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Editorial

THE success of the Australian involvement in the United Nations INTERFET Operations in East Timor has been widely acknowledged both nationally and internationally. The success of the operation is directly attributable to the men and women who served at sea, above it and ashore during the commitment. As Australians we should be proud not only that we were asked to lead the peacekeeping force, but that we were fortunate to have such a great team so well led by the then Major-General Peter Cosgrove AM MC. As Australians with a keen interest in maritime matters I hope that you find much interest in the content of this edition of the journal, much of which has the Naval operations in support of the independence of East Timor as its focus.

I would especially like to thank General Cosgrove for his permission to use his ANZAC Oration as the lead article for the edition. Also, my thanks go out to Commodore Brian Robertson AM RAN, who has written a very interesting account from his perspective as the Naval Component Commander. I am sure that you will find both of these articles particularly valuable reading. Alongside these are other articles from ships at sea during the INTERFET Operations, as well as a number of others of more general interest.

This month I have included an article from November 1990 as the 'Shot from the Past' in the hope of

generating some interest in women's issues in the Navy, which we hope to focus on in the last edition of the year. The role of women in our Navy is without doubt continually changing. Right now we have women in command of shore establishments, aircraft and ships at sea, as operators in submarines and surface ships and the Chief of Navy's Senior Advisory Committee will, in the not too distant future, consider the issues associated with women being accepted into the Clearance Diving Branch. It is worth comparing this to the way things looked in 1990, just ten short years ago.

Thanks again are due to the Warrant Officer of the Navy, David Wilson, for his comments on what he sees in the Navy during his travels. Martin Dunn has written a great article which reflects on fifty years of the Geneva Convention while Claire Burt and Bob Short have co-authored an article about the DERA Trimaran Project. In order to keep the submariners satisfied I have also included another of Graham Wilson's fascinating historical essays, the account of the sinking of the Spanish submarine C-3.

Welcome to another edition of the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute. I hope you enjoy reading it and look forward to your comments on its content.

MATTHEW ROWE

Letter to the Editor



Sir,

I recently had the pleasure of listening to DCN and the PERSAT before sailing for the week and was captured by some issues that the Admiral mentioned, which I have thought over since then.

The first is the sea service badge. Apparently we voted for it and as a result I'm all the more in favour of democratic rule. I think it's a great idea and a few of us were talking about it at scran the other day and came up with a few others. One of my messmates reckons the white uniform is a sea service badge in itself and so we would be keen to see a shore service badge developed too. You see something that is important to many of us is to be able to say, 'I've been ashore and I'd like it to be recognised'. It adds a bit of credibility when involved in seamanship evolutions and the like.

As the discussion continued we also mulled over the \$1 million shortfall in Navy uniform finances. I'm sure it will please DCN to know that we have come up with a few

innovative ideas to help out – so maybe half-way into next financial year he won't have to scrounge for a spare million elsewhere. Please, lend me your ears.

Let's go for a little corporate sponsorship – for the back of the white uniform shirt we could go for a combined sponsorship from Nike, DSCM and DNOP with something like the "Just do it" range. Bring back the bell-bottoms for sailors with a tasteful strip down the leg courtesy of Bells (the dry-cleaners, not the pub next to "Rockers"), maybe a little Sikorsky or Kaman sponsorship on top of the white service cap and of course, out of respect for the traditions of the old days, someone like the Bourbon and Beefsteak Bar for the soles of the Purser's issue shoes.

I'm sure there are a whole host of better ideas than these few that came to mind, all with the main aim of keeping DCN and Monsieur JG out of the bank loans department come June.

Yours Aye,

A. Ware



The ANZAC lecture at Georgetown University

Tuesday 4 April, 2000

*by Major General Peter Cosgrove, AM MC**

LADIES and gentlemen, may I begin by thanking my host, Ambassador Richard Teare, Director of the Centre for Australian and New Zealand Studies at Georgetown University, for his kind invitation to deliver this important occasional address. I am honoured to be included in such distinguished company. My thanks also to the Australian Ambassador for his kind introduction.

This address is my first opportunity to articulate a more measured and contemplative assessment of what we did in East Timor. The very fact that the mission in East Timor resulted in such clamour and a sort of collective sigh of relief in Australia is actually quite revealing and instructive of the perceived stakes in my country over our involvement in the UN mandates under Security Council Resolutions 1264 and 1272.

Time is too short and the audience too knowledgeable for me to delve into the background of the problems which beset East Timor before the events in late August and September 1999. For compelling reasons of statecraft and international relations, Australia had been passive and acquiescent to Indonesia's occupation of East Timor in 1975. The continuing East Timorese resistance to Indonesian administration and the aspirations of a strongly vocal group in exile had been over the years a mote in the eye of the Australian public. Australians became keenly focussed on the UN operation to stage the referendum in the May to August period last year. They then became fixated on the destruction and slaughter which preceded but markedly followed, the poll. Not only did it irritate that mote in the eye from 1975 but it was happening over our front fence and one of the protagonists was a giant neighbour. To be an older soldier and to observe the catalytic effect all this had on the national mood was really fascinating, especially since I was also in the Australian military hot seat.

Over the last few weeks, I have canvassed the media reports of the period, something I was much too busy to do at the time in other than a cursory way. It seems to me that in this regard, there is great interest in studying the collective psychology of a nation, building to what I might term a mood of 'crisis resolution' or 'crisis intervention'. This, if you like, was the change that overcame Australia during the

period. Commentators who bemoan that Australia and others did not intervene weeks earlier when the excesses of August and early September took place, simply ignore the need for there to be within any democratic state a psychological mood or constituency or critical mass, before which dangerous military or other international initiatives are not possible. Soldiers have no part to play in this process except to give advice to government and to get on quietly with their prudent preparations, but we military people should profoundly understand the way of it if we are to be useful servants of the government and the people.

As you may know, during the period leading up to and after the referendum, Australia prepared forces to assist the Indonesians in evacuating UN and other authorised people from East Timor, should the security situation require it. Within that operation we had several options of how it might pan out, from a simple administrative air bridge requiring very little presence on the ground, through to a major if short lived deployment of ground elements set at much higher force levels, in case the need was to go fetch people from outlying areas – with armed protection of those being fetched provided by TNI and Australian Defence Force personnel. The planning was unilateral in that we did not seek a finite commitment from other friends nor for reasons of sensitivity did we canvass the details with Indonesia – in this latter case we would expect to have negotiated with Indonesia what they would recommend and permit. In the event the minimalist option was the one executed, with our ground elements for the evacuation being confined to a small number of soldiers to give intimate security to aircraft on the ground in Dili and Baucau and to process evacuees. Over about five days in a hectic, sometimes chaotic, but ultimately very successful operation we evacuated over 2000 UN and East Timorese with the agreement and cooperation of Indonesia.

Meanwhile however, the images of communal violence and arson which flooded out of East Timor convinced the international community and Indonesia that external assistance to put a stop to it was necessary. Many of you will recall the serendipitous timing of the APEC meeting in New Zealand in allowing face-to-face consensus building and commitment by the leaders of a "coalition of the willing".



It became apparent near the end of the first week of September that an international intervention into East Timor would probably be agreed by Indonesia and that the UN would want Australia to play a major role. Although we in the military had turned over in our minds the "what ifs" attendant upon a UN evacuation and a consequent potential vacuum of international presence in East Timor, this was far from the depth of planning desirable for an emerging military contingency. A frantic round of concurrent, round-the-clock planning and consultation began. The ADF prepared plans to be the core of what was emerging as likely to be a UN-mandated, multi national force of unknown composition and structure, with crucially the extent and strength of the mandate also unknown. I took the high-end evacuation plan and modified it to require the insertion of a light infantry brigade through Dili and expanded it to include some more robust capabilities and of course a logistics component, which in the short duration-footprint version for the evacuation operations was unnecessary ashore. We were battling hard for information on all fronts during this period. I knew that regardless of the prudent military needs for balance and logistic viability, when the starter's flag dropped our own people and government and the international community would expect us to be in East Timor very quickly.

Each commitment to join the coalition was a victory and a relief during this phase. As the combat troops of New Zealand, Britain, Thailand, Philippines were added to the list, the spirits of politicians and planners lifted even as the military equation got more complicated – the issues of who, how, when, where and for what purpose, were thrown into a boiling pot of planning, over a roaring fire being stoked by intensive diplomatic effort. It was plain that although the ADF maintains what by US standards are only tiny forces at high readiness, the 'payoff' for our taxpayers was now at hand – Australians with some Kiwis and Brits would have the weight of operations ashore in East Timor for the crucial first few weeks. Simply, other regional coalition partners could not get their troops there any quicker. Now all things are relative and while a matter of some weeks were required before the International Force East Timor achieved critical mass of around 6000 or so (rising to about 11500 at its maximum strength), I need to emphasise my conviction that all this was much more rapid in its initial deployments and then build up than could ever reasonably be expected of a blue beret force.

But with that remark, I have got ahead of myself and I need to get back on track. Even as the "coalition of the willing" was being assembled, the UN Security Council was hammering out and issuing (on 15 Sep) UN Security Council Resolution 1264. This mandate which authorised under Chapter 7 of the charter, 'all necessary steps' to establish peace and security in East

Timor, gave the task to an unspecified number of member states acting in coalition under a lead nation and noted Indonesia's agreement to Resolution. The Secretary General separately invited and accepted Australia to act as the lead nation. A political Rubicon had been crossed.

The die was cast and the operation commenced on 20 September. The preceding day I had visited the senior Indonesian officer in East Timor and had been shocked and saddened at the huge level of destruction and the almost total evacuation of the capital Dili. I must say though that I had to put that to one side. There was a noticeable presence of anti-independence militia. This I took full account of. My deputy commander, Major General Songkitti Jaggabatar of Thailand and I were much more concerned to find out the scope of the military problem we would confront in East Timor generally and in Dili in particular, over the crucial first few days while we were building up combat power ashore. In an initially cautious but positive meeting with my counterpart, Major General Kiki Syahnakrie of TNI, we negotiated the details of my initial requirements for airfield and port use and deployment areas. He and his advisers seemed taken aback at the size and rapidity of the initial deployments and my clear intention to embark immediately on security operations in Dili. I was uplifted by my early discussions with General Syahnakrie – he seemed to want to avoid the same sorts of disasters that I did and I felt then and throughout that he was a man I could deal with.

I might digress here momentarily to canvass the view expressed in some quarters at home that in some way Australian Defence Force involvement with ABRI (now TNI), over the preceding couple of decades had proved useless in contributing to avoidance of the violence in East Timor. Broadly that is at best a moot point but I am clear that it had two major benefits as we in INTERFET went about our business. First, TNI had a clear view of our competence and determination and secondly, I'm convinced that from time to time personal relationships and mutual respect had payoffs in minimising and resolving misunderstandings at the level of our troops' interaction. They also predisposed protagonists from my level down to talk through issues rather than to shoot through them. Maybe our astonishingly low casualty count on both "sides" so to speak is to some degree testimony to that factor.

Again back on track, and a note of reassurance – I am not going to turn this engagement into a "filibuster" by giving you all the minute detail of the operation but rather like a butterfly to flit from flower to flower to enable me to touch on some lessons learnt.

The next remarkable aspect from my point of view is that of the media attention. The media conference in Darwin before my visit to Dili the day before we launched the operation was reputedly the biggest ever



seen in Australia. For the first few months of the military operations in East Timor there was a substantial media presence in the area. Nothing new about that in terms of conflict areas around the globe. To me though the particular point was that the military operation plainly had an information operations quotient to it. By that I mean that our military operations to provide a peaceful and secure environment in which the UN could conduct humanitarian assistance and nation building activity were to be seen in two dimensions: what we were actually doing and achieving on the ground; and what we were perceived as doing, its relevance, proficiency and legitimacy.

Those perceptions were further divided into four areas where they were importantly felt: our own nations as individuals; our collective nations both as a coalition and the wider community of nations; thirdly, those several nations whose attitudes to the mission, its composition and leadership might be termed jaundiced; and finally the parties within East Timor – namely the people, the UN agencies and the NGOs. All of these groups were hugely important and their perceptions were not just factors in success. On balance, they were success or otherwise.

I assessed at the outset that there would be a powerful campaign by some interests to discredit the operation and that this must be counterbalanced vigorously and effectively. I thought it best not just to accept or acquiesce in the media presence in East Timor but to embrace it and encourage it, not just from participant countries' media but from anywhere. I emphasised that we would be transparent, accountable, available and very proactive. Rather than engage in adversarial rhetoric in relation to some of the grotesque distortions of the truth that characterised a lot of the opposing campaign, I preferred to invite such scrutiny of our broad demeanour and behaviour and the outcomes of our operations to allow people to assess the lies for what they were. I cannot stress enough this aspect of information operations in its crucial contribution to a successful coalition mission. In this area of nurturing your constituencies, you can be figuratively just as damaged by a headline as a bullet.

In an extension of this logic, it's now necessary to talk of that major constituency, the coalition force itself. On the first day of the operation, only a few of the likely force elements of INTERFET could be described with any accuracy or finality. For example the possible US contribution was still being considered and would not be settled for some time, although the presence in the area of USS Mobile Bay was a welcome asset. Australia was scouring our inventory for both deployable and enabling forces to round out the suite of capabilities in theatre and assist coalition partner forces looking to mount through Australia. So the forces I took in the first week or so were the ones which naturally lent themselves to the

more robust mission employments. Aussies, Kiwis and Brits, later backed by Canadians and Irish took on the tasks involving peace-making in Dili, the western regencies and later in the Oecussi enclave.

Acknowledging the urgent need for humanitarian assistance to the people and the more settled nature of the eastern and central regencies of East Timor, the Thais, Philipinos and South Koreans were able to deploy forces more structured and tasked for peace keeping and humanitarian assistance. As other contingents were promised, the overall force could be divided into about three elements apart from the logistic support force and headquarters elements: first there was a field deployable, mobile component; next there was a group which while organised for combat operations, for one reason and another was best able to operate from a semi-garrison environment; lastly there was a group which was oriented more towards rendering HA with protection. This led to a natural grouping into a manoeuvre brigade in the west, a separate combat unit in Oecussi, a garrison brigade in Dili and a number of separate national task force areas of operations for the latter HA etc function in the east and centre.

This fairly natural and comfortable "fit" of forces to tasks was a little more fraught than it appears in the telling but it betokens a most compelling need for a coalition force commander. I found it crucial to establish and meet the needs and concerns of each troop-contributing nation, to achieve understanding, congruence, frequently by give and take and vitally, good will and cooperation. We were by no means faultless in INTERFET, but given the keenness of national interests involved we navigated our way through most testing times with our international relationships very much enhanced in virtually every case. Even in those first few weeks when the operational imperative was driving every waking moment, we all had to remind ourselves that every member of the coalition had to be valued and embraced.

Of course coalition concerns went well beyond simple deployment issues and more sensitively will go to operations, their styles, outcomes and implications. In this regard, I was keenly aware of two factors – first that there were some pretty tough jobs of "pacifying" work to be done which would not "do themselves" so to speak; secondly they had to be done in a way which did not alienate some members of the coalition. Even in the pragmatic halls of a combined headquarters, these operations needed careful description both as to desired effect, and sometimes justification and limitation to ensure the high internal confidence and good will of the coalition was maintained. This principle of 'reciprocal transparency' is an important one in combined operations, commensurate with sensible regard to detail and operational security from time to time.



If strict military factors are a focus for coalition amity and cooperation, language and cultural aspects are hardly less important. I'm pretty sure that the Australian Defence Force will conclude we need more linguists, not just in the language of the country in which we are operating but in the constituent languages of the coalition. We deployed a large number of linguist LNOs and needed more. LNOs and language proficiency was absolutely key to avoiding and resolving misunderstandings, irritants and other 'friction of war' phenomena. We got through but it would have been a challenge if the tempo of operations had been uniformly high.

Culturally, we came to understand our regional coalition partners and some of those others with whom we have only infrequently worked very much better, but I think we still have much to do in this area. Interestingly, I think all coalition partners would agree that the scheduling and mutual attendance at true cultural events run by constituent nations turned out not just to have some symbolic value of solidarity and respect but to provide very useful insights into the psyche of our coalition friends. Of course I include that many of our friends gained the same sort of insights into the Australian character.

The nature of this type of coalition operation, wherein one nation is allowed some level of pre-eminence through "lead nation" status makes coalition relations absolutely key to success. One doesn't have the great amorphous blanc mange of the UN to hate or criticise – it comes down to the sensitivity and professionalism of one country – one's own. This should be, and in my case was, enormously focusing.

If what I'm describing to you is the true new wave of military operations, then we actually as a collegiate group need to think of these cross-cultural issues. The robust and rough and ready lip service we pay to the interoperability issues between proudly different, but vastly similar, national and military cultures such as those of the USA and Australia does not ring true when the potential combined force has a different make-up. Platitudes such as "fish or cut bait" or "if it's too hot in the kitchen, etc" don't mean much if the coalition won't form, or if having formed, won't work. We have all been working on these relationship issues for decades, so I'm not saying we're starting from scratch but if the requirement is for true burden-sharing then part of the burden is a sensitivity to accompany our clear and fierce mission focus.

A point to make on coalition nurturing in the environment to which I am referring is of course the evident fact that the coalition is not merely to be tended in the mandate or operational area. If a country is the lead nation as in the INTERFET construct, then much of the nurturing is to take place in the capital of the lead nation and from the embassies of the lead nation in the capitals of the troop contributing nations

and of course in New York. This adds a burden of immediacy, relevance and comprehensive of information-sharing emanating out of the operational force in a way which is unique to this style of operation.

The next coalition issue to canvass with you is linked to my remark of several minutes ago concerning the lead nation's need to acknowledge the diversity of military approaches to the peacemaking/peace keeping problem. In similar vein, it is necessary to note that of course each participating nation will have its own unique national interests to be protected or achieved as part of its multi national force involvement. In a somewhat disingenuous manner I found myself in Timor asserting the congruence of at least two national objectives for each participating nation: first, I believed each nation was there to assist the upliftment of the East Timorese; secondly that each nation wanted to improve or at least maintain the health of its relationship with Indonesia as a result of its participation in INTERFET mission. I thought I was on safe if somewhat pious ground in saying these blinding glimpses of the obvious. What I was really saying to my many interlocutors on then subject was that as a military leader, I appreciated that there were eternally national interests at play and that my task was to appreciate that fact and to zero in on the lowest common denominator ones that served my mission. I suppose under that sub-text, there was a sub-sub-text which said that I was going to be very sensitive to the expression of any national interests which were inimical to the two fundamentals I stated at the outset.

Moving on from these early-in-the-mission references, a vital part of my force commander responsibilities which I need to canvass was my relationship with the UN. Why so? Well to me it was crucial and it may well typify an "evolving role", the subject of this seminar. I had never worked with the UN before at any level, so that in some ways was a drawback and in some other ways a significant advantage. In any event it required a crash course on my part in order to prosecute two of the three pillars of my mission. The first was to achieve "peace and security" using all means; the other two were to assist the UN in its mission and to facilitate within capabilities the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Having watched and admired the UN bureaucracy at work, I now wish abjectly to request forgiveness from my own Defence bureaucracy, now to be regarded as shark-like in their efficiency. Seriously it has its weight, form and momentum which if it is to be supported so that the job can be done must be understood and to some degree embraced. My caution to mission commanders is not to waste one joule of energy trying to change this bureaucracy in any material way but to understand and facilitate it both in the mission area and as appropriate in New York. My remarks are not meant to criticise because it is hard to



see how the UN could reasonably be any different. There are so many firewalls and vertical structures in the UN that you would get a hemorrhage if you didn't adapt to cope with the UN way of doing business. That said there are some enormously talented and dedicated people working therein and while I have steadfastly stayed away from personalities in my remarks let me just say that people like Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello, the Special Representative of the Secretary General in East Timor are truly outstanding and it was a privilege to work with them.

