SEA POWER
IN THE NEW CENTURY

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

Volume 21 Number Three
August/October 1995

AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE INC

The Australian Naval Institute was formed and incorporated in the Australian Capital Territory in 1975. The main objects of the Institute are:

- To encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the maritime profession,
- to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and the maritime profession, and
- to publish a journal.

The Institute is self-supporting and non-profit-making. All publications of the Institute will stress that the authors express their own views and opinions are not necessarily those of the Department of Defence, the Chief of Naval Staff or the Institute. The aim is to encourage discussion, dissemination of information, comment and opinion and the advancement of professional knowledge concerning naval and maritime matters.

The membership of the Institute is open to:

- *Regular Members*. Regular membership is open to members of the RAN, RANR, RNZN or RNZNVR and persons who having qualified for regular membership, subsequently leave the service.
- *Associate Members*. Associate membership is open to all other persons not qualified to be Regular Members, who profess an interest in the aims of the Institute.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Australian Naval Institute is grateful for the assistance provided by the corporations listed below. They are demonstrating their support for the aim of the Institute by being members of the "Friends of the Australian Naval Institute" coterie.

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SPECIAL FEATURE

This issue presents the Institute's 1995 Vernon Parker Oration: SEA POWER IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY which was presented by Eric Grove, and the Institute hopes that all delegates to the SEA POWER IN THE NEW CENTURY conference find it informative.

Cover Photograph: ***Defence artist Jeff Isaacs gives the Institute his impression of the new ANZAC Frigate during operations in the 21st Century. The ANZAC is being built in Australia for the RAN and the RNZN.***

Features

Layout & typeset by COMMUNICATIONS Stirling ACT
Phone 06 288 5990

From the President

During the October meeting of the Council of the Australian Naval Institute I had the good fortune of being elected the Institute's ninth President. I look forward to working with Council to achieve the Institute's remaining objectives for 1995. Chris Oxenbould, my predecessor, did a fine job in working with Council to carefully maintain ANI objectives and manage initiatives, and I thank him for handing over a good 'ship' crewed by a healthy mix of Councillors in terms of age and experience. Having been a member of the Institute for many years it is very pleasing to see that the financial constraints that plagued the Institute in earlier years have been largely overcome, and we are now on a sound financial footing. This is mainly as a result of gaining corporate sponsorship through the Friends of the ANI, which is a coterie of committed organisations interested in joining with the Institute to encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the navy and the maritime profession. This group comprises fourteen companies, both large and small, and they are listed in the inside front cover of this journal.

Other things have changed for the better since my last involvement in helping to put together the ANI journal. In the early years, members and councillors got together to literally 'cut and paste' material to make up the journal, but today desktop publishing makes life a lot easier, and I am sure you will agree that the journal looks more professional with every issue. Certainly lots of good feedback about its quality of presentation and variety of stories has been received, and the journal will continue to be our 'flagship' in 1996 to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas on subjects related to the navy and the maritime profession. In terms of journal content a major objective of Council in 1996 will be to encourage sailors and junior officers to make contributions in the form of letters to the editor, short pieces and articles.

Prominent among the remaining objectives for 1995 is the successful conduct of the SEA POWER Conference in Sydney during 22-23 November. The conference offers informed debate on prospective developments and changes that will affect regional navies in terms of future operations and force structures. If we are not responsive to these changes and developments in terms of adjusting missions, capabilities and doctrine we will have a flawed vision for the future and will almost certainly waste scarce resources and perhaps even lives. Consequently, the Australian Naval Institute is a major sponsor of the conference and has 'combined forces' with the RAN's Maritime Studies Program, the Australian Defence Studies Centre, Transfield and Australian Defence Industries to produce a conference in the finest traditions of the Institute's SEA POWER conferences of yesteryear. The Minister for Defence and the Minister for Defence Science and Personnel will both give presentations at the conference, and many first class international presenters are also attending. These include Rear Admiral John Sigler, CINCPAC's Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations and Dr B.A. Hamzah, Director General of the Malaysian Institute of Maritime Affairs. From the US Naval Institute, Dr Norman Friedman will be giving two presentations on developments in maritime warfare technologies, and Dr Jan Breemer of the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey will give insights into changing aspects of naval strategy and operations. Other high profile international presenters include Vice Admiral Mihir Roy, Rear Admiral Sumihiko Kawamura, Dr Derek Da Cuhna and Dr You Ji.

SEA POWER IN THE NEW CENTURY provides an ideal venue to promote our Institute and its objectives. The editorial committee has prepared this issue as a 'promotion' issue for distribution at the conference, as well as developing a new look ANI information/ membership brochure for prospective members. Conference attendees will also get a copy of our 20th Anniversary journal which was produced earlier this year and, in addition, an ANI information and product display will be set up to provide information and recruit new members. Members of the Institute, who already receive a 12% discount on registration cost, can also stock up on ANI ties, books and cuff links at the display!

I hope to see many old friends at the SEA POWER conference, and perhaps make a few new ones as well.

Chris Barrie

From The Editor

The hardworking editorial team of the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute (JANI) welcomes delegates to the SEA POWER IN THE NEW CENTURY conference, and we hope you enjoy reading this issue and material in the generous sampling of back issues found in your conference 'show bag'! In many ways JANI is the 'Flag Ship' of the Institute and aims to regularly bring our diverse readership in eight countries a variety of interesting and informative stories. The common thread in our journal is commentary on naval strategy and operations, but it also concentrates on international relations, defence and foreign policy issues and project mangement, as well as personnel management matters.

This issue starts off with 'IIlumination Rounds', which provides a forum for commentary on current issues affecting the navy and the maritime professions in addition to feedback on previous stories that have appeared in the journal. The journal also has regular contributions from overseas correspondents and in this issue Tom Friedmann, our long time friend in Washington, reflects on the 50th Anniversary of World War Two and the debate concerning the necessity, or lack of necessity, of attacking Japan with nuclear weapons in 1945.

In the spirit of sound naval strategy this issue also includes a transcript of the 1995 Vernon Parker Oration, which is arranged by the Institute each year to promote its aims - the chief aim being to promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the maritime professions. The late Commodore Vernon Parker was the first President of the Institute, and the 1995 oration was made by Eric Grove of the Centre for Security Studies at the University of Hull in the UK. The presentation is aptly called 'SEA POWER IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY'. Another important ANI activity is to encourage scholarship in maritime matters and this involves presenting a medal and other prizes to the best RAN Staff College essay on each course, and in this issue we have published ANI prize winning articles by David Hulse and Gary Hogan. David Hulse gives an unofficial American view of positioning the RAN for the future, and Gary Hogan looks at the rhetoric and reality associated with Australia's attempts to build a strategic partnership with South East Asia.

Other contributors of articles in this issue include Graham Dunk, a former RAN ASW officer, who looks at the prospects and problems for selling variants of Australia's new Collins Class submarines. Another Australian author of articles that I put in the 'particularly interesting' category, is our old friend Martin Dunn whose contribution is called 'The Tyranny of Jointery'. In it he considers the nature of organisational jointery, suggests natural limits to its application and identifies the impact of jointery on the Royal Australian Navy. Martin has also promised JANI an article on the triumphs and heartbreaks of life in the Force Development and Analysis Division. We look forward to reading it in '96 - which isn't that far away!

From the Institute's extensive stable of talented historians, Graham Wilson - our prolific author on maritime matters off-beat-returns after his excellent article on the British Impress Act. In this issue he chose to look at two aspects of US naval history and gives a brief history of the US Coast Guard in Vietnam, together with an account of the first salute for 'Old Glory',which is the story of the USS ANDREW DORIA at St Eustatius.

Of course no issue of JANI would be complete without a small offering from me, so I produced a piece loosely following on from my article on naval leadership, which I was fortunate enough to have produced in the May/July 1994 issue of JANI. It is something 'different' and I hope you find it informative.

Once again, WELCOME all comers to the SEA POWER conference at the Novotel Brighton Beach in Sydney, and please consider joining the ANI so that you too can enjoy the substantial benefits and privileges of being a member of the Australian Naval Institute.

Alan Hinge

06 2688454

ILLUMINATION ROUNDS

With ODDBALL

'Press Gangs' Australian Style

I thoroughly enjoyed Graham Wilson's entertaining and informative story of Press Gangs and their victims in not so merry old England (JANI May/Jul 95). While reading his story I remembered that some of our Australian ancestors were not averse to adopting drastic measures to complete ships crews, and I was encouraged to relate some stories of shanghaing for which one Australian port was notorious during the late 1840's and early 1850s. According to J.B Cooper in his book *Victorian Commerce: 1834-1934*, Sandridge or Port Melbourne enjoyed a particularly evil reputation. In fact, '...among the ports of the world it was said to be the most notorious port where sailor men were robbed, drugged and shanghaied...conditions prevailed in the daily lives of sailors ashore in Port Melbourne, that were shocking'.

In the early 1850s shanghaing or 'crimping' became an art form in Port Melbourne. It was practiced by such notable sharks as 'Flash Jack', 'Blue Nose', Jack Sheppard, Port Wine Mary Anne and the King of the Crimps himself: the notorious 'Blueskin', who frequently worked with a shadowy partner known as the 'Ghost'. At the height of their power in the early 1850s the crimps are said to have shipped three out of every four seamen 'engaged' in the Port of Melbourne. This was a considerable number given that during the Gold Rush it was not uncommon for 100 ships to be anchored in Port Phillip Bay.

In straightforward cases of 'doing' a sailor the crimps and their agents plied the sailor with drugged liquor in a local pub, he was then robbed of his kit, kicked, cuffed and ironed and taken to a ship to fill an 'order', or placed temporarily in a 'dead house' — a hidden room in a pub or brothel to store drugged sailors. After a day or two poor 'Jack' was half-wittedly turning to as part of a hapless crew destined for unknown parts.

Crimps were used by ships' captains for a multitude of purposes. Before the Gold Rush some crimps were used to lure sailors off ships without proper discharges and keep them drugged in 'dead houses' until the ship had set sail. Without proper discharge from the ship 'Jack' had to forego his wages and a captain would therefore make the trip more profitable. But during the heady days of the Gold Rush the problem for Captains was to retain and get full crews for sailing, because British pay rates were about four quid a month compared to the ten quid colonial rate. The crimps got about five quid a head from a captain for 'doing' a sailor.

The head crimps were often publicans whose establishments were riddled with secret rooms and exits. Bedrooms were partitioned off with spring doors and panels providing entry. Inside the partitions were ladders leading to roof escape routes for the crimps, their 'cargo' and clients such as seamen headed for the goldfields and sundry criminals on the run. Various systems of signal, alarm and 'ambush' drill were used by the crimps, for example, at Blueskin's popular hostelry the single ring of a ship's bell gave the signal to hide in a secret room, while two rings meant climb the ladders and make an escape over the roof tops.

The following two episodes convey some of the ruthlessness, alacrity and humour with which crimps like Blueskin and the Ghost went about their rapacious business :

Blueskin and the Ghost were commissioned to snare a crewman with better than average boxing skills by a pugilistic Captain who wanted a sparring partner at sea. The Captain specifically mentioned a well known and skilful Negro boxer called 'Black Albert'. Blueskin could not entice Black Albert to his pub, but managed to lure a local boxer named Jimmy Shannon on the pretext of arranging an exhibition bout in the pub. Jimmy was drugged, cuffed, 'polished black' and delivered to the ship in the dead of night. Lying on the unlit forecastle, Jimmy passed for Black Albert and a fiver was awarded to Blueskin and the Ghost who left in jovial spirits.

Of course the crimps had to watch out for resentful victims who did not appreciate the humour of it all when returning from their long, involuntary voyages. Three vengeful sailors once plotted to get even with Blueskin, and invited him to a nearby pub for a 'no hard feelings' drink. Blueskin regretted he could not make the scene and asked them over to his pub for drinks on him. The 'Ghost' was planted in Blueskin's bar and 'shouted' them generously. By the time Blueskin emerged the three conspirators were drugged, robbed, cuffed and destined for another long voyage. Fortunately, the crimps happened to have an 'order' for the following day.

...Having grown up in South and Port Melbourne during the 1950s and 60s, well before the area's present gentrification and yuppification, I remember that there seemed to be a pub on practically every corner — I lived directly across the road from the 'Maori Chief' which was established in 1857 — and numerous colourful, if shady, characters still lived in the area (some, like my uncle Lenny 'The Fox' Hogan being near and

dear relatives). And I still remember my father saying that American gangsters portrayed in movies had nothing on some of the characters who had once inhabited the Port Melbourne and South Melbourne area. After reading about the crimps of Sandridge I can well believe it.

Al Hinge

P.S. Those wishing to know more of the nefarious crimps and their capers can refer to Bill Wannan's *Folklore of the Australian Pub* - from which most of this material is gleaned - or J.B Castieau's *The Reminiscences of Detective Inspector Christie.*

Oddball's comment: Sir, your shady background explains a lot of things.....

A Case for Overtime

In these times of 'user pays' and efficiency drives, I am surprised that the ADF has not reduced or abolished Service Allowance and replaced it with a system of overtime payments. If Captains were given a bucket of money to use to pay personnel for any out-of-hours work, then I am certain they would ensure that only absolutely necessary tasks were carried out. For instance, many duty rosters would be quickly trimmed of personnel currently considered 'essential' and, instead of a dozen interminable parade practices at 0700 in the morning, the Commanding Officer might discover that the final result following the additional eleven practices was not worth the money expended. Those in authority might even be required to think about the extra work associated with their decisions before they put pen to paper and produced another awe-inspiring directive or order which required a driver, two door-openers and a steward to stay up until midnight playing cards while their boss represented the RAN at another combat effectiveness enhancing social event!

The thought that you were not being paid to work until late might even encourage people to work quickly and efficiently to finish tasks during the day. No longer would a boss stay around working late trying to impress her superior and gain promotion if the superior was not there to notice it and he was unwilling to pay his staff overtime to do nothing except be there because he was.

Of course, there would be an administrative overload associated with implementing and maintaining the system but this has not stopped us from sustaining such costs in the name of economic efficiency in the past. The FENM immediately springs to mind. Indeed, implementing such a program would appear to be the ideal job to give to those 200 odd excess junior supply officers that Robinson identified in his report.

The Thoroughly Modern Manager

CONTROVERSY CORNER —Time for a Naval Restructure?

The Navy is attempting to embrace and adopt modern business practices in its ongoing effort to achieve efficiency and greater expenditure visibility. These practices include an emphasis on quality (through Naval Quality Management) and accrual accounting techniques. The Navy structure, however, is at odds with the structures of large business enterprises, and could be contributing to the inefficiencies that continue to be demonstrated.

The current practice in business is for a flat corporation structure, with as few as five layers from Managing Director to the worker on the factory floor. The military ethos is vastly different with its emphasis on rank as the means of advancement, responsibility and visibility. The naval structure contains at least 15 levels (and more if the CDF is a naval officer, and under-training ranks are also included). Whilst it would be nigh-on impossible to reduce to 5 levels, surely it is time for some rationalisation!!

The current spectrum of ranks can be broken down into four business-equivalent bands as follows:

Senior Management : Captain and above.

Junior Management: from Midshipman to Commander.

Supervisory: from Petty Officer to Warrant Officer.

Working: Leading Seaman and below.

The following rationalisation could therefore be effected:

Senior Management: Abolish the rank of CDRE.

Junior Management: Abolish the rank of MIDN.

Combine the ranks of CMDR and LCDR.

Supervisory:Combine the ranks of PO and CPO.

Working:Abolish the rank of SMN.

This rationalisation would therefore reduce the number of levels from top to bottom by 5. Provided that greater responsibility and accountability could be devolved downward in the new rank structure (something that has proved difficult to achieve in the past), and reward for superior performance within rank could be achieved with some pay flexibility, greater efficiencies should result through factors as diverse as greater visibility of actual events by senior management by a reduction in the number of reporting levels, through to less time spent by personnel on worrying about the next promotion.

Mr Spock

A Letter from Washington

from Tom A Friedmann

I was going to let the 50th anniversary of the end of the war against Japan pass in unaccustomed silence. Not because it wasn't important to reflect on the events of a half century ago, but because I didn't want to become involved in what I knew would be a field day for revisionist historians.

America's historical view of the Second World War has been recorded in much the same way the decision was made to fight the war: Germany first, Japan second. And a poor second at that. Pearl Harbor and Tokyo Bay served as "bookends' to the war against Germany. This is not to say that the "Germany First" strategy was wrong, only that the historical perspective of the war against Japan has been skewed by that decision.

Things here in the States got off to a rocky start when the Air and Space Museum of the Smithsonian Institution decided to editorialise about the Japanese "victims" of Hiroshima in the text accompanying its exhibit of a portion of the *Enola Gay*, the B-29 that dropped the first atomic bomb. After everyone from the American Legion to the Congress was heard from, however, the Smithsonian took the advice of the *Enola Gay*'s pilot, Paul Tibbets, and exhibited the aircraft without editorial comment.

"Distressing," I thought, "but not unexpected."

Next came a report in *The Economist* that Australia would be commemorating "Victory in the Pacific" and not "Victory Over Japan."

Could this be true?" I asked myself in dismay. "Has political correctness spread its tentacles to my home away from home ?"

Did an ocean make war against us for four years?

Did the "Imperial Pacific Navy" sink the *Perth* and the *Houston*? I didn't know it was "Pacific's" aircraft that bombed Pearl Harbor and Darwin and crashed into *Australia*, *Franklin* and *Aaron Ward*'. Did our forces fight the "Imperial Pacific Army" in New Guinea, Guadalcanal, the East Indies, Malaya and the Philippines?

Finally, the summer of 1995 has brought the expected orgy of self-flagellation about the use of atomic weapons to end the war against Japan.

Germany was forced to come to grips with its conduct of World War II and its atrocities against mankind. Japan never has. In the same way General Douglas MacArthur did not purge traitors in the Philippines when he returned, he failed to make Japan account for atrocities that were, with the exception of extermination camps, every bit as terrible as those perpetrated by the Nazis. Asian countries still resent the Japanese for what they did. Their collective memories are neither as short nor as selective as those in the United States.

How did Japan become the victim in World War II? The unprovoked invasion of China and the Rape of Nanking. Pearl Harbor, Kamikazes and the barbaric medical experiments of Unit 731. The forced prostitution of women from occupied countries. The maltreatment of civilian internees. The destruction of Manila. And last, but far from least, the Bataan Death March and the bestial treatment of Allied prisoners of war. Treatment that was, incidentally, directly in contrast to that provided to prisoners during the Russo-Japanese War and World War I. Japan was a perpetrator of the war, not a victim.

Revisionists say that the Japanese were on the verge of surrender in August 1945. An invasion of the home islands would not have been necessary, particularly after the Soviet Union entered the war. Use of the atomic bombs was, therefore, immoral.

