


Journal
of the
Australian
Naval
Institute

Volume 23 Number One
January/March 1997





AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE INC

The Australian Naval Institute was formed and incorporate Australian Capital Territory in 1975. The main objects of the Institute are:

- To encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the maritime profession,
- to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and the maritime profession, and
- to publish a journal.

The Institute is self-supporting and non-profit-making. All publications of the Institute will stress that the authors express their own views and opinions are not necessarily those of the Department of Defence, the Chief of Naval Staff or the Institute. The aim is to encourage discussion, dissemination of information, comment and opinion and the advancement of professional knowledge concerning naval and maritime matters.

The membership of the Institute is open to:

- *Regular Members.* Regular membership is open to members of the RAN, RANR, RNZN or RNZNVR and persons who having qualified for regular membership, subsequently leave the service.
- *Associate Members.* Associate membership is open to all other persons not qualified to be Regular Members, who profess an interest in the aims of the Institute.
- *Honorary Members.* Honorary membership is open to persons who have made a distinguished contribution to the Navy or the maritime profession, or by past service to the institute.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Australian Naval Institute is grateful for the assistance provided by the corporations listed below. They are demonstrating their support for the aim of the Institute by being members of the "Friends of the Australian Naval Institute" coterie.

ADI Ltd
Blohm + Voss
CSC Australia
Jeumont Schneider Division
STN Atlas (Australia)
Ansett Australia
Scientific Management Associates

Rockwell Systems Australia
Stanilite Electronics
GEC Marconi
Westinghouse Electric
CelsiusTech
Thomson Sintra Pacific
Dawson Group

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

ISSN 0312 — 5807

Volume 23 Number 1 January/March 1997

From the President	5
From the Editor	6
Illumination Rounds	7
Letters	12



COVER PHOTOGRAPH

HMAS Collins during sea trials (CPOPHOT Cameron Martin)

SPECIAL FEATURE

China and Maritime Security — a workshop report from Greg Austin

Page 30

- 16** Soldier and Sailor Too — The Royal Naval Division in the First World War
Graham Wilson
- 23** The Anglo-German struggle for the Australian airwaves before 1914: Marconi versus Telefunken
Peter Overlack
- 41** Life and Unrest in the Lower Deck of the RAN in the 1930s
Kathryn Spurling
- 49** ANZUS and the Radford-Collins Agreement: Australia's Naval Mission
Graham Priestnall
- 53** Timor Triumph: HNINS *Tjerk Hiddes* at Timor - 1942
Graham Wilson
- 58** The Emperor's Clothes
The Economist

*The Phalanx is the RAN's standard Close In Weapons System
(ABPHOT Stephen Coates)*



From the President

1997 is shaping to be an important year for the Australian Naval Institute. Over this past year the Council has spent much effort in identifying the areas which we must address and then in developing and refining a business plan. Although these will be presented in detail at the Annual General Meeting in February I will set out the major points so that you can give them some thought.

Commodore Bill Dovers has led a group to study the composition of the Institute's membership. Our ranks are mainly filled by retired members or serving members over 35. While it is not possible to draw too many conclusions based on the study it does seem as though we are failing to appear relevant to the vast majority of junior officers and sailors. The Council will propose a number of measures to address this, including an increased emphasis on chapter activities in Sydney and Western Australia and renewing emphasis on presentations, principally the Vernon Parker Oration. Fundamentally we had to assess what we believe the worth of the Institute to be and, if we find its aims worthy, then encourage others to join our ranks. Serving members of the rank of Captain and Commander can be particularly influential in this process.



Much of the Council's attention during 1996 was directed towards improving our financial position through reinvigorating links with the Friends of the Institute. They are an aspect of our operations which must be given constant consideration. To maximise the benefit which both the Friends and the ANI obtain through association the Council will propose for consideration some changes to the terms on which a company may become a Friend of the Institute. Essentially this will involve removing the set conditions and allow Council the flexibility to negotiate a package with each individual company. This will allow smaller companies to become associated with the Institute in a way that is different from larger companies and provide the potential to increase advertising revenue from the *Journal*.

Perhaps the most significant matter to be addressed at the AGM is a proposal for raising membership subscriptions. Last year members received over \$35 worth of *Journal* and paid a \$25 subscription or less if they took advantage of the discount for two or three year subscriptions. Obviously this leaves very little room for other activities of the sort I identified above. Although the *Journal* is our flagship it is not our only activity, and it would be a poor fleet which had only a flagship and nothing else. We cannot sustain this position beyond the short term. Council is considering a proposal for the AGM that membership subscriptions be raised to \$40 per annum, and that this be maintained for a minimum of two years. Simply as a comparison I note that subscriptions to *The Naval Review* are over \$30 per annum and bring several tax advantages to them which are not available in Australia.

There is much to consider and I hope that the discussion at the AGM will be lively. I would like to encourage all our members to attend when possible. If that is not enough there is more in this edition of the *Journal* with articles on China's maritime power, ANZUS and more aspects of naval history. I hope that you all had an enjoyable Christmas and New Year and wish you all the best for 1997.

Chris Barrie

From the Editor

The RAN has been in the spotlight quite a lot recently thanks to the combined efforts of the RAAF's P-3 Orions and HMAS *Adelaide*. Besides the well deserved congratulations to all of those involved with the rescue of the solo yachtsmen, much of the media attention has focussed on the cost of rescuing the two men, whose survival still seems almost incredible. Many opinions on the matter have been expressed, but they all seem to miss the point: the monetary cost is negligible and probably irrelevant.

Australia has maritime interest beyond all proportion to the size of her economy and population, including the second largest Exclusive Economic Zone in the world. Besides the vast marine wealth that this country possesses the great majority of its trade goes by sea. Australia as a nation benefits enormously from its marine rights, but with the rights come responsibilities, such as for one of the largest maritime safety zones. All Australians must realise that the nation benefits far more from our surrounding oceans than the cost of any rescues of solo yachtsmen. The cost of rescuing them is repaid many times over from the worldwide goodwill which is generated. Not everything can be counted in terms of dollars and cents.

The sheer size of Australia's maritime areas, perfectly exemplified by the rescue of the solo yachtsmen, is the best fundamental reason for Australia maintaining strong maritime forces. In fact the rescues illustrated many things which are required for the defence of Australia. The cooperation between aircraft and surface ships, utilising the unique capabilities of each platform, is exactly what is required. This argument extends to all platforms which operate in the marine environment, 'whether they float, swim or fly'. These platforms require long endurance and need to have a range of capabilities which can be called on at short notice. The Australian Defence Force must be capable of more than simple maritime patrol and it must be able to defend Australia's interests over as wide an area as possible.

In keeping with Australia's broad range of maritime interests, this edition of the Journal has articles on a range of subjects. Peter Overlack has contributed an excellent piece on the extent and significance of the German telegraph network in the South Pacific before the First World War. Greg Austin's summary of a recent workshop on Chinese maritime interests is a good overview of what can only become a more important subject. Kathryn Spurling has written a very interesting commentary on sailor's lives in the RAN during the interwar period. In addition to these there are some more intriguing historical articles from Graeme Wilson and some interesting Illumination Rounds.

Finally, those with access to the Internet may wish to have a look at the ANI's home page, the address for which is below. I hope you will enjoy this issue and look forward to letters on the subjects raised.

Alastair Cooper

ANI Homepage <http://www.navy.gov.au/ani/home.html>

ILLUMINATION ROUNDS

Command and Control Arrangements.

It seems as if there are two main objectives of the new C2 arrangements - to facilitate independent Australian operations without support of any great and powerful friends and to further integrate the three services. That the ADF needs to be able to carry out operations in defence of Australia's interests independent of other nations forces is undeniable; whether the new C2 arrangements are the best way to do it is another matter and not the subject for discussion here. The further integration of the services is in many ways a much larger and more contentious issue. The services certainly benefit from a degree of integration, though such benefits are mainly in terms of financial savings and not operational efficiency (and the two are different, despite whatever peacetime strictures are force). Furthermore there is no denying that future conventional wars will be won by the forces which can most efficiently utilise the three forces together. Unfortunately the indications coming from HQADF are not always consistent, and the dearth of discussion is not comforting. There are a few questions which need to be asked and answered, like what practical benefits are gained and, given the Canadian experience, how far should integration go before it becomes counterproductive. Otherwise one become cynical and ask whether the new push for jointness is a way for the army to gain greater say by virtue of weight of numbers - a 1990s Canberra version of the tactics employed on the Western Front in 1914-18.

The Fleet Mid.

Northern Basing - Why?

For the past decade and more the ADF has been repositioning many of its combat assets in the north of Australia. The RAAF have built a base at Tindall and several other 'bare bases' across the north of the country. More recently the Army have commenced moving a large portion of their assets to Darwin. Surely it is time that the Navy homeported a similar proportion of its assets to northern bases too. Then again perhaps it isn't.

Navies are dependent on a wide range of support infrastructures, everything from bread roles to computer hardware to heavy engineering. This support infrastructure is best located in areas with a large population, as the Navy is not the only organisation which requires their services. In practise this means that the Navy's major units are most efficiently operated from a city such as Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide or Perth.

But these areas are far away from where these ships are likely to operate, except perhaps for rescuing solo yachtspeople!! The value of a great distance between a base and an operating area is always debatable. But given the outstanding strategic mobility possessed by warships it is preferable to have a base safely beyond easy reach by an enemy.

This is not to say however that the Navy should have no presence in the north of Australia. Major units should, and do, operate there regularly to gain experience in the prevailing conditions. Smaller ships, such as patrol boats are not as capable of rapid strategic deployment. In fact the nature of their operations, quick response to Coastwatch sightings, makes their northern basing an obvious matter. They are relatively simple craft to maintain, hence the limited infrastructure in the north is no inhibition. In addition their crews are small and so they do not have a disproportionate effect on the society of which they are part. While this should not be major consideration in basing, it is worth accounting for the long term effects that unpopular basing can have, both for military personnel and the surrounding area.

In fact it seems to me that the Navy has its basing about right now, although HMAS *Stirling* still seems to be an unpopular destination for many people, particularly couples where the spouse works. The RAAF too seem to be about right. But the Army appear to have got their plans and practice mixed up. They are currently moving many people and assets to the north. But Army 21, obscure and moribund though it is, seems to argue for a technologically advanced, highly mobile and hard hitting force. Something like a Navy on land. You would think that their requirements for infrastructure and basing would be similar to those of the Navy. Perhaps, for once, jointery might help the army benefit from the other services' experience.

Janus

APPROACHING A TOTAL FORCE - Administratively still a long way away?

“Reserve elements no longer exist solely to assist rapid expansion of the permanent forces during mobilisation for war. Instead, Reserves now have specific roles in defending Australia in short-warning conflict, both as individuals and as formed units. In peace, they perform a number of essential tasks on a permanent part-time basis. They are, therefore, a fundamental part of the Total Force.” (DA94, para 7.1)

Endorsed strategic guidance has recognised for some time now the valuable contributions to the ADF and the defence of Australia that reserve forces can make. To ensure a successful working relationship between the permanent and part-time components of the ADF, policies and work practises need to recognise the relationship between these components and the many varying and differing factors that act upon them. Within the RAN, the office of DGRES-N is nominally responsible for reviewing and providing advice on this developing relationship. Clearly, with the naval reserve now comprising about 5439 personnel, as at 30 June 1996, policy guidance is increasingly needed for the part-time components of the RAN. However, efforts should not concentrate too exclusively on this strategic guidance, as it is also becoming increasingly obvious that work practises for existing personnel urgently need to be clarified - both for the organisation itself and for the personnel concerned.

As an example of the obvious need for the clarification of issues, I will briefly focus on the situation in Canberra. Given the central location to Defence, one would have imagined that naval reserve personnel located here - especially those that are also Defence civilian staff - would be well aware of the correct reserve procedures to which they must function, and that they would be administered and recognised as the valuable ADF components that they are purported to be. However in reality, for the Reserve Officer based in Canberra there is considerable frustration to be encountered in pursuing service related issues. The principle reason for this is that there appears to be no one area in Navy responsible for Reserves or reserve elements. As an indication of the confusion and general lack of guidance, from experience Canberra based Intelligence (INT) Officers must work to the following “self-discovered” arrangements:

Postings are the responsibility of MHQ (or used to be, coordinated by the previous

SONIR who has handed over these responsibilities to?);

Admin is handled by HMAS *Harman*, or HMAS *Kuttubul* - depending on the member concerned;

Pays are best processed by personally walking pay requests to Navy Office - D Block, as the admin area at *Harman* cannot assist with reserve payment;

Training elements are conducted by HMAS *Creswell* (without warning, last June some reserve officers were told they were also part of a REOC, essentially a 6-month NEOC via ongoing correspondence), though there is no nominated training officer, no correspondence since May (as tasks completed from this time have not been paid), and with no contact it appears the whole scheme has bogged down;

Medical is an ad-hoc arrangement as neither HMAS *HARMAN* nor JSHC know who is to retain our medical files; and

Employment is presently in DIO, individually arranged by the members themselves, under the supervision of tri-service personnel posted there.

When an INT Reserve Officer has a problem or needs advice on promotion prerequisites and/or procedures, available courses, or even just on conditions of service, there is no coordinating area or nominated point of contact to consult, hence no career management. The only assistance given so far has been through DNOP-Staff Officer Reserves. Until now, informal networking amongst the INT reserve members in the area has been the only mechanism for coordinating problems, though this approach often sees the individual reserve member later accused of not working within the system to set procedures or as part of a team (though how they are to know these procedures one is not told).

Unsure of how to proceed, the reserve INT officer is often stumbling along his/her navy career hearing all sorts of random information. A recent example concerns a reserve LEUT who was officially advised that if he hadn't completed an Introduction to Defence Intelligence Course (IDIC) by a certain date that he may be demoted to SBLT. The officer concerned, however, was not instructed as to how to get on this course, and his efforts to do so remain unsuccessful (perhaps he is not following the unknown correct procedures). That reserve members must seek to manage their own careers is perhaps not a bad thing in itself, but there is concern that their efforts are being wasted as there is no guidance or nominated contact, and even the existence of such procedures for reserve officers to work to cannot be confirmed.

It is widely understood that the Australian naval reserve is in a period of transition from a force held in reserve for war to an integrated component of the Australian navy. Within this period, however, issues of concern to utilising the part-time component as a whole in the future and utilising the personnel available now should be given equal priority. Further to

this, contact with the personnel concerned needs to be maintained, not forgotten, as the way ahead is known or even becomes clearer. Amongst the many contributions of the reserve forces, the part-time component of Intelligence, and similarly Naval Control of Shipping and the reserve Diving Teams, forms a key part of the Navy's combat force structure. The lack of management or concern as outlined above, however, does not indicate that the INT officer is part

of such a vital element of Navy structure. Given the rhetoric and lip service paid to the growing integration of Reserves with the PNF into the new RAN, such ad-hoc arrangements in managing these components should not exist and require urgent clarification. Only then can both full-time and part-time personnel better understand themselves and each other, and we will really see the growth of an integrated Australian Navy.

Mastermind

PR5s and PERS1s - And you thought your one was bad.

Excerpts from DNOP and DSCM files gathered by our roving investigative reporter ...

His men would follow him anywhere, mainly out of curiosity.

This Officer is really not so much of a has been, but more of a definitely won't be.

When she opens her mouth, it seems this is only to change feet.

He has carried out each of his duties to his entire satisfaction.

This submariner would be out of his depth in a car park puddle.

This officer is technically sound but socially impossible.

As an Officer of the Watch he reminds me of a gyroscope - always spinning around at a frantic pace but not really going anywhere.

This Medical Officer has used my ship to carry his genitals from port to port, and my officers to carry him from bar to bar.

Since my last report he has reached rock bottom and started to dig.

She sets low standards and consistently fails to achieve them.

He has the wisdom of youth and the energy of old age.

This officer will go far - the sooner he starts the better.

In my opinion this pilot should not be authorised to fly below 500 feet.

This Flight's helicopter needs two engines, to carry the quantity of flying maccas they consume on every sortie.

The only ship I would recommend this young man for is citizenship.

Works well, when under constant supervision and cornered like a rat in a trap.

This officer is depriving a village of its idiot.

The Battleship Mentality — Revisited

The battleship dominated naval thinking for a long time. In its day it was "The Capital Ship". Its function was to be so powerful that it could implement Mahan's phrase to "sweep the enemy flag from the sea". The logic was that, having swept the enemy flag from the sea, the battleship's owner would have found the holy grail, having gained what had been sought for centuries, command of the sea.

Essentially then, the battleship was the sea denial weapon system par excellence. The *Jeune Ecole* in France had sought to achieve much the same ends with new technologies exploiting the invention of the torpedo. Torpedoes were the weapon of choice for the torpedo boat and the submarine. However the latter was slow and short-ranged until technological progress in World War I made it a serious threat to Britain's survival. As for the torpedo boat, technology came to the rescue with the first Torpedo Boat Destroyers, the ancestors of all of today's destroyers.

Technology has reached a point where the true submarine has now become feasible. That is, there is now the nuclear submarine which can remain submerged almost indefinitely, or at least for as long as its crew can endure it and the food supply lasts. With air independent propulsion systems even non-nuclear submarines can enjoy the advantages of not needing to surface to replenish their oxygen supplies. To this extent, they too, approach the ideal of the true submarine. For some commentators the submarine has become The Capital Ship and the inheritor of the glamour surrounding the battleship - and for much the same reason. The submarine is generally regarded as the best sea denial weapon system available.

Australia, dominated by its essentially continentalist defence philosophy, has taken to this option with enthusiasm. There is talk of acquiring two more Collins class submarines and arming the submarine force with Tomahawk cruise missiles to give them a power projection capability as well. This would give another dimension to an Australian equivalent of a strategic bombing deterrent. Though whether any Australian politician would have the nerve to use it, or whether a necessarily small force would be able to provide a significant number of missiles, or, indeed, whether any power in our region would be impressed anyway is another matter again. The North Vietnamese, for instance, did not seem to have been overly impressed by the great weight of strategic bombing inflicted on them during the Vietnam War.

Strategic strike potential apart, the perceived primary role for Australia's submarines is sea denial in the sea-air gap between Australia and Indonesia. As the former Defence Minister, Kim Beazley, has been

quoted as saying, "All we are doing is defending our borders". Thus speaks the continentalist mind. He is also reported as having said words to the effect that, "We have given up sea control (sic) and are now concentrating on sea denial". Presumably he meant "sea assertion" rather than "sea control".

So, Australia is in the business of acquiring its own latter-day battleships with a principal objective of defending its northern coastline against the essentially bogus threat of an invasion. This is a "credible threat"? And "small raids" are also "credible threats"? Credible to whom? Oh come on! Let's get real!

But proponents of today's battleships have said that they can also be used for sea assertion. The suggestion is that they can be used in the SSK role off enemy submarine bases; that they can strike enemy ports and airfields (using Tomahawks?); and that, if technology hopes are realised, the submarine launched anti-aircraft missile may enable them to provide some air defence at sea. Whether, of course, the latter capability would be of much use against stand-off anti-ship missiles is another matter again.

When it comes to anti-submarine warfare too many generations of Australian warriors have been impressed by the frequency of green grenades seen in ASW exercises off Jervis Bay, where the dice are loaded in favour of the submarine. "We must get maximum value out of the training time and ensure plenty of incidents". While it would be irresponsible to neglect the tactics of the ASW action, too much attention has been focussed on last ditch detection and the subsequent prosecution of a submarine contact. Unless things have changed dramatically in the last decade too little attention has been paid to the broader strategic context and the availability of intelligence. For instance, country X has, say, ten submarines, based five each in ports A and B, and intelligence reports that there is one submarine in dockyard hands in each port. Further, two more are being used as clockwork mice for ASW training and one cannot be manned due to shortages of trained personnel. Of the five boats still constituting a threat, S1 and S2 have been on patrol and should now be returning to replenish fuel and supplies; and this has been confirmed by a recent locating report. S3, S4 and S5 have all been observed departing their home ports in the past three weeks.

The point is that, in this scenario, an ostensible threat of ten submarines is more properly reduced to a threat of three submarines and, after some years of observing country X's submarine operating patterns, and backing that up with geographic information, it may be possible to make a fair deduction as to where those three will be deployed. Accordingly the task for one's own ASW forces begins to look less alarming.

This scenario is not the product of a late night round the bar but is a version of actual experience. The fact is that if you have a pretty good idea of where a submarine is it can be avoided, or you can send hunter-killer forces out to make its life difficult.

None of this is meant to suggest that submarine threats can be dismissed as unimportant. Equally, nothing here has been suggested here about the kind of technologies which might be exploited to gain advantage from the submerged submarine's critical dependence on underwater sound sources.

Altogether, it is alarming to see the sort of uncritical respect now accorded the submarine in Australia, and for much the same sort of reasons that the battleship enjoyed its time in the sun in a previous generation. That is, until technology overcame its perceived invincibility. It is also alarming to read glib pronouncements that sea assertion is no longer an Australian requirement. A few years ago when international shipping was being attacked daily in the Persian Gulf, and no response was forthcoming from any of the nations affected by those attacks, it was solemnly asserted in Canberra that Australia could discount the possibility of attacks on vital international shipping because the nations owning such ships would rise up in their wrath to smite any aggressor. Besides, they said, in any case evasive routing would be a cheap


and easy counter to employ. This, of course, was asserted by the very same people who also said that ocean surveillance systems were now so effective that there was no place to hide at sea for aircraft carriers, and they could be targeted by long range weapons, so that their day was over.

Official attitudes in Australia today, to the balance to be struck between sea denial and sea assertion capabilities, may be likened, it seems, to those taken by Britain in the early years of World War I and in Japan for most of World War II. That is, sea denial embodies the proper Nelsonian offensive spirit to obtain sea control, while sea assertion is defensive, expensive, and not necessary anyway, despite the country's critical dependence on being able to use the sea for both commercial and military purposes.

Sadly it seems, we have swallowed the snake oil salesman's pitch. "Take this sea denial weapon system for anything that ails you at sea, and go back to sleep". The echoes from the day of the battleship are too insistent. In short, it is fair to say that the Battleship Mentality is alive and well in Australia today. Apart from those experts in Canberra who will never have to account publicly for their part in the fight against sea assertion capabilities, does that make everyone else feel comfortable?

Alan Robertson





Letters to the Editor

Conflicting views on Sturdee & von Spee

Dear Sir,

I have been reading the article from the February-April issue, 'Sturdee Steams South' by Geoffrey Bewley and I find myself compelled to comment on it. My reaction to this article ranges from surprise at first to finally abhorrence. I think Mr. Bewley must have been short on factual material and research, but whether this contributed to his string of fanciful conclusions, I don't know.

Briefly, some of the facts concerning Vice Admiral Graf von Spee's squadron and your article are as follows.

At the Battle of Coronel Vice Admiral von Spee manoeuvred his incomplete squadron into a tactically more favourable position, his speed just prior to the commencement of action being 16kts. At 6.34 p.m. *Scharnhorst* gave the signal to inaugurate fire, ship against ship, with the range at 10400 metres, or 104 hectometres. As the range reduced to 92 hm the English ships replied. *Scharnhorst* hit *Good Hope* with her third salvo and *Gneisenau* obtained the range on *Monmouth* after a few salvos. The Germans reported that at first *Monmouth's* shooting was rapid and accurate, but that soon her salvo fire fell off. Once the Germans began obtaining hits they opened a rapid fire so that a salvo was being fired every 15 seconds, a rate which would have continued until the range was lost. By 6.50 p.m. *Monmouth* began to slack aft. At 7.23 p.m. a large munition explosion was observed aboard *Good Hope*, but by 7.30 p.m. the German's had lost sight of the English ships. In the space of 56 minutes two German armoured cruisers, armed with 21cm and 15cm guns, had dispatched two similar ships, one as equally well armoured, one slightly less well armoured. *Scharnhorst* expended 422 21 cm shells and 215 15cm shells, *Gneisenau* 241 and 198 respectively. This left *Scharnhorst* 360 21cm shells and 1070 15cm shells, and *Gneisenau* 538 and 1087 respectively. The range of the battle had mostly been 70 to 80 hectometres but at one stage had been as low as 60 hm. *Scharnhorst* was hit by one 10.2 cm shell and one 7.6 cm shell and *Gneisenau* was hit four times with one shell temporarily jamming her aft 21cm turret. The Germans suffered no deaths.

The author's assertion that Graf von Spee benefits from the famous British gift for seeing the best side

of British enemies is without foundation. More usually allied writers laud their victories and disguise their defeats, and denigrate the opposing Admirals whenever possible. For example, instead of relating Admiral Hipper's fine record as the leader of the German Reconnaissance Forces, he is often referred to as merely a torpedo specialist. Similarly I have seldom seen Admiral Scheer favourably reported, except by Frost.

