




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## AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE INC.

The Australian Naval Institute was formed and incorporated in the ACT in 1975. The main objectives of the Institute are:

- to encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and maritime profession; and
- to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and the maritime profession.

The Institute is self-supporting and non-profit-making. Views and opinions expressed in the Institute's publications are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Institute or the Royal Australian Navy. The aim is to encourage discussion, dissemination of information, comment and opinion and the advancement of professional knowledge concerning naval and maritime matters.

The membership of the Institute is open to:

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The editorial guidelines for articles are that they are:

1. in electronic format (e-mail or disk); letters to the editor will be accepted in any format
2. in MS Word; and
3. either 250-400 words (letters and illumination rounds), 1500-2000 words (smaller articles) or 3000-5000 words (feature articles).

We can support black and white photography and diagrams but please supply originals or electronic copies. Colour plates are limited within the journal and will normally be reserved for feature articles.



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*Cover — OOW on bridge of HMAS Brisbane*



*Back Cover — ABBM hauling in berthing hawser on HMAS Brisbane*

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# Editorial

## *"The Human Element of Capability"*

"The Human Element of Capability" is an obvious choice of theme to follow our "Knowledge Edge" edition. This Journal will address various aspects of this theme – from pay to training and discipline. I trust it will provide an interesting glimpse into the thoughts and feelings behind the significant changes confronting personnel.

The question of people versus technology is not a new issue. The maritime professions have been melding the two factors since seafaring began. Even on the bridge of a modern warship with radar, thermal imaging equipment, GPS and Inertial Navigation systems, there are people maintaining a proper lookout. The technology has certainly made the maritime environment a safer place but it has not yet replaced the human factor.

The military aspects of seafaring are similarly balanced between technology and people. The ability of commanders to effectively combine the attributes of both will determine success in battle.

The Chief of Navy, VADM Don Chalmers AO RAN, introduces this edition with a short statement on the theme. The ability to read the view of Navy's capability manager is not a privilege the Institute should take for granted. The support of the Institute from many of our senior officers is always appreciated.

The feature article for this edition is by Captain Paddy Hodgman who is credited with coining the phrase "the human element of capability". This article discusses the strategic view of this capability. Doug Steel then provides a very operationally focussed view of the same theme by discussing female employability in the Clearance Diver Branch.

The Reserves are a crucial aspect of our overall capability and Captain Karel De Laat points out some significant issues regarding their role. The ability to fully integrate reserve forces into the permanent Navy is an issue that will certainly require further discussion before it is adequately resolved.

LCDR Dalton received the ANI Medal for his Naval Staff Course essay. This essay "Maritime Strategy Beyond the Maritime Approaches" is reprinted in this edition.

Two short pieces address the issues of discipline and remuneration. The later article was submitted in time to gain a response from Financial Conditions. These articles certainly demonstrate that there is still some fire in issues regarding personnel.

The history section contains two pieces with a personnel flavour. Lcdr Greg Swinden has produced a short article on the travels of some AE2 sailors who were taken prisoner and Mr Bill Reave gives a personal account of the Scrap Iron Flotilla. Mr Reave was the only survivor from his mess HMAS *Stuart*.

Major General Peter Dunn has forwarded his view of the human element of capability. As the Head of the Defence Personnel Executive this is a very interesting insight. Commodore Jack McCaffrie continues the discussion with a view from the RNZN. It is always useful to note that personnel issues are very similar throughout the maritime world.

The RSL has also contributed to this edition and their article is last but by no means least. It would be a foolish organisation that fails to heed the advice of those who marked the trail.

A short thank you to the various members who have contributed their time to the Institute by submitting book reviews. Please also note the short notice by the ANI Library Officer at the end of the Book review section.

Our next edition deals with the developing theatre of Amphibious Warfare. HMA Ships *Tobruk*, *Kanimbla* and *Manoora* are all due out of refit in 1999. This will be a timely theme for the first edition of the new year.

ANDREW BEWICK





## VADM D.B. CHALMERS AO RAN

Since becoming Chief of Navy in July 1997 I have presided over many fundamental changes to the way the Navy does business. The Defence Efficiency Review and the resultant Defence Reform Program have meant greater pressure on us all, to work more efficiently and effectively while ensuring our ability to meet the requirements of our Government is not diminished. It hasn't been easy.

While I think the comment 'people are our greatest asset' has become somewhat over used, the fundamental truth behind the phrase has not altered despite the upheavals we have experienced. Without trained, professional and dedicated people we have no capability – it is as simple as that.

When I issued my Future Directions Statement at the end of 1997, my first, and I feel, most important goal was to staff the Navy with well trained people who can win at sea and who want to be in the Navy. When my senior advisers and I revisited the Future Directions Statement in September this year we again affirmed this as our most important goal, and an area in which we need to increase our efforts to make better progress.

We still have some way to go before we can claim success in achieving this goal. We have set in place mechanisms specifically designed to ensure the unique needs of Navy's people are recognised, appreciated and catered for wherever they work. The establishment of a Navy capability management board within Navy Headquarters, specifically tasked with personnel issues will give the Navy greater input into the issues that directly affect our people. With development of the tri-service Defence Personnel Executive we must find ways to establish a closer and more effective working relationship with that organisation.

My own revised role as a capability manager, with oversight of all the inputs to capability through whole of life, will contribute significantly to the achievement and success of such goals because I now have direct input into all aspects and levels of capability management. This means that I am not only concerned with materiel issues but also with the fundamental questions that determine how capabilities are obtained and managed, from the design phase, through acquisition and in-service.

Clearly, the human element of this process is both integral and fundamental to its success – or failure. People, as an integral element of capability, must be considered at all levels and in all phases of the life of each capability. The role of capability manager is being refined and developed in the months ahead, and I am confident that it places me in a strong position to ensure we can meet our goals of managing the Navy's

people effectively. We must be able to ensure that everyone in Navy is working in a safe environment that encourages them achieve their maximum potential.

The management of Navy capability is the fundamental role of my Commanders and the decision-makers within the Chain of Command. As we work towards a 14000 Navy, of whom 65% are combat and combat related, we have had severe constraints placed on our manpower and our ability to implement the changes we need to become a more efficient and effective fighting force. Everyone in the Navy recognises those constraints because, in many cases, they have directly affected their postings. My primary aim is to provide all naval personnel with greater certainty and to ensure that everyone is aware of the plan my senior advisers and I have to restructure the Navy. Most importantly, I want to ensure that people know exactly how restructuring will affect them, this is really important. I know that the human element of capability must be managed carefully, the capability decisions made at the top directly affect many others – it cannot be avoided. What can be avoided is the disquiet and disillusionment felt when people do not believe their interests and welfare is being given the emphasis it deserves.

*...The human element of capability is a fundamental aspect of the RAN capability equation...*

it has to be. It is also often the most difficult aspect to control and manage. People are different, they have different goals and aspirations and these cannot be ignored if we hope to staff the Navy with professionals who want to be here and who want to go to sea. The challenge is before us.





# People are Capability

CAPT J.P.D. Hodgman – RAN

*"People and not things are the fundamental factor determining the outcome of war."*

General Lo-Jui-Ching, May 1965

## Introduction

Generating and sustaining military capability is what the Navy, the ADF and the whole Defence organisation ought to primarily be about. If what we are doing is not clearly focussed on that purpose, we should be asking ourselves why we are doing what we are doing.

It's not as simple as seeing military capability solely in terms of investing in exciting new items of capital equipment. There's much more to it than that, and there is increasing emphasis in Defence on the realisation that we need a whole of life, whole of capability approach. That is to say, our capability planning, decision making and management must be based on viewing capability from a holistic perspective which covers the entire life of platforms and systems.

Equally, our approach to capability must embrace all the integral elements of that capability. These elements include in-service support, the platforms and systems themselves, infrastructure, collective and individual training and, of particular relevance to this discussion, the people who will develop, acquire, operate and support each capability. Defence is evolving a focus on its capability outputs, each of which should be delivered through a cost-effective balance, throughout life, of the resources invested across all the elements which go to make up that capability.

Within that holistic approach to capability, our present focus is upon one of the major, integral elements of every ADF capability – people. In the past, there has been an occasional tendency to look globally at the resources the Defence portfolio expends in various areas, without linking those resources to the various individual outputs we should be seeking to deliver. One result of such a mindset is language like "... people *or* capability..."

*...ADF personnel deliver skills that are...  
used in no other sector of the community...*

The aim of this paper is to explain that people *are* capability.

## Discussion

### *The Unique Military Requirement*

Firstly, it's worth looking in from the outside. Just as military capability is aimed at meeting a unique

requirement in the national scheme of things, so the contribution made by ADF personnel to military capability is unique. In 1996 the Minister for Defence Industry Science and Personnel sought assistance in articulating why the ADF needed to grow its own unique workforce. Such a question might be seen by some as seeking a statement of the blindingly obvious. Beyond simply asserting that of course we need a dedicated workforce, dissecting and explaining the issue proved an interesting intellectual challenge. The answer provided by Defence<sup>1</sup> embraced several factors.

Firstly, ADF personnel deliver skills that are either used in no other sector of the community or which, while being more widely used, must be performed in unique circumstances, for example, repair and maintenance in a combat environment. As the sole user of these skills, the ADF must develop them itself and sustain the necessary trade structures to ensure they can be delivered. Meeting that requirement involves a significant and continuing investment.

Secondly, military planning depends upon and reflects the need to ensure the ADF has at its disposal the range and depth of suitably skilled personnel to deploy and sustain operations. Both readiness and sustainability requirements mandate a trained and available workforce upon which military planning can rely, and this necessitates a force comprised of individually and collectively trained personnel.

Thirdly, legal issues such as the Law of Armed Conflict, which limits the application of State sponsored violence to members of a properly constituted Defence Force, and the military discipline framework necessitate the existence of a dedicated organised body of personnel in a command structure.

None of these requirements are readily met from within the non-military sector of the community. The individual skills needed by the ADF are met through considerable training investment and the collective skills, which are a measure of the capability of all force elements, are similarly the product of considerable investment in operating costs.

### *ADF Personnel as an Asset*

Why, then, does Defence invest so heavily in the human element of ADF capability? Again, the answer might seem, on the face of it, as simple as the reason a football team trains. It is, however, worth looking a little more deeply because an understanding of the principles involved should assist both the





decision making process and the decisions we make about the workforce.

*...Unlike capital equipment, the ADF workforce is continuous...*

The cost of the ADF workforce has hitherto been seen more as running costs consumed at the point of expenditure, rather than as programmed investment in an asset. Both as a whole and in its individual components, resourcing the workforce is, nonetheless, an *investment*. The investment nature of the workforce is demonstrated by the return sought. Whether one considers the skilled individual acquired as a result of an expensive training course and career development program, or the capability inherent in a fully staffed and trained ADF unit, the required investment has led to the acquisition of a human asset. It is not a case of expenditure on consumable goods or services.

Unlike capital equipment, the ADF workforce is continuous. Viewed as a whole, it does not have a specific acquisition phase or a finite operating life. The capital equipment element of capability is developed in 'blocks', for example with the acquisition of major new platforms or systems. On the other hand, the development of the human element of capability is more evolutionary, changing in response to changes in requirement, force structure, policy, new equipment, etc. Nonetheless, the divisions of responsibility between capability requirement definition, and the processes for delivery are as relevant to the human element of capability as they are to the capital element.

#### *People – Integral to Capability*

There's not a lot to be gained from having the best weapons system in the world if it can not be used, maintained and supported through life and integrated into joint operations. The fact is that there is a human dimension to every capability in terms of delivering and employing that capability, as well as in all aspects of its development, acquisition and support through life.

As noted by the Chinese General I quoted at the outset, people are fundamental. The human factor is the determining element in decisions as to whether and how to apply military force and, equally in the implementation of those decisions. One constant principle applies whether capability is viewed in the context of what motivates conflict and how it is physically waged, the intimate relationship between weapons systems and those who operate and maintain them, or in terms of securing decision cycle advantages through waging information warfare. This constant is that the human dimension transcends and is an essential element of all aspects of military capability.

In simpler terms, the best weapons system in the world is useless without the application of human intellect, usage and support. People are integral to military capability in its every dimension.

The ADF workforce is an integral element of each military capability output, in both force structure and preparedness terms. Rather than being considered as part of running costs, the ADF workforce, as an integral element of capability, should be seen more as an *investment*. Taking this view highlights the need to bring planning, resource programming and investment decision making for the workforce, capital equipment and other elements of capability into balance, within the context of each capability output.

**Force Structure** Development of the human element of military capability must be integrated with the development of capital equipment. There is a need for more comprehensive scrutiny of the personnel aspects of capital equipment, and more detailed analysis of these aspects earlier in the development process. This applies particularly to the need for a through-life perspective on the balances to be struck between capital investment and personnel in delivering each capability output. There is also a need to ensure provision is made to cover the lead times to develop necessary skill sets, and recruit, train and develop the personnel required for new capital equipment. The investment decision should include these elements. In some cases, where the personnel lead time is longer than the capital lead time for delivery, the human element may well have to be the trigger for approval and programming for a new capability.

*... Of even greater significance ... is the need to remember that there are people at the end of all our decisions...*

**Preparedness** The ADF workforce is equally an integral element of preparedness. In this context, the budgetary processes upon which preparedness ultimately depends will continue to function as for operating costs. They will thus be less subject to the block decision making processes which are applied to capital equipment. In that environment, however, it will be essential to ensure that decisions are based on the cost-effective delivery of capability outputs. Similarly, Defence's processes for determining capability priorities must reflect a balanced focus on preparedness. There must also be strong linkages between preparedness processes and strategic workforce planning or there is every chance that the latter will be largely nugatory.

#### *Linkages*

I have already made reference to the need for effective linkages between workforce planning and capability processes and decision making. There is an equally vital need for synergy within the broad range of personnel related processes, policies and planning.





In the simplest of terms, I would advance the proposition that there is no other significant reason for any of Defence's personnel policies, conditions of service, conditions of employment or personnel management practices than to support achievement of workforce planning. In other words, the only reason we pay, reward recruit, retain or discharge is to ensure the ADF cost effectively maintains the number of people it needs with the requisite skills. It's a simple principle, but I believe we challenge it more often than we apply it.

The logical successor to the proposition I have just advanced is that there's no other significant reason for having workforce planning than to deliver the required military capability outputs. Simply put, if we aren't defining the workforce requirement and employing the troops so that we're able to fight and win, we've got it wrong.

Those two propositions should guide our policies and decision making. They are about an output focus and they should keep our eye on the capability ball. When some economic rationalist comes up with a great new way of saving money (halving all salaries – to take a rather extreme and hypothetical example), it should be tested in terms of its impact on the cost effective delivery of capability rather than just on the salaries budget. If, for example, the consequences of 'savings' initiatives are decreased retention, then the resultant costs of increased recruiting, training throughput, postings turbulence and, most of all, lost training investment must be offset against the supposed saving.

Of even greater significance, particularly in moral and leadership terms, than cost effectiveness, is the need to remember that there are people at the end of all our decisions on personnel policy and management, as well as on workforce planning. This need arises because we must have skilled people who are also committed to what the ADF is trying to achieve. If the ADF is to deliver the goods in terms of both capability and the successful conduct of operations it must also be well led, with all that entails in terms of trust, loyalty and commitment.

In organisational terms, capability is most likely to be optimised through effective distribution of responsibilities, effective linkages between personnel, workforce and capability processes, and similarly focused higher committee processes. The roles played by those responsible for capability definition and capability development, as well as by those responsible for personnel policies, workforce planning, training, acquisition, in service support and overall capability output management must be understood and accepted by all concerned. They must also be effectively linked. Those roles, their linkages and the policies and processes involved must all be

strongly focused on the cost effective delivery of capability.

#### *The Services*

The DRP has laid bare the fact the ADF will always need to be comprised of the three services. The outputs delivered by the ability to operate in three environments combine to deliver a significantly more capable joint whole. Similarly, the DRP has laid bare the critical role of the Services' headquarters and the Chiefs of the Services. Uniquely positioned to bring a whole of life, whole of capability perspective to their Services' capability outputs, the Service Chiefs and their headquarters have a crucial role in bringing together all the contributing elements of those capabilities to deliver the most cost effective package.

On any list of reasons for the maintenance of the three Services and their organisations, *people* will always be close to, or at the top. The unique implications for military personnel of single Service identity, ethos and culture have been widely canvassed. These factors are of little significance to material activities such as technical data, inventory management or maintenance planning. Rather, identity, ethos and culture reside solely in the minds of collectively and individually trained personnel, who are intrinsic to the capability of their force elements.

*...the overarching principle is to bring a range of organisations and processes together...*

The significance of each of these factors to the ADF's people combine to support the notion of a strong role for the Service HQ in guiding and influencing personnel policy, workforce planning and personnel management. The capability manager has a key role in defining the requirement for the human element of his or her capability outputs, and ensuring that the Defence Personnel Executive is provided with the guidance to ensure that this requirement will be delivered. While significant rationalisation of workforce planning processes and other supporting functions can be achieved within the Defence Personnel Executive, this must not be at the cost of isolating the Services from the process.

#### *Bringing it All Together*

How then does Defence bring all the elements of its approach to personnel together and ensure that its investment in personnel is about cost effectively delivering capability outputs? Clearly, from the preceding discussion, the overarching principle is to bring a range of organisations and processes together, with their outputs closely focused on the capability outputs. Defence must organise itself and its processes to achieve this.

Equally important is the need to recognise that the workforce is an integral element of each capability



output and that it is an asset in which Defence invests, rather than a consumed expenditure or cost.

Based on the issues discussed above, the key players and their roles are as follow:

- The Service Chiefs and their headquarters:
  - definition of the human element of their capability outputs;
  - influencing personnel policies and practices to support delivery of that human element;
  - sustaining safety and professional standards, ethos, identity and leadership for their people;
  - contributing their perspectives to capability processes and decision making; and
  - integrating the human element into the each of the capability outputs for which they are responsible
- The Defence Capability Committee, supported by:
  - Strategic Policy and Plans Division – Supporting determination of overall capability priorities and providing broad overall capability definition for workforce planning.
  - Capability Development Division – Integration of personnel factors, and a whole of life perspective into capability development decision making.
- The Defence Personnel Executive:
  - aggregating Service input, capability definition and capability development input into workforce planning and all other personnel planning, policies and processes;
  - overall coordination of the human asset, and translation of capability definition guidance into workforce planning; and
  - ensuring effective linkages between personnel processes and wider capability processes such as capability development and preparedness management.
- The Service Training Commands and Joint Education and Training – supporting achievement of the workforce plan.

The outputs of the foregoing roles and linkages should be:

- a workforce closely focused on delivery and maintenance of military capability;
- capability processes which optimise the contribution through life of the human element of capability;
- cost effective balances through the whole of life between the human, capital and other elements of each capability output; and

- more effective application of the capability output manager concept to a whole of life, whole of capability approach to the delivery of capability outputs.

Achievement of those outputs will help ensure we get the capability we pay for through our people.

8 Oct 98

#### NOTES

Background Paper: "The Need for the Australian Defence Force to 'Grow' its Personnel" HQADF Personnel Division, 1996







# Reviewing the Employment of female RAN members in the Clearance Diving Branch

*By the year 2000, an RAN Recruiting Video may attempt to attract potential volunteers for the Clearance Diving (CD) Branch with the following introduction:*

**I**n 1951, the Royal Australian Navy created a crack team of highly trained divers to defend their fleet, and called them the Clearance Diving Branch. The threat of underwater saboteurs and explosives demanded an elite force of divers, and the challenge has always been to find *the right men and women...*.<sup>1</sup>

## And women?

Female RAN personnel are excluded from employment in the CD Branch under the provisions of Defence Instruction (General) Personnel 32-1 *Employment of Women in the Australian Defence Force*. Under this Instruction, ADF policy excludes female members from employment involving 'direct combat duties', i.e. duties requiring a person to commit an act of violence against an armed adversary, or exposing a person to a high probability of direct physical contact with an armed adversary.

