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AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE Inc.

The Australian Naval Institute was formed and incorporated in the ACT in 1975. The main objectives of the Institute are:

- to encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and maritime profession; and
- to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and the maritime profession.

The Institute is self-supporting and non-profit-making. Views and opinions expressed in the Institute's publications are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Institute or the Royal Australian Navy. The aim is to encourage discussion, dissemination of information, comment and opinion and the advancement of professional knowledge concerning naval and maritime matters.

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The *Journal of the Australian Naval Institute* welcomes articles and letters on any subject of interest to the naval and maritime professions. In general articles should be no longer than 5000 words and should conform to the *AGPS Style Manual*. Spelling will be in accordance with the Editor's copy of the *Macquarie Dictionary*. Submission of a disk and hard copy is preferable. Enquiries, articles and letters may be directed to the Editor.

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

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Are they valid elements in Australia's future maritime strategy?

by Major A E Foulds, RAInf.

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
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*The Italian Navy in Sydney
(ABPH Simon Metcalfe, RAN)*



*HMNZS Canterbury post refit with CIWS and LWO8
(CMDR Richard Jackson, RNZN)*



From the President

I find myself in an interesting position. On the one hand I am happy to be able to introduce myself to the members of the Australian Naval Institute. On the other I must also say that I will shortly be retiring from the RAN and thus also from the Presidency as well.

The Vernon Parker Oration by Professor Jack Grunawalt of the US Naval War College was recently held over lunch at HMAS Harman. The occasion was very well attended, not only by ANI members. Members and guests were entertained by Professor Grunawalt's presentation which covered the Law of the Sea and its implications for Asian navies from an American perspective. We must continue to encourage a broad audience for this sort of activity which assists us strengthening the influence of the Institute and provides opportunities to achieve our mission of encouraging the advancement of maritime knowledge and the exchange of ideas.



Two similar events are scheduled in July. The first is an ANI organised address by Professor Martin van Crevald of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, to be held at the Australian Defence Force Academy on Thursday 10 July. Professor van Crevald, an internationally acclaimed researcher and writer in the area of strategic studies, is in Australia as the 1997 QANTAS Fellow at the Australian College of Defence Strategic Studies. His subject will be *Do Navies have a future in modern warfare?* Those who want to attend should contact Lieutenant Commander Andy Naughton on (06) 265 3252. The second event is the conference, *Maritime Power in the 20th Century: The Australian Experience*, which is partly sponsored by the ANI. Further details can be obtained from Mr David Stevens on (06) 266 6114. I commend both of these events to members and non-members alike.

There have recently been some encouraging signs that the local chapters of the ANI are gaining momentum. This is a particularly important step. We need to find ways to involve members in the Institute's activities and to encourage new members. The ANI is not a closed society nor does it have anything to hide. I see reinvigorated local chapters as being an excellent means of advertising and demystifying the Institute. I hope that all members will support the initiative of those who are organising the chapters.

Involvement in ANI activities should not be limited only to our members and potential members. The Navy and the Maritime profession is very broad and includes organisations as well as individuals. Those companies who are Friends of the ANI must not be left out of the picture. They facilitate many of the Institute's activities through their support and I would hope that they will feel able to participate in discussion of issues relevant to them. Though it will be for my successor, something we hope to organise is a sea day for the Friends later in the year as the Fleet program permits.

The Defence Reform Program is now in full swing and I am sure that everyone is aware of its essential elements and the benefits it will bring. I think that it highlights, more than ever, the need for institutions such as the ANI, which provide an element of continuity in the rapidly changing defence environment. Australia will certainly always need maritime forces to defend its interests at sea and I can only see that need increasing. The Institute seeks to play a substantial role by maintaining the focus on the important issues in the maritime sphere in spite of changing national circumstances. Or even in spite of changes in President!

I have enjoyed my brief tenure as President and am much encouraged by the activities I have experienced and by the enthusiasm of your Councillors. I have learned a great deal about a not well known aspect of our Naval service, and now realise that I have missed out on much in not having been involved in the activities of the ANI much earlier in my career. There are many others I am sure who do not know how their careers may be similarly enriched. I will watch with renewed interest and with confidence in the Institute's future relevance as a nationally respected forum for public debate on maritime and defence issues.

Murray Forrest

From the Editor

Many people have commented to me that the last issue was too historical in its focus. I agree with them to the extent that it is always good to have a healthy discussion of current issues facing the professional naval community. However, given the reticence displayed by so many it is often difficult to find such articles. In fact there does not seem to be much serious debate on very many issues at all. So if you feel that the balance of material in the Journal is not good, then you can help correct it by writing in on a subject which interests you.

I am not, however, in total agreement with those who think there is too much history and not enough current affairs. History is our corporate memory and traditions. It is experience bought, often at great cost, from which we can all learn. While it is no sure guide to the future, it provides the knowledge with which informed decisions can be made. A service which has no history has very little to fall back on in times of adversity.

While on the general subject of contributions to the Journal, from time to time I receive books for review. I can't review all of them. So if any members would like to volunteer their services in principle, specifics could be agreed upon for the exact books as the opportunities arise. If anyone would like to be on the list of potential reviewers please write to me with your contact details. There will be a prize, yet to be determined, for the best review published during the year. Unsolicited reviews will be considered.

One subject which the RAN has yet to fully come to grips with is doctrine. We have never explicitly stated our doctrine. Discussions then inevitably proceed to one of two questions: we have never had it before, why do we need it now and what is doctrine anyway. The first is a valid question, however is usually used as a statement to end further discussion. The second is reasonably simple if there is a genuine interest in answering the first question. The three navies most closely associated with the RAN have all produced doctrine publications. While having doctrine for the sake of keeping up with the neighbours is not sensible, it is equally nonsensical not to consider why the USN, RN and RNZN have all thought it worthwhile to set out their doctrine. For those who make it beyond the pictures in JANI, and have access to pen and paper at least (preferably word processor), I would suggest that this is a worthy topic for consideration in the Journal. Contributions on any aspect of doctrine, definitional, historical, contemporary or otherwise will be welcomed.

Finally, on behalf of the ANI Council, I would like to thank the Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Rod Taylor, for his permission to publish the prize winning essays from the Peter Mitchell Essay Competition.

Alastair Cooper

The Institute's Internet site is at:
<http://www.navy.gov.au/ani/index.html>

ILLUMINATION ROUNDS

The Future Face of Battle

Military services are often accused, with some historical justification, of preparing for previous conflicts. While there is much consideration of the revolution in military affairs, by armies at least, and some discussion of the 'shape of future conflict', this is usually limited to variations of what is currently feasible. Military planners, somewhat naturally, determine what can be done with what capabilities are available either currently or in the near future.

What about some other 'less conceivable' possibilities - contingencies such as environmental terrorism and computer crime/warfare and how conventional military services will play a role? Even if conventional militaries do not have a role in directly countering such threats, is it morally, legally, politically, economically justifiable to respond with conventional military force: i.e. if country x puts a computer virus in one of country y's bank's computers (assuming it is attributable or detectable) can country y bomb something in country x?

There is no condemnation in not having a concrete answer to such scenarios, but it would be a gross dereliction of duty for the ADF not to have realised the possibility - a possibility that is becoming more and more likely with every month which passes.

Cyber Warrior

DRP Form or Substance?

The current round of Defence Force reforms raises more questions than have been answered. Are there features of each service which need to be maintained? What are they? Do they contribute to operational effectiveness directly (unique operational procedures, doctrine, tactics, etc.) or indirectly (esprit de corps, morale, tradition, culture)?

Is there a point at which unification of the services becomes more an exercise in

changes of appearance rather than substance? If the services are completely integrated then personnel should be reasonably easily interchangeable, but fighter pilots will not necessarily make good platoon commanders or supply officers. Is there a point at which further integration of the services is counterproductive?

If service integration is aimed at operational effectiveness, then what are the benefits for the ways that the three ADF services currently interact?

A cynical observer might say that the current government does not wish to answer these questions nor have the ADF examine them seriously. No matter how many times we are told that funds are being moved from the tail to the teeth, it all seems like another peacetime cost cutting exercise. If not now, then later. After all, if the ADF has become so much more efficient, it won't need so much money, perhaps during the next electoral cycle.

True Believer

Drug and Alcohol Counselling

Trying to be a loyal employee to the Navy these days is like being in love with an alcoholic.

You are proud to be a part of it and want it to be admired and respected.

So, you give and give with little reward but eventually you realise that as you keep giving, it is starting to affect you. No-one can survive in a one-way relationship.

Finally, you conclude that you must either let it go on in its self destructive ways or leave the relationship, saddened, but a survivor.

The ADPA

THE NAVAL HYMN - NAVY HEADQUARTERS SUPPLEMENT
TO THE TUNE OF ALMIGHTY FATHER

1.
ALMIGHTY GOD WHOSE POWER
DOTH SURGE
AND GIVE OUR BRASS THE RE-
SEARCH URGE
WHO DRIVES THEM FORTH TO
SPEECHIFY
AND TASK ROs TO 'FIND OUT WHY'
OH HEAR US WHEN WE PRAY TO
THEE
FOR THE ROs OF THE NAVY.
 2.
O FATHER, SON AND HOLY GHOST
WHOSE MINISTERS LIKE BUREAUC-
RACY MOST
THE ADMINO IS THERE TO EASE
AND FAST TRACK STAFF WORK
MAY IT PLEASE
OH PAPER SHUFFLERS PROUD ARE
WE
TO HELP KEEP SHIPS AND CREWS
AT SEA
 3.
WHEN MEDIA DO GET IT WRONG
AND CN's FACE GET LONG
THE PI STAFF WILL FIGHT THE
CAUSE
AND SEEK TO GAIN NAVY AP-
PLAUSE
O FATHER PLEASE ADMIT TO
HEAVEN
THOSE HARD WORKED SOULS
FROM DPI-N
 4.
LORD THINK OF THOSE WHO
SHOOT AND CUT
AND EVENTUALLY GIVE US
SCUTLEBUT
WHOSE STAFF INTREPIDLY GO
FORTH
 - AND GET THE STORY FROM THE
SORTH
LORD PLEASE ENSURE THEIR NOT
FORGOT
THE PO WRITER AND THE PHOT
 5.
CN HAS ASKED US PURSUE
THAT YOU MIGHT BLESS THE RETI-
NUE
WHO SOMEHOW MAKE HIS DAY
COMPLETE
AND STRIVE TO KEEP HIS DIARY
NEAT
O HEAR US WHEN WE PRAY TO YOU
FOR ALL THE TEAM OF RETINUE
 6.
AND RATHER THAN WE FACE RE-
BUFF
WE PRAY FOR ALL SUPPORT OFFICE
STAFF
WHO TRACK THE CORRESPOND-
ENCE TRAIL
AND FIX IT SHOULD THE SYSTEM
FAIL
PLEASE SPARE A THOUGHT OR TWO
FOR THE CHIEF AND FAITHFUL
CREW
 7.
AND LAST OF ALL WE'D BETTER
BLESS
OUR OWN BELOVED CNS
WHO LEADS US ALL THROUGH
STRIFE AND WAR
AND KEEPS THE MINISTERS FROM
THE DOOR
PLEASE BLESS US ALL AS WE DO
FACE
A WELL EARNED BREAK AT
CHRISTMAS
-

In the Beginning

In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was GOD. In the beginning was GOD, - and all else was darkness and void and without form.

So GOD created the Heaven and the Earth. He created the Sun and the Moon and the Stars so that light might pierce the Darkness. And the Earth GOD divided between the land and the sea and these he filled with many assorted creatures.

And GOD created life in many forms, one of which was called Man and the lowest of this form He called *Soldiers*. But GOD is filled with Love and Mercy and to cover their Nakedness He gave them trousers which were too long and shirts which were too short and in the trousers He placed deep pockets in which they could warm their hands. He gave them very loud voices and a limited vocabulary of words, all of which had only one syllable, so that they might communicate with one another.

But the result was such that even GOD's sense of humour was outraged, so He embellished their uniforms. He gave them Badges, and He gave them Coloured Cords. And He gave them Ribbons,and Patches, and Stars, and Bells. He gave them Emblems, and Crests, and all sorts of shiny things which glittered and devices which dangled.

When You are GOD You tend to get carried away in a big way.

When all this was finished it was the fifth day of GOD's labours, for looking after Soldiers is very tiresome and GOD looked for an easier creation.

The GOD created flighty creatures of the Air, which He called *AIRMEN* - (GOD is VERY bright) and these He clothed in Uniforms which were ruffled and fowl. But being a Wise and Just GOD He allowed them to wear bushy moustaches to cover their Ungodly features. And the Airmen too talked to each other, and

occasionally to Soldiers, but their words were of two syllables and were not understood by the Soldiers, so most of the time the Airmen talked to themselves and remained in constant admiration of their own dialogue.

And on the seventh day GOD rested.

On the eight day GOD looked upon the earth and was not happy. GOD WAS NOT HAPPY.

So He thought about His labours, and in His infinite Wisdom GOD created a divine creature, and these creatures he called *SAILORS*. And GOD made SAILORS in His own image. He made Them Tall and with a Fair Countenance, and gave Them a Calm Demeanour, Resolute and Courageous. GOD made Them to Rule the Sea and to give Direction and Guidance to the lesser creatures of the Earth. And to complement Their Superior Bearing GOD gave Them Wonderful Uniforms.

He gave Them practical fighting uniforms so They could wage war against the Forces of Darkness and of Satan.

He gave Them Service uniforms for Their daily work and training, so that they might be sharp and ready,

And He gave Their Officers Evening Dress Uniforms. Sharp, Stylish, Handsome things, so that They might win the hearts of all at Cocktail Parties and Impress the hell out of everybody!!!!

And at the end of the eight day GOD looked down upon the Earth and He saw that it was good. But was GOD happy? No!

GOD WAS STILL NOT HAPPY.

Because in the course of HIS Labours, GOD had forgotten one thing He did not have a Sailor's Uniform. But He thought about it, and finally satisfied Himself in knowing that, well, not everyone can be a SAILOR



The Facts of Life

- 1 Indecision is the key to flexibility.
- 2 You can't tell which way the train went by looking at the track.
- 3 There is absolutely no substitute for a genuine lack of preparation.
- 4 Happiness is merely the remission of pain.
- 5 Nostalgia isn't what it used to be
- 6 The facts, though interesting, are irrelevant.
- 7 The careful application of terror is a useful form of communication.
- 8 Someone who thinks logically is a nice contrast to the real world.
- 9 Anything worth fighting for is worth fighting dirty for.
- 10 Friends may come and go but enemies accumulate.
- 11 I have seen the truth and it makes no sense.
- 12 If you think there is good in everybody you have not worked in a tri-service environment
- 13 If you can smile when things go wrong, you have in mind someone to blame.
- 14 One seventh of your life is spent on Monday.
- 15 By the time you make ends meet, they move the ends.
- 16 Not one shred of evidence supports the notion that life is serious
- 17 There is always one more imbecile than you counted on.
- 18 Never wrestle a pig. You get dirty and the pig likes it.
- 19 Youth and skill are no match for experience and treachery.
- 20 No amount of planning can ever replace blind luck.

Whither Command of the Sea?

For the last 100 years, it has been an axiom of naval warfare that 'command of the sea' was not the same as command of the land. War at sea does not have front lines nor is there territory to defend in the way that there is on land. These propositions can however, no longer be taken for granted. This is a result of the increased importance of marine resources and the expanded and more definite national jurisdictions resulting from the 1982 UNCLOS. This situation is in some senses ironic, as the greater mobility possessed by land forces, particularly in an Australian environment, is making land warfare more analogous to war at sea than was previously the case.

100 years ago, when Mahan, Corbett and others first codified theories of naval warfare, the sea was used for fishing, transport, and some limited recreation. There were very few centres of gravity which were susceptible to attack by military forces. As Corbett wrote, the sea could not be possessed, nor could armed forces subsist upon it. (Julian S. Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, Annapolis, 1988 page 93.) While man-

kind does not actually exist on the sea in any significant way for long periods, the uses of the sea are now greatly expanded and mankind's dependence upon its resources much increased. The trend is only likely to continue. The situation is further complicated by other factors not apparent 100 years ago. The existence of other forms of monitoring and controlling the sea, other than surface ships. Submarines, aircraft and increasingly satellites play a major role in controlling the sea. The sea is not an isolated monolithic and inexhaustibly bountiful place. Not only must its use be sustainably managed, but it must be protected as well. While high explosives may not have significant effects, a deliberate oil spill (chemical warfare?) or the release of a biological toxin could have far reaching consequences. The sea is a much more important and complicated arena than was ever imagined 100 years ago. While concepts such as command or control of the sea remain useful tools, they must be understood in ever more complex ways. Perhaps it is time for a reassessment.

Firefly

BIKINI ATOLL: NUCLEAR SECRETS REVEALED AT THE NATIONAL MARITIME MUSEUM

In a special talk at the National Maritime Museum on 1 September, maritime archaeologist James P Delgado will reveal secrets from the 1946 nuclear testing at Bikini Atoll, USA.

In July 1946, the United States conducted the first atomic tests against a fleet of nearly 100 ships at Bikini Atoll, 2500 miles west of San Francisco. The two tests, known as Able and Baker, sank a number of ships, including the aircraft carrier *Saratoga* and the battleship *Nagato*, and a number of destroyers, submarines and attack transports. The remaining ships were heavily contaminated with radiation, and ultimately were sunk by gunfire in the deep ocean. With many of its results classified Top Secret, the Bikini tests retreated into public memory as a well-publicised but ultimately little understood harbinger of the nuclear age and the dangers of contamination.

In 1989-1990 a team of underwater archaeologists from the US National Park Service documented the sunken fleet at Bikini in the first comprehensive assessment of the ships since 1947. Diving to considerable depths, they studied the carrier *Saratoga*, the battleships *Nagato* and *Arkansas*, and several other wrecks.

Trained as an underwater archaeologist, Mr Delgado has led or participated in several shipwreck archaeological expeditions and projects in the United States, Canada, Mexico, and the Marshall Islands. He has worked on shipwrecks including the USS *Arizona* at Pearl Harbour, the brig *Somers* in Mexico, the California Gold Rush steamship *Tennessee*, Gold Rush sailing ships in the Sacramento River, the brig *Isabella* at the mouth of the Columbia River Oregon, the polar exploration ship *Maud* in the Canadian Arctic, and the sunken fleet of the 1946 atomic bomb tests at Bikini. He has also served as project

historian for the USS *Monitor* shipwreck project.

James P Delgado has been Executive Director of the Vancouver Maritime Museum since April 1991. He is one of two representatives from Canada to the International Committee of Monuments and Sites Committee on the International Underwater Heritage and also serves on the Executive Board of the International Congress of Maritime Museums.

His most recent publications include *Ghost Fleet: The Sunken Ships of Bikini Atoll* (1996) and recently completed editing the *British Museum Encyclopaedia of Underwater and Maritime Archaeology* (1997).

On 1 September he will talk about the insights it offers into the beginning of the nuclear age and the Cold War and show a series of historic images and colour transparencies of the ships as they look today.


Some places are still available. Cost is \$15 (\$10 ANMM Members and concessions) including refreshments.

Mr Delgado is also participating in the Shipwrecks Seminar on maritime archaeology on Saturday 30 August. This seminar is a key event for the exhibitions *Pandora - piecing together the puzzle* and *Cargo for the Colony: the story of the Sydney Cove on display* at the National Maritime Museum, Sydney until 21 September 1997. People attending this seminar receive free admission to Delgado's talk.

Contact: John Glenn on telephone (02) 9552 7555 or fax (02) 9281 2885 for further information and bookings. You can also email him at jglenn@anmn.gov.au

*Sailors aboard USS Fall River watching "Able" test at Bikini Atoll in 1 July 1946, with the mushroom cloud of the detonation visible from 25 km away.
(USNI Photo Library)*





Letter to the Editor

Dear Sir,

It was a pleasure to read another lively contribution by Alan Robertson ("The Battleship Mentality - Revisited", Jan/Mar 97). Nonetheless, I must take issue with much of his argument.

Clearly, aside perhaps from SSBNs, submarines are no more the apotheosis of naval might than battleships ever were, post 1914. Our naval inventory should contain the mix of vessels and aircraft necessary to achieve the degrees of both sea assertion and sea denial which should ensure our national survival in a reasonable range of contingencies. Our submarines, if properly employed, are purely offensive units and are particularly suited to sea denial operations. They are quite useless - lacking nuclear power - at defending other units. Alan is in error in crediting a possible future submarine launched anti-aircraft missile with the purpose of providing air defence for other units. He correctly doubts their value in their possible use 'against stand-off anti-ship missiles' for instance. In fact, their use would be confined to attacking too-threatening ASW helicopters, using target information data from the periscope or towed array.

I was disappointed to read, 'With air independent propulsion systems even non-nuclear submarines (my underlining) can enjoy the advantages of not needing to surface to replenish their oxygen supplies'. In fact, this advantage was conferred on diesel-electric submarines without air-independent propulsion systems by the invention (in the 1940s) and its subsequent significant refinement, of the snort (or "schnorkel") system. It has always been possible for our OBERONS to dive in Sydney Heads, proceed on patrol - say, in the Sulu sea, and return and surface in the Heads about three months later, never having had any need to surface in that time. It is surprising that this capability should not be more widely known some thirty years after the introduction of the OBERON into our order of battle.

I begin to despair if, as Alan asserts, 'the perceived primary role for Australia's submarines is sea denial in the sea-air gap between

Australia and Indonesia', to the exclusion of other more distant areas of strategic interest, or if anyone contemplates using them 'with a principal objective of defending its (ie Australia's northern coastline', or any other coastline. Their relatively low mobility would mean that they would usually be in the wrong place in any fast-moving situation, and the risk of 'blue on blue' incidents in this battleground for surface and air forces would be very high unless strict and probably unrealistic degrees of separation by time or space could be enforced.

In the specific instance of 'the sea-air gap between Australia and Indonesia', the width of the gap could vary between about 200 and 1,000 miles. In such circumstances, it might 'be reasonable for our submarines to patrol in the open ocean, well clear to the northward of other own forces. This concept of operations would however require the frequent provision of intelligence concerning the position and movements of enemy forces to compensate for the small number and relatively low mobility of our boats. Open ocean "guerre de course" operations by submarines demand the high mobility and endurance conferred by nuclear power, and even then the provision of up-to-date intelligence would often be crucial. Any sort of submarine barrier in the open ocean, particularly if consisting of non-nuclear powered boats, would probably require prohibitively large numbers.

