Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

Autumn 2002

AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE Inc.

The Australian Naval Institute was formed and incorporated in the ACT in 1975. The main objectives of the Institute are:

- to encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the maritime profession; and
- to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and the maritime profession.

The Institute is self-supporting and non-profit-making. Views and opinions expressed in the Institute's publications are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Institute or the Royal Australian Navy. The aim is to encourage discussion, dissemination of information, comment and opinion and the advancement of professional knowledge concerning naval and maritime matters.

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Back Cover: HMAS *Kanimbla* conducts a RAS with *USNS Walter S. Diehl (J.Straczek)*
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FROM THE PRESIDENT

Dear Members,

The Annual General Meeting of the Institute was held in Canberra on 22 March. At the meeting I raised a number of issues which I would like to share with all members of the Institute.

The 2002 AGM had a pleasing attendance and it was heartening to review the positive results of the ANI reinvigoration program. In particular, the financial state of the ANI is much healthier than 12 months ago. As I mentioned in the last Edition, this is due to a combination of improved administration and oversight, reduction in operating costs and increases in our corporate sponsorship and membership. Included in this edition is the financial report; I commend it to you.

I would like to take this opportunity to welcome onboard our corporate sponsors for 2002 - LOPAC, Raytheon, Saab Systems and Thales Underwater Systems. I am pleased that not only are they keen to help financially support the objectives of the Institute, but they are also making valuable contributions to the pages of the Journal.

I also welcome new and returning members to the Institute. The initiative to provide a special membership rate for Defence Academy and Staff College students is already bearing fruit. Your contribution to the Journal would be welcomed and encouraged. Commander Henry Pearce is developing a plan in consultation with the Council to further increase our membership.

At the AGM there was an election of office bearers. For my part, I volunteered to stay on until such time as a willing and suitable successor volunteers. Captain Peter Jones stood down as Vice President after two years in that post and was replaced by Commodore Warwick Gately. The full list of the new Council is below. I think it contains a good mix of experience and new blood. I look forward to working with all members of the new Council to build on the good work done over recent years.

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Captain JPD Hodgman, RANR	Friendship Councillor
Lieutenant DG Mullins, RAN	Public Officer (non-Council member)

FROM THE EDITORIAL BOARD

The "children overboard" incident has dominated headlines over recent months. In this Edition, Lieutenant Commander DJ Chessum, RNZN has written an article that looks at the impact of international conventions on efforts to address people smuggling into Australia.

In last year's Spring Edition, Commander Julie Mitchell wrote an article on the demands of Shore Command. We follow that theme with an article on *Character Considerations for Sea Command* by Commander Steve McCarey. To complete a command trilogy, the Winter Edition will include an analysis of the leadership style of Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward during the Falkland Islands Conflict.

This year the RAN introduced standing Flotilla commanders and this arrangement is now being exercised in the Arabian Gulf. The Canadian Forces (CF) have long experience with the national Task Group Commander. Laura Higgins, a recent Masters graduate from Dalhousie University in Nova Scotia provides an insight into the Canadian experience. In the Winter Edition, Captain Alan Du Toit will discuss the RAN arrangements following his experiences as a Multi-National Interception Force Commander in the Arabian Gulf.

In the Autumn-Winter 2001 Edition, Rear Admiral Peter McHaffie, the CNS of the Royal New Zealand Navy, wrote of the RNZN and its future direction. His article summarised the New Zealand Government's defence decisions of 8 May 2001. With the 23 January 2002 release of the NZ Maritime Forces Review, the way ahead for the RNZN is now clear and Richard Jackson, editor of the RNZN's magazine *Navy Today*, outlines the future force structure of the RNZN.

One of the aims of the Journal is to be a forum for discussion about issues affecting the Navy. To that end the Editorial Board is keen to receive letters and articles on any subject the readers think would be of interest to Institute members. With the delights of email, submissions can be forwarded through this address: **a_n_i@bigpond.com**

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Letters to the Editor

From Bill Rourke and Ron Calder

The article by Sutekh in the Summer 2001-2002 Edition was entitled *Funding the Frigates*, but from what it had to say, *Underfunding the Frigates* seems more appropriate. The underfunding is reported as having a number of adverse effects on capability of our ships. Perhaps even more importantly, the shortage of funds to maintain our warships is undoubtedly linked to advice given at the Pacific 2002 Conference that the high rates of separation of personnel are due, more than any other factor, to not having the tools to do the job.

Billion Dollar Business by Paul Earnshaw discussed the Australian Frigate Project and quoted a 1985 report by the then Chief of Naval Materiel. It stated that staff requirements were commonly over-optimistic with regard to costs, and that a separate cost assessment group should be established. It is not clear whether or not this has been done. Some of the underfunding problems were probably engendered by separation of procurement and support activities between Navy and Defence. We understand that the current organisation is bringing the two elements back together under a Type Desk, where it should always have been.

More specifically we would recommend today that costs of maintaining our ships at a satisfactory level of capability be assessed by a costs assessment group, and compared to the type maintenance costs of other navies. This data could be used to produce maintenance and capability development cost projections necessary to provide a high degree of readiness. The Commander of the Surface Combatant Force should be provided with the financial and other resources needed to meet his accountability for the whole of life capability of the ships in his command.

From our association with naval dockyards and local industry we would see no substantial reasons why our Navy should not manage the task with the support of local industry so that the ships are maintained as effectively and efficiently as in the past. Reduced complements should help reduce overall costs. Being a "parent navy" has undoubtedly required additional effort and cost but has provided opportunities for Australian suppliers. Commonality of equipment across ship types could lead to cost reduction. A successful and cost-effective approach needs to ensure that technical expertise is maintained in the Service and in industry.

Costs of maintaining ships can vary significantly with useage. It is usually preferable to maintain a ship in very good condition, rather than have to attempt recovery when high demands and inadequate maintenance have reduced operational readiness.

From Captain Grant Ferguson, RAN (Director Naval Officers Postings)

I refer to the article "Career Managing Pregnancy for the Seaman Officer" by Lieutenant Commander Mary-Louise Ganter, RANR in your Summer 2001-2002 Edition.

LCDR Ganter raises some extremely valid points in her article about the difficulties that face female officers who attempt to balance a stable and consistent family life with a competitive, challenging and rewarding career. As a Seaman Officer, LCDR Ganter focussed her article on the Seaman primary qualification (PQ) but the points she raises are valid for officers of any other seagoing PQ. Rest assured, DNOP Desk Officers are acutely aware of the dilemma that faces many female officers and that an officer's personal, as well as professional aspirations are considered when formulating career progression plans. Of the three Seaman Desk Officers in DNOP, two are female and one is in the exact situation that LCDR Ganter describes. She is therefore able to empathise with other women who find themselves in the same predicament.

I make no bones about the fact that it is indeed a predicament; the ability to balance family and career is difficult at best.

Notwithstanding the fact that we have actively recruited women for seagoing service for just over 15 years, a point raised by LCDR Ganter, it would be dishonest of me not to acknowledge that current career models still reflect a time when only males went to sea. I speculate, rightly or wrongly, that there was an expectation that women who wished to pursue a seagoing career would follow the same career path as their brother officers. It is only now that we are beginning to fully appreciate the effects typical career models have on women who wish to combine motherhood with a rewarding and meaningful career. The models are quite rigid and provide little flexibility for officers, male or female, to take time out, for whatever reason, and to later pick up where they left off without detriment.

On the positive side, women whose career paths have followed that leading to sea command, are now reaching or have reached the ranks of LCDR and are located in positions where, by virtue of their personal and professional experience, they are important contributors to the formulation of personnel and career management policy. As a result there have been a number of advances in recent years that have facilitated the full participation of female officers in the Navy workforce. Flexible employment opportunities such as Part Time Leave Without Pay, job sharing and flexible working hours have made life easier in the early child-rearing years. Resources such as ADF childcare facilities in close proximity to the workplace enable more diverse employment options, particularly for mothers who are nursing. In the future the Navy may need to explore other innovative ideas such as flexible child minding hours with subsidised fees which may allow mothers to return to watch keeping roles.

I think it is fair to say that at present most of the women effected by our current paradigm have children under the age of five and, without intending to generalise, it is not unreasonable to assume that these women have a strong desire to remain ashore in the early years of their child's life. It would be naïve however, to assume that these women will never resume their seagoing careers in fact, the Navy can ill afford for them not to. It is highly probable that we will see a shift in years to come where a good proportion of these women, at some stage after they have nurtured their child or children, would wish to pick up where they left off without undue detriment to their careers. Acknowledging the good work done to date in providing flexible employment options when posted ashore, logically, the next and perhaps most telling step is to review extant career models to provide a similar degree of flexibility. While DNOP has a significant role to play in this regard, the onus is on PQ sponsors. The way in which the Navy grows its officers, the hurdles that have to be cleared and the hoops that have to be gone through in progressing to charge and ultimately, in the case of a Seaman, major fleet unit command, must be re-evaluated.

LCDR Ganter refers to LCDR Jayne Craig's comprehensive study of similar issues as they effect the Supply PQ. I am confident LCDR Craig's report will be the catalyst for a significant shift in our thinking on the structure of Supply Officer's careers. I am equally confident that the vast majority of the findings and recommendations of her study are easily translatable to other PQs, most notably Seaman. I am pleased to say that LCDR Craig's report is being taken forward, with the Supply Advisory Council recently analysing her findings and recommendations with a view to intensifying Navy's focus on implementing policy change aimed at better accommodating the family and career balance.

While I may have alluded to the fact, it would be remiss of me not to explicitly mention that much of what has been discussed here and in LCDR Ganter's article is also applicable to male officers. As societal trends evolve, Navy fathers may feel less inclined to remain at sea during the child rearing years and will seek similar flexible employment opportunities. Given the high proportion of service marriages and an increasing number of men with civilian partners in equally challenging careers, it will inevitably become a part of the career management process.

Ultimately, having children or taking time out to meet personal needs is a choice made by the serving member and his or her partner but it is a choice that should not result in opportunities being lost and careers prematurely curtailed. While there must be a balance between the corporate need and personal desires and aspirations, without flexibility the RAN runs the risk of losing a significant proportion of its future leaders before they have truly commenced their careers.

ANI TREASURERS REPORT

Financially 2001 proved to be a watershed for the ANI. Since late 2000 the ANI has focused on:

- increasing membership levels,
- attracting sponsors,
- improving cost controls,
- strengthening accounts management, and
- providing the Council with an improved financial picture.

As a result of these changes the ANI has turned the corner in respect of its financial position. Whilst the fund incurred a net loss of $1,198 this compares most favourably with the net loss of $14,253 in 2000. This is a significant improvement and is due to an increase in membership numbers, support from sponsors and a focus on constraining costs. Costs have reduced by11% during the period and revenues have doubled.[1]

	2001	2000	1999
Income	**$20,725**	**$10,403**	**$19,962**
Expenditure	**$21,924**	**$24,656**	**$18,084**
Profit/Loss	**-$1,198**	**-$14,253**	**$1,878**

Despite this improvement, total equity dropped to $390.00 in 2001 down from $630.00 in 2000. This is a product of the ANI incurring significant losses in four of the last five years and the cyclical nature of the ANI cash flow. **Net Assets** have improved totalling $11,062.00 in December 2001, up from $7,075.00 at the end of 2000. **Non Current Liabilities** (prepaid subscriptions) have increased by 40 percent to $10,671.00, up from $6,445.00 at the end of 2000. This indicates an improvement in overall membership numbers. The fund has no outstanding creditors and is well positioned to meet all operating costs for 2002. The ANI's **cash position** is sound with $10,500.00 in the Bank compared to $7,000.00 in 2000.

2001 has been a year of rebuilding for the ANI. Much of this has been directly attributable to individuals on the Council in soliciting sponsorships, increasing our membership numbers and constraining costs. Membership levels are at a three-year high totalling 540 up from 463 in 2000 and 500 in 1999. Significantly the number of non-financial members has dropped from 174 (37%) in March 2001 to 65 (12%) in March 2002. Accounts management has improved significantly with the hiring of Mrs Jean Davitt in September 2000 as the ANI bookkeeper. The Fund moved its accounts from SBA to MYOB in September 2000 thus providing for increased transparency in all aspects of Fund accounting.

The proposed budget for 2002 seeks to build on the work done in 2001 and is based on keeping costs at 2001 levels and improving revenue flows. Given the current membership levels and improved sponsorship prospects it is believed that the ANI will return to profit in 2002.[2] These funds should be used to build up the ANI reserves whilst continuing to meet the needs of its members and sponsors.

ANI Balance Sheet December 2001

	2001	2000
Assets		
Commonwealth Bank	$9,955.80	$5,851.04
Cash at Bank S50	$524.84	$1,200.07
Cash at Bank S30	$14.16	$14.16
Stock on Hand	$558.00	
Shares – DFCU	$10.00	$10.00
Total Assets	**$11,062.80**	**$7,075.27**
Liabilities		
Current Liabilities		
Trade Creditors		$716.50
GST Liabilities		-$904.56
Pre-Paid Subs 2001		$5,363.10
Pre-Paid Subs 2002	$8,581.94	$915.00
Pre-Paid Subs 2003	$1,950.00	$355.00
Pre-Paid Subs 2004	$140.00	
Total Liabilities	**$10,671.94**	**$6,445.04**
Net Assets	**$390.86**	**$630.23**
Equity		
Accumulated Surplus	$630.23	$14,883.41
Equity Adjustments[3]	$959.00	
Total Members Equity	$1,589.23	$14,883.41
Current Year Earnings	-$1,198.37	$14,253.18
Total Equity	**$390.86**	**$630.23**

[1] Income/expenditure normalised by removing King Hall Conference figures that were cost/revenue neutral at $29,415.

