



# **Journal of the Australian Naval Institute**



**Autumn 2003**



# AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE

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- to encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the maritime profession; and
- to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and the maritime profession.

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**Front Cover:** HMAS *Manoora* encountering heavy seas during transit to the Gulf. (RAN)

**Back Cover:** HMAS *Anzac* flying the Battle Ensign while providing NGS to allied troops in the southern Al Faw peninsular. (RAN)

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## **ANI LIBRARY**

The ANI Library has been repatriated from the Defence Library system and is now housed in the RAN Sea Power Centre. The Institute will gladly accept book donations on naval and maritime matters (where they will either be added to the library or traded for difficult to obtain books). Could prospective donors please contact Dr David Stevens on (02) 62662423.



## FROM THE EDITORIAL BOARD

The Annual General Meeting (AGM) was held on 18 March 2003, and members agreed to amend the Institute's membership categories to those of members and honorary members, dispensing with the previous distinction between uniformed and civilian members; Council membership was also amended to reflect these changes. A Special General Meeting will be held later in the year to consider updates to the administrative sections of the Constitution. The date will be advised in the Winter Edition of the Journal.

During the AGM, Rear Admiral David Campbell, RAN (Ret'd) issued a challenge to all members to increase the Institute's membership by recruiting at least one new member a year.

The third King-Hall Navy History Conference on *The Navy and the Nation* will be held in Canberra on 24-25 July 2003. The annual ANI dinner will be held in conjunction with the conference on 24 July and Professor Geoffrey Till will deliver the Vernon Parker Oration. The insert to this Edition provides administrative and registration details.

The Editorial Board seeks articles on naval or maritime issues for publication in the Journal. Articles may range in size from a few pages to 10+ pages - anything larger should be submitted to the Sea Power Centre for possible publication as a Working Paper. Articles concerning operations or administration/policy are of particular interest but we will consider papers on any relevant topic. As much of the RAN's operational and administrative history is poorly recorded, the recollections of members (and others) on these topics are keenly sought.

The Journal will publish articles and letters under a pen name if prospective authors so desire; the Editor will manage the list and identities of such authors.

Back copies of the Journal (where held) cost \$5 for members and \$15 for non-members. The Institute will take back old copies of the Journal if members no longer wish to hold them.

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## Letters to the Editor

### **Historic Gun Restoration**

(See LCDR G Swindon, p. 20, Spring 2002)

Commander Anthony Vine, RAN (Navy Safety Certification & Acceptance Agency) - The efforts of the members of HMAS Kanimbla's ship's company in restoring the Christmas Island gun are to be commended, however the photograph of the sailors undertaking the work raise serious concerns about how safely the restoration was carried out.

The photograph, while being excellent from a photographic perspective, could also be used as a good example of where Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) is not used correctly. The following is of particular concern:

- The sailor in the background is operating the needle gun while wearing sun glasses and not goggles.
- The female sailor in the foreground right, has her coveralls unrolled to her waist, exposing her skin to the dust and grit removed by her grinder. The sailor to the left of the photograph appears to be wearing a tee shirt also whilst operating a grinder.
- The Christmas Island Gun having been on the island since 1940 would have been painted with a plethora of different paints before and since its installation. The photograph does not indicate that any precautions were taken during the paint removal to prevent the members involved being exposed to dust particles (ie dust masks etc). The accompanying article does not confirm that the paint was analysed to ensure that it did not contain heavy metals such as Zinc Chromate or Lead prior to the restoration.

The RAN has a duty of care to ensure that its personnel use safe work practices both at sea and ashore. The photograph as published does little to enhance our reputation as a safe employer.

### **Reforming Naval Planning 1977-78**

(See CDRE A Robertson, pp. 14-17, Summer 2003)

Admiral Mike Hudson, AC RAN (Ret'd) - I have just finished reading the Summer 2003 Edition of the Journal and, as always, am most impressed with the quality of input; particularly from Navy's current generation of younger

officers, with their very well informed understanding of broader strategic issues and the people factor.

I write now in response to Commodore 'Rocker' Robertson's article *Reforming Naval Planning 1977-78*, not least because of his implied criticism of my performance as the Director of Naval Plans, in being laggardly in developing on his behalf a 'proper strategic long-range plan'. As our offices were very close to each other I am a little surprised that he infers that for six months after receiving a direction from him in January 1978 there was no communication between the two of us.

For the record, I was posted as the Director of Naval Plans (DNP) on 17<sup>th</sup> June 1977 and for the first six months largely engaged in a joint planning review, tasked by the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Throughout 1978 I was busy with a myriad of activities attendant upon the position of the then DNP and I recall a constant shuffling of priorities. Commodore Robertson's strategic plan was one of those and while he may now see it was unduly delayed I can assure him that Plan Blue had not been forgotten.

On 18<sup>th</sup> December 1978 I was promoted to Commodore and relieved Rocker as Director General of Naval Plans and Policy (DGNPP). I remained in that position for two years.

In August 1979, the Chief of Naval Operational Requirements and Plans, on my recommendation, approved the formulation of a dedicated team to expedite development and completion of a review of the RAN's Force Structure. The end result was called NAVY 2001. That team, responsible to DGNPP, consisted of the then Commander Sam Bateman (Staff Officer Plans), Lieutenant Commander Frank Allica (a PWO and DGNOR rep), Roger Creaser (Directorate of Operational Analysis - Navy) and R Stewart (Research Officer).

In the covering memo (May 1980) promulgating NAVY 2001 I stated:

*NAVY 2001 had its origin in DI(N) Admin 37-1, dated 22 July 1977, which established the production of a Naval Long Range Plan as a Management Objective. The aim was to provide broad guidance for long term naval development, and responsibility was vested in the Director of Naval Plans under the oversight of the Director General Naval Plans and Policy.*



*For a number of reasons, principally shortage of staff effort, progress was spasmodic and generally unsatisfactory up to the mid 1979. Furthermore, it came to be realised that the data base for the production of a long range plan was grossly inadequate if it was to be anything more than a simple extension to the Naval Medium Range Plan, embracing a projection of the existing force structure.*

*Nevertheless it was obvious that some form of review was urgently needed. Major naval force structure decisions were to be made during the period 1980-81 and looking ahead to the late 1980s/early 1990s, it was clear that the time had come to examine whether the RAN should continue in its present form or whether its force structure should follow some other direction.*

*In progressing NAVY 2001, the review team sought input from a wide range of sources, within and outside the Defence Department.*

*As NAVY 2001 developed, its aim was modified from a simple review of the force structure to an identification of force structure options which would, ultimately, be presented to the Chief of Naval Staff through his Advisory Committee. Thus, NAVY 2001 is not in itself the Naval Long Range Plan. It is, however, a step in the right direction.*

*I sincerely congratulate Commodore Robertson for his vision in developing Navy's technicolour range of plans. NAVY 2001, part of that process, was invaluable to me when I*

*later became Chief of Naval Staff in 1985.*

*Although it had been overtaken by other plans it was part of the basis on which the RAN made the difficult transition from the carrier era to the versatile force the Navy has become today. With appropriate funding it will get even better. I remain very grateful to Sam Bateman and his team.*

*For Rocker to now call the present RAN a sort of glorified Coast Guard does him no credit. It certainly does not reflect the multitude of demands that are being put upon it today, the professionalism of its men and women, nor the esteem in which it is held by our allied and other navies.*

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*JH Straczek (Senior Naval Historical Officer) - I read with interest the article by CDRE Robertson and had the opportunity to see the response from ADML Hudson on the development of long range strategic planning in the RAN. To my mind both of these items are important contributions to the historiography of the RAN. The reason for this is that so little has been written on the administrative and organisational history of the Navy.*

*I would hope other officers would follow suit by putting pen to paper and discuss how Navy as an organisation evolved and functioned since the 1960s.*

*By way of information the Naval History Directorate holds a set of Plan Greens as well as copies of Plan Blue.*



Crew members from HMAS Darwin investigate a submerged dhow - 26 Mar 03 (RAN)



## Sea Power as Strategy

By Dr Norman Friedman<sup>1</sup>

What I want to talk to you about is a view of national strategy, which has to be something more than simply saying that sea power is very useful. If you're on an island, very obviously you start talking about what effect the sea has on whatever you do. A sea power view starts with the fact that it's very easy to move things by sea, easier than any other way. Let me give you an example. I was at a discussion of fishery protection and there was apparently a recently celebrated case in which a poacher operating off your Southern coast was intercepted, not near your Southern coast, but eventually all the way across the Southern Indian Ocean off South Africa. *'Well you say, that's a pretty remarkable thing'*, but that's an illustration of the fact that in effect at sea distances shrink very dramatically. They don't shrink in the sense that you just snap your fingers and you're five thousand miles away instantaneously, but there's a sense in which things get a whole lot closer. It's an odd sort of sense. I'm not sure how to express it properly, but another way of saying that is that what floats can be remarkably mobile.

From the point of view of defending yourself, that means that anyone else using the sea as a highway can show up anywhere around your island. Talking about protecting a limited area of your coast becomes self-defeating. People find other places that are easier to approach or attack. That seems to mean that the defence has a terrible peripheral problem. By the way, that is not unique to Australia. The United States faced much the same problem. Is coastal defence the right way to protect the country? A few years ago we did a study. The argument was that movement by sea was really quite easy. The conclusion was that it might be a lot less expensive for us to discourage attack by threatening to move our own concentrated force into an enemy's waters, to threaten his coast and present him with the intractable coastal defence problem we faced. That seemed much better than waiting for enemies to come to us. That is

certainly part of a sea power approach to national defence, an approach which takes into account the full defensive (and offensive) effect of seaborne mobility.

Another part of a sea power approach (and I'll give you some historical examples) is always to ask what the point of any particular war actually is. Sea power offers alternatives which land powers generally lack; the sea power decides when and where to attack. Matters are very different from a land power's point of view, because if it borders a country bent on invasion, the war is fought simply to stop the invader from overrunning his victim. France in 1914 is a case in point. If it is not so easy to be overrun, then a government can ask how to get to the desired outcome. It can take a wider view. The wider view may very well be that attacking some particular place will offer valuable leverage. Your troops participated in exactly that kind of war. Look at Gallipoli, and forget for a moment that it was badly carried out and horribly tragic. In a strategic sense, it was an attempt to face the central issue in WWI. From the point of view of the British Empire, including Australia, it was not simply to defend France. Rather, it was to defeat Germany. Once Germany lost it would have to disgorge whatever it seized in Europe, including whatever part of France it got. But simply ejecting the Germans from France would not have defeated them, and they would always have been able to strike again (by the way that is one way to see the outcome of WWI and the ultimate second round of WWII). The British Empire was seaborne. It could not be defeated as long as the Germans could not gain control of the sea. It could, at least in theory, decide when and where to strike at the Germans. Had Gallipoli succeeded, then in theory the British might have knocked the Turks and then the Austrians out of the war. Probably more importantly, they would have strengthened a Russian army, which would have subjected the Germans to a far more desperate two-front war. It was that maritime component that gave the British Empire the

<sup>1</sup> Edited transcript from the Vernon Parker Oration delivered on 7 Nov 02 at HMAS *Harman*.



freedom to entertain such possibilities. That they did not work out in practice was tragic, but it does not change the fact that sea power offered alternatives that land power could never have offered. So part of the sea power view is that force should be applied when and where the payoff is greatest. Sea power in effect magnifies the effect of relatively small but extremely mobile land forces.

This point is illustrated by the way the war was actually fought. The Australian Army proved extremely effective in France. But that was only part of a larger story. The reason the Army could go to France as opposed to standing in the Northern Territories trying to defend this island was it could be projected by sea - and the Germans had no way what so ever of projecting their own army the same way. We often forget that because it's so easy, transport by sea seems almost automatic. It isn't. It was terribly important that the Royal Navy and the other Empire navies, including the RAN, dominated the seas, at least in a positive sense (they could not always keep the Germans from sinking some ships, but they and not the Germans could move masses of men relatively freely).

Sea power is not just about navies. It is about the way all of a country's military power is used. Sea power affects the way a government views a war. The government may well want to limit its participation. The war may turn out badly; going somewhere may turn out to have been something other than a really good idea. I realise that although my crystal ball doesn't work, government's do much better, but you know, occasionally they get it wrong. The fact that the force was moved there by sea and that there is a lot of capacity means it can leave by sea. If the force shows up in ships, projecting air power from moving platforms, then it can leave quietly. If troops are ashore like say, the Marines, then it's a little less quiet, but they can still move away somewhere else when it pays to do so. Otherwise they need permission, both to come and go, and that presents both far more problems and far more loss of prestige on withdrawal. Fear of that loss of prestige can lock a government into disaster.

Sea based forces don't have to have permission to go places. Most of the time your government isn't interested in burning down someone else's country. However, it may be very interested in giving them the idea that

they could get burnt down in future. After all, most of our business isn't the actual violence; it's letting them get that idea. If you have to have permission to be there, they can really throw you out and they don't suffer any unpleasant consequences. The ability to go in by yourself is extremely valuable.

Now in a lot of cases it may be that you do much better with coalition partners. However, the ability to go it alone tends to make coalition partners decide their national interest and go along with you. If they have a veto, then there are always a lot of good reasons to veto whatever you want. You hear a lot about the United States being very unilateral (and here I'm speaking for myself, I'm not a US Government spokesman); we can go burn down Iraq by ourselves, we don't care. Clearly part of that is *'You can't stop us'*. Another part of that is, however, that many governments know they may want to join in but also know that local critics will say: *'Well, bad things will happen if you hurt this poor Saddam, a nice man you know, don't hurt him'*. Our ability to go it alone gives those governments freedom of choice, because they can tell their local critics that nothing they do will stop us; they might as well follow their interests. During the Gulf War I think the Saudi's were extremely nervous about allowing Americans in to protect Saudi Arabia, and you know that the Iraqis tried very hard to make them a lot more nervous. We showed up with three aircraft carriers, which provided the air defence of Saudi Arabia for a while. Once we could do it whether they wanted us to or not, suddenly they realised they rather wanted us to. That made a big difference to us.

Is it always a good thing to be able to do it alone? Well, I must admit that every once in a while a government may try to do something by itself that isn't very clever. I know that many of our critics feel that we're about to do that. What can I tell you? We work for our governments, and while we do we have to assume they know what they're doing.

So the first thing about the sea as a venue for moving is that it's possible to move heavy masses and concentrated weight. Another example: When we were in Kosovo the question came up of whether we could deploy attack helicopters. It may be that the real story is the Army didn't want to use them, so they showed how difficult it was to deploy. But I would point out that the Marines had large



amphibious ships, which were in effect moveable bases, and they could have deployed attack helicopters or any other sort of helicopters essentially instantly. Now whether that's desirable or not is a Government issue, but the ability to go somewhere without preparation seems to me worth the effort. By the way, the other side of that is the talk that you're getting now about the danger of Al Qaeda putting things in containers and God knows how many shipping containers there are. Most of what travels around the world goes by sea and if someone subverts that traffic of course there are problems.

But the important thing is that there isn't a lot of geography at sea, and that makes a big difference. It also means that ships cannot easily be detected in the open ocean and they can't by the way, if you're not stupid. That means that anyone facing a descent from the sea has to deal with a much larger number of different alternatives and that's a virtual reduction in his forces, that's leverage. If you have a numerically small but extremely competent land force, that is terribly valuable. The US Marine Corps is a good case in point. You may have others that you would think of. In any case, seaborne mobility gives such an organisation a lot of advantages, which it doesn't have if it has to land with permission, if it has to deploy in a more conventional manner. Those advantages come with a price. That nice naval package or sea based package is quite finite. The unit can't carry as much with it as a large army. On the other hand if it is a lot more effective than whatever they're up against, that's perfectly enough.

Now, these arguments are not new. If you go back to the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, Mahan, who was a US Navy Captain, was extremely popular because what he said was that navies eliminate distance. Most trade is maritime, so if you can cut maritime trade you starve people. He was a product of the American civil war. The Union Navy in the civil war imposed a very tough blockade on the South. Naval officers of his generation believed the blockade was decisive, therefore in navies they had the ultimate strategic weapon. Much the same as what Curtis Le May would later say about strategic bombers with H bombs. Now it turns out that no, it's not quite as decisive as all that. People faced with embargoes usually find a way to work around them, but when that is done in

conjunction with something else it is terrifying. For example, the South did manage to break through the blockade, but at a horrible cost. The cost shredded their society, which probably had effects on whether they would keep fighting. When they were fighting a hot war on land and they were denied a lot of stuff by sea, that made life a lot rougher. If you look at WWI with the Germans, it is clear that blockade alone could not stop them from operating, but if you look at the way they were say in 1917-18 the combination of the drain of fighting a war and being blockaded was a very interesting one. What does that say about sea power? It says it is very effective, but if you are going for ultimate objectives, by itself it is unlikely to be decisive. If the objectives are not ultimate, the threats you can make from the sea are likely to be very effective ones. The business about being more independent of distance than land power I think is well worth thinking about. Mahan hoped for decisive action. As I say, it did not quite work as he had hoped.