Without the crunching detail necessary to illustrate this broad point concerning the UN, let me just reiterate that there is need to have a sophisticated understanding of their *modus operandi* either through experience or training or both, in order to operate a multi national force in conjunction with a UN mission.

There were of course a tremendous range of more direct military experiences and thus lessons to be learned out of Operation Stabilise. While I will not enumerate even all the major ones for this eminent audience, there are one or two which I wish to mention before moving to summarise these formal remarks and opening up for discussion.

First, there was an issue much beloved of academics and strategists in my part of the Pacific, that of the force structure emphasis suggested by 'new wave' employments such as peace keeping operations. Many here will view this debate with an interest less than vital because there seems little danger that the USA with its global responsibilities will optimise the structure of its forces for other than higher end conflict. Yet some of your regional friends are seriously examining this proposition: if the most likely recurring "off shore" role for a defence force is to be some kind of coalition peace keeping employment, then why retain high order capabilities and training regimes? Why not lighten up the force structure to specialise in the sort of "policing plus" role which typifies most peace peacekeeping missions?

Our experience in East Timor is enlightening. We found there in that peace making, not peace keeping, role that forces structured and equipped, ready if necessary, for war were actually very effective, probably more effective than had they been less capable. Our troops were able to starkly demonstrate to all interested parties the penalties and sanctions that would accompany any attempt to deliver on the

wealth of violent rhetoric. Our high-end capabilities meant that with battlefield mobility and surveillance systems we were able to seem ubiquitous. I believe the very capable structure and training inherent in the force actually was a major factor in restraining the number of casualties on both sides. A force optimised for peace keeping would have in my view invited more adventurist behaviour by our adversaries. A quick and relatively bloodless success is always to be preferred to the alternative, even if some might see the background investment and the particular cost for force structure reasons, expensive in dollar terms.

Another military blinding glimpse of the obvious is the utility of sea power in the East Timor operation. The persuasive, intimidatory or deterrent nature of major warships was not to me as the combined joint force commander an incidental, nice to have "add-on" but an important indicator of national and international resolve and most reassuring to all of us who relied on sea lifelines. It was a classic case of the "presence" pillar of sea power.

A further obvious point was the high value, indeed crucial nature of amphibious and military sealift operations. So typically of the region the airfields and land lines of communication in East Timor were tenuous and we relied very heavily on surface LOTS and helicopter capable ships to keep supplies and people moving. We surrounded East Timor with floating warehouses, gas stations, airports and docks and motels. It would have been a real struggle to maintain tempo and achieve sustainment ashore, without our afloat logistic capability.

In summary, about 11,500 men and women last year were extended the privilege of helping 800,000 people in desperate need. The commitment to go to East Timor came from great international political resolve from the coalition partners. The outcomes in that devastated land came from the tremendous professionalism and skill shown at every hand by the men and women from the 22 participating countries. In digesting the results of the Operation we must of course factor in the unique qualities of the situation and the ever present part that luck played. Nonetheless there seems little doubt that our intellectual dining table this evening as we consider emerging security involvements and modalities, groans under the weight of much food for thought, arising from East Timor.

*Lieutenant-General Cosgrove is now the Chief of Army.





'Not Learning the Lessons of Operation Stabilise'

By Commodore B.D. Robertson, AM RAN

History may show Operation *Stabilise*, a United Nations sanctioned, Australian led, international peace making operation in East Timor to be an enormous success, perhaps an unprecedented success. We in INTERFET will leave this to others to judge, but Operation *Stabilise* once again proved the flexibility and professionalism of naval forces.

Without question, the Navy performed outstandingly well. But the employment of naval ships and other assets in Operation *Stabilise*, while certainly within the Navy's capability, did not fully expose the RAN's raison d'être. There exists a risk that those who do not know the full range of the Navy's capabilities, or who mischievously may wish to misrepresent them or the need for them, could use the experience of East Timor to lessen the Navy's role. This article will briefly describe some of the reasons behind the success of the operation from a naval point of view, but caution against drawing the wrong conclusions.

Deployable Command and Control

Early in 1999 a new organisation at Maritime Headquarters, Deployable Joint Force Headquarters (Maritime) (DJFHQ(M)) was stood up. It is designed for flexibility of employment, which may range from Composite Warfare Commander or Commander Task Group duties at sea, to forming the nucleus of the joint (or combined staff) in a headquarters or the Naval Component Command for a joint or combined Task Force, such as was the case in INTERFET. This organisation, headed by Commodore Flotillas, comprises 23 positions, many of which are "dual hatted" for other functions and only used for certain DJFHQ(M) roles. By about June of 1999 the majority of the incumbents had taken up their appointments.

In July 1999 the fledgling structure was exercised when it formed the Naval Component Command of a Combined Task Force Headquarters in Exercise Crocodile 99 at Gallipoli Army Barracks, Enoggera. Thus, when Operation *Stabilise* arose in September 1999, the personnel were already worked up and familiar with Deployable Joint Force Headquarters (DJFHQ) operating procedures. Importantly, DJFHQ(M) officers and sailors knew many of the personalities in the DJFHQ, had exercised with them and had established good

working relationships. **The good fortune in this timing can not be overstated, but the success of the concept cannot be understated.**

Fifteen personnel deployed to Dili to form the NCC in HQ INTERFET. This comprised the Commander (initially CDRE Jim Stapleton RAN and then, from November, CDRE Brian Robertson AM RAN), Chief of Staff, Operations Officer and three warfare watch officers, one logistician, one legal officer, one officer responsible for both plans and communications and an intelligence officer. This small group of men and women controlled (under a variety of command and control arrangements) a force of 35 naval ships (20 at one time at the height of activities in October), coordinated the effort of eight other naval ships that operated purely in support of INTERFET and assisted with the management of approximately 35 merchant ships.

In addition, RAN personnel in the NCC took on the role of Harbour Master for all East Timorese ports from the date of arrival, 20 Sep 99. In this role, NCC managed the entry of all military vehicles, equipment and personnel and the port requirements for ships carrying internally displaced persons (IDPs) and humanitarian assistance, and commercial shipping through numerous ports and landing sites. An East Timor Ports and Logistics Over The Shore (LOTS) Guide was produced and this has now been established on the World Wide Web (ADF web site).

Amphibious Operations

Operation *Stabilise* saw the greatest concentration of amphibious operations conducted by the ADF since the Second World War. The insertion of troops during the first wave into Dili and subsequently into Suai and Oecussi, was spearheaded by the Navy's small but versatile amphibious forces. In their wake vast amounts of military equipment, vehicles and personnel were inserted into, or transported around, East Timor by sea. In fact, 91.7% by weight and 93.2% by volume of all equipment deployed from Australia to East Timor was shipped. Due to the geographic isolation of Atauro Island and the Oecussi enclave, and the impact of the wet season on roads, sea transport took on a mantle of its own. After insertion, sustainment of food, water and essential supplies was a constant chore and one that stretched INTERFET resources to the limit.



Over the course of Operation *Stabilise*, Australia, France, Italy, Singapore, Thailand and the United States of America contributed sealift ships to INTERFET. The efforts of the Singaporean Navy are most noteworthy. Quiet, unassuming and highly professional RSS EXCELLENCE, INTREPID and PERSERVERANCE conducted a continuous ferry service from Darwin to Dili for many weeks and were instrumental in establishing land forces. The ease with which the Singaporean Navy slotted into the coalition, particularly the way in which they related to the RAN, was testament to years of maritime exercises. Surely the Navy's program of engagement is working well and could be expanded in the area of amphibious operations.

The experience of Operation *Stabilise* suggests that insufficient military amphibious units were available and supplementation by civilian charter was necessary. In a low threat environment this may be possible but such reliance is fraught with danger. When the bullets are flying, or even have the potential to fly, professional and reliable naval forces will have to do the job.

TOBRUK, having had her refit progressively delayed for five years was operating on 'thin ice'. Suffering major defects enroute from Sydney to Darwin her availability for essential tasking looked to be unreliable. RAN Landing Craft, aged and in desperate need of major works were almost paid off in the mid 1990s. The planners of the initial lodgment into East Timor were thankful that such plans had not come to fruition. In the planning phase it was clear that no fewer than two LCHs were essential for D-Day. Three were allocated in the seemingly certain knowledge that at least one would have a major defect, preventing her from taking part. Not only did all three take part in D-Day landings, but no serious impediments to the operation were ever experienced due to defects with either TOBRUK or the LCHs.

The capability of MANOORA and KANIMBLA will be ideal for operations similar to those experienced in East Timor. Capable of carrying large numbers of personnel and a good size lift of vehicles and equipment, they will be able to discharge either alongside or to landing craft in stream. They could have operated at any location in East Timor. Importantly, they will operate helicopters and, perhaps just as importantly, be able to provide "lillypad" (emergency landing facility) decks and refueling for rotary wing aircraft. They will have highly capable health facilities. The fact that they have the space and weight for features such as a capable command and control suite has not gone unnoticed. In summary they are great ships. If they had been available for Operation *Stabilise* they would have given the Commander the greatest of capabilities – endurance and poise. Soon we will be saying how did we ever manage without MANOORA and

KANIMBLA. Let's hope that the debate for the next generation of amphibious ships gets some attention soon.

Fast Cat

The advent of the fast catamaran is the most exciting advance in naval technology since the aircraft carrier. JERVIS BAY, built by INCAT in Tasmania, was leased to the RAN on 17 May 1999, on a two year contract. After rudimentary changes to the ship, a quick docking in Sydney and a fast transit north, it arrived in Darwin in late June 1999. It was, therefore, available for tasking by the ADF for Operation *Stabilise*. A brilliant concept and a vital capability that has proven its worth time and time again in East Timor, but what about more demanding amphibious operations?

The suitability of East Timor, and Dili in particular, as a destination for JERVIS BAY is remarkable. The port is easily within range of the fast catamaran, at speed, without the need for refueling. The minimum depth alongside in Dili is 6.4 metres, again ideal for a vessel which draws 3.8 metres but prefers more because of its wash effect and preponderance to ingest foreign matter, "vacuumed" from the seabed.

For the first three weeks of the operation, JERVIS BAY carried only personnel and light cargo, but after purpose designed mooring buoys were layed in the harbour she was able to mediterranean moor to the wharf and discharge cargo through her stern doors. In most states of tide the height of the wharf above water was suitable for this operation. By mid November the moorings had made way for another cargo offload system. From this time the ship berthed alongside the wharf and discharged her cargo directly onto a "dumb barge", leased commercially, astern. From there the cargo could be manoeuvred, by way of a ramp, to the wharf.

The capability JERVIS BAY provided is without question the most exciting advance in maritime technology since the aircraft carrier. The military planner need only concentrate on the operational problems that result from her obvious vulnerabilities. For JERVIS BAY, and vessels like her, these primarily include the ability to load and unload her (access to suitable wharfage and the availability of material handling equipment), the ability to fuel her (dependant on the distance of the destination and fueling services) and the ability to protect her (dependent on the threat). The development of solutions to these problems, without reducing the cat's greatest gift, speed, will be interesting to watch.

Essential Oiler

Yet another critical link in the logistics chain for Operation *Stabilise* was fuel, both F76 (diesel) and



F44 (aviation fuel). The only fuel in theatre, apart from the INTERFET oiler, was controlled by the Indonesians. This was not a sound option upon which to rely. Within 24 hours of arrival in Dili a Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP) was established at Komoro Airfield, Dili, for helicopters. This fuel dump was replenished from sea. Initially using collapsible fuel drums, underslung from RAN Seaking helicopters from both SUCCESS and TOBRUK, fuel was ferried ashore. This method persisted until fuel trucks were brought into theatre in mid October. From this point fuel trucks, shipped to and from the oiler in LCHs or Army LCM8s, replenished fuel stocks ashore, reducing the need for aircraft fuel transfer operations. As the force expanded, and the need for fuel broadened geographically, so the complexity of the distribution of fuel increased and the reliance on the oiler escalated.

SUCCESS was relieved in this role by HMCS PROTECTEUR in November and then HMNZS ENDEAVOUR in January 2000.

While there is no doubt that the oiler fulfilled a vital role, the transfer of fuel ashore could be done more effectively and efficiently. Transferring fuel by tanker loads is akin to filling tanks by buckets. It is a slow and vulnerable process and denies the oiler from its main role of refueling ships. Luckily this was not a major task in Operation *Stabilise*. The ADF needs a deployable, rapid fuel transfer system such as a pipeline direct from the oiler to an ashore facility.

Destroyers and Frigates

There is at least one General who understands the meaning of "presence" in the maritime sense. General Cosgrove, Commander INTERFET, often speaks of the impact that the presence of "warships" had on promoting INTERFET's mission and on the morale of all forces. In Dili, Suai and Oecussi, up until the last day, he used the warships as symbols of his seriousness and intent. In the early days he achieved this long before he had the troops on the ground to be effective. Also the General tells the story of how reassuring he found the presence of warships when he flew into Dili at H+2. Similarly, he speaks of the same ships having a devastating impact on the resolve of the militia and Indonesian forces who on D-Day would have woken in their splendid waterfront homes to look out across Dili Harbour and see wall to wall grey ships.

Australia and many other countries contributed warships to the effort. ANZAC, ADELAIDE and DARWIN, FNS VENDEMAIRE, HMNZS TE KAHA, HMS GLASGOW and USS MOBILE BAY were part of INTERFET when the initial landings were made. The role of the destroyers and frigates in the early days was that of surveillance and

reconnaissance of the AO and the greater Timor Sea area; protection of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC), including the escort of both military and merchant sealift assets; lillypad and refueling support for rotary wing aircraft operations, particularly those transiting from Australia to East Timor; health support services (generally level 2) and aeromedical evacuation; and general aviation assistance (a requirement of all air capable platforms), particularly in remote areas, such as Suai early in the operation and Oecussi throughout.

For the first few days and weeks of the operation these roles, perhaps those considered traditional for such assets, remained important. However, over time (and particularly as Indonesian maritime, land and air forces progressively departed from the East Timor area) many of these tasks became less important. More emphasis was progressively placed on the provision of direct assistance to Army forces ashore.

Presence remained important throughout. The opinion of the Commanding Officer of AMBENOFOR, the sole company inserted in the Oecussi Enclave in October, is testament to the reassuring feeling that a frigate portrays to the men and women on the ground, and perhaps to would be protagonists, when lying close to seaward.

The versatility provided by the ships' aircraft was also invaluable throughout. Naval aircraft, however, were predominantly used in the utility role and not in normal naval warfare roles. Activities included lifting Army troops and equipment into areas difficult to access and conducting reconnaissance of border regions. Personnel transfers and aeromedical evacuations were commonplace. Twice the number of airframes, and double the number of air hours for each frame, could have been put to good use.

Hods "Who"

The Hydrographic Office Detached Survey Unit (HODSU) was among the first elements to arrive in East Timor, and immediately reminded us all why the hydrographic service is a military role and why it should always be a part of the Navy. Embarked in SUCCESS, the unit was called in as soon as a presence was established at the port precinct. The unit quickly conducted a rudimentary survey of the port approaches and wharf and determined it to be safe for navigation that same day, permitting JERVIS BAY, TOBRUK and the LCHs to enter harbour. It was a common sight to see this small tinny with its strapped on sonar steaming back and forth across Dili Harbour. The capabilities of this unit of three personnel enabled the very first RAN ships to enter harbour in (navigational) safety. Indeed it may have averted disaster. Had there been an undetected obstruction in the harbour channel the fate of one of the RAN's ships, and the operation, could have been in jeopardy.



Over the course of the next 10 weeks the unit steamed over 1100 nautical miles of soundings in its 5.3 metre light utility boat, initially providing "mud maps" for use at ports and beach landing sites for military and merchant (humanitarian and commercial) shipping. Without the provision of such vital hydrographic information, sealift and amphibious operations would have been significantly more difficult, if not impossible. Later the RAN Hydrographer used this hydrographic data in the production of revised charts for East Timor.

Clearance Diving

A Clearance Diving Team (Four) detachment of eight personnel arrived in East Timor on D-Day, and was called into the port with HODSU. They undertook a check dive at the wharf, to check for underwater obstructions. As soon as the wharves were cleared they were directed to establish a beach landing site for LCH landings. By sunset on the first day the entire port had been cleared and a beach landing site swum, cleared and was operating. An amazing feat.

In view of the amount of work encountered, this detachment was boosted to 12 personnel in October 1999, and changed out by a detachment from Clearance Diving Team (One) in early December.

Many beaches were swum by the teams, (and surveyed by HODSU) in an effort to establish suitability for amphibious operations. As much of the island is inaccessible by road, particularly once the wet commenced in November, the speed and accuracy of this work was paramount.

In addition, the value of having a diving team present was proven several times in Dili Harbour. On one occasion a large merchant ship managed to foul the riser of a mooring buoy, and could well have closed the harbour. She required emergency underwater work to clear her. Before the New Year no less than three merchant ships had wrapped berthing hawsers around their propellers, making one wonder about the mariners skills of the vessels which were starting to ply their trade in the newly independent country.

A large amount of ordinance was exploded, mostly ex-TNI ammunition dumped hastily in the shallows but also some found ashore. The most interesting task was the detonation of torpedoes and depth charges recovered from the wreck of HMAS VOYAGER I, at Betano, on the south coast of the island. The most unpleasant task was searching a lake near Liquica for bodily remains, following a massacre there in April. The versatility of our divers remains a great asset.

Coalition Forces

The accompanying spreadsheet indicates the contribution of maritime forces to INTERFET. While the greatest effort was contributed by the RAN, maritime tasks could not have been achieved without

contributing nation support; neither from a practical point of view, nor perhaps, from a political perspective.

Assistance Ashore and Humanitarian Assistance

From early in the operation naval personnel were regularly employed in assisting with the clean up of devastated buildings and other infrastructure ashore. In 'Obrigado Barracks', an Indonesian military campus (from where I write this article), many of the streets are named in honour of the ships which assisted in the tedious, difficult and dirty task of cleaning the barracks, ready for habitation by INTERFET Troops. INTERFET Headquarters was established in the Dili Library, burnt out by either Indonesian military or militia (seemingly one in the same) and still smoking when INTERFET arrived on 20 September. The ships' companies of SUCCESS, ADELAIDE, DARWIN and ANZAC all lent a hand in restoring this building to a usable form.

The ships' companies of numerous ships from Australia and many other nations provided valuable humanitarian assistance to the populations of different communities. There are too many achievements to mention in this article, but suffice to say that many East Timorese owe their lives, and many thousand some degree of shelter and comfort, to the hard, selfless work of sailors. An enormous amount of good will was generated by such effort, both with the local peoples and with the humanitarian assistance organisations, who generally had neither the resources nor the people on the ground to achieve much more than essential food distribution until December, or even January 2000 in some places.

Physical and Morale Support for Interfet Troops

For many Australian soldiers, this operation represented their first experience with the Navy. A very firm and favourable first impression has been established. With little clean water and only "hard rations" for weeks the generous offer of a shower, a hot, fresh meal and a few minutes respite in air-conditioned comfort was truly welcomed. For others the opportunity to tap out a note to loved ones on the internet, to send flowers home or to have a hair cut was timely and much appreciated.

Even those distant from wharves were treated to freshly baked bread buns or a piece of fresh fruit, and occasionally a barbecue delivered on the back of a truck, compliments of "mobile sailors". The diggers were so impressed, they wrote a poem:

*"Don't let anyone say that the
ANZAC spirit is dead
Those legend sailors on the TOBRUK
They baked the diggers bread"*



The ships concerned in these gestures of good will, most particularly TOBRUK, SUCCESS and the Oecussi Guardships (SYDNEY, NEWCASTLE and MELBOURNE) all received tremendous accolades from numerous Army units for their support. My father-in-law, Mr. Ian Scott, was a member of Sparrow Force which evaded the Japanese in the mountains of East Timor during WW2. He remembers the risks the Navy took to resupply and rescue the Army. Perhaps a new generation of soldiers has rediscovered the value of a Navy and what it can do to support troops ashore in remote areas.