[2] Sponsorship monies from Raytheon, SAAB and LOPAC

[3] Comprises $401.00 as creditor brought to account after 12 months and $558.00 in stock brought on charge.

ANI Profit and Loss Statement
January - December 2001

	2001	2000
Income		
Corporate Sponsors	$2,500	$5,000.00
Journal Sales		$785.00
Membership/Subscriptions	$18,169.80	$4,198.00
Conference 2001[4]	$29,415.00	
Interest Received	$56.09	$420.16
Total Income	**$50,140.89**	**$10,403.16**
Expenditure		
Administration Costs	$1,363.02	$2,135.26
Bank Charges and FID	$369.68	$110.90
Clerical Assistant	$648.50	
Conference 2001	$29,415.00	
Entertainment Expenses		$412.00
GST[5]	$2,755.65	
Journal Packing	$376.52	
Journal Postage	$1,701.28	$1,693.18
Journal Printing	$14,709.61	$17,035.00
Unknown Expenses		$3,270.00
Total Expenses	**$51,339.26**	**$24,656.34**
Net Operating Profit (Deficit)	**-$1,198.37**	**-$14,253.18**

Proposed ANI Budget 2002

	2002	2001
Income		
Subscriptions 2001	$20,000	$18,169
Friends	$8,500	$2,500
Postage	$200	
Interest	$60	$56
Total Income	**$28,760**	**$20,725**
Expenses		
Admin costs	$1000	$1,363
Bank Charges and FID	$300	$369
Clerical Assistant	$700	$648
ANI Dinner	$1,000	
Journal Packing	$500	$376
Journal Postage	$1,600	$1,701
Journal Printing	$13,000	$14,709
General	$1,000	
GST	$2,000	$2,755
Total Expenses	**$21,100**	**$21,921**
Annual Profit and Loss	**$7,660**	**-$1,198[6]**

[4]King Hall Navy History Conference - Cost neutral for the ANI
[5]Includes $904.00 in GST expenses brought to account from Jul-Dec 00
[6]Figures rounded and may not add to the last dollar

HMAS Kanimbla in the Arabian Gulf conducting boarding operations in support of UN sanctions on Iraq

The Impact of International Conventions on Efforts to Address People Smuggling into Australia

By

Lieutenant Commander DJ Chessum, RNZN

Recent incidents and operations to the north of Australia have highlighted the challenges facing a modern maritime democracy that chooses to restrict entry to aspiring asylum seekers.

A combination of oppressive regimes and poverty in the Middle East and South Asia have created an environment where significant numbers of people are willing to embark on a risky boat passage to Australia's offshore territories in the hope of achieving asylum in Australia. This situation is exacerbated by the operation of people smugglers prepared to profit from the misery of their charges, and intermediate countries that are either unwilling, or unable, to prevent the flow of asylum seekers through their territories. This article considers whether the 1982 *UN Convention on the Law of the Sea* (hereafter the Convention) and the 1951 *United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees* (hereafter the Refugee Convention) are impediments to current efforts by Australia to address the problem of people smuggling into Australia. People smuggling by sea has increased significantly in recent years,[1] and has been described by the United Nations Secretary General as:

> *"a reckless exploitation of people in distress, and thus ... a reprehensible form of international crime."*[2]

The arrival of unauthorised arrival of immigrants by boat is not a new phenomenon for Australia. More than 2000 Indochinese arrived during 1975-1980, and a further two hundred Cambodians arrived in 1989-1990. Throughout the 1990s there was a regular flow of Chinese, with 1867 arriving between 1989 and 2000.[3] In 1999, however, there was a substantial shift in the pattern of illegal migration. In the two years prior to June 2001, the number of unauthorised boat arrivals (8316) was more than double the total for the previous ten years, and there was a distinct shift in the nationality profile from mostly Asian to mostly Middle Eastern in origin. Furthermore people smuggling was now behind a large proportion of

the unauthorised arrivals, with Indonesia becoming a staging post for the movement of people to Australia.[4]

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982

The rights and obligations of coastal States in offshore waters are prescribed by the Convention. For the purposes of immigration control, the sea can be divided into four zones; internal waters, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, and areas outside the contiguous zone (the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and the high seas).

The Convention prescribes that "except as provided in Part IV, waters on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea form part of the internal waters of the State."[5] Sovereignty over internal waters is not explicitly defined, however it can be inferred that States are entitled to exercise the same absolute sovereignty in internal waters as they are on their land territory.[6] In Australia this sovereignty is asserted by the *Seas and Submerged Lands Act* 1973.[7]

Outside internal waters is the territorial sea: "sovereignty of a coast state extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters ... to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea."[8] Sovereignty over the territorial sea is not, however, absolute as the "sovereignty over the territorial sea is exercised subject to this Convention and to other rules of international law."[9]

One limitation on a coastal State's sovereignty in the territorial sea is the right of innocent passage, whereby "ships of all States ... enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea."[10] Passage is defined as innocent only "so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State".[11] Moreover "passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in ... the loading or unloading of any ... person contrary to the ... immigration ... laws and regulations of the coastal State."[12]

The coastal State's rights of protection are defined in Article 25 where "The coastal State may take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which is not innocent."[13] Furthermore, "in the case of ships proceeding to internal waters ... the coastal State ... has the right to take the necessary steps to prevent any breach of the conditions to which admission of those ships to internal waters or such a call is subject."[14]

It can therefore be seen that Convention provides adequate provision for the control of people smugglers in the territorial sea. If people smugglers intend to unload persons in the territorial sea contrary to a coastal State's immigration laws and regulations, then their passage is not innocent, and the coastal State may take the necessary steps to prevent their passage. If they intend to proceed into the coastal State's internal waters to unload persons, then the coastal State has the right to take necessary steps provided the unloading of such persons is a breach of the conditions to which ships are admitted to internal waters. The establishment of immigration laws and regulations, and the setting of conditions for ships to enter internal waters, are matters of domestic law not limited by the Convention.

A further provision that strengthens the ability of coastal States to control people smugglers in the territorial sea is Article 27. *"The criminal jurisdiction of the coastal State should not be exercised on board a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea to arrest any person or to conduct any investigation in connection with any crime committed on board the ship during its passage, save only ... if the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal State."*[15]

As the consequences of illegal immigration clearly extend to the coastal State, then this provision allows coastal States to stop and arrest vessels in the territorial sea if they are in breach of domestic immigration legislation.

Outside the territorial sea, is the contiguous zone where a coastal State "may exercise the control necessary to ... prevent infringement of its ... immigration ... laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea, [and] punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea."[16] This allows for the control of people smugglers in the contiguous zone.

Outside the contiguous zone lies the EEZ and high seas. The sovereign rights granted to coastal States with respect to the EEZ are limited to those specified in the Convention. These primarily relate to the economic resources

of the EEZ, and do not include immigration. Outside the EEZ lies the high seas where "no State may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty."[17] The rights of a coastal State to stop and board vessels on the high seas are limited to those circumstances prescribed by Article 110, which does not cover immigration issues. The Convention therefore makes no provision for a coastal State to act against people smugglers either in the EEZ or on the high seas.

UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951

The Refugee Convention was adopted in December 1951, and entered into effect in April 1954.[18] A refugee is defined as a person who

> *"owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country."*[19]

The Refugee Convention initially applied only to persons whose fear of persecution resulted from events occurring before 1 January 1951, however the amending 1967 *Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees* extended this coverage to include all persons who met the above definition.[20] Australia acceded to the Refugee Convention on 22 January 1954 and the 1967 Protocol on 13 December 1973.[21] The Refugee Convention is effectively brought into Australian law by the *Migration Act* 1958, and the *Migration Regulations*. Protection as a refugee is given by granting a protection visa, which confers permanent residence on the holder.[22]

The Refugee Convention requires receiving states to provide a wide range of services to refugees, including education, social security, access to courts of law, and the right to obtain gainful employment.[23] These requirements mean that the quality of life accorded to refugees in developed countries such as Australia may be considerably superior to the quality of life experienced by many people in the developing world. This creates a situation where there is an incentive for

individuals who do not meet the criteria established by the Refugee Convention, to travel to a developed country and claim refugee status. Such people are commonly referred to as economic migrants, and they form much of the customer base for organised criminal gangs of people smugglers.[24]

The Refugee Convention contains two key obligations that impact on the ability of a coastal state to counter people smuggling. The first is the prohibition of expulsion or return: "no Contracting State shall expel or return ... a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion."[25] Secondly, "the Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry.., on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened ... enter ... their territory without authorisation [sic], provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence."[26] The impact of these two obligations is that asylum seekers who enter Australia by boat, and then claim refugee status immediately upon arrival, cannot be immediately returned their home countries, nor can they be penalised for their illegal entry.

The *Tampa* Incident

On 26 August 2001, a vessel carrying 433 potential asylum seekers to Australia broke down approximately 80 miles north-west of Christmas Is. The Norwegian container ship MV *Tampa*, responding to a call from Australian Search and Rescue, intercepted the vessel, and embarked the passengers. The master of the *Tampa* had intended to take the passengers to Indonesia, but diverted to Christmas Is at the passengers' request. The *Tampa* was instructed to remain in Australia's contiguous zone, however on 29 August the *Tampa* issued a distress signal, and proceeded into Australian territorial waters surrounding Christmas Is where it was boarded by soldiers of the Special Air Service. The refugees were subsequently transferred to the HMAS *Manoora*, and then landed on Nauru.[27]

Australia's international obligations with regard to the removal of the refugees from Australia's territorial waters arise from the

prohibition of expelling or returning a refugee in Article 32 of the Refugee Convention. This provision prevents refugees from being returned to a place of persecution, however by making appropriate arrangements with Nauru and New Zealand for their subsequent protection, Australia ensured that the asylum seekers were not being returned to a place of persecution. The Refugee Convention does not confer a right on refugees to choose their country of asylum, and Australia's actions therefore met Australia's obligations under the Refugee Convention.[28]

Legislative Amendments

In response to the *Tampa* incident, and the ongoing pressure from people smugglers, Australian recently enacted a number of measures to counter people smuggling.

The *Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act 2001* removes a number of offshore territories, including Christmas and Cocos Islands, and the Ashmore Reef from the migration zone. The *Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act 2001* limits the

type of protection visa that asylum seekers arriving in territories excised from the migration zone, or who have lived for a week in a country in which they could have obtained protection, can claim.[29] Although such asylum seekers can still receive the minimum rights guaranteed by the Refugee Convention, their temporary protection visa will not entitle them to family reunification rights, or permanent residency. Furthermore the Act includes powers for asylum seekers arriving in territories outside the migration zone to be moved to another country where their claims, if any, for refugee status may be dealt with.[30] The objective of these measures is to reduce the incentive for asylum seekers to travel to Australia's offshore territories. These Acts have also enabled Australia's offshore territories to be used as trans-shipment points for asylum seekers rescued at sea by Australian warships, and then moved on to a third country. This power was recently used for 233 people rescued by the HMAS *Adelaide*. Rescued from the sea after scuttling their boat, they were landed on Christmas Is before being moved to PNG.[31]

Contemporaneous with the Acts to excise Australia's offshore territories from the migration zone, was the *Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act 2001*. This Act contains retrospective provisions to ensure that the Australian Government's actions with respect to the *Tampa* and *Aceng*[32] were lawful when they occurred. The Bill also enhances the border protection powers in the *Customs Act* and the *Migration Act*, including the provision of powers to detain, search, and move vessels carrying unauthorised arrivals, and those on board.[33] Finally the Bill provides mandatory sentencing arrangements for people convicted of people smuggling offences under the *Migration Act*.[34]

This package of legislation has been criticised within Australia as offending a number of long-standing principles. These include the fact that it is retrospective, it imposes mandatory minimum sentences, it excludes the jurisdiction of the courts, it gives the Crown prerogative to eject people from the realm, and it sanctions detention without trial.[35] The manner in which the Acts were forced through the Australian Senate before debate had been completed has also been criticised.[36] The further allegation, however, that excision of the offshore territories from the migration zone violates international agreements "by pretending that parts of Australia are not part of Australia"[37] is incorrect. The provisions that allow unauthorised immigrants to be removed from Australia to a third country contain specific safeguards to ensure that they will receive adequate protection in the third country, and Australia's obligations under the Refugee Convention will therefore be met.[38]

Coincident with the legislative changes, Australia made a significant effort to detect and intercept boats carrying asylum seekers into Australia. Maritime patrol aircraft and Navy warships were deployed to intercept and turn back boats carrying asylum seekers. Suspected people smuggling boats were intercepted on the high seas, and masters advised of the legal consequences of continuing into Australian territorial waters. When asylum seekers abandoned their vessels, and leapt into the sea, they were rescued by the Navy, and taken to the offshore territories for subsequent deportation to a third country.

Conclusion

In internal waters, the territorial sea, and the contiguous zone, the Convention provides adequate powers for coastal states to take effective action against people smugglers. Outside of the contiguous zone, in the EEZ and on the high seas, the Convention does not provide such powers, and coastal states are limited in their ability to counter people smuggling in these areas.

The Refugee Convention provides a framework for the protection of refugees, and imposes obligations on signatory states to provide for the needs of such people. Significant elements of the Refugee Convention in relation to people smuggling, are the prohibition of expulsion or return, and the prohibition on imposing penalties on account of their illegal entry.

