

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute



Summer 2000-2001

AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE INC.

The Australian Naval Institute was formed and incorporated in the ACT in 1975. The main objectives of the Institute are:

- to encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the maritime profession; and
- to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and the maritime profession.

The Institute is self-supporting and nonprofit-making. Views and opinions expressed in the Institute's publications are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Institute or the Royal Australian Navy. The aim is to encourage discussion, dissemination of information, comment and opinion and the advancement of professional knowledge concerning naval and maritime matters.

The membership of the Institute is open to:

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The editorial guidelines for articles are that they are:

- in electronic format (e-mail or disk); letters to the editor will be accepted in any format;
- in MS Word; and
- either 250-400 words (letters and illumination rounds), 1500-2000 words (smaller articles) or 3000-5000 words (feature articles).

The ANI can support black and white photography and diagrams but please supply originals or electronic copies. Colour plates are limited within the journal and will normally be reserved for feature articles.

Editor's e-mail: peterrhonda@bigpond.com.au

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Front Cover: HMAS *Dechainuex* (RAN Official)

Back Cover: HMAS *Manoora* (RAN Official)

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FROM THE PRESIDENT



Dear Members,

At the 2001 Annual General Meeting on the 20th March I made the following remarks which I would like also to share with the full membership through our Journal. First the ANI Renewal is making progress but this year will be crucial.

Administration

In this crucial area we have reorganized the procedures of the Institute. Ms Jean Davitt is providing professional assistance to the Secretary and the Treasurer. This has resulted in:

- Better administration,
- A clearer appreciation of the Institute's financial state; and
- The freeing up the ANI Council to do the real business of the organization.

Membership

The Council in conjunction with Ms Davitt has been working hard to ensure all members are financial. This has been a most effective exercise. I thank the many members who have forwarded renewals over recent weeks. The aim for 2001 must be to increase our membership numbers and I encourage all members to see what can be done in this area.

Friends of the ANI

I have sent letters to leading defence industry companies requesting their support in the form of a new tiered system. An increased level of support will be crucial to our renewal program. The new tiered Friends program offers greatly flexibility and has the characteristics detailed in the table below.

Journal

The journal must be the focus of our attention. Following on from the good work of Matt Rowe the Council is continuing to reinvigorate the Journal. This includes attempting to ensure it has wider appeal and content. Currently the Council is undertaking the Editorship of the Journal. This is only a temporary arrangement and our aim must be to have a professional editor.

Finances

The financial state of the ANI is unsatisfactory. Details of the ANI's funds are detailed later in this edition. In short we are operating from Journal to Journal and this underscores the need to undertake the renewal program. On a positive note we now understand the dimensions of the problem and have taken steps to address the situation. The budget tabled at the ANI is ambitious but gives the prospect of a viable future for the ANI.

FEATURES	TIER 1 FRIEND	TIER 2 GOLD Supporter	TIER 3 SILVER Supporter	TIER 4 BRONZE Supporter	TIER 5 SHIPMATE
Corporate Membership	1	1	1	1	1
JANI Subscription	2	2	1	1	1
Recognition on ANI Letterhead	YES	YES	YES		
Ad in JANI	Colour Full Page	One B+W Full Page	One B+W Half Page	One B+W Quarter Page	Logo
Places at ANI Dinner	2	1	1	1	
Appear on ANI Website	YES	YES	YES	YES	
COST (PA)	\$10,000	\$5000	\$2,500	\$1,000	\$500

ANI Activities

For the ANI to achieve its stated goals it is essential that it to do more than just produce the Journal. We are therefore keen to expand its activities. One example is the co-sponsorship of the King-Hall History Conference (26-27 July). I am keen also to host visiting speakers on an opportunity basis in Canberra, Sydney and *Stirling*.

The Council.

A key to the renewal plans is to expand the council and assign particularly duties to members as was effectively done in the past. We also need a younger and more diverse Council to more accurately reflect the membership. I am pleased that this in fact occurred and the new Council is:

President: Rear Admiral Brian Adams

Vice President: Captain Peter Jones

Public Officer: Lieutenant David Swanson

Secretary: Commander John Shevlin

Treasurer: Lieutenant Cameron Moore to be relieved by Lieutenant Commander Drew Forster

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Captain Paddy Hodgman RANR

Commander Rex Edwards RNZN (New Zealand Chapter representative)

Commander Craig Pritchard (Australian Defence College rep.)

Dr. John Reeves (Osborne Naval History Fellow & ADFA rep.)

Commander Mark Fitzpatrick

Commander Ray Griggs

Due to the demands of my position as DCN it is my intention to hand over the reins of the ANI this year. This will only occur once a suitable candidate is forthcoming.

Summary

2001 is the make or break year for the ANI. We will either to the 2002 AGM and say the ANI has a firm future or we will propose the disbandment of the Institute. I am confident however that we will succeed.

AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE - ABSTRACT OF AUDIT FOR 2000

This is an abstract of the ANI Audit for 2000. It was presented at the 2001 Annual General Meeting is detailed below.

PROFIT AND LOSS STATEMENT FOR THE YEAR ENDING 31 DECEMBER 2000

INCOME	2000	1999
Corporate Sponsors	\$5000.00	\$10,000.00
Journal Sales	\$785.00	\$769.00
Subscriptions	\$4198.00	\$6478.00
NZ Chapter		\$2080.00
Sundry Income	\$420.16	\$76.00
Interest Received		\$559.00
TOTAL	\$10,403.16	\$19,962.00

EXPENDITURE	2000	2001
Administration Costs	\$2135.26	\$52.00
Bank Charges & FID Charges	\$110.90	\$43.00
Entertainment Expenses	\$412.00	\$781.00
Internet Expenses		\$250.00
Journal Postage	\$1693.18	\$1507.00
Journal Printing	\$17,035.00	\$13,175.00
Medallions		\$600.00
Unknown Expenses	\$3,270.00	\$1,676.00
TOTAL	\$24,656.34	\$18,084.00

BALANCE SHEET – DECEMBER 2000

ASSETS	
Current Assets	
Commonwealth Bank	\$5851.04
Cash at Bank S50	\$1200.07
Cash at Bank S30	<u>\$14.16</u>
Total Current Assets	\$7056.27
Investments	
Shares – DFCU	\$10.00
Total Investments	\$10.00

LIABILITIES	
Current Liabilities	
Trade Creditors	\$716.50
Total Trade Creditors	\$716.50
GST Liabilities	
GST Paid	-\$904.56
Total GST Liabilities	-\$904.56
Non-Current Liabilities	
Pre-paid Subscriptions 2001	\$5363.10
Pre-paid Subscriptions 2002	\$915.00
Pre-paid Subscriptions 2003	\$355.00
Total Liabilities	\$6445.04
Net Assets	\$630.23
Equity	
Member's Equity	
Accumulated Surplus	\$7507.41
Total Members Equity	\$7507.41
Current Year Earnings	-\$6877.18
Total Equity	\$630.23

THE 2000 PETER MITCHELL PRIZE WINNING ESSAY

MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF *DEFENCE 2000*: A Transformational Fleet for Australia's Future Defence Force

By Lieutenant Commander Richard Gimblett Canadian Forces

The 2000 Peter Mitchell Essay Competition asked entrants to look at the White Paper and the possible shape of the future RAN. The winner gives a Canadian perspective of the RAN's future.

The RAN is at a crossroads. New *Anzac* frigates, *Collins* class submarines and the *Jervis Bay* fast catamaran are joining the fleet, but a replacement for the guided missile destroyers is urgently required, the *Adelaide* class guided missile frigates are overdue their mid-life upgrade, and the bulk of the replenishment and amphibious vessels are ageing. Still, amongst the country's three armed services, the broad range of capabilities resident in the fleet make it uniquely well equipped for operations across the spectrum of conflict.

The public discussion paper, *Defence Review 2000 – Our Future Defence Forces*, identifies key choices which must be made with respect to Australia's defence needs for the 21st century. With the flexibility inherent in a balanced naval force, the RAN stands positioned to lead the ADF in meeting the challenges of the 21st century.

The present structure, however, was designed to meet the challenges of the Cold War. The simple fact is that the new and imminent procurements will complete a fleet of platforms which, aside from incremental systems upgrades, could be in service for the next half century. The transition to a new global order raises serious questions as to the continuing relevance of a navy conceived in the 20th century. Arguably, the fleet has multi-purpose capabilities, but are they the best balance to meet the challenges of the 21st

century? Does it have the right combination of resources to meet the objectives of *Defence Review 2000*? Can it remain relevant to the needs of the state? How can the naval service adapt to the future?

The paths at the crossroads are these: follow the tried and true rationale of the past 50 years; or embark on a new endeavour. Military institutions are essentially conservative in nature, so the temptation is to stick with the known. But implicit in *Defence Review 2000* is the sense that, rightly or wrongly, in keeping with the spirit of the new millennium, the government is searching for a new defence strategy. Accordingly, the premise of this paper is that continuation along the present course will lead to diminishing relevance to the state and, ultimately, the withering of the fleet.

With the flexibility inherent in a balanced naval force, the RAN stands positioned to lead the ADF in meeting the challenges of the 21st century.

As an alternative, the discussion below will describe a number of factors that are coalescing to make the Navy the logical focus of a new defence strategy for Australia. These

factors stand to have a major impact on the decisions which are pending within the coming years on replacing the area air defence capability and revitalising the expeditionary forces. The present plans to modernise the fleet will demand a significant portion of the defence budget, putting the Navy in competition with the Army and Air Force for scarce funding. This is potentially a self-defeating strategy. As logical as these plans are to any naval professional, they are based upon *old* thinking. They will prove difficult to sustain before politicians seeking a *different* solution. The survival of a professional Australian fleet is contingent upon the

military spending on the basis of direct defence of the homeland. The vast reaches of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, not to mention the absence of any apparent aggressor, reduces the notion to an abstract. Strategic analysts are unanimous in the assessment that, with no peer competitor to the US in sight, there is little chance of global or even major theatre war for several decades.

Evolving security concepts such as asymmetric threats are difficult for politicians – let alone the general public – to grasp, and especially when presented in naval terms; protection of seabed resources and the environment are only slightly less so. Their professional experience leads dedicated staff



HMAS Darwin

Photograph: John Mortimer

demonstration of its continuing relevance to the state. It is critical that thinking begins immediately to obtaining the right equipment – and in the right mix and numbers – so as to address the new strategy. Urgent consideration must be given to the transformation of the Australian fleet.

The Changing Foreign Policy Dimension

More so than at any time in the past, it is increasingly difficult to justify Australian

officers to devise counters to these various threats, if only because they cannot afford to be wrong. Indeed, history proves that, sooner or later, a capable warfighting fleet again will be required. At the same time, history also demonstrates that the RAN has prospered when its rationale clearly reflected the state's foreign policy (e.g., at the time of its creation in 1909; rearmament in the 1930s; and the balanced fleet of the early 1950s).

Conversely, the fleet has atrophied when it did not (retrenchment following each of the World Wars; and rust-out in the 1970s). In the present uncertainty, once again we stand at the brink of the abyss.

Without fail, in two world wars and in UN operations from Korea to the Arabian Gulf, Australia has turned in need to a well-balanced fleet. Indeed, in each of these instances, it was the Navy that made the initial deployment of forces. The more recent experience of East Timor, however, is perhaps more indicative of the future security challenges. Tellingly, in this instance the fleet was not first upon the scene, and when it did arrive its power projection capabilities were employed in non-traditional fashions. The logic is clear: if the fleet is to survive as a professional force for the inevitable calling, it must remain relevant to the state in the interim, and this is most ably accomplished by visibly supporting the government's foreign policy.

While critics might choose to interpret this as catering to narrow service interests, it actually is in the best interests of the state. In the absence of major warfare, the future security environment will be dominated by operations other than war (OOTW), which one analyst has labelled "Peacetime Engagement and Chaos Management".¹ Indeed, OOTW is at the core of *Defence Review 2000*. Capable defence forces will continue to be relevant, because crisis management in peacemaking, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance to failing states (peace support operations) is pre-conditioned upon the professional management of violence.

The single most important factor to be addressed in fleet planning today, therefore, is tailoring the Navy's basic warfighting capabilities to provide this service.

How has the RAN fared in this changing environment? Twice in the past decade, Australian naval forces participated in UN peace support operations. But in neither the Arabian Gulf nor in East Timor did the destroyers and frigates of the RAN come in contact with the predicted enemy. It also is easy to envision scenarios such as a stand-off over the Spratly Islands which will demand a

role for naval peacekeeping forces, and for which the *Adelaide* and *Anzac* classes are uniquely qualified. But what if over the next decade there comes no such call for the use of these traditional forces? Certainly it behoves the RAN to maintain frigates and destroyers to meet such eventualities, but in the present business-case oriented environment, governments need more tangible evidence of a return upon their investment or else they will begin to lose interest.