Weather

East Timor lies at the northern extremity of the Southern Hemisphere cyclone belt. The south coast experiences a historical average of three cyclones per annum. Noting INTERFET's reliance on the air and sea lines of communication, the weather in the Timor Sea was very influential on the success of the operation. Indeed, as Darwin represented a hub in the logistic chain, the effect of the weather between Darwin and the southern states on land, sea and air transport was a further Achilles heel. Luckily no cyclones were experienced during Operation *Stabilise* and, with few exceptions, the weather throughout the region was conducive to the maintenance of the force's logistic chain. Someone was watching over us!

Instream offload operations in particular require ideal weather conditions (almost glass calm in fact). The most difficult of these operations entails the transfer of containers to landing craft. When Canadian and New Zealand forces were inserted into Suai in October 1999 and Jordanian forces arrived at Oecussi in February 2000, each required the transfer of large numbers of containers. In addition, the weekly supply of fresh food to forces at Suai was conducted in containerised form. Even a low swell can make these operations hazardous as the containers swing wildly. The fact that these operations were achieved, with few delays, no cancellations and no serious accidents, is testament to the skill, professionalism and good fortune experienced by INTERFET. Thankfully, the weather remained good throughout the entire course of the operation.

Imagine

While in some ways inevitable, and certainly convenient to do so, it is dangerous to draw too many conclusions from the RAN's experiences in East Timor. The likelihood of factors aligning themselves in a similarly advantageous manner again are slim, to say the least. For the sake of military strategy, let your imagination drift away from the success story outlined above and dwell for a minute on some pertinent alternate scenarios.

Imagine that the area of operations was further than a one and half-hour flight away from K-Mart in Darwin. Could the Blackhawks have self-deployed, if not, then how would they get into theatre? Assuming the right number of aircraft could get into the AO then how would the increased demand for aviation fuel be met? How would JERVIS BAY refuel enroute? How would the requirement for increased surveillance be conducted?

Imagine that there was a credible military threat. For example imagine that the adversary had a submarine or two that he had threatened to use to thwart intervention. Perhaps, also, there is a hostile task group comprising warships armed with surface to surface missiles. Imagine these are Harpoons or even Exocets. What would this mean for the many ships that would be needed to insert, support and resupply the operation? How would we protect the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs)? How would we deter the submarine and surface ships and protect our shipping?

Imagine that the adversary has mined the main ports. No. Just imagine he has "said" he had mined them. How would this affect the military plans? What could be done to determine if the ports have been mined and to clear them? What affect would this have on the logistics resupply of the troops ashore? In East Timor, without impediment, our troops were on hard rations for over a month, how much longer would this have been the case if our lines of resupply could not be guaranteed?

Imagine the adversary has credible air power and was prepared to use it. How would we defend our troops ashore, our amphibious ships, our minesweepers and the survey units? How would we protect the resupply ships and oilers?

Many of these scenarios have their solution in credible sea power. Such scenarios, however, raise the question of whether conclusions should be drawn from the success of maritime operations in INTERFET and, in particular, RAN operations in East Timor.

East Timor was certainly a challenging episode in the ADF's history, including that of the Navy. Much of great value was learnt (and inevitably some lessons were re-learned). The need for modern amphibious forces has been demonstrated. Operation *Stabilise* was not, however, a valid test of the RAN's war-fighting capability or proficiency and one must be cautious not to draw the wrong conclusions from this experience.

Acknowledgement

In the research and writing of this article, as during the conduct of Operation *Stabilise*, I am indebted to the professionalism and excellent support of my Chief of Staff, Commander Daryl Bates RAN.



Maritime Interfet Vessel Dates

UNIT NAME	1ST DATE IN	1ST DATE OUT	1ST PERIOD	2ND DATE IN	2ND DATE OUT
AUSTRALIA					
ANZAC	20-Sep-99	29-Sep-99	9		
ADELAIDE	20-Sep-99	19-Oct-99	29		
SUCCESS	20-Sep-99	28-Oct-99	38		
DARWIN	20-Sep-99	3-Nov-99	44		
SYDNEY	3-Nov-99	19-Dec-99	46		
NEWCASTLE	19-Dec-99	26-Jan-00	38		
MELBOURNE	20-Jan-00	23-Feb-00	34		
JERVIS BAY	20-Sep-99	23-Feb-00	156		
TOBRUK	20-Sep-99	6-Nov-99	47		
BALIKPAPAN	20-Sep-99	13-Nov-99	54	8-Dec-99	15-Jan-00
BRUNEI	20-Sep-99	1-Nov-99	42	8-Dec-99	15-Jan-00
LABUAN	20-Sep-99	14-Oct-99	24	10-Nov-99	8-Dec-99
TARAKAN	30-Oct-99	8-Dec-99	39	13-Jan-00	16-Feb-00
BETANO	19-Jan-00	19-Feb-00	31		
AUSCDT ONE	30-Nov-99	21-Feb-00	83		
AUSCDT FOUR	20-Sep-99	2-Dec-99	73		
HODSU	20-Sep-99	2-Dec-99	73		
NCC	20-Sep-99	23-Feb-00	156		
CANADA					
PROTECTEUR	23-Oct-99	23-Jan-00	92		
FRANCE					
JACQUES	28-Nov-99	12-Jan-00	45		
CARTIER					
VENDEMAIRE	20-Sep-99	17-Nov-99	58		
PRAIRIAL	10-Oct-99	29-Nov-99	44		
SIROCO	10-Oct-99	25-Nov-99	46		
ITALY					
SAN GIUSTO	26-Oct-99	31-Jan-00	97		
NEW ZEALAND					
CANTERBURY	26-Sep-99	12-Dec-99	77		
TE KAHA	20-Sep-99	26-Sep-99	6		
ENDEAVOUR	21-Sep-99	24-Sep-99	3	28-Jan-00	23-Feb-00
PORTUGAL					
VASCO DA GAMA	16-Nov-99	22-Feb-00	98		
SINGAPORE					
INTREPID	10-Oct-99	13-Dec-99	64		
EXCELLENCE	10-Oct-99	27-Nov-99	48		
PERSEVERENCE	9-Jan-00	17-Feb-00	39		
THAILAND					
SURIN	28-Oct-99	20-Feb-00	115		
UK					
GLASGOW	20-Sep-99	29-Sep-99	9		
UNITED STATES					
KILAUEA	20-Sep-99	2-Oct-99	12		
MOBILE BAY	20-Sep-99	5-Oct-99	15		
BELLEAU WOOD	5-Oct-99	28-Oct-99	23		
SAN JOSE	25-Oct-99	31-Oct-99	6		
PELELIU	26-Oct-99	27-Nov-99	32		
TIPPECANOE	16-Oct-99	24-Oct-99	8		



Maritime Operations in East Timor

The HMAS MELBOURNE Experience

By Lieutenant Benjamin A. White, RAN

Introduction

Since INTERFET began operations in September 1999, the focus of public coverage in East Timor was directed towards Land Operations. Land Operations were critical to the success of INTERFET in securing the East Timor Area of Operations (EM AO) for onward civilian reconstruction of a devastated country. Maritime operations in support of the Land forces were not so directly apparent to media and international observers, yet they too were vital to the success of INTERFET's mission.

HMAS MELBOURNE, like many other RAN, and International Naval Units formed part of Naval Component Command (NCC) INTERFET, and as such became an integrated force element of INTERFET. This article will present a written picture of MELBOURNE's participation in OP Warden/Stabilise, and reinforce some "age old" maxims of Maritime Power.

Naval Component Command INTERFET

Naval Component Command (NCC INTERFET) was established in September 1999 as an "Environmental Sub-Unit Command" under Commander INTERFET

(Major General Cosgrove). NCC's primary role was the Command and Control of all operational maritime assets assigned to INTERFET. Commanded by Commodore Brian Robertson AM RAN, NCC operated out of Dili and provided central command of maritime units for COMINTERFET.

The coalition naval force was functionally subdivided into five broad elements: "Dili guardship", Amphibious and Afloat support, Escort duties and "Suai guardship", "Oecussi guardship" and forces on R&R visits to Darwin. On taking over from HMAS NEWCASTLE on 24 January 2000, MELBOURNE became "Oecussi guardship". She also acted as Composite Warfare commander for the naval forces.

The Australian maritime units were also sub-divided according to platform type: surface combatant force, amphibious lift, logistic support and hydrographic support. The surface combatants formed Task Unit 627.1 and MELBOURNE became CTU 627.1.1 after "taking over" from HMAS NEWCASTLE.

Oecussi Enclave Guardship

MELBOURNE spent the majority of time on station in the EM AO as the "Oecussi Enclave Guardship", fulfilling a variety of roles in this remote satellite province of East Timor. From a tactical stance, MELBOURNE operated as a Local Area Warfare



"Operation Stabilise" – 3 Feb 2000. Picture by Corporal Troy Rodgers.



"Operation Stabilise" – 31 Jan 2000. Picture by Corporal Troy Rodgers.

Commander (LAWC) in the enclave, while also maintaining responsibility for all "Theatre Maritime Warfare Duties". The only other surface combatant on station was the Portuguese Frigate *VASCO DA GAMA*, which operated between Dili and Darwin according to INTERFET and national tasking priorities.

Oecussi is physically surrounded on all sides by West Timor (Indonesia), and is some 100 nm from Dili. In both a geographic and political context the Oecussi Enclave is isolated. Significant logistic and military support was required to ensure the enclave's continued integrity as part of East Timor.

The "Oecussi Enclave Guardship" was expected to conduct a wide variety of tasks. Maritime operations in the enclave focused upon ensuring the safe transit and delivery of logistic supplies via the "Sea Lines Of Communications" (SLOC) by establishing and maintaining a naval presence. The guardship also acted in support of the 3 RAR Battalion Group ashore. Although popular media coverage focused upon the "Humanitarian Assistance" (HA) provided by naval units to various East Timorese communities, and without diminishing its obvious importance, this activity was the lowest command priority. In priority order, the following key roles were fulfilled by MELBOURNE whilst operating as the "Oecussi Enclave Guardship";

- a. Maritime Patrol as a presence mission within enclave waters;
- b. Building and maintenance of the Recognised Maritime Picture (RMP) and Recognised Air Picture (RAP);

- c. Aero Medical Evacuation, and Aviation support as tasked by 3 RAR;
- d. "Hotel Service" support to 3 RAR as requested, involving sixteen 3 RAR personnel each day onboard MELBOURNE;
- e. Catering Support to 3 RAR to supplement hard rations with freshly prepared meals; and
- f. Humanitarian Assistance to the local population in the form of medical clinics, chaplaincy support, and building reconstruction.

Traditional naval picture compilation was the main focus of "Operations Room and Bridge activity" while on station in the "Oecussi Box". Day and night, MELBOURNE used all available sensors to continually collate and assess information in the building and maintenance of the Recognised Maritime and Air Picture. MELBOURNE was able to then operate as an Air Traffic Control platform, de-conflicting airspace and reporting SAR times in for all INTERFET and UN aircraft operating in and out of the Oecussi area.

It was MELBOURNE's aim to own "the box", in terms of being aware of all sea and air traffic in or near the patrol area. This focus provided constructive reinforcement to the activities of 3 RAR ashore in the enclave, and to wider Theatre level picture compilation for NCC and HQ INTERFET in Dili. Through excellent co-operation, the two principal INTERFET units in the enclave were able to work together in building a more secure environment for the local Timorese. MELBOURNE could be seen easily from the coast, and so it was often useful to position the Ship where its presence might best



influence decision-makers in and around the enclave. Terms like "Gunboat Diplomacy" would be incorrect and inappropriate, however, the "presence mission" of MELBOURNE was effective and occasionally vital in deterring acts of aggression ashore. We received the strong impression from our soldiers ashore that they were very pleased to have "their own frigate" patrolling the waters!

One of the operational highlights of the deployment, (for both Army and Navy), was the excellent level of interaction that occurred at all levels between the two services. Most soldiers and sailors from both units had experienced little if any real joint operational exposure prior to OP *Stabilise*, and if "grassroots attitude" is any indication then the ADF had a real win for the future through this process. Most days MELBOURNE sent a party ashore to provide HA and 3 RAR sent 16 soldiers onboard for "Hotel Services". During the HA work 3 RAR provided transport and local guidance, while onboard the diggers enjoyed the opportunity to have a shower, wash their gear, sit in air conditioning, watch a movie, and have a couple of freshly cooked meals. The end result of this program was that MELBOURNE completed the hospital and two schools for the local Timorese that previous Ships had started, and 3 RAR were able to rotate their men through a "pseudo R & R" period which was greatly appreciated by all involved. MELBOURNE's ship's company throughout this period selflessly shared their mess space to accommodate the 3 RAR personnel; although it must be said that while being all warmly greeted they were thrust towards the showers with great gusto after initial pleasantries. A key part of this program was the serviceability of the Ship's boats. The boats were essential to Oecussi operations, and thankfully remained available for constant tasking during the entire deployment.

The most important contribution made to joint operations from 3 RAR's perspective was the constant availability of MELBOURNE's S70B aircraft "Tiger 73" for AME and AMO sorties. Tiger 73 flew 95 hours in support of 3 RAR, which was a truly excellent rate of effort maintained almost continually throughout MELBOURNE's time on station. The "Birdies" were privileged to see the best and the worst of Oecussi and Timor at large, which also provided vital input toward onboard command appreciations of the operational environment ashore. They performed Aero Medical Evacuations, Air Mobility Operations, Surveillance, VIP movements, and several smaller tasks as required by 3 RAR, NCC INTERFET, and MELBOURNE. Key mission sorties performed by Tiger 73 in support of 3 RAR included airlifting malaria struck soldiers out of the highlands, transporting important supplies to remote 3 RAR positions, and assisting INTERFET/UN investigation staff to the site of a major mass grave.

The sight of the steep and rugged Oecussi coastline will live with all MELBOURNE's personnel for many years. The personal dimension of OP *Warden/Stabilise* is another issue that is yet to fully present itself. Most members were able to go ashore as part of the work parties for at least one day, and from there they could plainly see the devastation that had been wrought some months prior by Militia and others.

A significant factor that will emerge from the Australian involvement will be the emotional connection that remains between the Australian Defence Force and the East Timorese people. The building of schools, hospitals, and the interaction with the locals will leave a lasting impression on those involved in this operation. As MELBOURNE left Oecussi waters on 15 February 2000, much internal thought centered on the future that lay before the local people. With the job done and the handover to UNTAET complete, MELBOURNE departed Oecussi for Dili.

The Last Dili Guardship

Upon leaving Oecussi waters, MELBOURNE joined HMNZS ENDEAVOUR to replenish and make ground towards Dili. In the early forenoon of 16 February 2000, MELBOURNE anchored in Dili harbour for the second time to assume duties as the "Dili Guardship". MELBOURNE then departed in company with ENDEAVOUR for the southern township of Suai. Over the period 17-20 February, MELBOURNE remained in company with ENDEAVOUR and continued to patrol the maritime approaches associated with the INTERFET AO.

The highlight for MELBOURNE during this time was the co-ordination and execution of COMINTERFET's maritime farewell from Dili enroute Darwin. There were several occasions in which the entire Ship's Company reflected upon the fact that they were witnessing events of possibly great historical significance to both Australians and East Timorese. COMINTERFET's final address to MELBOURNE, his farewell dinner held onboard, and the ceremonial departure were special events that will leave strong memories with all concerned. With the departure of General Cosgrove, MELBOURNE departed Dili following at a modest 28 knots vice the 40 knots, of JERVIS BAY, enroute for Darwin Australia.

Lessons Learnt

Much of what has been written in this short discourse has barely touched the surface of the deeper operational issues of concern to MELBOURNE, and maritime operations in a "peace enforcement" mission such as INTERFET. Operation *Stabilise* was



clearly unique in the context of recent ADF overseas deployments, and will no doubt provide numerous analysts with considerable data to pour over for many years. From our own experience, MELBOURNE provides the following key lessons learnt during *OP Warden/Stabilise*;

- a. Credible maritime power is essential to any long distance joint operation in our local region. This includes surface combatants, amphibious lift ships, fleet auxiliaries, landing craft and naval aviation.
- b. Integrated and fused C4I operations are possible, can work, and will act as flexible force multipliers if given the correct structure, applied with the proper level of discipline and dynamically implemented by unit commanders.
- c. Logistic Sea Lift is absolutely critical to future operations in a maritime archipelagic environment to effectively sustain land forces.
- d. Surface Combatants can provide an excellent presence mission, coupled with a deterrent effect if deployed correctly in support of land forces. They can secure the SLOCs and empower land force commanders in achieving their mission by denying approach from seaward boundaries.
- e. While the requirement for aviation assets to provide force mobility and resupply for land forces in difficult terrain is implicitly understood, the utility of providing that support from a naval platform with its organic aviation facilities is less well realised – except by 3RAR.

- f. The quality of our people is exceptional! No task was too menial or too difficult, no mission was out of reach. Day after day the Sailors and Officers of MELBOURNE did their best, which was to demonstrate the excellent quality of our sea going people at all levels.

Conclusion

HMAS MELBOURNE operated as a deployed surface combatant and Composite Warfare Commander as part of *OP Warden/Stabilise* for the period 21 January to 23 February 2000. During this time the Ship achieved a great deal, and effectively contributed to the overall INTERFET mission by providing support to land forces and through demonstrating control and presence over the maritime approaches and SLOCs. It was a unique operational deployment, and will stand out as a significant point in the history of ADF operations. A closing synopsis provides a brief picture of MELBOURNE's efforts; 34 days on station, 95 air hours flown in support of INTERFET, 210 3 RAR soldiers provided with "Hotel Services", and 3000 hours of "Humanitarian Assistance". As with all the other RAN units involved, MELBOURNE worked hard and achieved much, but most importantly succeeded in its mission and improved the potential future for the East Timorese.

Lieutenant White is MELBOURNE's Signal Communications and Operations officer.



"Operation Stabilise" – 03 Feb 2000. Picture by Corporal Troy Rodgers.



A Much Neglected Lady Proves She Can Still Deliver the Goods

HMAS TOBRUK'S role in Operation Spitfire/Warden/Stabilise

*By Lieutenant Commander John Prichard, RAN, Operations Officer HMAS TOBRUK and
Lieutenant Commander Peter Arnold, RAN*

The crisis which erupted in East Timor following the resounding 'Yes' vote from the East Timorese for independence from Indonesia on 30 August 1999 had been brewing for years. Developments in East Timor had been closely watched by Australia since it was first annexed by Indonesia in 1975. However, the speed with which East Timor was rushed towards its present crisis, by the fast tracking of the referendum for autonomy or independence, caught Australian Defence planners not so much off guard. (the commissioning on 10 June 1999 of the 86 metre wave-piercing catamaran HMAS JERVIS BAY for fast troop deployment being testimony to their foresight), but rather not at the preferred state of materiel readiness for heavy military sealift and amphibious operations. HMAS TOBRUK was awaiting a long overdue refit, her previous refit having been eight years ago, and the two LPAs, HMA Ships MANOORA and KANIMBLA, were still refitting in Newcastle.

With signs of unease in Indonesia increasing as the East Timor referendum drew nearer, TOBRUK was put on short notice to move. The ship sailed for Darwin from Sydney on 30 August 1999 on the very day that the East Timorese people cast their democratic votes overwhelmingly in favour of independence. The ship called into Townsville enroute Darwin to embark two LCM8s, an Amphibious Beach Team (ABT), and elements of 3 Brigade. TOBRUK arrived in Darwin on Wednesday 08 September, as the post referendum crisis in East Timor began to mushroom, joining the growing force of international naval units gathering in Darwin Harbour. Upon berthing at Fort Hill Wharf the embarked elements of 3 Brigade were off-loaded and elements of 2 Cavalry Regiment (22 ASLAVs) were embarked.