The simple fact is that Japan had not surrendered by August 6, 1945, when the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. The Soviet declaration of war and the atomic bombing of Nagasaki on August 9, 1945, still did not bring an immediate surrender. Hard liners in the Japanese military were not forced into accepting capitulation until the Emperor intervened on August 14. Even then, members of the Imperial Family had to be dispatched to the field to make sure the Emperor's orders were obeyed.

In many ways, any discussion about the use of the atomic bombs becomes a battle of statistics. From 1939 to 1945, at least 42 million civilian and military casualties had been killed, wounded or listed as missing. General MacArthur's medical staff — the people who should have known the facts — estimated that the cost of an assault upon Kyushu would be 147,500 dead and 343,000 wounded. The Navy looked toward 50,000 dead and 50,000 wounded. As for projected Japanese losses, based on the figures from Leyte,

Luzon, Iwo Jima and Okinawa, the ratio of our casualties to the Japanese ranged from 1:1.25 to 1:5! Projected Japanese civilian losses were not included in these statistics and, of course, these battles were not in Japan where the opposition — military and civilian —was expected to be ferocious.

In August 1945, the President of the United States had at his disposal weapons that might bring the killing to an end without an invasion of the Japanese home islands, an invasion, all sides now concede, that would have caused hundreds of thousands of additional casualties, Japanese and Allied. Could Harry Truman have morally not used the atomic bombs? I think not.

Two sets of statistics from the "might have beens" arising out of the end of World War II have personal meaning to me.

The first is the No. 1. And that one is my father, Howard W. Friedmann.

Dad served his nation for four years as an officer in the United States Naval Reserve. The only member of his graduating class from the University of Kansas City to graduate in uniform, he volunteered for the Navy when he was not drafted fast enough to suit him.

Attached to the USS *Straus* (DE 408) as anti-submarine officer, he was so viciously afflicted with seasickness on the ship's shake down cruise from Houston to Boston and then through the Panama Canal to Pearl Harbor, that his captain wanted to put him ashore at CINCPAC. ("They had to tie him to the wheel so he could stand his watch," is my mother's uncharitable description of Dad's affliction.) So terrible was the memory that, 20 years later, he couldn't take me below decks on the *Queen Mary*, a ship 20 times the size of his and tied up in the Hudson River (luckily, a wonderful stewardess took me instead, but that's another story!).

But Dad refused a transfer. He said he had not joined the Navy to work in an office, so he remained with the *Straus* for nearly three years, through radar picket duty off Okinawa and two of the worst typhoons on record and as part of the first occupation forces into Sasebo, Japan.

As I began writing this column, I was again reminded how little Dad talks about his war experiences. One night, some 20 years ago, Dad began to expound on his service during dinner with me and a friend of mine. Stories I had never heard before — about depth charging a suspected German submarine in the Caribbean and a kamikaze that landed five feet off the bow of his ship — were real revelations. He also said something about how "falling asleep at your post in wartime was a capital offence" and how lucky he was when the chief quartermaster reminded him to order the lines slackened before the ship took on a greater list toward the pier!

I didn't know until six or seven years ago that Dad kept in touch with several members of the *Straus'* crew, as well as with the widow of his captain. He never discussed the reunion he had with his shipmates despite the fact that everyone else I know knows I would have been interested in that information.

To this day, when watching a television program about the ground war, Dad will say that the war fought by the infantry and the Marines "was the real war." After all, "they were under fire all the time. And we had showers and hot food every day and clean sheets every night."

But Dad was eloquent about how he felt about his military service when it came time to discuss mine. One night, after Mother had banished all discussion of the topic from her presence, Dad and I were in his office discussing my service options. He leaned back in his chair and said, "I spent two years in the Pacific so you wouldn't have to." The Vietnam War ended before I had to make a decision.

Some 30 years ago, I asked Dad where his service medals were. He said that he had never received his medals, only ribbons. I wrote the Navy Department and discovered that this was not unusual during the rapid demobilisation after the war. However, if Dad would send in a request, his medals would be forwarded to him. I wrote the letter, Dad signed it and several weeks later a small package containing the American Campaign, the Asiatic-Pacific Campaign (with three battle stars, Victory and Navy Occupation (Asia clasp) Medals arrived. Despite some good-natured ribbing he took from Mother and some of his friends, I think Dad was pleased that I had persuaded him to request his medals. Luckily, one medal — the Purple Heart — was missing. And that brings me to the second set of statistics from the end of World War II that is personally important to me. The Purple Heart is one of America's most respected decorations because it is awarded to any member of the Armed Forces who is killed or wounded in action against the enemy. In anticipation of the invasion of Japan, the Army ordered more than 370,000 Purple Hearts, while the Navy ordered several hundred thousand. Some 370,000 Purple Hearts have been awarded since 1945, so presumably 200, 000 or more remain in storage from these massive stockpiles. Dad had fought his war unscathed until August 1945. Because World War II ended when it did — and no matter how it was brought to an end — my father luckily missed any chance to reduce the inventory of Purple Hearts. And for that, my family is eternally grateful.

SEA POWER IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY

The 1995 ANI Vernon Parker Memorial Oration

by

Eric Grove, Deputy Director, Centre for Security Studies, University of Hull.

First of all I would like to thank Admiral Oxenbould and the Australian Naval Institute, of which I am proud to be a member, for giving me the signal honour of inviting me to give this annual speech. I chose the term "sea power" deliberately. It is nowadays usual to emphasise, with Corbett, the significance of maritime power rather than sea power. This reflects the fundamental fact that people live on shore rather than at sea and that, therefore, seapower must make an impact ashore if it is to mean much. All this is true but, apart from sounding better, sea power is more specific, especially for a *Naval* institute. By seapower I mean the power one obtains from a capacity to use the sea for commercial and military purposes. This means the passage of shipping. Of course shipping — in its widest sense — may be used to support operations ashore or to carry out independent operations against the shore. As well as usually providing logistical support for land and land-based air operations, sea based assets can land troops from the sea and bombard targets at variable ranges with guns, aircraft and missiles both ballistic and cruise. This "power projection" capability has greatly increased in the last three quarters of a century or so, and in the post-Cold War world has become the major role for the greatest of the world's major navies. In an era of "battlespace dominance" of the surface, subsurface, air, land and space environments (not forgetting the electromagnetic spectrum) never has it been more true that sea power is but a form of air power, and land power too. But the unifying element in what I shall be talking about and what I hope the ANI is primarily interested in is the sea and what I think the future holds for sea based forces.

It seems unlikely that the sea will lose its so far unchanging characteristics in the next century. Seventy percent of the world's surface remains covered by the sea and, if the prophets of global warming are correct, this proportion may increase marginally over time. Water will remain inherently the most efficient means for transport of large and bulky items. A dramatic indication of this greater efficiency is that it costs the same to transport a tonne of coal from Australia to the UK as it does to transport it 100 kilometres from the port to the power station inland. Moreover, the sea gives great access. Seventy percent of the world's population lives within 175 kilometres or so of the sea; thus the centres of world population and power are within easy range. Indeed the range of sea-based systems is now such — thanks to the sea's utility as a mobile basing medium for such large and bulky items as ballistic missiles — that sea power can co-opt the ubiquity of air power to give it almost unlimited access.

Unlike air power, however, a much greater proportion of the free access provided by sea power is legal and exercisable in all conditions of political relations. Despite attacks by the more recent supporters of *mare clausum*, assaults spurred on by the new technologies of economic exploitation of both the sea and the ocean floor, the rights of maritime forces and merchant shipping to traverse "on their lawful occasions" not just high seas but exclusive economic zones remain very considerable. They are enshrined in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea that has just come into force. I think these rights will remain. Although much of the impulse that has seen naval forces grow in recent years has come from the need to assert rights and undertake duties in variously enclosed areas of sea, that very growth of naval forces has given more states than ever an interest in maritime rights of passage. Moreover, the key importance of seaborne trade to the growth of the fastest-growing economies in the world — those of the Asia-Pacific region — gives new force to the maintenance of rights of free passage on Mahan's "great common" Not for nothing has Commodore Bateman spoken of Mahan being alive and well and living in the Asia-Pacific.

In some ways he is, but there are important differences caused by the very different structure of the current politico-international system compared with that with which Mahan was familiar. Although 'realism', the view of states acting as billiard ball-like independent actors in a context dominated by military relationships, is far from superseded as a paradigm of the international system, it exists side by side with 'complex interdependence', the analysis of international politics that emphasises those international and

transitional connections that increasingly exist at all levels between states and the nationals of states. No aspect of human activity demonstrates 'complex interdependence' better than the shipping industry, where ships owned in one state can be managed by a company registered in a second, fly the flag of a third, be officered by the nationals of a fourth and fifth, be crewed by those of a sixth and seventh, carry the cargo of an eighth and ninth and, finally, be insured in a tenth.. Such a situation does much to undermine the traditional mercantilistic notions of the nation identity of the elements of sea power enunciated by Mahan. It can certainly create problems at the interface of merchant shipping with military navies and when merchant shipping has to be used for military purposes.

These problems, however, will probably not seriously undermine the traditional attributes of sea power in a military sense. Sea power provides great mobility, the ability to move over two thirds of the world's surface at a rate of four hundred miles per day. This mobility is combined with — indeed forms a key component of — considerable stealth. The oceans are so huge that even the largest ships can lose themselves in their wide open spaces. Modern techniques of surveillance — satellites in particular — have gone some distance in undermining the stealthiness of surface ships, but it is likely to remain inherently difficult for a satellite to be able to get a real time fix on where a particular surface ship actually is rather than where it was some greater or lesser period before. Satellites can have their most effective sensors — electronic intelligence receivers — defeated by emission control regimes and operational decoy techniques. And when the vessel dives beneath the sea the problems of finding it become greater still. The evidence of the last decade and a half or so seems to demonstrate the inherent ability of the submarine to defeat by increased quietness the ability of long range sensors to "make the seas transparent". The ability of water to defeat virtually all forms of electromagnetic radiation is a fundamental law of physics and the maritime environment is such a complex one that it will always be difficult to be certain about the presence of submarines from the detection and analysis of surface data such as wakes or 'humps'. When one side to this is diminished willingness to spend scarce resources on submarine detection in the post-cold war world, it becomes even more difficult to imagine circumstances where an ability to deploy stealthily or base forces at or beneath the sea will cease to be advantageous.

This is especially so as sea based forces are so versatile. They are inherently flexible and adaptable in a wide variety of roles. Moreover they provide sustained reach, the capacity to deploy at a distance with their own integral logistic support. This leads to an attribute of sea power which is especially important today and likely to remain so in the future, the ability to 'poise'. The ability of a naval task force to remain on station for long periods either openly or covertly can keep options open for a government that has difficulty making up its mind. I sometimes call this the "John Major factor" but all politicians are likely to be grateful for forces that can be used to maintain the maximum number of open options in circumstances of unprecedented fluidity and uncertainty, conditions which may last for some little time, perhaps well into the next century.

It all adds up to disproportionate leverage for sea power, a leverage that is likely to continue. It has been fashionable to see the twentieth century as a period when Sir Halford Mackinder's land power came to become more important then Mahan's sea power, an era dominated by continentally based states. Nevertheless, as my colleague Professor Colin Grey has shown, even in this period of continental advantage sea power allowed nations and coalitions who possessed it decisive superiority in strategic agility and mobility and an ability to put together coalitions of superior total strength to the dominant continental power. In the next century, an era when maritime communications may well be of greater importance once more, this "leverage of sea power" may be more enhanced still.

The next century is beginning with a period of great uncertainty. There is no clear threat but considerable global disorder. Instant worldwide communications and the political pressures they foster lead to a propensity to intervene, often at some distance from one's own shores, if for no other reasons than to evacuate one's own and friend's nationals caught up in the conflict. What is unknown and unknowable is where that intervention will take place and when. These are conditions where forces require the maximum degree of flexibility, adaptability and deployability. Given the attributes just explored it can be seen that these are conditions tailor made for sea power and navies. Nevertheless navies alone usually cannot operate ashore or even in the air in the required strength. The challenge for nations is going to be to develop an overall joint defence posture based around an ability to project power from the home base capable of sustained operations at a distance: In other words an expeditionary capability.

The use of the term "expeditionary" is important. "Maritime" might be a more descriptive term, as the sea must be the key component in any ability to deploy power at a distance. But "maritime" has tended to be adopted as a synonym for "Naval". "Expeditionary" may be a truly joint term that can conquer traditional service prejudices. What one is looking for is not aggrandisement for the navies of the world but the creation of the most appropriate overall defence posture for the new world disorder. Each posture, however, would have to rely on the attributes of

seapower to gain its effectiveness.

Technological developments are working in the direction of enhancing expeditionary capability. Aircraft are becoming more suitable for operating from relatively simple seaborne platforms. There can be little doubt that conventional catapults and arrester gear combined with conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) aircraft will always provide the most capable sea based air forces (and the USA will continue to deploy large aircraft carriers for the next half century). But the adoption of newer techniques STOBAR (short takeoff but arrested landing, made possible by high thrust to weight ratios and fly-by-wire and pioneered by the Russians on the *Admiral Kuznetsov*) and the more widely used STOVL (short takeoff and vertical landing) proven by the United Kingdom and adopted by other countries make possible cheaper options of increasing relative effectiveness. It is worth considering at length the implications of the fact that the planned replacement for the F-18 is also the planned replacement for the Sea Harrier. This will probably be a modular design in which a price in performance will probably have to be paid for a STOVL variant compared to the more conventional version that will also be produced, but even Air Forces might begin to see the advantages of sea basing — and therefore STOVL — as a useful option adding greater flexibility to their deployment options. The possibility will therefore exist for more unified sea based/land based air forces, although care will have to be taken to ensure that the pitfalls of the past are avoided. Navies will still need their own 'organic' air assets to operate effectively, especially helicopters, but STOVL fixed wing too.

Another air technology that will add to sea power is tilt rotor. The ability of such VTOL aircraft to operate at greater distances and speed compared to helicopters could greatly enhance the value of sea based air platforms, especially — but not exclusively — in forcible entry amphibious operations or evacuations.

Missile technology in its various forms is also enhancing the impact of other sea based components of 'air power'. At the most cataclysmic end sea based ballistic missiles are just as accurate and discriminating as any land based missile. This allows them to cover all the nuclear options required by a nuclear power. It also sets them at one end of a more unified spectrum of naval power projection capabilities, rather than confirming them as a highly specialised force of 'boomers'. The conventionally armed sea launched cruise missile can cover a large range of precise targets, including those defended to a point where attack by all but the most stealthy aircraft is inadvisable (such as downtown Baghdad in the Gulf War). Their ability to hold directly at risk what a potential third world aggressor might value — such as his own life — has greatly enhanced the concept of 'conventional deterrence'. Shorter ranged tactical missiles with advanced sub-munition warheads, such as the American ATACMS can also be adapted for sea launch from either surface or subsurface platforms. This will reduce, but not replace, reliance on ship-based artillery. In the defensive mode any twenty-first century naval area air defence system worthy of the name will have some anti-ballistic missile potential, at least against the more primitive forms of device likely to be used by potential rogue missile operators This will give an important new dimension to the role of surface combatants.

This brings us to the increasing importance of space in thinking about warfare at and from the sea. Space platforms play an increasing role in surveillance, navigation, missile guidance and communication. An ability to use space and/or deny its use to an opponent thus becomes an ever more vital part of sea power. It is true that the new century will begin with potential enemies of the major sea powers not very capable (if capable at all) in space — a factor that will allow certain liberties to be taken with submarines, for example — but this cannot be taken for granted for ever. Consideration is going to have to be given to the security of space assets, and holding at risk or destroying potentially hostile space platforms either in orbit or at source. This will be an area of American pre-eminence — another good reason to maintain good relations with the US Navy — but it is a factor that many navies will have to bear in mind. Satellites provide the keys to most modern forms of C^5I^2 as we must now call it — Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Consultation, Intelligence, Information. The revolution in this area has perhaps been the most important of all the revolutions in naval warfare this century. The advent of the operations room (CIC to Americans) as the nerve centre where electronic inputs are synthesised in order to fight the ship is the most obvious dimension of this revolution. We are close to the fiftieth anniversary of the sinking of the Japanese cruiser *Haguro* by surface torpedo attack, a fascinating example of the combination of an obsolescent technology (destroyer torpedoes) with radar and operations rooms. Now, half a century later, information gained from a wide range of sensors can be displayed in the operations room of an ordinary destroyer or frigate giving a good idea of not just the tactical but the strategic operational situation too. Electronically linked forces have become the norm for major navies and now this principle is being extended by the development in the United States of Co-operative Engagement Capability (CEC), the sharing throughout the whole force of fire control quality information. This exciting development that allows the entire force to fight as a single unit places still further emphasis on the requirement for different naval forces intending to operate together to possess the same command and control technologies. Certainly navies with a traditional close relationship with the USN, such as the RN and the

RAN, need to acquire CEC as soon as practicable.

International naval co-operation is an increasing trend. This allows national naval forces to respond to the increasingly powerful dynamics of complex interdependence. Operations under UN mandates, if not UN control, have become the rule rather than the exception. Recent experience in the Gulf and the Adriatic has done much to develop a corpus of doctrine and experience in combined naval activities. Differences in rules of engagement can be worked around effectively, although it is of course desirable to achieve the maximum possible level of interoperability.

A key factor making international naval operations the future rule rather than the exception is that the USA is going to be decreasingly willing to act independently — or perhaps at all if the commitment of ground forces is required. Naval forces are often the best forces to use for coalition building because of their utility for development with limited commitment. Moreover they are often at a premium at the early stage of a crisis when embargoes and demonstrations of force are required. By these means international solidarity can be shown sufficiently for the commitment of some US assets. However, these assets might be primarily maritime. The clear trend in US policy is to prefer offshore carrier and amphibious contributions rather than more fixed ground based forces. This may well continue with the USA preferring to give necessary support — including key space-based C^5I^2 assets — to another nation's or group of nations' expeditionary operations rather than taking the lead itself.

Nevertheless the USA will remain the pre-eminent naval actor well into the next century. It will continue to possess capabilities no-one else can match — notably large aircraft carriers and a massive amphibious force. After the USA will come, for a time at least, the two large European navies of the United Kingdom and France with their much more limited but still significant global force projection capabilities. Then come the smaller medium power navies of the broadly 'western' coalition, such as Canada and Australia. These need to provide a sufficiently comprehensive set of capabilities to control their own maritime environments and to contribute significantly to combined forces of a regional or more broadly international nature. A noteworthy tendency is the trend towards air capable support ships — even in the German Navy — to provide a mobile base for a flexible national 'medium power' expeditionary capability.

The future of the Russian Navy is tied up with the uncertainties of the future of the country itself. A recent visit to the Northern Fleet revealed a numerically much reduced force of modern destroyers and large anti-submarine ships and an equally slimmed-down but efficient submarine force. Power projection capabilities seemed very limited with only one carrier-type ship left running and the amphibious shipping more or less laid up. Presumable there are more pressing uses for Naval Infantry elsewhere. For the time being the pattern of Russian deployment seems to have reverted to extended coastal defence with occasional forays by individual units, sometimes to take part in international operations, sometimes to deploy nuclear-powered submarines in more traditional ways.

