

A full-page background image of a diver underwater. The diver is wearing a black wetsuit, a diving mask, and a scuba tank. Bubbles are rising from the diver's equipment. The water is a clear, deep blue.

ISSUE 139 headmark

MARCH 2011

Future Submarine

– A GROWTH IN AUSTRALIA'S
NAVY'S CAPABILITY. SOME
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE RAN

'Winston Is Back' – Churchill & The Naval Empire

Future Submarine

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NAVY'S CAPABILITY

New Entry Officers Course & Sailor Transfer Trainees

Splash-Dot Warriors

– RAISE, TRAIN, SUSTAIN RAN
CYBER SKILLS

Supporting Breastfeeding Women in the ADF Workplace

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
Australian Naval Institute



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Letters to the Editor

Please may I respond to the article arguing for spirituality to have a more prominent part in Navy life – and a particular part in programmes of character development.

Our Navy, and the people who serve in it and in the wider Australian Defence Force, stand severally and individually in defence of human rights and freedoms.

Much discourse of human rights is found in the various spiritual and religious traditions.

However, there is an equally compelling case to be made that spiritual and religious traditions of all kinds in many generations, have been responsible for the obliteration of human rights and dignities.

The evangelical Christian church would be a particular case in point. This institution was responsible for the zealotry and butchery of the crusades. In recent times, those of the evangelical stamp – particularly those Anglicans indoctrinated at Moore College in Sydney – have emphasised duties, rather than rights. For these people, the Bible imposes duties upon us, and these duties very often expunge the claim of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which, in Article One, argues that all people, being endowed with reason and conscience, are free and equal in dignity and rights.

Not for the evangelical Christian, they are not. Because were equality a reality, then spiritual women would be ordained and consecrated as bishops in that church. But they are not, and neither are gay men. Even Anglicans from the quieter, more liberal and intellectual tradition are marginalised by the intolerant Anglican cult which

flourishes in Sydney.

Equally intolerant, Catholic doctrine holds the rights of God over the rights of man – a peculiar dogma which diminishes the status, dignity and rights of those who may be female, practice their religious devotion under the doctrine of another faith, enjoy same sex partnerships or perhaps even heterosexual sex outside the boundaries of marriage.

The article published in Headmark was obviously sincere, but it was intolerant, inconsistent in its use of terms and evangelical in its admiration for the chaplaincy – which has a place, but not the place for which this article lobbied.

from correspondent Matthew 10:36

Letter to the Ed

I was most interested in Lieutenant Withers "Fuel for Thought: Nuclear Propulsion and the RAN" (September 2010). It seems to me that a crucial question is the attitude of the US towards Australia acquiring nuclear submarines.

I have heard that the US pays Australia a large amount not to go nuclear, but I emphasise that this is simply scuttlebutt. Can anyone say with authority what US policy is?

Dr Hal G. P. Colebatch

Clarifications

Gwynn Boyd advises that in Issue 137 the top photograph on p56 shows Rear Admiral Sir William Creswell, Captain DW Grant and several officers, together with what can presumably only be lady guests, at the Passing Out parade on 10 December 1917.

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Front cover photograph: Members from Australian Clearance Diving Team Four conduct dive train during workups.

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FUTURE SUBMARINE – A GROWTH IN AUSTRALIA'S NAVY'S CAPABILITY. SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR THE RAN

BY REAR ADMIRAL PETER BRIGGS RAN RTD

The Defence White Paper released in May 2009 calls for a doubling of Australia's submarine capability, with 12 submarines of greater range and capability than today's Collins class. Why is the growth required? How might it be achieved? What are some of the personnel implications for the RAN.

STRATEGIC RATIONALE

By 2030, our region will be dominated by the growing political, economic and strategic power of China and India, constraining Australia's choices. There will be an increasingly fierce global competition for resources: energy, minerals and water, made more important by the alteration in the strategic balance between China, India and the US in terms of political, economic and strategic reach. Australia has many of the resources that will be critical to the new powers' economic prosperity.

This is not a 'business as usual' scenario – nor should we presume it will be a smooth, linear process, free of confrontation and crisis.

*'For Australia, foreign affairs and defence policy are getting serious again.'*¹

Australia is an island: the maritime environment will continue to be increasingly important to our economic well-being. Significant growth in regional Navies, including use of advanced military and commercial surveillance systems will make it more difficult for our Navy to operate freely in the region. There is also a growth of modern European and Russian designed submarines and advanced military technologies being deployed in our region. China and India are also developing nuclear powered and armed submarines. This developing situation will constrain

Australia's strategic options.

A capable Australian Submarine Force will be able to operate in these difficult strategic circumstances, providing a 'strategic sting' that would make a potential aggressor avoid a military confrontation with Australia. There are two critical parts to this strategy. Firstly, as for all forms of deterrence, the perception of the capability in the eyes of the adversary is critical. Secondly, if put to the test, the sting must be able to deliver the promised outcome –unbearable pain.

'It would be in our strategic interest in the decades ahead that no power in the Asia Pacific region will be able to coerce or intimidate others in the region through the employment of force, or through the implied threat of force, without being deterred, checked or, if necessary, defeated by the political, economic or military responses of others in the region,' according to the 2009 Defence White Paper (DWP), Force 2030.²

WHY SUBMARINES?

Submarines are the ultimate stealth platform, able to operate without fuss in areas where sea and air control is

not assured and to gain access to areas denied to others. Large submarines, such as Collins, are able to operate at long range for weeks. They can carry a flexible payload of sensors, weapons and specialist personnel. A capable Australian Submarine Force creates great uncertainty: countering them is difficult, expensive and cannot be guaranteed.

More than just a good insurance policy, submarines are unique in many ways, able to:

- Loiter without replenishment and simultaneously observe activities under water, on the surface, in the air and over the electromagnetic spectrum in areas denied to other eyes and ears including satellites.
- Deliver the most potent antisubmarine capability.
- Covertly position precision land attack missiles, retire if not required, or launch and withdraw undetected.
- Assist in the protection surface naval operations.
- Covertly launch and recover special forces.
- Lay sophisticated, precision

Collins Weapon Compartment (RAN photo)



mines to deny access to selected facilities and areas.

In situations short of conflict, submarines are able to provide unique indications of another's long term intentions, facilitating counter measures via diplomacy and force preparation that will hopefully avoid an escalation to conflict. To be able to exploit the initiative gained from their stealth, Australia's submarines must be able to covertly reach sensitive areas throughout our region with sufficient mobility, operational radius of action, payload and habitability for the long duration missions involved, frequently in or through hot tropical waters. Some explanation of these terms is appropriate:

- *Mobility* is the capacity to complete the long transits required expeditiously and discreetly, ie with low chance of counter detection.
- *Operational radius of action* is a measure of the practical endurance of the submarine, fuel, food and habitability to complete the mission in an operational setting.
- *Operational radius of action* is a more demanding regime than *maximum range* frequently quoted in specifications. Such figures tend to be based on a non-operational scenario with transits completed at an optimum, low speed with prolonged and predictable periods for recharging batteries.
- Habitability over the long missions is important not only for crew effectiveness but also to ensure an acceptable quality of life for crews; a key factor in attracting and retaining personnel.

The strategic sting of the Submarine Force is underpinned by stealth. Australia should avoid a dependency on forward bases to conduct submarine operations; access to such bases cannot be guaranteed. The reduction in operational security through the use of such bases would reduce the submarine's freedom of action and add to the hazards faced by our submarines. The use of a depot ship, requiring a forward base with appropriate protection to support it suffers from similar limitations with the added disadvantages of the diplomatic and strategic indication provided by its deployment. The capital, sustainment and personnel costs entailed in a depot ship also make this an expensive option.

A submarine's stealth and access confers significant initiative; they should be employed proactively to exploit this. Where appropriate, they are best employed offensively to maximise the benefits gained from this advantage - one of the few weapons systems in Australia's orbit with this characteristic.

Arguments that Australia's submarines should be used defensively and constrained to defending the sea approaches to Australia would deny Australia the initiative, priceless intelligence and ability to influence the development of a situation that can be gained by imaginative use of a capable Submarine Force in situations across the whole spectrum of likely contingencies rather than simply the least likely, 'last-ditch, defend the moat scenario.' There is a significant possibility that submarines deployed under such a strategy will be in the wrong place at the wrong time and lack the ability to quickly reposition – it surrenders the initiative to the opponent who may well calculate that he should be able to avoid the defending submarines. Such

a capability has significantly less deterrent value.

The strategic setting and the unique contribution that Australia's submarines can make in these circumstances are discussed further in the Submarine Institute of Australia's (SIA) submission to the DWP.³ Keeping this starting point firmly in mind let us turn to consider how Australia can achieve the capability.

WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS?

It is worth reviewing what the DWP analysis concluded:

'8.40 In the case of the submarine force, the Government takes the view that our future strategic circumstances necessitate a substantially expanded submarine fleet of 12 boats in order to sustain a force at sea large enough in a crisis or conflict to be able to defend our approaches (including at considerable distance from Australia, if necessary), protect and support other ADF assets, and undertake certain strategic missions where the stealth and other operating characteristics of highly-capable advanced submarines would be crucial.'

'9.3 The Future Submarine will have greater range, longer endurance on patrol, and expanded capabilities compared to the current Collins class submarine. It will also be equipped with very secure real-time communications and be able to carry different mission payloads such as uninhabited underwater vehicles.'

'9.4 capable of a range of tasks such as anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare; strategic strike; mine detection and mine-laying operations; intelligence collection; supporting special forces (including infiltration and exfiltration missions); and gathering battlespace data in support of operations.'

'9.5 Long transits and potentially short-notice contingencies in our

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primary operational environment demand high levels of mobility and endurance in the Future Submarine. The boats need to be able to undertake prolonged covert patrols over the full distance of our strategic approaches and in operational areas. They require low signatures across all spectrums, including at higher speeds.

No current European conventional submarine design has the mobility, operational radius of action, through life growth or payload capacity required to meet the requirements set out in the DWP. This is a matter of size. Fitting this capacity impacts on many systems in the submarine and is not easily or efficiently achieved by adapting an existing design. Designing a submarine involves consideration of a multitude of interacting physical factors; as Professor Peter Joubert observes in his excellent paper on the subject:

‘It is a principle of successful design that no particular feature can be considered in isolation but must be considered with all its interactions on the rest of the design.’⁴

Adapting an existing design would involve significant changes to a highly integrated and compact vessel, entailing significant cost and capability risks - arguably greater risk than a new design specifically targeting our requirements. Adapting an existing design will result in a unique design, requiring Australia to sustain it through life as the parent navy; probably without owning all the intellectual property underpinning the design.

I should distinguish between ‘adapting’ a design, where the design team are constrained within the current size and form of the ‘off the shelf’ submarine and ‘evolving’. In the latter situation the design team is free to alter all the parameters to meet the new requirements; much as Airbus

developed the A-310, A-320, A-330 aircraft series, each building on a common design philosophy, learning from its predecessors, evolving to best meet the requirement.

One option is to lengthen the submarine. What is involved in stretching a submarine? The first point to make is that once you start making such substantial modifications, it is no longer a military off-the-shelf option, but a developmental project.

In the case of submarines there are many complexities to be considered. To simplify this considerably; there are two basic laws of physics that impact significantly in such an undertaking. The first is that the submarine must be neutrally buoyant when submerged; it floats like an airship underwater. A submarine has little capacity to accept additional weight eg from new equipment, additional fuel and personnel. One of the lessons from the Collins class is the need to provide generous design margins of stability and buoyancy to allow for future growth during the life of the submarine. Once a submarine’s relatively small design margins for growth are exceeded, the only option is to increase the size of the submarine to regain the buoyancy required to offset the weights that have been added.

At this point the second key law kicks in. For maximum underwater efficiency and quietness the submarine must have a length:diameter

Submarine	Length Overall (m)	Pressure Hull Diameter (m)	Submerged Displacement (tonnes)	Relative Volumes
European Conventional	65	6.3	1750	55%
COLLINS	78	7.8	3300	100%
A1	85	8.4	4000	125%

ratio within certain limits. This restriction determines that a substantial increase in volume cannot be simply achieved by adding length; the pressure hull diameter must be increased to maintain a suitable ratio for the new, larger volume.


A European sourced Military-Off-The Shelf (MOTS) submarine designed for the shorter distances and cooler waters compared to Australia’s environment is too small to meet the requirements. Nor is stretching one a simple undertaking, a larger diameter pressure hull will be required – ie a new design, to achieve the requirement. Let me illustrate my point by a comparison of the internal volumes of a range of submarines.

Illustrative internal volumes using open sourced information on dimensions and a simplified model for calculating the resultant internal volumes are provided in Figure 1 above. The internal volume of a mid range European conventional submarine design is compared with COLLINS and a conceptual design for FSM:

- The concept design, submarine A1, was developed by an Australian

Figure 1 - Internal Volumes Compared for Selected Submarine Shapes

Figure 2 – Examples of Submerged Displacement V Length of Current Submarines and the Conceptual A1 Design



Note: Virginia, Astute and Barracuda are nuclear powered submarines

design exercise, against the requirements set out in the SIA's DWP Submission.

- The submerged displacement of A1 would be approximately 4000 tonnes (compared to COLLINS at 3,300 t).

The comparison illustrates that the current European submarine designs have significantly less internal volume than the larger range of submarines.

The spectrum of submarine sizes, based on open source information is illustrated below, pressure hull diameters are given in brackets after each submarine. L/D refers to the length (L) to pressure hull diameter (D) ratio of the submarine.

Figure 2 illustrates that the closest conventional submarine starting point for the capability sought in the DWP is Collins. Further, the design, operational experience and support capability developed for Collins combined with the extensive data gathered by operating it in Australia's environment provides a valuable starting point for development of FSM.¹ We should not lightly discount the value of this experience, it offers the opportunity to build on the strengths and design out its weaknesses, an option that would be less accessible if we were to start afresh.

Any submarine adapted or developed for Australia's requirements requires a significant level of design expertise to maintain, operate and develop the submarine through life, along with the engineering and design skills to safely oversee its operations; the equivalent of the airworthiness authority. Co-location in Australia is the cheapest and most effective solution for providing these essential services.

Being a parent navy² can be

¹ Australia has been the design authority for Collins since 2001.

² Note Collins is the only major combatant for which the RAN is the parent Navy.

expensive. In the case of a submarine, the cost of acquisition is 25 - 30 per cent of the total cost of ownership; in-service support and operating costs make up the majority of the cost of ownership. In developing the design, Australia should aim to minimise the total cost of ownership; if necessary being prepared to pay more in the acquisition phase to achieve a platform that will be cheaper to operate and therefore overall cheaper to own.

In developing the design, Australia should make maximum use of proven European and US submarine technologies to reduce risks and achieve the capability required. Australia needs access to both European and US sources of technology.

The most sensitive information may not be available. Additionally, there will be some areas of the submarine where suitable equipment is not available; in both cases, solutions will have to be developed. For example, it is unlikely that there will be a well tested diesel generator for a submarine of this size (one of the problems that was encountered during the design of the Collins class) and a suitable production diesel generator may have to be modified for use in a submarine environment.

An R&D program involving both industry and the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) will therefore be a key part of reducing risks and achieving the capability; it will be ongoing throughout the life of FSM to maintain the capability edge Australia seeks. The diesel generator example is at the low sensitivity end and would entail significant industry input; there are other areas such as signature management and countermeasures where sensitivity will be a significant matter and access to state-of-the-art R&D capacity critical. The need for Australia to develop the anechoic

coating tiles to reduce Collins active sonar signature is an example of this category.

The design and its supporting R&D program must be undertaken with Australia's operational environment in mind and leverage off the significant experience Australia has gained in operating a large conventional submarine in it. The design and outcomes from the R&D program must be protected; it would be counter-productive to have advances achieved through this process simply exported into the region.

An Australian design environment will allow us to balance these competing issues. This offers significant and unique advantages in its ability to access both European and US sourced submarine technologies; such access must be based on Australia's demonstrated ability to protect this information to the satisfaction of the owners and to avoid advances achieved by an Australian led R&D program being exported back into our region. To minimise risks, we must make best use of the Collins' lessons and ensure adequate design support, backed up by ownership of the intellectual property necessary for the parent navy role that is inevitable. This does not mean we do it all, significant assistance will be required for European and US sources of technology and design.

The critical issues arising from the initiation of the FSM project are discussed further in the SIA's Critical Issues Paper.⁵

CONCLUSIONS ON ACQUIRING THE CAPABILITY

The recent Defence White Paper has set a justifiable if challenging set of top level requirements for Australia's future submarine capability. In order to achieve a viable deterrent and if necessary, an effective strategic sting, Australia requires a force of long-range,

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highly capable submarines, able to carry significant and flexible payloads to potential adversaries’ sensitive areas.

Current European MOTS options are designed for a different requirement and consequently have a smaller hull diameter. It is unlikely that adapting one of these designs will provide the necessary capability. Any adaption would require a significant developmental project with concomitant risk.

Collins is the closest starting point to the DWP requirements and benefits from the operating experience gained in Australia’s environment.

The core decisions to be made in initiating the concept development phase are therefore to:

- Confirm the Defence White Paper strategic setting and analysis of the top level requirement.
- Recognise that a developmental project is required.
- Agree that an Australian design environment, evolving from Collins, offers the least risk to achieve the capability for the lowest total cost of ownership and within schedule/cost boundaries.
- Initiate a single concept developmental and design process, accessing support from US and European submarine designers and technology providers.

WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR THE RAN?

With the strategic setting and top level requirements set out in the DWP firmly in mind Navy should now review its management of the Collins Class to ensure that it provides the foundations for the FSM capability. Collins is an essential starting point for a successful FSM capability; it will not be sufficient to hand the FSM project to the Capability Division/DMO and await delivery in 2022 – we must view Collins and FSM as interdependent

capabilities. Appropriate leadership structures should be put in place to ensure a high level of coordination in the resources employed to achieve the current and future submarine capability, establishing the long term road map to bring coherence between Collins and FSM to minimise risk, disruption and source efficiencies through common procedures, training and logistics (to name a few).

Collins manning and availability is slowly improving from a near terminal level; improved management, increased funding of the manning, sustainment and operational capability of Collins class should be seen as part of a continuum leading to FSM.

The public perception of the Collins capability has suffered significantly as a result of the recent availability and manning hiatus – as reflected in the letters to the editor and cartoon pages. Defence and Navy need to demonstrate that the causes have been understood, the lessons learnt and the way ahead set so as to avoid a repeat in the future. I suggest there is much to be done in order to achieve this happy outcome.

The transition to Collins demonstrated the difficulty of manning a new class of submarine from a shrinking orbit of Oberons. The transition was extremely disruptive; a 25 year leap in technology and systems, with significant impact in Navy and


Industry, combined with a substantial loss of the skills in Navy and Industry for submarine refitting, provided one of the inputs to the current hiatus in Collins availability.

One of the other major lessons learnt was the need for a buffer of additional crews to cover the transition when training capacity in the new class is limited and capacity in the old is shrinking. One obvious solution is multi crewing in Collins – a conditions of service improvement recommended in the Submarine Workforce Sustainability Review.⁶ It is difficult to contemplate multi crewing of Collins at a time when we have only 3 crews building to 4, none the less the planning must start now if we are to manage this better than the last time and avoid the transition discontinuities that waste much effort and money.

WHAT MIGHT A TRANSITION MANPOWER PLAN LOOK LIKE?

The final plan will depend on the FSM timings; timings may be a different to this, but the profile should be similar. My points are the inter-linkages between Collins and FSM manning and the date the plan starts – **NOW!** How will this affect the balance of the 2030 Navy? My estimate of the orbit and manpower may serve as a starting point for the discussion _see next page for table.

Figure 3 – An Illustrative SM Crewing Plan for The Transition To FSM



Ship	Number of Ships	Crew Size (People)	Aircrew (People)	No. of Crews	Total People	% of Navy's Total Seagoing
Surface Combatants						
AWD	3	250	25	3	825	16%
LHD	2	250	75	2	650	12%
FFG	8	184	25	8	1672	31%
Total for Surface Combatants						59%
Support & Minor War Vessels						
AO	2	120	20	2	280	5%
PTF	16	25		20	500	9%
MHC	6	40		9	360	7%
Hydro	4	35		6	210	4%
Total for Support Ships and Minor War Vessels						25%
Submarines						
SSG	12	68		12	816	15%
Total for Submarines						15%
Total Seagoing Manpower					5313	

Figure 4 – An Illustrative Breakdown of RAN Seagoing Manpower ~2030

Notes

1. SSG, PTF, MHC, Hydro are multi multi crewed, 3 crews for each 2 operational platforms, 2/3 of SM force operational at any time, ie 8 out of 12.
2. SSG crew of 68 including 3rd watch.¹
3. AWD & LHD complements based on Spanish practice.
4. Aircrew guess.

³Adding an additional watch to the Collins Class normal two watch seagoing structure has been implemented following the Submarine Workforce Sustainability Review.

The final numbers will no doubt be different, my point is that ~ 15% of the seagoing navy seems a reasonable and an achievable allocation.

Bearing mind the parent navy lessons apparent from Collins, Navy should now consider the civilian and uniformed naval engineering skills

necessary to sustain the Collins capability and to develop and transition to FSM. These will take time to develop or acquire. The shore-based structure requires an appropriate hierarchy, shaped to support the RAN's new responsibility as the parent for Australia's principle strike capability – I doubt that 2 CDRE and 4 CAPT billets will suffice.

The time to grow this workforce afloat and ashore must be factored into the SM manpower plan – 2022 is closer than you think.

A return to a naval strike capability - that sounds like a topic for the next debate? 🚢



Peter Briggs retired in 2001 after a 39 year career including command of HMAS Otway, Oxley, Platypus, Stirling, Flag Officer Naval Training Command, Head of the Strategic Command Division and Head Submarine Capability Team. As the President of the Submarine Institute of Australia (SIA) he led the SIA's contribution to the DWP.

(Footnotes)

- 1 Adding an additional watch to the Collins Class normal two watch seagoing structure has been implemented following the Submarine Workforce Sustainability Review.

(Endnotes)

- 1 White, Hugh. *Power Shift: Australia's Future between Washington and Beijing*. Sydney, September 2010.
- 2 Defending Australia In The Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030. Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, 2009.
- 3 Briggs, Peter RADM. *Keeping Australia's Options open In Constrained Strategic Circumstances: The Future Underwater Warfare Capacity*, "Australia's strategic Sting, Canberra, 31 August 2008. <http:// www.submarineinstitute.com
- 4 Joubert, Peter Professor. *Some Aspects of Submarine Design Part One Hydrodynamics*, DSTO-TR-1622, October 2004.
- 5 Briggs, Peter RADM. *Critical Issues for The Initiation of Australia's Next Generation Submarine Project*. Canberra 31December 2008. <http:// www.submarineinstitute.com
- 6 Crane, Russ,VADM. *Navy's Response to the Submarine Workforce Sustainability Review, Part 1 & 2*, Canberra, 8 April, 2009.

“WINSTON IS BACK” – CHURCHILL & THE NAVAL EMPIRE

THE VERNON PARKER ORATION, 16 SEPTEMBER 2010

GRAHAM FREUDENBERG

Mr Graham Freudenberg was the principal speech writer to the leadership of the Labor Party during 1961–2005. Starting as Arthur Calwell's press secretary in 1961, over the next 40 years he became the close confidante, adviser and speechwriter to Gough Whitlam; Bob Hawke and to NSW Premiers Neville Wran, Barrie Unsworth and Bob Carr. He wrote nearly a thousand speeches, including the key policy speeches to open election campaigns. Many of his sentences became indelibly associated in the public mind with those who spoke them.

He is the author of the award winning political biography *A Certain Grandeur: Gough Whitlam in Politics* (1977), the centenary history of the NSW Labor Party, *Cause for Power* (1991) and his autobiographical political memoir *A Figure of Speech* (2005). His magnum opus appeared in 2008. *Churchill and Australia* (2009) is a wide-ranging examination of the relationship between Winston Churchill and all the major actors on the Australian political stage from Alfred Deakin to John Curtin. It was this book which caused the ANI to request that Graham Freudenberg deliver the annual 2010 Vernon Parker Oration.

I deeply appreciate the honour of delivering the 2010 Vernon Parker Oration, and the opportunity to pay tribute to Vice Admiral Parker as a founder of the Australian Naval Institute, in this Centenary Year of the Royal Australian Navy.

I feared I had damaged my naval credentials irretrievably by a gross



Sir Winston Churchill

error about the battle of Savo Island in the Solomons in 1942, in the first edition of my book, *Churchill and Australia*. I ascribed Japanese success at Savo Island to aircraft from Rabaul. Among several letters of correction, I received a most charming one from Lt. Commander Mackenzie Gregory of Melbourne, now aged 88. He had served on *HMAS Australia* when she was part of the expedition sent by Churchill to seize Dakar, West Africa, in September 1940. Dakar joined the long list of failed amphibious operations inspired by Winston Churchill.

Two years later, Commander Gregory was serving on *HMAS*

Canberra in the Pacific. He records:

When the Battle of Savo Island commenced at 0143 hours on August 9, 1942, as a 20-year-old Sub Lieutenant RAN, I was on *HMAS Canberra*'s bridge as her officer-of-the-watch. On page 438, Graham Freudenberg reports that Japanese aircraft sank *Canberra*.

I can assure you that it was a Japanese surface naval force of six cruisers and one destroyer that did all the damage, plus a torpedo we picked up on our starboard side that emanated from our starboard escort destroyer *USS Bagley*. The Japanese force split in two to steam each side of the northern

US cruisers and sink US ships *Quincy*, *Vincennes* and *Astoria*. Japanese float planes illuminated the scene with flares, but did NOT sink any ships. About 0800 hours on August 9, US destroyers finally sank *Canberra* with shells and torpedoes.

The battle of Savo Island, an early reverse in the drawn-out Guadalcanal campaign, serves to remind us of the strength and tenacity of the Imperial Japanese Navy, even after Coral Sea and Midway.

I have called my address tonight – “Winston is Back”, with the sub-title “Churchill and the Naval Empire”. “Winston is back”, of course, are the words of the famous signal flashed around the Royal Navy in September 1939, when Churchill was installed for a second time as First Lord of the Admiralty. Alas, Churchill’s official biographer, Sir Martin Gilbert – the ultimate authority on all things Churchillian – can find no record that the signal was ever sent. But the story is too good not to be true. Just like the remark attributed to him, dismissive of the traditions of the Royal Navy. “What are those traditions?” Churchill is supposed to have snarled at a group of admirals protesting some change he proposed in 1912; “Rum, sodomy and the lash”. Martin Gilbert states that Churchill denied having said it – but wished he had.

However, I use “Winston is Back” to make another point, about Churchill’s role in world history. I believe that the very rapid onset of the Cold War, barely a year after the Second World War, has obscured for the post-war generation the full menace Hitler and Nazism represented to our civilisation.

It is only since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union that the study of Hitler’s Germany has been undertaken free

of Cold War pressures, priorities and polemics. And the picture that emerges is of systematic atrocity and pervasive evil far worse than even Churchill imagined. Thus, on the One Big Thing – that Nazism must be destroyed at all cost – Churchill was so superbly right, against such odds, that it far outweighs in the balance of history all his manifest blunders and human flaws.

And in my sub-title “Churchill and the Naval Empire”, I make another point: British Naval power was crucial to Churchill’s ability and credibility in standing out against Hitler in the year and a half that the Soviet Union was Hitler’s ally until June 1941, and the more than two years before the United States came into the war in December 1941.