A timely and invaluable amphibious training period with LCHs, LCM8s and 2 CAV ASLAVs was conducted at anchor in Darwin Harbour the following week. TOBRUK departed Darwin Harbour on Saturday 18 September 1999 in company with elements of TG 627.1 for the passage to Dili. On the morning of Tuesday 21 September, 24 hours after H hour, TOBRUK and HMAS JERVIS BAY, under the protection of Allied escorting destroyers and frigates and watched closely by Indonesian naval vessels at anchor in Dili Roads and alongside in Dili Harbour, commenced off loading troops and equipment ashore. TOBRUK's unloading operations at anchor with BALIKPAPAN, BRUNEI, LABUAN and two LCM8s lasted most of the day due to difficult weather conditions arising in the late forenoon.

Despite the landing site being within the confines of Dili Harbour it was nonetheless a proper amphibious operation as troops and equipment were landed over the shore by amphibious craft at a hastily prepared beach. This beachhead had been surveyed by the Response Force (RESFOR) and Hydrographic Support Unit (HODSU) the day prior to the Task Group's arrival at Dili and was used in favour of other intended landing sites within Dili Harbour due to their congestion by Indonesian vessels. Prior to the commencement of TOBRUK's off loading operation the ABT's engineering plant prepared the beachhead to enable vehicles being landed from amphibious craft to exit the beach through a gap made in the seawall. It was pleasing to note that this first operational landing in East Timor ran smoothly, despite the difficult weather conditions throughout the day. This set the trend for TOBRUK's amphibious operations in the Area of Operations (AO) over the next six weeks. The ship was able to sail later that same day for the return trip to Darwin to reload more troops and equipment bound for Dili.



TOBRUK loading in Darwin and then passing to Dili to unload cargo and troops set a pattern of operations for the next three weeks. When wharf space was available in Dili TOBRUK would berth alongside to unload and provide services to troops ashore. Whilst alongside in Dili on 25 September TOBRUK achieved its fastest off-load throughout the whole Operation. Utilising five stations simultaneously, LCM8s at the stern door and alongside, the ship's 70 ton Velle derrick, the two 8 tonne Favco cranes and the Seaking, TOBRUK managed to off-load a full cargo in just over three hours. Operations whilst at anchor were a more protracted affair due to the transit distance to shore and the prevailing weather conditions of strong sea breezes and accompanying swell from late morning through to the late afternoon. The resulting ship motion made stern door marriages for LCHs and LCM8s untenable and berthing alongside difficult. TOBRUK completed five voyages from Darwin to Dili between 18 September and 10 October during which over 3000 tonnes of cargo and 590 soldiers were transported. TOBRUK was either at anchor in Dili Roads or alongside in Dili Harbour on September 21, 25, 29-30, October 6, 10-11, and November 4 1999.

On 11 October 1999 TOBRUK's familiar pattern of Darwin to Dili express runs in support of Operation *Stabilise* changed. Whilst alongside in Dili, TOBRUK embarked elements of 3 Brigade in preparation for an Amphibious Assault at Suai, codenamed Operation LAVERACK, planned for 13 October. The ship departed Dili early in the evening of 11 September, rendezvoused with ADELAIDE for escort in the afternoon of 12 October and then rendezvoused with BALIKPAPAN and BRUNEI off Suai at 0500 on 13 October 1999.

There was considerable build up to the reported importance of this day for the RAN and the ADF with it being described as the first proper beach amphibious assault conducted by the RAN and ADF since World War Two. Messages of encouragement were received from CTU 627.1.1, NCC INTERFET and CN in ascending order to this effect. It could be argued, though, that this noteworthy occasion had actually occurred some three weeks earlier on 21 September with the initial landing of troops and equipment from TOBRUK, BALIKPAPAN, BRUNEI, LABUAN and LCM8s across the beach in Dili Harbour. Semantics aside, the operation was conducted successfully, if not as excitingly as the actual historical record would suggest. In the event, the embarked forces and their equipment were landed over the beach from TOBRUK by the LCHs BALIKPAPAN and BRUNEI, TOBRUK's two LCVPs and the embarked 817 Squadron Seaking helicopter, Shark 07.

After the Suai Assault TOBRUK recommenced her theatre resupply role, conducting four return trips from Darwin to Suai during which almost 2000 tonnes of cargo and 642 soldiers were transported. Amphibious off loading operations with available LCHs and LCM8s were conducted at Suai on October 13, 17-18, 22-24, 28-30 and November 1-3. The conduct of these Military Sealift/Amphibious Lodgements was definitely an Allied affair: TOBRUK transported cargo and troops from Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Ireland, whilst being escorted by, assisted by or working in concert with Australian, Canadian, French, New Zealand, United Kingdom and United States warships and aircraft. Of particular note were the two off loads at Suai on 22-24 and 28-30 October. On 23 October TOBRUK, assisted by USMC CH-53 Super Stallion helicopters and the Combat Cargo Team from USS BELLEAU WOOD, off loaded 22 International Standard Organisation (ISO) 20 foot containers weighing as much as 22,000 lbs each, setting a RAN record of over 500,000 lbs of cargo "vertrepped" in one day. A similar operation was conducted on 29 October when USMC CH-53s and the Combat Cargo Team from USS PELELIU off loaded 16 ISO 20 foot containers. It is worth noting, though, that the remainder of the 101 containers carried during the Operation were off-loaded via Velle derrick to LCHs.

In addition to TOBRUK's primary roles of amphibious lodgement and military sealift, the ship provided support for INTERFET forces ashore whenever the opportunity arose. Either alongside or at anchor in the AO, TOBRUK offered recuperation services of showers, laundry facilities, fresh meals, temporary air conditioned comfort, e-mail and Interflora facilities to very grateful troops. For those unable to take advantage of the hospitality aboard, TOBRUK delivered hundreds of kilograms of fruit and rations ashore.

Prior to East Timor's wet season the conditions ashore were dry, dusty and dirty, not to mention burned, vandalised and destroyed, with little water available for the small 'niceties', (most would consider them necessities), of life. TOBRUK's arrival in harbour was often described as a "God Send" and the positive impact that the ship's support made to the morale of troops ashore was acknowledged on numerous occasions, with the camaraderie and respect for each other's Service being raised significantly.

The following figures indicate the success of TOBRUK's team in providing support for INTERFET troops:

- in excess of 1800 personnel utilised the onboard services, (including meals, showers, laundry facilities, e-mail facilities and Interflora services);
- over 500 loaves were baked by the catering crew and sent ashore;



- 1250 kg of fruit were distributed to those who were too far from the harbour to make use of the other services provided; and
- over 1450 snack and BBQ packs were developed and sent ashore.

As well as providing direct support to troops ashore, TOBRUK provided fuel, water and engineering repair services to Naval and Army units in the AO, transferring 320 cz of fuel (F76 – 141.6 cz and F44 – 178.7cz) and 210 tonnes of water either ship to ship or ship to shore. Transfer of liquids ashore was achieved with the assistance of LCHs, LCM8s and helicopters, and also road tankers whilst TOBRUK was alongside in Dili.

During the two months that TOBRUK was involved in Operation *Spitfire/Warden/Stabilise* the ship carried more cargo than during any entire year since 1987. During 1987 TOBRUK was involved in Operation MORRIS DANCE, three major amphibious exercises,

two minor exercises and five ancillary transportation voyages carrying cargo as diverse as FFG 05 modules, Boston Bombers, HMAS MELBOURNE's 6" gun and DCP stores for the South West Pacific. Whilst cargo carried during Operation *Spitfire/Warden/Stabilise* may not have been quite as peculiar as that carried during 1987, the intensity of operations and the volume of cargo transported to and within the AO during the period 18 September to 5 November 1999 has shown that TOBRUK can handle virtually any task asked of her. Involvement in previous operations such as MORRIS DANCE, LAGOON, SOLACE, or BELISI did not entail the tonnage or tempo experienced in 1999. One week's amphibious operations in East Timor completed the annual continuation training requirement for the entire year.

TOBRUK's amphibious support to Operation *Spitfire/Warden/Stabilise* from a simple numerical viewpoint is summarised in the table:

MILITARY SEA LIFT/AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT DATA	AMOUNT/NUMBER
TOTAL WEIGHT OF CARGO CARRIED	5250 TONNES
TOTAL NO OF PASSENGERS CARRIED	1545
MILITARY SEA LIFT (9)	
WEIGHT OF CARGO CARRIED	5000 TONNES
CARGO CARRIED:	
WATERCRAFT,	5
A VEHICLES (APC/ASLAVS)	94
B VEHICLES (UNIMOGS/LANDROVERS)	160
C VEHICLES (PLANT/ MHE)	13
ISO 20' CONTAINERS	101
BMS 10' CONTAINERS	47
GNL CARGO (PALLETS)	651
NUMBER OF PASSENGERS CARRIED	1232
AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT (1)	
WEIGHT OF CARGO CARRIED	250 TONNES
CARGO CARRIED:	
B VEHICLES (UNIMOGS / LANDROVERS)	72
GNL CARGO (PALLETS)	17
NUMBER OF PASSENGERS CARRIED	313
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS DATA	
TOTAL NUMBER OF AMPHIBIOUS MARRIAGES	160
STERN DOOR MARRIAGES:	
LCH	19
LCM8	52
LCVP	9
LARC	4
ALONGSIDE MARRIAGES:	
LCH	38
LCM8	20
LCVP	18



Operation *Spitfire/Warden/Stabilise* was an extremely busy but satisfying experience for the ship's company of HMAS TOBRUK. The whole Operation has reinforced to the RAN and the ADF the important role and many capabilities of TOBRUK, which for so many years has been battling to be recognised as an essential element of the ADF's fighting and operational force. The same can be said for the rediscovered utility of the LCHs, a craft of their size and carrying capacity being essential for the off loading of diverse cargoes from TOBRUK, combined with their ability to be self sustaining and to operate alone in an AO. The portability and versatility of the LCM8s was also clearly demonstrated, their capabilities coming to the fore when the depth of water or restricted manoeuvring area favoured their use over the LCHs.

The Operation has also come at a time when Australian Defence planners were beginning to put feelers out to move away from the simplified notion of protecting Australia by denying the sea/air gap to any would-be adversary. The Operation has shown that Australia may be best served by a policy which enables the Defence Force to project force ashore, to stabilise trouble spots before they erupt in violence disrupting the peace of our region, or, as in East Timor's case, nipping that violence in the bud before it could spread further.

TOBRUK's contribution to Operation *Spitfire/Warden/Stabilise* can perhaps be best illustrated from two perspectives and corresponding quotes. Major General Cosgrove, Commander

INTERFET, visited TOBRUK on 4 November during the ship's last visit to Dili before departing the AO. In an inspiring address to the ship's company General Cosgrove summed up TOBRUK's performance during the Operation; he stated that without TOBRUK the amphibious landing of forces ashore at Suai would not have been possible and thus the western region of East Timor would not be secure even now, and without TOBRUK the whole Operation *Spitfire/Warden/Stabilise* would still have been in its infancy. TOBRUK's provision of recuperation services to INTERFET forces ashore and the corresponding boost to morale is best summarised in a poem received from 3 CER which included the text:

"Never let it be said out loud, that the Anzac Spirit's dead,

The legend sailors on TOBRUK have baked the digger's bread."

TOBRUK's achievements in Operation *Spitfire/Warden/Stabilise* have shown that not only is she an essential unit within the ADF's order of battle, being the catalytic vessel for true Joint Operations, she also remains a very capable unit providing flexibility of manoeuvre for the projection and sustainment of forces ashore. Despite the lack of profile and appropriate care over the years, when the call to action was received by TOBRUK to perform her amphibious role she was able to respond and perform true to her motto – Faithful and Strong. Despite years of neglect, this fine lady has proven she can still deliver the goods.





East Timor

Maritime Lessons

By James Goldrick

NB: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the RAN or the Department of Defence

IT is an old military law that in any contingency more lessons are relearned than learned anew. East Timor may have been Australia's most important experience of the realities of the "new wave" in world affairs, but it was no exception in terms of the lessons it taught. Many of those lessons apply to the maritime environment and to naval operations and capability.

The importance of sea lift was understood from the beginning and manifest until the end. Effective movement of personnel, vehicles, equipment and supplies would be the element upon which the success of the operation stood or fell. The charter and commissioning of the high speed catamaran JERVIS BAY was a timely measure that filled a key capability gap, but the whole operation would not have been possible without the presence of the heavy landing ship TOBRUK, the RAN's heavy landing craft and the smaller mechanised landing craft of the Australian Royal Army Corps of Transport. The Australian Defence Force would also have found it intensely difficult to support its logistic requirements and those of INTERFET as a whole if there had been no chartered merchant shipping. While the processes for identifying and securing suitable merchant ships went smoothly and were completed in a timely fashion, this was an important reminder that effective sea lift in strategic terms rests even more upon the ability to access commercial tonnage than it does upon military vessels such as amphibious craft.

What is most striking about the vital function of sea lift is that, in terms of the Australian strategic circumstance, East Timor probably enjoys the most favourable proximity to Australian bases, airfields and ports of any locality. The overall problem of transportation, with little more than 400 miles between bases and destination, was therefore much simpler than it would be in many other circumstances. Even so, the challenge could not have been met by airborne means alone. By historical standards, the East Timor operation was substantial, but by no means enormous. Nevertheless, the dependence upon the sea of both the military and the relief effort was demonstrated by the fact that there were often no less than 18 ships in Dili Harbour, with two to three shipping arrivals a day. Over 90% of military cargo went into and out of East Timor by sea

and the lack of roads and infrastructure meant that sea transport was vital in-theatre as well. For the military in particular, the demand for fuel and the need for large quantities to be readily available were manifest from the start. Here, the replenishment ship SUCCESS played a vital role as a "floating gas station" for all environments. Naval units, in fact, provided the only source of diesel and aviation fuel for the entire INTERFET force for the first three months of the operation.

Furthermore, although East Timor does possess a very basic port in the form of Dili Harbour, over the shore capabilities proved essential here and at many other points on the coast, particularly in the enclave of Oecussi. In East Timor, as elsewhere within the region – and around much of the Australian coast – amphibious forces are essential to any realistic efforts to make land forces mobile over long distances.

The surface forces which supported INTERFET played vital roles throughout the operation. The first key activity was that of presence. The deployment of capable surface combatants operating in close cooperation with maritime patrol aircraft and other airborne forces was a clear signal of INTERFET's resolve and its capability to defend itself. INTERFET maritime forces rapidly built up and maintained a comprehensive surveillance picture of the area of operations using both their organic and remote sensors. They were able to locate and track contacts of interest and demonstrate that they would not be caught by surprise. Furthermore, this effort could obviously be – and was – sustained for as long as it would be needed. In all of this, maritime forces effectively created a protective umbrella, within which the land component could operate confident that it could concentrate on the job to be done in East Timor itself without the possibility of external interference.

The same capability and resolve were also apparent in terms of the air environment. Although Australia's guided missile frigates (FFGs) and the British destroyer GLASGOW provided an important measure of air warfare surveillance and combat capability, the more useful because of their ability to remain posted on station, the highly capable AEGIS cruiser, the United States Ship MOBILE BAY was a



vital enabler in the opening stages of the operation. Her long range air warfare systems, both in sensors and weaponry, and her excellent battle management and command capability meant that the force could contemplate any situation with a high degree of confidence, even without the continuous presence of friendly fighter aircraft.

Implicit in this activity was another important lesson, the requirement for interoperability and the important part which frequent and challenging exercises play in achieving and sustaining the required levels of that interoperability. Bi-lateral and multi-lateral exercises pay huge dividends in this regard.

There was, however, a gap in interoperability and this was the absence of an Australian unit which could act as an offshore command and control facility. Either MANOORA or KANIMBLA would have been able to fill that gap and provide the necessary degree of connectivity for the INTERFET headquarters in the critical early stages of the operation. This would have allowed the senior commanders to remain onboard until the infrastructure for a shore based headquarters had been fully developed and its communications proven. Much effort and many work arounds were required to achieve the marriage of the maritime surveillance picture with that on land. The newly refitted LPAs represented a significant new capability for the ADF and it is one that must be developed to its full potential.

The connectivity with information and intelligence sources which the surface forces could provide certainly assisted considerably with the situational awareness of the land force, particularly in the early stages of the operation. Here, as in other areas, the close integration of the naval component commander with the Commander INTERFET enabled a highly responsive coordination of naval units to achieve the best efforts for the coalition force.

The grey hulls and guns of the surface combatants covered the insertion of INTERFET land forces at their most vulnerable time. While the multinational units set up ashore and began to secure their positions in Dili and elsewhere around East Timor, the naval gunfire support capabilities of the frigates of the RAN and RNZN and the British destroyer GLASGOW provided the reassurance that effective firepower was immediately available if the situation demanded it. This was not only a confidence builder for the INTERFET forces themselves, it also sent a very clear message to those in East Timor who might have disputed the arrival of the force.

The process was repeated for the arrival of INTERFET at the isolated enclave of Oecussi. From the time that troops first went ashore until the final withdrawal of INTERFET, a frigate remained on patrol within sight of the shore.

The next major area of activity for surface combatants in particular was the protection of sea lines of communications. With the substantial and continuing sea lift effort, the uninterrupted passage of shipping was a key vulnerability and INTERFET maritime forces never lost sight of the need for its protection through constant patrols and the monitoring of shipping movement. The physical presence of surface combatants was also a very important measure of reassurance for chartered shipping. Many merchant ships would have been loath to enter the area of operations without the confidence instilled by the constant patrolling of INTERFET's maritime forces. A warship would thus maintain visibility on each merchant ship from when it entered the area of operations until it arrived at its anchorage. In this way, dozens of merchant ship movements were allowed to achieve a safe and timely arrival at their destinations.

The RAN organic air units, operating from the FFGs, provided a valuable asset to the troops ashore and supplemented the efforts of the workhorse Sea King utility helicopters in TOBRUK and SUCCESS. One S70B-2 Seahawk, operating from the on-station FFG, was ready to conduct aeromedical evacuation from the isolated Oecussi enclave if required. Seahawks were also utilised for load-lifting stores and equipment on a regular basis.

Naval parties ashore took on a wide variety of tasks. Hydrographic survey personnel were instrumental in determining navigable safe water for supply units and naval forces. They completed surveys of all the main port and landing areas, as well as of the anchorages. Amongst their productions was a comprehensive port guide. RAN personnel became responsible from the outset for port control and management of Dili Harbour. Clearance diving teams were in great demand. The Navy's Team 4 led the way until its relief by Team 1. In addition to beach and wharf surveys, both overt and covert, the teams conducted dives in support of war crimes' investigations, detonated large quantities of ordnance which were beyond the capacity of shore Explosives Ordnance Disposal teams and provided emergency diving support in Dili Harbour. One merchant ship was immobilised when its propeller fouled a mooring buoy, but naval divers were able to free the buoy and allow the ship to sail. In a port the size of Dili, any delay would have had an immediate impact on the flow of supplies and the support of INTERFET and the relief effort.

There were other areas, less obvious, in which naval forces played a key role. The ability of ships' companies to assist in repair and reconstruction is something that has been repeatedly demonstrated during disaster relief operations around the world and it came into play very rapidly in East Timor. The technical skills and the enthusiasm of the naval teams



resulted in some substantial successes for East Timor's reconstruction process, most notably in Oecussi, where the hospital, church and a number of other buildings were completely refurbished. They had already done excellent work in supporting the establishment of the INTERFET headquarters and accommodation areas.

One of the hidden lessons of the East Timor operation was the way in which naval units could conduct so many apparently disparate activities concurrently and for extended periods. On a typical day in theatre, a single frigate might, while acting in the presence and deterrence roles in a high state of combat readiness and contributing to the development and maintenance of the wide area surveillance picture, send parties ashore to assist with repair and rehabilitation work, act as a fuelling platform for maritime and land

helicopters, provide onboard rest and relaxation for land component personnel, provide communications facilities and support logistics over the shore.

In all, East Timor demonstrated very clearly the progress that the ADF has made towards achieving joint capabilities at the same time as it has shown the areas which need improvement. It showed the vital part played by maritime forces in protecting, supporting and sustaining any kind of expeditionary operation in a maritime-littoral region. It also demonstrated – and just as clearly – the extent to which such operations depend upon the maintenance of a wide range of capabilities in all environments, upon effective combat capability, upon sustained logistic support, on versatility and readiness to adapt and upon interoperability with prospective coalition partners.