The capacity of the Russian Navy to operate in force effectively far from its shores, however, must remain limited for some time. This, together with a natural desire to retain the status the Soviet Navy achieved in the 1970s and 80s, helps explain the Russian interest in developing techniques of co-operation with other major navies.

Russian technology is allowing China to emerge as a significant naval power. There is a tendency to overestimate China's naval forces. The numbers of fully modern destroyer/frigate types remain very small indeed and will only grow relatively slowly. The Chinese submarine force is significant but not overwhelmingly powerful in terms of real operational capability. The Chinese seem to have taken a sensibly long-term approach to their naval build-up, emphasising it in resource terms but working on building up training and personnel skills first, rather then rushing into building ships that cannot be operated properly. Assuming that China stays together and continues to expand economically at the present rate — perhaps two rather large assumptions — one might expect the Chinese navy to grow into a fully-fledged Great Power navy but it will take several decades yet. This is not to say that China cannot create problems closer to its shores, notably in the South China Sea against weaker neighbours. But, for some time to come, it picks quarrels with more well-established major naval powers at its peril.

In technological terms the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force is far ahead of the Chinese PLA Navy. It possesses perhaps the finest destroyer/frigate fleet outside the USN — especially now that it deploys AEGIS-equipped ships — but it lacks both SSNs and carrier-type vessels, for obvious political and historical reasons. The latter gap is to be filled by an enhanced landing ship but it will take longer for Japan to adopt nuclear power. The growth of Japan's navy is vitally dependent on the continuation of the American defence relationship. If the USA cannot or will not provide the naval cover it has done since the Second World War, Japan, as one of the most sea-dependent nations in the world, can do no other than invest a larger proportion of the world's second-largest GNP in a navy of her own, including carriers and SSNs. She has the technological prowess to do so and in classical Mahanian terms ought to be a global naval power.

Major expansion in the Japanese Navy would of course have massive regional implications. Even without it, however, the South Koreans are looking forward to a future after reunification when they might well have a GNP comparable to a current major European power and a long-reach navy to match. As long as Taiwan retains its current status it requires a powerful escort force to deter blockade by the mainland. In combat tonnage it is one of the world's top ten navies and its technological capabilities are remarkably high. If peaceful unification occurred its surface fleet would transform the overall capabilities of the Chinese Navy.

The highly maritime nature of the Asia-Pacific region encourages the nations of the area to invest the fruits of their growing economies in naval forces. Throughout the region growth is taking place, with new Malaysian frigates, large scale second-hand buying by the Indonesians and , perhaps most notably of all, the Thai aircraft carrier. Submarines are under consideration by those states who do not already have them. All these states have important off-shore interests and responsibilities and the process need not necessarily be dangerous. Yet there are important disputes over sovereignty, even among ASEAN partners and, despite local rhetoric, some of the building is interactive. It would still be wrong to characterise these developments as a regional "naval arms race" but steps should be taken of a confidence building nature to prevent unnecessary suspicion being engendered. Naval co-operation at various levels is a key part of this process.

In the Indian Ocean India retains the ambition to be the dominant regional power. Her naval build-up has been limited by economic problems and these are likely to persist for some time. This will mean that the Indian Navy will not grow as much as originally planned but it will remain a significant force with limited power projection capabilities to maintain a favourable situation in neighbouring island states. India, however, also seems to have responded to constraints by developing a new emphasis on naval co-operation with other littoral nations such as South Africa.

If a trend can be extrapolated from the above it is a dialectic of more national naval power but also more international naval co-operation. This is a natural outcome of the wider dialectic of 'realism' and 'complex inter-dependence'. Modern sea-power in its civil sense provides one of the main mechanisms by which the world is bound together. Its international nature emphasises the mutuality of state interests. In parallel, naval power is also being increasingly conceived of as an international expeditionary (and sea control) capability to mitigate the effects of a new world disorder ashore as well as afloat. This is a very different world from Mahan's image of competitive self-sufficient maritime empires.

Of course it all might change. As Colin Gray puts it "Bad times always return". One need not be quite so pessimistic but recent disputes between the USA and Japan show at least the potential for a breakup of the liberal economic order. There might also arise a new major 'threat' requiring containment by the Western maritime coalition. In these circumstances naval forces may well have to exploit their inherent flexibility to re-emphasise sea control at sea rather then power projection from it. One should therefore beware the siren voices who speak of "the end of naval strategy" or who wish to abandon more traditional warships for slow offshore support vessels or even rig-like offshore airfields. Such over-specialisation denies the inherent nature of sea power, its flexibility and mobility.

Whatever the future holds, the use of the sea for civil and military purposes is going to be at least as important as it has been in the past, probably even more so. This is a promising environment for navies on both sides of the world. I see no need to revise my conclusions in "The Future of Sea Power" that the prospects for sea power and its practitioners remain as sound as ever.

THIS IS AN ANI MEDALLION-WINNING ESSAY

POSITIONING THE RAN FOR THE FUTURE:

An Unofficial American View

by

Lieutenant Commander D.C. Hulse, USN

Defence policy has evolved dramatically in Australia since the early 1980's, and the pieces are now in place to take the next significant step beyond simply 'defending Australia'. The budgetary pressures now assaulting the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) are likely to be present for the next several years. Further, the global and regional environments have been transformed in ways that point to greater responsibilities for the RAN with respect to regional stability and protection of Australian interests beyond sovereignty. A bottom-up review of the RAN's missions at this point would serve to refocus attention on 'outputs' (what the Navy adds to national security), and identify activities that contribute little in the post Cold War environment. The sweeping cuts in western defence forces suggest that other countries may have re-evaluated their strategic situation and found that they can achieve security at lower force levels. The RAN's strategic circumstances, which are not entirely unlike those of many western nations, suggest that there may be room for realignment of force structure, organisation, and training.

This paper will explore the salient security factors of the post Cold War world, focusing on the nature of the threat to world order, the international preoccupation with economic growth, and emerging hopes for collective security. This survey of the strategic landscape forms the foundation for a number of proposed principles for the future of naval power. The analysis then shifts to Australia's unique strategic circumstances to establish the relevance of the previous conclusions regarding naval forces. The aim of this essay is to explore the factors that will shape RAN missions and resources in the future, and suggest that greater emphasis on national interests is warranted to ensure the RAN remains relevant to Australia's security.

THE POST COLD WAR WORLD

The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is not the only defence force struggling to come to grips with the post Cold War world. Most western nations have aggressively claimed the 'peace dividend' that came with the collapse of the Soviet Union and general retreat of communism world-wide. Domestic political pressures have forced statesmen to devote greater attention and resources to domestic concerns at the expense of their military forces. Most of these countries undertook an extensive military drawdown fully aware that melting the rigid bi-polar international structure was likely to unleash a variety of ethnic, nationalist and regional disputes. Were politicians world-wide recklessly bowing to public pressure in dismantling the forces crucial to national defence, or did the end of the Cold War usher in changes that fundamentally alter the international system?

Diminished Threats to World Order

The collapse of the Soviet Union represented not simply a symbolic 'defeat' of communism, but more fundamentally the passing of the major threat to world order. For the community of western nations, the security threats that remain (ethnic/nationalist conflicts, terrorism, extremist religious movements, etc.) are not likely to require, or be responsive to, the sort of rigid world alignments required of the Cold War containment effort.This development suggests a greater security role for the United Nations (UN), as well as regional or ad hoc arrangements, and a declining significance of military alliances.

In a world increasingly dependent on conflict resolution via regional or ad hoc coalitions, the role of middle powers can only grow. These actors' widely dispersed interests, and their ability to influence outcomes through diplomacy and coalition building, suggest that they will be increasingly at the center, rather than the fringes, of key policy debates. Further, the loosening of international alignments indicates that these middle powers can be expected to take positions dictated more by their national interests than by the needs of security alliances. What has not changed, though, is the fact that statesmen must possess diplomatic, economic, and military options for protecting those interests. For the foreseeable future, a middle power's credibility will probably continue to rely heavily on its ability to protect its vital interests and contribute to global and regional security.

Economic Security at Center Stage

As physical dangers fade, statesmen have rapidly refocussed on other threats to security, most impor-

tantly economic ones. Economic revitalisation has emerged as the best hope for generating the resources to: alleviate a host of domestic ills; undertake pressing environmental initiatives; gain access to, or exploit, modern technologies (including weapons technology); and enhance international influence. As the debate over alternate economic systems has diminished, the business of both democratic and non-democratic governments world-wide seems to be enhancing market efficiency to realise maximum economic growth. This effort includes restricting expenditures on military forces, since it is widely believed that the Cold War rate of expenditure acted as a significant drag on western economies. The most widely accepted conclusion is that defence spending must shrink to finance the sort of education and infrastructure projects essential to economic growth.

The Uruguay Round of international trade negotiations indicates that, for the great majority of economies, this vigorous growth should rely heavily on increased trade rather than simply domestic economic diversification. The acceptance of widening webs of trade dependencies, especially by the most developed western economies, indicates that for most countries the benefits of interdependency are now believed to outweigh the risks. This is a dramatic shift from Cold War efforts, particularly in the United States (U.S.) and western Europe, to carefully manage economic dependencies out of fear for the vulnerabilities associated with them. It could be concluded that even China has pinned its hopes for economic revitalisation on foreign trade and investment. The interest in expanded trade points to a growing international constituency with a tangible stake in global stability, while also suggesting that the 'boundaries' to technology transfer will become more permeable.

Hopes for Collective Security

In addition to declining threats to global security and greater attention to economic development, there are signs that the end of the Cold War signalled some other significant changes. Important themes in current international affairs include: general acceptance of national sovereignty and existing borders; a greater global security role for a United Nations freed from the constraints of superpower rivalry; and more demanding tests of legitimacy for intervention in a state's internal affairs, given the obviated need to contain communism.These factors, together with progressively widening economic interdependence and the potential for a revitalised United Nations, point to an emerging opportunity for collective security, based on coalitions vice alliances, that has not existed since the aftermath of World War I. The soaring number of UN-sponsored peace keeping missions and multiplication of regional conflict resolution forums/associations since 1990 may reflect an international desire to experiment with this system. These developments suggest that security can be achieved with smaller forces because the likely threats appear less militarily intimidating and because the international community is better able to *collectively* confront future aggressors determined to be the exception to this rule.

It could certainly be argued that such a view of the world is at best a case of mirror-imaging, and is at worst naive. Critics have pointed out that these fundamental changes to the international system are western illusions, and that the rest of the world has not necessarily embraced the primacy of stability. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 would appear the obvious case in point of a nation flouting these 'principles'. Nevertheless, the Gulf War served to only delay, not prevent or even substantially diminish the scale of, the western military drawdown. This is because events in the Persian Gulf served to validate, not contradict, the view of an increasingly co-operative and interdependent world.

The international response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait demonstrated that an ad hoc collective security arrangement could function to counter aggression, but it also demonstrated an important limitation: in the near term, collective security will be concerned more with maintaining order than ensuring justice. Collective efforts are, therefore, unlikely to emerge in response to lower level threats to small groups of interests. The available examples suggest that future collective security efforts will be similarly focused on order (vice justice) because: western nations will lack the political will, economic resources, and military forces to pursue causes beyond their vital interests; western nations have learned that there are limits to the utility of military force; and consensus is more likely to be reached in protecting vital interests than in defining fairness. These factors enabled the U.S. to remain focused on the liberation of Kuwait, resisting pressure to expand the scope of operations to include the removal of Saddam Hussein, and are currently limiting the extent of external involvement in the former Yugoslavia. Despite their limitations, opportunities for collective security are likely to figure heavily in individual states' security calculations.

Naval Power into the Next Century

Diminished threats to world stability, preoccupation with economic interests, and hopes for greater reliance on regional conflict resolution and collective security have broad implications for the role of naval forces in global security. Navies will increasingly be relied upon to contribute to regional and global security, and protect economic and environmental interests against poorly defined threats. While it is more likely that war-fighting will be conducted collectively, national navies may or may not find partners in defence of economic interests. The combined operations in 1984 to clear mines from the Red Sea, and efforts to escort oil tankers coming under cruise missile attack in the Persian Gulf in 1987 are examples of shared interests evoking collective responses. On the other hand, management of Exclusive Economic Zone

(EEZ) resources or countering localised piracy are examples of missions in which national navies must be relatively self-sufficient. To further complicate the issue, policy-makers will be torn between their desire for a balanced fleet to counter a range of possible threats and budgetary pressures to consider smaller, more mission-specific naval forces.

Such broad-brush implications can be reduced to more specific planning guidelines. First, preoccupation with economic threats and opportunities suggests that western defence budgets are likely to be flat or declining as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product for the next several years. Second, despite limited resources, defence planners will face increasingly sophisticated threats, due to the spread of weapons technologies. Third, naval forces will be structured and trained less for general sea control and more for protection of economic and environmental interests at sea. Fourth, interoperability will be a priority for those forces tasked with warfighting or protection of interests shared with other nations. Fifth, interoperability with regional neighbours and major trading partners could become more significant than interoperability with formal allies. Finally, deterrence of adventurism and promotion of stability require continued use of naval forces in the 'presence' role, suggesting the importance of endurance and effective self-defence in warship design. Given the unique geo-political circumstances of individual states, a more fine-grained analysis of naval missions and force structure must be done on a navy-by-navy basis.

AUSTRALIA'S STRATEGIC SITUATION

While the foregoing discussion has attempted to summarise the global factors that will shape naval forces in the future, it has relied heavily on generalisations whose applicability to Australia's situation may appear tenuous. Drawing conclusions of value to the RAN requires analysis of the salient factors in Australia's strategic equation. Specifically, attention is now turned to Australia, her geographic neighbourhood, and U.S. interests in the region.

Australia as a Middle Power

Australia's role in international affairs and her strategic position can be broadly categorised as those of a 'middle power'. Although a middle power's interests tend to reach worldwide, its individual influence is relatively limited, except where it is able to join with other middle powers or influence a major power. Referring to Australia's case, Senator Gareth Evans describes this as having to '...take the world more or less as we find it...' This can be contrasted with a major power's ability to influence nearly any aspect of its environment.

Although a middle power in global terms, Australia is much more significant relative to her region. Despite a population of only 18 million (less than one tenth that of Indonesia), Australia's modern, free-market economy produces over twice the goods and services of its largest neighbour (once again, Indonesia). Further, Australia relies on sophisticated technology, extensive transportation and communications infrastructure, and a well developed public education system to maintain its economic competitiveness. Additionally, Australia's regional preponderance of military power and relatively high diplomatic profile, which includes special access to the only current super power, suggest that Australia is in a position to substantially affect regional security and economic cooperation. Recent budget trends, though, indicate that any increase in Australia's regional security role in unlikely to be accompanied by greater defence spending. Defence officials must realistically plan to defend Australia's interests with either zero or negative real growth in expenditures. This constraint highlights the need to focus on capabilities essential to Australia's security and protection of her interests.

National Interests. Australia's primary interest is its continued existence as an open, democratic society. Contributing to this, its vital interests include: defence of Australia's sovereign territory and contiguous seas against threats ranging from armed assault to environmental degradation; preservation of a healthy and growing economy with free access to foreign markets; promotion of stable and secure regional and world environments; and being seen to be a good international citizen.These interests generally describe those of a satisfied power, which tends to benefit from stability and economic growth. As will become apparent, these interests have a great deal in common with those of the U.S. and several of Australia's regional neighbours.

While furthering the national interest is the starting point for foreign policy, it also forms the basis for developing military forces and strategy. The primary interest, preservation of Australia's sovereignty, occupies a prominent position in the current Defence White Paper, Defending Australia 1994 (DA 94). This document describes in detail Australia's basically defensive strategy, with discussion of the range of capabilities maintained within the ADF to provide for national security. Of note, DA 94 emphatically states that self-defence needs are the sole determinant of ADF force structure; other tasks in support of national interests are to be provided for from the forces acquired for national defence.

In contrast to the detailed discussion of the ADF's contribution to Australia's survival, the military role in supporting other vital interests is given little treatment. For example, while the value of regional stability and open Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) are acknowledged, DA 94 offers no strategy for countering threats to them. Despite these omissions, it should be obvious that Australia's security is heavily dependent on her economic viability, which in turn

requires unhindered access to markets and security of assets and territories. Further, the discussion of Australia's strategic situation indicates that she can bring substantial political, economic, and military resources to bear on threats to these interests.

Australia's Immediate Neighbourhood

The 1987 Defence White Paper defines South-East Asia, the South-West Pacific and the East Indian Ocean as being Australia's region of primary strategic interest. Politically and culturally diverse, this region is best characterised as economically dynamic and militarily benign, despite a substantial arms buildup over the past several years. The region's economies have benefited greatly from a relatively stable environment, enabling them to focus on internal security and economic development. Sustained economic growth is raising the standard of living while providing for extensive modernisation in most countries. These factors have spawned greater interest in regional associations intended to enhance economic cooperation, but which also have an inherent conflict resolution potential.

Although the countries of Australia's region of primary strategic interest would generally be considered, with some notable exceptions, Lesser Developed Countries (LDC), their economic growth rates are the highest in the world, averaging well over 5% annually. With this growth being led by expanding trade and internal restructuring designed to produce even more open markets, these nations have a substantial interest in continued regional stability. The gradual improvement in standards of living that accompany economic growth, together with the emergence of a middle class, point to improving conditions of internal security as well. These developments should be viewed very favourably in Australia, since domestic stability gives predictability to foreign affairs and trade interdependence has produced a vibrant regional dialogue in a multitude of forums.

Defence analysts can point to a naval arms buildup and to potential for conflict in the Spratly Islands as causes for concern in an otherwise 'benign' region. With respect to growing arms purchases, most of these are 'consistent with the legitimate self-defence needs of regional countries'. Further, these purchases must be put in perspective: Australia spends more on defence than all of its immediate neighbours combined. Finally, despite increased spending on naval forces, the capability to project and sustain substantial combat power onto the Australian landmass has not yet emerged. The Spratly Island sovereignty dispute will be an important indicator of future regional stability. A peaceful resolution will validate the effectiveness of trade, investment, and political pressures in preventing China's use of force to achieve an objective. A forcible resolution, on the other hand, may stall or even reverse the process described above of greater reliance on regional and world conflict resolution fora.

In short, the regional focus on economic growth, and the stability which underpins it, fits well with the model of international affairs described previously. Despite vast cultural differences, the common language of interests is enabling the region's leaders to enhance each other's security through cooperation across a broad range of military, diplomatic, and economic initiatives. While economic and political competition will no doubt become fierce at times, the costs associated with resorting to force are substantial and growing. Should these trends survive such disputes as the Spratly Islands, many of the principles for naval power enumerated previously will become directly applicable to the RAN.

