go for your life no matter what you are doing.

We are arriving back at Fremantle tomorrow. Fremantle itself isn’t much of a place as it is a very old city and a typical sea-port, but Perth, about 12 miles away, is a very modern place and is quite a busy city. They have some very nice shops in it and Cox Bros. also have a branch but I haven’t been in to it yet.

You’ll be surprised to know that the other night in Perth, a chap tapped me on the shoulder, and when I turned around it was Mr Parsons. He was on one of the ships that we had with us. I certainly got a shock to run into him and he looks very well which is hardly to be wondered at since he is away from that ‘beaut’ wife of his. He probably thinks this war will be a picnic by comparison.

7.10.41

We arrived safely this morning and as the mail closes in a few minutes I will finish this now and write again later.

Your Loving Son

Keith

P.S. Give my love to Lance and all the others.

Same Address

7.10.41

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
The Global Maritime Partnership and the Aegis Global Enterprise: Australia at the Crossroads of the “Maritime Century”

By Captain George Galdorisi, US Navy (Retired) and Scott C. Truver, Ph.D.

Perspective

The nexus of world power is shifting decidedly to the Asia-Pacific region and Indo-Pacific Ocean, Robert Kaplan explains in Monsoon. “The Greater Indian Ocean,” he writes, “stretching eastward from the Horn of Africa past the Arabian Peninsula, the Iranian plateau, and the Indian Subcontinent, all the way to the Indonesian archipelago and beyond, may comprise a map as iconic to the new century as Europe was to the last one.” Its shores washed by both oceans, Australia in 2011 is poised to be a critical player – some would say the critical player – in the security and prosperity of the entire Indo-Asia region. And, as Australians know, the oceans – not the land – define the region, and those oceans and the global commons are more important to Australia’s security and prosperity than ever before.

These themes were echoed by Air Vice-Marshall Kym Osley, AM, CSC, Australian Defence Attaché and Head of Australian Defence Staff Washington in an interview for The Year In Defense 2010. “The world of the future will be increasingly multipolar and more focused on the Asia Pacific Region,” he said. “I think we’re now seeing that the power is shifting to the Pacific and Indian oceans and will continue to do so in the next two decades.” Hence the Defence White Paper is most appropriate given its title of Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century.” This Defence White Paper, the first such document issued by the Australian Department of Defence in nearly a decade, represents the highest-level document describing the way ahead for the Australian Defence Force.

Globalized Regional Threats and Challenges

As globalization has accelerated, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, it has generated a step-function increase in maritime trade – seaborne trade having more than quadrupled in the past four decades – bringing prosperity to Australia and the community of nations. However, with the dependence on reliable oceanic commerce to undergird world prosperity come vulnerabilities. Those who would disrupt trade and the rule of law on the global commons have many opportunities to attack vessels on the high seas or coastal waters.
The dramatic increase in piracy is but one manifestation of the threat to the global commons. Climate change, burgeoning populations and demographic shifts to coastal and near-coastal regions, and ever-greater pressures on marine resources are focusing attention on a broad spectrum of irregular challenges that navies and coastguards must deal with today. Natural disasters – hurricanes, tsunamis, coastal flooding, volcanic events, earthquakes and a host of others – bring suffering to millions. Often, naval and maritime forces are the only ones capable of responding in a timely fashion and in the volumes necessary to bring assistance and relief.

Australia is among the most proactive nations in ensuring the rule of law on the global maritime commons. And the Royal Australian Navy has been prominent in this and especially in teaming with regional and global partners in accomplishing this task. This has been embedded at the highest levels of national policy. Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030 puts it this way:

Australia’s defence policy... entails the maintenance of alliances and international defence relationships that enhance our own security and allows us to work with others when we need to pool our resources...this defence policy means that we must have the capacity to lead military coalitions when we have shared strategic interests at stake with others... and make tailored contributions to military coalitions when we share wider strategic interests with others.

As Jack McCaffrie and Chris Rahman point out in the U.S. Naval War College Review, during the past decade Australia has shifted from fielding a defence force with a continental focus to building one that is predominantly maritime. Part of this dramatic strategic shift stems from the fact Australians live in a decidedly dangerous neighbourhood. Tensions on the regional maritime commons are high.

Whether it is North Korea lobbing missiles over Japan in 1998, China’s repeated skirmishes with many of the ASEAN nations in the South China Sea during the past decade, or perhaps most egregiously North Korea’s sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan in May 2010 and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010, Australia and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) have been prominent in addressing threats and challenges as part of regional and global partnerships. And increasingly, those nations that threaten Australia and other nations on the global commons possess ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction.

**Australia’s Leadership in Regional Maritime Security**

Australia and the RAN have been leaders in the global maritime partnership (GMP) as well as regional partnerships throughout the Indo-Pacific region. Indeed, the need for global and regional partnerships is likely to increase in the future. The emerging international environment after the end of the Cold War is evolving around the concept of global interconnectedness and the need for nations to work in “cooperative action” to maintain the stability of the global economy. The 2010 Australian Maritime Doctrine notes:

Australia’s strategic environment is most fundamentally shaped by the global distribution of
The Global Maritime Partnership and the Aegis Global Enterprise: Australia at the Crossroads of the “Maritime Century”

Power...the strategic environment is increasingly complex and interconnected, and the boundaries between international and domestic security issues are progressively more blurred.8

And as defense budgets internationally come under increasing stress (witness the U.S. DoD mandate to save almost US$200B during the next five years and the United Kingdom’s draconian defense reductions impacting all UK defense components, but especially the Royal Navy with cutbacks in ships, aircraft and personnel), nations and especially their navies are likely to seek even more savings while generating greater effectiveness via collective regional if not global security.

But while the concept of the GMP has been embraced by the international community since the then-U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Michael Mullen first unveiled the “Thousand Ship Navy” in September 2005, and regional maritime partnerships have sprung up to do important work such as anti-piracy patrols and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, the “high-end” of naval warfare has not been part of the concept of operations of the GMP.