In regard to Graf von Spee's decision to return to Germany with his squadron, he had little choice. His squadron consumed vast quantities of coal daily and its supply was a continuing problem. Whilst revictualing was not so great a problem there was no re-supply of munition. After the battle of Coronel Graf von Spee had gained sea mastery of the South East Pacific off the coast of South America, however temporary this turned out to be. His sojourn in these waters for so long after the battle was perhaps due to his awaiting events in the land battle in Europe, after all, everyone expected the war to be over by Christmas. Events proved to be otherwise and Graf von Spee continued his homeward voyage and made his first strategic error, the attack on the Falklands. At a conference aboard *Scharnhorst* Kapitan zur See Maerker, commander of *Gneisenau*, voiced his opposition to the attack and later, during the Falklands battle, Graf von Spee signalled him, 'You were right.'

When it comes to the Falklands battle Bewley's facts and conclusions are again in error. He seems to agree with Admiral Sturdee's tactic of a long range action, although there is much evidence that this tactic was flawed. We have already seen it took just 56 minutes and 666-21cm and 413-15cm shells to dispatch two armoured cruisers whose protection was similar to the German squadrons'. Further evidence is available. During the battle of Jutland the battlecruiser *Lutzow* sighted the English armoured cruiser *Defence* at a range of 76hm, and opened fire with five salvos in quick succession. In less than three minutes *Defence* exploded and sank. Although other German ships were also firing at *Defence* at that time Korvettenkapitan Paschen, *Lutzow's* gunnery officer, reported that *Lutzow* hit the *Defence* with two salvos, the first hit near the aft turret, the second on the forecandle, and it is generally reported that she was hit seven times. *Defence's* consort, *Warrior*, another armoured cruiser, was disabled and sank after taking 15 heavy and 6

medium hits. If further evidence were needed *Thuringen* fired 10 30.5cm and 27 15cm shells at *Black Prince* during the night encounter the hits of which were sufficient to destroy this cruiser. These four encounters clearly demonstrate the effectiveness of heavy and medium gunfire at medium to short ranges against armoured cruisers. Nevertheless, the survivors from *Gneisenau* detailed 29 12inch hits on their ship. So, given that the German ships were better constructed and their damage control excellent, perhaps it would have taken marginally longer to dispatch Graf von Spee's ships at a medium range. As it was it took over 4 hours and some 1171 12 inch shells, out a total compliment of 1280 shells.

Bewley contends Admiral Sturdee kept the engagement at a long range so that he could score hits whilst von Spee couldn't score any. The facts are otherwise. Commander Dannreuther, gunnery officer of *Invincible*, later wrote 'Our maximum range at the time was 16000 yards, with the guns at extreme elevation', that is 148 hm. Groner states that *Scharnhorst's* 21cm turret guns were ranged to 163 hm, the casemate 21cm to 124 hm and the 15cm to 137hm. Therefore Bewley's supposition, 'but by fighting at long range, hammering *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* when they couldn't hit back, he made sure of the best result possible' is clearly in error and in fact this nearly led to the English running out of ammunition. Furthermore *Invincible* and *Inflexible* were hit repeatedly, *Invincible* 22 times and *Inflexible* 3 times, with *Invincible* taking on a list. Commander Dannreuther reported that much to their surprise the third German salvo straddled *Invincible* at a range of 143hm. He states that *Invincible* 'suffered a good deal of damage. One struck forward on the waterline and flooded the two bow compartments. Another entered the side 10 feet below 'P' turret, the bunker was flooded and gave the ship a bit of a list. However, we came all the way back to Gibraltar with these compartments flooded.' The Germans were well able to hit and damage the English ships, even at long range.

Under the heading Ship Speeds, the author states that *Invincible* and *Inflexible* were designed for 25kts but in service they reached 28. The best speed a ship will ever do is during her trials, and during their trials *Invincible* reached a top speed of 26.64kts and *Inflexible* 26.48kts. He goes on to quote a contemporary Jane's regarding the German ship's speed's and saying *Scharnhorst* grounded badly in 1909. Not quite correct. *Scharnhorst* began her trials in October in 1907 but interrupted them during November to escort the Royal Yacht to Portsmouth. On 14-1-1908 she ran aground near Bulk and was under repair until February 22nd, after which her trials were completed. *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau's* trial speeds are listed as 23.5 and 23.6 kts respectively and after her trials *Scharnhorst* was able to join the High Seas Fleet Reconnaissance Forces as Flagship of the B. d. A.

Gneisenau's First Officer mentions that at Coronel his ship had difficulty in keeping up with *Scharnhorst*.

In conclusion I find it totally abhorrent to suggest, as the author does, that Graf von Spee entered the battle of Coronel with the idea of being hit by a couple of 9.2inch shells and going into internment. This is just palpable rubbish. Vice Admiral Graf von Spee was a loyal, honourable, dedicated and skillful leader of ships and men. He can easily be judged by his actions, which he resolutely, cheerfully and dutifully carried out to the end.

With so much literature available, both narrative and technical, I find it hard to comprehend the article, 'Sturdee Steams South'. Perhaps the author's first step should have been the two books by Gneisenau's surviving officers. K.K Pochhammer's *Before Jutland* and Lt. z. S. Lietzmann's *Auf verlorenen Posten*. Other sources include:

Der Kreuzerklieg.- Raeder.

The pursuit of Admiral von Spee- Hough.

The Invincible Class -Roberts.

Die Deutschen Kriegsschiffe. - Hildebrand.

Die Deutschen Kriegsschiffe 1815-1945- Groner
British Battleships of WW.I -Burt.

Gary Staff.

Geoffrey Bewley responds:

Dear Sir,

It's nice to see such a long comment on the Sturdee piece, by a chap who's obviously done lots of homework. But it's a bit dismaying to see so many shots going so wide of the mark.

Actually, I never meant to say much on Count von Spee's deeds and character. I'd set out to take a fresh look at Admiral Sturdee's strategy. From that angle, Sturdee was the main figure, and von Spee, Cradock, Fisher and Churchill were all supporting players.

Point by point, now. Facts on Coronel? I had lots, but they had nothing to do with Sturdee. I stopped short there so I'd get to the main issue sooner. And then, was von Spee's squadron really incomplete? At first, Cradock's ships just sighted *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, but *Leipzig* and *Dresden* had joined the line by the time the shooting started, and *Nurnberg* turned up in time to finish off the crippled *Monmouth*. Actually, Cradock's squadron was the more incomplete. He was missing the old battleship *Canopus*.

Does von Spee, now, benefit from the British gift for seeing the best side of British enemies? Well, I was

out to try to see the best side of Sturdee, but I thought. I was being more than fair to von Spee, too. But more of that later.

Von Spee had little choice but to return to Germany? No, he had plenty of choices, but none of them looked too promising. Heading back to Germany may have been his best choice, but it didn't turn out too well, did it? And if he'd let the Falklands alone and dodged past Sturdee there, there'd still have been plenty of British ships between him and home.

Sturdee's tactics at the Falklands? Most naval writers seem happy enough with them. Obviously, he didn't mind how long he took, or how much ammunition he spent. If he'd fought at medium range, most likely he'd have sunk the big cruisers sooner, but he'd have taken much more damage himself. He didn't think that looked like much of a bargain.

Sturdee wasn't in a position to draw too many lessons from the battle of Jutland, because it hadn't been fought yet. Anyhow, gunnery conditions at Jutland were nothing like gunnery conditions at the Falklands, and gunnery conditions at Coronel weren't much like either.

The detail of Sturdee's tactics at the Falklands has actually been fairly widely criticised. He kept *Inflexible* in line astern of *Invincible*, when he might have tried her to steer wide of his funnel smoke, so she could shoot better. This might have saved a bit of time and ammunition. It wouldn't have made much difference to the battle's result. It struck me as a fairly minor point, and I was looking at his strategy, not his tactics, so I left it out.

Ships mostly make their trials with brand new machinery and crews new to it. Often they go a bit better later on, when the machinery's run in and the crews know it better.

'Better results were obtained in service when they had shaken down,' Dr. Oscar Parkes says of the *Invincible* class, in *British Battleships*, 'and all reached 28 knots.'

There are lots of examples of this. According to Jane's, the British scout cruiser *Boadicea* had a designed speed of 25 knots, a trial speed of 25.5 and a best recent speed of 27.9. The German battlecruiser *Von Der Tann* had a designed speed of 25 knots, a trial speed of 27.4, and a best recent speed of 28.1, not too far from *Invincible*'s figures of 25, 26.6, 28.6 knots.

The argument over *Scharnhorst*'s speed just goes to show ship speeds aren't easy to pin down. It's possible to find holes in this version, too. Maybe Jane's were wrong about the scale of the damage from grounding. Could they have been wrong about the year, too? Possible, but less likely. Or else, did

Scharnhorst ground in 1908 and then again in 1909?

Or else, maybe the Germans fixed her but found she was a bit slow. So then they gave out false trial figures, to confuse rivals, save face, and so on. After all, we've had two world wars since then to teach us we can't always believe everything the Germans tell us.

The point I was trying to make was that listed speeds are only a rough guide to what a ship will actually be good for in action on any given day. Speed is affected by casual defects, wear and tear, the crew's skill, fuel load, marine growth on the hull. Most of these factors will reduce a ship's speed, a couple may boost it.

One example is *Kent*'s action with *Nurnberg* at the Falklands. In that steaming race, a shrewd, informed punter would have put his shirt on *Nurnberg* getting away and he'd have lost it. *Kent* was older, she was said to be the slowest of her class, but she was fresh from a refit and light on coal, and that made the difference.

Published speeds are useful, but they don't tell everything. Allowances need to be made. That's a good point, I thought it was a good idea to make it then, I'm happy to make it again here.

Then, internment. What's so specially dreadful about von Spee considering it? Lots of other German cruisers and raiders actually did intern themselves. It was certainly one of his options, right from the start of the war. It can't have not crossed his mind.

When he went into action at Coronel, he didn't know his ships would all get through nearly untouched. He must have given thought to what he'd do if one of them was knocked about. Slog on back to Germany at the speed of the lame duck? Scuttle it there and then? Or else, send it in to sit out the war in Valparaiso?

He'd already done a lot for Germany, winning Coronel, sending off the *Emden*. He could have chosen to park his big cruisers in Chile, while his light cruisers went out as three more raiders. The Chileans weren't likely to be as strict on interned warships as, say, the Dutch or the Americans. He'd have been a permanent worry, and the Allies would have had to post ships nearby in case he made a break back to sea.

At least he'd have saved his ships and the lives of his men. As it was, a month or so later, he found he'd thrown them away. The run home to Germany was a huge risk and the farther he got, the steeper the odds against him would be. And when he attacked the Falklands, even if he'd have found them deserted, he'd still have shown where he was. Right away, the British net would have started closing round him.

Von Spee was a loyal, honourable, dedicated and skil-

ful leader? Well, up to a point. He was certainly an inspiring leader. Apparently he was very good at training. He may not have been a first rate tactician. He was easily baffled by the French at Tahiti, he wasn't seriously tested at Coronel. At the Falklands, he missed his best chance early when he turned away instead of closing Sturdee's ships as they filed out of harbour.

As a strategist? Not specially gifted, not awfully imaginative. *Emden's* cruise was her captain's idea, not his. And then, in the end, not terrifically successful, either. At Samoa and Tahiti he didn't do much but show everybody where he was. On the other hand, he wasn't specially lucky, either. If he'd found and fought H.M.A.S. *Australia*, he'd have come out looking much cleverer.

Still, from a professional point of view, he comes out pretty well. Probably a better leader of men than Sturdee, about as skilful a tactician, not as good a strategist.

From a human point of view? This is where that British readiness to see the best of an enemy comes in. At Coronel, *Good Hope* and *Monmouth* went down with all hands. After the main action, *Nurnberg* found *Monmouth* crippled and listing, and she sank her because her flag was still flying. That was fair enough. *Sydney* reopened fire on *Emden* at the Cocos Islands in the same sort of way. But when *Monmouth* sank, none of von Spee's ships tried to pick up survivors.

It was dark then, and von Spee said later the weather was too rough for rescue work. The officers of H.M.S.

Bristol, retiring south, agreed the weather was bad. Even so, it's possible to feel von Spee may have been just a little too ready to give up on it.

It's interesting to compare *Monmouth's* sinking with the battlecruiser *Scharnhorst's* in 1943. *Scharnhorst* went down in much worse weather, in a freezing winter night, 10 degrees north of the Arctic Circle. German survivors were hard to find and hard to get at, and they couldn't last long in the cold. Just the same, Sir Bruce Fraser's ships went after them, and they managed to pull 36 of them out of the sea.

Fraser tried, von Spee didn't. Afterwards, in Valparaiso, von Spee refused to gloat over his victory. Most people give that as evidence of his chivalrous spirit. Maybe it's evidence of a twinge of conscience.

Von Spee's had the benefit of the doubt from most people. He had it from me, too. I thought this was a bit fishy, a bit of a poor show, but I was writing about Sturdee's strategy, not von Spee's character, and I left it out.

As far as I'm concerned, that's the full score on von Spee. A good officer, a pretty sound fighting admiral, a questionable strategist, and maybe also just a bit of a callous Hun brute. I still think most of that doesn't have much to do with Sturdee's strategy, and I'm still glad I left it out.

Geoffrey Bewley



“SOLDIER AND SAILOR TOO”

THE ROYAL NAVAL DIVISION IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR

Graham Wilson

In late 1917 two British military policemen on patrol in Paris took into custody a man wearing a British Army officer's uniform which bore insignia odd enough to arouse suspicions of “spy” in the minds of the two MPs. Despite vehement protestations of innocence, the offender was dragged off to the office of the Provost Marshal where his detainers were sure that, at the very least, he would receive a dressing down for wearing unauthorised uniform or, at most, be arrested as a spy. On dragging their still protesting victim into the presence of the PM, however, to their surprise and confusion that officer leapt to his feet and saluted the prisoner. Their confusion was allayed a short time later when it was explained to them that their “spy” was an officer of the Royal Navy serving with the 63rd (RN) Division and that his “unauthorised” embellishments were actually naval badges of rank.

Anyone with even a passing knowledge of Australian naval history will be aware of the activities of the New South Wales Naval Brigade in China during the Boxer Rebellion and of the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force and the Royal Australian Naval Bridging Train during the Great War. However, despite this Australian experience of sailors serving ashore in a military capacity, it still may come as a surprise to readers that there was actually a fighting organisation on the Western Front in the First World War which was largely made up of sailors. An organisation which, while in all other aspects a common, run-of-the-mill infantry division, was very much a part of His Majesty's Navy and jealously guarded and maintained naval customs and traditions, even in the trenches. This article is to introduce readers to this remarkable and unique fighting formation, the 63rd (Royal Naval) Division.

Background

At first glance, the concept of sailors serving ashore as infantry seems odd to the point of being bizarre. Yet this concept has a long and honourable tradition in the Royal Navy. During the Crimean War, guns from ships of the Baltic Squadron, and sailors to man them, were landed to join the siege lines around Sebastopol; the sailors bemused their military comrades in arms by keeping watches and marking the change of watches by ringing bells. Sailors served at the battles of Isandlwana and Ulundi during the Zulu War of 1879

and there is evidence to suggest that the last British serviceman to die under the Zulu assegais after the disastrous defeat at Isandlwana was a bluejacket from the Naval Brigade who had retreated into a rocky cleft and held off his attackers for some time with pistol and cutlass until finally overwhelmed. A Naval Rocket Battery accompanied Napier's relief force to Magdala during the Abyssinian Campaign of 1867-68 and in fact helped turn the tide at the Battle of Adowa by their timely arrival.

Both the Boer War and Boxer Rebellion saw sailors (including, in the case of the Boxer Rebellion, Australian sailors) employed as infantry. And of course, there were the innumerable incidents throughout the 19th and early 20th century where ships of the Royal Navy landed parties of armed sailors in various out of the way parts of the world to protect British interests and subjects.

But all of these were fairly ad hoc arrangements and of short duration, often resulting from the fact that the sailors were the only fighting men available. The case of the Royal Naval Division was different in that, although at first conceived as a stop-gap measure, it resulted in the formal raising of a military formation consisting largely of sailors and marines and this organisation lasted for over four years.

The Beginning

The Royal Naval Division was very much the child of the fertile imagination of Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty at the outbreak of the First World War.

Churchill had already considered before the war what to do with the 30,000 or so naval reservists who would be “left over” after the Fleet was mobilised and all ships manned. His plan was to raise a formation of sailors and marines capable of landing from the sea and establishing a “strong foothold for a following army” - in effect, an amphibious assault division. The idea had much merit as at that time all sailors in the Royal Navy received extensive training in the use of small arms and in small unit infantry tactics and there was a fairly large pool of officers and senior sailors who had actual experience of naval landing party operations.

With war looming, a General Mobilisation Order went out on 2 August 1914 and reservists from the various divisions reported to the naval barracks in the great port cities of England. Men were allocated to ships as speedily as possible and by the third week of August it was apparent that there would be enough members of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR), Royal Naval Reserve (RNR) and Royal Fleet Reserve (RFR) available to form eight battalions. Additionally there would be enough marines to form an additional four battalions. As the 1914 war establishment for an infantry division called for three brigades of four battalions each, the Royal Naval Division was well on its way. To form the new division, naval reservists drawn from the Port Divisions of London, Clyde, Bristol, Mersey, Sussex and Tyneside were directed to report to the Depot of the Royal Naval Division which had been established at the Crystal Palace at Sydenham. The site of the great Exhibition of 1851 was to remain the "home" of the RND for the entire war and was in due course commissioned as one of His Majesty's naval shore establishments under the uninspiring name of HMS *Crystal Palace* (complete with cap tallies!). The eight naval battalions were formed from a skeleton of RNVR officers and senior rates, with the rest of their establishments being filled out by members of the RNR and RFR surplus to Fleet requirements.

For reasons of unit pride and *esprit de corps* the naval battalions were named after famous fighting admirals, being titled respectively Drake, Hawke, Benbow and Collingwood (1st RN Brigade) and Nelson, Howe, Hood and Anson (2nd RN Brigade). In somewhat more pedestrian vein, the four battalions of the 3rd RM Brigade were simply numbered 9 to 12 with the 9th Battalion being formed from members of the Royal Marine Artillery (RMA) and the 10th, 11th and 12th Battalions by members of the Royal Marine Light Infantry (RMLI) drawn from Chatham (10th), Portsmouth (11th), and Plymouth and Deal (12th).

First Actions - Belgium

Training camps for the RND were set up at Walmer and Betteshanger and it was from these camps that members of the division departed for Belgium in August and October. The 1st RN Brigade landed at Antwerp in the first week of October and went into action immediately, followed shortly by the 2nd RN Brigade. During the confused fighting that typified the ill-fated attempt to deny the Germans the Belgian ports, three battalions of the 1st RN Brigade - Hawke, Benbow and Collingwood - became detached and most of their members were either taken prisoner or were forced over the border into neutral Holland where they were interned for the duration of the war.

The sailors were not the first into the fight, however, as the marines of the 10th (Chatham) RM Battalion had landed at Ostend on 27 August. They were followed shortly after by the rest of the 3rd RM Brigade which had been undergoing a reorganisation resulting from the decision to break up the 9th (RMA) Battalion to provide trained men for the RND's artillery. As a result of this reorganisation, the battalions were re-numbered 9th (Chatham), 10th (Portsmouth), 11th (Plymouth) and 12th (Deal). The 12th Battalion was formed by drafting members from the other three battalions and filling out the establishment with reservists and volunteers. This reorganisation while one of the battalions was already in action must have been cause for incredible confusion.

The surviving members of the RND were returned to England in the second week of October and moved into Blandford Camp to reorganise and re-equip. The 1st (RN) Brigade having lost three battalions with only Drake remaining, the decision was made to transfer Nelson from the 2nd (RN) Brigade, leaving that formation with Howe, Hood and Anson. To fill out the depleted brigades, Hawke, Benbow and Collingwood began reforming immediately.

The 3rd (RM) Brigade had also suffered in Belgium and Deal Battalion in particular required a draft of 600 "Kitchener" recruits to bring it back up to strength. The units of the RND were fairly scattered at this time with Hawke, Benbow and Collingwood being at Deal, while the rest of the naval battalions were at Blandford. As for the Marines, the 9th (Chatham) Battalion was located at Gravesend, the 10th (Portsmouth) Battalion was at Browndown, the 11th (Plymouth) was at Tavistock and the 12th (Deal) was at the RND Depot at HMS *Crystal Palace*.

Gallipoli and the Dardanelles

Despite all of this energetic activity, however, the RND was fighting for its very existence at this time, with many influential people, especially senior Army officers, questioning the logic of such a unit. Luckily for the division, it had a powerful champion in the person of the pugnacious and combative First Lord of the Admiralty. Loath to see his brainchild cast aside, Churchill frantically searched for any excuse for its continued existence and quickly settled on the forthcoming operations in the Dardanelles. As he craftily pointed out to detractors of his pet, there would be an urgent need for troops with both the amphibious landing expertise and combat experience of the RND in the upcoming campaign.

Whether or not Churchill's arguments swayed the decision or if, in actual fact, people eventually gave him his own way for the sheer sake of peace and quiet, the decision was made to commit the RND to the Dardanelles. Accordingly, it embarked for the Medi-

terranean in February 1915, following a divisional inspection at Blandford Camp by King George V.

The advance elements of the RND arrived at Lemnos on 12 March 1915. Delays in the arrival of some units required some frantic last minute reorganisation of the division prior to the landings on the Gallipoli Peninsula on 25 April 1915.

As an aside, it should be mentioned here that two members of the division made their names during the Dardanelles Campaign. These were Rupert Brooke and Bernard Freyberg. Brooke was to become one of the most famous British poets of the First World War, largely as a result of the supposed "romantic" nature of his death in action in the Mediterranean - in actual fact, he died of septicaemia resulting from an infected mosquito bite on his lip and before ever hearing a shot fired. Freyberg, on the other hand, received the Distinguished Service Order for his gallantry throughout the Gallipoli Campaign and, in particular, for his personal reconnaissance of the invasion beaches prior to the landings; he later received the Victoria Cross for gallantry in France and, later still, commanded New Zealand troops in the Middle East, North Africa and Italy during the Second World War and was a post-war Governor General of New Zealand.

The Gallipoli Campaign.

The units of the RND went ashore at V and Y Beaches at first light on 25 April 1915 and, with the rest of those who fought in that unfortunate campaign, went down in history. The division was involved in the campaign from 25 April until its last elements were withdrawn in the last week of 1915. During that period the sailors and marines of the RND took part in many desperate actions and suffered severe casualties.

At the third Battle of Krithia on 4 June 1915, for instance, the battalions of the RND were caught in enfilade after the Turks had repulsed a French attack which the RND were moving up to support and during the action Collingwood Battalion was, in the words of a witness, "obliterated as a ship is sunk with all hands, tumbled heaps of khaki everywhere, looking like dead leaves in autumn". The men of the RND who fell at Krithia, like the Australian light horsemen who fell at the Nek, could not be buried because of enemy fire and remained where they fell. Their remains were generally not recovered until after the war, by which time they were mostly unidentifiable. Most are now commemorated on the Helles Memorial to the Missing, the first eight panels of which are dedicated to the Royal Navy.

As a result of their grievous casualties, Benbow and Collingwood were broken up (never to be re-formed) and the survivors drafted to Hood, Howe and Anson.

The Marines also suffered and in June 1918 Deal was split up and its survivors drafted to the other three marine battalions, which in turn were reorganised into two battalions, 1st RMLI (Chatham and Deal) and 2nd RMLI (Plymouth and Portsmouth). Following these actions, the division was reduced to two brigades, 1st with Drake, Hawke, Nelson and Hood, and 2nd with Howe, Anson and 1st and 2nd RMLT.

To Fight Another Day

When the end finally came at Gallipoli, the survivors of the badly depleted RND were withdrawn, first to Lemnos, then to Egypt and, finally, back to the UK. But their return to England was a return to yet another battle for survival. The enormous casualties suffered by the division at the Dardanelles, coupled with a lack of need for any special amphibious qualifications which the division may have been able to offer seemed to spell the end, especially as their great champion, Winston Churchill, was no longer in a position of influence in which to fight for them. To his credit, Churchill had accepted responsibility for the Dardanelles disaster and resigned from parliament.

Yet, the Royal Naval Division was to survive to fight another day as the result of two powerful influences. The first of these was the King. In common with most of his predecessors as far back as the Tudors, King George V had a strong interest in "his" navy. When Admiralty representations were made to him about retaining the RND, he was quick to lend his support and to let his feelings be known through the oblique means employed by the English monarchy to do so.