Frankly, the fleet has to be seen to be doing something to justify its upkeep. In the decades of peace following the Napoleonic Wars, the RN rationalised its existence by delivering the mail to the far-flung outposts of Empire. In a global situation analogous to today, although Britain was the only global power, the world was far from peaceful. To effectively conduct this seemingly trivial task, the Royal Navy had to maintain a variety of core capabilities, which came to serve it in good stead. Peace support has all the makings of being the "mail" of the 21st century.

Indeed, basic warfighting skills are anything but mutually exclusive with OOTW. A good case can be made that a determined commitment to support peace operations will require a rigorous application of many of today's core capabilities (see discussion below) across the spectrum of warfare. If there is little threat of general war in the coming decades, there remains no end of potentially hostile littoral operating environments in Australia's own backyard, in Southeast Asia and around the Indian Ocean basin. It is not unrealistic to project the development of no shortage of East Timors, Solomon Islands, Cambodias and Somalias – locations of recent ADF peace support operations – with unfortunate regularity in the coming anarchy.² All of these states are islands or have lengthy coastlines. The RAN undoubtedly will have a role in any such future operations. The question remains – what would be the most advantageous contribution?

Finally, it is necessary to ground any evaluation of the changing foreign policy agenda against a realistic assessment of the current domestic political situation. Especially important in this regard is the fiscal climate within which military spending can be anticipated. *Defence Review 2000* is blunt in its prognosis: "Government will need to balance defence requirements against other social objectives and

¹ Alberto Coll, "The Role of the Naval Services in Operations Other than War: Peacetime Engagement and Chaos Management," in Richard H. Schultz Jr and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr (eds.), *The Role of Naval Forces in 21st Century Operations* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2000), pp. 85-91.

² Robert D. Kaplan, *The Coming Anarchy* (New York: Random House, 2000).

priorities" and "Funding decisions, particularly for the next few years, will take into account measures to further improve the efficiency of the Defence organisation."³

Capabilities Vs Platforms

An important clue to the direction sought in *Defence Review 2000* comes in the statement, that "A policy focusing on contributing to regional security could be a legitimate alternative to structuring against a direct attack on Australian territory."⁴ Since peace support operations necessarily will come to be applied on other states' territory, the underpinning of Australian defence policy will continue to be the land forces. The Navy and the Air Force must accept the fact that they will be enablers of the Army. This does not mean that they are irrelevant.

Our major allies have accepted this logic. The United States Navy has produced its *Forward... From the Sea*. The Royal Navy's *The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine* underscores an expeditionary role. It only makes sense that a medium power such as Australia, with an activist international perspective and wishing to maintain interoperability with its major allies, should adopt a complementary force posture. Indeed, the ADF's own developing joint doctrine speaks to the logic of enhancing its amphibious capability, for this would focus some rationality to its defence structure. It would not mean that the individual services should have to abandon their basic warfighting skills, which any responsible force must retain for future eventualities. It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess the required capabilities of land or air forces in expeditionary peace support operations, but examining those of naval forces is instructive. Even assuming a permissive delivery environment (i.e., a non-opposed landing), Australian naval forces operating in the littoral could expect to participate in mid-intensity hostilities and shall require (in rough order of priority):

- distant deployability
- self-defence
- across-the-beach delivery
- C4ISR (command, control and intelligence support), including:
- embarked joint headquarters

- allied interoperability
- green water undersea warfare
- area air defence (to include providing for forces ashore)
- operational sustainment
- naval fires (i.e., precision land attack)
- in-theatre airlift (i.e., embarked aircraft)

Present realities are that the *Anzac* frigates, *Collins* submarines and *Huon* minehunters now entering service will be the platforms still operating several decades hence. Indeed, allowing for systems upgrades to meet the evolving threat environment, several of the capabilities required for the expeditionary peace support role can best be met by this mix of vessels. Within only a few years, however, the RAN will be deficient in the critical areas of area air defence, deployability, sustainment and across-the-beach delivery, while it does not at present hold a true naval fires capability. More fundamentally, as witnessed in East Timor, the ADF does not have a functional joint structure to undertake peace support operations. Addressing these significant deficiencies individually through a platform-for-platform replacement or acquisition would prove prohibitive. A cost-effective solution to these problems lies in adopting the idea of capability-based procurement, and providing for these capabilities in a common platform, the Multi-Role Combat Vessel (MRCV).

Traditionalists will be quick to dismiss these concepts as limiting the flexibility inherent in a balanced naval force, while creating a high value unit whose loss would prove crippling.⁵ The answer is that none of the core naval capabilities need be lost (in fact, several of them could be enhanced), and that the key lies in procuring sufficient numbers of a common hull. At the same time, the changing security environment allows for this method of obtaining

⁵ Other analysts argue that the global trend is for "more cheap and nasties" (e.g., the USN's Streetfighter concept – see VAdm(USN) A.K. Cebrowski and Capt(USN) W.P. Hughes, "Rebalancing the Fleet," *USNI Proceedings* [November 1999]). While these might be practical for a large navy, the numbers needed to provide the required critical mass would put insupportable pressures on a medium-sized navy. Moreover, they provide for a narrow offensive combat capability not obviously required in the security environment that is the basic assumption of this paper (and indeed of *Defence Review 2000*). Finally, the experience of the Tanker War in the Arabian Gulf is that large ships can absorb a great deal of combat damage.

³ *Defence Review 2000*, p. 56.

⁴ *Defence Review 2000*, p. 61.

greater efficiencies demanded by fiscal necessity.

It is instructive to examine the case of another medium naval power that is grappling with these issues. Canada is a nation with much the same experience, values and interests as Australia, and whose military developments tend to mirror those of Australia, plus or minus a few years. While not yet perfect, *jointness* has become a fundamental characteristic of the Canadian Forces (CF), its utility proven in various operations over the past decade. To address the competing service demands for new equipments, the CF are moving toward a procurement strategy that would see the traditional platform-centric approach replaced by one based more rationally on capabilities.⁶ Encouragingly, departmental bureaucrats, politicians, and even the three services are intrigued by the logic of the process.⁷ More to the point for the purposes of this paper, the Canadian Navy's AOR replacement project has grown to encompass several other capability deficiencies made apparent in recent operations, specifically the need for military sealift and an embarked Joint headquarters. It is now being pursued as the Afloat Logistics and Sealift Capability (ALSC) program.⁸ Again, broader appeal for this approach has been demonstrated, with recent press discussion of the project already labelling ALSC as "the peacekeeping ship."⁹ Also, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that the need to replace the command and control and area air defence capabilities of the *Iroquois* class destroyers could come to be included (this project is known as "CADRE", which term will be used henceforth in this paper). If there is a flaw in the ALSC/CADRE approach, it is that all of the various capabilities are likely to be combined into each of only 3-4 vessels. There is a physical limit as to what can

be accommodated within even the planned 26,000-tonne hull. The attempt to be all-inclusive is more likely to result in compromises that would see none of the needed capabilities properly fulfilled; moreover, it literally is too many eggs in too few baskets.

A far more rational approach would be to build small numbers of hulls emphasising each of one or two of the capabilities. Modular construction, containerised suites, and other options in design flexibility would allow task tailoring to the various roles (crews would be determined in a complementary fashion). These modern techniques could optimise, for example, 2-3 vessels with a combined Joint HQ and sealift mission fit, recognising that a hull of that size would retain a residual AOR and even area air defence capacities. Alternatively, a CADRE-specific fit in 2-3 others would retain the capacity for limited AOR and sealift, while also providing abundant precision strike capability (either vertical launch cruise missiles or extended range gun munitions), making it a truly potent vessel. As well, a two ocean navy such as the RAN needs to consider the flexibility in numbers required to allow for simultaneous employment on several peace support missions and the more traditional task group operations (let alone maintenance scheduling), which would inevitably lead to a conflict in mission priorities.

A Transformational Fleet Structure

A shift in emphasis from a Cold War posture to one more responsive to the government's peace support agenda demands a re-distribution of vessel types within the RAN – the "transformational fleet" of the title of this paper. The moment has arrived where the RAN should seize the initiative and develop the concept of the MRCV as the basis for the fleet – indeed of the ADF – of the 21st century. There will always be a need for frigates and submarines, as there are traditional tasks that can only be undertaken by those platform types and specific capabilities that can only be maintained in them. Peace support operations, however, demand the replacement of a number of other capabilities that cannot all be met in the present fiscal environment.

It must be emphasised that the proposed structure is intended to allow the realisation of greater efficiencies within the present establishment of the ADF. Since no increase in naval personnel should be expected, an increase in numbers of one platform must mean

⁶ Government of Canada, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, *Strategic Capability Planning for the Canadian Forces*, [nd – June 2000]

(http://www.vcds.dnd.ca/dgsp/dda/strat/info_e.asp).

⁷ VAdm(CF) G.L. Garnett, "Shaping the Future Force: A Better Understanding of Defence Policy and Strategy," *Vanguard* (Issue 4, Fall 2000), pp. 15-18.

⁸ Government of Canada, Chief of the Maritime Staff, *Canadian Afloat Logistics and Sealift Capability Ships (ALSC) - Concept of Employment Guidance*, promulgated 10 January 2000.

⁹ David Pugliese, "Canadian troops trapped in shipping dispute," *Ottawa Citizen*, 25 July 2000 (www.ottawacitizen.com [00/07/25]).

reductions in others. It can be expected that diesel-electric propulsion and other efficiencies will allow a significant drop in the size of an MRCV crew compared to the present amphibious and support ships and air defence destroyers and frigates. Perhaps more important is the fact that replacement of three or four vessel types with one common hull would result in significantly reduced infrastructure costs.

Time now for the tough question – what about numbers? Operational research modelling would be required to confirm the numbers needed to allow for the various roles, and the possibility that 2-3 peace support missions may have to be undertaken concurrently. For the purposes of discussion, however, the Australian fleet of the 21st century should be distributed, with appropriate coastal consideration, as follows:

- 6-8 Multi-Role Combat Vessels
- 8 *Anzac* class multi-purpose frigates
- 6 *Collins* class conventional submarines
- 6 *Huon* class coastal minehunters

The MRCVs should be commissioned in an order of priority seeing the first 2 or 3 as a basic joint (sealift and force HQ) package. Thence the introduction of the CADRE package should be timed with the paying-off of the *Adelaide* class into reserve (seeing them to the end of their useful life without mid-life upgrade). Finally would come implementation of the AOR package.

Institutional factors recommend the implementation of this re-structuring over an extended period. To begin with would be the rate of building of the MRCVs. The commissioning of one every two years would allow for an orderly training program and transfer of crews from the destroyer-frigate core to the MRCV, while bringing some long-term stability to the Australian shipbuilding industry (assuming an indigenous design or at least licence-building would be a political requirement). Again, it must be emphasised that, although the basic hull would be common to the class, each ship down the slips would be built to a different operational suite. An extended building period would allow the fleet to keep abreast of the latest technological developments, rather than being consigned to block class obsolescence, as has been the habit. The final but vital consideration is that a 15-20 year period also would allow the Army and Air

Force sufficient time to adjust their own force structures in line with the new joint posture.

There is no need to proceed at any faster rate. The proposed re-structuring should not be seen as inherently radical. The underlying assumption is that there is nothing fundamentally wrong with the present structure and roles of the ADF. Rather, this would allow a more efficient execution of the *de facto* concept of operations. The expeditionary role is the logical “defence” input to the foreign policy peace support agenda.

Conclusion

Regional security has been the foundation of Australia’s foreign policy for many decades. The post-Cold War notion of peace support is merely a shift in emphasis which demands a re-focussing of the country’s sea, land and air forces to a truly joint expeditionary posture. Many factors recommend such a re-structuring, which can and must be accomplished without loss of each service’s basic warfighting capabilities. For the Navy, the required shift in scale of effort can be accomplished with a redistribution of the numbers of various platforms in the fleet, which allows also for a rational implementation of other procurements needed to address essential continuing capability requirements. The transformational fleet described above is not definitive, but does offer one solution to the continuing Australian defence “problem”.

About the Author

Lieutenant-Commander Richard Gimblett graduated from the Royal Military College of Canada (BA, 1979), Trent University (MA, 1981), and Université Laval (PhD, 2000). He served as Combat Officer of HMCS Protecteur in the Persian Gulf, and subsequently co-authored (with Major Jean Morin) the official history, Operation FRICTION: The Canadian Forces in the Persian Gulf, 1990-91. He is posted to the Directorate of Maritime Strategy.

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
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UGLY DUCKLING or SWAN



By Commander Tony Vine, RAN

The controversial LPAs are now back at sea. Beyond their changed appearances are some impressive capabilities.

Manoora and *Kanimbla*! Rust buckets what a waste of money, we should get rid of them!! How many times have I heard that over the last two years from ill informed fellow naval officers and sailors, none of whom have visited the ships since *Manoora* re-entered service in December 1999.