As Australia moves forward to make the RAN a world-class navy, however, national, defence and RAN officials are mindful of the potential for the RAN to be involved in “high-end” warfare in the future, either solely or as part of global or regional partnerships. Accordingly, as the RAN looks ahead, one aspect of “high-end” warfare, dealing with ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), represents a crucial aspect of the RAN’s capability and capacity.

This is consistent with Australia’s strategic worldview, as articulated in Defence White Paper, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century:

**Force 2030:** “There is no greater responsibility for a national government than the defence of the nation, its people and their interests.

Australia has an enduring strategic interest in the stability of the wider Asia-Pacific region, which stretches from North Asia to the Eastern Indian Ocean.” Air Vice-Marshall Kym Osley, AM, CSC, Australian Defence Attaché and Head of Australian Defence Staff explained it a tad differently: “Australia is really a middle power; one that considers itself as part of the broader world community, and who certainly sees itself as very relevant on the world stage.”

Australia’s decision to purchase the Hobart-class Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD) equipped with the U.S. Navy Aegis weapon system and the RAN’s exploration of potentially equipping these ships with ballistic missile defense capability reflect the commitment to field a navy that is clearly poised to take a more prominent leadership role in the Indo-Pacific region. Acquiring this capability could open the door to enhancing Australia’s leadership of the GMP in the area of “high-end” warfare, specifically, defense against ballistic missiles armed with WMD.11

As Air Vice-Marshall Osley notes; “The air warfare destroyers will deliver to the Navy a significantly enhanced air defence capability primarily through the acquisition of the U.S. Aegis missile and weapons control systems that will be installed in each of the air warfare destroyers.”

The capability of the Aegis weapon system to be the “shield of the GMP fleet” and defend against manned and unmanned aircraft and cruise missiles has spawned an Aegis Global Enterprise (AGE) through which increasing numbers of navies are embracing the Aegis solution. Moreover, the success of Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) – 21 successful test intercepts in 25 tries since January 2002 – has resulted in several navies embracing as well the BMD component of Aegis. The President’s Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA), announced in September 2009 to protect Europe from the threat of ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), is but one manifestation of the growing global reliance on Aegis BMD. Indeed, one of the major themes underpinning...
NATO’s November 2010 Lisbon summit was collective defense against ballistic missiles. Clearly, the type of navy a nation acquires has an enormous impact on what kind of warfare that country is equipped to undertake. For the Australian Defence Force (ADF) in general and the RAN specifically, there is compelling evidence that Australia will build a navy equipped for high-end, coalition warfare. As McCaffrie and Chris Rahman point out:

Recent, ongoing, and future (Force 2030) ADF capability developments will dramatically enhance the potential for Australian maritime forces to contribute to U.S.-led coalitions in future contingencies. The air warfare destroyers and, especially the new frigates – with their LACMs, SM-6 missiles, CEC, possibly theatre-ballistic-missile defence, and advanced antisubmarine warfare systems – would add measurably to any U.S. Navy-led maritime force. The white paper proposes a robust future defence force with a very strong maritime emphasis, including a sea-based strike capacity and the ability to deploy, protect, and sustain a substantial land force.

But, like other nations and navies, the RAN’s resources are constrained, and the need for Aegis BMD must be balanced against other defence needs. So at this juncture, it is fair to ask, just how compelling is the threat of ballistic missiles armed with WMD and how, and why, should the RAN be prepared to deal with this threat?

The Need for Effective BMD

In early 2011, some 30 countries have ballistic missiles deployed, compared to only nine countries in 1972. Potential enemies possess ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction and today’s rogue leaders view WMD as weapons of choice, not of last resort. In 2007, the last year for which complete records are available, potential adversaries launched 120 ballistic missiles in tests and demonstrations, a significant total compared to previous years. This spike in foreign ballistic missile launchings, especially in the short- to intermediate-range category, was particularly pronounced in China, North Korea and Iran.

In the Indo-Pacific region, China’s impressive inventory of missiles underpins its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capability, an emerging capability and capacity so dangerous to it has led directly to urgent calls to deal with it. As pointed out by Marshall Hoyler in the Naval War College Review, “China seeks the capacity to find U.S. aircraft carriers roughly a thousand miles from the mainland and to attack them with homing ASBMs (antiship ballistic missiles).” Among the most troubling aspects of this threat is China’s development of the world’s first anti-ship “carrier killer” ballistic missile, the DF-21D, leading commentators to note; “The DF-21D is the ultimate carrier-killer missile.”

The half-century of progressive Aegis system and Standard Missile development that enabled the U.S. President to make his decision to pursue a Phased Adaptive Approach for ballistic missile defense in Europe signals not only a reliance on Aegis BMD to defend Europe and the Middle East, as well as its previous mission to protect much of the Pacific Rim, but much more. With each success of the Aegis BMD test program, other states have realized the enormous potential of Aegis BMD to defend against short-, mid- and long-range ballistic missiles.

Part of the attraction of the Aegis weapon systems in general – and Aegis BMD specifically – to an increasing number of nations is that Aegis BMD takes maximum advantage of more than $80 billion of investment in the sensors, weapons, command-and-control systems, ships, people and facilities that comprise the Aegis weapon system. The early success of Aegis BMD is not surprising considering the history of progress fueled by substantial and steady investment in developing the baseline and upgraded systems: nearly 50 years of Aegis weapons system and more than 60 years of missile research.
development, testing and real-world performance. And as Australia and the RAN look to the future and consider the efficacy of Aegis BMD for this Canberra’s defence needs, it is instructive to look to what is happening half a world away in Europe.

**Aegis BMD Foundation for PAA**

The Phased Adaptive Approach for Europe is being built around the Aegis BMD system and the Standard Missile-Three (SM-3) to defeat the short- to intermediate-range ballistic missile threat. The PAA, in 2011 being implemented only in Europe, could eventually be adapted within other regions, particularly the Middle East and East Asia. It can also be specifically tailored to the threats unique to those regions, including their scale, the scope and pace of their development, and the capabilities available and most suited for deployment. The U.S. President determined that the Aegis/SM-3-centered BMD option, complemented by other, ground-based missile defense systems, was sufficiently mature for near-term operations and had the growth potential to perform this critical mission as missile defense requirements increase in complexity and danger.