HMAS Brunei transfers vital equipment and stores ashore.



The Warrant Officer of the Navy

By Warrant Officer David Wilson

Thank you for the opportunity to let your readers know about the Warrant Officer of the Navy (WO-N), some things about today's sailor and what I aim to achieve as WO-N.

Firstly, some background on WO-N. The position was established in 1993 as a result of one of the recommendations of Project MAINSTAY, which was established to seek better ways to employ RAN Warrant Officers and Senior Sailors. The fundamental role of WO-N is to represent sailors and their concerns to the Chief of Navy (CN) and to any other authority that needs to know these issues. WO-N achieves this by finding out what the sailor has done about the issue, then raises the concern through the sailor's Divisional System to the Commanding Officer. It must be understood that WO-N is not there to break down the Divisional System but to assist in its use. I also sit on a number of committees such as the Naval Health Benefits and the Naval Capability Management Boards.

I want to clarify what I mean by being a sailor. Though I spend most of my time with Junior Sailors, as they make up the bulk of the Navy's compliment, I believe that everyone in the Navy is a sailor. I am certain that the issues facing a 28 year old Petty Officer are very similar to those concerning a Lieutenant of similar age. Issues raised are very important to the individual and they deserve the right to have their say and to have someone listen to them and assist them in resolving their concerns.

My Naval career stems from the operational area, having served in a number of surface combatants in the Underwater Control Category. I also served in the Sail Training Ship YOUNG ENDEAVOUR, at the Australian Defence Force Academy, the Australian High Commission in Pakistan and at HMAS WATSON managing Junior Seaman Officers working towards their Bridge Watchkeeping Certificate. As well, I served at HMAS CRESWELL instructing staff skills to Chief Petty Officers and as the Warrant Officers' Career Manager in the Directorate of Sailors' Career Management in Canberra. I am the third WO-N and was appointed to the position on 31 July 1999.

I am constantly presented with a range of issues, not just RAN specific but in almost all aspects of human life. I have been contacted for advice from all ranks in the Navy, as well as from parents, spouses, other relatives and friends of

sailors and from people in the other services and foreign Navies. WO-N is a very interesting and challenging job and is certainly the most public profile job I have ever been in. I accept this public life and am welcoming to any comments people may have regarding how I conduct my business.

Having travelled extensively throughout the Navy and met so many sailors, I am in a unique position to advise people on not only what issues are affecting sailors but also what type of person today's sailor is. Firstly, they are neither better nor worse than their predecessors. They still possess a sense of humour, are happy to let people in authority know when things are not going well, know when to look after their shipmates, and have that great Australian attitude of getting the job done with a minimum of fuss. This was proven during the INTERFET operation, where our sailors at very short notice got on with the job, achieved excellent results and were vital to the success of the operation. These successes were achieved at sea and ashore in Timor and Australia.

What is different is that today's sailor is far better educated, usually more mature on entry and worldlier than in the past. They have a better knowledge of current technology and can accept new technology faster than their predecessors. Again, this does not make them better or worse than other sailors; it is simply an indication of changes in society. Most of our sailors are great people who seek challenges and want to achieve excellent results. They want the Navy to be seen in a positive light and work towards achieving this. Not all of them seek a long-term career in the Navy, however, all are volunteers and most want the best for the Navy.

As WO-N I intend to do something about the issues affecting our sailors and increase the awareness of the WO-N in the Navy and the Australian Defence Force. This is not for my own reward but is aimed at letting people know that WO-N has access to those in authority and those whom can make a difference. I want sailors to aspire to be the WO-N so they can do something about issues affecting their shipmates themselves. And somewhere in the process I want to have some fun.

Thank you again for the opportunity to write this. I welcome comments on it and on any part of my job. I can be contacted at david.wilson@cbr.defence.gov.au. Until we meet, take care and good luck.



The 1949 Geneva Conventions at Fifty – Making War More Humane?

By Martin Dunn

Introduction

In 1859, a Swiss citizen, Henri Dunant witnessed the battle of Solferino fought between the armies of France and Austria. Dunant was shocked by the suffering of the many soldiers wounded in the course of the battle. At the time he enlisted assistance from local villagers and sought to rescue those that he could. Subsequently, he became instrumental in establishing the Red Cross and developing the first Geneva Convention in 1864.

While the first Geneva Convention was inspired by the fate of wounded soldiers, subsequent conventions sought to protect others who should be *hors de combat* or not otherwise participating in conflict. Geneva law¹ eventually protected the wounded on land and at sea, prisoners of war, and civilians and their property. The most recent versions of Geneva law are the four Geneva Conventions of 1949² and the two Additional Protocols of 1977.³ Almost every state has signed and ratified the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Most have also signed and ratified the Additional Protocols, although a few prominent states have not, most notably the United States and many of states in South East Asia. The United Kingdom only ratified them in 1998.⁴

Geneva law does not attempt to regulate everything that could restrict conflict. It does not, for example, determine whether war is just (*jus ad bellum*), it mostly does not address the issues of how war should be fought – the subject of Hague law – and it does not take the place of international human rights law. Unfortunately, these boundaries are not exact, and are less so since the introduction of the Additional Protocols. These address, for example, Hague law issues which previous Geneva law had neglected.

Geneva law is also unusual. States have voluntarily submitted themselves to protect those who cannot defend themselves. Nevertheless, how significant is this? The Geneva law needs periodic amendment, with major revisions after the First and Second World Wars, as some states have shown that they could disregard the provisions. Those states that are scrupulous arguably would have behaved in a civilised manner anyway. Fifty years after the last major revision, and 22 years after the update of the Additional Protocol, how well is Geneva law faring?

Conflicts and Combatants

One of the difficult aspects of international humanitarian law is the definitions of conflicts and combatants. The 1949 Geneva Conventions were defined as applying to armed conflicts between states and the occupation of states, and not just to recognised states of war.⁵ Members of resistance organisations were recognised as combatants provided they were identified by a fixed sign, in addition to members of armed forces, and hence were entitled to prisoner of war status if captured.⁶ The Conventions also specify minimum conditions in Common Article 3 that apply to non-international armed conflict.⁷

The Additional Protocols further extend the nature of the conflicts and the combatants that are protected. Protocol I recognises conflicts against colonial domination, alien occupation and racist regimes as being the equivalent to conventional international conflicts.⁸ Guerrillas were considered combatants provided they carried arms openly during engagements and when deploying for an attack.⁹ For other non-international conflicts, Additional Protocol II applies. Although much briefer than Protocol I, it contains far more detailed provisions than Common Article 3.

Additional Protocol I also denied combatant status (and hence prisoner of war status) to "mercenaries".¹⁰ The definition of mercenaries, however, excluded members of national armed forces such as the Gurkha units of Britain and India or the French Foreign Legion.

Interpretation becomes more complex as the legitimate types of warfare are expanded. Powers that represent status quo interests would be unwilling to recognise their opponents as being anything other than terrorists. It is often unclear whether a guerrilla group is fighting for a legitimate right of self-determination, and hence what protections they might be entitled to – for example, the IRA or the Tamil Tigers.¹¹

The Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked

The wounded were the focus of the Geneva Conventions since the first was adopted in 1864. The 1868 Geneva Conference adopted Additional



Articles which extended the provisions of the 1864 Treaty to naval forces. Although not ratified, these provisions were applied in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1 and the Spanish-American War of 1898. These provisions were updated several times until 1949 when Geneva Convention I dealt with wounded and sick on land and Geneva Convention II dealt with wounded, sick and shipwrecked at sea.¹² In 1977, Protocol I further updated these provisions.

The treaties require that both sides should, at the earliest opportunity, search for missing people.¹³ They should evacuate any wounded and sick people. While the shipwrecked also needed to be collected, the practical situation at sea, where the combatants were highly mobile and vulnerable meant that survivors were not rescued promptly. For example, the cruiser HMS DORSETSHIRE abandoned its efforts collecting survivors from the BISMARCK when it suspected the presence of a submarine, and the submarine HMS CONQUEROR was similarly unable to rescue the crew of the GENERAL BELGRANO in the Falklands War.¹⁴ These treaties lay down the principle that the priority of medical treatment should be determined solely by need.¹⁵

Medical personnel, hospitals, hospital ships, units and transports are not to be subject to attack.¹⁶ Technically, medical personnel could not become prisoners of war, although they could be "retained" by the rival power.¹⁷ The symbol of the Red Cross or Red Crescent would be used to identify immune facilities, personnel, etc.¹⁸

Medical experimentation, such as practiced by the Nazis in the Second World War, was explicitly ruled out.¹⁹

Prisoners of War

The issue of prisoners of war was first considered in the Brussels Conference of 1874, although its declaration was not ratified. It was the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 where regulations protecting prisoners of war were first adopted. These rules were expanded and made more specific by the Geneva Convention in 1929 and Geneva Convention III in 1949.²⁰ Protocol I further updated these provisions in 1977. A key issue with determining who is entitled to prisoner of war status is what conflicts are considered international and who are recognised as combatants. This issue is addressed above.

The treaties made the capturing power responsible for the treatment of prisoners.²¹ The captor was obliged to treat the prisoner in a humane way at all times.²² This requirement was spelled out in detail in relation to accommodation, food clothing, medical care, recreation and so on.²³

The capturing power was restricted in interrogating prisoners, in the places where they could detain prisoners, in the circumstances when they could use weapons against them, and in the type of work they could be made do.²⁴ The treaties also dealt with such matters as prisoners' representative, pay, discipline, rights of communication, and rights to complain.²⁵

Civilians

The rights of civilians in war were largely unaddressed until after the Second World War. The ICRC had prepared a draft convention in the years leading up to the war, but it intervened before the conference could be held. Eventually, 1949 Geneva Convention IV was adopted to deal with the rights of the civilian population.²⁶ This was further extended in 1977 Protocol I.

Geneva Convention IV sought to guarantee the provision of medical services to the civilian population, as Conventions I and II did for the military.²⁷ In addition to the sick and wounded, children under 15, the elderly, expectant mothers and mothers of young children were identified as potentially needing special protection.²⁸ It also sought to protect the civil rights of civilians. Overall, Convention IV concentrated on the circumstances of civilians who found themselves under the control of a hostile power. Internment and assigned residence are the most extreme measures that were permitted to be used against citizens of an enemy power.²⁹ Generally, they should be permitted to leave if they so desire, or remain in gainful employment.³⁰ Civilians in occupied territory were not to be subject to coercion, torture, corporal punishment, collective penalties, pillage or hostage taking.³¹ Occupied territories should be administered in a humane manner with the existing public officials, judges and laws to remain unchanged to a significant extent.³² Internees should be treated humanely, in much the same way as prisoners of war.³³

Protocol I recognised that the way in which war was fought had a significant influence on the civilian population. Thus, the Protocol ventured into areas previously considered part of Hague law, while reiterating the main principles from Convention IV. It started with the basic rule – the parties shall distinguish between civilians and combatants, and between civilian objects and military objectives, and operations should be directed at military targets.³⁴ The Protocol outlawed "indiscriminate" attacks which included area bombing as practiced by the Germans, British and the Americans (against Japan) during the Second World War. It also included any attack where the likely civilian casualties are out of proportion to the military benefits.³⁵ In addition to restricting attacks against civilian objects generally,



it applied additional protection for cultural objects and places of worship, agricultural assets, the natural environment, and installations containing dangerous forces such as dams and nuclear power stations.³⁶ The humanitarian role of civil defence organisations was also recognised.³⁷ However, the easier recognition of guerrilla movements, combined with the greater restrictions on use of air power made countries with powerful air forces reluctant to subscribe to the Protocols.³⁸

Rights in all circumstances

The treaties endeavoured to make the protections apply to as wide a range of circumstances as possible. There had been clear and blatant breaches in previous wars, and the ICRC hoped to make the later treaties as robust as possible. As the treaties needed to be agreed on by governments, this was not always possible.

The difficulty in covering all eventualities has been recognised for a century. The preamble of 1899 Hague Convention II contained the so-called "Martens Clause", which declared that the Convention was not complete and that the gaps are covered by principles derived from custom, civilised behaviour, humanity and public opinion.³⁹ The Geneva Conventions use a similar technique to remind the signatories that if they denounce the treaties, they are still obliged to comply with customary international law.⁴⁰ Reiterations of the Martens Clause can also be found in Article I of Protocol I and the preamble of Protocol II.

The treaties try to specify minimum standards of civilised behaviour, to be complied with in all circumstances. The Geneva Conventions offer Common Article 3; that those not taking part in conflict should not be mistreated and that the wounded should be cared for. Protocol II itself tries to cover non-international conflict but also repeats a similar list of basic rights.⁴¹ The International Court of Justice when considering US actions against Nicaragua, effectively established that Article 3 represented the core customary humanitarian provisions.⁴²

The Geneva Conventions prohibited reprisals against the persons they were protecting.⁴³ Reprisals are acts of a state designed to cause another state to cease committing some offence or to gain reparations. They are not normally legal but can be considered legal in the circumstances of the case.⁴⁴

Similarly, the treaties provide that individuals are unable to renounce the rights protecting them.⁴⁵ This was designed to prevent people being placed under undue pressure in order to surrender their rights.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, one of the first problems with this principle occurred with the Korean War where a

number of North Korean prisoners were unwilling to be repatriated – despite the terms of Geneva Convention III – and the United Nations was reluctant to compel them.⁴⁷

Enforcement and Supervision

Recent years have seen grave breaches in former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Liberia, the Congo, Cambodia and several other places. Lower level problems are also common. In many of the conflicts this century, problems have arisen with combatants not fully complying with international law. Laws are broken frequently. Sometimes because of deep hatreds and passions found in the causes of the war itself, and other times just out of military convenience.

States have proven reluctant to take responsibility for enforcing its own standards, increasingly placing the burden on the Red Cross, the United Nations and non-government organisations. In few occasions since World War II have states appointed protecting powers. Similarly, the "International-Fact Finding Commission" was slow starting, with only 53 states accepting its jurisdiction by early 1998.⁴⁸

Enforcing law remains one of the hardest issues to address. The use of reprisals is curtailed by the treaties themselves. The International Court of Justice can only deal with disputes between states and then only if they submit to its jurisdiction. National courts always could punish offenders, but in the most systematic cases of abuse, the courts were mute. In the wake of World War II, international tribunals were established to punish war criminals, although they could be criticised for bias. More recently, tribunals were established to punish criminals from the Rwandan and Yugoslavian conflicts,⁴⁹ but many of the offenders are yet to face trial.⁵⁰ Another positive development is that the Statute for International Criminal Court has been opened for signature. This court will have the capacity to try most war crimes.⁵¹

Conclusion – Did Law help?

Determining the value of international law is difficult, as there is not a definitive way of ascertaining what would have happened in the absence of it. We see that laws are still breached, often quite seriously. Yet at the same time some efforts are still made to condemn and punish those responsible. A direct measurement of laws' performance would give a mixed answer.

As the Martens Clause recognised, it is difficult and probably impossible for a treaty to cover every possibility. Some issues will not be addressed, because either they were considered too small a matter of detail or they were not foreseen. The rapid change of technology, for one reason, will result in



there being issues that have not been the subject of treaty law. Protocol I's discussion of nuclear power plants comes as a new subject for the law. Some gaps are well known, but difficult to close such as the legality of nuclear weapons.⁵² Thus, the laws are likely to continue to have loopholes.

In many cases, laws are ambiguous, or oblige combatants to take risks with their safety to secure the safety of enemy *hors de combat*. The state may find it difficult to recognise a guerrilla army as equivalent to a regular army. The bomber commander may find it difficult to assess proportionality, balancing numbers of enemy civilian lives against a military outcome. The naval commander will not wish to risk his ship rescuing survivors of an enemy vessel. Moreover, what is necessary suffering? The dividing line separating reasonable behaviour from unreasonable is hard to define, and large grey areas will exist where demarcation is needed.

The treaties, and even customary law, are in the end made by states. Certainly, in the conferences that developed many treaties the International Committee of the Red Cross played a major role. The Red Cross is liable to see the treaties being derived from humanitarian principles: humanity, pity, charity, etc.⁵³ In the end, however, it is states that sign the treaties. While they may have in mind public opinion and humanitarianism, they also have in mind state interests. Thus, some well-intentioned treaties have been stillborn, and others have taken many years to find acceptance.

Today the place Dunant started, the wounded on the battlefield, has improved markedly. Yet, the improvements are not his alone. Florence Nightingale started her contributions a decade earlier. Today prisoners of war are mostly better treated; but civilians appear to be victims of warfare at as high a rate as ever before in history. As society progressed towards total war, changes were happening that make some aspects of war more humane and others less so. How much the Geneva treaties have improved the situation is difficult to say.

We are yet to reach a world where everyone performs in a civilised manner, but at least identifying standards of behaviour might help to guide some. Moreover, for the first time since the Second World War there is a consensus in the international community that those guilty of horrendous crimes should be punished.

NOTES

1 Jean Pictet (*the Principles of International Humanitarian Law*, ICRC, Geneva, 1991) divides "Humanitarian Law" into the "Laws of War" and "Human Rights". The Laws of War are in turn divided in "The Law of Hague" (Belligerents do not have unlimited choice in the means of inflicting damage) and "The Law of Geneva" (Persons placed hors de combat and those not directly participating in hostilities shall be respected, protected and treated humanely). This traditional division is not very exact and the reference to Hague and Geneva is potentially confusing.

While most of the significant laws of armed conflict were negotiated at Hague and Geneva, there are plenty of exceptions and some cases where the treaties fall into the opposite categories to that dictated by convention. For example, the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare is properly part of Hague law.

2 The four current Conventions are:

- Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field (Convention I of 12 August 1949), International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, Reprint July 1970.
- Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked of Armed Forces in the Field (Convention II of 12 August 1949), International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, Reprint July 1970.
- Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Convention III of 12 August 1949), International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, Reprint July 1970.
- Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in time of War (Convention IV of 12 August 1949), International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, Reprint July 1970.

3 These are:

- Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), of 8 June 1977, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, Revised edition 1996.
- Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), of 8 June 1977, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, Revised edition 1996.

4 Database on ICRC web site, <http://www.icrc.org/>.

5 Geneva Conventions, common Art 2.

6 Geneva Conventions III, Art 4.

7 Geneva Conventions, common Art 3.

8 Protocol I, Art 1.

9 Protocol I, Art 44.

10 Protocol I, Art 47.

11 Arguably, the IRA should not be recognised as they do not control territory, while the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam do (a position taken by Hilaire McCoubrey, *International Humanitarian Law: The Regulation of Armed Conflicts*, Dartmouth Publishing Co, Aldershot, 1990, p 172.). See also the TamilNation web site, http://www.tamilnation.org/armed_struggle.htm. Yet many guerrilla organisations only control secret bases in rugged and remote countryside, and are prepared to abandon them should they become endangered.

12 Adam Roberts and Robert Guelff (eds), *Documents in the Laws of War*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982, pp. 169-71, 193-4.

13 Protocol I, Art 33; Geneva Convention I, Art 15; Geneva Convention II, Art 18; Geneva Convention IV, Art 16.

14 Hilaire McCoubrey, *International Humanitarian Law: The Regulation of Armed Conflicts*, Dartmouth Publishing Co, Aldershot, 1990, pp 164-5.

15 Protocol I, Art 10; Geneva Convention I, Art 12; Geneva Convention II, Art 12.

16 Protocol I, Art 12ff; Geneva Convention I, ch III, IV, V, VI; Geneva Convention II, ch III, IV, V.

17 Hilaire McCoubrey, *International Humanitarian Law: The Regulation of Armed Conflicts*, Dartmouth Publishing Co, Aldershot, 1990, p 51.

18 Protocol I, Art 18; Geneva Convention I, ch VII; Geneva Convention II, ch VI.

19 Protocol I, Art 11; Geneva Convention I, Art 50; Geneva Convention II, Art 51; Geneva Convention III, Art 130; Geneva Convention IV, Art 147.