These are the arguments against him. The main argument was that one of the elements of a sea power strategy is the descent of land forces on someone else's coast. That is what I have been saying. I am not pushing your navy at the expense of everything else. I am talking about a way of using national forces. In Mahan's day land armies were growing very rapidly and there were a lot of railroads. There was a fair chance that wherever you descended from the sea an army could build up very fast to face you down. That is certainly a part of the story of Gallipoli. I would add however, that Gallipoli was a much closer run thing than people realise, that despite an unbelievable catalogue of mistakes, which I am sure you blame on the British, most would not guess at that. It very nearly worked. The payoff for working would have been that the Germans would have had a much tougher time in the East. If the French had held out at all, which they probably would have, the effect would have been absolutely devastating. That is the strategic view that I am advancing. Otherwise you say '*well why Gallipoli?*' I mean, it is a strange, remote place. Well, because you get something out of that place.

Well what happens to mass armies? In WWII we learned that we can move enough mechanised materiel by sea that whatever force comes out of the sea can be fairly powerful.



What has happened since is the cost of armies has goes up quite sharply. You find that the cost per man goes way up, therefore the number of people goes down. The number of organised units goes down. The best piece of news of all is that a lot of the people who probably would oppose you (and us also) are not very wealthy. They are unlikely to be able to pay to replace or repair what they have. It used to be that they could get it free from the Russians or the Chinese. The Chinese seem much less interested in giveaways and the Russians have gone out of that business altogether. That suggests that the future of mass armies is not good, that most armies will get smaller if they want to remain mechanised. But if they do not mechanise they will probably be easier to destroy. From the point of view of a mobile high tech organisation, that is excellent news. Also you know that international trade is increasing, that people tend to specialise for economic reasons. That may mean that if access to the sea is broken, it is actually more important now than it would have been in Mahan's time. That may be one of the messages of globalisation. Again from the point of view of imposing national will by the sea, that is interesting.

Now I must tell you that if I had been giving this talk say five years ago, I would have mentioned an American analysis that really there was very little in the world that was more than a couple of hundred miles inland. Therefore, we could live with shorter-range naval aircraft. We could get rid of the tankers that allow us to project inland, because after all when would we ever really care about anything more than 100-150 miles from the sea. Then we discovered that there's a country without a coastline that we were recently involved in and there are two ironies. One, we got it wrong. Two, a lot of what we did in Afghanistan was maritime, which was interesting.

Australia has a relatively small population, which is extremely well educated. You are very good at high technology; those are your strengths. As an outsider I apologise for talking about what you should do, but it would seem to me that you should get very interested in technological leverage, because if you can take a consolidated force and hit someone with it effectively, that's probably the best pressure you can make. If you need numbers, then even if you get a population of 50 million (as

recently proposed, but apparently not terribly popular) that's still not a billion and a half right? Too, if you look at the new forms of commercial surveillance what you find is that photo satellites are really not very good at finding moving objects. They're very good at finding large concentrated objects. A client can certainly ask to look at his border and see if anyone is getting ready to attack. That almost means that large land armies setting up in advance where it takes them weeks or months to bulk up large concentrations are going to be detected - which by the way says that what the coalition army did in the Gulf War will not work. To do that massive flanking attack we had to build up a large force. It would seem to me that your chances of effectiveness get better compared to larger more or less fixed forces. Land forces can't move that fast, because although the vehicles are quite fast they do not carry much with them, so that they have to stop to fuel every so often. They also need lots of spares and maintenance. Even if the vehicles make 50 miles an hour on a road they cannot keep that up for long. Ships are not as fast, 30 knots is not 50 miles an hour and certainly not 500, but because we carry a lot with us at sea, we go a lot further.

A very good British naval historian once said it this way. If you look at a convoy battle in WWII and the distance say from London to Warsaw, which in land terms is an unimaginable distance, the whole thing takes a couple of weeks. To cover the same distance on land you're talking about months or years. But the force is very thin. The number of troops would maybe be a battalion, maybe a couple of squadrons of aircraft. So when you're looking at what happens at sea, you're looking at things that are spread out. Things like reconnaissance and deception tend to count more at sea than they do on land. A phrase I once saw in a novel about land warfare was '*on land, geography is destiny*'. If you are smart and you look at a map you can figure out what will happen. Helicopters make life more interesting, but if mass has to go by road, there are only so many roads. It is not like that offshore. If I am projecting land power from offshore, at least when I start, I can start from an unpredictable place. I can also reduce what has to go ashore by putting more of the firepower if you like, offshore. If it is all unified of course, I can then call on that firepower from offshore. Of course, you have



to buy the right stuff to do that. In addition I may be able to keep more of the logistics base offshore, for longer. That means I land less and I land a greater proportion of teeth. That can make it easier to move around. There are obviously limits to what I can land and obviously if most of the support is from aircraft, or missiles or guns offshore, there will be times when things go wrong so that whoever goes ashore wants some organic backing. Right now for us is a major issue as to how much organic materiel the Marines have to carry ashore.

If you buy yourself a finite Navy, or finite sea based force, it has to do a very wide variety of things. Because you can hang around unliked and you can gather intelligence. Very often your government wants that more than anything else. There is some crisis brewing, you would like to know what is happening and you would prefer people not to figure out that you are finding that out. Even with satellites, which will eliminate your national treasury very rapidly, people know when they are around. You cannot move them around very easily. You can to some extent, but that raises the price. With aircraft, most people who like aeroplanes can buy books showing all the specialised aircraft in the world and they can easily guess exactly what they do. Submarines are different. Most people in this region cannot find submarines to save their lives. So they are a way of gathering things covertly. The covert part includes not effecting an ongoing crisis until you decide to do it. That is valuable because it maximises your government's range of choices.

Once a decision has been made the same navy shows up for coercion. In that cases it is definitely worth while for people to see it. The fact that they cannot throw it out by denying it a base of some kind makes a big difference. That says that larger more survivable surface ships buy a great deal. Since I work for a Navy that really likes big ones you might have guessed that I would say that - but that does not make it any less true. Then there is this. A lot of governments like to impose embargoes as a way of imposing pressure and your Navy has been very prominent in the embargo in the Northern Arabian Sea against Iraq. Well as I said before, embargoes do not often cripple, but they are a way of applying pressure. Flexible ships offer the widest possible choice, which means that the government, which pays

for them, gets the most for its money. I apologise if what I say is obvious.

Then there is strike. I would distinguish strike from a protracted campaign because very often you want to show someone that you can come back and hurt them later if they stay out of line. For example, in 1986 we thought that the Libyans had ordered the bombing of that disco in Berlin, which killed some Americans. We decided to give them a hard time. We went in with a mixture of carrier and land based very long-range air. I think the land base was to force the British to agree that they were in with us (the aircraft flew from British bases). We were very big on making our allies be shown to be part of what we were doing. Again my guess, this is not official. The main point of this to me was not that we achieved enormous destructive effect in Libya, we did not, everyone knew that. Later there was some talk that a couple of Tomahawks would have done the same job. What we did in Libya was we basically waltzed through their air defence system and did not get hurt. We showed we could come back later and do what we like. Well that seems to have impressed them, they did not come back and do a lot more terrorism. We were pretty happy about that.

Then there were protracted ground campaigns and you may be about to see one soon. There I would say the pay off on projecting by sea is that we pick where we go. That means that it is much harder for someone else to mount a serious defence. Number two: if things do not do that well, we can leave. Now, if you were a maritime power that thinks like that and you have more land oriented coalition partners, they generally do not appreciate this point of view at all. Their objective is to make sure that you stay with them and preferably that a lot of you stay with them more or less permanently. Your government's objective is to gain some kind of end - which is not to be nice to whoever you're partnered with. Before WWI there was a discussion in Britain of whether they would basically go for maritime or a coalition land oriented view. It seemed to me reading the discussion at the time, that the proponents of total coordination with the French on land were saying *'well this naval stuff which is a sea power view, is sort of cold blooded, even reptilian'*. Well they lost a lot of people including a lot of your people showing how warm hearted they were towards their coalition



partner. The last I looked you signed up to be Australians rather than citizens of some wider assembly of countries like, say, ASEAN. Alliances are not the same as nationhood. Coalitions are often a very nice thing to have, but at some point your national interests may differ. The ability to choose I think is worth a lot. These are questions that come up. If you buy a sea power range of strategy, it costs. So how much leverage do you get out of sea power alone?

The answer is a lot, but not everything. This one is important. It matters what your objectives are. If you are a satisfied country (you qualify, we qualify) there is not much territory that you really want all that badly. For example, we went in and overran Afghanistan. To Afghans presumably Afghanistan is a very valuable place. I do not think that very many Americans would regard it as a terrific place to run. They may claim it is a strategic place between central Asia and Pakistan, but from my point of view we would prefer not to be in a strategic place at all, it is a miserable place, you know that. Our interest was in destroying a safe rear area for Al Qaeda. That is a transitory interest. You go in and do something very unpleasant and then you find something else to do. Because we have forces that are very easy to redeploy, that is possible. Once you land somewhere and you garrison it, it suddenly becomes terribly important. That is a very distorting thing. You have had a little experience of that and we have had a whole lot more. How much did you really care about the merits of Vietnam? Well it was part of a larger war. How important was Vietnam itself? Once we'd invested enough bodies, we couldn't figure that one out. If you look at different places that people describe as strategic, usually they are strategic as part of some bigger war. When the bigger war goes away, our national strategy is going to change, or at least the details will change. The less that you are forced to buy permanent presence in places the happier you're going to be. So you want the benefits of being there without the bad part about having to be there permanently.

If I get a lot out of the fact that my enemies cannot figure out where I am, then how long does that last? All I can tell you is that I spent a lot of time studying how we tracked the Soviet Fleet. It's hard to track moving ships at sea especially if they do not cooperate. The methods we used, passive satellites, some radar

satellites, do not really correspond to commercial satellite applications. That says to me, that probably the future of the sea sanctuary is better than the future of a lot of others. When you buy ships, and now I will get to specific naval things, there is a tendency to specify exactly what you are supposed to do. The trouble is they last a long time and your crystal ball tends not to be all that hot. So actually being a bit bigger pays off. The reason a bit bigger does not really cost that much is that what supports a ship at sea is buoyancy, you do not have to pay a lot just to sit there. If you buy yourself a much bigger aeroplane you have to spend a lot more on propulsion. If you buy yourself ten million more tanks, you have bought yourself ten million tanks. So for me as an American it has to be easier to modify, and by the way, also a lot harder to sink if you design it right. All of these things do not automatically work, if you are a dummy you do it wrong and bad things happen to you, you have been in this business long enough to know that.

There is a lot of interest in netting and remote sensing. Navies probably do more of that right now than other services, because ambiguity and reconnaissance play a larger role in naval warfare, because they are more spread out. One thing you will see I think, is that if the Army is going more towards what we call the digitised battlefield, where netting allows a small army unit to attack beyond its own horizon, you will see them split into smaller units and their thinking will be more like what we associate with naval thinking. The great problem is they will have to solve logistics problems, which do not occur at sea. By the way, also if you get a lot more lethality out of a numerically small but very sophisticated army unit, that becomes a very natural thing to project by sea and if it's very lethal, it is really a nasty thing to project. You know there is a lot of interest in stealth. This is not the right talk for it, but I think stealth probably will not last that long, that is because computers get better all the time. That says '*do not worry so much about stealth, be survivable*'. The weapons do not get much better. It is not that easy to sink something if you make it a bit bigger, right.

Let us look at some historical cases. The point I want to make is that there are really different ways of looking at wars. Look at the two World Wars. I was a defence analyst for



years during the Cold War. You know that we always talked about the central front. Now the central front was called central because it was the middle of the West German border. But obviously many people thought the central front was central to what would happen. So the question always was *'What if the Russian Army was any good?'* I question now whether it was. If they were good, they would overrun all of Germany and France and they get to the Channel. Well would that win WWII? Our answer in the Maritime Strategy was no. WWII would really be about whether Russians would dominate the world. We would not like it if they reached the Channel. I mean, we would prefer the Europeans still to be intact. On the other hand we also had this sneaky feeling that some of them might decide to avoid having their countries completely trashed by surrendering. Our answer was *'Guess what? The war does not end when you give up, so you may as well fight'*. This was not always popular for some reason. I cannot imagine why, but that is really a difference in outlook.

The other thing was this. If you look at the central front in the Cold War and you imagine a war actually occurring, it becomes a horrible meat grinder like the Western front in WWI. So if you are an analyst and you think that you are earning your pay, the question that comes up is *'was there some way to fight WWI in which a whole generation of Westerners did not get killed?'* Well, I was involved in developing the US Maritime Strategy and in effect we were saying *'yes there is'*, because if you look at the seaward flanks of any advance into Europe, those flanks become terribly interesting. If you present a real threat to those flanks, then whoever is advancing has to take account of it and probably has to pull back until he secures it. That means that if you are willing to take real risks at sea, because flanking attacks are going to be expensive and tricky, then there is a way of slowing down a Soviet advance. Now why would you care about that? Because a lot of NATO strength was through mobilisation - there were a lot of reservists. They could not maintain standing forces the size of the Russians, but if you could make sure that any war in central Europe was in slow motion, there was a fair chance that the odds would even up. Another example of the Maritime Strategy was in the Far East. We got very friendly with the Chinese. The Russians

had a feeling that one day the Chinese would like to have Siberia back. The Chinese have maps that show that the Tsarists stole Siberia and that it was very unfair - and it was only a mere three or four hundred years ago (as you know that is moments) and the Russians would never quite forget that possibility. So that would tie down fairly large Russian forces. They really could not redeploy them because of poor communications, but we were interested also in tying down mobile forces. For example, anti-ship bombers, submarines, things like that. What we got out of having a strong Pacific Fleet was they could not bet that we did not have a secret deal with the Chinese to overrun Siberia when the good times came. I would imagine the Chinese did not want any part of it. But you can do attacks that look as though you are preparing for them to go in and then let them explain in Moscow later. That is the kind of thing you get out of mobility. Would it have been decisive? We think it would have been kind of useful. We thought that having minor amphibious forces would make them worry a lot about places like St Petersburg. That is a very sobering business. Just the idea that we could match them in places that were asymmetric for them probably sobered them up a lot, and we think we got a lot of mileage out of it.

Now let's look at a WWI example. If you were British and you did not feel culturally close to the French, you might ask yourself what the biggest threat was. You might say something like *'Ok, if the Germans are most sensitive about say East Prussia where the German military elite came from, pay the people who will give them the hardest time right? Go in the Baltic and threaten to land there'*. The Germans tried to laugh that off, but I do not think it would have been very funny, I think it might have worked.

Another example shows how bad things can be. The Crimean War in its time was called the Russian War. It was really about getting the Russian Empire to stop threatening various places including Turkey. So the question was *'how do you deal with these Russians? They have a big land empire far away, so what do you do?'* The first idea the British had was *'we will make a maritime raid. There's a place - the Crimea - in the Black Sea, and the Russians are threatening the Turks in the Black Sea. We will grab the Crimea as a demonstration of our power and our will.'*



Apparently their intelligence was terrible. They did not realise the Crimea was actually well defended and that they would get bogged down there. As soon as they were bogged down there, suddenly the war was about the Crimea. The British Cabinet developed the idea that if ever they won in the Crimea the war would end in their favour. This was absolute insanity. From the Tsar's point of view, the Crimea was a useless place in the Black Sea far from where everyone cares. He did not really care about his own troops. It was perfectly acceptable to use up a few more troops and tie down the enemy. There was no way that the loss of the Crimea would shatter the Russian Empire. The British had to find something that mattered.