An Aegis-enabled European BMD is now embedded in NATO’s new strategic concept, as a “core element” with the document going further to state, “NATO will actively seek cooperation on missile defense with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners.” Indeed, the new PAA-NATO BMD approach has been instrumental in turning Russia’s previously strident criticism of NATO BMD to a desire to join in this collective defense. As the 2010 U.S. Government Ballistic Missile Defense Review acknowledged:

> Other allies already own or are working with the United States to acquire specific capabilities, such as naval vessels equipped with the Aegis defensive system, that could be adapted to include a missile defense capability.... A primary U.S. emphasis is on ensuring appropriate burden sharing. The Administration recognizes that allies do not view the specifics of the missile threat in the same way, and do not have equal resources to apply to this problem, but there is general recognition of a growing threat and the need to take steps now to address both existing threats and emerging ones.19

The participation of allied navies in the U.S. Aegis program – initially Japan and later Australia, Korea and Norway – has laid the foundation for an AGE. The United States began with a foreign military sales relationship with Japan, moved to an expanded relationship with Australia and Korea, and then to a commercial relationship with Spain as well as an enterprise between Norway and Spain. Several other governments have expressed interest in the Aegis weapon system and Aegis BMD.

In 2011, the foundation for an Aegis BMD-based GMP has evolved as allies build Aegis warships. The Australian MOD became interested in using the Aegis architecture to connect other maritime assets into an integrated architecture as well. South Korea has announced plans to build six 5,600-ton KDX-III Aegis-equipped destroyers beginning in 2019, to complement the three Sejondaewon Ham KDX-III
destroyers that will be in service by 2012. Several navies have participated in the U.S. Aegis BMD Flight Test Mission (FTM) program. The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) Aegis Destroyer Kirishima (DDG 174) was the first foreign warship to participate, in FTM-10 (2004). The HNMS Tromp (F 803) was the first European participant in the test program, with the ship’s modified SMART-L systems tracking the ballistic missile target in FTM-11. The Spanish Navy’s Mendez Nunez (F 104), outfitted with a BMD software modification, tracked a ballistic missile target in FTM-12. Four times over the past several years, JMSDF ships launched SM-3 missiles at medium-range, separating-warhead targets.

The Way Ahead for RAN BMD

Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030 is unequivocal: “Maintaining a credible defence capability is a crucial contributor to our security, as it can serve to deter potential adversaries from using force against us or our allies, partners and neighbors.” Deterring the burgeoning ballistic missile threat is likewise a crucial part of this strategy. This commitment by Australia is real, as Air Vice-Marshall Osley explained, “We see it as very important that we invest in security, and as a consequence, we have maintained a relatively high rate of investment, by world standards, in our military forces.”

And it is this growing worldwide commitment to Aegis BMD – a capability that Australia may well embrace for its three Air Warfare Destroyers – that promises virtually unlimited potential to field an international global maritime partnership that is well-capable of defending against what is clearly the most imminent – and growing – threat to nations and navies on land and sea alike, the threat of ballistic missiles armed with WMD.

The AWD will be an enormously capable ship. According to Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, “The Government will proceed with the acquisition of three Air Warfare Destroyers (AWD). In order to enhance the air defence capabilities of the AWDs, the Government will equip them with the Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) long-range anti-aircraft missile. The SM-6 missile is the most advanced weapon of its type, with a range of more than 200 nautical miles (370 kilometres) and effectively extends the air defence protection offered by these advanced ships. As they enter service, the AWDs will be equipped with a sophisticated Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), which enable each vessel to act as part of a wider ‘grid’ of sensor and weapon platforms that can share surveillance and targeting information. Clearly, the robustness of the planned AWD would make a BMD capability a natural transformational capability.”

Aegis BMD is making the Global Maritime Partnership girded for high-end warfare a reality. Should Australia elect to add this significant capability to its fleet it would quickly become one of the most important partners in the Aegis BMD enterprise, and in so doing, further serve to achieve the goals of the Defence White Paper.

George Galdorisi is Director of the Corporate Strategy Group at the Space and Naval Warfare System’s Center Pacific, the US Navy’s C4ISR laboratory and Center of Excellence. Prior to joining the lab as a Navy civilian, he served for 30 years as a naval aviator, commanding two helicopter squadrons, USS Cleveland, and Amphibious Squadron Seven. He published “Naval Cooperation for the Future Force” in Headmark (Dec. 2009)

Dr. Truver is Director, National Security Programs, Gryphon Technologies LC, and since November 2007 has managed Gryphon Technologies’ strategic planning and communications efforts. In addition to his corporate responsibilities, he supervises and carries out research, analytical and advocacy efforts relating to international security, homeland security and defense, and naval and maritime requirements and programs. Since 1972, Dr. Truver has participated in numerous studies for government and private industry in the United States and abroad, and he has also written extensively for U.S. and foreign publications.
The Global Maritime Partnership and the Aegis Global Enterprise: Australia at the Crossroads of the “Maritime Century”

(Endnotes)


9 Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, op.cit.


11 For example, Air Vice-Marshall Osley notes, “The air warfare destroyers will deliver to the Navy a significantly enhanced air defence capability primarily through the acquisition of the U.S. Aegis missile and weapons control systems that will be installed in each of the air warfare destroyers.” Interview: Air Vice-Marshall Kym Osley,” op.cit.

12 Ibid.


19 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, op.cit., p. 32. The success of Aegis BMD afloat and the promise of Aegis Ashore have also garnered interest from a wide range of non-traditional partners such as India (Amy Kazmin and Farhan Bokhari, “New Delhi Weighs up US Missile Shield,” Financial Times, January 8, 2009).