In the *Tampa* incident, the predominant restraining factors that impeded the implementation of the Government objectives were domestic obligations under the *Migration Act*, and issues regarding the alleged detention of asylum seekers in *Tampa*. These are issues of domestic law, and recent changes to domestic law have removed these impediments without impacting on Australia's obligations under the

Refugee Convention. While compliance with the Convention limited the ability of the Government to act decisively against the asylum seekers onboard the *Tampa* until the *Tampa* had entered Australia's territorial sea, this restriction did not preclude effective action being taken before the *Tampa* reached internal waters.

Recent changes to Australian domestic law have sought to discourage the practice of people smuggling. Initiatives include limiting the rights of asylum seekers arriving in Australia's offshore territories, making provision for them to be moved on to third countries, improving the enforcement powers under the *Customs Act* and the *Migration Act*, and imposing mandatory sentencing for people smugglers. These initiatives are all compatible with Australia's obligations under the Refugee Convention.

By enacting appropriate domestic laws, and backing this up with effective enforcement action, the Australian government has effectively met the people smuggling challenge. It has achieved this while remaining in full compliance with both the Convention, and the Refugee Convention. Recent events have demonstrated that these conventions are not an impediment to current efforts by Australia to address the problem of people smuggling into Australia

About the Author

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[1] *Cooperation for Law and Order at Sea*, CSCAP Memorandum No. 5, Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, Feb 2001, p. 15.
[2] *Oceans and Law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary General*, UN Doc. A/53/456, 5 October 1998, supra note 2 at para. 134.
[3] P Ruddock, *Background Paper on Unauthorised Arrivals Strategy*, 2001, http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/media_releases/media01/r01131_bgpaper.htm, p. 1.
[4] ibid, p. 2.
[5] United Nations, *The Law of the Sea*, New York, 1983 (hereafter LOSC), Article 8(1). Part IV of the Convention refers to archipelagic states, and therefore does not apply to Australia.
[6] This article states that the "sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters."
[7] RD Lumb, 'Australian Coastal Jurisdiction' in KW Ryan (ed), *International Law in Australia*, 2nd ed, The Law Book Company Ltd, Sydney, 1984, p. 374.
[8] LOSC, Article 2(1).
[9] ibid, Article 2(3).
[10] ibid, Article 17.
[11] ibid, Article 19(1).
[12] ibid, Articles 19(2) and 19(2)(g).
[13] ibid, Article 25(1).
[14] ibid, Article 25(2).
[15] ibid, Articles 27(1) and 27(1)(a).
[16] ibid, Article 33(1).
[17] ibid, Article 89.
[18] A Millbank, *The Problem with the 1951 Refugee Convention*, Parliament of Australia Parliamentary Library, Canberra 2000, p. 8.
[19] Refugee Convention, Article 1(A)(2).
[20] A Millbank, *The Problem with the 1951 Refugee Convention*, p. 8.
[21] A Millbank, *The Detention of Boat People*, Current Issues Brief 8 2000-1, Parliament of Australia Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 2001, p. 7.
[22] S Chetty, *The Refugee Review Tribunal - Facilitating Australia Compliance with its Obligations Under the Refugees Convention*, www.australianpubliclaw.com/retreating/chetty1
[23] Refugee Convention, Articles 22, 23, 16, 17-19 respectively.
[24] C Williams, *Unlawful Activities at Sea - An Australian Perspective*, Paper presented at the Strategic Importance of Seaborne Trade and Shipping Conference, Canberra, 3 April 2001.
[25] Refugee Convention, Article 33(1).
[26] ibid.
[27] N Hancock, *Refugee Law - Recent Legislative Developments*, Parliament of Australia Parliamentary Library, Canberra 2001, p. 2.
[28] I Campbell, Speech to Australian Senate, 20 September 2001.
[29] D Spooner, & R Hancocok, *Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone)(Consequential Provisions) Bill 2001*, Bills Digest No. 70 2001-02, Parliament of Australia Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 2001, p. 4.
[30] ibid, p. 2.
[31] 'Refugee Imbroglio now Utterly Ridiculous' *Canberra Times*, 13 October 2001.
[32] The *Aceng* was an Indonesian fishing boat that attempted to enter Australian waters near Ashmore Reef. The asylum seekers onboard were transferred to HMAS *Manoora*, which at the time was also carrying the former *Tampa* rescuees.
[33] The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia House of Representatives, *Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Bill 2001 - Explanatory Memorandum*, p. 3.
[34] I Campbell, Speech to Australian Senate, 20 September 2001.
[35] C Hull, 'A litany of legal horrors mars Tampa refugee affair' *Canberra Times*, 22 September 2001.
[36] K Lawson, 'Debate gagged to race refugee Bill through' *Canberra Times*, 27 September 2001.
[37] C Hull, 'A litany of legal horrors mars Tampa refugee affair'
[38] D Spooner, & R Hancocok, *Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone)(Consequential Provisions) Bill 2001*, Bills Digest No. 70 2001-02, p. 3.

CHARACTER CONSIDERATIONS FOR SEA COMMAND IN THE RAN

By
Commander Steve McCarey, RAN

Captain JM Armstrong and Commander HC Wright of the cruiser HMAS *Australia*. Armstrong was one of a generation that produced some exceptional cruiser captains, such as Hector Waller and John Collins. In this article Commander McCarey takes a contemporary look at Sea Command.

Achieving the position of Commanding Officer (CO) at sea represents a career pinnacle. Success or otherwise, whilst in Command will be the primary mechanism for assessment for further Command or promotion. The ultimate responsibility for a CO is to ensure that the Maritime Commander's standards and objectives are met, or exceeded, whilst aso appropriately proportioning the CO's drive towards having his/her Command favourably viewed, against the happiness and welfare of the Ship's company and their lifestyle requirements.

In achieving the latter proportionality, a CO must apply a mix of leadership and management styles that will effectively prepare a ship during a peacetime environment for increased readiness or conflict. The purpose of this paper is to explore the leadership and management qualities required to successfully command at sea and to make conclusions on an optimum character model for a CO.

Command

Command, the most exciting time of one's naval career, is where ultimate responsibility for success or failure remains yours and yours

alone. Such a concept is easily bounced around in discussion forums with knowing nods of agreement in terms of the and understanding *buck stops at the top* expressions of the Captain's ultimate responsibilities. However, it is not until one is in the Captain's chair and previous mental pictures of success are crumbling around you within a rapidly disintegrating tactical picture, or yet again, another significant mechanical failure (the fourth this month by human error), combined with a general ship's company discontent over the ship's disjointed program brought about by the latter, that one begins to truly appreciate the loneliness of Command.

How can it be so lonely? One has an Executive Officer (XO) to discuss such issues and problems with, to confide and team with. Well, very simply, the XO answers only to you as the CO, you alone answer for your ship and you alone are being assessed for your leadership and management abilities in your ship's successes and failures.

However, there are not enough minor Commands, or for that matter major XO positions available for an ideal career path for all officers in preparation for major Command. Thus, the selection of a CO relies primarily on their previous Command performance. If this is to remain the case, a healthy understanding of the mechanics of sea Command should be mandatory for all officers prior to assuming major Command. Such an understanding should commence at the earliest stages of a naval officer's career.

The key to effective sea Command is appropriate leadership; however, leadership alone does not necessarily equate to a successful Command. The other main Command characteristic is sound management skills. It is from the mix of leadership and management characteristics that a baseline model for successful sea Command evolves.

Such a model assumes that a person's character will always underpin a CO's leadership methodologies, whilst also accepting that good management is a maturing process which grows with experience. Of course, experience will help mould a naval officer's leadership characteristics through failures and successes, and in observing COs that they have previously served under, especially those they have viewed as role models. Another avenue in appreciating Command is by studying the career events of great naval leaders.

A CO can never afford to have their own integrity questioned.

The RAN, like all navies, has various levels and types of sea Command appropriate to rank, seniority and warfare specialisation. There are two mechanisms for achieving a major sea Command: either one or more minor Commands, or as an XO of a major Command.

In terms of preparation for major warship Command, there can no better preparation than a lesser Command. However, a minor Command cannot be compared to a major Command in terms of complexity in fighting, seamanship and ship management. A combination of both minor Command and XO of a major Command as preparation for major sea Command would provide the best possible background. Such a combination would provide the opportunity for an officer to experience the isolation of Command at a junior rank, with all of its ups and downs, whilst gaining an understanding of the enormity of managing a major warship.

Effective leadership with the ability to take judgement call risks is what is required to fight and win battles. However, fighting and winning sea battles only occur in time of conflict. In the RAN's case, over the last couple of decades, peace has been the predominant operational environment. It is not acceptable to over expend scarce resource in terms of say, ammunition and fuel, or for that matter to work a ship's company on a war footing level for extended periods during peacetime. In essence, during peacetime it is of more importance to ensure that appropriate management occurs

both in planning and execution of a sea Command.

Of course, a CO could manage his/her way through a peacetime Command following all the rules to the letter of the law without any personable or true Command presence with their people. They could abstain from making a stand on any controversial issue, and still be judged by higher authority as being precise, considered and stable. These characteristics, however, will invariably falter in a rapidly changing wartime tactical situation, where true leadership through self-inspiration and strength of character is required.

Admiral Sir Victor Smith, seen here as the Chief of the Naval Staff, had the distinction of having the two ships he commanded: *Queenborough* and *Quadrant* receive the Gloucester Cup.

Leadership

At this point it is relevant to explore both leadership and management characteristics in some detail. Daniel Goleman highlights six styles of leadership, all of which will be recognisable through positive or negative past experience.[1] Coercive leaders demanding immediate compliance; authoritative leaders mobilising people towards a vision; affiliative leaders creating emotional bonds and harmony; democratic leaders building consensus through participation; pacesetting leaders expecting excellence and self direction; and coaching leaders developing people for the future. The application of these leadership styles on their own or in combination by a CO will have a direct effect on operational performance and ship's company morale.

Coercive leadership, although highly negative in its emotional impact on a long-term basis, does have its place within a military environment, especially in rapidly changing tactical situations. However, coercive leadership is all too easy to apply within the military, particularly in the unique environment of ships at sea by those COs who lack the necessary Command characteristics to apply it for effect rather than as a constant repressive isolationist control management tool. Such an environment can only be one of low morale through repression of initiative, reward and equity. Coercive leadership should only be employed by a CO as an initial change management tool in situations requiring immediate turnaround results and, in life and death situations where Command decision and directive output requires immediate compliance.

Authoritative leadership seeks to motivate people through clear visionary purpose, via mission and objective strategies, gaining commitment by creating an environment of progressive innovation, self worth and job satisfaction. At the same time, this leadership style is firm in its guidance and direction. Authoritative leadership, by this definition, is at the upper level in establishing and maintaining a positive emotional environment. Indeed, it is the most positive leadership style out of the six leadership styles being considered. Nevertheless, it cannot be employed in isolation to other styles, as the sea Command environment is diverse and dynamic, requiring more than just an authoritative perspective.

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[1] D Goleman, 'Leadership That Gets Results' *Harvard Business Review*, March-April 2000, pp. 78-90.

Affiliative leadership strives to achieve open communication within an environment of subordinate happiness and emotional upward and downward loyalty. It is the opposite to coerciveness, being people focused. A CO should indeed have affiliative leadership traits, to not only be able to take a ship's company into difficult and trying military situations with complete solidarity, but also as a management means of promoting retention of one of the Navy's most valuable resources - people. Obviously, affiliative leadership provides a positive emotional environment. However, used as a predominant Command style, it has the real potential to create an environment that tolerates unsatisfactory and mediocre work performances through over indulgence and routine unwarranted praise. It also has the potential to accept repetitive disciplinary transgressions in the name of harmony.

Democratic leadership style infers a collaborative environment that seeks input by consensus on issues and direction. Within a sea Command democratic leadership has its place, but not in critical situations requiring decisiveness. It must also be applied at appropriate levels of competency and timeliness. Although democratic leadership could indicate a lack of Command decisiveness or clarity of direction, it is indeed a valuable leadership tool when applied in the right areas and at the right time, in matters that boost morale but do not negatively affect operational effectiveness and efficiency. Within the military environment, the application of such a leadership style at the wrong time has the real potential to break down subordinate confidence in its Command, which has direct negative consequences to the fighting effectiveness of affected units. **Pacesetting leadership** seeks to achieve excellence and achieve it quickly, regardless of the emotional consequences. This leadership style within a sea Command has its place and indeed is required in certain circumstances, such as in a Work-ups, an Operational Requirement Evaluation period, elements of certain exercises and in initially striving to achieve an Operational Level of Capability. In reference to the latter, during time of conflict a CO should well have the attitude that if their team is not the best they will have a short battle life expectancy. On a day to day basis, this leadership is emotionally negative as it seeks only results now and leaves little room for coaching to achieve better results for the future. If top driven, a CO would find it more and more difficult to delegate or trust their subordinates in achieving tasks, becoming a micro-manager.

Coaching leadership style ranks highly in terms of promoting a positive emotional environment and should be a strong characteristic in a CO's overall leadership style. Coaching necessarily infers performance improvement for both the immediate and long term. As training and exercising, alongside and at sea, in preparation for conflict occupies a significant proportion of a ship's annual program, coaching leadership should be emphasised, second only to an authoritative focus. Another aspect to coaching is of course counselling, an important attribute in any CO's leadership toolbag.