The second factor was that indefinable thing which can best be termed "fighting spirit"; that special something which sets a great fighting formation apart from those which are merely good and which makes service with the formation attractive. At this stage of the war, when full conscription had yet to be introduced and when the first flood of Kitchener recruits had slowed to a trickle, anything which could encourage recruitment was fostered by the High Command. And the RND certainly did this.

It is worth digressing shortly to examine why this was. After all, at first glance, the RND was an uncomfortable hybrid at best and an unlikely candidate for the title of "elite". Yet, the RND was a popular unit for volunteers throughout the war. This was largely due to the Royal Navy's popularity with the miners and artisans of the great coal mining towns and counties of Northumbria, especially Durham.

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there was a constant two way flow between the coal fields and the Royal Navy. For its part, the navy was eager to accept fit and hardy recruits who were familiar with machinery and who were inured to a

hard life and used to working in confined spaces and shift work. For their part, the pitmen, used to working shifts not unlike the navy's watch bill system and accustomed to long hours in confined spaces, found in the navy a style of life which suited them. To a pitman used to being paid by the basket of coal hewed, with no pay when the pit was idle, under the threat of instant impoverished unemployment if he was rendered incapable of work through illness or injury, and having to provide his own food, drink, clothing and tools, life in the Royal Navy with regular pay, three meals a day and all found, opportunity for advancement and the chance of visiting foreign parts must have seemed like heaven on earth. And when they gave up the sea (and passed onto the reserve list), they would find a ready market for their service acquired skills back at the pits.

When they returned home on leave or discharge, these sailors from the coal fields would regale their families and friends with tales of their life in the Royal Navy, with the result that a steady stream of recruits was fed to the navy from the northern coal fields. With the outbreak of war, the naval reservists from the Tyneside were called up and many of them went to the Royal Naval Division. On their return home on leave from Belgium and the Dardanelles they recounted tales of the courage and fighting qualities of their division to relatives and work mates and many of these set off for naval recruiting offices where they undertook to join the Navy or Marines on the strict understanding that they would only serve in the Royal Naval Division.

This flow of volunteers was to continue for the whole war and when efforts were made to disband the division on its return from the Dardanelles, the division's supporters used this recruiting attraction as a powerful argument for the division's continued existence. Combined with the patronage of the King, these arguments worked and the decision was made to retain the Royal Naval Division but, as a compromise, it was removed from the direct control of the Admiralty and placed under the control of the War Office. From then on, the Admiralty was responsible solely for the recruitment of the sailors and marines to man the naval and marine battalions and support units and specific naval administrative matters, with the War Office responsible for all other aspects of operations and administration. With this decision agreed to, the Royal Naval Division was taken on strength with the Army as the 63rd (RN) Division.

It should be noted that the 63rd Division already existed, having been raised as a Second Line Reserve Territorial Force division in 1914 as the 63rd (2nd/Northumbrian) Division. The division was formed from units raised in the north country with battalions of the Durham Light Infantry, the Northumberland Fusiliers, the Green Howards and the East Yorks mak-

ing up the infantry brigades, that served on Home Defence duties and as a training formation and was based around Newcastle. Gradually reduced in strength as more and more drafts of trained men were sent off to the Regular and New Army divisions, it was finally disbanded on 21 July 1916. As the 63rd (Royal Naval) Division was raised on 19 July, 1916, there were actually two 63rd Divisions on the British Army's strength for a period of three days. Prior to the disbandment of the 63rd (2nd/Northumbrian) Division, the divisional artillery had already been transferred to France and this was subsequently taken over as the divisional artillery of the 63rd (RN) Division.

The Western Front

The Royal Naval (not yet the 63rd (RN)) Division arrived in France in May 1916 consisting of a divisional headquarters, two brigades (1st and 2nd (RN) Brigades), a divisional cyclist company (disbanded in June 1916 and never re-raised), a divisional signal company, two engineer field companies, three field ambulances and the divisional train (transport and supply units). The 1st (RN) Bde consisted of Drake, Hawke, Hood and Nelson and the 2nd (RN) Bde contained Howe, Anson, 1 RMLI and 2 RMLI. All of the existing supporting units at this time (signals, engineers, medical and train) were formed from marines and were to remain so until the end of the war, despite strenuous outside efforts to convert them into Army units.

Nevertheless, once the RND passed under Army control, some dilution of its nautical character was inevitable. Firstly, army uniform replaced navy dress, a process that had been in train for some time. In order to assert their naval origins, naval badges were retained and special naval embellishments, which will be detailed later, were developed. Next, formations were quickly re-numbered to bring them into line with Army practice, with the division becoming the 63rd (RN) Division (as previously described) and the 1st and 2nd (RN) Bde becoming the 188th and 189th (RN) Bde respectively (188th and 189th Brigades had been units of the old 63rd (2nd/Northumbrian) Division), and necessary supporting units were added to the divisional order of battle (ORBAT). To fill out the ORBAT, a third engineer field company (marines) was raised; a third (Army) brigade (190th - also inherited from the former 63rd (2nd/Northumbrian) Division) was added; each brigade was allotted a machine gun company and a light trench mortar battery; and an Army field artillery brigade and pioneer battalion were added.

Later Changes.

While this was to remain broadly the organisation of the division for the rest of the war, there were a number of later changes including the departure of 1/1 HAC

from the 190th Bde in June 1917, its place being taken by 1st/28th County of London Regiment (Artists Rifles).

In February 1918, as a result of casualties, all brigades of the British Army were reorganised into three battalion formations. In order to accomplish this in the RND, Nelson and Howe were disbanded and the 10th Royal Dublin Fusiliers transferred, leaving 188th (RN) Bde with Anson, 1st RM and 2nd RM, 189th (RN) Bde with Drake, Hood and Hawke; and 190th Bde with 4th Bedfordshire, 7th Royal Fusiliers and 1/28 Artists. In March 1918, the three brigade MG companies were combined into the 63rd MG Battalion. Finally, in April 1918, the two RMLI battalions were combined into one battalion (1/2 RMLI) and the gap left by this was filled by 2nd Royal Irish Regiment (2 RIR).

The Somme and After.

Command of the division was passed to an Army officer, Major General Parish, a man of great personal courage and charm who became fiercely proud of his division and whose loyalty was returned in kind by the sailors, marines and soldiers under his command. The 63rd (RN) Division went into the line on the Somme Front in the last week of July 1916. It was to remain there for the rest of the war, following the standard routine of rotating brigades through the front-line trenches and with the battalions taking turns at one week (sometimes more) in the front line, one week in support and one week in reserve. From time to time, battalions were withdrawn from the line for periods of "rest" and, of course, members of the division were able to enjoy the luxury of home leave, an unheard of event in the Dardanelles.

The division took part in the Battle of the Somme from July to November 1916, performing well and receiving the congratulations of the Army Commander for their actions. In particular, the RND performed magnificently in the assault on the Beaumont Redoubt. On the debit side, however, the division's fame was won at great cost in casualties. One of those casualties was Major General Parish who lost his leg to a shell burst during a visit to the forward areas. He was replaced by Major General Schute, a man who most definitely was not suited to command of the RND.

While neither a bad officer nor a bad general (as First World War British generals went), Schute was every inch a soldier and was never able to come to terms with the nautical and naval idiosyncrasies of the RND. Schute got off to a very bad start when, following his first inspection of the division's trenches, he sent out a blistering 'rocket' to all ranks on the subject of excreta in the trenches. Unfortunately, he failed to take account of the fact that his division had only taken over trenches from a Portuguese division on the morn-

ing of the inspection and the excreta in the trenches was Portuguese not British and as they were concerned with the myriad operational details of trench relief, his men had not had time to see to hygiene arrangements. Schute never rectified his mistake and his men never forgave him (a rude song on the incident, to be sung to the tune of *Wrap me up in my Tarpaulin Jacket*, more familiar to Australians as *Wrap me up in my stockwhip and Blanket* was composed by the division wardroom and a copy is available to readers from the author of this article if they are interested).

An example of Schute's insensitivity was his directive in regard to badges of rank. Under Parish, naval members of the division were allowed to wear only naval badges of rank on their Army uniforms. Leading Seamen, Petty Officers and Chief Petty Officers wore their combinations of anchors in the normal position on the left arm while officers wore khaki rank lace on their sleeves in the normal positions. Schute directed that while naval badges of rank could continue to be worn, they must be worn in combination with Army badges. Thus a Leading Seaman had to wear his anchor on the left sleeve and corporal's stripes on the right sleeve while a Sub-Lieutenant wore his single row of lace with the executive curl on the cuff but was forced to wear one or two Army officer's pips on his shoulders. The division complied but loathed the order and loathed Schute for issuing it.

The Case Of Sub-Lieutenant Dyett.

It was also at this time that the division attained a degree of unwanted notoriety with the court martial of Sub-Lieutenant Dyett, RNVR, of Nelson Battalion. Dyett was shot for desertion, one of only two British officers to be executed for this crime in the First World War (the other was an Army officer). The secrecy surrounding British capital courts martial in the Great War is such that the only reason that the bare details of Dyett's case is known is the fact that it became the subject of some intense activity in the British parliament after the war, following representations to parliament by Dyett's family.

Dyett had served throughout the Dardanelles campaign and by the time of the Somme battles was apparently so battle weary that he requested sea-duty as he could no longer face the trenches. This request was made in October 1916 and his commanding officer apparently looked favourably on the request as Dyett was relieved from front line duty and posted for base duty only pending a sea draft.

On 13 November 1916, the 63rd (RN) Division was ordered up for the attack on the Beaumont Redoubt on the River Ancre. When Nelson Battalion moved up, Dyett remained behind in reserve. Later, however, when most of the other officers were killed in the initial assault, Dyett was ordered to join the battalion.

Dyett apparently disobeyed this order as he failed to report to his battalion and was later found hiding in a ruined farm house well behind the lines. Charged with desertion in the face of the enemy, he was found guilty by a court martial and executed at dawn on 4 January 1917 by a firing party drawn from his own battalion.

Following the Battle of the Somme, the 63rd RND was withdrawn from the line to refit and rebuild its depleted battalions. The winter and spring of 1917 were spent in trenches in the Arras region as part of Third Army. During this period and on into the summer and autumn, the division took part in a number of limited offensives, interspersed with trench raiding operations. Towards the end of the year, following another period of rest and refitting in the rear areas, the division was moved to the Cambrai region where it was deployed to cover the so-called Cambrai Salient. This bulge in the British line had been created in November when a British attack had driven the Germans back almost seven miles and had resulted in the British capturing the dominant geographical feature of the region, a derisory hillock named Welsh Ridge, which overlooked the German held village of Marcoing. When the RND took over the Salient at the end of the second week of December, defence works were rudimentary and shambolic based on the shattered remains of the former German rear lines and the division worked to exhaustion through the long winter nights to rebuild the defences. They had not completed their labours when, in the early hours of 30 December, the Germans launched an all out assault on the Salient with the intention of retaking the ground lost the previous month. Initially taken by surprise, the two forward brigades of the division, 188th (RN) and 189th (RN) Brigades, fought back ferociously with the result that while some ground was lost, the momentum of the German attack was stalled.

Limited local counter attacks enabled the sailors and marines of the 188th and 189th Brigades to recover most of the ground lost on the right flank but they were unable to recapture a substantial length of the left flank defences. Intent on recovering all of the lost ground, Schute ordered up one of the battalions from the 190th Brigade which was in reserve and tasked it with carrying out a *coup de main* to recover the lost ground. Obedient to the general's orders, 1st/28th Artists Rifles went over the top in broad daylight at about 1400 and were slaughtered to no avail. Interestingly, when the 10th Royal Dublin Fusiliers were ordered up at the same time as the Artists to recapture that portion of the right flank still in German hands, the CO ignored orders to mount an immediate attack and instead waited until dusk, at which time he began infiltrating his men forward and then mounted a surprise attack at midnight which caught the Germans completely unawares and carried the position at a cost of three casualties. The Germans mounted a furious attack on the left flank on the morning of 31 Decem-

ber but the decimated Artists Rifles fought back with such ferocity that the attack petered out by mid-afternoon. In just over 30 hours of fighting, the 63rd RND lost 1,500 men killed wounded and missing.

Early in 1918, the 63rd RND spent some time in (GHC) Reserve as it once again went through a period of refitting and rebuilding. Then in March, following reorganisation, moved back into the Third Army area, taking over the Flesquieres Salient. At this time, doubtless to the pleasure of both parties, Major General Schute left the division and was replaced by Major General C.E. Lawrie, a man who seems to have been neither loved like Parish nor despised like Schute. The division was in the line at the beginning of the last big German offensive of the war, Operation *Michael*, which was launched on 21 April 1918. Although the division was not heavily engaged at the beginning of the offensive, they quickly became involved as heavy German attacks began to develop on the Flesquieres Salient. The division was already exhausted, as were all of the other divisions of V Corps, and had suffered 2,500 gas casualties in the days leading up to the offensive. As a consequence, when the main weight of the German attacks fell on the division on the morning of 23 March, it, along with the other divisions of its corps, was forced to retire. As the division was breaking contact, a large British depot to its rear was blown to deny it to the Germans, but, as this was done without warning the 63rd RND, great confusion reigned and division began to lose cohesion. This confusion was partly sorted out when the division reached the vicinity of Beugny but attempts to reorganise the division were hampered when it was once again attacked on the morning of 24 March. Falling back again, the now badly disorganised division was relieved by the 12th Division and pulled further back to try to reorganise.

The division moved back into the line on 26 March, holding a position in the vicinity of Albert. There was a respite as the Germans gathered their strength and weakened and by now thoroughly exhausted division worked hard at strengthening its defences and bringing some sort of order to the chaos which had reigned over the previous days. When the Germans, including interestingly enough the 3rd Naval Division, resumed their attack on 31 March, although some outposts were overrun, the 63rd RND, although tired and depleted, fought back so vigorously that the assault was stopped in its tracks. The division held in place until the Allied counter-offensive got under way, at which time it was relieved and withdrawn for badly earned rest and a period of reorganisation and reinforcement. It was a sadly depleted division which went into camp in the rear area in April 1918. It was at this time that the two RMLI battalions in the 189th Brigade were combined into a single battalion as it was seen as impossible to bring both battalions back up to strength. The division re-entered the line in May but by this time

the strength of the German attacks had switched to the north and killing pressure of the previous months was off. The German offensive finally wore itself out in July.

The End

This last gasp by the Germans on the Western Front was followed by a period of rest and recuperation for all concerned as the Allies prepared themselves for their big push. The German offensive had hurt the Allies and, in truth, thrown something of a scare into them. As the assault ground down, however, it had become clear to the senior Allied command that the Germans were on their last legs, divisions depleted, troops exhausted and morale weakened, where it was not actually shattered. The end was apparently near and this came at the beginning of August, after massive preparation and build up, and as the British, Australian, Canadian, New Zealand, South African, French, Belgian and American troops went over the top, it quickly became apparent that this time the shoe was on the other foot as demoralised and disorganised Germans allowed their positions to be overrun and surrendered in their thousands. The turn of the 63rd RND came on 2 September when, following a successful breakthrough of the German lines in the Mont St. Quentin area by the Canadian Corps, the RND passed through the gap and fanned out into the open country beyond and raced down to cut the Queant-Cambrai railway line.

After three years of static trench warfare, the 63rd RND, as with all of the other Allied divisions, had some difficulty in adapting to the vastly different requirements of mobile warfare in open country. But adapt they did and joined with the rest of the divisions of the BEF in the

final breaching of the Hindenburg Line and the inexorable drive towards Germany which finally led to the Armistice on 11 November.

With the war over and the British armies disbanding, the 63rd RND also began to

contract. Early in 1919, while the division was based at Dour in France, presentation of colours were made to each of the infantry battalions, the Union colours issued to many of the service battalions raised during the war. On 6 June 1919, 1000 members of the RND paraded before the Prince of Wales at Horse Guards Parade as a farewell gesture and the following week the 63rd Royal Naval Division ceased to exist.

Conclusion

The 63rd Royal Naval Division was an unlikely candidate for the appellation of "elite unit" and yet, despite, perhaps because, of the division's unique and hybrid make up, that is exactly what it became. The division suffered from its detractors throughout its existence, one of these detractors being one of its own commanders. Despite this, and despite the apparent incongruity of sailors serving in the trenches in Army khaki, it acquitted itself superbly. All the men who served with the division were fiercely proud of it and of their service. Landlocked sailors clung fiercely to their naval traditions and customs and all ranks were very jealous of the division's famous red foul anchor divisional sign. As was said of the just as famous 51st Highland Division at the end of the Second World War "their likes will never be seen again".



The Anglo-German Struggle for the Australian Airwaves before 1914:

Marconi versus Telefunken

Peter Overlack, History Department, University of Queensland.

'The installation of wireless telegraphy will obviously prove of no slight importance to any future development of German naval power in the Pacific'. Sydney Morning Herald, 28 December 1909.

The Asian-Pacific region ranked second in importance to North America for German economic and strategic interests before World War I. That radio and cable connections were a major consideration in German operational planning in the region is shown by the large archival holdings on the subject. The German Government was keen to extend radio connections within Germany's Pacific possessions and there was repeated use of phrases emphasising the military-political importance of establishing the network. How naval communication might otherwise be facilitated from land-based stations features prominently. While a continent like Australia with its vast distances would be a rich commercial prize, more importantly for the German Navy and its wartime task of sinking shipping in the Asian-Pacific region a land-based Telefunken system would have definite advantages. With the vast potential of the Australasian market, it was inevitable that the two great radio-telegraphy companies working with similar technology eventually would come into conflict. By the beginning of 1909, worldwide of some 1,500 radio-telegraphy stations 673 had been constructed by Telefunken, 550 by Marconi, and the remainder by smaller companies. The following years saw aggressive competition by both companies, with 161 new stations being constructed by Telefunken alone between January 1909 and July 1910.

From cable to radio: growing defence concerns.

There had been a long history of German commercial and strategic interest in cable communications in the Asian-Pacific region based on its colonies. However, it proved difficult for German companies to enter the Australasian market. Five months after Federation, the Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft (AEG) informed Chancellor Bernhard von Bulow that it was tendering for the contract to lay sea cable. With growing defence awareness, local press opinion in any case was mixed on the virtue of the idea of a German cable from the Dutch Indies to New Guinea, let alone requests that its extension be granted a landing site

on the Australian mainland. Senator Staniforth Smith, writing in the *Sydney Daily Telegraph*, commented on the proposed extension of the cable from the German Caroline Islands to Herbertshohe in New Guinea, that 'It is a palpable fact that the commerce of New Britain does not justify the expense of a cable, but as Simpson Haven is to be a German naval base, it is not hard to understand the motive of cable extension ... it is to be hoped that the Commonwealth will consider the matter seriously before entering into any arrangements ... German activity in the Pacific should act as a warning to Australian Ministers to keep their eyes open.' The Germans were always looking for suitable opportunities. Already in August 1901 the British Colonial Secretary had issued a circular on the Navy's use of Marconi, "as it is most important that in time of war communication by wireless telegraphy should be conducted between H. M. ships and British possessions abroad on the same lines". In 1908 there was considerable activity in the radio-telegraphy field. In May the Postmaster-General called for tenders for the construction of stations at Cape York, Thursday Island, Goode Island, Port Moresby and Fremantle. Those at Port Moresby and Fremantle were to have a minimum range of not less than 350 nautical miles, while for Thursday and Good Islands it was only 50 miles. At these distances it had to be possible to receive signals at the guaranteed speed of working during any hour of the day or night, and in any climatic condition. Preference would be given to installations capable of rapid tuning to any wave from 100-600 metres or upwards. It was not doubted in Australia that the German initiative to establish radio telegraphic connections between its colonies would have an important bearing on the adoption of Britain's "all red" Imperial scheme for the Pacific and its consolidation for defence requirements. Consul-General Dr. Georg Irmer reported that from time to time the matter was raised in Parliament. Independent of the efforts of the various Dominion Governments, the British Admiralty had some time previously decided to provide a number of ships of the Australian Squadron with Marconi systems, which complicated the situation for Telefunken. Irmer's report also advised that, accord-

ing to newspaper reports, a Mr. Sutton in Melbourne had invented a new system that currently was being tested by the Australian military. A critical assessment by W. A. Gosche, an electronics engineer working for Telefunken's agents Staerker & Fischer subsequently followed in the *Sydney Morning Herald*. Gosche also cleverly used the visit of the American Fleet to promote the advantages of Telefunken, used by the Americans, over the Marconi system in the Royal Navy.

Following Irmer's report, the German Naval Attache in London also directed his Navy Office's attention to the Commonwealth's decision to build further stations at Melbourne or a suitable point on the Victorian coast, King and Flinders Islands in Bass Strait, and Georgetown or Launceston in Tasmania. The proposals were to be presented by the beginning of December 1908. The advantage for Telefunken was that the conditions stated the stations were not bound to using a specific system, and there were only a few technical specifications laid down. Another opening for Telefunken finally had appeared. Why was the German Navy so interested in a commercial venture? It must be kept in mind that the Sydney-Bass Strait-Fremantle region was designated the main cruising ground against Anglo-Australasian shipping in the event of hostilities. Things in any case developed propitiously, as Telefunken's Berlin office had received directly the submission requirements for the tenders to erect stations in Launceston, Melbourne, King Island and Flinders Island, and a response had been despatched promptly to be submitted by its Sydney agents Staerker & Fischer.

The Company's letter to the Foreign Office pointed out that the North German Lloyd steamer *Bremen*, which travelled to Australia several times a year, carried a Telefunken system, and at this particular time was underway with a Company engineer aboard, who could assist with the bid. The Navy Office expressed ongoing interest in Telefunken's success. In May 1910, the chief of the Cruiser Squadron recommended that in view of the construction of the network of Anglo-Australian stations in the Pacific, the cruisers should be fitted with modern apparatus. Of particular importance was the installation of radio on the Lloyd steamers, and their provision with a code which would permit them to be in contact with the cruisers at any time. With the threat of British action promoting Marconi, a new sense of urgency was to be found in Berlin. The Navy Office acknowledged that steamers fitted with radio would be 'the focal point of the intelligence system for wide areas'. From the Navy's viewpoint, interception of transmissions from Telefunken land stations was of great importance.

At the height of the 1909 'Dreadnought scare' and anti-German feeling, the *Sydney Star* emphasised the importance of the new technology in an article in July 1909, complete with a map of the Pacific showing

the ranges of Anglo-Australian and German transmitters. The strategic importance of radio to Australia was shown by the constant messages between Melbourne and Sydney transmitted by the Navy, as well as the long range implications of communication between land stations and warships at sea. The Admiralty was still sensitive about the Marconi system, and refused a request to photograph the apparatus. The technology presented 'national aspects which cannot be ignored', and with the system a network of stations could be established by which 'the approach of any hostile fleet would immediately be communicated to Australia. Under present circumstances a hostile fleet could hide among the islands for months waiting for a chance to swoop down on Australia's shores. It is of Imperial, as well as Commonwealth, concern that we should know what is happening in...the South Pacific ... radio-telegraphic installations will be a source of great protection to Australia.'

The *Sydney Morning Herald* was concerned that German enterprise had taken the lead in the Pacific, and considered this a clear indication of which way the wind was blowing. From the standpoint of both commerce and defence, it was plain that the Dominions would have to keep widely awake. If it were true that Germany in the North Sea were a menace to Britain, then Germany in the Pacific 'can scarcely be a source of safety to Australia. German diplomacy looks a long way ahead, and the installation of wireless telegraphy will obviously prove of no slight importance to any future development of German naval power in the Pacific.' The main lesson for Australia was that of initiative and preparedness, but while Australians held conferences, Germany was preparing for the future.

In August 1909, a Captain Cox-Taylor gave a lecture to the United Service Institution in Sydney on the value of radio in war, particularly as it related to coastal defence. It was generally accepted that the most likely form of attack would be a surprise raid, and Australia's geographical position and extended coast made this a difficult factor against which to guard. Wires could be cut, and signal stations could only report what they saw. If all ships trading in Australian waters were required to carry radio, it would be most unlikely than an enemy could approach unseen. This reinforced the need for a British system.

The German push.

In September Irmer provided Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg with a detailed report on radio-telegraphy in Australia, with his own assessments of German prospects for entering the market. It was proposed to construct a large station on the east coast which would enable contact with Cape Leeuwin and New Zealand, and smaller stations on Cape York, in Papua, Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne, Tasmania, Adelaide, north of Perth, and Darwin. Also of interest

was the proposal, under the Navigation Bill, for the compulsory outfitting of all Australian-registered coastal passenger vessels with on-board stations. It had not yet been decided which system of radio-telegraphy would be chosen for the land stations, but Irmer was pessimistic that in the existing atmosphere of anti German feeling the Australian Government would choose Telefunken, even though in tests it had provided the best results.