20 Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, op.cit., p. 11.


22 Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century, op.cit., p. 71.
Book Reviews

Commanding Lincoln’s Navy: Union Naval Leadership During the Civil War
Reviewed by Commodore Jack McCaffrie RAN (ret’d)

Quite naturally, most writings on the American Civil War deal with the land campaigns and those who led them. Stephen Taaffe’s book Commanding Lincoln’s Navy, instead focuses on the Union Navy in the Civil War and in particular on those who led it. This is not a chronicle of the Civil War at sea and on the rivers. Instead it is a penetrating examination of the political and operational leadership of the Union Navy in the context of the major naval campaigns of the War.

The Navy’s contribution to the War was significant and was exercised through some 58,000 officers and sailors manning and supporting up to 680 ships and other craft of various kinds. The major campaigns included the blockade of Confederate ports on the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico coasts, protection of Union sea lines of communication from Confederate raiders and riverine operations, especially those to take control of the Mississippi River, which was so vital to the South for transport and the unity of their territory.

The Union Navy leadership which Taaffe analyses was headed by the Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, a New England newspaper proprietor, once a Democrat, one of Lincoln’s political appointments and a man with some prior experience within the Navy bureaucracy. For virtually all of the war he had as his Assistant Secretary of the Navy Gustavus Fox, who had served in the Navy before succeeding in business. During the War, Fox took care of the day to day running of the Navy Department and in Taaffe’s words was essentially Welles’ Chief of Naval Operations. The chain of command was simple in that Welles had direct access to Lincoln – but as Taaffe points out repeatedly, he was not the only one in the Navy who did.

The uniformed leadership comprised the commanders of the six geographically-based squadrons, which included the North Atlantic Squadron and the East and West Gulf Squadrons. Initially these officers were all captains or commanders, but during the War some of them were promoted to be the first Union Navy Rear Admirals. In all, 19 officers served as commanders of the six squadrons and at least six of them were relieved for inadequate performance. As a group, their defining characteristic was almost certainly their human frailty – most of them were flawed characters in many ways and many seemed unable to rise above the pettiness of organizational politics even in time of war.

Taaffe’s analysis of the Union Navy leadership highlights several major problems faced by Welles and Fox during the War. First among these was that of assembling a corps of loyal officers, given that about 25% of Union officers resigned or were dismissed at the outset of the War and many of them went or returned to the South. Those born in the South were removed from sea commands at the outset and even those who professed and demonstrated loyalty were treated with suspicion. As Taaffe points out, the situation early in the War was especially difficult for Welles because of his limited knowledge of the officer corps.

Age, seniority and competence were also significant problems for Welles in his attempt to find senior officers capable of prosecuting the naval war. The essence of his problem was that there was no mandated retirement age and no pension on which to retire, so officers tended to serve as long as possible. Combined with that, promotion was strictly by seniority and while that may have sufficed in peacetime, Welles saw quickly that it would not do in war.

Welles also saw that if he stayed with the status quo he would be continually appointing officers in their sixties to squadron commands. Taaffe provides the example of Captain Silas Stringham, aged 64 when appointed to run the Atlantic Coast blockade squadron, and points out that despite his good qualities, he simply found managing and leading a squadron in wartime beyond his capacity. The author exposes the challenges faced by Welles in trying to appoint younger and more junior officers. Taaffe, for example, notes the outraged reaction to the appointment of Captain Frank Du Pont to squadron command when he was ranked 51 of 65 available captains. Some saw it as a plot by Welles to force their retirement. Even so Du Pont was not far short of being 60 when selected.

Perhaps not surprisingly, health was another problem that dogged the squadron commanders. As Taaffe points out, however, it was not just a factor of age and it did affect primarily those officers serving at sea. The main causes of illness were the stress associated with long and sometimes tedious deployments, climate in the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean where yellow fever was a constant worry and of course wounds in action. All told, eight of the 19 squadron commanders, including the incomparable Farragut, suffered serious illnesses, enough in several cases for them to be relieved of their commands. Having to relieve commanders because of poor health was yet another unwanted pressure for Welles, for whom, as Taaffe points out keeping good commanders at sea was a constant struggle.
Taaffe devotes considerable attention to the matter of courage among the squadron commanders. Physical courage was rarely if ever in short supply; with Farragut in his attack on Mobile possibly the finest of many examples in the book. Moral courage on the other hand was, by the author’s account in shorter supply. That is to say, while some squadron commanders were quite prepared to stand in the line of fire, they were not prepared to make the decisions needed to launch operations, on the success of which their promotions would depend.

Captain John Dahlgren was the foremost example of this. Taaffe provides much detail of Dahlgren’s efforts to secure a squadron command, together with his subsequent and constant inability or unwillingness to launch an effective attack against Charleston. According to Taaffe, Dahlgren placed personal aggrandisement before the winning of the war. The author describes Dahlgren as having a great work ethic and forceful personality, but lacking entirely a sense of humour and social insight.

Taaffe also notes that Dahlgren was insatiably ambitious and had a thirst for glory which unfortunately overshadowed the excellent work he did as the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance before the war. Captain Samuel Du Pont was another whose fortunes slumped in the face of the need to take Charleston. He recognized the difficulties involved but, according to the author, lacked the moral courage to speak to Welles about them. This kind of hesitance greatly frustrated Welles, who at times desperately needed some naval success, given the lack of it in the field early in the War.

Unlike the Union Army, the Union Navy did not have to endure senior officers who were promoted through patronage alone. But the Navy leadership was not entirely pure in that respect. Some of the squadron commanders were well known by the President and as the author points out, Lincoln did promote Dahlgren to Rear Admiral, against the wishes of Welles. Unsurprisingly, the reaction among Dahlgren’s peers and subordinates was strong, as many believed the promotion was not merited. Others were also well connected in Washington and thought nothing of having family members lobby President and Congress, not always successfully, on their behalf.