Clearance Divers are employed in fleet units, Australian Clearance Diving Teams (AUSCDTs) and shore establishments on a rotational basis. The teams are currently deployed such that AUSCDT ONE is based at HMAS WATERHEN and AUSCDT FOUR is based at HMAS STIRLING. CD personnel in AUSCDTs are divided into three operational elements: Mine Countermeasures (MCM), Maritime Tactical Operations (MTO) and Underwater Battle Damage Repair (UBDR).

MTO element members are particularly susceptible to enemy contact, particularly when conducting reconnaissance and sabotage missions against enemy port facilities, sea platforms, seabed communications and other resource facilities. In addition, MTO members may be compromised by an enemy and come under direct fire while conducting tactical roles in support of amphibious operations.

As a recent example, during the Gulf War a 23 man CD Team carried out operations in the Kuwait theatre under extremely adverse conditions, including an instance where divers came under direct small arms fire.

## The Review

At a Chief of Navy Senior Advisory Committee (CNSAC) meeting in March 1998, CN directed that a review be conducted into the possibility of employing female RAN members in the CD Branch. As of September 1998, Navy's review is complete, and is awaiting consideration by CNSAC members.

Given that a decision is yet to be made by CN, this article is not intended to represent the employment of females in CD Branch as a *fait accompli*. There are many important and inter-dependant issues that need to be addressed before an informed decision can be made on the employment of female RAN personnel in the CD Branch. These considerations include, but are not limited to, the physical complexity of the CD element, the operational requirements of a CD, habitability issues and medical considerations.

## Physical Complexity

The fitness standard for a CD is one of the highest in the ADF, and is inextricably linked to the strenuous requirements of the job. As an example, MTO element personnel are required to insert via swims of up to 15km, carrying equipment weighing 20kg in air, during missions that can last all night. Similarly, MCM element personnel are required to undertake endurance swims while searching for underwater ordnance carrying diving equipment that is both heavy and cumbersome.

The development and maintenance of a high level of physical fitness allows diving personnel to perform effectively in harsh, physically stressful environments.

Given that a high level of physical fitness is directly related to a CD's operational tasking, it is important that the physical requirements for female personnel are no different to the requirements for the males. The existence of discrepancies, or 'double standards', would significantly undermine a female CD's credibility within a team environment, and may even lead to resentment and hostility at what is perceived as leniency.

It is not disputed that many women would have difficulty in achieving and maintaining the physical standards required. Due to the overall differences in





men and women's upper body strength and cardio-respiratory capacity, the average female is smaller and less strong than the average man. However, there is a small 'gender overlap' where stronger females are as physically capable as many men.

Research by the British Defence Evaluation and Research Agency's (DERA) Centre for Human Sciences suggests that a new training technique has been developed, allowing women to achieve the same levels of physical fitness as men of the same size and build.

Regardless, it must be acknowledged that there are some women, either in the community or currently in the ADF, who, although small in number, have the physical strength and endurance to be CDs.

## Operational Requirements

### *Full Integration?*

If the current ADF policy on the exclusion of females from employment involving 'direct combat duties' was to remain extant, the MTO element would continue to be closed to female personnel. Such a situation would be difficult to sustain, because, while AUSCDTs are functionally organised into MCM, MTO and UBDR elements, all CDs within the team are required to be capable of conducting operations in any other element. This is particularly important when a CD force is deploying on operations, where personnel may be drawn from a number of elements to make up the force.

If female CDs were employed in MCM and UBDR, but not in MTO, operational flexibility, overall expertise, and numbers for deployment would all be significantly reduced. Of course, fully integrating females into all elements of CD Branch is dependant upon amendments to current ADF policy, which would draw considerable interest from Army and Air Force.

### *Resistance to Interrogation (RTI) Training*

All CD Branch personnel undertake RTI training. This element of training simulates the considerable physical and mental stress associated with capture by enemy forces. As is evident throughout military history, and most recently (and vividly) during the Gulf War, Prisoners of War (POW) will most likely be exploited as valuable sources of intelligence. RTI training allows personnel to experience various forms of interrogation techniques and learn coping mechanisms to increase their chances of survival.

One such method of interrogation, which drew media criticism a few years ago, involves strip searching by opposite sex personnel. The object of this training is humiliation and degradation. In the case of male CDs, female Army interrogators are regularly employed on the RTI courses.

It is not impossible to conceive of an occasion where a female member misconstrues the training as harassment. In such a case, it would be difficult for the RAN/ADF to defend the type of training in the eyes of the public and sensationalist media.

Nevertheless, it is important to maintain the effectiveness of RTI training, and to ensure that there are no 'double-standards' for female personnel. RTI training for male and female personnel must be identical. The introduction of a same-sex 'multiple witness' rule, in conjunction with validated, well structured training procedures, may assist in the prevention of adverse outcomes.

### *Female CD POWs/Casualties?*

From a different perspective, however, is the question of real POWs. How would the Australian public react to a female CD being televised in the same condition as allied aircrew were during the Gulf War? Is the Australian public prepared for female prisoners, let alone female casualties?

To date, no official survey has been conducted in Australia to gauge public opinion on this issue. The varied reactions in the community and media in reaction to the recent tragedy aboard WESTRALIA prevented a reliable indication either way. Female ADF personnel are currently employed in combatant ships and combat support ground units where there is already the probability, although low, of them becoming casualties. The issue may be more appropriately defined as the public perception of females being involved specifically in hand-to-hand combat.

Would Australian society consider that while it may be morally wrong to wage war, it is significantly more immoral to wage it using women? Would it take 5, 10 or 50 years for Australians to accept female combatants?

## Habitability Aspects

### *Privacy*

Personnel in the MCM and MTO elements can be required to remain in a Zodiac for extended periods, normally up to around 4 to 6 hours. There are no ablution facilities, and personnel currently urinate and defecate over the side of the Zodiac if required in the area of operations. It is clear that the close working conditions necessary for most CD tasks and operations means that the privacy of personnel cannot be guaranteed.

Similarly, during surface decompression in a recompression chamber, personnel are not provided with anything other than rudimentary ablutions. Again, privacy is impossible. However, the circumstances for female CDs would be no different





to those currently experienced by female Underwater Medic sailors.

It may be possible that through the cohesive bond formed in small teams under arduous circumstances, the initial embarrassment and uneasiness would become manageable. Army personnel are required to adapt to this situation, and regularly share rudimentary 'facilities' when deployed on exercise or operations.

#### *Personal Relationships*

Given the close physical environment of the CDs, the advent of personal relationships would be inevitable. In a small, cohesive unit, such relationships would have a detrimental effect on teamwork, esprit de corps, and professionalism.

There is currently an ADF Policy on Fraternisation, which contains a reference to the Chief of Navy's prohibition of 'proscribed fraternisation' in HMA Ships and in any workplace or shore establishment. Proscribed fraternisation is described as 'a close and exclusive emotional relationship involving public displays of affection or private intimacy'. This prohibition is also applicable during any absence from establishments while on duty.

Effective leadership at all levels, appropriate policy, and awareness training would need to be implemented to try and ensure that personnel do not mix their private and working lives – thereby impairing operational effectiveness. This issue would have to be stressed in terms of mixed genders in close proximity, rather than simply 'women in men's teams'.

## Medical Issues

#### *Decompression Illness*

There is conflicting evidence as to whether females are more susceptible to decompression illness (DCI) than males. There are claims that this may be due to females having, on average, a higher percentage body fat composition than males, or, due to changes in hormones and electrolytes, women are more susceptible to DCI than men early in the menstrual cycle.

The most recent studies suggest that there is no greater risk. For example, a study by the US Naval Diving and Salvage Training Centre concluded that female divers were no more susceptible to DCI than males. In fact, a survey of diving activity in the United Kingdom has shown that males in the study

had a higher estimated rate of DCI per 1000 dives compared with the females.<sup>ii</sup>

#### *Diving and Pregnancy*

The other medical issue of particular interest is the concern that diving while pregnant may cause foetal abnormalities. The potential risk is believed to consist primarily of DCI, although CO<sub>2</sub> retention may also be a problem, and it is thought that the risk of injury increases as pregnancy progresses. As a result, in the USN, female salvage / deep divers are required to sign a medical form acknowledging that they have been formally advised of the risks involved in diving when pregnant.

Again, however, there is insufficient scientific evidence linking birth defects to maternal diving. It would be wise, until further data becomes available, for female CDs who know they are pregnant to not dive, just as they avoid alcohol, radiation, smoking and other environmental factors that may increase the risk of foetal injury.

To employ female RAN personnel in CD Branch may expose the Commonwealth to possible liability actions if abnormalities in a female diver's pregnancy can be linked to diving. Legal advice indicates that the signing of some form of indemnity or acknowledgment of risk, similar to the USN procedure, would have little effect upon the issue of liability – although it may assist in mitigating damages. Additionally, an indemnity form would not negate a claim made by the child against the Commonwealth in the future.

## Conclusion

There are many other important issues that need to be addressed before a decision can be made on whether to employ female RAN personnel in CD Branch. I have only briefly outlined those which I believe to be of particular interest.

There is no personnel pressure to open the CD category to females, as the RAN currently has an abundance of volunteers for this category. However, one thing is for certain: the RAN will be taking a significant step – particularly in the eyes of the public, our allies, and the region – if it is decided to employ female personnel in the CD Branch.

#### NOTES

- i Adapted from Quest Productions, RAN Recruiting Video, *Silent Warriors*.
- ii M. St. Leger Dowse, Dr P. Bryson, Dr A. Gunby, Dr W. Fife, *Men and Women in Diving: A Retrospective Comparative Survey of Diving Activity in Males and Females*

Doug Steel joined the Department of Defence as a Graduate Administrative Assistant, and has since gained experienced in various areas within the Department, including Air Warfare, tri-Service personnel policy, and Operational Health Policy and Doctrine. He holds a degree in Psychology from the University of Queensland, and is currently employed in the Naval Policy Analysis section of the Directorate of Naval Policy.





# Australian Naval Reserve – Getting Down To Business

By CAPT Karel de Laat RANR, Director General Reserves – Navy

With the ongoing pressure on all public enterprises to do more with less, it is not surprising to see the ADF come out of the Defence Efficiency Review with a standard private sector recipe for efficiency. The resulting Defence Reform Program sees the centralisation of non-operational activities into a classic head office driven rationalisation program where the operational parts of the organisation will be supported by a tri-service program suite to bring about greater efficiency without loss of (and hopefully a gain in) effectiveness. Whatever the outcome of the DRP, the emphasis on a business approach to defence has increased the focus on the Australian Naval Reserve (ANR) as a potential major contributor to both maintaining and (possibly) enhancing RAN capability.

## Mobilisation and the ANR

The maritime focus in formal strategy papers and its academic analysis suggests that the likely operational scenario for the RAN is lower level deterrent related activities with the surge capacity of the ANR being about sustainability of this targeted deployment scenario, rather than a full scale mobilisation of all available resources. However, while the level of activity may likely be lower than usually associated with deployment of Reserves, the ever present nature of the likely demand makes the structuring of the ANR for involvement in RAN capability more relevant than it has ever been. Particularly, the activities of the ANR have to be determined on the basis that they are not a training activity with extended lead times for events that are highly unlikely, but rather a part-time employment opportunity with a need to contribute to RAN capability now.

On a positive note, investment in defence assets is significant. However, the pressure this has created on the "Human Element of Capability" as addressed in this Journal is at its highest. Technology is far from self developing, self operating and self maintaining and its sophistication is both a bonus and a burden. Australia's efforts to stay in a position of strength in its region is as much about operating well as it is about committing substantial funds to new assets. The human element in the technical change scenario has a colorful history in industry that dates back to the industrial revolution. As technology in the RAN pushes training for full-time members to the limit, the

ANR struggles to provide a relevant input to a highly sophisticated socio-technical system.

In the final analysis, the Chief of the Navy has to make things happen in the capability department with the resources available. In the current climate, many good things are happening, but the development and maintenance of a skill base adequate to meet the demands is a mammoth and complex task. Not only are the assets changing, but also the entire structure which has been in place to provide stability in the past is changing at the same time. The challenge for the Reserve is to become more relevant to Australia's defence as direct contributors to the inputs that make up the RAN's various capabilities.

## The challenges of reserve input and RAN capability

Traditionally, the reservist is thought of as an individual who trains in a separate part-time unit which creates a team output that can be applied in a mobilisation situation or provides the reservist with skills that allow for rapid integration into a regular fighting force. For the ANR, this model was pursued for some years until it was determined at the beginning of this decade that, for the likely outputs, the training method was not cost effective, particularly in the training of Seaman, Engineering and Supply officers and sailors on a part-time basis. In more recent times

*...the RAN has developed a fully integrated philosophy in relation to ANR utilisation...*

The aim is to use the ANR to both maintain capability by smoothing the turbulence of personnel changes and to enhance capability by accessing specialist skills that are at a premium and have to be competed for with the private sector.

In maintaining capability, the human element remains a critical aspect of ANR strategy. In implementing a method of covering a range of tasks that become subject to shortfalls in availability of full-time personnel, a whole new theme has permeated the area of Naval Reserve service – a business theme. The values of "For Country not Self" are as strong as ever, but the prevailing mood is one of getting the job done. The aim is to create a management environment where the available people skills are drawn together in the most effective way possible to achieve the





required outputs. While progress is being made, many challenges are yet to be overcome.

In the past, the ANR maintained mostly separate training and skills with Command being exercised over part-time personnel by part-time Commanding Officers with limited full-time assistance. Now the challenge is to merge the current skills and create new ones that will fit into the RAN Command and Control structure. This raises a number of significant human issues.

## The human factors that will decide the value of the ANR contribution

There are some very basic long standing factors which remain central to the success of any organisation and they are as significant for the business of defence as they are for any other big business.

### Management

Employment of part-timers, contractors and consultants is the flavour of the decade. In the ANR, the RAN potentially has a combination of all of these in a very useful package. However, the downside to the efficiency/effectiveness equation with part-timers and casuals is that they require a greater level of input from a management and administration point of view than may seem warranted given their limited input. Further, they can be unexpectedly difficult to manage because of their commitment to other things in the short and long term, and their consequently potential low reliability.

It will seem an unlikely comparison, but the RAN can learn much from the experience of fast food chains around the world who have made a success of their businesses by embracing and becoming expert in the employment of the transient casual. The difficulty for the RAN is that the core of its business is based on the employment of personnel at the other end of the spectrum, with sea service exemplifying a commitment that is anathema to the transient casual/second career individual.

In the past, the phrase "all of one company" reinforced the idea of equality in commitment and competence. The facts of life are that there is no such thing as equal in any aspect of human endeavor and to attempt to manage without accounting for individual differences is to not manage at all. Managers everywhere have struggled with this aspect of management and leadership for many years and continue to do so, notwithstanding a plethora of legislation and learned literature seeking to assist them. In the first instance, the challenge for the RAN is to bring a positive view to the availability of part-time personnel and then to acquire the necessary skills to efficiently get effectiveness from the resource at a

workplace level and, ultimately, in a coordinated way across the entire organisation.

At the time of publication, RAN wide changes to achieve more efficient delivery of the opportunity to use ANR personnel are being implemented. The achievement of the necessary workplace changes, which are already well established in a range of areas, will flow from the structuring of ANR's activities totally within the RAN, but with recognition of the differing human elements of the Reservists' employment profile.

### Leadership and Organisation Culture

The success of any organisation is inextricably linked to the extent to which the CEO is able to project values down into the organisation. This requires clear values, strongly stated and fully supported by all managers in the organisation. The message is inevitably corrupted at various levels within the organisation and to varying extents, but the overall outcome has to be one of understanding and implementation of the values by the majority of the members of the organisation. With a large part-time force,

*...with differing loyalties and intermittent leadership contact, the danger of corruption in the process is increased...*

It is important to understand that the corruption of the message from the CEO may be, in many cases, inadvertent or even done with the best intentions. Regardless of intent, the successful organisation finds and eliminates these pockets of negativity and uncertainty to ensure that the strength of the organisation's focus and commitment is adequate to win. When the purpose is to *fight* and win, the establishment and maintenance of this strong value base is still more important.

The Chief of Navy has established strong values for the RAN and has communicated them as the implementation of the Defence Reform Program continues. His role as a Capability Manager is the equivalent of the CEO in a major business unit and the buck stops nowhere else. However, with a business unit of some 14000 personnel in direct reporting structures and many more service providers with varying loyalties, the communication challenge will be ongoing. The ANR is but one component of this challenge, but it requires a sometimes disproportionate input due to the low contact level on a day to day basis. It is in this area that the issues of motivation are being closely examined as the utilisation of the ANR changes to a business/employment model.

### Performance = Ability x Motivation

Driving warships and operating the associated combat systems is above all else a technical feat. The





motivational factors necessary to fight and win at sea are very important, but without the technical skills they are nothing. It is in this context, that the roles of the various members of the ANR must be decided. A major swing to employing ANR seamen, engineers and supply personnel in operational roles to contribute directly to maintaining RAN capability was a recognition of the fact that the first demand on the RAN will be on a come as you are basis, but at an optimum level in the areas of preparedness, readiness and sustainability. Current policy emphasises the need to access the ongoing value of a significant investment in personnel who have ceased to be full-time members of the ADF. With this group of ex-Permanent Naval Force personnel, the motivation aspect of the equation becomes more critical if the skills are current and relevant, presenting a different aspect to the traditional training and employment of reserves. At the same time, a significant investment has been made in ANR personnel who have made a second career (as a "Career Reservist") over a long period of time as operational types in Minor War Vessels or as specialist personnel (in some cases established as a part of an RAN business component from day one). The current challenge requires the matching of the RAN's needs with the current resource and establishing how future needs can be best anticipated and fulfilled. A Reserve Utilisation Plan is in preparation to address this aspect of workforce planning for the Chief of Navy. Some of the general issues are outlined below.

## Making it happen

*...The challenge for the RAN is to blend the available part-time resource into its full-time component taking account of the value of the skill, the cost of applying it where it is needed (as opposed to where the individual resides) and determining the true value of the investment in output terms...*

On the Reservist's side there are issues of family support, employer support and use of an established skill for cash and personal satisfaction in a unique team environment. For personnel considering post full-time service there are added issues of adjustment to a new life style, the "clean break" phenomenon, motivation to a second career and possible early retirement.

The diverse nature of the ANR population requires a better understanding of motivational factors and the development of an ANR slant on the cultural message that is simple and task focussed. For many long term Reservists, the initial involvement had a heavy emphasis on adventure and a hobby/second career. The integration with the full-time force was limited in both a cultural sense and an operational sense. In many ways, this disconnect built the very positive

ethic of "For Country not Self" and "hang in regardless" which meant that the ANR could be relied on to be there whatever obstacles might be placed in its path. All the finest Australian traditions of improvisation when resources are lacking or absent were practised. On the downside, the opportunity to develop an RAN based understanding of culture, tasking and capability was limited and now, as this becomes the only focus, some members of the ANR have struggled with the concepts. For others, the location of relevant RAN activity well away from their homes has severely limited their availability to contribute as the effectiveness analysis found that in many cases the investment was not warranted in capability terms – short or long term.