Precisely one month later, he reported that the Commonwealth Government was to obtain an opinion from leading British scientists and technicians as to whether the Australian tender would be restricted to Marconi, or opened to general competition. This would decide the possibility of introducing the Telefunken system once and for all. There were still problems to overcome, such as the open preference of the commander of the Australian Station, Vice-Admiral Poore, for the Marconi system. Although Irmer conceded that questions of such importance would not be decided in Melbourne but in London, he would exert his influence on Telefunken's behalf. He subsequently reported happily that London had removed the prohibition on naval ships communicating with other than Marconi stations. This would enable British ships on the Australian Station now to communicate with Commonwealth stations outfitted with other than Marconi - meaning, hopefully, Telefunken - systems. Given this opportunity, Irmer strongly recommended that a competent technical adviser be sent out from Germany to advise the Company. There was a great opportunity for Telefunken to secure 'a market whose winning is worth the greatest effort.' It was important that the matter concerned the introduction of the Telefunken system into all of Australia, New Zealand and the entire English island region.

The German Navy was particularly concerned that Telefunken gain a front-runner position in the competition for the installation of a radio-telegraphy system in Australia and the British Pacific possessions overall. In October the Senior Officer of the German Australian Station reported to the Admiralty regarding Defence Minister Cook's concern to speed up the installation of a network of stations around the Australian coast, which were of considerable defence significance in view of the intention to install on-board radio on the Australian Navy's new destroyers.

On 18 December 1909, the Radio-Telegraphy Conference comprising representatives of Australia, New Zealand, the Western Pacific High Commissioner, Fiji, the Admiralty and the Pacific Cable Board decided on the establishment of an 'all red' British-controlled route. The main decision was to establish high-power stations at or near Sydney, Doubtless Bay (N.Z.), Suva, and Ocean Island; and medium-power stations at Tulagi in the Solomons and Vila in the New Hebrides. This decision was commented on by the Naval

Attache in London, writing to Naval Secretary Alfred von Tirpitz early in February 1910. He considered that 'as Doubtless Bay and Suva are in addition connected by cable to Brisbane, the whole positioning of these stations increases in importance', covering as they did a strategic triangle of the Pacific.

The possibility of Telefunken gaining a foothold spurred the Marconi Company into action. In early December, Irmer expressed concern at the support given it in Parliament by the "imperialist" Member, Bruce Smith. In addition, Marconi had the technical advantage that at the time only Marconi outfitted steamers came to Australia. This resulted in the situation that 'in non-technical circles almost nothing is known about the Telefunken system.' Irmer recommended that it would be a great advantage if the vessels of the North German Lloyd and the German-Australian Steamship Company were outfitted with Telefunken systems in view of the upcoming coastal navigation legislation. It also needed to be publicised in the local press that German ships were using the Telefunken system. Thus attention would be drawn to it and its advantages. Irmer commented that 'I have people here who could in one way or another have such information published in the Australian press. It would also not be impossible to have the matter raised in parliament itself.' He also requested information on Telefunken in English for widespread distribution.

In February 1910 the German Post Office raised with the Foreign Office the matter of the proposed establishment of radio connections in Australia and the Pacific. Telefunken was making strenuous attempts to participate in the construction of planned Australian stations. The formation of a subsidiary company was in progress, which in the view of the Reich Post Office was essential in order to gain any substantial foothold. To assist in the overall perceptions of German expertise, the outfitting of German steamers on the Australian run with Telefunken systems had begun, and in fact the contract for postal steamers to East Asia and Australia now required a German system to be installed. Irmer in Sydney was to continue strongly promoting Telefunken in the public eye.

The German Foreign Office closely followed developments in Australia, and periodically requested technical information from Telefunken. As much information as possible on other users of the system was needed to be put abroad to facilitate expansion of the German system. In addition to the German Navy, those of Russia, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, Spain, Austria-Hungary, and Argentina used Telefunken exclusively on board their warships, while other navies such as that of the United States and Brazil mixed systems. It was estimated that some 1,700 stations existed worldwide, of which more than 50% were Telefunken. The Company undertook to supply the Consulate-General in Sydney with supporting

material in English for use in promoting Telefunken. In June 1910, Telefunken formed a subsidiary in Sydney under the name of Australasian Wireless Limited. For appearances, the major holders and managers were Messrs. Denison, McLeod and Wheeler, and the local firm of Staerker & Fischer moved into the background as the agent for Telefunken, but nevertheless would conduct all communication with the Commonwealth Government. This "Australian company" succeeded in obtaining a subsidy for the construction of major radio stations in Sydney in Fremantle. Hopes were raised as the word was about that the next budget would allow for a larger sum for the construction of stations. While Australian Wireless now had to order the stations from Telefunken, it hoped to be able to fabricate them itself in the future, in order to minimise the anti German bias which existed. For Telefunken it was obviously desirable that a close cooperation was maintained. The danger was that if Australian Wireless foundered or had to withdraw from the construction of further stations, Marconi again would dominate the field. The Company also worked out a proposal for stations at Adelaide and Kangaroo Island, St. Mary on the Tasmanian east coast, Brisbane, Mackay, Cooktown, Thursday Island, Port Moresby, Suva, Vila (New Hebrides), Tulagi (Solomons), Ocean Island (Gilbert Islands), Esperance, Darwin (reaching Timor where it also proposed to build a station), and in New Zealand. Simultaneously it was negotiating with the Union of Australian Coastal Shipping Companies for the installation of 30 systems on coastal steamers, to be rented from the Company which would retain possession.

The commander of the *Condor* advised that the Government should remain in close touch with Telefunken and Staerker & Fischer in Sydney. Given the strategic interests involved in radio-telegraphy, it is interesting that the Company built two stations at its own expense, in Melbourne and on King Island, each with a radius of 600 miles, whose ostensible purpose was to communicate with the steamer traffic in Bass Strait. While there is no concrete evidence that they would be used for any military purpose advantageous to Germany, one must bear in mind that this area was designated a prime "hunting ground" for the Asian Cruiser Squadron. By late 1910 the whole arrangement was questioned in Parliament, and Prime Minister Fisher stated that he did not know if the Telefunken system was better than the Marconi. Indeed, during the previous month several newspaper articles had attempted to thwart the introduction of Telefunken, and "naturally did not fail to indicate the German origin of the system."

The delay in getting the first Telefunken project underway provided more time for Parliamentary action on behalf of Marconi. On 15 and 16 November 1910 there were 'lively discussions and attacks on the Government, the Company and the Telefunken sys-

tem.' It was a source of concern that the Government had not chosen the system used in Britain and in the Royal Navy. The German origin of the Telefunken system was highlighted, it was depicted as incomprehensible how the Government could have chosen this system, used in the German Navy, and 'which should have come last into consideration.' The contract with Australian Wireless should be cancelled and the Marconi system universally introduced into Australia. Munzthaler considered it no coincidence that these attacks should immediately follow the arrival of a Marconi representative from Britain, his establishing contacts with various parliamentarians, and that in the previous weeks the newspapers had reported on new Marconi technical successes. The British origin of Marconi and the Pacific Radio Telegraph Company was also emphasised. However the Germans had not been inactive, and soon a series of articles appeared in the Sydney and Melbourne press extolling the technical advantages of the Telefunken system.

By the end of the year the Germans could breathe more easily and Munzthaler reported that the contract for the Pennant Hills and Fremantle stations finally had been signed after long negotiations. It had been a close fight, as Marconi had left nothing untried in order to shut out Telefunken. It now remained to be seen whether Australian Wireless succeeded in its bid for the five New Zealand stations. The situation in New Zealand was not as promising. Munzthaler reported that 'as was to be expected', now in New Zealand as in Australia the previous year, the Government was being strongly criticised for its choice of the German Telefunken system for the stations to be constructed there. This was primarily on the ground that the choice went against the best interests of national defence. A large part of the agitation in the press was again attributed to the presence of a Marconi representative from London.

With Australian Wireless about to change itself into a larger share company, Munzthaler noted optimistically that 'no more difficulties of this kind are to be expected in the bid for the additional...stations.' On 12 April 1911, the Australasian Wireless Company Limited began life with £65,000 share capital. With the agreement of the New Zealand Government, the seven stations to be constructed there soon would begin, to be completed by the end of 1912. In addition, the Company had received orders for nine on-ship stations from the Union Steamship Company of New Zealand, and it planned to eventually outfit all of its 60 ships in due course. Five contracts for on board stations were concluded with the Huddart Parker Company, and with the Australasian United Steam Navigation Company and Howard Smith. These four companies possessed some 150 steamers and planned to outfit all their ships with on board radio. 'It can thus be assumed that the Telefunken system soon will be dominant in the Australasian merchant fleet'.

Munzenthaler confidently assured Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg. Somewhat prematurely, the commander of the *Cormoran* reported in June that the introduction of the German system in Australia 'means a complete success for the Telefunken Company.'

Complications.

The middle months of 1911 were preoccupied with patent violation litigation between Marconi and Telefunken, the local press discussing, 'in detail and not without animosity', the effects of Marconi's contesting the decision in London upholding the legal permanence of Telefunken patents. In July, following Fisher's visit to London, the Government's attitude towards Telefunken and Australian Wireless appeared to undergo a change. The press picked up on the news that the Government had decided to postpone the allocation of the Port Moresby and Thursday Island stations. Munzenthaler saw the ominous hand of London at work: '...it can be assumed that the changed position of the Government can be traced back to the talks between Fisher...with the Admiralty, the War Department, and the Marconi Company...there exists the plan to connect all the British colonies and possessions with each other by radio.'

There now was a completely unexpected factor. In view of the litigation between Marconi and the Telefunken Company, which accused each other of patent infringement, the Australian Government decided to choose neither of these systems, but a third, which has been presented by the Director of Radio Telegraphy in Australia, Dr. Balsillie. This was similar to the system of the British Radio Telegraphic and Telephone Company Ltd, where Balsillie formerly was employed. He considered it certainly strange that this system should have been chosen, as following a decision of the High Court in London, it infringed on the Marconi patent. However, according to a statement by the Postmaster-General, the Australian Government was aware of this and prepared to pay any possible claims ensuing. Although the adoption of the new system had been stated as the definitive decision of the Government, Kiliani had it on good advice that the possibility of a different decision to the benefit of Telefunken still might be possible. Given the pointlessness of legal action, the Australian Wireless Company had decided to obtain Marconi's Australian patents 'at all costs'. The Telefunken station at Pennant Hills had been completed, and Australian Wireless did not appear to doubt that the actual intention of the Commonwealth was to choose 'the recognised best Telefunken system'.

However, this was not to be. On 9 February 1912, in the presence of the Governor-General, the Prime Minister, the Postmaster-General and many official guests, the Commonwealth's first "Balsillie system" radio-telegraphy station was opened. It was hoped to have

three more stations, at Hobart, Thursday Island, and Port Moresby functioning by the end of June. At least the Germans had the satisfaction of seeing the first transmission, from the Governor-General to Admiral Sir George King-Hall on board the *Drake* in Hobart, go unreceived and unanswered.

Australian Wireless representing Telefunken now took legal action against the Maritime Wireless Company as the manufacturer of the radio apparatus for the Balsillie system. To this end Telefunken had sent out an expert from Germany to provide technical opinion. The Commonwealth certainly had chosen an expensive manner in which to implement its radio-telegraphy plans, for in a strange twist of fate, both complainants united in a common action for patent infringement against the Government. It now remained for Telefunken to salvage what it could in the new circumstances.

In mid-1912 came the good news of successful Marconi-Telefunken negotiations, that the Commonwealth would pay a substantial compensation, and that '...after the dissolution of Australian Wireless a new Australian company will be formed, in order together to continue construction of the radio-telegraphy system ...' There appears to be no doubt about the willingness of the Government to work with this company. The Postmaster-General stated in Parliament that the Government intended to proceed with the construction of the ring of stations around the coast of the continent as quickly as possible. In immediate view were stations at Mt Gambier, Eucla, Eden, Rockhampton, Townsville, Cooktown, Wyndham, Roebuck, Geraldton and Albany. A station of suitable strength would be built in Darwin to connect into the All-British network being constructed by Marconi. While this was not the exclusive participation that Telefunken would have preferred, it at least ensured the German company a share in the construction of Australia's radio transmitter network.

The possible uses of radio were being increasingly appreciated. In December 1912, at the sitting of the Parliamentary Select Committee inquiring into the Marconi contract for the erection of the British Imperial network, it was pointed out that its establishment was a matter of urgency, for 'if war occurred within the next two years, Great Britain would be at a serious disadvantage.' Germany was well aware of this, and the underlying theme of the whole Marconi-Telefunken encounter was the German attempt to increase its own strategic advantage by securing a Telefunken monopoly of Australian land-based radio-telegraphy stations whose transmissions would be easy to receive in wartime, and assist implementation of commerce warfare in Australian waters by use of both naval forces and armed merchant auxiliaries.

The US Naval Institute

INTERNATIONAL NAVIES PHOTO CONTEST

RULES

1. Images must pertain to naval or maritime subjects of countries other than the United States.
2. There is a limit of five (5) entries per person. Eligible entries include black-and-white prints, colour prints, or 35-mm mounted colour transparencies (glass-mounted transparencies are not eligible). The minimum print size accepted is 8" x 10".
3. The Naval Institute will award cash prizes of \$200 to the winner, two first honourable mention awards of \$100 each, and two second honourable mention awards of \$50 each. Winning entries will appear in the 1997 International Navies issue of *Proceedings*. The Naval Institute will consider all other entries for purchase (at our standard rates) for use in U.S. Naval Institute publications. Any entry not accompanied by a self-addressed, stamped envelope or international postal coupon will become the property of the U.S. Naval Institute without the necessity of purchase.
4. On a separate sheet of paper and attached to the back of each print or on the transparency mount, print or type full captions and the photographer's name, address, social security number (if applicable), and date the photo was taken. Entries are not limited to photos taken in the calendar year of the contest. (Please do not write directly on the back of a print and do not use staples.)

Send images to:

U.S. Naval Institute
International Navies Photo Contest
118 Maryland Avenue
Annapolis, MD 21402-5035

Deadline: 1 August 1997



Whatever you're planning, talk to Qantas Defence Travel.

Every day we help more than one thousand Defence personnel achieve their travel goals. Whether it's defence business or a great holiday deal. We will help you get what you want at the lowest possible cost.

QIN 213 Qantas Airways Limited A.C.N 009 661 901

The Australian Airline. **QANTAS**



China and Maritime Security— A Workshop Report

compiled by Greg Austin¹

In 1995 and 1996, China launched ballistic missiles to land in the vicinity of Taiwan, a move which carried with it an implied potential threat to shipping, either on the high seas, or in the ports near which the missiles landed. In late 1994, Chinese military forces occupied yet another reef in the disputed Spratly islands, in spite of a promise by China in 1992 to observe the Manila declaration by ASEAN, which called on parties to the dispute not to alter the status quo. Governments in the Asia-Pacific, including the USA, Japan and Australia, have raised formally with China their concern that China's actions in the South China Sea in support of its territorial claims might threaten the security of shipping through that region. Scholars have documented the Chinese navy's doctrinal development both for local war and blue water naval operations. Journalists have written regularly of the 'rapid' expansion of China's naval forces in the last fifteen years.

On 24 October 1996, the Northeast Asia Program of the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies convened a workshop with international representation to discuss the implications of these moves by China for the security of shipping, offshore oil and gas fields, and offshore territories. The workshop sought to illuminate the broader issue of the motivations of China's naval development, as well as put on the record a considered account of the state of the Chinese navy. This summary represents the author's views of the discussion at the workshop on these issues. Four principal presentations were made at the workshop: 'China and the Law of the Sea', by Professor Chen Degong; 'Shipping Patterns in the Western Pacific' by Professor Peter Rimmer; 'Operations against Shipping—the Military Dimension' by Commodore Sam Bateman; and 'China and Maritime Security—the Military Dimension' by Dr Gary Klintworth.² Professor Chen was at the Australian National University with the generous support of the Australia-China Council.

China and the Law of the Sea

China is a coastal state, with a continental shoreline of over 18,000 km, and more than 6,500 islands. Since China was excluded by the rest of the world from the United Nations until 1971, that is only twenty-five years ago, it did not participate in the First and Second UN Conferences on Law of the Sea (1958 and 1960). It did participate actively in the Third Conference, which ran from 1973 to 1982, and which resulted in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. China's offshore areas, estimated about 4.7 mil-

lion sq km, are rich in living and non-living resources. Much of this area is less than 200 metres deep and all of China's maritime approaches are bordered by other countries (except east of Taiwan). The South China Sea is much deeper than most of the sea areas bordering China, and reaches a maximum depth of 5,016 m in the South China Sea Basin (a feature in the north and central areas), and in the central part has an average depth of 4,300 m. Very little of the South China Sea is continental shelf (less than 200 m), most is very deep water.

The potentially rich oil and gas deposits in offshore areas are in the East China Sea, and the northernmost and southernmost areas of the South China Sea—that is in the vicinity of the Chinese and Vietnamese mainland coasts, or in the vicinity of the coasts of Borneo. (The area around most of the Spratly islands is not included.)

China's economic development strategy launched in 1978, of which the open-door policy is an essential part, places great emphasis on the coastal zones and increasing their links with the outside world. In 1979, China declared four special economic zones in coastal areas. In 1984, China decided to open 14 further coastal cities, which together accounted at that time for 20 per cent of the country's industrial output. In 1985, the government opened several coastal economic areas, including the Yangzi and Pearl river deltas. In 1988, Hainan island (roughly the same size as Taiwan) off China's southern mainland coast, was also declared a special economic zone (and declared a new province). The population of the coastal cities and counties is 200 million. The population of China's islands is 27 million (excluding Taiwan and Hainan).

Development of offshore oil and gas has been a major priority for China since 1978. The first joint venture law was for offshore oil and gas, and total foreign investment in this sector by 1995 was about US\$22 billion, involving 48 foreign companies from 13 separate countries. Six jointly developed fields are now producing: three in the Bohai Sea (northern China), two in the Pearl River basin (near Hong Kong), and one in the Gulf of Tonkin. Another ten fields are in various stages of development. Offshore crude oil production is estimated to have reached more than 10 million tons in 1996, compared with less than 100,000 tons in 1985.

As for fisheries, in 1990, China became the world's biggest producer for the first time (12.37 million met-

ric tons). The proportion caught in ocean capture fisheries was 45 per cent, with fresh water capture fisheries accounting for 36 per cent and aquaculture (ocean and fresh) accounting for the other 19 per cent. Since 1979, the increase in ocean capture fisheries did not keep pace with the increase in fresh water captures, and the importance of aquaculture grew enormously. China has introduced regulations to slow down the pace of ocean capture fisheries to reduce pressure on them.

China's ocean shipping fleet comprises about 620 vessels, which carry about 110 million tons per year. China has an intensive program of port development and participation in international civil maritime coordination.

China's practice of the law of the sea underwent important transformations in the 1980s, with a series of new legislative measures introduced in line with a general program of legalisation and regularisation in the country as a whole. On 15 May 1996, China ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the same day as it issued baselines for its territorial sea in conformity with its 1992 Law on the Territorial Sea. According to China, the system of baselines it announced also conformed to the UN Convention and was fully consistent with state practice. Under Chinese law, the innocent passage of warships through China's territorial sea requires the approval of the Chinese government. This position is controversial in international law, and state practice is not conclusive on the issue.

Concerning the Spratly islands, there was no other claim made by any other current claimant before the 1970s, and therefore China's determination to protect its sovereignty there, which dates from two thousand years ago, but which was reasserted after the Second World War as early as 1946, is quite understandable.

The UN Law of the Sea Convention of 1982 is not particularly helpful in addressing the disputes in the South China Sea for a number of reasons. First, the disputes are primarily about territorial sovereignty of land territory, a subject not addressed at all in the Convention. Second, the international dispute settlement mechanism of the Convention is dependent on the political will of the states in a dispute to seek settlement. On the other hand, the South China Sea is a semi-enclosed sea, and the Convention imposes an obligation on states to cooperate in the joint development of such maritime areas. The respect of states, including China, for the Convention, does allow the international community to press all littoral states to honour their obligations to seek a settlement and to avoid use of force.

Some questions can be raised about the straight base-

line system decreed by China in May 1996. The first issue is the impact of the of the baselines on shipping in territorial sea areas and internal waters defined by the baselines. The associated regulation in Chinese law that foreign military vessels needed prior authorisation for transit of the territorial sea is inconsistent with international law. In 1958, the International Legal Commission had prepared a summary of what it regarded as the international law of the time, and in a vote of members of 57 to 5 came out in support of the coastal state's right to make prior authorisation a condition of transit of the territorial sea. In drafting the Convention on the Territorial Sea at the First United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1958, coastal states threw out a provision to this effect based on the ILC draft.

It is possible to see how China has reached its position on this issue. It is certainly the case that an act of prior notification by a state whose military vessel intends to transit the territorial sea of another state would help to reassure the coastal state that the transit is innocent. Moreover, the definition of innocent passage in the Convention itself makes reference to 'other rules of international law', which in China's interpretation certainly give the coastal state a vested or residual right to govern the security regime of the territorial sea.

Yet, expert opinion suggests that China's interpretation is too restrictive. There is a 'world of difference' between prior notification to the coastal state and prior permission. The latter implies clearly a right of refusal for the coastal state, and this would in itself negate the existence of a right of passage for the vessels of other states that is provided in the Convention.

Moreover, the 1982 Convention preserves the right of innocent passage in waters where it had been exercised but which were subsequently enclosed as internal waters by a coastal state through the use of new straight baselines. A 1989 agreement between the USSR and the USA, while not in itself binding on China, offered an interpretation of international law on this issue that prior notification was not a requirement for innocent passage. At the same time, while Indonesia is on record as demanding prior notification, it may have abandoned this position in practice.

Secondly, the decision by China to apply a system of straight baselines to its entire mainland coast and to many of its offshore islands was questioned. The 1982 Convention suggests that coastal state has the opportunity where certain geographical and economic conditions exist to apply straight baselines, but the intent of the Convention appears to be, as in the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, that a coastal state will probably only need or be able to do so for part of its coastline. The intent seems to be that a coastal state will probably have a combination of straight base-





The AS350B Squirrel, acquired and still used for training. Known variously as the 'Battle Budgie' or 'Plastic Fantastic'. (ABPHOT Andrew Bott)

lines and baselines based on the low water mark. Although China has not published all of its baselines, it has published the bulk of them and seems intent on applying straight baselines to its entire mainland coast and many of its island territories regardless of whether the circumstances provided for in the Convention exist.

One implication flowing from the above is that there is a clear role for outside states in pressing all disputing parties to be more conciliatory and to work for settlement. There is no special reason to single out China as having a primary responsibility in legal or moral terms to be the first to move, as some scholars have suggested. At the same time, China could because of its great power status take the lead and effectively defuse much of the unjustified international criticism of it on its failure to make specific proposals for settlement.

China has pursued quite a contrasting approach in its disputes in the South China Sea compared with its dispute in the East China Sea. One explanation of this is that in the East China Sea, China and Japan had reached a tacit agreement to shelve the dispute and not to alter the status quo. By contrast, in the South China Sea, other states, beginning with the Philippines in 1971, have consistently rejected overtures by China to shelve the Spratly dispute and over a period of seventeen years occupied islands in the Spratly group with military forces before China made its first such occupation in 1988. Since 1988, and probably as a result of China's move, these other states have extended their holdings or consolidated them.

Shipping Patterns in the Western Pacific

China and Australia share an interest in the security of shipping in the South China Sea. In particular, reliance by China for 50 per cent of its iron ore imports from Australia has made China's crude steel production vulnerable to any restrictions on movements from Australia to China through the Indonesian archipelago. Over the next decade, China will become quite dependent on crude oil from the Middle East, and this will increase its stake in ensuring the security of international shipping through key Indonesian straits. Only a small percentage of China's trade is carried in Chinese owned ships. For example, only about ten per cent of China's container traffic is carried by ships of the China Ocean Shipping Corporation (COSCO), even though this is the third biggest national fleet in the world.

By far the biggest share of Asia Pacific container traffic is trans-Pacific, rather than routed through the South China Sea. Southeast Asian ports account for only 17-18 per cent of this trans-Pacific container traffic, although this share has increased relative to Northeast Asia in the past decade. But in this period, main-

land Chinese ports registered even bigger increases, going from 4 per cent of eastbound trans-Pacific traffic in 1986 to 20 per cent in 1994. When Hong Kong is added in, the shares are even bigger and the increases equally dramatic. In 1994, China and Hong Kong accounted for 37 per cent of all eastbound trans-Pacific container traffic. When Taiwan is added in, the 'China' share rises to 54 per cent.

China has not been a major participant in intra-Asia container trade. Japan-China container traffic represented about ten per cent of total movements in intra-Asian trade. Hong Kong took only ten per cent of outward bound traffic in 1994, and Japan (23 per cent), Taiwan (21 per cent) and Korea (14 per cent) the main players. Two features of the intra-Asian trade with some strategic significance are Japan's strong links with Southeast Asia, and the imbalance between Hong Kong's imports (26 per cent of traffic) and exports (10 per cent).