US Interests in the Post Cold War Era

There is considerable concern in Australia that the United States is no longer strongly committed to Australian security and that the ANZUS alliance is practically an anachronism. Those advancing this view point to a declining U.S. military presence overseas and a preoccupation with domestic issues in Washington that boarders on isolationism. From this perspective, a 'western' Australia seems marooned in an Asian sea, without credible guarantees from America. Little of this hyperbole, though, is grounded in a rigorous analysis of U.S. interests.

A section of the 'United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region' begins with the statement:

> United States interests in Asia have been remarkably consistent over the past two centuries: peace and security; commercial access to the region; freedom of navigation; and the prevention of the rise of any hegemonic power or coalition.

The Strategy goes on to enumerate the factors that underpin ongoing U.S. interests in the region: existing security commitments embodied in six bilateral security treaties; the Pacific Rim's status as America's largest trading partner, accounting for over 36% of total American world trade; the U.S. economy's increasing reliance on trade; significant global bank reserves held in East Asian economies; reliance of the region's economies on open sea lines of communication; and America's central role in guaranteeing the stability that has been a key factor in this region's remarkable economic growth. The significance of these interests was recently reflected in President Clinton's commitment to maintain 100,000 troops forward deployed in East Asia indefinitely. U.S. Senator Malcolm Wallop put it bluntly: 'The U.S. presence in the Far East, as elsewhere in the world, is not a gift, it is to protect American interests'.

For those that consider the above points aimed at the region's larger economies, the Strategy goes on to describe Australia as a 'an invaluable strategic partner...' The significance of Australia's markets and

natural resources pale in comparison to its political and strategic significance to the U.S. America's reliance on Australia as a stabilising force in the region, and a long-standing ally willing to share security risks, makes any failure to address Australia's legitimate security concerns politically untenable for the U.S. While there are a range of lesser threats that would fail to evoke a substantial U.S. response, any threat to Australia's sovereignty impacts U.S. interests both directly and indirectly. The key point here is that the U.S. commitment to Australia's security flows naturally from American interests in the region; interests which have remained remarkably constant throughout considerable international turmoil. Finally, U.S. interests also suggest ongoing support for Australia's proactive efforts in building regional security and stability with her neighbours.

The U.S. commitment to Australia's security within the framework of a noticeably less rigid post Cold War alliance has some implications for the RAN. First, Australia will likely continue to have special access to U.S. defence technologies, a potentially invaluable asset for a fiscally constrained defence force seeking to maintain a balanced force capable of operating in a technologically advanced threat environment. Second, shared interests in Australia's freedom, regional stability, open SLOCs, etc. provide an effective system for prioritising U.S.-Australian interoperability procurement programs and exercises. Third, and conversely, Australia should plan towards a self-sufficient or regional approach to protecting interests unrelated to Australian sovereignty or of little concern to the U.S.

CONCLUSION

In a world of diminishing threats to national sovereignty and widespread preoccupation with economic development, the common currency in international affairs will become national interests. The collapse of communism has left states more free to pursue their individual interests, but within an international framework where acceptance of national sovereignty is the standard. These developments have produced military forces that are both smaller and less likely to be engaged in non-coalition warfighting. Significantly, this essay has shown that these global strategic trends are also operating in Australia's region, suggesting that the principles for the future role of naval power enumerated earlier may be applied to the RAN.

First, and most important, as regional cooperation matures and a threat to Australia's sovereignty fails to materialise, the RAN will increasingly define its mission in terms of protecting vital interests and promoting regional security. Further, this point suggests that: interoperability with regional forces will become a more important planning factor; force structure may no longer be determined strictly by the needs of 'defending Australia'; and the unpredictable nature of the threats argues for a balanced fleet that will further strain resources in the future.

Second, mapping of U.S., regional, and Australian interests will identify shared interests as well as 'interest gaps', where the RAN should expect to be self-sufficient. Some obvious shared interests include: defence of Australia, security of SLOCs, regional stability, and freedom of navigation.

Third, the western military drawdown, the trend toward collective response to aggression, and Australia's desire to be an active international 'citizen' suggest that the RAN will be called upon in the future to participate in a variety of collective security operations, at both the regional and global levels. These operations could range in scope from UN sanction enforcement to warfighting.

Fourth, barring the emergence of a major threat to regional stability, the RAN should plan on steady or slowly declining budgets. Aggravating this trend will be the desire to maintain a balanced fleet to offset threat ambiguity and the need to counter increasingly sophisticated threats. These demands suggest a resource scarcity problem that will test the ability of senior officials to go beyond seeking new efficiencies in operating existing systems; survival of a healthy RAN will require focusing on outputs and selection of the most effective means of producing them.

Finally, continued access to U.S. weapon systems will not only enhance interoperability, but it will provide an invaluable hedge against the emergence of technologically advanced threats. Australia's ability to purchase or cooperatively produce hardware equivalent to that operated by the U.S. Navy represents significant dollar and time savings in research and development. These benefits should not be casually forgone in the name of 'self reliance'.

In a complex and rapidly evolving environment, a Navy unable to define its mission in terms of furthering national interests risks becoming inefficient or, at worst, an anachronism. The RAN will be heavily tasked in the future with regional engagement, presence, collective security, and shipping defence missions. It is important to recognise that these are no longer 'side-shows' or 'lesser included cases' of the defence of Australia mission, but rather a vital part of an outgoing foreign policy that is committed to building security *with* regional neighbours rather than *against* them. It is time to rethink the RAN force structure in terms of the missions that are actually being performed in an attempt to better match scarce resources to the tasks that support Australia's vital interests.

LCDR Hulse was a student on Staff Course 33/95 at the RAN Staff College, HMAS Penguin. The foregoing article was written as a course essay.

Crater Lake, Mount Ruapehu.

When Mountains Shoot Back!

Some dilemmas in Military Adventurous Training

by Alan Hinge

'Come with me, and I will show you where the Crosses of Iron grow'

Steiner to Stransky in the book 'Cross of Iron'

I had a lousy over night stay at Waiouru in New Zealand during October 1990. My room seemed to be just above some sort of monstrous air conditioning plant; the pillow was hard and my skin literally 'crawled' (later that day I broke out in a nasty rash which covered one third of my *once* perfectly proportioned body). It might have been the Kiwi beer I drank the night before that contributed to my discomfort but, rather than stay in bed listening to the air conditioner from hell's bearings disintegrate, it seemed like a good idea to make an early getaway back to Auckland along the Desert Highway.

I'm never at my best at 5.00 am, but on loading the car (provided courtesy of the RNZN) I was *arrested* by the sight of Mt Ruapehu towering majestically above the horizon, its slopes still covered in deep white snow made iridescent by the first rays of sunlight. It was that time of unreal twilight, and the stars had not yet given up their thrones as the frozen mountain stood in stark contrast against a growing brilliant blue haze around it. I had not taken any notice of the mountain on arrival the afternoon before, but my personal suffering suddenly paled into insignificance as I remembered something I read in a paper shortly after arriving 'in country' on ANZAC exchange: On that same magnificent mountain only weeks before, six servicemen died of exposure under atrocious conditions. This article tells part of their story and aims to emphasise the necessity for, and hazards of, adventurous training for the military in peacetime. It also loosely follows on from my article on naval leadership which appeared in the May/July 1994 issue of JANI. In it I suggested that adventurous training, which *stretched* individuals well beyond their emotional and physical comfort zones, promoted the insight, flexibility of response and *poise* so important in military leaders.

I wanted to find out more about the Ruapehu tragedy for two reasons. First, for six years I was heavily engaged in adventurous training in the RAN and had done various survival courses while a 'gung ho' young infantryman way back in the mid '70s, so I knew that one of the best ways to 'get by' in the field was by using judgement based on the lessons of past experiences and mistakes. To learn, we can either make the mistakes ourselves or note those made by others. Learning from others is generally much cheaper and healthier, and I knew the lessons of the Ruapehu tragedy should be brought back to Australia, where only a few people had much idea of what happened and why it happened.

My second reason was more personal. As I looked at the ominous but strangely *alluring* snow giant, memories of being stranded on a mountain for three days in very uncomfortable conditions returned. It was not a particularly big mountain, nothing like Ruapehu, but it was cold enough to kill in August 1972 when a friend and I developed a healthy respect for the treachery of alpine weather. I was sixteen, had never been kissed, and was ready to take on the world with second rate gear and third rate knowledge. On the second day of our ascent we reached the summit, did the right thing and made camp well above the snowline about 4.00 pm - no worries - we then took a walk we estimated would only take twenty minutes. It didn't. It took longer, grew darker and bad weather suddenly set in. All we had was our day clothing and the civilian equivalent of 'basic webbing' - knife, water bottles, poncho, compass and survival pouch. To cut a long story short we couldn't find our campsite, but just managed to get to a hut before things got too serious. From that freezing night on we took mountains and their changeable weather very seriously indeed. I have never been *cold* on any expedition anywhere since - life long lessons are learned from being sick with apprehension....from being at the margins of a condition I call OVERWHELM.

So, just what did happen on Ruapehu?

Prologue to Disaster

On Thursday August 9th 1990, eleven students and two instructors from the New Zealand Army Base at Waiouru on the North Island of New Zealand climbed Mount Ruapehu to train in winter mountain craft as part of the Army Adventurous Training Centre's (AATC) Winter Basic Course.

That night was spent in a Dome Shelter, a pre-constructed shelter set up near the summit of the mountain (see figure on p.20). The next day was clear and fine and the group moved 300 metres from the Dome



Shelter to practise constructing two snow caves and a snow dome, which they slept in that night (Friday 10th August).

Next morning the weather had deteriorated dramatically, so the group remained in the shelters to wait out the storm. At about 11.00 am the weather had improved and a decision was made to leave the snow shelters and head for the Dome shelter. However, once out of shelter the group experienced the full force of the storm, extremely heavy snowfall and very high winds. The group made then their way back to their shelters, but were only able to locate one snow cave and the snow dome. Moreover, because of trouble in keeping the entrance of the snow dome clear of snow, the entire group ended up sheltering in one snow cave. Soon the snow fall had became so heavy that the group had to maintain a continual shift clearing the entrance way throughout the night to maintain circulation and avoid being sealed inside the cave.

By 7.00 am on Sunday 12th October the roof of the snow cave had distorted and cracks appeared in the walls. Three metres of snow was estimated to be on the roof of the cave, and fears that the cave would collapse and bury the group alive began to grow. At about 10.00 am a break in the weather was noticed and this, coupled with the rapid build up of snow, and concern that the cave was near collapse, led to a decision to head for the dome shelter.

Ambushed by the Elements

Upon leaving the snow cave the thirteen experienced the full force of the storm. Conditions proved to be much worse than anticipated, with visibility reduced to only a few metres and wind speed estimated at 70-80 knots. On the way to the Dome Shelter the group moved to the flat col between Paretetaitonga and the Dome, which was probably the most exposed position on the mountain. Surviving members of the team reported actually being lifted off the ground by the wind. The group stopped and attempted to get some sort of cover using their packs as wind shields and by digging trenches as emergency shelters.

After remaining in the col for three hours with no improvement to the weather, a second move was made to get shelter in the lee of the ridge.While attempting this move the first cases of hypothermia became apparent and the group was immediately stopped to take care of them. An attempt was made to construct a snow dome, but building this proved impossible because of the wind. This was followed by an attempt to dig a shallow trench, but a layer of ice prevented this. By this time two hypothermic cases and a case of frostbite were apparent; several members of the group were close to exhaustion. At one point the chief instructor was blown back ten metres by the wind during the initial attempt to reach the Dome Shelter.

An instructor and a student then left the group to get help; those remaining attempted to complete the snow

trench and get into sleeping bags and plastic survival bags to await rescue. However, sleeping bags were ripped away by the wind and lost, and during the course of the night and next morning six trainees, including Able Rating Jeffrey Royden Boult of the RNZN, died of exposure.

The instructor and student seeking help made contact with staff members of the Ruapehu Alpine Lights and the Duty Ranger at approximately 5.30 am on the morning of Monday 13 August. Despite continuing atrocious weather, by 7.15 am search teams had departed from Whakapapa by snowcat and foot, and survivors were rescued about 2.00 pm and treated in the Dome shelter. They were taken off the mountain by snowcats and the six bodies of their comrades were removed by helicopter on the morning of Wednesday 15th August.

Aftermath

The Court of Inquiry found that the principal cause of the tragedy was the inadequate level of skill and experience of both AATC instructors to deal with the extreme conditions encountered. This lack of experience led to a series of decisions which were seen to have been wrong. In particular, the Court identified the decision to leave shelter to strike out for the Dome Shelter as an error of judgement. Also, the Court criticised the absence of a radio with the group and recommended that radios capable of operating on the mountain be obtained before any further training take place. It was considered that radios would have led to a faster reaction time by rescuers, nevertheless, given the time factors involved in this case, the question of whether they would have made any difference to the casualty outcome remains a matter of conjecture.

Although not directly attributable to the actual events that occurred, the Court also reported that the written standard operating procedures at the Army Adventurous Training Centre were inadequate in content. Moreover, while the court found that the personal clothing and equipment used on the course was adequate, it did identify some items where better alternatives were available than those currently in use, for example, gloves and civilian survival/bivvy bags.

Evidence was heard from the Japanese climber, Mr George Iwama, who survived the storm for five days in two snow caves. Mr Iwama was said to be a very resourceful character who had ten years of mountaineering experience. When Iwama moved out of his first snow cave he found himself on the lee side of the ridge which protected him to some degree from the 80 knot winds that battered the thirteen when they emerged from their caves. Consequently, he had been able to dig a second cave successfully.

Comments criticising the level of experience and leadership effectiveness in the group were made at the inquiry by a Mr Chris Knol. He was the specialist adviser for the Army on mountaineering during the Court of Inquiry, and was a field officer with the New Zealand Mountain Safety Council. He claimed that, while never having been on Ruapehu during the antarctic like conditions encountered by the AATC group, the situation would have ended differently if the instructors had been more experienced in leading groups. Furthermore, he stated that mountaineering skills are one thing, but leading a group of inexperienced people in a tough situation requires a much broader range of expertise, and he suggested that one of the reasons George Iwama survived that same blizzard was that he had no one else to worry about.

Knol also suggested the ratio of instructors to students (2:11) was too low, and a ratio of 1:4 was appropriate. But he added that the ratio is unimportant if there is not the depth of knowledge to deal with all the situations that can be thrown at people training in the mountains. Knol concluded that mistakes compounded during the crisis and the leader had to make very important, tough decisions. He cited the failure of the group to rope themselves together as one such error. Asked what he would have done if he had been caught in the open under these circumstances, he said he would repeat his actions of an earlier situation: Put on all his clothes, jam extra gear under these clothes to create extra 'dead' space for insulation, get into his pack, pull the plastic survival bag over his head and let the snow cover him up.

The Court found that high standards of personal behaviour were demonstrated by those in the group still physically able to provide assistance to their comrades in the face of extreme conditions during the night and following morning. Its principal recommendations were that:

- The Army Adventurous Training Centre stop conducting courses until a training review is completed. A training review should be initiated as soon as possible and should consider all matters related to staff selection and training and operating procedures.
- The Senior Medical Officer, Waiouru be made responsible for maintaining current expertise in the treatment of hypothermic and related cold weather injuries.
- The programmed purchase of communications equipment for the Army Adventurous Training Centre proceed immediately.

The review of training at the AATC, Army Training Group Waiouru was completed in October 1990. The review team looked at policies, operating procedures and regulations at the centre; qualifications and possible psychological testing for instructors; student

selection procedures and what the Centre's weather forecasting requirements should be.

Of particular note during the inquiry and review processes was the apparent objectivity, consistency and understanding with which they were carried out. The authorities got on with the job of finding out what happened and why it happened, with a view to learning from the tragedy and stopping its repetition. There was no search for 'scapegoats', no undue blame or recrimination and this was to the credit of the New Zealand Defence Force.

Personal Reflections

Every service person should be trained to *face* danger, which involves the risk of damage and injury. This is especially so during long periods of peace when decisive characteristics in war tend to be relegated to the background - physical and moral courage, will and determination, physical strength and endurance, self sacrifice and comradeship. The closer a service man or woman is likely to be to the shock or sustained tension of battle, the more demanding and potentially 'dangerous' should be his or her adventurous training. *Gradually* taking *some* adventurous training close to the point of OVERWHELM is sometimes necessary because, with each *graduated* demand made during adventurous training, the average person gets better at coping with 'alien' conditions and develops more flexibility of response - As the old saying goes, half of courage is having done it (or something like it) before!

This is not to advocate a mindless, 'no pain, no gain' adventurous training regime in the military. Detailed preparation, good equipment, contingency planning, sequenced build up of skills and multiple *rehearsals* are essential. However, from my experience of adventurous training in the navy (experience which is probably getting dated) such training has only been a 'sideline' in navy curricula. This probably stems from the attitude that anything not directly related to 'real navy work' is a 'jolly'. Therefore, adventurous training in the navy has often suffered from insufficient resources, time and talent and therefore real challenge has been lacking. Certainly, physical trainers who have traditionally handled adventurous training do a good job, but they are not really specialists, and are usually run off their feet satisfying a host of other routine and 'short fuse' activities. Consequently, there has been the temptation to either exercise overly tight control over navy expeditions or to eliminate risk to absolutely minimise any chance at all of things going wrong. But things can go too far in the safety direction, and if there is no risk little benefit is generally had. Unless real and varied demands are made on the individual during adventurous training, flexibility of response may not be developed. This is because the most common activity in demanding expeditions is that of quickly generating action options and balancing the risks and consequences associated with them.

Conclusions

In August 1990, thirteen men were 'ambushed' by extraordinary, antarctic-like conditions in a natural killing ground on the exposed col between Paretaitonga Ridge and their objective, the dome shelter. Six died. Like most of us they were pretty capable, pretty fit and pretty confident, but that was not enough when overwhelmed by circumstances outside the scope of their contingency planning and levels of training and experience.

Hindsight is a wonderful thing, and no judgement on the particulars of what should have been done and what should not have been done on Ruapehu has been made here, either directly or by implication. The Ruapehu tragedy is used to highlight the importance of recognising and being prepared for OVERWHELM when it starts to *infect* a group.

Many of us over the years have sought experience and challenge in situations which sometimes end in us being bone tired, under a lot of pressure to get to a rendezvous under atrocious conditions, with members of the team losing their confidence, composure and the ability to contribute. I call this syndrome OVERWHELM and, because every service person should be trained to face danger, we must be alert to, and prepared for the onset and consequences of this condition. To best prepare for the onset of OVERWHELM in a group, and break its *thrall*, the first thing we can do is learn the lessons of events such as the Ruapehu tragedy by documenting them, remembering them and applying them both ashore and afloat. This helps develop the insight, flexibility of response and *poise* so important to building that rare and elusive, but critically important quality we must all aspire to — Military Leadership.

And finally friend, when planning your next trip *out*, remember that the seas, deserts, mountains and jungles where you seek to test yourself are not always neutral...sometimes they shoot back!