The modern weapons of our submarines, together with the enhanced capability of the COLLINS class for long range passive detection, classification and range-finding, should enable each to dominate roughly cylindrical columns of water of theoretical radii probably in excess of thirty miles for surface targets and rather less for submarine targets. However, the actual radii would be dependent on target radiated noise levels and the vagaries of the oceanographic environment. Even at their maximum dimensions, such adjacent areas would seldom be of operational value in expanses of the open ocean.'

The optimum place for our limited number of submarines in war or a preliminary period

of tension is either off enemy bases ready to carry out covert offensive mining and/or to attack hostile forces when they emerge, or at intermediate choke points. Our submarines are the only units capable of operating alone and unsupported, for prolonged periods, in waters controlled by the enemy; that indeed is largely their *raison d'être*.

Alan's remarks concerning realism in ASW exercises off Jervis Bay do not square with the facts. Exercise constraints were habitually loaded in favour of ASW units - sensibly so, since the aim was to achieve ASW training in fairly short time frames. Additionally, submarines were constantly enjoined to provoke incidents to provide training value. In the less constrained environment of lengthier open-ocean exercises, surface forces were too often submarine homing beacons when operating medium range sonar, whilst the main threat to a successful submarine attack was the ASW helicopter. That was in the days when our submarines' weapons had to be fired within a range of about one mile. Today, of course, they are fired from ranges many orders of magnitude greater.

Alan also states that 'it is alarming to see the sort of uncritical respect now accorded the submarine in Australia...'. I do not believe that to be true; certainly today's custodians of maritime warfare skills are better informed and educated in their trade than most of us were, and less vulnerable to "snake-oil salesmen" of whatever stripe. I do not believe that they suffer from "battleship mentality" tunnel vision in any manifestation, and suspect that they have a sounder understanding of the capabilities and limitations of modern submarines than many of their predecessors. The COLLINS class are the most potent ship and submarine sinkers we have, if properly employed, but sea denial in specific limited areas may be insufficient alone to force a final and favourable decision.

One final point if I may: it is surely misconceived to write off strategic bombing on the basis of the US experience in Vietnam. The vast preponderance of the ordnance dropped fell on jungle to collapse tunnel complexes and to interdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Had a small proportion of such bombing been applied by the US to Hanoi, Haiphong and other major cities of North Vietnam, the country would have ceased to exist as a coherent entity. Other governments at other times might not share such scruples. Land attack cruise missile systems, if fitted to our submarines, would be for precision strikes on individual targets of strategic importance. Variants of this system could of course equally well be fitted to surface ships, aircraft or, for that matter, the back of a reasonable sized truck but the submarine would have the unique advantage of concealment and instant readiness within launch range for an extended period.

Submarines may not be the maritime defence panacea which Alan apparently fears many in our community believe them to be. However, for the roles of deterrence, covert surveillance, maritime strike, ASW, covert offensive mining and clandestine operations they are our most capable units - indeed, they are the only units able to carry out some of those roles. The defence of shipping, inshore defence, mine countermeasures and power projection roles such as amphibious operations require units with different capabilities. We have some of them, but I for one would be much happier if we could achieve a balanced, ie multi-capable, maritime defence force by the restoration of integral tactical airpower. Perhaps the revival of that fight could be Alan's next foray. It would make a lot more sense than falsely denigrating the Submarine Arm and he would have my full support.

Tim Duchesne
Captain RAN (Ret)

Sea Power and Sea Control in Contemporary Times

John B. Hattendorf

Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History, U.S. Naval War College¹

Today, sea power and sea control have a new context. Like so much in the era in which we live, everything seems to have changed. Navies, themselves, have changed. Compared to the situation a mere fifty years ago, ships look different and have different propulsion systems; aircraft are faster and have a wider variety of capabilities. Naval weapons are much more accurate and more devastating in their effects. Communications have proliferated in every imaginable way. Each of us now can have global communications through the Internet, while navies have vastly more complex means to obtain, share, store, sort, and present information to decision-makers at various levels of command. The art of navigation and our very understanding of "the way of a ship" have changed through the use of satellites and global positioning systems.

The pace of change in navies is remarkable. Virtually every day, navies are faced with some new technological innovation. Everyday, a new technology seems to overtake an old. One of the most difficult and fundamental questions for naval leaders is how to deal with this type of change. While new technological ideas appear every day, it takes time to bring them to fruition — time during which a whole range of other ideas could appear. The practical problem involves identifying the most important new technologies, selecting them for testing and developing, and then, with some confidence that they have not inadvertently excluded something critical for future conditions, deciding which new technologies to distribute widely to the fleet.

To deal with the wide-spread technological nature of navies, there has been a fundamental change among sailors. We can no longer personify them by the bluff and hearty line-haulers who were so essential to the sailing-ship navy. Today, men and women in navies around the world are sophisticated in science and deeply educated in technology.

In this environment of ever more rapidly increasing technological change, navies around the world are faced with developing adequate naval force and maintaining it while costs rise and budgets decrease. It is more than a question of new technologies, it is further complicated by questions of national finance,

bureaucratic decision-making, the personalities of leaders, and legislative understanding of and support for navies.

While navies were once separate, autonomous entities within a government structure, they are no longer so today. One of the most telling lessons of the Second World War was the need to coordinate more closely the joint operations of all the armed services. Throughout the world, over the past half century, ministries of defence have slowly unified admiralties and naval ministries with war departments, ministries of the army, and air ministries, often adding to them in the same defence ministry or department, the munitions and logistics support agencies involved with armed forces. Moreover, naval officers have had to learn to talk with colleagues in other armed forces using the same terms, the same approaches to planning and budgeting, and sharing the same appropriations of tax dollars. Each of the services is increasingly becoming part of this same process, dependent upon one another and essential to one another in planning, budgeting, and operations.

At the same time that this lengthy process of unifying armed forces is occurring within nations, another process of integration is developing beyond and across national borders. While once we could think of a navy entirely in terms of one country and one country's maritime concerns, today we are learning to think of navies operating as part of United Nations forces, in terms of regional alliances, or even, in terms of *ad hoc* coalitions gathered together to undertake some particular, mutually agreed upon task. Additionally, one is no longer just concerned about coordinating the ships and air craft of one country, but now increasingly in finding ways by which the forces of one country can operate effectively with those from another. This is an immensely difficult task that involves not only the obvious differences in language, culture, and tradition, but also the basic patterns of solving practical problems and carrying out routine tasks. Moreover, it means sharing a certain number of procedures and certain types of information that we were once state secrets.

In recent years, ships of various navies have operated together very successfully under the United Nations

as well as under Nato and under other regional organizations and agreements. We have seen them during the Gulf War, in Somalia, in the Adriatic, and off Haiti. Our recent experience with such multilateral naval forces has emphasized the common concerns and natural ties that exist among sailors around the world.

It was these fundamental ties, found in the shared heritage of centuries of naval tradition and the mutual understanding of ships and the sea, that Nato built upon in the late 1940s in bringing together the naval forces of many European countries. It was the fundamental basis that helped to form the still-continuing Inter-American Naval Symposia in 1959. It was the initial starting point for the successful initiative in 1967 to create the Nato Standing Naval Force, Atlantic, and, in 1969 to establish the first world-wide gathering of chiefs of navies at the International Seapower Symposium.

In subsequent years, the Standing Naval Force has become a model for several other multinational naval forces. The International Seapower Symposium continues to meet each odd-numbered and has proliferated into regional meetings, in the even-numbered years, with the Western Pacific Naval Symposium in 1988, and the West African Naval Symposium in 1992. Further initiatives along these lines continue to develop.

Old ideas seem to be disappearing. Among them are the traditional view that navies are a nation's "first line of defence", that a navy and its battle fleet exists to fight a huge battle with a similar kind of enemy battle fleet, that a navy is somehow always connected to the growth of imperial power.

In large countries, some citizens wonder why they need naval forces at all, when there is no aggressive naval force threatening them. Large navies are becoming much smaller. In terms of its ships, the U.S. Navy is forty percent of what it was five years ago; the Royal Navy, today, is one-tenth of the size of the U.S. Navy. Yet, at the same time, small- and medium-sized naval forces are proliferating. There are more countries in the world today and there are more naval forces in the world today. In 1946, the editor of authoritative reference work, *Jane's Fighting Ships*, listed 52 navies.² fifty years later in 1996, there were 166 listed.³ What is the role of a navy today and what is the purpose of sea power and sea control in the contemporary world?

The fundamental answer to this question lies in the fact that navies operate, not only in the context of national defence, but also in the context of the broad scope of general, maritime affairs. One can not separate the traditional roles of naval force from its war-time uses. Certainly, it derives its strength for peacetime applications from its military potential in the

event of war. Today, we understand that, in addition to fighting, navies also have policing and international diplomatic roles to play.

When we think about strategies for a navy, we are thinking of ways of using a navy that will achieve particular ends. Strategy is not something limited to battles and conflict, but to achieving specific goals in any interaction with another power. It is something that is inextricably bound up within the broad context of a situation. This means that navies are not only part of the broader context of national defence issues, but also part of the much broader maritime world and its issues. Thus, navies are inextricably connected with two traditions and two lines of thought which, in modern thinking, are often separate from one another. Maritime affairs are essentially peacetime and civilian activities that range from fishing to ship-building, from activities in ports and harbours to long sea passages across the ocean. A navy does not normally dominate or overwhelm such maritime activities, but it is fundamentally connected with them as part of its own basic nature. Thus, navies need to understand themselves as part of a wider, maritime strategy.

Maritime strategy is a kind of sub-set of national grand strategy that touches on the whole range of a nation's activities and interests at sea. In its broadest sense, grand strategy is the comprehensive direction of power to achieve particular national goals; within it, maritime strategy is the comprehensive direction of all aspects of national power that relate to a nation's interests at sea. The Navy serves this purpose, but maritime strategy is not purely a naval preserve.

Maritime strategy involves the other functions of state power that include diplomacy, the safety and defence of merchant trade at sea, fishing, the exploitation, conservation, regulation and defense of the exclusive economic zone at sea, coastal defence, security of national borders, the protection of offshore islands as well as participation in regional and world-wide concerns relating to the use of oceans, the skies over the oceans and the land under the seas. Such issues include expanding scientific and technological understanding of the entire maritime environment, working with the full range of national organizations, (the navy, the army, the air force, customs, coast guard, commerce and trade, to name but a few of the ministries, bureaus, and departments that touch on these issues) in order to bring forth a truly national concept and plan for the maritime aspects of national life.

This broader understanding emphasizes that different nations have individual forms and types of interest in maritime affairs. Thus, their strategies and approaches to the use of national power in the maritime environment are different. Maritime powers, continental states, and coastal states, each use and value navies for different functions, some navies playing a rela-

tively more important role in the exercise of national power than in others. For maritime nations, the navy is traditionally its main arm with an offensive strategic stance on the open ocean. Continental powers have depended mainly on armies and land-based air forces, using its navy to complement and enhance the army's and the air force's role as part of a generally defensive strategic stance. Traditionally, small states have had to rely on alliances and had to adjust their stance according to the capabilities of their larger partners.⁴

Today, one can detect some new differences in the way that a major maritime power and the way that a coastal state think about contemporary sea power and sea control.

For a major maritime power, the fundamental focus of the military element in maritime strategy centres on the large-scale control of human activity at sea, through the use of armed force in order to contribute to the broad ends established in a national maritime policy. There are two parts to this: (1) establishing control and (2) using control, once it has been established.

In the effort to establish control and, along with it, to deny control to an enemy, there are gradations that range from an abstract ideal to that which is practical, possible, or merely desirable. In this, one can consider whether control is to be general or limited, absolute or merely governing, widespread or local, permanent or temporary. Generally speaking, it is not practically possible to have direct control for an indefinite period of time. The normal situation is a kind of equilibrium that has been set in balance in some previous period of control. When any degree of control is exercised, whether it be through gentle influence or aggressive seizure, it is exercised with a specified amount of force, for some discrete period of time, and to achieve a specific object.

Following the establishment of control, there is another aspect: the use of the situation that has been created in order to achieve further goals. The effort to achieve control, by itself, means nothing unless that control has an effect. Thus, in war, the point is not merely to have a battle, but to create a situation that has a larger effect. In the wide spectrum of activity that this can involve, the most important aspect is the use of maritime control to influence, and, ultimately, to assist in controlling events on land. In this, the fundamental key is to have an effect on those places, times, or routes of travel to which an adversary is sensitive, and which are critical and essential enough to move an adversary to alter plans or actions so as to accommodate one's own objectives.

In wartime, a nation can seek a degree of control at sea that will allow it to carry on its merchant shipping and fishing, to secure its coastline and offshore resources, to move troops, and to support air and land operations.

The manner in which a navy seeks this control and handles its forces today has changed in the last fifty years.⁵ The way that naval forces form themselves and the effectiveness of their weapons are an integral consideration to new methods to search for and detect enemy forces and countermeasures that can neutralize an enemy. The most important naval weapon today is the missile designed to sink enemy ships. Below it in effectiveness come torpedoes, mines, gunfire, and bombs from aircraft.

Throughout naval history, naval battles have mainly taken place close to land. The only major exception to that has been in World War Two with the mid-ocean struggle against Axis U-boats in the Atlantic and the battles between opposing carrier air forces in the Pacific. In the past fifty years, the U.S. Navy has supported air and land operations and also carried out a variety of amphibious landings and coastal blockades. In the past few years, these traditional types of naval operations have come to be called "littoral warfare," and renewed emphasis has been placed on the way in which such military operations in coastal areas are carried out as joint-service operations.

The use of highly effective missile weapons in areas close to land creates a tactical environment for navies that reinforces the tendency in both grand strategy and in defense management for close interaction between land, sea, and air forces. In the environment of "littoral warfare" the distinctions between armed services quickly blur as all engage in complementary activities to achieve a shared object.

Today, high-speed and maneuverability characterize operations. Fast, small vessels operating in coastal waters have the ability to put much larger warships out of action. Amphibious assaults are made with high-speed surface-effect vessels and with armed helicopters launched from large ships offshore. High-speed missiles can be launched from great distances with great effect. Detecting such attacks are particularly important today, as the range and power of weapons have increased. Today, some equipment can detect ships and air craft at ranges of thousands of miles, merging strategic and tactical considerations. In this, the uses and the analysis of the full range of the electromagnetic spectrum have become as important in modern warfare as the weapons that electronics control and guide. In facing a difficult, fast-moving environment, responsible commanders in maritime areas depend upon fast and reliable transmission of large amounts of data. While essential to one's own exercise of command and control over forces, the situation also provides another area for manipulation, blocking, and interfering with an enemy's essential needs. In short, warfare in coastal areas requires the close interaction of army, air force, and amphibious landing forces. The interaction of forces with the intensity and speed of operations have shifted empha-

sis from the craft carrying weapons and the color of the uniform behind them to the effectiveness and countering of the weapon itself.

This change in the character and in the focus of contemporary naval warfare is paralleled by a larger matter of maritime interest that also emphasizes coastal regions. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea has now come into effect and has been ratified by the majority of the world's states. This development in international law has granted coastal states specific rights and responsibilities in offshore waters.

These changes include the extension of territorial seas to twelve nautical miles and the extension of some rights to an Exclusive Economic Zone out to 200 nautical miles and on the continental shelf. These responsibilities and rights in these areas include such matters as the establishment of artificial islands, the conduct of maritime scientific research, and the protection and conservation of the natural marine environment, including controlling the catch of fish and exploiting other natural underwater resources on and under the continental shelf.

This extension of a coastal state's jurisdiction at sea has placed certain limitations on the freedom that the great naval powers have traditionally and exclusively exercised. In effect, it has transferred them, in many cases, to small- and medium-sized coastal states, just at a time when those offshore resources are becoming increasingly important, both economically and politically. This situation demands that coastal states have the adequate power to manage their responsibilities. This fact, combined with the capabilities of modern naval weapons, has made small- and medium-sized navies into major actors. This position is enhanced even further as the world's major naval powers reduce their size. Today, we must take seriously an entirely new dimension in naval affairs: the sea power of the coastal state.⁶

Coastal states exercise their naval power in a different manner and with a different concept than navies that focus on the high seas. The coastal environment provides an advantage that an approaching naval power does not have. One's home waters provide protection to defending forces, particularly when they are intimately acquainted with them and specifically trained to deal with them. At the time, such coastal naval forces can be directly supported by land-based aircraft and coastal defenses, including missile defenses, mines, and torpedoes. Coastal states will be able to employ their entire range of armed services to support their navy. From the point of view of force development, a coastal state can more advantageously than others share roles and missions with its other uniformed services. Coastal navies have their secure support facilities nearby, designed directly to support

them in a full range of combat conditions, as they meet any threat. With supplies so close, a coastal navy is not so concerned about on-board supplies and the logistics involved in their more limited radii of action.

Small coastal states use their armed forces in a more restricted manner than those of much larger powers. By their very size, their limited industrial and economic base, and their smaller military capacity, small- and medium-sized often can not maintain all their interests by themselves. Small states can rarely hope to defeat completely a larger power. They can, however, use their armed forces to control an enemy's actions in a way that will shape the outcome of a conflict or a crisis.

Coastal naval forces exercise national sovereignty over offshore areas and enforce national jurisdiction and management over maritime resources. Their capacity for wartime operations allows them to serve as a deterrent to others who might wish to seize or dispute sovereignty. In war, the coastal navy continues to serve a deterrent purpose as its very presence raises the stakes of a foreign navy operating in those waters. It can be a delaying, and an increasingly costly and distracting, obstacle to another power. From the smaller, coastal states point of view, the objective is to preserve its own identity and sovereignty when the struggle is over. In this, there are alternative courses of action that a small coastal state can choose. It can seek direct opposition on its own, it can align itself with other states, or it can even acquiesce with an opposing power, allowing the opposition to take certain actions as long as they do not fundamentally alter the primary national interests of the coastal state.

The power of coastal states' objectives and rights lie fundamentally in maintaining and carrying out the guiding spirit of international law. Thus, many of them agree that the United Nations Law of the Sea regime and the Geneva Conventions on the conduct of war are currently the essential criteria for determining a favorable conclusion to any conflict and for guiding peacetime policy.

Emphasis on international law is particularly important to states that focus on the quality of their position after a war is over. By adhering to international law, they would hope to secure both popular support at home as well as international support for their position, while also avoiding recriminating penalties in a post-war era. Among other things, this leads to focusing one's military and naval forces and one's military objectives in terms of an enemy's armed forces, not the civil sector of any enemy's society. In following this policy, a coastal state would not want to initiate attacks on a belligerent's merchant shipping. Without a seagoing force, a coastal state could do relatively little harm to a major maritime power's merchant shipping and would probably suffer more from retaliation.

tory attacks on its own civilian maritime activities. The coastal state's primary naval objective in war will be to deter a belligerent's naval attack by having forces that are so effective that it would make such an attack too costly to risk. Should the attack be made, however, the coastal state's objective is only to stop the attack, to force the enemy away from one's own waters, and to prevent an enemy from attaining his goals. With such objectives, it is unnecessary for a coastal state to destroy the enemy naval force when the primary object is merely to disable it.

In developing maritime defenses, a coastal state may develop a highly specialized naval force that is designed to deal with one particular dimension of defence, leaving other aspects to its other armed services or its allies. Taking such a choice, a country might choose to develop a relatively large force of sophisticated shallow water, defensive submarines, or alternatively it might choose to invest in a large number of highly sophisticated sea mines, to prevent an enemy seaborne attack.

In its fundamental interest to avoid military conflict, a coastal state has an obligation to exercise its sovereignty in the appropriate areas designated by International Law. Maintenance of appropriately firm and consistent authority in the maritime Exclusive Economic Zone will help to reduce conflict among nations and prevent the problems that arise from other nations unilaterally assuming control of an area outside its own jurisdiction or when an area is left in anarchic conditions. International Law does not yet provide for all situations; a variety in practice may arise as nations take up their responsibilities in these new areas and one may need to make changes for the future. This situation, however, is better than one of neglect. Effective surveillance and control of sea areas are positive means that can assist to control a crisis and are useful means to help avert war.

If we look at this new development from another perspective, however, it suggests new possibilities that could spark a crisis or even a war. As coastal states expend their sovereignty outward on the open sea, they may easily create friction with their neighbors, who have conflicting interpretations of the facts or overlapping claims in a region. Additionally, the new interest of coastal states in maintaining control in off-shore areas put them potentially in opposition to large naval powers who have traditionally maintained the right of warships to pass on the high seas. It creates potential restrictions for major maritime powers who would like to use their navies as direct adjuncts to diplomacy. At the very least, it moves a coastal state's naval forces further offshore, into positions where a misunderstanding could take place and create a conflict or a crisis.

Here, we see the possibility of a major problem for contemporary sea power and sea control. The very increase in areas under sovereign control, the increase in range and capabilities of naval armaments, and the increase in the number of nations with navies increases the potential for conflict.

The parallel rise in the use of multinational naval forces, however, suggests one possible antidote to the situation. While multinational naval cooperation is one very practical means to augment one's limited resources, by complementing one nation's naval capabilities with those of another, it also requires close co-operation and interaction between the participating navies. This interaction builds understanding between nations, providing direct links of communication and discussion.

Through such multilateral cooperation, neighboring navies in a particular region can join forces, share responsibilities and costs for surveillance, and for control of maritime regions. These shared duties could prevent conflict that could arise from neglect. The very means by which such cooperation takes place is also a major avenue to prevent misunderstanding. It builds the connections that could serve mutual solutions to problems and be essential to defusing a crisis. Through such connections, one side could explain to another the rationale for actions that might otherwise appear threatening. In the context of contemporary sea power and sea control, multilateral cooperation can be a positive influence in three ways: (1) helping to maintain lower defence costs at home, and (2) at the same time making it unnecessary to increase naval armaments, while also (3) lowering tensions.