20 Adam Roberts and Robert Guelff (eds), *Documents in the Laws of War*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982, pp. 215-6.

21 Geneva Convention II, Art 12.

22 Geneva Convention II, Art 13.

23 Geneva Convention II, Art 25-38.

24 Geneva Convention II, Art 17, 21, 22, 42, 49 and 50.

25 Geneva Convention II, Art 58-108.

26 Adam Roberts and Robert Guelff (eds), *Documents in the Laws of War*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982, pp. 271-2.

27 Geneva Convention IV, Art 18-23.

28 Geneva Convention IV, Art 14.



- 29 Geneva Convention IV, Art 41.
- 30 Geneva Convention IV, Art 35, 39.
- 31 Geneva Convention IV, Art 31-4.
- 32 Geneva Convention IV, Art 54, 64.
- 33 Geneva Convention IV, Pt III, Sect IV.
- 34 Protocol I, Art 48.
- 35 Protocol I, Art 51, paras 4-5.
- 36 Protocol I, Art 53-6.
- 37 Protocol I, Art 61-7.
- 38 Squadron-Leader M.J. Gordon, *Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Implications for Australian Air Power*, Paper No 3, Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, April 1992, pp 25-6.
- 39 Adam Roberts and Robert Guelff (eds), *Documents in the Laws of War*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982, pp. 4-5.
- 40 Geneva Convention I, Art 63; Geneva Convention II, Art 62; Geneva Convention III, Art 142; Geneva Convention IV, Art 158.
- 41 Protocol II, Art 4.
- 42 Hilaire McCoubrey, *International Humanitarian Law: The Regulation of Armed Conflicts*, Dartmouth Publishing Co, Aldershot, 1990, p 192-3.
- 43 Geneva Convention I, Art 46; Geneva Convention II, Art 47; Geneva Convention III, Art 13; Geneva Convention IV, Art 33. Also Protocol I, Art 20, 51-56.
- 44 Jean Pictet, *The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 - Commentary: I, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field*, ICRC, Geneva, 1952, p 341ff.
- 45 Geneva Convention I, Art 7; Geneva Convention II, Art 7; Geneva Convention III, Art 7; Geneva Convention IV, Art 8, Protocol I, Art 1.
- 46 Jean Pictet, *The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 - Commentary: I, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field*, ICRC, Geneva, 1952, p 78ff.
- 47 Peter Rowe, *Defence: The Legal Implications - Military Law and the Laws of War*, Brassey's, London, 1987, p 173.
- 48 Geores Abi-Saab, "Respect for Humanitarian Norms in International Conflicts: Interstate wars and wars of national liberation" in Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues, *Modern Wars: the humanitarian challenge: a report*, Zed Books, London, 1986, pp. 66-73; "Greece: Declaration in Accordance with Article 90 of Protocol I" in *International Review of the Red Cross*, No 322, 1 March 1998, p 191.
- 49 ie the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
- 50 Joan Beaumont, *International Humanitarian Law: Survey Essay*, Deakin University, Geelong, c1996.
- 51 Marie-Claude Roberge, "The new International Criminal Court: A preliminary assessment" in *International Review of the Red Cross*, No 325, 1 December 1998, pp 671-91.
- 52 Mohammed Bedjaoui, "Humanitarian law at a time of failing national and international consensus: A Report for the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues" in Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues, *Modern Wars: the humanitarian*

challenge: a report, Zed Books, London, 1986, pp. 13ff. A Hague Law issue.

- 53 Jean Pictet, *the Principles of International Humanitarian Law*, ICRC, Geneva, 1991, pp. 13ff.

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Biography

Martin Dunn entered the Department of Defence in 1986 through the Assistant Research Officer program. Mr Dunn spent most of the next seven years in Navy Office as a policy analyst. After a short period in capability analysis with Force Development and Analysis Division, Mr Dunn joined Headquarters Australian Defence Force in 1994, where he was responsible for the development of the Purple Book (ADF major capital equipment bids) and Defence long-term planning. After serving with the former Directorate of Research and Analysis in Army Headquarters in 1996-97 he attended the Joint Services Staff College in the second half of 1997. Mr Dunn served as a Senior Research Fellow with the Land Warfare Studies Centre until February 1999. He is currently Director Strategic Outlook in Defence Headquarters.

Mr Dunn holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the University of Sydney (1985) majoring in pure and applied mathematics, a Graduate Diploma of Management from Central Queensland University (1994), a Master of Defence Studies from the University of New South Wales (1996) and a Master of Arts degree in international relations from Deakin University (1999). He is a graduate of the Royal Australian Navy Staff College (1991) and the Joint Services Staff College (1997).

Published works by Mr Dunn include *Redefining strategic strike: the strike role and the Australian Army into the 21st century* (1999), *Coastal Shipping: Its Importance to the Economy* (1987) and the *Ten Year Defence Plan 1995-2004* (as principal author). He has also had articles published in the *Journal of the Australian Naval Institute*, the *Journal of the Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence Officers*, and in *Research and Analysis*, the newsletter produced by the former Directorate of Research and Analysis in Army Headquarters.



The Dera Trimaran Project

Sea Systems, Defence Evaluation and Research Agency, UK

By Bob Short and Claire Burt

The Trimaran Hull

For ten years, Defence Evaluation and Research Agency of the UK Ministry of Defence has been evaluating the trimaran hull-form for future warship designs. The work is aimed at informing the decision on whether the Royal Navy's Future Surface Combatant will be based on a trimaran hull.

The trimaran offers a number of potential advantages over the monohull:

- The trimaran has lower hull resistance at higher speeds, where the narrow, slender main hull results in a saving of about 20%. As it is this top speed that determines the size of the machinery fit, a lower power requirement should be reflected in lower machinery costs on build and in through-life costs.
- Scale-model sea-keeping experiments suggest a similar performance to that of a conventional vessel of the same length. A trimaran is typically 20-30% longer than the equivalent conventional vessel.
- The trimaran is more stable because stability is obtained by adjusting the side-hull sizes and separations. Thus heavy equipment such as large radar's can be fitted more easily.
- A major design driver for frigates in recent years has been the upper-deck length required to provide sufficient space for modern, complex combat systems. The trimaran offers not only deck length but also deck area, particularly in the most useful amidships portion. This, and the greater effectiveness of the whole ship design and the scope for different layouts, provides a better place for a helicopter close to the centre of pitch of the ship, and a good stern width for additional underwater systems. The central section of the vessel experiences significantly lower movements, giving much better helicopter availability.
- Because of its wide beam, the trimaran could accommodate a second helicopter hangar, which could be used for other service helicopters such as Apache for land attack support, or relief and special operations helicopters. It could also accommodate containerised units such as additional accommodation for a Marines unit, unmanned air vehicles or future weapon systems.

- Space and stability will enable more of the equipment and machinery to be mounted high in the vessel where shock levels are lower. Shock is the dominant cause of equipment failure in action.

Many of these potential benefits affect affordability in terms of initial and through-life costs, and the flexibility for accommodating the different types of mission the ship can expect to undertake. The design and build of the trimaran demonstrator, RV TRITON, and an extensive series of sea trials, will enable these benefits to be explored. As a result, large trimaran vessels will be better understood, which will determine their suitability for a future fleet of frigates.

Trimaran Research

Work was first carried out at University College London, where the MoD sponsors a department studying warship design. In the late 80s, as part of their MSc course, students were tasked with designing various trimaran warships. The results were so encouraging that DERA started work in the early 90s to confirm the advantages promised by the hull form and also to understand the design constraints imposed on its use in warship design.

At first, this work concentrated on the hydrodynamic aspects of the hull design, and involved running small-scale models, typically 8 metres long, in the tanks at DERA Haslar. The research was successful; key parameters of main hull length-to-beam ratios, and side hull length and position were identified. As this was progressing, computer design tools were developed for predicting the resistance, propulsion, seakeeping and manoeuvring characteristics of a trimaran warship.

Once the hydrodynamic design was set, DERA Rosyth started to investigate the structural design requirements, for which numerical models were developed. These models have been used to predict loadings and stresses in different sea states, which has enabled structural rules for the design of trimaran warships to be formulated.

The third area of research covers survivability, where any peculiarities of using a long slender hull-form are being investigated by using scale-model experiments and developing computer-based numerical models.



The Need for a Demonstrator

The results of this research have been most encouraging and to date nothing has been found to undermine any of the perceived advantages. However, small-scale model testing alone cannot provide sufficient evidence for a commitment to a fleet of trimaran warships; an intermediate step is needed and this is the trimaran demonstrator – RV TRITON.

It is unusual to build a prototype warship on this scale but there is a great deal at stake: a fleet of trimaran warships would be a significant change from the more conventional monohull, both in the design challenges and the operation of such ships.

Perhaps the greatest concern is that of structural design, the critical issue being exactly what design loads and associated safety factors should be applied. While most other aspects of design and performance can be predicted adequately by mathematical or small-scale physical modelling, structural synthesis relies on knowledge of the loads the ship is likely to encounter.

Warships are inherently lightweight structures, to maximise payload in a small platform and to ensure high speed at low cost. A conservative approach to structural design could severely penalise a trimaran when compared with a monohull designed to the same requirement. To establish appropriate design criteria, an accurate knowledge is required of the loads an ocean-going trimaran will experience. Gathering relevant data is the primary purpose of RV TRITON.

In addition to structural questions, a number of issues under the broad heading of seaworthiness will together determine the acceptability to the RN of a trimaran hullform: features such as sea-keeping, boat handling, upperdeck operations and manoeuvring must all be evaluated. Furthermore, the trimaran concept introduces some uncertainties in naval operations, and RV TRITON will be used to carry out a number of typical exercises including replenishment at sea and small-boat operations. The opportunity will also be taken to acquaint RN officers in the operation of a trimaran ship of this size.

In summary, the ship will be used in its first eighteen months of life to validate the research that has been undertaken and to provide data to fully develop and validate the numerical-model toolset. Importantly, it will be used to de-risk the hull-form as a naval platform. On completion of these trials, RV TRITON will be a facility that can be hired from DERA for testing and trialling military and defence equipments.

The Design of RV TRITON

The contract for the design and build of RV TRITON was placed with Vosper Thornycroft in July 1998 after competitive tendering. Progress with both the design

and build has been excellent, and the ship was successfully launched on the 6 May 2000. Delivery to DERA is planned for September of this year, when the de-risking trials will start.



RV TRITON – DERA's Trimaran Demonstrator

Layout

The main parameters of the ship are:

Length overall	98 m
Length between perpendiculars	90 m
Beam overall	22.5 m
Depth to main deck	9.0 m
Design draught	3.2 m
Design displacement	1035 t
Maximum speed	20 knots
Range	3000 nautical miles

Structural, stability and hydrodynamic considerations drove the main dimensions and configuration of the vessel. Nine watertight bulkheads, which subdivide the vessel, were required to satisfy damaged stability and, in way of the cross deck, strength requirements.

Accommodation is situated in the superstructure to allow cabins to have natural light, as required by the MCA. The superstructure is located forward on the cross deck to maximise space for the helicopter deck. The main working deck of the ship is 2 deck, which contains amenity spaces, including the galley, forward, immediately below the accommodation. Switchboard rooms and generators are positioned aft on 2 deck, for ease of access and simplicity of construction. The shaft line dictates the location of the motor room below 2 deck.

The weatherdeck includes the flight deck and locations for up to 8 TEUs required for potential trials equipment. A work boat and deck crane are situated alongside the superstructure to starboard, while the SOLAS rescue boat and davit are to port. The layout of the weatherdeck was dominated by safety considerations, in particular the requirements of lifesaving.



RV TRITON – Cutaway

Propulsion

RV TRITON is a diesel electric ship, with propulsive and ship-service power provided by a pair of diesel generators. Drive is provided by a single conventional shaft-line in the main hull, plus a right-angle drive thruster in each side hull. The main shaft is driven by a single 3.5 MW AC electric motor through a reduction gearbox. Side hull thrusters are driven by 350 kW electric motors. The prime movers are two Paxman 12VP185-powered 2 MW diesel generators backed up by a 400 kW harbour set and an 80 kW emergency set. A single fixed-pitch propeller and rudder are conventionally arranged under the aft end of the main hull.

The capability to fit a larger permanent-magnet motor of up to 5 MW has also been provided.

The trials programme

The plan for using RV TRITON is split into three phases

Phase 1a

condition taking and inclining experiment
powering trials – calm water and in waves
zig zag manoeuvres
manoeuvring in waves
low-speed side hull manoeuvring
natural roll period
structural response when docking/undocking
motion response in irregular seas
ship motions throughout vessel including extremities of beam and length
general ship handling
helicopter trials

Phase 1b

shallow-water operations
long-term seakeeping and structures
exhausting between hulls representation

- Phase 1 – Initial naval architectural trials
Delivery date 1 Oct 2000 – March 2002
- Phase 2 – Propulsion and other equipment trials including long-term structural data gathering
May 2002 – March 2004
- Phase 3 – General purpose DERA trials vessel
May 2004 – onwards

The expected programme dates for the Royal Navy's replacement for the Type 22 and Type 23 frigates – the Future Surface Combatant (FSC) – drive the timing of the first phase, results from these trials being required to inform the decision on the hull form.



RV TRITON – Replenishment at Sea

The following is an outline of the phase 1 trials; the key items are the recording of structural loading and assessment of seakeeping characteristics, as well as more general ship handling and familiarisation.

turning circles and pull out manoeuvres
ship design and layout (habitability and operability)
astern manoeuvring
windage effects
noise and vibration
small-boat operations.
replenishment at sea (interaction and station keeping)
towing and towing an array
vibration measurement (modal analysis)
senior officer acquaint

additional helicopter landing trials
limited response to shock trial
electric propulsion trial



Phase 2

The phase 2 period is to be used to de-risk various technologies, and include a preplanned mini refit to change the main propulsion motor for a US developmental permanent-magnet motor for evaluation at sea. Other motors being developed by various countries, including the UK, are being considered. The details of this trials period are still fluid. Technologies that might be tested on RV TRITON include:

- Integrated Technology Masts
- SRAM structures
- gas turbines
- fuel cells
- UAV
- helicopter autoland systems
- composite propellers and shafts
- electrically driven rudders.

This period is also where the vessel will become available for general hire, although there are also hiring opportunities during the phase 1 trials.

Phase 3

Typical trials are expected to include sonobuoys, small towed underwater systems, unmanned air

vehicles, helicopter guidance, and signature control programmes. The rear deck section can be easily reconfigured between a flight deck and a general working deck, to maximise its suitability for a variety of trials. There is a dedicated trials laboratory, adjacent to the working deck, equipped with desktop screens showing outputs from the TIS and ship's instrumentation. There are eight TEU container-mounting points, together with power supplies, to allow containerised test or trials equipment to be installed easily. RV TRITON also has potential as a training platform.

Conclusion

The trimaran hull-form has potential advantages over the conventional monohull.

Significant among these are the lower unit production and through-life costs attributed to the lower hull resistance.

The large volume of the trimaran hull and the stability inherent in the design provide adaptability and flexibility in equipment layout and in fitting mission-specific equipment easily.

Early trials of RV TRITON should help to confirm these advantages and to reduce the risk in taking the hull-form forward into future warship designs.





Hitler's First U-Boat Kill

The Sinking of the Spanish Submarine C-3 by U-34

By Graham Wilson

In 1997, Antonio Checa, a Spanish lawyer and amateur historian was fishing about two miles offshore from the Spanish port of Málaga. During the course of his fishing expedition, he was intrigued at the sight of some oil smudges rising from beneath the Mediterranean to stain the sea's surface. The oil, which he assumed to be from a sunken ship, piqued his historian's curiosity and he set out to discover the source. After a great deal of research he became convinced that he had been fishing over the site of the wreck of the Spanish submarine C-3 which had been lost in 1936 in what were, at the time of the sinking, mysterious circumstances.

Senor Checa was eventually able to mount a small expedition which, equipped with a remotely piloted vehicle fitted with video cameras, was able to obtain some poor images which confirmed that the wreck at the site was in fact that of a submarine. The poor quality of the images, however, did not allow the submarine to be positively identified by Sr. Checa and his team. This identification had to wait until October 1998 when the Spanish Navy sent the diving support ship *Mar Rojo* to the site.¹ *Mar Rojo* and her divers located and photographed the wreck and confirmed at last that it was the Republican submarine C-3.

Interesting enough in its own right, this introductory tale is linked with one of the more fascinating though least known naval historical events of the 20th century, the sinking of a Spanish warship by a German U-boat in 1936, three years before the outbreak of the Second World War! This is that story.

In 1931, at the end of a long series of political crises, a Socialist dominated government took power in Madrid and proclaimed a Spanish republic. Generally well meaning and possessed of an undisputed raw idealism, the Republican government was, unfortunately, beset with bitter religious, class and ideological divisions. These divisions quickly led Spain to the brink of anarchy and social chaos. As the government began to lose control of the political and security situation and the country floundered towards disaster, a military led revolt was mounted in July 1936. The aim of the conspirators was to depose the government, reinstate the monarchy and stabilise the security situation. Unfortunately, the rebels' hopes for a quick victory were dashed and rather than saving Spain the revolt triggered an explosion of violence and counter violence in the Spanish people.

After a fairly confused, chaotic and bloody first few days, the country found itself divided into two fairly evenly matched armed camps. Left leaning and regionalistic "Republicans" versus right leaning and centralist "Nationalists". In this particular civil war there were no shades of in between, you were either a "red" or a "fascist" and that was that.

Following those first chaotic days of violence, the country physically was divided roughly in two. More to the point, the armed forces were also divided between the two sides. The army and air force were split roughly half and half although the fact that the long serving, combat hardened, veteran professionals of the Army of Africa sided with the Nationalists almost to a man was a decided advantage to Franco and his fellow generals. Of the two paramilitary police forces, the bulk of the Guardia Civil sided with the Nationalists while the Guardia d'Asalto remained almost totally loyal to the Republic.

The navy was a different story. Highly politicised, the sailors of the fleet were largely supportive of the Republic and on a number of ships mutinied against their officers when they tried to declare for the Nationalists, seized the ships in the name of the Republic and set up ship's "soviets" to replace the murdered or imprisoned officers. Despite the best efforts of the Nationalists, the Republic ended up with the bulk of the fleet including all but one of the navy's 17 destroyers and all 12 of the navy's submarines.

The Spanish Navy's submarine flotilla consisted of six boats of the B Class commissioned between 1922 and 1926 and six boats of the C Class commissioned between 1928 and 1930. Although isolated attempts were made by some officers to declare for the Nationalists, the crews and most of the officers remained loyal to the Republic. The Republican naval authorities quickly moved to dismiss officers whose loyalty was suspect and shuffled the remaining officers around the flotilla, filling vacancies with new appointees, usually officers with merchant navy experience.²

The subject of this article, C-3, was no exception. Like the others of her class, C-3 was based on a Vickers design purchased from the UK and she had been built in Spain by SECN. Laid down on 5 May 1925, she was launched on 20 February 1929 and commissioned into the Spanish Navy on 4 May of the same year. Length of the submarine was 73.3 metres, with a beam of 6.3



metres; she displaced 925 tons on the surface and 1144 tons submerged. Powered by two 1000 HP Vickers diesel engines for surface sailing and two 375 HP electric engines for submerged propulsion she had a maximum surface speed of 16.5 knots and a submerged top speed of 8.5 knots. Armament consisted of six 533 mm torpedo tubes, four in the bow and two astern with a 75 mm deck gun. Maximum submerged depth was 90 metres and she carried a normal complement of 40, commanded by a lieutenant commander.

At the time of the rebellion, *C-3* was commanded by Lieutenant Commander Javier Salas Pintó. The commander was suspected of disloyalty and dismissed, his place being taken by Sub Lieutenant Arbona who had been serving aboard *B-5* when he received orders to take command of *C-3*. The fact that command of *C-3* changed from a lieutenant commander to a sub lieutenant is indicative of the drastic command changes instigated in the submarine flotilla. This replacing of senior experienced officers with inexperienced junior officers was to have a dire effect on the operational efficiency of the Republican submarines, indeed the entire Republican Navy, for the whole war.