As so often happens, mud sticks. There is still a perception in the naval community of two rusting LSTs sitting alongside in Sydney sucking up maintenance dollars. This is far from the truth. Both ships are now back in service, and already *Manoora* has already made a significant contribution to ADF

operations and *Kanimbla* is poised ready to do the same.

Background

In 1994 the RAN took the opportunity to purchase two ex-USN "Newport" class Landing Ships Tank. It is not my intention to go into the politics behind the decision to purchase the ships, or the project creep (and mismanagement) which resulted in the ships being in modernisation for an extended period. I will however give a brief overview of the condition of ships when purchased, and the changes made to the vessels, to allow the reader to gain an appreciation of the work undertaken by

FORGACs Dockyard, and the respective ship's companies in converting the vessels into Landing Platforms Amphibious.

The LSTs were designed and built in the late 1960s early 1970s, at a time when the USN World War Two fleets were being decommissioned, and the USN was faced with an ongoing involvement in both the Cold war and Vietnam. The ships were built with a projected life of 20-25 years and were designed to be able to transport equipment and personnel long distances, where they would be discharged to shore over a ramp fitted to the front of the ship.

The ships are fitted with six ALCO V16 Main Propulsion Diesel Engines (MPDEs). ALCO, short for American Locomotive Company, identifies the heritage of the engines, they are in fact train engines, extremely robust, simple in construction and at the time the ships were built, there were thousands of V8, V12 and V16 ALCO engines in service all around the world. In fact during the last six months of *Manoora*'s refit many of her Marine Technical sailors undertook a one week ALCO diesel course at the NSW State Rail Training centre in Sydney, as State Rail at that time still had sixty locomotives in service powered by ALCOs.

Both *Manoora* and *Kanimbla* were almost 25 years old when purchased and they had all the problems of ships of that age. The ships contained significant amounts of asbestos, now removed as a result of an expensive and well-documented exercise during the refit. A number of MPDE and Ships Service Diesel Generator (SSDG) engine blocks were found to have significant cracking and were subsequently replaced by re-conditioned blocks during the refit. The ships hull, decks and compartments were found to have extensive wastage, which resulted in a large amount of unplanned work in ensuring that the ships were safe to return to service.

The Conversion

In May 1996 *Manoora* was towed to Newcastle to commence her conversion at FORGACS Dockyard to a Training Helicopter Support Ship (THSS), later to be changed to a Landing Platform Amphibious or LPA.

Structural changes

The LPA's new role required significant structural changes. This included extensive reconstruction of the area forward of the

superstructure which involved the removal of the bow horns, ramp and operating equipment to provide the forward helicopter landing spot. Modifications aft included the construction of the hanger, the Primary Care Reception Facility¹ (PCRF), and the extension of the flight deck aft.

Other modifications were the construction of a Classroom, a Briefing Room and a Embarked Force Operations Room on 03 Deck. The vessels were also fitted with bilge keels, which have significantly improved their seakeeping characteristics.

A boat deck was constructed port side, fitted with two RHIBs and ship's crane was provided with a 70 tonne crane fitted forward, and a 2.5 tonne crane fitted at the rear of the hanger.

MANOORA CLASS LPA AT A GLANCE

Displacement, tons: 4,975 light; 8,450 full load
Dimensions, metres: 168.2 _ 21.2 _ 5.3 (Aft)
Main machinery: 6 ALCO 16-251 diesels; 16,500 hp (12.3 MW) sustained; 2 shafts; cp props; bow thruster
Speed: 20 knots
Range: 14,000 miles at 15 knots
Complement: 207 including 18 Army
Military lift: 450 troops (25 officers); 2 LCM 8; 320 tons aviation fuel
Guns: 1 General Electric/General Dynamics 20 mm Vulcan Phalanx Mk 15 fitted for but not with. 6-12.7 mm MGs.
Countermeasures: 2 SRBOC Mk 36 chaff and IR launchers. (*Manoora* Only)
Radars: Surface search: Kelvin Hughes 1007; F/G-band.
Navigation: Kelvin Hughes; Type 1007.
Helicopters: 4 Army Black Hawks or 3 Sea Kings or 1 Chinook

Habitability Upgrade

When acquired from the USN the ships relied heavily on saturated steam for galley services, potable water production, compartment heating and for the provision of hot water to bathrooms. The steam was provided by boilers, which were found to have reached the end of their economical life. The boilers were removed

¹ The PCRF is a Level Three Medical facility consisting of operating theatre, high and low dependency units (wards), blood bank, pathology and x-ray facilities.

during the refit and replaced with a fourth ALCO V8 Ships Service Diesel Generator.

The Galleys were gutted on both ships and were re-constructed using electrically heated equipment all protected with the latest fire protection systems. The original steam evaporator plant was replaced with a reverse osmosis plant capable of producing 150 tonne of potable water a day and six large electric calorifiers were fitted to provide enough hot water for 650 personnel, the galley, laundry and PCRf. The ship's laundry was re-constructed and fitted with equipment capable of supporting the entire ships company and embarked force. The laundry is also capable of meeting hospital linen requirements in support of the PCRf.

The original air conditioning units have been replaced by state of the art high capacity units, which can deliver more than enough chilled water throughout the ship. The units have sufficient reserve capacity to allow the ventilation in the Troops Messes to be improved at a later availability.

Environmental Upgrade

To ensure that the ships complied with the latest International Maritime Organisations (IMO) regulations on pollution control and with Australia's obligations under the Montreal Protocol significant changes were made to the ships.

The existing CHT system, was modified to provide a chlorine injection system to treat both grey and black water, and a large grease trap fitted to remove greases and oils from galley and pantry grey water systems. All Ozone depleting refrigerant gases were replaced and an IMO compliant Oily Water Separator fitted to treat bilge water prior to its discharge overboard. *Kanimbla* has been fitted with a solid waste disposal compactor and incinerator facility, *Manoora* will be fitted with a similar facility at a later date.

Electronic Upgrade

The ships when purchased contained a large amount of unsupportable "orphan" communications and navigation equipment. In the course of the conversion the ship was fitted with a Kelvin Hughes 1007 radar, a sophisticated array of Flight Deck landing aids, a Mk37 laser gyroscope, and a comprehensive communications suite. *Manoora* is also fitted with a deployable Joint Force Headquarters capability under Joint Project 8001.

Propulsion Plant

The LPAs have two shafts fitted with controllable pitch propellers, each of which can be driven by up to three MPDEs. The ships have three Main Engine Rooms each containing two MPDEs. The MPDEs connect to the shaft through air operated clutches via a single reduction gearbox. This unique machinery layout provides immense flexibility and redundancy, as the number of MPDEs connected to the shaft train can be matched to the desired ship speed to ensure that the engines are operating at peak efficiency. The ships have proven to be extremely economical in service using up to 50% less fuel than an FFG at speeds of less than 15 knots.

The Bird Johnson Propulsion control System fitted during the modernisation allows the bridge to control the operation of the Main Engines and shaft, and prevents overloading of the MPDEs during rapid changes of shaft speed and pitch. The combination of two shafts, Controllable Pitch Propellers and the Large "tunnel" Bow thruster make the ships extremely manoeuvrable.

On *Kanimbla* the original switchboards were replaced with electronically controlled switchboards which have significantly improved both operator and equipment safety. It is envisaged that *Manoora* will receive a similar upgrade at a later availability.

The refit also included a number of maintenance packages, which included the upgrading of the MPDEs and SSDGs to the latest modification state, and the replacement of the original engine control system with the Bird Johnson computerised system. The maintenance packages also included the replacement of the original Air Compressors with modern locally supportable PLC controlled Medium Pressure Air Compressors.

A little known fact is that the responsibility for a large amount of maintenance conducted during the refit remained with the ship. As the crew increased in size from the 30 strong steaming party that accompanied the ship to Newcastle to its full complement of 207 so did the workload. For example in twelve month period the three man ship's lagging team re-lagged over a square kilometre of ships hull, often after having to preserve the hull first.

Manning and Training

The RAN is operating the LPA with 60 less crew than the USN. Despite the modifications made to the ships the ships will always be labour

intensive to operate and maintain. The Engineering Department of the LPA is 83 strong of which 67 are Marine Technical sailors. A single watch below requires twelve sailors, two of whom require Engineer Watchkeeping Certificates, with a further three having Machinery Watchkeeping Certificates. With personnel absent on course, or doubled up for career progression, this leaves only a handful of sailors to maintain what is a very large ship.



The LPA is an ideal platform to provide initial sea training for junior sailors and officers of all branches. Unlike the minimum manned FFG, ANZAC and COLLINS classes, the LPAs have a veritable feast of accommodation available for trainees. Since re-entering service *Manoora* has conducted a Midshipman Training Cruise to Dili, Darwin and Vila, embarked large numbers of *Kanimbla*'s sailors for on the job training, and a detachment of 17 junior Marine Technical sailors from FIMA for competency log and operator qualification progression. On each occasion the trainees received exposure to life at sea gaining invaluable life skills.

The First Year.

In her first year of operational service in the RAN *Manoora* spent 240+ days outside of Sydney, participated in Operations PLUMBOB, GOLD and TREK², whilst at the same time squeezing in Contractors Sea Trials, Work Up, Mariner Skills Evaluation and First of Class Flight Trials. In December 2000 the Ship was awarded the Australia Cup for Marine Engineering Excellence. Not a bad effort for a ship still labelled a liability and a

"Rust Bucket" in many quarters. At the time of writing *Manoora* is once again enroute to the Solomon Islands to provide logistical support to the International Peace Monitoring Team.

The Future

The availability of both LPAs now allows HMAS TOBRUK to undergo a much postponed refit. The LPAs still require some shortcomings to be resolved and much of the LPAs capability is still to be realised. *Manoora* is expected to be formally accepted into Naval Service (AINS) during 2001, operations permitting.

The LPAs, along with TOBRUK, are quickly earning a name as "CAN DO" vessels. Their flexibility in being able to undertake a wide range of taskings including, but not limited to, Amphibious Operations, Peace keeping/Peace monitoring support, ADF Training, and providing a platform in support of civil aid to the community, will ensure that they are constantly in demand.

Despite their age, the LPAs, have significantly increased the ADF's ability to operate offshore and are a true "Force Projection" asset. As the ADF continues to explore the ship's capabilities a clearer view of what the follow on class of amphibious ship will develop.

Just as the ugly duckling eventually grew into a swan the transformation of *Manoora* and *Kanimbla* from LSTs to versatile and capable LPAs is almost complete.

About the Author

Commander Tony Vine joined the RAN in January 1971 as a 15 year old Engine Room Artificer apprentice. He was selected for submarine service training in 1977 and was a member of HMAS Otama's commissioning crew in 1978. In 1984-86 he served on the staff of Flag Officer Submarines at Gosport in the United Kingdom. Commissioned in 1988 he completed a BE(Maritime) (Hons) at the Australian Maritime College in 1991. After postings as the Marine Engineering Officer of HMAS Orion 1993-95, Vine served on exchange with the Canadian Forces during 1995-97, was the SUBSAFE Material Safety Officer 1997-98 and the Engineering Officer of HMAS *Manoora* from January 1999 to February 2001. Promoted to Commander in January 2001, he is currently posted to DSTO - DTRIALS. Commander Vine resides in Canberra with his wife and two of their four children.

² Operation PLUMBOB - Evacuation of foreign nationals from Solomon Islands June 2000.
Operation GOLD - Olympic Games Security Operation, Aug-Oct 2000.
Operation TREK - Solomon Islands Peace Monitoring Mission Nov-Dec 2000.

The Commonwealth Naval Forces Australia's Navy -100 Years of Service to the Nation

By Dr D.M Stevens

Amidst the barrage of publicity surrounding the Australian Army's 100th anniversary, it has been easy for Australians to overlook the fact that their Navy has attained the same milestone.

Although some might point to 10 July 1911, and the Sovereign's granting of the title 'Royal Australian Navy' as the birth of Australia's Navy as a more recognisable landmark, the truth remains that Australia had already possessed a unified naval force for more than a decade.



HMA Ships Yarra & Parramatta pictured soon after their arrival in Australia, and before the Union Jack was replaced by the Commonwealth's own flag. (RAN)

The legal basis for the creation of the first two national armed services came from Section 51 of the Australian Constitution, which gave the new Parliament the power to make laws with respect to the naval and military defence of the Commonwealth. At Federation, the Governor-General, the Earl of Hopetoun, became Commander-in-Chief, and on 1 March 1901 the states transferred their naval and military forces and everyone employed in their connection to the Federal Government. However, until Parliament could create the necessary legislative and administrative machinery, the various forces

continued to be controlled under the existing Colonial Acts and regulations. The four states that had maintained maritime forces through to 1901—Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia—each possessed a Naval Commandant who reported individually to the Minister of Defence. For the first year all military and naval units retained their old colonial titles, but by May 1902 the Federal bureaucracy had adopted the collective names Commonwealth Naval Forces (CNF) and Commonwealth Military Forces (later Australian Military Forces) to distinguish the two arms of Australian defence.