In his 50-year close association with Australia, Churchill had many brushes with us, and one of the first was a naval matter. In 1906, Churchill became the British Liberal Government’s spokesman for colonial affairs in the House of Commons. At the beginning of 1908, he learned that Australia’s Prime Minister, Alfred Deakin, wanted President Theodore Roosevelt to include Australia in the round-the-world voyage of his Great White Fleet – the first global show of strength of the US Navy. Because Australia then had no independent international existence or identity, Deakin had to ask the British Government to sponsor the invitation. Churchill tried to stop it. He ordered his officials: “This ought to be discouraged in every way...” It was, as Churchill saw it, an unwarranted assertion of Australian independence.

Churchill lost out on that one, and Deakin used the triumphant visit of the US Fleet to Sydney and Melbourne to make a pitch for an Australian navy of our own. “But for the British Navy, there would be no Australia”, Deakin said at a welcoming ceremony. “That does not mean that Australia should



Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin at Yalta

sit still under the shelter of the British Navy – those who say we should sit still are not worthy of the name of Briton. We can add to the squadrons in these seas from our own blood and intelligence something that will launch us on the beginning of a naval career, and may in time create a force which shall rank among the defences of the Empire.”

Already, by 1908, the defence of Australia was being seen quite specifically in terms of a threat from Japan. Japan had stunned the world with the destruction of the Russian Fleet at the Battle of Tsushima in 1905. Thus, in this little row over the Great White Fleet in 1908, all the elements were present in embryo of the disputes which were to test relations between Churchill and Australia in 1942: Australia’s defence role within the Empire, the Australian quest for a degree of independent policy, the tug of our relations between Britain and the United States, and differing perceptions of the threat from Japan.

Churchill never really changed and, as late as 1953, King George VI’s private secretary, Sir Alan Lascelles, would write: “Winston is incurably colonial minded”. As Robert Menzies was to tell the Australian Cabinet during his first Prime Ministership in 1941: “Winston’s trouble is that he cannot see dominions like Australia and Canada as separate entities”.

“WINSTON IS BACK” – CHURCHILL & THE NAVAL EMPIRE

THE VERNON PARKER ORATION, 16 SEPTEMBER 2010

The British Prime Minister, H. H. Asquith, appointed Churchill First Lord of the Admiralty in September 1911, just as a new German Naval Law was intensifying the naval arms race between Britain and the German Empire. Inspecting the fleet at Portsmouth, a vision of the naval empire rose before him:

On these ships, so vast in themselves, yet so small, so easily lost to sight on the surface of the waters, floated the might, majesty and dominion of the British Empire. What, he conjectured, would happen if somehow this fleet were to be lost:

The British Empire would dissolve like a dream; each isolated community struggling forward by itself; the central power of union broken; mighty provinces, whole empires in themselves, drifting hopelessly out of control, and falling prey to strangers; and Europe after one sudden convulsion passing within the iron grip and rule of the Teuton and of all that the Teutonic system meant. There would only be left far off across the Atlantic unarmed, unready, and as yet, uninstructed America to maintain, single-handed, law and freedom any more.

Here, writing in 1920 about his fears in 1912, Churchill sketched his message to the world in 1940.

Churchill's vision of an Empire wholly dependent upon the Navy translated into a very specific policy against the German challenge – concentration of the Fleet in Home waters, the North Atlantic and the North Sea. This was the doctrine laid down by Jacky Fisher, the dynamic prima donna who had created the Dreadnought navy. Churchill embraced the doctrine with his characteristic single-minded vigour at the expense

of the Far East squadrons and even the Mediterranean. He remained unsympathetic towards Australia's naval aspirations, and tried to keep our first flagship, *HMAS Australia*, in the Atlantic when she was commissioned in 1913.

It was Churchill who sent the signal around the world “Commence hostilities against Germany” on 5 August 1914. In accordance with the 1909 Agreement between the British and Australian Governments, the RAN came completely under Admiralty control, and Churchill exercised his authority to the uttermost. He even claimed credit for placing *HMAS Sydney* at the vital point in the Indian Ocean enabling it to destroy the German raider *Emden*. He certainly could claim credit for the superb organisation of the convoys which took the British Expeditionary Force to France and the Australian and New Zealand expeditionary force – the 1st A.I.F. and the Anzacs – to complete their training in Egypt, as he would write “without the loss of a man or a ship”.

And it was Churchill's decision and drive – his “excess of imagination”, in the words of the Australian official war historian, Charles Bean – which took the Anzacs to Gallipoli in April 1915. I won't here enter the enduring controversy over Churchill's campaign to capture Constantinople by forcing the Dardanelles. I canvass it thoroughly in my book and spread the blame. I write:

Asquith was the cleverest British Prime Minister of the twentieth century. Lord Kitchener (Secretary of State for War) was hailed as the greatest British soldier since the Duke of Wellington and Lord Fisher as the greatest British seaman since Nelson. Churchill became the greatest wartime Prime Minister in British history. Between

them, they produced Gallipoli.

In 1919, after the temporary truce which ended the first ruinous round of Europe's Thirty Years civil war, the Royal Navy was eager to restore its old imperial role as the guardian of a three-ocean Empire. Admiral Lord Jellicoe – of whom Churchill had said in 1914, “the only man on either side who could lose the war in an afternoon” – was invited to Australia to advise on naval defence. Jellicoe advised bases at Sydney and Fremantle, and above all a strong naval base at Singapore. Jellicoe wrote: “Singapore is the key to deterring the ambitions of Japan”. Those ambitions were now vastly expanded by its acquisition of German colonial possessions north of the Equator and on the Chinese mainland, as a reward for wartime service as our ally, including the presence of the cruiser *Ibuki* in the 1914-15 Anzac convoys across the Indian Ocean. Thus originated the Singapore strategy which dominated imperial and Australian defence thinking between the wars.

Churchill always opposed the Singapore strategy. The British official war history records Churchill, now Chancellor of the Exchequer, saying to Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin in 1926:

I do not believe that there is any danger to be apprehended from Japan, and I am convinced that the picture of Japan going mad and attacking us has no sure foundation whatever. If I had foreseen that the decision to develop a base at Singapore would be used as a gigantic excuse for building up armaments and that this country (Britain) would then be invited to pour out money with a view at the other end of the world, I would never have agreed to the development of the base.

More than anybody else, Churchill was responsible for the delays and downgrading in building the Singapore base. Admiral David Beatty wrote to his wife: "Winston has gone mad – economically mad, and no sacrifice is too great to achieve what in his short-sightedness is a panacea for all evils – take one shilling off the income tax". By the time the base was completed in 1938, its basic proposition – "Main Fleet to Singapore" – had been rendered an impossibility by the European situation created by the rise of Adolf Hitler.

From the beginning, Australian attitudes to the Singapore strategy mingled doubt, faith and hope. When it was first mooted at the Imperial Conference of 1923, the Australian Prime Minister, Stanley Melbourne Bruce, told his Dominion colleagues: "While I am not quite as clear as I should like to be as to how

the protection of Singapore is to be assured, I am clear on this point – that apparently it can be done". That was more or less the Australian attitude for the next twenty years. The fact is that Australia sheltered under the Singapore strategy because we lacked the political will to offer an alternative. All criticisms and explanations of Churchill's attitude to Australian defence in 1941 and 1942 must take account of the fundamental fact of Australian unpreparedness. As Dr Robert O'Neill has written of the inter-war years: "It is scarcely to Australia's credit that it had preferred British reassurances at face value and to do so little of its own volition to exploit the defensive worth of its long approaches to its own shores."

On the eve of war in September 1939, the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, brought Churchill out of the political wilderness

and appointed him First Lord of the Admiralty. The handover of the RAN to the Admiralty was not as immediate as in 1914, but on 9 November 1939, for a second time, Churchill became ruler of the Australian navy. Menzies, then six months into his first, failed Prime Ministership, complained that Churchill was keeping his government in the dark over shipping arrangements and was treating Australia as a colony. "We are represented as a government which knows less than the newspaper reporters", he cabled Bruce, now Australian High Commissioner in London.

On 17 November 1939, Churchill sent Menzies a cable which was to be decisive in making Australian policy right up to Pearl Harbor, and many of our problems after it. He wrote:

As long as the British Navy is undefeated, and as long as we hold Singapore, no invasion of Australia

The US Navy's Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer USS Winston S. Churchill follows a suspected pirate vessel in the Indian Ocean



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or New Zealand is possible
but if the choice were presented
of defending Australia against a
serious attack, or sacrificing British
interests in the Mediterranean,
our duty to Australia would take
precedence.

This reassurance was central to
Australia's decision to send the
expeditionary force of the Second
AIF to the Middle East – a decision
pregnant with honour and danger for
Australia.

Churchill's promise took its most
solemn form in August 1940. Now
he spoke with all the authority of the
Prime Minister who had galvanised
Britain and Australia with his
leadership after the Fall of France in
June 1940. On the eve of the Battle of
Britain, he cabled Menzies:

If, however, contrary to prudence
and self-interest, Japan set about
invading Australia or New Zealand
on a large scale, I have the explicit
authority of the Cabinet to assure
you that we should then cut our
losses in the Mediterranean and
sacrifice every interest, except
only the defence and feeding of
this Island, on which all depends,
and would proceed in good time
to your aid with a fleet able to give
battle to any Japanese force which
could be placed in Australian
waters, and able to parry any
invading force, or certainly, cut its
communications with Japan.

In the light of actual events in the
Pacific, this might all look somewhat
fantastic. Yet no more fantastic, if we
consider the grim realities of mid-1940,
than Churchill's defiance in the House
of Commons on 18 June:

The Battle of Britain is about to
begin. Upon this battle depends
our own British life, and the long
continuity of our institutions and

our Empire
Hitler knows that
he will have to
break us in this
Island or lose the
war. If we can
stand up to him,
all Europe may
be free but
if we fail, then
the whole world,
including the
United States,
including all that
we have known
and cared for,
will sink into the
abyss of a new
Dark Age, made
more sinister
and perhaps
more protracted,
by the lights
of perverted
science. Let us,
therefore, brace
ourselves to our duties, and so bear
ourselves that, if the British Empire
and its Commonwealth last for a
thousand years, men will still say:
This was their finest hour.

This is marvellous rhetoric but, 70
years on, I believe every word of it to be
absolutely vindicated.

The Battle of Britain effectively
ended the possibility of a German
invasion. British sea power in the
Channel and air power over the
Channel remained intact. In October,
Hitler shelved Operation Sea Lion –
the invasion plan – never to be taken
down. The planning for Operation
Barbarossa – the invasion of Russia –
began in earnest in December 1940.
Hitler had only to convince his generals
that it would not mean fighting on two
fronts East and West. They were eager
to be convinced, and it was easy for
him to argue, not so much that Britain



Sir Winston Churchill

was finished, but that the conquest
of the Soviet Union would deprive
Churchill and Britain of their last hope
– “her last prop on the continent”, as
Hitler put it. It cannot be emphasised
too strongly that Hitler's strategic
rationale for Barbarossa was to knock
Britain out of the war.

I regard our decision to fight on
after the Battle of Britain and before
the invasion of Russia as even more
important for the world than the
decision to fight on after the Fall
of France. If ever there was a time
when Churchill and Britain could
have exited the war decently and
honourably, this was it. It would have
involved no surrender, no parley, no
deal. All that was required was that
undefeated Britain, increasingly safe
beneath the RAF, secure behind the
Navy, successful against the Italians in
North Africa, simply stop fighting. But
a neutral Britain would have become,

effectively, Hitler's accomplice. So, for that matter, would have an increasingly isolationist America, as Hitler's propaganda machine went to work to portray his attack on Russia as a Western crusade against communism.

When Hitler told his generals that the conquest of the Soviet Union would remove Britain's last hope and prop, he was, of course, making a massive miscalculation of Churchill's motivation. All Churchill's hopes rested with the United States. This was his great Big Idea – to keep fighting until America came in. "I can see my way through", he told his son Randolph. "I will drag the United States into the war." And the operative words were "Keep fighting". This explains his ruthless order to destroy the French fleet in the harbour at Oran, Algeria. It explains his Middle East, North African and Mediterranean strategy – not just to hold on, but to keep fighting. It explains, if not justifies, the Greek debacle in which the Anzacs of the 6th Division and the New Zealanders played their notable but foredoomed role. The gallantry of the Mediterranean fleet under Cunningham – the RAN alongside the Royal Navy - insisting on the rescue of the Army from Greece and Crete is one of the imperishable actions in this sorry saga.

Historians commonly refer to Hitler's invasion of Russia as his worst blunder or mistake. These are the wrong words. They overestimate his military rationality and underestimate his racial and ideological obsessions. His whole policy had this fundamental aim: to seize the territories and enslave the people of Eastern Europe, as far as the Urals – the *Lebensraum*, the living space, for a purified master race – and to destroy what he called Bolshevism, which he invariably referred to as the Jewish international conspiracy. Hitler was not a madman; he was a

fanatic to the Nth degree, and these twin obsessions drove him on with ferocious single-mindedness. But this fanatic was in complete control of a highly educated and motivated people, and the world's most effective fighting machine, all bent to his will and his purpose of enslavement and extermination.

Churchill, too, had his obsessions, but it is a measure of his greatness that he was able to put them aside in pursuit of the defeat of Hitler. When Hitler invaded Russia in June 1941, Churchill said: "If Hitler invaded hell, I would at least make a favourable reference to the Devil in the House of Commons". The joke masked the pain of giving up the two causes which had dominated his inter-war career. In 1919 he had tried desperately to organise an international crusade against the Russia revolution, "to strangle Bolshevism in its cradle", as he put it. He had put himself in the political wilderness in the 1930s by his emotional and anachronistic opposition to any move towards self-government, Dominion status, or independence for India. When both Hitler and Churchill spoke of the British Empire they both meant, first and last, India; and when Hitler offered his guarantees for the Empire, he meant India, not least against Russia's age-old ambitions. The only thing Hitler wanted from Churchill was a free hand in Eastern Europe. Most particularly, he never made it a condition of British neutrality that Britain give up its Navy. Yet, in the final analysis, it was the Navy which had enabled Churchill to choose between dealing with Hitler or fighting on against him. At the same time, American concerns about the navy and Atlantic security gave Churchill his strongest card with President Roosevelt.

The price of admiralty in the Atlantic was, of course, any remaining

credibility of the Singapore strategy. The idea of the Main Fleet to Singapore to deter Japan was always unrealistic; after the Fall of France it was sheer fantasy. Yet Churchill continued to issue his reassurances to Australia that, if Japan threatened, he would cut his losses and rescue the "kith and kin" in the Pacific.

Fundamentally, his reassurances rested on two propositions:

- (a) That Japan was unlikely to come into the war unless Britain was defeated; and when that became untenable;
- (b) That the US would come into the war, if Japan attacked.

Because of Pearl Harbor, this is now seen as inevitable, one of the grand certainties of history. Yet as late as a month before Pearl Harbor, President Franklin Roosevelt was still refusing to give guarantees to go to war even if Japan attacked Malaya, Singapore or the Dutch East Indies. Indeed, one of the toughest strands in American isolationism was opposition to anything that smacked of protecting or saving the Empire, or any European colonial possession. Churchill himself personified these American suspicions.

Desperate as he was for American aid, Churchill was reluctant to press Roosevelt ahead of American public opinion. He rebuffed Admiralty attempts to entice the US Navy to use Singapore as a base to reinforce the South-West Pacific. He wrote to the First Lord in February 1941: "Our object is to get the Americans into the war, and the proper strategic dispositions will soon emerge when they are up against reality."

A year later, after Pearl Harbor and Hitler's declaration of war on the US had done what two years of Churchillian eloquence and pleading and fighting had failed to achieve, he changed tone. "Ah, that was how we

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talked when I was wooing America. Now we have them in the harem, we speak quite differently.”

But it still remains a matter for conjecture whether the US would have come into the war if Japan had not attacked Pearl Harbor. “In all the war”, Churchill was to write in his war memoirs, “I never received a more direct shock”. He was referring to the sinking of the *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* off the Malayan coast two days after Pearl Harbor. Against the Admiralty’s strong opposition, he had sent them to Singapore, partly to meet his promises to Australia. They were without air cover because the carrier *HMS Indomitable*, intended to be part of Z Force, had run aground in the Caribbean. Churchill wrote: “As I turned over and twisted in bed the full horror of the news sank in upon me. There were no British or American capital ships in the Indian Ocean or the Pacific except the survivors of Pearl Harbor, who were hastening back to California. Over all this vast expanse of waters, Japan was supreme, and we everywhere were weak and naked.”

Two factors dominated Churchill’s wartime attitude to Australia and led him into mistakes and misjudgements. First, he was desperately worried that the psychological shock of Pearl Harbor on the American people would divert the United States from the “Beat Hitler First” priority. Second was his inability, as Menzies had discovered in 1941, to accept that Australia had a separate identity or independence within the British Empire, or his concept of it. In my book, I add a third factor: Churchill’s lack of understanding of Australian party politics and his hostility to the Curtin Labor Government which had come into office in October 1941, two months before Pearl Harbor, as a result of a vote in the House of Representatives where two independents held the balance of

power.

Churchill’s prejudices meant lost opportunities for imperial cooperation, even after the Fall of Singapore in February 1942.

If Churchill had chosen to give due weight to Australia’s role, and had treated Australia as Britain’s fighting proxy and partner in the Pacific, he could have maintained the concept of Empire partnership. Instead, he chose confrontation with Curtin over our relations with the United States, insisting for as long as possible that Australia’s imperial duty lay in the Middle East. Even after El Alamein in November 1942, he still tried to hold on to the 9TH Australian Division for unspecified operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. He had continued to sneer at Australia’s turning to the United States, yet his own conduct had ensured that Australia would take the very course he professed to deplore. I should say here that John Curtin’s famous New Year’s Message – “Australia looks to America” – in 1941 was never intended to convey an abrupt turning away from Britain. It was Churchill’s overheated reaction more than anything else that made it look like that. The surprising thing is how much Curtin and his Labor Government still thought and were willing to act in terms of Australia’s relationship with Britain and the Empire, of which Churchill himself remained the embodiment.

By 1944, there was a remarkable convergence between Churchill and Curtin in the most traditional of all strategic terms – their common desire for the return of the Royal Navy in strength to Far Eastern waters and the Pacific. Churchill’s over-riding aim was the restoration of British prestige and power in the “lost places of Empire”. “What I feared most”, Churchill was to write, “was that the United States would say in after years ‘We came to

your help in Europe and you left us alone to finish Japan.”

Curtin and Churchill were in complete agreement on one thing: that the best and quickest contribution Britain could make against Japan in the last stages of the war would be the Navy.

Curtin wrote to Churchill in July 1944 that he “had come to the conclusion that the best manner of ensuring the earliest and most effective association of British forces with those of the United States and Australia in the war against Japan would be to assign to General MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief of the South-West Pacific, the British naval forces becoming available this year”. Sending the navy would be, Curtin wrote, “the most effective means of placing the Union Jack in the Pacific alongside the Australian and American flags”, and “would evoke great public enthusiasm in Australia and contribute greatly to the restoration of Empire prestige in the Far East”.

Churchill and the Royal Navy, however, now faced a new and formidable adversary – the Chief of the US Naval Staff, Admiral Ernest King, who detested the British Empire almost as much as the Japanese Empire. King’s daughter said of her father: “He is the most even-tempered man I know – he is always angry at everybody”. King’s real objection to the Royal Navy’s re-entry into the Pacific was his unwillingness to share the Central Pacific strategy against Japan with anybody – and that included the US Army and General MacArthur, in command of the American and Australian forces in the South-West Pacific Area. MacArthur himself told the British High Commissioner in Canberra: “It would be a great thing that an American general (himself) should sail into Manila on a British ship under the British flag”.

Indeed, King and Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief Pacific, tried to persuade Roosevelt to bypass the Philippines in the drive towards Japan, thus cutting MacArthur out of the main action. King was more successful in persuading Roosevelt to delay any decision to allow the British Navy to join the Pacific war in strength, however much Churchill argued, indeed begged for it. Long gone were the days of equality between the United States and Britain, when Churchill, in his historic wartime correspondence with Roosevelt, had signed himself “Former Naval Person”.

It all led to Leyte Gulf in October 1944. There is immense symbolism connected with the Battle of Leyte Gulf: the ultimate assertion of American naval power in the Pacific; for Japan, the end of the road that began at Pearl Harbor; the coming together of the two rival US strategies – MacArthur’s drive from Australia to return to the Philippines and the King-Nimitz-Halsey grand strategy of advance to Japan across the Central Pacific.

Symbolic, too, for the Royal Navy’s imperial role and Australia’s share in it. To me, there is something quite moving in the unspoken sentiment in Churchill’s telegram to Roosevelt congratulating him on the victory at Leyte Gulf. The message mingled pride and regret, with an undertone hinting at Churchill’s humiliation: “We are very glad to know”, Churchill wrote, “that one of His Majesty’s Australian cruiser squadrons had the honour of sharing in this memorable event”. Thus ended Churchill’s dream that the Royal Navy would restore British imperial prestige in the Pacific and the Far East. It was a far cry from his boast before the defeat of Hitler: “If I live, I will fling all we have into the Pacific”.

Not only Japanese and Churchillian dreams crashed in the flames of Leyte

Gulf. In the first kamikaze attack on *HMAS Australia*, Commodore John Collins was badly wounded. Curtin told newsmen in Perth on 22 October 1944: “News came this morning that Collins is wounded in action. How badly no-one knows. It may mean the end of our dream of an Australian Navy under an Australian-born Admiral.”

However, more than the Fall of Singapore, more than the loss of *Prince of Wales*, Churchill’s failure to persuade Roosevelt to allow the Royal Navy to return in strength to the Pacific marks the end of the naval empire.

The surrender of Japan took place on board *USS Missouri* on 2 September 1945. You may permit me here to salute by brother-in-law, Stoker Leslie Victor Lawler, present on the corvette *HMAS Pirie* in Tokyo Bay. He died a few years ago of asbestosis, aged 77. The Department of Veterans Affairs recognised that his condition was war-caused, as a result of his three years service in the asbestos-clad boiler room of *HMAS Pirie*.

The American victory in the Pacific was by no means the end of the British Empire, and it was certainly not the end of the Royal Navy. But it was the end of a long imperial era based on the world-wide reach of British sea power. The British revisionist historians – and they are mainly right-wing conservatives – complain that the price of destroying Nazism in Europe was the exhaustion of the Empire world-wide and its eventual demise. These critics imply that this price was too high, but this resentment is often a disguised form of anti-Americanism. It is true that the outcome for the British Empire was its supersession by American world power. Churchill always realised in his heart that this would be the price of victory. And whatever judgements we may make from time to time about the use of American power, few among us who survived the Cold War would

think that the ascendancy of the United States was too high a price for the destruction of Hitlerism.

If Churchill had not kept fighting on in 1940 and 1941, there would have been no Lend-Lease, no El Alamein, no Operation Torch, no landings in Sicily and Italy, no D-Day, no liberation of Western Europe – and in all probability, no Stalingrad. The choice Churchill had to make was not about the continuance of the British Empire. The alternative was the domination of the Nazi system throughout Europe and the protracted rule of organised and systematic criminality, of which the Holocaust itself would have been but a foretaste; and, at best, decades of a deadlocked struggle for mastery between Germany and the Soviet Union and their rival totalitarianisms, with consequences for our civilisation beyond imagination.

That this did not happen, I profoundly believe, is due to what Winston Churchill did – and did not do – in 1940 and 1941. He did not surrender; he did not deal; he did not despair. And whatever our Australian disputes with him, despite the justice of our criticisms of his attitudes and methods, Churchill’s stand led Australia to play a notable and honourable part in the struggle against what Churchill called “this monstrous tyranny never surpassed in the dark and lamentable catalogue of human crime” and to play that part while facing a grievous threat to our own shores. So in the grand sweep of the history of the past 70 years, I say emphatically in 2010: “Winston is back”. 🇦🇺

New Entry Officers Course & Sailor Transfer Trainees

BY LIEUTENANT KRISTY WILSON

Current policy for Royal Australian Navy sailors from the rank of Seaman (Qualified) to Leading Seaman (hereafter referred to as Junior Sailors) transferring to Officer is completion of New Entry Officers Course (NEOC). NEOC is a 22 week initial entry course designed to take a civilian with no previous military experience and provide them with the training and experiences necessary to function as a Naval Officer in the RAN. Within the Australian Qualification Framework (AQF), the completion of NEOC results in the statement of attainment towards a Diploma of Government (Management).

This article will examine the transition from completion of individualised courses such as Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology Entry Officers Course (RMITEOC) and Qualified Entry Officers Course (QEOC) to completion of NEOC as an alternative; discuss the validity of the current practice of sailor transfer trainees completing NEOC; and present potential alternatives to current practices. It is noted that all sailors from Petty Officer to Warrant Officer attaining a commission are not required to complete NEOC, and will therefore not be discussed in this paper.

My aim is to discuss current training policy pertaining to Junior Sailors upon attainment of a commission, and present a potential alternative to the current model.

WHAT IS NEOC?

IAW Section B of the NEOC Curriculum, the aim of NEOC is to “provide the knowledge, skills and attitudes to enable a junior officer to contribute effectively and to lead a naval team. The course is designed



HMAS Creswell, the home of the RAN College (Courtesy RAN)

to imbue the trainee with the Naval Values: honour, honesty, courage, integrity and loyalty. All lessons are built on these values and trainee progress is measured against both their performances in assessments and demonstrated Officer Qualities throughout training.”¹

NEOC is the flagship course of the Royal Australian Naval College. It is conducted twice a year, with January and July intakes, and trainee numbers vary from 90 to 125 per intake. Each intake is broken down into four or five divisions: Bass, Cook, Flinders, Jervis and Phillip. As stated above, at its most basic this course is designed to take a civilian and give them the basic skills required to function as a junior officer in the RAN. Junior sailors successful in their application for commission must complete NEOC.

AVENUES TO COMMISSION

Currently there are five schemes under which a junior sailor can apply for a commission.² Between the ranks

for Seaman (Qualified) and Leading Seaman a sailor may apply for the following:

- a. Sailor Entry (SE);
- b. Engineering Officers Scheme (EOS);
- c. Sailor Entry to ADFA (SEA) Scheme (LS only);
- d. Undergraduate Entry (UE); or
- e. Defence Academy Entry – Naval officer Year One (DAE-NOYO)³

It is noted that the SEA scheme is the only avenue open only to LS.

GAP YEAR SAILORS

The ADF Gap Year scheme was introduced in 2008. It was designed as an experiential program, exposing participants to the “wide range of employment opportunities available within the RAN.”⁴ As the name suggests, this is a 12 month program, after which time the participants are under no obligation to remain in the RAN, but are “encouraged to consider Navy as a career choice.”⁵

While it is acknowledged that Gap

Year sailors experience many things within the 12 month program, these experiences are not considered robust enough to be equivalent to that of a General Entry sailor for the purposes of this paper.

NEOC AND SAILOR TRANSFER TRAINEES

Historically the majority of sailor transfer trainees have much to say about the validity of NEOC for them.⁶ In essence, the belief is that while parts of the NEOC curriculum are pertinent and useful training, many aspects are not. These aspects include Initial Training Phase (ITP); elements of practical phase already completed such as Survival At Sea (S@S) and Standard Combat Survivability (CS); and Sea Training Deployment (STD). The crux of the argument is simply that they are essentially repeating training previously conducted. It is noted that these arguments are generally borne from a self-reflective point of view, rather than a synergistic one. Despite the individual focus of these arguments, it is worth examining them from a holistic training perspective.

ITP. Initial Training Phase is designed to produce rapid conversion from civilian to military routines, processes and culture. This stage is predominantly service and teamwork focussed, not specifically 'officer' or leadership focussed. As such, as sailor transfer trainees have successfully completed Recruit School and beyond, a strong argument can be made to recognise that these trainees already possess the basic service and teamwork skills taught during this phase. It is acknowledged at this point that ITP is a prominent formative stage for the division in achieving team synergy. However, one could further argue that while difficult, it is not unfeasible for a sailor transfer trainee to assimilate into

a division post-ITP, and that as sailor transfers they should already possess the skills to do so. It is not unlike joining a ship post-work up cycle.