Differing leadership styles on their own have limited positive advantage in establishing and maintaining a robust and optimal leadership environment within a Command at sea. Indeed, at a certain point singular leadership styles without variation becomes negative. The more emotionally negative the style is to start with, the quicker that style will begin to have unacceptable negative effects. The obvious and logical answer is to utilise all of the various leadership styles in conjunction with each other at the appropriate time and in the appropriate environment, based on the prevailing priority objectives and dynamics of the existing and predicted future environment.

Utilising these leadership styles, a CO at sea should conduct their Command with a predominance of authoritative leadership style, with an emphasis on coaching, a lesser degree of the affiliative and pacesetting style and the timely, but judicial application of democratic and coercive leadership styles. If such an overall leadership style is not within a person's character when they join the Navy (a so called born-leader), then such traits will need to be instilled though experience and coaching leading up to major sea Command.

Command Character Model

Figure 1 outlines a Command Character Model that incorporates the previously discussed leadership styles, but also considers Command

management and Command principles, which are discussed in more detail below.

Command management requires discussion with respect to the optimum type of management style applicable in a predominantly peacetime Navy, yet flexible enough to facilitate a rapid change to a conflict footing without negative management impact. It would be reasonable to suggest that a CO's management style should complement their leadership style. The latter of course would be true if the CO possessed the optimum leadership style traits to start with. To add to the already developing model for Command characteristics, management discussion will lead towards an optimum style to complement the optimum Command leadership attributes.

Rather than attempting to identify corresponding positive or negative management styles to leadership styles, two categories are utilised under the broad headings of authoritarian and autocratic management.

The authoritarian and autocratic managers are by definition on opposite sides of the scale. The authoritarian management style in this case should not be confused or aligned with the authoritative leadership style. Authoritarian management favours the principle of subjection to authority as opposed to that of individualism. As inferred by Professor Dixon,[2] an officer possessing this trait tends to seek and promote conformity, managing issues with over deferment to seniority and obedience without waiver to the letter of the law. Such a manager possesses strong points in sequential reasoning and processes, which are indeed worthwhile attributes. However, if such attributes are applied with little imagination or initiative within an environment that not only tolerates, but also encourages a blind group think psyche, then they are no longer positive attributes.

Such a management style of 'toeing the party line', of not 'fighting the white', of not 'creating waves' and so on, applied religiously and without real thought is very much a peacetime management trap. Authoritarian management is emotionally negative in that it suppresses process creativity and innovation, and the integration of new processes in realising increases in productivity and efficiencies. The latter may be able to be accommodated within non-operational shore Commands, but there is no place for it within a sea Command where an environment of positive emotional outcomes need to be achieved both in management and leadership.



Figure 1: Command Character Model

[2] Alston, 'Leaders and Managers: Chalk and Cheese' *The Naval Review*, April 1998 Vol 86, pp. 128-133.

This must necessarily be the case to ensure that a warship is able to almost seamlessly and confidently transfer management processes from a peacetime footing to the unpredictable requirements of a conflict arena.

When correlating the authoritarian management style to Command leadership styles, it becomes apparent that authoritarian management will most likely accompany a predominantly coercive leadership trait. The combination of these management and leadership styles would produce an emotionally negative environment with overall poor morale as the indicator of this combination occurring within a Command.

Autocratic, by definition, infers independent or self derived power, which translates to management as independent thinking with emphasis on initiative and process rationalisation with a view to value adding and improvement. Autocratic management requires significant acumen, with a strong strength of character in order to stand up and be counted on issues requiring a stance, both on moral and process efficiency/improvement matters. One of the most significant advantages of autocratic management is its penchant towards alternative thought contribution in opposition to the pitfalls of groupthink associated with authoritarian management.

Accepting sea Command management as being either predominantly authoritarian or autocratic, the question is what management style should a CO employ and insist upon from those within their Command. On the surface it appears that autocratic management style wins outright, but good management will not necessarily be the overall outcome. Possessing all the right autocratic attributes is not enough to be an effective manager at sea. Having comprehensively and positively rationalised an issue, the process articulating that issue at the right time and the right place may fall well short of the mark due to a lack of experience within the greater bureaucracy, that is the RAN.

The right variation to the pure autocratic management style for Command should be one based on experience and maturity within not only the RAN, but also the ADF. For the purpose of this paper, such a style is categorised as mature autocratic management. Mature autocratic management requires a CO to possess autocratic traits in the main, with the ability to effectively contribute and achieve positive results within the Defence bureaucracy. Mature autocratic management also applies the positives of an authoritarian perspective, recognising when and where 'letter of the law' process application are necessary, but always cognisant of its limitations and potential for improvement at a more appropriate or opportune time. The leadership style that best correlates with mature autocratic management is authoritative. However, this management style also facilitates the other leadership styles in combination.

Having discussed leadership and management characteristics of Command, the final component of the major attributes required of a CO at sea is in the conduct of Command itself is through underlying principles. Command principles are characteristics that are applicable in every aspect of both leadership and management. The main principles are professionalism, responsibility, loyalty, integrity, equity and consistency. These principles may be viewed as test gates in any Command decision making process, ensuring validity in the processes of both leadership and management.

Professionalism with respect to a CO, is easily dismissed as a given, rather than a Command principle that should always occupy the foremost of their consciousness. If a CO is not perceived to be professional by members of their Command, then respect and confidence is lost, which is directly linked to unit operational effectiveness. Professionalism creates pride and boosts morale. Excellence in warfare, seamanship and ship handling, especially berthing and unberthing a ship, are obvious examples where professionalism becomes publicly evident within a Command, and to other observers. Professionalism requires attention to detail and dedication, not only to Command, but also to the Navy in general. As CO of a warship, professionalism is not about being a perfectionist, it is about doing the job right with adeptness and always conducting oneself with propriety consistent with the responsibilities and traditions of that position and the Navy.

As a Command principle, responsibility also infers accountability. With Command comes ultimate responsibility and

accountability. A CO in the conduct of their Command must have full realisation of the consequences of their decisions and actions, whether it be operational, material or personnel wise. The RAN, like many other navies, holds the principles of Command responsibility and accountability beyond the legal outcomes of attributing negligence through formal proceedings, with a negative judgement on professional ability by superiors being the ultimate sanction. Such an inference that Command responsibility extends beyond the normal means of legal processes is well articulated by Admiral JD Watkins, USN.[3] He stresses the importance of responsibility as the sole principle of Command, and concludes that: '*Our country, and every Navy man and woman serving at sea or ashore, has the absolute right to expect that our commanding officers will be the finest, and the most responsible, we can provide*'. Although responsibility is a very important aspect of Command, it is only one of several Command principles.

Loyalty as a Command responsibility refers to not only professional allegiance to superiors but also the same allegiance to subordinates within a CO's Command. Loyalty builds trust and confidence, which in turn creates solidarity and team strength. Loyalty must be purposeful and not given lip service, as insincerity with respect to upward and downward loyalty is easily recognisable and can incur irreversible damage to the necessary need for trustworthiness, support and protection.

Integrity is the soundness of moral principle and character, uprightness and honesty. A CO, especially in the isolation of sea Command, must be above inference of immoral behaviour or conduct that could be interpreted as unbecoming or even dishonest. Leading by example provides ultimate guidance to a ship's company, therefore, integrity in conduct through honest and transparent work and social practices are required of a CO. A CO can never afford to have their integrity questioned.

Equity may well be interpreted as a more contemporary Command management consideration, however, equity has always existed in successful Commands within the RAN. Unfortunately, equity has been lacking in isolated cases, requiring remedial educational emphasis on the necessity of equity and diversity throughout the RAN. Equity, in terms of fairness and impartiality, is not a management consideration, but is indeed a principle of Command. A CO must not display fear or favour in leadership traits and management decisions, to ensure that the expectation of being treated fairly, equally and with respect by each individual is maintained.

The last of these Command principles is consistency. Consistency refers to the constant adherence to the Command principles already outlined and consistency in leadership and management practices. Inconsistency serves to produce a disjointed and disorientated Command, constantly on edge and drained of morale through a lack of clear and firm direction. Of course, consistency in poor Command practices is not what is being sought within this principle; rather, consistency in the application of the positive aspects of the Command Character Model is the aim. Such consistency infers stability and strength of character.

The Command Character Model is not designed to be prescriptive or final in its development. It is, however, designed to provide an understanding of the main characteristics required for effective and successful sea Command.

Conclusion

Although differing avenues are taken towards major sea Command, either through minor Command, XO of a major Command or a combination of both, an officer must gain sound leadership and management experience prior to that event. Command leadership and management must be considered and effective, whilst being underpinned with a set of robust Command principles, in order to not only be effective as a CO, but be successful in every aspect of the requirements of sea Command. Sea Command is unique in its life and death purpose, operating in peacetime and in conflict. Therefore, the CO of a warship must be an officer of the highest calibre and quality to justly be entrusted with such an important and unique responsibility.

[3] JD Watkins, 'The Principle of Command' *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, July 1974, pp. 32-33.

The preparation of officers for the position of sea Command should entail career education and guidance towards understanding a recommended optimum model of CO characteristics in which to aspire to. A model such as the Command Character Model emphasises the importance of the right leadership, management and principles for sea Command, providing an optimum character model for a potential CO to strive towards criteria by which to select a CO.

The modelling of a future CO necessarily requires direction and education to ensure that naval officers are provided with every opportunity to achieve optimum Command characteristics. These optimum Command characteristics should also be utilised; not only for officer education but also in ensuring the best officers are selected by the RAN to effectively and successfully command its ships and people.

About the Author

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This year the RAN introduced standing Flotilla commanders and this arrangement is being tested in the Arabian Gulf. The Canadian Forces (CF) have had a longer experience with a similar concept as Laura Higgins explains.[1]

The Task Group (TG) concept is an integral part of Canadian naval strategy and is the basis for the development and application of naval capability. If the Maritime Command of the CF is expected to continue to contribute to the realisation of national domestic and foreign and security policy objectives, it is pragmatic to pursue the concept within which the broadest scope of objectives can be met. A complete TG, as outlined in Canadian defence policy, is designed to reduce weaknesses and vulnerability by increasing the overall capability provided, which ideally contains a variety of vessels with different capacities.

The pattern of global conflict and development, as well as the domestic environment, suggests that the requirements of the CF in the near future will continue to follow the lines set out by the activities and experiences of the past few years. To determine the applicability of the TG in the future, operations of the past ten years (1990-2000), where characteristics of the TG concept were applied will be discussed. The application of the TG concept in these situations will be identified and these characteristics will be applied to the picture of future Canadian TG (CDN TG) applications. The capability components that will dictate the successful applicability of the CDN TG will also be identified. Ultimately, the goal is to demonstrate why the TG concept is a functional focus for naval strategy today and in the future.

[1] The views expressed in this article are those of the author and should not be attributed to Maritime Command or the Department of National Defence.

The Task Group Concept

The basic requirement for maritime forces in the current international environment is flexibility. There is a need for flexibility of the individual units, as well as the necessary ability of the CF to deploy the best mix of ships, submarines and aircraft to undertake whatever task the Government determines.[2] Also increasingly vital is the need for interoperability, especially with the US, given the more frequent joint and combined operations. These requirements are best met through the application of a national TG, organised and designed to include a mix of capabilities that are crucial to specific missions.

It is important to note that the concept of the national TG as a theoretical entity. Its application in CF planning and training are the most important factors. This is what creates the foundation for Canadian naval operations in a national TG or within a multilateral TG. The CDN TG will likely operate as a self-supporting unit in domestic operations and international multilateral exercises, but at the international level, crises or contingency operation support will probably follow the pattern of Canadian ship contributions to multinational TGs.

The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine states that a TG is a group of warships whose individual characteristics are combined to provide a mutually supportive suite of offensive and defensive capabilities. To accomplish this, a TG should possess an array of surface, air and sub-surface assets that function as a whole and allow the group to operate at higher threat levels where conditions would be beyond the capability of a single ship.[3] The CDN TG concept reflects that of the RN and, as identified in the 1994 *Defence White Paper*, calls for the maintenance of two multi-purpose, combat capable naval TGs. The could be comprised of up to four combatants made up of any combination of *Halifax* class frigates (FFH), *Iroquois* class destroyers (DDG), and *Victoria* class submarines, with a support ship and appropriate maritime air support.[4] While individual platforms may be oriented towards specific types of tasks, the overall force must be structured to provide a balanced or full range of capability.[5] Rear-Admiral David Morse states that the TG concept is a subtle one in which the grouping of capabilities is formed in response to the mission rather than to a predetermined format.[6] Each platform contributes to the applicability of the TG and creates a force that is the critical mass of warfare capabilities at sea.

Joint and Combined interoperability, is the other important factor. TG functions are impossible without interoperability. *Defence Planning Guidance 2000* directs the CF to meet Defence Objective 4 (participation in bilateral and multilateral operations) "by maintaining the ability to operate effectively at sea, on land, in the air and in space with the military forces of allies and in particular the US."[7] Maintaining a CDN TG provides the basis for retaining Canadian control over its own ships in multinational operations and provides the commander with the necessary experience and abilities to exercise sea control, either independently, or in conjunction with forces from other navies.[8]

Current Thought on Task Groups

The 1994 Canadian *Defence White Paper*, recognises that "the Government believes that combat training, undertaken on a national basis as well as with allies remains the best foundation for the participation of the CF in multilateral operations," and acknowledges that, "...[i]n situations short of war, such training equips CF personnel with the complete range of skills that may be needed to meet the varied demands of the unexpected situations they will encounter".[9] The Navy has translated this policy as a commitment to maintain the TG focus, which is reflected in the strategic policy

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[2] Fred W Crickard and Peter T Haydon, *Why Canada Needs Maritime Forces*, Naval Officers' Association, Napier Publishing Inc, 1994, p. 28.