Some of the squadron commanders were also quite happy to undermine their fellow officers by writing to Welles, in the hope of taking their jobs. David Porter was one of these. When called to account for a different discretion, he simply left Welles’ office and walked across the street to the White House, saw Lincoln and left with a job more to his liking. Perhaps it is as well that there is a lake between Russell and Parliament House.

Overall, Taaffe has provided a detailed examination of the operational leadership of the Union Navy at war and how it responded to political direction. He has exposed a ‘senior leadership group’ which was by no means perfect, but which in the end got the job done. His descriptions of squadron commanders really do illustrate just how individual and imperfect we humans are and possibly equally important, how imperfection does not necessarily mean inability.

Clearly, not everyone can be a David Farragut. Fortunately, however, not everyone is a Charles Wilkes either:

Wilkes was a lean, erect, clean-shaven man...among the most unpopular officers in the Navy. He was quarrelsome and contentious, opinionated and critical, and carping and complaining...although he was quick to find fault with others, he had little introspection or self-awareness. Something of a martinet, he expected immediate obedience from his subordinates, but he also interpreted his orders from his superiors as suggestions...this hypocrisy, combined with his greediness, unhealthy ambition, and unthinking willfulness gained him few friends’.

A rare individual no doubt.

This is a very useful book and it will reward careful reading. Few of us have much of an idea as to what makes a good leader when we begin our climb of the greasy pole. How would we approach the task if we knew just how far from perfect some of our predecessors were?

GUESTS OF THE EMPEROR

By Linda Goetz Holmes

Naval Institute Press 2010; hard cover, 128 pages, illustrated, USD $29.95

Reviewed by Commodore David Hobbs RN (ret’d)

Linda Holmes spent over 20 years researching the experiences of American, Australian and British prisoners of war who were held at Mukden in Manchuria, occupying the largest fixed camp of its kind in the Japanese Empire. The men were treated brutally and, contrary to international laws endorsed by the Japanese Government, they were forced to work on components for combat aircraft in the nearby Mitsubishi factory.

The author describes how the majority of Red Cross officials were deceived by the Japanese authorities into thinking that conditions in the camp were far better then
they really were. The comparison between the poor standard of fitness of the Americans held in the Philippines and the better state of British and Australians who had been held in Changi is interesting and the attempts by officers to get messages out the camp in statements authorised by the Japanese are analysed in detail. The hidden messages were not always comprehended by Allied Governments or the Red Cross and apparent praise for the Japanese led to resentment against their officers among other prisoners.

By focusing on this single camp, the author is able to trace the prisoners’ experience from the cramped hold of the SS Tottori Maru which carried 1,993 American prisoners from the Philippines, through the desperate journey to Manchuria in which many died and on to liberation by a resourceful OSS team that was dropped by parachute nearby in August 1945.

Unusually the author continues the story into the post-war era describing the need for rehabilitation when the prisoners returned home, the evidence some gave at war-crimes tribunals and even the return by a small number to one of the surviving buildings which has recently become a museum. The city is now known as Shenyang and still has a major aircraft production facility on its outskirts.

Linda Holmes has a reputation as the leading American authority on Allied prisoners of war and this work fully measures up to the standard that one would expect from her. She describes Japanese brutality not merely for its own sake but attempts to explain the mental attitudes that led to it and the effect it had on the prisoners. It is the first book to shed light on the medical experiments carried out on some American prisoners and the author’s research has allowed some of the survivors to better comprehend what happened to their fellow prisoners.

*Guests of the Emperor* is a work of clarity that sheds new light on a subject that has not, until recently been studied in sufficient depth. It is pleasing that it has proved possible to publish it while some of the former prisoners are still alive. All too soon the events described will have passed from living memory and it is important that future generations can read a work that was researched and written with the aid of people who were there. It is illustrated with contemporary sketches, photographs and maps and makes a positive addition to the available literature on the suffering of Allied prisoners in the hands of Japanese. I thoroughly recommend it.

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**PASSPORT NOT REQUIRED**

By Eric Dietrich-Berrymann, Charlotte Hammond and R E White

170pp; extensive bibliography and page notes; 28 photographs; Naval Institute Press, Annapolis 2010.

Reviewed by CMDR David Hobbs MBE Royal Navy (retired)

This delightful, well-researched book tells the story of twenty-two American citizens who volunteered to serve in the Royal Navy between 1939 and 1941 when America was neutral and the British Empire fought alone for the cause of freedom.

The authors have clearly enjoyed their research and produced a wealth of information about an aspect of World War II that has not, previously, attracted the attention it deserves.

The Naval Institute Press is to be congratulated for recognising the importance of the subject matter and publishing it.

In addition to the central story the book contains a wealth of fascinating asides which are not strictly relevant but which add colour to the account and help the reader understand the contemporary situation. Among them is the story of an American-manned Home Guard unit in London which equipped itself with 100 ‘Tommy’-guns, 100,000 rounds of ammunition and its own motor vehicles.

Americans who joined the RAF’s ‘Eagle’ Squadron were constantly in the limelight; their countrymen who joined the RNVR were just as determined to fight for a cause they believed in as part of a foreign armed service but achieved rather less publicity at the time or subsequently.

This book redresses that imbalance and presents the reader with a group biography that is a joy to read and which serves as a fitting tribute to the memory of a group of brave men who ‘bent’ their country’s rules to join up and fight. It is a fascinating story, well told that will, I hope, appeal to a wide readership in both the USA and the Commonwealth; I thoroughly recommend it.
The first UCLASS unit is expected to join a carrier air wing in 2018 using four or six air vehicles based on the Northrop Grumman X-47B which is being prepared for carrier-suitability trials. It will displace a conventional manned strike-fighter squadron and will have operational capability from the outset which is expected to grow rapidly as experience is gained. This is not some futuristic ideal but a practical scheme that is close to being demonstrated at sea. In a little over a decade we are likely to find unmanned air operations at sea increasing commonplace. This book is an excellent first step towards understanding their potential.