Practical Phase Training. The repeating of practical training such as S@S and Standard CS seems somewhat unnecessary, as long as the trainee has maintained their currency in the respective elements. As an example, Standard CS currency expires if the time ashore since a member's last sea posting has exceeded three years duration.⁷ While the same argument regarding team bonding can be made for these elements as for ITP, equally the same counter argument remains applicable.

Sea Training Deployment. Sea Training Deployment is a more difficult element. On one hand, with the stated aim of STD being to "assist initial entry officers to gain the knowledge, skills and attitudes necessary to assimilate into Naval life at sea"⁸ an argument can be made that sailor transfers with sea experience already possess the skills to assimilate into Naval life at sea. On the other hand, on the subject of Recognition of Prior Learning (RPL) for STD, RANC Standing Orders states unequivocally "RPL will not be granted for the STD. All trainees must complete all tasks, from the perspective of Initial Entry Officer (sic), not a sailor." This stance tends towards the argument that there is a difference between life at sea as an officer and as a sailor. On a more esoteric level STD often acts as a catalyst for sailor transfer trainees to shift their mindset from that of a sailor to that of an officer, forcing them to confront the practicality of their choice to seek a commission rather than stay within the sailor ranks. For this reason and more it is considered an imperative part of the transition for sailor transfer trainees and current policy therefore valid.

HISTORICAL ALTERNATIVES: RMITEOC AND QEOC

RMITEOC. Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology Entry Officers Course, or RMITEOC, was designed to provide sailor transfers from both RMIT and ADFA with basic officer training. It was conducted over four phases, all of which were two weeks in duration, throughout their degree studies. The course curriculum was based on that of NEOC, but acknowledged a level of prior service knowledge and was structured accordingly.

QEOC. Qualified Entry Officers Course (QEOC) was designed for specialist entry officers. It was conducted over ten weeks, the first three of which were Initial Training Phase. This course was modelled on NEOC, with elements such as communications training omitted. Ostensibly this was because it was believed that specialist officers should already have gained the requisite level of competence in areas such as these. Sailor transfer trainees would only be eligible for this course if completing studies of a specialist nature.

When discussing these courses with RANC staff it is evident that many ideas exist surrounding the reason for their discontinuance. Interestingly, it seems that the Engineering fraternity had much to do with the amalgamation of RMITEOC into NEOC, contrary to what many Engineers believe. From a practical point of view, it was noted that the NEOC syllabus covered everything that both RMITEOC and QEOC covered and more. Further to this, the staffing and resources needed to run these courses as well as NEOC was high and seemingly unnecessary. From an officer development point of view, it was noted that the structure of RMITEOC meant that the sailor transfer trainees were being socialised as officers with other sailor transfer

New Entry Officers Course & Sailor Transfer Trainees

trainees only. Likewise, through the formative stages of the specialist officer's development, they too were being socialised with other specialist officers only. This was considered an impediment to their Officer Like Qualities (OLQ) development. As such, QEOC was ceased as of April 2002, and the final legacy phase of RMITEOC was completed in February 2010.

It is acknowledged that re-instating these courses would be of no value, and this article does not address this as a possibility. It is agreed that the fiscal and resource-based arguments for the discontinuance of these courses remain valid. It is also agreed that the lack of socialisation through the formative stages of officer development with a more diverse range of trainees is an impediment to the progression of OLQ's. The wider benefits of completion of NEOC for both the RANC and the trainee outweigh the perceived personal and training issues of doing so. However, none of these arguments hold up against the concept of phase - based training.

PHASE – BASED TRAINING V RECOGNITION OF PRIOR LEARNING: WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE?

RPL is defined as “an assessment process establishing the value of life and work experiences, informal learning and non-credentialed study toward the claimed course, module, learning outcome or competency.”⁹ This process also encapsulates the notion of mutual recognition/credit transfer. RPL enables a trainee to move in and out of the established training continuum based on identified and approved equivalencies.

The key issue with this system when applied to a formative course such as NEOC is the potential disruption to team synergy within a division when

one or more members are entering and exiting the training continuum at various stages. Acknowledgement of this issue is expressed within the RANC Standing Orders: “In considering applications for RPL both staff and trainees are to be mindful of the emphasis on team building as an outcome of RANC training. RPL for individual modules may be declined if the effect will produce a negative impact on the group as a whole.”¹⁰ Since Jan 2009 no application for RPL from a NEOC trainee has been approved.

Phase-based training is a notional system of introducing sailor transfer trainees into the already established NEOC continuum at a certain stage based on currency of competencies and previous naval experience. While utilising the principles of RPL within the administrative process, the major divergence is that once a trainee has entered the NEOC continuum they will remain until graduation. This serves to both acknowledge the previous achievements of a sailor transfer trainee, while limiting the potential disruption to team synergy within respective divisions.

The introduction of phase-based training would require the majority of changes to be made as the pre-course administrative level; the overarching requirement being co-operation between Navy People Career Management Agency (NPCMA) and RANC to determine currency of competencies and therefore the phase in which the sailor transfer will enter the NEOC Continuum.

Unless individual circumstances dictate otherwise, all sailor transfer trainees would enter the continuum within the course of the practical phase of NEOC, ostensibly between weeks five and ten. This provides for the acknowledgement that they possess basic service and teamwork skills, and

therefore are exempt from completion of ITP. Further exemptions would then be investigated on a case-by-case basis to determine what elements of practical phase the trainee needs to complete and what has already been completed and is current. Based on this analysis, the trainee would then be placed in the division whose program most closely aligns to these extant training requirements. An example of phase-based training continuum is shown here.

Example Phase – Based Training Continuum

Week	Phase	Course Content	
1	ITP	Basic service and teamwork skills. Ex Dardanelles and Ex Sunda Strait	
2			
3			
4			
5	Practical Phase	Standard CS	Trainee Insertion Point - ABSN
6		Small Arms	
7		Small Arms	
8		S@S/First Aid	
9		Boatwork	
10		Sea Training Famil	
11	Academic Phase	Academics	Trainee Insertion Point - LSBM
12		Academics/ Ex Coral Sea	
13		Academics	
14		Academics	
15		Ex Matapan	
16		Academics	
17	STD	At Sea	
18			
19			
20	Exams/ Pre-Grad trg	Exams	
21		Pre - Graduation drill and ceremonial instruction	
22	GRAD	Graduation Week	

LSBM analysis assumptions:

Completed sea rotation 6 months ago.

Completed Intermediate BM Course.

ABSN Analysis assumptions:

Completed sea rotation 12 months ago.

From the point of entry into the continuum, the sailor transfer trainee would then complete all further

curriculum components up to and including graduation. Post practical phase, the NEOC continuum becomes focussed on leadership development and service knowledge with particular emphasis on Officer-related subjects. While it is noted that this may include a revision of information previously learnt, it is considered that the benefits of remaining within the NEO body for the remainder of the course far outweigh the potential repetition.

While requiring all officer trainees to complete NEOC is a fiscally sound approach to training, it is not the most optimal use of the training continuum. By ostensibly treating sailor transfer trainees the same as a civilian entering the RAN for the first time, the RANC runs the risk of turning out very disgruntled junior officers into the fleet. Further to this, it is feasible to argue that the number of junior sailors seeking commission may decline in the face of such management.

Phase-based training appears to be potentially viable solution to this issue. It is acknowledged that significant further investigation needs to be conducted into phase-based training to determine feasibility and potential impact on external recognition within the AQF. However, the use of phased insertion into an established continuum presents as a relatively simple way to acknowledge current competencies and previous naval experience while minimising the impact on the staffing and resources of an already undermanned faculty.

In conclusion, I recommend the commencement of a feasibility study into the potential use of phase-based training within the NEOC construct for sailor transfer trainees. 🚢



Lieutenant Kristy Wilson RAN joined the Navy in 2000 as a Seaman Officer. She completed a degree in Indonesian and English at ADFA in 2003 and has served in various fleet units. She posted into the Officer Initial Training Faculty at the Royal Australian Naval College in Jan 2009.

"Type of Boy Required"

The Royal Australian Naval College in its early years was certainly definitive about what type of entrant was thought most suitable for officer training. A look at the 1918 edition of the *College Handbook* illustrates the point very well. It is interesting to ponder the changes in requirements over time...

The intricate mechanism of the modern ship – be it battleship, destroyer or submarine – requires such delicate handling and intimate technical knowledge that the "fool" would soon find himself hopelessly out of his depth and incapable of "carrying on".

The bulk of executive naval officers may divided into two classes, the Specialists and those who are commonly known as "salt horse". The former are those, who when promoted to the rank of lieutenant, specialise in Gunnery, Torpedo, Engineering etc. The Specialists (say 30% of the whole) are, generally speaking, the "high-brows of the Navy", and need brains.

Boys who successfully pass the educational examination...may be considered suitable for entry, as far as the educational standard is concerned.

A bright, smart, cheery boy, fond of games and open-air life, with a leaning towards the sea as a profession; alert and full of *joie de vivre*, even with a spice of mischief in him; imbued with a sense of honest straightforward manliness, who would not stoop to prevaricate in order to escape punishment; a strong-minded boy of good moral courage; capable of "taking charge", who will not be likely to lose his head in an emergency; quick to act and do the right thing; good physique – this is what is wanted, the ideal type.

The sensitive; the highly strung; the prosy, slow, poetical type; the bookworm; the effeminate; the boy without ambition, who is content to float along with the crowd; the boy lacking initiative, energy and vitality; the boy who is *inordinately* fond of home life; the sly type who confuses illicit acuteness with cleverness; the boy who never plays games, but prefers to mope indoors with a book – these are not wanted.

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Bridging Oceans: The Philippine Coast Guard Auxiliary & the Australian Volunteer Coast Guard

BY COMMANDER MARK R CONDENO

Strategically situated in the Asia-Pacific region, the Republic of the Philippines and the Commonwealth of Australia share a common bond of being maritime nations. The Philippines is an archipelago comprising 7,107 islands with a coastline of 36,289 kilometers¹ while Australia an island continent that has a 25,760 kilometer coastline.² Both nations depend on the sea as their lifeline and as means of transport and livelihood making their maritime environment a vital part of each nation's strategic interest. This paper provides an overview of the Philippine Coast Guard Auxiliary (PCGA) and the Australian Volunteer Coast Guard (AVCG) growing relationship as well as past, present and future endeavors of the two organisations.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The late 19th century saw the beginning of Philippine-Australia relations in the trade and economic sectors which expanded in the early 20th century. The outbreak of World War II saw both Commonwealths on the Allied side where cooperation was further strengthened during the critical days of conflict to that of the postwar period.

Unknown to many prior to the Japanese occupation of the country, two Filipino supply ships based in Sydney were running the gauntlet of Japanese naval blockade to reinforce the besieged fortress of Corregidor.³ A Parachute Battalion⁴ and a Reconnaissance Battalion composed of Philippine Army Soldiers and Philippine Scouts evacuated prior to the fall of

the Philippines were formed in Australia in 1943.⁵

The re-conquest of the Philippines and the subsequent Battle of Leyte Gulf saw a contingent of the Royal Australian Navy with the United States Third and Seventh Fleets counter the Japanese pincer movement in this spectacular naval battle. A flotilla of RAN warships also saw action in the Lingayen Gulf landings in the northern part of the country where General Douglas Macarthur launched his drive toward the liberation of Manila.⁶ The Royal Australian Air Force also made its presence known through the attachment of a Signals Group with a USAAF unit in Leyte,⁷ and later the basing of a number of RAAF transport and Fighter units in the latter stages of the war.

After the conflict, diplomatic and military relations resumed that further

strengthened the defence forces of both nations through military equipment procurement, such as the purchase of Harbor Defence Launches during the 50's⁸, the acquisition of GAF N22 Nomad aircraft, and the recent Tenix-built Search and Rescue vessels of the Philippine Coast Guard. Another significant aspect in the field of defense cooperation is characterised in the PASSAGE, LUMBAS and KAKADU Exercises, and exchange of students in the service schools between the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Australian Defence Force (ADF).⁹



APCMSEC 1st Day
Photo



MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

between
THE AUSTRALIAN VOLUNTEER COAST GUARD ASSOCIATION
 VICTORIAN SQUADRON
 and
THE PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD AUXILIARY
 DISTRICT 4

The purpose of this Agreement is to cooperate in mutually exchanging knowledge and expertise for the enhancement of their common goals of promoting boating safety, saving human lives and protecting the marine safety interests of the citizens of respective countries.

15 September 2001



[Signature]

R.A. Campbell
 Commodore
 Victorian Squadron

[Signature]

C. Gillette
 National Commodore
 Australian Volunteer Coast Guard Association



[Signature]

Higinio G. Mendoza, Jr.
 Commodore
 4th District PCG Auxiliary

THE PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD AUXILIARY

The Philippine Coast Guard Auxiliary (PCGA) is the volunteer support arm of the Philippine Coast Guard. Established in February 1972,¹⁰ its primary mission is to support and promote safety of life at sea and protection of the Marine Environment. Other than that it can be directed to:

- Assist the PCG in Search and Rescue
- To promote Programs towards the Protection of the marine resources
- To promote the Governments Youth development program such as the Sea Scouts.

It has its own primary program, known as the six cornerstones, which covers:¹¹

- Promotion of SOLAS
- Operations
- Public Education
- Marine environmental

protection

- Fellowship and
- Youth development

It is organised geographically into ten districts similar to the PCG. The PCGA is headed by a National Director with the rank of Auxiliary Vice Admiral and assisted by two deputies (Operations and Administration) with the rank of Commodores. It also has a National Staff.

Major Commands such as the Air Operations Wing and the Auxiliary fleet are led by Rear Admirals or Commodores. Auxiliary Districts are either under a Rear-Admiral, Commodore or Captain depending on the geographical size of each command. The Squadron and division are the primary units and are headed by Captains for the former and Commanders for the latter. Today, a 19,000 strong PCGA serves as the PCG's partner in the accomplishment of the varied missions of the organisation.

THE AUSTRALIAN VOLUNTEER COAST GUARD

Established in September 1961, The Australian Volunteer Coast Guard (AVCG) is one of the Two Coast Guard type organisations in Australia, it is patterned after the United States Coast Guard Auxiliary. It has radio bases and flotillas from the Gulf of Carpentaria to South Australia. It provides courses on basic seamanship, navigation, boating safety and Coastal Navigation.¹²

The AVCG is organised into the following: a National Board, a Squadron Board, a State Council which comprise two or more Squadrons, and Divisions and Flotillas. The Flotilla is the operational unit of the organisation.¹³

The National Board comprises the National Commodore with the rank of Vice Admiral. He is supported by a Deputy National Commodore, a National Training Commodore, and a National Administration Commodore. AVCG Squadrons are

Bridging Oceans: The Philippine Coast Guard Auxiliary & the Australian Volunteer Coast Guard

under Commodores while Flotillas are headed by Flotilla Commanders.¹⁴

THE ROAD TO COOPERATION: DISTRICT AND NATIONAL LEVEL MOU

On 24 June 2000 a milestone in the history of the PCGA was written as a Memorandum of Understanding and Sister unit agreement was made between the then 4th District Philippine Coast Guard Auxiliary based in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, and the 14th District United States Coast Guard Auxiliary based in Hawaii. The MOU “is intended to promote mutual understanding and sharing of knowledge and expertise for enhancing common goals on promoting boating safety saving human lives and protecting the maritime safety interest of both nations.”¹⁵ A few months later, a reenactment of the signing was held during the US Coast Guard Auxiliary Convention in Missouri witnessed by the US Coast Guard Commandant Admiral James Loy.

At the above conference Commodore Higinio C Mendoza Jr., then 4CGDA District Commander presented a proposal for the establishment of an “International Federation of Coast Guard Auxiliaries” with the aim of enhancing the maritime and boating safety of interested member countries. Subsequently a directive was issued to the International Affairs section of the 4CGDA to coordinate with similar organisations in the Asia-Pacific region of which after months of exchange of communications, on 15 September 2001 a similar MOU/ Sister Unit agreement was signed between the Victorian Squadron of the AVCG under Commodore Raymond Campbell and the 4CGDA during a convention of the former in Melbourne. The three man PCGA

delegation is made up of three officers: Commodore Higinio C Mendoza Jr., then Squadron Commander Captain Melchor N Prado, and Legal Officer Captain Jaime G De Ano.

Following this, the two districts were in constant touch with each other under the auspices of the District level MOU. Exchange of communication and updates on both organisations continued. Eight years later, in December 2008, a contingent of PCGA Flag officers including National Commander VADM Eduardo Alvarez, RADM Higinio C Mendoza Jr., PCGA International Affairs Director Commodore Harold Wolf and Commodores Melchor N Prado and Pablo Ortega attended the AVCG convention for the signing of the National Level MOU between the Two Organisations.

THE APCMSEC

In a US Coast Guard Auxiliary Conference in 2001, the idea for an alliance of volunteers in the Asia-Pacific region was formed. This finally came into fruition in March 2009 as delegates from six nations including representatives from the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Maritime Rescue Federation (IMRF) convened in Manila, Philippines for the First Asia-Pacific Conference on Maritime Safety and Environmental Concerns.

The event jointly hosted by the Philippine Coast Guard Auxiliary (PCGA) and the Australian Volunteer Coast Guard (AVCG) was made possible through the dynamic stewardship of the PCGA International Affairs Directorate and ably assisted by the RP-UN White Helmets and Team Rescue.

The program aims to promote International Volunteerism in Asia-Pacific with the goal of establishing

an alliance within the Navies, Coast Guard, Coast Guard Auxiliaries, Maritime Safety Agencies and SAR organisations within the region. Several topics discussed during the event were on Maritime Domain Awareness, Diving Operations during SAR operations and Environmental Protection among others. The AVCG was represented in this occasion by their National Commodore VADM Raymond Campbell, ESM, AVCG.

The Asia-Pacific Conference on Maritime Safety and Environmental Concerns paved way for the formation of the Asia Pacific Network of Maritime and Search and Rescue Organisations in October 2009 during the US Coast Guard Auxiliary Convention. The initial members were the attendees of the APCMSEC.

TOWARDS THE FUTURE

Historically, the Philippines and Australia has a rich military and security cooperation that continues to the present as both countries are major players in UN peacekeeping missions. As a major strategic partner of the Philippines, the Memorandum of Understanding and future endeavors was recently re-affirmed by the two Coast Guard organisations in March 2010 during the recently concluded Philippine Coast Guard Auxiliary Convention. Mutual assistance and exchange of ideas on its respective functions will further strengthen maritime safety security cooperation and the traditional good relations between the two countries. 🌊

Commander Mark R Condeno PCGA is currently Liaison Officer to the Foreign Armed Forces Attaché Corps, International Affairs Directorate, Philippine Coast Guard Auxiliary. He holds a Batchelor of Science Degree in Architecture from Palawan State University and is a graduate of the Philippine Navy Basic Naval Reserve Officer Training Course and the Philippine Coast Guard Auxiliary Officers Indoctrination Course.

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SPLASH-DOT WARRIORS – Raise, Train, Sustain RAN Cyber Skills

BY LIEUTENANT PAUL PELCZAR

The RAN is very familiar with tangibles such as ships and submarines as essential constituents and support forces – specifically logistics, mine warfare and geospatial – as vital force multipliers.¹ But the Navy is now also required to focus more on the development and investment within the cyber domain; exploiting the opportunities, overcoming the challenges, and defeating the threats. Rather than being judged as a disparate concept to maritime operations, Computer Network Operations (CNO)² should be considered as a tool by which the Navy will be able to provide agile and adaptable maritime forces. Additionally, CNO elements arguably accord with key strategic maritime concepts:

- a. Cyber Network Defence (CND)³ protects networks and denies successful intrusions similar to the concept of sea denial.
- b. Cyber Network Exploitation (CNE)⁴ exploits the battle space and produces intelligence enabling the ADF to dominate the spectrum corresponds to sea control.
- c. Cyber Network Attack (CNA)⁵ delivers effects with the intent to influence events and is therefore power projection in the cyber domain.

The ADF is formulating policy to cater for these emerging technologies, their military application and battle space relevance. The RAN is required to develop its cyber plan so that the maritime component is adequately represented in a joint and combined environment to contribute to ADF

operations and comprehend the extent of cyber effects in the maritime commons.⁶

This article broadly discusses several strategies to develop the RAN's contribution to ADF CNO. It does so without doctrinal guidance or reference to the Defence Force Remuneration Tribunal. It contends that some of the envisaged roles will need to be conducted at sea. I aim to assist in the development of a progressive but considered RAN cyber policy to enhance the delivery of adequate skill sets to support anticipated ADF requirements.

A CYBER FORCE TO BE RECKONED WITH

State sponsored CNE is widely regarded as the greatest threat to Australia's cyber security. Certain countries are attributed to be the most serious and persistent in this activity. These foreign forces' capabilities are widespread and continually improving.

The Australian Government's Defence White Paper⁷ noted cyber security as a primary concern⁸ and resulted in the establishment of the Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC).⁹ This centre has enhanced the Australian government's situational awareness on CNO. The large scale monitoring of internet protocol traffic permits a deeper analysis and detection of cyber intrusions against the Defence information environment. Concurrently, DSTO's Shapes Vector network security system represents a breakthrough in real-time visualization and identification of network attacks.¹⁰

Recent military application to shape the strategic and operational battle space demonstrates CNA effectiveness. Russian interests carried out distributed denial of service¹¹ attacks against Estonia in 2007, and Georgia during the South Ossetia conflict in 2008. However, the assessed inability to contain the collateral effects of a CNA operation led to US Bush Administration to reject a plan to

Older battle computers will give way to new (Courtesy RAN)



target Iraq's financial system before the Coalition invasion in 2003.¹²

The emerging cyber threat is no less apparent in the maritime domain with the RAN's progress towards network centric warfare,¹³ the increasing reliance on computerised systems and greater personal access to the internet at sea. *HMAS Melbourne*, recently deployed to the Middle East, is the first RAN major fleet unit to be fitted with an internet café that allows the ship's company to use Skype and access popular social media sites. In addition, the introduction of uploading biometrics data by boarding parties is but one example of greater RAN use of mobile devices.

A successful network intrusion may be unlikely due to RAN information assurance¹⁴ protocols but the Navy's C4I¹⁵ infrastructure remains vulnerable. CNA against a high capacity data radio-maritime communication network as will be delivered to the RAN under Defence Project SEA 1442,¹⁶ would threaten mission success. Although these type of digital systems have thus far proven invulnerable to such compromise there are recent examples of penetrations into current naval computer systems with varying results.

In January 2009, the French Navy computer network was infected with malware – software designed to infiltrate a computer system without owner consent. The Conficker virus allegedly resulted in the grounding of French fighter aircraft at several naval air stations because flight plans could not be downloaded.¹⁷ Also early in 2009, the same malware seriously infected the computer systems of up to 75 per cent of the Royal Navy.¹⁸

One of a navy's traditional responsibilities is maintaining the capability in protecting maritime trade and associated sea lines of communication. The issues of

performing this role are becoming more dynamic and complex as the merchant marine increasingly depends on information technology to facilitate efficiencies in a highly

competitive market. AMD-2010 reminds us that 75 percent of Australian exports and imports by value go by sea and navies will still be expected to provide protection in the face of threats to maritime trade. CNA affecting global navigation systems and aids, commercial maritime communications and networked manifests will disrupt merchant shipping, inhibit global commerce and repress Australia's economy. These outcomes are in addition to the probable adverse environmental and human consequences of such events.

The cyber threat has implications beyond warships at sea as it extends to the defence industry and support services ashore. High levels of dependence on contracting services for logistics, maintenance and capability pose a genuine risk to naval operations. Successful CNE endangers Australia's technological advantage in military sensors and weaponry research and development, ultimately undermining the RAN's warfighting ability. Concurrently, a wide range of military functions are vulnerable to CNA by way of targeting power, telecommunications and water utilities that serve a base. Facilities may have limited backup power generation for essential services but an extended outage will adversely affect base operations and its ability to support



ships at sea.

There is now emerging evidence that computer systems do not need to be networked or connected to a modem to be vulnerable. There are chip-level actions or 'chipping' where microchips in hard-based computer systems have been altered during production allowing remote command by potential adversaries. And that remote manipulation can be actioned through shore-power if the relevant power grid servicing the target has been compromised. These scenarios are in addition to inadvertent breaches by our own personnel or close access operations. A recent CNA example provides an insight into the sophistication, destructiveness and selectiveness of the technology being used to achieve commensurate operational objectives.

The Stuxnet computer virus – recently discovered in June 2010 but believed to have been launched as early as mid-2009 – targets a specific supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) management system associated to the Iranian nuclear program.¹⁹ Its complexity – including the use of four never-before-seen exploits – is unprecedented. The virus was directed to commandeer the SCADA software and reprogram the system. Due to these details, it is widely speculated that the CNA was a state sponsored project. But even though it

SPLASH-DOT WARRIORS – Raise, Train, Sustain RAN Cyber Skills

is widely acknowledged that Iran was the intended target, the virus spread to other countries in varying proportions. India and Indonesia have been largely affected – considered as probable accidental victims of the attack.²⁰

CYBER ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Intelligence and communications/information technology professionals are required to master different aspects of cyber related activities. Both specialisations contribute in varying degrees to threat assessments, intrusion analysis and reporting, planning and coordination of cyber event (including deliberate) responses and network vulnerability operations.

Investigative specialists mainly focus on forensics to respond to computer intrusion events. Intelligence analysts specialise in reviewing cyber data for items of potential intelligence value and can apply their expertise to produce a range of effects including both active CND and CNA.

CNA operators use innovative methods to rewrite code, install remote network devices and may conduct delivery packets to the target. Successful CNE operations – commonly called ‘hacking’ – provides access to data unavailable to SIGINT systems including data that is never communicated or gained prior to encryption.

CNE and CNA requires detailed analysis to fully comprehend the objective’s profile, and reveal network vulnerabilities that allow access. As part of any targeting process, legal considerations,²¹ indirect effects and non-kinetic collateral damage estimation methodology need to be understood and rigorously applied. Most CNA and some CNE activities require the capability to access remotely by exploiting known software

vulnerabilities. Dependent on the required skill levels, specialised education is expensive with an extended training liability for any of these roles.

While it is reasonable to assume that a proportional CND capability will be required at sea, the deliberation of the need for at-sea CNA and CNE contingencies are more opaque. Will CNE technology replicate the evolution and cost-versus-benefit of remote SIGINT systems reducing the human interface legacy? What are the possibilities, risk-versus-benefit and legitimacy of CNA conducted from and at sea? The solutions to these deliberations will ultimately influence the number of required personnel in uniform and the necessity for a cyber primary category. The RAN will need to manage these issues and associated threats within the fiscal and manning constraints of the Strategic Reform Program.

RAISE

CIS and CTS are the RAN categories closest aligned to the skills required for CNO. However, additional pressures would be encountered while managing the current personnel shortfall in these trades to incorporate any cyber training requirements. The inclusion of a cyber function into the CTS and CIS realms would need to be deftly controlled due to career management implications.

In the longer-term, naval applicants should be screened for computer aptitude during the recruiting process, guiding appropriate members towards the CTS or CIS paths. The requirement



to progress towards a cyber-related sub-category would be part of a longer-term tactical validation. Although there is currently no separate category, there is ongoing discussion in the US military about cyber-electronics evolving into its own specialty in due course.²²

The RANR may be a potentially rich source of expertise to draw on cyber skills while permanent naval force’s numbers are being developed for future contingencies. Apart from focussing on recruiting suitable members for the RAN, a concerted effort to recruit or seek existing Naval Reservists from diverse elements of information technology and computer security would greatly enhance the core knowledge base.