The pre-Federation naval forces were intended solely for local defence, and were prohibited from operating outside the three-mile limit. But even functioning within these constraints the colonial governments had soon found that the responsibility of maintaining, repairing and operating warships was an expensive business. In an age of technological transition few authorities could afford the commitment of scarce industrial, financial and human resources required to keep their vessels in continuous and efficient commission. As a result, the ships inherited by the CNF were tired, old and inadequate even for training. They included the ironclad monitor *Cerberus* and four torpedo boats from Victoria, the gunboats *Gayundah* and *Paluma* and two torpedo boats from Queensland, and the gunboat *Protector* from South Australia. The oldest vessel, *Cerberus*, had already seen thirty years of service. The youngest, the first-class torpedo boat *Countess of Hopetoun*, had been completed in 1891. Permanent personnel strength totalled only 239 officers and men, while another 1659 served with the part-time naval brigades. Like their ships, many of these men were overage,

and one suspects that security of employment often ranked above a real desire to serve.

The early federal administrations were too busy to be overmuch troubled with naval defence and, with the ongoing war in South Africa, public attention was concentrated far more on military matters.¹ The CNF's budgetary allocation in 1901-02 was just £67,000. In contrast, the 16,874 men belonging to the various military forces were allocated £638,000. Despite the disparity, a dilapidated CNF was not a major national concern if the Royal Navy could continue to be relied upon to provide maritime protection. Successive British commanders of the Australia Station provided this reassurance, and the Commonwealth's payment of a subsidy towards maintaining a Royal Navy Squadron in Australia, reinforced the idea that issues of naval policy were best left with the Admiralty in London.

Concerned by the rapid growth of Japanese and German naval power in the Pacific, the State naval commandants were less confident. Led by the Queensland commandant, Captain (later Vice Admiral Sir) William Rooke Creswell, they feared the withdrawal of British forces under the exigencies of war. Australia, they argued, lying at the extreme end of the world's sea routes and possessing no land frontier was open to attack only by sea. Unprotected, Australian floating trade would be at the mercy of even a small enemy force, and soon be either sunk or forced to seek refuge. With communications cut, industrial paralysis and economic devastation would follow.

Creswell consistently objected to the far higher proportion of Commonwealth funds expended on the Australian Army's field force, 'that branch of the forces that cannot see, much less come into contact with, an enemy, until the Empire is crushed at sea'.² As he observed sharply in a 1902 parliamentary report: 'The spectacle of some 5,000,000 Anglo-Australians, with an Army splendidly equipped, unable to prevent the burning of a cargo of wool in sight of Sydney Heads, is

only the ordinary consequence of a policy of naval impotence.'³



Captain Creswell observes the CNF's 1905 Easter manoeuvres from the torpedo boat HMAS *Countess of Hopetoun*. (RAN)

Deep issues of naval defence exercised only a handful of Australian minds. Nevertheless, the idea of a more capable Australian navy, locally manned, and under the Commonwealth's executive direction, gradually gathered support. The process was assisted by further progress towards setting up the machinery to impose federal control over all defence matters. The proclamation of the *Commonwealth Defence Act* in 1904 led to the simultaneous creation of both a Director of Naval Forces and an Inspector-General of the Military Forces. The constitution of Boards of Administration for the two services likewise occurred together in January 1905. Prime Minister George Reid deliberately chose Australia's best known navalist, Captain Creswell, as the first Director of Naval Forces.⁴

¹ Notwithstanding the South African War's greater visibility, at Federation Australian naval personnel were serving in China during the Boxer Rebellion.

² Cited in G.L. Macandie, *The Genesis of the RAN* (Sydney: Government Printer, 1949), p. 137.

³ *Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers*, 7 February 1902, p. 149.

⁴ Orders for CNF uniforms were first placed in 1904. Of passing interest, CNF officers adopted the same

While admitting that his service was 'practically on the verge of collapse', and that only two of his lieutenants were fit for active service, Creswell embarked on a program designed to breathe new life into the CNF's operations. Despite a restricted budget he managed to bring several of the gunboats and torpedo boats back into commission and renewed regular training exercises in Port Phillip to improve combat readiness. These exercises soon grew into substantial events with the torpedo boats commonly called upon to demonstrate flotilla tactics against an approaching 'enemy' cruiser. The part of the latter was normally played by one of the Queensland gunboats. The naval commandants of Victoria and South Australia alternated in command afloat. No longer confined to service in their own State waters, Creswell also ordered selected vessels to undertake flag showing cruises along the southern and eastern coasts and down to Tasmania. Public lectures, illustrated by lantern slides, further helped to push Creswell's message.

The greater visibility and renewed activity of the CNF proved the quality of Australian naval men and managed to excite public interest, but the service could not long survive without the replacement of its ancient vessels. Fortunately, Creswell found an ally in the new prime minister, Alfred Deakin, who, like his Naval Director, preferred active cooperation to subsidies. In September 1906, Deakin announced an initial three-year program of eight coastal destroyers and four torpedo boats, but deferred appropriating funds until after the general election scheduled for early the next year.

Subject to political calculation as much as strategic perception, Deakin's naval scheme made slow progress. In December 1907, following discussions at the Imperial Conference in London and Admiralty advice, he announced that the CNF's force structure had been modified to include nine small submarines and a flotilla of six coastal destroyers. Meanwhile, the Government had sent two senior CNF officers on a mission to the United Kingdom where they were directed to obtain plans, specifications, and cost estimates for the construction of various warships. On 6 February 1909, Australia's

naval representative in London requested tenders for the first three vessels, the River Class torpedo boat destroyers *Parramatta*, *Yarra*, and *Warrego*. Already in place were measures to build up a local defence industry. The successful yards were each required to employ at least a dozen Australian workmen to help build *Yarra* and *Parramatta*. This allowed *Warrego* to be taken to pieces and shipped to Australia, where it was re-erected at Cockatoo Island Dockyard. Three subsequent destroyers were built entirely in Australia.

Australian authorities intended the CNF's destroyer flotilla to take on full responsibility for coastal defence, leaving the Royal Navy to deal with more distant operations. However, by the time *Parramatta* and *Yarra* arrived in local waters in December 1910, Australian naval policy had made an even greater advance. Finding itself hard pressed to maintain its global naval supremacy the Royal Navy had already decided to support a more substantial Australian contribution towards defence in the Pacific.

At the 1909 Imperial Conference the Admiralty's First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir John Fisher, suggested that the CNF expand from the planned local defence flotilla to include a self-contained 'fleet unit' based around his revolutionary battle cruiser and several light cruisers. The combined package, argued Fisher, represented an ideal force structure; small enough to be managed by Australia in times of peace but, in war, capable of effective action with the Royal Navy. Federal Cabinet gave provisional endorsement in September 1909 and orders were placed in the United Kingdom for the additional ships.

Just as important was the passing of the *Australian Naval Defence Act 1910*, which provided the clear legislative authority for a navy that would no longer be limited to Australian territorial waters. The difference between the naval and military forces of the Commonwealth was now striking. With an Army compelled by law to serve only on local soil, Australia had to raise a separate volunteer expeditionary force to serve overseas in 1914.

Since 1904 CNF warships had been designated His Majesty's Australian Ship (HMAS), but this had never received the King's sanction. During their visit to London for the coronation of King George V, Australian ministers made known their desire to have the prefix 'Royal' attached to the Australian Navy's title. On 10 July 1911 King George approved the

rank insignia as that previously worn by the Queensland Marine Defence Force. A triangle was used in place of the more familiar executive curl. Creswell's role in this decision remains obscure.

request 'with great satisfaction'. The decision was promulgated to the CNF on 5 October. Thereafter the Permanent CNF officially became the Royal Australian Navy, and the Citizen Naval Forces the Royal Australian Naval Reserve. At the stern of Australian ships, the White Ensign replaced the Australian Blue Ensign. The Australian Commonwealth flag took the place of the Union flag at the bow.

The Royal Australian Navy did not just happen in 1911. The bestowal of the title 'Royal' reflected the progress made in the previous ten years in turning a motley collection of obsolescent vessels into a true fighting service. Perhaps more significant in hindsight, however, was that the revitalisation of the CNF marked Australia's first major step towards nationhood. Arising from a deeper recognition that Australia's defence interests could no longer be consigned to others, the decision to acquire a sea-going navy represented an assumption of national obligation of momentous proportion.

The foresight of men like Creswell and Deakin was amply rewarded just a few years later when in 1914 the German East Asiatic Squadron was decisively deterred from carrying out its plans for cruiser warfare in the Pacific. But for the navy, wartime Prime Minister W.M. 'Billy' Hughes later declared, 'the great cities of Australia would have been reduced to ruins, coastwise shipping sunk, and communications with the outside world cut off'.⁵ One would be hard pressed to find a more appropriate sentiment to mark the Australian Navy's first centenary of service to the nation.

About the Author

David Stevens served for twenty years in the RAN. Since 1994 he has been the Director of Naval Historical Studies.

⁵ W. M. Hughes, 'A Policy for the Times', *Navy, Army and Air-Force Journal*, 1 September 1933, p. 3

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Mr David Griffin
Naval History Directorate
CP4-1-002
Campbell, ACT 2601
Tel: (02) 62662654

Email: david.griffin@cbr.defence.gov.au



This paper was presented by Captain Goldrick to the Royal Thai Navy Seminar on the future of medium power Navies in November last year.

To attempt a survey of the world and of the Asia-Pacific in particular and to suggest what the role of medium power navies will be in the new century is an ambitious project. Let me begin with some definitions and assumptions.

First, what is a medium power? Rear Admiral Richard Hill, in his 1986 book *Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers* went to some trouble to examine this question. He noted that superpowers are unlikely to suffer direct challenges to their territory, their political independence or their national welfare. Small powers, on the other hand, are unable to guard their own interests without some form of external support and guarantee. Medium powers fall between these two groups and they are most clearly identified not so much by any inherent characteristics as by their primary security objective. Richard Hill suggested that a medium power seeks to 'create and keep under national control enough means of power to initiate and sustain coercive actions whose outcome will be the preservation of its vital interests'.¹

It follows from this that a medium power navy is one that seeks to maintain and employ sufficient naval capabilities that the preservation of vital national maritime interests can be achieved. In this context, maritime air forces and amphibious land forces must be considered as integral to any thought about medium power navies. Effective Joint systems are essential force multipliers for any medium power and that they must be Joint without duplication.

All these definitions do not suggest that medium powers are capable of protecting and advancing every aspect of their vital interests by themselves. This is a key issue. As Richard Hill has noted, 'Medium powers need to be as brave as lions and as cunning as foxes.'² Each medium power needs to achieve a balance between national autonomy and co-operation or alliance with other nations. Every medium power navy needs to achieve the same balance between its inherent capabilities and the extent to which it will deliberately interact with other navies as a

¹ Richard Hill *Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers*, Croom Helm, New York, 1986. p.21, note 1. See also: R. Hill *Medium Power Strategy*

Revisited, RAN Sea Power Centre, Working Paper No. 3, March 2000, pp.4-5.

² R. Hill *Medium Power Strategy Revisited Op. Cit.* p.7.

mechanism for achieving the protection of its vital interests.

This is not an easy task. Medium navies by their nature face several challenges in terms of structure and organisation. They place heavy demands on the domestic resources of their nations and on the hard currency resources of their governments. Navies require substantial industrial and technological infrastructure to support their activities, infrastructure which, in the case of smaller services, may seem disproportionate in relation to the combat capability which it generates.³ Both in uniform and out of it, navies need the most highly educated and technically competent people that their countries have to offer, particularly in engineering and information systems. They are thus in direct competition for the same resources on which nations are coming increasingly to depend for economic growth in an era of globalisation. Being instruments of government, governed by the regulations and constraints of government, they are rarely in a position where they can offer direct competition to business for the people that they need. All too often, businesses leech from navies the people that the latter 'caught young' to train and educate. This is a syndrome that practically every modern navy has experienced at some period in the last decade – and which many are experiencing now. Conversely, however, navies suffer in periods of economic recession because of the inevitable reductions in national spending which follow – reductions to which navies are particularly vulnerable. Medium navies in particular are constantly forced to justify their utility, both to others and to themselves. Perhaps the greatest challenge that they face is thus that of understanding their place in a constantly changing world.⁴

³ For an assessment of the issues involved in analysing naval activity see Jon Tetsuro Sumida & David Rosenberg 'Machines, Men, Manufacturing, Management and Money: the Study of Navies as Complex Organisations and the Transformation of 20th Century Naval History' in J.B. Hattendorf (ed) *Doing Naval History: Essays Towards Improvement* US Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, 1995, pp. 25-40.