COSCO has remained outside the main container conferences and has some difficulty competing with the majors, such as Maersk and American President Lines. Weaknesses in logistic and onshore services have contributed to this poorer position. But there has been some improvement in onshore delivery infrastructure, including a dedicated container rail link from Guangzhou (and in 1997 from Hong Kong) to Beijing, and orders for significant numbers of new ships. COSCO trebled its capacity for deep-sea container traffic between 1989 and 1994.

As for bulk seaborne trade, China's share is still relatively small compared with other countries in the Western Pacific, but in some commodities China takes a significant share of these bulk cargoes moving through the region—iron ore (20 per cent), steam coal (15 per cent), refined petroleum products (15 per cent), and grain (9 per cent), according to 1993 figures. Most of the Chinese controlled tanker fleet is engaged in crude oil shipments from Indonesia to Chinese ports. Oil tanker shipments bound for China and passing through the South China Sea in one year (May 1993-April 1994) totalled 567, which was one third the number bound for Japan (1555). In the same period, the number of chemical tankers bound for China was more than half the number going to Japan.

Australian shipping represents a very small share of Asia-Pacific shipping and this share has declined as dramatically as trade between China and the USA has expanded. Australia is an exception among Asia-Pacific economies in its reliance on bulk export trade.

Some financial aspects of shipping patterns relevant to national security decision-making were raised in discussion. In particular, the cost of rerouting shipping simply from Malacca to Lombok was regarded in the industry as significant, and therefore any greater

diversion such as south around Australia to avoid the South China Sea would probably increase pressure for governments to act to end any blockage of shipping through Southeast Asia. The high dollar value of some contemporary container cargoes, often as high as US\$300 million per ship, changed the calculation about risks and costs for the loss of one ship compared with previous periods in history, such as the Second World War or even one or two decades ago. (Air transport complemented seaborne trade in value if not volume, representing about 25 per cent of trade by value in Australia's case. Trans-Pacific trade by air is the largest regional air freight route by volume in the world.)

Competition between regional ports is likely to intensify in the coming decade and cause some shifts in existing patterns. For example, Khaosung in Taiwan or Kobe in Japan might become necessary transshipment points for China because of its own poor port facilities and related infrastructure. China could not easily move into bulk container traffic on the level of countries such as Japan because of the large cost of investments required. The statistics on port use for Shanghai relative to Hong Kong, and projections, suggested that the prospect of Shanghai replacing Hong Kong as a regional hub were pretty remote. The figures also suggested that Taiwan had a very strong dependence on China trade.

Operations against Shipping-the Military Dimension

Insufficient attention in the past twenty to thirty years to the concept of economic warfare had allowed some confusion about important aspects of it, including those affecting maritime security. Economic warfare, were it to become an issue, would represent a major confrontation. It would not be a low-level affair. The more likely first stage in an economic confrontation in the Asia Pacific would be a 'war by sanctions', some escalation of recent US pressure on Japan or China, but something short of a systemic confrontation.

The security of shipping is an important issue on which contemporary debate is underdeveloped. The question of potential threats to shipping may owe more to perceived vulnerability by major trading states rather than the actual intentions or capacities of potential enemies. The insecurities of Japan and South Korea about their shipping in the South China Sea are quite genuinely felt but are probably not justified by China's actual naval strengths or actions. (China is better positioned to threaten shipping closer to its coasts than it is in the South China Sea, but Japan and Korea had not expressed much concern about shipping in these locations.) The expansion of seaborne trade certainly carried with it a pressure on great powers to build up their navies.

The notion of defending sea lanes or sea lines of communication (SLOCs) often receives unusual treatment since one does not defend strips of water, but ships. In defence of shipping, the main principle is to establish a moving zone of sea control that moves with the ships. At the same time, the concept of SLOCs has some use but more as a description of the sea routes.

A central concept in analysing the security of shipping is that of focal areas. These need not be limited to straits, but can include the approaches to ports. From this perspective, the often raised prospect of diversionary routing to avoid one focal area such as a narrow strait loses relevance since focal areas can always be found. Convoying has been the only effective means of protecting merchant ships since it maximises the effect of defensive resources. Mining is not likely to be a serious threat in the international waterways of the Asia Pacific because of its indiscriminate application. It is more likely to appear in ports and harbours, or associated focal areas, of target countries.

In some respects, convoying may not be feasible or appropriate along the entire length of sea routes from the Persian Gulf to Japan or China. The existence of choke points in the Indonesian archipelago made it difficult to conceive of a moving zone of sea control through the narrow straits. The volumes of sea traffic are now so great (600 ships per month using the Malacca strait) that it is difficult to imagine the sheer size of naval forces required for convoys. This therefore raised the question of whether sea control might not become more of a static affair in the South China Sea region, where land bases (not on small island specks) may be more important. The volume of shipping certainly dictated a need for a very clear prioritisation of cargoes that would need to be protected.

Attacks on shipping do not necessarily represent an outright declaration of total war but in a number of circumstances have been used as an intermediate level of confrontation. Moreover, shipping could be interrupted by non-violent measures, such as temporary closures or tighter inspection regimes. Certain officials in Malaysia and Indonesia have certainly made fairly explicit a view that their governments hold this sort of power to disrupt shipping. Attacks on shipping in the open ocean are certainly a softer option than attacks on ports.

The protection of shipping is a multinational issue. It potentially engages many national governments (the importer, the exporter, the flag state, the crew, the owner of the ship, and the insurer of the ship). Seen from this perspective, it is not difficult to postulate security of shipping in the Asia-Pacific as a common interest which deserves closer attention as an area of regional cooperation, in particular, multinational naval coordination. One characteristic of trade in the Asia

Clearance Divers at work! (POPHOT Scott Connolly)



Pacific that makes this region stand out from Europe or the USA is that almost all international transport is by sea or air, rather than by rail or road as it is in Europe or North America. In this respect, the Asia Pacific can be conceived as one big archipelago. The big increases in intraregional Asia Pacific trade in the last decade had brought new dependencies and with them, new vulnerabilities. The case could be made that all the major powers of East Asia are equally vulnerable.

There are four main aspects of threat to maritime trade in the Asia Pacific: maritime territorial disputes could disrupt shipping without open warfare; piracy, although this is somewhat overrated because most attacks are robbery and assault against crew not against the cargoes or the ships; pollution from hazardous cargoes, such as oil, chemicals or nuclear waste; and the potential strategic reach of littoral states, big or small, because of the presence of important focal areas right along the coast of the Asian mainland.

Maritime security also included broader economic and ecological issues. The numbers of ships carrying dangerous cargoes had increased rapidly in recent years, particularly LPG and LNG imports into Japan. Exploitation of fisheries, and the maintenance of biodiversity in them are becoming more urgent issues. And it is not unreasonable to expect dramatic destabilising shifts in regional security relations resulting from energy demand and availability. Coastal states in the region still had a 'beggar thy neighbour' attitude in their abuse of the marine environment.

On the question of piracy, the possibility exists that state-sponsored piracy (sea-borne guerilla warfare to destabilise trade routes) could be used as an excuse for a great power to exercise greater naval control over a sea area and expand its naval presence there. Piracy certainly offers the opportunity for deniability. It also obliges a defending force to spread its assets. The recurrence of piracy in the East Asian area certainly need to be explained more fully, since it does not appear to have had the same resurgence in other areas. Is it the result of a peculiar geography linked with unusual social conditions? Is it lack of capability by shipping states or coastal states to protect the shipping?

China and Maritime Security—the Military Dimension

The exercises by China in the Taiwan Strait in March 1996 may have represented the biggest assembly of its naval ships since 1949. The exercises showed the new face of the Chinese navy, a force conceived more and more in China as needing to grow and mature commensurately with China's expanding maritime interests and its increasing economic power. Statements by senior military officers in China talking of a 'new advance to the sea' or a 'new Chinese maritime

Great Wall' are becoming quite frequent. An increasing share of the defence budget is being spent on the navy, and the percentage share of naval personnel has risen from 8 to 11 per cent of the PLA total.

Some international perceptions of China have changed in line with the modernisation of the Chinese navy and its more robust posturing opposite Taiwan and in the South China Sea. Commentaries identifying China as the new bully of the region, or as a powerful new influence on the regional strategic balance are not uncommon.

But a different perspective is possible. China's new maritime interests gives it a stake in the international order of the seas. The stake of China in international trade and the security of shipping, particularly for increasing imports of food and oil, is also growing. The ambitious and somewhat ominous statements by senior Chinese naval officers has to be measured against the realities of the Chinese navy. More importantly, on present trends, it would take a long time for China to match its naval ambitions with the reality of the cost, competing demands for government finances, and the advance of military technology. It would take two decades for China's navy to begin to look like the US or Japanese navies of today in terms of technology. A big gap would therefore remain between the technological levels of China's navy and those of the other two Pacific great powers.

The Chinese navy is actually advancing quite slowly. Most of the increases in spending had gone on personnel costs. It has not purchased an aircraft carrier despite many reports that it would, and it is unlikely to get one for two decades. It has a limited air and sea lift capability for its marine force of 10,000 and there is no evidence of significant new construction of amphibious lift or support ships. As the Chairman US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikshashvili, has observed: China has 'no capacity to invade Taiwan'. The number of major surface combatants, already just lower than the number in the Japanese navy, declined from 56 in 1995 to 52 in 1996. Less than ten of these surface combatants can be described as relatively modern. The US intelligence community's view of China's navy is that it would not significantly increase its power projection capabilities in the next decade. The navy has severe limitations in command and control and is unable to sustain more even low to medium intensity combat operations at any distance from shore.

Few qualifications can be made to this assessment of the capabilities of the Chinese navy. But the Taiwan situation in March 1996, particularly the deployment of US aircraft carriers may have strengthened the hand of naval power advocates, in much the same way as the Cuban missile crisis strengthened the position of naval advocates in the USSR. The incident between a

Chinese nuclear submarine and aircraft from the *USS Kittyhawk* in the East China Sea in 1994 was an equally salutary lesson to China of its naval inadequacies. The disputes over maritime jurisdiction involving China also added weight to naval lobbyists in Beijing. China does not have to depend entirely on its indigenous military technology and could make quicker advances by purchasing foreign add-on systems, such as torpedos or electronic counter-measures. Certainly, the *Luhu* class ships are roughly state of the art.

But even so, naval technology is undergoing a profound change. West European navies which previously were able to maintain state of the art are dropping off the pace, as are the navies of Australia and Canada. The only navies keeping pace may be those of Japan and the Republic of Korea. This carries penalties for China but it also has a demonstration effect for China. A surge in the level of naval technology by these East Asian states might press China to attempt to close this technological gap. But even so, the high costs of such a move would dictate a fundamental and massive readjustment of Chinese government priorities. On current priorities, China would not be able to afford to compete.

There was little dissent from the views that the expansion of China's maritime interests provided a substantial basis for further cooperation, and that countries of the region are handling the historical problems cautiously and carefully, even though quite different perceptions remained of the rights and wrongs of various positions. Since 1993, dialogue and negotiation have become more established on maritime issues. It is important to make some calculation of the navy's influence on Chinese foreign policy, since it cannot be assumed that the whole policy making corpus in Beijing is moving forward with the same vision.

Some important questions worthy of further investigation included the relative priority of Taiwan and the South China Sea in Chinese navy planning; the likelihood of a naval arms race with Japan; and whether a military confrontation over resources is still more likely to come in the Middle East (where much more is at stake) than in the South China Sea.

Conclusion

The workshop highlighted the considerable degree to which China's maritime interests coincide with those of other Asia Pacific countries, particularly in respect of security of shipping, access to offshore resources, and heavy economic dependence on a peaceful maritime environment. The heavy concentration of economic resources in China's coastal areas would make China bear a heavy cost in the unlikely event that a major maritime conflict erupted. In any conflict with

Taiwan, China's biggest nightmare may well be Taiwanese air attacks on its major coastal cities. Disruption both of shipping and offshore resource exploitation would similarly be costly for China.

China's practice in the law of the sea has for the most part conformed with international law, and in those areas where there is suggestion of non-conformity, China's practice is not out of step with a significant number of other states. Two areas of concern are China's straight baseline system announced in May 1996 and its laws on innocent passage of warships in the territorial sea. On the latter issue, other Asia Pacific states should actively seek to influence Chinese opinion because China's law almost certainly does not conform to international law. On the straight baseline system, similar international practice, including by Australia, undermines the strength of claims that China's system is contrary to international order, even if it can be demonstrated to be at odds with the letter of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.

China is a major beneficiary of trans-Pacific trade, and its national economic policies in the last sixteen years have been premised on continually increasing that dependence. Its imports of natural resources, particularly oil from Southeast Asia and iron ore from Australia have increased its stake in good political and economic relations with these countries in the last decade and these trade patterns are almost certainly going to intensify in the next ten years. Only a small proportion of China's trade is carried in Chinese flag vessels and Chinese merchant shipping retains concentrated in smaller classes of vessels.

Focal areas (such as narrow straits or the approaches to ports) or are the more likely local for any attacks on shipping than are open ocean sea routes. Shipping can be more effectively interrupted by land-based aircraft or by mines in these focal areas than in open-ocean areas. For these reasons, concerns expressed by Japan and South Korea about the effect of territorial disputes in the South China Sea on security of shipping are probably not justified. However, since these concerns do exist, other governments in the region could usefully seek to influence opinion in Japan and Korea on these issues.

China's naval forces are quite backward and are shrinking in size after quite rapid expansion in the 1980s. The navy remains smaller and less well equipped than the Japanese navy and it has serious deficiencies in logistics and command and control. China, like other countries, may well fall further behind the technology level of the US, Japanese and South Korean navies given current resource allocation patterns in China and given the rapid advance of western technology and an equally rapid advance in its cost per unit. A decision by China to purchase and operate even one aircraft carrier would seriously dis-

tort its capacities to perform a range of high priority naval missions.

There are clearly powerful people in the Chinese armed forces who would like to see a navy that can match the US and its allies, and that can effectively pressure Taiwan. Considerable effort is put into doctrinal development in preparation for a bluewater navy. These plans will however remain pipe-dreams unless and until the Chinese civilian government decides to radically alter spending patterns of the past decade and undertakes massive increases in defence spending on a sustained basis. Even if the armed forces of China did receive a substantial boost in funds, it is far from clear that the navy would be the beneficiary compared with a disastrously backward air force, or that within the navy the funds would be spent on power projection capability (including amphibious and

ground attack options, such as a carrier task group) rather than on other missions (surface warfare), other capabilities (communications and intelligence), or other areas of expenditure (personnel or facilities).

Substantial opportunities exist for China and Australia to work cooperatively in maritime and naval affairs based on common economic interests and common security interests. A more hostile China with much more threatening naval forces is a possibility for the future, but the likelihood is very low. If a war were to erupt over Taiwan, China would pay a high price in its maritime economic interests. It is partly for this reason that Chinese leaders have effectively shelved the use of conventional military force directly against Taiwan and actively pursued policies of greater economic integration.

1. Greg Austin is a Research Fellow in the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies at the Australian National University.

2. Professor Chen Degong is one of China's most prominent experts on law of the sea and represented his country at the Third United Nations Conference on Law of the Sea. He was formerly Deputy Director of the Institute for Maritime Development Strategy under the State Oceanic Administration of China. Professor Peter Rimmer, formerly head of the Department of Human Geography in the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, has published extensively on issues of transport and communications and is widely known for his studies for international organisations and governments on transport in the Asia Pacific region. Commodore Sam Bateman is head of the Centre for Maritime Policy at the University of Wollongong, and has been an active participant in regional security dialogues, especially the Coucal for

Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), for which he directs a maritime issues working group. Dr Gary Klintworth, of the Northeast Asia Program at ANU, has over twenty years experience as an analyst of China's foreign and defence policies, both for government and universities in Australia and overseas. The discussion in this report is issue-oriented and the ideas have been presented thematically. For this reason, it was not considered practical to comprehensively identify the source of individual comments. In each of the four sections, the ideas of the principal presenters are presented in the first several paragraphs. The workshop included scholars, naval officers and government officials from Australia and abroad. Dr Greg Austin, convenor of the workshop, can be consulted for further information on the source of particular ideas, where this is not identified.



HMAS Vampire off Jervis Bay



LIFE AND UNREST IN THE LOWER DECK OF THE RAN IN THE 1930s

Kathryn Spurling

It has been the fault of Historians that members of the Defence Forces are viewed by the public at large as a single homogeneous entity rather than as a group of diverse individuals. It is the fault of Naval Historians that Naval History is viewed as a subject evolving around weaponry, battles, tactics, strategy and maritime power. Naval History is about such themes but most of all Naval History is about people, not only Admirals, or winners of bravery awards but about the many different, individual Australians who enter the Navy with varying aspirations and needs. To view Naval personnel is to view a microcosm of society. To examine the personnel of the lower deck of the 1930s is to observe a collection of men, largely of Australian birth, for whom the battle for survival was not against some foreign force but against the Royal Navy senior officers who administered their service.

In December 1934 the Chief of the Australian Naval Board, Vice Admiral George Hyde, was asked by the Minister for the Navy, to explain the causes of the recent unrest within the lower ranks of the RAN. Admiral Hyde reported that, *"disciplinary troubles in the RAN (as elsewhere in the Empire) can usually be traced to one or more of the following sources:-*

- a) Unsatisfactory pay conditions;*
- b) Unsatisfactory food;*
- c) Bad Officers;*
- d) Subversive influence of persons whose direct objective is the causing of disaffection."*¹

His paper offered some pertinent points but the emphases, language, and most importantly omissions, highlighted a lack of understanding of, if not a lack of regard for the men of the Australian Navy.

Naval Historian Alun Evans refers to the Australian Navy in 1930 as a, *"Navy in a desperate condition"*.² In 1930 the Australian Navy continued to feel the effects of decisions made since its formation in 1911. It was a Navy with its roots firmly grounded in the halls of the British Admiralty. All officers of flag rank as well as the majority of senior officers were Royal Naval officers. After initial training at the Australian

Naval College, Australian-born midshipmen would travel to the United Kingdom for years of further training and service on board Royal Naval vessels. As part of the navy of the Empire Australian vessels flew the English White Ensign and were normally not deployed in Australian waters but where Admiralty believed the interests of the empire lay. Major decisions on the make-up of the fleet itself rested with Admiralty rather than the Australian Government. With very few exceptions Australian warships were built in English and Scottish shipyards or were excess Royal Naval vessels. Uniforms for Australian Seamen were the same as their British counterparts, sailors black silk with its three rows of tape on the blue collar commemorated Nelson's battles of the Nile, Copenhagen and Trafalgar.³

The decade began in a period of acute world depression. Australia faced a severe budgetary crisis and confronted with rising unemployment, ballooning overseas payments and steeply falling government revenues, the Scullin Labour Government was forced to move towards retrenchments and deflation. At the beginning of 1929 the Australian fleet had consisted of eleven vessels. A reduction of 376,000 in naval estimates over the next two years made the maintenance of such a force impossible⁴. By July 1930 the fleet had been reduced to four seagoing vessels, the cruisers *Australia* and *Canberra*, the Seaplane carrier *Albatross*, and the destroyer *Anzac*. Personnel retrenchments had reduced the 1929 permanent naval force of 4,200 by 69 officers and 639 men.⁵

As Admiral Hyde suggested pay was certainly an issue of great importance. It was also a very complicated issue. In 1929 the Government had implemented a 22% pay cut in the salaries of all Government employees. An Able Seaman's basic salary was reduced from 7/- a day to 5/8d a day or £1/19/8 per week. This was well below the basic wage. For the lowest ranks of the Navy, those on the smallest salaries, particularly those with dependents, it meant the difference between subsistence or not. To survive seamen set themselves up into small shipboard businesses plying their trade to better off shipmates. Some cut hair, others organised laundry services. Shipwrights worked teak off cuts into jewel boxes and desk lamps. Hawks bill turtles were caught and their shells fashioned into ornaments and jewellery. Seamen with

cameras photographed others, developed, printed and pinned their pictures on sheets for selection and sale. Fishing supplemented many family diets. As this was often undertaken whilst on duty the catch was divided up with those duty men who watched out for officers.

But times were hard for a large number of Australians and the seaman appreciated this. What was more difficult to accept was the perception that the pay cut had not been conducted fairly. A Lower Deck Welfare Committee submission of 1932 included the reaction, "*The Public Servant within the Defence Department fortifies his position at the rating's expense ... The Financial Emergency Act was enforced not as it should have operated, but as interpreted by the protected Public Servants to suit their own particular ends.*"⁶ Whereas prior to the reduction the previous Naval pay rise had come in 1919, Federal public servants had been granted several salary gains between 1919 and 1929. The strongest resentment was that Naval salaries should be justified by way of comparison with those of civil servants, given that the conditions of service were entirely different. Unlike his civil service counterpart the naval rating had a binding twelve year enlistment period. Mandatory retirement age was between 40 and 50 rather than 60 to 65. For civil servants the average employment ran to 37 hours per week, overtime was paid and time off in lieu was granted, in most instances weekends were

not worked. For ratings minimum duty hours numbered 50 hours per week as well as 68 additional hours required to remain on board, and this was of course when not at sea, there was no additional payment for overtime.

There had also been reductions to marriage allowance and good conduct pay. There had been no increase in Deferred Pay in 1919 but under the Financial Emergency Act it too was reduced, from 1/9d a day to 1/5d a day. Introduced in 1910 as a form of naval pension, Deferred Pay was included in the gross salary figure and taxed accordingly but was withheld until completion of service. The awarding of deferred pay was however open to interpretation by Naval Board and consequently abused with none or only a portion being awarded some individuals such as those discharged for disciplinary reasons, for venereal disease, illness or on grounds of invalidity.

It was with some justification that The Lower Deck Welfare Committee alleged, "*Naval Board refuses to understand or accept the humanitarian side of Lower Deck wages*", and, "*the Naval Board is unsympathetic to the Lower Deck*".⁷ Study of Naval Board Minutes of the 1930s suggests this allegation to be accurate. Those running the Australian Navy were intent firstly in safeguarding the privileges of flag officers and secondarily in the protection of members of the



HMAS Australia in Farm Cove. During the 1930s there were many sabotage attempts onboard her sister ship HMAS Canberra, as men tried to bring notice to their grievances.

officer corps. In the Commonwealth Parliament in May 1930 the Member for Cook, Mr Riley, found it strange that there were more Flag Officers overseeing a Navy that consisted of four vessels than there had been when the Navy had 30 ships in commission in 1920.⁸

In 1931 The Secretary for Defence advised that further stringencies were called for and recommended that certain Captains positions be reduced to Commander rank. Naval Board argued against such a reduction and won. When Naval Board was forced to accept that a charge of £271/- a year be added to other allowances for the purpose of fixing gross salary for those Flag Officers receiving free housing and furniture, the Board immediately ruled that the cost of rent for this housing be reduced to £120/- per year and there be a further reduction in the cost of furniture rental.⁹ Also passed was the recommendation that cooks and stewards attending senior officers in their homes not be costed to those officers but to the Naval Budget. Naval Board continued to agitate for financial relief for officers yet advised the Minister that, "*the (RAN) rating is substantially better off than his 'opposite number' in the Royal Navy*".¹⁰

Retrenchments enacted by Naval Board resulted in fewer officer retrenchments. Between 1929 and 1932 officer numbers were reduced by 26%, sailor's by 40%. Many sailors were discharged "Services No Longer Required". SNLR discharges were immediate without further salary and without deferred pay. Not only did the seamen lose their employment but pensions they were by rights entitled to. By contrast half pay for twelve months was granted by the Board to retrenched officers who were unable to find alternate employment. Even officers who were discharged on grounds of "general unsuitability", service separation came with six months or more half pay.¹¹

The second reason offered by Admiral Hyde was, "Unsatisfactory food". He wrote, "*R.A.N personnel are fed very well, though economically.*" He believed that, "*isolated and unavoidable occasions*", would occur when a complaint was justifiable, but the subject of food was not of undue importance in any grievances felt by the men. The diaries and recollections of men of the RAN argue to the contrary, with numerous tracts of text given to the securing of supplies and the preparation of food. Records also argue that there were more than "*isolated*" incidents for complaint.