On the other side of the conflict, the complete lack of any sort of a submarine force was a huge disadvantage for the Nationalist Navy. Desperate to redress the imbalance, a high level naval contingent travelled to Germany in an attempt to purchase submarines. Although Hitler would not permit the sale of any of his U-boats, he was keen to use the opportunity offered by the Spanish Civil War to provide battle experience for his submarines and their crews.³ Accordingly, though very much against its will, the German Navy mounted Operation "Ursula", a top secret operation to deploy U-boats on war patrols into Spanish waters in support of the Nationalists.

The first two units deployed on "Ursula", the Type VIIA boats *U-33* and *U-34* slipped out of Kiel under the most stringent secrecy on the night of 20 November 1936. Clearing the Straits of Gibraltar on the night of 27/28 November, they relieved two Italian submarines, *Torricelli* and *Topazi* on the night of 29 November. The Italian boats were operating in support of the Nationalists on the orders of Mussolini who, like Hitler, saw the Spanish conflict as an ideal training vehicle for his submarine arm. After the rendezvous, the Italian submarines withdrew to La Spezia to avoid the possibility of mistaken identity.

The first attack was carried out on the night of 1 December when *U-34* fired a torpedo at a Republican destroyer. The torpedo went wild and struck the shore where it exploded. Luckily for the Germans, the explosion was not linked to a torpedo and Operation "Ursula" remained secret.⁴ Attacks mounted on succeeding nights until 8 December by both boats

were all either aborted or unsuccessful. Just as it began to look as if "Ursula" was a total failure, *U-34* spotted *C-3* steaming on the surface of Malaga on the afternoon of 12 December. Finding himself in a reasonably good tactical position, *Kapitanleutnant* Harald Grosse decided to mount an attack on the Republican submarine.

Although his tactical position was reasonable, Grosse was hampered by the fact that besides the Republican submarine there were quite a few other ships or boats in the area and he constantly ran the risk of having his periscope spotted. Luck was on his side, however, and a few minutes before 2 p.m. he had manoeuvred into an attack position. He knew he would only get one shot at the Republican submarine and would then have to quickly leave the area to avoid attacks by Republican surface units out of Málaga. Intent on making sure of his kill as well as concealing his presence if possible, he ensured that the torpedo crew paid particular attention to the settings of the torpedo. The shallow draft of the target meant that the torpedo had to be set to run at a very shallow depth; this carried with it the risk that the torpedo, if it was not set exactly right, would "porpoise" out of the water enroute to the target and thus give away the presence of the attacking submarine.

At about 2.15 p.m. Grosse gave the command: "Rohr ein Feuer" and the single model G7a torpedo was on its way carrying 300kg of TriAl explosive towards the unsuspecting *C-3* at a speed of 40 knots. The torpedo crew had done their job well and the torpedo stayed beneath the surface.

Aboard *C-3* lunch had just been completed. On the bridge *Alférez de Navio* (Sub-Lieutenant) Arbona, the sub's captain, was chatting with *Capitan* Augustín García Viñas, a merchant navy officer who had been appointed navigating officer of *C-3*. As the two talked, a deck hatch opened and *Marineros* (Seaman) Isidoro de la Orden Ibáñez and Asensio Lidón Jiménez came onto the rear casing laden with cans of food scraps for disposal. Approximately two miles away, close inshore, the Coast Guard auxiliary *Xauen* was relieving the motor boat *I-4* on patrol while about two miles to seaward the fishing boats *Joven Antonio* and *Joven Amalia* were fishing for anchovies.

At 1419 there was an explosion as the German torpedo struck *C-3* on the port side about 8 metres from the bow. The submarine immediately listed forward and to starboard then, within less than a minute, sank to the bottom of the Mediterranean at a depth of about 70 metres. As the submarine went down, *Capitan* Viñas struggled free of the conning tower and fought his way to the surface. *Marineros* Ibáñez and Jiménez, thrown from the after casing by the explosion, also struggled to the surface. Rushing to the scene, the other vessels in the area immediately began a search for survivors. Viñas, Ibáñez and Jiménez, picked up by one of the



anchovy boats which had been first on the scene, were, however, the only survivors. As *C-3* had plunged to the sea floor, she took the remaining 37 members of her crew with her. The German submarine, in the meantime, quietly left the area without anyone ever knowing that she had been there.

The sinking of *C-3* was a shock to the Republican Navy. She was the third of the Republic's submarines to have been lost despite the fact that the war was barely six months old. On 18 September *B-6* had been caught on the surface off Santander by two Nationalist armed tugs and the Nationalist's one and only destroyer, *Velasco*. Despite support from Republican shore batteries, *B-6* was quickly reduced to a wreck and abandoned by her crew. Less than a month later, on 12 October, *B-5* disappeared under mysterious circumstances. It has long been theorised that *B-5* had been deliberately sunk by her captain, *Capitan de Corbeta* Carlos Barreda Terry who was believed to be a Nationalist sympathiser.⁵

Investigations immediately began into the cause of the sinking. Interestingly, the very first cause put forward was a torpedo from a submarine! This was discounted almost immediately as it was widely known that the Nationalists had no submarines. The involvement of German and Italian submarines was not known or even suspected at this time. Working from fragmentary and largely conflicting eye witness reports, the Republican Navy finally decided that the sinking of the submarine with almost all of her crew was the result of an explosion of unknown cause in the battery compartment. This theory was based on the reports of an explosion forward and in the C Class this was where the battery compartment was located. With no other facts to go on and with no knowledge of the German presence, this theory became the accepted cause of the sinking and was to remain so until the end of World War Two when the full facts about Operation "Ursula" finally came to light.

The two U-boats in the meantime had reached the limit of their endurance and withdrew from the Mediterranean, clearing the Straits of Gibraltar on 15 December and arriving back at Keil on Christmas Eve. At least six more U-boats would be deployed on Operation "Ursula" but none of these would enter the Mediterranean, all later operations being confined to the Atlantic. This decision was made as a result of the difficulties of co-ordinating the movements and actions of German and Italian submarines in the Mediterranean. For the remainder of the war, the Mediterranean was the preserve of the Italian submarine arm.

Although it is now known that *C-3* was in fact sunk by a torpedo, which broke the submarine almost in two, it is still not clear what exactly happened. There are now two theories about the death of the submarine. The first theory is that the torpedo struck the submarine but at

such an angle that it failed to detonate. This theory states that even though the torpedo failed to detonate it penetrated the pressure hull, allowing water to flow into the battery compartment causing a catastrophic internal explosion. This theory is supported by the fact that eyewitnesses reported a large white cloud rising from the sea at the spot the sub went down. This cloud was chlorine gas formed when the sea water flooded the batteries.

The second theory is that the torpedo **did** explode and the explosion blew the forward part of the submarine off allowing water to flow into both the battery compartment forward and the remainder of the hull aft of the break. This theory would explain the reports of a number of witnesses who reported hearing **two** explosions. The first and loudest would be the torpedo detonating. The second muffled explosion reported by these witnesses would have been the battery compartment exploding. Again it would also account for the cloud of chlorine gas.

Whatever the actual cause, the final verdict on which must wait until a detailed examination of the wreck, the damage caused was enough to send the stricken submarine to the bottom in less than a minute. The Spanish Navy team from *Mar Rojo* ascertained that the wreck of *C-3* is in two parts. The main portion of the hull, about 55 metres long, rests almost upright on the packed sand of the sea floor. The forward section snapped off completely, either at the time of the explosion or, more likely, on impact with the bottom, and is in an inverted position. It must have been a terrible way for the crew to die, but mercifully, it would have been quick.

Of interest in the context of this article is an attempt made by the Nationalist Navy to disguise the acquisition of two Italian submarines by referring to a pair of existing Spanish boats in a somewhat bizarre attempt at disinformation. The shock of losing *C-3* had barely settled for the Republican Navy when her sister ship *C-5* disappeared in unexplained circumstances after leaving Bilbao on 30 December. As with the earlier mysterious loss of the *B-5*, the loss of the *C-5* has long been generally ascribed to an act of sabotage by her captain, *Capitan de corbeta* Jose Lara y Dorda, another suspected Nationalist sympathiser. The Nationalists, meanwhile, had been pressing their German and Italian supporters for submarines of their own. Finally, in April 1937, the Italians sold the Nationalist's two relatively old boats, the *Archimede* and the *Torricelli*. In a fairly clumsy though understandable attempt to disguise the provenance of the two boats, the Nationalists originally commissioned them as *C-3* and *C-5* while at the same time publicly claiming they had defected from the Republican navy. Nobody was fooled for a moment and the Nationalists, who had only been humouring Mussolini anyway, renamed the two subs *General Mola* and *General Sanjurjo* and got on with the war!



For the record, neither *U-34*, the U-boat which sank *C-3*, nor her captain survived the later world war. The submarine was sunk with the loss of four men on 5 August 1943 off Memel after a collision with a submarine depot ship. Although raised a few weeks later she was stricken in September. The now *Korvettenkapitan* Harald Grosse died with his whole crew on 23 February 1940 when his latest command, *U-52*, was sunk by depth charges from the British destroyer HMS *Gurkha* in the North Sea.⁶

Back in the Mediterranean, meanwhile, *C-3* sleeps on. Still aboard the sunken submarine and still "on patrol" are the following members of the Spanish Navy:

Alférez de Navío Antonio Arbona Pastor
Auxiliar 2º Naval Francisco López Lozano
Auxiliar 2º Electricidad y Torpedos Enrique Más Ayala
Auxiliar 2º Electricidad y Torpedos Manuel Pacheco López
Auxiliar 2º Radio Francisco Carrillo Mira
Auxiliar 2º de Torpedos Francisco Martín Portugués
Auxiliar 2º de Torpedos Carlos Sánchez Bernal
Auxiliar 2º de Máquinas José García Paredes
Auxiliar 2º de Máquinas Fulgencio Conesa Pérez
2º Maquinista José Sastre Gabarrón
3º Maquinista Miguel Palmer Bonet
3º Maquinista Antonio Asensio Martínez
3º Maquinista Juan Baamonde López
Cabo de Marinería José Rorgjues Ruiz
Cabo de Marinería Estaban Berenguer Robert
Cabo de Marinería José Sánchez Velasco
Cabo Electricista Pedro Saura Galindo
Cabo Electricista Joaquín Ruiz Baena
Cabo Electricista José Martínez Ponce
Cabo de Artillería Hipólito Rodríguez Anido
Cabo de Artillería Ismael Conte Aviño
Cabo Radio Constantino Blanco Sánchez
Cabo Enfermero Francisco Fuentes Quesada
Cabo de Fogoneros José Samper Torregrosa
Cabo de Fogoneros Francisco Torremé Sevilla
Marinero Carpintero José Carrión Luján
Marinero de 1º José Caparrós Rubio
Marinero de 1º Antonio Jiménez Saura
Marinero de 1º Diego García Llamas
Marinero de 1º Salvador Caparrós Rubio
Marinero de 1º José Fernández Martínez
Marinero de 2º José Limón García
Marinero de 2º Pascual Martínez García
Marinero Cocinero Francisco Ros Nicolás
Fogonero Preferente Gabriel García García
Fogonero Preferente Benito Pardillo Bruno
Fogonero Preferente Bartolomé López Cobo

It is planned, if possible, to raise the submarine, possibly in 2000, and the crew will then receive a proper burial with full naval honours.

Lest we forget those who go down to the sea in ships.

NOTES

1. *Mar Rojo*, launched in 1975, is a former oil rig tender purchased by the Spanish Navy and commissioned as a diver support vessel in 1988. Equipped with a dynamic positioning system and side scan sonar, she also carries a remote control DSRV which was used to locate the wreck of *C-3* for the ship's divers.
2. The cramped living conditions of submarines had fostered a far closer relationship between officers and men than was the norm in the Spanish Navy at the time and resulted in the officers generally being supportive of and in agreement with the Republican sentiments of the ratings. Despite this, and despite the fact that the majority of officers declared for the Republic, they were still dismissed. This ideologically driven decision was carried out in the surface fleet as well and was to have far reaching effects on the naval conduct of the war.
3. Hitler was forced to change his policy in 1942 when *U-573* took shelter in the Spanish port of Cartagena after suffering battle damage. Too badly damaged to depart Spanish waters in time to comply with the deadline imposed by the Spanish government, *U-573* was sold to Spain for a nominal amount. Eventually commissioned into the Spanish Navy as *G-7*, she served until 1970, the last operational U-boat in the world!
4. The unreliability of their torpedos was to haunt the U-boat arm right up until the end of World War II. Although problems with both magnetic firing pistols and the impact firing pistols, as well as the problem of excess air pressure in torpedo balance chambers had been resolved by the end of 1942, by that stage Allied ship production capacity had outstripped U-boat sinking rates and the U-boat arm never caught up.
5. Terry had been *Alférez de Navío* Arbona's captain prior to his transfer from *B-5* to *C-3*. If the generally accepted theory of the cause of the loss of *B-5* is correct then perhaps the Republican authorities were quite right in dismissing suspect officers.
6. Hitler had established a special award to recognise service in Spain, the Spanish Cross or *Spanienkreuz*. In recognition of his achievement in sinking *C-3*, Grosse received a unique naval award of the highest grade, the Spanish Cross in Gold With Swords and Diamonds (*Spanienkreuz mit Schwertern in Gold mit Brillanten*) one of only 29 awards of this class overall, the other 28 going to members of the Heer and Luftwaffe.



Navy – on watch for Australia

Naval Aspects of the Anzac Campaign

Dr Frame is the author of many works of naval history, and in his distinctive manner this most recent addition is likely to stir up fresh and valuable controversy on the role of the RAN in the Gallipoli campaign.





Shots from the Past

This article originally appeared in the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, November 1990

The Role of Women in a Seagoing Navy

By Commander G. Cutts RANEM

Joan Griffiths, Commandant of the Australian Defence Force Academy, slipped into her admiral's dress and admired herself in the mirror – the bright blue material gently hugged her shapely hips and the red silk scarf accentuated the beauty of her face.

I wonder what Admiral Irena Guerassimoff will be wearing, she pondered, for the Russian Navy had recently announced that they were doing away with the floral blouses and red skirts that they had all been wearing for the last 10 years and were allowing their officers any design as long as it incorporated the national colours. She was not concerned about the Chief of the Air Staff, nor the Chief of the General Staff, for Sylvia and Helen had agreed to wear simple pant suits in their force colours.

The principal guests were going to be the duxes of the first group of graduates from the Academy in 1988 – Katherine Joiner, dux of the Army, Lisa Evans, dux of the Navy and Natasha Carlile, dux of the Air Force and of the Academy. My God, she thought, that was a vintage year – the first real step on the ladder.

She took out her speech for a final check. She already knew it by heart but she was a bit worried about the possibility that some of it could be misconstrued – it was so tempting to become emotional about all they had achieved: The signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement, so that there was no possibility of war ever occurring again; the agreement to hold Chiefs of Staff conferences annually to discuss sporting and cultural exchanges between the various Disarmed Forces of the world; the agreement to use naval ships for goodwill visits with paying passengers; the promotion of the first male to executive rank for thirty years and the educational exchanges between the forces of other nations to study peacekeeping tactics.

Older men were still not accustomed to having so many female senior officers, though the younger ones accepted that they would have to show their aptitude for peace, compromise and conflict resolution before they could be promoted. There was a ready acceptance of their lower position in society generally, but the Disarmed Forces had always been a bastion of male chauvinism; the educational programs of various Prime Ministers –

Laura, Pauline and Mary in particular – had dramatic effects, though there was now a need to encourage a few men to study maths and science and the engineering profession were desperate to recruit a few males. Joan was sad to think that so few males were capable of passing the promotion tests beyond the rank of Lieutenant – the major holdup seemed to be in the subjects of Courtesy, Manners, Forgiveness and Consideration. They found difficulty making the break from the old subjects such as War Studies, Armed Conflict and Combat Operations. She would have to have another look at it.

She practised the opening words of her speech: *Distinguished Guests, Ladies, Children and Gentlemen, we are here today to celebrate 50 years of Affirmative Action, 50 years of peace, kindness and understanding between all nations of the world. It has taken a great deal of hard work, but the feminine spirit has triumphed and we have succeeded in making the world a pleasurable place in which to live ...*

Introduction

Those words were penned by my daughter for an assignment which she had to write whilst she was studying George Orwell's *1984*. My thesis is that the role of women in a sea-going Navy is one which will dramatically alter the long term strategic plan, if not as dramatically as my daughter envisages, then certainly along those lines. Women will initially strive to obtain equality with men: In fact they will strive to do better than men in traditional male roles, billets and subject knowledge. Subsequently, having achieved superiority by weight of numbers and skill, they will change the essential nature and philosophy of conflict and the armed forces as they have been known.

I am not suggesting that there is a conscious plot by the women's movements, nor by individual women. I do suggest that there is a natural evolution that will take place and it is already in evidence. This idea is expounded not as a warning to males to protect their presumed societal role but rather as a precursor to the inevitable!



Definition

Women in a seagoing navy is not quite the same thing as women at sea: In the former they could be employed purely in shore jobs whilst the men did all the hard yacker at sea. In the latter we would have to consider the billets women could fill in ships at sea.

Currently, of course, women in the Navy are forbidden in combat roles, which mean that women *at sea* are restricted to support and training roles. In the event of hostilities they would be withdrawn from any ship which was about to go into combat. Women in a *seagoing* Navy at present can presumably fill any position ashore in times of hostility or otherwise.

For the purpose of this article I will consider the role of women in both categories, i.e. the role of women in the Navy as a whole. Their ultimate effect on attitudes, philosophy and strategy will be such that there will be no difference between women at sea and women in a seagoing Navy. The role of the Navy will be the changing factor.

Women at War

Any book or encyclopedia on war will tell you that the 50 most significant leaders are all men – everyone knows this. We would be hard pressed to name but a few women who have distinguished themselves on the field of battle – which includes the waters of battle too. I wonder how many people could go beyond Boadicea, Joan of Arc and the Amazons.

At the simplest human level, the male with his persistent attraction to females, his greater physical strength, unencumbered by offspring, was in the natural battling position. The females, though not necessarily passive or uninterested in the battle, were nevertheless to a great degree pawns in the game.¹

One who was more than a pawn was Boadicea, also known as Boudicca, a champion warrior of the Iceni, who wreaked revenge on the Romans in AD60:

In appearance terrifying, in the glance of her eye most fierce, and her voice was harsh; a great mass of the tawniest hair fell to her hips.²

The famous historian Tacitus is said to have noted in surprise that the British did not object to a woman as their leader! However, neither the British nor any other race appears to have had *any* female leader on the waves. Helen of Troy may have had the face to launch a thousand ships and Elizabeth I may have inspired a host of maritime adventurers, but I cannot recall the name of one female sailor of any note.

In more recent times women have served in the navies of the world but rarely at sea. Only in the last decade or so have they been employed at sea by commercial lines and more recently by the military. Women have won the

prestigious award for seamanship, at the Royal Australian Naval College and one was dux of ADFA and there are presumably far more than this, especially in other navies. For example – there was a female graduate at the top of the US Naval Academy's class of 1984.

However, they are still restricted to non-combat roles in all except the Danish armed forces, which opened all jobs to women as of July 1989.

In the Navy most jobs have been open to women since 1986. The Defence Ministry decision ... allows women to pilot Lynx helicopters and command corvettes and patrol boats.³

According to an article in the (International) Armed Forces Journal the history of women in combat and as military leaders pre-1933 is dominated by three themes:

First, when the mores of the times and society permitted the participation of women in combat the ladies performed well and in some cases outshone the men ... Secondly, when emergency situations arose and convention could be breached, women could and did use weapons effectively against the enemy ... Thirdly, they also demonstrated that they could take charge of military operations ... when circumstances warranted, or when the accident of high birth, social position or simple opportunity thrust them into leadership roles.⁴

I do not intend to enter into a discussion of the semantics concerning the word 'combat', most of which have been more than adequately covered elsewhere, nor do I intend to argue the pros and cons of allowing women to enter combat roles, for similar reasons.