[3] Royal Navy, *The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine*, HMSO, London, 1995, p. 58.

[4] Department of National Defence (DND) *1994 Defence White Paper*, Canada Communications Group, Ottawa, 1994, p. 38.

[5] Department of National Defence, *The Naval Vision - Charting the Course for Canada's Maritime Forces Into the 21st Century*, Ottawa, May 1994, p. 19.

[6] Rear-Admiral David Morse, 'The Canadian Naval Task Group' in Ann L Griffiths, Peter T Haydon, and Richard H Gimblett (eds), *Canadian Gunboat Diplomacy: The Canadian Navy and Foreign Policy*, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax, 2000, p. 288.

[7] As quoted in Command and Control and Area Air Defence (CADRE) Concept Definition/Concept of Employment Report, DGMDO, 15 February 2000.

[8] *MARCOM Defence Planning Guidance 2000*, as quoted in the CADRE Report.

[9] DND, *1994 Defence White Paper*, p. 34.

documents *The Naval Vision* and *Leadmark. The Naval Vision* states that there is no realistic alternative to the concept of balanced capabilities within the Navy. The removal of one component will result in the forfeiture of capabilities significantly greater than just that of a single unit and, as a consequence, results in a loss of capability out of proportion to that of the individual units withdrawn. "Only the TG as a whole incorporates the full range of capabilities needed to respond to the overall challenge",[10] facing the CF.

One of the concepts crucial to the current thinking on TGs is that of the Tactically Self-Sufficient Unit (TSSU). A TSSU must be modular and adaptable, capable of integrating into a combined force with other international and national forces,[11] and able to conduct up to medium intensity operations to make a military contribution to an operation that is sufficiently relevant to be identified as Canadian. A naval TG is one example of a TSSU; the various ships that form a TG are capable of sea control in a limited area and therefore can make a tactically valuable contribution to an alliance operation.[12] Each ship within the TG provides unique capabilities and the combination of their capabilities creates a synergy that multiplies their effectiveness. However, it can also be argued that even one ship is a TSSU. One example is the FFH, which has sufficient capabilities to provide an effective contribution to an operation of limited sea control on its own, or as part of a force projection operation when combined with a multinational fleet or integrated with a USN Carrier Battle Group (CVBG).[13]

This individual TSSU example can be used to extend the TG concept beyond the national context that is currently the predominant mindset within naval circles. A single Canadian ship deployed in a multinational TG contributes assets that allow the TG to operate at a higher level. This constitutes an application of CDN TG capabilities and produces an evolution of the TG context that will be of significant relevance to Canada in future operations.

TGs and the Past 10 Years

The practice of operating in an international TG is not new to Canada; NATO's Standing Naval Force Atlantic (SNFL) deployments throughout the Cold War functioned around this type of construct and still do so today. Canada retains a position in the command rotation of the combined SNFL TG, and the Canadian DDGs acted as the command and control platform during 1999-2000.

The 1994 *Defence White Paper* formulation of a CDN TG is still viable, but the TG that Canada provides is not likely to be an independent CDN TG operating on an international stage. Rather, Canadian maritime forces are more likely to participate in combined/joint operations in which their contribution constitutes an easily recognisable single or multiple Canadian ship contingent. Operationally, the TG concept has been validated through a number of international events and crises in the 1990s not the least of which was the deployment of a CDN TG (three ships) to the Persian Gulf in support of Operation *Friction* in 1990-91. Other international multilateral operations of note where the TG concept was fundamental in their success include Operation *Forward Action* off Haiti (1993), and Operation *Sharp Guard* (1993-1996) in the Adriatic Sea.

Operations

During the Gulf War, the CDN TG (comprising a DDG, a refitted *Restigouche* class frigate, five Sea Kings, and an AOR), found itself taking on a crucial logistics/support command and control role; while the navy TG Commander commanded the multinational logistical force.[14] This responsibility was unique among non-American force commanders and can be attributed both to the experience of the CF and personnel, compatible communications, and the credibility that had been gained throughout previous years of combined TG operations and exercises with the USN and NATO's maritime forces. The CDN TG, in addition to its logistical support role, contributed to the UN sanctions enforcement against Iraq conducting

[10] DND, *The Naval Vision*, p. 19.
[11] Department of National Defence, *Strategic Capability Planning for the CF*, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, Ottawa, 2000, p. 18.
[12] DND, *Strategic Capability Planning for the CF*, p. 19.
[13] ibid.

[14] See Major Jean Morin and Lieutenant-Commander Richard Gimblett, *The Canadian Forces in the Persian Gulf - Operation Friction 1990-1991*, Dundurn Press, Toronto, 1997; and Commodore Duncan (Dusty) E Miller and Sharon Hobson, *The Persian Excursion - The Canadian Navy in the Gulf War* The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, Clementsport, NS, 1995.

Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO). Since 1991, Canada has participated in the ongoing sanction enforcement against Iraq, both in the Red Sea and in the Arabian Gulf. These deployments have evolved into the full integration of a Canadian warship into an American Surface Action Group or CVBG. These operations are a major commitment for the CF; they require extensive pre-deployment training to achieve full interoperability as well as a considerable amount of resources. Canada's previous experiences working with the USN serve as the starting point for these operations.[15] These operations expand Canada-US relations, increase Canada's interoperability with the US, and provide training and developmental experiences that add credibility and prestige to the Navy.

In October 1993, a three ship CDN TG joined US ships off Haiti to ensure the enforcement of UN Security Council Resolutions 841 and 875. This was achieved through the interception, inspection and clearance or diversion of all shippping destined for Haiti.[16] The CDN TG operated in conjunction with the US ships in theatre until oher countries' contributions arrived, after which one Canadian vessel remained in the multinational force to maintain a firm and visible presence off the coast.[17]

The initial Canadian contributions to Operation *Sharp Guard* in the Adriatic Sea between 1993 and 1996 occurred in conjunction with Canada's commitment and contribution to the SNFL. The sea control and denial objectives that were achieved during *Sharp Guard* confirmed that interoperability, especially NATO interoperability, is a significant asset and force multiplier in multinational contingency operations. CF provided nine different vessels plus two CP-140 Aurora Maritime Patrol Aircraft over the course of the operation, operated in conjunction with other forces in the area to contain the hostilities and contributed to the operation as salient and respected components of the operation.[18]

The TG concept has also been utilised for domestic operations. During operations off the West Coast in 1999, numerous CF resources, such as Auroras, *Kingston* class maritime coastal defence vessels (MCDV) and larger warships with embarked helicopters were used to identify, track and respond to situations that arose during an influx of illegal Chinese immigrants. During the summer of 2000, a two-ship contingent was deployed to address the GTS *Katie* situation in the Atlantic just outside Canadian waters. The TG definition applies in this context because the combined resources and capabilities of the two ships, HMC Ships *Athabaskan* and *Montreal*, enabled a strong synchronous statement of national intent and supported Canada's national interests.

Only the Task Group as a whole incorporates the full range of capabilities needed to respond to the overall challenge.

Operation *Deliverance* off the coast of Somalia, and Operation *Toucan* in East Timor are examples of single ship responses to crises and operations within a combined Task Force in theatre, which drew upon experiences within CDN TG applications.

When HMCS *Preserver* was deployed to the eastern coast of Africa in 1992 its task was to support the joint/combined operation in Somalia, first under UN auspices, then under the American-led coalition. In Somalia, the Canadian presence demonstrated the benefits of the inherent jointness that the TG embodies. The ship was the preliminary location for the Joint Headquarters. Sailors provided twenty-four hour security over stores on the ground and participated in humanitarian aid projects, re-

[15] Doug Thomas, "Canadian Maritime Operations in the 1990s in *Maritime Affairs*, Commemorative Issue, Spring/Summer 2000, p. 32.
[16] ibid, p. 30.
[17] ibid.

[18] Sean M Maloney, *The Hindrance of Military Operations Ashore: Canadian Participation in Operation Sharp Guard, 1993-1996*, Maritime Security Occasional Paper No. 7, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax, 2000, p. 59.

building schools, hospitals, and critical infrastructure; the ship acted as a technological support centre for NGOs in the region and *Preserver*'s organic air component was fundamental to the successes of the Canadian contingent. The embarked Sea Kings acted as medium lift vehicles and transferred supplies for the advance party to shore, they also acted as transport vehicles for the Theatre Commander. In addition, due to the forward-looking infrared (FLIR) capabilities of the Sea Kings, the only airborne FLIR capability in theatre, the Canadian helicopters were used over land for intelligence gathering on day, and especially night, missions over the Canadian area of responsibility and beyond. The employment of the Sea King in support of the land mission illustrates the flexibility, as well as the possibilities, for TG deployments in the future.

In 1999, the Canadian Government committed an AOR as Canada's contribution to peacekeeping and humanitarian initiatives in East Timor. HMCS *Protecteur* became the fuel pipeline for the entire Australian-led coalition effort, providing vital logistic support both ashore and offshore. The presence of the Canadian AOR was crucial and allowed the coalition fleet to remain in the area and assert its presence to the Timorese militia and the Indonesian Army.

Exercises

In addition to an operational template, the CDN TG concept functions as a preparedness, readiness and training framework. Some training is possible and required as a single unit, but much is done with at least one other vessel, regardless of its nationality. These exercises set the stage for Canadian participation in multinational combined/joint TG operations. Large-scale international, multilateral exercises include:

- NATO training exercises;
- PACEX, with navies from Pacific-oriented countries;
- RIMPAC exercises, which draws participation from interested navies from Pacific countries out of Pearl Harbour;
- TANDEM THRUST, which is a US-Australian initiated exercise;
- UNIFIED SPIRIT, which is an American led exercise in the Atlantic; and
- MARCOT, a Canadian maritime exercise, which alternates annually between the two coasts.

On a smaller scale, Canada undertakes bilateral exercises with interested countries, for example the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) or the Republic of Korea's Navy. The CF also exercises on a regular basis with the USN. These smaller scale exercises can also be multilateral in nature, like those that include the USN, JMSDF, and the CF. All of the skills practiced in these exercises can be applied to operations that are current or were required during the past ten years. In addition, the contact initiated and maintained through these exercises contributes to multinational naval cooperation and advance Canadian national objectives in a number of areas.

There is also TG training opportunities that Canada undertakes within a national context. Ships and embarked Sea Kings join in formation and conduct MIO or other operational training procedures - often supported by Auroras. These exercises are quite often double tasked with patrol duty. The ships practice a variety of procedures, including:

- coming alongside a merchant vessel;
- articulating an intention to board;
- dealing with a belligerent vessel;
- firing warning shots across the bow;
- employing organic air resources to enforce presence and board the vessel in question; and
- conducting boarding party training by running through boarding party protocol and practices to conduct inspections of suspicious vessels.

Task Group Results - 'Lessons Learned'

From the examples cited, it is concluded that the TG concept has found relevant application in the national and international security environments since the end of the Cold War, both within and outside the familiar NATO framework. It is difficult to cite an example where the TG concept does not have relevance, especially in an international context. Since the Gulf deployment, CF ships have remained active in TG oriented exercises and operations. NATO operations and the SNFL have maintained their importance in the deployment schedule, with continued ship contributions to the fleet. Internationally, the TG concept has

allowed Canada to support official Track I as well as Track II diplomatic actions and strengthen relationships with other countries, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. The existence and practice of the TG concept provides opportunities to future Canadian multinational commanders to gain experience operating in a TG environment. The inclusion of the TG concept in Canadian doctrine and the application in domestic operations provides the foundation for TG command and control opportunities in multilateral exercises and operations. Training in this bilateral or multilateral environment through large- or small-scale exercises prepares the CF and international forces for real-world crises, which are increasingly likely to elicit a combined response. With this in mind, training and operational defence planning have maintained the TG as a core concept of the CF's current and future force structure.

The benefits accrued from operations and training within a TG concept go beyond being able to chalk up a successful mission. The interoperability aspect of exercising or operating as a naval TG creates opportunities to expand other areas of defence policy and extends to foreign policy objectives, cultural understanding, and trade. Other navies working with the CF have the opportunity to observe Canadian equipment and operational practices. They may be inclined to purchase equipment or emulate certain practices with a view to defence sales and common doctrine. Some analysts and practitioners have even argued that the CF can act as a representative of and role model for professional armed forces and medium power navies, which may 'rub off' on those they make a good impression on.[19]

Task Groups in the Future

In *Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020* it is predicted that the next 20 years will not see the rise of a peer competitor to the US or a notable narrowing of Canada's broadened security agenda. This prediction makes it possible to conclude that the focus of naval strategy will remain rooted in the concepts of combat-capable, interoperable and rapidly deployable task-tailored forces;[20] functions which can be met through the application of the TG concept.

Leadmark speculates that the Maritime Command of the CF must retain its competence in TG operations because future operations will become more multinational and largely littoral in nature.[21] In order to operate effectively in this environment, it will be necessary to maintain TG capabilities that offer a broad range of military and political options in a fully interoperable manner. The capabilities required to accomplish this are:

- Command and Control;
- Self-Defence;
- Fleet Replenishment;
- Multipurpose capabilities; and
- Littoral Component Capabilities.

Command and Control - C2

Successful participation in current international operations requires the ability to attain information superiority in theatre. Future C2 capabilities will require the ability to handle large amounts of in-theatre information. The TG must be able to contribute to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations to build a common operational picture. Integral to this capability is technology that is interoperable with allied forces, and the ability to communicate information between units in theatre. Any future mission is likely to be joint and/or combined, so the ability of the TG to accommodate an embarked Joint Headquarters or a Maritime Component Commander is also an important aspect of future C2 capabilities.