The ANR is much more focussed on RAN capability than ever before, but the required level of cultural and task associated understanding is yet to be achieved. To achieve the end result necessary for contributing meaningfully to maintaining and enhancing RAN capability the following goals must be reached:-

- (a) acceptance of the business/employment model for managing an integrated PNF/ANR force by all stakeholders
- (b) a complete understanding and acceptance by all members of the ANR of the role they can (or cannot) play in capability terms
- (c) mechanisms for tasking of the ANR that overcome the challenges of information gathering and matching in relation to the RAN's needs and the ANR's human resource profile individually and collectively
- (d) defining tasks that "belong" to the ANR because they are able to be "gapped" when required or are best done for efficiency reasons on an ongoing or project basis by a part-timer
- (e) establishing a framework for monitoring the effectiveness of ANR employment by Branch as a benchmark against which to determine improvements in re-directing ANR activity to the operational areas of the RAN

Work on (c), (d) and (e) are well under way, but will require years of development to arrive at a genuine Total Force implementation that has an "edge". To achieve (a) and (b) requires a long term application of the "Sistent Rule" i.e. being consistent, persistent and insistent about how you want to do business.

## Conclusion

The service given by Naval Reserves in previous world wars was characterised by their inclusion as an integral part of the RAN. The lesson for current Reserve development is that, when the conditions of employment are the same, the only thing that will differentiate the Reserves from their PNF colleagues





in operational settings is how they got there. The challenge in preparing for a different type of defence requirement than full mobilisation is to create a similar level of mutual respect based on performance in an operational setting, despite the fact that the Reservist will at least have different conditions with respect to hours of work and will likely have significant other career and lifestyle differences.

In the final analysis, people will always have to be managed skillfully, flexibly and creatively. If they are part-timers, they also need the application of much

better than average communication skills (and a crystal ball at times) to build loyalty and reliability. As many large enterprises have found, the contribution of casuals, part-timers, contractors and consultants (and they are all different legally and psychologically) can be a make or break issue. In the ANR, the RAN has a mix of them all because of the motives and personal circumstances of the various players. With skillful planning, efficient administration and effective leadership they can be a continuing integral part of the RAN's successful capability profile.

#### *Biography*

CAPT Karel de Laat RANR

Director General Reserves – Navy

Captain (Frans) Karel de Laat was commissioned into the Australian Naval Reserve in 1978 as a Direct Entry Lieutenant (Reserve List) Psychology, having been earlier associated with the Royal Australian Navy as a part-time Consultant Psychologist to the Area Psychologist (Queensland). Throughout his ANR career, his varied national assignments have included the RAN Officer Career Management Survey, strategic planning work with the Directorate of Naval Officers' Postings, work on performance management systems for the RAN, and an advisory role with the Navy's Defence Reform Program team. He was promoted to Captain and appointed Director General Reserves – Navy on 30 April 1998.

In civil life, Karel de Laat is a Registered Psychologist, manages de Laat & Co, Organisational Psychology, and a Master of Letters (Psychology). He is married, has four children and lives in Brisbane.





An Essay On

# Maritime Strategy Beyond The Maritime Approaches

by Lieutenant Commander S.G. Dalton, BSc, RAN

*For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.*

*Sun Tzu – The Art of War<sup>1</sup>*

## Introduction

The study of war is older than civilisation itself. Warriors have been concerned with improving their art since the dawn of humanity, a practice that has been refined over millennia. Written in the fifth century BC, the words of Sun Tzu remind us that there is more skill involved in neutralising an enemy without recourse to full-scale armed conflict, than simply fighting and winning. These words of wisdom are close to the heart and soul of modern defence: prevention of conflict rather than resolution on the battlefield.

In Australia's unique strategic circumstances, Sun Tzu's wisdom has much relevance. With its vast lands, island continent, limited resources and relatively sparse population, Australia is both hard to attack and hard to defend. Given these constraints, the successful resolution of a full-scale conflict involving Australian interests would be very difficult to achieve without outside assistance.

The nature of international relations has fundamentally changed since the end of the Cold War. Although the United States is unchallenged as the only superpower, the world has become a more complex and less predictable place. In such a world, outside assistance in any conflict that involves Australia cannot be guaranteed. Full-scale conflict, whether successful or not, is extremely costly in both human life and national resources. When full-scale conflict is a possible course of action, the concept of subduing the enemy without fighting sounds extremely attractive.

Since the 1980s, Australia's defence strategy has become more self-reliant, and has increasingly tended towards a maritime strategy. Government strategic guidance has emphasised the importance of the maritime approaches, sometimes called the sea and air gap. When one considers the nature of maritime strategy and the types of military operations that

might be required, the importance of these maritime approaches warrants closer attention.

## Aim

The aim of this essay is to determine whether the primary defence effort should focus on the maritime approaches, with reference to a future maritime strategy.

## Australia's Strategic Circumstances

### *Geographic and economic situation*

Compared to Australia, several other countries have similar populations, cultures, economies, infrastructures, systems of government and geographic sizes. However, no other country occupies a single continental landmass, nor has a comparable mix of the other factors. If Australia's situation is unique, then its defence requires a unique strategy.

Australia borders the archipelagic region of South-East Asia, and is flanked by the Indian Ocean, the Pacific Ocean, and the Southern Ocean. The busiest trade routes in the region pass well clear of the continent, but all Australia's overseas trade must cross the sea by ship or aircraft. Overseas trade represents between 10 and 20 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and almost half of it is with Asia.

*...Australia's GDP is among the top twenty in the world, but is far behind the economic giants...*

of the USA, Japan and the major states of the European Union. Compared to the world, Australia contains only 0.3 per cent of the population, but occupies 5.2 per cent of the total landmass,<sup>2</sup> produces 1.2 per cent of the global product, and controls 2.5 per cent of global capital assets.<sup>3</sup> Although these figures are only a small share of the world's economy, they represent considerable leverage for such a small population.





It is instructive to think of Australia as a medium power, to quantify its place in the world. Rear Admiral Hill loosely defines a medium power as a country with 'sufficient weight and power to be in charge of its own destiny,'<sup>4</sup> and places Australia firmly in that category. Recent events such as Australian involvement in the Gulf War, the Cambodian elections, humanitarian relief in Somalia and Rwanda, and peace operations in Bougainville support this definition. The fact that most of these operations involved projecting power across the sea also support the notion of Australia as a medium maritime power.

#### *Australia's strategic interests*

A fundamental plank of Australia's strategic policy is that it is not based on any particular threat.<sup>5</sup> Developed from thought processes that began with the Dibb Report, the assumption of no particular threat makes complete sense in the multi-polar world that has evolved after the Cold War.<sup>6</sup>

Australia's Strategic Policy 1997 defines strategy in terms of interests rather than threats. These interests are rather vaguely divided into defence of Australia, defence of regional interests, and support for global interests. However the document goes into more detailed description of these interests, and the common thread between the three levels is the promotion of peace and prosperity, support for United Nations' efforts to deter aggression, and support for humanitarian missions.<sup>7</sup> Hill uses a less geographically constrained definition, and describes Australia's 'vital interests' as: territorial integrity and political independence, offshore resources, trade, and international stability. The latter definition is easily understood as it specifies exactly what those interests are, no matter where they may be. The most important observation about Australia's policy, though, is that by starting from interests rather than threats, it has not made too many assumptions about what will threaten those interests. This approach can only serve to encourage vigilance and rigorous examination of possible threats, a powerful strategy for dealing with a complex and turbulent international scene.<sup>8</sup>

#### *Threats to Australia's interests*

In an address to the Oxford Strategic Studies group, Vice Admiral Blackham captured the nature of the new era as a time where there is

*...a much greater use of the threat of force to coerce and a corresponding need to revert to force to back up diplomatic and peace support activity...<sup>9</sup>*

Although the end of the Cold War has reduced the threat of superpower conflict, the absence of an all-pervasive balance of power has made the international scene much more complex, and the potential for the use of force more likely.

International relations in the Asia Pacific region are a complex affair. Even during the Cold War, the presence of China, and non-aligned India and Indonesia complicated the reactions of regional states to security issues. The security architecture of the Asia Pacific region is marked by a notable absence of alliances and a myriad of seething, unresolved disputes. These disputes represent the greatest threat to regional security and include: the Kurile Islands and Takeshima Rocks disputes; the Taiwan issue; the Korean crisis; the Spratly Islands dispute; China's border disputes with Myanmar, India, Vietnam and Mongolia; the fragile peace in Cambodia; nuclear tension and territorial dispute between India and Pakistan; and minor insurgencies and civil unrest in Indonesia.<sup>10</sup> Happily there are few similar disputes between Australia and its neighbours.

Another type of threat comes from economic turmoil. The great disparity of wealth between the rich minorities and the masses of poor can cause serious civil unrest during economic recessions. The situation in Indonesia during 1998 is an instructive example. The collapse of the Rupiah and the International Monetary Fund's stringent guidelines for economic reform provoked unprecedented civil unrest in Indonesia, and resulted in the sudden downfall of the Soeharto regime. These events demonstrate how easily an economic shock can cause a dormant issue to flare into crisis, and exemplifies the complex and uncertain nature of the new era.

Transnational criminal activities also threaten Australian interests in the region. Such activities include the drug trade, smuggling of prohibited goods and weapons, and maritime crime. The drug trade from the 'Golden Triangle' region in Myanmar, Laos and Thailand is particularly prolific; this region is estimated to be the world's biggest supplier of heroin.<sup>11</sup> Cash from the drug trade has even financed low-level insurgencies in Myanmar, and target countries suffer the ill effects of drug-related crime.<sup>12</sup> Maritime crime remains a problem in the busy shipping lanes through South East Asia, particularly in the Singapore Straits, the Natuna Sea, the Gulf of Thailand, and the Philippines archipelago. The final type of crime that transgresses national boundaries is illegal trading of arms and weapons technology, which thrives in regions with weak governments and near anarchic conditions.<sup>13</sup>

Depending on the scale of activity, when armed groups involved in criminal activities take on the characteristics of military organisations, the distinctions between crime and war become blurred.<sup>14</sup> This situation has happened in a number of countries including Afghanistan, Colombia and Myanmar. When the security apparatus of host countries cannot cope with the scale of the problem, a 'deterrent vacuum' is created, and intervention by a third party may become necessary.<sup>15</sup> Most countries are sensitive





about foreign intervention, which was a problem the United States faced when it considered military intervention to deal with narco-terrorists in Colombia during the so-called 'Drug Wars' of the late 1980's and early 1990s.<sup>16</sup>

A feature of the modern world is the trend for a decline in the number of interstate conflicts, and a rise in the number of intrastate conflicts. Alongside this trend is the growing urbanisation of the world's population; by 2025 urban population is expected to triple the 1990 level, and reach four billion people, or 61 per cent of the total population. The implication for defence planners is that future wars are likely to take place within states, and within the confines of urban areas. Characterising the shape of things to come, the Commandant of the US Marine Corps pointed out that: 'Future war is most likely not the son of Desert Storm; rather it will be the stepchild of Somalia and Chechnya.'<sup>17</sup>

Stability in the near region is vitally important to Australia's economic health. Up to forty per cent of Australia's trade is with Asian countries, and must pass through the northern archipelagos to reach its markets.<sup>18</sup> Any escalated trouble in this region could threaten the viability of Australia's overseas trade, cause havoc with financial and commodities markets, and threaten the lives of Australians working and travelling overseas. Such threats should be factored into Australian defence strategy.

## Maritime Strategy and Australia's Situation

### *The significance of the maritime approaches*

According to Australian defence strategy, the maritime approaches are the most important factor for the defence of Australia. The maritime approaches are seen as a buffer zone for preventing an enemy from exerting any long-term influence on Australian territory.<sup>19</sup> The ability to defeat a potential enemy in the maritime approaches is the key factor used to justify the future force structure.<sup>20</sup> A controversial argument against this justification is that 'the notion of the sea-air gap is one that dictates a defensive concept that is too close, too late, too restrictive and designed only to establish the need for large ground forces.'<sup>21</sup>

The realities of potential threats in the region indicate that Australia should have a wider strategic field of view. The ability to defend one's own country is the primary purpose of any defence force. However, Australia should avoid a preoccupation with the maritime approaches that is detrimental to the more likely possibility of defending its interests in more distant and less stable parts of the world.

Building a defence force that is only capable of defeating an enemy in the maritime approaches

misses the link between the security of other regions and Australia's well being. The interdependence of nations is a global-economic reality, and events in the near region have a direct impact on Australia's economic stability. Australia's Strategic Policy specifies a maritime focus for defence, and implies a much wider strategic view.<sup>22</sup> Therefore, rather than concentrating on the maritime approaches and basing force structure on defence of Australia scenarios, Australia needs to embrace a more outward looking maritime strategy.

### *The whole picture*

The maritime approaches are only one part of the strategic picture. However, in almost all cases, Australian defence contingencies will involve maritime forces, or at least projection of power across the sea. Many defence contingencies in recent years have occurred well outside what has traditionally been considered the maritime approaches. For example, the interception of illegal fishermen near Heard Island and the evacuation of Australians from strife-torn Cambodia in 1997, were executed well outside the continental maritime approaches. The only real-life peacetime activities that regularly occur in the maritime approaches are the policing tasks referred to by Ken Booth, such as fishing patrols and the interception of illegal immigrants.<sup>23</sup>

Sometimes Australia's strategic interests defy boundaries. Even events that are well outside the accepted region of interest have resulted in an Australian response. Deployments to Somalia and Rwanda for humanitarian relief are noteworthy examples. Such deployments require flexible, joint forces, and in these particular cases substantial Army components. The global trend towards greater urbanisation dictates that many future conflicts will take place in cities or other densely populated areas. In such urban conflicts, ground forces are the only force that has the flexibility and discrimination to properly deal with the complex situations that are likely to arise.<sup>24</sup> Therefore it is vitally important that ground forces are given careful consideration in any maritime strategy.

### *Australian sea power*

*...A future maritime strategy must take into account the full extent of Australian sea power...*

Geoffrey Till states that the sources of a nation's sea power are its maritime community, its resources, style of government, and geography. He also states that the elements that contribute to that sea power are its merchant shipping, bases, and fighting instruments.<sup>25</sup> To properly understand the potential of Australia's sea power, these sources and elements must be examined for strengths and weaknesses that are relevant to a future maritime strategy.





Australia has an enormous area of responsibility for self-defence, let alone power-projection outside that area. With an upper limit to the resources available for defence, Australia's maritime strategy must carefully maximise the strengths of its sea power and seek to minimise its weaknesses.

Sources of strength of Australian sea power are moral authority, stable government, politically bipartisan defence policies, growing military-industrial self sufficiency, its respectable defence force, and defence scientific community. Of these, moral authority is probably the most vital factor for enhancing sea power. Now that the strength of the United Nations has grown, few states can afford to embark on military adventures without the support of, or absence of interest from, the Security Council. The strength of moral authority is that it garners the support of powerful friends, which is a principle that no medium power can afford to ignore. The intellectual problem of balancing moral authority with international realism must be carefully calculated, and although compromises must sometimes be made, a reputation as a good international citizen is something that should be striven for.

Sources of weakness of Australian sea power are its small trading fleet, paucity of overseas facilities, and enormous area of interest. The size of Australia's trading fleet has been in decline for some time. In 1996 there were only 65 Australian trading vessels over 2000 deadweight tons, plus another 14 minor vessels, for a total deadweight tonnage of 3.2 million.<sup>26</sup> A result of the economic law of comparative advantage, the small size of this fleet limits its ability to provide extra sea-lift capacity for the military in times of crisis. However, this should be balanced with the added burden of protection that comes with a larger fleet in times of crisis; such a burden would seriously stretch the escort capacity of the navy.

The paucity of secure bases outside Australia is a weakness that must be factored into a future maritime strategy. Since the end of the Cold War there has been a growing tendency for the world's biggest maritime powers to reduce their number of overseas bases. Closure of United States' overseas bases was partially compensated by its enormous sea-lift capacity, and the global flexibility of its aircraft carrier and amphibious forces. A paucity of overseas bases certainly limits the contribution of Australian fixed-wing air power to maritime operations outside the range of Australian bases, but this may be compensated for in other ways. The web of multilateral defence relationships that Australia has built up over the years has given its defence force limited entree to foreign bases. The limitation of this strategy is that the use of overseas bases is tenuous, particularly when the host government is at variance with Australian policies.

Finally, the size and nature of Australia's area of defence interest are both a source of strength and weakness. The relatively benign nature of the near region, and the disproportionate force required for a direct attack are its greatest strengths; the vast area that must be covered by the limited number of Australian defence assets is its greatest weakness. However, a maritime strategy that seeks to deal with threats outside the maritime approaches is one that may prove to be most cost effective in the long term.<sup>27</sup>

## An Australian Maritime Strategy

### *The acme of skill*

At the beginning of this essay the ancient wisdom of Sun Tzu was used to draw attention to the concept of winning without fighting. This concept implies an ability to out-maneuvre and outwit a potential enemy. But a maritime strategy that embodies this concept must also have the force to coerce the enemy into submission.

In his book about the Second World War, Winston Churchill refers to that conflict as 'the unnecessary war'. Churchill always maintained that the course of events leading to the Second World War could have been averted by resolute action backed up with force.<sup>28</sup> In 1935 Great Britain failed to use its sea power to enforce sanctions against Italy. This irresolute action caused the sanctions to fail, and Italy easily conquered Abyssinia. In contrast to these events, the announcement of British and French intentions to mount anti-submarine patrols during the Spanish Civil War stopped Italian submarines from sinking Spanish ships in support of Franco's war. Although only a small victory, the latter incident demonstrates how the will to use a credible force is often enough to prevent aggression. In his scathing condemnation of 'appeasement', Churchill provides numerous examples of wasted opportunities to defeat German and Italian aggression, with the ultimate price being the calamity of the Second World War.<sup>29</sup>

*...An Australian maritime strategy must use the principle of the will to use force, supported by moral authority...*

To earn international credibility, words must be supported by appropriate actions when necessary. As Churchill made the point, continued aversion to military action can only lead to disaster. For the threat of force to have credibility, it must be supported by a formidable capability. In Australia's case this must involve maintaining an advantage in its core combat capabilities, as well as demonstrating those capabilities to the world. The type of maritime strategy that suits this preventative approach is one that is pro-active, exploits Australia's strengths, and minimises its weaknesses. Such a maritime strategy acknowledges that its principles have application in





times of peace and war, and is concerned with the achievement of specific political objectives as well as defeat of an enemy.<sup>30</sup>

#### *The security network*

Australia's situation demands a strong network of security. Although there has been a worldwide decline of alliances as guarantors of security, the latest trend is for networks of bilateral and multilateral relationships for building confidence and improving defence capabilities. Australia is no exception, and has built a healthy network of defence relationships within its region, as well as maintained its longstanding ANZUS alliance. Some priority must be given to naval diplomacy to support this network of friendships, but to achieve effective naval diplomacy, defence and foreign policy must be closely coordinated.<sup>31</sup>

Another aspect of a viable security network is a command, control and intelligence system that is capable of supporting a pro-active maritime strategy. Much has been written about the 'revolution of military affairs' of modern information systems, and Australia cannot afford to lag behind. Part of this revolution is the shift from 'platform-centric' to 'network-centric' warfare, which is a shift in command, control and intelligence focus from the platform to networked sub-units. The advantage of networking is the greater speed organisations are able to adapt to complex situations, when they are organised from the bottom-up.<sup>32</sup> This style of warfare is well suited to Australia's widely dispersed area of interest, and enables more effective coordination of forces in the complex situations that are likely to be found in the future.

#### *A credible force*

Building a credible force within budgetary constraints requires a delicate balance of resources between services, as well as between force elements. Gorshkov wrote at length about the problem of building a balanced fleet in the most advantageous combination. In the Soviet case this involved developing greater numbers of ballistic and guided missile submarines, and anti-submarine aircraft.<sup>33</sup> As Till points out, the problem of finding the right balance is complex and expensive, but the price of getting the balance wrong is even more expensive.<sup>34</sup> In Australia's case, one way of achieving the right balance between services, force elements, readiness and efficiency is to focus on missions instead of force structure.