Well in the Baltic the British figured out there was something that mattered and that was St Petersburg. About 1855 the British took a Russian Sea fortress called Sveaborg. That's usually treated by historians as a sort of a cute but irrelevant stunt. Well the Russians felt a little differently. Those defences were not very different from what was defending St Petersburg. Also because security was not brilliant, the Russians could watch the British building a specialised force that would have taken St Petersburg. That is, you could see the force being built and you had the demonstration it would have worked. The Crimea might not matter, but St Petersburg really did matter and probably that threat had a lot to do with the Russians deciding that this was not really a whole lot of fun. There were other things also. The point I am making is that a sea power way of thinking assumes you can go anywhere along someone else's periphery and that very often there is some place other than where you happen to be that gives you a bigger pay off. It is about leverage. Now if you have an army with ten million people, all of them feel like getting killed for Allah, then presumably leverage and economy are not all that important. I doubt many - if any - such armies exist.

If I look at WWII, look at Churchill after June 1940, the thing that they were so desperate to prevent had just happened. By the way, they do not have an ally in the East giving the Germans a hard time. This is a pretty bad thing. People who do not like Churchill say well, he had this mystical vision that there was some way out, but of course he was crazy and we should have settled. Well no, he was a historian. If you look at their previous

wars like the Napoleonic War, what happens is that as long as the British stay in business, they can keep forming coalitions, and eventually they form one that busts the French. It takes a while. Things do not always work. You go in, you land troops, you try to do something, something goes wrong, you take them home and land them somewhere else. Now you can see that either as (as somebody at Newport once said) a Mrs Mcawber type of strategy '*Something will turn up*', Or you can see it as a very reasonable way of using sea power. By the way, part of the sea power story was that they had access to world resources, including incidentally, yours. That made a tremendous difference. Now I would guess that at some point Churchill said to himself. It's 1800 again, or 1801 or whatever. The other side runs the continent, but they cannot jump the Channel, lets give them a hard time and eventually we will get friends. His guess was that he would get the US. The Russians were not as satisfactory, because they probably would have enjoyed also seizing all of Europe, which would have meant another unpleasantness later, but you work with what you have got. That is a very different view. If you look at casualties in two World Wars, you will notice that your chance of survival as a British soldier went up rather dramatically in WWII, even though army people feel that they did not do that good a job in places like Normandy. They did not know how to combine arms properly. Still, the peripheral approach really was a very good one. In wars you do not get high grades for showing how tough you are, you get high grades for winning. If someone else wants to bleed as part of your war, that is his business.

If you look at the Pacific War, there's a real question of what the war aim is. For the US Navy, which I regard as correct, the war aim is simply to defeat the Japanese. After they lose they disgorge whatever they have grabbed, that is the end if it. The view taken by the US Army in a lot of its historical work is that war was about how evil it was for the Japanese to seize the Philippines, which we owned. *How important was taking back the Philippines? Did it win the war? No. Were we still fighting there on VJ Day? Yes. Did it eat up a lot of people? Yes.*

The last thing I will tell you is if you look at Afghanistan, the only reason we were able to go into Afghanistan was sea based power. Now sea based does not mean it is just sailors, do



not get me wrong. If I look at Afghanistan, problem one is if you are going to make an attack in Afghanistan where does it come from? Well no one in the region is all that hot about playing with us. In many cases they will not try and stop us flying overhead, because we will bomb them, but other than that they are not interested. Well, we could strike at Afghanistan from carriers. The problem was that we had gone cheap on carrier based tanking, so we absolutely had to have that amount of cooperation. That is, we absolutely needed to have bases available with tankers. In fact, Australia contributed some tankers. However, the strike at least did not have to be land based. That made a tremendous difference in how much we had to pay people to let us in. In the ideal world we would have kept the A-6Es and we would have been able to do it off the carriers by themselves. The world is not ideal; our crystal balls are not perfect. The second thing was do you need ground forces? Well you now hear about how these special forces people in Northern Afghanistan would act as the artillery for the Northern alliance and people say 'what do you need troops there for, look at what you can do from the air?' First, it is what we can do from the air in support of a ground army. No ground army, no fun. Secondly, in Northern Afghanistan there were a lot of people who had good reason to really hate the Taliban, so we said to them 'We will help', and they said 'Great idea', once we demonstrated that we were serious. And by the way that took a little while, before they would play. So Northern Afghanistan works pretty well without a lot of American troops.

Now lets ask about the other half. If you look at Southern Afghanistan, actually more South Eastern Afghanistan, which is mostly Pushtuns (the Taliban were Pushtuns) one of the mistakes was that we thought of it as an ideological split; it was more ethnic. You know, we may not like the brand of Islam that they are pushing, but by god they are our creeps not yours, so we will back them up. That meant that there was not going to be any Southern alliance spontaneously forming to kill the Taliban. What do you do? Well I would argue that moving those US Marines that took Camp Rhino near Kandahar was not just a cute stunt, but instead was absolutely decisive. It was decisive because once we had a serious fighting force on the ground in Taliban country, then that convinced a lot of other

Afghans that we were serious and that we were not backing down. Second, the Taliban had a choice. They could try to wipe out our Marines, or they could basically admit that they were powerless. They admitted powerlessness. Well that killed their prestige a lot. Now the Marines complained that there were not enough of them to go out and do offensive action, so they felt weak. No, they were decisive. Now, why did that work? It worked because their logistic and firepower base was at sea where we could move it around easily and as little as possible had to move inland and it was very effective. That is a sea power kind of application. You get a lot more for your money when you have real national mobility, when everyone can move freely at your government's dictate, when there is enough fire power offshore so that what lands really gets backed up against opposition, and fire power has to include aircraft.

I apologise if I have imposed on national decisions here, but it's a kind of strategy I think is well worth thinking about.

### **About the Author**



*Educated as a theoretical physicist, Dr Norman Friedman is a defence analyst concerned primarily with the interaction between technology and tactical, strategic, and policy issues. He was a staff member and then Deputy Director of National Security Studies of the Hudson Institute from 1973 through 1984. Since that time he has served as a consultant to the Secretary of the Navy (in the Office of Program Appraisal, 1984-94) and to various defence contractors. He has published 26 books, most recently *Seapower as Strategy*, an account of modern naval strategy; a history of the Cold War, *The Fifty-Year War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War*; and *Seapower and Space*, an account of the role that space and information assets now play in naval warfare. He is a member of the U.S. Naval Institute, the Royal United Services Institute, the American Society of Naval Engineers, the American Physical Society, the Naval Submarine League, and the British Naval Review.*



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## The Australian Naval Shipbuilding and Repair Sector Strategic Plan

By John Jeremy

In late August 2002 the Minister for Defence released the Department of Defence *Naval Shipbuilding and Repair Sector Strategic Plan*. It is one of the most thorough examinations of the realities of this market sector that has been made publicly available, and many of the plan's observations and conclusions will come as no surprise to those with experience in this industry. The plan is particularly notable for its emphasis on the importance of retaining a naval shipbuilding capability as well as that for ship refit and repair. It is the clearest statement of industry capability requirements that Defence has made for many years.

The main conclusion of the Strategic Plan is *'that future demand is sufficient to sustain only one shipbuilder, and that single shipbuilding entity model provides the only feasible structural arrangement to meet Navy's new construction capability requirements.'* Clearly, this conclusion will be a most controversial aspect of the plan.

Today, the naval shipbuilding and repair industry is in commercial hands (apart from ASC), and its ability to survive and prosper is largely dependent on sufficient workload to justify the necessary investment in facilities and people. No commercial organisation can retain special facilities and capabilities on the off chance that they might be needed - and the necessary investment in facilities and skills development and retention is considerable.

Ideally, continuing competition for the supply of ships and services to the navy is a desirable outcome. However, if the price of maintaining competition in a very small market (by international standards) is a loss of essential capability then that price is too high. The lead time for this essential capability is years - it cannot be turned on and off like a tap.

The Strategic Plan outlines a new way of managing business in a sole-source environment. The proposed strategic alliance will introduce interesting complexities to the relationship between Defence and the Alliance Entity (as it is called). The plan notes that

Defence will need *'visibility of the Entity's operation and management without constraining day-to-day activities.'* This can surely be done, but it would be essential for the relationship that the Alliance Entity be allowed to manage its business, to hire, fire, train, invest and innovate without interference by bureaucracy.

Perhaps the greatest challenge for the Government if it decides to implement this plan will be making it work in Australia's political environment. Each State will lobby for a piece of the action, and politicians will be pressed by firms in their electorates who believe they can do it faster and cheaper, even if they have never done it before. At least, in this case, there is only one customer, unlike the market for railway locomotives and rolling stock where political pressure has frequently resulted in work being spread amongst the States when a single source would have been more efficient.

Acceptance of the recommendations in the Strategic Plan will not be easy for the Government, but doing nothing is likely to produce a similar but more random and less satisfactory result.

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## Australia's War Against People Smuggling

By Commander Ken Burleigh, RAN

Few terms arouse passion among people quite as much as the word 'refugee'. Since August 2001, when the Norwegian flagged vessel *Tampa* arrived off the coast of Christmas Island, there has been an unprecedented amount of interest in the Australian government's policy, toward the illegal entry of foreign nationals into the Australian migration zone.<sup>1</sup> The unlawful entry of people into Australia is well documented and indeed, is not a new phenomenon. Since the early 1970s stories of 'Vietnamese boatpeople' abounded and became ensconced in Australian colloquial vernacular. Since 1990, however, the apprehension and treatment of 'illegal immigrants' has become extremely topical again within the community. During the 11 year period leading up to the arrival of *Tampa*, about 14000 people<sup>2</sup> of predominantly Middle-eastern origin, arrived into Australia by boat, although from 1999, the frequency and number of arrivals increased significantly.<sup>3</sup> The vast majority of these people arrived at the Australian offshore territory of Ashmore Islands by way of decrepit fishing vessels or inter-island ferries from Indonesia. After surviving untold perils both ashore and at sea on these vessels of questionable seaworthiness, people arriving into Australia would be transported to the mainland for questioning and processing by officials of the Australian government.

Since the *Tampa* incident, Australia has adopted a far more stringent approach to the treatment of these arrivals. The so-called 'Pacific solution', the excising of offshore territories and installations from the migration zone and the prevention by naval and customs units, of illegal entry vessels entering the contiguous zone (CZ), have received a good deal of international and domestic condemnation. By implementing these tactics, the Australian government has ensured that no foreign national has arrived in Australia illegally by boat since the *Tampa* affair began. The question that needs to be asked however is whether Australia is within its rights to execute the legislation that it has. Many commentators criticise the policy, but there is generally a great deal of emotion and morality involved in their

arguments.<sup>4</sup> The aim of this article is to assess whether the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) and the 1951 Refugee Convention (RC) are impediments to current efforts by Australia to address the problem of people smuggling into the country.

### Australian Policy and the Law of the Sea Convention

The *Tampa* affair sparked a fundamental shift in Australia's position in terms of the reception of illegal immigrants. The incident was an unfortunate case in which the master of the *Tampa* exercised his obligation to assist personnel in distress in accordance with the LOSC Article 98, propelling him into the centre of a contentious international and domestic debate on illegal immigration. The legality of the way Australia dealt with this incident is beyond the scope of this article, but suffice to say, it became a conduit for Australia to change it's policy on illegal immigration. This change in policy was principally designed to combat people smuggling syndicates based in Indonesia and elsewhere in Asia that had been operating with impunity throughout the 1990s.<sup>5</sup> People smuggling can be defined as '... to import or export (people) secretly, without legal duty or in violation of law'.<sup>6</sup> In essence, people smugglers organise the transport of asylum seekers to a destination where they can pursue refugee status, having fled their homelands. This transport can occur by a number of means but for the purpose of this essay, arrivals by sea will be concentrated on.

Since the *Tampa* incident, the Australian government has empowered naval and customs law enforcement officials, to apprehend Suspected Illegal Entry Vessels (SIEV) before they reach the territorial sea (TS) of Australia. Naval boarding parties now intercept these vessels, which are invariably attempting to smuggle asylum seekers into Australia, in the CZ. In the first instance, the objective of the boarding parties is to ascertain the identity of the SIEV and its purpose for sailing towards Australia. When a vessel is identified as a vehicle for people smuggling, the vessel is either escorted to the nearest point of the TS of the country from whence it commenced its voyage,



or alternatively, the personnel are detained for relocation to another destination. At no time are the passengers in the vessel allowed into the Australian migration zone, unless there are extenuating circumstances, such as critical illness or injury. The government's required end-state, is that no person enter the migration zone illegally, and that processing of claims for refugee status occur at a place outside Australia, under the auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).<sup>7</sup> To assist in this process, the government passed legislative amendments to the 1958 Migration Act that excised the offshore territories of Christmas, Cocos and Ashmore Islands, in addition to offshore installations like oilrigs, from the migration zone. Provisions for the relocation to another country, of people apprehended while attempting to enter Australia illegally were also incorporated in these amendments.<sup>8</sup> At the same time and to complement changes to the Migration Act, legislative amendments to the 1999 Border Protection Act were also passed by parliament. Under these changes *'vessels may be prevented from arriving in or removed from Australian territorial waters using "reasonable force" if necessary if suspected of carrying "unlawful" immigrants'*. The amendments also remove the opportunity for asylum seekers to apply for protection visas, as well as introducing mandatory sentencing for those found guilty of people smuggling offences.<sup>9</sup>

The LOSC prescribes the rights of coastal states in offshore areas. For the purpose of dealing with people smugglers, four zones are applicable:

- internal waters,
- the TS,
- the CZ, and
- the high seas (including the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)).<sup>10</sup>

The LOSC states that within internal waters and the TS, a coastal state exercises full sovereignty. In the CZ, the coastal state exercises sovereign rights, and on the high seas, including the EEZ, the coastal state has no sovereign power in relation to immigration or people smuggling. Noting that current operations against people smuggling only occur outside internal waters, this article will only deal with the TS, CZ and high seas.

Subject to Article 17 of the LOSC, *'ships of all states, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the TS'* of

another coastal state. Article 18 goes on to state that such passage shall be *'continuous and expeditious'*. Article 19 places a caveat on the right of innocent passage in so far as, such passage should not *'prejudice the peace, good order or security of a coastal state'*. This article further articulates that a foreign vessel *'loading or unloading any commodity, currency or person contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws of a coastal state'*, would be guilty of such prejudice and would not be complying with the tenets of innocent passage. The right of a coastal state to adopt rules and regulations *'to prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws'* is promulgated in Article 21. In such cases, these rules and regulations require *'due publicity'* and foreign ships exercising innocent passage are required to *'comply with all such rules and regulations'*. The rights of a coastal state are amplified again in Article 25, which allows for the coastal state to *'... take the necessary steps in its TS to prevent passage, which is not innocent'*.<sup>11</sup> Clearly, these provisions within the LOSC, allow Australia to execute the policy amendments that now exist in relation to people smuggling and asylum seekers. The key provisions relate to Australia being able to introduce rules and regulations that prevent infringement of its immigration laws. Additionally, Australia as a coastal state, is permitted to take necessary steps to prevent passage that is not innocent within its TS. The actions of vessels attempting to perpetrate people smuggling offences in the Australian TS are obviously not consistent with innocent passage, giving Australian authorities due cause to intercept and turn these vessels around. Noting that powers of a coastal state are more robust within the TS than further out from the coast, the provisions relating to the CZ will now be examined.

Australian authorities currently plan to intercept SIEV's within the CZ and before they reach the TS. This plan is dependent upon the detection of a vessel of interest and the response time available to the naval or customs vessel in the vicinity of the SIEV. Since introduction of the new legislation, most SIEV's have been intercepted in the CZ, but at least two vessels have penetrated the TS.<sup>12</sup> In terms of a coastal state's rights within the CZ, Article 33 of the LOSC provides that *'... a coastal state may exercise the control necessary to prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration*



or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or TS'. The article also allows a coastal state to 'punish infringement of the above laws and regulations within its territory or TS'. In defining the CZ, the article states that 'the CZ may not extend beyond 24 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of its TS is measured'.<sup>13</sup> Rigid interpretation of this provision shows that Australia, as a coastal state, has the right to exercise control over its 24 nautical mile CZ, for the purpose of preventing infringement of its immigration laws by a foreign ship. By intercepting SIEV's within the CZ, Australian authorities are simply preventing these vessels reaching the TS or migration zone where they would be in contravention of the Migration Act. The actions of Australia in preventing access to the TS and migration zone prevent unnecessary difficulties when asylum seekers come in sight of or land on Australian soil. Having discussed Australia's rights with respect to the areas over which it has sovereignty and sovereign rights respectively, the rights of navigation on the high seas will

now be discussed.