C2 functions are vital. They enable the CF to conduct its own operations. They are also the mechanism through which command of multinational forces can be exercised. These skills have been honed by the CF through years of experience and combined exercises with the USN and NATO forces. The majority of C2 capabilities are located in the DDGs. The two vessels located on the East Coast were upgraded last year to function as SNFL C2 platforms. As these platforms age, their reliability diminishes. A plan for replacement of this capability being discussed by the DND is called the Command and Control and Area Air

[19] Suggestion taken from personal interview conducted by the author.

[20] Defence Planning Guidance 2000 states in the Vision Statement that "the Defence team will generate, employ and sustain high quality, combat capable, inter-operable and rapidly deployable task-tailored forces".

[21] Department of National Defence, *Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020*, Ottawa 2001pp. 67-9.

Defence Replacement - CADRE. The discussions about CADRE have been careful to concentrate on those capabilities that will be necessary for maritime forces to operate as a TG.[22] Whichever replacement path is taken, this capability is a requirement for Canada to assure its place in the decision-making process within multinational forces. Without this capability, the CF will lose its ability to provide meaningful input into evolving allied doctrinal and tactical changes.[23]

Self-Defence

Operations of the future, if they follow current trend patterns, will increasingly take place in littoral areas. This increases potential threats to vessels and the probability of encountering threats requiring self-defence in theatre. Shorter distances from land mean that a number of air threats are possible, many more than in a blue-water campaign, in addition to surface and sub-surface threats. Any vessel in the CF needs to be able to perform its offensive mission as well as confront and survive (at least marginally) potential threats that may be encountered in future operations. In order to accomplish this, each unit must possess a multi-dimensional self-defence capability. The survivability of an independent unit depends ultimately on the platform's ability to deny the potential enemy the ability to conduct an effective attack.[24] The presence of a TG with its diversified capabilities incrementally increases the chances of survival.

Also included in the CADRE framework is a proposal for Area Air Defence. This capability extends beyond the protection of the CDN TG to a wider area and allows the CTG to determine when an adversary has stepped over the line from threat to hostile action and react accordingly. An important aspect of this capability includes the ability of the CTG to collect and process information in theatre, as well as relay and receive information from the national authority. This relies heavily on the Command and Control and ISR capabilities of the deployed forces.

Other self-defence force multipliers include a fleet structure working in theatre creating a synergy and covering all threats. The diversified nature of a TG should provide the necessary coverage and support for all vessels.

Fleet Replenishment

The replenishment vessel of a TG is often the most vulnerable in theatre. However, the presence of a fleet replenishment capability is a key force multiplier since the TG would be unsustainable without it. Recent operations in Somalia and East Timor have shown that some regions may not have all the port facilities or infrastructure necessary to support operations. Situations such as this require support of both onshore and offshore operations from the sea, almost certainly in a joint/combined context. A concept development process is underway to create an Afloat Logistics and Sealift Capability to replace the current pair of AOR, which are nearing the end of their operational lives. The future of the CDN TG concept rests heavily, on the replacement of this capability.

Multipurpose Capabilities

Multipurpose capabilities are the primary purpose of constructing a TG and operating within the broader concept. The presence of multiple platforms, which contain varied, but uniquely critical capabilities is the foundation of the TG concept. The FFH are considered to be multi-purpose platforms, and their abilities are gaining greater appreciation throughout the global naval community. Their value can be interpreted through their ability to replace an USN vessel in a carrier battle group on a one-to-one basis. As a result, the current trend of increased FFH employment with multinational formations is expected to continue, if not increase further.[25] There are plans underway to initiate the Frigate Equipment Life Extension Program (FELEX), in order to maintain the current combat-capable, multi-role function of the FFH to be able to counter the forecasted threat of 2025.[26]

The structure of this project has yet to be defined. It will however, include measures to ensure the safety, maintainability and supportability of the hull and machinery to permit it to operate for the remaining effective life of the platform. It is also likely that the combat equipment will be upgraded, in order to permit the FFH to maintain their combat capability in the face of an evolved threat. New

[22] CADRE Report
[23] DND, *Leadmark*, pp. 67-9.
[24] CADRE Report 6.6.1
[25] DND, *Leadmark*, pp. 67-9.
[26] Capt (N) D McFadden.

or upgraded radars, missiles, electronic support and countermeasures systems, and a low frequency passive sonar system are all being considered as components of this process. Perhaps most significant is the proposal to upgrade the ships' on board command and control system to improve the volume of data handling, the speed of decision making, and interoperability with allied forces. The multipurpose scope of the FFH, and therefore the CDN TG capabilities of the immediate future, will be defined by how much of this is possible.

Littoral Component Capabilities

The trend of conflict and operations increasingly occurring in littoral areas has already been discussed. The MCDV and the new diesel submarine capabilities must be integrated into the CDN TG construct. The MCDV were developed with shallow water/littoral niche capabilities in mind so the presence and utility of this capability is not surprising. Perhaps more unexpected is the role that the new *Victoria* class submarines can fulfil in littoral areas. "They are particularly suited for inshore operations, making them a unique and potentially essential component for allied forces operating in the littoral." Canada's principal maritime allies, the RN and the USN, maintain only nuclear submarine capabilities, which have limited operational capabilities in shallow water due to associated risks.[27]

The CF's success in operations as part of a multinational TG is apparent when examining the actions in which it has participated over the past 10 years. However, its ability to continue to apply the TG concept will depend on its adaptability to advancing technology and the maintenance of the noted characteristics. These factors not only affect TG flexibility, but also the ability of the CF to remain interoperable with the US and our major allies - the two key foundations of the concept.

Conclusion

Canada's recent naval experiences suggest that in the future Canada will find itself operating with many nations in addition to traditional NATO allies. Just ten years ago, the likelihood of military cooperation with some of these countries would have been judged as remote at best. The TG concept in Canadian context is an ideal. The CDN TG is realistically unable to function alone in an international operation and future CDN TG deployments on an international level will be rare. The TG should be viewed as a component that will deploy and provide an integral unit in a combined operation. The principles of the concept will be applied to definitive single ship deployments in joint/combined operations, but the capabilities required to field a CDN TG are necessary to successfully participate in multinational TG operations. Exercising and operating with the TG construct in mind, even on a unilateral basis, allows familiarity with the TG concept, maintains preparedness and readiness levels required to operate effectively and expediently, and develops a teamwork mentality that is valuable when employed in real world multilateral contingencies. When expressed in real world applications, operations which followed the TG concept yielded satisfactory results and allowed the CF to increase and maintain its operational credibility and utility.

About the Author

Laura J Higgins received a Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of Calgary, Alberta and holds a Master of Arts degree from Dalhousie University, Nova Scotia. Ms Higgins has researched recent Canadian naval operations and conducted research onboard a Canadian frigate operating with a US CVBG in the Persian Gulf in June 2001. She currently works for the Department of National Defence in Ottawa.

[27] DND, *Leadmark*, pp. 67-9.

THE RNZN: A CLEAR FUTURE!

By
Commander Richard Jackson, RNZN (Rtd)

The New Zealand Government's decisions on the future force structure of the RNZN, announced on 23 January, marks the end of a five-year period of uncertainty.

The *Maritime Forces Review*,[1] which was publicly released the same day, will now be a key policy document for defence planners, underpinning the Navy's operational focus as well as its capital equipment plans.

Our Government has committed itself to a practical naval fleet with five specific force elements:

- A naval combat force of two *Anzac* class frigates.
- A naval support force of a naval tanker (HMNZS *Endevour*) and a future Multi-Role Vessel (MRV) with tactical sealift capabilities.
- A naval patrol force with inshore, EEZ and ocean surveillance and response capabilities.
- An MCM force of diving support (HMNZS *Manawanui*) and Q-route survey craft (the current Inshore Patrol Craft) and an Operational Diving Team.
- A naval hydrographic force (which has been undergoing a separate review).

The decision on the naval combat force is particularly important. Much of the RNZN's force structure uncertainty occurred from 1997, when a previous government declined to accept the plan for ordering two more *Anzac* classs frigates (as allowed under the Anzac Ship Treaty between NZ and Australia). Back then, the first of our two new frigates had not yet sailed into NZ ports, NZ's extensive industrial involvement was still largely unappreciated and the Navy's combat element was also the subject of political debate. Despite some determined initiatives by Tenix and some innovative solutions suggested by the RAN, as well as the strong case put forward from Defence Headquarters, it became clear that a new frigate

[1] The Maritime Forces Review is available online at www.defence.govt.nz or www.navy.mil.nz

(the argument was no longer about two!) was unlikely to have much parliamentary support. Certainly the current Government, soon after taking power, gave a clear signal that the RNZN should not expect a third frigate.

The dilemma for defence planners during 2000 was to anticipate the way government policy would develop. The first indications came with the release of the *Defence Policy Framework* in June 2000.[2] This document gave priority to force elements that are "trained, equipped and maintained at appropriate levels of combat viability and readiness." One of the principles adopted to guide the reshaping of the NZDF was that it should be "equipped and trained for combat and peacekeeping".

On 8 May 2001 the Government announced the way ahead for the NZDF,[3] including the statement that "the 2 *Anzac* frigates will continue in service." However, the main decision from Naval Staff's point of view was the announcement of another review - the Maritime Surface Fleet Review (which subsequently became known as the Maritime Forces Review). At the same time the *Maritime Patrol Review* was publicly released, which had specifically focused on the civil maritime tasks required by other government departments. The 2001 *Maritime Patrol Review*, as a precursor to the 2002 *Maritime Forces Review*, was initiated to incorporate the present Government's 'whole of government' approach to major policy decisions.

The Maritime Forces Review team was led by the civilian MOD, but with a good naval involvement and clear lines of communication and consultation to HQNZDF and the Naval Staff. While the issue of asserting national authority over our EEZ and adjacent ocean regions was a major focus of the review team, the review process enabled the case for combat-capable naval force elements to be restated. Events aided the naval case, as well. In June 2000 the Solomon Islands erupted into lawlessness, and HMNZS *Te Mana* was the first combatant on the spot (just after HMAS *Tobruk*). HMNZS *Te Kaha* later relieved *Te Mana* in the Solomons, and subsequently hosted the first of a series of peace talks between the factions. Since the resultant Townsville Peace Agreement, the RAN and RNZN maintained a naval presence in the Solomons (until recently). At a policy level, these events underlined the versatility, relevance and responsiveness of warships. Certainly by early 2001, Cabinet was well aware of the value of the frigates in delivering military outputs.

The terrorist attack of 11 September 2001 also changed the atmosphere within Wellington; the strategic environment had changed and the unthinkable now could happen. A multi-party commitment by our Parliament to the War against Terrorism was proof of a significant shift in political attitudes in NZ. The largely sea-based immediate response by the United States, Canada, Britain and Australia to the terror attacks further underlined the value, versatility and responsiveness of naval forces.

Hence, when the *Maritime Forces Review* was released in January, there was almost no public controversy - a refreshing change after five years of debate. Specifically, the retention of a naval combat force of our two *Anzac* class frigates was widely accepted - although the implication of a 2 frigate force is, as the *Review* noted, that within any 12 month period we would now be limited to deploying just one ship for only 6 months. This limitation will impact on the RNZN's capacity to sustain its contributions to multinational operations. However, much of the Maritime Forces Review focuses on the constabulary tasks for the RNZN as these were the least well defined area of naval requirements.

The Maritime Forces Review

The *Maritime Forces Review* had specific terms of reference, in addition to the military and foreign policy related uses of naval vessels (ie NZ's strategic interests and defence obligations), and the *Review* also had to take into account the recommendations of the *Maritime Patrol Review*, in particular:

- The civilian requirement for coastal and mid-range offshore capabilities.

[2] RT Jackson, 'Public Consultation and Defence Policy Making - An Anzac Contrast', *Journal of the ANI*, Summer 2000-2001.

[3] P McHaffie, 'The RNZN - Its Future Direction, *Journal of the ANI*, Autumn-Winter 2001.

- The roles to be performed in conjunction with New Zealand's responsibilities and obligations in respect to the Southern Ocean and Ross Dependency.
- The need for an appropriate sealift capability, including the use of such a capability for disaster relief and other tasks in the South Pacific.
- The need for, and priority to be accorded to, the roles performed by the RNZNVR.

The *Review* explains the rationale behind New Zealand's naval combat force. The **Naval Combat Force** is required to undertake the most demanding military tasks. These include providing for the defence of New Zealand and its territorial waters and EEZ, meeting our alliance commitments to Australia including responding to South Pacific and Southern Ocean contingencies across a broad front, meeting our Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) obligations and contributing to UN and other multilateral peace support operations. The ships of the Naval Combat Force also demonstrate New Zealand's commitment to regional and global security through ship visits and training and exercises with other countries. With the disbandment of the Air Combat Force the ability of the Naval Combat Force to participate in FPDA activities will take on added importance.

There are two elements to the **Naval Support Force**. The first is the provision of underway replenishment of deployed forces, currently provided by the fleet tanker, HMNZS *Endeavour*. The second is the provision of a sealift capability for the transport and deployment of equipment, vehicles and personnel without access to a port. No RNZN capacity currently exists. An MRV that is able to meet a range of roles in our region, such as: responding to natural disasters in the South Pacific; undertaking humanitarian relief operations; participating in peace support operations; military support activities; and contributing to development assistance in the South Pacific; should also have a tactical sealift capacity.