Alan Hinge has proposed three core missions that deal with the entire range of defence contingency; these are: task force lift, surgical strike and suppression, and exclusion zone operations. Peacetime exercises should be designed to test, evaluate and improve these core activities. The ultimate aim should be to use this 'repertoire of missions' to define force structure, improve readiness, and even drive strategy, rather than

the other way around. Such a bottom-up approach to defence is well suited to a pro-active maritime strategy.<sup>35</sup> Significantly, these core missions have a maritime focus, and move away from a preoccupation with the maritime approaches. One of the dangers of adopting a purely maritime strategy is that it may prove detrimental to other branches of the armed services; by concentrating on core missions, there is enormous potential to get the balance right, and to build a truly joint force with superior capabilities.

## Conclusion

*...Australia fits the strict definition of a medium-sized maritime power...*

and enjoys a moderate level of economic power in a relatively benign strategic environment. Australia's strategic policy flows from its vital interests rather than from assumptions about threats, and is well suited to the multi-polar environment of the post Cold War era. The nature of Australia's interests implies that threats will most probably occur outside the immediate area of the maritime approaches. Although the maritime approaches are an important part of defeating a direct attack against Australian territory, that event is unlikely. The maritime approaches are therefore of more relevance to the naval policing role than to the diplomatic or military roles. Future threats to Australian interests are likely to be complex and geographically dispersed, and therefore demand a more outward-looking strategic focus. Defence contingencies to deal with these threats are likely to involve movement or projection of force across the sea, to be in response to intrastate urban conflicts, and to require ground forces.

Government policies have done much to exploit the strengths of Australian sea power by building a network of close relationships with the nations of its primary region of interest. In turn, these policies compensate for a paucity of overseas bases, and the formidable problem of defending vital interests in such a vast region. Command, control and intelligence will need to become more network-centric in order to cope with the increasingly complex nature of future conflicts. Such an approach delivers better coordination of operations, and maintains the initiative from the bottom-up.

A future pro-active maritime strategy should embody Sun Tzu's principle of 'subduing the enemy without fighting.' Such a maritime strategy will be relevant in both peace and war, and must recognise that its object is not simply the destruction of an enemy but the pursuit of political objectives. Australia must retain its moral authority, and be prepared to use credible armed forces whenever and wherever the need arises. A credible force is one that achieves the best balance of resources, between services and force elements, to





support the defence of Australia's interests. The key to achieving the right balance is to identify a repertoire of missions that cover the entire spectrum of defence contingencies, and to become expert at their application. A likely repertoire of missions will probably include task force lift, surgical strike and suppression, and exclusion zone operations. When implementing a maritime strategy, planners must be careful not to neglect the non-naval force elements, particularly the army, because a tight-knit but balanced *joint* force must be the objective.

This essay began with the words of an ancient strategist, so to achieve balance it will end with the words of a more modern strategist. Soviet Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov always emphasised the symphony of effort that ought to be achieved between the different arms of the services. His thoughts stemmed from the Soviet struggle against Nazi aggression in 'the Great Patriotic War', but have as much relevance for Australia now as they had for the Soviet Union in the 1940s:

Only the concerted efforts of all branches of the armed forces, full-blooded, harmoniously developed, well-trained, intelligently deployed and comprehensively supplied, can smash the military power of an aggressor and achieve complete victory.

Gorshkov – The Sea Power of the State<sup>36</sup>

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## Regain The Navy

*The purpose of this article is to advise members of the ANI of a series of recent innovations at HMAS CERBERUS addressing the training regime of the sailors yet to join the fleet and undergoing initial category training – the Seaman Star or SMN\* as they are perhaps better known.*

At any time there are over 700 SMN\* undergoing category training in CERBERUS. These sailors have completed the 10 week Recruit induction at the Initial Training Faculty located at CERBERUS and are now undertaking specific qualification training in their chosen category – including Marine Technician (MT), Electronic Technician (ET), Boatswains Mate (BM), Cook (CK), and Communications Informations Systems (CIS) to name but a few. Category training can be completed in under three months for non technical branches and can last up to nearly two years for technical trainees. Training is nationally recognised and accredited by civilian authorities.

Following a reorganisation within Naval Training Command the Lead Authority concept was introduced on 1 January 1998. In addition to command responsibilities, the Commanding Officer CERBERUS is now Lead Authority Logistics (LA-LOG) and responsible for the functional delivery within Navy of all Engineering, Supply and Health training conducted. In effect a number of campuses and staff report to the Lead Authority for delivery of training and are located throughout Australia in areas such as Perth, Sydney, Adelaide, Melbourne and even Launceston to name only some! Other Lead Authorities have responsibility at CERBERUS for the delivery of certain training – for instance Lead Authority Maritime Warfare (LA-MW) is responsible for training outcomes of staff at the ADF PT School which is located at CERBERUS. Command of Navy personnel posted to CERBERUS regardless of their employment remains with the Commanding Officer.

Due to the increased scope in LA-LOG responsibilities an enhanced role has been assumed by the Executive Officer of CERBERUS, who now is delegated as the action officer many of the traditional "Command" activities – such as Promotion Boards, external civilian requests for assistance and Navy point of contact with other Defence programs such as Defence Estate and Corporate Support.

The main product, in terms of pure numbers and throughput, which Navy receives from CERBERUS is that of trained Seamen Rank personnel who have qualified within their category and are ready to serve Navy at sea. Whilst we can debate the various standards of trainee delivered to the fleet, in general terms I believe most personnel would accept that the sailors who receive their right arm rate at CERBERUS

(and elsewhere within Navy) meet the minimum requirements to join their units with the basic skills necessary to undertake future employment. These sailors, provided they receive appropriate encouragement, experience and mentoring at sea by more senior personnel, will more than meet the category specific requirements of their branch in Navy and grow into our future senior sailors and officers over time.

That said, one area of concern senior staff in CERBERUS have become increasingly aware of has been the apparent inability of these junior sailors to quickly adapt to life at sea and understand that service in Navy is ultimately about winning the war/battle or action should this be necessary. No second best response is appropriate or acceptable. Informal and sometimes more formal feedback from sea from a variety of sources has indicated our junior personnel do not, collectively, have the "hard edge", self discipline, stamina or apparent willingness to work long hours in a busy and demanding environment to meet this ultimate test.

To address these concerns a number of initiatives have been introduced to further reinforce to trainees, and in particular the SMN\*, what it really means to be part of the Navy. This specifically addresses non category training issues and includes expected standards of military behaviour, general conduct, commitment to the Navy and an individual's ship, our collective traditions, values and culture. In writing this I can see some readers saying now that these efforts are a waste of time and inappropriate in the late twentieth century when technical knowledge and expertise is apparently paramount.

I beg to differ with these people and in doing so

*...I believe it is this lack of real attention in these areas by personnel in authority which has led to the current situation where standards are perceived to have dropped significantly...*

It sometimes seems that all Navy people do is whinge and complain about this situation and how good the service was in yesteryear. We in Navy can hide behind the constant change we all face, the despair of personnel brought on by Members Required in Uniform (MRU) effects currently being felt and general uncertainty of our working lives if we choose, but at the end of the day we are selling ourselves short of what we could and should achieve, both





individually and collectively if this continues much longer. After careful consideration of all these concerns in CERBERUS a new initiative has been developed to overcome the concerns felt.

This program has been called "Regain the Navy". During August and September 1998 all ship's company of Leading Seaman rank and above have received personal briefs by the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer of CERBERUS to clearly bring command concerns to each individual's attention. Civilian support staff have also been briefed on the program. The objective of the program is as alluded to above and essentially involves ensuring our trainees live in a fair but demanding military environment. The program addresses areas including poor manners and etiquette, lack of military bearing, low respect for authority, an apparent general willingness by many personnel to challenge legitimate authority in an appeals type culture, loss of belonging to the Naval community, lack of prudence and restraint and a lack of sense of mutual obligation. The emphasis is one of more senior personnel – and that means all personnel wearing rank – clearly setting the necessary standards and living by them in a fair, yet demanding environment. It has been extremely pleasing how the vast bulk of personnel have adopted the program willingly and with the clear knowledge that the command is there to support them make it happen.

*...The program calls for more senior personnel to intervene as necessary and not turn a blind eye to inappropriate, minor indiscretions...*

The program relies on all of us to support each other in effecting appropriate discipline and leadership to trainees and those more junior or inexperienced. It cannot succeed effectively if personnel isolate themselves within their working or training environments and relies on active participation by everyone to succeed.

Incorporated within the program is the call for Navy personnel to adopt a strategy of "Zero Acceptance". By this CERBERUS command implies that if we develop an environment where poor behaviour, general slackness, ill discipline and minor misdemeanours are no longer ignored then junior personnel, in this case the SMN\*, will learn and adapt a positive culture embracing self discipline and evenhandedness. The program reiterates the requirement for all senior staff to use the legitimate authority invested in them to set the example and not accept second best efforts from junior personnel.

CERBERUS hopes that by clearly setting the required standards of behaviour to SMN\* before they finish category training that when these personnel join their first ship they will understand the necessity to be an active and committed member of their own team onboard and the ships company. Provided these

personnel receive necessary encouragement and clearly understand what is required of them they will be able to integrate into the ships company quicker and accept that service in Navy is not a "Nine to Five" job, but a way of life and a calling.

What can personnel not posted to CERBERUS do to assist with this program? Obviously senior personnel – and by this I mean all those of Leading Rank and above – can set their own example by adopting the same or very similar tenets as those developed by CERBERUS and treat all personnel appropriately for the situation in which they find themselves. Senior officers and senior sailors can be seen "on deck" more, attend Divisional periods for their staff, discuss this and similar initiatives and attempt to reinvigorate the teamwork and standards which seem to have been lost in Navy of late.

Next time you are greeted by a more junior officer or sailor with their hands in their pockets and in a very relaxed pose with a clear lack of respect in their voice, just think, is this really the message we wish to send to each other? Do we aspire to be a professional Navy where individuals skills and commitment are second to none? If so, **you** must set the necessary standard yourself and clearly communicate our collective culture, ethos and values.





## ILLUMINATION ROUNDS

### Striving for Mediocrity

Get some time up! Such a common phrase with absolutely no logical support. The phrase is used to indicate competence and refers only to time.

Time is of little benefit to some when it comes to competence.

However, the entire system for promotion and pay advancement is based on time. Isn't there any room to promote (or financially reward) those among us that are exceptional?

Your rank indicates the level of responsibility with which you are delegated. If you are more responsible, have ability greater than others to conduct various tasks, should not you be compensated?

To some extent we do reward special skills. Doctors and dentists are paid more than their officer counter-parts. (Lawyers are not paid extra ... interesting). Why not expand that system in our current pay review to allow individual packages to be implemented. If a Chief Petty Officer is of great benefit to the Navy why should the Navy not recognise that benefit ... before Morgan and Banks does. If a young engineer shows brilliance in their chosen profession why shouldn't they be given responsibility earlier than a colleague who is struggling. If someone can do the job ... should they be permitted and paid to do it. If someone is not capable of doing the job ... why should he or she.

Competency based pay is not a new concept. It has support but it has quite a few knockers too. The prime concern for those against competency is that it would be unfair. I tend to disagree ... the current system is unfair. Work as hard as you want but you won't advance much faster than the struggler who seems to spend more time chatting or brewing-up than working... more time complaining about how unfair the system is than attempting to improve it.

We are busily changing the Defence Culture on a massive scale. The DRP is currently reorganising the structure of Defence and the 'way we do business'. It is about time we did an individual reform program and get rid of the 'get some time up' attitudes. Get good at what you are paid to do and be rewarded.

If you want to be dead wood in the organisation don't expect to advance.

### Response by: Air Commodore Ford Director Financial Conditions

The author makes some good points regarding remuneration. His/her proposal for a form of performance based pay is not appropriate for an organisation of the size and complexity of the ADF.

There are, however, a number of initiatives being considered by the ADF which would fit within the author's concept of a fairer system of remuneration. These initiatives are part of the ADF Pay Structure Review and include access to flexible remuneration packaging, salary structures for specialists based on recognised civilian competencies, officer remuneration based on work value, and the application of targeted measures such as bonuses to address the separate problems of attraction and retention of personnel with particular skills.

One way for the author to stay abreast of remuneration initiatives is via *The Key*, the monthly newsletter for the Defence Personnel Executive. Reference to most of the initiatives described above can be found in editions 4 and 6 of *The Key*.





## The AE 2 Graves

*By Lieutenant Commander Greg Swinden, RAN*

In the Baghdad North Gate Cemetery (Iraq) are the graves or memorials of four RAN sailors who died during World War I. Who were these men? How did they come to be buried here; hundreds of miles from where they died and even further from where they wrote an undying page in Australia's Naval history.

When the Australian submarine AE 2 penetrated the Dardanelles in the early hours of 25 April 1915 she made naval history as the first Allied submarine to breach this well defended waterway. Five days later on 30 April she was attacked and sunk by a Turkish gunboat and her crew of 32 were made Prisoners of War. Her story is well known.

The men commemorated at Baghdad were the four crewmen from the AE 2 who did not survive the next three and a half years in captivity. The Turks put the POW's to work doing manual labour, notably on the railway lines in Southern Turkey near the Taurus Mountains. The men worked long and hard in difficult and often freezing conditions. It was not long before the affects of malnutrition, exposure, exhaustion and disease began to take their toll (shades of another war and a different group of Australian POW's).

The first to die was Chief Petty Officer Stoker Charles Varcoe who died of Meningitis on 18 September 1916 while at the POW Camp of Belemelik. In Greg Kerr's book "Lost ANZAC's" his grandfather, Corporal Kerr (an Australian POW from the 14th Battalion captured at Gallipoli) records Varcoe's death – "Charlie Varcoe who had been ailing for some time went to hospital yesterday and on his way fell down unconscious. He was picked up by one of our lads and admitted to hospital. In the afternoon the doctor sent down a message to the effect that Charlie would die in an hour. He had not regained consciousness. In the morning we were told he had died at 7 o'clock in the morning. He was buried the same afternoon." Varcoe was a Royal Navy sailor on loan to the RAN and left a widow in England.

Within a month three other AE 2 crewmen had died. On or about 29 September 1916 Stoker Michael Williams is alleged to have died at Bozanti, sometimes referred to as Pozanti, of disease (some sources cite it as Dysentery and others as Malaria). Following his death his body was not recovered and it is believed he was buried in an unmarked grave. It was recorded at the time by another AE 2 crewmen that the Turks were 'doing away' with the sicker POW's, and while there is no proof that Williams was murdered his disappearance certainly remains a mystery.

Williams was only 22 years old and had joined the RAN in 1912 from Hamilton in Victoria. Three of his brothers were also killed during the war while serving in the AIF.

A plague of Typhus swept the POW camp at Belemelik in October 1916 and on 9 October Petty Officer Stephen Gilbert died. He was followed on 22 October by Able Seaman Albert Knaggs. Again Corporal Kerr recorded the events – "Gilbert of AE 2 died this morning. It is thought to be Typhoid. He had been in hospital for a fortnight." Another POW recorded – "Petty Officer Gilbert died of a very high fever and was buried. All available prisoners followed him (his coffin) to the grave". Gilbert's death is recorded by the Navy as occurring on 9 October, but other sources state it was in late September).

Gilbert was an ex Royal Navy sailor who had joined the RAN in 1913. Albert Knaggs was also an ex Royal Navy and although he did not survive the war his diary of his time in AE 2 and as a Prisoner of War did. Copies of his diary are now held at the Australian War Memorial and the Submarine Museum at Spectacle Island in Sydney.

At the conclusion of hostilities in November 1918, the bodies of Allied servicemen lay in thousands of small cemeteries and individual gravesites across the globe. The Commonwealth War Graves Commission charter stated that it was to commemorate all Allied sailors, soldiers and airmen who had fallen in the war. To do



*The Grave of Chief Stoker Charlie Varcoe*



so was a mammoth task, which would take years to complete. To make this task easier many bodies were moved from their original remote burial sites to those more accessible.

As a result the Commonwealth War Graves Commission began to relocate the graves of Allied servicemen who had died as Prisoners of War in Turkey. These included the bodies of Varcoe, Gilbert, Knaggs and several British submariners from the submarine HMS E 7 (sunk in the Dardanelles in September 1915). As Stoker Williams grave could not be found he was commemorated on a special memorial.

By 1922 the Baghdad North Gate Cemetery held nearly 6,000 graves, mainly of those killed in the fighting in the Mesopotamian Campaign. Among

these were the graves or memorial for 35 Australians who had died as Prisoners of War. Ten men whose bodies could not be located are recorded on the Bozanti, Nisibin or Angora Memorials).

Apart from the four sailors from AE 2 there were men from infantry battalions captured at Gallipoli, Light Horsemen captured in the campaign in Palestine, and Australian Flying Corps ground crew captured at the fall of Kut-el-Amara in April 1916. Also buried at Baghdad are six Australians from the 1<sup>st</sup> ANZAC Wireless Signal Squadron who fought with the British forces during the Mesopotamian campaign of 1917-18.

So the men from AE 2 lie far from their homes and loved ones in the War Cemetery at Baghdad. They are, however, in good company. Lest we forget.

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Photographs courtesy of Lieutenant Mark Bolt, RAN and Petty Officer 'Shiner' Wright (Royal Navy) - UN Observers stationed in Baghdad.



Grave of Petty Officer Stephen Gilbert



Baghdad North Gate Cemetery in Iraq





## "The Scrap Iron Flotilla"

"A Personal Account"

by Mr Bill Reave

I left school in 1936 in Hobart and started engineering. The next two years were very care free, study, work, good social life, amateur football with the Public Schools Old Boys in the winter and sailing with the Royal Yacht Club of Tasmania in the summer – life was pretty good. In 1939 the N.O.I.C Tasmania approached the R.Y.C.T. and advised the Naval Reserve strength was to be increased and would any yachtsmen be interested in joining. About fifty from the R.Y.C.T. went along to the depot one evening and signed up in the Naval Reserves. They went through the list alphabetically and by the time they came to the "R's" there were only vacancies for cooks and signalmen so I became an OD-CB. I now had to learn Morse code, semaphore and the difference between an Admiral's pennant and the Jolly Roger. I also learnt the first Naval commandment – if it moves, salute it – if it stays still, paint it. My commitment to the Reserves was a night parade of two hours once per week and one Saturday morning a month. In the middle of 1939 they commenced an engine room branch in the Hobart Reserves and I managed to transfer to this as an E.R.A.V. I was grade "V" because there was no grade "VI" which was good seeing I had not as yet graduated as an engineer.

On Friday 1st September 1939 I received a telegram at home telling me to report immediately to the Naval Depot. I was informed that a state of emergency existed and that I had been mobilized. I was issued with most of a seagoing kit and told to catch the boat train next morning at 8.30a.m. for Launceston, then board the *Taroona* for Melbourne. I was met at North Wharf in Melbourne and taken to Spencer Street Station where the R.T.O. gave me a ticket for Sydney on that night's train. The train left at 5p.m. and we arrived at Albury. Whilst changing trains, on that night of 3rd September, we heard over the loud speaker system, the Prime Minister Robert Menzies state that war existed between Germany and Australia. I was in the system.

I was met at Central Station in Sydney next day, taken to Circular Quay and put on the ferry for Garden Island where I joined the E.R.A's Mess on the depot ship H.M.A.S. *Platypus*. Then followed a medical for overseas service, vaccination, injections, inoculations, making of a will, pay allotment etc. Considering thousands of Reservists descended upon Sydney in that week the system ran like clockwork, a most impressive start. After two weeks I was drafted to the H.M.A.S. *Stuart*, the Flotilla Leader of the Australian

destroyers. *Stuart* had been in reserve and was being recommissioned at Cockatoo Island.