A daily allowance was made for each man per day. This allowance although included in a seaman's wage and taxed, remained in the hands of the Naval Paymaster where the method, "*general messing*", normally in larger ships, was used. If the Paymaster managed to feed the men for less than the allowance the excess money was returned to Naval Office. When

under the Financial Emergency Act the allowance was reduced to 1/4d, achieving an excess resulted in a further drop in quality. It was alleged in 1932 that Chief Petty Officers and Petty Officers were being given better food than the men so as to create a rift within the ranks. Dry tea was no longer issued to messes containing men lower than Petty Officer. Instead the tea was brewed in a general galley, three quarters of a pound per 300 men. Soda ash was used to give it a better colour.¹² In smaller ships, "*repayment messing*", was used. The Navy deducted 10d per day per man for an allowance of meat and bread and then each mess purchased other requirements from the ship's dry store. Men would often pool additional funds for fresh produce and each mess deck would organise a duty roster of member seamen to oversee the provisions and the preparation of meals. The food was only as good as those rostered. One duty seaman recalls, "*My specialities were scones or biscuits, if they rose they were scones, if not a sprinkle of sugar and they were biscuits. They were still delicacies for thirty or more hungry stokers, they loved them weevils and all*".¹³

There was no refrigeration onboard most ships so only in harbour was fresh food available. For those serving in the older ships once out of harbour the galley fire usually went out and for the duration of the time at sea, ship's company lived on bully beef and ship's biscuits served cold. Ship's biscuits defied even the best efforts of weevils, cockroaches and rats to digest them. The experienced seaman would encourage the larger thin red weevils to seek alternate accommodation by hitting the biscuits on the table and then soaking the biscuits overnight.

At the same time Seamen observed that provisions for officers were unlike their own. From the diary of one sailor, "*Even under the most trying circumstances the officers digestive tracts required more refined tucker ... The officers supplies were stowed on the after end of the ship whilst the tucker for the seaman was stowed forward. With the exception of sugar, flour, tea and tobacco the goodies for the men were beans, bully beef, biscuits and packs of hard rations, for the officers, as well as the rations, there were a few crates of tinned ham, tinned fruits, a few crates of grog and sometimes even a few eggs. Once the sun had set a few of us busied ourselves by transferring a few of the luxuries from aft to forr'd*".¹⁴

Ship's Company complaints concerning food were not well received as a case in 1928 had clearly demonstrated. At the request of the British Government HMAS *Brisbane* had been sent into the Pacific to suppress indigenous unrest on the island of Malaita in the Solomon Islands. The quality of the food was poor. One member of the ship's company was Stoker Moulineaux who was well known for his witty writings in the ship's newspaper. When he wrote a few

verses in which he complained about the quality of the food Stoker Moulineaux was charged under naval regulations with an offence, "to the prejudice of good order and naval discipline".¹⁵ He was subsequently sentenced to 90 days imprisonment and dismissed from the Navy. His deferred pay was withheld.

Food was only part of the broader heading Living Conditions and for seamen their accommodation was poor and their comfort not considered. Hammocks were slung anywhere there was a space. Petty Officer Philip Jay recalled, "The worst mess decks would have been those in the old destroyers, *Swordsman*, *Success*, *Tattoo*, they were terrible ships in a seaway and except when one was on watch one spent all one's time closely confined in an ill-lit, ill-ventilated and rather crowded space".¹⁶ Bathing facilities were spartan. A sailor would draw a bucket of water from a hand pump on deck, heat it in a steam pot and squeeze into a breezy partly sheltered space on the upper deck called "seaman's bathroom".¹⁷

In 1933 Admiralty recommended that the Australian Navy loan from the RN the destroyers, *Stuart*, *Waterhen*, *Vampire*, *Vendetta* and *Voyager*. The Naval Board complied. The vessels were WWI vintage and would achieve fame in WWII as the "Scrap Iron Flotilla". Conditions onboard these vessels for ship's company were appalling. Seaman Norm King wrote, "living conditions on *STUART* were atrocious, the ship was lousy with bugs, cockroaches and rats. The bugs fed off the crew, the cockroaches ate the bugs and the rats fattened off the cockroaches".¹⁸ In the R.A.N. unlike the other services officer and man lived in very close proximity of each other, their different living conditions a constant and stark contrast.

So too were their duties. Officers directed the doing of work, for ship's company working conditions were inherently dirty and dangerous. Throughout Naval Board minutes cases of seamen injuries and death are recorded yet it is in the area of disability and compensation that the gravest lack of regard for the welfare of the men is demonstrated. Cases involving broken legs, loss of fingers and limbs, deafness, lead poisoning, were debated at length yet the emphasis was not on the welfare of the man discharged on grounds of invalidity but on the saving of money. Regardless of the extent of the injury most sailors received compensation of less than 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ % and between 1930 and 1936 only two were awarded more, 50%.

When a court of inquiry was appointed by Naval Board in September 1930 to investigate an injury to Cook Eric Sims on board HMAS *Canberra*, it reported that Cook Sims had sustained his injury, "through irregularly placing his hand in the dough mixer when the machinery was in motion". The Court concluded

that, "as this man's culpability was not of such a degree as to warrant the withholding of compensation under the regulations, he be granted 30% of the maximum compensation".¹⁹ The following year Naval Board would refuse compensation to another Cook when he lost fingers whilst cleaning a mincing machine in the galley of HMAS *Albatross*. The reason given for this judgment was, "that in keeping with admiralty fleet orders and navy orders, notices are posted at these machines warning ratings against carelessness in handling them, and emphasising that hurt certificates will not be granted in cases where the instructions are disregarded".²⁰ In 1935 during a night shoot exercise involving HMAS *Canberra* a Petty Officer Steward developed appendicitis and the surgeon recommended that the patient be put ashore to Berry Hospital for immediate surgery. The Captain was persuaded by the Gunnery Officer to wait until the conclusion of the shoot. When the sailor arrived at the hospital the next morning, the appendix had burst and he died. In true Australian style a diarist wrote, "It was hushed up but for the next couple of years you only had to say you had a pain in the guts and you were in Randwick Hospital in nothing flat".²¹ Nonetheless in the close quarters of seamen of the Australian Navy the observation was not as humorous.

As in the decade before Tuberculosis was the most common cause for lower deck medical discharge. The living conditions of the men proved a fertile ground for the disease and its transmission. While a Secret Naval signal dated 1932, referred to, "causative factors which arise during service afloat from crowded accommodation, absence of sunlight in the spaces, insufficient ventilation and heat and humidity between decks,"²² Naval Board continued to contest compensation on the grounds that the disease was not attributable to naval service.

Admiral Hyde in his 1934 submission cited bad officers as a contributory factor to matters of discontent. On expansion he believed that for a small service such as the RAN an, "especially high standard of officer" was needed so that there was, "immediate and implicit obedience of commands". Of the Royal Navy Officers who administered the Australian Navy through its infancy Vice Admiral Sir Henry Burrell wrote, "We did not attract officers of a high calibre and later I realised that my training had suffered because of this. It was patently clear to me that the social life of many of my seniors took precedence over the service".²³ In 1938 Lieutenant Burrell was informed by his Royal Naval Captain, his report on Burrell included the condemnation that he was, "too familiar with the sailors." Burrell did not agree, "In my view the ship would have been more effective if officers and ratings had been in closer touch."²⁴ Few officers appeared to share this sentiment.

Admiral Hyde believed that the Australian born member of ship's company was no different than other peoples of the British Empire, that a specific, "*Australian temperament*" did not exist and certainly not one that "*makes Australians less amenable to discipline*". The actions and words of Australian sailors do suggest the existence of a particular Australian manner. When snow fell on the fleet at Scapa Flow the Australians pelted the British sailors on the next vessel with snowballs, but were mightily disappointed when the British seamen removed to below decks. During HMAS *Canberra's* maiden voyage to Australia the unpopular Chief Buffer Darby Allen was washed overboard. In heavy seas the Captain manoeuvred the ship so that a lifeline could be thrown and the Chief brought back onboard. Throughout this exercise the ship's company lined the guard rail and set up the cry, "*let the bastard drown*".²⁵ In 1920 33¹/₃% of the PNF were Royal Navy personnel, by 1932 there were three RN members within the 2,787 Petty Officers and men of the lower deck.²⁶ Perhaps unlike their RN counterparts, for Australian seamen respect was not an automatic given to commissioned personnel, but needed to be earned. Words such as "*Fair*", "*Good Bloke*" are used when referring to favoured officers. Much more frequently appear terms less flattering. One seaman thought his captain was a "*pleasant enough Englishman*",²⁷ but was unimpressed by his lack of ship handling skills. Another wrote, "*As far as Torpedo Officers were concerned I remember none of them with a great deal of goodwill....One thing we did realise, if the petty officers and the men under them didn't know their jobs, the officers were fairly useless.*"²⁸

Sailors were angered by how Naval discipline was administered. A naval discipline drill of the period was the command, "*Hands will go to general drill*". Seaman Phillip Jay describes that, "*It was a favourite item of the Admirals we had at the time, as well as with many skippers all of them RN and with fiendish delight in thinking up the most grotesque things for the lads to do.*"²⁹ One of the most ridiculous instructions was, "*Officers cook to flagship with fried egg*", which involved an egg being fried, then taken in the pan by boat to the flagship where it was inspected by the Admiral. One of the cruelest orders was, "*raise the anchor by deck tackle*". One of the most peculiar orders, "*officers stewards to Garden Island to bring back ten cats*". The cats were wild and difficult to capture. The stewards returned with four cats sporting severe scratches and torn clothes.

Admiral Hyde defined a bad officer as one who through reasons of "*timidity*" or the desire to be popular, "*fails to award a fair but firm punishment to offenders*". Consistent and fair punishment was accepted by ship's company but many of their superiors were autocratic and punishment was harsh. Of Commander Graham Francis Winstanley Wilson de Wilson, known

by Ship's Company as "*Strawberry*" because of a large red nose, Philip Jay wrote, "*Hooks and badges disappeared like magic and for the flimsiest reasons*". Men referred to Commander Barwood as "*Benny the Bastard*." Rear Admiral Lane-Poole was known as "*Plain Fool*". At the main training establishment, Flinders Naval Depot officers rode the heavy metal bicycles of the day between the wardroom and their places of employment. The unpopular ones came across an unusually large number of small groups of sailors who would swing into a vigorous salute. The sailors reward was when the officer was unable to return the salute without losing his equilibrium and control of the bicycle.³⁰

The Navy organised its own trials and vetted out its own punishment without any external interferences. Sailors were represented at their trials by junior officers, officers by senior officers. Punishment was less severe for officers than for men. One particular court martial caused such dissatisfaction within the ranks of the Lower Deck that it was reported in the Australian newspapers. Petty Officer Edward Dickerson was highly regarded by the men. A career naval man who had enlisted in 1918 at the age of 16. He was in 1932 at the age of thirty a gunnery instructor on HMAS *Australia*, a popular Petty Officer of whom his Divisional Officer said, "*Petty Officer Dickerson is highly recommended by me for any position of trust.*" In July Dickerson was charged with, "*behaviour with contempt to a superior officer*", to Midshipman Rendall Hay Collins. The seventeen year old Collins had admonished Petty Officer Dickerson in front of his men for what Collins believed was incorrect gunnery drill. The exchange between he and Dickerson could not be agreed on but it appears Dickerson retorted, "*I think I know how to teach four inch gun drill*". His response was a chargeable offence. Although it was suggested during the trial that Midshipman Collins had been involved in an earlier enquiry, at Flinders Naval depot for, "*failing to tell the truth*", the president of Petty Officer Dickerson's Court Martial declared, "*Midshipman Collins is an officer and if his evidence is untrue it must be assumed either that he is mistaken or that he has deliberately made false statements in an endeavour to injure the accused*", and this the Court could not accept. The case was found proved and Dickerson reduced to Leading Seaman and deprived of two good conduct badges.³¹ Several years later Sub Lt Collins was discharged on medical grounds, for reasons of short sight.

Admiral Hyde had suggested that unrest was caused by, "*subversive influence of persons whose direct objective is the causing of disaffection*", that certain individuals joined the Navy, "*specially to spread their doctrines*." Given the conditions of service it is hard to believe any individual would suffer them purely for this purpose. Rather Naval managers were particularly careful in the process of recruiting with rat-

ing selection bordering on paranoia when it came to eliminating any challenge from within the ship's company.³² As early as 1927 Naval Board minutes included the comment, "a process of weeding out ratings has been instituted".³³ During the 1930s men who complained were placed on a list of men having Communist tendencies and their further careers restricted. In 1932 Naval Board decided that the re-entry of men retrenched should be avoided. In such cases that this was necessary, confidential enquiries as to the life and associations of the men during their period outside the service were to be conducted. This the Board believed, "should lessen the possibility of the re-entry of men whose associations have tended to give them extreme views."³⁴

Rather it was changes within Australian society reflected in lower deck personnel that senior officers failed to appreciate. When rating recruitment recommenced with a vengeance in 1934, those entering were different from those before them. The Navy was recruiting older sailors. Previous to 1928 the majority of ship's company had come through the boy sailor training ship HMAS *Tingira*. Onto this vessel moored permanently in Rose Bay, Sydney, went Australian youth aged from just over 15 years, under a scheme referred to as "Training Naval Seamen at a pliant age".³⁵ This system ceased in 1928 when the refitting of *Tingira* proved too expensive. In the 1930s the depression and resulting high unemployment ensured applications from men to enter the Navy far exceeded demand. Electrical Artificer Reville in a letter to his fiancée in 1937 expressed the thoughts of many of his shipmates, "I wish I was back home and still battling as we were together then but then again you know it was a hard trot and perhaps this is best. We have something definite here and if I work hard and save we should be able to benefit later."³⁶ The Navy of the "Expansion Period"³⁷ was better educated. Skilled sailors were needed as steel replaced wood, oil replaced coal, and weapons and communications systems depended on electronics. Whereas the earlier recruits had listed occupations like Farm Boy, Labourer, Blacksmith Striker, Hay binder and Coal cart man, new recruits listed clerical work or trades. By 1938 ships company with technical skills to the age of 28 were being recruited.

The 1930s was an era of unprecedented industrial turmoil and seaman were not immune to the agitation amongst their civilian counterparts. Yet while Naval Board believed communist sympathies thrived in the lower deck. Rather the commonality amongst the men was just that, the pride felt in being a member of the Lower Deck. Such sentiment was expressed by a one rating in the following way, "It was the ambition of every young sailor to buy a tailored tidily suit from Robby's the naval tailor whose shop was in Swanson Street ... Jackets so tight that help was required to get them off...trousers skin tight around the hips but bal-

looning out to 32 inch bottoms below the knee, as an extra he would sew lead pellets into the hems so they (the trousers) would keep walking after the legs had stopped. ... In a surge of patriotism we tattooed ourselves with slogans. First the design was painted on the approved area then with four needles wrapped around a match and dipped in Indian ink the art work was followed, it was torture. 'For King and Country' and 'Death Before Dishonour' were popular. Fortunately for me it faded before being put to the test."³⁸

There was a bond between the men who went down to the sea in ships and shore time was spent in public houses in the company of other seamen. The lower end of George Street, Sydney, was the gathering place for seamen from all over the world and the Brooklyn Hotel was its centre piece. The bar was presided over by a lady with the name, "Jessie the Bull". Jessie was a middle aged woman respected by all due to a rumoured prodigious sexual appetite and a baseball bat under the bar counter.³⁹ It was in places such as the Brooklyn Hotel that grievances were discussed and sentiments of solidarity exchanged. Their emotions born were of collective discontent, which in a larger social context may have become diffused, but within the close confines of a ship this could not occur, particularly as sailors had few official avenues through which they could register their discontent. Members of the RAN were prohibited under the Naval Defence Act from discussion of their duties with outside parties. Carefully and politely worded grievances could be submitted through their divisional officers who could pass such grievances to his ship's captain who could pass on such grievances to Naval Board. Invariably grievances were not passed on by officers in case it reflect on their own performance. In 1933 the elected body of the men, The Welfare Committee, was shut down by Naval Board.

There were sabotage attempts onboard various Australian warships as men vented their frustration. In 1932 a mutiny occurred on HMAS *Penguin*. The Commanding Officer passed the men's request for improvements to Naval Board. The Board believed the requests, "so subversive of discipline", that they could not be considered. Furthermore the Board criticised *Penguin's* Commanding Officer for accepting such requests and for failing to take disciplinary action against the men concerned. In 1933 a number of seamen in HMAS *Canberra* refused duty. In 1934 on HMAS *Moresby* ratings refused to obey the command for hands to fall in. Seven members of ship's company were discharged SNLR for being, "the probable ringleaders."⁴⁰ During the decade there were increases in pay and allowances but the unrest continued. Naval Board did not respond, indeed although Naval Board Minutes of 1937 describe a secret message concerning sabotage on HMAS *Canberra* and HMAS *Australia*,⁴¹ the First Naval Member continued to deny such misdeeds.⁴² ERA Fred Reville noted, "They

are still having trouble on the Australia ... things thrown overboard and small electric wires cut, so the old bloke's denial of discontent in the paper falls a bit flat ... often wonder how it will finish up."⁴³

As the decade had started with unrest so too did the decade conclude. In May 1939, 500 naval personnel left Port Melbourne on the SS *Autolycus* bound for Portsmouth to collect the 6,830 ton cruiser HMAS *Perth*. A Melbourne newspaper reported, "*Luxury Trip for Sailors*". The newspaper's reporter had in-

terdeck, instead they mustered on the foc's'le, this meant mutiny. *Perth's* officers arrived wearing side arms and proceeded to order individuals below decks. No one moved. It was announced in the Australian Parliament on 7 August 1939⁴⁵ that a "*Minor strike*" had taken place on HMAS *Perth* but that this had been "*amicably settled*", "when men were allowed to proceed ashore in blue uniforms when they made individual requests to do so. Perhaps it should be left to Australian seaman Norm King to offer his version of the culmination of the mutiny, "*Several car loads of*



Messing arrangements in the RAN during the 1930s were spartan at best.

terviewed officers who shared the vessel's comfortable cabins. Naval seaman slung their hammocks and ate their meals in ship holds recently vacated by horses. According to one, "*no amount of scrubbing with carbolic could get rid of the stink.*"⁴⁴ As the newest Australian warship underwent sea trials, the ship's company became increasingly unhappy with their officers. One member believed, "*It should have been a happy ship but it wasn't Captain Farncombe was a very autocratic man and his attitude towards the crew worked its way down through his officers*". When *Perth* berthed in New York harbour ship's company were told that the uniform for shore leave would be whites. Liberty men would have to return to the vessel at 1800 and change into blue uniforms. It was one more aggravation and the crew registered a formal complaint. Hands were ordered to muster on the quar-

New York police arrived armed to the teeth. They carried enough weapons to start a major war and nobody knew whose side they were on, the fiasco was called off."⁴⁶

The Royal Australian Navy was a navy which benefited the Empire but raised questions as to its suitability for Australia. It was a policy of dependency not autonomy, which encouraged, division between officer and sailor, placed tradition before reason and discouraged Australian nationalism. The Lower Deck of the Australian Navy of the 1930s was more Australian, older and better educated. Rather than physical labourers they had become more technically skilled. Their managers were British officers who clung to the traditions of Nelson's Navy where ship's company had been seen in barely human terms. The

new ship's company recruit would not accept the attitudes and deprivations imposed on his predecessor. It would take World War II before the legacy of a policy of such Admiralty paternalism was fully appreciated

but it was during the 1930s that the traditions of a British Naval administration proved unacceptable to the Lower Deck of the RAN.

- 1 and 2. Australian Archives, ACT, A5954/1, 1003/13, Discipline in the RAN-Report by Chief of Naval Staff 1934-35.
3. Evans, A. *A Navy For Australia*, 1986, ABC, Sydney, p.105
4. Australian War Memorial, PR 84/26, *Memoirs of AB Seaman Robert Wilson, RAN, 1914-1918*. Although there is some debate on the meaning/origins of the uniform, this version is clearly the interpretation at the time.
5. Australian Archives, ACT, A2585, *Naval Board Minutes* No.83 of 1929.
6. *Parliamentary Debates*, Vol 126, p.5089, 31 July 1930.
7. Australian Archives, Canberra, A5954/1, 1003/13, *Discipline in the RAN-Report by Chief of Staff, 1934-35*.
8. *ibid.*
9. *Parliamentary Debates*, 12th Parliament, 1st Session, Vol.124, 2 May to 18 June 1930, p.2287.
10. Australian Archives, ACT, A2585, *Naval Board Minutes*, nos. 101, 104, 107 of 1931.
11. Australian Archives, ACT, A5954/1, 1003/13.
12. *ibid.*, No.26 of 1930 and No.38 of 1932, offer two examples.
13. *Smith's Weekly*, 3 October 1931.
14. Australian War Memorial, MSS 1502, *Norm King Papers*.
15. *ibid.*
16. *Parliamentary Debates*, 13th Parliament, 1st session, Vol 136, 13 Oct to 15 Nov. 1932, p.1623.
17. Australian War Memorial, MSS1083, *Musings of a Matelot*, Phillip Jay.
18. Australian War Memorial, MSS 1081, *Ean McDonald Papers*.
19. King, N. *op cit.*
20. Australian Archives, ACT, A2585, *Naval Board Minutes*, Nos. 218 and 259 of 1930.
21. *ibid.*, No.88 of 1931.
22. Jay, P. *op cit.*
23. Australian Archives, ACT, A461/7, L337/1/5, *Compensation for Naval Personnel*.
24. Burrell, Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Burrell, *Mermaids Do Exist*, 1986, MacMillan, Melbourne, p.14.
25. *ibid.*, p.65.
26. Jay, P. *op cit.*
27. Australian Archives, Canberra, A5954/1, 1504/23, *Manning Situation in the RAN*.
28. McDonald, E. *op cit.*
29. Jay, P. *op cit.*
30. *ibid.*
31. *ibid.*
32. Australian Archives, Canberra, A471/1, 22478, *Proceedings of Court Martial held on board HMAS Australia*, Dickerson, Edward Walter James, no.10615, RAN.
33. Australian Archives, Canberra, A461/9 N337/1/5 Att, *Recruits for the RAN*.
34. Australian Archives, Canberra, *Naval Board Minutes*, no.212 of 1927.
35. A461/9 N337/1/5, *op cit.*
36. *ibid.* also Australian Archives, Melbourne, MP981/1/0 564/201/161, *Alleged discontent in the Navy*.
37. Australian War Memorial, PR85/326, Reville, ERA Fred. W., *Letters HMAS Canberra, 1934-1937*.
38. Australian Archives, Canberra, *Naval Board Minutes*, No 14 of 1934.
39. King, N. *op cit.*
40. *ibid.*
41. Australian Archives, Canberra, *Naval Board Minutes*, No.209 of 1934.
42. Australian Archives, Canberra, *Naval Board Minutes*, Nos. 41 and 48 of 1937.
43. Australian Archives, Melbourne, MP981/1/0, 564/201/161, *Alleged Discontent in the Navy*.
44. Reville, F. *op cit.*
45. King, N. *op cit.*
46. *The Argus*, 7 August 1939, p.1.
47. King, N. *op cit.*



ANZUS and the Radford-Collins Agreement

Australia's naval mission

Graham Priestnall

Since the early 1940s a foreign policy initiative of successive Australian governments, both Liberal and Labour, was to involve the United States in the security of the Asian Pacific Region (APR). This policy was realised when Australia, New Zealand and the United States concluded the Tripartite Pacific Pact (later known by the acronym ANZUS), in 1951.¹

Despite criticism that the US security guarantee under ANZUS is not valid and that ANZUS promotes a dependent defence posture rather than one of self-reliance, ANZUS remains the key element of the Australian defence policy.² This situation was paralleled in New Zealand defence policy until 1985, when New Zealand's anti-nuclear stance resulted in its suspension from the ANZUS alliance.

The lack of a detailed naval mission plan in the ANZUS Treaty could lead to the assertion that there is not an ANZUS naval mission assigned to Australasia. This approach is, however, limited and does not take into account the complexities of the ANZUS treaty. In addition to reviewing the treaty, this examination analyses the political circumstances in which the treaty was signed and reviews the naval co-operation between the ANZUS partners.

This methodology - which includes a description of the main aims of the Radford-Collins Agreement - will assist in the explanation and evaluation of the Australasian naval mission assigned under ANZUS.

Security Setting

The security concerns of the governments and people of Australasia - due to the isolation from other Anglo-Saxon nations - have been prominent in government policy since settlement. Historically, a reliance on a "powerful friend" was seen as the best means of guaranteeing security, and Britain filled this role until the Second World War. The realisation that Britain could no longer continue to guarantee their security prompted Australasia to turn to the United States for protection. Despite victory in the Second World War, the Australasian security concerns remained and diplomatic efforts to keep the US engaged in the western Pacific continued. The United States, however, sought to limit their Pacific involvement to Hawaii, Japan and the Philippines.³

The onset of the Cold War, the Korean War and communist expansion in China and Southeast Asia, whether real or perceived, caused a change in US foreign policy.