As one looks toward the future, international cooperation among naval forces is quickly becoming a key issue. It is useful, therefore, to think more precisely about it. Of course, it will never be possible for all navies to cooperate all of the time on every matter. It is a matter of great political sensitivity, involving very expensive forces and highly trained sailors. No nation can afford to use them indiscriminately or wastefully.

To avoid this, one naval leader has suggested three criteria for naval cooperation. The first is to cooperate with those countries who share fundamental values. These values could be the shared concepts of democracy, human rights, free market exchanges, and recognition of the fundamental importance of the United Nations Charter.

A second criteria is to cooperate with neighboring navies in geographical proximity of one another. In practical terms, it is easiest to start cooperation on a sub-regional basis and to expand gradually. Yet, there is a difficulty here in identifying regions and in drawing the boundaries too narrowly. In some cases, co-

operation needs to span the boundaries between conventional regions. Further problems arise with this criteria in those cases where one country falls into two or more regions. The solution may be merely to cooperate in whatever multidimensional way that includes one's neighbors.

The third criteria is to cooperate with navies that share similar national interests. While the recent fragmentation of larger states into smaller ones might suggest to some observers that a kind of tribalism is being rekindled, this diffusion of national power is also creating a similarity of certain security interests. This is particularly true for maritime interests.

Using the triple criteria of shared values, geographical proximity, and shared interests, one can develop a plan of multinational naval cooperation that includes both regional navies and distant navies with regional capabilities and local interests.

The agenda for such cooperation could be nearly anything imaginable, but United Nations Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's "An Agenda for Peace" provides some very valuable ideas for consideration: preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, post-conflict peacebuilding, peace enforcement. In more specific terms, neighboring navies, sharing mutual values and complementary interests, could undertake such broad missions as:

- providing humanitarian assistance;
- intervening to evacuate civilians at risk;
- making a show of force to stop a universally unacceptable action;
- conducting maritime peacekeeping operations;
- protecting sea and air traffic;
- controlling armaments and enforcing demilitarization;

- enforcing maritime agreements, and
- respond to a mutual threat.

Among these missions, there are some specific maritime tasks that could be shared by multilateral naval forces:

- protecting the maritime environment;
- regulating the use of maritime resources;
- preventing and controlling pollution;
- enforcing laws relating to fishing and sea bed use;
- controlling illegal immigration;
- interdicting illegal trade;
- suppressing piracy, and
- enforcing the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

These are some of the primary issues in the maritime world today. Such tasks are difficult and complex to carry out at sea, often requiring advanced capabilities in surveillance, readiness, and specialized equipment for command, control, and communications. The threats they involve are often regional, not national. All these aspects point again to the need for cooperative, multinational solutions.

In conclusion, sea power and sea control are increasingly important factors in contemporary affairs, but as such they have a new context. Navies, themselves, have changed, as have many of their most important future missions and tasks. Yet, because of the increased scale of naval proliferation, the expansion of maritime interests among coastal states, as well as by the very mobility of naval forces and their multidimensional capabilities, the issues surrounding sea power and sea control continue to be important at present. There is every indication that they will become even more important for the future.

¹ The views expressed in this paper are entirely the views of the author. They do not represent any official policy or position of the Naval War College, The United States Navy, or any other agency of the United States of America.

² *Jane's Fighting Ships, 1946-47*. (London: Sampson Low, 1946).

³ Captain Richard Sharpe, ed., *Jane's Fighting Ships, 1996-97*. (London: Jane's, 1996).

⁴ See Clark G. Reynolds, *Command of the Sea: The History and Strategy of Maritime Empires*. (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1974), pp. 12-16.

⁵ The following is an interpretation based largely on a draft version of Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., "Contemporary Naval Tactics" in *The Oxford Companion of Military History*. (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

⁶ See Jacob Børresen, "The Seapower of the Coastal State," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 17 (March 1994), pp. 148-175, upon which this and the following paragraphs are a modification and interpretation.

⁷ The following is based on Admiral Angelo Mariani, Italian Navy, "Peacetime Patterns of Cooperation," in John B. Hattendorf, ed., *Thirteenth International Seapower Symposium: Report of the Proceedings of the Conference, 5-8 November 1995*. (Newport: Naval War College press, 1996), pp. 37 - 48.

Equal First Prize winning essay in the Open section of the
Peter Mitchell Essay Competition

The Dynamics of Defence Treaty Systems in the 21st Century

Lieutenant Commander Alan Hinge

The Cold War has been likened to two experienced chess players in a darkened room involved in a game they could hardly see. The stakes were high; each player relied on the other not to upset the table and each player's supporters kept respectful distances, tried to make sense of the game and rarely gave advice. But times have changed. The dynamics of international relations in today's multipolar world are becoming much more complex. More players want to get into the game in the still darkened room. Several of these players don't seem to know the rules very well, and some - like China - even try to make their own rules. Therefore, the danger of 'the game' being upset may well increase as we enter the 21st Century, and this essay attempts to identify the likely dynamics of defence treaty systems and national security alignments in the first two decades of the next century.

Some believe that traditional, formalised treaty systems are *passé* and that they did little more than escalate or even cause wars. Others agree that conventional treaty systems are increasingly irrelevant, but differ by having the view that treaty systems often helped to deter wars. Still others believe formal defence treaties remain enduring foundations of international relations, while several commentators have recently suggested that ad hoc, 'vertical coalitions' lasting barely more than a mission will be the hallmarks of tomorrow's international security system.

Who is right and who is wrong? And where will Australia fit in? To find out, we can begin by examining the reasons why nations have traditionally aligned in security relationships. We then look at just how much national security circumstances are likely to change in the light of economic, political and military trends to get an idea of the general security environment in the first two decades of the 21st Century. This puts us in a position to outline the nature and extent of the dynamics of future security relationships, and then suggest how nations may interact in the new century.

Alliance Dynamics - How Nations Choose Friends

National alignments are the key determinants of tomorrow's geostrategic landscape and they will be shaped by perceived convergence of national inter-

ests of the main players. At this point it is important to emphasise that the rumour of the death of the Nation State is greatly exaggerated! Some suggest that ethno nationalist strife within countries will destroy central governments and lead to the systemic breakdown of nation states, but two things must be borne in mind.¹ First, even the most destructive ethno nationalist groups favour the nation state, that is, *their* intended nation states - it is only a question of boundaries and *who* is in charge. Second, while there is likely to be more 'failed states' like Somalia in the next century, there will still be a vast majority of states where the power of the state is likely to have grown. The Nation State will almost certainly persist as the fundamental unit of international relations well into the 21st Century.

Nation states have traditionally made pacts and engaged in treaties to form alliances which are defined as, "...promises of mutual military assistance between two or more states"². Generally, an alliance is a declaration of future intent to consult, convey a deterrent signal and if necessary act together. Such alliances have been based on common national interests, and there are many good and enduring reasons for forming alliances. Alliances convey signals and are seen to produce prestige, and some still believe that treaties can improve domestic stability and increase economic entree, as well as achieving their classical goals of deterrence and intimidation.

According to Stephen Walt in his book *The Origins of Alliances*, nations have formed alliances during the last 350 years for three basic reasons - to balance, to bandwagon or to bond.³ A *balance alliance* is a pragmatic response to a real or potential threat. It usually involves clear and unambiguous commitment being sought by all parties. For example, after WWII both emergent superpowers sought to surround their rival and contain him. This generated a myriad of countervailing alliances, the most prominent being NATO in 1948 and the US-Japan Security Alliance in 1951. On the other side, the Warsaw Pact of 1952 was instituted as a balancing alliance against NATO and the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of 1980 was set up to act as a countervailing influence against the US, and especially China. Some groups form weak, *de facto* balance alliances, like that represented by the 1976 ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation which arose

from deep fears of Vietnamese expansionism in South east Asia. All these are prominent examples of nations getting together to contain and deter a common adversary.

Balance alliances and alignments are based on classical balance of power politics, and it was commonly believed that networks of balance alliances precede and promote general wars (wars involving the main forces of five states, including at least three major powers).⁴ The conventional wisdom is that when two nations started a war, their alliances automatically drew in other nations. However, Geoffrey Blainey in his seminal work *The Causes of War* concludes that:

'...This interpretation has often been applied to the First World War, but it is doubtful whether it fits many general wars ... Moreover a peacetime alliance between major nations did not necessarily mean that a war involving one member automatically embraced other members of the alliance. Certain alliances seemed firm before a war, but when tested were shown to be fragile. Some alliances on the outbreak of war, had no more force than a flapping sheet of paper⁵ ... [Furthermore] the six general wars fought since the 1770s had much in common. They began as wars between two nations and then were multiplied by power shaking victories; the First World War differed only because the decisive events were clearly anticipated before the war [like rapid mobilisations]. On the eve of each of these wars nobody could have logically predicted how many nations would ultimately take part in the fighting'.⁶

A *bandwagon alliance* occurs when a country allies, or more generally aligns with a state that is a dominant neighbour having the potential to economically or militarily threaten it. Small states close to large dominant states are usually under pressure to bandwagon. Thailand's informal alignment to China involves a strong element of band wagoning - it initiated the first state visit to Beijing after the Tienanmen massacre in 1989. Similarly, Jordan had a close but somewhat reluctant band wagoning relationship with Iraq during the Gulf War. Band wagoning can even involve organisations hitching their 'wagons' to a dominant state's star to share in the spoils of victory, or even just to survive. This was seen to an extent with the PLO taking a big chance in supporting Iraq during the Gulf War.

A *bonding alliance* is best represented by the special relationship between the Britain and the United States. This kind of alliance is characterised by traditional allies who are linked by close coincidence of interest, shared national traits and natures together with ideological and political solidarity. Such attributes often lead to a positive and complex web of economic, political and military understandings, formal agreements and practical working relationships.

Besides the Anglo-American alliance, the ANZUS Treaty and the ANZAC Pact represent established, bonding alliances. Alliance bonding demands traditional free association, shared values and similar world views, together with a tradition of commitment to each other. Bonding alliances are the most enduring and comprehensive alliances and are almost invariably characteristics of countries with strong, liberal democratic traditions. Interestingly, a characteristic of the Asia Pacific region is the lack of strong, traditional bonding alliances or alignments among Asian states. Whether this is a result of oriental pragmatism, or mutual distrust borne of centuries of enmity, or simply of the sheer ethnic and religious diversity of the region, traditional bonding alliances are practically non-existent. Pragmatic balancing and band wagoning relationships characterise the region.⁷

Having set the baselines of why and how nations have traditionally chosen their security partners, we can now examine the general security environment of the 21st Century and see how these traditional treaty/alliance dynamics may be affected.

Security in the 21st Century

Now that the capitalist/communist ideological battle is over, and revolutionary dynamism has ground to a halt, the world is no longer governed by a relatively simple and well defined bipolar relationship. It is evolving into a multipolar world where power will be much more diffused. This diffusion of power is not restricted to or dependent on military might, and it involves economic and technological influences which are turning traditional assessments of national power and security upside down. In fact, the very concept of security itself is broadening to emphasise economic, social and environmental aspects.⁸

A major prop of national power in the next century will be economic influence. Today, the ranking of and relationships between states increasingly depend on the size and real growth rates of economies, rather than on physical size and population. Physical annexation of territory, colonies, labour and resources is no longer necessary because these can be brought or leased from eager sellers, anxious to have their own place in the economic 'sun'. Entire industries can go 'off-shore' and are no longer confined to sovereign territory, and there exists an accelerating global trend towards economic integration, intensified communications and transport use as components of one's economy can exist and thrive off-shore in welcoming states.

These economic developments have given rise to an 'only one pair of hands' theory, in which nations busily making money will have no spare time, energy or incentive to fight wars; that 'old fashioned' wars of gain are obsolete, unprofitable and are without rational

purpose. It is also thought that global convergence of economic interests, market interdependence and the imperative of growth will enhance understanding, bring nations together, deter war and promote peace. But, is it all as simple as that? Will economic interdependence really bring nations together and suppress conflict?

Perhaps with economic interdependency will come heightened sensitivities which may cause rivalry and increase tension as the economic aims and performance of others vitally affect one's own interests. Economic disputes over product dumping, oil leases, pollution, restrictive market practises and exploitation of workforces or new maritime exclusive zones may lead to tensions and conflict not much different to territorial disputes of the past. Trade friction between Japan and the US, as well as aggravation over South China Sea territorial claims testify to this. Even so, other more serious causes of tension exist, including weapons proliferation.

The increasing availability of sophisticated weaponry to a much wider array of users is a worrying trend. A still robust global 'military industrial complex' seeks markets for its goods. Advanced weapons are spreading, are likely to be in surplus and are available to those who can pay for them. Buyers include a new 'cast of characters' who put few taboos on weapons use: guerilla/freedom fighter armies as well as ethnic and religious minorities - all violently pursuing various objectives like self determination, justice or even the glory of their particular god. The net effect is that groups previously lacking the capability and credibility to perpetuate organised and widespread violence will have that ability. The ability to wage small scale conventional war for limited periods may even one day be acquired by terrorists, bandit gangs and international criminals.⁹

Therefore, the world of the 21st Century is likely to be a very dangerous place, and little comfort should be taken from the mistaken belief that growing economic interdependence between states will outweigh the negative factors. As Blainey reminds us, 'The assumption that whatever binds nations together economically; assists communications and enhances familiarity will minimise the prospects for armed conflict cannot explain that most wars have been fought by neighbouring countries; not countries far apart. Also, it cannot satisfactorily explain civil wars, which rank among the most bitter of human conflicts'.¹⁰ Consequently, the security environment is likely to be more complex as regional powers emerge against a backdrop of greater ambiguity of threat and a general build up of forces in the developing world. Economic 'alliances' are highly unlikely to be borne of economic interdependence, in fact economic interdependence may well be a *destabilising* factor in the new century.

So, how are nations likely to respond to these developments in terms of their international security relationships?

Security Alignments in the New Century

Since the end of the Cold War, the need for formal treaties and alliances has come into question, especially in the United States.¹¹ The US is now under much less pressure to form and maintain close alliances with nations where the relationship is asymmetric or too one sided in terms of advantage. It will not be prepared to pay as heavy a price as in the past in treaty relationships, and it can be expected to be more inward looking and less ideologically driven. However, while the US is likely to continue a *decoupling* process from the developing world, it can still be expected to support democracy and self determination abroad and on occasion may still be prepared to enter into defence treaties directly linked to its own *vital* interests. For example, the 1991 security pact with Kuwait is an example of the US gaining further entree into the Middle East as a countervailing influence against Iran and Iraq; to support Saudi Arabia and Israel and secure access to oil supplies not only for itself, but for Europe and Japan.

Traditional alliances are likely to remain strong. In Europe, NATO is likely to *grow* despite the erosion of the three original underpinnings of the NATO Alliance - the Soviet Threat, Western European dependency and American economic preeminence in terms of ability to bankroll security. The US will maintain its commitment to NATO for at least three reasons. First, it has a vital market interest of maintaining Western Europe's economic prosperity and therefore its security. Second, it must remain actively engaged to have a say in the makeup of a still undefined Greater Europe. Third, the political direction and character of Russia is still unclear and dangers persist. Finally, numerous practical benefits of decades of NATO teamwork in operational training, interoperability and logistics support were made patently clear during the Gulf War, after sanctions and economic 'alliance' pressures proved completely ineffective.

Similarly, the US finds itself irrevocably engaged in the Pacific. It has no choice but to remain strongly coupled to Japan for conspicuous economic reasons, and Japan's long term geostrategic advantages in the North West Pacific as an 'unsinkable aircraft carrier' remain. This role is likely to take on renewed importance if China reaches the status of a *peer competitor* with the US by the 2020s. Similarly, Japan has little real choice but to stick with the foreign devil it knows'. While the Soviet threat has dissipated, deep suspicions and traditional enmities exist concerning China, which is considered a long term and jealous threat to Japanese security. Moreover, North Korea is considered by many Japanese as 'a knife at our throats'.

Linkage with the US is also critical to future Japanese relations with its neighbours throughout the Pacific. Like China, lingering suspicions exist about Japan, and Japan is unlikely to ever establish a leadership role in the Asia Pacific region outside the legitimising framework of a strong US-Japan Security relationship.

Thus, the US is obliged by its own *enduring*, long term, vital economic and security interests to maintain major traditional treaty relationships and lead in efforts supporting global peace and security using forward presence and multi lateral operations.¹² Nevertheless, while fundamental US interests have not changed, new factors have come into play and will probably increase in prominence in the new century. There will be less tolerance worldwide for US unilateral action among nations as well as less and less preparedness to risk American lives. More burden sharing will be expected by the US as the costs of US power projection become increasingly costly, and indications are that there is a growing tendency to look beyond established alliances and treaties to the *preferred* use of flexible, ad hoc alliances to resolve regional conflict.

'Vertical Coalitions'

Security coalitions involve joint military action by two or more states when an urgent requirement overrides the problems of developing a treaty and forming and maintaining an alliance. Coalitions may evolve into major and enduring alliances or may only last for a single mission, and during the 1990s a dozen crises have been dealt with in the context of some kind of coalition which arose from common interests or threats demanding immediate action.¹³ Consequently, coalition efforts are now widely considered as appropriate means of dealing with crises and therefore provide participants with enhanced legitimacy of action.

As discussed, the first decades of the 21st Century are likely to be marked by an increasing array of lesser, more diffuse threats as opposed to single overriding adversaries. We may see ad hoc alliances for specific and pressing reasons such as countering rogue nations or groups presenting nuclear, chemical, biological or highly organised criminal threats. In situations where its vital interests are not affected, the preferred 'division of labour' for the US seems to be to form *Vertical Coalitions*.¹⁴ These involve the US providing information intensive support and information based systems to nations that will be expected to supply all the front line troops and most of the weapons systems. However, coalitions have their 'down sides' and it should be remembered that severe difficulties can exist in coalition management. Coalitions involve many national views, degrees of threat perception, arguments and obstacles to forming effective teams, and the structural characteristics of different coalitions will vary markedly.

There will basically be two categories of attractive coalition partners - those who can make a useful contribution in military operations and those that cannot, but who can add significant political 'cover'. Coalition operations will proceed more smoothly if *core* nations exclude or sideline those that cannot conduct combined operations with similar equipment and doctrine. Consequently, there will still be a prominent place for core coalition members from highly institutionalised alliances, even once the original rationales of formation have gone. This helps explain NATO's persistence and continued attractiveness to all its members *and* to those from eastern Europe eager to join up.

Partners who have years of shared operational experience will increase in importance and value to each other, especially if they specialise in areas of relative advantage and possess capabilities, local knowledge and *entree* that other partners are not capable of easily duplicating. The stability of tomorrow's coalitions will also be enhanced by increased 'density of connections' with prospective partners. These connections include closer diplomatic relations, educational and military exchanges and operations, commercial links and international contacts among influential elites. But the question must be asked that, if a more pragmatic US is prepared to 'get into bed' with non traditional allies in ad hoc coalitions, just what advantages do traditional 'junior partners' get out of a relationship demanding permanently increased burden sharing? The answer to this question may simply come down to the practical, day to day operational advantages gained from decades of cooperation - the same glue that keeps NATO alive.

For example, the benefits of the Armies of America, Britain, Canada and Australia (ABCA) Treaty - which comprises over 100 arrangements - form the real, day to day working ties that have bound traditional security partners together. ABCA was set up in 1946 with the aim to, 'cooperate closely in all defence matters; discussions should deal not only with standardisation, but cover the whole field of cooperation and combined action in the event of war'. ABCA's standardisation programs have proliferated and evolved to include a multitude of areas of defence operational, logistical and scientific cooperation. By being firmly committed to ABCA, Australia keeps abreast of the latest developments in military doctrine, operations, tactics and scientific research despite its isolation.¹⁵ These benefits are appreciated by countries like Singapore and Malaysia who value the expertise of Australian military forces and who highly value long established defence treaties like the Five power Defence Arrangement (FYDP) of 1971.¹⁶

Paradoxically, close linkage with the US provides *enhanced security entree* into our region, and Australia has capitalised on this with initiatives like the

Malaysia - Australia Joint Defence Program (MAJDP) in February 1991, the Joint Australia Singapore Co-ordination Group (JASINGCG) of September 1992 and the Australia-Indonesia Defence Treaty of December 1995. All these defence treaties can promote defence solidarity, potentially reduce costs and lead to improvement in capabilities in selected areas. Therefore, the fundamental forces likely to bring states together or drive them apart seem unlikely to drastically change in the first decades of the 21st century, and even small players like Australia and its near neighbours clearly recognise the benefits of cooperative defence arrangements and treaties as they enter a highly uncertain century. We may even share Blainey's conclusion after comprehensively looking at three hundred years of human conflict that:

'.... Changes in society, technology and warfare in the last three centuries spurred some observers to suggest that international relations were thereby so revolutionised that past experience was largely irrelevant. There is much evidence, however, that there is considerable continuity between the era of the cavalry and the era of the intercontinental ballistic missile'.¹⁷

Conclusion.

Contrary to some widely held opinions, growing economic interdependency is unlikely to be a decisive factor in promoting peace, or providing a better basis for security in the 21st Century than traditional defence treaty systems which have shown remarkable resiliency.

The future security environment is likely to be more complex as regional powers emerge and greater ambiguity of threat arises as a new, well armed 'cast of characters' pursue their objectives. Therefore, the United States must necessarily maintain an internationalist policy of active engagement to maintain its vital interests in Europe and Asia. However, in cases where its vital interests are not affected, it will prefer to enter into 'vertical coalitions' and contribute information intensive support rather than troops and large amounts of hardware.

Burden sharing will become an even bigger issue in the new century, and ad hoc alliances or coalitions will likely form for specific and pressing reasons such as shoring up states facing systemic breakdown or combating nuclear, chemical and biological threats as well as state sponsored terrorism and highly organised criminal networks. Consequently, the US will more than ever be on the look out for regional partners who can readily absorb and integrate down loaded information and who possess capabilities, *local* knowledge and entree that it is not able to easily or quickly duplicate.

'Junior Partners' in traditional treaty systems like Australia must be careful to 'do their sums' concerning the pros and cons of the burdens they are called on to share. In the confused world of the 21st Century these sums will have to be done on a case by case basis, in the knowledge that there may be less of a convergence of interest between a superpower and a relatively isolated middle power than has been the case in the past. Nevertheless, the balance is still clearly in favour of Australia maintaining its traditional treaty arrangements if only for the numerous day to day, practical operational benefits it acquires through such treaty arrangements as ABCA. Furthermore, effective strategic partnerships with our near neighbours are *promoted* rather than *constrained* by our traditional defence treaty arrangements with traditional allies.