In 1917 *Stuart* was laid down in England as a Scott Class destroyer leader and was transferred to the R.A.N. in 1933. She had a displacement of 1500 tons and speed of 36 knots. Main armament consisted of five 4.7 inch guns and one 3 inch H.A. as well as six 21 inch torpedo tubes. After recommissioning there followed sea trials, gunnery trials etc. and after refueling and taking on stores we left Sydney in company of two other destroyers, the *Vendetta* and *Waterhen*, and set sail for Brisbane arriving the next night. Refuelled and sailed next morning for Townsville. Of the ships company on the *Stuart* 75% were Naval Reservist, half of whom had never been to sea in a Naval vessel before.

We exercised action stations, air raids, submarine attacks, damage control, fire drill, etc. at the least expected time day and night. By the time we reached Townsville we had some idea of what we had let ourselves in for. After Townsville, north through Torres Straits to Darwin exercising all the way. Refuelled and stored ship and off through the Sunda Strait to Singapore where we met our two other destroyers, *Vampire* and *Voyager*, who had been stationed in Fremantle. *Vampire*, *Voyager*, *Vendetta* and *Waterhen* were laid down in 1916/17 in England and were part of the "V" and "W" Class destroyers. They were slightly smaller than *Stuart* being 1100 tons with four 4 inch guns. Two sets of 3 x 21 inch torpedo tubes. One set of tubes was removed and replaced with a 12 lb. H.A. gun. Their maximum speed was 34 knots. They all saw service with the Royal Navy in W.W. I. They also were transferred to the R.A.N. in 1933.

In Singapore the five destroyers exercised for a whole week with the R.N. Submarine *Rover* and it was the first time some of our A.S.D.I.C. operators had exercised with a live submarine. After ten days the five Australian destroyers left Singapore for Colombo. By this stage we were beginning to look more like a Naval vessel. Arriving in Colombo we had time to refuel and store ship when *Stuart* was ordered to sea, leaving the other destroyers behind. When clear of harbour the C.O. Captain Waller advised we were on a special mission. The German pocket battleship *Graf Spee* had rounded Cape of Good Hope and was playing havoc with shipping in the Indian Ocean. *Stuart* was to act as a decoy whilst over the horizon were two County Class cruisers the *Cornwall* and *Devonshire*. It was our task to find the *Graf Spee* and





hold it until the cruisers caught up with the action. Was this to be our introduction into Naval Warfare? You could almost hear the medals clanking!! Well we chased every sign of ship or smoke. We had no RADAR in those days and you depended upon visual contact. On the 10th day out we were very short of fuel and had to put into Diego – Suarez in Madagascar and arrived with only 12 tons of oil left in the bunkers. To our relief we heard the *Graf Spee* had returned to the Atlantic Ocean where, as you know, she met the *Ajax*, *Achilles*, and *Exeter* in the battle of the River Plate.

In Madagascar we put ashore one of our seamen who had contracted meningitis. As a result we were quarantined for three weeks. We sailed for Aden, refuelled, and then through the Red Sea to Suez. In the Red Sea the engine room temperatures averaged 150 degrees F or 65 degrees C. It was impossible to keep four hour watches. We had to break into 2 hours on and 4 hours off. Through the Suez Canal, Port Said and on to Malta where we met up with the rest of our destroyers.

At this time the Mediterranean Fleet only consisted of these five destroyers, all the other ships had been withdrawn to the Atlantic. Doctor Gobbels on the Berlin Radio called these destroyers scrap iron from the First World War and he welcomed them to the Mediterranean in that bleak December of 1939. He called them a consignment of junk and the "Australian Scrap Iron Flotilla". Hence the origin of the name.

*Stuart* sailed for Marseille where we arrived on 21st December 1939 as the first Australians to land on French soil in W.W.2. We collected a convoy of troopships and sailed for Haifa. Troops that had been in Palestine since the riots began in 1936 were being relieved and sent back to England via France. The Mediterranean was at its worst in the winter of 39/40. Some of the roughest seas I have encountered were in the Mediterranean. The gyro compass on *Stuart* was graduated 0–50 deg. on either side and it was hitting the stops. The guard rails were 8–10 feet under water when rolling and the mess decks were always awash with water. At times it was not possible to keep the galley fire alight so it was cold meals. Quite a contrast to the Red Sea of two weeks earlier. In 1940 Italy announced a policy of non belligerency so shipping movements again resumed in the Mediterranean and convoys were again being run with destroyer escorts to guard against presence of German submarines. *Stuart* operated the Malta – Haifa leg and the other destroyers operated Malta – Gibraltar and Marseille legs.

At this stage I had been on the *Stuart* for almost six months and during that time I was a real "dogs body" – helping repair breakdowns of auxiliary machinery, spending watches in the engine room as a trainee and doing all the chores others did not want to carry out.

The Chief E.R.A. was a fair but hard task master and he had me when off watch crawling through bilges, over main engines and boilers preparing a sketch of all the steam, oil, water and exhaust lines with all their valves and fittings until I knew the ship backwards. He suggested the time was right for me to sit the examination for an Engine Room Watch – keeping Certificate. In due course I presented myself at the Engineer – Commanders Office and sat for a three hour written examination. After lunch I had a two hour oral examination. I felt reasonably confident but had to wait for 48 hours when I was informed I had passed with distinction and I must attend Captain (D) Request Parade and ask to be granted the necessary certificate. This was duly done and I was informed I was now entitled to wear Chief Petty Officers uniform. There I was 20 years of age and in charge of the engine room of a destroyer. It would never happen in peace time but rules are only made to be bent in a war.

As the weather improved the aircraft carriers *Ark Royal* and *Glorious* came into the Mediterranean to train pilots. We were the crash boat for the *Glorious* which involved steaming close to the bows when aircraft were either taking off or landing so if any pilot overshot the deck we could pick them up. It was a nightmare on watch in the engine room as the exact speed was essential or you would have an aircraft carrier up your stern. After doing our stint as crash boat we took the *Glorious* through the Straits into the Atlantic and into the Bay of Biscay where two R.N. destroyers *Ardent* and *Acasta* took over. The three ships went through the English Channel, North Sea and off the coast of Norway where they met the *Scharnhorst* and all three were sunk. Of the 1561 men on the carrier and two destroyers only 46 survived.

Back in the Mediterranean the Italian neutrality deteriorated and it was anticipated Italy would throw in her lot with Germany. France was fighting for her life and the British had strengthened the Battle Fleet in the Mediterranean with Admiral Andrew Cunningham as Commander-in Chief. His flag was on the *Warspite*.

Admiral Cunningham proved to be a very popular C in C. He was affectionately known to all as "Uncle Andy". He first won distinction when in command of the destroyer *Scorpion* during the Gallipoli campaign when he was awarded the D.S.O. Later he was awarded two bars to this decoration. When things were tough he would make a point of sending a personal signal or even a visit to boost morale and as a result everyone would follow him anywhere. On the *Warspite* he lead by example.

On June 10th 1940 at midnight Italy declared war on Britain and France. At dawn next day Admiral Cunningham took the Battle Fleet to sea – *Warspite* and *Malaya*, and five cruisers including the *Sydney*





with screening destroyers. This was the first time we had experienced real fleet work. The Fleet stayed around the Eastern Mediterranean, went within sight of southern Italy and after 10 days resumed to Alexandria, not having sighted any enemy craft.

Early in July an important convoy was taking place, one which was evacuating the women and children of service personnel who had been stationed in Malta. The fleet was at sea protecting this convoy. *Stuart* was with Vice-Admiral Tovey's Light forces. A R.A.F. flying boat from Malta first sighted the Italian fleet. Shortly after, it was sighted by the cruiser *Neptune* who had the privilege of signalling *Enemy battle fleet in sight* for the first time in the Mediterranean since the Napoleonic Wars. *Warspite*, an excellent gunnery ship, opened fire on one of the Italian battleships and scored direct hits at the range of 26,000 yards. The Italians retreated behind a smoke screen but our destroyers raced in, line abreast at 30 knots. *Stuart* was well to the fore with the Australian flag flying from the foremast for the first time in W.W.2. As the smoke cleared we could see the Italians had escaped. The fleet prowled around for a while but no further contact could be made.

So ended the Battle of Calabria. It was the first time we had seen real action and down below in the engine room you could hear the gunfire. Flakes of paint from the deck head and asbestos dust from the lagging descended like a snow storm but you were too busy to worry about what was going on outside. When at high speed – if a forced lubrication pump broke down and you lost oil pressure you had one minute to get things going before the main engine and thrust block bearings began to seize. Likewise if you lost an air pump and lost the vacuum in the condensers the build up of water would strip the blades at the end of the L.P. Turbine in 30 seconds. You were kept busy, eyes wandering around gauges all the time and you never had time to worry about what was going on deck. At Action Stations two E.R.A. were on watch in the engine room and two were close by on deck for damage control or fire party. If you were not on watch below you had a chance to observe what was going on.

*Stuart* continued to operate with the fleet along the Western Desert, bombarding installations etc., refuelling in Malta, round Crete to bombard the Dodecanese Islands and back to Alexandria. A regular 10 day tour and not an enemy sighted. *Stuart* had a few other missions. The Navy were concerned that Italy was receiving fuel oil by barge down the Danube, past Turkey and Greece to Southern Italy. *Stuart* was sent to the Aegean Sea to check out the oil supply. The navigator of the *Stuart* was R.N. 26 years of age, a full ginger beard and a very keen sense of humour, Lieutenant Teacher by name. We were on patrol amongst the Greek Islands when the alarm bells rang for air raid alert. Everyone at action stations,

lookout had reported sun's reflection on wings of aircraft well up in the sky. Navigator rushes up to the bridge just as the 3 inch H.A. opens fire and shouts "Bloody fools you will never hit that, it's Venus". Whilst we are on the Navigator, I must relate an incident that occurred off Gibraltar when a Midshipman joined *Stuart*. He was R.A.N. but had been on loan to R.N. Battleships for training. Lt Teacher and Midshipman were on watch together and Midshipman was asked to ascertain ships position. A few minutes later the following conversation took place:

Midshipman "Sir, position Latitude — Longitude —"

Lieutenant "Take your cap off, according to your reckoning we are in the middle of Westminster Abbey".

I did not witness the event but news flew around *Stuart* like a bush fire. Midshipman later became the Chief of the Naval Staff.

*Stuart* was kept busy and we were lucky if we had more than two short leaves each month. Short leave was when you finished for the day, usually about 5.30pm or 6pm till 10pm and we had one night of all night leave per month. Leave ashore meant the usual chores, haircut (much better than the ships crew) and a good meal was a must. It was quite a relief to have food served that had not been cooked in the Navy style.

At this time *Stuart* acquired a ships mascot "Chico" a small African monkey. "Chico" had a long lead attached to the foremast above the galley and close to the flue for warmth. Her hearing was fantastic, she could hear an airplane's engine long before the lookouts could spot it. Chico would screech and point in the directions of the noise. When *Stuart* returned to Australia in 1941 Chico was quarantined at the Melbourne Zoo. Unfortunately she contracted pneumonia and died.

On one occasion the fleet had just left Alexandria. This time *Stuart* was not with them but had patrol duty outside harbour. One night we detected a submarine in the Swept Channel in the process of laying a minefield. We were in the middle of it! We could not depth charge the sub for obvious reasons so sent for *Voyager* to await the departure of the sub. *Stuart* plotted the position of every mine in the field with the ASDIC. This was the first time ASDIC had been used for this purpose. Captain Waller cleared lower deck and said if he had to hit a mine it would be with either bow or stern – nice for engine room watch below! Meantime submarine had moved out of the field and *Voyager* pounced and had a confirmed kill. Mine sweepers came out and by the chart *Stuart* had prepared cleared the field so when the fleet returned everything was normal.





*Stuart* was in need of a refit having not had one since leaving Australia at the beginning of the war. It was agreed *Stuart* would proceed to Malta for two months refit – Captain Waller transferred to *Voyager* as Captain (D) and our First Lieutenant became acting C.O., *Stuart* was due to sail with fleet next morning and be dropped off at Malta. The night before we were due to sail, First Lieutenant was taken off to hospital and our Navigator the bearded Lt. Teacher became acting C.O. We sailed with the fleet and after 24 hours the high speed was too much for *Stuart* and we blew a main steam line. Temporary repairs carried out at sea gave us a speed of 8 knots maximum so we were ordered back to Alexandria. The acting C.O. thought if he returned direct we would arrive in the middle of the night so he decided to “go walk about” and see if any enemy submarines were around. At about 10p.m. that night we detected a submarine and sat over it all night, depth charging at regular intervals. Next morning at about 10a.m. the submarine surfaced and the crew bailed out before it sank. It transpired the first depth charge attack had extinguished all their lights and ventilating system so they had a most uncomfortable night. Forty seven of the submarine *Gondar* were taken P.O.W. two were lost. *Stuart* returned to a great welcome, the P.O.W.’s being under guard on the quarter deck. On passing “*Voyager*” with Captain (D) on board a signal was received on “*Stuart* Whacko whiskers, shave off or we won’t see your medal!!” A keen sense of humour. Lieut. Teacher received a D.S.O. for this effort. He later reverted back to the R.N. and was killed in action in 1943 in a combined operations raid. *Stuart* finally got to Malta for a two months refit and during our spell in dockyard hands we were having 8–10 air raids per day. December 1940 saw *Stuart* back with the fleet and at this juncture the German influence was most obvious in the Mediterranean. Increased troop movements by the Germans into Libya and more effective dive bombing kept the fleet on the move.

When operating along the Desert we had been able to pick up some Italian Breda A.A. guns plus thousands of rounds of ammunition. We mounted these Breda guns on pieces of 4 x 4 inch wood lashed to the matting runners of the steel deck. The guns crew consisted of Cooks, Stewards, Supply Assistants and anyone else that could be spared. Every round was a tracer and a very formidable barrage could be fired by these “honary gunners”.

Rommel had arrived in Libya to counter the Allied advance and he had begun to push the British back towards Egypt, however Tobruk was left as an isolated pocket.

In the meantime Greece had to be reinforced so the long business of convoying troops and supplies began. Late in March 1941 we had just left a convoy of troops in Greece when word came through that the Italian Fleet were at sea. *Stuart* joined the First Battle

Squadron with the battleship *Valiant* and carrier *Formidable* and two flotillas of destroyers. There were “hit and run” tactics with the Italians all day and when night fell the C in C had to accept certain risks. Apart from the powerful British force screening the quarry, somewhere he had cruisers and destroyers in the darkness to the north. If waiting for dawn, the Italians were only 300 miles from home, they would have the advantage of shore based aircraft so the famous signal went out “All not engaged in sinking the enemy withdraw”. That left *Stuart* and *Havock* who went off after a burning cruiser and *Greyhound* and *Griffin* who went chasing fleeing Italian destroyers. *Stuart* saw the enemy cruiser *Zara* ablaze with another cruiser standing by. *Stuart* fired full outfit of torpedoes into both cruisers scoring direct hits on both vessels. If this was not enough an Italian destroyer shot past *Stuart* who could only manage to get off three salvos and had to leave it for *Havock* to finish. This night action by four destroyers resulted in the sinking of the three cruisers *Zara*, *Pole* and *Flume* and two of the enemy destroyers. By this stage *Stuart* had been separated from the other destroyers, so Captain Waller sent this signal, “I am now feeling somewhat alone so I will rejoin the fleet”. Such was the Battle of Matapan my 21st birthday.

Captain Hector MacDonald Laws Waller was one of the great destroyer captains of W.W.2. He was very popular and affectionately known as “Hec”. He had served with the Grand Fleet in W.W.1 and specialised as a signals officer. This proved a great help with the fleet work, in the Mediterranean as when a string of bunting went up on the flagship Captain Waller did not need his Chief Yeoman to give him the message, he read it and had a reply before anyone else in the fleet. As a result *Stuart* earned many “Brownie Points”. Whilst on the *Stuart* Captain Waller was awarded the D.S.O. and bar, and was mentioned in dispatches twice. Everyone was sorry when he left *Stuart* and was given command of *Perth*. It was sunk by superior Japanese forces in the Sunda Straits, Java. He was a great loss and it is fitting that one of the Collins Class Submarines has been named after him.

On return to Alexandria I left *Stuart* and transferred to *Vendetta* to make up their compliment of engine room watch keepers. *Vendetta*, who had been at Matapan but did not have the lively time of *Stuart*, was sent back to the Western Desert where the Allied forces were retreating from Libya to Egypt and required support from the sea. For a while *Vendetta* and *Waterhen* undertook hit and run raids on Derna and Bomba. The idea being one would turn on its searchlight outside the breakwater sweeping the harbour for shipping while the other blasted anything in sight, then run like hell along the coast. This proved too dangerous and after a while these raids were stopped. The 14th April is a day we will all remember, “*Vendetta*” and “*Waterhen*” in Tobruk, air raids





started at dawn and lasted till after dusk. The hospital ship *Vita* who had been evacuating wounded was bombed and the engine room flooded. *Waterhen* took *Vita* in tow but four tow lines parted. *Waterhen* took off all the wounded and hospital staff while *Vendetta* carried out AA and ASDIC sweep. *Waterhen* left and arrived safely in Alexandria while two trawlers took *Vita* in tow and reached Egypt.

This day cost the Germans 22 planes shot down by A.A.guns. *Vendetta* joined by *Greyhound* then went patrolling off to Benghazi where we sighted an ammunition ship and blew it up by gunfire. It was all over in 30 seconds.

To the north things were grim in Greece. *Vendetta* was withdrawn from the desert and sent to Suda Bay in Crete. *Vendetta* was joined by the cruiser *Calcutta* and four other destroyers and ordered to proceed to Megara just north of Corinth Canal and evacuate troops. In the middle of the evacuation the motor boat broke down so it had to be paddled the same as the whaler and skiff. *Calcutta* and the other destroyers quickly filled up with troops. As we had no motor boat, and there had been a field hospital ashore with wounded still on the beach, our C.O. Commander Rodney Rhodes moved closer inshore and cleared the beach of wounded and left at 4.30a.m. with 469 wounded and troops. The worst of the wounded we were able to get into various mess decks but quite a few were left on the iron deck with no protection what so ever. The ship's doctor, Surgeon Lieut. Campbell, a 27 year old RANR from Adelaide did an amazing job under heavy air raids and in crowded conditions. He was awarded a D.S.O. for his work and it was well deserved. We had exhausted our small arms ammunition and organized the troops who had rifles to gather around the guard rail and fire volleys of 303's at the diving aircraft. It was very spectacular to see one dive bomber hit and plunge into the water amidst loud cheering from the army. Arriving at Suda Bay next day we refuelled and set out to Navplion south of Megara for another load. This time again with *Calcutta* and destroyers. In all 4,500 troops were lifted that night. It was necessary to sail by 4 a.m. to clear the coast and be beyond bomber range. We did not clear till 6 a.m. when the Germans came over with about 30 dive bombers. The Dutch ship *Slamat* was packed with troops and was hit by dive bombers. *Wryneck* and *Diamond* two destroyers went to her aid but alas all three ships were sunk with a huge loss of life.

*Vendetta* made it back to Suda Bay safely refuelled and set off for the Western Desert and began what was to become the famous Tobruk Ferry. In all, *Vendetta* held the record of 39 trips and was the last of the old destroyers to leave the run.

I feel many who were on the Tobruk Ferry adopted a fatalistic approach to life at sea. In my case I felt the

day you were born the good Lord commenced your log book. In it he recorded the date of your birth, the date you will die and all the important events in the period between. There is nothing you can do about it so why not enjoy life whenever you can, until your use by date comes up.

Now back to Crete, we were withdrawn from the Ferry to escort from Crete to Egypt the SS *Lossibank* in the company of three cruisers and two destroyers. We were attacked continuously for the entire trip and all arrived safely in Egypt. We found out later that the reason for all this enemy attention was that the *Lossibank* had the Greek Crown Jewels and gold reserve which was to be held in Cairo for safe keeping.