To counter these "threats" to US interests, the United States sought to establish a network of interlocking security treaties as a "buttress" against communist influence and promoted an economically strong Japan as counter to Soviet-Chinese influence in the northern Pacific. The ANZUS Treaty served to console Australasian concerns of a "soft peace" producing a militarily resurgent Japan and provided the United States with a western Pacific link in their security network. Similarly, the ANZUS Treaty provided the United States with politically stable alliance partners near Asia who were sympathetic to US interests. The Australasian land mass provided an excellent strategic setting for US installations and as a forward base in future operations. Finally, both Australia and New Zealand were relative regional powers who possessed small but modern defence forces.

The ANZUS Treaty

The ANZUS Treaty is not a particularly long or complicated document. The most well known section is Article IV which contains the perceived security guarantee; 'Each party recognises that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.'⁴

The actual action taken by the treaty partners is ill-defined and the ambiguity of Article IV has been the centre of much debate about what action the US would take to ensure Australia's security. However, this ambiguity does enable the treaty partners a large degree of flexibility in their response to aggression against other partners.

In addition to providing a security guarantee to Australian and New Zealand, the ANZUS alliance provided a framework for future cooperation and agreements. Article II of the treaty enjoins the signatories to 'separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack'.⁵ Yet the ANZUS treaty offers no spe-

cific detail on how this capacity is to be maintained. A further complicating factor is that ANZUS does not have a standing Headquarters or planning staff.⁷ Accordingly, the means of addressing specific naval issues is through joint operational agreements and signed under the auspices of ANZUS, and interaction between the ANZUS nations' defence forces.⁸ The Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement⁹ and the Radford-Collins Agreement are examples of such operational agreements that provide for direct planning and co-operation between naval commands.

Although the ANZUS treaty does not explicitly detail the naval mission assigned to Australasia, Articles II and IV imply that the naval capability of Australia and New Zealand must be able to meet aggressive action against their countries - using whatever means their governments decide - separately or jointly (with the United States). Ensuring this level of capability, dictates that the Australasian naval force-in-being must be flexible enough to mount a variety of responses and have a high degree of interoperability with each other and United States Navy (USN) vessels.

Naval Co-operation

The most visible sign of naval co-operation between the ANZUS nations is their participation in large multinational exercises such as Rim of the Pacific Exercises (RIMPAC)¹⁰ and Kangaroo and Tasmanex Exercise Series.¹¹ In each exercise, participating forces - which included the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) until 1985 - practice and refine procedures, test equipment and analyse tactics against fictitious enemy forces. These exercises - which emphasise interoperability - develop the individual and collective capacity of the naval forces.

Interoperability is most effectively achieved through commonality of equipment. Since the early 1960s, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) has mainly purchased ships, equipment and weapons of US origin. In addition, equipment which was sourced from other suppliers must be compatible with US equipment.

Compatibility and interoperability is also the focus of several ANZUS nations' defence committees which set operating and performance equipment standards.

The commissioning of the North West Cape Naval Communications facility in 1964 is another example of co-operation between ANZUS members. This high profile co-operative project drew a large amount of criticism due to the perceived loss of Australian sovereignty and the concern that the installation would make Australia a target in a nuclear war. The facility plays a vital role in the transmission of target information to USN Inter-continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) equipped submarines. Public debate over the facility has since subsided as its role has been down-

graded and the facility was transferred to the Australian command in 1991.

Naval co-operation also extends to the provision of support facilities for USN ships and submarines, particularly at HMAS STIRLING, which is used by USN vessels transiting the region. This support has also resulted in a more active participation by Australian naval forces in support of US interests and aims. Two examples of this active support were the increased surveillance of the Indian Ocean and the integration of Australian naval vessels with USN battle groups patrolling the Indian Ocean in the early 1980s, in response to US concerns about increased Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean, and the quick deployment - Australia was the first to offer assistance - of three RAN vessels to the Persian Gulf in support of Operation Desert Shield.

The Radford-Collins Agreement

The Radford-Collins Agreement was concluded during September 1951 in Hawaii, as a result of discussions between senior naval officers from the US, Britain, Australia and New Zealand.¹¹ The discussions centred on the use of "lessons learnt" from the Second World War in regard to the coordination and co-operation in maritime security, and produced a mechanism for the co-ordination of defence planning by the four nations within the maritime regions of Australia and New Zealand.¹²

The resulting agreement, (the details of which are still classified), is officially known as the Radford-Collins Naval Control of Shipping Agreement 1951. This navy-to-navy agreement is the only publicly acknowledged operational contingency plan that has been formulated under the provision of ANZUS. Although the details of the agreement are still classified, Dr. Thomas-Durell Young's research detailed the intent of the agreement to provide for maritime security in the old ANZAM (Australia, New Zealand and Malaysia) region. Australia was given an area of responsibility of approximately seven million square miles.¹³

Under the overriding nomenclature of maritime security, the major intentions of the Radford-Collins Agreement are the co-ordination of the protection of merchant shipping (which encompasses measures such as the use of convoys, safe routing of shipping and weather warning), surveillance, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and search and rescue.¹⁴ Each responsibility was very important in both peace and war. However, the ASW function increased in importance from the early 1960s with the increased activity of Soviet submarines in the area. This increase in Soviet submarine activity was responsible for the large emphasis placed on ASW in both the RAN and RNZN. The surveillance aspect of the agreement was re-evaluated and further emphasised in 1978 with the conclu-

sion of the related 1978 MARSAR Agreement.¹⁵

Explanation and Evaluation

This examination concludes that although an area of responsibility was designated under the Radford-Collins Agreement, a specific ANZUS naval mission was not assigned to Australasia. Rather, in accordance with the fluid international environment in which the treaty was signed, the Australasian naval forces are to maintain a capability which enables a variety of responses, either separately or in partnership with the other ANZUS partners. This contention is consistent with the ambiguous nature of the wording of the treaty, which allows each government flexibility in its response to aggression, including decisions about what constitutes aggression.

This flexibility has enabled the ANZUS Treaty and the naval mission to remain relevant, despite changing strategic circumstances. Additionally, the detailing of a specific naval mission in the treaty would have probably required the formulation of a headquarters and planning staff to review and update the naval mission in response to changing circumstances and perceived threat. This was a situation that the ANZUS partners - particularly the US - were keen to avoid.¹⁶

Instead, the treaty contained a rather broad mission which emphasises the development of individual and collective capacity to meet aggression. Measures to counter specific threats are contained in other treaties, such as the now defunct South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) which aimed to contain the perceived spread of communism in Southeast Asia. Article II of the treaty provides the co-operative mechanism which enables the creation of operational agreements such as the Radford-Collins Agreement that detail more specific naval missions and provide for combined naval exercises. The specific responsibilities detailed by the Radford-Collins Agreement complement the broad aims of the ANZUS Treaty, being primarily surveillance orientated and to provide information on which the government can base a rational and appropriate response to any incident. The review of the naval co-operation between the ANZUS partners provides an insight in evaluating the Australasian naval mission.

Firstly, the RAN (and RNZN until 1985) has developed a high level of

material and procedural interoperability with the USN. The maintenance of this capability enables naval forces to act effectively when needed and yet does not restrict the government's freedom of action - due to specific treaty obligations - when negotiating with other nations. The Australian Government has been able to direct the deployment of RAN ships at short notice whenever it has deemed that such a response was necessary. In each case the RAN ships have integrated effectively and with the USN task group.

Critics such as Joseph A. Camilleri¹⁷ have argued that by maintaining such a high level of interoperability with the USN, a level of "dependency" has developed which has detracted from Australia's self-reliant posture and imposed economic burdens on equipment which is unnecessary for Australia's defence needs. This situation, according to Camilleri, creates a defence force (and, in particular, combat forces) which is unsuitable for Australia's defence. While the economic burden can be quantified - though a fully self-reliant force would also be expensive - Australia's stable security environment has not allowed the opportunity to test the validity of Camilleri's claim.

Conclusion

The Australasian naval mission under ANZUS is assessed as relevant, achievable and within the resource constraints of Australia and New Zealand.

This mission is still relevant today, despite being a purely RAN mission. The broad scope of the naval mission provides for preparedness through interoperability and exercises.

Further, the broad scope of the naval mission allows the Australian Government the flexibility to deploy naval forces in response to developments. The ANZUS Treaty does not prevent parties entering into other treaties which contain specific naval missions. Additionally, specific naval issues are addressed by the use of operational agreements, such as the Radford-Collins Agreement, which provide for co-operation in maritime security aspects - specifically the protection of merchant shipping, surveillance, ASW and search and rescue.

¹ Churchward, L.G., *Australia & America 1788 - 1972: An Alternative History*, 1979, Sydney: The Alternative Publishing Co-operative Ltd, p. 166. The Pacific Pact (the ANZUS Treaty of September 1951) was hailed by both Government and Opposition as the fulfilment of Australia's post-war aim of a tripartite or regional security pact.

² *Defending Australia 1994*, 'Policy Information Paper presented to Parliament by the Minister for Defence', Senator the Hon. R. Ray, 1994, Canberra: AGPS, p. 16. Our treaty relationship with the US, though more than four decades old, continues to be a key element of our defence policy.

³ Barclay, G. St. J., *Friends in High Places:*

Australian - American Diplomatic Relations since 1945, 1985, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, p. 35. The main difficulty was that both Secretary Acheson and General MacArthur had made it clear that the defence perimeter that the United States was committed to hold did not go anywhere near the region in which Australia was directly interested. [...] The defensive perimeter runs from the Ryukus to the Philippine Islands.

⁴ Camilleri, J.A., *Australian-American Relations: The Web of Dependence*, 1980, Melbourne: The Macmillan Company, p. 8. As a politically stable continent off the mainland of Asia, with a government profoundly sympathetic to United States interests and objectives, and a small but not insignificant military capacity, Australia provided a secure base for American military installations in time of peace, as well as a useful springboard for mounting forward operations in the event of a major conflict in Asia.

⁵ *Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America*, dated 1 September 1951, Article IV, in 'The ANZUS Alliance', Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, 1982, Canberra: AGPS, Annex A.

⁶ *ibid.*

⁷ Young, Thomas-Durell, *ANZUS War Planning*, Research Paper for, The Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies, The Graduate Institute of International Studies, University of Geneva, 1985, Washington, p. 7.

⁸ Young, Thomas-Durell, *The Radford-Collins Naval Control of Shipping Agreement*, Research Paper

for, The Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies, The Graduate Institute of International Studies, University of Geneva, 1985, Washington, p. 2. [The Mutual Assistance Agreement] This was the first post-war defence arrangement agreed to by these two countries and it was to provide Australia with military assistance under the Mutual Defence Assistance Act of 1949. A similar agreement with New Zealand was reached on 19 June 1949.

⁹ *ibid.*, p. 3. However, it was not until September 1951 that Admiral Radford and Vice Admiral Collins signed an agreement relating to the defence of lines of communication in the Pacific. This agreement also provided for direct bi-lateral naval planning and established a liaison system between the two navies under the ANZUS Security Treaty.

¹⁰ Participation in these exercises is facilitated through mechanisms other than ANZUS.

¹¹ *ibid.*

¹² *ibid.*

¹³ *ibid.*, pp. 1-4.

¹⁴ *ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 4-5. Indeed, it was probably this mutual concern between the ANZUS partners which led them to further delineate operational arrangement for co-operation in maritime surveillance in the 1978 MARSAR Agreement which is associated with the Radford-Collins Agreement.

¹⁶ Young, *ANZUS War Planning*, p. 2.

¹⁷ Camilleri, *American Relations*, p. 43.



Timor Triumph

HNIMS *Tjerk Hiddes* at Timor — 1942

Graham Wilson

In 1869, William III, King of the Netherlands, anxious to have some outward sign to bestow on his soldiers and sailors to recognise their service in the hard campaigns in the Indies, established the Cross for Important War Actions (Kruis voor Belangrijke Krijgsverrichtingen), more commonly known as the Expedition Cross (Expeditie-Kruis). The first campaign clasps were backdated to 1846 and the last clasp issued for this interesting medal, 'TIMOR 1942', went to Dutch soldiers serving alongside Australian commandoes on Timor and to Dutch sailors who went to their assistance. And therein lies a tale which is inextricably linked with Australian military and naval history.

Timor

In 1941, the British, Dutch and Australian authorities in the Indies and Malaya were girding themselves for the expected onslaught of the Japanese. The bulk of Holland's overseas empire consisted of the Netherlands East Indies and with the Japanese attack expected soon, the decision was made to reinforce the Indies with British and Australian troops. In particular, it was decided to reinforce the garrison on Timor, an island with a number of good airfields within 500 miles of Darwin and expected to be a priority target for the Japanese. For the western half of the island this presented no problems as this was Dutch territory and it was planned to base an Australian brigade group code named "Sparrow" Force on this half of the island. To that end, an Australian infantry battalion, 2/40 Australian Infantry Battalion, the planned nucleus for the brigade group, arrived at Koepang, along with elements of brigade headquarters and some brigade troops in February 1942.

The eastern half of the island, however, presented more of a problem as it was a colony of neutral Portugal. The Allies knew that Japan was not likely to let Portugal's neutrality stand in the way of acquiring the excellent port and airfield facilities at Dili and Bacao yet, for their part, the Portuguese were adamant that no foreign troops would be garrisoned on Portuguese territory. The Portuguese attempted to forestall Allied moves by reinforcing the colony from Africa. This move came to nothing, however, as following the Japanese commencement of hostilities in the first week of December 1941, ships carrying 5,000 reinforcements from Africa were forced to turn back at the halfway point as a result of Japanese refusal to allow the ships free passage. With no alternative, the Portuguese gov-

ernor gave in under protest and allowed the deployment of an Australian commando unit, 2/2 Independent Company, onto East Timor.

It was all, unfortunately, too little and too late and when the Japanese invaded Timor, 2/40 Battalion was wiped out, most of its members either killed or captured and the Dutch forces in West Timor fared no better. In the east, however, while the Japanese swept the comic-opera 200 man Portuguese colonial force aside with contemptuous ease, 2/2 Independent Company managed to get away into the rugged mountains which form the central spine of Timor. There they were joined by a few survivors of 2/40 Battalion who had managed to avoid capture and by about 250 headquarters troops under the command of Brigadier Veale, the commander of "Sparrow" Force". They also made contact with about 200 Dutch troops under Lieutenant Colonel van Straaten who had escaped into Portuguese Timor following the fall of the Dutch half of the island.

The Australian and Dutch soldiers were to wage a relentless guerrilla campaign against the Japanese for almost 12 months. For the first few months, this campaign was carried out in isolation and without support as the guerrillas had no means of communicating with headquarters in Australia and it was assumed that all forces on Timor had been killed or captured. Eventually, the signallers of 2/2 Independent Company managed to cobble together a Morse transmitter and established contact with an incredulous high command in Australia. Immediately seeing the advantage of continuing the campaign in Timor, headquarters established a tenuous link with "Sparrow" Force using small ships of the RAN to run into the island at night to deliver supplies and take out wounded and sick. Eventually, it was decided to replace 2/2 Independent Company with a fresh unit, 2/4 Independent Company. This operation, however, resulted in the loss of the Australian destroyer HMAS *Voyager*, which ran aground and was scuttled after she was stripped of weapons and supplies on 23 September, 1942, underlining the perilous nature of the "Timor Ferry".

Although the Australians of "Sparrow" Force (later re-named "Lancer" Force) and their Dutch compatriots carried out a brilliant guerrilla campaign against the Japanese, eventually time and increasing Japanese pressure took their toll and it was decided to withdraw the Australians. At the same time, Dutch headquarters in Australia, mindful of the political and

propaganda advantage of maintaining Dutch troops active in the Indies, decided to relieve their force on the island with fresh troops.

This plan went tragically wrong when the Australian corvette HMAS *Armida*, carrying 65 Dutch troops, was sunk by Japanese aircraft on 1 December 1942 while en route to Timor. Only 49 of the 150 aboard, none of them Dutch, survived the sinking. The senior RAN officer in Darwin, Commodore Pope, RAN, Naval Officer in Command (NOIC) Darwin, responsible for the "Timor Ferry", now decided that the task of maintaining contact with the guerrillas on Timor was too hazardous to entrust to the small, lightly armed and relatively slow vessels which had until then been shouldering the bulk of the burden of this task. With no assets of his own, Commodore Pope turned to Commander South-West Pacific Area and requested a destroyer.

As a result of this request, at midnight on 4 December, 1942, Lieutenant Commander W.J. Kruys, Royal Netherlands Navy, captain of Her Netherlands Majesty's Ship (HNIMS) *Tjerk Hiddes*, then lying alongside at Fremantle, was handed an urgent TOP SECRET signal. *Tjerk Hiddes* was ordered to make for Darwin at best speed, there to receive further instructions for an unspecified mission.

Tjerk Hiddes

The ship that lay at Fremantle that December night in 1942 was not the ship that the Royal Netherlands Navy had originally intended to commission as *Tjerk Hiddes*. That ship actually lay on the bottom of Rotterdam harbour in far off Holland.

Before the Second World War, the Dutch navy had been a somewhat unbalanced force, consisting of half a dozen cruisers, some submarines and a small force of torpedo boats and gunboats. This force was eminently suitable for coastal protection and colonial peace keeping, the two main tasks of the pre-war navy, but was unsuitable for the war that was looming in Europe. With war in the offing, the Dutch naval authorities set about establishing a destroyer force to complement the rest of the fleet and redress the balance.

Among the ships ordered were the three destroyers of the Callenburgh Class, laid down in 1938-39 and scheduled for commissioning in 1940. Comparable to the Royal Navy's Javelin Class, the three Callenburghs, which were to be named Gerhard Callenburgh, *Tjerk Hiddes* and *Isaac Sweers*, were nearing completion at Rotterdam when the Germans invaded the Low Countries in 1940. Attempts were made to tow the three ships to England to prevent them from falling into German hands but only *Isaac*

Sweers made it. Beaten by the swiftness of the German advance, the Dutch navy scuttled Gerhard Callenburgh and *Tjerk Hiddes* at Rotterdam. Unfortunately, while *Tjerk Hiddes* was destroyed by the scuttling, efforts in the case of Gerhard Callenburgh were less successful and she was eventually salvaged and repaired by the Germans and commissioned as *ZH. 1*.

As an aside, none of the Callenburghs survived the war. *Tjerk Hiddes* was, as noted above, reduced to a useless hulk by scuttling. *Isaac Sweers* was completed in England and commissioned into the Royal Netherlands Navy, only to be torpedoed and sunk in the Mediterranean by a German submarine in November, 1942. Finally, *Gerhard Callenburgh*, now serving the *Kriegsmarine* as the *ZH. 1* was sunk by the Royal Navy off the French coast in June, 1944.

With their country overrun by the Germans, the remnants of the Dutch navy which had managed to get away to England began to rebuild. As part of this process, in 1941 the Netherlands Government in Exile purchased two brand new Javelin Class destroyers from the Royal Navy. HM Ships *Noble* and *Nonpareil* (sister ships to the RAN's famous 'N' Class) were laid down in 1939 at the yards of Denny & Brothers at Dumbarton in Scotland. Commissioned in 1941, the ships, which had a complement of 183, displaced 1,690 tons, were 348 feet long and were armed with 6 x 4.7" guns, 1 x 4" AA gun, 6 x AAMG and 5 x 21" torpedo tubes. Depth charge racks were later added. Their Parsons geared turbines developed 40,000 SHP, giving the ships a rated top speed of 36 knots.

While the ships were originally commissioned into the Royal Navy, they saw very limited service under the White Ensign, transferring to the Royal Netherlands Navy in October, 1941. On transfer *Noble* was commissioned as HNIMS *Van Galen* (named after a Dutch warship which had gone down fighting in 1940) while *Nonpareil* became HNIMS *Tjerk Hiddes*.

The ships immediately went to work on convoy escort and anti-submarine duties and in November, 1941 *Tjerk Hiddes* sunk a German U-boat off Norway. Next month, however, following Japan's entry into the war, she and her sister ship were ordered East to reinforce Dutch naval units in the Indies. Arriving too late to take part in the disastrous fighting in the Indies the ships diverted to Australia and became part of the Dutch forces being rebuilt there. Most of 1942 was taken up with convoy escort in the Indian Ocean and in September *Tjerk Hiddes* and *Van Galen* along with the Dutch cruiser *Jacob van Heemskerck* took part in the invasion of Madagascar. On successful completion of this operation, the three Dutch ships were detached from the Eastern (i.e. Indian Ocean) Fleet and despatched back to Australia for service in the South-West Pacific Area.

Timor Ferry

Tjerk Hiddes had arrived in Fremantle late on the afternoon of 3 December, 1942 following an extended patrol. In anticipation of a few days alongside for maintenance, Lieutenant Commander Kruys had given most of the crew liberty on the night of 4 December. His first order on receiving the signal ordering his ship to Darwin was: "Get the crew back to the ship. Be ready to sail at 0500".

The fact that *Tjerk Hiddes* sailed from Fremantle on time and only one crew man short (he later caught up with the ship) is testimony to the professionalism of the captain and crew.

While the reason for the ship's orders to proceed to Darwin were not revealed at this stage, all aboard would have realised that the reason was important as it was unusual for a lone ship to make the dangerous transit to Darwin in the face of heavy Japanese air activity. As if to underscore this, *Tjerk Hiddes* was spotted by a Japanese reconnaissance aircraft one day out of Darwin and shortly after was attacked by a squadron of bombers from Timor. Although Commander Kruys manoeuvred his ship successfully to avoid Japanese bombs, he was forced to jettison his depth charges for fear that a hit or near miss on the stern would detonate the charges and cripple or sink his ship.

Arriving in Darwin on 7 December, ironically enough, the first anniversary of Japan's entry into the war, *Tjerk Hiddes* picked her way through the wrecks in the harbour to secure and await further orders. Although Commander Kruys received detailed orders, the crew were still kept in the dark, the only clue to their mission the six collapsible boats which were delivered to the ship. Kruys, who had attended a small boat course at the British Army's Commando School in Scotland, took the opportunity of the short stay in Darwin to drill his crew in erecting, launching, landing and loading the cantankerous little collapsible boats.

Tjerk Hiddes departed Darwin on the afternoon of 9 December and once clear of the harbour, the captain informed the crew of their destination and mission. Commander Kruys had received fairly flexible instructions from Commodore Pope. While the time and place for the rendezvous with the Allied troops on Timor were fixed, the method of getting to and from the rendezvous in one piece were left up to the ship's captain. Commander Kruys had no reason to discount the difficulties involved, especially considering the earlier loss of HMA Ships *Voyager* and *Armidale*.

The captain counted on three advantages, however, to offset the probable hazards. Firstly, while in Darwin, he had been given a copy of the Japanese aerial patrol schedule which had recently been recovered

from a downed Japanese aircraft. While RAAF intelligence believed that the schedule would probably be changed, Kruys, who had served many years in the Far East before the war and had some knowledge of the Japanese military, believed that the schedule would not be altered without convincing evidence that it had been compromised. Secondly, he was both familiar with the waters around Timor and confident in the accuracy of the pre-war Dutch charts which he would be using and which had been compiled by a former class mate of his at the naval academy. Finally, he had the utmost confidence in his ship and crew, describing them a number of years later (when he had become a Vice Admiral) as the best crew on the best destroyer in the best navy in the world - a somewhat extravagant claim but one difficult to refute.

In order to avoid Japanese air patrols listed on the captured schedule, Kruys at first steamed his ship due north after leaving Darwin. At dusk, the ship turned sharply westward and increased speed to 30 knots. Needless to say, the crew were all at battle stations the whole time and would remain there until the ship returned to Darwin. Racing through the darkness, *Tjerk Hiddes* arrived off the rendezvous point some time before midnight on 9 December. In Darwin, Kruys had been advised to lay a mile or two offshore but he replied at the time that this would mean that the boats would take far too long to get to the shore and back, running the risk of the ship still being close ashore at daylight when the Japanese patrols were due over. Instead, trusting to his own knowledge and the excellent charts of his class mate, Kruys decided on the extremely risky move of running as close inshore as he could get. Following this plan, *Tjerk Hiddes* steamed directly for the rendezvous point at 30 knots until the echo sounder placed her about four miles offshore. The ship then went ahead dead slow with the anchor run three shackles out as a sounding lead. This manoeuvre enabled *Tjerk Hiddes* to approach to within less than half a mile of the shore, just outside the surf line. Sighting the agreed on signal on the dark beach, three small fires, the ship hove to and the collapsible boats were assembled and launched. The first man ashore waited apprehensively on the dark beach until he was approached by a lone figure who asked in English: "Did you come to pick us up?" The relieved Dutch sailor replied that they had and shortly after the personnel to be evacuated began to fill the beach. The sick and wounded were taken off first, followed by about twenty women and children, in all 300 people being taken off the beach in three trips. Reminiscing on the operation some years later, Admiral Kruys recalled that at some time during the night the leader of the boat party from *Tjerk Hiddes* and one of the leaders of the evacuees realised that, although they were speaking to each other in English, they were in fact both Dutch and both broke down and cried on the beach.