Friedman explains how the ‘swarm’ potentially spread over a wide area, can feed an ‘ever-changing array of potential targets’ into a network-centric grid and use the information to attack them without delay as they appear. UCLASS does not focus on the individual air vehicles but on the system or ‘swarm’ as an entity, leaving it to choose which airframe has the optimum weapon and is best placed to attack; which needs to refuel in flight and so on.

There are many operational capabilities to be considered before making the best use of the ‘swarm’ but the author points out that there are also sound economic reasons for developing UCLASS. Unmanned air vehicles do not need to maintain flying currency like human pilots, they do not need to rest between sorties and they remain sharp throughout potentially long, dull or dangerous missions. Operating from a carrier enhances the flexibility of UCAV since distances from ship to target can be varied as necessary and aircraft can be refuelled and re-armed on deck quickly if necessary.

The ‘swarm’ can be protected against interception by fighters from the carrier air wing and its long-term presence over a designated area gaining ‘real-time’ information for the network centric ‘picture’ can force an enemy to fight when he might not otherwise choose to do so.

UCAV are not cheap and can certainly not be considered as expendable but they clearly have an important future and it may well be that the present generation of manned strike fighters will be the last.

There will be readers who disagree with the importance the author ascribes to UCAV operating from warships in the near future but they will have to argue against the potent economic and operational arguments contained in this book which are difficult to refute. There are certainly few other weapons systems in prospect that offer a genuinely enhanced capability at a significantly reduced operating cost.

The book has two Appendices, the first of which describes the UCAV ‘state of the art’ and the second a most useful and comprehensive directory of the world’s military unmanned air vehicles with notes on their development.

In summary this book explains why the US Navy believes that a transition from an entirely manned to largely unmanned aircraft fleet is an attractive prospect. That is something none of us can afford to ignore. It also gives a valuable appreciation of the state of the art which will help readers understand the vast range of UCAV used in current operations. The book is bound to generate interest and debate and deserves to be on the Royal Australian Navy’s Reading List. I thoroughly recommend it.
I was asked to review Iain Ballantyne’s excellent book *Warspite – from Jutland hero to Cold War warrior*, but feel I should start by revealing where I am coming from, since it may bias my views. Firstly, I know Iain Ballantyne and have worked comfortably with/him occasionally. I follow his publication of *Warships International* with close attention, seldom disagreeing with what he has to say there. Secondly, I was the Commanding Officer of the “Cold War warrior *Warspite*” from late 1969 to just before she went into refit in 1971, indeed, I am probably in the photo on page 205.

So, while in no way trying to diminish the “Jutland Hero”, I am a touch sad that the seventh *Warspite*, the Cold War warrior, had to be so summarily dealt with – as Iain reminds us, the Official Secrets Act has a very long arm even 40 years later. We are effectively left with the amazing and fascinating history of the sixth *Warspite* with the other five predecessors and the one successor rather sidelined.

While the early *Warspites* before the famous super dreadnought have their honoured places in history, it is the battleship of 1913 to 1945 that takes the limelight in this book. Rightly so, for she had a remarkable life in her 32 years of service before a sad but perhaps suitable end. She was among the first of a new type of ship; she was a “capital ship” with a revolutionary propulsion fuel, she had a massive broadside and her share of violent misfortunes - all these she shared with the Cold War warrior. It was in her more glorious engagements from the Battle of Jutland the Battle of Matapan that she excelled and outshone all the rest.

Iain has passed all this on to us in a thoroughly readable manner. Of her several near terminal experiences, the German glider bomb attack in 1943 came closest to ending her illustrious career – an event not widely known or publicised at the time for obvious reasons – leaving “a hole the size of a double-decker bus” in her bottom, she still survived to fight another day – altogether a remarkable survivor, she even tried to avoid being the breaker’s yard when she met her end by losing her tow and grounding in Prussia Cove, close to Penzance in Cornwall. This was as remarkable as so much of her previous career if a good deal less glorious.

My initial interest in this book was primarily to see what Iain had to say about the seventh *Warspite*. The submarine had been as close to disaster as her predecessor at least three times before I joined her as Commanding Officer. She nearly sank in the wet docks at Barrow-in-Furness when proper procedures for removing a hull valve were not adhered to by the builders; her ‘eggbeater’ auxiliary propulsion motor had fallen out of its bearings leaving a large hole in the bottom of her hull while alongside at Faslane; disaster was averted on these occasions only by very prompt action on the part of ship’s crew members; and she was knocked over to 65 degrees of heel [the notional ‘safe’ limit for the reactor was 44 degrees] twice by an iceberg.

On the positive side, she was in the lead in the pioneering days of British SSNs despite being the third SSN to join the Royal Navy. *Dreadnought*, our first SSN, had an American power plant and was fairly noisy, relying mainly on active sonar for her anti-submarine work. By 1969, the emphasis had shifted towards the quiet, passive sonar mode of operations and a very different tactical scene. *Valiant*, our second and “all British” SSN, had largely concentrated on the Cold War warrior speciality, leaving me deeply involved in developing much of the more stealthy anti-surface ship and antisubmarine tactics now possible by this new way of operating as well as indulging in a bit of the Cold War warrior scene between times. In my 18 months, the seventh *Warspite* covered all the roles and skills of SSNs in an exhilarating kaleidoscope of operations, exercises and trials ranging from trailing the Soviet Helicopter carrier *Leningrad* at 21 knots from 70 feet directly underneath her, via ‘sinking’ all the surface ships twice over in a large ASW exercise without being counter-detected, to establishing the ‘safety envelope’ of angles of heel and pitch for the class – events not entirely unrelated.

But all that may yet be the subject for another *Warspite* book, hopefully as good as this one.
Book Reviews

RED STAR OVER THE PACIFIC: CHINA’S RISE AND THE CHALLENGE TO U.S. MARITIME STRATEGY
by Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes
Naval Institute Press, Annapolis Maryland, 2010
Reviewed by Dr Gregory P. Gilbert – Air Power Development Centre

“We should endeavor to build a powerful people’s navy that can adapt to its historical mission during a new century and a new period.”
President Hu Jintao, December 2006

Australia’s strategic outlook has changed significantly in the last ten years and the systematic rise of China has been one of the main drivers for this change. Red Star over the Pacific is an excellent overview of China’s emerging naval capabilities, doctrine and strategy. It places China’s rise in context.

Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes have used Chinese language sources extensively, including strategic discourses and official statements, to improve our understanding of modern China’s strategic culture. By examining China’s rise from the Chinese perspective the authors have distilled the essence of Chinese thinking on sea power for a wide English speaking audience.

This book adds to its predecessor, Chinese Naval Strategy in the Twenty-First Century: The Turn to Mahan, by examining the apparent popularity of Alfred Thayer Mahan among Chinese strategists. The discovery that the Chinese have competing schools of thought when it comes to sea power should not have come as a surprise but perhaps in China, just like the West, Mahan represents different things to different people.

Chinese maritime ascendency need not follow the naval race of the Imperial German precedent, especially as China is in a much more fortunate strategic position than Germany ever was. The Anglo-American cooperative model may be a useful alternative, but at this time it still seems improbable that the United States would willingly surrender its sea supremacy to the Chinese like the British did during the early part of the 20th century.

The reality is that modern China has moved away from the capability-based naval thinking typical of continentally-minded powers and has already moved into the intellectual realms of a fully-fledged maritime power. Chinese scholars are developing their own forms of thinking on Chinese sea power, and they now talk about sea control instead of sea denial. Yes, Mahan is influential but so is Mao Zedong – whose thoughts on active defence dominate Chinese People’s Liberation Army–Navy (PLAN) doctrine – and there are a plethora of more recent Chinese strategists who have influenced the push for China to turn itself into a sea power.

The strategic debate cannot exist in isolation, without some understanding of how aspects of China’s rise are influencing naval tactics. For the practically minded Red Star over the Pacific includes chapters dealing with Chinese fleet tactics, missile and antimissile interactions, and China’s nuclear deterrent at sea. The importance of antiship ballistic missiles (ASBM), submarines, and aircraft carriers are discussed although anyone after detailed analysis will need to consult the sources listed in the associated notes.

The full implications of such weaponry are only just starting to emerge. For example, over the last 65 years American naval superiority has made it possible to strike down the ‘archer’ before they could fire their ‘arrow’ at the fleet. This approach, however, can no longer be guaranteed, and therefore surface combatants must be able to ‘take a hit’ and suffer battle damage. Past generations of naval architects designed combatants with ‘staying power built into their very structure’ but this is no longer the case. Even if enhanced passive survivability requirements were adopted overnight it would take some decades before such warships would dominate the fleet.

Indeed, the US Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) has been designed with just the opposite philosophy in mind.

One of the most important chapters in the book is on China’s soft power at sea. The idea that the Chinese have developed a ‘usable past’ that combines Confucian pacifism, cultural management and a cult of defence, into a new Chinese maritime identity, is fascinating. The historical message has been used for both internal and external consumption – to emphasise China’s presence and power in maritime Asia before the arrival of Europeans but also to highlight China’s ‘peaceful diplomacy when it was a big power’. China has declared its peaceful intentions. ‘It is an inevitable choice based on China’s historical and cultural tradition that China persists unswervingly in taking the road of peaceful development’ Of course such a benevolent use of Chinese sea power has not been accepted without comment by many nations such as India and Japan.

Red Star over the Pacific takes the debate one step further in discussing the impact that China’s rise is having upon American maritime supremacy in the Pacific. The tactical and operational implications of Chinese sea power are not limited to the Taiwan
Strait or the so-called First Island Chain. Chinese maritime strategy and PLAN doctrine now emphasise the importance of sea lines of communication (SLOC) and the South China Sea. If a PLAN fleet is able to operate independently at a distance from China, then that fleet could operate across the Pacific or even globally. How should America and its Allies react to a PLAN operating from the Second Island Chain – should they be treated as friends, enemies or neutrals? The impact on US maritime strategy in the Pacific is still hotly debated. The Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower offers an avenue for a peaceful future with many naval forces working together to police the global commons, but it is unclear whether China will pursue this post-modern approach to maritime power. Either way, America’s response to China’s rising sea power in the Pacific will be critical to the future security of Australia and our neighbours.

One can only agree with the authors’ suggestion that Americans need to ‘pay special attention to the human dimension of maritime strategy’ and ‘avoid projecting their own assumption onto societies with vastly different traditions, experiences, and habits of mind.’ During the late 1990s and early 2000s most Western Defence analysts believed that China was a technically backward nuclear power, capable of massed land offensives within its region, but unlikely to win in a conflict at a distance over Taiwan. For many China was a sleeping giant which would take decades to wake up. By 2005, however, it was clear that China’s maritime modernisation was much more than just the introduction of new ships and weapons – it was the logical outcome of the Chinese effort to become a sea power with influence across the Pacific.

The extent of China’s maritime transformation, characterised by modern warships, submarines, and missiles, is now beyond debate. Today we need to question how to interpret China’s rise, and what can be done to avoid a future confrontation between China and the West. For Australians, our understanding and response to China’s rise will be critical for our future prosperity. Red Star over the Pacific will help to inform the debate. For this reason alone, this book will be an important source for anyone working in the fields of international relations, strategic studies or defence. For naval professionals it is essential reading.

The Norwegian campaign was the first in which naval, land and air forces were required to work together harmoniously in a joint venture and the failure of the British to do so led to a re-appraisal of operational concepts that had far-reaching consequences. The Royal Navy’s Home Fleet included the first operational carrier task force in history and it was used to fill the gap left by the land-based aircraft of the RAF which lacked the range to operate over Norway from the UK for more than a few minutes.