Despite ad hoc, vertical coalitions becoming increasingly employed as solutions to immediate security problems, traditional defence treaties and alliances will remain the *enduring* foundations from which developed nations will characteristically pursue their common security interests. Importantly, the *core* team members of future coalitions are likely to be drawn from those nations who continue to be linked by traditional defence treaty relationships.

* *Mine Warfare in Australia's First Line of Defence* (ANU, Canberra, 1991)

NOTES

¹. For example, see Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*, (Free Press, New York, 1991) and *Technology and War* (The Free Press, New York, 1989) for interesting and controversial accounts of the various and changing paradigms of warfare through the ages. He concludes that human conflict will revert to 'medieval' style warfare between many self determining groups as the central governments of many nation states decline.

². A. Wolfers, in D. Sills (ed) 'International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences' (MacMillan, New York, 1968) p.268

³. S. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Cornell University Press, New York, 1987) p.5. See also G. Snyder, 'Alliances, Balance and Stability', *International Organisation*, Vol 45, No 1, Winter 1991 for a good discussion of modern alliance theory written shortly after the Gulf War.

⁴. 'General War' is defined by G. Blainey in his book, *The Causes of War* (Sun Books, Melbourne, 1976) p.229

⁵. Ibid.

⁶ Blainey, op cit, p.241

⁷. The now defunct S.E.A.T.O Alliance is sometimes brought up to prove the inapplicability of western alliance models in Asia. S.E.A.T.O never really worked because of the divergent and incompatible interests of an unworkably wide variety of participants, including France and Britain. See L. Buszynski, *S.E.A.T.O: The Failure of an Alliance Strategy*, (Singapore University Press, Singapore, 1983) for a detailed account of the formation, life and death of the alliance. In particular, Chapter 7, 'The Misuse of Alliance', pp.219-226.

⁸. For a detailed discussion on the broadened security agenda, which is by no means agreed by all, see R. Ullman, 'Redefining Security', *International Security*, Vol 8, No 1, 1993. For the case against, see Daniel Deudney's articles: especially 'Muddled Thinking', *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, April, 1991.

⁹ See Martin Van Creveld (1991) op cit, Ch 1 and 7 for his views on future war.

¹⁰ The argument that economic interdependence will reduce the probability dates back to the 19th Century. The 'Manchester' theory evolved during the beginning of the industrial revolution; its theme being that commerce and technology were promoting peace by having a civilising influence on human affairs, and leading to a decline in the warlike spirit in Europe. The creed grew in influence throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century. It was clearly wrong and Blainey looks at it in Ch 2 of *The Causes of War* op cit.

¹¹. See P. Cronin (ed), *2015: Power and Progress* (Institute for National Strategic Studies, National De-

fence University Press, 1996). In Part III, pp.85-110, Stephen Walt looks at current US alliance/coalition theory and practise. On pp. 102-3 he gives a valuable checklist of criteria and conditions which should be considered by US policy makers when preparing a multilateral military response.

¹² This has been made clear in many recent, key US strategy documents such as the US National Security Strategy 1991 which stated that the US is, '... dependent on the support of regional friends and allies to support and enhance regional security agreements'. Similarly, in the US Defence Planning Guidance for FY 1994-1999 the US aims to, 'strengthen and extend the systems of defence arrangements that bind democratic and like minded nations together'.

¹³ US coalition operations have included, *Desert Shield/Storm, Southern Watch, Provide Comfort, Vigilant Warrior, Uphold Democracy, Deny Flight, Able Sentry, Sharp Guard, Support Hope* and *Provide Relief*.

¹⁴ 'Vertical Coalition' theory is outlined in Cronin, op cit, pp. 90-108. Also, see M. Maurer, *Coalition Command and Control*, (Centre for Advanced Concepts and Technology, National Defence University Press, 1996) Ch 1-4.

¹⁵. See T. Durrell-Young, 'Wither Alliance Strategy? The ABCA Clue', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol 17, No 2, Winter 1991, pp. 277-297 for a comprehensive review of ABCA origins, programs and valuable linkages.

¹⁶. Singapore, for example, has repeatedly endorsed and outlined the importance of the FPDA not only in terms of providing 'political and psychological deterrence', but for indirect access to possible US involvement with Australia in time of crisis. See L. Hsien Loong (Defence Minister), 'The FPDA and Regional Security', *Asian Defence Journal*, 2/90, p.30.

¹⁷. Blainey, op cit, p. 273.



First Prize winning essay in the Sailors' section of the Peter Mitchell Essay Competition

Small Navies in a Big World

Chief Petty Officer Clyde Smith, HMAS Stirling

During the period from the end of the Second World War to the early 1960s instability and turmoil were the hallmarks of South-East Asia. Various nationalists groups in the area were demanding independence from their colonial masters who were eager to continue their presence as it was prior to December 7, 1941.

Since 1965, relative political stability has been achieved within the Asian region. Economic activity within the region has increased to a stage where investment funds are flowing freely, exports to the western world are booming and also within the region itself. All nations within ASEAN have now transformed their economies into market driven formulas, and the present arms sales in the region amounts to \$US 135 billion.¹ This amount is more than three times the military expenditure of the Middle East and has in many respects introduced uncertainty and instability into the region.

However, problems between ASEAN's northern neighbours China and Taiwan could have spill-over effects for the area if there was conflict between the two offshore neighbours. The political and military relationship between Taiwan and the United States is an important one and could very well hold the key to future stability for the region.

This essay aims to assess whether small to medium sized navies in the Asia Pacific Region can make a contribution to maintaining peace or to help resolve conflict.

ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE ASIA/PACIFIC RIM

In the next 10-15 years a bloc of Asian nations will possess economies superior to that currently enjoyed by many European countries. This will be a far cry from the initial establishment in 1967 of the ASEAN group comprising Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore. The military strengths of the ASEAN group and Australasia will increase significantly but the economic power will be such that sovereignty disputes will be settled internally without interference from outside powers.

Free Trade will be the major cornerstone of ASEAN with investment money flowing in a borderless region, harmonised government regulations and respect for each others intellectual property rights. Recently

Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines formed the East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA). This reflects long standing cultural and ethnic ties within the sub-region, and traditional trade links between local communities.² There are other such examples of this sub-regional economic co-operation which there is formal recognition of high level commitments from each national government. As Dr Tony Tan, Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister of Singapore stated "Bi-lateral relationships develop co-operation and improve understanding."³

During 1994 ASEAN'S trade with the world rose 21% from \$US 448 billion to \$US 543 billion but growth within ASEAN increased a staggering 40% from \$US 79 billion to \$US112 billion. There is a growing consensus amongst ASEAN leaders that "ASEAN must strategise to optimise"⁴ The Asia/Pacific rim has developed rapidly as a Free Trade area and has relied on the inflow of capital investment to develop industry and infrastructure. Defence spending had always been given a low priority until recently, when block obsolescence of naval units necessitated replacements. According to Abdul Razak, Executive Director of the Malaysian Strategic Research Centre, "Economic development has become the top priority for regional countries and this has some degree reduced the possibility of conflict."⁵

Despite the sabre rattling "China has become Taiwan's fastest growing export market while the Taiwanese are close to becoming the largest source of investment funds in the Mainland".⁶ If the takeover of Hong Kong is factored into the equation in 1997, Taiwan will be China's largest trading partner, a major key to the future well being of the region. As Joseph Nye, US Assistant Secretary for International Security stated in October 1995, "The region has no choice but to engage not contain, it must draw China into the regional and Global security dialogue. This will help promote confidence building measures and transparency in strategic planning."⁷

RELATIVE NAVAL STRENGTHS WITHIN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

ASEAN

Naval forces in the ASEAN sphere of influence have until recently comprised mainly of World War II frigates and patrol boats which were the legacy of their former colonial masters. Flushed with growing econo-

mies, ASEAN nations are now upgrading their forces to replace old assets which have long outlived their usefulness. As Dr Tan stated recently, "There is no arms race, it is just that countries in this region are devoting more attention to modernising and upgrading their armed forces."⁸

All ASEAN Navies are embarking on modernisation programs based around frigate-sized units of either British, German, French or Chinese origin. Most of these units are well equipped with short range surface to air missile (SAM) suites, multiple batteries of sea skimming anti ship missiles and some anti-submarine capabilities.

However as Mark Taylor states "Ship-borne air defence has not kept pace with the regional anti-ship strike capabilities."⁹ All ASEAN nations, Taiwan and China have received high-performance fighters with maritime strike capabilities able to deliver over-the-horizon sea skimming missiles. Without a medium range SAM system, most ASEAN naval ships will be at a distinct tactical disadvantage against these weapons.

Singapore has arguably the best balanced defence force within ASEAN and is currently the only user of the Grumman EC-2 Hawkeye Early Warning Aircraft (AWAC) which is a force multiplier. These aircraft are especially useful in the confined spaces surrounding Singapore and the South China Sea and being able to co-ordinate air and sea units over a large area.

Regular naval and air exercises are held within Asia/Pacific nations, and many ASEAN nations are now actively investigating the possibilities of acquiring diesel powered submarines. Indonesia has already two German Type 209 units and Singapore is to lease a Swedish submarine to establish performance parameters for future purchases.

AUSTRALASIA

Since the end of the Vietnam conflict, Australia and New Zealand have each followed an Island Defence Concept (IDC). However recently Australian policy has changed to supporting a constructive engagement policy with stronger ties with all defence forces within ASEAN

With the impending introduction into service of the Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN) in 1998, The Chief of the Australian Defence Forces (CDF) has already intimated Australia will in future be sharing high level intelligence with Indonesia and other ASEAN nations. High level talks have been held between Australian Defence Chiefs and their Asian counterparts during the past two years which is an attempt to bridge the gap between East and West and avoid any misunderstandings or miscalculations on either side.

Without doubt Australia is the most comprehensively equipped Navy in the region with well maintained frigates and support groups for limited deployments. The Air Force has F111C/G and 52 F/A18A aircraft which are amongst the most advanced attack aircraft in the region, and can be fitted with Harpoon anti-ship missiles. By the year 2000 the *Collins* Class submarines will have achieved full operational capability and will be the most advanced conventional submersibles in the world.

The decision to develop *Stirling* as the major Western Approaches Base in Western Australia during the 1980s represented a milestone. The transfer of three FFG frigates, three new *Anzac* Class frigates and three *Collins* Class submarines are all to be permanently based at this location. Previously the bulk of the fleet was stationed on the East coast which was based on the World War II doctrine of keeping the US/Australia life line open in case of super power conflict. The new policy reflects a realisation that the future of the nation lies within the boundaries of the South-East Asian region.

CHINA and TAIWAN

The Russian/China ideological split in the late 1950s caused fundamental problems for the Chinese Armed Forces in that new generation equipment was no longer available from Russian sources. Since changing in the late 1980s to a socialist/market driven economy, the Navy has expanded to represent a blue water navy with new frigates fitted with western missile systems. The air force has recently acquired 26 SU27 Flankers from Russia prior to commencing licensed production. These are a formidable long range aircraft and can be fitted with anti-ship missiles. Other major developments also include delivery of the first of a reported 22 local and Russian built *Kilo* Class diesel submarines for the Navy.

The Chinese armed forces will require a considerable amount of time to assimilate the latest generation of weaponry into full operational capabilities and to qualify as a true blue water navy, many aspects of equipment levels will need to be addressed. As Professor Dibb, Head of Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian University stated, "China will undergo a major political transition in the near future which could produce instability at home and more aggressive policies abroad. This could have serious implications for the whole region".¹¹ However the timeframe required to fully address hardware imbalances could take between ten to fifteen years which would limit any potentially aggressive moves.

Taiwan's Navy is extremely well equipped with *Knox* Class destroyers, *Oliver Hazard Perry* Class frigates and an air force consisting of F16 multi-role aircraft. Deliveries of French *Mirage* 2000s commenced dur-



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ing the last six months. The role of the Grumman Hawkeye E2-C AWAC Aircraft in conjunction with an up-to-date defence force ensures that for the time being Taiwan has a distinct numerical and qualitative advantage over China's navy and airforce.

DEFENCE TREATIES WITHIN THE ASIA/PACIFIC REGION

The Five Power Defence Arrangement comprising Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the United Kingdom consists of regular defence contacts and to consult if there is an attack on any one of the signatories. Indonesia is not a member of this Treaty as it was initiated during a period of uncertainty due to President Sukarno's confrontationalist policies towards the new Malaysian Federation. Regular military exercises between the member states continues, but in a different vein which is in line with current individual states policies of loose bilateral relations within the region.

The Indonesia-Australia Agreement on Maintaining Security 1995 was introduced for the two nations to consult if either is threatened by military action.¹² The strong personal relationships cultivated by members of the previous Australian Government with Indonesian leaders led to this arrangement, but it remains to be seen whether the ties continue with the new Australian Government.

The ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States) Treaty, formulated in 1951 at the height of the Korean War, was evolved to perceived threats by communist nations to the stability of ANZUS members. The Treaty has undergone fundamental changes since 1984 with the cooling of relations between New Zealand and United States over nuclear ship visits to New Zealand ports.

As recent events have shown, most nations previously regarded as potentially hostile are now following combined socialist/market driven economies. The RAN, USN, NZ and other non-Asian nations involve themselves in the Bi-annual RIMPAC series of exercises, combining air, land and sea units which are held off Hawaii.

The Sino-Russian Treaty on Confidence Building Measures (SRTCBM) was signed in 1995 and represents attempts to diffuse tensions relating to the continuing border disputes between the ex-communist giants by dialogue and peaceful means.

As Dr Tan has expressed, "Collectively the national resilience of ASEAN nations would enhance regional resilience."¹³ and "Singapore's view is that there exists a security architecture comprising a network of bilateral relations between countries in the region as well as between others outside the region."¹⁴ The de-

velopment of Bilateral Defence relations reflects a continuing policy of ASEAN nations, which could in future see the formation of a Joint Command Structure within the Asia/Pacific region

UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN THE ASIA/PACIFIC REGION

The recent provocative military exercises conducted by China near Taiwan during April 1995, showed that instability between China and its offshore neighbour could have a destabilising effect on ASEAN for a number of reasons:

- a. Any military conflict will have an immediate affect on investment capital flowing into the area.
- b. Taiwan Relations Act which constitutes the US Government to consider military action against any nation if there are attempts to determine the future of Taiwan, by other than peaceful means.¹⁵
- c. The Beijing Agreement 1992 under which the US agreed to gradually reduce defence exports to Taiwan. (This agreement was never passed into US law.) Also the US agreed not to deliver its latest military technology hardware to Taiwan.¹⁶

There is no question that the US is unchallenged in the capacity for real time intelligence and projects the ultimate blue water navy. However, some Eastern nations have deep reservations about US-style values and intentions. They are afraid of possible connotations of superpower political manipulations of lesser nations and self-interest dictating policy.

A willingness by the US to despatch two carrier task forces to Taiwan in response to China's military exercises close to the Taiwanese mainland adds to a stronger presence in the area. A stronger US level of military commitment in the region will tend to alleviate some ASEAN fears of attempted dominance by other larger nations in disputed areas, where mediation and dialogue are the preferred options.

FUTURE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS WITHIN THE ASIA/PACIFIC REGION

One of the recurring lessons of naval warfare since the beginning of World War II has been that, without air supremacy naval forces have found extreme difficulty in achieving their objectives, especially where passage through hostile waters is concerned. Examples of heavy naval losses where opposition forces had achieved air supremacy included Battle of Crete, Defence of Malta and Arctic Ocean convoys. Losses to the Iraqi Navy during the 1992 Gulf War included the bulk of its frigates and corvettes to anti ship missiles, launched mainly from Royal Navy Lynx helicopters.¹⁷

At the present time there is currently not one ASEAN nation capable of carrying out an amphibious opera-

tion, and able to sustain a logistical support lifeline, nor able to provide continual air support for the entire operation. This includes China, Taiwan and even Australia. To mount such an operation a nations entire merchant fleet would need to be commandeered. As Mark Taylor states "Without proper command platforms to orchestrate naval task groups and supporting units, most regional navies lack suitable platforms".¹⁸ In this case the lessons of World War II have not been learnt or, to the point, the Asian nations defence forces are not geared for offensive operations, but are purely defensive in nature, with strong emphasis on maritime strike air power.

Air supremacy is a major key to any operation if maritime forces are to occupy an island or land mass. It is anticipated that all ASEAN and Pacific Rim nations by the Year 2005 will possess advanced maritime strike aircraft armed with smart versions of Exocet, Harpoon, Sea Eagle and Penguin anti-ship missiles. Lessons gained from the Falklands conflict in 1982 confirms that ships without air cover are seriously at risk against high speed, low flying aircraft armed with a reasonable stand-off, anti-ship missile.¹⁹ In comparing current ASEAN naval capabilities Mark Taylor states "For now no South-East Asian Navy is able to put together a fully-layered air defence at sea."²⁰

In World War II US submarines sank 261 warships including a battleship, nine aircraft carriers, 15 cruisers, 22 submarines and 46 destroyers. Alternately German U-Boats sank two battleships, six aircraft carriers, six cruisers, nine submarines and 52 destroyers. In both cases the merchant tonnages sunk was enough to destroy one nations entire fleet whilst the other by 1942 very nearly strangled a nation.²¹

The power of the submarine cannot be underestimated as recent events have shown in the 1982 Falklands conflict with the loss of the old Argentinian cruiser *General Belgrano* to the nuclear submarine HMS *Conqueror*. Also the exploits of the Argentinian Navy submarine *San Luis* suggests it operated undetected amongst the British Task Force with defective torpedoes. As Captain C Wilbur commented, "The mere presence of a small submarine can have a major impact on the conduct of war at sea."²² If the Argentinian torpedoes had been properly tuned the outcome of the campaign could have been entirely different. The RN was regarded as having the most sophisticated ASW suite within NATO, and not to have once located the submarine suggests future problems for surface forces.

Antony Preston, the well-noted naval historian and naval strategist stated, "The silent running diesel-electric boat every Navy fears them. Every year that goes by sees their capabilities growing and the day may be not far off when they take over from all but the smallest surface warships."²³ The current power of maritime attack aircraft and the effective use of the diesel

powered submarine will require Navies to possess very powerful anti-air and anti-submarine suites to counter the dual threat.

ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM — THE ROAD TO DIALOGUE AND UNDERSTANDING

The Asian Regional forum (ARF) was created by ASEAN members in 1994 amidst fears that the growing arms race could possibly have a destabilising effect on security within the region. Included in the ARF are all ASEAN members, and seven dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, European Union, and the US), two observers (Laos, PNG), and two consultative partners (China and Russia).

There is a growing awareness amongst many outside nations that the ARF is rapidly becoming an important working relations tool. As General Moerdani, former Indonesian Defence Minister commented after the inaugural meeting "It was a monumental achievement in ASEAN's short history of regional and multilateral co-operation."²⁴ Added to the consensus Wong Kan Seng, Singapore's Foreign Minister also stated, "It is the first time that China and Russia are sitting at the same table to discuss security matters in the Post Cold War era. It will also see former adversaries, USA and Vietnam, exchanging views on security face to face."²⁵

The new mood is a reflection on the economic development underway within the region and the need for tolerance in the area of territorial claims. The recent confrontation between China and the Philippines at Mischief Reef in the Spratlys has already resulted in the Chinese offer to co-chair a working group on confidence building measures with the disputes over the Spratlys. Although there are other disputes within the region, the current method of resolving is by mediation between the parties.

Many other countries are lining up to become members of ASEAN and its rapidly forming sub-groups such as the ARF. (India and Burma were admitted to ASEAN in July 1996). Pakistan, France and United Kingdom are all seeking membership of the ARF and their memberships are being dealt with separately. As Alexander Downer Australian Foreign Minister commented "The ARF was proving to be the most comprehensive framework for security dialogue in the Asia/Pacific Region."²⁶

There is a desire for multilateral security and cooperation within the region and it is growing. Chen Jian, head of China's delegation, commented "This form of dialogue could help build up confidence amongst the participants. In this way we can enhance security



USS Independence — Everybody's getting in on the act!



in the region."²⁷ However there are sceptics such as Professor Paul Dibb, Head of Strategic and Defence Studies Australian National University "The problem is that a rather unreal sense of peace in our time is descending on some quarters, just as the balance is changing."²⁸ As the cost of a single maritime attack aircraft approaches the \$US 30-40 million per copy, coupled with today's sophisticated airborne radar guided weaponry, heavy losses can be expected in a single engagement.

"The current multiculturalism in the Asia Pacific will last so long as the major powers were not involved in any rivalry. If they were, the ARF would cease to function because competing powers would try to draw as many small nations to their side."²⁹

This is the view of Dr Mashashi Nishihara, Director of Japan's National Institute of Defence Studies. However Surin Pitsuwan Thailand's Deputy Prime Minister reiterated, "ASEAN will always be in the driver's seat."³⁰

The ARF has offered new grounds for peaceful negotiations and is a reflection of the growing majority of

ASEAN members in being able to set aside their individual priorities for the overall wellbeing of the region.

CONCLUSION

Although Navies in the Asia/Pacific rim are re-equipping they are being armed primarily with defensive weapons. As discussed earlier major logistical problems would need to be addressed if any occupation of land masses was contemplated, even commandeering commercial shipping would not assist. However the economic cost would be incalculable to the region if, in the immediate future, action of this nature was initiated.

Because the trade net is so distinctively interwoven within the region, nations with medium-sized navies at the present time are not geared for offensive operations. As such no Asia/Pacific Navy will have any bearing on being able to deter external aggression, or have the ability to help maintain peace within the region.

NOTES

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First Prize Winning Essay in the Officers' Section of the Peter Mitchell Essay Competition

Is Control of the Sea Still in Dispute?

Lieutenant Alastair Cooper

The USN has begun to articulate a new maritime strategy which assumes that it has 'won' sea control and can now concentrate on projection of power ashore - littoral operations. Can regional navies make the same assumption, or is the need to seek and assert sea control likely to remain more important for small or medium sized navies?