Commensurate to raising a skill base is to also raise awareness of cyber issues for Navy personnel. An ADF-wide (including Reserves) recruiting, awareness and education campaign would not only identify existing skill sets and steer potential candidates towards cyber-orientated streams but also promote cyber-security beyond the technical trades. The RAN and its personnel are prolific users of social media and progressive technology. Well-crafted internal coverage aimed at the appropriate level would reaffirm current information assurance policies, mitigate inadvertent breaches and

USS Wisconsin. born in an age where computers were primitive, she was updated to fire Harpoon and Tomahawk missiles but was never fully integrated into the world of cyberwar. (Public domain)

better protect our personnel from cyber vice.

TRAIN

The cyber training function must be flexible and adaptable to meet a range of full spectrum operations not yet fully envisaged. Economies of effort and joint training should remain fundamental but Service requirements must be articulated so there is minimal inter-Service discord of what type or level of output is delivered.

In any decision for new specialist skills, core military proficiencies need to be maintained. The training investment must be skillfully managed to minimise the risk of personnel equipped with these much-sought-after skills separating prematurely from the Service. Given the recent national and global recognition of the cyber warfare threat, individuals with computer and information security experience are in high demand. Training could be graduated and Service loyalty rewarded such as fixed contracts, allowances and assured career progression.

Civilian CNO operators undergo specialist training. Between three to six months of on-the-job training (OJT) is generally required for basic operations, nine to 18 months for mid-level proficiency and greater than two years for unsupervised operations. However, these personnel are specialists in the field, usually have a tertiary background in a related discipline and are not affected by the demands of military service.

OJT should be extensive but not without fundamental training modules for both technical and operational personnel. Certified and tailored CND courses from certain Australian universities could form a basis for ADF training and be centrally managed by a Defence School. Rotations between select tactical, operational and strategic

agencies for personnel would be preferred.

These rotations could be organised within a single (two-three year) posting cycle allowing broader exposure to the relevant Australian government organisations and the ability to consolidate skills, while ADF requirements mature. These postings would form a core knowledge base prior to subsequent joint operations and single service postings. The creation of two levels of a familiarisation course conducted by the relevant national agency would provide near-term sufficiency for supervisory and support roles. All stakeholders would be engaged to manage RAN net training liabilities.

SUSTAIN

The US Chief of Naval Operations elevated information to a core USN war fighting capability in 2009. As a result, the USN established US Fleet Cyber Command and stood up Tenth Fleet²³ by realigning 44 000 personnel under a newly defined Information Dominance Corps.²⁴ N2 and N6 organisations have merged structures and processes required to define, develop, resource and oversee the USN's information capabilities. RAN's Naval Communications and Information Warfare Directorate is proportionately similar to the USN structure. RAN N2 and N6 organisations share many pursuits and logical steps are being taken to ensure closer collaboration in the future. The benefits include the formulating of capability policy for both the users and potential exploiters of networks are located within the one area reducing the effects of 'stove-piping'.

Although the RAN is unable to fully recreate the USN framework largely due to capacity,²⁵ it is well placed to take advantage of the combined cyber

security policy framework. The RAN should leverage the outcomes of the US cyberspace policy review²⁶ through existing bilateral military relationships and other international coordination working groups.

Advanced training is conducted in the USA and military personnel are encouraged to attend workshops and other cyber related conferences.²⁷ ADF personnel should attend and participate in these types of seminars to learn and impart their own experiences.

Personnel exchange programs (PXP) and integree postings could be created within the USN and existing ones gradually aligned towards emerging technologies. Select postings within the USN will allow partial insight into the implementation of US cyber doctrine. These experiences will contribute to the RAN knowledge base on the member's return to Australia.

In conclusion, the ADF cannot afford to have an incongruent approach to CNO. In the absence of established doctrine, VCDF is the appropriate organization for coordination of ADF cyber security policies and HQJOC for the conduct of the activities. Therefore, the production of a cohesive strategy to secure and validate the ADF information and communications infrastructure – especially for deployed operations – will be required including the clarification of roles, responsibilities and application.

Military considerations make cyber a priority for the RAN. Evolving Navy's expertise will need careful management so existing trade skills are not diluted and personal career considerations are appropriately recognised. While the RAN will not match the US in capacity, it can leverage the USN in supporting mutual objectives in this sphere. The RAN cannot currently afford to duplicate training and resource investments that can be sought from elsewhere in the

SPLASH-DOT WARRIORS – Raise, Train, Sustain RAN Cyber Skills

ADF or with our Allies.

OJT should be significantly utilised but cannot be solely relied upon to up-skill both technical and operational personnel. Well-constructed career streams and curriculum should be developed that aligns training resources, reduces skill-set atrophy and discourages the departure of highly trained individuals into a competitive labour market. Creating a cyber-focused RANR function, greater attendance at cyber conferences and the realignment of certain PXP's will enable a mutually beneficial exchange of knowledge and best practices across and beyond the RAN. 🚢



Lieutenant Paul Pelczar, RAN joined the Navy in 1986 as an Adult Recruit, initially as a Signaller, ultimately as a WOCTL before attaining his Commission in 2007. He has served in a wide number of ship and submarine classes, and has completed four tours of the MEAO.

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Notes

(Endnotes)

1. Royal Australian Navy. *Semaphore Issue 6–Australian Maritime Doctrine 2010*. 25 July 2010. <http://www.navy.gov.au/Publication:Semaphore>
2. CNO involve the use of computer technology to attack, defend and exploit information and data networks. CNO has three sub-elements.
3. CND involve defensive measures to protect and defend information, computers and computer networks from disruption, denial, degradation or destruction.
4. CNE involves the clandestine exploitation of computers, switching systems, data networks and other computer controlled communications equipment via remote access, undertaken for intelligence

collection purposes.

5. CNA involve operations to manipulate, disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks or the computers and networks themselves.

6. Australian Defence Force. *Force 2020*. 15 August 2010.

<http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/f2020.pdf>

Force 2020 describes Network Enable Operations as the networking of forces to obtain common and enhanced battle space awareness, and with application of the awareness, deliver maximum combat effect. The future Fleet will operate in a multi-dimensional battle space characterised by the interaction of the physical, cyber and temporal dimensions.

7. Australian Government. *Defence White Paper 2009*. 10 August 2010.

<http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/>

8. *ibid*. The White Paper referred to progressing major enhancements to Defence's cyber warfare capability.

9. *ibid*.

10. Defence Science Technology Organisation. 20 September, 2010.

<http://www.dst.defence.gov.au>

11. Botnets imitate the legitimate subscriber service. Botnets are controlled remotely and are used to shut down the internet activities of the target through distributed denial of service attacks, as well as to deliver emails or crack passwords. Malware are malicious programs, which perform functions not authorised by the users likely leaving a back door open to the computer or transmitting passwords or sequences of keystrokes to an online collection point. The use of IO, combating the malware threat with social engineering aims at convincing users to undertake activities they otherwise would not. Phishing – masquerading as an authorised agency/organisation and using fake emails and websites to trick users out of passwords and other identify credentials.

12. Australian Strategic Policy Institute. ASPI Special Report – Issue 26–Cyber Security: Threats and Responses in the Information Age. 20 January 2010. <http://www.aspi.org.au/publications/publicationlist.aspx?pubtype=10>

13. Network Centric Warfare (NCW). Means of organising a force by using modern information technology to link sensors, decision makers and weapon systems to assist personnel work more effectively together to achieve the commander's intent.

14. Measures that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. These measures include providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities.

15. Command, control, communications, computers and intelligence.

16. Defence Material Organisation. 19 September 2010.

<<http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/esd/sea1442/sea1442.cfm>>

SEA 1442 is a multi-phased program that will enhance the RAN's maritime communications capability in support of the ADFs NCW concept. The program will contribute towards a 'networked navy'.

17. National Business Review. 20 September 2010. <<http://www.nbr.co.nz/article/french-navy-surrenders-conficker-49733>>

France admits its naval systems were taken offline but disputes that aircraft were grounded.

18. The Register. 15 November 2009. <http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/01/15/royal_navy_email_virus_outage/>

UK Ministry of Defence reported that some of its major systems and desktops were infected. The worm spread across Navy Star desktops aboard various RN warship and submarines.

19. Symantec. 10 August 2010. <<http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/distilling-w32stuxnet-components>>

Stuxnet looks for a particular model of Programmable Logic Controller (PLC)

made by *Siemens*, used within certain SCADA systems. PLCs are often – and in this case – controlled by computers. If the virus did not find this certain PLC it remained inactive and dormant. If it did find a match, it would activate.

20. There is also speculation that STUXNET was responsible for destroying an Indian broadcasting satellite contributing to a theory that the Indian Space Research Organisation – which also uses *Siemens* PLCs – was also a victim of the attack and feeds into conspiracies of the China/India 'space-race'.

21. There are specific laws within the Telecommunications Security Act (and other Australian legislation) that relates to the conduct of Electronic Attack and by extension, Computer Network Attack.

22. Slashdot. 20 August 10. <<http://interviews.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=08/06/12/1642212>>

As an example, LTCOL J. Bircher of the US Army CNO EW Proponent's Futures Branch discusses related issues

23. Federation of American Scientists. 25 August 2010. <<http://www.fas.org/irp/>>

<doddir.navy/opnavinst/5300_12.pdf>

The USN established and stood up Fleet Cyber Command/U.S. 10th Fleet as the Navy's operational element for cyber and information-related activity and as the USN Component Command to Department of Defense's new sub-unified command, U.S. Cyber Command (US-CYBERCOM). The establishment of FLT-CYBERCOM was effective 01 Oct 09, with a directive to be fully operational by 01 Oct 10.

24. *ibid.* By creating 10th Fleet, USN Chief of Naval Operations has directed that the Navy be the most prominent and dominant Service in the areas of Intelligence, Cyber Warfare, Command and Control, Electronic Warfare, Battle Management and Knowledge of the Maritime Environment.

25. The US has a number of agencies and Commands involved in the cyber space, with significant jurisdictional overlap.

26. US Government. 15 August 2010. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/cyberspace_policy_review_final.pdf>
US Cyberspace Policy Review: Assuring trusted and resilient information and communications infrastructures of May 2009.

27. Defcon Hackers' Security and BlackHat conferences.

Danish Navy Niels Juel-class corvette HDMS Peter Tordenskiold-photo 2 by Michael Nitz.



Royal Danish Navy decommissions three Niels Juel-class corvettes

All three Royal Danish Navy Niels Juel-class corvettes have been decommissioned from service.

The three 1,300 tons (displacement) 84 meter vessels *HDMS Niels Juel*, *Olfert Fischer* and *Peter Tordenskiold* were built by Aalborg Shipyard and launched in the period 1978-1980. A major upgrade involving

a modernisation of their weapon- and sensor systems was conducted between 1998 and 2000.

The crews of the decommissioned vessels will man three new frigates, *Iver Huitfeldt*, *Peter Willemoes* and *Niels Juel*, which will enter service in 2012, 2013 and 2014.

All three 5,900 ton frigates are

under construction at Odense Steel Shipyard.

Although there has not been taken a definite decision on the future utilisation of the decommissioned corvettes, their hulls will most likely be scrapped after weapons and sensors are removed for future use.

Michael Nitz, correspondent, Hamburg

PLA NAVY SEA RIDE – 15-20 SEP 10 – A SUMMARY OF EXPERIENCES WITH THE CHINESE NAVY

BY MIDSHIPMAN ANGUS MCDONALD

I was excited but anxious in the days leading up to the six day sea ride on the PLA Navy's training ship, the *Ghenge*. What I was anxious about was adapting to a completely different way of living in a short period of time with the expectation of observing and taking note of the differences, but also the similarities between the Chinese Navy and our own. Along with the other Australian Midshipman, James Hill, the sea ride would be a fascinating experience and one to be remembered throughout our respective naval careers.

When all four of us, including two NZ junior officers, arrived at Auckland Port where both the *Ghenge* and the Chinese Frigate *Ngang Yang* were berthed, a large group of Chinese media raced up to us and the Chinese Midshipmen who were our companions for the trip took our bags and greeted us with open arms. We were taken to the flight deck and were greeted immediately by the CO of *Ghenge*, Captain Feng and the three resident Chinese Admirals.

Chinese media, CCTV, were also sailing with us and we had a number of interviews in regards to life with the Chinese Navy. This was an interesting experience as we had always been briefed on media awareness but had little firsthand exposure to foreign or Australian media in the past. Our expectation was that senior officers would be conducting such interviews, so this came as a surprise. In many instances, I demonstrated to the Chinese media at their request the skills that I had learnt throughout the practical and theoretical classes, including the use of the sextant on the flight deck. They were particularly

interested to interview us whilst tasting traditional Chinese cuisine and resting in our respective dormitories. To our amazement, Chinese journalists also greeted us upon arrival at Garden Island.

As we were taken below decks, I was informed that 200 Chinese Midshipmen are onboard the *Ghenge* at any one time. The accommodation was very basic, with four bunks per cabin- which they called dormitories, and a wash room with no shower or bathroom facilities close by. The Chinese placed a large emphasis on time management and we barely had enough time to unpack when they started trying to dress us in ceremonials ready for the welcoming cocktail party.

The party was fantastic with a large variety of traditional Chinese food, an interesting insight into what we would be eating throughout the trip. There were also Chinese beers and teas to sample.

The transit from Auckland to Sydney on the *Ghenge* was a memorable experience. What instantly came to mind when we left Auckland harbour was emergency drills onboard. I expected a large number of alarms to go off and to be rushed to an emergency station within the first hour of sailing however there were no sea evolutions throughout the entire passage. I struggled to find a life jacket or a fire extinguisher onboard so I assumed that they had their own system of carrying out emergency evolutions and that we would all be accounted for in some other way.

Water onboard the *Ghenge* was particularly precious. The crew believed in showering on the last night

of sailing to conserve water and conducted wash up in the morning at 0630 and just before lights out which for the Chinese

midshipmen was at 2200 with two hour watches following throughout the night. The tap water onboard was contaminated, so they boiled the water and let it cool down in a large kettle for six hours at a time. It did appear that this was always the case as there were a number of hot water taps and facilities throughout the ship and the Chinese midshipmen were very mindful when we initially filled our water bottles with the contaminated tap water. This was surprising as most ships normally cleanse the water through filters before supplying it to the crew and are aware that hydration is a major issue in regards to the operation of a warship. Clean water in my view should always be readily available. I remember filling up a water bottle after waking up and drinking it warm by the end of the day. We did get very dehydrated by the second day of sailing and our Chinese companions, the Midshipmen who shared our accommodation, informed their leaders of the situation and we were sent bottled water. Wash up in the morning consisted of waking up and washing our faces and arms with soapy water and a face towel.

The Chinese were very discreet in regards to their divisional system whilst



A member of the Chinese PLA holds a national flag outside the Great Hall of the People in Beijing

at sea. Throughout the transit, we requested bridge time and to meet with the three Admirals to present our gifts. In response, the Chinese Midshipmen would refer to their Divisional Officers or higher ranking officers as their "leaders". There were a number of meet and greets with the Captain and three Admirals throughout the passage. On many occasions, the leadership group of *Ghenge* were interested in our thoughts thus far and relations between the Chinese and Australian navies. On the second last night of the trip, we presented our four ADFA plaques to the leadership group including one for the Captain and one for the three admirals, as well as a plaque for each respective dormitory. The Chinese Officers were very pleased with the gifts and we were astonished at the number of presents that we received in return including pens, Chinese novels, Navy hats and chopsticks. The Navy hats issued to each midshipman consist of a golden reef similar to the headdress worn by senior officers in the RAN. When I first boarded, I almost mistook the midshipmen for Commanders.

In addition to boiled water, the Chinese cuisine on the *Ghenge* was memorable. Unlike the food from Australian restaurants, it was very savoury. Obviously the Chinese kept well hydrated by drinking hot soups. The soups were fishy and they cooked the vegetables and beef in a special way which did not resemble Australian methods. We enjoyed the food for the first three or four days, however it became increasingly harder to digest. Once again, the Chinese midshipmen consulted with their leaders who provided us with bread and beef for lunch and dinner by the final day of sailing. I was very appreciative of the friendliness and good nature of the midshipmen and senior officers onboard. There were times when our companion midshipmen would check

on our progress and they made sure that we were always accompanied when moving throughout the ship.

When we started sailing for Sydney, the foreign Midshipmen onboard (the four of us) expected to be taught about Chinese naval operations and we were also expecting to observe weapon serials and other practical evolutions. However, the Chinese way of training onboard was completely different to our seamanship training in the RAN. Every day, the Chinese Midshipmen would have two main classes in which we also participated. They would either study celestial navigation with sextants or general navigation in the morning from 0800-1130, and chart work or geographical navigation in the afternoon from 1230-1730. These classes were divided into practical and theoretical components. Practical components for celestial navigation involved taking sun sights using the sextant with a companion, whilst, for navigation classes, the three main modes of fixing (visual, radar and GPS) were tirelessly practised although they mainly carried out GPS fixes even

within sight of land. There were two main classrooms for each theoretical lesson. In the navigation classrooms, large charts written entirely in Chinese were provided and a siren sounded at the end of each fixing interval. To our surprise, the Chinese midshipmen carried out ten minute fixes without ever going to a shorter interval.

Depending on what was taught in the morning, there would be a one hour siesta from 1230-1330 and a chance to rest. Whenever there were no classes, we would stay in our cabins with no chance to head to the bridge or relax on the flight deck. The upper decks were specifically out of bounds for all midshipmen onboard. The classes were long and the Chinese midshipmen were not given a break for stand easy at any point.

Throughout the rest periods, we socialised with the Chinese midshipmen. They would drink tea or hot coconut drinks and read Chinese Defence magazines. The use of mobile phones or any other electronic device was strictly prohibited throughout the trip. The Australian midshipmen used

The Guangzhou, one of China's front line warships, pictured in Leningrad (Public domain)



PLA NAVY SEA RIDE – 15-20 SEP 10

– A SUMMARY OF EXPERIENCES WITH THE CHINESE NAVY

this time to find out everything there is to know in regards to training and the lives of the Chinese midshipmen. Talking to the Chinese provided a great insight into their culture, living standards in the Navy and why they chose to join the Navy in China. I found that it was easy to talk to our midshipmen companions, however, hardly surprising, most of the sailors on board could not speak English. Our companions, similarly to us, had almost completed three years in the Chinese Navy with one more year of study to go before graduation from their Academies. They also receive promotion at the end of this four years of intense training.

Many of the Chinese midshipmen were uninspired by the navigational training conducted on the *Ghenge*. Many had no career plans or intentions to stay in the navy for an extended period of time. They also talked a lot about the three main Naval Academies in China, which have up to ten thousand students each, and were clearly very proud of the particular Academy from which they came. It was emphasised that their training is primarily focussed on completing their selected majors at the three main Naval Academies before moving on to more specialised training such as navigation or engineering – this was mainly conducted at sea. What they did expect to receive were qualifications that would assist in continuing with civilian studies after completing their return of service obligation, which, similarly to RAN Seaman Officers going through ADFA, is nine years. They had little or no aspirations for the future and appeared to be accustomed to following strict orders and guidelines with little influence over their own careers, a big surprise to most of us when we learnt this.

What the Chinese midshipmen did respect, however, was life at sea and

travelling from one destination to the next. When touring the upper decks, they were in awe at the heavy sea state throughout certain periods of the passage and the beautiful scenery when leaving Auckland harbour. We saw this as testimony to the little experience that most of the midshipmen had at sea.

In one instance, the Chinese midshipmen practise drill for 80 days in preparation for major graduation parades. They major in navy related subject whether that be navigation, engineering or even geography and mathematics. Notably, engineers must also carry out navigational duties onboard.

I was interested to know when the Chinese midshipmen would apply these theoretical skills in a practical sense. After lights out, the 200 midshipmen onboard would commence two hour watches throughout all departments of the ship. They would carry out one different watch per night of two hours duration, however I did not discover whether they circulate throughout the ship to other departments. I myself was restricted to keeping watches in the executive department and started in the chartroom for the first night at sea, then progressed to the bridge, including radar, helm and deck watches. On average, we had five to six hours of sleep per night as a result of these two hour night watches.

As a Seaman Officer trainee, I was interested in the bridge layout of the ship and how they conducted watch keeping and manoeuvres at sea. The charthouse, as they called it, was separate to the pilot house (the bridge). The ship had up to four Lieutenant equivalent navigators who would keep six hour watches in the charthouse. The bridge was mainly manned by senior sailors with a sailor on the helm, another sailor simply watching the



Capable neighbours - a Song Class submarine of the Chinese Navy

radar, a commander of the deck (our officer of the watch equivalent) and one of the three admirals or the Captain keeping respective six hour watches. At any one time, there were 14 personnel on the bridge including up to ten senior sailors looking out in each bridge wing, together with a navigator on watch in the charthouse.

We were particularly intrigued as to how the commander of the deck performed their duties on the bridge. When *Ghenge* was approaching a course change, the navigator would confirm the ships' position on a chart in the chartroom and move to the bridge when it was time to perform the wheel over. The navigator would inform the Captain who would conduct the wheel over – a very interesting difference from the RAN, considering that we rely on the officer of the watch to conduct these manoeuvres and evolutions on the bridge without assistance. Throughout my time keeping watch on the bridge, the commander of the deck would talk to us without taking the usual actions I would have expected of the officer

Air warfare destroyer of the PLA-N with Hanchow Bay Bridge behind the ship (Public domain)



of the watch, even watching ahead of the ship. At times, I was concerned that something might happen if the commander of the deck didn't start to keep watch or pay any attention to the situation. Situational awareness and any form of clear command structure in this sense seemed lacking on the bridge and we started to doubt, as midshipmen, whether this ship would be operational in complex situations.

Throughout the two hour watches, I assisted my designated companion with their specific duties. On the first night of sailing, I carried out three minute fixes from the charthouse, to their surprise. The navigator questioned why I was doing three minute fixes instead of their standard ten minute fixing by GPS. The radar and helm watches on the following nights were great in the sense that I had the opportunity of steering the ship with little difficulty, due to the fact that the markings on the helm were written in English. For my radar watch, I was less fortunate and watched a radar screen for two hours. The Chinese senior sailors in contrast, conduct six hour watches on the bridge, which led me to question how alert they were by the end of the fourth or fifth hour.

The final night of the sea ride approaching Sydney Heads, the Chinese hosted a Midshipman party. I expected the celebration to include traditional Chinese food and tea, however, they provided us with Western food and tables of beer and wine. The Chinese explained that they believe in drinking at sea on the last night as a symbol of good luck for when they come alongside the next day.

Arriving in Sydney on the Chinese training ship was an unforgettable experience. The Chinese midshipmen and also officers for that matter were very intrigued with every moving vessel in Sydney Harbour and it was obvious that they had little exposure to

the conditions of entering and leaving harbour. I specifically remember sailing past Australian warships alongside and taking note of how the Chinese salute ships junior and senior to them. As the PLA-N ships were coming alongside, the local Chinese community put on a magnificent show with dragons and Chinese art along the wharf.

After disembarking *Ghenge*, we did not anticipate that any Chinese midshipmen would be attending the cocktail party apart from senior ranking officers, although the Cocktail party on *HMAS Manoora* celebrated what was for me a wonderful sea ride on the PLA- N ship and I was very proud of the way that the ceremonial sunset ceremony was conducted by the RAN. I remember taking photos with the Chinese before disembarking the *Ghenge* and exchanging phone numbers with the hope that one day we may meet again. It was great to acknowledge the strong relationships that were built during the sea ride and the fact that I can sail in a foreign Chinese ship and build friendships that will put me in good stead throughout my naval career.

What I can draw from these experiences is not only the teamwork and leadership opportunities that they provided but the networking opportunities and the chance to appreciate the significance of training with international navies and the experiences at sea that it provided me with. Hopefully more young officers Midshipmen will receive the chance to observe a fully operational Chinese Navy at sea as I did and learn to appreciate the significance of international relations for the Royal Australian Navy. 🌊

Midshipman Angus McDonald joined the RAN in 2008 as a Seaman Officer. After graduating from the New Entry Officers Course 39 in 2008, he commenced a Bachelor of Science degree at the Australian Defence Force Academy. He is currently in his second year of study.



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Supporting Breastfeeding Women in the ADF Workplace

BY LIEUTENANT LEE KORMANY

As of 01 May 2010, women made up 13.6% of the permanent full time ADF.¹ This is lagging behind civilian workplaces with women making up 35.4% of the normal fulltime workforce in Australia.² On 19 November 2009 the Chief of the Defence Force released his Action Plan for the Recruitment and Retention of Women. During his speech CDF stated several times that he wanted to '...see higher female participation rates across the three Services,' and have a defence force that was more representative of the broader Australian community.³

The Action Plan is being progressed by a VCDF Steering Group. It consists of six priorities:

- a. Enlistment,
- b. Workplace Flexibility,
- c. Career Management,
- d. Accountability,
- e. Mentoring, and
- f. Communication.

If the action plan succeeds, it stands to reason that the ADF will have more female members and therefore it is likely a number of these women will become mothers during their service, with as many as 44% returning to work during the first year of their babies' lives.⁴

The Australian Government has recently released the "Australian Breastfeeding Strategy 2010–2015". It recognises the biological, health, social, cultural, environmental and economical importance of breastfeeding and the need for workplaces to implement breastfeeding friendly policies. This would realise the government's vision where 'Australia is a nation in which breastfeeding is protected, promoted, supported



and valued by the whole of society'.

The strategy provides a governance mechanism and the mandate to progress these issues.⁵

Currently, the ADF has no policy on supporting breastfeeding women in the workplace. While current Flexible Work Arrangement can certainly facilitate combining breastfeeding and returning to work, it does not provide specific support that addresses the needs of a breastfeeding woman. This can lead to breastfeeding members being discriminated in the workplace, as supervisors may not understand their legal responsibility to accommodate breastfeeding members,⁶ which is due to be strengthened by establishing breastfeeding as a separate ground of sex discrimination as announced by the Federal Government on 04 May 2010.⁷

This paper will investigate why such a policy is necessary for the ADF and

provides an Recruitment and Retention of Women initiative that demonstrates that the ADF is committed to families, equal employment opportunity and supporting the Australian Government by being a model Breastfeeding Friendly employer.

This article demonstrates the need for the ADF to develop and implement a Breastfeeding Support policy. Breastfeeding is the normal way of providing young infants with the nutrients they need for healthy growth and development. The World Health Organisation (WHO) recommend that infants be exclusively breastfed up to six months of age, and then continued breastfeeding along with appropriate complementary foods up to two years of age and beyond. Breastmilk contains all the nutrients a baby needs for at least the first six months of his life and continues to be the most important part of his diet throughout the first

Baby and Navy woman (Leading Seaman Helen Frank)

Supporting Breastfeeding Women in the ADF Workplace

year, supplying half or more of his nutrients till his first birthday and up to one third to his second birthday

This has been reinforced with the Australian Breastfeeding Strategy 2010–2015 developed by the Australian government in response to 'The Best Start: Report on the inquiry into the health benefits of Breastfeeding (2008)'. The Objective of the Strategy is 'To increase the percentage of babies who are fully breastfed from birth to six months of age, with continued breastfeeding and complementary food to twelve months and beyond.'