JANI CHART FEATURE

This issues' chart feature is Woody Island (YONGXING) in the Paracel Group (South China Sea)



"Woody" has been built up since the early 1980's and is now capable of supporting limited SU-27 ops from a one kilometre airstrip. Anchorages and limited facilities exist for major and minor war vessels.

PRESIDENTIAL PROFILE

The Ninth President of the Australian Naval Institute: Rear Admiral C.A. Barrie AM RAN

The Australian Naval Institute welcomes Rear Admiral Chris Barrie as its ninth President since the ANI's foundation twenty years ago. He was unanimously elected by the ANI Council in October 1995 and has been a member of the Institute for 17 years, having previously served as Secretary in 1978-79.

His wide variety of current interests include strategy, international relations, personal computing, war gaming and playing tennis and golf. In his spare time - which he has a little more of after recently completing his MBA - he learns piano and enjoys music, especially opera. He now lives in Canberra with his wife Maxine and has two sons: Duncan aged 17 is still at school and Nicholas aged 21 entered the Australian Defence Force Academy in 1992.

He entered the Royal Australian Navy in January 1961 after attending North Sydney Boys High School, and early sea training included service in HMA ships *Anzac*, *Vampire* and *Melbourne*. This period included involvement during the confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia and, after various courses in the UK, Acting Sub Lieutenant Barrie found himself in the commissioning crew of the Guided Missile Destroyer HMAS *Brisbane*; this posting included a tour of duty in Vietnam.

Specialist courses in navigation were then undertaken in the UK and in September 1970 Lieutenant Barrie took up his first command; that of CO HMAS *Buccaneer*, an Attack Class Patrol boat. After his command, an exchange posting to the UK found him as the Navigating and Operations Officer of the Dartmouth training ship HMS *Eastbourne* for 15 months. After this he stayed on in the UK to instruct at the navigation school HMS *Dryad* for a further nine months. Immediately on return to Australia, in May 1973, he became Navigation and Operations Officer of the Guided Missile Destroyer HMAS *Perth* until September 1975, when he returned to the UK for the Advanced Navigation Course. On return to Australia another posting to sea followed in early 1976 as Navigating and Training Officer on board the Daring Class destroyer HMAS *Duchess*. Future postings to sea would include Executive Officer HMAS *Vampire* in 1980 and Commanding Officer of the River Class (Modified Leander) frigate HMAS *Stuart* from July 1983 to December 1984.

Shore jobs have included an appointment as Commanding Officer HMAS *Watson* where he also served as Director of the RAN's Surface Warfare School. He had previously been the Director of the RAN Tactical School at *Watson* in the mid 80s and was promoted to the rank of Captain from there in June 1986.

Rear Admiral Barrie has enjoyed a very wide variety of staff and representative positions, including Defence Adviser New Dehli from February 1989 to July 1991. He is also a graduate of the National Defence University in Washington (which he attended as an International Fellow in 1986-7), the Joint Services Staff College (1980) and the Army Command and Staff College at Fort Queenscliff (1977). This training held him in good stead for Canberra based appointments in the Plans and Policy Branch of Navy Office (1978-79) and on the Force Development Staff of HQADF (1987-89).

In January 1991 he was promoted Commodore and became Chief of Staff at Maritime Headquarters and Deputy Maritime Commander, Australia in 1992. For his outstanding contribution in this job he was made a Member of the Order of Australia (AM) in the Military Division in the 1994 Australia Honours List, and promoted Rear Admiral in April 1995. So, all in all, Rear Admiral Chris Barrie brings very broad experience and an impressive repertoire of skills to his new and very busy *jobs* as Deputy Chief of Naval Staff and President of the Australian Naval Institute. It remains to be seen which position becomes the more demanding!


AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE

AUSTRALIAN-BUILT SUBMARINES —WHAT OF THE FUTURE?

by

Graeme Dunk

The Australian Defence Force (ADF) and the Department of Defence have made a substantial investment in the development of a submarine building capability in Australia. This capability is based on the ability to build under license from Kockums of Sweden, the six *Collins* class submarines for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), a variant of the *Type 471* submarine. The lead submarine, HMAS COLLINS, is currently undergoing sea trials. Early indications are that the submarine is, as planned, extremely quiet.

The building of these submarines in Australia, rather than their import from Sweden, has raised significant problems for Defence; namely, how to secure the long term viability of the manufacturer and hence long term access to the expertise built up by the Australian Submarine Corporation (ASC). The immediate response has been to suggest, in the latest Defence White Paper, that a further two submarines, may be a possibility.

This paper will address the dilemma that building *Collins* in Australia has raised for Defence; and will explore the implications of a number of the options that may affect the continued capability to build submarines in this country. These options are not necessary mutually exclusive.

The first option is obviously for ASC to develop export markets for its product. As for all other manufacturers, both in Australia and overseas, this is easier said than done. It is perhaps most difficult for ASC in the submarine market, as the company has only a single design to offer. There is little possibility that other Kockums designs would be released to the company, for Australian manufacture and export, as that would provide unwanted, and unnecessary, competition for the Swedish company. ASC is therefore left with the *Collins* design; a design for a large (3200 tonne, 77 metre), sophisticated submarine which specifically meets Australia's operational requirement, and is more suitable for those with considerable submarine operating experience.

And what of the likelihood of exporting the *Collins* design. After all, there is a great deal of interest in submarine forces internationally, and in Asia in particular:

- Singapore - interested in submarines for protection of the important sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in its vicinity. A smaller submarine would seem warranted for this task, and Singapore has been previously linked with the possible procurement of ex-German Navy *206* submarines.
- Thailand - has a requirement for submarines and has shown interest in the *209* (German) and *T96* (Swedish - export version of *A-19*) classes. The most recent reports have suggested that Thailand's procurement plans have been postponed due to other funding priorities.
- Malaysia - is interested in submarine procurement for maritime denial roles, and to protect the SLOCs between East and West Malaysia. Most interest has focused on Germany (*209*), Sweden (*T96*) and Russia (*Kilo*) as potential sources. Malaysia also is hampered by funding considerations.
- Indonesia - currently operates 2 x *209* class submarines, and has a stated requirement to procure additional submarines. Indonesia had shown an interest in the ex-Netherlands Navy *Zwaardvis* class. Unconfirmed reports indicate that Indonesia may be back in the submarine market, and the *Collins* may be a contender.
- Taiwan - has been attempting to improve and increase its existing force. A large conventional submarine such as the *Collins* would seem to fit into Taiwan's strategic and operational scenario; ie. SLOC protection and sea denial in the event of a Chinese military attempt to take over the island. It is difficult, however, to see the Australian Government risking the wrath of China by selling *Collins* class submarines to Taiwan.
- South Korea - interested in moving toward



OUT WITH THE OLD
OBERON CLASS
SUBMARINES



IN WITH THE NEW
COLLINS CLASS
SUBMARINES

a more traditional blue water role for its navy, and in the protection of the SLOCs on which the South Korean economy depends. South Korea could therefore be a candidate for larger submarines, such as the *Collins*. Based on its track record however, it is most likely that South Korea would want to manufacture any such submarines, although the production of any lead submarine could be undertaken in Australia.

- India - currently supports a submarine force of *209* and *Kilo* class submarines. As in the Korea case, India has shown a determination to manufacture and support its submarines by its own industries. India's main interest at this time is in the development of an indigenous nuclear-powered submarine.
- Japan - has a sophisticated conventional submarine force, built and supported by indigenous industries. Highly unlikely that Japan would source submarines from external manufacturers.
- South Africa - could be a longer term possibility for the sale of larger submarines. The South African force structure is being rebuilt after years of neglect, and is in process of modernising its *Daphne* class submarines. New boats do not figure in current planning.
- South America - a number of South American countries operate submarine forces, and many of these are currently interested in updates. This market, however, is sown up by the Germans (almost exclusively variants of the *209*), and it is unlikely that these countries would wish to accept the additional support and training costs associated with changing platforms types.
- Other - Middle Eastern and Mediterranean countries are also showing interest in conventional submarines and upgrades. The proximity to northern hemisphere suppliers, and the dominance of these manufacturers in providing other aspects of the force structure of these countries, would increase the difficulty of achieving sales into these areas. (As an indication of this, German *209* class submarines are to be built under license in the United States for provision to Egypt under Foreign Miltary Financing (FMF) arrangements).

The next option is the procurement of additional submarines by Australia for the RAN. This would ensure a longer production run for ASC, and could breach any gap between the build of the last submarine and the refit of the first. This option does however have a number of drawbacks. It is essentially a short-term, stop gap solution aimed at solving an immediate problem for the Defence Force, and does not address the fundamentals behind that problem.

More importantly, such action would divert increasingly limited funds from other aspects of the force structure, and thus distort the balanced force that Defence has been endeavouring to maintain. Submarines may well have an important role to play in the defence of Australia, but they cannot be used in the peacetime task of providing national presence, nor in providing support to United Nations peacekeeping and other enforcement operations. The question must be asked as to whether such force distortion and impact on the ability to undertake national and international goals can be justified merely to prop up one Defence company.

The third option for ASC may be to essentially stay in the submarine business, but to concentrate on providing training, support and upgrade services to other operators. At first glance this may seem like a reasonable option, but there remains significant competition and the ASC remains in a weak position. Training and support inevitably comprise part of any acquisition package, and many countries (such as South Korea, Taiwan, India, etc) have a preference for in-country logistic support. Joint ventures with local support providers would therefore appear a necessity in most Asian markets. In addition, the ASC has little, if any, expertise or experience with other designs.

A further option may be for the ASC to branch out into other defence areas; such as shipbuilding, ship repair, and systems integration (as it is attempting to do at present). The field here is no less competitive (and may actually be more so) than the submarine field, with a number of shipbuilding and integration activities already in existence in Australia. The shipbuilding field is dominated by Transfield, with other activity conducted by Australian Defence Industries (ADI) and smaller operations such as North Queensland Engineers and Associates (NQEA). Ship repair and systems integration activities are similarly dominated by Transfield and ADI. There is much evidence to suggest that the amount of work available within Australia will be insufficient to support existing operations, and a further player in these areas will exacerbate an already delicate situation. Transfer of specific technologies developed under the submarine programme (platform quietening, specialised welding techniques, etc) may also be a possibility.

Should it not be possible for any of the above to come to fruition, the ASC may finalise the build of the six *Collins* class submarines, and then close down. This would provide a major problem for Defence in that the investment made in setting up a submarine manufacture capability within Australia, will not have led

to the availability of continuing repair, refit and upgrade facilities and expertise. The capability to undertake the refit and upgrade of the *Collins* would need to be transferred to some other systems integration entity, with Transfield and ADI being the logical choices. The possibility of a take-over of the ASC must also be considered in this context, but this seems unlikely (except at a bargain basement price) due to the fundamental weakness in its market position.

In summary therefore, the future position of the ASC cannot be regarded as rosy. A bail-out by the Government through the procurement of a further two *Collins* class cannot be supported strategically, and would result in a serious distortion of the entire force structure of the Defence Force.

What the *Collins* example shows is that further effort is required in Australia in determining which industries are strategic in nature, and thus worth establishing, nurturing and, if necessary, paying a premium for. Any such determinations need to be based on rigorous analysis, rather than the present *ad-hoc*, "bugle-blowing" arrangements designed to appease vocal sections of the community.

Further work is also required in the developmental stages of major Defence projects to assess whether indigenous manufacture is feasible over the longer term, and whether the industry thus created can be essentially self-supporting, or whether it will merely become a political, economic and strategic millstone.

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

The Collins class submarine



"A HANDY BERTH"

Australian Perth Class DDG alongside in Sydney town.


ENTRY
PROHIBITED
BY ORDER
M.S.P.

New Zealand Chapter's Prizeman for 1995

Ensign Timothy Foote of the Royal New Zealand Navy receives the New Zealand Chapter of the Australian Naval Institute Prize from the Air Commander, New Zealand, Air Commodore G.J.W. Goldsmith AFC. (Photo: RNZN)

The prize, a pair of binoculars, is awarded annually to the junior officer who has contributed the most to the Junior Officer Common Training Course. The prize was awarded at the JOCT Graduation Parade held on 14 July 1995 at HMNZS TAMAKI, where the Air Commander was the Reviewing Officer.

Ensign Foote is 22 years of age and joined the Royal New Zealand Navy's Marine Engineering Branch in January 1995. After completing academic studies Tim can expect to be posted to sea in early 1996 prior to attending engineering application training in Australia later that year.

Last year's prize winner was (then) Midshipman Sandra Green RNZN.

The Council of the Australian Naval Institute would like to take this opportunity to thank all members of the ANI's New Zealand Chapter for the enthusiasm and interest they have shown in supporting the Institute and its objectives. In particular, we thank the New Zealand Chapter Convenor, Commander Bruce Coffey for his efforts, especially for his patience with sometimes slow trans-Tasman communications. Also, special thanks go to Commander McKillop, Lieutenant Commander Olliver and Lieutenant Commander Stevens who help him administer the growing Chapter.

Another ANI Medallion-winning essay

STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH SOUTH-EAST ASIA: RHETORIC AND REALITY

by

GARY HOGAN

There is a decided difference between the cohesion of a single *army...and that of an* allied force...*In the one, cohesion is at its strongest and unity at its closest. In the other, unity is remote, frequently found only in mutual political interests, and even then rather precarious and imperfect; cohesion between the parts will usually be very loose, and often completely fictitious.'*

- Carl von Clausewitz

Throughout most of its nationhood, Australia's defence has depended heavily upon 'great and powerful friends' for strategic direction and policy formulation. The gradual withdrawal of its traditional allies from the Asia-Pacific region since World War II has meant an increasing requirement for Australia to define its own regional security objectives. Most recently, those objectives have been couched within a policy of 'regional engagement,' comprising 'constructive contact' with major Asian powers, 'strategic commitment' to the South-West Pacific and 'strategic partnership' with South-East Asia.

Australia can realistically expect to exercise extremely limited strategic leverage over major Asian powers, just as there can be limited expectations of significant strategic dividends obtaining from commitment to the South-West Pacific micro-states. The developing and newly-industrialised nations of South-East Asia are quite another matter. Geographically proximate, economically powerful and militarily potent, South-East Asia offers the best prospect for return on Australian strategic investment.

The last five years have seen Australian Foreign Affairs and Defence officials increasingly calling for active participation in '...the gradually emerging sense of community - of shared strategic and security interests - in South East Asia.' In theory, a secure strategic environment will be maintained by multi-dimensional regional engagement, using seven policy instruments: military capability; politico-military capability; diplomacy; economic links; development assistance; 'non-military threat' assistance; and exchanges of people and ideas. While the rhetoric proposing this strategic partnership is promising, the realistic prospect of achieving it is much less so.

Any description of the ten South-East Asian nations as a 'region' is probably sustainable only geographically. In political, economic and cultural terms, the region is as diverse as any in the world. Rapid regional economic growth and concomitant military expansion have produced the official Australian declaration that '...policies in the 1990s are increasingly shaped by the need for engagement with Asia across the whole sphere of national activity.' This will be easier said than done. This paper discusses the proposals, problems and prospects for an Australian strategic partnership with South-East Asia. Some historical background is provided, to determine how new the policy really is and to place it in strategic context. The rhetoric behind strategic partnership is examined, and a three-stage 'road-map' is put forward as a guide to achieving it. The realities of strategic partnership are explored, including the daunting obstacles it will face and some potential pitfalls for Australia. Finally, the likelihood of achieving strategic partnership is assessed, and a cost-benefit analysis for Australia proposed.

Although regional engagement involves the full range of political, economic and military policy instruments, this paper is confined largely to those which advance Australia's defence strategy and, by association, regional security. While comments within the paper apply generally to all ten South-East Asian nations, only those five with defence representation in Canberra are discussed in detail. Bilateral defence cooperation with Vietnam remains contentious for domestic political reasons. It is also likely that the 'stunted and impoverished' nations of Indochina, isolationist Burma and Brunei's small military will play only a peripheral role in Australia's defence strategic partnership with the region until at least the end of the decade.

WELCOME TO DARWIN

Regional Engagement in action. Australian and regional warships alongside in Darwin during Exercise KAKADU 95

Before examining how strategic partnership will work, the challenges it will face and the potential value it represents, it is necessary first to discuss the historical background to the policy and Australia's relations with the region.

'YELLOW PERIL' TO 'STRATEGIC PARTNER'

The Historical Context

Australia's concern with its region dates from the first day that Europeans landed on its shores to found an outpost of Empire on the outskirts of Asia. The idea of a threat from the 'Yellow Peril' was popularised by *The Bulletin* as early as 1886. Whether potential invaders have been French, Russian, German, Japanese or Communist Chinese, a small, isolated population has sought its security in concert with larger allies. Throughout this century, Australia has clung variously to British apron strings and American coat tails in defining an effective and economical defence strategy. In return, Australia has provided military support to its guarantors, fighting all its wars outside its borders. The three enduring historical themes relevant to regional engagement have been identified as 'longstanding commitment to forward defence, the priority attached to military alliances, and attitudes to race.'

Australian defence planning has always been conducted with at least one eye on Asia. South-East Asia came into clearer focus after World War II, with the proliferation of national liberation and independence movements throughout the region. The focus was further sharpened by the regional disengagement of Australia's traditional allies in the 1970s. Australia's own withdrawal from Vietnam is commonly portrayed as marking a retreat from the discredited policy of 'forward defence' and its replacement with 'continental defence,' known also as 'Fortress Australia.' These two themes recur historically throughout Australian defence policy.

Strategic partnership has been criticised as a '...move back towards a new "forward defence" posture under which Australian military forces will again be deployed into our region.' Such views over-simplify the two major trends in Australian security strategy, seeing them as discrete and mutually exclusive. It is almost as if Australia had retreated across its maritime moat and raised some drawbridge. 'Fortress Australia' was more a psychological construct than a viable or practiced policy; a catharsis to ease the national anguish over Vietnam. The defence of Australia and 'forward defence,' in various forms, are symbiotic, not separate. The one guarantees nationhood, while the other has '...brought Australia into active sovereign membership of the world of states.'

Strategic partnership is not a reversion to some discredited policy. Australian defence strategy is not returning to South-East Asia, for it never left the region. Even at the height of post-Vietnam defence isolationism, the Defence White Paper of 1976 announced an intention to:

> '...continue our defence connections with [South-East Asia], by such means as defence co-operation programs, occasional military exercising, consultations and visits....we do not expect that any significant change will be called for to support our important common interests and to maintain our valuable co-operation with them.'

The means of Australian defence strategy have shifted little throughout this century, and the ends even less. Strategic partnership is in keeping with the historical continuum of Australia's relations with the region since 1945. With, first, British and, increasingly, American crutches being removed, Australia's first steps in an independent security policy have been northward. This marks an important milestone in Australia's relations with the region, indicating a desire to be '...secure in and with Asia not from it.' Even if strategic partnership appears to be 'old wine in new bottles,' the wine shows encouraging signs of maturing. A range of strategic factors in both Australia and the region have brought about this sea change in Australia's security outlook.