The high seas is defined by Article 86 of the LOSC as 'all parts of the sea that are not included in the EEZ, in the TS or in the internal waters of a state, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic state'. Articles 87 through 90 go on to provide for freedom of navigation on the high seas, the requirement to use the high seas for peaceful purposes and the fact that no state can claim sovereignty over any part of the high seas. Within the convention, there is no provision for the boarding of vessels on the high seas for immigration purposes, however Article 95 does provide for the complete immunity of warships on the high seas from any other state other than the flag state.<sup>14</sup> In the execution of the current policy against people smugglers, there is no contravention of these provisions by Australian authorities in the first instance. Vessels are not boarded for investigation until such a time as they come within the CZ. It is later in the policy execution that some contention arises between the actions of Australia and the LOSC. Once a SIEV has been

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boarded and it has been determined that it is engaged in a people smuggling activity, the preferred option is to escort that vessel back to the Indonesian TS. During these escort operations, a navy security element remains in the SIEV while the warship remains in close company. When the vessels reach a position just outside the Indonesian TS, the security element returns to the warship, while the SIEV is monitored, as it proceeds back to Indonesia. When the warship is satisfied that the SIEV is complying with instructions to return to an Indonesian port, the warship returns to Australian waters.<sup>15</sup> The issue here is that Australian military personnel embark in a foreign vessel during a voyage across the high seas. While these personnel do not assume command of the SIEV at any time, they are there to ensure that it complies with instructions to return to Indonesia, arguably interfering with the vessel's freedom of navigation in accordance with Article 87 of the LOSC. While this type of activity is not provided for in the LOSC, it is possible to justify the presence of a security element by loosely interpreting Article 98 of the LOSC pertaining to a duty to render assistance.

In dealing with this issue of safety of life at sea, Article 98 provides that *'every state shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far as he can do so without serious danger to the ship, or the crew ... to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost'*.<sup>16</sup> While the link may be tenuous, it can be argued that the security element from the warship is rendering assistance to the crew and passengers of the SIEV. This line of argument can be annunciated in two ways. First, that the security element is rendering assistance to the crew, in that the lives of the crew could be in serious danger from the passengers, if the security element was to leave the vessel.<sup>17</sup> Second, rendering assistance to everyone onboard the SIEV can be argued, noting the propensity for asylum seekers to inflict damage to both themselves and the SIEV itself. Indeed, in November 2001, two female asylum seekers drowned after the SIEV they were travelling in was set on fire and sunk by fellow asylum seekers.<sup>18</sup> This type of desperate action by asylum seekers is designed to circumvent Australian policy in the hope that they will be allowed entry into the country. As already stated, this argument is tenuous at best, but represents the only avenue to justify Australian actions in these instances. In short, Australian

actions on the high seas in these circumstances are not provided for in the LOSC and this represents a possible legal impediment to current operations. To fully assess the Australian policy towards people smuggling however, it is necessary to address it in terms of the RC.

### Australian Policy and the Refugee Convention

The RC which was agreed in 1951 and entered into force in 1954, defines a refugee as a person who has

*... a well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence ... is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.*<sup>19</sup>

Recognising a person as a refugee affords that person certain rights within a country that is a signatory to the convention. Determining the refugee status of a person, requires an objective assessment of that person in accordance with guidelines and processes provided for in the RC. Until such an assessment has been made, a person is not deemed to be a refugee under the RC or the 1958 Migration Act. Rather, terms such as 'asylum seeker', 'illegal immigrant' and 'unlawful non-citizen' are used.<sup>20</sup> Australia's current policy entails the processing of asylum seekers in other countries, in cooperation with the governments of those countries and the UNHCR. By stopping asylum seekers entering the migration zone of Australia, the government is not bound to provide social services required by the RC, by virtue of the fact that the asylum seekers have not yet been classified as refugees. By addressing the people smuggling issue in this way, Australia has not contravened the definition of the term refugee, simply because that term is not applied to a person inside Australia. Their legal status is defined in a third country and appropriate action is taken from the time the definition is applied or otherwise. Despite this fact, there are two additional articles within the RC that bear looking at in terms of Australia's current policy.

Article 31 of the RC provides that

*... contracting states shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or*



*presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened ... enter or are present in their territory without authorisation.*<sup>21</sup>

It can be argued that Australia is in contravention of this article, due to the fact that denying entry to Australia and detaining people for processing in a third country, can be perceived as imposing a penalty.<sup>22</sup> Despite the fact that no determination is made on the status of asylum seekers until a later point in time, this argument does appear to be flawed. By conducting itself in this way, Australia is merely relieving itself of the possibility of accepting refugees that arrive illegally or 'queue jump'. Additionally, detention of people in a camp where processing occurs, is a logical step in preserving the integrity and security of the nation in which the processing is taking place. Before allowing asylum seekers the privileges afforded to refugees, their movement is controlled while their claims are processed. In terms of removing asylum seekers to a third country, it is necessary to now look at the way the RC deals with returning refugees to another country.

The obligation of states not to return a refugee, in any manner whatsoever, to a country where his or her life or freedom would be threatened lies at the heart of Article 33 of the RC, and is also known as refoulment.<sup>23</sup> While many commentators look on the Australian policy as breaching this article, in terms of closing borders to entry, mandatory detention for processing and escorting SIEV's back to Indonesian waters,<sup>24</sup> strict interpretation of the article indicates that this is not the case. The vast majority of asylum seekers attempting to enter Australia, are from the strife-ridden Middle East and have no immediate neighbours in this region. The Australian government has adopted the position that there is no chance of their lives being in danger, either by being returned to Indonesia, or by being held in a third country as part of the Pacific solution.<sup>25</sup> On the surface, this appears to be a valid assumption and there has certainly been no documented evidence, of an asylum seeker being placed in danger when turned away from Australia.

### Conclusion

In the current strategic environment of uncertainty, Australia has made a decision to close its maritime borders to unauthorised persons arriving by sea. These people generally

arrive by way of Indonesian vessels organised by people smuggling syndicates. Australia's decision is consistent with concern over the growth of transnational crime, and is designed to defeat people smugglers who operated with impunity throughout the 1990's. This strategy against people smugglers entails the prevention of asylum seekers reaching Australian territorial waters, by way of naval and customs interception within the Australian CZ. Asylum seekers are then directed back to Indonesia, or relocated to a third country for processing of their application for refugee status. While there are arguments against this policy stance on the grounds of morality, a study of the LOSC and the RC needs to be conducted to ascertain the legality of the Australian position.

The LOSC allows Australia to exercise sovereignty over its internal waters and TS. Additionally, it allows Australia to exercise sovereign rights over its CZ in order to protect the infringement of immigration laws. Asylum seekers entering Australia by boat are clearly breaching immigration laws and circumventing the formal application process for entering the country, by providing payment to people smugglers. The policy does not breach the LOSC, as Australia is merely exercising its sovereign rights for the purpose of stopping people smugglers. Although there is an issue with Australian military personnel maintaining security onboard SIEV's on the high seas, while on transit back to Indonesia, this point can be argued in terms of assisting with the preservation of life at sea. Furthermore, strict interpretation of the RC shows that the Australian government does not breach this convention either. In order for refugee privileges to be granted to an asylum seeker, that person must first go through a process that defines them as a refugee. Australia has adopted a position whereby that classification process is to occur outside Australia. Once a person has been classified as a refugee then Australia recognises that classification as a signatory to the convention. While the issue of asylum seekers is emotive within Australia and sound moral arguments can be made against the Australian policy, it is clear that the LOSC and the RC provide no significant impediment to Australia's war on people smuggling.

### About the Author

*Commander Burleigh joined the RAN as a seaman officer in 1984. A Principle Warfare*



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<sup>1</sup> South Asian Human Rights Documentation Center, *Legislating for Exclusion: Australia's Flight from the Refugee Convention*, The Daily Star Internet Edition, Issue Number 26, 2002, p. 1.

<http://www.dailystarnews.com/law/200201/03/>

<sup>2</sup> M Uricher, *Asylum Seekers in Germany and Australia: Policies, Politics and Polemics*, Speech to the Goethe Institut Sydney 4 March 2002.

<http://www.goethe.de/an/syd/enpurich.htm>, 12 September 2002.

<sup>3</sup> F Brennan, *Developing Just Refugee Policies in Australia: Local, National and International Concerns*, Speech at the University of Sydney, 7 August 2002.

URL:[http://www.media.usyd.edu.au/speeches/2002/brennan\\_print.html](http://www.media.usyd.edu.au/speeches/2002/brennan_print.html), 12 September 2002.

<sup>4</sup> Personal opinion of author based on readings containing significant attention on humanitarian issues. While these humanitarian views are certainly relevant, they should not be allowed to cloud the legal imperatives derived from the principal conventions of LOSC and RC.

<sup>5</sup> Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Information Paper, *Excised Offshore Places (Migration Zone Changes)*, 2002, p. 1.

<http://www.immi.gov.au/illegals/uad/03.htm>

<sup>6</sup> *Macquarie Dictionary*, Sydney, 1988, p. 939.

<sup>7</sup> Based on government instructions in the planning and conduct of anti-people smuggling operations in Northern Australia and Christmas Island.

<sup>8</sup> *Excised Offshore Places (Migration Zone Changes)*, pp. 1-2.

<sup>9</sup> *Legislating for Exclusion: Australia's Flight from the Refugee Convention*, pp. 2-3.

<sup>10</sup> DJ Chessum, *The Impact of International Conventions on Efforts to Address People Smuggling into Australia*, 2001, p. 2.

[http://www.navy.mil.nz/rnzn/article.cfm?article\\_id=967&article\\_type=discuss](http://www.navy.mil.nz/rnzn/article.cfm?article_id=967&article_type=discuss)

<sup>11</sup> United Nations, *The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982*, New York, 1997, pp. 26-29.

<sup>12</sup> One SIEV actually ran aground on Ashmore Reef in October 2001 after implementation of the new legislation.

<sup>13</sup> *The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea*, pp. 31-32.

<sup>14</sup> *ibid*, pp. 53-56.

<sup>15</sup> Standard escort procedures being used by Australian warships in the operation to counter people smuggling.

<sup>16</sup> *The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea*, p. 56.

<sup>17</sup> Personal experience has shown that asylum seekers become very angry and potentially violent with the crew of a SIEV, if they perceive that they are not getting what they want.

<sup>18</sup> C Sidoti, *Refugee Policy: Is There a Way out of this Mess?*, Speech to Racial Respect Seminar, Canberra, 2002, p. 3.

<http://www.hrea.org.au/refugees.htm>.

<sup>19</sup> Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, *United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees*, Geneva, 1951, p. 2.

[http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/o\\_c\\_ref.htm](http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/o_c_ref.htm), 11 September 2002.

<sup>20</sup> *Excised Offshore Places (Migration Zone Changes)*, p. 2.

<sup>21</sup> *United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugee*, p. 10.

<sup>22</sup> Human Rights Watch, *Background: Refugee Convention Violations*, 2001, p. 1.

<http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/12/refconbg1211.htm>

<sup>23</sup> *ibid*.

<sup>24</sup> *ibid*.

<sup>25</sup> *Excised Offshore Places (Migration Zone Changes)*, p. 1.



## Australian Naval Medicine and the Boxer Uprising 1900-01

By Commander Neil Westphalen, RAN



Boxer Area of Operations, 1900-01 (Author )

The Boxer Uprising began for the foreign legations (embassies) at Peking on 20 June 1900, when they came under siege by a secret society with the covert support of the Chinese government. Allied reinforcements at Tsientin were also trapped until they were relieved by 20,000 men on 13 July, and, when it became known that the legations were still (just) holding out, they were relieved on 14 August. The siege received the Hollywood treatment in the film *57 Days at Peking*.

The Australian colonial response to a British request for assistance led to the departure of HM Ships *Mohawk*, *Lizard* and *Wallaroo* from Sydney for China on 2 July.<sup>1</sup> Midshipman A.L. Fletcher left his impressions of the RN medical branch at the time

*The surgeons were about 75 per cent ex-Trinity College, Dublin, 20 per cent Scottish universities and the odd 5 per cent English. Perfect dears but very thirsty when young. Their medicine may have been crude but they knew a lot about malaria and VD.*

*My chief memories of the sick bay were No 9 pills, almost atomic in action, for internal disorders, santonin for worms - very prevalent in the East - and vats of zinc ointment for everything else.<sup>2</sup>*

The British also accepted 200 Victorian and 250 NSW sailors for service ashore, plus the South Australian gunboat *Protector*. However, all three contingents were delayed by pay wrangles and this cost them any chance of seeing action. This article describes some of the medical aspects of these deployments.

### ***Protector's* Deployment**

Five days after requesting clothing allowances for *Protector's* crew, her commanding officer Captain C.J. Clare added 'A doctor may also require an allowance for uniform when appointed. Will the Hon the Chief Secretary please approve this slight alteration if required.'<sup>3</sup> As a result, Dr Bedlington Howel Morris was the last member to be appointed to the ship. Born in Wales in 1868, he had



graduated from Durham University in 1893 and migrated to Adelaide in 1896.<sup>4</sup> His daughter-in-law recalled him as a charming, upright, straightforward man, who loved burlesques.<sup>5</sup> Founder of the RAN Captain William Creswell later wrote '...Surgeon Morris, to whom the success of the expedition owed much, quite the ideal man for the work under such temporary conditions, and earned the confidence and regard of all on board.'<sup>6</sup>

Morris arrived in time to generate a bill for

wrote:

*Sir Edward Seymour plied me with questions, asked and noted many details and particulars of the ship.*

*And how many sick do you have?*

*None sir, the fact is there's nowhere to put them.*

*I told him of our gruelling trip to Hong Kong. Well if you have no sick, I'm hanged if I see why anybody else should have any sick.*

*I learned later that a battleship anxious for a run to Japan had submitted a big sick list in support of her request.<sup>11</sup>*

In the event, apart from mine clearance duties, *Protector* spent most of her time in China carrying dispatches.<sup>12</sup> Captain J.R. Jellicoe (later commander of the Grand Fleet at Jutland) complimented *Protector* that she was *never sick or sorry, and always ready for a job of work.*<sup>13</sup> *Protector* was released on 2 November and, after stopping in Sydney to celebrate the new Commonwealth of Australia,

she returned home on 6 January 1901. The *Adelaide Register* recorded the following excerpt from an interview with Captain Clare on her return

*[Q]: What has been the general impression concerning the men? [Clare]: Throughout I may say the opinion expressed has been complementary. It is interesting to know that ours was the most healthy ship on the station. While nearly every man-of-war had 15 to 20 percent sick, our sick-list was practically nil, with the exception of a few cases of influenza.<sup>14</sup>*

In 1900 the Victorian Navy had five part-time surgeons, including Staff Surgeon Charles Alfred Stewart. Born in Hobart in 1855,<sup>15</sup> Stewart had qualified in 1879<sup>16</sup> and became Principal Medical Officer (PMO) to the Victorian Navy in 1885.<sup>17</sup> He was paid £383 5s. 0d. per annum plus imperial pay rates and 4s. 4d. per day field allowance in China,<sup>18</sup> compared to his usual rate of £41 13s. 4d. per



HMCS Protector, c1900 (B18116, permission Mortlock Library of SA)

£7 13s 2d from F.H. Fauldings<sup>7</sup> before *Protector* left Adelaide on 6 August.<sup>8</sup> On arrival at Sydney on 10 August, Morris expended another £74 17s 1d on medical stores.<sup>9</sup> Creswell joined four days later in Brisbane and *Protector* reached Hong Kong on 9 September, after a horrendous voyage at the height of the typhoon season. En route Creswell drilled his crew hard and 'Our Correspondent' for the *Herald* (not identified) wrote

*...the port watch were given an hour's lecture on 'First Aid' by Doctor Morris, who is interesting, instructive and amusing at the same time. Imaginary limbs were bound up, arteries and veins stopped from bleeding, until some advanced pupils began to handle bandages and tourniquets as if they wished for a real subject on whom to show their efficiency.<sup>10</sup>*

*Protector* arrived at Wei-hai-wei on 30 September, where Creswell was interviewed by Vice Admiral Seymour. In 1924 Creswell



month.<sup>19</sup> He conducted all the medicals for the Victorian contingent, aided by Sick Berth Steward<sup>20</sup> (SBS) William Stanley Patchett. Born in 1870, Patchett was a permanent member of the Victorian Navy and had only recently married.<sup>21</sup>