Currently, while 92% of babies in Australia leave hospital being fully breastfed, this drops to 80% by one week old and then steadily declines to only 56% of babies being exclusively breastfed at three months old, with 14% at six months. The number of babies receiving any breastmilk (ie being fed both breastmilk and artificial breastmilk) is 56% at six months of age, 30% at 12 months and only 5% of infants receiving any breastmilk at 24 months old.⁸

Why Breastfeeding Is Important

A large body of Australian and International evidence shows that breastfeeding has significant value to babies, mothers and the community.⁹

11. For Babies. There is solid evidence for the protective effects of breastfeeding against three classes of infectious disease in babies: gastrointestinal illnesses, respiratory tract infections, and otitis media (middle ear infections). Studies suggest that the longer a baby is breastfed or receiving breastmilk for, the greater the protection against infections¹⁰.

12. For Mothers. Breastfeeding is beneficial in promoting a new mothers recovery from childbirth

and significantly reducing the risk of breast and ovarian cancer in later life.

- 13. For the Community:** Protective effects of breastfeeding in infancy may extend to later life, with reduced risks of obesity and chronic disease. Therefore it has the potential to alleviate costs to the public health system in both the short and long term.
- 14.** Breastmilk is environmentally friendly, when compared to any other infant feeding product. Breastfeeding can lead to reduced workplace absenteeism and disruptions to look after an ill child and there are health risks and financial costs associated with not breastfeeding.¹¹

Barriers to Breastfeeding

- 15.** The barriers to initiation and continued breastfeeding are varied and diverse across populations. They include community attitudes and perceptions about breastfeeding, structural barriers such as lack of facilities to support combining breastfeeding and work, workplace policies and legislative gaps, such as the lack of entitlement to maternity leave. Other barriers identified included lack of partner or family support, lack of breastfeeding education and inconsistent health care provider information and advice.

Returning To Work After Having A Baby

- 16.** An increasing number of women return to work within the first 12 months of their babies' lives: 11% within the first 3 months, 21% within 6 months, 31% at 9 months and 42% at 12 months.¹² One of the biggest obstacles many of these women face is how to continue to breastfeed their baby in line with the infant feeding

recommendations.

- 17.** Current federal and state anti-discrimination legislation does provide that employers are legally obliged to 'reasonably accommodate' breastfeeding mothers, but this is open to interpretation. Some employers feel that a toilet is an appropriate place for a woman to express for her baby, and many employers simply do not understand how breastfeeding works and why a breastfeeding employee may require lactation breaks several times a day.
- 18.** Breastfeeding works on a supply and demand basis, therefore to ensure adequate supply, milk needs to be removed regularly from the breast throughout both the day and the night depending on the baby's age and needs. Regular draining of the breast is also required to ensure good breast health as engorgement (overfull breast) can lead to blocked ducts and mastitis.
- 19.** Without the right support a significant number of women experience anxiety, choose to delay their return to work, reduce their working hours or leave their job altogether. This can also lead to premature weaning, mixed feeding (combining breastmilk with artificial breastmilk) or deciding not to breastfeed at all as it can seem to difficult to combine breastfeeding and working.
- 20.** Many women successfully combine breastfeeding and work. Employers have found that helping breastfeeding employees return to work from maternity leave is not only demonstrating a supportive and caring approach, it makes good business sense. It can deliver significant cost saving associated with improved retention rates,

earlier return to work, duration of service and reduced recruitment and re-training costs.¹³

Breastfeeding and the ADF

21. ADF workplaces are, in general, quite supportive of breastfeeding members. Many bases have defence family rooms that have specific facilities arranged with the breastfeeding member in mind e.g. Defence Plaza, Melbourne.¹⁴ Where there is not a specific family room, some members make use of their local first aid room.¹⁵
22. Not all ADF workplace are 'reasonably accommodating' to breastfeeding, so the support experienced by breastfeeding members is inconsistent and varied depending on the unit. Units that have a high number of Defence APS staff will usually have good breastfeeding support as the DECA 2009 makes provisions for facilities to support breastfeeding members¹⁶. Whereas members in a uniform only environment have no policy support, so it is unclear what provision for breastfeeding in the workplace exist.
23. The current flexible work practices and policies¹⁷ available to members are often used by women returning to work after a period of maternity leave (MATL). This allows women to meet their parenting responsibilities, while making the transition back to the workplace after having a baby easier. Part Time Leave Without Pay (PTLWOP), Temporary Home Located Work (THLW) and flexible working hours can be used by breastfeeding and non-breastfeeding women (and men) alike, however, a breastfeeding woman has specific needs which are not met by the current policy and she is reliant on her ability to

negotiate with her workplace to ensure that her needs are met.

24. Not all women who return to work, from MATL take advantage of flexible work arrangements. This means that they may return to work in a full time capacity with a very young baby who they are still breastfeeding, or attempting to breastfed exclusively. By nature of her fulltime status, she may find the requirements of service placed on her make it difficult or impossible to continue to breastfeed exclusively.

Specific Needs of Breastfeeding Members

25. To be able to continue to meet her parenting responsibilities a service member who is breastfeeding will need the following provisions in her workplace:
 - a. A private room (not a toilet area), with a comfortable chair and 240v power point available (for use with an electric pump),
 - b. a refrigerator (or space in one) to store expressed breastmilk,
 - c. appropriate storage space for a breast pump and associated equipment, and
 - d. Regular lactation breaks to express or breastfeed.
26. The number and frequency of lactation breaks varies depending on the infants' age and needs. A member with a young infant, less than six months, may need to express frequently possibly every 2-3 hours to maintain her milk supply, where as a member with an infant over 12 months old may only need to express once during working hours or not at all.
27. Some members may be able to have their infant brought to them

for feeds, or if their infant is near by, able to go and breastfeed their baby. This can be a good option, as it is often faster and easier to breastfeed an infant directly rather than express.

28. Infants need to be fed both day and night. This means that a member with a young infant may be unavailable for overnight duties, but even many older infants, 12 months plus, are still regularly breastfeeding overnight to make up for the feeds they may not be having during the day due to a mother being at work, so it would be most appropriate to either exempt breastfeeding members from overnight duties or have facilities which allow them to be accompanied by their infant.
29. Often, ADF members are required to have extended absences from home, to attend courses or other service related activities. This can be distressing and inappropriate for a breastfeeding member, unless they can be accompanied by their infant and possibly a carer to look after the infant while they are attending to work in the other locality.

Breastfeeding Support Resources

30. The Australian Breastfeeding Association (ABA) have a program that provides employers and organisations with the opportunity to become accredited as Breastfeeding friendly work places.¹⁸ This includes support to develop a breastfeeding policy and set up the appropriate facilities, 'Return to Work' resources for employees about combining breastfeeding and work, and a certificate of accreditation.
31. The ABA also conducts prenatal breastfeeding education classes. These ensure that attendee's

Supporting Breastfeeding Women in the ADF Workplace

understand how breastfeeding works, what normal newborn behaviour is and most importantly where to go for help and support when experiencing difficulties.

32. With the positive effect that breastfeeding has on mothers, infants and society it is therefore prudent that the ADF should include prenatal breastfeeding support to pregnant members.

CONCLUSION

33. In conclusion, breastfeeding is the normal way to feed infants and small children. The WHO recommend breastfeeding exclusively for six months, then with complementary foods, continuing to two years old and beyond. The Federal Government has cemented its commitment to breastfeeding with the release of its Breastfeeding Strategy 2010–2015. This has the stated vision of 'Australia is a nation in which breastfeeding is protected, promoted, supported and valued by the whole of society'.
34. Breastfeeding members have specific needs that are not being met by the current flexible work policies. This leads to inconsistent approaches by supervisors to breastfeeding members, which may result in a member being discriminated against or not being treated equitably, and exposing the ADF to possible action by the HREOC.
35. The introduction of a formally and culturally accepted Breastfeeding support policy would ensure that breastfeeding members are treated fairly and consistently. It would demonstrate the ADF's commitment to the health and well being of pregnant, potentially pregnant and breastfeeding members and show these

members contribution, to defence, is valued regardless of their parenting responsibilities.

36. This policy would also contribute to the recruitment and retention of women strategies and build defences reputation as a family-friendly employer. By removing some of the barriers to sustained breastfeeding the ADF would also enjoy the benefits of reduced absenteeism and minimised disruption to work flow, due to parents requiring less time off to care for a sick child, and create a culture that is supportive of breastfeeding.
37. More so, by embracing the Federal Governments commitment to increasing breastfeeding rates and duration, the ADF could show itself an employer of choice, who takes its commitment to being family friendly seriously, and lead the way for the larger Australian community to recognise breastfeeding as normal.

As a result of analysing current ADF policy, the Federal Government's position on breastfeeding, and the benefits that sustained breastfeeding delivers to the community. The following course of action is recommended:

- a. ADF develop and implement a Breastfeeding support policy that includes:
 - (1) Pre natal Breastfeeding education;
 - (2) A 'Return to work' program;
 - (3) Provision for suitable facilities for breastfeeding or expressing and storing breastmilk;
 - (4) Adequate lactation breaks to either breastfeed or express;

- (5) Exempts breastfeeding members from overnight duties, or provides for accommodations for infant to accompany member if appropriate;
- (6) Provision for breastfeeding member to bring an infant and carer with them, if required to travel for service reasons with an infant that is less than 12 months old, including financial support for travel and accommodation costs.

- b. ADF to included awareness of the breastfeeding members rights in current equity and diversity training.
- c. ADF to become accredited as a Breastfeeding Friendly Workplace by the Australian Breastfeeding Association. 🐼



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QUALITIES OF LEADERSHIP

BY LIEUTENANT COMMANDER TOM LEWIS

This series examines selected traits of leadership to compare Royal Australian Navy leaders against a criteria. The first of the articles took Admiral Lord Nelson, the hero of Trafalgar in 1805, as a model, as well as examining the characteristics of other well-known leaders, both civilian and military.

Seven qualities of leadership measures the subject matter, suggesting a capable naval leader is an achiever; expert in his or her field; inspires others, and takes initiative; impresses by their physical qualities; empathises with others, and is an effective communicator.

ACHIEVEMENT

Did the person under discussion improve their organisation? Did they leave it a better place by being a member? Promotion is recognised as a measure of achievement. By many measures which traditionally mark out achievement – education; decorations; amassing of physical wealth perhaps – we gain some beginnings of whether a person is a success.

EXPERT IN ONE'S FIELD

Anyone who aspires to be a leader and an example to others must obviously have expertise in their craft. In naval terms, that translates as being an expert "ship-driver"; an aviator *par excellence*; an engineer possessing a wealth of theoretical and practical knowledge – and so on. Nelson, for example, was a master at strategy – which becomes a commander of fleets – but also of tactics, which behoves a ship captain. He was also an inspired man-manager.

INSPIRATIONAL

This leader inspires others to perform similar deeds. Often this is shown by

the leader's actions in front of their subordinates. Nelson inspired his followers in being resolute, courageous and honourable. It is one measure of the man that so many did: Hardy, who was with him when he died; his fellow admiral Collingwood whose battle line he raced to be first to engage at Trafalgar; ship commander Berry, who followed him from ship to ship, and Captain Hallowell, who after the Battle of the Nile made him a present of a coffin fashioned from the French ship *L'Orient's* mainmast – Nelson kept it in his cabin and was indeed buried in it.

INITIATIVE

Sometimes described as "going in where angels fear to tread", this measure means to use judgement and advance where necessary. The leader is brave in psychological terms and takes the lead where necessary. It does not mean going forward rashly.

Nelson was a man who had the courage of his own convictions, who could often have left off and blamed superiors for failure. Instead, he was a man who chose to use initiative and advance when he knew the defeat of the enemy was attainable and essential. At the Battle of Copenhagen, walking the deck while the guns roared their broadsides, and deadly splinters whistled about his ears, he confided to Colonel Stewart, commander of infantry, who was with him on the quarterdeck, that he would not be "elsewhere for thousands". Whether he was fearful or not – and who would not have been – Nelson led by example. And when his uncertain superior, Admiral Parker, made the signal to leave off the action, Nelson refused to see it, putting his telescope to his blind eye and exclaiming: "I really do not see the signal". The British won the battle

with much help from Nelson's use of initiative.

IMPRESSIVE PHYSICAL QUALITIES

This might be rephrased as "looking the part of a leader". Would anyone have said that Horatio Nelson achieved this? Yes – and no. A short, thin man not blessed with good looks, he first entered the British navy in 1771 as a midshipman at 12 years and three months.¹ Despite being prone to sickness: "I have had all the diseases that are", he once said; he adapted well to the vigorous and often dangerous life that was the Navy.

Nelson was a man of raw physical courage who led by example. He lost an eye when an enemy shell, exploding during the siege of Calvi in Corsica, drove splinters and dust and rock fragments into his face. He suffered most terribly and often from wounds, quite willing to lead from the front. His right arm was amputated after the battle of Santa Cruz in Teneriffe due to his being hit by grapeshot.

This is what is meant by "looking the part of a leader": behaving in such a way that people can be inspired. It means to look resolute and act with resolution – as did Nelson. To lead by example. To not show physical cowardice. It might include "panache"; "the almost untranslatable expression of dash, of valour, the ability to do things with an air of reckless courage and inspiring leadership".² Finally, we might add that the bearing, carriage and speech of a leader should be of the highest standards.

EMPATHY

The great soldier of the 18th century, Frederick the Great, had good advice on how to attain the next quality of the



leader – Empathy:

...talk with the soldiers, both when you pass their tents or when they are on the march. Sample often to see if the cookpots have something good; find out their small needs and do what you can to satisfy them; spare them unnecessary exertion. But let fall the full vigor of law on the mutinous soldier, the backbiter, the pillager...³

Empathy means to be able to imagine yourself – as leader – in the role of your people, and to show that. It is “the power of understanding and imaginatively entering into another person’s feelings.”⁴ General Montgomery said to his troops at the Battle of Alamein: “We will stand and fight here. If we can’t stay here alive, then let us stay here dead.”⁵ Montgomery was entering into the feelings of all of his people, who feared that they would die. Churchill’s speech of WWII did the same: “We shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills: we shall never surrender.” Alexander the Great “shared in the men’s dangers, as the scars of his wounds testified...he ate the same food as they did. He was highly visible....he fought hard himself but he was ever on the watch for any acts of conspicuous courage in the face of danger amongst his men.”⁶

Such statements say to you that your leader will be with you, no matter what the cost.

COMMUNICATION

One needs to be understood at all times. Nelson employed in his leadership style something unusual for its day: the art of effective communication. One characteristic was to invite others to contribute their

ideas for a campaign, or a battle, or a change of some sort; to educate his men and get them – and him – to know each others’ minds. Nelson embarked upon the Battle of the Nile in 1798 by letting his captains engage in individual fashion. The French fleet, anchored by the bows in a line in shallow coastal water, engaged in ship to ship fashion by five British vessels sailing inside the line and anchoring, and the rest engaging from outside. Thus the French were caught between two forces. At the end of hours of fighting, the French had lost 1,700 men to the British 200; their fleet was largely pounded to pieces, and Napoleon and his army were stranded in Egypt. Nelson had hoisted just two signals through the entire battle.⁷

For the autocratic manager this would have been disastrous: an authoritarian leader would not trust his subordinates to make momentous decisions and fight on their own. Nelson trusted his individual captains. So too, in the long pursuit of the French, years later in 1805, he had regular meetings with his “Band of Brothers” – the name applied to those who fought under him at the Nile.⁸ During the long chase the officers would pool their ideas for forthcoming battles; the best use of tactics; what a following ship would do when its fellow was sighted engaged and so on. Consequently even the necessity for signals within the ensuing battle was dispensed with; the captains knew each others’ minds.

Communication means to be able to use words effectively to persuade others. Winston Churchill was a great exponent of this. Eisenhower, then a US General and later President of the United States, experienced the British Prime Minister in action:

Churchill was a persuader. Indeed, his skill in the use of words and logic was so great that on several occasions when he and I disagreed on some important matter – even when I was convinced of my own view and when the responsibility was clearly mine – I had a very hard time withstanding his arguments.⁹



A capable naval leader is an achiever; expert in his or her field; inspires others, and takes initiative; impresses by their physical qualities; empathises with others, and is an effective communicator. We have seen many great leaders who exhibited those traits. This series examines how many of Australia’s naval leaders performed in these fields.

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
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STUDIES IN TRAIT LEADERSHIP – STRATEGIC VISIONARY

VICE ADMIRAL SIR HENRY BURRELL, KBE, CB, RAN

BY LIEUTENANT COMMANDER TOM LEWIS

Vice Admiral Burrell shares with Vice Admiral Creswell a sense of strategic vision for Australia and its Navy. Although he commanded two successive destroyers in WWII, it was probably his first major shore appointment in America that sparked his breadth of understanding and vision for the role and future of the Royal Australian Navy. He understood more than most, acknowledging it often, the debt the RAN owes to its Royal Navy heritage. Yet when it was necessary he steered the acquisition of new ships to American models, with consequent benefits for his country. Resolute in fighting for what he perceived as right, he fought hard – and succeeded – in getting a 1959 decision to disband the Fleet Air Arm reversed. He has been described as one of the first ‘dinkum Aussie’ admirals, and remains one of the most influential flag officers in the RAN’s history.

Henry Mackay Burrell had plenty of family tradition to live up to when he decided on a career in the Royal Australian Navy. His father Thomas, who his son later described as a ‘frustrated sailor’, was a member of the Army Reserves, and his grandfather and great-grandfather both had careers in the RN.¹ His grandfather, also Thomas Burrell, served over 30 years as a ‘Chief Boatman’ in the Service.¹ Burrell’s father and his uncle both emigrated to Australia in the late 19th century; and his father settled

in the Parramatta region west of Sydney, working as a schoolteacher. There he met and married his wife Heather Mackay. They raised five children, with Henry being the third, born on 13 August 1904.

Burrell’s father seems to have been a strong influence on his children. He was interested in almost everything, from shooting to the Arts. He was a strong patriot and supporter of the Church, where he was an organist, warden and reader. When war broke out in 1914, despite being 55 years of age, he presented himself for service. He was accepted, and served in Egypt. In 1917, with his father away, Burrell became interested in the Navy, somewhat to his mother’s chagrin. Nevertheless, he applied, and was duly given an officer’s cadetship.



Naval training began in 1918 at the RAN College in Jervis Bay; Burrell in the most junior class. He thought some of the training too practical – he learnt to use a lathe – and disliked the lack of literature, and the emphasis on manners. In fact his opinion later was that the College’s product would be ‘an illiterate engineer who could enjoy to the full sailing and stargazing during weekends in a French condominium.’² However, on the whole he found his four years interesting and enjoyable. He liked sports, but did not excel at them while at the College, and he disliked sailing in the College yacht *Franklin*. In 1921 he was given a Second class pass³ and graduated 10th in his class, enabling him to escape the forced reduction in officer numbers being brought about by the Washington Treaty. Only 14 out of the original intake of 36 were retained in the Navy after graduation.


Once out of the College, the young midshipmen’s training continued for two and a half years, during which time they were given appointments to ships of the RAN and the RN. Burrell was posted to *HMAS Sydney*, the winner of the Navy’s first sea-action of WWI, against *Emden*.

During his time with the ship Burrell decided to specialise in navigation, supposedly, according to his somewhat modest autobiography, because this would allow him to avoid the unpleasant and arduous task of ‘coaling ship’, an all-hands activity from which only telegraphists and navigators were exempt.

Early voyages in the cruiser saw the ship visit Tasmania, and then Noumea,

*Burrell as a Lieutenant
(Courtesy Fayne Mench)*

¹ General background material on the career of the subject is drawn from Burrell’s autobiography *Mermaids do Exist*. Except where direct quotations have been taken, such material is not annotated.



STUDIES IN TRAIT LEADERSHIP – STRATEGIC VISIONARY

VICE ADMIRAL SIR HENRY BURRELL, KBE, CB, RAN

where some members of the ship's company including Burrell climbed the slopes of an active volcano. He served for a month on board the destroyer *HMAS Stalwart*, and 'thoroughly relished' his first time in a 'small ship'.⁴

In April 1923 Burrell travelled to Britain to gain experience with the RN; the voyage being made on the liner *Orient*. The three RAN travelling midshipmen enjoyed the sports on board, but their low pay level precluded any social activities. On arrival in Britain the midshipmen joined the cruiser *HMS Caledon* somewhat late, as Burrell recalls, principally because they had taken some time to consume a hearty lunch. The ship's captain, Sir Dudley North, gave them extra duties for the first three weeks as a sign of his displeasure.

Burrell soon noticed substantial differences between the standard of RN midshipmen and the RAN counterparts: the Australians were well behind, principally in dress and journals, in which many facets of training were recorded. Burrell soon set to work to re-do his journal.

In June 1923 *Caledon* journeyed to the Baltic, with ports such as Riga, Stockholm and Copenhagen visited: in this last Burrell managed to leave behind two dozen of his stiff white collars. Over the next 18 months the ship travelled to Scotland's waters and participated in a Fleet Review, before the Australian midshipmen were posted off to *HMS Malaya*, a battleship with eight 15' guns. Time in the Mediterranean followed, and in August 1924 they sat the midshipman's seamanship exam, which Burrell passed with flying colours. This was followed by promotion on 15 September 1924 to acting Sub-Lieutenant, with confirmation in rank in April of the following year.⁵ More courses ashore followed: at Greenwich Naval College;



for gunnery at Whale Island and for navigation at *HMS Dryad*, and to learn about mines and torpedoes at *HMS Vernon*. This last course was difficult for Burrell, and he emerged at the end with a second-class pass to offset the four first-class versions he had already acquired. For leisure he played some 'rugger' and cricket.

The next hurdle on the road to lieutenant involved gaining a bridge watchkeeping certificate, and so followed time on board another battleship, *HMS Valiant*. From there Burrell transferred to the cruiser *HMAS Melbourne*, and returned to Australia. He acquired promotion to lieutenant on 15 July 1926, and was appointed to the destroyer *HMAS Tasmania* under (Acting) Lieutenant Commander Harry Howden, who he found most unusual and somewhat eccentric. Burrell's duties included being correspondence officer and having charge of the ship's confidential books. The ship's duties took her to Tasmania, and later to act as part of the escort for *HMS Renown*, carrying a Vice-Regal party to open the new Parliament House in Canberra. Burrell

took part in these ceremonies as part of a naval guard.

He returned once more to the veteran *Sydney*, where one of his reports commented 'In every way the right type'. From there in 1928 he went to the newly-built cruiser *Canberra*, commissioning in Britain. Around this time Burrell made the decision to spend as much time as possible at sea in order to gain experience in personnel management. This meant delaying making a choice of sub-specialisation in addition to his chosen field of navigation.

After trials and work-ups, *Canberra* sailed for Australia. Port visits to show off the new ship to Australians ensued, and on 16 February 1929 the ship arrived in Sydney. A circumnavigation of Australia followed. In January 1930 Burrell left the ship to do his navigation course in Britain, concluding that he had indeed learnt a lot about handling men in his time on board. His reports rated him as 'Above Average'. This was fortunate, for unbeknownst to Burrell further reductions in the number of officers necessary to the Navy were being considered as a result of the

Burrell and Arleigh Burke (Courtesy Fayne Mench)

Depression. Officers were rated into three categories, one of which would see those so sorted asked to leave the Service. Burrell was rated in the category of being definitely to be retained to the Navy's advantage.⁶

Upon course completion Burrell was given the task of navigating a brand new ship – the Indian Navy's *Hindustan* – just out of the maker's British yard, all the way to Bombay. A successful voyage ensued; and a return to Britain on a troopship, and then an appointment to a minesweeper, *HMS Pangbourne*. Burrell rightly recognised this as a backwater, but he was determined to succeed. He perceived that the growing competence of the RAN – which was being tutored and 'grown' from 1911 – was somewhat resented by some RN officers. His approach in his own words⁷ was to 'hide his light under a bushel': keep literally quiet and be rather backward in coming forward. In this way the new officer was accepted. In his time with the minesweeping squadron he took part in the re-development of night-sweeping; navigated around most of Europe, and helped search for the submarine *M2*, tragically lost when her seaplane hangar flooded. His reports while posted to *Pangbourne* were impressive: his first saw two of the highest 'nines': unusual in any officer's report but doubly unusual to gain two of this rating. Before posting off on 16 October 1931 Burrell also completed a meteorological course.⁸

On 5 December 1932 Burrell arrived back in Australia to join *HMAS Tattoo* as First Lieutenant. He did well there but his reports show no great marks of distinction. The Great Depression had reduced the size of the fleet. However, it soon began to expand again with the acquisition of the five veteran destroyers, eventually to achieve fame as the 'Scrap Iron Flotilla'. Burrell was appointed to *Stuart*, the largest

of these, as navigator, and was promoted to Lieutenant Commander in July 1934. He did very well in his Captain's opinion: his reports were a mixture of 'sevens' and 'eights'. He was married in the

Christmas leave period to Margaret Mackay.⁹ Perhaps in celebration, he later noted that he took up alcohol consumption aged 30, having previously been a teetotaler.¹⁰

In 1935 Burrell joined the old coal burner *HMAS Brisbane* to navigate her to Britain, where she was to be sold for scrap, with the ship's company commissioning the new *Sydney*. Burrell however, was not amongst them, as he had a new navigation course to undertake at *HMS Dryad*. Upon completion of this he was 'loaned' to *HMS Coventry*, which was in the process of being converted at Chatham dockyard to an anti-air cruiser. Refitting finished, the ship sailed for Alexandria in the Mediterranean, with the ominous loom of war on the horizon as Germany and Italy thought of expansion. The ship was busy perfecting her new armament, and there was little time for leisure. Burrell recorded he spent a little time ashore playing tennis, but the night life was 'sordid' and he avoided the local food because of the 'discomfort' that seemed to follow it. His reports were most positive, with four 'eights' being recorded on one of them

In 1937 *Coventry* returned to the United Kingdom, and Burrell was given a new appointment, to *HMS Devonshire*, a 10,000 ton cruiser, and sister ship to the Australian



Canberra. The ship was deployed to the Mediterranean, with the Spanish civil war breaking out, and the cruiser tasked with attempting to prevent the shipment of war materials, but without any real legal backing. It was a frustrating time for many, and fortunately Burrell was soon posted in January 1938 to Greenwich for the Staff Course. He was perhaps a little put out by his final reports, for they had been variable: although they contained much in the way of positive comment he had been criticised for not having yet developed his powers of command, and of being 'far too kindhearted' and "too familiar with the sailors". He later commented that: 'In my view, the ship would have been more efficient if officers and ratings had been in closer touch.'²

In later years an RAN officer of flag rank commented on Burrell and that criticism:

That comment says a lot for Sir Henry Burrell's style. He was very good at communicating with his fellow human beings and bridging, for example, the generation gap between himself and someone

² *Mermaids do Exist*. (65) It is of interest in that Burrell notes here that he was summoned to his captain's cabin and shown this last comment which had been underlined in red. Previously officers did not get shown their personal reports, but Burrell explains that a new rule had just been introduced: if there was anything negative in an officer's report he was to be shown it.

HMAS Melbourne



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years younger. This quality lasted him throughout his life.¹¹

His time at the Staff College was perhaps not very pleasant for Burrell: his reports contained biting judgements on his 'personality' or rather, a lack of it. 'Has a very poor delivery'; commented one, presumably referring to his speaking manner. 'He has a nervous manner which affects his power of verbal expression', confirmed another, and furthermore suggested he 'lacked personality'. It is unclear what this implied: were all Staff Course officers given similarly hard treatment to make them try harder to fit the preferred model, or perhaps did Burrell's 'lack of personality' mean that he did not have the desired manners

and characteristics?