The German invasion of Crete began on the morning of 20th May and *Vendetta* was sent to join the First Battle Fleet in an area west of Crete to repel any intervention by the Italian Battle Fleet. *Vendetta* did not go to the beaches in Crete to evacuate troops but was employed screening the Battle Fleet which was repeatedly attacked from the air. After the evacuation *Vendetta* returned to Alexandria while the Navy licked her wounds and counted the losses.

We had lost three cruisers and six destroyers sunk, a carrier, three battleships, six cruisers and seven destroyers put out of action. The Eastern Mediterranean Fleet consisted of only four cruisers and seven destroyers that were seaworthy. The fleet had lost thousands of men both navy and army at sea. Admiral Cunningham pointed out that it took three years to build a ship but it took three hundred years to build a tradition, therefore the navy could not let the army down.

Ships that had made it back to Alexandria after being damaged were in a frightful mess, with the sickening task of cleaning out the dead. The cruiser *Orion* was dive bombed many times, one bomb going through the bridge and exploding on the crowded mess decks killing and wounding 560 army and navy personnel. In passing through the bridge all senior officers were killed. It was a case of who was who and what was what. The indescribable slaughter was unreal. What was left was placed in mass body bags. With similar stories from other ships, the *Protector* a R.N. minelayer was pressed into service as a burial ship. With two destroyer escorts, *Vendetta* was one, the *Protector* slipped out in the middle of the night into the Mediterranean and hove to. The Chaplain on minelayer said a few prayers, firing party fired farewell volley, and the weighted body bags slid down the mine chute into the sea. A bugler sounded "Last Post" and we returned to harbour. Hundreds were thus buried at sea that night, many of whom were known only to God. It was a sad day.

Now back to Tobruk Ferry. In spite of the heavy naval losses the supplies had to get through. It just meant we





had to work a lot harder. Destroyers operated in pairs on the Ferry for if one was hit the other could rescue troops and crew. Despite the heavy losses we were able to keep going. *Waterhen*, *Defender* and others were casualties. Very few trips on the Ferry were a picnic. As mentioned we operated in pairs. In Tobruk one would drop anchor in the harbour and the other would go alongside the old oil wharf. We were always within range of the German guns on the perimeter and air raids were the norm. Speed was essential in the harbour and if you could disembark the troops and supplies and take on the wounded in an hour you were doing well. It was not unusual to unload 60 tons of ammunition and supplies plus 200 troops and take on 150 wounded of which 100 were stretcher cases and be out of the harbour in just over the hour. It was every man helping, officers and ratings alike – boxes of 12 pound ammunition felt like feathers when passed into lighters in an air raid and all was done in total darkness.

On 28th August 1941 *Vendetta* made the last run on the Tobruk Ferry, our 39th. Long periods of high speed and near misses had taken its toll and after two years without a major refit the time had come to retire gracefully.

Admiral Cunningham in his autobiography "A Sailor's Odyssey" refers to the old Australian destroyers and I quote:– "The Tobruk run was an arduous operation under constant air attack. This entailed steaming at high speed and the twenty three year old Australian "V's" were literally dropping to bits after much hard work. Indeed patched up again and again, and all in need of extensive refits, they were kept running by the sheer grit and determination of the officers and men of their engineering departments."

At the end of October we left for Singapore, the last of the Australian Scrap Iron Flotilla to leave the Mediterranean. We arrived in Singapore late November and tied up in Keppel Harbour for the much needed refit. The engine room and boiler rooms were gutted of machinery and taken to dockyard workshops.

On 7th December Japanese aircraft raided Singapore, then after the raid declared war, the same as Pearl Harbour. It was decided that a Care and Maintenance Party would suffice on *Vendetta*. Of the four E.R.A's, two only were required for the C & M Party so we cut the cards to see who would remain. I was lucky so left with the rest of the crew sailing in the *Kanimbla* for Melbourne arriving in late December. Hobart was my home port so I travelled to Hobart for 28 days leave, the first for the war.

So ended my association with the Scrap Iron Flotilla – *Waterhen* was lost on the Tobruk Ferry – *Vampire* was lost in the Bay of Bengal – *Voyager* was lost at Timor – *Vendetta* was towed from Singapore to

Melbourne, refitted and saw the war out as an escort destroyer in the Pacific. In July 1948 having been stripped of all fittings *Vendetta* was towed 25 miles outside Sydney Heads and sunk – *Stuart* survived the war in the Pacific as an escort destroyer and then as a fast transport. *Stuart* was sold to ship breakers in Sydney in April 1947 and was towed upstream to Ryde where she was cut down to the waterline and the remains now lie in the mud. It is very sad that a destroyer with the record of the *Stuart* could not be given a burial at sea instead of falling under the oxy-acetylene torch of a ship breaker's yard. That's history.

People have asked me what made the greatest impression during the time I spent with the Scrap Iron Flotilla. I think one incident will always remain in my mind. The *Vendetta* had just completed a rather torrid run from Tobruk and we had tied up alongside the pontoon at Mersa Matruh. The wounded were being carried ashore to the waiting ambulances. I came up onto the deck from the engine room just as a badly wounded digger was passing on a stretcher. He looked a tough customer, was covered with bloody bandages and a weeks growth of beard on his face. As he passed, his good hand grabbed my arm and you could see the tears well in his eyes. He pulled me down and all he said was "Thank God for the Navy". Then he was gone. When you hear such sentiments it makes you feel your efforts have been worthwhile.

*Editor's Note:* Mr Reeve was the only survivor of his mess in HMAS *Stuart*.





# The Human Element of Capability

Major General Peter Dunn AM  
Head, Defence Personnel Executive

## The Way We Were

The Report of the Defence Efficiency Review (DER), in March 1997 concluded that the Defence organisation was a collection of 'tribes', whose 'predominant concern was ... protecting their assets and influence'. The Navy, Army, Air Force and Public Service functioned as separate entities, working towards roughly the same objective and offering similar, if not identical, personnel support services. Defence Headquarters also had a personnel agency doing much of what was being done within the four areas. The resultant bureaucracy was inefficient, ineffective, costly and prone to divergent interpretations of the one policy document. The men and women of the ADF and APS were not getting the service they deserved.

Do not think that only Defence had problems with management of human resources and personnel administration. In 1995 the Karpin Report: *Enterprising Nation* concluded that Australian businesses needed to lift their performance in leadership and Human Resource (HR) management if they wanted to be competitive. Corporate Australia was jolted into the realisation that people management practices needed to be aligned to organisational needs. People and the associated management and administration had to be part of the corporate solution.


Cultural baggage and historical precedent hampered the growth of Australian business until the problem could be correctly identified. The Australian Defence

organisation was in a similar situation. The tribal structure resulted in an inability to effectively control personnel and associated personnel costs. There was no central oversight and the cost of managing personnel was increasing over time. There was a disconnect between the cost of personnel to the Defence organisation and the capability generated from such an investment.

The bureaucratic nature of Defence Personnel Management also made the process of implementing change extremely time consuming and riddled with compromise. The review of ADF housing and accommodation is a good example. Initial review and consultation was conducted in accordance with the appropriate processes of the day. Discussion and decision papers were submitted to the relevant higher Defence committees for consideration, endorsement and agreement. Ministerial oversight was provided at the critical points of the review and Service Chiefs were updated as the process rolled along. By the time the review was nearing completion and the final phase for implementation was commenced, none of the original personnel involved in the consultation and decision making were in the same positions within the organisation, or they had in fact, moved out of Defence.

Naturally, the new faces in the decision making process were unfamiliar with the arguments, research and rationale for the review up to the point of their involvement. The final phase, therefore, was consumed by re-briefing on old information to enable the new

**Direct Personnel Costs as a Percentage of Defence Expenditure  
(Salaries & Superannuation)**







personnel to 'catch up'. This generated unnecessary stress and anxiety and highlighted many inadequacies in the way we manage our human capital.

The Defence organisation led the world in so many different technological fields, yet our personnel practices were still mired in a 1960s mindset.

The Defence Efficiency Review identified the problems outlined above – spiralling people costs, quadruplication of processes, bureaucratic stagnation and a loss of effectiveness. But there was (and still is) another, equally important, reason for change. The organisation itself was changing because the society in which Defence functioned was also changing. By way of example, here are some basic demographic changes identified by the Australian Bureau of Statistics and the potential challenges they will create for the Defence organisation:

- The Australian workforce is ageing and increasing more slowly than ever before. Population growth is likely to be generated as much from immigration as from natural increase. By 2005 the number of people aged between 15 and 24 is expected to decline by 4.5% (23.4% in 1995 to 18.9%). **Therefore, Defence will have a smaller and increasingly multi-cultural selection pool for entry-level recruits and the average age of the civilian workforce is likely to increase.**
- There is now greater diversity in the labour force in terms of ethnicity and the participation rate of women. People born overseas make up 25% of the labour force, with over half of these from non-English speaking backgrounds. Over the next 10 years, women are predicted to outnumber men by 2:1 in entering the labour force. **Defence must address this growing diversity if it is to recruit its share of the workforce, in particular it must address the increasing number of women seeking employment.**
- In the 10 year period from 1986–1996, one-parent families as a proportion of all families with dependent children increased from 15% to 19% and between 1981 and 1996, the proportion of families with children aged between 0 and 14, in which both parents worked, increased from 41% to 54%. **Defence must consider more flexible work practices and the availability of long term child care during deployment as a factor in attraction and retention of our workforce.**
- In 1987, 46% of the workforce held a tertiary qualification; by 2001 this is expected to reach 60%. In addition, the participation rate of women in higher education is now better than for men – in 1979 it was 20% lower than for men and by 1990 it was 12% higher than for men. It continues to rise. **Defence must be able to recruit its share of these better educated workers by offering**

**attractive and rewarding careers. Defence must establish consultative workplace mechanisms consistent with its mission and core business in order to harness the considerable intellectual capacity that will amass in the smarter organisation of the future.**

- People are marrying at a later age. The median age for first marriages between 1986 and 1996 increased to 27.6 years for men and 25.7 years for women (from 25.6 years and 23.5 years respectively). **The conflict between work and family is occurring at a later age, around the time when retention is more critical due to the experience and level of investment made in the individual. Flexible work practices, including a career breaks scheme and part-time work need to be available to the entire Defence workforce.**

The examples I have given above are not exhaustive, but give an idea of the changes that are occurring within the wider Australian society. In a nutshell, the workforce is changing, the nature of work is becoming more flexible, an individual's career expectations are more demanding and people are expecting to be remunerated in a manner that best recognises their worth to the organisation. Defence has to address these realities now or risk being left further behind by society. If we slip further behind, we will find it increasingly difficult to be accepted as relevant, will therefore be unable to recruit and retain personnel and will ultimately fail to meet the expectations of the Australian government and the people we serve.

It is important to stress that the changes being experienced, and that will continue to be experienced, impact on civilian members of Defence just as much as those in uniform. Our APS personnel have been downsized and significantly restructured already and more changes and reductions are underway.

## The Way We Wanted to Be

Many of the problems/issues mentioned above have been identified by several different reviews over the last 20 years. Some of the recommendations were implemented while others were relegated to the 'too hard basket'. Some of the main change drivers you may recall over that time were the:

- ❖ Regular Officer Development Committee
- ❖ Sanderson Review
- ❖ Force Structure Review, and
- ❖ Serving Australia

By the mid-1990s, many of the problems and inefficiencies identified by earlier reviews had reached critical mass – either drastic change had to occur, or the Australian Defence Organisation would





be incapable of fulfilling its obligation to the Commonwealth within the budgetary constraints of the day. Our capability was in doubt and our position in the region as a strong middle-power was at risk of being eroded.

The Defence Efficiency Review was a reaction to our lack of progress in achieving lasting and effective change. It did not come as a surprise. Every military and civilian member of Defence could not help but be aware that changes had been taking place; however, much more remained to be addressed. We had been nibbling away around the edges, but had avoided making the hard decisions. None of the reviews had really achieved the magnitude of change necessary to ensure the ADF could maintain capability into the 21st Century. This is not to say that changes had not occurred – on the contrary, the way we were conducting business in 1997 was definitely different to how we functioned in 1987. Yet we were still a paternalistic organisation and our HR practices were not keeping pace with business.

As far as human capital management was concerned, the DER forced the rationalisation and amalgamation of all personnel services for the ADF and APS. Five organisations became one – the Defence Personnel Executive – and the savings and benefits began to flow immediately. Workforce planning, service conditions and health policy for example were three areas that initially merged and rationalised the various 'tribes' and provided a more comprehensive, total management package for the men and women of the ADF. A lot of the unnecessarily differing practices across the Services were highlighted and eliminated. A more efficient and equitable system was allowed to emerge.

The management of our human capital was identified as a vital element of the ADF's long term capability. We had previously talked in terms of the importance of personnel to the wider ADF mission, but the reality was not quite as positive. When you consider that the total cost of personnel (including direct and indirect costs) amounts to 46% of the defence budget it is surprising that we took so long to realise what a valuable asset our people were. The time had come to recognise what the corporate world had been rudely awakened to – organisational effectiveness and the achievement of goals and objectives had to actively include people.

## APS Element of Capability

In the last ten years there have been major changes in personnel management and practice affecting civilians in the Department of Defence, for example:

- a wide range of powers and functions once held by central Public Services agencies – the Public Service and Merit Protection Commission and the

Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business – have been devolved to departments, including Defence

- stress has been placed on the need to make personnel administration as efficient and effective as possible, and
- improvements in pay and conditions for staff have had to be funded, to a significant degree, from internal savings.

Through these changes Defence has been given greater scope to develop personnel management arrangements for civilian staff that are more closely aligned to its particular circumstances. At the same time there have been substantial incentives to use this capacity to generate and support greater management efficiency in the Defence Organisation.

Thus, the removal of many of the Public Service-wide requirements for civilian staff in Defence is facilitating a greater integration of military and civilian personnel policy and administration in Defence. Of course, there will always be differences reflecting the different requirements of military and civilian employment, however, there is much that is common and there is much to be gained by recognising this in policy, organisation and process terms. This is a major area of focus for the Defence Personnel Executive.

## Changes Underway and Why

The proliferation of information technology, particularly in the area of HR management and personnel administration, has presented the Defence organisation with an excellent avenue for improving efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of personnel services. Yet merely *using* technology has not forced us to change many of the underlying principles relating to the delivery of personnel support services and the management of our human capital. As recently as last year we still had 177 HR information systems and only 4 of these could actually talk to each other. This was clearly cumbersome, ineffective and costly.

In July 1998 a contract was signed with PeopleSoft to develop **one** integrated personnel management system for Defence. The Personnel Management Key Solution Project – PMKEYS – is one of the largest HR information management system projects ever undertaken in Australia. PMKEYS will encompass aspects of service delivery, career management, administrative support and information retrieval. PMKEYS will help Defence move from a paternalistic organisation to one in which *mutual responsibility* will be the foundation for the relationship between employer and employee. An





individual will have much greater control over their own personal information and career management. The vision is for a system that allows the men and women of Defence to access it whenever and wherever they may be. By phone, e-mail, internet – at home, at work or from the field.

While PMKEYS will enhance and improve the way we manage our human capital, it will have an equally important impact on our operational capability. By freeing up people from the routine administrative support to the workforce, and by maximising the efficiencies from technology, we can re-direct resources to the combat and combat-support force. This outcome will be a critical factor in ensuring the Australian Defence Organisation can continue to contribute to, and remain effective, in the region and the world.

Another factor that the Defence organisation has acknowledged is the changing nature of remuneration and the increasing difficulty in competing with business for skilled workers. The method of remuneration for those in uniform is not keeping pace with business – our system is outdated and is not capable of fully recognising or remunerating the appropriate competencies, skills and personnel. Our skilled professionals have been sought after by industry and we have not been able to compete. The Other Ranks pay structures were revised to reflect work value in 1995 but the Officer Corps pay structure was not reviewed then. Something needed to be done urgently and the Pay Structure Review is the result.


Accurately assessing the work value of all specialisations, and acknowledging the impact of the open market, will give the Defence organisation greater scope to manage the workforce to best meet individual and organisational requirements.

Several papers have already been presented to the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Defence Executive outlining a plan for the way ahead to revitalise our remuneration system. Topics presented include the:

- ❖ Development of a Work Value Assessment Model
- ❖ Higher Command and Management Group Structure
- ❖ Reform of ADF Pay Related Allowances and Associated Reforms
- ❖ Command and Management Group Remuneration Structure

The changes being planned to the remuneration system are designed to link closely with the Flexible Career Management System being developed. Research has shown that individuals want more control over their careers, both in terms of joining and separating from the workforce, as well as while in-service. Individual control produces flexibility to meet personal circumstances. For example, if an individual has a need to move out of the workforce for six months to care for a sick relative, we will now be able to accommodate that request as long as operational capability is not compromised. Flexible employment practices recognise that individuals are

### WORK VALUE SPREAD FOR ADF RANKS



As can be seen from the above graph the overlap of ranks indicates a structure that is not effectively recognising skills and competencies that are of value to the Defence organisation. Accurately identifying where the current system is deficient has enabled us to develop a way ahead to redress our shortfalls.

mature and responsible partners in the management of the human capital of Defence. The organisation also needs more flexibility – flexibility to conduct realistic long term workforce planning to maximise resources and avoid unnecessary wastage.





The Flexible Career Management System (explained in the diagrams below), combined with the new remuneration system, will give the Defence organisation the ability to ensure that committed and well performing individuals are not lost to business competition. At the end of fixed periods of appointment completion incentives could be offered to selected personnel to ensure their retention in Defence. A Market Forces element in the new pay structure will provide an additional tool to aid retention.

Interestingly, completion incentives need not be purely financial. Some individuals have indicated that education and training opportunities would prove to be equally attractive and encourage retention. Nonetheless, the linkages between remuneration, career management and ADF future capability will be critical.

Another aspect of the remuneration framework is the ADF Workplace Bargaining Arrangement. The current agreement is due to expire in April 1999 and planning has already commenced for the replacement Arrangement. Similar to past Arrangements, the ADF will actively seek the involvement of members by way of suggestions or comments. These suggestions/comments will not have to be limited to just pay and allowances – in the spirit of *mutual responsibility* we will be encouraging members to include any aspect of their employment that they feel needs addressing. In addition to calling for member input, member representatives will be drawn from across the three Services to assist in the two-way consultation process.

As indicated above, dollars alone are not always the only means of rewarding, retaining and motivating personnel. Following extensive consultation and input from ADF members themselves, the current



Arrangement also resulted in additional benefits and outcomes such as the:

- ❖ Early Intervention Program for special needs children
- ❖ Introduction of a bereavement benefit for dependents of a deceased member, and the
- ❖ Review of housing and accommodation management


The importance of consultation and collaboration cannot be understated. The ADF into the next century will need to harness the potential of its people to ensure viability. The men and women of the Defence organisation are the key to the ADF's capability. They are an asset that must be managed sensitively, maturely and professionally.

## The Human Capital Strategy for Defence

The importance of people to the ADF's capability is only just being fully realised. To this end, the Chief of the Defence Force and the Secretary are about to issue *The Human Capital Strategy for Defence* including a Strategic Personnel Plan. The Human Capital Strategy is a high level personnel planning document and supports the mission, vision and strategic direction of the







organisation. It also directs our effort towards ensuring that the contribution of our people meets current and future capability needs. The document acknowledges that human capital management must be open and responsive to contemporary circumstances and that Defence may need to do things differently and adapt modern management techniques to suit our unique circumstances.

The first *Human Capital Strategy for Defence* is being developed with a number of issues in mind: strategic planning, support to capability, changing circumstances, and individual aspirations and needs. The HC Strategy will support the strategic objectives of Defence by setting the direction for the development of personnel policies, by facilitating the allocation of workforce priorities and outlining the obligations on Programs to meet the aim of achieving best practice human capital management.