Control of the sea is the ultimate aim of maritime forces, whether it be to make use of the sea or to deny its use to an enemy. The United States Navy's new maritime strategy, outlined in ... *From the Sea and Forward ... From the Sea*¹, reflects its change in focus from open ocean to littoral operations. While this doctrine concentrates more on the uses to which sea control will be put once gained, it does not assume control of the sea, particularly in the littoral, is won automatically.² Rather than control of the sea no longer being in dispute, for the USN and its allies the most likely location for any dispute has changed. For smaller navies, particularly many in the Asia Pacific Region, the change is less marked, as they have always had a stronger focus on littoral or enclosed water operations. The requirement for them to seek and assert sea control remains, though it is no longer in the context of a bi-polar alliance framework.

This essay will examine why sea control is important, which nations require it and in what circumstances. Specifically it will look at why sea control cannot be taken for granted by the United States Navy or any regional navy. Some of the potential political and legal restrictions to military action will be discussed in terms of their influence on the process of gaining or denying sea control.

The natural state of the sea is for it not to be controlled at all. In this state all nations may make use of it for the purpose of trade or exploiting resources; the most significant examples at the moment are fishing or drilling for petroleum products. The actions of nation states are governed by international laws, the most recent of which is the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). UNCLOS sets out the limit to which a state can claim territorial waters (sovereignty) and economic rights (sovereign rights); it also outlines rights, conduct and responsibilities in territorial waters and on the high seas. While international law guides the use of the seas, it does not amount to control of the seas.

As the seas are normally uncontrolled, allowing use by all states, control is only significant if there is a

dispute between two or more countries over their use of the sea. Control of the sea can thus be defined as the ability to use the sea for one's own purposes. It is contrasted with sea denial which is the act of preventing an enemy from controlling the sea. An important distinction is that being able to successfully deny the use of the seas does not equate to controlling those seas. Both sea control and sea denial are concepts limited by time and space.

Disputes over control of the sea are the result of a disagreement by at least one state on the uses to which the sea is being put. Moreover, control only becomes significant if that dispute is sufficient to motivate at least one state to attempt to exercise control over a particular area or use of the sea, or to attempt to deny control to another state. These operations do not necessarily have to be part of a declared or acknowledged war, though that is the way in which control of the sea is normally understood. Nor do they necessarily have to involve more than one state, as a single state may act unilaterally to prevent unauthorised exploitation of resources in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or the use of the sea by extra national groups such as pirates. In doing so the state is exercising a form of sea control. There are still at least two parties to the dispute, even if one party may not be directly associated with or supported by another nation. This is important because if there was no second party, a state or other user could exercise sea control simply by doing what they wished. The concept of sea control is only significant if that control is opposed.

A nation's need to control the sea should it have occasion to assert that control, is directly related to its dependence on the sea for trade and/or resources. The need to control the sea in turn usually motivates a nation's ability to exercise that control; the greatest maritime nations in the last 200 years, Britain and the United States, have been and are the nations with the greatest naval forces. For a nation dependent on the sea, an attack on its sea lanes of communication or marine resources can be as significant as an attack on its land; under international law many such attacks

HMAS Otama in Sydney Harbour

would be defined as a violation of sovereignty or sovereign rights. They naturally seek to develop naval forces commensurate with the extent of their dependence and the perceived risk to their interests. The ability and desire to fund the naval forces is also a factor, linked to a marked degree on the level of perceived risk.

These are not however immutable laws. In contemporary times Asian, South West Pacific and OPEC nations are noteworthy for a much greater dependence on the sea for trade and resource exploitation than ability to control the sea. While some Asian countries, most notably Japan, have a significant naval capability, neither it nor the OPEC nations could exert sea control over the whole length of the trade routes on which they depend. To varying extents they rely on the mutual interests of other nations, their trading partners, to protect the trade which passes between them. This situation is satisfactory only while there are no significant threats or in the absence of asymmetrical threats - threats which are made only against certain sectors of a country's trade. By threatening trade between two nations whose naval capabilities are insufficient to protect that trade, an aggressor could limit the potential for reprisals from nations with more capable naval forces whose interests are not directly threatened. For example, Australia would find it difficult to protect the live sheep trade between it and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has an even more limited capacity to contribute to its defence and threats against the trade might not attract the assistance of a nation with a more capable navy. Papua New Guinea has no capability to protect its timber exports. By contrast, a threat against US car exports to Australia would be of direct interest to the United States. Such a threat would most likely be countered by US naval action.

The South West Pacific nations are not major trading nations and are greatly dependent on the exploitation of marine resources, usually living, for their survival. They have very limited abilities to monitor their areas of interest, let alone enforce their sovereignty or maintain any form of control over any sovereign rights. These nations rely on fledgling naval (effectively coastguard) forces, assistance from nations with more capable forces, and the fact that at least until recently, their marine resources have been abundant enough to support them and the depredations of other nations. Recent research into fish stocks indicates that they are not inexhaustible. South West Pacific nations cannot assume that other countries' fishing fleets will act according to the laws of the country in which they fish. They must have some method of monitoring compliance and punishing breaches. In essence they require a form of sea control.

Though nations such as Australia and New Zealand have a greater capacity to monitor their own EEZs, they too require this form of sea control. Many na-

tions have a growing capability to exploit marine resources of all types, living and non-living, on and off continental shelves, on the seabed and in the water column. This is a trend which will continue for the foreseeable future and in conjunction with the expanded national jurisdictions under UNCLOS, may change the way in which control of the sea is viewed. Nations may be more likely to regard control of the sea as an absolute requirement, rather than something which can be asserted when necessary. This trend will make control of the sea in open ocean areas more important. Many nations which do not currently have the capacity to defend their interests in those areas will be forced to at least consider acquiring them. Such considerations will be guided by the principles noted above: the value of the marine resource or trade and the perceived threat to it. This situation is not likely to occur in the short term and the forces necessary to maintain control of these open ocean areas may not be those which are currently associated with blue water navies (aircraft carriers and nuclear powered submarines). These matters are not, however, crucial to the fundamental direction which places more emphasis on the importance of the sea and hence the ability to control it.

The USN has been used to project power ashore. To do this it requires control of the area in which it will operate, which is usually in or near the littoral. However the littoral environment, and the immediate vicinity of the littoral is the most difficult for naval forces. The number of threats is multiplied, the threat axes along which they can approach are expanded, and the environment provides the greatest number of hiding places for all types of threat.⁶ It is particularly in this area that sea control is in dispute and where no navy can take it for granted, even in the face of what are theoretically minimal enemy forces. During the 1980s and early 1990s, the USN has conducted numerous power projection operations: off Lebanon, against Libya, Grenada, Panama, and most recently Iraq. In none of these instances has there been significant naval opposition. The greatest threat to the USN's ability to exercise sea control was provided during the Iran-Iraq war when the Persian Gulf was mined. It then proved to be very difficult for the USN to sweep or even detect some of the simplest of mines. The damage to US warships was significant, though not terminal for the operations in which they were participating. The result was reminiscent of the Korean War (Wonsan) and to some extent the Vietnam War (Haiphong).⁷ In each instance the USN's control of the sea was threatened by mines.

Though the threats were not insuperable, they were sufficient to deny the USN the ability to do exactly as it wished. The fact that the USN is now usually able to dominate an area, to the extent that it seems as though it can assume sea control, belies the truth.⁸ In addition it will only motivate countries who wish to

oppose the United States at sea to find alternatives means of doing so: mines are an obvious example and terrorist actions another. The potential for conventional submarines to pose a significant threat to attempts to control the sea is also not unrealistic. In the Asian region the number of modern conventional submarines at present is relatively small and likely to remain so in the short to medium term. There are however a number of navies which are considering them. Even in current circumstances there are many navies who possess submarines, including China, Russia, Japan, the two Koreas, Taiwan, India, Australia and Indonesia. Though the fleets are of widely varying quality and size all have the potential to be significant in regional terms.

The USN may not always be free to act in the militarily most efficient manner. Rules of Engagement, influenced by political restrictions, and International Laws may provide opportunities for otherwise weaker forces to temporarily deny the USN sea control. In limited conflict political considerations are likely to be very important in deciding the manner in which navies conduct operations. This will be particularly true for navies such as the Royal Australian and United States Navies, where factors such as minimising damage to 3rd parties or casualties within friendly forces will be prominent. The large number of ships, representing numerous nations, and the complicated coastal state jurisdictions in the Asian region, would make the interpretation and implementation of even simple rules of engagement a difficult task. International maritime law, UNCLOS 1982 in particular, has considerably extended the rights of coastal states, the most radical of which was the recognition of the archipelagic state. There are also an increasing number of reasons a coastal state may take action: migratory fish stocks and protecting the marine environment are two recent examples which have been prominent. The net result is to further limit freedom of action at sea and increase the potential for dispute. Sea control is thus more likely to be important, in dispute and difficult to assert.

While the United States Navy has recently rediscovered littoral operations, less capable navies have always tended to concentrate on operations in the littoral, simply because they have had no choice but to do so. Smaller warships are not capable of operating at great distances for extended periods, either because of their own limited endurance or the lack of an underway replenishment capability. They often require support from supporting arms, such as land based aircraft for air cover, target location and identifica-

tion. Though they are less dependent on bases and supporting forces, smaller conventionally powered submarines are most effective in littoral areas, operating in choke points which are common in the South East and East Asian regions. Littoral, rather than open ocean areas have more often been crucial areas for the maintenance of sea control, and not only for smaller navies.⁹ As sea power has mainly been important for the crucial support it provides to military conflict ashore, sea control in and near the shoreline has always been important.

In the South East Asian region, the importance of the sea lanes of communication is particularly noteworthy. The physical geography of the area dictates that sea transport will always play a more significant role than in areas such as Europe. Thus the nations in the region will require to be able to assert sea control to ensure that these economic arteries are protected. Regional navies could face a similar range of threats (conventional military or terrorist) and restrictions (political and legal) to the United States Navy. While their capabilities are not so great as those of the USN, their need to control the seas if their trade or resources are threatened is just as great. In the past most Asian regional navies have concentrated on force structures and operations emphasising sea denial, usually to counter any threat of invasion. Increasingly however, as their economies are growing they are focussing on the requirement to protecting their marine resources and trade. This process is likely to continue for the foreseeable future and will place greater emphasis on the need to control the sea.

This paper has examined the varying circumstances under which naval forces have sought to assert or deny sea control, the factors which influence where and why they do so. As the USN's change of focus in recent years has demonstrated these circumstances and factors can and do vary. As marine resources become more important for many nations control of the sea may become a more pervasive requirement. But the fundamental need for sea control does not change, and if anything the need for sea control in littoral areas has been more constant and common than in other areas. The reasoning underpinning all of these considerations is that while nations have maritime interests, they will seek to develop forces to protect trade or resources and to assert what they perceive to be their national rights in the maritime environment. Control of the sea is an indispensable basis of national security and whether it is asserted or denied in littoral waters or the open ocean is a mere matter of detail.¹⁰

Notes

¹ S. O'Keefe, F.B. Kelso and C.E. Mundy, ... *From The Sea. Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century*, (Department of the Navy, Washington DC, 1992) and J.H. Dalton, J.M. Boorda and C.E. Mundy, *Forward ... From The Sea*, (Department of the Navy, Washington DC, 1995).

² O'Keefe, ... *From the Sea*, 4.

³ Julian S. Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1988) 91.

⁴ The relationship between perceived risk and spending on armed forces is most obvious in countries with a democratic political system. In other countries armed forces often fulfil a social or domestic political function and as a result their base level of spending may be a higher proportion of government expenditure, however the relationship between risk and expenditure is still evident.

⁵ In naval terms, even for a small navy, the immediate vicinity may be defined as 50-100 nautical miles. For more capable naval forces the immediate vicinity could be anything up to several hundred nautical miles.

⁶ In the littoral environment land can cause radar shad-

ows as well as clutter which makes smaller targets more difficult to detect and the lack of uniformity of oceanographic conditions makes sub-surface detection similarly difficult.

⁷ Michael T. Isenberg, *Shield of the Republic: The United States Navy in an Era of Cold War and Violent Peace, 1945-1962*, (St Martin's Press, New York, 1993) 210 and 231-2; and Edward J. Marolda, *Operation End Sweep: A History of Minesweeping in North Vietnam*, (Naval Historical Centre, Washington, 1993) 42.

⁸ O'Keefe, ... *From the Sea*, 4.

⁹ The submarine and anti-submarine campaigns in the two World Wars are the most significant exception.

¹⁰ This is adapted from the more familiar quotation: 'Command of the sea is the indispensable basis of security and whether the instrument which exercises that command swims, floats or flies is a mere matter of detail. Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, *Statesmen and Sea Power*, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1946) 136.

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Awash in a Sea of Agencies

Handling ADF Surveillance in the 1990s

Lieutenant Tom Lewis, RAN

The writer is a part-time Intelligence Analyst in the Royal Australian Navy, working in the Joint Intelligence Branch, Headquarters Northern Command, Darwin. In this article he discusses perceived difficulties in the handling of coastal and resource surveillance, and proposes a radical new solution - the forming of a Coastguard division within the ADF - which would subsume all surveillance and interdiction responsibilities in policing Australia's maritime boundaries.


A multitude of agencies are responsible for surveillance, information gathering and barrier law enforcement along our coastline and over the vast expanse of Australian waters within our Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Some of these agencies have this duty as part of their charter; others become involved on a necessity basis. For example, Coastwatch, a division of Customs, operates daily airborne surveillance flights using aircraft under charter from Surveillance Australia, a subsidiary company of National Jet Systems. Other agencies, such as Immigration, become involved when their intelligence indicates incoming Suspected Illegal Entry Vessels (SIEVs). The Australian Federal Police (AFP) maintain an active interest in criminal activities such as the running of drugs and guns across our international borders. One of the biggest users, Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS), is concerned with the essential role of keeping Australia disease-free.

All of these organisations and more (see Diagram One below) generally funnel most of their information into the Australian Defence Force's surveillance network. This provides information to the sharp end of the organisation - the Navy's patrol boat fleet, which makes the bulk of the interceptions of illegal fishing boats and SIEVs. On occasion Customs will use their own vessels to make an interception, as will the AFP. But the vast majority of interdictions utilise the 15 Fremantle class patrol boats that are owned and operated by the Royal Australian Navy.

officer in the Strait to deal with this growing problem.¹ In the event of gaining information about a small problem that could be handled by this one officer, it is probable that the AFP would simply instruct their officer to make the interception. However, if the operation involved the detection of a large group, then the AFP would enlist the help of the RAN and that operation would revert to the normal cycle.

Similarly Customs operate some 17 launches of their own, four large Minister-class vessels, capable of work outside harbours, with the remaining 13 limited to sheltered-water operations.² In the event of a Customs launch being in the area of a suspect target sighting, the information could go straight from their own contracted surveillance platform - one of the chartered National Jet System aircraft operating as Coastwatch. It is probable in both situations that the ADF would supply additional information if available, thus occasionally seeing the normal cycle reversed.

There are, however, substantial problems in the fact that this process uses such a variety of agencies for surveillance work. These problems may be itemised as problems in communications, personnel management, bureaucratic politics, lack of expertise in gathering and processing intelligence, difficulties in applying funding, and last but definitely not least, the utilisation and permanent deployment of civilian personnel in the area of what may one day become an operational combat zone.



occasionally the normal cycle of surveillance and interdiction is bypassed. For example, AFP may gain information about drug-running through the Torres Strait. Recently the AFP has stationed a permanent

While these problems are discussed in detail below some solutions are also suggested. These are controversial and contentious. Before the solutions, however, some historical perspective.

In 1988 Senator Grant Tambling of the Northern Territory called for:

...northern Australia's Coastwatch system to be handed to the defence forces. He said foreign fishermen saw our coastal surveillance system as a joke because it was full of gaping holes. "Civilian agencies simply do not have the equipment or manpower necessary to undertake regular and effective patrols..." Senator Tambling's call has been backed up by the Federal Opposition primary industry spokesman, Mr Bruce Lloyd, who called the present Coastwatch a farce. Referring to reports that the Australian Customs Service allowed up to 15 Indonesian fishing boats illegally poaching for trochus shells to escape, Mr Lloyd said it was time the Government recognised the seriousness of the situation.³

Three years later, and not for the first time, inter-agency sniping was out in the open. This time 10 Indochinese boat people were escorted into Darwin around 8pm one evening after being spotted "at sea by a Coastwatch aircraft in the afternoon".⁴ Given the speed of these vessels it is interesting to ponder their distance from Darwin when they were spotted - Coastwatch advised it was some 25 km west of Darwin. Then followed some ducking for cover by both Immigration and Coastwatch, as also cited in the *NT News*:

A Coastwatch spokesman denied the vessel's sighting was an '11th hour' discovery. "We might not have found it 'til it was near Darwin, but we found it" spokesman Brian Flanagan said yesterday....Immigration Department spokesman, Mr Gordon Benjamin, said he could not comment on the circumstances surrounding the sighting. "It caught us by surprise but this department cannot comment. That is a Coastwatch matter" Mr Benjamin said."

In 1992, over 56 illegal immigrants landed at Montague Bay, in Western Australia. They were undetected for some time, and eventually, after considerable cost, the wandering people were discovered at a variety of locations. The undetected arrival sparked some investigation. Amongst the suggested explanations were:

The Immigration Department did not ask Coastwatch for special surveillance flights, despite persistent rumours that a boatload of 56 Chinese refugees was on its way, a senior immigration officer said yesterday...⁵

and:

Both the Customs Service and the Department of Immigration had been alerted to newspaper reports in the Northern Territory and Indonesia in July that a group of people, said to be Chinese, were making their way towards Australia. Yet the Asians were not discovered until more than 30 of them stumbled across a cattle station...⁶

This was disputed at the time by the two agencies: "...a Coastwatch official has denied that any information about the boat's travel had been passed on to them."⁷

At the time, there were calls for more efficiency, and indeed, the abolition of this inter-agency confusion. Retired Air Marshal David Evans said that "Coastwatch operations were almost completely ineffective and should be handed over to the defence force".⁸ Senator Jocelyn Newman claimed that the boat involved "had been in Australian waters for at least three weeks without being detected".⁹ Michael O'Connor, executive director of the Australian Defence Association, said in the *Australian* that "none of the existing bureaucracies wants to surrender their fiefdoms". He suggested that "...over the years, a grab-bag of disparate bodies, more or less co-ordinated, have battled each other as much as offenders".¹⁰

The ensuing report, compiled by members of Customs, Department of Immigration and Quarantine,¹¹ was only slightly critical:

Surveillance of our coastline is performed on the basis that good clear intelligence and risk analysis must focus where and when to put aircraft into the skies. On this occasion the intelligence was not clear. (3)

The report, while suggesting a lack of intelligence rather than anything else was to blame for the missed interception, did stress the need for inter-agency communication improvement:

Despite very good inter-agency communication there is strong support from Coastwatch, defence, Immigration and Quarantine agencies to the proposition that liaison and cooperation arrangements could be even better structured and streamlined in anticipation of possible future incidents.¹¹

Further embarrassments regularly took place. In November and December of 1994, a veritable flood of SIEVs proceeded south. On 22 November, at 4am in the morning, a Vietnamese "boat-person" flagged down a newspaper delivery van in Nightcliff, one of Darwin's beach suburbs, and then caught a ride to a public pay phone at a nearby Post office.¹² Thirteen people on board a small SIEV were later processed by Immigration, and subsequently returned to the Galang refugee camp off Indonesia from where they had come. Coastwatch revealed their organisation had been "diverted" to another boat, the third of three bigger vessels detected that month. It is interesting to wonder, however, at the intelligence link between Indonesia and Australia in this matter. Had notification of the departure of the vessel from Galang been passed to Australia's Immigration authorities? Had they passed it to Coastwatch? Had it been passed to Navy? In such a myriad of agencies it is perhaps inevitable that confusion occurs. This "miss" was highlighted

by another, similar, incident a little while later. This time an early morning jogger was the contact point for a group of boat people who landed near Broome.¹³

In March of the next year - 1995 - more embarrassment occurred. This time a SIEV with 52 people on board came within five kilometres of the Australian coast before being detected.¹⁴ This time the vessel was much bigger - a 28 metre fishing trawler - thus bringing to mind unhappy images of foreign patrol boats of similar size approaching our coastline with ease. This time the weather was blamed - storms, according to Coastwatch, had blown the vessel "off the normal anti-entrant flying patterns" of the surveillance aircraft. This is interesting - given that SIEVs following such patterns are detected, and a good number of illegal refugees are returned to their place of origin, it would not take too much of a sea navigator to work out which patterns to avoid in the future. It is instructive to ponder the unknown factor in SIEV landings - how many land on a Broome beach or the like and are met by a contact who spirits them into Australia? Such landings of course do not make the list of sightings, interceptions or the statistics that make up the whole picture. Are we dealing in the whole picture with only the part of the iceberg we can see?

In the March 1995 incident once again inter-agency problems seem to have been a factor. According to the Department of Immigration, the vessel had left "southern China in August last year, and had spent some time in the Philippines". If this sort of information was at hand, it is presumed that the intention to travel to Australia was at least anticipated. Was this information passed on?

However, it must be said that the overall detection program has not been unsuccessful. In a report given in November 1995, Peter Naylor, the National Manager of Coastwatch, pointed out that: "Since 1989 there have been 43 arrivals of suspect illegal entry vessels. Only four of these were not detected by Coastwatch prior to their arrival".¹⁵ But given that five examples of detection-or-not have been outlined above, what constitutes successful detection? However, although this statement of success might be questioned - what of those arrivals who arrived completely undetected? - the present organisation seems to have some successes. But how much more efficient could it be, both in operational terms and in cost-efficiency.

Consider the existing problems.

• Problems in Communications

Different agencies often use different languages. This is sometimes not apparent - an FFV (Foreign Fishing Vessel) or a SIEV (Suspected Illegal Entry Vessel) are common terms that seem to be understood by all. But take another seemingly simple system - the rank

structures of the different agencies, for example. What constitutes the non-commissioned officer status in Customs or in the AFP, for example, is a mystery to most people in the ADF, let alone understanding what constitutes the management structure within a Federal Public Service agency such as Immigration. Does a Commander in the Australian Federal Police rank the same as a Commander in the Navy, for example? Does the term "Chief" in the Navy signify the boss? These are small and simple things, but anything adding to confusion works to the detriment of the overall operation.