September saw the breaking of the Munich Agreement, and the appeasement of Hitler by Chamberlain and his proclamation of 'Peace in our time'. In Burrell's opinion, the British Prime Minister was 'naïve', and he recalled the exhortations of Churchill in the past imploring his country to 'wake up'. Burrell's opinion of Winston was 'His rhetoric may have been exaggerated, but there was no doubting his sincerity.'¹² All of the staff officers on the course were receiving sea-going appointments, with naval mobilisation ordered. Burrell's was to *HMS Emerald*, another cruiser, but this was then changed with the lessening of the crisis, and he was posted to Melbourne's Naval Headquarters, to be

a staff officer – Director of Operations and Plans – on the Naval Board. War still seemed imminent, and there was much work bringing plans up to date. Burrell found a distinct lack of accurate information in the preparations for war, and recalled later that seldom had he worked harder than during his first four months in the job.

In June 1939 the Reserves were called up and advanced leave given to regular forces. Retired naval officers were called back to the Colours, ship preparation increased, and the planning for the first few days of conflict intensified. Late at night on 3 September Captain John Collins, Burrell's superior, gave the order to notify all of the RAN's ships and establishments that the country was

Melbourne II



at war.

For the next few months, Burrell and the staff were frantically busy, organising anti-submarine patrols; the movement of Australia's warships, and the use of troopships and shipping taken up from trade. Burrell's expertise in navigation and in minesweeping was of considerable use. Around the world the conflict was increasing in strength, but was still largely confined to Europe. However, isolated incidents with raiders in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific were of concern. Burrell received his promotion to Commander in June 1940, and six months later was posted to Washington DC to act as a liaison officer. The sensitivities of some of the USA's people to going to war had to be considered, and Burrell would need to use all of his powers of diplomacy. The appointment of a foreign naval officer to the American capital was so delicate that Burrell was provided with a false passport and travelled in civilian clothes. In Washington he was installed at an Australian diplomatic worker's house, so as not to attract attention.

Burrell consulted with many different American departments and authorities, and so opened up many doors which in the forthcoming conflict against Japan would prove highly useful. He suggested a permanent naval attache be stationed in Washington, and after the production of a paper detailing his proposal, this was accepted. In fact, Burrell's first command – *HMAS Norman* – being built in Britain, had her launch date delayed by an air raid, and Burrell was placed in the position he had just suggested. As perhaps a measure of his early achievements, a seven-ship USN flotilla soon visited ports in the Pacific and Australia. He was attached to the staff of the 'Australian Minister in Washington', RG Casey, and participated in the

diplomatic circle of official receptions.¹³ However, in the background was much inter-naval diplomacy, and strategic suggestion: one of Burrell's reports highlights, for example, a proposal the Americans should bolster the defence of Singapore in the event of war with Japan. However, a subsequent report had to admit that the Americans had not been drawn into such support. But much preparation was made behind the scenes in the event the Americans were brought into a war against Japan, and subsequently Germany and Italy.

That such work was able to be done before conflict broke out impacted directly on the duration of the Pacific War, and thus Burrell and those he worked with – both American and Australian – deserve much credit for their unseen work. It is a tribute too, to Burrell's negotiating skills and considerable powers of personality, that a commander could deal with flag rank officers to such an extent. At the end of his Washington time the Naval Office of New Zealand commented to the Secretary of the RAN that Burrell's reports were of the 'utmost value' and '...so complete and clear that they have been specially commented upon by the New Zealand War Cabinet.'¹⁴

At the end of this appointment Burrell received a letter of appreciation for his efforts from the Government of New Zealand. Unfortunately, while his professional life was going well, on a personal note, Burrell's first marriage – in his words – '...which had failed, had been terminated.'¹⁵

After three years ashore Burrell proceeded to Britain to take over his new command. *Norman* was still building, and so the new captain stood by his ship and both endured the attentions of the Luftwaffe night after night. The destroyer was the latest in technology: capable of 35 knots; armed with six 4.7" guns; ten 21' torpedo tubes and 45 depth charges.

She boasted the latest fit of radar, asdic and communications. The ship was commissioned on 15 September 1941 and proceeded to sea trials. Everything went well, and two weeks later Burrell was able to sign a rather crumpled piece of paper one of the Thornycroft representatives produced from his pocket: 'Received Warship No. 235'.

The ship's first mission was to escort the cruiser *Kent* to Scapa Flow. On the way Burrell found that despite his watchkeeping officers holding certificates of competency, most were very inexperienced. The next months were a combination of bringing the 226 men of the ship's company to their full fighting efficiency, and coping with various assignments. One of these included the carriage of a VIP 'political' group to Russia, with various patrolling while awaiting their return. Burrell and the ship's company ventured ashore in Archangel but found it a thoroughly depressing experience, with roads made of wood; most of the population absent, and the local vodka something to be treated with caution. Ken McRorie, who served with Burrell in *Norman*, recalls that when the time came to leave Archangel with the VIPs., the ship was frozen to the wharf, which presented a new challenge for a while.¹⁶

On either the voyage there or during the return the ship shot down a German bomber. According to a rather melodramatic clipping in a Burrell family scrapbook, the grandly-titled 'Able-bodied Seaman Fred Miles' reported that 'The Hun did not attempt to bomb, but circled our ship three times. We got him silhouetted against the moon and fired all guns. The Hun exploded. It was a lovely sight.'¹⁷

After fleet manoeuvres, the ship returned to Southampton to have boiler faults repaired at the manufacturer's expense. More armament was added, and soon *Norman* was back in the water and



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escort work commenced. The threat of U-boat attack on the convoys was constantly present, and to add to the sense of foreboding there was the increasingly gloomy news of Japanese successes after Pearl Harbor: the loss of Singapore; *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse*, amongst other reverses.

A convoy to Freetown was next, and Burrell noted in pessimistic terms how he knew that any ship torpedoed would have to be abandoned: conventional practice with the experience in the past showing that stopping almost always led to further submarine attack and even further losses. *Norman* was deployed with the Seventh Destroyer Flotilla to serve in the Indian Ocean. She joined a large but not terribly modern force of British and *Australian* ships which included three aircraft carriers – *Indomitable* and *Formidable* together with the smaller *Hermes* – the battleships *Warspite*, *Resolution*, *Ramillies*, *Royal Sovereign* and *Revenge*, and five cruisers, 16 destroyers and five submarines. Burrell commented that although this seemed a formidable force, many of the ships were old, and it was underpowered with aircraft. Burrell also caught up with a colleague from before the war, Harry Howden, now in command of the cruiser *Hobart*, and noted that Howden and officers looked somewhat strained. Burrell did not know of the tremendous enemy assaults the cruiser had gone through; the loss of *Perth* under Hec Waller, and the battering the RN and RAN units had taken as they beat a fighting retreat south.

The strategic aim was to defend Ceylon, and careful manoeuvring by the fleet began. Battle was joined on 5 April 1942 with a Japanese air assault on Colombo. The Allied fleet was split into two flotillas, with two cruisers detached. But *Dorsetshire* and *Cornwall* were soon attacked and quickly

overwhelmed. In the subsequent hours, the Allied fleet came perilously close to Admiral Nagumo's First Carrier Striking Force. These were the veteran ships and men who had overwhelmed Pearl Harbor and Darwin, and they strongly outnumbered the Allied ships: their numbers of aircraft (105 fighters and 123 bombers) being merely one measure of their strength.

In the next few days another Japanese force under Vice Admiral Kurita raided commerce and sank 20 ships without opposition. On 9 April Nagumo's force attacked Trincomalee naval base on Ceylon's north-eastern coast. The RN carrier *Hermes* and the RAN destroyer *Vampire* were both caught and sunk.

The surviving ships were split into two forces, and Burrell's group was detached to Bombay. There were Allied fears the Japanese would seek to further dominate the Indian Ocean, and so the strategically placed island of Madagascar was to be attacked and taken. The operation was a success, and the next for many of the ships in the force was to raise the siege of Malta. The ships proceeded through the Suez canal and joined other Australian and British ships in the Mediterranean. Burrell rightly describes the project as 'ambitious': the expedition was without aircraft carriers or battleships and were dependent on shore-based aircraft for support. The resultant operation showed some signs of success, particularly when the heavy Italian warships expected from Taranto were kept at bay by aircraft, but in the end determined air attacks turned the Allied ships back to Alexandria. A depressing finale was a successful submarine assault on the cruiser *Hermione*. The Australian destroyer *Nestor* was also sunk by a direct bomb hit while close to *Norman*. In hindsight Burrell concluded that the

operation should have pressed on, but he conceded that its prospects were gloomy as it was down to one-third of its ammunition supply, primarily because of its Admiral's decision to lay a heavy barrage over the fleet when attacked from the air.

August 1942 saw *Norman* deployed as part of a force to complete the full occupation of Madagascar. She led a line of Allied ships into Tamitave harbour, and the Vichy forces there were called upon to surrender. Instead they shot at one of the small boats which had been sent into shore, and so the ships returned fire. One minute later a white flag signalled surrender.¹⁸ Burrell was later awarded a Mention in Despatches for this action.¹⁹

This operation successfully completed, Burrell and his command were ordered to South Africa to deploy against a force of German U-boats operating in the area. The advantage lay with the submarines, which were almost impossible to spot by night and difficult to find in the day. This was a situation being overcome in the north Atlantic by the use of land-based aircraft and carrier escorts, but it was impossible to duplicate with the small group of warships of which *Norman* was a part. Instead Burrell and his command hunted down spurious echoes and rescued three groups of survivors from 20 merchant ships sunk in those three months.

March 1943 saw *Norman* in for a quick refit, and Burrell in hospital recuperating from a case of boils. Earlier he had noted the ship's company members were falling victim to poor diet, heat and arduous conditions: even a simple injury like a gashed ankle took two months to heal. Back at sea a man was lost overboard, and later, another killed when the ship was in dry dock temporarily at Cape Town. Burrell received the 'displeasure of My Lords

Commissioners of the Admiralty' for not having enclosed the ship before pumping of the dock commenced, although he later noted that such a procedure had not been used in that dock for some years.²⁰ At the end of the year he was posted back to Australia and arrived at Geraldton. In *Norman* he had steamed 124, 000 miles.

Back in Australia Burrell spent time in hospital, both in WA and in Sydney, recovering from what he later described as a combination of stress, bad diet and exhaustion. His next appointment was as Director of Plans in Melbourne. Some aspects of the new job entailed catching up with war operations that for reasons of security he had not known about in more than sketchy detail: the sinking of *Perth*, for example, and the campaign by Japanese submarines off the east Australian coast. On 21 April, 1944, Burrell's personal life took a turn for the better: he married Ada Theresa Weller after a three-week courtship. His new wife was a woman of resource. At the age of 15 she had run away from home, and some years later had ended up working on the mica fields of WA and the NT.²¹

The new job, although onerous, did not last long. Burrell's reports noted that he was 'A most zealous, able and painstaking officer' but given his experience, needed at sea. Burrell was appointed to command another destroyer, the new *Bataan*, then finalising construction at Cockatoo Island in Sydney. In February 1945²² his first daughter Fayne was launched upon the world, and four months later the destroyer commissioned.

The deployment of the new ship to the Pacific War meant the ship's company would be working closely with the Americans. New signals and procedures had to be learnt in a hurry. Revised techniques in damage control also had to be acquired, with the decision made that every man on



board would be skilled in this vital defence measure. The ship carried 260 men, and boasted the latest technology: improved radar; proximity shells for anti-aircraft defence, and six 4.7" guns; depth-charge throwers; torpedoes and a 36-knot turn of speed.

Tests and trials completed, the new ship deployed with Commodore Collins aboard, who had been recovering from the wounds brought about by an attack some months earlier on *HMAS Australia*. Work began with the American fleet rehearsing a massive amphibious assault. This was perhaps for the final massive attack on Japan, but the atomic bombs precluded the necessity, and on 15 August peace was declared. Burrell later recorded that he thought the atomic bombs completely justified in stopping the German and Japanese attempt at world domination:

...we were entitled, if not bound, to thwart such aims...In the short term, at the cost of many Japanese lives, it stopped the war and saved millions of lives on both sides, probably including my own.²³

Bataan took part in surrender ceremonies held in Tokyo Bay, although Burrell thought that the legitimacy of the ship's presence there was somewhat doubtful given her inexperience. Following the ceremonies there was much to be done with prisoner repatriation and *Bataan* embarked hundreds of them from various areas, transporting the POWs to ships returning home. Many of the prisoners were in very poor physical condition, as were Japanese people Burrell saw on his trips ashore. One of the shore excursions included a run up Tokyo River, with the sailors embarking on a frenzy of bartering - mainly with cigarettes - with the locals ashore. The remaining cigarettes in the ship's store were soon stolen. Burrell announced replacement stocks would not be made, but if the cigarettes were returned, the theft would not be investigated further. The missing items were soon returned.

Burrell was commended for his work by Admiral Halsey of the Third American fleet. The famous Admiral commented:

He skilfully and diligently executed the various duties assigned him.

Burrell on flight deck (Courtesy Fayne Mench)



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His initiative and devotion to duty assisted materially in the prompt liberation and in many cases the saving of lives of Allied Prisoners of War and was in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.²⁴

On 18 November 1945 *Bataan* sailed for home. Upon arrival in Melbourne the ship's company took leave, and then the ship was sent on a somewhat different mission. The federal government at the time was seeking to raise public money, and as an incentive, offered some hours at sea on a warship to any members of the public contributing within a set period. Consequently *Bataan* sailed from Brisbane, Sydney, Newcastle and Brisbane, embarking 3, 298 passengers on these 'joy rides' out to sea and back again. Burrell's final report as a Commander commented in most positive terms on his efforts in the ship:

An officer of outstanding all round ability who has proved his worth as a Commanding Officer...an excellent staff brain, quick and sound powers of appreciation and a strong personality...he is fitted in every way for higher rank and is strongly recommended for immediate promotion.

Burrell was promoted to Captain and placed in charge of the 10th Destroyer Flotilla. Return to Japan as part of the Occupation Force ensued. His vessels were busy intercepting smuggling vessels, with the attendant risk of imported health problems. His reports were excellent: the second last giving an unusual unbroken string of eights. So although busy carrying out operations, perhaps Burrell should not have been surprised to receive a signal advising of his relief, and return to Melbourne. Upon his arrival after a long journey by

DC-3 aircraft he was informed of his new position: Deputy Chief of Naval Staff, based in Melbourne.

The beginning and composition of the new Fleet Air Arm was of immediate concern, and Burrell, although describing himself at first as an 'interested spectator'²⁵ was soon in the thick of it as a member of the Joint Planning Committee. Other matters concerned the formation of an electrical branch; the construction of two new large destroyers, *Tobruk* and *Anzac*; the re-commissioning of *Australia*, and the decision by the Australian Government to appoint an RAN officer – John Collins – to be Chief of the Naval Staff. Meanwhile, back in Australia, a son, Stuart, was born on 21 March 1947.

On 3 October 1948 Burrell took command of *Australia*, the Fleet flagship. The vessel's main role was to act as a training ship, and as such she made many short voyages around Australian ports. The Imperial Defence College Staff Course followed in 1950, with the Burrell family, complete with housekeeper 'Bridie' and husband, took up residence in Sloane Square in London. However, Burrell's wife saw a possible commercial possibility for her small company's products and when she found a factory space some 20 miles out of London the family moved to a 'stately home' at Gerrards Cross, mid-way between the factory and the Defence College. In 1948 the family saw the arrival of daughter Lynne.

Burrell found the Staff Course invaluable, with lecturers including Prime Ministers, experienced warriors of flag rank, a host of highly qualified academics and what today would be called 'subject-matter experts' of all varieties. It included a lengthy tour of war-ravaged Europe, a depressing but useful experience.

When the course was completed

Burrell was appointed Assistant Defence Representative on the staff of the Australian High Commission. His main task was to interpret defence matters for Australian audiences. It was a liaison task of two years which Burrell later said he found 'not very satisfying',²⁶ but it was important work in a time of re-organisation of the RAN's fleet. In the meantime, the Burrell children had gone to school, and his wife had turned her small business into a larger and more profitable enterprise.

A surprise appointment at sea followed, with Burrell commanding the aircraft carrier *HMAS Vengeance*, which was to be sailed for Australian waters and used to maintain the two-carrier fleet concept while *HMAS Melbourne* was being readied with a modernisation program. The Burrell family returned to Australia by ocean liner, the mica factory now able to run without Mrs Burrell's management. The carrier was readied for sea; the ship's company trialling many concepts new to a Navy that had not operated carriers before. Burrell noted new ideas were quickly absorbed - one surprising aspect of a big ship being the embarkation of some of the motor cars of the ship's company. She embarked in early 1953, on a largely uneventful voyage, except for a freighter coming too close for comfort in the Mediterranean. The carrier's first Australian port was Melbourne, where Burrell and his family also planned to take up residence.

The embarkation of the carrier's air group followed, with Sea Furies and Fireflies landing on from Jervis Bay. Practice for the pilots in landings and takeoffs followed as the carrier and escorts moved north to Queensland waters. Soon the group had worked up to attacking sea and land targets. To the ship's company's surprise, the

ship was not sent to the conflict taking place in Korea, but her three squadrons disembarked and transferred to the other RAN carrier, *HMAS Sydney*, along with 200 officers and sailors.

Vengeance took on three new squadrons, and began working them up instead. Ironically *Sydney's* aircraft attacked their old ship a little later in exercise as she proceeded north to the war.

Burrell enjoyed his time on the carrier, and made a determined effort to know the large number of people on board. He encouraged fishing expeditions and competitions and organised through his wife prizes of beer tankards for the winners. His reports were excellent, but through his account of this command runs a thread of frustration, for this time of Australia's Navy operating two effective aircraft carriers was to be short-lived. In Burrell's mind there was only one reason for the erosion of this force: politicians who could not, or would not, understand the need for this naval structure.

Before the axe fell, the Royal Visit to Australia in 1954 occurred, with Burrell and *Vengeance* heavily involved. However, this happy event was then followed by an announcement from the Minister for Defence in April that protection for ships at sea within the range of land-based aircraft was to be assigned to the RAAF. The effective outcome meant that in the political view, fewer aircraft at sea were needed, and therefore the requirement for two carriers was to be halved.

As Burrell points out in his autobiography, this was a strange and illogical move. In a threat situation, aircraft were needed permanently over the top of a group of ships (a concept known as a Combat Air Patrol) and this was not possible with shore-based aircraft which would be 'called up' as necessary. RAAF fighters would

not have the time, nor necessarily be within range to cater for this need. The decision also meant that the fitting of an angled flightdeck to *Sydney* would now not proceed.

Burrell posted ashore following this momentous announcement, into a temporary position as Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, and then as Flag Officer Commanding HMA Fleet. On 23 February 1955 Burrell hoisted his flag in *HMAS Lonsdale*, a shore establishment in Melbourne. Protocol calls followed: to the Governor General, then Field Marshall Sir William Slim, where Burrell was invested with the CBE 'for thirty-seven years of undiscovered crime';²⁷ as he put it; then the Governors of various capital cities, along with the chief identities of the local communities.

Although Burrell had now reached a mighty peak in any naval officer's career, he recorded later that he found his position somewhat dull, as he was removed far from direct command of a ship or people. To make matters somewhat worse, *Vengeance* was returned to the RN, thus bringing home the fact that *Sydney*, with her straight flight deck, was to become a liability of a sort.

Burrell's new job was one of managing policy, interspersed with formalities such as a fleet visit to New Zealand, where his arrival at functions in a helicopter was a major talking point. He worked hard in the role until mid-1956, being confirmed in rank as a Rear Admiral along the way, and then posted into a position in Navy Office where he was to review the structure of the officer corps.


Burrell's subsequent research and consequent decisions were to be felt throughout the entire Navy. In brief, he divided officers into 'Wet' and 'Dry' Lists; streamlined and broadened the organisation of the officer branches, and made a host of smaller changes,

including creating a new special duties list of officers promoted from the lower deck. At the same time he had to incorporate, although he disliked the concept himself, changes in officers' executive status. It was widened, causing Burrell to comment that one day '...the captain of a ship will be a non-executive officer with a staff of technical advisers to counsel him on how best to command and fight his ship!'²⁸

The changes were not all successful. The two Officer Lists were unpopular with some: Commander Dacre Smyth, RAN, found himself on the 'Dry' List, '...which meant that I was destined for ever after to be limited to shore-jobs. Years later the Naval Board fortunately rescinded the evil scheme (initiated by Admiral Henry Burrell, curse him) and I was eventually able to get back to sea...'²⁹

Although the appointment was controversial and involved hard work, it did have the advantage of being based in Melbourne, which meant some enjoyment of family life. The appointment was extended in January 1957, with Burrell being made Second Naval Member with the task of establishing the new officer structure. This was also a time of change in the Navy's geographical placement: the move to Canberra was begun and implemented slowly over a number of years. Amongst other responsibilities Burrell oversaw the reintroduction of the RAN Nursing Service; the overhaul of the officers' promotion scheme, and in general had oversight of courts-martial, and the personnel situation as a whole.

On 7 January 1958 Burrell took command of the Fleet. This meant moving on board *Melbourne*, and also a marked advancement in carrier operations in Burrell's experience. An angled flight deck, a new generation of aircraft, and for the first time an RAN



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officer, Commodore George Oldham, as Fourth Naval Member – the Member for Air. Burrell noted it meant the RAN was growing up, by shedding some of its RN members necessarily dictated from the first days of the RAN. The carrier and her escorts proceeded to Hobart, Fremantle and Singapore on exercises and visits, culminating in South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) evolutions with the navies of five countries taking part. Visits to the Philippines, Japan and Hawaii followed, and at Pearl Harbor during exercises Burrell was given operational command of both USN and RAN ships: proof that, as with Collins and Farncomb, an Australian admiral was judged to be as competent as the admirals of larger nations and navies. However, Burrell noted that the social calls he was obliged to pay took up the majority of the time, with his report on such functions taking up eight pages. He was able to find the time however, to make a visit to the world's first nuclear submarine, *USS Nautilus*.

En route to Suva with the RAN fleet Burrell received a signal informing him that he was to be the next Chief of the Naval Staff. He recorded later that he was stunned by this advice: feeling at 54 years of age he was too young, and moreover that he lacked administrative experience ashore. Nevertheless, it would mean more time for his family. For his wife, who had opened a new factory for her mica enterprise in Melbourne, it would mean she could stay in contact with the business. Towed ashore on a jeep at the end of the command, Burrell nevertheless was in for a surprise.

The dithering over government departments' move to Canberra was finally being resolved. Burrell soon learnt to his dismay that he would be moving there too, and for further upset the family would be accommodated in

a small brick veneer cottage. The new house was far too small. Vice Admiral Sir Roy Dowling, who had preceded Burrell as Chief of the Naval Staff, and was now Chairman of the Chief of Staff Committee, had also been moved into an identical house. He walked out of his in disgust for private accommodation 'ashore'. The Burrell family took his house instead, for at least it had an acre of land surrounding it. A Member of Parliament, Senator Kendall, later commented upon the matter in Parliament, describing the house as 'a fibro house of about ten squares' in a 'sea of mud'. A response from the appropriate Government member blamed the allocation of the accommodation to the Department of Defence and the amount of rent Burrell's predecessors were prepared to pay. Burrell and family soon moved out into a purchased residence, but of course the house was not an official Admiralty House, and so, as Burrell noted: '...the visible signs of an admiral in Canberra disappeared.'³⁰

However, Burrell had heavier matters on his mind. His working time was constrained with many meetings, unexpected briefings; a Minister who kept at first in too close contact, and a fleet that was small; ageing rapidly and not strategically useful. For example, it had no mine warfare capacity; three RN submarines which were mainly used to exercise against in anti-submarine warfare, and a Fleet Air Arm approaching obsolescence.

Burrell was equal to the task. He ordered a strategic review both anticipating the needs of the next three years and also the next 20. An enlargement of the scientific studies area was made leading to the development of the Ikara anti-submarine weapon. This technology was significant for pushing Australia into the group of navies that were

embracing a technological future. However, this success was countered by a Cabinet decision in late 1959 that the Fleet Air Arm was to be abolished. Burrell, waiting outside the Cabinet office, in case his advice was needed on a short-term futures paper for the Navy, was told the decision by his Minister in so many words.

This was a serious blow, to say the least. Burrell considered resignation in protest, but then dismissed the idea as being a 'twenty-four-hour wonder' which would not achieve much. He did not concede overall defeat, but nevertheless the forthcoming implementation in 1963 hung over the Navy like the sword of Damocles. Burrell moved into countering the possibility in a positive way. He pointed out that dismissal of the Fleet Air Arm would mean that the Navy would have to embrace Surface to Air Missiles as a means of defence when out of range of the supposed RAAF air support. At the same time he worked hard to build support for the realisation that airpower at sea was now a necessity. This was very much the lesson of the loss of *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* in WWII.

At the same time other challenges had to be met. Anti-submarine helicopters were offering potential for anti-submarine warfare, and much thought and research was needed into this acquisition. Mine warfare vessels had to be investigated. A dedicated hydrographic purpose-built ship was very much a Burrell proposal. And a choice of submarines was pending too, and so Burrell travelled to Britain and was instrumental in the decision to acquire the *Oberon* class, a very quiet, efficient hunter-killer submarine of diesel-electric propulsion. Built in Britain, the RAN eventually acquired six, and they served the Navy very well for over 30 years before their

replacement by the *Collins* class. Incidentally, before travelling overseas Burrell had been instructed by his political masters not to raise the subject of a replacement aircraft carrier in any way, and so when in America he was slightly embarrassed by an offer from Admiral Arleigh Burke of an *Essex* class carrier for the RAN.

The American visit was an opportunity to inspect a warship type that could carry Surface-to-Air-Missile systems. This was the *Charles F. Adams* destroyer, and Burrell was impressed by both the platform and the Tartar missile it carried, with a performance twice that of the British alternative of Sea Slug coupled with the County class.

Back in Australia Burrell was formerly knighted on 8 August 1960, having been awarded the distinction in the New Year's Honours List.³¹ An alternative to the disbanding of the Fleet Air Arm suggested itself, and so a proposal to keep *Melbourne* as a dedicated ASW/Commando-style carrier was developed. At the same time six Ton class mine warfare vessels were proposed, the fleet tanker *Supply* was to be commissioned, and the *Charles F. Adams* class acquisition was put forward. Burrell anticipated the attendant difficulties: terminology differences; a range of new systems, and even different threads on metal screws would have to be dealt with. At the November 1960 meeting of Cabinet all of the proposals were accepted, albeit with Air Force resistance. Burrell's elation at this success was topped off for the year by his address to the Passing Out Parade of the RAN College, now re-located back in Jervis Bay after 27 years at *HMAS Cerberus*.³²

The vexed question of the nature of the Fleet Air Arm hung in the balance. Would fixed-wing aviation continue; and if it did, would a different carrier be necessary to cope with changes in

aircraft? Although, as he outlines in his autobiography, Burrell continued to press for the retention of the concept as originally devised, there was much bitter political infighting as the debate continued. Some of Burrell's detractors thought he did not do enough. For example, 'According to one of his staff officers, during the latter part of his time as CNS, Burrell had refused to look at any staff paper that recommended the retention of any fixed-wing capability for the RAN.'³³ However, this does not sit well with his vehement support for the entire concept of naval aviation that he himself professes.

Burrell's third year as CNS brought no lessening of the pace. New ships were launched and commissioned – one by Burrell's wife - and the RAN celebrated its 50th anniversary. Helicopters arrived, and work began on the first two of the new destroyers in America, and on the first two submarines in Britain. Building also began on the new Defence building complex at Russell in Canberra, and Navy Office was formally transferred there from Melbourne.

Burrell's strategic vision was taking shape. It is a testimony to his long-term thinking that Australia's naval defence of the decades to come were able to be formed on the solid rock that he envisaged. He was tireless in pushing the cause. At a Country Women's Association annual conference in that year he even expounded to that audience the need for Australia to have a strong Navy: '...we will need a Navy as long as Australia remains an island - and the best place to fight, if unhappily that should be required, is as far from Australia as possible.'³⁴ This sentiment was still being reflected even 40 years later in the Defence White Paper of 2001.