⁴ For a perspective on the issues of navies in developing nations in particular see the author's *No Easy Answers: The Development of the Navies of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka 1945-1996*, Lancer Press, New Delhi, 1997. Chapter 9

Other Challenges to Medium Power Navies

What other challenges are there for medium power navies? The first assumption in understanding such challenges is that the nation-state, despite the progress of globalisation, will continue to be the principal factor in international relations. Coercion, the use of force or the threat of the use of force, will remain a feature, however undesirable, of their interaction. This reality is one that national armed services, particularly navies, need to bear firmly in mind when contemplating the future of armed conflict.⁵

For armed conflict is acquiring further dimensions, not losing them and this is another assumption we must incorporate within our thinking. To the rivalries of nation states must be added the activities of non-state organisations, such as international criminals and insurgent movements, as well as the consequences of economic, political and environmental failures. And in the context of East Asia, we must bear in mind that we exist within a region that is profoundly maritime in nature, to the extent that practically all the issues and problems listed have a maritime context. More than 50% of the reported acts of armed robbery at sea take place in East Asia, according to the Kuala Lumpur Regional Piracy Centre of the International Maritime Bureau.⁶ A significant proportion of the increasing activity in illegal immigration by seaborne means either originates in or passes through East Asian waters. Drug smuggling is another activity of international organised crime that has a significant maritime element within our region. Environmental degradation is a fact of life and we face the prospect of increasing competition at sea for a greatly depleted and constantly diminishing amount of living natural resources.⁷

National armed forces will need to do more, not less to adapt to all these situations and all these possible conflicts. They will need to do more, not less to meet the spectrum of conflict.

⁵ See RAN Doctrine 1: *Australian Maritime Doctrine*, Canberra, 2000, pp. 21-22.

⁶ Report of the RPC dated January 2000.

⁷ This is probably the most comprehensive recent assessment of the implications of these developments for maritime forces. Not wholly focused on the American situation – is found in Bruce Stubbs & Scott C. Truver *America's Coast Guard: Safeguarding U.S. Maritime Safety and Security in the 21st Century* USCG Headquarters, Washington DC, 2000, especially Chapter II.

Given the inherent constraints on resources which medium powers and thus their naval forces face, this may only serve to complicate the problem even further. To what extent do medium power navies distribute their resources between high level warfighting capabilities and those required for other operations? What will be the division of labour and thus of resources between navies and other maritime agencies in meeting all the threats to good order at sea? These are certainly questions which medium navies in particular face as they enter the twenty first century. But they are not alone. Many armies are also facing similar issues.

On the other hand, these developments may not mean as profound a change for the maritime environment as they do for the land. Naval forces by their nature possess what can only be described as a historical and cultural affinity for operations other than war to a far greater degree than is inherently true for armies. It was international naval forces in the nineteenth century which played a critical part in the suppression of slave trading. Naval forces have been engaged in fishery protection and other constabulary tasks for hundreds of years, while the creation of ad-hoc multinational maritime coalitions goes back nearly two centuries⁸.

This acceptance of roles additional to warfighting has been recognised by many analysts and described most effectively by the British Professor Ken Booth, who explained that navies have three primary roles: warfighting, constabulary and diplomatic.⁹ One of his most important points was that much of the capacity which navies possess to accomplish the huge variety of diplomatic and constabulary tasks which they do from day to day rests upon the capabilities which they have developed for warfighting.

⁸ Arguably starting with the Anglo-Dutch bombardment of Algiers in 1816 over the slavery issue. While such activities were often for imperialist purposes (the intervention in China in 1900 and the blockade of Venezuela in 1903), there were also interventions for disaster relief. For a chronology of the Royal Navy's activities in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, see *The Royal Navy List or Who's Who in the Navy London*, January 1917. Republished as *The Naval Who's Who 1917* J.B. Hayward, Suffolk, 1981, pp. 211-217.

⁹ Ken Booth *Navies and Foreign Policy* Croom Helm, London, 1977, p.16.

The Relationship Between Conflict Intensity and Technology

Another important assumption is that the intensity of a conflict and the sophistication of the technology which will be employed within that conflict do not have a direct relationship. Nor is there any certain relationship between warning time and the weapons which may be employed. Missiles can be acquired and other elements of naval capability readily assembled by those who have the funds and the will. The recent example of the discovery in central America of the attempt by a drug smuggling syndicate to construct a highly capable small submersible is the most striking recent example of this reality. This means that medium navies need to consider comprehensive force protection as one of the foundations of their capability for operations in which *any* degree of armed conflict is possible.

Strategic Developments

We also need to be aware of two key developments affecting the shape of modern naval forces. The first relates to the conclusion of the Cold War. The end of the strategic competition between the Western Alliance and the Soviet Union in maritime terms also marked the end of a century in which the maritime capabilities of the West had served as a counterweight to the continental strength of a succession of 'central alliances'. That counterweight came in the ability to supply reinforcements and resources across the oceans of the world, most notably but not only between North America and Western Europe. The naval forces of the Western Alliance concentrated substantially upon capabilities which would protect seaborne communications and were thus principally configured for sea control rather than power projection operations.¹⁰

Despite the reductions in defence spending which followed the end of the 'Cold War', the Western powers and particularly the United States, found themselves in possession of an unprecedented degree of uncommitted military capability, particularly seaborne capability. This has allowed them to focus on the employment of that capability to meet the emerging problems of an increasingly complex, unstable and multipolar world.

¹⁰ See Colin S. Gray *Modern Strategy* Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, pp. 218-219.

The 'Revolution in Military Affairs'

This process is being assisted by the second development, the profound changes in technology sometimes described as the 'Revolution in Military Affairs'. Many of these technical advances are related not only to extended range missiles and munitions, but also to improvements in the speed with which amphibious forces can be deployed ashore by means of surface effect landing craft and tilt rotor aircraft. The extraordinary advances in C4I – as well as surveillance and reconnaissance – which may permit maritime forces to achieve much higher degrees of what is now termed 'battlespace awareness' also play their part.¹¹

Operations in the Littoral

The result of all this has been the redirection of many navies away from sea control towards operations in the littoral¹² and to employment in crisis management. The USN has encapsulated its new doctrine in a succession of documents, beginning with *From the Sea* in 1992¹³ and the same approach has been adopted by other Western navies, as evidenced in the RN's capstone doctrine of 1999, *BR 1806: British Maritime Doctrine*¹⁴. It is notable that this redirection extends to navies much further down the ladder of capability, such as the Netherlands. Recently the RNIN completed one large landing ship and is planning for another. Spain has a similar programme while Germany is building a class of multipurpose logistics ships for crisis management operations.¹⁵

The interest in crisis management capabilities has not wholly been confined to

the West. Most notably, the Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force has begun a building programme of much more capable multipurpose helicopter carrying landing ships than it has ever possessed before, with the specific intention that these be available for disaster relief and associated tasks. Thailand, of course, commissioned a light carrier for such purposes only a few years ago.¹⁶

Nevertheless, issues remain for medium navies in general and for those in the Asia-Pacific in particular over the extent to which the requirement for sea control capabilities has diminished. Even for the navies of Europe, the absence of a challenger at sea is a strategic reality that may not last for ever. The Asia-Pacific includes a large number of nations with significant maritime and air capability and it would be extremely unwise to make the assumption that the preconditions for sea control will exist whatever the strategic situation. If regional medium navies intend to develop improved crisis management capabilities they must therefore do so without prejudice to their other roles.



INS ABHAY is designed specifically for littoral operations. Photo: John Mortimer

What do Medium Navies Need to Do?

Medium navies in the Asia-Pacific thus have many questions to answer as they enter the twenty first century. Despite the obvious dangers in being prescriptive for a group of organisations of such a complex variety as the region's medium navies, it is possible to identify a number of key areas in which decisions do need to be made.

The first is the question of autonomy, which itself falls into two parts. The first is the extent to which a medium navy insists on operational autonomy by comparison with the

¹¹ See Norman Friedman *Seapower and Space* USNI Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1999.

¹² The 'littoral' is here defined as: 'The areas to seaward of the coast which are susceptible to influence or support from the land and the areas inland from the coast which are susceptible to influence or support from the sea.' *Australian Maritime Doctrine, Op.Cit.* p.154.

¹³ *From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century* United States Navy, Washington DC, 1992.

¹⁴ The recent development in British thinking in the direction of expeditionary operations is particularly evident when the text of the 1999 edition of *British Maritime Doctrine* is compared with the previous (1995) edition of *BR 1806: The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine*.

¹⁵ Richard Sharpe (ed) *Jane's Fighting Ships 2000-2001*, Jane's, London, 2000, pp. 471, 639 & 257.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* pp. 379 & 689.

degree to which it integrates with the operations of other navies. This will often be through the mechanism of formal alliances. But it is important to remember that a degree of latent integration can be achieved by co-operation outside the framework of alliances. A latency that governments may well find a very valuable asset in an unexpected contingency when the national interest requires participation in an ad-hoc coalition. What is clear is that achieving latent integration does have a price for a medium navy, not in terms of political commitments, but in the degree to which resources – including steaming and training time – will need to be allocated to international co-operation rather than specific national tasking.

On the other hand, it is also true that co-operation greatly assists in establishing and maintaining bench marks in terms of operational effectiveness and may well assist in achieving the necessary standards. Co-operation in the form of large multi-lateral exercises, for example, can achieve economies of scale in the provision of targets and opposition forces which individual national forces cannot manage. The perils of conformity and group thinking can be avoided by exposure to different concepts, novel ideas and unfamiliar equipment. Navies generally do not prosper in isolation; like many other complex organisations and professions, they need windows on the world to keep themselves up to date and effective.

The second question is the degree of infrastructure autonomy that a medium navy should seek. Only the United States Navy can seriously attempt to be on the cutting edge of every aspect of naval development and even this organisation has had its failures. Medium navies have to make clear choices between capabilities in which their requirements are such as to produce unique systems and platforms and those which can be derived from the efforts of other countries. This is not only a question of alliances and interests shared by nation-states permitting the necessary degree of co-operation; there are also highly complex problems relating to the involvement of domestic industry, technology transfer and, in particular, reliable and effective through-life support. Nevertheless it is clear that no medium power can afford to sustain all the costs of being a parent navy in every area of maritime warfare. Nor, if it wishes to spend its budget wisely, should it try.

The next major issue is the question of the balance to be drawn between high level capabilities and those on the lower level. Here Professor Booth's concept of the triangle of sea usage allows the clarification of thought on the subject. Medium navies are defined fundamentally by their warfighting capabilities and their primary effort needs to be directed towards an assessment of what is needed in these areas, provided that the needs of all three elements are borne firmly in mind at all times.

The question of meeting the full range of national security requirements in areas such as surveillance and enforcement – particularly in the constabulary role – and the methods by which national needs are met is a question for national decision rather than by navies alone. Whatever the approach taken, however, medium navies must be closely involved and the solution adopted must allow a coherent, systematic and comprehensive national effort. If the solution is to give the navy primacy in or a leading responsibility for civil surveillance and enforcement, then the force structure must allow for these activities without detriment to warfighting capabilities.

On the other hand, even if the solution adopted for the formation of Coast Guards (and even if wholly independent of naval or military control), medium navies and maritime air forces have much to contribute. They would supplement the surveillance effort and providing 'fall back' capabilities in the event of more complex operations, particularly those requiring the deployment of substantial coercive force.

No matter what their individual situation, therefore, medium navies will need to sustain a very high degree of awareness of and expertise in surveillance and enforcement and take seriously their constabulary role. It follows in force structure terms that credible maritime surveillance capabilities are and will be inherent to an effective medium navy and that surveillance operations should be a significant element of naval effort, whether in 'normal' conditions or in conflict.

Achieving the Balanced Fleet

If there is one striking feature of the modern world, which should be apparent from the arguments advanced in this paper, it is the theme of complication, not only in terms of strategic requirements but also in the methods and structures developed to meet national needs. The key goal of medium navies has always been to achieve the right balance of capabilities and the

concept of the 'balanced fleet' must remain central to most of their thought in this era of complication.

Balance to React

Balance in this sense has two aspects and both are important for medium navies. The first aspect is balance to protect against the unexpected threat. This concept is something that has a long history for navies, one that needs to be understood in an era when many observers are highlighting the existence of 'asymmetric threats' as if they were something new. They are not, and the very term 'balanced fleet' derives from the response necessary to the development of the first seagoing asymmetric threats in the modern era, the torpedo boat and the submarine, just on a century ago.¹⁷ By integrating small craft, scouting vessels and capital ships and, later, aircraft, the maritime powers which sought to retain their ability to control the sea were able to reduce the threat to the extent that they could achieve their ends.