Most NSW officers were commissioned reservists with little seagoing experience, while the Victorians had mainly ex-sailor Warrant Officers. In 1900 the NSW naval forces had seven part-time medical officers, led by Fleet Surgeon<sup>22</sup> Thomas Knaggs, who had introduced St John first aid training to Australia in 1881. This pre-empted the first official Australian St John organisation (formed in 1883 in Melbourne).<sup>23</sup>

Slow recruiting for China led to numbers being made up by 24 men who were originally going to South Africa. These men became the NSW Marine Light Infantry (NSWMLI), the only Australian Marine force in its history. The contingent also included an 18-man Ambulance Party led by Staff Surgeon John James Steel,<sup>24</sup> which had been raised at Newcastle in 1896.<sup>25</sup> Born in Scotland in 1855, Steel was educated in Sydney, Edinburgh and Paris before qualifying in 1878.<sup>26</sup> He rapidly acquired an extensive practice in Sydney<sup>27</sup> and was appointed into the NSW Naval Brigade in 1896.<sup>28</sup> A widower with one daughter, he was proficient in languages and a student of Shakespeare. He received £500 pa for his China service.<sup>29</sup>

The medicals were performed  
... with wonderful celerity and tact by Staff Surgeon S.T. Knaggs, VD, Staff Surgeon J.J. Steel and Surgeon G.L. O'Neill. The men were admitted to the offices by squads and then subjected to several tests. At the outset the volunteer had to pass the sight test - reading different sized capital letters backwards and vice versa with two eyes and then with a single orbit at a distance of seven or eight paces. He was then ordered to strip to the waist, when he was well

sounded and critically inspected and his height and weight were taken. As was anticipated the percentage of "rejects" was exceedingly small - a sure proof of the stamina of the men comprising the naval forces.<sup>30</sup>

It seems the pass rate was improved by only examining the candidates from the waist up. There was however

*One poor fellow who was desperately anxious to get away, and who looked strong and fit for anything, burst out crying so great was his disappointment at being refused. He pleaded with the two doctors, but whilst they were sympathetic, they were implacable.*<sup>31</sup>

The transport *Salamis* sailed on 8 August, after her civilian Chief Steward shot himself and a sailor fractured his ankle falling off a tram.<sup>32</sup> Just prior to sailing lymph was obtained for



*Salamis* departing Woolloomoolloo wharf, 8 August 1900 (AWM A05042)

smallpox vaccinations,<sup>33</sup> a NSWMLI member was landed ill<sup>34</sup> and it was found Steel's name was omitted from the list of personnel receiving field allowance.<sup>35</sup> One wonders how long it took Steel to receive his money.

The voyage north had the Ambulance Party performing vaccinations while exercising both bandaging and cutlasses (reflecting their somewhat ambivalent role prior to the 1907 Hague Convention).<sup>36</sup> Second-in-command of the NSW contingent, Commander Edward Connor, wrote of many men feeling side



effects<sup>37</sup> and also referred to 'one poor chap with a nasty haemorrhage of the lungs.'<sup>38</sup> Despite the allegedly 'rigorous' examinations, four men from the NSW Contingent were invalided home from Hong Kong.<sup>39</sup>

*Salamis* arrived at Taku on 9 September<sup>40</sup> and on 15 September the Australians moved to Tsientin, where 300 men began a forced march to attack a fort. Lieutenant H.E. Lofts NSWMLI wrote

*The water was from a village moat and very dirty. Fuel to boil it was from thatch, even so tea was good, although we had been forbidden from bringing mess tins we had to find tins thrown away by some Russians to boil it in. None that I know of except the Doctor [probably Stewart] got dysentery.*<sup>41</sup>

As men fell out with exhaustion and sunstroke, Steel was at their side, bringing in four stragglers overnight before collapsing himself. He was carried unconscious back to Tsientin and returned to camp three days later to an enthusiastic ovation.<sup>42</sup> As the remaining Australians camped near a swamp, 25% soon developed dysentery, influenza, 'fever' and 'ague'.<sup>43</sup> Most were evacuated to the British hospital at Wei-hai-wei, but on 6 October Pte T.J. Rogers NSWMLI died of influenza. He had almost been sent home from Hong Kong with rheumatic fever 'but ... was given the benefit of the doubt'.<sup>44</sup>

Both contingents were assigned to attack Pao-ting fu city (population 200,000), before taking up winter garrison duties at Peking. However the NSW Contingent was ordered directly to Peking and they left Tsientin on 10 October. The move included 20 sick, while another nine MLI personnel were left behind due to illness. The latter arrived 'scarcely able to crawl. They were left behind without anyone to attend to them and without food, but we soon fixed them up as well as our resources permit for we were not very flush with rations.'<sup>45</sup>

The Victorians departed for Pao-ting fu two days later, leaving behind Boy Albert Gibbs, who died of fever aboard the hospital ship *Carthage* on 19 October and was buried at sea. On arrival they were spared laying siege when the city surrendered. Disaster was narrowly averted on the way back when an ammunition junk exploded with over 90 casualties, although no Victorians were hurt.<sup>46</sup> Back at Tsientin they moved into a godown (storehouse) until they left China five months

later.

At Peking the NSW contingent split into three groups for police duties, although 'mission creep' soon had them setting up other municipal authorities. AB J. Hamilton died on 6 November of dysentery,<sup>47</sup> followed four days later by Steel himself. He had been ill since his collapse and Connor wrote on 8 November that *the PMO [Principal Medical Officer] came round and invalided Vine, Conwell and Oliver. Was hoping Steel would go too.*<sup>48</sup> Two days later he wrote 'Poor Steel died this morning! Awful day blowing a gale and oh! so dusty. Rode over to HQ to find out about Police patrol then took Major Nawal St Dula there and lunched with the 1<sup>st</sup> Sikhs. Called on Roberts and came back. Had a yarn with Steel before dining. Germans came over for whist and I went over and read papers which degenerated into a chinwag about Malta. Back at 10 - Passing the Dr's cabin I looked in and saw the bed empty. Not seeing him at the rear I looked in again and saw him lying on his side near the door with his great coat on. I picked him up and found his face quite cold but his hands were warm so he could only have just died. Sent over for Hazleton and the Civil Dr also came up. Took the body over to the hospital.'<sup>49</sup>

Steel was known to be taking a 'sleeping draught' and an inquiry assumed he had accidentally overdosed on chloral hydrate. He was buried at the British Legation<sup>50</sup> and was re-interred in a British cemetery located near the current Beijing Hotel. His burial records were lost during the 1968 Cultural Revolution.<sup>51</sup>

Lofts wrote of the revised medical arrangements for the NSW Contingent

*A small party of ambulance men, mostly enthusiastic young fellows from St John's Association consorted and marched with the Marines. After the death of Surgeon Steele (sic) Captain Moore Indian Medical Service and later Dr Cope a civilian surgeon took over the medical duties but did not leave China with us on our return to Australia.*<sup>52</sup>

The medical inspection of 8 November did not prevent the death of AB Eli Rose from pleurisy on 6 January. On 31 December 14 men were in hospital, including one with smallpox,<sup>53</sup> while two men sent to Wei-hai-wei ended up in Japan.<sup>54</sup> Meanwhile the Victorians sustained



several wounded in scrapes with foreign troops, including AB J. Harding, who sustained sabre wounds from some Germans.<sup>55</sup>

A report in mid-February stated that the health of the contingents was excellent after the smallpox case had been discharged.<sup>56</sup> However, the prospect of relief proved too much for AB Arthur James Bennett, who shot himself on 14 March. A veteran from the 1885 Sudan contingent,<sup>57</sup> his apparent suicide possibly resulted from being demoted, after assaulting CPO J.G. Sparkes while drunk.<sup>58</sup>

The Australians were relieved on 23 March and left China aboard the transport *Chingtu* on 5 April. On the way home Stewart diagnosed Cpl Thomas Symonds NSWMLI with chickenpox, but the ship was quarantined on arrival in Sydney on 25 April when the quarantine MO confirmed he actually had smallpox. Although Symonds recovered Pte Charles Smart NSWMLI died of smallpox instead.<sup>59</sup> The Victorians boarded a train for Melbourne on 3 May, where those whose vaccination status was in doubt had another enforced holiday at the Portsea quarantine station.<sup>60</sup>

### Aftermaths

Stewart was promoted to Fleet Surgeon in 1901 and retired in 1905.<sup>61</sup> Patchett transferred to the Commonwealth Naval Forces and was court martialled in 1906, *after* being dismissed from the navy for prejudicial conduct. He appealed, requesting either an impartial review or a court martial and received two letters; one refused both requests and the other granting the court martial. The court martial found him guilty and he was sentenced to be discharged anyway!<sup>62</sup> He died in 1949 and was buried in the Cheltenham New Cemetery.<sup>63</sup>

LS Connor served in the Boer War and in WWI. AB Field also served in France, and his China Medal is at the Australian War Memorial. AB C.A. McDonald served during WWI with the Army in Australia, AB Pascoe served in France, and AB Whitelaw served with the RAN Bridging Train.<sup>64</sup> AB Hidden served with the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force to New Guinea, and later also went to France.<sup>65</sup>

Morris was promoted to Fleet Surgeon in the Royal Australian Naval Brigade (later the RAN Reserve) in 1910,<sup>66</sup> retired from the RANR in 1924 and died in 1936.<sup>67</sup>

### Conclusion

Although no medical journal appears to have survived, his favourably reported first aid training and lack of illness on board suggests that Morris did well. The fact that the requirement for medical support came late in deployment planning remains a consistent theme today. Other medical themes with the shore contingents include performing pre-deployment medicals en masse at short notice and sustaining the obligatory casualty-on-departure (not to mention MO pay blunders). One can only hope these recurring problems will improve during the next 100 years!

With seven deaths out of 460 men in six months (30 deaths/1000 men per annum), the Australian shore mortality rate greatly exceeded the 5.4 deaths/1000 men experienced by the RN in 1899, or even the 7.2 deaths/1000 RN personnel in 1900, associated with the Boer War.<sup>68</sup> By comparison, Australia lost only 11.7 deaths from illness/1000 men per annum in South Africa.<sup>69</sup> Of the seven deaths, one may have been prevented if he had been sent home, while another may have been prevented by an effective smallpox vaccine. Steel's death appears to confirm the axiom that the doctor who treats himself has a fool for a patient.

Despite their Ambulance Party, the NSW contingent had six of the seven deaths, as well as 17 invalided home compared to six Victorians.<sup>70</sup> It seems likely that individual sailors, lacking collective training and led by amateurs, did not perform as well as a homogenous group lead by ex-sailor officers. It also seems likely that the Ambulance Party's first aid training was of little use for managing infectious disease, although conditions in China may have created a daunting task for medical personnel whatever their level of expertise.

### About the Author

*Commander Westphalen qualified at Adelaide University in 1985 and joined the RAN as a Medical Officer in 1987. His shore postings have included Cerebrus, Balmoral Naval Hospital and Kuttatubul, as well as two stints as SMO Albatross. Sea Postings have included Swan, Stalwart and Success, participation in Op Damask in Sydney in 1993 and RIMPAC 96 in Perth. He is currently SMO Stirling.*



<sup>1</sup> In addition to the RN ships of the Australia Squadron, the 1888 Naval Agreement gave the colonies partial control of five small cruisers and two gunboats manned and operated by the RN, in exchange for a small colonial subsidy. Besides acting as a reserve, the Auxiliary Squadron was intended to train Australians for naval service. Although this arrangement was never satisfactory for either the Admiralty or the colonies it lasted until the Royal Australian Navy was established in 1911. See Bob Nichols, *Statesmen and Sailors: Australian Naval Defence 1870-1920*, Standard Publishing House, Balmain, 1995.

<sup>2</sup> Quoted in John Wells, *The Royal Navy: An Illustrated Social History 1870-1982*, Bath Press, Avon UK, 1994, p. 57.

<sup>3</sup> 'HMCS Protector and Boxer Rebellion 1900-01', South Australian State Archive file GRG 24/64

<sup>4</sup> *South Australian Government Gazette*, 19 November 1896.

<sup>5</sup> Interview Mrs Dulcie Morris (daughter-in-law) 9 Feb 01.

<sup>6</sup> 'Our First Australian Warship - Story of the Protector - Interesting Reminiscences by Admiral Sir William Creswell.' *The Register*, Adelaide, 21 June 1924, p. 9; quoted in Bob Nichols, *Bluejackets and Boxers: Australia's Naval Expedition to the Boxer Uprising*, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1986.

<sup>7</sup> A century later, Fauldings is the current contractor for supplying pharmaceuticals to ADF health facilities throughout Australia.

<sup>8</sup> 'HMCS Protector and Boxer Rebellion 1900-01',

<sup>9</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>10</sup> Quoted in Nichols, *Bluejackets and Boxers*.

<sup>11</sup> 'Our First Australian Warship' p. 10.

<sup>12</sup> Australian War Memorial 3DRL 2246 'Copy of Diary of George Frederick Jeffery on the expedition of the HMCS Protector to the Boxer Rebellion, China'.

<sup>13</sup> Quoted in Colin Jones, *Australian Colonial Navies*, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1986, p. 127.

<sup>14</sup> *The Register*, Adelaide, 7 January 1901, p. 6; quoted in Nichols, *Bluejackets and Boxers*.

<sup>15</sup> C Corfield, *The Australian Illustrated History of the Boxer Uprising*, Slouch Hat Publications, Rosebud 2001, p. 224.

<sup>16</sup> J.J. Atkinson, *Australian Contingents to the China Field Force 1900-1901*, NSW Military Historical Society, Clarendon Press, Sydney, August 1976, p. 48.

<sup>17</sup> L Bruck, *The Australasian Medical Directory and Handbook*, (5<sup>th</sup> edition), Balliere, Tindal, London, August 1900.

<sup>18</sup> NSW Colonial Secretary In-Letter 5/6559 16083 dated 30 July 1900.

<sup>19</sup> Australian War Memorial 1 Item 2/3 - Finance Records, Victorian Naval Contingent, 1900-01.

<sup>20</sup> The rate of Sick Berth Steward was changed to Sick Bay Attendant (SBA) in 1920. The RAN changed from SBA to MED (Medical) in the early 1970's.

<sup>21</sup> A.M. Smith, *Carving Up the Melon: Australians in the Boxer Rebellion, China 1900-1901*, Mostly Unsung Military History Research and Publications, Melbourne, 2000, p. 65.

<sup>22</sup> The rank of Fleet Surgeon was changed to Surgeon Commander in 1920.

<sup>23</sup> Ian Howie-Willis, *A Century for Australia: St John Ambulance in Australia 1883-1983*, Brown Prior Anderson, Canberra, 1983, p. 170.

<sup>24</sup> NSW Colonial Secretary In-Letter 5/6559 16083 dated 30 July 1900.

<sup>25</sup> NSW Colonial Secretary In-Letter 5/6549 11223 dated 29 May 1900.

<sup>26</sup> 'The Late Staff-Surgeon Steel of the New South Wales Naval Forces' *The Australasian Medical Gazette*, 20 November 1900, p. 488.

<sup>27</sup> Bruck, *The Australasian Medical Directory and Handbook*.

<sup>28</sup> W Grainger (ed), *NSW Army and Navy List*, Corrected to 15 Oct 1900, Government Printer, Sydney 1900, p. 159.

<sup>29</sup> NSW Colonial Secretary In-Letter 5/6559 16083 dated 30 July 1900.

<sup>30</sup> *Sydney Morning Herald* 30 July 1900 p. 7.

<sup>31</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> Nicholls, *Bluejackets and Boxers*, pp. 46-48.

<sup>33</sup> C.E. Murnin, *Diary of Midshipman C.E. Murnin NSW Naval Brigade on Service in China, from 7th August 1900 to 2nd May 1901*. Typewritten photocopy held by Naval Historical Society, Sydney, p. 1.

<sup>34</sup> *Sydney Morning Herald* 7 August 1900, p. 5.

<sup>35</sup> NSW Colonial Secretary In-Letter 5/6559 16363 dated 8 August 1900.

<sup>36</sup> Murnin, *Diary of Midshipman C.E. Murnin*, p. 1.

<sup>37</sup> E.R Connor, Photocopy of handwritten diary held by Naval Historical Society, Sydney, entry dated 18 August 1900.