The corporate philosophy for human capital management encompasses, but is not limited to, the following:

- Defence recognises that its greatest strength is the knowledge, skills and capabilities of its people.
- Defence recognises, values and uses the diverse nature of its workforce.
- Defence will ensure that its people are appropriately skilled to do their jobs and pursue their career aspirations.

- Defence will monitor the latest developments in human resource management practices and adapt and use these where appropriate.
- Defence supports individual involvement, consultation and communication at all levels in the decision making process and will provide mechanisms to allow this to happen.
- Defence will offer fair and reasonable remuneration.
- Defence will respond quickly and flexibly to change.

## The Future

Organisations do not think, plan, operate or make decisions – people do. Human capital management is a major vehicle for continuous improvement and management of change. The Australian Defence Organisation is on the starting block for the next century. We have underway plans, policies and changes to ensure we are a capable organisation into the future. The changes have just begun – the impact will be enormous. The challenge is there to be met, conquered and mastered. Our history is full of examples of the men and women of Defence achieving greatness when challenged. By meeting these challenges, the Australian Defence Organisation will become a High Performance Organisation.





## "People... the last to be considered"

Commodore Jack McCaffrie CSM RAN<sup>1</sup>

Like the RAN, New Zealand's Navy is heading into the 21st Century with a fresh approach to its perennial personnel problems. Just as the Defence Reform Program and the new, influential, Defence Personnel Executive are changing attitudes in Canberra and across the ADF, so too has the NZDF embraced change for its personnel management. This means that at the highest levels of naval leadership, intense effort is focused on what the civilian world calls 'Human resource management'.

In fact our new emphasis has developed in response to a major retention problem. In 1995/96 the outflow of trained and qualified personnel reached 15% across the NZDF – an attrition rate that would knock any combat unit out of the fight<sup>2</sup>. This outflow affected the Navy particularly, but was also experienced by the RNZAF, which lost 25% of its trained pilots that year and still suffers any time the airlines want more aircrew. Indeed it was not frigates or replacement fighters that grabbed the attention of Wellington's politicians during 1997, it was the defence personnel crisis.

For the RNZN the personnel crisis meant that the new sealift ship *HMNZS CHARLES UPHAM* had only a brief sea going career, before being laid up at extended notice for sea, pending the design studies and funds for conversion to her intended role. For the same reason the training frigate *HMNZS WAIKATO* prematurely stopped running in 1997. Our oceanographic research ship *HMNZS TUI* had already been laid up, after her nuclear-test protest duties off Mururoa in 1995.

The RNZN's manning priority was, quite correctly, the new ANZAC-class frigates; hence many of our trained people were (and are) standing by the new ships and undertaking the lengthy and vital pre-joining training courses. Along with an extension to *HMNZS MONOWAI*'s survey commitments and a slow entry into service of her replacement *HMNZS RESOLUTION*, the RNZN was, for a period, a one frigate Navy.

This experience reflected the harsh truth behind Commodore McCaffrie's remark that heads this essay – the RNZN was so focussed on new ships, saving money and other significant policy changes, that the Navy's personnel policies had been given a lower priority. "If there is a weakness" Commodore McCaffrie went on to say, "it is in our inability to keep as many of the good people for as long as we like". The Commodore was talking about the RAN, but the New Zealand experience was similar and, in some

ways, occurred ahead of the RAN's current problems. But this is not a 'me too' cry from the Shaky Isles, rather the RNZN's experience should be seen as a case study for the RAN.

### Defence Reform

New Zealand's equivalent of the Defence Efficiency Review occurred in 1988. It was the Defence Resource Management Review, known as the Quigley Review. But rather than a subsequent internal Defence Reform Program as in Australia, the Government of the day enacted the Defence Act 1990 to create two separate defence organisations: the NZDF, comprising a Headquarters and the three single Services under the command of CDF; and the civilian Ministry of Defence, responsible for defence policy advice and development. Of course the Headquarters and the MoD are co-located, since defence policy development cannot occur in isolation from defence operations.

However, unlike the DRP, the new defence structure was also aligned to the government-wide financial management reforms, so CDF became the prime budget manager for the NZDF and he allocated financial resources to the three single-Service Chiefs. Any other functions were carried out on an agency basis by the single Services; there were no other high level budget managers. (The new MoD, however, managed the capital equipment budget.) Compared with the ADF's 14 budget managers under the DRP, the Kiwi solution is admirable in its simplicity.

As intended by these reforms, the Service Chiefs became more directly responsible for their personnel policies. Their new financial responsibilities meant that the costs of all the various conditions of Service were finally linked to operational outcomes. Service Chiefs could now see, for example, the costs of overseas study by doctors and weigh them against the cost of, say, tanker safety courses. In other words, all the costs of personnel, previously lost in the maze of different financial responsibilities, started to become apparent to top management.

And most visible of all was the cost of pay, at a time when the NZDF was also committed to building new frigates, reequipping the Army's artillery, engineers and transport units, and also modernising the Air Force. The pay system too was being restructured, with the goal of setting a 'pay for performance' system in place, when we had long been used to an 'all of one company' approach.





New Zealand was in a recession back in the early 90s, but the government-wide reform process served to constrain overall government spending, reduce the tax burden and so allow the overall economy to pick up. When conditions improved (and incidentally the contracts from the ANZAC frigate project played a large part in New Zealand's subsequent recovery) the civilian sector proved flexible and responsive – by the mid-90s the New Zealand economy was enjoying very high growth rates.

But Defence Force pay rates were dependent on central government funding, yet the government was determined to hold the cost of Defence down. The effect on the armed forces was predictable: the pay of our Service men and women fell behind that of their civilian counterparts. The much vaunted benchmarking of pay rates under the new pay system proved inadequate to enable NZDF rates to respond. As late as 1997, a merchant service marine engineer could be paid \$NZ 70,000, while his RNZN counterpart was paid only \$57,500<sup>3</sup>. Similar tales were heard among cooks and stewards, radio and radar technicians, indeed across the spectrum of defence skills and specialties.

The result was inevitable; from the onset of the economic recovery in 1994 until this year, departures from the armed forces far exceeded the ability of the recruiting and training system to train and replace people. A temporary scheme of retention bonuses was developed for critical branches (primarily pilots but also adapted for naval technicians) in an effort to stem the flow. Yet the ability of the NZDF to react was hampered by our open ended engagement policy, which allowed every Service person to expect a 20 year career, yet enabled them to choose if and when to leave. "All the cards were held by Service people" the Assistant Chief of Defence Staff for Personnel told NZ Defence Quarterly, 'but [the open ended engagement] didn't give management any assurances for planning'<sup>4</sup>.

Not only did 'management' have a hard time planning, but postings into personnel management were not seen as desirable. Commander Tony Chadwick, a veteran of many personnel staff jobs, commented: "Personnel absorb 70% of the Navy's resources and 70% of the problems come from personnel yet many officers, aspiring to higher command, do not want to spend time in this area."<sup>5</sup>

## Project 'Service 21'

The retention crisis of the mid-90s ensured that the NZDF had to focus on its people. Under the guidance of the CDF, Lt Gen Tony Birks, who had made it clear that people and improved conditions of service were his personal priority, Defence Headquarters began to develop a fundamentally new approach to our human resource management.

The result is "Service 21", an extensive and joint-Service reassessment of conditions of service. The Service 21 project was initiated in 1996, briefed across the NZDF during 1997 and its key elements came into force in July 1998. Compared with previous personnel policy implementation, this was a remarkably quick project.

The key philosophy behind Service 21 is a shift from a paternalistic relationship (in which the Service tells its people what is good for them), to one of mutual responsibility between each Service person and his or her Service. In other words, the individual Service person will now gain some influence over his or her career development, through having a better knowledge of options and the opportunity for individual consultation.

The new project also has enhanced the engagement structure to a series of renewable fixed term engagements for all (new) regular force personnel. Initial engagements can now be as short as eight years in the RNZN (15 years for officers), but this can vary depending on specialty and complexity of training. In addition Service 21 seeks to put in place better career management systems, and to develop a continuing process for monitoring people's perceptions.

Linked to the renewable fixed term engagements is a series of new financial incentives, comprising both completion bonuses for those completing a contracted term and incentive bonuses targeted at those whom the Service wishes to retain. This article is not the place for the detail of these bonuses, but it is clear that this element will be critical to the success of the new engagement scheme, since pay has been a major dissatisfier over the past decade.

## Navy Initiatives

But a Defence Force-wide shift in philosophy and a promise of new engagement rules for new recruits does little to address the needs of personnel now. Within the RNZN, the then CNS recognised the looming personnel crisis and in late 1995 convened a special, high level, conference on 'Our People'. Intended to review the whole of our personnel management approaches, the Conference delivered an array of recommendations to the Naval Staff. The major initiative, accepted by CNS, was to set up a series of Retention Action Committees, which began work in January 1996. Each RAC took a detailed view of retention problems across each of the branches of the Navy. By survey, anecdote and personal experience the committees assessed the issues facing their branch and then reported through the Maritime Commander to CNS.

First of the RACs to report back was the Marine Engineering Branch RAC, since without sufficient MEs, our ships were not sailing. As a result of the





RAC's work, the ME branch is being extensively restructured, training tempo increased and mature-age recruits accepted. Of course many of the ME issues were also found to apply to the WE branch, whose work remains central to our ships' capacity to fight. So due to the RAC process, the employment structure of the technical branches of the RNZN is changing, reflecting our new ships and new equipment.

But all branches in the Navy are important to our ships' performance, and CNS has introduced a series of initiatives designed to enhance conditions across the Navy as a whole: sea going allowances have been revised, to encourage continued service at sea; recruit training reviewed to remove dehumanising or intimidatory practices; duty watches in Auckland reduced; and the place of women across all branches in the Navy, confirmed\* (Women are prohibited only from joining the Diving Branch.) Together with a coherent plan to rebuild and modernise the naval base complex, and a determination to introduce family support initiatives, the atmosphere throughout the Auckland naval command has greatly improved.

In parallel with this process, the training establishment, HMNZS *TAMAKI*, has been accredited as the Naval College, with most of its courses linked to the nationwide national Qualifications Framework. This enables the accredited naval courses to be recognised in the civilian world, enhancing both the Navy's credibility and each individual's personal qualifications.

Many of these are non-pay changes to conditions of service; since pay had to be addressed within HQNZDF on a joint-Service basis, the Naval Staff sought to improve other conditions quickly, so as to encourage an awareness of issues other than just pay. None the less pay is crucial, and in the 1996 pay adjustment a conscious effort was made by the Navy to improve the pay structure at the AB/Leading Hand level. Subsequent annual reviews have improved pay for the PO/CPO level and now in 1998 for the WO level.

The Naval Staff's experience with the RAC process ensured that the naval officers assigned to the Service 21 project were able to inject many of these new ideas into the joint-Service environment. In addition, the RAC process underlined the importance of two-way communication throughout the organisation and the success of the RAC initiatives has been due, in part, to better communication of their implementation. Internal communication has been enhanced by a new Navy news magazine, which also improves our communication with families and the wider civilian world. As well, the current CNS has initiated an

annual Navy Week, intended to further link the general public with the fleet, but also intended to boost the RNZN's own corporate sense of self-esteem.

## A training ship

One initiative was vital, the dedication of HMNZS *WELLINGTON* to the role of training ship. *WELLINGTON*, fresh from refit and rearmed with Phalanx CIWS in place of the old Seacat, was expecting the usual cycle of workup exercises and deployment; instead she has had a reduced core ship's company so that groups of up to 100 ordinary seamen can be embarked for four month periods. *WELLINGTON*'s program was then adjusted so that in each four month period, the trainees would experience the equivalent of a year's events and activities. In fact *WELLINGTON*'s overall program was not greatly altered – at present she is deployed to North East Asia, including port visits in Japan, Korea and China. The ship has successfully produced nearly three times the usual number of qualified junior ratings, thus materially improving the overall manpower shortage that was affecting our other ships. Yet pressure on the training system will not reduce; clearly the demand for more, higher level, training will also increase as these new trained people progress through the system.

At present, the prospects for our naval personnel are good. After *CHARLES UPHAM*'s planned conversion, we will deploy an effective sea lift ship that will supplement the RAN's amphibious squadron when required; the *RESOLUTION* gives us a very high-tech survey and oceanographic ship, with only one quarter of the manpower bill of its two predecessors, while *TE KAHAKA* is proving to be an excellent ship (and *TE MANA* is imminent). *CANTERBURY*, recently reequipped to operate Seasprites, is now in all but its engineering plant a state-of-the art frigate. And most importantly, our revamped training system is producing the trained young men and women to operate these ships.

## Conclusion

1998 has been a year in which the RNZN as a whole is starting to enjoy the results of the greater emphasis on human resource management. Personnel policies are all-encompassing – affecting facilities, the training system, the pay and incentive structure, fleet operations and public perceptions. Obviously many personnel issues are joint-Service in nature, yet the Naval Staff realised that there had to be single-Service responsibility for their application. Rather than being 'unfashionable', personnel policies

\* After public allegations of sexual harassment in a frigate deployed to the Gulf, the subsequent series of investigations and courts martial initially divided the Navy during 1996/97. But, like the incident in HMAS *SWAN*, the events – painful as they were – served to illuminate the RNZN's attitudes to change as well as to emphasise the permanency of the changed place of women in the contemporary Navy.





are central to the Navy's well being, but only if those policies are coherent and mutually supportive.

Commodore McCaffrie's remark has been borne out by the RNZN's experience; for too long our personnel policies had a low priority. The near shut-down of the fleet in 1996/97 showed us that our people are too important to be taken for granted. With the new policy and the array of recent initiatives, the RNZN's personnel managers (that is, all those in the command chain) should be able to better manage our officers and sailors. In the long run, our success will be proven by the quality of our ships' performance. But at this stage, the indications within the RNZN are good; while ship building projects, equipment and facilities remain important, without trained and experienced people, our organisation would have withered.

Hence the RNZN experience can be a useful case study for the RAN. While there are many differences of scale between our two navies, the similarities of philosophy and operational policy are such that the RNZN has lessons for the RAN, especially while Australia undergoes the perils and promise of defence reform.

#### NOTES

- 1 McCaffrie, J. The RAN and Australia's Maritime Security, p267 in *Maritime Power in the 20th Century*; D Stevens (Ed); Allen and Unwin, 1998
- 2 Barber, David. Jumping the Fence, in *NZ Defence Quarterly*, no. 21 Winter 1998
- 3 *ibid.*
- 4 *ibid.*
- 5 *Navy Today*, p 6; No.7, December 1996

*Note.* The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Captain John Ladd RNZN and Mr Peter Cozens in developing this essay. None the less the author alone is responsible for the opinions expressed here, as well as for any errors.





# CONSTANCY AMID CHANGE – an RSL Perspective

by Maj-Gen P.R. Phillips and CDRE M.A. Clarke AM

## "Change is the only constant"

Australia's servicemen and women of the 1990s could be forgiven if they felt they were enduring more rapid and far reaching change than their predecessors.

Changes have ranged over the broad spectrum of the Australian Defence Force (ADF), brought about by political decisions, often following some inquiry, which in turn have resulted in yet another re-organisation. One could be cynical and recall the words of the Roman Centurion, Petronius Arbiter, in 210 BC who is reputed to have said:

*We trained hard but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams we were re-organised. I was to learn later in life, that we tend to meet any new situation by re-organising and what a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while actually producing confusion, inefficiency and demoralisation.*

## Change – Cost efficient or cost minimisation?

The current emphasis on reduction in the numerical size of the ADF is presented as a need to increase the front line capability of the armed forces with new technology, at the expense of the administrative tail because of the very high personnel costs – a 'bigger bang for the buck'. It follows the trend in the industrialised world to cut staffing levels, focus on core competencies and outsource competitively wherever possible.

The Coalition Government's Defence Reform Program (DRP) continues this trend of cost cutting efficiency. The DRP has also been touted as a necessary precursor to any attempt to have the proportion of GDP spent on Defence increased. Cabinet needed to see that Defence had been 'screwed down hard' and milked of any further efficiency dividends before capital spending is increased.

With the massive increase in the costs of the sophisticated weapons and equipment now needed for the armed forces in order to compete with, match or be superior to, those of any potential aggressor in our region, a fair balance needs to be found when seeking and retaining the personnel of the ADF.

With the second Howard ministry in place, the new Government has indicated that it is more concerned about issues beyond the economy. It is to be hoped that this might lead to a better balancing of economic considerations with the major issues of retaining credible forces and with some regard for the demands of Service life.

## Change and "The Knowledge Edge"

Even with the greatest arsenal of modern weapons systems, no defence force can operate them efficiently or successfully without competent personnel, capable and willing to do so in all situations. The 'knowledge edge' is an important strategic advantage which Australia enjoys in the region. However, the human element, the question of courage and morale, as well as conditions of service, must be addressed in any serious consideration of this most important factor in any concept of defence force operations, with its ultimate sanction of serious injury or death.

With the ever decreasing numerical size of the uniformed ADF and the ever increasing tendency towards civilianisation of "shore based" non-military style jobs,

*...the morale of ADF personnel must be addressed...*

This together with the ever present requirement for loyalty, courage and sacrifice, and with the demand for total adherence to the military disciplinary code and ethos, the unique nature of service in the ADF does not fit easily with the current contemporary social trends, attitudes and lifestyles.

There is constant need to:

- be aware of and preserve the high standards of courage, morale, patriotism, training, discipline, and leadership while personnel are serving in the ADF;
- be acutely aware of the needs and expectations of personnel, including their families, and the rewards due to them while they separate from the ADF; and,
- recognise and accept fully the unique nature of the service in the ADF.





## Courage – A Constant

There are two distinct kinds of courage – moral and physical. The definition of physical courage is probably fairly simple; it is, in a fighting person, the ability to prevent the fear of pain or death from affecting his or her conduct, and this of course includes the ability to hide the outward signs of fear from their compatriots. But, the definition of moral courage is more complex and difficult. In a leader it includes the will and the ability to take unpopular decisions. In everyone, it includes the will and the ability to do the right thing in the face of ridicule. It means holding on to the right when it is easier and much more comfortable to do just that little bit of wrong. It means also endurance in the face of boredom and fatigue.

Moral courage is greater than physical courage, much more difficult to achieve. In most cases the possessor of moral courage will also be physically brave. The reverse is by no means certain. Perhaps we all know the tough insensitive character who never shows physical fear but who will always take the easy way out if doing right is difficult or uncomfortable. Whilst there is no guarantee that the present most comprehensive selection criteria and procedures for entry into the ADF can ever remove the possibility of a human element breakdown in courage, it is clearly a matter for the ADF to address.

However, one must be aware of the many factors which tend to sap courage. Courage can be quickly sapped by any general lowering of morale, lack of faith in leadership or in the cause. It is as if every person has a bank of courage that in normal circumstances, by exercise of will, can be topped up. If however he or she is exposed to great danger over a prolonged period, without the opportunity to replenish the capital of courage by rest and relaxation, then it is spent more quickly than it can be replaced. Then even the bravest can crack.

## Conditions of Service – A Change for the Better

There are many other seemingly small or unimportant factors outside the broad consideration of conditions of service, which seem to be a constant source of irritation to serving members of the ADF and which can, and frequently do become major problems while still serving and on separation from the service. The past decade has seen great improvements in the conditions of service for the ADF, including the procedures in situ for review of pay and allowances. Nevertheless, a lack of a current updating on other personnel matters will be a source of dissatisfaction leading to a drop in morale.

One of the great success stories of post-War ADF

administration was the Defence Housing Authority. Following thirty years of government neglect, which reduced Service families to living in welfare housing ghettos, a remarkable change was wrought in less than a decade.

*...Housing became a positive attraction of Service life...*

Moreover, it positively contributes to national security through enhancing the preparedness of Service personnel. It would be a grave step back if the Authority was to be dismantled for some ideological or miserly whim.