The concept of the balanced fleet remains a central element of force planning for medium navies because, without a proper balance and range of capabilities, they and their nations become immediately vulnerable to asymmetric threats in the maritime environment. This article has already mentioned the requirement for comprehensive force protection in low intensity conflict. This provides a good start to the possibilities which medium navies need to encompass. This is because force protection operations mirror those which can be described more broadly as 'maritime protective activities', such as the defence of merchant shipping and the protection of harbours, coasts, offshore installations and waterways from mines and from other attack from the sea. This creates an obvious hierarchy of required activity. Mine countermeasures are essential to all medium navies. Maritime surveillance has already been discussed, but with these elements must also come a proper maritime command, control and communications system.

The remainder of the range of capabilities within the order of battle of medium navies must depend upon their

strategic requirements. If there is a requirement for the capacity to exercise sea denial, then a submarine force is likely to be a leading element. The medium sized surface combatant will also be central to operations to exercise sea control and to support the projection of power. It is worth observing that some elements of the RMA, most notably unmanned aerial vehicles and extended range munitions fired from medium calibre guns, have the potential to give medium power surface combatants a utility in power projection against the land which they have never enjoyed before.

Balance to Act

At this point it is appropriate to introduce the second aspect of balance. This is the balance required to be able to do the unexpected, to provide options for national governments not only to react, but also to act. Medium navies must be about providing the maximum number of possibilities for their governments. Many of the force elements already discussed provide those options. But in medium power terms, and in the context of an uncertain and dangerous world order, there are clear benefits in the possession of amphibious and logistics units and, just as important, land forces which have the necessary equipment and expertise to operate in the maritime environment.

It is unlikely that most medium powers will ever have the resources to conduct such operations in higher intensity conflicts unless in coalition. Nevertheless, being able to insert people, vehicles and logistic supplies without the need for developed facilities provides many possibilities for constructive responses to the unexpected. No nation is immune to natural disasters and seaborne means – particularly in the Asia-Pacific – may well be the *only* way in which a substantial relief effort can be mounted. Peace operations, too, in a maritime region, are likely to require significant maritime elements.

Joint Operations

There is another theme inherent in the concepts of balance, both in terms of threat and of action, for medium navies and that is the increasing requirement for effective joint operations with other national services. Medium powers cannot afford duplication between their individual services and the reality is that credible national capability will depend increasingly upon the effective integration of all combat services. Very few medium navies can afford to sustain organic air defence and even when they do, their

¹⁷ See in particular Jon Sumida *In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology and British Naval Policy 1889-1914*, Unwin Hyman, Boston, 1989 and Nicholas A. Lambert *Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution* University of South Carolina, 1999.

potential must be greatly increased by proper co-ordination of carrier borne aircraft with those based on land. No medium navy can sensibly contemplate sea control operations without the involvement of maritime patrol aircraft. Very few medium navies can afford to maintain their own marine forces. Even if they can, the reality remains that these marines must develop close working relations with their armies. The list goes on.

Keeping Up with Technology

Finally, and still on the question of balance, medium navies have hard decisions to make about the extent to which they attempt to adopt the latest technology. It is easy to be caught in the situation of expending excessive funds and human resources in attempting to maintain elderly and obsolescent platforms and equipment. On the other hand, there may be no alternative if the capital costs of acquiring new technology are such that they cannot be afforded within the budget. In the case of medium and small navies, it is sometimes better to be able to do something badly than not to be able to do it at all.¹⁸ The tests must always be: first, does the capability, however limited, present options which may prove vital to the national interest and which can be provided in no other way? Second, is the capability not being maintained at the expense of other more useful capabilities? It is possible to fall into the trap of pouring resources into one element of the fleet when others, equally vital to a medium navy, are being neglected. If the capability passes these two tests – keep it.

Conclusions

This article has attempted to outline the contemporary situation and the challenges facing medium navies in the future. Its principal conclusions are that medium navies need to do as they have always done. They need to develop and maintain the greatest possible range of capabilities in order to provide the balance necessary to protect against threats in the maritime environment and to provide their governments with the widest possible range of options. Medium navies need to make hard decisions about the extent to which they will be autonomous by comparison with the degree to which they will

co-operate with other nations and navies in acquiring and maintaining their capabilities. Medium navies need to work closely with their national air forces and armies to achieve the most effective results for national security. Above all, medium navies need to understand themselves and their situations – and be much better than many of us have been in the past at explaining our roles to ourselves and to others.

About the Author

Captain Goldrick is the Chief Staff Officer to CN. He gave this paper when Director of the RAN Seapower Centre. Captain Goldrick has commanded HMA Ships Cessnock and Sydney (twice). He is a prolific writer on naval history and maritime strategic matters.

FOR THE DIARY

Dr Andrew Gordon, author of *Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command*, will be coming to Canberra in July 2001 as the RAN's Synnot Lecturer.

He will give at least two public presentations in Canberra which ANI members are welcome to attend. They are:

High Command: Jellicoe & Beatty the basic RN paradigms.

The presentation will be delivered on 18 July in the R1 Theatre at Russell Offices

Crisis Escalation & Command Dilemmas.

This will be presented on 19 July at the Australian Defence Force Academy.

Rules of the Game: Jutland & British Naval Command.

This will be presented on 20 July at the Australian Defence Force Academy.

For confirmation of times and further information contact Mr David Griffin at the Naval History Directorate, CP4-1-002, Campbell, ACT 2601, Tel: (02) 62662654 Email: david.griffin@cbr.defence.gov.au

¹⁸ See this argument developed in the author's *No Easy Answers: The Development of the Navies of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka 1945-1992 Op. Cit.*, pp. 201-202.

PUBLIC CONSULTATION AND DEFENCE POLICY MAKING – AN ANZAC CONTRAST

By R T Jackson

The extensive public consultation process that Australia undertook before its new Defence White Paper gave some of us in New Zealand a sense of *deja vu*. Back in 1984 a public process for defence policy-making on this side of the Tasman, became mired in controversy.

Ultimately in that Kiwi experience, the politicians of the day ignored the results of the public process and took NZ down the nuclear-free, independent path that has affected NZ defence policy-making ever since.

But for the new Labour-Alliance Coalition Government now in Wellington, defence policy-making last year has been, in comparison with 1984, far more decisive. Not only was there little public consultation by the newly elected government, but Defence officials have indicated that there was minimal consultation with the Ministry of Defence¹. Instead, the Labour Party based their party policy on previous work by a Parliamentary Select Committee, negotiated their policy with their parliamentary partners, and then presented it to Defence and the public. Defence officials are now expected to, and of course will, implement this policy.

In an academic sense this is policy-making at its purest - the newly-elected government consults its own circle of advisers, policy is shaped to be palatable to their parliamentary allies, and then the government machinery is expected to implement the political decisions. To some extent this recent process in NZ reflects the strong academic backgrounds of members in the current Cabinet, who see - especially in the case of Defence - that government departments exist to deliver results, and should not capture policy-making².



Certainly there are those in Parliament with memories of the 1984-1987 defence debate who view the Defence organisation as unresponsive and reluctant to accept external guidance. The ANZUS debate of those years was long and bitter. The break in our alliance with the US occurred despite being (albeit narrowly) against surveyed public opinion³.

So it with a sense of irony that we watched the extensive process of public consultation conducted in Australia. In this

¹ Personal discussions with the author

² The issue of policy capture has been at the heart of NZ's state sector reforms since 1986. See

Government Management Vol I, The Treasury, 1987

³ See for example, Addenda II and III to *Defence and Security. What New Zealanders want*.

discussion of the New Zealand perspective, I will explore two aspects:

- First, what is the current NZ policy? and
- Secondly, what of our 1984 experience - does it hold any lessons for Australia today?

New Zealand's 2000 Defence Policy

Despite widespread apprehension among defence commentators, the defence policy announced in June 2000 did not emasculate New Zealand's armed forces. Rather, our new *Defence Policy Framework* emphasises particular roles for the NZDF, while stating clearly that combat viability has to be a fundamental attribute for NZDF units.

Much of the earlier apprehension was due to the impact of a 1999 Parliamentary Select Committee, which had undertaken a wide-ranging review of defence issues. The Select Committee review, which took place over two years, was open to public submissions but it was not a public consultative process in the manner of the recent Australian defence policy review. Chaired by (now former) MP Derek Quigley, the Committee's report, (titled *Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000*) cemented the public impression that the Army was under-funded, that the Navy needed no more than two frigates and that the Air Combat Force (then anticipating F-16s) should be reviewed. The Committee emphasised peacekeeping duties over preparations for combat⁴.

During the 1999 election campaign, the Labour Party defence policy stated that the Select Committee report would be the basis of future defence policy. So there were some familiar themes in the new Government's formal statement of defence policy, which was announced in mid-June last year. As well as having the support of the Alliance Party, the governing coalition partner, two minor parliamentary parties, the NZ Greens and New Zealand First, also stated their support for the new policy.

Our *Defence Policy Framework* states the following basic guidelines:

- NZ's defence is to be based on NZ's own assessment of the security environment;
- the primary reasons to maintain a Defence Force are:

- to secure NZ against external threats,
- to protect our sovereign interests and,
- to meet likely contingencies in our area of interest.
- There is a need to work collaboratively with like-minded partners, and no strategic partnership for NZ is closer than that with Australia.
- We have special obligations in the South Pacific for maintaining peace, preserving the environment, promoting good governance, and to achieve economic well being.
- We want a secure South Pacific neighbourhood, and diplomacy and mediation are relevant as well as military force.
- New Zealand will contribute to UN and other appropriate multi-national peace support and humanitarian operations.
- The Government will maintain the integrity of our nuclear-free policy but we will not undertake military co-operation with nations that suppress human rights.

New Zealand's specific defence policy objectives are:

- to defend NZ's people, land, territorial waters and EEZ, natural resources, and critical infrastructure.
- to meet our alliance commitments to Australia.
- to assist in maintaining security in the South Pacific.
- to play an appropriate role in Asia Pacific and to meet our obligations under the FPDA.
- to contribute to global security and peace keeping through participation in the full range of UN and multi-lateral peace operations.

The DPF recognises that the NZDF has to continue to be modernised and **seven principles** will guide this process. They are:

- the NZDF is to be trained and equipped for combat and peacekeeping.
- the NZDF is to be deployable, with a flexible mix of air and sea lift capabilities.
- the NZDF is to be interoperable, with bilateral exercises with Australia and multi-lateral exercises under the FPDA.
- the NZDF is to be held at appropriate levels of readiness.
- NZDF deployments are to be sustainable

⁴ *Defence Beyond 2000*, pp 29-31

- the NZDF is to keep abreast of technological changes, specifically the Revolution in Military Affairs.
- the NZDF rebuilding is to be fiscally sustainable.

Thus the Government's capital investment programme is aimed at creating well-equipped combat-trained land forces, which are able to act as effective peacekeepers, supported by the Navy and Air Force. There are **three immediate priorities**:

- to upgrade the Army's mobility, communications, surveillance and fire support capabilities.
- to provide effective air and naval transport capabilities.
- to maintain effective maritime surveillance capabilities of the Navy and Air Force within the NZ EEZ and the EEZs of Pacific Island states.

Supporting the DPF, the Government also released two other official papers: a Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade paper titled *New Zealand's Foreign and Security Policy Challenges*; and also, *Strategic Assessment 2000*, written by the External Assessments Bureau; the first time EAB has released such a review to the public. Both these papers discuss New Zealand's international environment in a clear and thoughtful way. Sadly, for those wanting a better informed public, both these documents were largely ignored by the mainstream news media. At the time of its release, one prominent commentator wrote of the DPF:

"The Labour Alliance coalition's Defence Policy Framework confounded those who thought the Clark government would retreat from combat viability into peacekeeping. Peace support operations rank behind the relationship with Australia and our obligations under the FPDA," said political analyst Ian Templeton in his weekly newsletter⁵. "The dimensions of the policy underline how far the thinking of PM Helen Clark and her senior ministers has evolved, since taking office and absorbing the regional strategic priorities."

One worry was that the role of the RNZN and RNZAF in "supporting the land forces" was not clearly enunciated; some

commentators interpreted their future role as transport only. Even Templeton noted that, as Washington and Canberra signed a defence technology transfer agreement, and made arrangements to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the ANZUS pact, those events underlined Wellington's "increasing isolation from the mainstream of Western defence."



A computer image of a fully fitted out RAN ANZAC class frigate. RAN Official

Subsequently, the Government in Wellington has made some capital equipment decisions in accord with its new defence policy. The NZ Army is to get 105 LAV III armoured vehicles to replace the old M113 APCs, and a new series of tactical radios. The future of the air combat force of the RNZAF remains in doubt, but should be resolved with the next round of defence decisions due in May 2001. However, indications are that our Orions won't be scrapped, but neither will they get a full military upgrade for their maritime surveillance suite.

For the RNZN, the Prime Minister has given public indications that we may evolve as a two-tiered Navy, with, perhaps, some ocean patrol vessels of about 70 metres length to undertake resource protection and Southern Ocean surveillance and response tasks. The formal announcement is expected in May, although if this is the way ahead, then the RNZN will of course face some years of studies and acquisition processes before the future ships materialise. Meanwhile the fate of the *Charles Upham* remains in doubt, and we hope in May also to learn its future.