The small number of RAF fighters deployed to Norway relied on the fleet’s aircraft carriers to transport, sustain and, ultimately, evacuate them. Naval aircrew found themselves fighting a war for which they had not been trained and for which new tactics had to be evolved to meet every situation. They had the flexibility to rise to the occasion but suffered heavy losses and the author gives them due
credit for their achievements. Flag officers and their staffs faced new and uncertain challenges and modern communications equipment allowed Whitehall to interfere in decisions which should have been left to the men on the spot, adding to misunderstanding and confusion.

The author writes with unique insight and gives due weight to Norwegian perspectives, absent in previous accounts, that show how Allied fears that ‘fifth-columnists’ or ‘Quislings’ were present in large numbers complicated the relationships between some British senior officers and their Norwegian counterparts. For their own part, Norwegian senior officers could not understand either the British refusal to take advice or their timid plans to operate independently. Haarr makes the interesting observation that a simple error in translation may have had a major impact on policy when Norwegian ski-trained soldiers with good local knowledge were described as ‘militiamen’ by a translator to a British general who elected to use his own untrained ‘territorials’ on foot instead.

Operations at sea are recognised for their fundamental importance; in addition to the carrier task force, the author describes the operations of requisitioned local fishing boats used to move men and stores inshore, the importance of surface ships such as cruisers, destroyers and sloops in giving anti-aircraft coverage for the troops ashore and the task force and the tragic surface action that resulted in the loss of HM Ships Glorious, Ardent and Acasta. His description of the dilemma that faced Admiral Cunningham in HMAS Devonshire on receiving a call for help from Glorious as he secretly carried the Norwegian King, Crown prince and Government to the UK is the best account that I have read on the subject, and his insight into the failures of both Allied and German Intelligence are well considered and accurate. Haarr’s selection and use of photographs are impressive and he seems to have located the ideal image to illustrate every facet of his narrative.

There is a tendency among historians to look back on the victorious campaigns that ended previous conflicts and to pay less attention to the earlier stages when men, equipment and experience were in short supply and understanding of appropriate action was often absent. It was these early campaigns, however, that offer the biggest lessons for future generations. This was certainly the case with the Norwegian campaign; without it, the enormously successful undertakings at Normandy and Okinawa might well have proved more costly. The difficulty of providing air cover from distant fixed bases in the UK; the success achieved by carrier-borne aircraft with their reduced transit times and maximum time over the forces ashore stand out but the need for skill, training and effective equipment in all arms are also lessons that should not be forgotten.

In a generation when the projection of power from the sea is assuming such importance in Australia, this publication is more than just a well-researched work about a campaign fought 71 years ago; it provokes thoughts on how best to achieve the desired effects with HMA Ships Canberra and Adelaide when they enter service. Would similar mistakes be made?

This is an outstanding work of scholarship with significant contemporary relevance and a very readable account of how our predecessors coped in the opening stages of an unexpected war that will be of interest and value to a wide readership. I whole-heartedly recommend it.

Book Reviews

**HMAS BATAAN, 1952: AN AUSTRALIAN WARSHIP IN THE KOREAN WAR**

By Anthony Cooper


295 pp, illustrations, maps, appendices, notes, bibliography, index.


Reviewed by Greg Swinden

When Able Seaman Geoff Cooper wrote letters home to his mother, from Tribal class destroyer HMAS Bataan off the coast of Korea in 1952, he probably never suspected that one day they would form the basis for a book concerning the Australian warships role in the war. His son Anthony Cooper has used his father’s letters as the background for an excellent description of the ship’s service during its second deployment to Korea during February-August 1952.

This is, however, no ordinary ship history working its way through the day by day events of the ship and its crew. Cooper prepares the scene well outlining how Australia became involved in the war and describing the trials and tribulations of preparing a ship and the RAN for the conflict. The story flows easily through the experiences of the Lower Deck, Wardroom and Commanding Officer (Commander Warwick Bracegirdle, DSC and Bar, RAN) alike and makes comprehensive use of first hand sources such as the ship’s Reports of Proceedings, Captain’s Night Orders as well as private letters.

Cooper breaks the book down into interesting chapters
analysing various aspects of shipboard life and operational deployments such as liberty in Japan, shipboard living, leadership and morale, air and sub surface threats, navigating in hazardous water, shore bombardment and refuelling and ship-handling. The mundane tasks of plane guard duty are described as well as the few moments of sheer terror when *Bataan* came under enemy fire. This resulted in the ship being straddled by several enemy shells; one of which hit the Captain’s day cabin and tore a hole in his full dress uniform jacket which was fortunately the only casualty of the action!

The author also discusses the similarity and differences between the RAN warships operating off Korea with that of the Royal Navy, United States Navy and the Royal Canadian Navy. The Canadian Navy comes into reasonably close analysis, both good and bad, because the Tribal class destroyers HMC Ships *Athabaskan*, *Cayuga* and *Sioux* also served in Korean waters during *Bataan’s* first and second deployment to the war zone.

Books describing the Australian experience in the Korean War are few and those dealing with the RAN in the conflict are even fewer. This well researched and very easy to read book may signal the start of more written work concerning the Australian Navy during this often forgotten war. Highly recommended to all naval historians or those just interested in what it was like to serve in a warship during the Korean War.

*HMAS Sydney (FFG03) at anchor for the Royal Australian Navy’s Fleet Review 2009*
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On the evening of 5 January 1975, the bulk carrier *MV Lake Illawarra* collided with the Tasman Bridge, which spanned the Derwent River in Hobart. The impact collapsed two pylons, and 127 metres of bridge decking, together with four motor vehicles, fell into the water. Seven of *Lake Illawarra*’s crew died when she sank and another five people in the cars were also killed. At 0430 on 6 January a 14-man detachment from Clearance Diving Team 2 flew into Hobart for search and recovery operations. They were soon joined by two additional divers from CDT 1 with a one-person recompression chamber. Over the next ten days the divers cooperated closely with Tasmanian police, operating in conditions described as ‘appalling.’ In addition to the hazards of strong currents and minimal visibility they had to contend with falling bridge debris and live power cables. This picture shows diving operations underway at the base of one of the collapsed pylons.
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