To detail further, each agency utilises a different system of security terminology. Once inside that system, the only thing a member knows is not to share classified information with someone who is not cleared for that level. Consequently, sharing information with personnel from another agency is not possible, and thus the agencies and their members become compartmentalised. Common problems are discussed only after sanitising the information, or more commonly, not at all.

Consider too that people move into these agencies as part of job turnover or - within the ADF - as a posting. Each new person entering the web of surveillance has to learn all of the terminology in a very short space of time if he or she is to perform efficiently. Consider how much more efficient they could be in their agency's core business without such attendant learning curves.

The lack of communication is heightened even further by the fact that all of these organisations use different information storage procedures that don't talk to each other. For example, Coastwatch's target information is passed to HQNORCOM via fax - and that information is then entered by hand into the Navy's databases. This is time-consuming and liable to input error as the data is transferred. Other agencies too cannot feed data into the centralised ADF systems. This problem has been with us for some time, as Lieutenant-Commander JA Jacobi noted some years ago.¹⁶ Writing in 1990, and discussing the "vast amount of information" collected by a multitude of agencies who handle maritime scientific data, he pointed out that: "Computer networks exist between most centres of higher education and learning...However there is no overall system of information storage and exchange". Similarly today we use computers to process and store huge amounts of data gained by the many agencies handling surveillance data. But how much do these agencies share their data? To add to all of this is the previously mentioned problem of inter-agency security. Not only does an agency need to be happy about who is on the receiving end of its output, but also the "need-to-know" rule hovers in the back of the mind for many.

Personnel Retention - a lack of a Career Structure

How many members of these agencies offer a long-term career structure? Obviously some have not had the time - Coastwatch has been through restructuring and it is also a young agency. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to ponder for a moment, about the long term thoughts of the pilots, observers, and staff who make up that organisation. In the Immigration Department, how many people have a long term view of their career? In the Federal Police, how many officers have remained within sight for a substantial portion of their career of the problems of surveillance and interdiction in Australia's EEZ?

Contrast this with the experience of personnel within the ADF, where even interdepartmental postings mean working alongside similarly uniformed members who share the same language, training and ethos. Many of these people remain within their category for many years - it is not unusual to find members within the Intelligence categories - particularly part-time members - who have served within them for over a decade. Some personnel also spend a large percentage of their time working in the same location, building up a valuable store of knowledge encompassing local climatic conditions, the habits of intruding fishermen or SIEV skippers, and a knowledge of who does what, where and to whom that nothing can replace. This picture of normalcy is one that is essential to detect when something is different - and therefore needs to be investigated. Here is one example of expertise within Headquarters Northern Command. A Chief Petty Officer in Joint Intelligence has over 15 years of experience in the immediate area. Place names of obscure offshore reefs, re-offending fishermen, knowledge of the yearly climate and how it affects illegal fishing, even operational information such as where to get a spare radar part on a Friday afternoon - all are contained within those years of experience. This is valuable expertise that cannot be replaced by briefings or reading. The long-term usefulness of such people seems largely overlooked in the present multi-agency scenario.

Perceptions of Expertise and Ensuing Competition

Once enmeshed in the ethos and environment of a government agency - be it ADF, Coastwatch, Customs, Immigration, AFP - it does not take long for the new member to become submerged in the loyalty, terminology and accepted practices of that agency. Perceptions of that agency's capacities soon follow, and how many outsiders would agree that one agency is superior in its capacities over its sister agencies? This does not matter, for outside criticism is dismissed. Such loyalty is understandable, but it doesn't help. It leads to competition for funding, competition - some-

times - for publicity, which can dictate funding, and buck passing. And just to provoke the argument a little more, what Intelligence organisation has more depth of expertise than the combined arms of the ADF? With experience dating from before WWII, the Intelligence capacity of the armed forces should not be subsumed beneath the sister organisations which sometimes act in competition to it.

Similarly the expertise of the agency making the majority of interceptions is subsumed by the separatist approach. Why does Customs maintain four large sea-going launches, said to be manned by personnel who are paid at a merchant-sailor rate that makes their sea-going activities much more expensive than the amount needed to employ an RAN sailor for the same amount of time? Although the cost of training these two agencies' personnel might be argued to be of consequence this is not a compelling argument - why not train Naval personnel to perhaps a lesser level? These Customs vessels are not armed, and in the type of interception which requires a display of force which is sometimes used these vessels are obviously unsuitable for the task.

To make interceptions at sea using any other force than the Navy seems to be making a possibly dangerous task even more disaster-prone than it is for the experts. The force which is trained for sea-going interception is one which is constantly rehearsed, prepared and used in such scenarios, and it seems strange to allow another agency to get their feet wet in what is a very large and problem-prone sea.

Policing in Time of Conflict

In the late eighties, Paul Dibb predicted that low level conflict was a possible future war scenario that Australia might face in the future. Today the ADF pays significant attention to such scenarios taking place on our northern borders. Defence in the north has been strengthened and continues to be strengthened. Yet such timely and wise precautions, coupled with the way we patrol our borders, surely present a host of contradictions.

If low level hostilities break out, who at present will be responsible for the surveillance of an enormous area of Australian territory? A civilian agency is presently tasked with this role: Coastwatch. Given the enormous number of SIEVs and FFFVs detected in northern waters, any possible hostile intruder would be foolish to ignore the opportunities presented in covert insertion. And any intruder would be equally silly to ignore the portable possibilities presented in defending oneself against a suspicious overflying Coastwatch aircraft. At the first, most likely successful launch of a shoulder-launched Surface to Air Missile the entire Coastwatch fleet - minus one - is grounded. With their disappearance from the scene

so too disappears a large percentage of Australia's surveillance capacity. It is specious to argue that the RAAF's Orion fleet could take over the role. The Orion is a very different aircraft from the Coastwatch fleet models¹⁷ employed for maritime surveillance; it is differently equipped; its crews are differently trained; they would lack the local knowledge that heightens the achievements of the very capable Coastwatch crews in operation today. Besides, they would no doubt be already otherwise employed in such a scenario. The Orion is very capably equipped for anti-submarine and surface strike missions, and this is doubtless where they should and would be deployed.

There is, according to anecdotal and some minuted evidence from within ADF and beyond, a marked reluctance for the civilian agencies to even discuss their role in a possible conflict. This perhaps is not surprising, as even a cursory examination of the possibilities can see that these civilian agencies are carrying out duties in what would be a possible and probable operational area. To ignore this problem is to adopt an ostrich-like posture. Given that warning times for conflicts in the post-Cold War world are short, Australia's defence cannot afford to leave this problem unresolved. Political will in the area will doubtless be constrained by the financial arguments entailed in the solution, but money is not to be compared to the possibility of lives lost. This is the attitude that equips Navy vessels "for but not with" essential missile systems; shortens RAAF and Army flying hours, and results in training casualties and possible disaster in warfare. We should perhaps remember our Gulf deployment in 1990, where, as David Horner¹⁸ notes:

A guided missile destroyer (DDG) could perform the necessary tasks but did not have a Close In Weapons System (CIWS) for self-defence. The older destroyer escorts (DEs) were not regarded as suitable due to similar shortfalls in self-defence and limited endurance. (25)

and in respect of the deployment of HMAS *Success*: Unlike the two frigates, *Success* had no self-defence capability against aircraft except for the three obsolescent 40mm Bofors. While it was unlikely that the ship would be risked in a hostile area, it is prudent that it should have some more modern means of air defence. On Saturday approval was given for a detachment of the Army's 16th Air Defence Regiment to be placed on board with their RBS70 anti-aircraft weapon system. (39)

Once in the threat area, *Success* was deployed to areas of lesser air threat. The RBS70 system is not a suitable system for defending a large supply ship against aircraft or incoming missiles such as Exocet or Harpoon. Nevertheless, because of political decision making, our armed forces are often deprived of vital equipment that may save lives or make the difference between victory or defeat. Although the scenario is not as clearly defined, there are very obvious

areas of deficiency in coastal surveillance and interdiction during wartime that are being ignored by the present operational system. Exercise Kangaroo 95 and its predecessors have pointed out areas of deficiency in this area; analysis points to others, and the refusal to examine this problem until a conflict forces such examination upon us is both foolhardy and negligent.

A Possible Solution

The solution to this proliferation of agencies and the inevitable ensuing problems could perhaps be solved by the implementation of two changes. The first would be the development of a National Surveillance Policy, setting out target priorities, minimal and maximal engagement by the surveillance and interdiction platforms, procedures and policies.

The second solution is to hand over all surveillance and interdiction to the ADF, and form a new joint department within Navy and Air Force - Coastguard. Secondment to this division should be as with any other division within the ADF - by posting - and the identification of where members are serving should not be by any other than normal - the wearing of sleeve insignia, for example. Special consideration should be given in the Coastguard area to the long-term retention of part-time personnel, who will provide local knowledge and advice.

Within the operations of the new Coastguard, where necessary for interdiction legalities, officers from the relevant civilian departments would be carried. Coastwatch would be closed down entirely, and their aircraft and equipment, in the main operated by National Jet, offered to the RAAF, at least in a wet-lease capacity. Their pilots could be offered short service commissions within that arm of the ADF, and future training of RAAF pilots would not overlook streaming pilot personnel into the Coastguard. The expertise of presently employed pilots and observers should not be overlooked in the process - they could and should be inducted into the RAAF. Attention could be paid, too, to the role of pilot within the RAAF - why is it necessary for all RAAF pilots to be officers and managers, with the significant training cost those roles entail. Why not, perhaps, resurrect the role of sergeant pilot that was used capably by several air forces during World War II? These pilots could fly the less demanding coastal surveillance aircraft.

All surveillance is therefore carried out by RAAF platforms, and any incidental intelligence affecting possible illegal immigrants, fishing, smuggling and other incidents involving surveillance and interdiction is passed directly to the ADF Intelligence centres. The Navy becomes responsible for all interdiction - Customs divests itself entirely of coastal patrol boats, as does any other agency.

Further, the role of the current interdiction legislation should be reviewed within the implementation of such change. There are some problematic aspects of legislation in the arrest powers of naval personnel, for example. The procedure whereby vessels are towed back to port is also increasingly fraught with the possibility of the arrested vessel sinking, as a recent Maritime Headquarters minute pointed out.¹⁹ Some sort of legal rationalisation might be considered where the laborious process of subjecting these fishermen to a lengthy expensive stay in various harbours is revised. For example, perhaps a summary offence (and subsequent penalty) could be enacted to keep the interdiction platforms longer on station.

We all realise that it is necessary for the ADF to retain its warfighting role. Some may argue that the extra responsibility of taking on further roles in areas of policing will divert money away from that important core function. The purchase of more Dash-8 aircraft might be prioritised over the purchase of F-18 upgrades, for example. The Navy might argue that they will be forced to purchase more Offshore Patrol Vessels as against two more submarines. In short, the country's long term ability to defend itself might be subsumed against a short-term need to police its borders and protect its maritime interests.

These are very valid concerns, and ones which must be managed in the introduction of a new responsibility, and constantly after that. To highlight and to cope with an extended role for the ADF separate budgeting²⁰ of the coastguard function would be a necessity. Such an amount should be described in exactly that terminology - Coastguard. This emphasis and possible subsequent exhaustion of the funds will high-

light for the ADF, its political masters and the general public, exactly what stresses and strains the policing of the country's borders is undergoing. The amount of funding given should be realistic; should take into account the lessened expenditure of other agencies hitherto tasked within the area, and furthermore for the first triennial period should receive seed funding to establish new routines, equipment and personnel training.

If the policing role is overly strenuous and in any one period of budgeting the costs involved run over budget, then the new ADF version of Coastguard either comes to a halt or receives top up funding. Its personnel, their salaries known and offset for the year, are safeguarded, but if aircraft and patrol boat maintenance budgets, or flying or sailing costs are overrun due to unforecast bursts of SIEV or fishing activity then those operations are stopped. These budgets are not supplemented by tapping into the warfighting role of the ADF. Only with such budget management would the essential core function of the country's Defence Force be safeguarded.

Such a change should not detract from the dedication and various successes the multi-agency role has had. Over the last 20 years, there has been much to praise in the operations carried out by the personnel involved in the role of policing the country's borders. Nevertheless, the present arrangement has been largely dictated by events, rather than arrived at through logical analysis. The next 20 years may well see more of a threat posed for Australia's coastal security - and it would be well to plan for that threat now by wholesale revision rather than reaction.

¹ Personal telephone interview with Resident Naval Officer, Thursday Island, 10 April 1996.

² "To assist Customs carry out its activities it currently has 17 marine vessels at various sea ports" - <http://www.customs.gov.au/ac03.htm> (24 Oct 1996)

³ "Coast is too open" - Senator. *NT News*, 14 September, 1988. p.3.

⁴ "NT coast spotters almost miss boat 10": *NT News*, 11 May 1991, p.3.

⁵ "North 'wide open to infiltration': *Sydney Morning Herald*, 21 January 1992, p.3.

⁶ Editorial: *The Australian*, 20 January 1992, p.11.

⁷ "Searchers close in on last of lost boat people": *Sydney Morning Herald*, p.7.

⁸ "North 'wide open to infiltration'" *Sydney Morning Herald*, 21 January 1992, p.3

⁹ *ibid*

¹⁰ "Short answer to guarding a long coastline": *The Australian*, 23 January 1992, p.9.

¹¹ "Report on Investigation into arrival of Suspected Illegal Entrant Vessel (SIEV) into Montague Sound",

Australian Customs Service; Department of Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs; Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service, February 1992.

¹² *Weekend Australian*, 26/27 November, 1994. (27)

¹³ *Weekend Australian*, 11/12 March, 1995. (13)

¹⁴ *ibid*

¹⁵ "Coastwatch. Civil Maritime Surveillance. An Australian Perspective" paper by Peter Naylor, the National Manager of Coastwatch, Australian Customs Service, delivered at the Neighbours at Sea Conference, Darwin, November, 1995.

¹⁶ LCDR JA Jacoby RAN - "Information Management: the Key to Effective Coastal Surveillance".

¹⁷ Coastwatch operate three types of fixed-wing aircraft, plus one type of helicopter:

• **Dash-8** This is a high-wing aircraft that is capable of flights up to 6-7 hours @185 knots. It replaces the Seascan jet that Coastwatch employed up to 30 June 1996. The Dash-8 flies the longest missions both in terms of time and distance. The two remaining aircraft types Coastwatch operates patrol more closely

to shore, but are quite capable of extended flights over water.

• **Britten-Norman Islander** This is a high-wing, twin engine aircraft with one pilot and an observer on each side. Range of 5 hours @ 120 knots. The aircraft is equipped with a short-range radar which may be downtuned to detect surface craft; observation bubbles; still camera and GPS/Computer recording system. This replaced the Aero Commander Shrike

• **Vigilant 406** This is a low wing aircraft capable of flights up to 4-5 hours @ 170 knots - 650-850nm from the coastline. It is equipped with surface search radar and visual detection systems: binoculars, still camera equipment, and the GPS/Computer recording system. These aircraft replaced the Nomad previously used by Coastwatch.

¹⁸ Horner, David. *The Gulf Commitment*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1992.

¹⁹ Minute: "Losses of Foreign Fishing Vessels under Tow or Escort". Headquarters Northern Command, Darwin, 19 July 1996. The minute noted that determining a vessel as unsuitable to tow would "create a class of vessels that would not be apprehended, diminishing the deterrent to fishing illegally within the AFZ".

²⁰ This paper accepts wholeheartedly arguments put forward in "Responsibility for Civil Coastal Surveillance: Why not the ADF?" by Squadron Leader Noel Tesch. Tesch pointed out illogical cost arguments against the manning of coastal surveillance by the ADF. In addition, such arguments also usually fail to take into account the 24 hour per day crewing availability by ADF personnel - at no extra cost if their services are required for more than a normal working day. It would be interesting to see the total cost of rescuing round-the-World sailor Peter Bullimore if a civil organisation had undertaken the rescue.

YOUR STORIES WANTED

David Stevens, Director of Naval Historical Studies at the Department of Defence, is seeking to develop a comprehensive list of occasions where the RAN has been used to enforce or preserve Australian security interests outside periods of actual war.

At the time, many of these incidents were simply regarded as a normal part of naval operations and there is often no published record. Operations suitable for inclusion on the list will be widely varied but would almost certainly include the despatch of a naval vessel to show presence in a remote locality or a threat to use limited force.

Suggestions should be forwarded to:

David Stevens
Director of Naval Historical Studies
Maritime Studies Program
Department of Defence (Navy)
APW2-G-11
CANBERRA ACT 2600

Phone 06 2666873
Fax 06 2666754
email dnhs@exec.navy.gov.au

The Australian Naval Involvement in the Sudan Campaign 1884-85

Lieutenant G.J. Swinden, RAN

The Navy in the Sudan Campaign - Impossible, it was a purely Military affair!' exclaimed Colonel Blimp. Well almost correct, but the Naval Forces of Australia did have an involvement in the campaign. Although minor they were involved in three ways.

During the period 1882 to 1885 the British fought against the Mahdi (a self proclaimed chosen one of the prophet Mohammed) and his followers who sought to overthrow the British backed Egyptian controllers of the Sudan. In early 1884 the fighting was intense as the British forces advanced westwards, from the port of Suakin on the Red Sea, into the Sudan. Despite their superiority in training and weaponry the British suffered losses which they were quite unprepared for against a native enemy.

The Australian state of Victoria, like many Australian states, had its own navy and three vessels for this state navy had recently been built in Britain and were soon to make their maiden voyage to Australia. They were the gunboats HMVS *Albert* and HMVS *Victoria* (II) and the torpedo boat HMVS *Childers*. These vessels left Britain in early 1884 for their delivery voyage and, due to some concern over the legal status of the vessels, they were classified as units of the Royal Navy for the duration of the voyage to Melbourne.

Childers sailed from Portsmouth on 3 February 1884 and *Albert* and *Victoria* sailed from Spithead on 14 February. The two gunboats arrived at Malta on 26 February where they found *Childers* waiting in port.

The Victorian Government was keen to assist Britain and being aware of the problems in the Sudan, offered the three vessels for service with the British forces. This offer was accepted gratefully by the British Government who ordered the three warships to sail for Suakin and to report to the local Naval commander, Rear Admiral Sir William Hewitt, RN. All three ships left Malta on 8 March 1884.

Childers arrived at Suakin on 16 March and the slower gunboats arrived three days later. The situation in the Sudan, however, had improved and Rear Admiral Hewitt advised the Victorian ships that their services

would not be required. As a result of this the Victorian ships left Suakin on 23 March with *Childers* being towed by *Victoria*. They arrived at Aden, at the entrance to the Red Sea, a few days later and left that port on 31 March 1884. Apart from some heavy seas the remainder of the voyage to Australia was uneventful and the trio of ships reached Melbourne on 25 June 1884.

Thus the first Australian, or rather Victorian, Naval involvement in the Sudan was a rather short lived and uneventful affair. The three vessels served on in the Victorian Navy but *Albert* and *Victoria* were decommissioned in 1895 (although an attempt was made in 1917 to convert *Albert* to a Naval tug, but this was abandoned due to excessive cost). *Childers* on the other hand saw extensive service in the Victorian Navy, Australian Naval Forces and RAN. She was eventually commissioned as HMAS *Childers*, in the RAN, before being finally paid off on 15 September 1916 after more than 30 years service.

The second part that Australian Naval forces played in the Sudan campaign was the provision of men for the NSW Contingent which was dispatched to the Sudan in 1885.

The Australian colonies had been keen to offer troops for Britain's colonial wars for several years, but it was not until 1885, following the death of General Gordon at the battle of Khartoum, that the offer was accepted.

A number of men from the NSW Naval Brigade volunteered for and were accepted for service in the NSW Contingent. As one contemporary report states 'The appearance of the companies was odd, many of the men being in civilian costume, whilst many wore the dress of the respective New South Wales Regiments to which they previously belonged, and some were in Naval uniform'. The NSW Naval Brigade was a volunteer (non permanent force) unit which would not preclude some of its members from joining another unit.

The NSW Contingent was comprised of an Infantry, Artillery, Ambulance Corps and Staff units totalling 770 men in all. The unit left Sydney on 3 March 1885

and arrived at Suakin on 29 March. The campaign in the Sudan was virtually over by the time they arrived and they spent only seven weeks there before sailing for Australia on 18 May 1885. The contingent saw little fighting and although a few soldiers were wounded, the only deaths came from diseases such as Dysentery.

At least ten of the men who saw service in the Sudan later went on to serve in the NSW Naval Brigade unit which was dispatched to China in 1900 to help put down the Boxer Rebellion. These men were:

SUDAN	CHINA
No. 98 Private J Strugnell (Infantry)	AB J. Strugnell (C Company)
No. 123 Private A. Barrett (Infantry)	AB A.E. Barrett (C Company)
No. 124 Private A. Bennett (Infantry)	PO 2nd Class A.J. Bennett (B Company) later disrated to AB
No. 247 Private J. Pickering (Infantry)	AB J. Pickering (A Company)
No. 310 Private J. Allen (Infantry)	CPO J. Allen (B Company)
No. 313 Private J. Burnett (Infantry)	Ldg Smn J.J. Burnett (B Company)
No. 320 Private E.T. Cane (Infantry)	PO 1st Class E.T. Cane (D Company)
No. 400 Private F. Buckley (Infantry)	AB F. Buckley (B Company)
No. 439 Private J. Brown (Infantry)	AB J.H. Brown (D Company)
No. 484 Private J. Walsh (Infantry)	Signaller J. Walsh (A Company)

Again this unit saw little fighting, although Petty Officer Bennett had the dubious honour of being one of the units six fatalities when he committed suicide shortly before the Brigade returned to Australia in 1901. It appears he was in an unsound state of mind having been disrated from Petty Officer to Able Seaman after being drunk and assaulting a Chief Petty Officer. He left behind a widow and several children.

Private (later Petty Officer 1st Class) E.T. Cane is also

reported to have served in the RAN Bridging Train in World War I. Noting that this unit was formed in 1915, some 30 years after the Sudan campaign, he would have been in his late 40's or early 50's (at least 48 if he was a minimum age of 18 in 1885). His name does not appear on the RANBT Embarkation Roll which would seem to indicate that he did not serve overseas with that unit. He may have joined the RANBT and been discharged prior to going overseas. If he did he certainly had an interesting and varied Military/Naval career.