Public Input into Defence Policy Making 1984-1986

Isolation from Western defence, was, it can be argued, the actual goal of New Zealand's 'peace'

⁵ *Trans Tasman* 22 June 2000

groups in the defence debate of the mid-1980s⁶. Public consultation was attempted then, but only after New Zealand's 1984 Labour Government adopted a nuclear-free policy that put New Zealand's membership of the widely supported ANZUS alliance under threat⁷.

NZ's public defence policy consultation then proved to be divisive, because the government of the day was not really seeking public input. Rather, they wanted to educate the public into their view of defence, while allowing all their (supportive) pressure groups a chance to feel consulted⁸.

In contrast to New Zealand, through the 1980s the Hawke Labor Government was subject to parallel pressures from 'peace' groups, yet Australia maintained a bi-partisan political consensus towards defence and membership of ANZUS. Australians do have a sense of national vulnerability, but also the far-Left pressure groups in Australia then were relatively less influential on the executive - and today those groups are focussed primarily on environmental issues, rather than defence.

The Kiwi public consultation process of the 1980s started with a discussion paper, which when viewed today is clearly limited in its scope. Compared with the recent Australian public discussion paper, Wellington's 1985 discussion paper conveyed little of the roles and functions of the armed forces, while its focus was visibly idealistic - can defence be non-violent, is armed neutrality a viable option, what future for ANZUS⁹? With hindsight, it can be seen that the public consultation process back then was already weighted against the maintenance of balanced, national armed forces, and against collective defence.

A Committee of Enquiry was set up, with Frank Corner, a distinguished diplomat, as its chairman. Their final report was issued in July 1986: *'Defence and Security: What New Zealanders Want'*. After many public submissions, and public meetings around the country, the Corner committee concluded that the majority of New Zealanders favoured:

- collective defence,
- membership of ANZUS and, by a slim margin,
- were willing to tolerate the presence of nuclear-armed warships.

The Committee also noted the perceptibly pro-Soviet attitudes of the 'peace' movement¹⁰.

Because these conclusions were contrary to the Government's expectations, the Report became controversial, with its historical context being dismissed by the then Prime Minister as Mr Corner's 'personal memoir'¹¹.

But in the author's assessment, there are distinct differences between New Zealand then and Australia now:

- there was no political consensus in NZ about the role or value of defence;
- there was a determined and newsmedia-savvy 'peace' movement determined to get our defence policy changed;
- there was no sophisticated public defence of Defence; and
- there was a wide perception that the Cold War threatened global war on such a scale that New Zealand could not make a difference anyway.

It is relevant to recall that New Zealand headed down its independent, nuclear-free path in 1984 when the Cold War was at its height. Certainly some then were determined to paint the threat to NZ as actually coming from the US, while there was limited public awareness about the true nature of Soviet ambitions¹². There was a conviction within Wellington, fostered by the 'peace' groups, that the world then had never been so close to global war as under President Reagan¹³.

Former Secretary of Defence Gerald Hensley, writing in *The Dominion* newspaper, said "Because the defence of Australia and New

⁶ See for example issues of *Peace Researcher*, *Journal of the Anti-Bases Campaign*.

⁷ *Defence and Security, what New Zealanders want*, p 74

⁸ Jackson, Commander Richard; New Zealand and ANZUS; *JANI* Vol 19 No 2 May 1993

⁹ *The Defence Question, a discussion paper*; Wellington 1985

¹⁰ *ibid* p 72

¹¹ *Defence and Security, what New Zealanders want*, Addendum III, para2

¹² This is reflected in the opinion polling carried out by the 1985 Committee of Enquiry.

¹³ Personal discussions, Dr Rod Alley, Victoria University of Wellington 1989. I was serving in an exchange billet in Hawaii, 1982-85 and I was flabbergasted to return to NZ and discover this attitude. From the front line of USCINCPAC the Pacific balance of power had seemed quite stable. Even shocks such as the Soviet shooting down of KAL Flight 007 were not perceived as likely war starters.

Zealand cannot be separated, we have continued despite ourselves to be protected by ANZUS but without the defence and diplomatic advantages of an American alliance. We made this curious bargain for emotional reasons ...without much thought about its wider consequences. The fact was that, pushed by a well organised peace lobby, we resolutely backed into the future, excited by the process rather than its outcome.¹⁴

The attitude of New Zealand's 1984 Labour Government towards ANZUS and our traditional defence policies was influenced by perceptions that seemed to be Moscow-oriented¹⁵. Indeed some of the opponents of Defence in NZ now, still haven't lost their Cold War era, anti-American reflexes. For example, Project Sirius, the now-cancelled proposal to modernise the sensors and data processing capability of our P-3K Orions was a target for anti-defence opinion shapers, and politicians like Keith Locke of the Greens. They ignored the extensive maritime area that is New Zealand's unique responsibility and portrayed the Orion upgrade project simply as a scheme to get closer to the Americans¹⁶.

The apparent fear of those on the political far-Left is that the logic of the post-Cold War world and the growth of UN-mandated coalition operations mean that New Zealanders might see some value from getting back on side in military terms with the US¹⁷.

Conclusion

Time has moved on and our region is now clearly more volatile. The relevance of capable and versatile national armed forces is more obvious now than 20 years ago. Indeed with the East Timor commitment there was an outpouring of pride and support for the NZDF that was unparalleled in my experience. We have to look back to the Korean War to see a similar demonstration of public support.

In contrast, public opinion in Australia has long shown markedly more overt pride and

also more direct interest in the ADF than, until East Timor, New Zealanders did for the NZDF. And that is the key difference in the development of defence policies between our two nations. Twenty years ago public consultation became a device for New Zealand's far-Left to shape an anti-nuclear posture, which still has an impact in Wellington today¹⁸.

But as noted in the first part of this essay, the current defence policy in Wellington does recognise many of the geographic and international realities that actually shaped the balanced NZDF of earlier years. The new defence policy does not at this stage appear to be a marked change of strategic course from previous postures¹⁹; rather, the fiscal realities are biting deeper. Money will shape the NZDF of the immediate future, even though the policy makers do acknowledge the continuity of New Zealand's strategic setting.

But in Australia, I assess that the defence consultation process, because it focused on the roles and capabilities of the ADF as well as the tasks that Australia places on them, has built a broadly supportive attitude to the White Paper's plans for increased defence spending.

About the Author

Commander Richard Jackson RNZN (Rtd) had a 31-year naval career, before joining the NZDF as a civilian in the position of Deputy Naval Corporate Relations Manager. As a Midshipman, he gained a BSc at the US Naval Academy & later in his naval career earned an MPP from Victoria University of Wellington. After graduating from the Joint Services' Staff College, Canberra in 1996, his final naval posting was to the Directing Staff of the RAN Staff College, Sydney. He became a founder writer for the now defunct New Zealand Defence Quarterly & is now the Editor of the RNZN magazine Navy Today. He has regularly contributed to JANI & other defence journals and to RAN and NZ military history conferences.

¹⁴ Hensley, Gerald; Charting a strange course, *The Dominion*, 1 August 2000

¹⁵ *Defence and Security: What New Zealanders Want*, p72

¹⁶ Hager, Nicky; Big savings if defence is revamped, *NZ Herald*, 18 July 2000. On 23 August the Government announced its decision to halt Project SIRIUS and refer the entire question of maritime surveillance to a special committee of Ministers.

¹⁷ *Peace Researcher*, No 14 Dec 1997, p20.

¹⁸ Main, Victoria; Clark dons anti-nuclear hat before going defence shopping, *The Dominion*, 7 August 2000

¹⁹ *New Zealand's Foreign and Security Policy Challenges*, pp 4-9

AUSTRALIAN MARITIME DEFENCE COUNCIL

By Warren Barnsley

This article explores how the AMDC is evolving to meet the contemporary security challenges to Australia's maritime trade.

The AMDC is a non-statutory body appointed by the Minister for Defence. Its mission is:

"Promoting the partnership between the Australian Defence Organisation (ADO) and the Australian Maritime Industry, and to facilitate the provision of effective advice and support to Government on maritime issues in the interests of national security".

Membership

The AMDC Chairman is the Deputy Chief of Navy (DCN) with membership comprised of representatives from across the broad spectrum of the maritime industry, such as: the Australian Shipping Federation, Teekay Shipping, Howard Smith Towage, Australian Mines and Metals Association (representing the off-shore industry), Association of Australian Ports & Marine Authorities, Minerals Council of Australia, Liner Shipping Services and the Stevedoring Industry. Government is represented by the Department of Transport & Regional Development, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade; and Defence.

While the AMDC has a fixed representative membership, the Chairman has authority to invite other organisations to meetings if their attendance and contribution would be considered to add value to the agenda item discussions.

Originated in 1982, the purpose of the AMDC expanded beyond the discussions of Naval Control and Protection of Shipping (NCAPS) and accordingly its membership grew. The Department of Transport joined in 1982, the Department of Trade in 1985 and Chairman and the Australian National Maritime Association (AMSA) came aboard in 1990.



Revised Charter

In 1994 the then Minister for Defence Hon. Robert Ray approved changes to the ASDC. The revised aim of the Council was:

"To provide a consultative forum for Government and the Australian Maritime Industry to initiate and develop proposals for the provision of safety and protection of merchant shipping and Australia's maritime trade, and the provision of merchant shipping support to the Australian Defence Force, in time of threat, tension. Emergency and war".

Since 1994 other issues have come to the forefront. These have included maritime industry support to Defence in situations short of a Defence emergency, the decline in Australian shipowners and the increasing relevance of shipping agencies.

A former Chairman of Council, Rear Admiral Chris Oxenbould AO RAN, during his Chairmanship set in train the future direction for the AMDC by initiating a Strategic Plan for

Council and firmly emphasising that the Council was a "partnering" arrangement. It is the unanimity of purpose of the membership that will be the major driver of the AMDC in striving towards its vision of:

"being recognised as the leading authority in the provision of advice and support to Government, on Australian maritime issues in relation to the maintenance of national security."

While national security has primacy of purpose, the AMDC also facilitates discussion on maritime issues of mutual interest, and can establish mechanisms for cooperative arrangements. Recent AMDC topics have been implications of archipelagic sea lanes, oceans management policy, marine pollution, employment of women at sea, law of the sea, piracy, Defence access to and use of merchant shipping, Defence access to ports of strategic importance, and of course shipping reform and the effects of winding back cabotage.

The future direction of the AMDC foresees the involvement of members of industry in major Defence exercise planning, when merchant shipping and port support is required, a testing of developing procedures and mechanisms and a general strengthening of the current partnering relationships.

Conclusion

The AMDC has evolved both to meet the changing shape of the waterfront and the shifts in Australia's strategic environment. The fundamental need to have a close working relationship between the maritime industry and Defence remains as vital as it did a generation ago.

About the Author

Warren Barnsley commenced a maritime career in 1954 as a marine apprentice with BHP & served with British India Steam Navigation Company and Bank Line. In 1962 he gained a Master Mariner (Foreign-Going) Certificate of Competency in Southampton. In 1965 Warren commissioned in the Royal Australian Engineers (Transportation) as a Captain. He was Commanding Officer of AV1356 Clive Steele, a Landing Ship Medium (LSM) in South Vietnam in 1968/69. He retired from the Army in 1985.

Warren joined the APS in Directorate of Movement and Transport - Navy (DMOVT-N) in Navy Office and has served continuously in various logistic Directorates within Navy Office/Navy HQ. He is now as serving as Staff Officer Mobilisation, Navy Capability Branch. In that capacity he is Secretary of the AMDC.

NAVAL OFFICERS CLUB LITERARY PRIZE

The Naval Officers Club is sponsoring a new competition between Members and Associate Members of the Naval Officers Club for the best essay about **Australian sea power combat readiness**. Entries, between 1500 and 3000 words with graphics suitable for publication in the Naval Officers Club Newsletter, must be submitted to the Hon. Secretary, Naval Officers Club, PO Box 207 Rose Bay, NSW 2029, by 1 June 2001.

Prizes: The first prize will be \$500, second prize \$300 and third \$200. Prize winners will be invited to attend a prize awarding ceremony at a Members Luncheon at the RAC, Sydney, in July 2001.

Eligibility: The competition is open to **all Members and Associate Members of the Naval Officers Club**. All active and retired commissioned officers of the RAN and a number of other navies are eligible for membership (nominal membership subscription \$20 per annum). For the purposes of this competition, all Australian officers under training, including RAN Midshipmen, also Army and RAAF ADFA cadets, may be eligible for Associate Membership, for the same subscription.

Content: Subjects include Australian sea power combat readiness in the context of policy, strategy, tactics, operations, doctrine, organisation, force structure, weapons, training, recruiting or history.