<sup>38</sup> *ibid.*, entry dated 19 August 1900.

<sup>39</sup> *Sydney Morning Herald* 2 October 1900, p. 5.

<sup>40</sup> *Sydney Morning Herald* 18 October 1900, p. 5.

<sup>41</sup> Australian War Memorial file DRL 2180.

<sup>42</sup> 'The Late Staff-Surgeon Steel of the New South Wales Naval Forces' p. 488.

<sup>43</sup> Connor, entry dated 5 October 1900.

<sup>44</sup> *Sydney Morning Herald* 21 November 1900, p. 7.

<sup>45</sup> Quoted in Nicholls, *Bluejackets and Boxers*, p. 85. (Able Seaman Bertotto's diary - private collection).

<sup>46</sup> See W.P. Evans, *Deeds Not Words*, Hawthorn Press, Melbourne, 1971, pp. 91-94.

<sup>47</sup> *Sydney Morning Herald* 7 December 1900, p. 3.

<sup>48</sup> Connor, entry dated 8 November 1900.

<sup>49</sup> *ibid.*, entry dated 10 November 1900.



<sup>50</sup> *Sydney Morning Herald* 26 December 1900, p. 5.

<sup>51</sup> Nicholls, *Bluejackets and Boxers*, p. 97.

<sup>52</sup> Australian War Memorial file DRL 2180.

<sup>53</sup> *Sydney Morning Herald* 15 February 1900, p. 5.

<sup>54</sup> *Sydney Morning Herald* 16 February 1900, p. 5.

<sup>55</sup> Nicholls, *Bluejackets and Boxers*, p. 145.

<sup>56</sup> Quoted in *ibid*, p. 122.

<sup>57</sup> Corfield, *The Australian Illustrated History of the Boxer Uprising*, p. 23.

<sup>58</sup> Nicholls, *Bluejackets and Boxers*, p. 147.

<sup>59</sup> *Sydney Morning Herald* 29 April 1901, p. 7.

<sup>60</sup> Smith, *Carving Up the Melon: Australians in the Boxer Rebellion, China 1900-1901*, p. 30.

<sup>61</sup> Atkinson, *Australian Contingents to the China Field Force 1900-1901*, p. 48.

<sup>62</sup> See Evans, *Deeds Not Words*, pp. 135-144.

<sup>63</sup> Corfield, *The Australian Illustrated History of the Boxer Uprising*, p. 219.

<sup>64</sup> Smith, *Carving Up the Melon*, pp. 46-72.

<sup>65</sup> Atkinson, *Australian Contingents to the China Field Force 1900-1901*.

<sup>66</sup> *RN Navy List*, Sep 1912, p. 590.

<sup>67</sup> J.E. Hughes, *History of the Royal Adelaide Hospital*, Adelaide, 1967 (1982 supplement). On tracing Morris's descendants, the author discovered in January 2001 that he had babysat three of Morris's great-grandchildren when they were living next door to the author's parents in the 1970s!

<sup>68</sup> C Lloyd & J.L.S. Coulter, *Medicine and the Navy 1200-1900*, Vol 4, E&S Livingstone, London 1963, p. 271.

<sup>69</sup> The Australians lost 267 men from illness out of 16,175 sent to South Africa between December 1900 and May 1902; see P Dennis (et al), *The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History*, OUP, Melbourne, 1995, pp. 104-109.

<sup>70</sup> Atkinson, *Australian Contingents to the China Field Force 1900-1901*, pp. 12-18.

**HMAS Anzac providing NGS to allied forces on the southern Al Faw peninsular 21 Mar 03 (RAN)**





## Inaugural Frank Broeze Memorial Lecture

by the Hon Kim C Beazley, MP<sup>1</sup>

At the heart of statecraft lies geopolitical understanding and geostrategy. This is not geographic determinism. Such philosophies, now rightly discredited, lay behind much of the thinking, particularly Axis thinking, which dominated international politics in the first half of last century. Unfortunately those experiences have contributed to an inability among policy-makers and analysts, from many countries including Australia to think through the real meaning of their geographic situation in all its complexities, human, economic, developmental and strategic.

These were problems that never afflicted Frank Broeze's thought; his European background probably helped. Though deeply involved in national, particularly Western Australian life, he retained to the end a detachment that made his perspective on our country unique. He could situate us historically on a broad canvas. He could combine the coldly analytical approach required in geopolitical assessments whilst at the same time bringing a passionate, abundant heart to the foibles, activities and possibilities, prejudices and strengths of the people of his nation of adoption historically and in the here and now.

He wrote massively. There is not a person in this room with a fascination for any branch of history who would not have his or her insights expanded by reference to some part of it. For me, however, it was his capacity as what one Canadian commentator described 'as arguably at the time the world's most substantial maritime historian' that is the moving spirit for my remarks tonight. His book *Island Nation* has its opening part entitled 'Controlling Sea Space: Geopolitics, War and Naval Policy.'

No other history of Australia commences in such definite terms. No other signals that its writer intends to offer his/her view of the dynamic interaction of geography, power and general human experience as the basis of his

interpretation of national history. I intend later to look at one distinct area of national policy - our maritime defence and how it interacts with our general national security, our possibilities for self-reliance and its interaction with others, particularly allies.

Chapter two of Frank's book, though I disagree with some of its conclusions, is for me the best starting point. You could not get a better 30-page introduction to the terms and conditions of our survival and how we have handled them than that. I am humbled by Frank's writing. Years ago with a co-author I struggled through a book on the dynamics of Soviet and American naval competition in the Indian Ocean. I was taken aback during the last election campaign when having a cup of coffee in Sydney's Glebe Point Road to have a bloke bolt across the street from a tenth hand book store with a copy for me to sign. I was never more taken aback when reading for this lecture to come across a short article on Indian Ocean geopolitics written by Frank five years ago that contained more clarity and insight in a short piece than I had managed to labour at length to produce. It will remain one of the abiding tragedies of Frank's death that the history of the Pacific on which he was working will not be produced by his hand and his mind. Stuart MacIntyre described *Island Nation* in a delightful phrase as our first 'fully amphibious account' of Australia. The Pacific story deserved at least as much.

Frank's charge against Australian historical writing and national policy alike was that it was 'continentalist' and therefore incomplete.

*Images and perceptions of national identity have revolved largely around inward looking and often racist concepts of 'continental' Australia in which the sea was seen as a force shutting out unwanted institutions.* He goes on 'This exclusive focus on land not only runs diametrically against Australia's physical existence as an island ... surrounded by a vast ring of sea space, but also contradicts the profound

<sup>1</sup> This is an edited version of the lecture presented at the University of Western Australia on 13 September 2002.



*experience of the country's involvement with the sea in history, heritage and social life.'*

This continentalist outlook did not deprive our decision-makers of any interest in the sea, far from it. The defensive and incomplete character of that focus however diminished the rigour with which we analysed our own diplomatic, defence and economic requirements and rendered us naïve and I would add, lazy, in assessing both our own obligations and the actions and directions of our allies, essentially over the last century British and Americans.

Frank perceived us as having made a decisive break with this in the 1980s. Though he quarrelled with some aspects of the then government's policy he praised it for

*adopting a new strategic concept, somewhere halfway, between forward deployment and 'fortress Australia' and based on control of Australia's maritime approaches towards the north and west. The protection of Australia's overseas trade and the development of the mineral resources of the Pilbara and Timor Sea contributed considerably to that reorientation.*

Later he wrote

*With the gradual decline in the political and economic significance of both Britain and America, it is within the confines of that essentially maritime region that Australia has had to redefine its international position, identity and security. Defence policy has increasingly been focussed on maritime capability ... In the process finally but inevitably, defence strategy has also been geographically reoriented towards the continent's western and northern coasts and away from the penguins of Antarctica and the comforts of the boomerang coast.*

Lovely expression that - boomerang coast - the coastal zone between Brisbane and Adelaide.

It should be clearly understood that maritime defence is not a navy preserve. Sub-surface, surface and air threats for a country like Australia are a direct air force interest. Likewise for both the Australian littoral and the littoral in our area of immediate strategic interest in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific army amphibious capabilities are clearly important. The outcome in East Timor is clear enough demonstration of that.

Furthermore the revolution in military affairs of the last 15 years with its focus on the notion of battlespace is bringing the land and maritime environments closer together. This technological revolution is as much about platforms for enhanced command, control, communications, computers, and broad area surveillance as it is about precision-guided weapons. Nevertheless a naval platform endures. It is flexible in where it can be situated and with its submarine component it is capable of long distance, long-term placement in effectively any maritime and air-threat environment. It would require a Castro-like effort on my part to handle all force elements. Fortunately for you, I don't endure and therefore you don't have to.

I will concentrate on the navy. Until the 1980's I argue our geostrategic outlook distorted the development of a balanced naval force capable of dealing with Australia's needs and interests. Whilst no sensible analysis of our hundred year's history would suggest that discarding relationships with our British and American allies or not building relationships with like minded countries in our region would have advanced our security and better ensured our national survival (particularly in 1942) a naïve approach to the allied comfort zone left us impaired. We are indeed a lucky country to have survived our mistakes.

Allied connections need not have imposed wrong priorities on our force structure or caused us to dangerously ignore essential elements of a balanced defence, but they did. Even when resources in absolute terms have been adequate for a reasonably planned defence, the tug of ancient misperceptions drag us constantly away. Our allies are attractive, our legacy of human endeavour in war so rich that keeping us focused on a disciplined national strategy and associated military strategy is like bathing a cat.

As I look at Senator Hill's statement last week about further changes to our already highly questionable capacity to fund the enhanced ambitions of the last two Defence White Papers, based on our experiences in Timor and Afghanistan, I feel like reaching for the nearest moggy. We have been able to do those deployments with difficulty but adequately from our existing force structure. We've kept our allies happy but I wonder if we take this further to major force structure



changes what will start to fall between the cracks?

Well, probably the Navy again. We all play lip service to the maritime orientation of our defence structure and there really is something in it for every Service. However, if the Navy is at the heart of it, it is not at the forefront of our minds. Years ago, when we did the 1987 White Paper, Defence polled the public about their understanding of defence matters. ANOP asked which Services came to the public mind: 53% said army, 27% said air force, 16% said Navy. I've not seen a poll before or since that shifts those figures around more than a few percentage points. It seems that the value of the Navy being able to operate out of sight has the contrary effect of also being out of mind.

In this regard I would like to look briefly at a current naval deployment which I was privileged to share a day or so with onboard HMAS *Arunta* a couple of months ago. I want to look at it from the point of view of its achievements, but also from the point of its value to the core tasks of the navy closer to home, any lessons on its impact on our principle alliance and illustrative points on its relationship to the Navy's force structure. After that I want to return to the differences between our historical experience up to the 1980s and our capacity since to sustain a self-reliant strategy with important allied relationships intact.

Largely unnoticed by the Australian public the Royal Australian Navy this year has conducted a classic naval blockade at the head of the Persian Gulf enforcing UN mandated sanctions on Iraq. Australian ships have been involved on and off for a decade, but this year Australia has assumed command of this operation to relieve pressure on a US military focused on Afghanistan. It is commanded by Captain Peter Sinclair who operates with his staff mainly from an *Arleigh Burke* class guided missile destroyer. The other direct Australian contribution at the moment are HMA Ships *Arunta* and *Melbourne*. A porous operation for some years has tightened up.

Large numbers of frustrated smugglers are locked up for weeks in Iraqi waterways unable to move their illicit cargoes, particularly oil, without being forced back or if they are on large ships seized and their oil confiscated. This year several thousand ships have been interrogated: close to 400 boarded with about half of them found to be in breach of the UN

sanctions regime. A smuggling operation which has hitherto netted Saddam Hussein about \$1 billion a year has seen its Gulf leg dry up. The success this year has been based on the willingness of the Australians and others under Australian command to undertake what are termed non-compliant boardings.

That much is known to diligent followers of the odd flash about the Navy in the Australian media. What is not known is how complex this operation is and how taxing it is on the crews. In the first instance this is a multilateral exercise with Captain Sinclair obliged to coordinate a variety of ships and patrol boats from the US, UK, Kuwait, UAE, Argentina, the Netherlands and New Zealand. The capabilities tend to be specialised to particular areas. In addition, contact must be maintained with Iranian naval elements in the vicinity from both its regular fleet and the Revolutionary Guards element. Smugglers trying to escape Australian and other ships in international waters frequently slip into Iranian territorial waters.

The task group has access to American surveillance information and the product of the USS *Hopper*'s aegis system for which to say the least, Captain Sinclair's command team have developed an affectionate regard. Literally thousands of ships ply the Gulf from supertankers to a multitude of traditional dhows. Precision on potential smugglers is a difficult interpretive task. In mid-summer the temperatures even at sea are often 50 degrees centigrade. Crews work 5 and 7 hour shifts with equivalent breaks seven days a week throughout most of the deployment. Interception of non-compliant vessels is done by crews from ships boats, heavily tooled up and with the task of getting through barbed wire on the rails and bolted and welded iron hatches on bridges and holds. There is a cheerful excitement about the boats crews which is just as well because some breakouts have been attempted which require them to operate non-stop. I was luxuriously put up in the sick bay but could hear the boat above me being continuously launched and recovered all night.

There have been complaints but no resistance from the Iraqi government. Nevertheless the ships must be prepared for a hostile environment. The charts I looked at for the shallow draft Australian frigates operating close to the mouth of the Iraqi waterways



contained warning that the waters were mined. Outdated said the Captain - the American's have cleared it. Nevertheless at the back of everyone's mind must be the fact that the only maritime success enjoyed by Iraq in the Kuwait war were the mining of a cruiser and a helicopter carrier. They were not sunk but were taken out of the line - a reasonable outcome for \$30,000 worth of mines. The ships must also bear in mind the presence of Iraqi shore missile batteries. In addition crews have to be alert to September 11 type aircraft activity, if not air force activity and, with the thousands of dhows in the Gulf, a USS *Cole* type boat assault. This is a constabulary operation but in an environment in which a full suite of war threats must be prepared for and the capabilities to detect such threats and respond to them exercised. It is a compliment to the RAN that the USN is prepared to see it assigned tactical command in such an environment and make its assets available.

For the purposes of this lecture, what can we discern from this? Firstly Australian warships incorporated in our order of battle when our force structure was planned around a capacity to control Australia's maritime approaches and play a role in our area of immediate strategic interest are fully capable of meeting a government decision that we should contribute to a UN task well outside it. Secondly the ships so designed with minimal adjustment are capable of fitting into a US operational arrangement. Further evidence that self-reliance need not contradict an alliance commitment. Thirdly in performing their constabulary tasks the naval personnel concerned do not see their warfighting skills unexercised or diminished. The same cannot be said for those obliged to operate border patrols to our north under Operation Relex where months are spent on simple and boring tasks that should be in the hands of a coast guard.

However, the presence of the American guided missile destroyer brought other things to mind more directly related to the capacity for things to start to fall between the cracks as strategic discipline is modified and other tasks are added. If the Government decides to rebadge their operation in the event of an escalation of the conflict with Iraq, the current generation of Australian frigates will not be able to contribute at quite the same level as the frigates in the Kuwait War of 1990-91. Then

the centrepiece of the Australian contribution was the air defence optimised DDGs with 3D radar supporting their SM1s. They were used as picket boats at gaps in the Zagros mountain wall through which Iraqi air assaults were anticipated. The FFGs have SM1, the *Anzacs* only close range missile defence. Neither has 3D radar. The environment is less threatening now so this may not matter, but it is worth reviewing how we got here.

The 1987 White Paper proposed a surface fleet of 17: 3 DDGs, 6 FFGs, 8 FFHs (*Anzacs*). The first two classes were defined as tier one ships, the *Anzacs* as tier two. The role of the tier one ships was to be able to operate in a hostile environment in the archipelago, the tier two ships to support them in ASW activities at closer choke points. Particular reference was made to what was then seen to be substantial enhancement of submarine capabilities in the region. Not all were happy with the refocused strategy. There was a view in the government of the day that the 1987 White Paper had underplayed operations in the immediate littoral as a strategic requirement that needed to be addressed in the force structure. The 1994 White Paper saw amphibious capabilities added for littoral operations in the archipelago.