The **Naval Patrol Force** is required to conduct maritime surveillance, in conjunction with maritime air patrol assets, in the New Zealand EEZ, to assist South Pacific Island states to patrol their EEZs, and in the Southern Ocean. The surveillance tasks are primarily non-military in support of civilian agencies. These tasks can be grouped as *inshore tasks* that cover the area from the shoreline to about 24 nautical miles; *offshore tasks* that extend to the limit of New Zealand's EEZ; tasks in the South Pacific; and Southern Ocean tasks.

The **Mine Countermeasures and Diving Support Force** is required to provide mine countermeasures and clearance diving support capabilities. The requirement is to protect New Zealand's seven major ports through the development of safe routes into them; the maintenance of a route survey database; the development of a capacity to dispose of mines and other explosives underwater; and by practicing the skills necessary to lead merchant ships through cleared access routes into the ports.

A **Hydrographic Service** provides hydrographic survey and associated services to the NZDF, Land Information New Zealand (LINZ) and other civilian agencies (this is the subject of a separate review and is not addressed further in the *Maritime Forces Review*).

The *Maritime Forces Review* concluded that the Naval Combat Force, supported by *Endeavour*, should be devoted to primarily military tasks in the achievement of the Government's global and regional security

The terrorist attack of September 11 2001 also changed the atmosphere within Wellington; the strategic environment had changed and the unthinkable now could happen.

objectives. There would be some capacity to respond to patrol tasks that may arise during training.

Given the growing requirement for national response capabilities across the Southwest Pacific region and the limitations in port facilities in the South Pacific (as well as parts of Southeast Asia), there is a requirement for the RNZN to be able to off-load people and equipment without access to a port facility. The civilian requirement could include the delivery of heavy equipment such as bulldozers for disaster relief. The military requirement for sealift includes the transport of the Army's light armoured vehicles. The requirement to deliver onshore heavy equipment will influence the design of the proposed MRV.

The *Maritime Forces Review* has confirmed that patrol capabilities are required to conduct maritime surveillance, in conjunction with maritime air patrol assets, in our EEZ, to assist South Pacific Island states patrol their EEZs, and in the Southern Ocean. Surface surveillance provided by the Naval Patrol Force would complement aerial surveillance and other sources of information.

Although aircraft are the most cost-effective method of providing surveillance over a large area, surface vessels are required to maintain a physical presence and provide enforcement. They provide the capability to board, inspect, and arrest or conduct hot pursuit of offending vessels that may be engaged in illegal or unregulated activities and would be interoperable with maritime patrol aircraft. Their presence also serves to deter would-be offenders and demonstrate New Zealand's will to protect its territorial sovereignty and natural resources.

There are several agencies with surface patrol requirements, including the Ministry of Fisheries, the Customs Service, the Maritime Safety Authority (MSA), Police, and the Department of Conservation (DoC). The tasks required of the Navy by civilian agencies include surveillance; monitoring; boarding and inspection of vessels; arrest; hot pursuit of vessels beyond the EEZ; finding and retrieving items from the sea floor; detecting and responding to marine oil spill incidents; conducting search and rescue operations; providing limited towage facilities; and observing and recording marine species. There is also a sealift requirement for transport of personnel and supplies to remote DoC bases such as Raoul Island.

Tasks in the northern half of the EEZ (north of and including the Marlborough Sounds and Tasman Bay) are almost all inshore, while tasks in the southern half of the EEZ are mostly offshore (out to the limits of our EEZ). The level of activity in the north remains relatively constant during the year. Activity almost doubles in the south during winter, coinciding with the worst sea states.

The *Review* concluded that most of our national maritime patrol requirements can be met by two offshore patrol vessels - long endurance ships with helicopter facilities and sufficient speed to meet response requirements. Four or five Inshore Patrol Vessels are required to meet inshore tasks; one option may be to upgrade our current IPCs as an interim solution.

What next?

The NZ Ministry of Defence is preparing a set of output-based statements for both the MRV and patrol requirements, to identify the functions that potential vessels must perform and the standards and conditions to which those functions are required to be performed. These functional statements are being provided to industry to allow for a range of alternative vessel options and acquisition strategies to be developed that can be acquired within the set financial limitation. Following the identification of feasible options, the MoD will report back to the NZ Government with specific proposals for acquisition.

Because HMNZS *Canterbury* is an important factor in the RNZN's sea training capacity, the *Review* makes clear that the proposed MRV must also be able to offer a significant naval training capability. Thus the life remaining in *Canterbury* is a major factor in the timetable for the MRV acquisition; to ensure that there is no loss in training capability within the Navy, a smooth transition from *Canterbury* to the MRV will be necessary

The *Review* states that to be fiscally sustainable, capital acquisition costs must not exceed NZ$500 million and operating costs must be accommodated within the NZDF baselines that were set as part of the 2001

Budget. Initial rough order of magnitude costing suggest that within this ceiling it is possible to acquire:

- a MRV to replace *Canterbury* at a maximum cost of $US100 million,
- at least two offshore patrol vessels, and
- to upgrade the Navy's existing fleet of five Inshore Patrol Craft (IPC) so that they are able to provide some capability to meet the inshore patrol requirements of civilian agencies.

The *Review* notes that this is considered a minimum option and would leave some gaps. Replacing the existing IPCs with fast inshore patrol boats would be a longer term objective.

Comment

In my opinion, the *Maritime Forces Review* is an important policy document, which will underpin the roles and purpose of the RNZN for some years ahead. While the *Review* spends much time on the constabulary roles for the RNZN, it both integrates and endorses the Navy's frigate force.[4] It has clarified our national maritime tasks and explained the Navy's role, within the whole-of-government approach, to national maritime security and border protection. As a result the previously loud public debate has quietened, with a consequential improvement in self-confidence within the RNZN.

The *Review* confirms the central place of the Naval Combat Force, also but takes pains to discuss the whole-of-government responsibilities of the RNZN with its national maritime patrol and response capabilities. In a sensethe combat capabilities and diplomatic impact of, this element of the Navy will now be rebuilt, although the 21st Century environment (both physical and legal) for constabulary tasks is far more demanding than when the RNZN deployed *Bathurst* class minesweepers and patrol craft on similar duties during the four decades prior to 1990.

The most immediate impact of the *Review* will come from the MRV, which will have to be designed, built and enter service, in a tight time frame. The requirement for it to be able to land Army LAVs will clearly dominate the design. However there are some proponents of multi-role ships who could expect too much from the new ship. Industry will be faced with some high expectations as they develop their proposals.

Overall, the *Maritime Forces Review* is an important sea mark for the RNZN. It gives us a clear way ahead, endorses our 'practical' (multi-force element) fleet and leads to a new capital equipment plan. Perhaps most importantly, the *Review* has improved cross-party understanding in Parliament of the place of the Navy within the NZDF.

About the Author

Commander Richard Jackson RNZN (Rtd) had a 31-year naval career, before joining the NZDF as a civilian in the position of Deputy Naval Corporate Relations Manager. As a Midshipman, he gained a BSc at the US Naval Academy & later in his naval career earned an MPP from Victoria University of Wellington. After graduating from the Joint Services' Staff College, Canberra in 1996, his final naval posting was to the Directing Staff of the RAN Staff College, Sydney. He became a founder writer for the now defunct New Zealand Defence Quarterly & *is now the Editor of the RNZN magazine* **Navy Today**. *He has regularly contributed to* JANI & *other defence journals and to RAN and NZ military history conferences.*

[4] Of note, the *Maritime Forces Review* incorporates 'the triangle of sea use' as published in the RAN *Australian Maritime Doctrine* - a powerful way of illustrating the interconnectedness of naval operations.

Shiphandling Corner

Refuelling at Christmas Is

By Commander Ray Griggs, RAN

I thought it might be opportune to take a break from our wander through new ship classes in the RAN and to spend this issue having a look at the newest fuelling option available to the RAN in the Indian Ocean. This option presents as an achievable but nonetheless very interesting and satisfying evolution combining shiphandling, seamanship and engineering skills.

In recent months Christmas Island has, as we all know, become one of the foci for Operation RELEX; the ADF's contribution to the government's current border protection program. The dilemma of how to keep ships on station for extended periods was a vexed one for operational planners. This was particularly so given the range of other activities that needed to be supported around the globe late last year and the RAN's finite number of tanker assets. The answer came in the somewhat unconventional form of a couple of buoys, a cliff face, a floating hose, a modified non-return valve and a barge.

Christmas Island receives its own fuel supplies from a small commercial tanker which offloads through a floating hose over the cliff face at Smith Pt, tucked just around the corner from the Christmas Island port in Flying Fish Cove on the north eastern end of the island. A simple change to a non-return valve turned the facility into a gravity fed fuelling point that the RAN could suddenly exploit. At the same time it created an unexpected market opportunity for the facility's operators, GASENG Pty Ltd.

While I was writing this article I was told about an RNZN *Bathurst* class corvette which watered from the waterfalls in the 'sounds country' of the South Island after having tied the stern of the ship up to a tree. While Smith Pt doesn't quite conjure up the same visual splendour, I found sitting less than 40m off a cliff face for several hours at the mercy of a few lines and the wind, interesting enough to share.

An aerial shot of HMAS *Warramunga* fuelling at Smith Pt

Weather Patterns and their impact

For most of the year Christmas Island is affected by the SE trades, which blow between 15-25 knots. This flow provides reasonable protection for Smith Pt as there is no residual swell and the hills deflect the wind so that it largely runs along the line of the ship once secured.

From November onwards the trades are replaced by a traditional, and always unpredictable, monsoonal flow. Light SW-W winds predominate but the pattern is disrupted by passing depressions or tropical storms which result in (at times) significant north westerly swells that can close Flying Fish Cove for days or weeks on end.

HMAS *Arunta* during one of her three Smith Pt fuellings in late 2001

During the SE trade the fuelling point can be used with a high degree of reliability. During the monsoon it is essentially swell dependent; any NW swell at all turns the fuelling point into a lee shore situation and unacceptably increases the risk.

Arrangements

Figure 1 provides a good outline of the Smith Pt layout. The two outer buoys are large conventional buoys similar to those in Sydney harbour. A smaller inner buoy sits almost astern of the ship in the 'alongside' position. There are three shore securing points which are used in varying configurations dependant on ship length (to date *Tobruk* is the longest ship, military or commercial, to use the facility). The floating hose is then lowered on to one of the Christmas Island pusher barges which manoeuvres alongside to connect to the ship's fuelling connection.

The pumping rate is around 130-150 cubic metres an hour which, while slow for some, is certainly the best pumping rate going in the local area!



Figure 1: Arrangement of the Smith Pt facility

Shiphandling

The evolution is conducted in a number of discrete parts and with practice a ship can be ready to connect up to fuel from first line within about 30 minutes. I will describe the evolution for a non-bow thruster or APU fitted ship as this clearly involves the trickiest shiphandling.

The approach is straightforward enough, standard approach to the head buoy (this can be either the northern or southern buoy although all the RAN ships to date have used the southern buoy as the head buoy). *Arunta* connected up with the soft bridle following advice from *Adelaide* whose experiment with a hard bridle proved quite difficult to manage. Once the soft bridle is on the ship then comes astern and pays out the towing hawser to the after buoy. If the pusher barge is not required to keep you square during this part of the evolution it will run the line very efficiently otherwise the RHIB will do the trick albeit slightly slower.

The CI harbour master is keen to get ships to run the towing hawser to the stern buoy as the ship passes on the approach. While I could see the potential time saving I was not at all keen to be manoeuvring to connect up ahead with my towing hawser dangling astern.

Once middled up, the breast lines are run out using ship's RHIBs or the spare pusher barge if it is free. There are now purpose made lines made up and stored at Christmas Island for this evolution, before that however throughfooted berthing lines were used.

With these lines connected a combination of engine movements, a gentle push from the pusher barge and heaving in on the breast lines while paying out the lines to the outer buoys gets the ship moving in toward the cliff face.

Engines and the pusher barge are used only in the initial stages of this movement. The pusher barge can only push which means it needs to be repositioned on the other side if you require the opposite effect. The distances off the cliff simply do not allow enough time for this to occur.

Line handling coordination becomes critical in the latter phase of the ship moving into position, particularly as you have around 90 metres of line to the outer buoys. As you can imagine, with this amount of line, your response rate is very slow - lots of forward thinking required to get the ship to settle the right distance off and not overcook it, a good time for the XO to be right alongside Captain and Navigator.

Once alongside the southerly winds continued to push the ship back to the point where both engines were kept running between 2-3% ahead to keep everything in balance. Wind gusts have a disturbing visual impact as the ship's head needs only to pay off by 3-4° for things to look even closer than they are!

The key determinant for ship's positioning is the length of the flexible floating fuelling hose. GASENG are planning to extend the length of the hose which may even allow the fuelling to take place at the outer buoys; this would simplify this evolution considerably.

Departure from the facility can be very simple if there is an easterly component in the wind or very difficult if there is a westerly component and no free pusher barge to assist. The breast lines are disconnected and the ship heaves in on both lines to the outer buoys. The amount of purchase you get out of this again depends on ship's length and the relative leads on the lines. With a south easterly wind *Arunta* came off the cliff easily and settled between the outer buoys. At this point the after line was cast off, the stern screwed to seaward and then the soft bridle was cast off before conducting a sternboard clear to the north-west.

With a westerly component of wind, no matter how light, the initial move off the cliff face becomes more interesting. The spare pusher barge comes in handy at this point to push up forward while heaving in on the outer buoy lines and gently screwing the stern away from the cliff. The margins are such that this phase of the departure is as delicate as the final phase of the arrival particularly if you don't come off square.