For more details visit: www.navalofficer.com.au



THE USN INTO THE FUTURE: A VIEW FROM MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE

*By Commodore Jack MacCafferie
Australian Naval Attache Washington*

In the first of a series RAN Attaches, Advisors and Exchange Officers give a personal perspective about naval matters in their host nations.

The USN enters the 21st Century pre-eminent among the world's navies and does not appear to have a challenger for its position on the horizon. But, even though there may be no naval threats to its rule over the world's oceans, there is a new threat regime which demands close attention. The recent attack on the USS COLE will cause the USN and other navies, to review security of port infrastructure and ships alongside, throughout the world. It may be, for some time at least, that the USN will be more threatened when alongside, than when at sea.

There are also some domestic issues, which could cause fundamental thinking about the roles and shape of the USN. Essentially, the kind of thinking now being demanded, is that which was probably required immediately after the end of Cold War, but which only now can be done with sufficient objectivity and clarity.

As the Clinton era came to an end and the Bush Administration prepared to govern, the USN along with the other Services, considered that it was stretched, almost to the limit. It was deployed throughout the world's oceans, engaged in operations in well-known trouble spots, and having real difficulties in keeping operational units and their crews trained and supported. It was looking forward to the prospect of a Bush Administration, committed to ending the rundown in capability, which accompanied the end of the Cold War.

In something of a surprise for the USN, and the other Services, the Bush Administration has arrived with a commitment to a strong national defence, but one that looks

very much to the future. It could well demand a significant change in the way in which naval (and other) capability is generated. The new Administration is demanding a *transformation* of the military and is seeking to leap a generation of technology. The USN, no less than any of the other Services, may well have to take a deep breath and be prepared to face the future with a degree of boldness not seen for many decades.

The Challenges

Of the many challenges facing the Navy now, undoubtedly the most significant is that posed by the review of strategy being conducted for Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. A team, led by Mr Andy Marshall, who is characterized as "an unconventional thinker", is conducting the review. The significance of this review is twofold. Firstly, it is meant to underpin the desire of the new Administration to "transform" the US military, from what is alleged to be still a Cold War mindset, to one capable of fighting and winning the wars of the 21st Century. Secondly, the review is being conducted in great secrecy and thus without the ability of the Services and other interested parties to influence the outcomes.

While it is difficult to determine precisely what "transformation" will mean for the USN, there are several signs. For example, at a conference in early February, Mr Marshall noted that he wanted forces capable of long-range power projection. This could see less emphasis in the future on aircraft carriers with relatively short-ranged strike aircraft. But, it could also result in greater emphasis on arsenal ship concepts – surface ships or submarines. On another front, the recently stated USN

development priorities; networks, sensors, weapons and platforms do represent a new way of approaching maritime conflict, which could facilitate the desired changes.

Transformation could also see real interest in leaping a generation of technology, even though many people still have difficulty in defining exactly what is meant by it. The USN could argue that DD 21 represents such a leap; while the USMC could argue that by foregoing the F-18 E/F in favour of the JSF, it

confronted by a major challenge with current operations. Operational tempo is running at a very high level, with units and their crews dispersed all over the world. In the last decade, the USN has responded to crises of various sorts at a rate unheard of during the Cold War.

On the equipment side, the picture appears to be quite serious. Many air squadrons are finding it increasingly difficult to maintain aged aircraft at operational readiness standards. Additionally, there is a strong sense that not



USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63) makes her way towards Changi Pier in Singapore on 22 March 2001. Kitty Hawk is the first U.S. aircraft carrier to moor at Singapore's new deep-draft vessel wharf at Changi Naval Base. This new facility is one of the few piers in the Pacific that is large enough to berth a carrier and only one of two located in Southeast Asia. (U.S. Navy photo)

too is leaping a generation of technology. What the USN may need to consider in its assessment of leaping ahead, is whether its leaps are to technologies that reflect the new ways of fighting and winning now being demanded by the Bush Administration.

Even as it tries to grapple with a future that could be vastly different from previously reasonable expectations, the USN is also

enough money is available for training purposes. A similar picture is presented in both the surface fleet and the submarine force. In the surface fleet, current building rates are simply insufficient to maintain the Fleet at even the present barely satisfactory size. Similarly, recent studies have demonstrated a need for more SSNs, but there are doubts that the required funding will be made available.

But On The Other Hand...

It is, however, too easy to be gloomy about the prospects for the USN. There is much in the future that is exciting and in some cases genuinely revolutionary. There are new classes of ships and aircraft coming on line and new concepts which could impact significantly on the conduct of maritime operations and conflict.

Undoubtedly, the most radical concept is that of network centric warfare. In its mature form this concept will allow the USN and USMC to link together a range of combat units and formations, provide them with a common, aggregated and highly accurate picture of the relevant battle space. Part of this concept, the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) is in the final stages of operational evaluation, with the USN very confident of success. The RAN and RAAF have a significant interest in CEC and are hopeful of gaining access to the program, sometime after operational evaluation has been completed.

We can also expect to see a far greater USN emphasis on the use of unmanned vehicles and remotely operated sensors. Unmanned vehicles in naval use will comprise a variety of airborne, subsurface and probably surface types. They will be used in many roles, including reconnaissance, strike and mine warfare. In many cases, they will be supported, as will more conventional forces, by networks or grids of seabed sensors. Sometimes these sensor grids will themselves be put in place by unmanned vehicles.

On the weapons front, there will undoubtedly be major advances, especially in precision and range. Although the program has not been trouble-free, ERGM looks set to mature into a genuine long-range and extremely accurate land attack weapon. Not least of the concerns in its development, is the projected cost of rounds. With the coming emphasis on land-attack, we can expect to see other even longer ranging precision weapons appearing. Tactical Tomahawk is but one example. We can also expect to see weapons developed specifically for unmanned aerial combat vehicles.

Especially if the Marshall Review heads in directions expected by many media commentators, the most visible changes in the future USN will be in platforms. There is some debate as to the future of the large deck carrier, ostensibly on the grounds of vulnerability to missile attack. It is difficult to see how smaller

ones could be any less vulnerable. What may well determine the ultimate fate of the large deck carriers, however, is the extent to which their strike packages could be replaced by other systems. There is no doubting the "presence" value of a CVN, but could an SSBN converted to carry cruise missiles, pack an equivalent punch, without the need for the array of defensive systems?

The ZUMWALT Class destroyers (DD21) will also mark a revolution within the USN. They will be not just "electric drive" but all-electric ships. That is, through their Integrated Power Systems (IPS) the prime movers will generate electricity which will power propulsion systems, ships' services and weapons systems. Equally revolutionary will be the crew structure, which will take minimum manning to a new low level. Even if the projected number of 95 is not reached, this very large ship will have few enough people in it to require major changes in ship management concepts.

There is also widespread interest in the *Streetfighter* concept for small surface combatants optimized for littoral maritime warfare. That interest has also encompassed the fast catamaran technology, which is best exemplified by the products of the Australian firms, INCAT and AUSTAL, both of which now have joint venture partners in the USA. There is no agreement yet within the USN as to how this technology can best be used, nor on the roles for *Streetfighter*. Nevertheless, despite the funding difficulties within the DoD, there is a good chance that either an AUSTAL or INCAT product will be leased for a trial period in the near future. Such a trial would play well with Mr Marshall's recent cry for more experimentation.

And the People?

Like many navies around the world, the USN has significant challenges in attracting and retaining the right number of the right kinds of people. Nevertheless, it has consistently met its recruiting targets in recent times, not least because of an aggressive and very well resourced recruiting campaign. The USN has also been promoting joining and signing-on bonuses to good effect. Recent pay rises and the promise of more in the near future, must also be having an effect.

But, the USN is also working hard to boost retention; not an easy task at a time when operating tempo is very high and maintenance funding is constrained. This is being done

through a range of programs, which include attempts to reduce the time which sailors spend on menial tasks. There are also limits being placed on the time which sailors can be deployed from their home ports and financial compensation if those limits are breached. Although it may be too early to claim victory, this combination of measures does seem to be having the desired effect; with recent reports of



improving trends in retention.

Beyond that, the USN is examining new approaches to training, to accord with the new crewing philosophies, associated in the first place with DD 21. The new approaches will also be based significantly on the widespread availability of internet facilities at sea and ashore.

So, What of the Future?

This article is little more than a brief and selective look at the most powerful navy in the world. Consequently, any conclusions drawn from it need to be heavily qualified. No interested observer of the USN has difficulty in identifying present problems or future challenges, but it is far too easy to make judgments on that basis alone.

What has particularly impressed this observer, over the last year or so, is the strength of the institution that is the USN. Despite the recent reductions, the supporting infrastructure, human and physical, remains huge and capable, by any standard. Furthermore, despite some criticism to the contrary, the USN is capable of bold and significant change. DD21 and the focus on network centric warfare are evidence of this. While this inherent strength will certainly be tested in the future, the USN seems set to remain the world's preeminent navy for some time to come.

About the Author

Commodore Jack McCaffrie is the Australian Naval Attache in Washington; having agreed to leave the country as a condition of his recent parole from Navy Headquarters. In a former life he was an aviator, while more recently, he has been Head of what is now the Seapower Centre and a Branch Head in Navy Headquarters.

BOOK REVIEWS



India's Maritime Security

Rahul Roy-Chaudhury

Knowledge World in association with the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
New Delhi, 2000

ISBN 81-86019-29-4

201 pp, maps, tables and index.

Rahul Roy-Chaudhury is an Indian academic and defence analyst who has specialised in South Asian naval and maritime affairs. His first book, *Sea Power and Indian Security*, published by Brassey's in 1995, was a judicious and comprehensive assessment of the Indian Navy and the challenges which it faced. Although Roy-Chaudhury wrote from an Indian perspective and with India's national interests at heart, he did so without lapsing into the rhetoric which has marked much of what has passed for debate in Indian defence circles.

India's Maritime Security is marked by the same balance and good sense in the author's efforts to assess the maritime interests of India and the possibilities for improvement in the current condition of things. Roy-Chaudhury sets out to analyse the economic, political and military dimensions of India's maritime activities, focusing particularly on the future of India's naval capabilities and the potential for further international maritime and naval cooperation. He concludes with an argument for a comprehensive maritime security policy for India in terms which will be very familiar to those involved with the development of Australia's Oceans Policy in recent years.

Roy-Chaudhury's thesis is solidly written and based on a wealth of statistics. He is generally cautious in his criticism and careful to let the facts speak for themselves. Nevertheless, the difficulties which India faces in adjusting effectively to the modern world are manifest at many points. Not the least of these difficulties appears to be a highly complex bureaucracy ill adapted to face the challenges of globalisation and technological change.

In more directly military terms, the issue of Pakistan does appear to be one of the principal factors restraining India from embarking upon a wholly effective maritime security policy. Many issues that appear at first to be concerned solely with economic benefit, technological development or environmental protection rapidly assume a military dimension within the Indo-Pakistan rivalry.

Roy-Chaudhury's analysis of the problems facing the Indian Navy is both comprehensive and thoughtful. Again, many of the judgements within his text are implicit for the critical reader. He goes into great detail to display the financing of Indian defence effort, the restrictions placed upon the Navy and - by association - the byzantine administration of Indian defence. He highlights the fact that Indian naval finances have not been sufficient to support the force structure which India has long sought. Nor, quite probably, have they been enough to allow maintenance, training or operations at the levels required for a fully efficient fleet. India's economic difficulties in the early 1990s, the Navy's partial dependence upon the former Soviet Union for much of its technology and the relatively poor performance of the Indian shipbuilding industry have combined to create a decade long gap in new construction that will be practically impossible to remedy, even in the long term. Although Roy-Chaudhury makes clear the extent to which Indian naval development has revived, his financial analysis suggests that the IN will have substantial difficulties in finding the funds sufficient to exploit the latest naval technologies which its ships require to satisfy the IN's strategic and operational ambitions. The ways in which the IN seeks to work through this conundrum will be of particular interest to many other medium navies.



A symbol of India's contemporary naval sophistication. The new Indian destroyer INS *Dehli* at the 2001 Indian International Fleet Review in Mumbai.

Photograph: John Mortimer.

All in all, this is a good book and well worth reading by any student of Australian maritime affairs. India is a country to which we need to pay more attention than we have in the past and *India's Maritime Security* makes an excellent start for anyone seeking to understand the maritime dimension of South Asian affairs.

Should any would-be readers have difficulty obtaining the book through Australian retail outlets, their best approach would be to contact the publisher directly. The details are: Knowledge World, 5A/12, First Floor, Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi-110002, INDIA (Tel No. 91-11-3263498).

James Goldrick

IMAGES OF THE INDIAN INTERNATIONAL FLEET REVIEW



Photographs:

Top: The Russian Udaloy Class Destroyer *Admiral Panteleyev*

Bottom: The Indian frigate INS *Bramaputra*

Photographs: John Mortimer