Amidst all of these changes, Burrell's retirement loomed at the beginning of

1962. After a final round of visits, his 44 years in the Navy had come to an end. The newspaper reports of this event paid tribute to his insight at the helm. The choice of words such as 'architect' and 'foundations' are significant: 'Missile Age 'Navy architect' retires', was one headline, going on to note that 'The man who laid the foundations of Australia's 'missile age' Navy... will retire this week.'³⁵ The Defence Minister, Athol Townley, noted Burrell's '...important and far-reaching decisions...and outstanding service.'³⁶ USN Admiral Arleigh Burke wrote privately to him, and noted:

In your case, particularly, you should have no qualms as to the tremendous and far-reaching improvements you have made to the Royal Australian Navy. It should give you a sense of great achievement as you watch the increasing importance in which the Navy is held in your country.³⁷

His civilian workers in the Navy noted: 'We congratulate you on the great progress that has been made during your term in office...we thank you for your generous attitude to all. This has always made it easy for us to work with you and your officers as a team.'³⁸

From a distance, Burrell was able to watch with satisfaction his projects come to fruition and other people's disastrous proposals run satisfactorily onto metaphorical rocks. The *Charles F. Adams* class became three ships instead of two; helicopters arrived in force, and the submarine arm of the Navy began its life anew for the fourth time. *Melbourne* survived as a fixed wing carrier, for Douglas Skyhawks and Grumman Trackers eventually replaced her ageing aircraft and the proposed helicopter carrier did not eventuate. The mine warfare fleet arrived to provide its vital protection against this potent weapon which



STUDIES IN TRAIT LEADERSHIP – STRATEGIC VISIONARY

VICE ADMIRAL SIR HENRY BURRELL, KBE, CB, RAN

could paralyze Australia's harbours in wartime. Nevertheless, Burrell continued to advocate for his vision of a second attack carrier, a dream that many strategists agreed with.³⁹

Burrell turned much of his attention to his 'family ship' as he put it, and to his farm outside Canberra. The mica factories in Melbourne and Britain were running smoothly, and travel was necessary to both of them occasionally. A racehorse syndicate was joined, and it even paid its own way. For 13 years life for the Burrells went well, but in the late 1970s Burrell's wife was diagnosed with cancer. This was treated for some years and held at bay, but finally claimed her in 1981. A further tragedy saw an accident take the life of daughter Fayne's husband, Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Mench of the RAR.⁴⁰

Burrell himself had suffered heart attacks in 1978-79. At one stage he was given a year to live, and his wife was told of this. The couple had a concrete ramp installed to their back door to avoid steps and consequent angina attacks. For the rest of his days Burrell lived with tablets to cope with this new situation. Other people were largely unaware of this condition. For example, a country walk with visitors would involve frequent stops engineered by Burrell supposedly to talk and take in the view, thus disguising the need for frequent rest.⁴¹

Burrell watched with interest the end of naval fixed-wing aviation in the RAN with eventual disposal of *Melbourne*. Despite his own submission to the relevant committee at the time, and the problem being often revisited, this type of aircraft carrier has not re-appeared in the Navy. Although modern helicopters can carry out an enormous variety of tasks, including anti-ship attack not envisaged when they were introduced, they cannot provide a CAP over ships.

Burrell is perhaps lucky not to have been present when the last of the three DDGs were paid off, thus removing even more protection from enemy air assets. He died on 15 February 1988, aged 85.

His obituary, written by Commodore Sam Bateman, RAN, emphasised Burrell's many achievements in the strategic field, but also noted that he was 'renowned for his common touch and his interest in the well-being of his men.'⁴²

In rating Burrell as an outstanding RAN leader, what did others think of his abilities in the areas under discussion?

Burrell must be rated as one of the RAN's foremost achievers, chiefly for his strategic vision and determination to carry out his aims. In short, Burrell brought the Australian Navy into the capable and competent ships of the *Charles F. Adams* class of destroyers, initiated the *Oberon* class submarines, which served Australia so well for so long, introduced helicopters into the force, and saved *Melbourne* and fixed-wing aviation within the Navy. He commanded his ships in WWII with tactical excellence. However, perhaps the field in which he showed the most expertise was strategic vision, not only as outlined above, but also in his WWII role of American-Australian liaison.

An inspirational model to others involved in the 'big-picture' issues of envisaging where a Navy should be in decades to come, Burrell, like Creswell, can be held up to be a role model to inspire others to take a long-term view when making plans for defence forces.

Burrell brought an empathetic quality to the fore in his American liaison work, where he was able to tread a cautious line in the important negotiations between the huge armed forces the USA was building up, and the small, but strategically important

continent of Australia, from where MacArthur would launch his fight back against the Japanese. To his subordinates, it is undeniable that Burrell did not have that equivalence of spirit and a burden shared that marked Howden and Waller, but he did understand his juniors' role and exerted himself to manage it well. It is a measure of Burrell's ability to communicate that his vision of the Royal Australian Navy's future was understood and implemented by those who followed him in his strategic decisions as outlined above. Always looking and acting the part of a leader, Burrell is perhaps second only to Creswell in terms of his effect on the Navy. In summary, almost an unassuming leader, but one who saw a vision, and had the perseverance and determination to carry it forward and through to success. ✎



Lieutenant Commander Tom Lewis PhD, OAM, RAN has served in a variety of PNF and reserve roles within the Navy. He led US forces on deployment in Baghdad in 2006.

(Endnotes)

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SAAB

ROYAL NAVY NO LONGER?

BY VICE ADMIRAL JOHN MCANALLY RN, (RTD)

- a retired Admiral speaks out

What do I think about the outcome of the Strategic Defence and Security Review?

I wanted to report to Shipmates earlier. Trafalgar dinners followed by presiding over the International Maritime Confederation left me short of time. It also seemed worth reading others' immediate reflections and taking time to simmer down. But the more I think about it the more wound up I get. Not least by the way in which the late decision to scrap the Fleet Flagship *Ark Royal* was leaked overnight before the Captain could tell his horrified Ship's Company - an outrage for which a public apology is merited. So are the short answers to my question to agree with American comment: *a punch in the gut for the Royal Navy and UK Defence is in dreamland? Read on.*

Let's consider the Strategic context.

The main effort of UK Defence is locked into a campaign in Afghanistan which we re-entered under false pretences in 2006 and from which the Governments of both the UK and the USA evidently wish to withdraw as soon as possible. Meanwhile ours is determined to avoid being accused like its predecessor of underfunding this very costly war. But it continues the innovation started by Labour and which the Tories condemned in opposition, of drawing a very great chunk from the existing Defence Budget at the expense of all other operations and of future capability. The Coalition has thereby institutionalised preparing for the last war. I am indebted to Sir Jeremy Blackham for pointing out that we now plan

approximately to halve the Navy considered necessary by the 1998 Strategic Defence Review despite a world of growing maritime significance and danger not least to our energy supplies.

Turning to some elements of the Review itself.

To use a metaphor devised by Professor Paul Cornish, 'Affordability should have been the cart and Strategy the horse'. It looks like it was the other way round and conducted far too hastily to boot - half the time spent in 1998 with twice the remit given that Security was added to Defence. Even the just departed Permanent Under Secretary and Chief of Defence Staff who presided over the Review have in their internal letter to MoD staff admitted that the result has left a programme which will be incoherent for at least 10 years.

How incoherent?

Let's look at a few recent declarations in the White Paper (Cm 7948), in the National Security Strategy and by the Prime Minister and Ministers:

"we require an independent ability to defend the Overseas Territories militarily"

"an enduring presence within priority regions of the world"

"the ability to command UK and allied naval forces at up to Task Force level"

".....ensure continuous carrier strike capability"

"we will still punch above our weight- we have no less ambition" (PM 19 Oct 10)

"we will retain the ability to act separately when national interests require it" (SofS for Defence Today Programme 2 Nov 10)

"This is no time to be sea blind..

"(Liam Fox on numerous occasions in opposition)

All seem hollow. Leaving aside the reduction to 19 destroyers and frigates (13 below that deemed necessary in the quieter world of 1998) which will render us incapable of meeting current mandated tasks and further risk vital maritime trade and energy supplies together with more than halving the only world class amphibious force

AV-8B II Harrier during landing and take off practice



outside the USN just recently painfully acquired and paid for, let us look at Carrier Strike in more detail.

It is amazing that these vessels have become so totemic and occupied more than 90% of the debate despite being able to contribute less than 1% of the savings demanded. On the other hand they and the nuclear deterrent are iconic symbols of national power and the true keystone of whether or not the UK remains a serious player on the world stage which is why it was right to sign a binding contract for them and thereby to ensure national capability to build warships.

The essentiality of large aircraft carriers is clearly recognised by India, China and Russia all of whom are in no doubt of their need for them. It is also noteworthy that US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton singled out British Aircraft Carriers as a capability they wanted us to retain. Not surprising when the USN inventory is down to 10 carriers against rising maritime dangers and competition.

Land forces are, in the words of a retired General of my acquaintance, horribly vulnerable to air attack. The horrible truth for him and other Generals is that until Carrier Strike capability including fighters is restored the British Army cannot safely deploy outside the UK or Germany without the support of a foreign country either to provide access, basing and over-flight for the RAF or air capability from that supporting nation's own armed forces. So much for an independent ability to defend Overseas Territories.

Falklands Strategy

Our current strategy for the increasingly valuable and contested Falkland Islands is to rely on our in place garrison of four Typhoons (£200M apiece and more costly than a Type 23 frigate), a company group,

the constant presence of two warships and the occasional unadvertised appearance of a nuclear submarine. It is true that the Argentine Armed Forces have declined more than our own but the enemy always has a vote and the UK has a long tradition of being caught with its pants down at the opening of a conflict.

Another horrible truth is that without Carrier Strike including fighters and a Brigade level Amphibious force we have no prospect of responding to a *coup de main* which takes over Mount Pleasant airfield other than by a submarine blockade or attack on mainland Argentina – neither likely to be viable political options. For the next 10 years at least there is a window of opportunity for Argentina to inflict on us a national humiliation on the scale of Singapore in WW2 and one from which we might never recover.

The Treaty with France

The Carrier co-operation element of the treaty with France while good in itself needs far more exploration since it is quite unlikely to achieve the stated objective of *ensuring continuous carrier strike capability*. Do we know that:

- *Charles De Gaulle* will be able to launch and recover our new Joint Strike Fighters when we eventually get them?
- They will demand much more than France's Rafale and Super Etendard?
- Or that either nation's carriers would be able to supply the other's aircraft with weapons to carry out military missions?

Just achieving a common and compatible weapons inventory would be far more expensive than the more effective solution of running both our new Carriers.



Charles de Gaulle
carrier (Public domain)

Scrapping the Harrier

Perhaps the most inexplicable and least defensible decision is scrapping Harrier in favour of Tornado. In Afghanistan:

- which of these aircraft can take off and land from Kandahar runway if half of it is blocked?
- which responds in 30 minutes and which in less than 10?
- which performs better in hot weather and requires fewer ground crew?

More widely:

- which can deliver from Carriers close air support of ground forces, interdiction of surface units with Maverick missiles, rockets and smart bombs?
- deploy Storm Shadow with a little extra investment?
- has nearly twice as many airframes provided with precision guided ground attack capability?
- which will require a further £1.4B to re-engine it in 2014?
- which can remain in service until 2023 without any

ROYAL NAVY NO LONGER?

significant investment?

- Finally which will cost seven times as much to keep as the other?

In every case the advantage lies with the Harrier yet Tornado has been chosen. I urge all RNA members and everyone who reads this article to sign the petition at <http://www.ipetitions.com/petition/primeminister/>

The Fiscal Deficit

It is said that these risky reductions are essential to the vital elimination of our fiscal deficit. Yet just before the SDSR announcement several billion extra pounds were allocated to an extension of education to two year olds and the Coalition also decided on a vast expansion of DfID's budget. Both seem of dubious value at least I would have thought to most Tory supporters. Indeed a case could be made that we are subsidising India's new Carrier and Pakistan's nuclear weapons at the expense of our own. Defence is planned to get only about 5% of total Government spending which is still rising. Clearly political choices have been made and Defence cannot be said to have the priority so often stated and the Maritime element of it least of all. We will for at least the next 10 years apart from nuclear submarines slide below France, Italy, Spain, India and Japan's maritime capability.

Work in Progress

It is important to realise that the SDSR outcome announced on 19 October is a work in progress not a single event. It is as underfunded as its 1998 predecessor and that is before many of its decisions have been costed. No one yet knows where the 5,000 Naval and Royal Marine manpower reduction is to come from. There is much discussion to be had over implementation, on how to reach the desired 2020 state and in the next Review due in 2015 in which

Afghanistan will be seen as something to avoid rather than an overwhelming priority.

Shipmates might be tempted to believe the Naval Staff in MoD have done a poor job - shades of the earlier planned loss of Carriers in 1966. For the record that is not my view. I have been privileged to know as much about what has been going on as my retired status allows and I believe it was much worse at earlier stages and could have ended up that way. The Naval Staff have a strong intellectual case. It should be given more attention. This is an episode; there is plenty more to come and our serving Shipmates need and deserve our support and encouragement if the best result for our nation is to be achieved. Such a result should include:

- Carrier Strike capability to be regained as soon as possible on the basis of at least one RN Carrier fully operational at all times.
- Rescinding the inexplicable decision to retire the Harrier in favour of the Tornado.
- Recovering a Brigade level amphibious capability including one LPH continuously at high readiness (R2).
- Speedy fulfilment of the pledge to develop a new programme of less expensive modern frigates.



Vice Admiral John McNally



An AV-8-B Harrier assigned to the Sea Elks of Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 166 takes off from the amphibious transport dock ship USS Cleveland

Seagoing Allowance needs to be Reviewed

BY 'AGINCOURT'

A review of past *Headmark* editions shows myriad articles that attempt to address manning and retention shortfalls. Alternative rank structures, flexible leadership qualities, greater egalitarianism - even the impact of climate change. All presented as utopian solutions to the broader societal malaise impacting our present and future workforce.

Amongst all this you may have noted regular comparisons with civilian employer conditions. Sometime positive, occasionally negative judgment of Defence employment conditions when compared with civilian peers.

However there seems to be at times an admirable desire to continually improve conditions without assessing or identifying productivity improvement or offset - aside from an ill-defined impact upon recruiting and retention. I say ill-defined because the evolving 21st century RAN workforce has indeed become diverse as to have both positive and negative impacts contained within each admirable initiative.

Therefore I thought it timely to generate discussion toward the apparent imbalance in award of seagoing allowance. Properly managed, I believe a review of how this allowance is paid has the potential to address workplace - in particular seagoing - satisfaction, while at the same time contributing to the cost conscious environment that lies at the very heart of strategic reform.

Seagoing Allowance according to PACMAN Part 3 Chapter 4.3.2 Division 11- is fiscal compensation for:

- A. Particularly uncomfortable conditions encountered in seagoing ships;
- B. Inability of members to use their leisure time effectively
- C. Exceptionally long hours worked; and
- D. Almost complete lack of home contact

As Sub-Lieutenant Matthew Norris pointed out in his article 'Personnel Retention in the RAN' (Issue 133 Sept 09), serving in the Navy invariably means time away from home and family, however the award of seagoing allowance rightly aims to provide a financial counter balance.

Retention proposals to improve ship-borne conditions, particularly those technological initiatives espoused in the 22 July 2010 edition of *Navy News* such as enhanced email, internet and telecommunications access - alongside modern habitability improvements (all at great expense to Defence) have failed to instigate a review of the above award. When we also consider Rental Assistance, Reunion Travel, Minimum Duty Watch Manning, mandated Operational and Personnel tempo business rules - surely the award conditions are diluted?

Australian Fleet General Orders Chapter 2 defines a sea day as any cumulative period during the course of a calendar day of eight hours or more at sea either underway or at anchor. While a home port day is when a majority of the ship's company is granted normal local overnight leave in their home port and the ship has not been at sea for more than eight hours that same day.

Seagoing allowance is paid to salary earners posted to a seagoing ship (regardless of sea days) and to those members of Sea Training Group liable to undertake at least 100 sea days a year. Yet, in 2008 and 2009 there were five Major Combatants each year that did not conduct 100 days at sea with a further six scheduled to again not meet this level in 2010. The average across the 17 platforms during this three year period was 109 days per year.

As of 12 Nov 09, seagoing allowance rates were:

Completed less than 3 years - \$11,009.00

Completed 3 but less than 6 years - \$17,061.00

Completed 6 but less than 11 years - \$23,033.00

Completed 11 or more years - \$26,486.00

If we revisit the reasoning as to why seagoing allowance is paid (points A-D) it becomes readily apparent that there might be inequality in the payment of the award and at times lack of justification.

I propose this payment be better aligned so as to actually compensate those that are experiencing the uncomfortable conditions at sea, the excessive hours, reduced access to leisure facilities and separation from home. These conditions are experienced holistically only by Sea Training Group personnel who experience greater than 100 sea days per year - and the officers and sailors employed in a seagoing ship '*away from home port*'.

Using the same 2008-10 data the average '*away from home port*' per ship was 155 days per year. This suggests a daily pay rate might be applied as follows:

Completed less than 3 years - \$71.74 per day

Completed 3 but less than 6 years - \$110.07 per day

Completed 6 but less than 11 years - \$148.60 per day

Completed 11 or more years - \$170.88 per day

I am not suggesting that there should be a reduction in the allowance - for there are larger incentive and retention issues at play alongside an obvious risk to my future well-being and health! However, surely it rests on the RAN in a strategic reform environment striving to retain and recruit personnel - that the very award aimed at compensating seagoing hardship does what is intended?

Continuing to reward those who do not meet the basic conditions opens us at the very least to accusations of inequality and at worst ethical fraud.

I propose that paying personnel a daily rate (properly calculated) so as to compensate them as the PACMAN intends is in the best interest of both the Service and those individuals experiencing the hardship. To those that argue the retention impetus of the allowance or suggesting that it is unfair to personnel when schedules are altered by machinery defects or late notice program changes - I respectfully counter that you are conveniently ignoring what the allowance is designed to compensate.

Well intentioned suggestions often make comparison with non-defence employment conditions - rightly so. However, if we are going to do so, then let us also contemplate whether seagoing allowance is reflective of modern productivity and accountability award guidelines that are normal in the civilian workplace environment.

Perhaps it is time it was?



German Navy decommissions 60% of its submarines

BY MICHAEL NITZ

On 30 August 2010 the German Navy operated all six remaining class 206A submarines during a final tour at sea for the very last time under their own power in the Eckernförde Bight on the Baltic Sea.

Never in history this large number of six German Navy class 206A submarines had operated together in one sea area.

FGS U15, FGS U16, FGS U17, FGS U18, FGS U23 and FGS U24 conducted their final farewell tour to say goodbye to their homeport Eckernförde Naval Base, the personal and other ships and submarines of the 1st Submarine Squadron.

After more than 35 years of successful service the 48 meter long and 450 tons displacement submarines

will be decommissioned. In their service life these submarines have been recognised for effectiveness nationally and internationally. The class 206A submarines belong to the smallest armed submarines capable of operating worldwide. Due to their small size they are especially capable to conduct shallow water operations and can operate submerged in water depths of only 20 meters.

Before the budget cuts have been announced the German Navy had planned to decommission two class 206A submarines during 2010, two during 2012 and the final two in 2015.

The final fate of the six submarines is uncertain. After the decommissioning they either will be sold to another navy; converted to museum boats or scrapped. But well informed sources indicated that these

submarines could have at least another 10 years of useful service life in another navy. Countries like Indonesia or others could be highly interested in acquiring at least some of them to beef up their submarine flotilla.

The crews of the to be decommissioned submarines will be distributed to the four new class 212A submarines.

At the moment at Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft (HDW) shipyard in Kiel two additional class 212A (second batch) submarines for the German Navy are under construction. *FGS U35* and *FGS U36* are scheduled to join the German Navy in 2013. Nevertheless it is hard for many observers to believe that the German Navy in the future will have only six (class 212A) submarines in its inventory. 🚢





Pavlova and Vindaloo: *Natural Partners*

BY CAPTAIN JONATHAN MEAD

Something strange is occurring in our neighbourhood. For over 100 years, the dominant local power in Asia has, for good or for bad, been led by an authoritarian government. But change is afoot. Incredible India, a vibrant democratic state, espousing the principles of pluralism, freedom of speech and the rule of law, is turning the age old notion of authoritarianism and uni-polarity on its head. Clearly, this is good news for Australia. But it's only good news if we are prepared to invest the resources into nurturing Indo-Australian strategic relations. Something we have historically been reticent to commit to.

This paper aims to tease out some of the more subtle geo-political movements which are taking place in the Asian theatre. In broad terms, India's rise as a global player challenges the traditional concept that has seen, for the past century, the Asian region under the influence of a lone non-democratic hegemon (Japan pre WWII, the Soviet Union post WWII, China 1990-present). This is not to deny the quintessential 'balancing' role played by Britain and the US throughout the 20th Century. But the point is, these actors were extra-regional powers.

Coupled with India's rise, we are witnessing the slow decay of states that buttress the Indian Ocean – many of these states are slowly descending into the morass of anarchy.¹ On the back of this spectacle Canberra's and New Delhi's strategic trajectories will progressively intersect.

HISTORY IN THE MAKING

We Australians are a suspicious lot. And this suspicion dates back to the earliest days of colonisation.



Historically, our distance from Mother England and the vast expanses of ocean to Australia's east and west were viewed as a 'curse', giving rise to a phenomenon of strategic loneliness in the Antipodes. We never truly understood that instead of the ocean acting as an invasion route, the bodies of water surrounding us could act as a bridgehead.

To be fair, when it came to identifying a threat, Australia was indiscriminate. During the first hundred years of settlement, we feared invasion from the French, Germans, and Indonesians.² The turn of a new century did not bring any noticeable change to Australian paranoia. Indeed, the Great War only served to accentuate our anxieties. After the Versailles Treaty, the enduring thought of war was displaced by a deep-seated conviction and universal hope that global peace would prevail. Buoyed by that conviction, many countries opted to de-militarize and disengage. Some countries, however, elected to pursue a more military path. In our

own backyard, Japanese imperial rule eventually manifested itself in uber-nationalism and military adventurism.

After WWII, the pace of economic and strategic change was both unexpected and unprecedented. But one thing did not change – that of regional hegemony, and in the Asian theatre, an autocratic Japan was usurped by a Stalinist USSR. For the next 45 years, Asia, and its surrounding waters were under the influence of Soviet maritime reach. As a counter and by way of 'balancing' and 'containing' Soviet irredentism, America reacted by establishing a strong naval presence in the region.

Fast forward to 1991. For sure no one could have predicted the tumultuous events which would lead to the fall of the Soviet Empire – but fall the Soviets did. Again, history was to repeat itself, and as one Asian power fell another emerged. Inspired by Deng's Four Modernisations and fuelled by a free market economy, Communist China stepped up to the

A member of the Indian Navy boards the amphibious command ship USS Blue Ridge as he conducts a visit, board, search and seizure drill during Exercise Malabar 2009 (Courtesy US Navy)

plate to fill the strategic vacuum in Asia.

Throughout the ages, Australian security anxieties crossed political, economic, cultural and ideological boundaries. Notwithstanding the eclectic nature of countries which we viewed as a threat, each was defined by one common trait – an absence of liberal democracy. On this point, there is substantial literature that suggests that relations between democratic and non-democratic countries will invariably be strained and certainly never reach the heights of those between like minded (and governed) states.³ Commonly referred to as Democratic Peace Theory (DPT), the argument runs along the following lines: 'the apparent absence of war between liberal states, whether adjacent or not for almost 200 years has significance.'⁴ States that abide by the principles of liberal democracy tend to gravitate together, and over time a certain chemistry develops. All of this would be academic except for the fact that India has burst onto the strategic stage and is challenging the traditional dogma of uni-polarity and authoritarianism.

In case there is any doubt, let's be clear about India's potential. By 2028 its population will surpass China (Diagram 1), peaking at 1.6 billion in 2040. In 2010, the average age of the Indian citizen will be 25 years, whilst China's will be 34.2 years (Diagram 2). Without getting into too detailed analysis of the data in Diagrams 1 and 2, some broad generalisations can be made. The age differential provides the Indian economy with an enormous advantage. Younger people are generally more productive and in turn less of a drain on the government's social services purse. The theory goes that the older a person the more of a liability they become to the state. Whilst a nine year difference between

India and China may appear of little consequence, when this figure is extrapolated out to cover 1.1 billion people then the changes and benefits are immense.

Economically, India is projected to be the third largest in absolute terms by 2050 (Diagram 3). And with a standing army of 1.3 million men (and another 1.3 million in the paramilitary), an indigenous nuclear submarine undergoing sea trials, three aircraft carriers in various stages of build and underpinned by a credible nuclear deterrent which includes a nuclear SLBM (codenamed Sangrika), New Delhi can rightly claim its place as an Asian super-power. More to the point, the Indian Navy will be a potent maritime force capable of blue water projection and 'sea control in selected areas of the Indian Ocean'.

Diagram 1: Population India & China 2010-2050 (in thousands)⁵



Diagram 2: Mean Age India, China, 2010-2050⁶





Diagram 3: Projected GDP of G3 US\$ billion 2000-2050⁷



THE INDIAN OCEAN – ASIA'S NEW SILK ROUTE

The Indian Ocean is different to any other large body of water. Unlike its Pacific and Atlantic cousins which stretch from the South to the North Pole and are geographically unconstrained, the Indian Ocean is hemmed in by the mighty Himalayan mountain range, the Indian subcontinent and the wider Asian land mass. These topographical features give rise to a unique weather pattern resulting in rhythmic winds blowing across the Indian Ocean. When finally the secrets of the monsoonal wind were unraveled by the Greek navigator Hippalos in the first century AD, the gulf between Europe, Asia and Australia was suddenly narrowed.

Nowadays, strategic wisdom dictates that distance no longer matters. What has not changed is our reliance on the Indian Ocean to transport vital commodities. In that context, oil has replaced spices as the lifeblood of nations and the SLOCs stretching from Hormuz to Malacca have become the modern day Silk Route.