The Strategic Context

It has become commonplace to observe that the end of the Cold War has fundamentally altered the international strategic landscape. The evaporation of the Soviet threat in the Pacific, uncertainty over the roles of players like China, Japan and India, and the shift from 'globalism' to 'regionalism' have been cause for strategic recalculation in both South-East Asia and Australia.

Rapid economic growth and the control of internal insurgencies meant that, by the late 1980s, South-East Asian nations '...had acquired respectable regional power projection forces.' The closure of US bases in the Philippines has reinforced the region's perception that the US is embarked on a process of disengagement from the region, and Japanese defence spending is a further cause for concern. While the end of the Cold War has meant that the South-East Asian nations are '...more peaceful than at any time in their recent history,' tensions persist over '...competing sovereignty claims, challenges to government legitimacy, and territorial disputes.' Denial of an arms race in South-East Asia has been so strenuous as to indicate almost certainly the existence of one, often called euphemistically a 'rapid increase in military capabilities.'

This expansion of South-East Asian economic and military power has not been ignored by Australia. In a world increasingly restructuring into various regions, Australia has had to choose between Oceania and South-East Asia. The choice has not been difficult. There can be no doubt that the primary driving force behind Australia's focus on South-East Asia is economic. In defence terms, the fear that its 'special relationship' with the US may eventually go the way of its 'Imperial connection' with Britain, has spurred Australia to seek a closer relationship with its strategic neighbourhood. As Paul Dibb has observed, 'We should...develop closer military relations with our friends in Southeast Asia, who will have many defence planning problems in common with us in the 1990s.' The official Australian response to the need for 'closer military relations' is strategic partnership, the policy rhetoric of which requires some scrutiny.

STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP — THE RHETORIC

The Policy Context

Strategic partnership with South-East Asia is the latest mutation in the evolution of Australian regional defence strategy. It is a far cry from the tar-pits of 'fear, suspicion and condescension' which have characterised much of our history with the region. Our defence strategy has '...developed over the last two hundred years into a complex, sophisticated policy conglomerate....based on a broad matrix of economic, military, domestic political and international relations policies.' The direct progenitors of Australian strategic policy in the 1990s were the 1986 *Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities*, by academic Paul Dibb, and the Defence White Paper of the following year, *The Defence of Australia 1987*.

Both papers, however, remained coolly aloof from advocating direct involvement in South-East Asia. This cautious approach is reflected in a series of measured statements pointing out the difficulties of promoting '...a sense of shared strategic interests' with the region, while encouraging '...practical cooperation...in activities of common defence interest.' Even a Defence planning document endorsed two years later, proclaimed that the development of confidence with South-East Asia over strategic and operational issues would be furthered by a policy of 'selective cooperation' in certain areas.

A ministerial statement on regional security released by Foreign Minister Evans in late 1989 was anything but coy about courting South-East Asia. Evans put forward the idea of a multi-faceted commitment between equals, called 'comprehensive engagement,' as Australia's long-term goal in the region. This has been described as '...a shorthand expression for a complex framework defining Australia's political, economic, security and cultural relations with Southeast Asia.' Comprehensive engagement was given a Defence spin in *Strategic Review 1993*, resulting in the concept of strategic partnership.

The Defence document pointed to an '...integral link between the defence of Australia, and our increasing defence engagement with regional nations.' In the case of South-East Asia, the dual themes of strategic partnership were enunciated as the development of more substantive military links and cooperation in defence science and industry. *Strategic Review 1993* was as much an economic and political manifesto as a defence planning document, emphasising the Foreign Affairs '...idea of security as 'multidimensional,' meaning that non-military factors...make their contribution.' While eschewing the 'strategic partnership' rhetoric of *Strategic Review 1993*, the 1994 Defence White Paper places the high priority on defence relations with South-East Asia. It is useful, therefore, to examine in more detail the building blocks which will be used to construct this strategic partnership.

Regional Security Building Blocks

Senator Evans has elaborated on his 1989 concept for regional security as '...countries working in various ways, largely informally, to build multi-dimensional linkages of mutual benefit and interdependence,' describing this as a 'building-block approach.' Since 1989, Australian officials have '...suggested several particular multilateral "building blocks,"' including cooperation in maritime affairs, the creation of a regional security community and a network of security dialogues, and increased intelligence exchanges. *Strategic Review 1993* advocated an even wider range of initiatives in the search for security with our new partners, including increased strategic planning exchanges, cooperation in defence science and technology, combined exercises and military training exchanges.

Until now, there has been no attempt to collect, analyse and prioritise such 'building blocks.' There is no 'road-map' available to point the way to the achievement of strategic partnership, or to suggest what the final destination might look like. This study proposes that there will be three stages along the path to partnership in regional security with South-East Asia: foundational; developmental; and operational. The stages are not discrete, nor is it intended that the indicators within each stage be limited or limiting. The stages may be described as follows:

> **Foundational Stage.** In the foundational stage, basic Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) are implemented, such as an expansion of defence representation and increased defence exchanges at all levels. These are slowly augmented to

include more meaningful security collaboration, such as maritime patrols, combined strategic planning and defence industry cooperation.

Developmental Stage. In the developmental stage, the CSBMs from the previous stage are consolidated and developed. Sharing common threat perceptions, forces in the region attain a high level of interoperability, through common equipment, doctrine and training. Combined regional forces are formed for a range of tasks, including peacekeeping. An official regional security forum is established and total defence transparency is achieved.

Operational Stage. Following the foundation and development of meaningful security cooperation, the operational stage sees the final building blocks put in place. Forces attain total interoperability and the establishment of a permanent collective force represents the acme of the regional security structure.

Australia is presently embarking on stage one of an extremely long and doubtless frustrating journey. The first stage will be difficult enough, and the attainment of the following stages may be illusory. Either way, the entire endeavour will fail gloriously without the confidence and commitment of our South-East Asian partners.

The View From South-East Asia

Australian regional defence strategy is, essentially, a strategy of self-interest. Not surprisingly, the region's responses to its new 'odd man in' will be guided by similar tenets. Western nations are traditionally viewed by regional states as exploiters of the Third World, and Australia represents a conduit for Western interests and destabilising ideas. An Indonesian academic recently cautioned that Australia is regarded by South-East Asian nations as '...a less important factor in their regional strategic thinking than Australia perhaps realises.'

As Australia's nearest regional neighbour, Indonesia welcomes the opportunity for strengthened security ties, while harbouring concerns over Australia's growing strategic strike capability. Despite often prickly political relations, Malaysia has shown no desire to scale back its level of security cooperation with Australia. Malaysian officials have espoused the idea that 'Regional states in concert should exert their role in ensuring that the region becomes trouble-free.' Singapore officially considers its defence relationship with Australia 'vital to the stability of the region,' and values the access it affords to military training areas, industry, exchanges and combined planning. Thailand cautiously supports Australian advances, while the Philippines will welcome anything which fills the void created by the US departure.

Regional reactions to Australia's new-found 'Asianness' probably range from suspicion to cynicism to amusement. Australia must capitalise on any honeymoon period to demonstrate good faith and genuine desire for strategic partnership, while recognising that prospective partners will place national interests above regional concerns. While one strategic analyst may be right in recently observing that '...the atmospherics in the region are distinctly conducive to initiatives for region-wide engagement now,' there are significant impediments to achieving the strategic partnership ideal.

STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP - THE REALITY

Sticking Points and Stumbling Blocks

The obstacles to strategic partnership are manifest. South-East Asia is as diverse as any region in the world, comprising Buddhists, Muslims, Confucians and Catholics loosely organised under liberal democracies, Communist regimes, military dictatorships and constitutional monarchies. Geographic, demographic, economic and cultural heterogeneity belies the very notion of a region. Moreover, the scope for collective defence '...remains limited in the absence of a common and readily identifiable threat.' A recent study of the prospects for regional defence industrial collaboration concluded that regional diversity makes this, at best, a faint long term possibility. This possibility will dim further as the world's arms merchants increasingly compete for a share of the lucrative regional market, as evinced by the British sale of armoured, aircraft and anti-aircraft hardware to Indonesia.

Cultural differences compound the effects of regional diversity and external intrusions. The concept of strategic culture holds that nations approach security issues from unique perspectives, which '...profoundly influence how a country perceives, protects and promotes its interests and values with respect to the threat or use of force.' South-East Asian strategic culture is characterised by longer time and policy horizons than Western thinking, reliance on bilateral rather than multilateral approaches to security, informality of policy-making structures, and a commitment to non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Australia's predominantly Western history and culture will inevitably accentuate differences and exacerbate frustrations on both sides of the partnership.

Regional reactions to Australia are coloured by colonial suspicions, racist perceptions and religious divisions. The sanctimonious condescension of a reck-

less press and tactless politicians, frequently censuring neighbouring states for corruption and human rights abuses, will not assist in Australia's regional integration. To some potential strategic partners, '...Australian domestic criticism can be portrayed as meddling in their internal affairs and as counter to their overall national security interests.' Australia's military posture also runs potentially counter to good working relationships with the region. While assertions that Australia's possession of force projection and strategic strike capability have stimulated a regional arms race are groundless, equally naive is the traditional Australian view that this capability 'commands deterrent respect rather than fear in the region.' Occasionally, Australia's defence strategy sends understandably confusing and contradictory signals to the region. As one academic has noted:

> '...despite the rhetoric, much more effort is put into security against the region than with it. This is not unremarked in the region, as the immediate suspicious Indonesian response to Australia's recent additional purchase of F111s illustrates, but is not an obvious concern.'

The forging of any profound security relationship between Australia and the South-East Asian region will be complicated, on both sides, by historical legacies, strategic perceptions, national interests, economic competition, political differences and cultural diversity. If such sticking points and stumbling blocks are to be overcome, appropriate mechanisms and forums for regional dialogue will be required.

Avenues of Approach

Proposals for multilateral security dialogue and cooperation within South-East Asia focus on three options: extending the purview of the essentially politically- and economically-focused Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to formally encompass military issues; expanding membership of the militarily-focused Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) to include other states; and using various non-government security colloquia to enhance cooperation and foster CSBMs. Security was formally placed on the ASEAN agenda in early 1992, and there has recently been

> '...increased interest within the highest levels of ASEAN at possible security co-operation on an organisation wide basis.' The first steps in institutionalising regional security dialogue have now been taken, and the ASEAN Regional Forum met to discuss security problems for the first time in mid-1994. Australia was represented.

The FPDA have been '...a useful vehicle to allow Australia to re-establish links with the region.' FPDA rubric underpins air force cooperation with Singapore and collaboration with Malaysia on the construction of an offshore patrol vessel, and FPDA's Integrated Air Defence System provides a rudimentary but functional combined staff structure. While it may be that '...the full potential of the FPDA as a regional security model has yet to be realised,' Indonesian sensitivities will constrain this. With the formation in 1993 of a Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), the '...first regionwide forum for quasi-official dialogue on security problems' was established. Australia plays a leading role in CSCAP, as it attempts to '...both initiate and sponsor new conceptual approaches to regional security issues and also to support official efforts at regional trust-building and security cooperation.'

In addition to such formal, multilateral avenues for strategic dialogue, a system of ties and alignments already functions informally as a regional security community. This web of bilateral defence and security links combine to have strategic effect. With more formalised regional security forums still taking shape, Australia must continue to build confidence by pursuing bilateral security relations and defence links with the nations of South-East Asia. During the present foundational stage of strategic partnership, evidence of Australian desire and willingness to get involved militarily with the region is equivocal.

Getting Involved

In recent years, Australian defence interaction with South-East Asia has expanded in a range of areas. The Royal Australian Air Force has increased the level and amount of training with regional air forces, particularly Singapore, while the Royal Australian Navy has begun hosting multilateral exercises with regional naval and air force participation. It is now Australian Army policy that senior officers have basic skills in Asia-Pacific languages, and regional representatives have attended all Chief of the General Staff annual conferences since 1992. Australia assisted Thailand with its recent Defence White Paper, and has similarly consulted with Singapore and Malaysia. The Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) recently advocated an expansion of combined exercises with the region, while the newly-introduced CDF's Overseas Activities Directive is now used to monitor the military's business end of strategic partnership. While Australian proposals for a regional peacekeeping force are unlikely to get far, South-East Asia is '...showing an active interest in peacekeeping and the foundations exist for cooperative programs.'

Figure 1 South-East Asian Defence Personnel Trained in Australia Under the Defence Cooperation Program, 1989-94.

Year	Indonesia	Singapore	Malaysia	Thailand	Philippines	Total
1989-90		46	209	200	109	**564**
1990-91	14	56	250	110	99	**529**
1991-92	52	95	212	109	114	**582**
1992-93	90	68	161	152	172	**643**
1993-94	120	82	114	159	129	**604**
Total (by country)	**276**	**347**	**946**	**730**	**623**	**2922**

(**Source:** Department of Defence Defence Report, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, Years 1989-90 to 1993-94)

Although there are indications that regional defence cooperation has reached unprecedented levels over the last five years, a review of Australia's Defence Cooperation Program for the same period is somewhat ambiguous on this point. Figure 1 lists numbers of South-East Asian defence personnel who have received training in Australia since the Foreign Ministerial statement on comprehensive engagement with the region. Apart from the inclusion of Indonesian troops in the program, numbers have remained reasonably static, indicating that, in one area at least, strategic partnership rhetoric is at variance with fiscal reality. Getting involved in the regional initiatives outlined in *Strategic Review 1993* will entail considerable government expenditure. Regional partners will soon grow weary of any Australian attempts to engage them 'on the cheap.' An assessment of strategic partnership is therefore required, to determine whether the potential benefits warrant the considerable costs.

STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP - AN ASSESSMENT

The quest for full defence strategic partnership with South-East Asia appears quixotic, and a recent study is probably correct in concluding: 'The formation of some sort of regional organisation, based on ASEAN and including Australia, pursuing a coordinated security policy is very far away; in fact, it is probably an unrealistic objective for the foreseeable future.' Our present foundational stage will be difficult to achieve, the developmental stage almost impossible, while the operational stage lies in the realm of fantasy. Diversity, differences and divisions will see the process move at a glacial pace, and the regional approach to decision-making '...will make progress in a pan-South-east Asian security approach a longer journey than hoped.' Though likely to be testing and tedious, it is a journey which Australia cannot but make.

Cost-Benefit Analysis

Australia will not have strategic partnership all its own way, and Paul Dibb is right in warning that '...our concept of forging close security ties with Asia may also place constraints on us, unless handled carefully.' Close defence links with the region may draw Australia into regional disputes, or demand that it condone behaviour it might otherwise condemn. Defence technology transfer will facilitate the development of regional defence industrial bases, able to undercut Australian competitors with cheaper labour and less stringent work practices. The inadvertent disclosure of research and development information received from traditional allies will also pose problems. Similar considerations will dictate that intelligence exchanges proceed with caution.

The benefits of strategic partnership far outweigh its costs. The concept provides an outward focus to Australia's defence strategy, balancing it by recognising the strategic sense of seeking Australian security away from Australian shores. Whenever diplomatic relations with our neighbours have been strained, defence links have provided a steadying influence, allowing a basis from which relations have been rebuilt. At the operational level, increased military cooperation and exchanges '...help reduce tensions and make the remote chance that one of our neighbours might attack us even more remote.' To engage, or not to engage, is the strategic question. Partnership is the strategic answer.

Perhaps the greatest value of current defence strategy is the way it complements and combines with Australia's political and economic strategies, producing a cohesive and coherent national strategy. Since 1989, Defence and Foreign Affairs policies have been increasingly synchronous, with the two departments now in step for the first time in Australia's history. Equally encouraging is that defence strategy appears subordinate to political strategy. Critics of this, including one senior Defence official, claim that '...foreign policy and defence policy are not the same...[and] it is unlikely that...foreign policy imperatives...and defence strategic policy will remain in a nice balance.' This view ignores Clausewitz's maxim that defence strategy should be '...a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.' With consultation and consensus between Defence and Foreign Affairs continuing over relations with the region, the

'nice balance' in Australia's national strategy is likely to continue.

CONCLUSION

The economic and military emergence of South-East Asia, and uncertainty over the future roles of major powers in the region, have caused Australia to rethink relations with its near northern neighbours. Since 1989, Australia has defined its defence strategy towards the region as a 'strategic partnership,' involving a multi-dimensional scheme of exchanges and exercises, consultations and cooperation. While Australia has always kept at least one eye on Asia, strategic partnership marks the maturation of defence strategy towards the region. Australia now pursues its security in and with the region, rather than from it. Critics claiming that strategic partnership is an alias for 'forward defence' betray an outmoded 'Fortress Australia' mindset. Seeking Australian security away from Australian shores is simply good strategic sense.

While the rhetoric of strategic partnership is appealing, there are some major obstacles to its achievement in reality. Gaining the confidence of potential partners will be a prolonged process. Regional diversity and a cultural preference for informal bilateral links will frustrate any attempts at collective security arrangements. In the absence of common threat perceptions, all parties will place national interests above regional concerns. There will be three broad stages along the path from elementary defence contacts to the creation of a combined regional force. Australia will find this initial stage of defence dialogue and cooperation difficult enough. The creation of a fully interoperable security force is probably a pipe-dream.

Strategic partnership is nonetheless a worthwhile aspiration, and the current trend of increasing military involvement with the region should continue. Although Australia may surrender a degree of sovereignty through its regional involvement, the overall benefits of a balanced defence strategy and enhanced security prospects outweigh the costs. By directing its national strategic focus towards engagement with South-East Asia, Australia's military and political instruments of power have fallen into step for the first time in its history. This trend is likely to continue. A Chinese proverb known throughout the region holds that a journey of 10,000 leagues begins with a single step. Australia has taken the first step in its defence strategic partnership with South-East Asia. It is a step in the right direction.

BROWN WATER COASTIES

THE US COAST GUARD IN VIETNAM

by

Graham Wilson

A traditional method of transport used in South East Asia is water. Throughout the region small craft have plied the waterways and coasts for millennia, carrying goods and people. Unfortunately, during the Vietnam War, the coast and the inland waterways of Vietnam provided a ready made and difficult to interdict supply route for the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong.

To counter North Vietnamese and Viet Cong waterborne operations, the South Vietnamese and their US allies put much effort into blockading the coastline and patrolling the inland waterways.

The South Vietnamese Navy and Police, the US Navy and, to a small extent, the US Army, carried out these tasks.

One other armed service provided men and ships to take part in coastal operations — the United States Coast Guard.

Brown Water War

As far back as the 19th century, the French had used small craft to patrol the rivers of Annam and Cochin China as they extended their grip on the region. The Japanese used small craft to patrol the coast and rivers during their occupation in the Second World War. But the coastal and riverine forces, the so-called Brown Water Navy, came into their own in the First Indo-China War and reached a high level of competence during the later conflict.

The United States first became involved in the Brown Water War in 1965. In February of that year the US Army had damaged a Viet Cong junk loaded with weapons and ammunition at Vung Ro Bay north of Nha Trang but later plans to have the South Vietnamese Army and Navy mount a joint operation to recover the cargo failed due to the ineptness and disorganisation of the South Vietnamese which combined to allow the Viet Cong to remove the cargo at their leisure.