Conclusion

While not an earth shatteringly difficult evolution it is nonetheless visually disturbing until you get used to it. The risks need to be very carefully assessed, particularly given the lack of repair facilities in the area or vessels to tow you out of trouble should it strike. Wind and swell remain the key issues and even when all the arrangements have been made, the shiphandler has to have a long hard look at the conditions on the day before committing to the approach. Notwithstanding, it is eminently achievable in the right conditions and provides excellent shiphandling and seamanship training in a real operational scenario. As a result of this evolution *Arunta* remained on station off Christmas Island for 41 days without tanker support and without having to leave the AO to fuel. While this didn't suit all onboard - from a mission perspective it was critical.

A view from ashore showing the fuelling barge in position with the floating hose visible

Feedback

Thanks to Gerry Wright from New Zealand making contact over the question I posed in the *Anzac* shiphandling article on what other classes of ships may have been configured with inward turning screws and a single rudder. Gerry advises the World War II *Bathurst* class corvettes had an identical configuration (sans the CPPs of course).

Please email me at 01a@f151.navy.gov.au if you have any feedback or suggestions.

BOOK REVIEWS

At War At Sea: Sailors and Naval Combat in the Twentieth Century



by Ronald H Spector
Viking Penguin: New York, 2001
hardcover,
xiv, 463 pp., illustrations, index,
RRP $51.00

This is a book that general readers have wanted and academics have needed for a long time. Ronald Spector is a former US Marine and Vietnam veteran, a former Director of Naval History for the USN, and a professor at George Washington University. Many naval historical readers will be familiar with his other works, including *Eagle Against the Sun*, which after fifteen years remains the best single volume history of the Pacific War, combining outstanding scholarship with popular accessibility.

These qualities are again displayed in *At War At Sea*, which is in fact two books in one, depending upon how it is read. It is simultaneously a first-rate general history of 20th Century naval warfare and a stimulating thematic exploration of the human factor in modern naval operations. Beginning with a set-piece account (one of many) of the Battle of Tsushima in1905, it spans the era from the *Dreadnought* race to the end of the Cold War. It is global in scope, deriving its material from British, American, Canadian, Japanese, German and Russian sources and utilising eyewitness accounts extensively. Spector also has a mastery of the existing historical literature and his scholarship is meticulous.

Spector's particular theme is the interaction of naval people, naval technology and naval operations, in short the human factor in context. He understands the fundamental point that it is the interface between people and technology that forms the basis of all successful naval weapons systems and operations. His book is also something of a milestone in the early development of a 'face of naval battle' historical genre. In the twenty-five years since John Keegan's famous study of the human experience of land warfare, *The Face of Battle*, there has been a growing literature dealing with land battle experience, especially in the twentieth century, produced by writers such as Richard Holmes in his *Firing Line*. There has not been, however, a similar emerging literature about naval warfare. *At War At Sea*, while not specifically intended to do so, will hopefully assist in opening up this area of study, one of critical importance both to historians and naval practitioners.

At War At Sea is full of interesting information about sailors (including aviators and submariners), their relationships with their vessels, aircraft and weapons, their lives at sea, and their experiences of combat over a calamitous period of eighty years. Spector combines deft and vivid sketches with perceptive observations. He uses action stories, such as an extended description of the Battle of Crete, as pegs for analytical points such as the way in which air power at sea altered the nature of naval battle experience. Spector, to his credit, does not sanitise the horrors of naval warfare in the industrial age. Some passages, such as those dealing with aspects of the Pacific War, make one sit up and take notice. The structure of the book achieves a very good overall integration of social and strategic context, operational description, technological detail and human stories.

Various particular points struck this reader. These are just a few. How often have the crews of destroyers, often well forward in support of land operations, borne the brunt at the sharp end of modern naval warfare. What a dramatic alteration in the nature of naval battle was produced by strike

air power at and over the sea; naval engagements became significantly more protracted and stressful (a point made by Spector) and potentially more terrifying. What a vanished world, in some ways, is that of the early 20th Century naval officer caste. It could afford to be exclusive and elitist in an era of fewer wider employment opportunities in a less technical world, and in a more militarised society. The situation for the naval profession today is largely reversed and the fight is to retain people. With regard to the war against terrorism, there are probably lessons to be learnt from the experience of combating the kamikazes during the 1940s.

It is difficult to criticise this excellent book. One can say that it has a gap in terms of the Australian experience of naval battle - a gap which several books, coming out of the 2001 King-Hall Naval History Conference on 'The Face of Naval Battle', will soon help to fill.

The overriding lesson of *At War At Sea*, at least to this reader, is that the critical human challenge for navies is to combine reliability with imagination in their people, especially their leaders. Spector's conclusion that the human factor, as in the age of sail, has been supreme in modern naval warfare appears incontestable. If they are to fulfill their professional missions, navies must invest financially in their people and look after them well. Administrators and planners as well as operators, historians and commentators should read this book. Naval historical buffs should find it engrossing.

Reviewed by Dr John Reeve

Last Out: 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Battalion's Second Tour in Vietnam

by Jerry Taylor
Allen and Unwin: Sydney, 2001
hardcover, 270 pp.,
RRP $49.95



This story is worth telling. The title *Last Out* refers to the role of the Fourth Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (4 RAR) which was the last of the Australian infantry battalions to quit Vietnam and return home. For the Australian Army, which made by far the largest commitment of the three Services to the Vietnam War, it signalled the end of an era. From 1962, when the first small group of training advisers arrived in the country, to December 1971, when 4 RAR ceased active operations in Phuoc Tuy Province (where Australian forces had held sway since 1966) to board HMAS *Sydney* off Vung Tau for the trip home.

Moreover, it was appropriate given the battalion's particular composition that it should be the last to leave. The unit's broader title 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) emphasised the fact that one of its rifle companies was composed of New Zealanders who, from an army that was too small to contribute a battalion of its own, fitted smoothly and easily into an Australian command, much as its forebears had done in the First World War. This book by Jerry Taylor, formerly an officer in the battalion, honours that relationship.

A number of features stand out in his narrative. First, the record of the battalion's experiences during its eight months tour of duty in Phuoc Tuy underlines the great conumdrum of the war: how to imbue the South Vietnamese forces, mostly at the local level in these examples, with a set of beliefs, and the essential battlefield competence that goes with them, so as to be able one day to hold their own unaided against the Viet Cong. Despite the best efforts of all the battalions and other units that had preceeded 4 RAR, not to mention the blood and treasure expended in countless American attempts to do the same in most of the other provinces in the South, the result at the end was still a rag-tag, pathetic lot with low morale. Indeed the book's description of the South Vietnamese regional forces' arrival at Nui Dat base to take over from the Australians and New Zealanders was a signpost along the path that subsequent events would take. A soldier from D Company described it:

We watched them toiling slowly up the hill towards us. They wore an assortment of uniforms, civilian clothes and webbing, all in varying degrees of shabbiness and disrepair. One of them had the torso of a monkey wired to the foresight of his M16 [rifle]: his evening meal presumably. They might have been figures of humour or ridicule, but I felt overwhelmingly sorry for them. I think we all did, because nobody said anything and nobody laughed.

Second, the record of the battalion's operations illustrates how easy it was for the Viet Cong main forces such as 274 Regiment, which the Australians had been meeting and bettering (but not destroying) for years, to be suddenly reinforced by a regular North Vietnamese Army formation such as the 33rd Regiment, which had almost been wiped out in a series of engagements, but which was always able to disengage, withdraw to the privileged sanctuary of Cambodia to rebuild itself with fresh reinforcements and equipment and, when ready, to sally forth yet again to the South to lift the tempo of operations in a given area. It was this well trained regiment, which 5 RAR and a Tank and Armoured Personnel Carrier force had last met in the Binh Ba rubber plantation in 1969, that was to be 4 RAR's most formidable opponent in a string of heavy contacts during operations such as OVERLORD, and finally IVANHOE in September 1971.

Third, while the author has displayed great dedication and sincerity of purpose in compiling this account of the battalion's experiences, I find the book strangely unbalanced. Of its 270 pages the first 120 are taken up in describing the battalion's formation, training and indoctrination before it even got to Vietnam. From then on the author is running at breakneck pace to describe the series of operations and their consequences, which operations, after all, were the task the battalion was sent to Vietnam to perform. That task is, in any case, the most gripping part of the whole story. Further, rather than the detailed pen pictures and character sketches of unit personalities pre-Vietnam, it might have been better to give more space to similar descriptions relating to the period in country on operations. In turn, while cleanliness of weapons is important, it should not need the better part of a page to convince the reader of the fact. Again, while the contents of an after action report, with all its annexes from A to G, are important to the specialist, they are pretty tough going for the average intelligent reader, especially, as in this case, when they are described in the abstract. I also missed a good map or maps of the operations. The simple map at the beginning of the book does not really hack it.

Nevertheless there is a lot of good material in this account. If, in a hundred years time, our descendants then are still disposed to read books, this volume with its minutiae of how a battalion destined for Vietnam was raised, trained and organised will be a rich source for the historian and genuine inquirer trying to understand the particular age that some of us lived through, so long ago.

Reviewed by Lieutenant General John Coates

Centre of the Ocean World: Australia and Maritime Strategy

by Alan Robertson
Seaview Press
Paperback vi, 91pp.
Copies available from the author at:
51 Newry Island Drive, Urunga, NSW, 2455
Price $24.00 (includes GST, postage and packaging)

This is an excellent little book. It provides a succinct exposition of factors influencing maritime strategy in Australia against the background of the modern theory of maritime strategy. It is based on the lectures that the author gave at the Australian Naval Staff College in the 1980s. But it brings those lectures right up to date with the inclusion of contemporary issues including some telling criticisms of the 2000 Defence White Paper and

its perceived maritime strategic weaknesses.

Alan (or 'Rocker' as he was known to several generations of RAN officers) Robertson was at the forefront of the development of Australian Maritime Strategy through much of the 1970s and 1980s. In many ways he is the 'founding father' of a unique Australian approach to maritime strategy that properly recognises the particular circumstances of Australia's geographical and strategic environment. He was one of the leading figures behind the establishment of the Australian Naval Institute and served as its President in 1977-78. He has also been President of the Australian Defence Association. Few, if any, have done more to promote maritime strategic thinking in Australia and his latest book, with its review of current maritime strategic requirements, is right on the ball.

The title of the book originates in the author's recollections of a geopolitical theory current in the Soviet Union in the 1950s. This theory drew on Sir Halford Mackinder's concepts of 'Heartland' and continental strategy to place Moscow at the Centre of the Land World and Sydney, Australia, at the Centre of the Ocean World. The author notes that the point of citing this Soviet theory is not to give substance to old Cold War fears about Soviet intentions against Australia. It is merely to point out that geopoliticians in other part of the world, in the past at least, have considered Australia to be the Centre of the Ocean World.

Alan Robertson recalls in his preface that in 1994, Mr. Kim Beazley, a former Australian Defence Minister, stated that Australia had adopted a 'maritime strategy'. Australia had given up 'sea control' and was now concentrating on 'sea denial'. He goes on to note that the 2000 Defence White Paper observed that 'Australia needs to be able to control the air and sea approaches to our continent' with a maritime strategy. *Centre of the Ocean World* explores the concept of Australian maritime strategy at greater length. Predictably it is highly critical of the White Paper, which the author sees as owing 'a great deal to the thinking of continentalists and airpower enthusiasts whose belief in sea denial represents the sum total of their thoughts on maritime strategy'. The White Paper is based on myths that 'have no relation to known experience of what has happened in the past, or may happen in the future'. In the author's view, 'it is abundantly clear' that far from being an exposition of maritime strategy, the military strategy in the White Paper is essentially a continental strategy.

Centre of the Ocean World stresses the fundamental importance of sea assertion and power projection to Australia given our unique geographical circumstances and the vulnerability of our sea lines of communication. The author is especially concerned about the severe limits on the distance at which combat aircraft can be effective when flying from bases in Australia. He is justifiably sceptical about the ability of Australian aircraft to operate from regional bases and draws on past Australian experience to support his point.

The book concludes with some refreshingly frank views about current force structure issues. It is essential, in the author's opinion, for the Australian Army to see itself as a sea-mobile force, rather than as a continental army, which will always be too small to be effective. Predictably, Alan Robertson is pro-aircraft carrier and alludes to 'our childish antipathy to aircraft carriers'. In his view, 'all of the arguments raised against carrier aviation are mere prejudices, and cannot be logically sustained'. For him, the bottom line is that Australia must get over its fixation with continental strategy and realise that, given its geography and its historical experience in the Pacific War, an essential element in Australia's defence is a Navy which can perform all three sea power missions.

Centre of the Ocean World is highly recommended, not just for the Naval community but for all those seeking to be better informed about critical issues concerning Australian defence. It is not at all dated but rather on target with its views on the need for a comprehensive Australian maritime strategy.

Reviewed by Dr Sam Bateman

Naval Operations in the Arabian Gulf

Left - *Sydney* conducting Maritime Interception Operations
(RAN Photo)
Right – USS *Arthur W. Radford* (DD968) and *USS Mahan* DDG 72) commence their approach to the carrier USS *George Washington* to conduct underway replenishment. The *Arthur W. Radford* is fitted with the Advanced Enclosed Mast and Sensor (AEM/S), replacing her conventional main mast.
(USN Photo)

Right – HMS *Invincible* supporting Operation Enduring Freedom. (RN Photo)

Below – *USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74)* turns out of the wind and picks up speed to reset her course in preparation for the next cycle of flight operations.
(USN Photo)