My argument concerns the *future* of women in the Navy – the mores of society and the times *will* change and convention *will* be breached; the law will be used and philosophies will be adjusted.

Feminist Philosophy

The Women's Movement, Feminism, Female Liberation etc. are but fairly recent names to provide handles for a whole series of concepts. In general:

Women's liberation is a social and political movement that aims to achieve equality for women by changing the roles of the sexes in society. Those involved in the movement range from the radicals who see the complete overthrow of capitalist society as the only solution to those who seek to reform society on a more moderate scale.⁵

The feminist writers of the past few decades provided a massive shock to many entrenched opinions and as there were so few who achieved international recognition they were easily identified and their ideas fused. But the views they were expressing were diverse; they communicated, to a wide audience through the mass media, concepts that



appeared original but many of which had been expressed before. Unfortunately they were previously not so readily received – as a US Senator once said about suffragettes:

When the women of this country come to be soldiers and sailors, when they come to navigate the ocean ... then it will be time to talk about making women voters.⁸

Current Trends

Indeed, similar views appear to have been held by many prominent naval leaders less than a decade ago. Community attitudes to women in combat were still an oft-quoted reason for lack of equality and opportunity, not always, I suspect, with a great deal of forethought. The Chief of Naval Staff of the RAN was asked in 1982 what he thought about women in the Service; he replied that we were not in the same situation as the Israelis or the Americans:

We are not in that situation. It is more evolutionary than revolutionary. The Defence policy is that the services will adhere very much to the government's intention of equal opportunity, but this stops short of going to sea in ships ... but looking ahead, I can see the first step perhaps of women going to sea in what I would say was a non-combat ship – for example the oceanographic ship Flinders. That's quite a step forward, and that will be evolutionary. How long it will be I can't say, but I don't discount the possibility.⁹

That was 'as long ago as 1982' (as the TV commentators say) – I suggest the step forward is now revolutionary, rather than evolutionary. I have no need to quote the current status of women in the RAN, which has far exceeded the views of the then CNS.

At the same time as Admiral Leach was expounding his views on the future of women in the Australian Navy an article was being prepared which was to review the role of women in the US Navy for the decade 1972-1982.⁸ The author quoted a mass of statistics to show how dramatically the roles and the numbers were changing. For example:

- Growth – from 6,000 to 37,000 women in the Navy;
- One woman to 100 men became eight women to 100 men;
- From a top rank level of junior officer to two rear admirals and a Marine Corps Brigadier General;
- From 3/4 of the female officers as nursing staff to less than half;
- From restrictive occupations to wide acceptance.

Not all the changes were so acceptable to the affirmative action proponents – about half of all the enlisted women were still in traditional skills. Nevertheless, many new

skills had been opened up and women were assigned to new types of commands and locations. In 1978 all restrictions were removed on the employment of women in the Coast Guard and by 1982 two women were commanding officers of patrol boats and one was executive officer of a buoy tender; the current policy is that all women are to remain on their vessels in wartime and their assignments would not change in the event the Coast Guard came under the Navy. The Navy has not given its position on the ensuing legal ramifications of such an event.

In 1981, one year before Admiral Leach's statement, CNO said:

Without question the women in the ships program has been an impressive success. Women are routinely performing in both traditional and non traditional areas with skill, confidence and dedication.⁹

As far as the rest of the world is concerned I have already discussed the entry of women into combat roles in the Danish forces. A recent newspaper article says three women have made history in the Royal Air Force, under new policy to allow women pilots and navigators, though the government believes the time is not yet right for them to fly in aircraft carrying or firing weapons.¹⁰ The article goes on to say that women are allowed to fly jets in the US Air Force as well as in Holland, Canada and Norway.

Reasons for the Changes

How has Admiral Leach's evolutionary change become revolutionary? Many governments have been under increasing pressure to change their attitudes, from a mixture of economic and other forces – a long period of sustained peace, shrinking budgets, decreasing numbers of male volunteers, burgeoning women's rights movements, the passing of equal opportunity acts, legal challenges to law and military policies.

The changing views in society about the role of women generally are slowly being mirrored in the Navy, albeit faster than Admiral Leach predicted. Whereas single men once had to ask permission to get married and live ashore, we now have recognition of *de facto* relationships, retention of married women in the Services, nomination of career priorities for married couples, maternity leave ...

Some of the problems emanating from the change in personnel structure and some of the problems envisaged which may not have been realised concerning fraternisation, frequent medical visits, pregnancy, physical strength and the provision of sanitary facilities. Most of these have been addressed in other publications and most of them have been laid to rest.

Fraternisation is a vague term that was once clearly understood by commanding officers and strictly enforced according to their varying moral attitudes. The advent of Uniform Disciplinary Codes and the increasing use of legal aid by naval personnel has made this definition less



clear. Nevertheless, commanding officers *can* define non-sexist policies quite clearly if they wish, in terms of behaviour that compromises the chain of command or undermines good order and discipline.

Women in the US community between 1979 and 1980 had 4–17 per cent more infectious and parasitic diseases, respiratory conditions, digestive problems and other illnesses than men.¹¹ There is no reason to suppose that these figures are any different for naval men and women, nor for people in Australia. The point is that *anybody* spending more time in sickbay than anybody else should be regarded as worthy of medical re-evaluation.

Pregnancy can present more complex problems to the administration and even more so to the administrator at sea; more still to a combat unit. But arguments are now being put forward that pregnancy is an *individual* personnel problem that requires *individual* consideration – eg it may present an abuse of regulations worthy of immediate transfer or it may allow the female to be retained until a relief is available, but *all women should be discriminated against*. Indeed, one author says that:

*In hostile theaters the pregnant female physically unfit for duty constitutes a problem identical to that of a seriously wounded unit member and, on menstruation ... using the increased probability of recurrent hormonal problems as the justification of a ban on females in certain billets is no more valid than choosing the black population's greater susceptibility to sickle-cell anaemia as justification for a racial ban on certain types of duty.*¹²

Physical features of women or facilities should need no further discussion today, though they would have done less than five years ago. There are still a few proponents of the *women can't change truck tyres or fly fighter aircraft off a carrier* arguments – one of the diehards, Lieutenant Colonel Evans, US Marines, says:

*a female in her third trimester of pregnancy can hardly sit at a typewriter, much less change a spare tyre ... The presence of women in the Fleet Marine Force underlines the battle-proven axiom that "Every Marine is first and foremost a rifleman."*¹³

Such views were recently dismissed by aviation medicine expert Wing Commander Boothby RAAF as *showing a gross ignorance of any understanding of anatomy*.¹⁴

Women's Views on the Navy Today

Unfortunately the same source (an article on RAAF women, but presumably applicable to the RAN[?]) shows that when Australian servicewomen discuss life in the armed forces, traditional views tend to predominate – eg acceptance by married women that their husband's careers would take priority, even though the women were on higher pay scales. Allegations of sexism were rife and

supervisors were said to be unsympathetic and unsupportive. There were a few signs of the changing times.

They were accepting of but wanted to change the service attitudes to feminism in the sense of make-up, long hair and more stylish uniforms, but they also wanted equality, particularly with regard to combat billets.

In one study for the US Navy¹⁵ women leaving the Navy were asked what were the causes of job dissatisfaction and the results, bearing in mind the limits of the sample, are perhaps indicative of trends elsewhere. Many were critical of the lack of child-care facilities and others complained that the Service was not making enough effort to post husbands and wives in the same area. More than half the women complained they could not be as feminine as they wanted, primarily because of uniform and hairstyle regulations and the billets to which they were posted. Those discharged on pregnancy noted the need for better child-care facilities, longer maternity leave, interrupted enlistments, elimination of overnight duties.

The Future

I found the latter point of special interest because it is a seemingly trivial matter yet it symbolises my thesis: Women will continue to enter the Service in increasing numbers, will strive for supremacy and will then change the nature of the Navy as it has been known.

Many of the complaints that were just listed arise because women are entering what has been a male-dominated profession where there has been no need to even consider changes along those lines. A comment on the ban on females in combat can be applied to the attitudes to women in the Navy in general:

*... the result of archaic and overbroad generalisations reflecting earlier generations' views on a 'woman's proper place'. The ban is not based on rigorous analysis of objective data but merely reflects and reinforces sexual stereotypes rendered irrelevant by technology.*¹⁶

Vice Admiral Martin, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare) USN, laying the blame on community stereotyping, said in 1985:

*Obviously, we have to look at other avenues for them (women), but I can't say that it will ever be as good as it is for men as long as we operate under our constitutional restriction.*¹⁷

His senior officer, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Watkins, said in the same year:

*... our position has been ... that repeal of the current (combat exclusion law) or changes to the law are going to have to emanate from the grass roots of this country.*¹⁸



Which brings us back to the earlier quote about the *mores of the times and society*. As far as Australia is concerned, they are a-changing. The Australian Institute of Family Studies, for example, has attempted to show employers the advantages of child-care, flexible hours and parental leave:

And in using the employers' own concerns – improved productivity, increased retention rates and decreased absenteeism – it has advanced the case for treating family issues as an integral part of our economic structure.¹⁹

Professor Fay Gale, the future Vice-Chancellor of the University of Western Australia, commented that the situation in universities was similar:

When I began as an Adelaide undergraduate, there weren't even female toilets in the engineering department building ... the University now had a mechanism that enabled women to take extended time off for childbearing, where jobs could be shared and where role model assumptions could be included in criteria for appointments ... (though) we still have affirmative action for men.²⁰

As for the rest of the world, apart from changes in the status of women evident in many countries – and think especially of the remarkable rise to power recently of a couple of women in the very male-dominated societies of Pakistan and Japan – there are also significant changes in the global power struggles between the US and the USSR, the advances in Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the relaxation of exits from East European countries to the West ... One could put a case for these dramatic changes indicating that traditional female characteristics are more in evidence in the world of conflict.

In specific relation to the topic of this essay, Sadler notes that:

Between 1972 and 1982, major shifts occurred in the marital and parental status of women (in the USN). In 1972, Navy women were overwhelmingly single and almost none were parents... By 1980 the proportion who were married had jumped to 45 per cent ... 17 per cent of Navy women had children.²¹

I do not have access to similar figures for the RAN, if they exist, but I think that Admiral Leach's comment that *we are not in that situation* is probably flying in the face of reality.

The number of women entering the Navy will increase and there will be increased opportunities for them to specialise in previously male-dominated areas. Arguments that the USN is in a peculiar position because it went to an all-volunteer force do not hold much water as the RAN is in the same boat. Even the Royal Netherlands Navy's Defence Plan 1984-1993, with an expected 8.5 per cent of naval personnel from national service, foresees possible *difficulties in*

obtaining professional personnel with specialised knowledge in which there is also a shortage in civilian life.²²

With increases in the number of women there will be subtle changes in attitudes. For example, many women complained of sexual harassment and lack of support from supervisors, but as more women *become* supervisors, that will cease. And it was a female Lieutenant USN who, in a comment about women's supposed physical weaknesses, said:

No one has ever died from normal menstrual cramps.²³

Women supervisors are known to be much stricter (more realistic?) than male supervisors on women who cry women's problems.

Accompanying the increase in numbers there will be an increase in legal cases and evidence for this is already available. Women with more than adequate skill and women with families will not accept posting restrictions. The legal restrictions and exclusion from combat billets greatly affects the career advancement of otherwise qualified women and the Navy will have to take steps to guard against likely court cases of discrimination.

The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 1980 in the US attempted to remove all constraints on the promotion of women, amongst other things. However, women took exception to the fact that they were subsequently in competition with men for promotion – without the benefit of command of combat ships:

Consequently, the Secretary of the Navy and the services undertook several actions to ensure equitable treatment of women before promotion boards, such as instructing boards not to allow women's different career paths to prejudice their selection.²⁴

Lieutenant Spillane writes that: *Naval Military Personnel Command tells us that we cannot even include adverse remarks related to a sailor's performance resulting from her pregnancy in evaluation.²⁵*

This lady proposes a voluntary, binding, contractual system that females going to sea would have to sign, guaranteeing that they would not fall pregnant, or face disciplinary action if they did. She would make sea service a pre-requisite for promotion to first-class petty officer, male or female.

Most of the articles I have read have been written by males or by females still striving for equal recognition. I wonder what will happen when females reach senior positions in such numbers that they can *change* policy.

Commander Hixson USN (male) argues that overcoming the structural bias in society will be difficult



– women demand equal rights, they must be prepared to accept equal risks. Peacetime is the best time, he says, to try out any changes.

Captain Sadler USN (female) says, as I do, that the number of women will increase because the number of available men will be scarce and because women will be seen to be performing well.

The one factor that could result in a dramatic change, however, would be a court ruling permitting, or perhaps requiring, the assignment of women ... to combat units ... pragmatism will overcome institutional reluctance.²⁶

Cynthia Enloe's book *Does Khaki Become You? The Militarisation of Women's Lives* argues that attempts to control women's lives have been mostly covert and comments that the women's movement – to use the generic term – is divided over whether women should work for equal opportunity in the military or shun all activities that support war.

In my view women will strive for equality, but, consciously or otherwise, will then change the philosophy and attitudes of the Navy – in the interests of economic necessity, objectivity, fair play, reason and justice, protection of the universal family...

Who knows what women can be when they are finally free to become themselves? Who knows what the women's intelligence will contribute when it can be nourished without denying love? Who knows of the possibilities of love when men and women share not only the children, home and garden, not only the fulfilment of their biological roles but the responsibilities and passions of the work that creates the human future.²⁷

NOTES

1. Mead, p. 189.
2. Heritage of Britain, p. 32.
3. Isherwood.
4. Levens, p. 28.
5. History of Ideas, p. 915.
6. History of Ideas, p. 917.
7. Evans, p. 23.
8. Sadler, pp. 140-155.
9. Sadler, p. 153.

10. Anon, *The Australian* 11 Oct 89.
11. Spillane, p. 45.
12. Hixson, p. 40.
13. Evans, p. 56.
14. Stone, *Women with Wings*, p. 47.
15. Thomas, p. 48.
16. Hixson, p. 39.
17. Ganley, p. 104.
18. Canfield, p. 139.
19. Stone, *Sums Favour*.
20. Dawson.
21. Sadler, p. 144.
22. de Blocq, p. 201.
23. Spillane, p. 44.
24. Sadler, p. 147.
25. Spillane, p. 144.
26. Sadler, p. 155.
27. Friedman, p. 351.

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Coming soon – Women's issues in the RAN.



Nobody Asked Me But...

Making Navy the Employer of Choice

By Tom Newman

"More important even than the size of the navy is the question of its institutions, favouring a healthful spirit and activity..."

— A.T. Mahan

I have followed with interest of late some of the efforts that have as their final aim the idea that our Navy can be something better than it is today. Following the progress toward the new Navy has been quite difficult. What I have seen and heard though, has generated a few thoughts in me and some of those follow. I hope it is worth my while putting them into the arena.

The Generation of Depression

"Defence is a great place."

— Dr A. Hawke.

Most theories of human needs identify that people want to think they are doing a good job and want to feel good about doing that job, while feeling that their contribution is of benefit. In the months since the new Chief of Navy took over the watch, there have been many conferences, seminars, tours by various teams and individuals and "love ins" of one form or another all over the country. Most of them involve well-qualified and senior Navy people standing up to tell us what a mess our organisation is in, followed by the chance for discussion from the floor. The fact that the audience has generally been bombarded by bad news stories and told how badly things are going for the Navy is bound to put them in a negative frame of mind. After such discouragement, it's difficult to expect that anything but negativity could abound. This happens on ships too, where it is often easier to allow the focus to be on the negatives, than the positives. This "easy way" though, is an abrogation of our responsibility to lead.

Instead of encouraging dissent in our own troops, in conferences that we pay for and in ships that we own and operate, we should send our people to seminars that encourage them. We should be sponsoring our people to listen to speakers who will build in them the confidence to think and say positive things about *their* choices, *their* efforts and *our* future. If we truly want to reinvigorate our Navy, we need to put an end to this self-generation of depression and work hard at making Navy the employer of choice. This would surely be a much wiser way to spend our conference dollar.

There's No Time For Fun at Sea Any More

Next on my agenda is the retention of our good people. As the junior leaders of this organisation we need to fulfil our leadership function by working hard at motivating our people. In order to do this we need our senior leaders to reciprocate. We need to be able to honestly say that we are lucky, that we are being looked after and that the Navy is a place worth being. It's quite easy to tell sailors on a daily basis that the Navy is a great place to be, and that we are a really lucky bunch, but when conditions of service are gradually being eroded, it is difficult not to think that people have good reason to be frustrated.

Anyone who attended the Naval Symposium in December and was in any doubt about whether they should go back to sea again, must have left with a big cloud over their head. Hearing the Maritime Commander tell us that there was no longer time for steel deck barbecues and no time for nights at anchor certainly made it hard to see the positives of going to sea. It also cast the question in my mind as to just how effectively Commanding Officers will be able to use the three weeks annually at their discretion that the PERSAT has promised them, if things are indeed so tight.

This sort of news makes it very hard to encourage people, because they need to gain some inherent satisfaction in what they do if they are to continue happily and, therefore, effectively. People join the Navy because it is an exciting career and because the idea of going to sea is very much different to a nine to fiver in the city. If you spend time talking to visitors during a family sea day or open day alongside, you are quickly reminded that what we do is exciting. I don't think people join the navy expecting a Conradian adventure. I don't think anyone expects it to be easy all the time and there is certainly no one asking for permission to chuck scantily clad maidens over the side. But surely a steel deck barbecue isn't too much to ask. These elements of the seagoing culture are arguably most important in maintaining a motivated force.

What people need and deserve is for the innate pleasure of going to sea to be revived. But if the most senior person in the Fleet, the very man who is running the seagoing branch of our Navy, believes there is no time for fun at sea then how can I, a mere underling, honestly tell my sailors that it is worth their while.



The Reward of Being at Sea

I would like to think that the new Surface Combatant FEG Commander will have a positive effect on the direction of the Fleet. I remember one of the greatest feelings of the reward of being at sea came to me after a KAKADU exercise a few years back, when as the CTG he signalled his intentions for our return journey to FBW. The signal encouraged a productive program, then stated:

"Notwithstanding the above comments I do not want a program that removes the fun of being at sea. Use opportunities in the SOE for enjoyable activities such as steel deck BBQ, swimex and fishex. If you see a school of tuna (etc) stop and catch some, advising ships in company. Largest catch of the day to be advised with BFR... Welcome to TG628.1. Enjoy it."

I admit that I can barely begin to understand the enormous responsibility and the mammoth task within constrained budgets that MCAUST and others have. But surely we can afford a couple of hours in the dogs to anchor in JB and flash up the BBQ to transfer some funds into the "fun at sea fund"! And then we might have time to stop looking so closely at the reasons why so many of our officers and sailors are

going to work for someone else. If we are to revive recruiting and stay retention then we need to focus on the positives and be supported in doing so.

Making Navy the Employer of Choice

"Service at sea, and on operations, is very influential on the behaviour of people, and it is critical that it be a positive reinforcement, not a negative."

— VADM D.J. Shackleton, AO RAN

There lies ahead a period where the Navy faces the very serious task of making itself the employer that people choose. That is, the one they choose to join and the one they choose to stay with. If we are to be effective in that we need to speak well of ourselves, because we are good. To do that we have to work hard at making it true. Our people need to believe they are doing worthwhile jobs and that they are in an organisation that is worthwhile – because they are. They need to be encouraged to think they have made a good career choice – because they have. And we must all work hard in simple ways to stop encouraging our people to feel discouraged.



Ex HMAS TORRENS in half after being hit by Mark 48 Torpedo. Photo by POPHOT Scott Connolly.



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