The *Vung Ro Incident* gave the lie to South Vietnamese claims that no supplies were reaching the Viet Cong by sea. In fact, almost all of the Viet Cong's supplies were coming by sea since at that time the Ho Chi Minh Trail was no more than a series of foot tracks and had yet to become the highway that would see a constant flow of supplies from the north. The South Vietnamese Navy, which operated a fleet of almost 300 patrol craft and armed junks and sampans, was both unable and unwilling to counter the flow of supplies, lacking the seamanship skills to face the monsoons, usually steering well clear of any suspicious craft and preferring to spend their time extorting money from innocent fishermen and traders (one US Navy adviser at the time described the South Vietnamese Navy as "gun-shy pirates").

Following the *Vung Ro Incident*, the US commander in Vietnam, General Westmoreland, decided that the US Navy should take a more active role in the blockade and interdiction operations in Vietnamese waters and got agreement from senior naval officers in March.

The original US commitment was to coastal operations and on 28 March, Operation MARKET PLACE was officially initiated with two US destroyers making continuous patrols off the coast. Initially part of the 7th Fleet's Task Force 71 (TF 71), MARKET PLACE was soon transferred to direct control of Military Assistance Command Vietnam and became Task Force 115 (TF 115), the operation at the same time being renamed MARKET TIME. Operation MARKET TIME was to grow to the size of a small fleet with patrol craft ranging from destroyers down to Boston Whalers and Zodiacs and eventually included aerial surveillance and harbour defence operations. Most units committed to MARKET TIME were navy but also included Coast Guard elements. Vietnamese elements committed to MARKET TIME eventually reached a level of competence and commitment which wiped out the earlier stain of the *Vung Ro Incident*.

Established in parallel with MARKET TIME, Operation GAME WARDEN began in September 1965 to clear and keep the enemy from the rivers and other inland waterways of South Vietnam. This was the riverine element of the Brown Water war and was fought by units of the US Navy and Army and the Vietnamese Army, Navy and Police, equipped with an amazing array of ad hoc and specially built craft.

The Coast Guard Joins MARKET TIME

The aim of MARKET TIME was to cut off the flow

of supplies coming from the north by sea. To do this, the US Navy set up nine patrol zones from the DMZ to the Gulf of Thailand. Two barriers were set up, the inner stretching from the coast out from three to five nautical miles and the outer stretching out to forty nautical miles. Destroyer Escorts Radar (DER) were deployed on the outer barrier for command and control and were supplemented as necessary. The inner barrier was at first made up of small patrol craft, the ubiquitous "Swift boats" and junks, with destroyers operating as close to shore as possible. For radar coverage of the vital Mekong Delta, three, later four, radar equipped Landing Ship Tank (LST) were anchored in the Delta where they provided both radar coverage for the inner barrier and logistic support for riverine forces. Aerial surveillance was provided by P-3 Orions operating out of Sangley Point in the Philippines, SP-2V Neptunes operating out of Tan Son Nhut and Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, and SP-5M Marlin seaplanes (the last operational seaplanes flown by the US Navy) operating from seaplane tenders at Cam Ranh Bay and Con Son Island.

Despite all of these assets, however, what was sorely lacking was a force of small, fast, seaworthy, well-armed ships with shallow draft to balance the force of very small patrol boats operating the inner barrier. When MARKET TIME began as MARKET PLACE, the US Navy realised that both the type of equipment available to it and the level of expertise needed for the conduct of the operation were woefully inadequate. An aggressively "blue water" force, the USN at that time simply lacked the ships and experience needed for the close inshore operations on which the success of MARKET TIME depended. While this was to be remedied in time, in September 1965 the US Navy just did not possess the small, shallow draft patrol vessels needed near the coast. The navy began a program of design and construction of small craft but in the meantime it turned to an often despised "poor cousin" to provide ships suitable for and men experienced in coastal operations — the United States Coast Guard, often referred to disparagingly as "coasties".

The United States Coast Guard

The United States Coast Guard (USCG) was formed on 28 January, 1915 by the amalgamation of the Revenue Cutter Service (first formed in 1790 as the Revenue Marine) and the Life Saving Service (formed in 1848). In July 1939, the Lighthouse Service (founded in 1789) was transferred to the Coast Guard and the Bureau of Navigation and Steamship Inspection became followed in 1942. The Coast Guard does not come under the Department of Defence but rather is an arm of the US Department of Transport, having been transferred from control of the Treasury in 1967. Yet the Coast Guard, whose motto is "SEMPER PARATUS" ("Always Ready"), is by law "an armed service of the United States" and is available to support the US Navy in time of war or national emergency, or "as directed by the President." The Coast Guard has a strength of about 38,000 men and women and is responsible for coastal surveillance, anti-smuggling and drug enforcement, immigration control, maritime search and rescue, maritime safety, environmental control and enforcement, hydrographic survey, and construction and maintenance of aids to navigation. These responsibilities extend inland to the great waterways of North America, including the Great Lakes.

Often regarded as little more than a sea-going police force, rather than a military service, the Coast Guard has never hesitated to "go in harm's way" when needed. For eight years following its foundation in 1790 the Revenue Marine was America's only maritime defence force, the US Navy having been dissolved at the end of the Revolutionary War. This fact has always rankled with the Navy. Cutters of the Revenue Marine Service fought French privateers from 1798 - 1800, the British in the War of 1812 and took part in blockade and anti-blockade runner operations during the American Civil War. The Revenue Marine Cutter *Harriet Lane* fired the first naval shot of the Civil War on 12 April 1861 in Charleston Harbour. Coast Guard cutters provided convoy escorts and anti-submarine ships in the First World War and fought a number of running fights with fast and heavily armed smugglers during the Prohibition era. In the Second World War, Coast Guard cutters battled German U-boats on convoy operations from the US/Canadian East Coast to Iceland and in the Caribbean and provided escorts and NGS ships for the invasions of Southern France and Normandy. The Coast Guard took part in many of the island campaigns of the Pacific (Australian troops were taken ashore by US Coast Guardsmen in the invasions of Labuan and Balikpapan). In more recent times, Coast Guard ships and units deployed to the Gulf for Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

Although it operates a number of ships of quite respectable size, including its icebreakers, the Coast Guard is in the main a small ship force restricting its operations almost entirely to coastal and inland waters. It was natural that the USN turned to the "coasties" for assistance in the early days of MARKET TIME.

Coast Guard Squadron One

In obedience to a Presidential Directive partially mobilising the USCG to support the USN in Vietnam, the Commandant of the Coast Guard ordered the formation and activation of Coast Guard Squadron One (RONONE) in May 1965. The Squadron was officially commissioned at Coast Guard Base Alemeda, California, on 27 May.

The new unit was equipped with seventeen 82-foot patrol boats which were to be organised into two divisions, Division Eleven and Division Twelve. The Coast Guard uses the standard NATO ship designation system but prefixes individual designations with the letter "W" to distinguish the fact that it is a Coast Guard vessel. Thus, the patrol boats assigned to RONONE were designated WPB.

The patrol boats were loaded into cargo ships and transported to Subic Bay in the Philippines while the crews trained at Alemeda for their deployment. After a period of intensive training in survival, weapons handling, patrol procedures and other subjects, the crews travelled to the Philippines to join their boats. Once at Subic, a program of refresher training and shake down cruises was embarked upon. Division Twelve departed Subic Bay for Da Nang on 15 July and Division Eleven departed five days later for An Thoi on the Gulf of Thailand.

The WPBs were similar in size and performance to the RAN's "Attack" Class boats and were found to be well suited to their tasks. Eighty-two feet long (of course), with a displacement of 67 tons, they were powered by twin diesels and armed with a combination of an 81mm mortar and three to five .50 cal machine guns and carried a crew of 8 to 10, usually commanded by a Chief Petty Officer. The boats combined fairly good sea keeping qualities with good habitability and were popular with crews. All of the boats were built at the Coast Guard's own yard at Curtis Bay, Baltimore, Maryland.

On arrival in Vietnamese waters, RONONE passed under control of TF 115 and immediately went to work. The shallow draft of the WPBs enabled them to work closer in-shore where, in concert with units of the South Vietnamese Navy's Junk Force, they constituted part of the inner barrier, the outer barrier being maintained by US Navy destroyers and mine sweepers.

To co-ordinate the various units assigned to MARKET TIME, the US Navy established five Coastal Surveillance Centres (CSC) at Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Vung Tau and An Thoi. The Coast Guard cutters were assigned to one of these CSC as required and were placed under control of a destroyer or mine sweeper in the outer barrier which provided the smaller craft with radar and navigational aids. In turn, the cutters provided similar support to the even smaller craft (junks, PBRs, LCLs, etc) operating close in-shore and, if required, fire support.

During this early period, the cutters of RONONE intercepted numerous junks and other small craft carrying enemy soldiers and stores. They of course intercepted and inspected many craft which were quite legitimately going about their business and these were allowed to go their way with a minimum of fuss - the Coast Guard had acquired a well earned reputation over the years for firm politeness in dealing with "the public" and this policy was continued in Vietnam, much to the bemusement of many US Navy personnel and their Vietnamese counterparts.

Intercepted enemy craft often fought back but the firepower of the cutters was generally more than enough to counter this. Additionally, the "coastie's" cutters were occasionally called on to provide fire support for US Special Forces and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) units along the coast. On these occasions, the indirect fire provided by the cutter's 81mm mortars was extremely effective.

While Divisions Eleven and Twelve were doing a good job in their respective sectors, comparable US Navy patrol craft had still not come on line and as a consequence the central coastal sector was almost totally open. To remedy this, the Coast Guard was requested to provide additional assets and Division Thirteen of RONONE was activated on 12 December 1965 and its nine boats departed Subic Bay for Vung Tau on 12 February 1966, commencing operations as part of MARKET TIME at the end of that month.

The deployment of a total of 26 WPB to Vietnam placed an enormous strain on the Coast Guard and, amongst other things, resulted in the requirement to call up Reservists to fill personnel gaps. On the other hand, as compensation for having to strip some of its Stateside Districts of their extremely capable WPBs, the Coast Guard received funding from the US Navy to assist it in constructing additional PBs.

Throughout the spring of 1966, the three divisions of RONONE had numerous contacts with junks carrying contraband and also carried out fire support missions. In a brisk action fought in May, the cutter *Point Grey* (WPB 82324) later joined by *Point Cypress* (WPB 82326), intercepted and sank a 120 foot trawler from which navy divers eventually recovered a huge amount of arms and ammunition. A month later, a similar feat was carried out by *Point League* (WPB 82304), later assisted by *Point Slocum* (WPB 82313) and *Port Hudson* (WPB 82322). Sadly though, in August *Point Welcome* (WPB 82329) was the victim of mistaken identity during a night operation and was attacked by US aircraft in an incident which saw the cutter driven aground and two crew members killed and three wounded.

Routine operations continued for the remainder of 1966 and into 1967. In March of that year, MARKET TIME forces, including the cutter *Point Ellis* (WPB 82330), were involved in a large operation to intercept and destroy a 120 foot trawler which attempted

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THE TYRANNY OF JOINTERY?

THE TREND TO TRI-SERVICE ORGANISATIONS AND THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY

by Martin Dunn

The recent war emphasised a definite trend towards the closer relation of the Services through the Joint Service Departmental machinery... The closer integration of the three Services and their unified command and employment have involved a new conception of co-operation and strategical employment... A similar trend has not been evident to the same degree in the realm of the internal administration of the Services in which the feature of separation is more marked. Nevertheless, amalgamation has been carried out in one important sphere, and the possibilities in other directions are being explored.

J. B. Chifley
Prime Minister and Acting Defence Minister

"Jointery" has become a term like "efficiency" and "chocolate ice cream" - an unblemished good that you can never have too much of. The concept has often been supported by the truism: all operations in the future will be joint. But jointery has extended its reach far beyond the battlefield. Today we have joint corporate planning, joint personnel policy, and so on. How did this modern shibboleth gain currency, and what are its pros and cons?

As yet, "jointery" has not been defined in any dictionary. My own definition is:

> The practice of using organisational structures incorporating elements of at least two Services, more normally all three; including the product of those structures such as direction, doctrine, support and services.

This definition of jointery is in itself controversial. Most authors who use it introduce it in the inevitable inverted commas, use it as a positive or a pejorative depending on their perspective, and rarely seek to explain what it means. In contrast, other terms in the area all carry different shades of meaning: jointness, unification, integration, interoperability and so on.

A rear admiral responding on my request for his opinions on the issue observed that my definition "clearly misunderstands that 'jointness' does NOT mean 'integration'". Nevertheless, it is the organisational changes that have been one of the main manifestations of a search for improvements to the way the armed forces work together. My concern is not to examine jointness in the sense of cooperation between the Services. Thus I separate forms of coordination that do not rely on joint organisations from my concept of jointery; for example, Single Service Logistic Management agreements, liaison, advisory committees, and information sharing.

The definition also excludes two other important areas of defence integration: that involving the military Services and the public service; and that involving Defence and the broad civilian community. Both of these have been the subject of extensive public debate. The relationship between the military and the public service has been the subject of constant comment by politicians and the media since the re-amalgamation of the Department of Defence in the 1970s. The relationship between Defence, the public, and private industry only gained momentum with the release of the Wrigley Report in 1990. Although these issues are not unimportant, nor without significance to the issue of integration of the three Services, they have been excluded from specific consideration in this paper.

This paper aims to consider the nature of organisational jointery, identify any natural limits and the impact of this concept on the Royal Australian Navy.

THE HISTORY OF JOINTERY IN AUSTRALIA

Early History

The concept of a unified Department of Defence was not new to Australia. On Federation, Defence was one of the original seven departments. But its control over the military was limited. The armed Services were administered by their own statutory boards, giving them a high degree of independence. A separate Department of the Navy was established in 1915 but disbanded 1921.

In 1939, the Department of Defence was split into the Departments of Defence Coordination, Navy, Army, Air, Supply and Development. Other departments created during the Second World War included Muni-

tions, Aircraft Production, War Organisation of Industry, and Post-War Reconstruction. The Department of Defence soon lost the word "Coordination" from its title in 1942. Coordination between these departments was achieved by a number of committees, chief of which were the Defence Committee (established 1926) and the Chiefs of Staff Committee (established 1939).

By 1950, only the Departments of Defence, Navy, Army, Air, and Supply remained - the others being abolished or amalgamated in the Department of Supply. The remaining five departments were known as the Defence Group of departments. A sixth was added with the Department of Defence Production in 1951, only to be merged back into the Department of Supply in 1958.

In 1957 a committee chaired by Sir Leslie Morshead recommended fundamental reorganisation of the Defence Group, including amalgamation of the Service departments into the Department of Defence, abolishing the Service boards and creating two assistant ministers assigned functional responsibilities to replace the Service ministers.

The Government at the time was unwilling to go this far. The only major recommendation of the Morshead Committee to be implemented was the merger of the Departments of Supply and Defence Production. Instead, in 1958 the Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies, issued a directive asserting superiority of the Minister and Department of Defence over the other departments. A separate position of Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee was established.

The next major set of changes occurred in 1968, which saw the creation of a Joint Staff under a two star officer within the Department of Defence. This gave the Department of Defence a capability to address issues such as joint planing, operations, force development priorities, and doctrine. Nevertheless the actual control of forces and their administration remained with the Service departments.

In 1970, the Joint Intelligence Organisation was formed from the former Joint Intelligence Bureau and parts of the Service intelligence directorates and the Department of External Affairs.

Tange

On coming to office in 1972, the new Labor government announced its intention to amalgamate the Defence Group into the one Department of Defence. Lance Barnard, also Deputy Prime Minister, was sworn in as minister for all five departments. The Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee was designated the principal military adviser, and the Secretary of the Department of Defence (Sir Arthur Tange) was designated the principal adviser on policy, resources and organisation - and charged with the process of producing an integrated department.

Tange reported in late 1973, recommending a structure to meet the Government's wishes. The Service departments, boards and ministers were to all be abolished and their powers distributed. He recommended that the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee be redesignated the Chief of the Defence Force Staff (CDFS), with powers of command over all three Services. The Director of the Joint Staff would be retitled the Assistant Chief of the Defence Force Staff (ACDFS). New positions of a Surgeon General and Judge Advocate General would be created, answerable to CDFS. (The Surgeon General was disestablished in 1979, to be re-established after the later Sanderson review.) Under the Secretary would be six functional groupings: strategic policy and force development, supply and support services, resources and financial programs, manpower, organisation and management services, and research and development. The reorganisation would see closer integration of Service and civilian staffs, with some Service officers being "two hatted" having responsibilities to their Service chief as well as the Secretary or CDFS. The committee system was to be restructured, and administrative functions in the States were grouped into regional offices.

The essential elements of Tange's proposal were accepted by Government and implemented. The legislative changes to abolish the Service boards and create the CDFS came into effect in 1976. In addition to the ACDFS, another two star military position under CDFS, the Chief of Joint Operations and Plans, was created.

Utz, the Formation of HQADF and the Joint Commands

The Tange reforms provoked a range of criticisms of Defence performance. In response, in 1982 the Government commissioned a new review chaired by an industrialist, John Utz. Its major recommendation was the creation of separate Department of Defence Support to manage the defence factories, dockyards, laboratories, contracting and industry development. The department was duly established, but short lived with a change of government early the following year. Management of the laboratories returned to the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) in 1983. The department was abolished in 1984, with its remaining functions returning to the Department of Defence, the factories forming the Office of Defence Production (ODP) and the Capital Procurement Organisation catering for the acquisition and industry functions.

The Utz committee's other recommendations tended

to endorse the status quo as established by Tange. Although seeing a need to strengthen the position of CDFS, the changes proposed were incremental and the more radical proposals were all rejected.

1984 also saw two symbolically important changes: CDFS was redesignated the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) and the joint military staff was retitled Headquarters Australian Defence Force (HQADF).

The Australian Defence Force Academy, providing a joint training environment for junior officers, was also opened in 1984 having been planned since the 1960s.

In 1985 Maritime Headquarters was formed within Fleet Headquarters. This was soon followed, in 1986, with the formation of Land Force Headquarters and Air Headquarters using some of the assets and personnel of Headquarters Field Force and Headquarters Operational Command respectively. A new position, Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF) was created at the same rank as the Service chiefs of staff to control HQADF and act as CDF's senior staff officer. In 1987, the rump of the old single Service operational headquarters was merged into the new joint headquarters, and all headquarters were made responsible to CDF for operational matters. CDF had gained a greatly enhanced ability to command operations.

Northern Command was established in 1988 as a separate joint command, initially subordinate to Land Command. It came under the direct command of HQADF in 1993.

This process was prompted along by ministerial consultant Paul Dibb, whose 1986 review of Defence capabilities supported moves toward joint commands, argued for the creation of a "Northern Command", and complained about the lack of an adequate joint planning process.