The Labor Government acquired two Newport Class LSTs and the Navy did a fine job upgrading their capabilities, whilst journalists and the then Opposition did a superb job of covering the upgrade by claiming the Government had bought even rustier buckets than first thought and this caused a cost blow out. The new capability is considerable. Somewhere along the line however we lost three frigates. By the time of this Government's White Paper a new air-defence frigate was not to be a replacement for the DDG as originally intended but three might come in to replace the 6 FFGs as they start to pay out ten years from now. 17 ships down to 14 down to 11. This may all be acceptable and much greater capabilities are being built into the *Anzacs*. Except of course the *Anzacs* are no longer to have the Seahawk helicopter for the ASW role they were originally designed for. They will embark the SeaSprite, which is optimised for surface attack and surveillance.

The point is however a disciplined public strategic rationale was put in place for the 1987 structure for the surface fleet. It was not complete. It was arguable. It may have been wrong. But we have not had the disciplined



argument for subsequent changes. In tough budgetary times one feels the Navy will struggle to get the case for an air warfare frigate or destroyer accepted in the near future.

I have already discussed the role of the Navy in the redefinition of maritime strategy that occurred in Australia during the 1980s. Its force structure implications were for a balanced navy with a three tiered surface fleet - DDGs, FFGs in tier one, *Anzacs* in tier two patrol boats and mine countermeasures in tier three. In addition the Navy's contribution to maritime strike and long distance surveillance came through submarines. Underway replenishment ships were to sustain two task groups. Amphibious capabilities were weakest though this was subsequently corrected.

Given that allied cooperation with both the US and regional allies was not to be a force structure determinant, confidence was expressed that a force designed to control, or at least deny enemy access to an Australian maritime strategic zone that covers as it does more than 10% of the earth's surface, would have the flexibility to contribute to allied operations were a flag required. There was one qualification here. There would be constant pressure for the platforms to have the communications and information processing capacity to keep up with sophisticated allies. To this point that has proved to be the case. Massive though the USN is, there was a shortage of air defence platforms in the 1990-91 deployments in the Kuwait War which the RAN helped fill. The American enthusiasm for our *Collins* class submarines relates in part to their capacity to operate more effectively in some littoral waters than their nuclear powered submarines. With the striking power of its weapons fit they also augment the SSGN component of the Pacific Fleet by some 20%.

A force so structured was a long time coming. For most of Australian history the consideration of the unique aspects of our strategic environment have been subordinated to the requirement to fit in with an allied effort, first British, then British and American. In part this was based on the hope, often against experience and with an incredible naiveté about allied capacities and intentions - that fitting in would keep them here. Further, that it would keep them here in sufficient force to counter real threats. In part, it was often based on economy. Our government sought a permanent peace dividend.

This did not mean that our unbalanced naval forces played no role in Australia's defence. They were hugely active in all Australian war efforts. In WWII our navy participated in almost all ocean zones of combat. Close to home its effort in the supply and lodgement of troops was massive. We were engaged in many of the household-name naval battles - Coral Sea, Savo, Leyte Gulf. The last great naval battle in world history to date was fought at Leyte Gulf between the Japanese and an allied fleet - allied because despite the USNs massive preponderance, three Australian warships were part of the fleet. The Australian heavy cruiser HMAS *Australia* had the distinction of being the first warship struck by a kamikaze attack. However arguably the operation most damaging to Japanese sea power deployed from Australian soil involved no Australian combat forces at all. That was the campaign engaged from Australian ports by allied submarines, which accounted for more than a third of Japanese shipping losses. Fremantle was the biggest submarine base in the southern hemisphere.

But I will leave it up to Frank Broeze to summarise the geostrategic contribution of Australia to the allied success. He wrote

*Free Australia allowed contact to be maintained between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, which enabled the passage of troop transports and American convoys. On balance, Australia's most important function was probably as an advance base for naval warfare and the reconquest of South East Asia. It provided the indispensable geopolitical defence-in-depth of the Western colonial empires for the building up of the large invasion forces from South East Asia - a function played in the European theatre by Britain itself.*

In the immediate aftermath of the war an economically straightened Chifley Government confronted a region from which the colonial powers were retreating and the Americans moving to a northern Pacific focus. A hybrid maritime strategy emerged with some attention to independent capabilities. But economy and the allied presence at least in the furthest part of a very extensive region of strategic interest kept us heavily focussed on the allies with the hope of drawing them closer. The government's 1947 decision to acquire two carriers was a response to the Navy's desire for an independent capability for



naval operations within the region. They were the centrepiece of what was hoped to be a force equipped with capable surface combatants, minesweepers, logistic and amphibious ships - no submarines and in reality no money. The incoming Menzies Government completely discarded any notion of an independent regional focus and virtually all of what might be seen as a balanced force. In the middle of the Korean War a massive Australian economic peace dividend was achieved. The carrier's role was changed to augment allied anti-Soviet submarine capabilities. The ships that would have left a balanced force were gradually paid out.

For the next thirty years a debate over the relevance of the fixed wing fleet air arm obscured a deeper and more interesting debate over Australian maritime strategy and the right balance of naval forces. Two Strategic Basis Papers of the 1950s present a fascinating contrast - one in 1956 which was approved, another in 1959 which wasn't, but which arguably reflected the true state of defence force thinking and which consequently influenced changes in the 1960s to the Navy's force structure.

The 1956 paper suggested force structure planning could

*reasonably proceed on the basis that Australian forces engaged in operations in conjunction with United Kingdom and United States Forces, in accordance with common treaty obligations, will be supported by nuclear action by the United Kingdom and the United States when circumstances require such support. This is inherent in the SEATO strategic concepts developed to date for the defence of South East Asia in limited war and can be expected similarly to apply in other cases as plans are developed to meet other situations (eg, global war and contingency plans for the defence of Malaya). The form of support might well be making available for service with our forces elements armed with and capable of using nuclear weapons or by making such weapons available to our forces in the field under certain operational circumstances.*

Here a completely unreal picture of our actual geostrategic environment blinded us to forces at work in the real environment, which saw us unprepared for the actual counter-insurgency problems that emerged in Malaya. It did not

anticipate the emergence of Indonesia as a destabilising factor in regional defence calculations. A massive Chinese communist assault did not and was never likely to emerge. Those that did emerge caught us totally unprepared in our force structure planning.

The 1959 paper maintained

*The organisation of our defence must take into consideration two main requirements, viz the retention of non-communist South East Asia in friendly hands, and a future situation where we may be called upon to defend New Guinea or the north western approaches by our independent efforts. As our forces could be reshaped only over a long period of years, they should be designed primarily with the ability to act independently of allies. Such forces could act conjointly with allies in regional defence arrangements. On the other hand, forces shaped solely to act in concert with major allies would not necessarily be capable of an independent role.*

The Cabinet set back the development of Australia's strategic maturity by a decade, minuting 'Cabinet directed attention to the conclusions that the Australian forces should be designed primarily with the ability to act independently of allies. It found difficulty in accepting this conclusion and invited further discussion on the matter.' In the same year 1959, the government accepted a recommendation to disband the fleet air arm. There was no change of strategy implied in this, merely the thought that other cheaper forces such as submarines might make an equal contribution to allied anti-submarine efforts. The carrier was eventually reprieved until the latter years of the Fraser Government.

Despite these twists and turns, the 1960s did see the emergence of a more balanced naval structure. Highly capable surface combatants made a comeback with the acquisition of the DDGs, maritime as well as land based strike with F-111s, patrol boats for coastal surveillance and interdiction, mine counter-measure vessels and submarines. Of these the capability of which the Navy was most wary was the submarine. Navy Minister John Gorton forced through its acquisition. He said in 1959

*There is little doubt that the submarine is now the most effective anti-submarine unit. The clearest way to consider the effect that a submarine force by Australia would have*



*on a potential enemy is to consider the very large efforts Australia had to make and still has to make, to counter a comparatively small number of enemy submarines.*

It was the British who were decisive in changing the Navy's mind however. They simply told the RAN that as the British submarine fleet nuclearised, they would not have conventional submarines available to exercise with the Australian fleet.

It was the British and Americans who finally forced the need for change in Australian strategic thinking as well. The aborted 1959 Strategic Basis Paper finally became a reality when the British withdrew from East of Suez and President Nixon announced his Guam doctrine on allied self-help. Building on changes in strategy put in place by the Whitlam Government, Fraser in the 1976 White Paper announced national strategy would hitherto be based on self-reliance. That national strategy was finally converted into military strategy in the 1980s. The 1960s and 70s changes had produced a naval force structure that was relatively easily adapted to its requirements.

Our maritime geography and the area of greatest strategic relevance to us never change. Nothing however is static in the interaction between global and regional politics and so we are obliged to review constantly these dynamics to discern whether or not strategy should alter with all the implications that may have for the structure of our armed forces. There is no doubt that global and regional politics are very different now from those in the 1980s. It is easy to be caught up in the breathlessness of the news cycle that brings before us distant problems as urgent crises in our living rooms in the nightly news programs. The fundamental questions are these:

- Do changing events require us to alter a national strategy based on self-reliance within a framework of alliances?
- Do they alter a military strategy that has as its focus defence in depth for our maritime approaches?
- Do they change a need for a force structure built for that task?

I would argue nothing fundamental needs to change, but new technologies and economic constraints will always oblige constant review at the margins. Losing discipline in strategy for the exigencies of the moment means that in an environment where resources are limited, it is

possible to undermine fundamentals if we are not careful.

There are three standout changes in this political/strategic environment. Firstly, the central dynamic of the global system has changed from a bipolar-contest to one where the US enjoys massive hegemonic power. Secondly, the immediate region of the Asian, Southwest Pacific littoral is more unstable than it was in the 1980s. Thirdly, the events of September 11 have thrown into stark relief the vulnerability of stable nations to what is called asymmetric warfare and have exposed to greater public attention a decade old world-wide terrorist threat. Analysis of all this in detail is impossible here. However, several points need to be noted.

Firstly, the emergence of the United States as the world's first and exclusive - in the words of a French Minister hyperpower - as the core feature of the global system, is not to the disadvantage of its allies. Our planning would be very different if the Cold War had had the opposite outcome. The US now accounts for more than 40% of total global defence spending. Its expenditure is greater than the next six powers combined. This does not suggest that if ever the US needed our military assistance, it needs it more now.

There is however one substantial change in US defence policy which requires direct consideration in a lecture on Australian maritime strategy. In the 1980s we planned our self-reliant strategy in an environment where our ally's attention was elsewhere. The areas of global competition were in Europe, the Middle East and North Asia. Our contribution through the joint facilities to US capabilities in those areas was a very real one, though they were a long way from Australia's direct strategic interest. In the end, though, the US was quizzical of aspects of our approach; for them we were in a strategic backwater. Given our contribution and our willingness to deploy further afield if alliance requirements indicated it, the US let well alone.

The requirement for the US to discipline its force structure with half an eye to its Soviet competitor in those areas has now disappeared. For the last ten years the US has struggled to get to grips with a new basis for force planning. In the immediate aftermath of September 11, largely unnoticed the US released the product of its rethink in its quadrennial defence review. It is this review



rather than its moves to deal with terrorist based threats that drives long term defence policy. Its assumptions are important for us to understand in the context of our maritime strategy. The US is making dramatic changes in its intelligence capabilities and internal security arrangements. It is bracing friends and allies around the globe on policing and intelligence cooperation. It has conducted a forceful diplomacy around its actions in Afghanistan and more broadly, which has seen noted diplomatic success in its relations with Russia, China and on the South Asian subcontinent.

It has taken the US some time to appreciate how successful it has been. The appreciation however has come in time for it now to start moving multilaterally as it sorts out how it wants to deal with Iraq. Though the costs of these operations look massive to those of us who sit in Lilliput, they have required only minor adjustment to American force structure. September 11 produced no seismic shift in American force planning and how those forces are to be deployed, though the threat from non-state actors has been tagged on to possible threats from state actors when potential enemies are considered. The quadrennial defence review is another matter. The essence of new doctrine has shifted away from a capacity to fight wars in the focal points of cold war competition to being based on capabilities that would defeat local hostile forces at any point of the globe. Rather than address the capabilities of an equivalent power the US seeks out strategies of weaker actors for asymmetrical warfare that would deny US access to an area of interest. The US Defense Department seeks to structure forces in a way that renders them capable of defeating such strategies. The blue water, open ocean characteristics of US naval strategy and tactics has shifted to the green water littoral task.

The political task is to have allies embrace closer American attention to their immediate vicinity, offering bases and developing the capacity of their forces for interoperability with the US. A new geographic definition of the Asian littoral is provided in the document. One of the areas cited under US main objectives in which hostile domination is to be precluded is the East Asian littoral. This is defined as the region stretching from the south of Japan through Australia to the Bay of Bengal. Its scoops up Taiwan and the

Southeast Asian littoral, and interestingly, Papua New Guinea, on the way through. The global military posture is to be reoriented to developing a basing system that provides greater flexibility for US forces: temporary access to facilities to enable US forces to conduct training and exercises; redistribution of forces and equipment based on regional deterrence requirements; provide sufficient mobility, including airlift, sealift, prepositioning basing infrastructure, alternative points of debarkation, and new logistical concepts of operations, to conduct expeditionary operations in distant theatres against adversaries armed with weapons of mass destruction and other means to deny access to US forces. Nowhere in this report is China mentioned, but it is the ghost at this feast. The description of asymmetrical and sea denial tactics and strategies which are to be countered appear a mirror image of what US planners know of developing Chinese military doctrine.

Two years ago the RAN's Seapower Centre produced in public the product of years of hard work in defining the RAN's strategy and tactics for an Australian environment for Australian forces. It is entitled *Australian Maritime Doctrine*. David Stephens, who is head of the Naval historical section of the Seapower Centre was one of Frank's PhD students. It includes the Navy's perception of the Australian Government's identified Australian enduring strategic interests. The first of these is '*Avoidance of destabilising strategic competition developing between the US, China and Japan as the power relationships between these three evolve and change.*' Clearly sustaining this is going to be an interesting feature of allied relationships for some time to come.

Australia already contributes to the alliance many of the attributes the US seeks from its friends in its new strategy. What is different is that we move from a strategic backwater to greater focus. The new American strategy will mean more pressure in the relationship on issues of interoperability. We gain enormously technically from access to American capabilities. The technologies that go to managing battlespace are in large measure of American origin and are available to us. Surveillance of our approaches and our broader strategic environment is enhanced by our agreements with the Americans. Timor



demonstrated when there is substantial direct Australian concern in the region where Australian capabilities require enhancement they are prepared to be supportive.

There are often subtle differences of approach between us however and management of them will be much more difficult in the new environment than in the 1980's. Ensuring that the management of these issues do not impinge on a force structure well suited to our strategic needs is now critical. The Government's defence program outlined in its capabilities paper posited as it was on 3% real growth in defence spending is now heavily threatened. This is a product of several factors. Firstly blow out in existing programs. This includes the Navy's heavy weight submarine torpedo. Secondly, the addition of capabilities not included as essential in the original program but which now have been added on. A haphazard addressing of the new environment. \$300 million plus for the army's additional helicopters is one example. Finally there is the decision to enter the Joint Strike fighter program which pushes out the F/A-18 and F-111 replacement for 15 years. This is a development with consequences for the existing fleet of aircraft, which is central to our maritime strike capabilities. The air force has no costed solution for the upgrade of the existing aircraft within the budget laid down. The blowout is potentially billions. Part of the solution may be to shift land strike capabilities to a land strike missile with a combination of submarines, C-130s, P-3Cs and 737s as platforms. At least the platforms are within the existing program. All this will enforce severe discipline on the Navy and provide a major tactical challenge as its surface fleet shrinks below that envisaged fifteen years ago.

What I have tried to do in this lecture is to pick up some themes that influenced Frank Broeze's writing. To portray the complexities of the monumental struggle for maturity in what he called 'free Australia' as it got to grips with its maritime geopolitical situation he saw as one of his tasks. The fight for a relevant maritime strategy has in part been a fight about our national identity. It has been a challenge to narrow, naïve and prejudiced thinking. There is probably much in my analysis that he would find narrow. This is because while he understood military geography his view of history, culture and humanity would never be constrained by it. It will be up to other

lecturers in this series to reflect his broader interests. His memory deserves that.

Dutchmen were wrecked on this coast for hundreds of years and they disappeared without trace. Frank and Ulli made successful landfall and their contribution to the life of the Australian mind and particularly the Western Australian mind has been great.

### About the Author

*The Hon Kim C Beazley, MP was the Minister for Defence from 1984 to 1990.*

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## Some Developments down aft – A Brief Look at the Schilling Rudder.