What makes this situation all the more complex is the fragility of the IOR. Of late this region has achieved notoriety for all the wrong reasons. Foreign Policy's 2010 index of failed states has again determined that the vast majority of *critical*, *in danger* and *borderline* states are those that lie on the periphery of the IOR.⁸ Somalia, Pakistan, Myanmar, the entire east African seaboard, and segments of South and Southeast Asia are all singled out for specific mention – it's a gloomy but all too familiar story. And here lies the rub: the world's most important waterway is guarded by states judged least competent of doing so. In many cases, these same states are not only incapable of contributing

Pavlova and Vindaloo: *Natural Partners*

to regional maritime security, but are also incapable of policing their own territorial waters; the east African archipelago a case in point. The concept of maritime security in many parts of the IOR is problematic. Poor governance is but one part of the problem. But also regional frameworks for naval cooperation and information exchange are lacking and bilateral sensitivities often manifest in cooperative-paralysis.⁹

Of course, within this cornucopia of sickly states there are two exceptions, Australia and India – both militarily robust, both democratic and both with a clear interest in the long-term stability of an otherwise very fragile region.¹⁰

2+2≠4

A long time ago, Australia was connected to the Asian land mass. Around 75,000 BCE, ancestors of the first Australians migrated from South and Southeast Asia to the Great

Southern Land. Genetically these early Australians were at one with their Indian Ocean neighbors. But by a quirk of tectonic and climatic fate, the Australian continent drifted away from Asia's terra firma. And drift away we did – not only physically but psychologically. Ever since that time, it would be fair to say that Australia and India have been in each other's blind spot. To think otherwise would be, well, naive. On this point, we would do well to remember that strategic engagement is an abstract science (unlike mathematics, whereby $2+2=4$) and states, acting in a global anarchical society, will often act irrationally even if they are rational actors.¹¹

A review of Australia's interaction with India since independence reads like a Shakespearean tragedy. In the beginning it all started with the best of intentions. As Partition threatened to socially balkanize India in 1947, Australia quickly developed warm relations with its Indian Ocean

neighbour. Canberra's enthusiastic approach was rewarded when two years later Australia was the only Western country invited to attend the 'Eighteen Nations Conference on Indonesia' in New Delhi. India's Prime Minister Nehru noted that: 'here we are representatives of the free nations of Asia and our friends from Australia.'¹²

The development of the Colombo Plan further entrenched Australia's position in India, and this was met with strong approval by New Delhi. Unfortunately, from that point on, relations between the two countries deteriorated. Partly this can be explained by India's adherence to non-alignment and Australia's entrenchment in an alliance matrix.¹³ But the divide between the two countries was more complex than simple differences over ideology. Australia's security focus was driven by the fact that our major cities, political capital, economic/financial backbone and population base were all positioned

US FA-18F Super Hornets (foreground) fly in formation with two Indian Navy Sea Harriers, bottom, and two Indian Air Force Jaguars, right, over Indian Navy aircraft carrier INS Viraat (Courtesy US Navy)



on the eastern seaboard. Rightly or wrongly, this forced us down a 'Pacific Ocean' line of thinking, in much the same way that America's orientation, (with Washington and New York situated to the east) was toward the Atlantic. Demographics (and economics) were key features which shaped our thinking.

Not surprisingly, India did not rate highly in our list of strategic engagement priorities. Through necessity, Australia did dip its toe into the Indian Ocean in the early 1980s by way of naval deployments, but this adventure drove a further wedge between Canberra and New Delhi. The Soviet empire's sudden collapse in 1991 heralded a new wave of strategic thinking. Some authors argued it was 'the end of History',¹⁴ others waxed over a looming clash between civilizations¹⁵, but the more things changed in our own backyard the more they stayed the same. Even before the Soviet exit, another authoritarian power (China) sought to fill the strategic void. Despite the Soviet demise – maybe even because of it – Australia and India failed to connect.

In 1998 it all went horribly wrong. India's decision to cross the Rubicon and undertake five nuclear tests in the Rajasthan desert, and Australia's outspoken damnation bitterly soured strategic relations between the two; once again the relationship had been turned upside down. That said, change for the better did occur and in the dawn of the new millennium an upswing in naval engagement took place. For the past five years, the winds of strategic change have blown hard, led primarily by a robust naval relationship. Frequent visits by CN and DCN and the establishment of formal Staff Talks, naval exercises and exchange programs have underpinned the broader strategic relationship. It would seem reasonable therefore, that

as India continues to Look East and Australia Looks West, our strategic trajectories will further intersect.

On this front, there is cause for optimism. By way of example, the Maritime Doctrines of both India and Australia are strikingly similar. More recently, the Indian Navy, strongly supported by the RAN, established the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) in 2009, the aim of which was 'to sustain a regionally relevant, consultative forum within which the navies of the littoral States of the Indian Ocean Region can discuss issues that bear upon maritime security'.¹⁶ Similar in makeup to WPNS, the success or otherwise of IONS will largely depend upon the strength of RAN-IN bilateral cooperation. Whether it is via the medium of IONS or whether we choose a different mechanism to promote regional maritime security, one thing is clear, the IOR is in desperate need of strong leadership.

How we (Australia and India) provide this leadership is a telling question. Our current level of naval engagement has probably reached a glass ceiling and the next bold move would see us embark upon a sophisticated bi (or multi) lateral exercise program. Both navies still harbour an element of uncertainty about each other, and only through concerted exercising can we hope to add ballast to the trust equation. Ultimately, and in the final demonstration of naval cooperation, we should aim for both navies to work together in an operational environment. The fact that RAN and IN units pass each other in the night off the Horn of Africa, whilst undertaken identical tasking, is illustrative of the strategic distance that still exists between the two countries.

THE PATH AHEAD

Ever since Federation, Australia has been forced to 'balance' against the regional authoritarian power, but with the rise of India, we are faced with the exquisite alternative of being able to 'bandwagon' with a local regional power. However, the road ahead will not be an easy one. The past four years have seen a number of issues threaten to bankrupt the broader political relationship. In 2007 it was the Haneef affair, 12 months later Harbajhan Singh and Australian all rounder Andrew Symonds clashed on the centre pitch of the SCG, in 2009 it was the sordid harassment and violence of Indian students in Melbourne, and then it was Australasia's nomination of ex-Prime Minister Howard to the ICC council. That each event occurred on Australian soil is a telling point. Often lost in the polemic of mutual misunderstanding, events affecting the two countries have been cast into sharper relief than what the facts justified.

This is a story without an end. The Indian Ocean and India will forever remain a geographic reality. How we deal with this reality will largely shape the future prosperity of Australia and its people. As Gandhi once remarked, 'the future depends on what we do in the present'. 🌟

Captain Jonathan Mead RAN served three years in New Delhi, India, as the Defence Adviser. He is currently posted to Canberra as the Director Navy Personnel Policy.

(Endnotes)

1 By anarchy, I allude to a purer definition which describes a lack of higher government.

2 Professor Geoffrey Blainey cited the example of the city of Perth, which was settled due to a 'fear of Indonesian pirates on the north coast and fear of French ambitions

Pavlova and Vindaloo: *Natural Partners*

on the West Coast.'

3 Doyle M W, 1986 Liberalism and World Politics, *American Political Science Review*, Volume 80, No 4, pp 1151-69

4 Doyle M W, 1986 *op cit*, pp 1151-69.

5 Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision, <http://esa.un.org/unpp>.

6 *ibid*

7 Goldman Sachs *Global Paper No 99*, 1 October 2003.

8 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/2010_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings

9 Bateman, S, Capacity Building for Maritime Security Cooperation: What are we talking about, in *Maritime capacity Building in the Asia-Pacific Region, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No30*, Seapower Center Australia, Canberra, 2010, p 6.

10 To a lesser degree, South Africa could be included.

11 Many people would contend that states do follow paths of logic and that as they become more entangled and interdependent the possibility of irrationality decreases. However, a word of caution; in one of the better accounts of the causes of WWI, Barbara Tuchman (author of August 1914) revealed that the great powers of Europe clung to a similar

belief just prior to the Great War. She documented that in 1913 an author by the name of Norman Angell published a book called *The Great Illusion*. Angell spelled out the reasons why the countries of Europe would never go to war again: financial and economic interdependence of nations made war unthinkable and unprofitable as the victor would suffer equally with the vanquished. Angell's book developed a cult following and advisers to the British King were prophesying that economic factors would make war in the 20th century insane. Lectures were delivered highlighting the inevitable consequences of such a war and the financial suffering which would follow. History as we now know was not as forgiving. Within four years of Angell's prediction, the world was plunged into the greatest conflict yet known to mankind. There is a lesson here: countries do not always act on reason or logic – just as humans do not always follow the rational path of choice. (see Tuchman Barbara, August 1914, Macmillan Press, Hong Kong, 1962)

12 Jawaharlal Nehru, *Nehru The First Sixty Years Volume 2*, Bodley Head London, 1965, p 450


13 Menzies declared India's policy of non-alignment to be 'morally bankrupt'. He further claimed his view was vindicated by China's invasion of India in 1962, not so much the fact that it failed to deter

a Chinese attack, but rather that other nonaligned countries failed to come to India's aid.

14 Fukuyama Francis, *The End of History and the Last Man*, Free Press, New York, 1992

15 Huntington Samuel, *The Clash of Civilizations and the remaking of World Order*, Simon Schuster, New York, 1996.

16 <http://indiannavy.gov.in/ion.htm>



Australian Clearance Dive Team Four conduct an Assault Profile approach in the small boats compound at Fleet Base West, HMAS Stirling

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A large submarine is shown underwater, angled upwards towards the right. The water is a deep blue, and sunlight filters down from the surface, creating a bright, hazy area at the top. The submarine's conning tower and other structures are visible above the main hull.

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Image: Eye in the Sky

UK defence review should be about more than just cutting

MICHAEL GREY (13 SEPTEMBER 2010 LLOYDS LIST)

Sharing aircraft carriers, scrapping dockyards and making destroyers cheaper may trim the government's bills, but where is the evidence of a real strategic vision?

THERE is a strategic defence and security review under way in the United Kingdom, where the defence of the realm and the need to cut costs will clearly prove uncomfortable bedfellows as they wrestle for possession of the duvet.

Already one can detect that we, the taxpayers (who may think more seriously about defence than we are ever given credit for) are being softened up with a whole menu of daft scenarios. I am never quite sure who produces this stuff, whether it emanates from some Disinformation Department in the Ministry of Defence, or perhaps some crazed blogger in an attic, but one suspects that there is some sense of direction behind it all.

There is a mad plan, for instance, to share the new aircraft carriers (now being feverishly constructed in their various yards around the kingdom, lest some coalitionista pulls the plug on them) with the French Navy. This is so mind-bendingly bonkers that only a script-writer for 'Yes Minister' could possibly have thought of it. But just think of the arguments of occupancy. Certainly no commercial shipping person who has lived through the furious rages that seem to appear remorselessly at the conclusion of a bareboat charter would ever contemplate such an idea, which would probably mark the start of another 100 years' war.

Consider the disappointment of the French matelots, marching on board a British carrier, when they saw the food that they were expected to eat, from a galley half the size of that onboard

Charles de Gaulle. Surely some genius will have realised we speak different languages, and the possibilities of some confused stoker closing a switch which he thought would shut a watertight door and firing the Admiral's helicopter off the flight deck on a steam catapult. Such linguistic misunderstandings cannot be ignored.

But there are more insidious ideas being washed around the body politic, and filtering out to the population at large, about cheap and cheerful frigates that will cost one-tenth of the price of a Type 45 destroyer, the disappearance in effect of any amphibious capability and the scrapping of dockyards. I am told by people who understand military matters better than I that this is par for the course, with a review under way and the admirals, air marshals and generals energetically fighting their own corners.

But it is supposed to be a strategic review and the absence of any strategic vision about the reality of future threats and an ability to deal with them is worrying. A fleet once represented the integration of a complete range of capabilities, able to meet threats from air, surface and under the sea, and if cost cutting decrees that even one of these capabilities is missing, the whole point of a navy is lost. Can we protect the trade routes?

Examine for a minute the increasingly well-balanced Indian Navy, with its government apparently understanding the needs of trade protection, the principles of sea power, and the fact that if you wish to control a sea, you better be seen in it from time to time.

The Japanese Navy is a good example of a balanced force, one moreover where its procurement practices are such that a lead ship can



RN revolution? - a Royal Navy HMS Argyll crew member receives maneuvering orders from the bridge during a Joint Warrior training evolution in the control center

move from concept to acceptance in an astonishingly short period by comparison with the tortuous process in the UK.


But does anyone within the UK government have a proper understanding of the need to protect trade routes, which are more than those using the Eurotunnel and the Dover-Calais freight ferries? If a few hundred poverty stricken Somalis in plastic skiffs can cause such trouble in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden, what are the strategic implications if this problem is extrapolated elsewhere? Goodness knows there are other candidates in the failed states league. If the mysterious explosion that dented the after end of the M.Star in the Straits of Hormuz is a portent, what is our proper response? The vulnerability of any advanced industrial nation to any interruption to its sea trade has been illustrated on a number of occasions — how is this to be factored into any review of naval capabilities?

'Strategic' also implies a long-term view of naval and military requirements, in that ships and the seafarers to man them cannot be conjured out of thin air, or obtained, like capesize bulkers, on the spot market. It is about shipbuilding and marine technology and the provision of adequate weaponry, all of which require industrial sectors, which can hardly be started and stopped like a car.

The UK (hopefully) won't always be broke, and if policy is to be devised on the assumption we will be skint in perpetuity, the strategic review will be a disaster. Strategy is about the future, and what happens after we have disentangled ourselves from Afghanistan, when, doubtless, other bad things are certain to happen in this unhappy world. It is serious, cerebral, and deserves a proper consideration in what remains an unstable world. What we can do without is people playing politics with the security of the nation, and treating us as idiots. 🐸



Able Seaman Clearance Diver Joshua Cummins from Australian Clearance Diving Team Four maintains a vigil and watch during beach insertion training during workups



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
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Book Reviews



The Royal Navy and the Battle of Britain

By Anthony J. Cumming

Naval Institute Press, 2010; 232 pages, hard cover; USD \$29.95; ISBN 978-1-59114-160-0

Reviewed by David Hobbs

Anthony Cumming was awarded a PhD in History at the University of Plymouth in 2006 and won the Julian Corbett Prize for Research in Modern Naval History from the University of London in the same year. His important new book, published by the Naval Institute Press, makes a valuable contribution to understanding the events of the crisis summer of 1940 and the reasons why they were portrayed as they were by politicians.

Cumming develops his arguments with sensitivity and clarity to prove that, however gallant its aircrew, Fighter Command of the Royal Air Force did not prevent the Germans from invading Britain, nor could it have done so alone. The unlikely myth that it did has continued to grow, however, to the point where it is generally accepted that the gallant 'Few' in their Spitfires defeated an immediate and credible threat of German invasion with little help from the other armed forces or the wider civilian population.

Cumming's scholarly analysis demonstrates that, in fact, the Royal Navy was the dominant factor in Britain's ability to prevent invasion and was recognised as such by the German War Staff. Whatever the air situation, any attempt at invasion would have been made by sea and would have been

annihilated given the nature of the slow, extemporised shipping available to the enemy and the minimal ability of the Kriegsmarine to defend it after the losses suffered in the Norwegian Campaign.

German air power did not stop the British Fleet from evacuating troops from Norway, Dunkirk, Greece and Crete; it could not have prevented the Home Fleet from destroying the motley collection of invasion shipping at whatever cost to itself from air attack. The dominance of sea power was accepted by the Germans, who saw the probability of defeat at sea all too clearly, and by the Americans who envied British naval power. These self-evident facts lacked sufficient propaganda appeal for Prime Minister Churchill, however, as he sought to manipulate American public opinion to draw the USA into the war on Britain's side. To seek American sympathy, the British public-relations organisation stressed the colourful image of Fighter Command pitched alone against heavy odds rather than the 'silent victory' of the Navy which was so obviously superior that the enemy would not even contemplate fighting it. The RAF, keen to make a reputation for itself after defeat in France, was happy to accept this version of events.


The author does not belittle the achievements of the fighter pilots, some of which were lent to the RAF by the Royal Navy, but places their exploits in their due place, examining the Battle of Britain from a number of aspects which include the technical capabilities of the forces involved and the characters of RN and RAF Force Commanders. Cumming states in his conclusion that "as with most legends, there is a basis of fact and it is not my intention to denigrate the heroic sacrifices of the 'Few'".

He uses a comparison with the Merchant Navy, however, upon which

the British war effort depended, to illustrate the wider nature of the conflict. In the period between 10 July and 31 October 1940 Fighter Command lost 537 men killed but about 1,730 merchant seamen died in the same period. Outrageously, these men were classified as 'non-combatant' despite the fact that they sailed in a war zone and many manned guns to defend their ships against U-boats and aircraft.

The Battle must be seen in a wider context that recognises the key roles played by many different participants. Sea power prevented a German invasion of Britain and, arguably caused Hitler to look to the East. It also kept alive the possibility of liberating Europe once the United States did enter the war and Russia proved a more formidable opponent than Hitler imagined.

This excellent work deserves to be widely read and debated. In an age of joint operations it seems remarkable that the myth that part of a single Service could, alone, have deterred an invasion of the UK remains so widely accepted. The facts behind the legend and reason why the myth has endured are explained in Cummings' book together with the reasons why the wider picture should be understood and accepted. *The Royal Navy and the Battle of Britain* should be considered as required reading at ADEFA and the Staff College and I recommend it most highly to a wider audience.



Cruiser: The Life and Loss of HMAS Perth and her Crew

by Mike Carlton

Random House, North Sydney, 2010

Reviewed by Dr Gregory P. Gilbert
Air Power Development Centre

The story of the Australian light cruiser *HMAS Perth*, her last Captain Hec Waller, and her crew is one that deserves to be told and retold. In service with the Royal Australian Navy for less than three years *Perth* operated in the Atlantic, Mediterranean and Pacific theatres and was subjected to some of the most intense naval actions of the war; including German air attacks on Malta, Greece and Crete, as well as major surface actions against the Italians at Matapan; against the Japanese in the Battle of the Java Sea, and finally off Bantam Bay in the Sunda Strait.

Her sacrifice in the defence of Java on 1 March 1942 remains one of the most contentious decisions in Australian naval history. Many of the crew, who survived the ship's sinking, were lost in the long years of brutality and suffering that followed as Japanese prisoners of war. The loss of the ship in the narrow waters of the Sunda Strait and the experiences and sacrifice of *Perth's* crew needs to be passed on to honour their memory but also so that modern Australians understand the strategic significance and vulnerability of the archipelagic sea lanes to our north.

In 1978, the book *H.M.A.S. Perth* by Alan Payne was

published by the Naval Historical Society of Australia for what was largely a small group of veterans and naval history specialists. In 2007, Ian Pfennigwerth released *The Australian Cruiser Perth 1939-1942* which was targeted at a more general audience but remained very much an updated ship-centric study for naval enthusiasts. Mike Carlton's *Cruiser* takes the next step; it endeavours to make Australian naval history relevant to the modern reader. It is a determined effort to engage the Australian community by highlighting its nautical roots and by doing so to help put naval history to its rightful place in our national historical tradition. For this reason, *Cruiser* is a valuable contribution to the literature, which needs to be read widely and deserves to be the subject of conversation around the water cooler as well as in high school history classes.

The book is well illustrated with an outline of the ship, maps and a selection of photographic images. The faces of the individual officers and sailors themselves do also tell a story.

Cruiser is split into four parts: Part 1 Leaving Home, 2 War in the Mediterranean, 3 To the Sunda Strait, and 4 Prisoners and Survivors. Any one of these parts could form a small book in its own right, but together the complete book does form a considerable tome, at more than 700 pages. It could have been cut back in parts without loss of substance; indeed an editor's knife would improve much of Part 1 if ever a second abridged edition was produced.

In the past I have suggested that new works of general naval history need to incorporate elements of strategy, doctrine, leadership and command, human behaviour in adversity, and technologies in addition to naval tactics and warfighting. It is not sufficient for Australian naval historians to ignore the academic

rigor that is clearly self-evident in their international military history counterparts. It is Part 1 of *Cruiser* that most clearly shows that Mike Carlton has a way to go in this regard. His focus on people and the personal narrative complements his popular style of writing and the explanations of the naval way of life are particularly useful, but the author frequently descends into Australian parochialism rather than history.

Part 1 has many of the oft-repeated jingoisms to be found in many Australian secondary sources but are at best misinterpretations of the primary sources. For example, Chapter 2 is full of subjective histories of the inter-war period, the story of the foundation of the Australian Navy is poor (if not simply wrong), and the depiction of Australian society during the 1920s and 30s is more a product of 1970s Australian nationalism than a true reflection of the inter-war historical sources. Australian parochialism (such as that at pp. 87-88) and the anti-Churchillian, anti-Menzies rhetoric (pp. 188-90) are not only an unnecessary distraction from the book's main theme, they frequently fail to take into consideration the British imperial strategies of the time, where international trade was global, where the major powers were economically and culturally dependant upon the good will and cooperation of other powers, and where British sea power was a dominant part of Imperial defence policy.

The author's overview of Australia's involvement in World War I and the inter-war period reveals his limited knowledge and understanding of international relations, politics and naval strategy between 1914 and 1939. Without this insight it is difficult to understand why the RAN needed cruisers like *Perth*. One need only examine Graham Freudenberg's

Book Reviews

excellent work *Churchill and Australia* to recognise the land-centric trap that Carlton, who is cited as having a lifelong passion for naval history, has unwittingly fallen into.

The so-called failure of the Singapore strategy is another one of these oft-repeated gems. Many historians do believe that the concept of maintaining a strong base for air and sea power at Singapore was not only the right thing to do but was absolutely the correct way for the British (including Australia) to apply a maritime strategy in the Pacific. The failure of the Singapore strategy has more to do with the unpredictable timing and course of the war in Europe and the Mediterranean rather than the strategy itself. After the Fall of France the idea of sending the Royal Navy's main fleet to Singapore if the Japanese threatened Malaya became unrealistic. If during the inter-war period Australians had funded their fair share of the Pacific region's defence arrangements, then the situation in December 1941 may have been quite different. When will we accept the fact that it was the failure of a series of Australian Governments to recognise the importance of defence during the 1930s that led to the failure of the Singapore strategy and our own neglect left us grossly unprepared for war? Is it possible that the failure to provide *Perth* with the equipment and capabilities required (such as that described on p. 108) might have less to do with naval bureaucratic red-tape or the attitude of the 'higher-ups' in Navy and more to do with the lack of funding for Navy by government?

Although it is a good thing to aim for a general audience, I don't believe that every book needs to be dumbed-down for the modern reader. Carlton tends to rely far too much on descriptive narrative that is designed to present an impression, rather than strictly adhering to the historical evidence, and as a result there are times when the text becomes disjointed. Whenever *Cruiser* drifts too far from the remarkable story of *Perth* and its crew it starts to fall down. Fortunately for the reader as one gets into the book there are fewer distractions and the author more than makes up for the annoyances of the first 150 pages or so.

Parts 2 to 4 of *Cruiser* are mostly centred upon the events surrounding *Perth's* service with the RAN, as described by those involved, many of whom actually served onboard. This is where Mike Carlton's narrative excels. The story of the fleet action at Matapan is inspirational, however even that is surpassed by the description of the action off Crete in 1941 which is outstanding. The book includes some interesting cameos, such as the sorry tale of Petty Officer Haddow who was detached from *Perth* to perform diving tasks on the beached cruiser *HMS York* when the diving tender he was working from was hit in an air raid. Weighed down by lead boots and equipment he sank to the bottom of Suda Bay and

drowned (p. 253). The experiences of Royal Australian Air Force 9 Squadron Walrus aircrew at Suda Bay (pp. 247-52) brings us closer to the action and helps us better understand the mixed RAN and RAAF nature of the crew. Hopefully *Cruiser* will help to increase the public consciousness of the exploits of *Perth* and its crew during the Greece and Crete campaigns. Such recognition is long overdue in the annals of Australian military history.

The Pacific War and the events leading up to the tragic loss of *Perth* at 12.25 am on Sunday 1 March 1942 are covered in considerable detail in Part 3 of *Cruiser*. The author makes good use of official records (from Australia and the United States), and personal experiences from biographies and oral histories. The numerous extracts from Ray Parkin's classic trilogy should hopefully also convince more people to read his remarkable experiences first hand. Mike Carlton has made a valuable contribution to Australian oral naval history by conducting interviews with the surviving (c.2006) crew members of *Perth* and their families and collecting related records. Hopefully these will be retained in some suitable institution for use by future generations of family members and historians.

Carlton makes an effort to use the Japanese records that are available in English to help clarify parts of the *Perth* story particularly for the Java Sea and Sunda Strait actions. The lack of an English translation of the naval volumes of the Japanese *Senshi Soshō* official war history series however, remains a major obstacle for researchers in WWII naval history of the Pacific War.

Part 4 of *Cruiser* was hard to put down. The fight for life of those who remained of *Perth's* crew after she was sunk is written in such a way that the reader can feel empathy for

the individuals concerned without sentimentality. The fight for life and the nearness of death is described, by the survivors, in a matter of fact way without embellishment or grandiose propaganda. Such writing, by people who have lived through horrors and survived, comes off the page like a bright light illuminating the human spirit. It stands out in an era where political spin too often camouflages the truth. That any of these sailors survived their inhuman treatment as Japanese prisoners of war appears miraculous to our generation. That much of their experience was covered-up or politely forgotten just adds to the tragedy. The failure of Australia to decorate *Perth's* heroic Captain, Hec Waller, post-war, when the facts were known, with a posthumous Victoria Cross, was symptomatic of a general unwillingness to recognise the extreme valour of many RAN officers and sailors who consequently remain largely unknown to the wider public.

Overall Mike Carlton's *Cruiser* is a book aimed at the popular market written by a journalist with a life long interest in naval history, and as such it represents an advance from the previous narratives of *HMAS Perth* and her crew. Through this well researched book Carlton successfully reaches out to a generation of Australians who are unlikely to have heard of the life and loss of this gallant ship in their school history lessons.

Visions from the Vault

PEACE DIVIDEND PROVIDED DIFFICULTIES



The Korean War began on 25 June 1950 when the Soviet-equipped forces of communist North Korea crossed the 38th parallel and invaded the western-backed South. Although only five years had passed since the RAN had provided a major naval force during World War II, shortages of manpower and modern equipment now made it difficult for the navy to sustain a multi-ship commitment to extended war service. Nevertheless,

the RAN eventually made thirteen deployments to the war area including the light aircraft carrier, *HMAS Sydney* (III). Among the earliest ships deployed were the Tribal class destroyers *Bataan* and *Warramunga*, which served from July 1950 to May 1951 and August 1950 to August 1951 respectively. With a main armament of six 4.7inch guns, both destroyers took an active part in bombardment and escort duties as part of the Commonwealth contribution to the

United Nations' naval forces. Japan was routinely used as a support base. This picture shows *Warramunga* and *Bataan* together with *HMS Charity* at Yokosuka, on 26 January 1951.

ANI On-line: A guide to the website.

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


Figure 1

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In order to access the features of the site you must have a user account for the website. If you have a current subscription to the ANI, navigate to the website www.navalinstitute.com.au using your web browser (figure 1), click the “Members Login” menu item (figure 2), then click the link to download an application form. Fill in the form, then fax or post it to the ANI Business Manager. Once your account has been created, you will receive an email that outlines your member ID and password.




Figure 2



Figure 3

LOGGING IN TO YOUR ACCOUNT

Once you have your account details, you are ready to login and access the new features of the site. In order to login, navigate to the website (figure 1) and click the “Members Login” item (figure 2). Enter your member ID and password as they were provided to you, then click the “Login” button. The case of the member ID and password are important: i.e. “CaSe” and “case” are considered entirely different words by the authentication system. Each letter of the password will appear as a single “*” to prevent others from seeing your password as you type. If you have entered your details correctly, you will be presented with the news page. The grey status bar at the top notifies you of the account you are using (figure 4). You are now able to access all of the new features of the site.



Figure 4

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In order to protect your identity and to prevent malicious use of your account by others, you must log out of the site when you are finished browsing. This is especially important on public computers. In order to log out, click the “Logout” link in the grey status bar (figure 4).



Figure 5



Figure 6

CHANGING YOUR DETAILS

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


Figure 7



Figure 8

PARTICIPATING IN THE FORUM

In order to post topics and replies in the discussion forum, first login and click the “Forum” menu item (figure 8). Then select a forum that you would like to view by clicking its “View Topics” button (figure 9). Select a topic that you would like to read by clicking its “View this topic” link (figure 10). If you are not interested in any particular topic, you may add your own by clicking the “Add New Topic” button (figure 10). Similarly, once you are viewing a topic, you may post a reply by clicking “Add New Post”. Fill in the heading and body of your reply and click the “Submit” button to add your reply to the topic. If you change your mind while writing your reply, you may click the “Cancel” button and your reply will not be added to the topic.



Figure 9




Figure 10

FURTHER QUESTIONS

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The Flame of Remembrance, during 2010 Remembrance Day Ceremony held at Kings Park, Perth, Western Australia

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