Two other men of interest in the NSW Contingent are Lieutenant C.W. Bouverie (Artillery) who served in the Royal Navy during World War I and Private G. Trendle (Ambulance Corps) who had served previously in the Royal Navy in the Sudan campaign in 1882.

The third and final part the Australian Naval Forces played in the Sudan was that by 129 Private Hugh Cust Brownlow of the Infantry. Following his service in the Sudan he joined the NSW Naval Brigade and on 1 June 1889 he was appointed as a Sub Lieutenant. He was subsequently promoted to Lieutenant in 1892. In 1902 he was promoted to Lieutenant-Commander in the Australian Naval Forces (ANF) and became a Commander in 1905. Finally on 1 July 1913 he was promoted to the rank of Captain in the Royal Australian Navy.

When World War I broke out in 1914 he was the District Naval Officer in Sydney (DNO-Sydney) and one of two Naval Aide de Camp (ADC) to the Governor General. He remained DNO-Sydney for the course of the war and on 4 October 1918 was made an Officer of the Order of the British Empire (OBE) 'for services as District Naval Officer-Sydney'. Brownlow retired in 1920 after 35 years Military and Naval service. It was a long march from the sands of the Sudan to the DNO's office in Sydney and with his retirement the last link between the Navy and the Sudan campaign in 1885 was severed.

And thus you have the role of the Naval forces of Australia in the Sudan campaign of 1884-85. Not a major role, but a role none the less.

ANI Silver Medallion winning essay for Staff Course 36/96

Maritime Constabulary Tasks: Are They Valid Elements In Australia's Future Maritime Strategy?

MAJOR A E FOULDS

My concern is that the naval profession needs to focus on why it exists and for what purposes. It is essential for the Navy to play an integral part in the development of the maritime strategies which will be required as a contribution to our overall defence and security postures.

—Kim Beazley¹

The Royal Australian Navy provides forces for maritime operations, including patrol and response, interdiction and strike, and to assist in peacetime activities as directed.

—Defence Corporate Plan 1996-2000²

Just as Harold Macmillan's 'Winds Of Change' swept through Africa in the sixties so too are similar winds blowing in South East Asia. In the last 20 years both the Vietnam War and The Cold War have ended and there has been a dramatic effect in Australia's region. The reduced likelihood of major superpower conflict has changed the strategic situation for all players and this, combined with burgeoning economic growth for some nations has led to growth in regional armed forces and a reassessment of security issues.

Maritime strategy is no different and has been the subject of considerable debate as Australia considers its position in this changing world. Australia's defence posture will reflect its view of itself in the region and its maritime strategy is a vital component of this posture. Encapsulated in this, is the essential requirement to develop security relationships within the region, a view shared by many neighbours who also see advantages in being 'open to new security approaches and avenues of dialogue in a way that they have not been since at least the Second World War'.

Resulting from these fundamental changes has been the increased awareness of and emphasis on, 'constabulary tasks' by the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), such as policing of economic zones, the policing of immigration in Northern Australia and its increased use as an adjunct of Australian foreign policy. The dilemma facing defence planners is to what extent the increasing requirement for these 'constabulary tasks' should drive the force structure and future direction of the Navy as part of Australia's overall maritime strategy.

The use of the sea is divided into more than one element or function. Generally, most commentators accept Booth's division of naval functions into a diplomatic, policing and military role while accepting that the distinction between functions can be blurred. The functions most easily divide into those of warfighting and the projection of force and those of influence, policing and diplomacy. This essay will deal with the latter naval functions which loosely define what most writers now call constabulary tasks. However, it is important to note, as does Sherwood, that the present roles of the RAN should not be seen in isolation. That is, the warfighting and constabulary roles are complementary in Australia's maritime strategy. The maritime strategy of Australia has the primary aim of the defence of Australia and her vital interests and it is concentrated on warfighting capability. There is no suggestion that constabulary tasks will ever become pre-eminent and this essay should be read in that light.

The aim of this essay is to examine the validity of constabulary tasks as elements of Australia's future maritime strategy. The paper will define Australia's maritime strategy in broad terms and in relation to the strategic environment. It will attempt to place constabulary tasks in the perspective of Australia's maritime strategy while discussing how force structure issues are relevant and attempting to reach a conclusion on the importance of these constabulary tasks in terms of the strategic environment and the RAN's future roles. Comparison will be made, where relevant, with the experiences of other nations. While maritime strategy encompasses many elements, this essay will concentrate on the RAN as the primary vehicle for the implementation of Australia's maritime strategy.

AUSTRALIAN MARITIME STRATEGY

A traditional maritime strategy based on the writings of Mahan and Corbett emphasises large high seas fleets, commerce raiding, command of the sea and concepts such as the decisive battle. Where these strategies are relevant today, they are the preserve of a superpower and not the medium power which generally has not the resources, manpower or maritime tradition to implement them. There is wide agreement that Australia is a maritime power and most observers are prepared to accept that Australia is also a medium power. Certainly, Australia is used as an example of a medium power, along with Brazil, Canada and the United Kingdom, by no less an authority than Hill.⁶ The medium power status of Australia is critical in understanding the importance of maritime issues to Australia and the development of an identifiable maritime strategy which is based on a national strategy of defence in depth with an ability to provide limited sea control and rather more in the way of sea denial in any defence of Australia.

The sea has always been vital to Australia's defence and trade since colonial times though the earliest maritime strategy was based on the ability of the Royal Navy to protect against and deter any potential aggressor. Using Booth's division of uses of the sea as a basis, Australia's military role at sea was performed largely by Britain and the United States until after World War II, while most of the policing and a number of diplomatic roles were performed by the RAN from its inception in 1910.⁷ It was not until the mid seventies that Australia began to think of its defence strategies in terms of self reliance and this was not particularly well articulated until the 1987 White Paper, *The Defence of Australia*.

Australia now has a multi-dimensional national security strategy which has been best described by Gareth Evans as having military capability as just one among many instruments of national policy. Thus Australia's maritime strategy is one aspect of an overall policy 'in which *all* the components of Australia's network of relations in the region - military and politico-military capability; diplomacy; economic linksand the exchange of people and ideas - work together to help shape a security environment which is favourable to Australia's interests.'⁸ In this way Australia's maritime strategy is concerned with influence and control in support of national aims and objectives. The most recent military articulation of the general national security policy is contained in the White Paper, *Defence Of Australia*, 1994. In short, this emphasises military capability as part of a national policy of comprehensive engagement in the region in order to build a shared sense of security interests.

Australia's maritime strategy is related to the strate-

gic environment and the regional strategic environment in particular. This has changed markedly in recent years. The global and regional power balance has shifted, not least since the decline of the influence of the old Soviet Union and the ending of the Cold War and it is hard to determine the effects of these changes because, ironically, the strategic environment is now probably more complex than ever. Writers such as Goldrick indicate that with the improvement of security on land for many nations in the region, there has been a tendency to change the balance of force structure towards the sea.⁹ Maritime issues are at the forefront of most current regional security concerns and are heavily focussed on economic issues facing all nations in the region. Major uncertainties exist regarding competing claims to Economic Exclusion Zones (EEZ), rights of archipelagic states in determining Sea Lines Of Communication (SLOC) and rights of passage, illegal fishing, illegal immigration, piracy, environmental pollution and the general exploitation of off-shore resources by all nations and the effectiveness of the United Nations Convention On Law Of The Sea of 1982.

Australia's maritime strategy has had to adapt to these changes. Australia's maritime claims now not only concern the protection of fish stocks but also indicate a national intention to be involved in the exploitation of marine resources as a whole. It is salutary for maritime strategic thinkers to note, as Sherwood points out, that if Australia should declare a 200 mile EEZ, then Australia will have sovereignty over an area of sea one and a half times its land mass without including any Antarctic territories in the equation.¹⁰ Understanding of the strategic implications of this has led to an increase in national awareness of these maritime and economic issues which has served to highlight the future importance of the security of Australia's maritime claims. The protection and policing of these, including fishing stocks and EEZ are major elements of what are increasingly known as constabulary tasks and Australian defence planners must consider their relevance in the development of a future maritime strategy.

CONSTABULARY TASKS

There are many variations in definition of constabulary tasks but all agree that they are essentially directed against non-military threats. They are not warfighting tasks but as the name suggests, policing ones. According to the naval historian Taylor, they occur somewhere along the spectrum of national security policy between the politico-military function and the military diplomacy function and they are accorded the less than precise role of sovereignty assertion and protection against non-military threats.¹¹ It is, however, Booth's division of use of the sea into the trinity of military, diplomatic and policing roles

which is more widely used when discussing constabulary tasks for modern navies and which this paper will use with reference to the RAN and constabulary tasks.

Strictly, constabulary tasks are generally domestic in nature and involved with coastguard responsibilities, policing of coastal or littoral waters, protection of fisheries and general maritime surveillance. Till argues that there is recognition today, by most countries, of a further requirement to protect against terrorism and illegal immigration.¹² Also relevant as part of a navy's constabulary task, is the quasi diplomatic role of presence and confidence building. Neither are new but both have been raised in prominence as increasingly important roles of a peacetime navy. Bateman goes as far as to suggest that Australia's defence planners will find it hard to refute the argument that the increasing requirement for less capable warships for constabulary duties should mean a diminishing requirement for more capable warships given the significantly reduced risk of major conflict war involving Australia.¹³ This essay will now define further these constabulary tasks in relation to the roles presently undertaken by the RAN, relating them to present maritime strategy and identifying issues for the future.

Australia does not possess an independent coastguard force such as that of the United States. Instead, this littoral policing role is conducted by a number of agencies of which the RAN, mostly by patrol boat, is a major element. The policing of this coastal zone has always been important, as Booth puts it, for, 'furthering the interests of sovereignty, good order and resource enjoyment'.¹⁴ There appears to be general agreement that Australia's coast should be effectively patrolled and that it should be one of the RAN's important priorities though Sherwood points out that some research has demonstrated some public confusion regarding the navy's role in coastal surveillance and patrolling.¹⁵ The involvement of the RAN in coastal surveillance activities of any magnitude in peacetime is relatively recent (1960's) and largely reflects the increase in the offshore estate associated with the increased activities of foreign fishing fleets in Australian waters. The problems of coastal surveillance and the task of policing Australian waters grew into the seventies and the RAN, as the repository of existing skill and capability, became the single most important national asset devoted to this task.¹⁶

Surveillance and by extension, policing and patrolling, has now integrated both civilian assets and military in a coordinated surveillance program of Australia's coast. The 1988 report to Parliament on the management of civil coastal surveillance in northern Australia acknowledges the importance of Defence, primarily Navy, as a provider of surveillance assets.¹⁷ The importance of this is that it shows the increasing

understanding by policy makers that the RAN has important maritime tasks in its surveillance and policing role which must be undertaken in peace as well as during conflict and that in the future there is a national expectation that this will remain a significant part of Australia's maritime strategy.

Specific fisheries protection duties have again been relatively recent as a mainstream task for the RAN though it has been conducted on an ad hoc basis since the navy's inception.¹⁸ Now and into the future it is expected to become more important and this task is expected to continue to be linked to the RAN's response capability to intercept illegal immigrants under the auspices of other government agencies. Linked to this is the RAN's peacetime role as a *de jure* adjunct of the Australian National Parks And Wildlife Service and The Australian Customs Service, where coordination is given to routine patrolling of Australia's littoral coast. Closely associated with these tasks for the RAN and most modern peacetime navies, are the developing requirements for the monitoring, policing and enforcing of issues such as pollution control and protection of the environment. Protection of the environment, in particular, is likely to occupy more time of national security policy makers in the future.¹⁹

While these roles have no warfighting dimension, it is increasingly clear that governments consider it acceptable and appropriate to use defence assets for these constabulary functions and further, that the RAN will be required to increase surveillance functions in the future. The RAN is also expected to have an increased enforcement function of the type the United States reserves for its Coastguard.²⁰ As such, it is likely that constabulary tasks will become more prominent parts of Australia's maritime strategy than they are now. This is particularly so since the United Nations Convention On Law Of The Sea is likely to mean increases in bilateral and multilateral maritime policing based on the demarcation of national boundaries and resource stocks leading to joint efforts in resource security. The increasing economic importance of the oceans in Australia's region is very likely to embed bilateral and multilateral policing as an important part of Australia's maritime strategy.²¹ This is well in line with Australia's national security strategy of regional engagement and comprehensive security as spelled out in *Defending Australia*, The Defence White Paper, 1994.²²

The final aspect of constabulary tasks which should be addressed in passing is the element of sea use concerned with confidence building measures and presence. These are both in the overlap between constabulary and the strictly diplomatic roles for naval forces. They are relevant because a large part of the patrolling and surveillance role for the RAN also accomplishes the nebulous function of presence whereby

Australia shows a commitment to assert sovereignty or exert influence. The joint and multilateral surveillance issues dovetail with Australia's willingness and commitment to develop confidence and security building measures (CSBM) in the Asia Pacific. Both issues demonstrate the increasing importance of all of the continuum of constabulary tasks and how the nature and type will almost certainly expand in the future.²³

CONSTABULARY TASKS - A COMPARISON

It is useful at this stage to try and compare Australia's maritime strategy in terms of its constabulary tasks with those of Canada and Malaysia. Canada, because it closely models Australia in terms of government, history, population and GNP and because it is, in defence terms, a comparable medium power. Malaysia, though not an acknowledged medium power, is an important power in the Asia-Pacific region and because the debate over constabulary tasks is a central part of its strategic thought. Straight comparisons in themselves often say very little and it is this paper's intention only to show that constabulary tasks are very much a part of both maritime strategies and increasing in importance, particularly since the end of the Cold War. From this it will become clear that, as in Australia, these tasks can be persuasive in driving force structure among defence planners and for all countries the balance between the warfighting element of a navy and the remaining elements becomes harder to define and the specific warfighting platforms harder to justify.

The Canadian experience is similar to that of Australia. Canada is a maritime nation and it has the longest coastline in the world and one of the largest EEZ. Constabulary duties have been a mainstay of Canadian naval forces since 1905 when Canada's first ship was commissioned purely for fisheries protection duties.²⁴ Today Canada has three fleets; a navy, a coast guard and a fisheries fleet, yet, from the seventies, the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) has been intimately involved in sovereignty protection, fisheries protection, marine pollution monitoring, offshore energy and scientific research. Today, this has expanded to include drug smuggling, illegal immigration and maritime boundary delineations. The Canadian House Of Commons Standing Committee On National Defence And Veterans Affairs has focussed on non-military threats and itself notes that, 'the major challenge confronting Canadian maritime policy may not be 'Soviet submarines'.....but rather, the effective control of our coastal waters and the 200 mile economic zone'.²⁵ Although built and trained for its military role, the Canadian Government's focus for the RCN is at present openly on the policing and constabulary roles although it still recognises the defence of Canada as its primary mission.²⁶

The case of Malaysia has demonstrable parallels but in reverse. Until the seventies the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) operated in a largely constabulary role under the aegis of either the British or United States fleets. It was a 'brown water' fleet concerned mainly with coastal defence. With the United Nations Convention On The Law Of The Sea and the creation of a 200 mile EEZ, the RMN roles were required to change and the navy became responsible for the warfighting role of sovereignty protection along with protection of offshore hydrocarbon deposits, management of fishery resources, regulating scientific research and controlling the flow of illegal immigrants. The RMN's roles now also include maritime reconnaissance and anti-piracy. Malaysia, although stating that the RMN's primary role is defence of Malaysia and her interests, including establishing and maintaining local sea control, is incapable of this degree of warfighting capacity.²⁷ The RMN remains concentrated on constabulary duties.

For both Canada and Malaysia constabulary tasks are important. Through accidents of history and geography Malaysia was never required to build a navy designed to assert sea control, unlike Canada or Australia, but was always concerned with more littoral aspects of naval strategy. Debate in Malaysia about this issue concerns whether a separate warfighting and 'blue water' navy should be developed while retaining a specific coast guard to deal with constabulary duties. It is well understood that whatever direction is chosen, it is vital to make a distinction between the security capability of the RMN which is the constabulary focus and the deterrent capability which is the warfighting focus. Thus for all three nations, maritime strategy considers constabulary tasks to be increasingly important yet each in turn recognises, albeit at different levels, that the primary focus of maritime strategy is warfighting and that too close a focus on constabulary duties may have a detrimental effect on force structure issues.

CONSTABULARY ROLES - THE FUTURE FOR THE RAN

This country has certain expectations of the navy and its roles. Australia's maritime strategy is required to ensure that the RAN is able to prevent hostile forces from reaching Australian territory through the sea approaches and to protect shipping, resources and territories, in conjunction with air and land forces in the event of conflict.²⁸ But as Sherwood has shown, some defence planners, politicians and other groups in general are confused about the correctness of the RAN's role in constabulary duties although all elements acknowledge that these roles are critical and must be performed by some national agency.²⁹

The issue of constabulary tasks as part of Australia's maritime strategy is tied up with her status as a me-



A Wessex conducting a vertrep from HMAS Success

dium power and what that means. Essentially, to quote Hill, '(medium powers)... lie between the self sufficient and the insufficient'.³⁰ This means that considerable thought must go into defining Australia's vital interests for it is these which will determine force structure and allocation of resources towards the various conflicting needs. A medium power, by definition, must be sufficiently strong to look after its own destiny, usually in a framework of alliances, but in any event, maintaining enough power and capability to ensure preservation of its vital interests. Australia is no different and has determined a balance between constabulary forces for good order and regulation in the economic zone, long reach surface forces optimised to low intensity operations and a limited number of surface, air and submarine units of long reach optimised to higher level operations.³¹

When discussing constabulary tasks in relation to Australia's maritime strategy it is important to realise that this strategy is more than just warfighting. As Sherwood points out, the RAN, while primarily a warfighting organisation, is the pre-eminent organisation within the Australian community specifically designed to exert influence and control over Australia's maritime region as part of national security policy.³² As with all medium powers it is the balance between the ideal force structure and available resources which play a large part in force structure planning. In Australia's case, the White Paper of 1994, *Defending Australia*, indicates that warfighting capabilities will still have the priority in resource allocation but they will still be required to be used concurrently for constabulary duties, rather than having forces designed specifically for these duties at the expense of primary warfighting roles. Constabulary roles must therefore form a clear element of Australia's future maritime strategy.

If the past is any indicator of the future, it is clear that constabulary roles will continue to be performed by the RAN as they have since its inception with fisheries patrols in the early part of the century. There is also sufficient evidence that the RAN has been required to fulfil a diplomatic and a surveillance role along with its primary warfighting role throughout its existence. This indicates a longstanding willingness by defence planners to use maritime assets for non-warfighting tasks. The type of constabulary duty has generally been a reflection of the prevailing strategic situation and available resources. This paper has already shown that since the decline of the Soviet Union and the indications of a reduction in the United States presence in the region, the strategic and economic environment has altered markedly. There is every likelihood that the maritime focus of Australia will, like many other regional countries, be increasingly on protection of resources, general maritime surveillance and coast guard duties. In this there is consensus among commentators that these duties will

become increasingly important elements of the RAN's roles. It is force structure imperatives which will cause division.

There are those commentators, such as McCaffrie, who acknowledge that constabulary tasks will be more important in the future and will have to be conducted in peace and war but believe also that the maritime strategy to allow this will still depend largely on surface ships.³³ Other writers, such as Hill, agree that constabulary tasks will become more important in the future and that medium power navies will have to carefully judge their force structure imperatives in order to retain the capabilities their status requires. Hill spells out that Australia must balance its ideal force structure against the resources available and again emphasises that naval forces, and by implication, a maritime strategy is adaptable and can accomplish a range of tasks, for which not all elements were designed.³⁴ Till, agrees that the range of constabulary tasks will grow and argues that navies will be required to be flexible enough to perform them. He goes further in assessing that the resources allocated to modern navies will be reduced and there will be less political guidance for maritime planners, so emphasising the requirement for flexibility in maritime strategy and its implementation.³⁵

Given the current strategic environment and likely future scenarios in this region in the post Cold War era it seems clear that the RAN will become more involved in constabulary and non-military tasks into the foreseeable future, both independently and in co-operation with neighbouring powers. Naval forces, including the RAN, have proved to offer governments high political returns at relatively low risk up to the present. The dilemma for a medium power like Australia will be to avoid structuring the RAN specifically for constabulary tasks and not for the protection of vital interests.

CONCLUSION

This paper has outlined the present strategic situation in which Australia finds herself. That is, in a region where the end of the Cold War has precipitated a change in the regional strategic environment, where there is a lower likelihood of major conflict, yet stability appears to be challenged by a more complex mix of maritime issues than at any time in recent history. It has shown that the combination of fast growing economies and the implications of EEZ, environmental issues and fishery protection have made constabulary tasks more important and shown that Australia's maritime strategy should take account of this growing requirement. This has been reinforced by comparisons with Canada, a nation with many strategic, political and economic similarities to Australia and Malaysia, a rapidly developing nation in Australia's immediate region where constabulary tasks are

considered so important that the traditional maritime focus of warfighting in maritime strategy has been altered towards these roles.

At the same time as outlining the likely future developments and components of constabulary duties, for Australia's maritime strategy, which all commentators agree must be performed, the essay has also attempted to demonstrate that these have always been considered the duties of navies in general and the RAN has been no exception. Throughout its history, the RAN has performed most constabulary roles as part of Australia's extant maritime strategy. The twin, and sometimes conflicting, themes of who should perform constabulary duties and national priorities for force structure of naval forces are examined with the dominant view being that, for most nations and Australia in particular, it comes down to the national allocation of resources and a realisation and acceptance by defence planners, that the resources to fund a separate force, such as a coast guard, for constabulary duties are unlikely to be made available. This in turn has led to the acceptance, by these same planners, that, for Australia, constabulary duties are a definite and legitimate part of its maritime strategy. In the prevailing economic and strategic circumstances, there is no other effective way to ensure that these duties are performed within current and likely future resource constraints. This essay cautions that an increase in constabulary tasks in Australia's maritime strategy can

be persuasive in driving force structure among defence planners and the balance between the warfighting element of the RAN and the remaining elements can become harder to define and specific warfighting platforms harder to justify.