By Captain Ray Griggs, CSC, RAN

This edition is devoted to developments down aft. We often get focused on the more glitzy aspects of technology and some quiet revolutions can pass us by. The rudder continues to remain the preserve of the Engineer and one of those things the ship handler generally takes for granted that he or she will always have.

Developments in rudders or alternative directional control methods, such as trainable water jets and thrusters have generally been slow in introduction to warships. In some areas however developments have been very impressive, for example, many of us have witnessed significant developments in tug technology over the last 25 years with the advent of Kort nozzles and Z-pellers. The development of these technologies has been such that they have become available in smaller and increasingly more capable tugs.

Warship design down aft has not been anywhere near as revolutionary, with the possible exception of the controllable pitch propeller and developments in Mine Counter Measure Vessels (MCMVs). One rudder that is now in service in over 1000 vessels around the world is the Schilling rudder. It has some excellent properties that as a shiphandler it is worth being aware of.

The Schilling rudder is not in itself new and has been around in various forms for over 30 years. Its original design intent was to overcome the sluggishness of conventional rudder designs at slow speeds on barges and similar types of vessels in the constrained inland waterways of Europe.


The design of the Schilling rudder is fairly simple. The rudder is a fishtail shape with a fairly blunt leading edge and thin tail. The leading edge, is rounded and this causes acceleration in the water flow passing over it. This accelerated flow delays any stall and maintains 'lift' (which in rudder terms

translates into sideways force) at lower speeds through the water than a conventional rudder.

The thin 'fishtail' of the rudder is the key from the shiphandler's perspective to being able to use it effectively at rudder angles of up to 70°. The aft area of flow acceleration provides more enhanced vectoring of the water flow at these very large rudder angles.

### The Schilling concept

The Schilling rudder is based upon the 'fishtail' design concept shown below.



Source: Schilling Rudder Systems, Hamworthy KSE Ltd

Predictably, given the rudder's heritage, it is extremely effective when the vessel is operating at very low speeds. At 70° the Schilling rudder covers about 30% more of the propeller disc area than a conventional rudder at 35°. By trapping more of the propeller wash at lower speeds, the shiphandler is able to obtain significant lateral movement even in a single screw configuration.

With a properly optimised rudder operating at between 60-70° of rudder angle, sideways thrust of up to 50% of the equivalent bollard pull of the ships propellers can be achieved, effectively acting as a very powerful stern thruster. This is a significant capability and makes a single screw/bow thruster configuration far more flexible and reduces the need for tugs in a wide variety of conditions.

While the development of the Schilling was initially focussed on improving the slow speed



shiphandling problem, its design has now developed both hydrodynamically and in its construction methodology to cater for higher speed use. This opens up opportunities for possible applications in certain warship designs, particularly in amphibious and afloat support ships where top speeds in the low to mid 20 knot range are generally the norm.

At higher speeds the Schilling rudder will generate less rudder force than more conventional rudders. This is an advantage as the smaller the control force that is applied when trying to steer a steady course the better. In the merchant service this translates to reduced fuel, higher service speeds and reduced wear and tear.

Because the rudder is capable of much higher rudder angles, the shiphandler needs to be cognisant of how much wheel should be applied in certain circumstances. The maximum turning effect or sideways force while trying to maintain significant headway is achieved with about 40° of rudder applied. In the shiphandling sense the temptation to put the wheel hard over must be overcome as it may actually make the situation worse if a significant speed reduction is not what is needed.



**A twin screw, twin Schilling arrangement**  
Source: Hamworthy KSE Ltd

Manoeuvrability when underway is significantly enhanced by the Schilling rudder. The IMO set criteria for a ship's turning circles; these are normally expressed in units of the Length Between Perpendiculars (LBP) of a ship's size. For a 360° turn a ship's advance should not be more than 4.5 times the LBP and the tactical diameter should be less than 5 times the LBP. Hamworthy Marine report the results of turning trials of a 151,000 DWT Suezmax crude oil tanker (LBP of 264m) as follows:

	35° P	35° S	65c P	65° S
Adv/LBP	2.71	2.62	2.03	1.96
Tac	2.98	3.04	1.90	1.96
Dia/LBP				

Turns with 35° of wheel at 16 kts, 65° at 8 kts. (A typical naval AO has Adv and Tac Dia of 4.2 and 4.6 respectively at 35°)

(Source: Schilling MARINER, Hamworthy KSE Ltd)

The Schilling rudder needs to be very carefully tailored for the specific ship it is going to be fitted on. The actual rudder size and siting will depend on the role of the vessel, manoeuvrability requirements, under water hull section design and the like. It is certainly worth looking into for some of the upcoming new construction projects.

This overview has drawn heavily on the wealth of detailed information and documentation about the Schilling rudder at Hamworthy Marine's excellent web site at [www.hamworthykse.com](http://www.hamworthykse.com). It is without doubt the most impressive resource on the Schilling rudder available and well worth a visit.



## BOOK REVIEWS



### *Sober Men and True. Sailor Lives in the Royal Navy 1900-1945*

by Christopher McKee

Harvard University Press, 2002

hardcover, 285 pp, illustrations, index, RRP US\$29.95.



This is a book to delight all inquiring naval people, especially those seeking to better understand modern naval culture and traditions, as well as the human world of one of the great naval forces of history: a world in which RAN life was born. Christopher McKee is a respected American naval historian whose work on the early US Naval officer corps is well known. In this book he continues his enlightened interest in the human aspects and wider social context of navies, turning to Britain and this time to the lower deck. The result is an eminently readable and intellectually fruitful portrait of the British sailors who effectively made the Royal Navy during its last two generations as the sword of a great imperial power. McKee is scrupulous in letting the sailors speak for themselves - rather than seeing them through the eyes and records of authority - in the actual words of their letters, diaries, memoirs and oral testimony. The immediacy of their accounts is combined with his careful and imaginative writing in a vivid and moving book. Three dozen well chosen photographs include images conveying the misery and exhaustion of coaling a ship and the only known photograph of RN sailors partying in a brothel.

McKee explores the world of the lower deck in all its negative and positive aspects, with a sharp eye for the moral grey areas in between. He deals with sailors' backgrounds and reasons for enlistment, with naval discipline, officer-rating relations, and aspects of comradeship. There are also the terrors of battle. A signalman aboard the destroyer leader HMS *Kelly*, torpedoed in 1940, felt the universal fear of the warrior: he was afraid of being afraid. He took comfort, interestingly, in the fact that aboard a ship there was nowhere to run. There was also the deadly dangerous nature of routine life aboard ship as well as of illnesses. We hear of shore leave and binges, of sex and relations with women ('nice girls' as well as prostitutes), of sailors' marriages, and of homosexuality aboard ship (a serious naval offence but for obvious reasons hard to detect). We hear about life after the Navy and the reasonably good prospects sailors enjoyed, even in the midst of economic depression. The skills and values they had learned, together with the prestige of the Navy in society, generally served them well in civvie street.

Some of the most interesting aspects of the book deal with the apolitical nature of lower deck life, its necessarily consensual discipline, its unofficial hierarchies, and its lack of respect for formal religion. It was difficult for sailors to reconcile the official Christian ideal with the random and irrational horrors of war in which many suffered, good men died, and bad ones prospered. The serious rituals surrounding the distribution of the daily grog ration (which lasted until 1970) were almost a substitute sacrament. Rum (whether neat or diluted) still played a very central role in making sailors' lives bearable in the early twentieth century, as it had done in Nelson's day.

If a sailor learned his trade, re-enlisted for a further ten years on top of his initial twelve, kept his nose clean, and survived a hard existence, he was rewarded with a pension for life. Human beings stay sane by expunging - as far as is possible - bad memories in favour of good. But what is remarkable in these stories is the positive memories and the legacies which many sailors attribute to the Navy. They remember the spirit of adventure and the foreign travel which was, at that time, a privilege rarely enjoyed by the working classes. They remember the comradeship and miss it in later life, as they do the financial security of naval service. There is also the romance of the sea which when combined with military life has imprinted itself on the minds of many. Sailors remember '*A great respect for the sea.*'



*The loveliness of dawn, of sunrise and sunset. The clear bugle call of the Royal Marines at the ceremony of sunset echoing across the harbour'.*

But even more than this, the British sailors of this era were proud of being the men the Navy had made them and of doing the job they did. As one of them said 'There is no one like a naval man. I mix with no one other than that even today. And I know them before they speak.' The Navy became part of these men in a special way. One could take them out of the service, but not the service out of them. The Royal Navy became their spiritual home. In part this was the heritage which all excellent organisations pass on to their members. In part it was the rigour, effectiveness, and pride of one of the elite military forces of history. I knew just a few of these men as college staff in England twenty years ago and always enjoyed talking to them. Highly efficient and on duty always well turned out, they were gentle and quietly spoken, just occasionally sharp and combative, and very shrewd about others. One gave the best short historical judgement on Winston Churchill one could ever hear or read ('I was brought up to believe that no one is indispensable, but he was as close as you could get'). They were worldly and knew peoples and places from the Americas to the Middle East and the ports of Asia. Unlike many in England they knew Australia and appreciated Australians. By that time they were ageing men and part of a vanishing world. But they had a powerful pride in having been part of the Royal Navy and having policed and defended the Empire. Ours is a better world for what they and their allies did.

Much of the physical harshness of the old naval life is gone, and so is its all-male world. But its history still resonates and is relevant to today's naval issues, especially training, personnel management, and the conduct of operations. In this light this book can be read with profit. It is also something of a milestone in naval history, to be read in conjunction with such books as Nicholas Rodger's *The Wooden World* and Ronald Spector's *At War At Sea*. The volume on *The Face of Naval Battle*, shortly to be published by Allen and Unwin in conjunction with the RAN, is a further attempt to promote the naval face of battle genre. We need to know more about the human factor in naval history and its social context if the history of navies is to be fully and properly integrated into academic historical study. Strategy, policy, and operations are not the whole story. Above all, *Sober Men and True* is a book to be savoured for its humanity and its getting behind the stereotypes.

*Reviewed by Dr John Reeve, UNSW-ADFA.*

## ***Recent Defence Policy Documents***

### **The Australian Approach to Warfare**

Published in 2002 as the first in a three part series this booklet provides a clear and concise outline of the historical, legal and cultural underpinnings of the Australian Defence Force (ADF). Logically structuring each chapter operates as a building block which, when considered collectively, constitute the fundamental foundations of Australia's warfare philosophy. The areas examined are the relationship between the ADF and the community, its constitutional and legal basis for existence, the influences of Australia's geo-strategic position, national culture and defence posture. These sections are supported by photographs illustrating ADF operations, past and present. All priority task areas are covered, defence of Australia, promotion of regional security, support of Australia's wider interests and peacetime national tasks.

The Australian approach to warfare, specifically addressed by the last two chapters, draws together all the previous themes covered in the booklet. It outlines seven core qualities of the Australian warfare philosophy. These include legitimacy, community relations, focus on manoeuvre warfare and the personal qualities and values instilled in our commanders and troops, amongst others. The booklet concludes by suggesting that the ADF needs to remain anchored by its sense of history and place in society whilst embracing adaptability and flexibility in order to meet the challenges of the future. Although primarily targeted at those who have a limited knowledge of the services it is an engaging read and would make an excellent training tool for new ADF members.

### **Force 2020**

Developed in consultation with several working groups, including ADF personnel and civilian members of the Department of Defence, *Force 2020* released in 2002 forms the second part of the



three part series. Designed to guide the progress of the ADF towards the future world of 2020 it forms a foundational component of Defence's future vision. The subject matter is clearly articulated and insightful. Unfortunately the production style is at times confusing and distracting. The aims of the publication are significant. It intends to foster a common understanding of Defence's future direction and the necessary mechanisms required to arrive at that point. It is also designed to shape complimentary long range planning documents and to guide experimentation whether joint or single Service led in nature. Significantly *Force 2020* is positioned as an adaptable product that will be subject to review as new information emerges from both concept driven long range planning and experimentation.

The booklet is divided into three main sections. The first examines the importance of building on the past; highlighting the foundations that ground the ADF as it moves into the future. The second looks at present capability and warfighting concepts. It points to issues that need to be addressed now to ensure the success of the future vision. The final section consists of two chapters. The first outlines the future vision of Defence in theoretical terms whilst the second attempts to explain what measures are necessary to translate the vision into reality. *Force 2020* is essential reading for any individual interested in the future direction of the ADF.

### **Australia's National Security: A Defence Update 2003**

Launched by Defence Minister Robert Hill in February 2003 this 25 page, easy to read publication provides an update to the most recent White Paper, *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force*. Two years on it provides a revaluation of the challenges that Australia as a nation and the defence force in particular will face in the immediate future. It attempts to address significant changes in the international strategic environment and the emergence of new threats. Paying particular attention to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States and October 2002 in Bali the document acknowledges the increased importance of the global strategic and security environment for Australia's national defence and security. At the same time it illustrates that the likelihood of a direct conventional attack on Australian territory has diminished, at least for the short term. Although the *Update* positions terrorism as the dominant force shaping the strategic environment for 2003, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is also examined in detail. This changed global strategic environment means Australian national interests could be altered by outside events. One envisaged outcome of this shift is the possibility of increased coalition involvement by the ADF in conflicts further afield. However this projection is tempered by the suggestion that such contributions are likely to be limited to the provision of integral niche capabilities.

The document also provides an update on Australia's strategic regional environment, specifically Southeast Asia and the Pacific. It outlines the significant challenges our regional neighbours' face, including deteriorating law and order and economic instability. This decline in governance could make regional states more vulnerable to transnational crime making it extremely difficult for them to address the effects of terrorism. The factors driving increasing instability and the efforts of the Australian Government and the defence force to arrest this decline are detailed for Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji. One conclusion drawn from this discussion is that although Australia will continue to provide considerable assistance to these nations and acknowledges the likelihood of increased calls for operational assistance if the situation continues to worsen it cannot solve the problems of regional neighbours. These must be addressed internally.

The final component of the document outlines the measures the government will institute to address these new security concerns. It argues that the principles set out by *Defence 2000* remain sound. Rather a degree of realigning capabilities and priorities is required. This will ensure that the ADF can maintain the level of flexibility, mobility, readiness and capability required to meet these new and emerging threats. In conclusion the need for the document itself to remain flexible and to be updated as the strategic environment changes is noted. The document provides a timely and concise update of evolving government defence policy in response to significant world events.

### **Australia's Navy for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: 2002 – 2031**

This unclassified version of the Royal Australian Navy's long-range strategic plan was released in late 2002. Drawing on *Defence 2000*, *Force 2020* and the Defence Capability Plan it provides a vision of the transition of the current Navy Fleet through to the future level of desired capability over a thirty



year time frame. The first half of the plan examines strategic and technological issues shaping ADF and Navy planning in the present and the future. It outlines Australia's maritime strategy with a focus on the integral role of the Navy. It also addresses the nature of warfare in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century drawing heavily from *Force 2020*. However the discussion successfully moves away from the strategic to focus on the specific implications of technological advances on future Navy warfighting capability, addressing such issues as warship technology, communications and unmanned vessels.

The second half of the document focuses more specifically on fleet transition. The long-range plan is divided into three rolling stages. The first, Fleet-in-Being, examines the current capability level of the Navy. The second, the Enhanced Fleet, is the transition phase from the present to the future. It looks at necessary upgrades to existing platforms and the acquisition of new platforms in the medium term such as the Air Warfare Destroyer. The Navy Innovation Strategy directs the final phase, the development of the Future Fleet. It draws on regional trend analysis, technology projections, interoperability issues and projected government funding levels to suggest new capabilities that will be required to meet the demands of future missions. The role of the concept experimentation process, Headmark, is also discussed. The document provides a clear and informative outline of the importance of experimentation in the long-range planning process and the joint nature of the exercise. A table is included that provides an estimated time frame for each fleet stage. It clearly demonstrates the demarcations of each Fleet by listing the capabilities of each stage against all eight Force Element Groups. *Australia's Navy for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* is well presented and clearly structured making it essential reading for those interested in the future direction of the RAN.

*Reviewed by Amanda Coghlan - Navy Headquarters*

**Editor's Note:** contact Andrew Forbes on 62655062 or [andrew.forbes1@defence.gov.au](mailto:andrew.forbes1@defence.gov.au) for copies of these publications.



**HMAS Kanimbla Sea King crew - LS Jeff Weber, LEUT Paul Kimlin and LCDR Paul Moggach (RAN)**



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