Having embarked her 300 passengers, *Tjerk Hiddes* departed just before dawn and made a 400-mile full-power dash for Darwin, mostly in broad daylight, with all crew at action stations and a large number of passengers crowded on her decks. They never sighted any Japanese planes, however, and in fact Kruys's gamble had paid off and the Japanese did not change their patrol schedule until March, 1943, bang on time!

Reaching Darwin on the afternoon of 10 December, *Tjerk Hiddes* began preparations to make a second run to Timor to take of 2/2 Independent Company. This run was delayed, however, when she was deployed towards Timor to take part in the tragic and fruitless search for the 80 survivors from HMAS *Armidale* who had been left on the ship's rafts when the ship's whale boat and motor boat had departed to try and get help. Despite the best efforts of *Tjerk Hiddes* and the other ships and aircraft involved in the search, the rafts were never located and the men on them, Australian and Dutch, remain listed to this day as "missing - presumed lost at sea."

Returning to Darwin on 14 December, *Tjerk Hiddes* resumed her preparations for her next run to Timor and departed on this mission on the afternoon of 15 December. The ship and her crew repeated their previous flawless performance, lifting off the entire 2/2 Independent Company as well as a number of Dutch and Portuguese personnel and being well away from Timor and on her way to Darwin before midnight. While once again no Japanese aircraft were sighted, this trip saw combat of a sort in a battle of wills between Commander Kruys and some of his passengers. With 600 people aboard the ship and the crew closed up to action stations, the three cooks required assistance in preparing meals for everybody. Unfortunately, the hard bitten Australian commandoes felt that they deserved something better than potato peeling on their first day out of the jungle and refused to lend a hand. To this Commander Kruys replied that the Australians would either peel spuds or go hungry. He won.

Tjerk Hiddes made her third and last Timor run on the night of 18 December, 1942. By this stage, despite the very real dangers, the trip had almost become routine and the ship picked up her last load of passengers, 300 Portuguese refugees, including a number of women and children, and returned them safely to Darwin. On this trip, Commander Kruys was surprised to see three of his stokers playing with a small brown baby. His enquiries revealed that the baby was on its own and no one aboard knew where its parents were. The three stokers requested permission to adopt the baby but were refused by the scandalised captain who promptly handed the baby over to the first officer aboard when he reached Darwin. That officer was the Intelligence Officer from NOIC Darwin and Kruys recalled with pleasure some years later the look on the officer's face as he walked back down

the gangway with a baby in his arms.

Her mission now completed, *Tjerk Hiddes* left Darwin on 19 December and returned to Fremantle, arriving back there on Christmas Eve. In three weeks she had fought off an air attack, steamed almost 7,000 miles, taken part in an extensive sea search for the survivors of HMAS *Armidale* and, in a dangerous and sensitive operation, lifted almost 1,000 people from a hostile shore and returned them safely to Darwin. The ship, her captain and crew had nobly upheld the centuries old traditions of the Royal Netherlands Navy and for his part in the operation, Lieutenant Commander Kruys was later awarded the United States Legion of Merit.

To round off the tale, with the Dutch withdrawn and the Australian commandoes faced with increasing Japanese pressure, headquarters decided that the risks to the troops left on Timor far outweighed any possible further advantage. The bulk of 2/4 Independent Company was evacuated on 9 January 1943 by the destroyer HMAS *Arunta*. A small observer party of 10 men was left behind but these too were withdrawn on 10 February, bringing to a close the saga of "Sparrow" Force.

Afterwards

Following her Timor epic, *Tjerk Hiddes* saw further hard, though largely unspectacular, service in the Indian and Pacific Oceans until the end of the Second World War. The end of that war, however, did not mean the end of hostilities for *Tjerk Hiddes*. She was immediately at war again taking part in Dutch operations to suppress the nationalist uprising in the Indies. From 1945 to 1949,

Tjerk Hiddes was engaged on operations against the rebels, being employed on convoy, anti-infiltration patrol, troop transport and NGS tasks.

With the end of hostilities following the granting of Indonesian independence in 1949, a Dutch military and naval training team was sent to the new republic to help transform the former guerrilla forces into regular armed forces. The naval team set up an officers training school, staff college and technical school at Surabaya to prepare the small Indonesian Navy for receipt of a number of ex-Royal Netherlands Navy ships which were to form the nucleus of the Indonesian Navy.

On 1 March, 1951, HNIMS *Tjerk Hiddes* steamed into Surabaya flying for the last time the red, white and blue ensign of the Netherlands. Shortly after midday, the Dutch ensign and jack were hauled down for the last time and *Tjerk Hiddes* was decommissioned as a ship of the Royal Netherlands Navy. Shortly after, the red and white ensign of the Republic of Indonesia was

raised and the old "Timor Ferry" became KRI *Gadjah Mada*, the new flagship of the Indonesian Navy.

Gadjah Mada served as the Indonesian Navy's flagship until 1960 when she was disarmed and placed in reserve. The end came in 1961 when the proud old ship was broken up for scrap, a fairly common end for warships, but still a sad one for a ship which had ably served three navies and been the pride of two.

Conclusion

The saga of the *Tjerk Hiddes* and, especially, her epic voyage to and from Timor in 1942 make an interesting story in their own right. More to the point, the flawless performance of her hazardous and difficult mission to Timor are an example of what can be accomplished by a combination of good ship, good crew and good captain and an example of how speed, daring and professionalism will almost always pay off.

The fact that *Tjerk Hiddes* went on to serve for some years as the flagship of the navy of Australia's nearest large neighbour adds interest to the story. Finally, the fact that her wartime service was almost exclusively with the RAN and that she succeeded in a dangerous mission where the RAN, admittedly through

no great fault of its own, had failed, links HNIMS *Tjerk Hiddes* inextricably with Australian military and naval history. Her name deserves to live on.

End Note

The crew of the *Tjerk Hiddes* and the members of van Straaten's force of NEI troops were all awarded the Expedition Cross with clasp 'TIMOR 1942' in 1946 and were the last Dutch service personnel ever to receive this interesting campaign medal. Following standard Dutch practice, the medals were issued un-named but were accompanied, again standard Dutch practice, by an impressive, illustrated certificate referred to as a 'brevet'. The brevet carries the medal recipient's number, rank, name, ship or unit, and the name and date of the clasp. The brevets for army and navy, signed by the commander of the Netherlands East Indies Army, the KNIL, or the Minister of Marine, respectively, are visually quite different. My initial interest in the story of the *Tjerk Hiddes* was sparked by a naval brevet (minus, alas, its medal) named to a crewman from *Tjerk Hiddes* which came into my possession some time ago. I actually do possess an Expedition Cross (minus, again alas, its brevet) in my collection but the clasp is 'BALI 1849' rather than 'TIMOR 1942'.



THE EMPEROR'S CLOTHES

*They are ritzy, cost a lot of money and spook your competitors
but do computers contribute a zack to productivity?*

This article is courtesy of ©The Economist Newspaper Limited, London 1996.

Robert Solow, a Nobel Prize winning economist, once remarked that you can see computers every where but in the productivity statistics. The apparent absence of a productivity boost from the new technology has come to be known among economists as the productivity paradox. Take the United States' investment in computers in the past two decades, which has risen 20-30 per cent a year in real terms. In that time, the share of IT in companies' total investment in equipment has jumped from 7 per cent in 1970 to more than 40 per cent this year. Add the billions of dollars companies spend on software, and spending on IT now exceeds investment in traditional machinery.

This investment should, in theory, have lifted productivity and boosted growth. Yet productivity gains in the US, and in the big industrial economies, have slowed sharply since the early 1970s. Labour productivity growth in the big seven economies, which in 1960-73 averaged 4.5 per cent a year, has been a mere 1.5 per cent since then. Growth in total factor productivity (output per unit of labour and capital combined) during the same period slowed from an average of 3.3 per cent to 0.8 per cent a year. In other words, most growth since the mid 1970s can be explained simply by increased inputs of labour and capital; the contribution from technological progress appears to have been tiny.

Despite hundreds of studies, the dismal scientists remain deeply divided on why the computer revolution has failed to spur productivity. One possible, if depressing, explanation is that there has been no revolution, and that computers are simply not particularly productive. An economist at MIT, Paul Krugman, never one to dodge controversy, argues that recent technological advances are not in the same league as those achieved earlier this century. Looking back to the 1950s and 1960s when productivity surged, he points out that changes in technology then affected every aspect of life. In 1945, crossing the US by train could take three days, and groceries were bought in mum and dad general stores; by 1970, the journey from one end of the country to the other took five hours by plane, and groceries came from big, efficient supermarkets. By comparison, he claims, IT has less effect on the average person's life. Computerised ticketing is a great thing, but a cross country flight still takes five hours; bar codes and laser scanners are nifty, but a shipper still has to queue at the checkout.

Mr Krugman has a point. Just because today's computer is 50 times more powerful than it would have been 10 years ago, it will not necessarily be 50 times more productive. And as computers become cheaper, people sometimes use them for less than vital tasks, such as playing solitaire. One reason why spending on computers is high is that equipment is replaced ever more frequently but more powerful, newer models, long before it is worn out. Also, investment in new technology may not always be intended to boost productivity. In a recent study - Technology, Productivity and Jobs the OECD points out that a growing slice of spending on R&D and IT is devoted to product differentiation and marketing in a battle for market share, not to making existing production more efficient.

While there may be an element of truth in the argument that some IT spending is wasteful, it cannot be the whole story. A second, more hopeful explanation for the paradox draws upon history, which shows that there is often a delay of several decades before technological breakthroughs deliver economy wide productivity gains. Companies take time to identify the most efficient way to use new technology and to make organisational changes. It is the wide diffusion of a technology rather than its invention that brings the biggest benefits.

An economic historian at Stanford University, Paul David, explained in a classic study how the introduction in the early 1880s of the electric dynamo (which opened the way for commercial use of electricity) took 40 years to yield significant productivity gains. Growth in productivity in industrial economies actually slowed down after 1890 and did not revive until the 1920s. This partly reflected the slow rate at which electricity was adopted. In 1899 electricity accounted for less than 5 per cent of power used in US manufacturing; only in 1919 did its share reach 50 per cent. And even when companies had installed electricity, it still took them a long time to learn how to organise their factories around electric power and to take advantage of its flexibility. Previously, machines had had to be put next to water wheels or steam engines; electricity allowed them to be placed along a production line to maximise the efficiency of the work flow.

In the same way, spending lots of money on IT is not enough; businesses also have to learn how to use it efficiently. When computers first appeared in offices

in the 1970s, they were used to automate existing tasks such as typing. It took time for managers to understand that computers not only allowed them to do the same things differently, but also to do completely different things. Moreover, about three quarters of all spending on IT has gone into service industries, such as telecommunications and financial services. Until recently these were often sheltered from competition, and so had little incentive to use IT efficiently.

Although the computer was invented 50 years ago, the computer revolution did not begin in earnest until Intel introduced the microprocessor in 1971. The IBM PC was not introduced until 1982. If it took 40 years before electric power started to show productivity gains, perhaps it is not surprising that the benefits of computers have yet to materialise. On the other hand, thanks to plunging prices, computers are being diffused through the economy more rapidly than electricity was. About half of all US workers now use some form of computer (up from a quarter in 1984). Since Mr David's research seems to suggest that productivity benefits start to be reaped once the diffusion rate of a technology passes 50 per cent, the productivity gains may be just around the corner.

Indeed, at the company level, rather than the level of the economy as a whole, there is already evidence that computers boost productivity. Eric Brynjolfsson and Lorin Hitt at MIT, in a study which examined 367 big US manufacturing and services companies between 1988 and 1992, found that investment in computers yielded an average return of more than 50 per cent a year.

If the return is so good, why does it not show up in the economy as a whole? The explanation, say some, is that computers account for only 2 per cent of total US capital stock. On the surface, this might provide a third explanation for the productivity paradox: that the capital stock of computers at present is too small to make much difference to overall productivity growth. However, the 2 per cent figure covers only computers. Add in telecommunications equipment and computer software, and the total approaches 12 per cent, the same as for railways. Moreover, if, as many believe, the IT revolution is still in its early stages, with some sectors still barely touched by it, then as it spreads through the economy, so will its potential to raise productivity.

According to a fourth explanation of the productivity paradox (and perhaps the most persuasive of all), the benefits are already coming through, but standard economic statistics are failing to capture them. The tools used for measuring productivity are more suited to the output of 19th century dark satanic mills than 21st century electronic wizardry. An economist at Harvard University, Zvi Griliches, points to a clue to the paradox: the slowdown in productivity growth has

largely been in the service, where productivity is notoriously hard to measure. In manufacturing where the statistics are more reliable, productivity growth has held up rather better. This is significant, because many service industries have invested proportionately more in IT than manufacturing.

According to Mr Griliches, the measurement problem is twofold: first, economies are shifting towards services, which have always been tricky to measure, and; second, the nature of the gains from IT often makes them hard to quantify. In many services it is hard even to define the unit of output, partly because higher output often comes in the form of quality improvements. In areas such as finance, health care and education, government statisticians typically assume output rises in line with the number of hours worked. The bizarre effect is that measured productivity growth is zero by definition. Likewise, telecommunications output is measured in minutes of calls, leaving out the huge increase in information transmitted through faxes of faster modems. Or suppose a transport company introduces a computer system which helps drivers to pick the quickest route, and thus provide a better service for its customers. If mileage drops as a consequence, the official statistics will show a fall in real output.

The share of the economy that can be measured with any degree of accuracy is shrinking. In 1947, calculates Mr Griliches, about half of US output was in agriculture, mining and manufacturing, and so readily measurable. By 1990 that share had declined to only 30 per cent. And yet the other 70 per cent of output contains some of the fastest growing sectors.

One of the biggest problems is calculating price changes, which are used to deflate increases in nominal output between two periods to obtain changes in the volume of output. This is relatively easy for basic commodities, such as wheat or steel, but much harder for goods and services where new and better products are continuously emerging. A tonne of steel is much the same as 20 years ago, but the quality of a television set, say, will have improved vastly, so the increase in price needs to be adjusted for the higher quality.

Official price indices overstate the rate of inflation, and hence understate growth, in a number of ways. For instance, government statisticians tend to delay the inclusion of new goods or services in the consumer price index until they have been on the market for several years, thereby leaving out the rapid fall which usually takes place in the early years of a new product. When video-cassette recorders first came on the market in the late 1970s they sold for about \$US1000 (\$1260). By the mid 1980s the price had fallen to \$US200 and many new features, such as electronic controls and programming capabilities, had

been added. Yet it was not until 1987 that they were included in the United States' CPI, so the huge drop in price in their first decade went unrecorded. In the same way, personal computers were not included until 13 years after the first home computer was launched.

Another example is that the price of medical services is based on the cost of inputs, such as doctors' fees and hospital charges. But this fails to reflect improvements in treatment which reduce the consumption of these inputs. For example, in the early 1960s a typical cataract patient would spend seven days in hospital, whereas now the operation can be done in a day as an outpatient. None of this shows up in the official statistics.

A study by an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Leonard Nakamura, estimates that the US inflation rate has been overstated by an average of two to three percentage points a year since 1974, mainly because new products or product improvements have been neglected. If this is correct, then productivity growth in the rich industrial economies has been much higher than official figures suggest. This would matter less if new products and quality changes were introduced at a constant pace. The overstatement of inflation (and hence the understatement of growth) would be constant over time, so it would not distort relative productivity growth between two periods, and hence could not explain the productivity paradox.

However, there is good reason to believe that the degree of mismeasurement has worsened as product cycles have shortened. Mr Nakamura estimates that the mismeasurement of inflation has been 1.7 percentage points a year higher since 1974 than in the previous 15 years. The greater understatement of growth that this implies would be almost enough to explain all of the apparent slowdown in US productivity growth in the past two decades. And, if mismeasurement has been getting worse over the period, then true productivity growth may now be surging, not sagging.

The mismeasurement problem becomes more acute as output shifts to goods and services, where quality is an important factor. Henry Ford offered his customers a car of any colour as long as it was black.

But IT makes it economical to provide greater choice, even to tailor goods to the needs of individual customers. A large share of the benefits of IT comes through not as cost saving but in the shape of quality improvements, wider consumer choice, better customer service, time savings and convenience. These are important to consumers, but difficult to measure. For example, 24 hour automated teller machines have clearly made life more convenient for banks' customers, but this added convenience does not show up in the national accounts. On the contrary, as fewer cheques are processed, measured productivity appears to fall.

Many US economists believe that revisions made earlier this year to the methodology used to calculate GDP (a shift from fixed to annually adjusted weights), although defensible in themselves, have had the effect of understating growth even more than before. Even if the number crunchers are trying, getting the statistics right is clearly difficult. One reason is that government statistical agencies in many countries have been starved of funds. And even where the money is available, it is often badly allocated. The budget for the United States' national accounts statistics for example, is less than one-third that for agricultural statistics.

However, an even bigger reason for the inadequacy of official statistics may be that the economy is simply becoming unmeasurable. Conventional methods of measuring the economy are no longer up to the task and economists cannot agree on how to improve them. It does not help that within the profession, economic statistics is considered a less exciting subject than economic theory, so it fails to attract as much talent as it needs. But in any case, whatever the statisticians may eventually come up with, it is misleading to judge the value of IT by comparing productivity growth in the past two decades with that in the 1950s and 1960s. That was an exceptional period, when growth in many countries was making up for time lost in the 1930s depression and World War II.

Taking a longer view, recent growth has been quite respectable. Allow for the fact that mismeasurement is now much worse than earlier this century, and the rich economies' output per head may well be growing more swiftly than in any previous technological revolution. But what does that mean for jobs?



One centre of **excellence** for Naval Technology

Our product range includes . . .



Combat
Systems for
Submarines,
Surface Ships
and MCMV's



Advanced technology low
frequency Active/Passive sonars



Future generation
submarine
heavyweight
torpedoes



Maritime
Simulators for
shiphandling,
sensor and
tactical training



Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles



STN ATLAS ELEKTRONIK

STN ATLAS (AUSTRALIA) Pty Limited

UNIT 6, 39 HERBERT STREET, ST LEONARDS NSW 2065 BOX 718 ARTARMON

PHONE (02) 437 4577 TELEFAX (02) 439 7576

The US Naval Institute

Ninth Annual

INTERNATIONAL NAVIES ESSAY CONTEST

The U.S. Naval Institute will award cash prizes of \$1,000, \$750, and \$500 to the authors of the three winning essays in its Ninth Annual International Navies Essay Contest.

Essays should cover strategic, geographic, and cultural influences on individual or regional navies, their commitments and capabilities, and relationships with other navies. Authors of all nationalities are invited to enter.

Essay Contest Rules

1. Essays must be original and no longer than 3,000 words.
2. All entries should be directed to Editor-in-Chief, *Proceedings* (International Navies Essay Contest), U.S. Naval Institute, 118 Maryland Avenue, Annapolis, MD 21402-5035.
3. Essays must be postmarked no later than 1 August 1996.
4. Letters notifying the three award winners will be mailed on or about 15 October 1996.
5. All essays should be typewritten, double-spaced, on 8-1/2" x 11" paper. Include address, phone number, biographical sketch, and—if a U.S. citizen—social security number with each entry.
6. The Naval Institute will publish the winning essays in the March 1997 issue of *Proceedings*, its monthly magazine. Some entries not awarded prizes also may be selected for publication. Their authors will be compensated at regular rates.
7. The Naval Institute Editorial Board will judge the competition.

Essays must be postmarked no later than 1 August 1997.

THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE Inc.

Office Bearers

				Telephone	Fax
President	RADM	C. Barrie	A-4-18	(06) 265 5158	
Snr. V/President	CDRE	P. McGuire	CP3-1-06	(06) 266 4102	
Jnr. V/President	LEUT	J. Sears	ADFA	(06) 268 6099	
Secretary	LEUT	A. Nelson	F-3-64	(06) 265 4673	(06) 265 6206
Treasurer	LEUT	C. Roberts	CP4-1-B6	(06) 266 4790	(06) 266 4818
Journal Editor	LEUT	A. Cooper	APW2-G-11	(06) 266 6576	(06) 266 6754
Councillors	CDRE	W. Dovers	B-4-05A	(06) 265 6606	
	PCHA	M. Davis	D-3-26	(06) 265 3264	
	CMDR	A. Du Toit	CP2-3-16	(06) 266 3159	
	LCDR	D. Devereaux	D-4-06	(06) 265 3201	
	LCDR	A. Hinge	ADSC	(06) 268 8454	
	LCDR	K. Wallis	HMAS <i>Harman</i>	(06) 280 2809	
	LCDR	N. Wark	A-4-17	(06) 265 5157	
	LEUT	L. Blunden	A-4-24	(06) 265 2599	
	LEUT	B. Spurgin	D-3-15	(06) 265 4035	
	POWTR	P. Andrews	D-2-20	(06) 265 3950	
Public Officer	CDRE	A. Brecht	APW2-1-17	(06) 266 6297	

New Zealand Chapter

Convenor	CMDR	B. Coffey	OTS HMNZS <i>Tamaki</i>	64 9 445 5653	64 9 445 5677
Secretary	LCDR	C. Olliver	20 Pukeora Ave, Remuera, Auckland		
Treasurer	LCDR	W. Stevens	C/- PO Box 817, Auckland		
Wellington Liaison Officer	CMDR	R. McKillop		64 4 478 0725	

Past Presidents

RADM C. Oxenbould, AO (1994-95), RADM D. Chalmers, AO (1992-93), CDRE I.A. Callaway (1988-92), CDRE A.H.R. Brecht (1985-88), CDRE I.B. James, AM (1983-85), RADM R.C. Swan, AO CBE (1978-83), CDRE J.A. Robertson (1977-78), CDRE V.A. Parker (1975-77)

Honorary Life Members

ADM Sir Victor Smith, AC KBE CB DSC, VADM Sir David Stevenson, AC KBE, ADM Sir Anthony Synnot, KB OBE, CDRE J.A. Robertson, Rt. Hon. Sir Zelman Cowan, AK GCMG GCVO QC, RADM R. Swan, AO CBE, CDRE I.B. James, AM, CMDR G. Cutts, CDRE A.H.R. Brecht, CDRE I.A. Callaway.

Foundation Members

Bennet, G.A.	Dickie, D.D.	Jervis, G.E.	Macleod, B.D.	Scott, B.P.	Williams, K.A.
Berlyn, N.R.B.	Fisher, T.R.	Josslyn, I.K.	Nathey, R.J.	Sharp, W.R.	York, D.
Bonnet, V.W.L.	Fox, L.G.	Kemp, W.A.	Nicholson, B.M.	Shearing, J.A.	
Brecht, A.H.R.	George, J.	Knox, I.W.	Nicholson, I.H.	Smyth, D.H.D.	
Broben, I.W.	Gibbs, B.G.	Lee, N.E.	Orr, D.J.	Snell, K.E.	
Calderwood, G.	Goddard, F.C.	Loftus, W.B.	Parker, V.A.	Stephen, K.C.	
Cole, S.E.W.	Grierson, K.	Loosli, R.G.	Patterson, D.R.	Stevens, E.V.	
Cummins, A.R.	Hall, I.W.	Martin, D.J.	Ralph, N.	Stevens, J.D.	
Cutts, G.	Herman, F.J.	Martin, P.C.S.	Read, B.J.	Summers, A.M.F.	
Dalrymple, H.H.	Histed, G.	Mayson, J.H.	Reynolds, I.	Swan, R.C.	
Davidson, J.	James, I.B.	McDonald, N.E.	Robertson, J.A.	Swan, W.N.	

APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP

(Family Name) (Initials) (Title) (Organisation)

(Private Address)

(Postcode)

(Service/Business Address)

(Postcode)

I apply for FULL/ASSOCIATE membership of the Australian Naval Institute for:

☐ One Year (\$25)

☐ Three Years (\$65)

Please debit my BANKCARD/MASTERCARD/VISA card number

(Card Number)

(Expiry Date)

If accepted for membership I agree to abide by the Constitution and By-Laws of the Institute.

(Signed)

(Date)

Enquiries and membership applications should be directed to:

The Secretary

**Australian Naval Institute
PO Box 80 Campbell ACT
AUSTRALIA 2612**

MOVING? Please return the slip below to the Secretary.

(Family Name) (Initials) (Title) (Membership No.)

(Address)

(Postcode)

JOURNAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE Inc.

PO Box 80 Campbell ACT

AUSTRALIA 2612

Print Post Approved

Print Post Publication Number:

PP 229 219 000 20

1900 0002 295

CDRE JA ROBERTSON RAN(RTD)

57 NEWRY ISLAND DVE

URUNGA

NSW 2455

POSTAGE
PAID
AUSTRALIA

SURFACE
MAIL