Given Australia's status as a medium power and its current strategic guidance, it is not unreasonable to conclude that force structure determinants should be based on the warfighting element of the Booth trinity of naval functions in support of a national maritime strategy. That is, to accept the legitimacy and necessity of constabulary and political functions but not to base warfighting capability on them. Attempts to change the primary focus of Australia's maritime strategy from warfighting to constabulary tasks should be strongly resisted. In the final analysis and within extant resource constraints, the flexibility, mobility, sustainability and cost effective nature of the present RAN force structure will allow the full gamut of naval functions, both warfighting and constabulary to be undertaken. It would appear, however, to be prudent to recall Admiral Crickard's observation on those who are tempted to structure and focus future naval forces on only constabulary duties, usually on economic grounds: 'navies are indeed costly but it is worth reminding ourselves that not having the right one when you need it could prove to be even costlier'.³⁶

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¹ K. Beazley, 'The Development of Australian Maritime Strategy' in 'Selected Speeches 1985-1989 by the Hon Kim C. Beazley, MP, Minister for Defence (Department of Defence, Canberra, 1989), p.184, cited in R.J. Sherwood, *The Navy And National Security: The Peacetime Dimension*, Australian National University, Canberra, 1994, p 7

² *Defence Corporate Plan 1996-2000*, Directorate Of Publishing, Canberra, 1996, p 12

³ R. Babbage, 'The Post-Cold War Maritime Strategic Environment In The Western Pacific', in *Operational And Technological Developments in Maritime Warfare: Implications For The Western Pacific*, Edited By R. Sherwood, Australian National University, Canberra, 1994, p 41

⁴ K. Booth, *Navies And Foreign Policy*, Holmes & Meier, New York, 1979, pp. 16-17

⁵ R.J. Sherwood, *The Navy And National Security: The Peacetime Dimension*, Australian National University, Canberra, 1994, p 7

⁶ See J.R. Hill, Rear Admiral, *Maritime Strategy For Medium Powers*, Croom Helm, London, 1986.

⁷ For a more detailed description of some of the RAN's earliest diplomatic roles from the Sea of Azov in 1919 onward see, M.A. Harling, Lieutenant Commander, RAN, 'Australian Naval Diplomacy', in *Journal Of The Australian Naval Institute*, August 1993, pp. 11-18

⁸ G. Evans and B. Grant, *Australia's Foreign Relations In The World Of The 1990's*, Melbourne University Press, 2nd Edition, 1995, pp. 113-116

⁹ J. Goldrick, Commander, 'Developments In Regional Maritime Forces: Force Structure', in *Australia's Maritime Bridge Into Asia*, Edited by S. Bateman and R. Sherwood, Allen and Unwin in association with The Royal Australian Navy, 1995, pp. 101-102.

¹⁰ R.J. Sherwood, *op cit*, pp. 68-69

¹¹ M. Taylor, Commander, RANR, *Navies And The National Interest*, an address to RANSC, 25 September 1995, p. 5.

¹² G. Till, *Modern Sea Power*, Vol. 1, Brassey's, London, 1987, pp. 151-152.

¹³ A. Mack, Strategic Security Issues, in *Australia's Maritime Bridge Into Asia*, Edited by S. Bateman and R. Sherwood, Allen and Unwin in association with The Royal Australian Navy, 1995, pp. 91-93.

¹⁴ K. Booth, *op cit*, p. 265.

¹⁵ ANOP Research Services Pty Ltd, 'Public Attitudes To Defence', quoted in R. Sherwood, *op cit*, pp. 19-20.

¹⁶ R. Sherwood, *op cit*, pp. 20-25.

¹⁷ H. Hudson, *Northern Approaches. A Report On The Administration And Management Of Civil Coastal Surveillance In Northern Australia*, Australian Government Printing Service, Canberra, April 1988, p. 12 and pp. 27-29. The report goes on to question which

agency, Defence, Customs or the Australian Federal Police (AFP) should be responsible for control of surveillance.

¹⁸ R. Sherwood, *op cit*, p. 15. The industry as a whole has only developed into the fifth largest export earner in monetary terms in the last 20 years or so.

¹⁹ A. Burnett, 'Defence Of The Environment : The New Issue In International Relations', in *Agenda For The Nineties : Australian Choices In Foreign And Defence Policy*, edited by C. Bell, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1991, pp. 46-68.

²⁰ R. Sherwood, *op cit*, pp. 21-27

²¹ The Australia - Indonesia Timor Gap Zone of Co-operation Treaty of 1991 is an indicator of the future with its provision for joint surveillance on a formal basis.

²² *Defending Australia, Defence White Paper, 1994*, Australian Government Printing Service, Canberra, 1994, pp. 85-93

²³ A discussion on all aspects of confidence building as a strategy is laid out in, A. Mack, 'Confidence Building In The Asia-Pacific Region : Problems And Prospects', in *A Peaceful Ocean? Maritime Security In The Pacific In The Post-Cold War Era*, edited by A. Mack, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1993, pp. 1-19.

²⁴ F.W. Crickard, Rear Admiral, RCN (Rtd), 'Oceans Policy And Maritime Strategy : The Canadian Experience', in *Oceans Management Policy ; The Strategic Dimension, Wollongong Papers On Maritime Policy, No 1*, edited by S. Bateman and R. Sherwood, University Of Wollongong, Wollongong, 1994, p. 5.

²⁵ Canada, House Of Commons, 'Maritime Sovereignty, Report of the House Of Commons Standing

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²⁶ F.W. Crickard, Rear Admiral, RCN (Rtd), *ibid*, p. 13.

²⁷ J.N. Mak, 'The Maritime Priorities Of Malaysia', in *Maritime Change : Issues For Asia*, edited by R. Babbage and S. Bateman, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1993, pp. 117-125.

²⁸ *Defending Australia, Defence White Paper, 1994*, *op cit*, pp. 42-46.

²⁹ R. Sherwood, *op cit*, pp. 19-20.

³⁰ J.R. Hill, *op cit*, p. 20.

³¹ J.R. Hill, *ibid*, p. 209. Hill describes the equation which each medium power needs to work out in order to best optimise national maritime strategy in relation to national strategic security policy.

³² R. Sherwood, *op cit*, pp. 71-72.

³³ J. McCaffrie, 'Future Regional Naval Forces : Will They Swim, Float Or Fly?', in *Asia Pacific Defence Reporter*, November/December 1996, pp. 10-11.

³⁴ J.R. Hill, 'Australia's Maritime Interests And Defence : A UK View', in *Australia's Maritime Interests - Views From Overseas. Occasional Papers In Maritime Affairs : 6*, Edited By, W.S.G. Bateman and M.W. Ward, Australian Centre For Maritime Studies, Incorporated, Canberra, 1990, pp. 86-88.

³⁵ G. Till, 'Maritime Strategy And The Twenty - First Century', in *The Journal Of Strategic Studies*, Vol 17, March 1994, No 1, pp. 176-197.

³⁶ F.W. Crickard, *op cit*, p. 16.

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
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BOOK REVIEWS

A Forgotten Offensive, The Royal Air Force's Coastal Command's Anti-Shipping Campaign, 1940-45

by Christina Goulter

Frank Cass, London 1995

Reviewed by Commander Richard M Jackson, RNZN

During most of the war, a squadron of New Zealanders flew as part of Coastal Command's Strike Wings, the air assault force of Beaufighters and Mosquitos that cut Hitler's Germany off from its supplies of Swedish iron ore and isolated the Nazi forces in Norway. One of those Kiwi fliers was Flt Lt Charles Goulter, whose daughter was subsequently to study history at Canterbury University and come under the guidance of Vincent Orange, who has done so much to expand the antipodean academic study of military aviation and the contribution of New Zealander fliers in particular.

Dr Christina Goulter has developed her research into this book *The Forgotten Offensive* about the work of Coastal Command over the North Sea, as it strove to implement the economic blockade of Germany by cutting the sea routes linking Germany to the Swedish iron ore and Norwegian minerals, necessary for the German war economy. Goulter's book is not yet another "Kiwis in the war" narrative but a serious history about offensive maritime aviation.

Her starting point is the RNAS experience in WWI (where ironically it learned most of the lessons to be re-learned by Coastal Command at such cost in the early forties) and she takes us through the lean inter-war years where not only funds but doctrine and official support were so badly wanting. Then come the harsh years of 1939-42 when the torpedo squadrons of the RAF are nearly destroyed by poor tactics, inferior aircraft and luke-warm support from an Air Ministry preoccupied with strategic bombing. Coastal Command withdraws from the battle to rearm and in 1943 returns with the Beaufighter-equipped strike wings, utilising massed tactics and enjoying better intelligence. By 1945 they have cut Germany's links to Scandinavia, destroyed much of the Nazi merchant fleet and forced the diversion of AA guns, fighters and some 200,000 men away from the direct defence of the Reich to Norwegian waters. It is a notable campaign, but as the title suggests, a forgotten victory; forgotten in fact within the RAF itself, which attempted to dismantle the strike wings even before the war was over.

Goulter's purpose is to assess the campaign, both from the RAF's point of view and, by going back to wartime German documents, from its impact on German industry. She succeeds, but the narrative lacks the occasional feel for actual operations: the grim determination of the aircrew operating against heavy odds, the tiring searches, their elation at success. Given her family connection, it is a shame she didn't humanise the story with some glimpse of the aircrew themselves. She even overlooks the torpedo squadrons' VC earned in a suicidal attack on the *Scharnhorst* at Brest in 1941.

The Forgotten Offensive is an analytical history and, unexpectedly, is a very critical history of the RAF. The RAF had fought bitterly to retain control of maritime aviation — to this day they have not forgiven the Royal Navy for regaining control of the Fleet Air Arm — yet determined to prove the indivisibility of air power, the RAF did nothing to prepare for air war over the sea. In fact as John Terraine has outlined in *The Right of the Line* the RAF's inability to execute its basic war plan in 1939 was virtually criminal negligence. Goulter's narrative of those interwar years ironically underlines how much better maritime aviation, shore-based as well as carrier-based, could have been if it was unified under naval command. She denies this in her introduction, but the facts of her narrative make a compelling case. The 1937 decision to give the RN only half of the naval aviation function, ie the Fleet Air Arm, was a political compromise that was to cost the allies many ships and men. The very fact that Coastal Command's torpedo squadrons had to be withdrawn from the battle in 1942 is a stark illustration of the defeat they suffered because of the flawed pre-war doctrine.

Yet what is the point of refighting old interservice battles? None; unless today's maritime aviators and their commanders learn from the events that Goulter lays out. Maritime strike is a major role for No 75 Squadron, as it is for the Hornets and F-111s across the Tasman. There are practical lessons in this book for our aircrew, and lessons too for the joint force commanders who may direct them in battle. The lack of knowledge of the naval aviation experience in WWI was costly to Coastal Command a generation later; Goulter's book enables the RNZAF and other air forces to review those lessons and ensure that their peacetime preparations are not clouded by the complacency and ignorance displayed by the RAF of the thirties.

Most Perfectly Safe: The Convict Shipwreck Disasters of 1833-1842**GA Mawer****Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1997****Recommended Retail \$24.95****Reviewed by John Connor**

Proving once again that there is nothing new under the sun, Allen Mawer's new book on convict ships, *Most Perfectly Safe*, is set against a background of savage cuts to navy administration by a newly-elected Liberal government. As Mawer writes, the Liberals came to power in Britain in 1830 'committed to reform and retrenchment', and the Admiralty 'got its share of both'. Sir James Graham, the new First Lord of the Admiralty, replaced the old administrative structure of semi-autonomous boards with a system of principal officers who were directly responsible to the Board of Admiralty, and cut the Royal Navy's estimates. At the same time, Lord Melbourne, the new Home Secretary, decided to pander to public opinion with a 'get tough on crime' policy and greatly increased the number of convicts being transported to Australia. This placed the Admiralty in a bind: the budget to transport convicts was slashed, while the number of convicts being transported went up. James Meek, who as Comptroller for Victualling and Transport Services was responsible for convict transport, was given the unenviable task, familiar still today, of having to do more with less.

Mawer's interest in this book, however, is not with politics, but with the ships and the men and women who sailed in them. *Most Perfectly Safe* tells the story of the convict ships that sailed from England and Ireland to Australia, and especially the stories of the only ships which sank on this journey: the *Amphritite*, *George III*, *Neva*, *Hive* and *Waterloo*.

Mawer corrects many of the myths about convicts and their treatment. Despite the perception that most convicts arrived around the time of the First Fleet, three quarters of convicts transported to Australia arrived after the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815. The busiest year for convict transportation to Australia was in fact 1833, when almost 7000 convicts were landed, and convict ships were arriving at an average of three a month. In the same way, the perception that convict were crammed into death ships for their journey to Australia is false as well. A convict on board a transport had better living conditions than the sailors aboard, subject to less discipline than the soldiers aboard, and had better health than many migrants aboard emigrant ships.

No convict ship was lost from the First Fleet in 1787 until 1833, the peak year of transportation. The *Amphritite* set sail in 1833 with 102 female convicts but got no further than the English Channel, where she was caught in a storm and ran aground on the

French coast near Boulogne. Only three people survived. In 1835 the *George III*, hit rocks in the D'Entrecasteux Channel south of Hobart and 127 of 208 convicts drowned. A few weeks later the *Neva* ran aground near King Island in Bass Strait. Of the 241 people aboard, only fourteen survived. In December that same year, the *Hive* was stranded on Bhewerre Beach in (what then became) Wreck Bay, just south of Jervis Bay. Fortunately on this occasion, all but one person got ashore safely. Finally in 1842, the *Waterloo*, en route to Hobart, sank at Capetown with the loss of 188 lives.

After such a string of shipwrecks, a British parliamentary select committee was formed. The Admiralty's management of the transportation system under budgetary constraints was examined, but any changes that had been made were found not to have directly caused any of the accidents. As Mawer writes, the ultimate cause of these disasters can not be pointed to any one factor except 'statistical probability'. The more ships the British government sent, the more chance that a mishap would occur.

Most Perfectly Safe is a fascinating story told by an author with a love of the sea and the days of sail. Allen Mawer has previously written a history of the clipper ship *Walter Hood*, and in the preface of *Most Perfectly Safe*, he describes standing on Bhewerre Beach while marine archaeologists discover the remains of the *Hive* hidden under two metres of sand.

Most Perfectly Safe can be recommended to anyone interested in Australian maritime history, and also to any genealogists looking for an evocative account of how their convict ancestors came to Australia. As Mawer notes in his preface, one of ships that carried convicts to Australia, the *Edwin Fox*, still survives in New Zealand, where an appeal to restore the ship has been launched. More information on this appeal can be found on the Internet at: <http://www.wcc.govt.nz/extern/efox/default.htm>

The Royal Australian Navy in World War II**Edited by David Stevens****Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1997****Recommended retail \$24.95 in paperback****Reviewed by Lieutenant Alison Hartigan**

David Stevens' *The Royal Australian Navy in World War II* provides an analysis of the RAN's war effort and gives excellent accounts of the RAN's contribution in an important and dangerous support role conducted under immense constraints. For those who like the more traditional style of naval history, there are the usual "warries" about the 'exploits of individual Australian ships during World War II', but this is only one of the many facets of RAN history covered in this book. The scope of *The Royal Australian Navy in World War II* is broad, providing an interesting pic-

ture of the RAN's involvement in the South-West Pacific and the Mediterranean, the strategic and policy issues which drove the Government's decisions to deploy Australian vessels in different theatres, and the many issues affecting the home front.

This book presents the RAN's contribution to World War II in a new and innovative light. It is well presented, with many excellent, previously unpublished illustrations, but most importantly, a fresh approach to RAN history. The book is a result of the 'RAN in World War II' conference co-sponsored by the RAN Maritime Studies Program, the Australian Naval Institute and the Australian National Maritime Museum to commemorate fifty years since the end of World War II. At this conference, David Stevens of the RAN Maritime Studies Program drew together a number of leading Australian and foreign naval and maritime historians, to increase the awareness of RAN history and provide a series of perspectives on the RAN involvement in this period. The result is a book which successfully begins to bridge the gaps still present in the research and publication of RAN history.

The overall scene is set by analyses of RAN strategy and policy and a strategic overview of the South-West Pacific region, including RAN exploits in the European and South-West Pacific theatres, the contributions of other navies, and their effects on the RAN. Special attention is also paid to the contribution of Australian industry to RAN endeavours, and to the types of men and women who were part of the RAN and WRANS during this period. Included are interesting biographical examinations of Vice-Admiral Collins and the contributions of Commander R.B.M. Long to Australian intelligence and its links with foreign organisations. The book draws to an exciting close with two autobiographical accounts - John G. Betty's experiences when conducting hydrographic surveys to spearhead safe passages for Allied naval advances in the region, and Marsden Horden's involvement as a Sub Lieutenant in the daring 'Timor dashes', saving fellow countrymen and Portuguese from Timor in the small 'Fairmile' Motor Launches. All of the chapters are written in an approachable style making this book an interesting and easy read - not a textbook by any stretch of the imagination.

The scope of topics and historical perspectives covered in *The Royal Australian Navy in World War II* is a result of the range of leading historians involved in its production. Their ranks include Australian RAN officers to ex-RN and ex-WRANS officers, RAN Reservists and prominent members of the Australian and British maritime and naval history academic community. This eclectic combination has given the book a depth and appeal that may reach beyond the usual followers of naval history.

There is a great need for RAN history to enter the

mainstream of Australian historical study, particularly as the RAN has played such a large and unique role in the development of Australia and its influence in the region. Too long have treatises on Australian naval history have tried to depict the RAN in the same light as greater navies. This book is an excellent example of how interesting the untapped depths of Australian naval history may be, and hints at the promise of the facts yet to be uncovered; the stories as yet untold. It is a long needed celebration of what the RAN's contribution and role in World War II actually was rather than what it was not, presented in an easily readable style which should attract a broad audience.

Rediscovering Australia

by Pat Burnett

Published by the author, Sydney, 1997

Reviewed by Lieutenant Peter Rekers

In this book we are told the story of the maritime explorations that lead to the discovery of Australia as it is known today. Pat Burnett does not merely retell the stories we learnt at school, which in retrospect seemed extremely selective and biased toward an English perspective. He reconstructs the full picture with an even handed, narrative feel not found in many history books.

The story commences in 45 million BC with an introduction into the formation of the continent and its first inhabitants. It flows all the way through the first Asian explorations, to the first Western voyages of discovery and a few made by mistake. The story ends with Lort Stokes' extensive charting as the last 'discovery' work. Wherever the records are sketchy and disputed, Burnett is the first to admit it, and when he ventures onto a limb, his conclusions are reasonable and supported.

Burnett has researched widely and the book is punctuated with quotations that help to illustrate the diversity of sources. This is an honest and apolitical investigation of the enormous number of cultures and individuals who have contributed to the Maritime exploration of the Nation. In doing this, Burnett has gone to enormous trouble to place what may appear as minor moments of discovery into the context of the formation of a nation. As a superficial indicator, the variety of contributors to the mapping of the coast has given Australia names from Aboriginal, French, Portuguese, Dutch, Spanish and English descent.

He is especially keen to emphasise the interaction of many of the characters despite their political and cultural diversities. Even when their respective nations were at war, Flinders and Baudin maintained not only a gentlemanly relationship, but their cooperation led to a greater sharing of information. Australia continues to grapple with these diverse cultures today. We

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
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teeter between a colony of European descent, and yet strive to reach into Asia, while still struggling to come to terms with an indigenous culture who have never really been embraced by many as a significant part of the Nation. It seems a pity that so many have lost the ability to be so productive and yet still remain tolerant of cultural and political differences.

If a criticism is to be found in the book, it might be in Burnett's skimming over of the stories we are familiar with, such as the first journey of Cook's in 1770. Although this is clearly deliberate, when you get into the story it does seem a bit of a pity to not relive the whole series of events. Nevertheless, Burnett is right in saying that these are events that have been told and are well known.

The book is short (a good afternoon in the sun by the beach is recommended) and is a pleasure to read. It is not the definitive "History of the discovery of Australia" and very intentionally so. This is a re-awakening of the story of the discovery of a large and diverse continent which has had arguably more diverse influences than others. Indeed, it seems to have been discovered more times than many others!

To end with a quotation from the Epilogue -

".....the story of Australia's emergence is a microcosm of the story of civilisation up to the beginning of the twentieth century, the development of imperialism and colonisation and the triumph (in political terms) of Western industrialisation and technology."

This is a great read and I would recommend it to anyone for another look at Australia's discovery and a chance to relive some of the incredible stories of these intrepid people.

Pat Burnett is a retired Naval Officer and marine teacher with a B.A. in English literature and history. This is his third book following *Memoirs of a Naval Person* and *Travels with my Mother-in-Law*. The book is published by the author and copies are available on request to:

P.R. Burnett
2/14Tunks St
Waverton NSW 2060
Ph 02 9957 6049

PHOTO CONTEST

Enter the International Navies Photo Contest and win \$US200

The US Naval Institute has launched its annual International Navies Photo Contest. Photographer of the top entry will win \$US200 [currently about \$A265]. Two first honourable mentions will win \$US100 each, two second honourable mentions \$US50 each.

All images must pertain to naval or maritime subjects from countries other than the United States. Anyone may enter.

There is a limit of five (5) entries per person. Eligible entries include black-and-white prints, colour prints or 35mm transparencies. The minimum print size is 8" by 10".

Send entries to:

International Navies Photo Contest, US Naval Institute, 118 Maryland Avenue, Annapolis, Maryland 21402-5035 USA

Entries must be postmarked no later than 1 August 1997.

On a separate sheet of paper attached to the back of each print or printed on the transparency mount, print or type full caption and the photographer's name, address and the date the photo was taken. Entries are not limited to photos taken in the calendar year of the contest. Please do not write directly on the back of a print and do not use staples or paper clips.

Winning photos will be published in the 1997 International Navies issue of *Proceedings*. The Naval Institute will consider all other entries for purchase (at standard rates) for use in US Naval Institute publications. Any entry not accompanied by a self-addressed stamped envelope or international postage coupon will become the property of the US Naval Institute without the necessity of purchase.

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