## Change by Commercialisation

There seems to be a loss of confidence by some personnel that there are still worthwhile long term career prospects in their chosen service. This uncertainty, coupled with a tendency by Governments to treat the ADF as an industry or just another branch of the public service, can lead to worries by personnel and their families about job security and job satisfaction, both during service and on separation. Nowhere is there more evident than in the Commercial Support Program.

The recent report of the performance audit by the Auditor-General on contracting out within Defence (*Commercial Support Program Department of Defence*) presented to the Parliament in July this year, is highly sceptical whether reported savings are being achieved. Further, it refers to the UK experience with outsourcing where savings over time have been much less than originally estimated. The report makes the telling point that "generally speaking the Department is not in a position to accurately define and cost an activity as it exists prior to CSP." Later in the report there is an indication that the Auditor-General suspects that the savings from contracting out could be as low as 1 per cent of the cost if performed within Defence.

But against the backdrop of limited savings,

*...there are indisputable grounds for reviewing the overall value of outsourcing...*

One major consideration is the risk that no substitute arrangement will be implemented to replace the historic role played by the Services in providing the trained personnel needed to maintain the highly sophisticated weapon systems of a modern Defence Force. The Auditor-General touched on one aspect of this issue in what he called 'a note of caution' by quoting from a report of the Joint Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade issued in April 1998:

*Through employing already-trained (ex Defence) personnel, that successful civilian tenderer is able to provide a commercially attractive initial price*





*... because there is no need to factor in staff training costs ... With the need for the civilian agency to begin training replacement personnel, the increased costs will be reflected in the cost of the function to Defence, and the apparent gains achieved in the short term may not be sustained.*

Related to this issue, is what will arise when current contracts mature. In many areas it may not be feasible for an alternative tenderer to the current supplier to effectively compete, due to the intimate knowledge that the contractor will have, the lack of personnel with the necessary training, and the disturbance to the workplace during any period of transiting from one contractor to another. There must be a considerable risk of 'contractor lock in' with the attendant risk of his price becoming unattractive and the benefit of the contract generally deteriorating.

There is also a plethora of personnel considerations involved in outsourcing. To just touch on some of these, there are matters of critical mass' for professional and trade groupings. The size of the employment group naturally bears upon career progression and personal fulfilment in employment. Indeed this issue is relevant to each Service as a whole must raise concerns in the minds of many young people about the attractiveness of that Service as a long term career.

The loss of non-operational positions due to outsourcing, must impact on the average length of tours in ship/field appointments, and must impact on members and families in terms of members' absences from home and families' periods of location in the more remote areas away from extended families. These factors bear critically upon morale and commitment to longer term service.

The issues that are involved in outsourcing are complex and far reaching, but extremely important to maintaining an efficient and effective defence effort and a Defence Force of high morale and professionalism. The total canvas of interrelated matters raised by outsourcing needs best possible judgement of the optimal balance between a viable defence force and a supportive civilian infrastructure.

The indications are that in implementing outsourcing, only lip service has been paid to factors other than cost savings (and as we have mentioned these seem to be largely illusory). For example, after seven years of CSP, the Auditor-General asserts that the Department of Defence does not have a complete detailed specification of Members Required in Uniform. Elsewhere he states "another area where CSP could have been more effective is that of in-house options."

In this regard, in some instances it may be overall more effective and certainly much less disturbing to present arrangements, to access accurately the saving to be achieved from outsourcing (assuming this can in

fact be done) and to require the Defence elements to operate within a budget equivalent to the cost if the function were outsourced.

This solution would not necessarily mean that the public interest would be the ultimate loser. The Auditor-General shows that the private sector does not always deliver more efficient services than in-house. He states: "One of the contracts reviewed had significant problems from the time the contract was signed. Despite numerous meetings over three years, the overall standard was poor." On the next page he states: "In one case over 150 notices of non-conformance were issued in three years."

## The Constant and Unique Nature of ADF Service

To conclude, what better than to recognise and accept those unique features of service life. This will go a long way towards forestalling perceived problems associated with the human element of capability.

- The profession of arms demands from all personnel a total commitment of service to their country, a commitment which involves loyalty, responsibility, discipline and dedication beyond that normally required from the society to which they belong;

*...this loyalty and dedication can be in direct conflict with the loyalty and dedication expected in a marriage...*

- Military personnel are subject to military law, with its own judicial arrangements and punishments, in addition to civilian law. They are subjected to the authority of the lawful command that is potentially operative on a continuous basis all day every day, and which may require considerable risk to life.
- Failure to conform with the requirements of military law and discipline can result in penalties varying from extra duties, fines and imprisonment, spouses may find, at no notice, their partner incarcerated and their pay stopped or severely reduced by fines which can far exceed the civilian norm. Military law proscribes any form of collective action to redress grievances; this proscription has been observed by most families and has militated against spouses speaking out through fear of loss of their partner's ADF career.
- All members of the ADF are required to be proficient in military skills as well as their trade skills. They are required to perform any legal task within their ability, without regard to normal employment skill, duty statement or rate of remuneration; thus the anxiety and fears related to combat or training for combat affects all families.
- *...All personnel are often required to work long hours...*





shift work, irregular work or a combination of all, with no say as to whether they will, or will not, do so. When they carry out such work there are no penalty rates of pay, although some compensation by way of leave and Service Allowance may be given; this establishes a feeling of insecurity in some families, leading to stress.

- ADF personnel can be sent to live, work and/or fight anywhere within or outside Australia, with no option. This can have disastrous effects on marriages and families.
- ADF personnel are restricted in their style of living by having to conform to standards of dress, appearance and behaviour and by being restricted in the times they must keep, the places they can visit and, in some instances, the conversations they can have; this also imposes lifestyle limitations on both the spouse and the family. At times ADF personnel are required to live and work in most uncomfortable conditions for varying periods; the results can be felt in the home through changes in the member's behaviour attitudes.
- ADF personnel do not have a trade union to protect their conditions of employment. Their protection comes through their conditions of service and the diligence of their senior officers in pursuing a fair deal.

*...Members have a perception that the system has failed in cases of removal or reduction of a subsidy...*

which has occurred in relation to rent subsidy and in other areas in the past. Reduced income causes great hardship and a lowering of morale, particularly in the families of the lower ranks.

- Personnel may be separated from their families for service reasons for periods up to twelve months or more, due to duty, exercise, training or operations; some families cope with this, others do not; there are not always support mechanisms from extended families available at the particular posting locations.
- ADF personnel and their families are subject to frequent moves, with attendant stress on their physical and psychological well-being, finances, personal belongings, schooling, extended families, marriage, social adjustment and general well-being. On moving, networks of friends and supporters for family members may be broken due to attitudes to the profession of arms or to particular commitments, (eg. Vietnam).

National Headquarters  
Returned & Services League of Australia  
Canberra ACT





## Book Review

### SHIPMATES

Illustrated tales of the Mascots carried  
in RAN Ships and Establishments

By Vic Cassells

Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander Greg Swinden

While many Naval historians are concentrating on the larger issues of maritime policy, doctrine or where the Navy fits into the big picture, there are others who are looking at the minor details. Vic Cassells recently published book on the mascots carried in RAN ships and establishments is certainly one of the latter. His book describes in detail the many and varied animals which have seen 'service' in the RAN particularly during World War II.



The carrying of mascots in ships has now become very much a bygone event as the nature of modern warfare and minimum manned ships effectively prevents this type of activity, although mascots in Shore Establishments have persisted until fairly recent times. Up until the end of World War II, however, no self

respecting cruiser, destroyer or corvette went to sea without some form of mascot, which was often carried as a good luck charm. In fact the attempts by HMAS *PERTH*'s ships cat 'Redlead' to leave the ship, just prior to the cruiser being sunk in the Battle of Sunda Strait with the loss of over half the ships company, were seen by many onboard as a very bad omen.

Vic's book lists the mascots in ship alphabetical order and is very well illustrated with over 200 interesting photographs and contains a wealth of information on the mascots which have 'served' the RAN well. These include the standard Naval issue bulldogs, cats, birds, a plethora of monkeys and the occasional koala and crocodile.

*Shipmates* is an A4 laminated paperback book available for \$30.00 (which includes postage) from

the author Vic Cassells PO Box 229 Paradise Point QLD 4216 and cheques/money orders should be made payable to Vic Cassells. This book is another welcome addition to the rich and varied history of the RAN and one that all keen Naval historians should invest in.

### THE VUNG TAU FERRY

HMAS *SYDNEY* and Escort Ships

(Vietnam 1965-72)

By Rodney Nott and Noel Payne

Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander Greg Swinden

1998 has certainly been a bumper year for Australian Naval histories concerning the Vietnam War. Firstly we had 'In the Oceans Dark Embrace' by Lex McAulay which described the role of Clearance Diving Team 3. Then came 'Up Top' by Jeffrey Grey (the RAN's history as part of the Official History of Australia in South East Asian Conflicts series) and last but by no means least 'The Vung Tau Ferry'. Effectively the number of books written about the RAN in the Vietnam War has doubled in the space of a year.

The Vung Tau Ferry details the involvement of the Fast Troop Transport HMAS *SYDNEY* in her 25 voyages to South Vietnam between May 1965 and November 1972. The book also includes details on her escort ships (Frigates or Destroyers) and the voyages made by the MV (later HMAS) *BOONAROO* and the MV (later HMAS) *JEPARIT*.

This history describes the events which lead up to *SYDNEY* being used as Fast Troop Transport, her time in South Vietnamese waters and there are a number of interesting stories from several of her crew and soldiers who were transported to and from Vietnam. The book also goes into depth concerning the lengthy fight, by the Vietnam Logistic Support Group, to gain official recognition for the role played by *SYDNEY*, and her escorts, which culminated in the issue of the Vietnam Logistic and Support Medal in 1992.

This later fight for official recognition makes interesting reading and reminds me of a story told to me by one of my high school teachers who had served in *SYDNEY* as a Naval Reservist. He claims that several *SYDNEY* sailors attempted to have Australian troops ashore fire on the vessel, in order to strengthen future claims that the ship had served in a 'War Zone'.





Who knows, but why in this case, let the truth spoil a good story.

This hardcover book is well illustrated with several interesting and very clear photographs and also includes a comprehensive list of all personnel who served in the RAN during Logistic Support Operations during the period 1965–72.

## REGIONAL MARITIME MANAGEMENT AND SECURITY – EDITED BY SAM BATEMAN AND STEPHEN BATES

*Reviewed by: John Mortimer*

This book which is published by the Strategic Defence Studies Centre of the Australian National University comprises the discussion papers from the third meeting of the Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) held in Bangkok from 30 May to 1 June 1997.

The theme of the meeting was regional ocean management and security. Its objectives were to:

- \* to review progress with the Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation;
- \* to contribute to the development of new ideas about cooperative management of regional sea and ocean areas,
- \* to identify present and planned activities in some area of regional maritime cooperation (such as shipping, resource management, pollution prevention, maritime safety, and law and order at sea) which have benefits for regional security (that is value added); and
- \* to share national and sub-regional perspectives of cooperative oceans and marine management.

The majority of the book comprises a series of presentations on the marine administrative arrangements for a range of countries extending from India to Japan. These presentations are largely provided by academics and the odd Government official, though not necessarily from the relevant Government organisation. The result is that one is occasionally left questioning the accuracy and validity of comments offered and indeed whether they reflect the Government's view or that of the presenter.

The national issues are followed by a series of papers covering regional maritime cooperation. These include Southeast Asia, the South Pacific, the South China Sea, the Baltic and Mediterranean seas and the Caribbean. A copy of CSCAP Memorandum No. 4: Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation, is also included.

Overall, the book is somewhat disappointing. While it is useful as a starting point for those wishing to understand national management arrangements, it is

not comprehensive, nor indeed accurate. For example, the discussion of Australia's maritime cooperation with its neighbours confines itself to maritime surveillance with Malaysia, Indonesia and New Zealand, and oil pollution control. No reference is made to the Pacific Patrol Boat program where Australia provided patrol boats to a host of South Pacific countries to assist in their sovereignty protection. Nor is there reference to the CSIRO's cooperative oceanographic research activities or to P3 patrols of the South Pacific. No mention is made of the considerable body of maritime cooperation that the Australian Defence Force undertakes with most countries of South East Asia and the South West Pacific.

It is evident that if we are to get full value out of this second track initiative future representatives will need to liaise more closely with relevant Government officials especially in areas on the environment, transport, scientific research and defence.

Much has happened since the CSCAP meeting in 1997, most noteworthy being the Australian Government's initiative to develop an "Oceans Policy", which covers all areas of ocean management. Similarly, there has been progress on developing maritime cooperation in the region. Of particular note is the cooperation between the Singaporean and Indonesian navies to clear World War II minefields in regional waters. The Royal Australian Navy has also undertaken to assist in these mine clearance operations.





Edited by Michael Pugh,  
**The UN, Peace and Force.**

(from the Cass series on Peacekeeping)

London: Frank Cass, 1997.

209 pp. \$60.00

Peacekeeping is at a crossroads. The experience of the post-Cold war era suggests that traditional peacekeeping is not sufficient for the challenges posed in this new context. It also suggests that UN structures are having difficulty in addressing these challenges. This is in large part as a result of member state's unwillingness to bear the burden of financial commitment and the danger associated with the transition from traditional to more ambitious forms of peacekeeping.

*UN, Peace and Force* is the second in the *Cass Series*. This series examines all aspects of peacekeeping, from the political, operational and legal dimensions to the development and humanitarian issues that must be dealt with by all those involved with peacekeeping in the world today. As the title suggests, this book aims to provide a comprehensive examination of the UN and the use of force to achieve peace.

The composition of the book is not as the result of a conference but a selection of academics. The authors represent both established academics whose reflections are informed by years of research, and relative newcomers finishing or who have recently finished post-graduate work.

Of the eleven chapters, four deal essentially with the main issue: the UN and the collective use of force. The most thoughtful of these chapters is that by Stephen P. Kinloch (GHS, Geneva) who considers the concept of a permanent international military volunteer force. This issue is at the heart of the current debate over the reform of the UN. A permanent force is viewed by some as a pragmatic solution to emergencies, however, it has been rejected by others as utopian. Consequently it is an ongoing unresolved issue within the UN.

The second main theme of the book is what Michael Pugh describes as the 'conservatism' of the peacekeeping concept itself, that has led to a lack of commitment in individual nations. The chapters by Fred Tanner (University of Malta), Don Daniel (US Naval War College) and Bradd Hayes (US Naval War College) all suggest that peacekeeping needs to adapt to survive new environments where consent for a UN presence may be fragile or partial. These authors all seek a 'third option' for UN forces, one that is more robust than traditional peacekeeping, yet short of war. The aim being to induce parties to abide by their agreements, compel them to disarm, or to convince them that continued combat is futile. The editor reminds the reader that a messy environment is rarely

repaired by a messy intervention. The remaining chapters focus on the practical implementation of UN mandates, humanitarian intervention and the success (or lack of) of recent operations.

The final chapter is by the editor himself, Michael Pugh (University of Plymouth), who clearly summarises the books previous chapters while discussing what he describes as horizontal and vertical 'mission creep'. In 'horizontal mission creep' he discusses the unintended engagement of military forces in non-military activities such as humanitarian relief and refugee aid. In 'vertical mission creep' he analyses the unintended escalation of the scale of force used. As is often learnt in hindsight, unintended escalation often means being unprepared. In his concluding remarks Pugh exposes the inconsistency of peacekeeping and provides a stage for subsequent analysis of the politics of maintaining peace in the international system.

*UN, Peace and Force* explores the multidimensional role the United Nations has played in peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding over the last few years. By examining missions such as that in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, and drawing lessons from the UN 'success stories' in Cambodia and El Salvador, the book seeks to point the way towards more effective ways for the international community to address conflict in the post-Cold War era.

This book is especially timely given its focus on the empty middle ground between traditional peacekeeping and all out peace enforcement. As events in Bosnia and Somalia have shown, the lines between warfighting and peacekeeping have not always been drawn as clearly as they should. Certainly, the politicians, diplomats, bureaucrats, and military advisers most responsible for engineering the twin failures of Bosnia and Somalia would have profited greatly from reading *UN, Peace and Force*.

This individual studies contained in this volume provide a wide-ranging discussion of the institutional, political, and military aspects of peacekeeping at this moment of uncertainty in multilateral efforts to respond to new challenges in the field. In addition to defining the problems, they provide a number of recommendations on how to rise above the apparent crisis in peacemaking. As is highlighted by all contributors the issue remains not so much what the problems are, or how to solve them, but whether there exists in the international community sufficient resolve to do so.

The book's main deficiency is a lack of focus at times. In one volume it is difficult to digest the extent of international security issues relevant to post-Cold War peace enforcement and some selectivity is required. The structure of the book may have been better organised by rearranging the order of the chapters to provide better context and continuity.





The main contribution of this volume is bringing to the fore the politics of participating in operations. This book will be welcomed by policy makers and planners, academics and students, military personnel in the field, journalists and members of humanitarian organisations. It is an objective study, at the same time critical and constructive. This book has the twin virtues of timeliness and relevance while its contemporary content will prevent it becoming obsolete.

The other book in the series thus far is *Beyond the Emergency: Development within UN Missions* edited by Jeremy Ginifer.

Reviewed by:  
Lieutenant Lee Goddard  
Gunnery Officer  
NUSHIP ARUNTA

## Where Australians Fought

### The Encyclopedia of Australia's Battles.

By Chris Coulthard-Clark,  
St. Leonards NSW: Allen and Unwin,  
1998, 320 pp, AUS \$50.00

Chris Coulthard-Clark's detailed encyclopedia covers every battle that Australian's have fought in the past 210 years. Among the 300 plus actions covered are; aboriginal struggles against white expansionism, the convict uprising at Castle Hill, the Eureka Stockade, the unheroic Australian riots in Cairo during World War I and the miner's battles at Dingbat Flat, Kalgoorlie. It carefully reconstructs the naval battles Australia fought during World War I and II and details Australia's most recent participation in the Kuwait conflict and subsequent DAMASK operations. The book is comprehensive and reinforces the impression that fighting is firmly embedded in the Australian cultural myth.

Coulthard-Clark claims that the toughness of Australia's early years shaped our fighting men and women. He demonstrates through each action why Australians are renowned for their bravery, resourcefulness, and often unconventional approach. Some of the more remarkable features of Australia's military past has been that most Australians who fought in these conflicts so far from home were volunteers, not career soldiers.

*Where Australians Fought* has been arranged chronologically with the 300 actions carefully detailed. A ready reference is provided to the date and location of each event, and the main units and commanders involved. Based on a study of the historical record and first-hand accounts the book is illustrated throughout with explanatory maps and contemporary drawings and photos of the battle in

progress. This is an accurate and readable account of the course of the conflicts and the outcomes.

Chris Coulthard-Clark is one of Australia's leading and most versatile historians with many notable volumes already to his name. This book is both an invaluable reference for the military specialist and an important guide for general readers unaware of the breadth of Australian experience of combat.

The book is published by Allen & Unwin with the sponsorship of ADI Limited. Every reader will have something that holds special interest in this book.

Reviewed by:  
Lieutenant Lee Goddard  
Gunnery Officer  
NUSHIP ARUNTA



## Library Corner

### Books

The ANI Library is located within the Campbell Park Library. The is an extensive collection available for loan to ANI members. A list of the books held by the Library Councillor and all future new additions to the Library will be listed in this column. Enquiries in regard to **borrowing** the books may be directed to:

Mrs Julie Nicholls  
CO2-5-B5  
Campbell Park Offices  
Canberra ACT 2600  
Phone: (02) 6266 3035  
Fax: (02) 6266 2556

The Library Councillor  
LCDR Kerry Wallis  
Ph: (02) 6265 3297  
Fax: (02) 6265 3297