In 1987, the Government made a significant change in its approach to appointing junior ministers. Up to that time it was believed that the Constitution forbad the appointment of a minister who did not have a department to administer. Thus while ministers assisting could be appointed, these had their own departments to administer as well. The change in policy saw junior ministers appointed for several departments, including a Minister for Defence Science and Personnel to assist the Minister for Defence.

Also in 1987, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade studied the Defence Organisation, recommended a significant concentration of powers in the hands of CDF at the expense of the Secretary and the Service chiefs. Although its recommendations were not adopted, it raised specific criticisms of rank creep and the lack of central military policy formulation that were to become central concerns of the Sanderson review.

In 1987-88, the Williamstown Naval Dockyard was sold and the Government Aircraft Factories transformed into a Government owned Company (Aerospace Technologies of Australia Pty Ltd). In May 1989, the remainder of the Office of Defence Production was converted into another Government owned company — Australian Defence Industries Pty Ltd.

Sanderson

1989 saw a major review of the ADF conducted by Major General J.M. Sanderson. Ostensibly, this was to address the perceived over-ranking and over-staffing in Canberra, and to introduce flatter management structures. In practice, it also saw a major transfer of functions and staff from the Service Offices to HQADF.

The major change was the creation of Development Division as part of HQADF, formed from the operational requirements branches in the Service Offices and the existing joint policy staff. Logistics Division was strengthened and made responsive to VCDF, as well as subordinate to the appropriate deputy secretary. Some administrative and personnel functions were transferred (principally from the civilian side of the department) to a new Personnel Division in HQADF. These reforms were implemented in 1990. Some of Sanderson's recommendations were not pursued, most notably his proposals to establish a joint geographic information systems branch and to transfer the command of Army special forces to HQADF. In late 1990, the intelligence staff from HQADF were merged into the Joint Intelligence Organisation to form the Defence Intelligence Organisation.

Concurrent with the Sanderson Review, the Secretary reviewed the civilian side of the Organisation. This resulted in a reduction of some 300 civilian positions, including 17 Senior Executive Service, about 10 percent of the Canberra based civilian staff.

Also in 1989, the Defence Regional Support Review (DRSR) was commenced. This sought to gain efficiencies in the administrative support throughout Australia. Whereas previously the Defence Regional Offices had consolidated the local civilian staff, support services were still being duplicated by the armed Services. The new Defence Centres drew together the military as well as civilian support functions in each region.

Program Management and Budgeting (PMB) was also introduced at this time, replacing the financial management structure which had been in place from amalgamation. This reform, driven by the Department of Finance's Financial Management Improvement Program, sought to ensure that resources were organised

on a rational basis and to devolve authority - "to let managers manage". Defence is divided into eight programs. VCDF and the Service chiefs of staff were appointed program managers, as were three deputy secretaries and the Chief Defence Scientist. Every program contained some personnel from all three armed Services as well as the public service; but the three programs headed by the Service chiefs of staff contain the majority of their Services, and collectively the majority of the public service staff. In part this change enhanced the ability of the Service chiefs to manage their Services - although not generally recognised as such, it was a major departure from the trend towards organisational jointery.

The Defence Logistics Redevelopment Project was announced in 1990, aiming to rationalise warehousing with one central storage and distribution facility in Sydney.

Sanderson, now a lieutenant general, served as Commander Joint Forces Australia (designate), a position nominally filled only in conflict, with the existing Joint Exercise Planning Staff as his staff, from the end of 1993 to mid 1995. While symbolically significant, this move fell short of establishing a permanent joint operational headquarters.

THE HISTORY OF JOINTERY OVERSEAS

The process of jointery has not been unique to Australia. Various nations have also followed the path towards increasing jointery. Indeed, it is hardly surprising that the major English-speaking countries have been an important source of inspiration for Australian organisational reform. Dibb referred to Canadian and American practices, while Sanderson looked at the examples provide by Canada and Britain.

United States

Organisational change in the United States started in 1947 with the National Security Act, which created a single Secretary of Defense (cabinet minister) to oversee the Departments of Navy, Army and Air Force. In 1949, this position was strengthened. The Service secretaries lost their cabinet status and the three Service departments were formally made components of the Department of Defense, albeit retaining their separate administration.

In 1958 the "unified and specified commands" were created to command operational forces. This established a chain of command that ran from the President through the Secretary of Defense, advised by the Joint Staff, to the commanders in chief of the operational commands. the military departments retained responsibility for the administration, training and supply of forces, but had lost their operational responsibilities.

The next major change did not occur until the Goldwater-Nichols defence reorganisation act in 1986. This sought to further enhance the position of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CinCs of the operational commands. The chairman was made the principal military adviser to the President and Secretary of Defense, replacing the corporate advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Joint Staff has been made responsible to him rather than the corporate body. A new position of vice chairman was created, with responsibilities for resource management, joint personnel policy, joint military education policy, oversight of the defence agencies and oversight of war planning.

United Kingdom

In the United Kingdom, the armed Services had a long tradition of independence. Coordination was done by liaison and some committees. The Committee of Imperial Defence was formed in 1902 (later retitled the Defence Committee) and the Chiefs of Staff Committee in 1923. The approach of World War Two saw a proliferation of coordinating committees.

In 1946 a Minister of Defence was created, with a small staff, to coordinate the armed Services. The Service ministers, although removed from Cabinet, still had substantial influence, and full control over their Services resources. In 1955, the position of Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee was created (retitled Chief of the Defence Staff in 1958), but his role was one of liaison and representation, having no staff of his own. 1958 saw the Minister of Defence given responsibility to formulate unified policy, but without the resources to put it in place. Gradually, the Minister and CDS gained power over the Services, and some joint commands were established overseas, but the process was incremental.

The 1963 White Paper, inspired by the CDS, Lord Mountbatten, saw the creation of an integrated Ministry of Defence. The Admiralty, War Office and Air Office became the Navy, Army and Air Force Departments and their ministers made clearly subordinate to the Minister of Defence. Functional integration occurred in areas such as operations, communications, intelligence, scientific research and force development.

1985 saw another major reorganisation of the British defence machinery. The minister, Michael Heseltine, sought further efficiencies and in the process the single Services lost further functions to the central organisation.

Canada

Canada provides an example of a nation which has moved furthest down the path of "jointery" - having formally abolished the separate armed Services. In 1946, the three Service departments (with their own ministers) were integrated into a single Department of National Defence under one minister. The process of integration accelerated with the Glassco Commission in 1962, which saw integration as the path to administrative efficiencies.

In 1964 the separate chiefs of staff were replaced by a single Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS). Thus there became a single military adviser to the defence minister, responsible for the conduct of operations, readiness and the administration of the armed forces. The next step, in 1965, integrated the operations, logistics, personnel and administrative branches of the three armed Services. Six new joint commands were created to replace the previous eleven: maritime, mobile, air defence, air transport, training and materiel.

The most controversial step came on 1 February 1968, when the separate armed Services were formally abolished and the common green uniform of the Canadian Armed Forces adopted.

In 1972, a new National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) was formed by integrating the military and civilian staffs into a cohesive organisation.

Since then, debate in Canada has continued and at least two government reviews have been conducted into the process. At various times, decisions have been made to edge away from the original unification. The creation, in 1975, of an air command from the previous air defence and air transport commands, and other air assets, produced a lead command associated with each of the separate environments, and hence the establishment of defacto Service chiefs. In 1985, separate uniforms for the three environments were re-introduced.

THE PLACE OF JOINTERY

The post-war history of defence reorganisation in English-speaking nations has been one of increasing centralisation: both "jointery" and integration of civil and military structures. Little research has been done on this topic, and what exists tends to concentrate more on the issue of civil-military integration rather than jointery.

Kronenberg and Earnshaw attempted to explain the trends towards centralisation in English-speaking countries since the Second World War based on four factors: the political character of the government, the budgetary position, the existence of warfare and the actors supporting change. They concluded that:

- reorganisation by non-conservative governments is invariably centralising, while conservative governments have a more mixed record;
- more changes are made in periods of budgetary pressure;
- warfare is likely to delay the process of centralisation; and
- support of more than one actor is needed to affect change.

These conclusions are generally accurate, although they depend on the events selected for analysis (with equal weight given to each) and how they are categorised. For example, the rejection of the Morshead report in 1957 is listed as a decentralising decision (rather than a non-decision), although the Menzies directive and creation of the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee followed as a consequence of the report and were categorised as centralising. The formation of the Department of Defence Support is listed as decentralising; while the formation of Australian Defence Industries with essentially the same functions is not included. Some of the conclusions do not tell us a lot about the process. For example, the number of actors needed for change - in Canada's case two was sufficient and both were politicians. In fact, the more fundamental the change, the more likely that it was supported by a single powerful individual, who could take others with him. Finally, the conclusions do not reveal the causal relationships: is the greater change in times of budgetary restraint because such periods coincide with peacetime?

The major problem with this approach is that it analyses change in a way markedly different to the way government decision making processes would address the issue. Organisational change is seen by Kronenberg and Earnshaw as an ongoing process, influenced to varying degrees by external factors. In contrast, government decisions are made, at least formally, by developing solutions to specific problems. Thus the issue is to find what the characteristics of jointery are that so often makes it an attractive solution.

To gain an assessment of current attitudes towards jointery the author surveyed Canberra-based naval officers of the rank of captain and above. Neither the sample size nor the response rate was sufficient to draw conclusions with a high level of statistical validity, although some trends were noted. This survey was supplemented by personal interviews with selected senior naval officers: most notably Vice Admiral R.G. Taylor, AO, RAN, Chief of the Naval Staff, whose advice was quite valuable.

The general result of the survey is that senior naval officers showed generally positive attitudes towards

organisational jointery, and believed that further change was desirable.

Operations

Today, it has become almost unthinkable that military operations would be anything but joint. As former US Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Herres, put it:

> No one can intelligently argue any longer that jointness in not the most effective way to operate the military.

This view is, however, a comparatively modern one. In contrast the classic naval strategist, Sir Julian Corbett who saw the Navy and Army as part of an integrated national strategy, did not believe in appointing joint commanders:

> Since the elder Pitt's time it has never been our practice to place combined expeditions under either a naval or a military commander-in-chief and allow him to decide between naval and military exigencies. The danger of possible friction between two commanders-in-chief came to be regarded as small compared with the danger of a single one making mistakes through unfamiliarity with the service to which he does not belong.

Admittedly, the problems Corbett was looking at were comparatively simple by today's standards. Today, defence forces are more willing to appoint a single joint commander, but assisted by a larger staff than would ever have been the case in earlier centuries.

At the tactical level, army-navy cooperation still does not present major problems. Both forces predominantly operate in their own environment and tend to come together infrequently for short lived specific purposes. Here doctrine, support arrangements and temporarily appointed joint commanders were able to satisfactorily regulate the way cooperation was provided. Exceptions exist where cooperation between land and sea forces was frequent and ongoing, such as the Pacific campaign in World War Two, but even here the joint command arrangements were seen as temporary war-time expedients.

The change that had the greatest impact on joint operations was the emergence of aircraft. Here was an asset which could be used in the land and sea environments, as well as against other aircraft. It could quickly assert combat power across an entire theatre of operations, and required specialised logistics and support. To some extent, almost every aircraft is multirole: fighters, strike aircraft, transport aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft, and so on. Questions on how to use aircraft most efficiently became an issue of debate in several nations, and this debate was sustained for many years.

An American summary of one side of the debate, the "air force view", is:

- An air ... campaign can be distinct from ground and naval operations.
- To achieve unity of effort, the air ... campaign should be planned and directed by one commander, regardless of the source of air ... assets.
- In most cases the commander best equipped to do the planning and commanding is an Air Force officer.
- In no cases should the air commander be subordinated to a ground or naval commander; he should be responsible to the theatre commander.
- The air commander, within the general guidance provided by the theatre commander, is in the best position to determine priorities among various air missions in the theatre.

Similar views have been expressed by the Royal Australian Air Force:

> [The Maxim of] Independence acknowledges that air power can conduct specific military operations unique to its own purpose, in an organisation structured for that purpose and necessarily separate from other military organisations.

In contrast, the other Services have argued that some increment of air power is integral to their own operations, and should remain under the control of the commander who would make the greatest use of the asset. Arguably, in Australia's case the allocation problem has been simplified by the decommissioning of the last aircraft carrier in 1983, and the transfer of RAAF helicopters to Army in 1989. Now the RAAF control all multirole aircraft, while the other Services controlled those with specific relevance to their environment and which operated closely with their forces. This view is dangerously provocative because these issues are still hotly debated.

This debate is not easily resolved, as both sides can make valid points. Both however, assume that aircraft need to be commanded by a single Service. Much of the growth of joint operations doctrine can be attributed to the need to find a satisfactory compromise that will allow for unity of effort in each of the three environments, with aircraft available to operations in each according to need.

These developments spell the end of single Service environment command structures for wartime, at least

at the higher levels of command. Some joint command structure is needed to set the overall strategy in a theatre of operations; to balance the interests of adjacent sea, land and air theatres of operations; and to set priorities and guidelines for the use of multirole assets. It is fair to argue that Australia's existing joint headquarters still are essentially single Service, oriented to peacetime training requirements, and thus are not appropriately organised for command during conflict where elements of all three services would be employed.

Nevertheless, at the lowest levels cooperation can be readily controlled through support arrangements and doctrine. One captain observed: "The degree to which a joint approach can and should (beneficially) be applied needs to be addressed at each level of warfare separately. There are distinctively different requirements at the Strategic, Operational and Tactical levels."

The senior naval officers surveyed overwhelmingly saw the impact of jointery on operations as a positive influence. Vice Admiral Taylor observed that when the Service chiefs were removed from the operational command chain, many feared that the result would be ineffective, but in reality it worked quite well and the system proved itself in the 1991 Gulf War.

Further changes are planned for the future. For example the 1994 Defence white paper, states that:

> To provide for more effective command at the operational level, the existing joint headquarters will be collocated by 2000. This will provide more flexible options for operational command: where necessary, the appointment of a Commander Joint Forces Australia, the appointment of a lead Joint Force Commander or continuation of our present system. A transitional arrangement will be established in 1995 at the existing Maritime Headquarters site at Potts Point. This will help define joint operational concepts, requirements and staff processes.

But the increasing need for cooperation in operations, does not necessitate cooperation in other areas. What it does require are:

- flexible command and control arrangements that can manage different mixes of forces and adjust to changing circumstances;
- well developed doctrine, that makes clear how forces should interact;
- reliable and compatible communications between the different types of assets and their headquarters; and
- sufficient liaison officers, joint staff, and training in joint doctrine so that the employment of the different types of assets is well understood.

Policy Development and Administration

Two major reasons are advanced for the increasing trend of jointery in policy development and administration: joint structures permit greater efficiency by avoiding duplication of effort and confrontation; and some areas to be effective need the skills and knowledge which can only be provided by individuals from the different Services, particularly the formulation of policy for the Defence Organisation as a whole. The changes to force development, corporate and resource planning have generally been supported by senior naval officers, who see scope for further centralisation.

Nevertheless, the benefits of integration are not as clear cut as appears. The extent of duplication of effort is hard to measure, but even where it exists it is not necessarily wasteful. Cheeseman argues that the Tange reforms actually strengthened the positions of the Secretary and Service chiefs at the expense of the Minister who was isolated from the decision making process and alternative sources of advice. Builder, citing the American practice, sees "jointness" and the military planning "calculus" as the means by which alternative force structure options are hidden from the Congress and the taxpayer. Duplication provides more options and sources of advice for the individuals charged with political control of Defence. The difficulty of providing adequate political control over a large organisation like Defence was the key reason for the Menzies government rejecting the Morshead report and for the Utz committee recommending the formation of the Department of Defence Support.

In contrast, it has been argued that ministers found it easier to deal with one ADF commander rather than four separate individuals with divided responsibilities. While exceptions, like Winston Churchill, might relish the role of war lord, not every minister had the inclination or the confidence to resolve every inter-Service dispute which came their way.

The notion of inter-Service rivalry is often a powerful argument used for supporters of organisational jointery, and not an issue unique to Australia. One author observed that:

> The serious cause for concern is not that there is argument and disagreement within the defence departments among the Services, but the extent to which strong feelings may warp judgements, distort facts, and lead to a defence policy that does not make use of the available resources. During the aircraft carrier controversy in Britain in 1965-66,.. one study moved 'Australia 600 miles northwest in order to bring

> certain targets within the already elastic radius of action of the F-111.'

It is not clear that organisational jointery is itself a solution to intellectual dishonesty. In contrast, strong, independent Service advice could be better placed to challenge such frauds. Inevitably some duplication of effort is needed from an independent perspective to test the veracity of new initiatives. Argument (referred to by Tange as "creative tension") can be an important mechanism for highlighting problems. Joint structures risk internalising arguments, having key problems resolved at relatively junior levels with little visibility or scrutiny.

Some changes to management structures seem to increase jointery, but at the expense of civil-military integration. At times the establishment and growth of HQADF showed signs of this effect. The Sanderson review, for example, had the effect of reducing the number of servicemen posted to civilian areas of the Department. The Utz committee, commenting on the proposal to establish a Defence Force headquarters observed:

> ...it is difficult to discern the advantages it would offer over present arrangements. The potential disadvantages may, on the other hand be considerable. These would include isolation of the Defence Force leadership from the Central Staff divisions, a diminution in the strength of the joint process and a substantial risk of duplication of work between the Department and the headquarters.

Jointery does not obviate the need for organisation. Rather it substitutes functional structures for ones which were primarily based on operating environment. Thus as jointery centralises policy formulation and planning, it does so by grouping these functions for all environments and separating them from their Services. The more centralised, the more distant the formulation becomes from those who use its product: those who execute the policy, use the equipment selected, etc. While force development is now centralised in Development Division, it arguably has not yet developed a joint perspective on what the shape of the ADF should be, still being internally based on the old operational requirements branches, yet it has invoked criticisms that those selecting equipment have not paid sufficient heed to manning, operating costs, support or the acquisition process: functions which reside with the Service Offices and the Department.

Finally, jointery has been accompanied by a trend towards seeing military operations as being essentially common in all three environments. This has lead to neglect of some traditional naval roles such as "presence", and seen some awkward attempts to describe command and control arrangements in terms of three levels of war for all environments. Often jointery has been interpreted as doing things the Army way.

Notwithstanding these caveats, as the one organisation there is a need for a common policy direction. Vice Admiral Taylor observed that the Sanderson reforms, which many feared would not work are in fact working pretty well. However, he makes the point that the Services provide specific expertise in their operating environment, and their professional advice needs to be taken into account. While more organisational jointery could be pursued, provided the benefits can be clearly demonstrated, there will remain a need for professional heads of the Services who are adequately supported.

Information Management

The need to integrate information (fusion in today's buzz words) has long been a driver of integration. The Joint Intelligence Bureau was one of the first joint organisations established in Australia, later becoming the Joint Intelligence Organisation and now the Defence Intelligence Organisation.

Today, the need for organisational integration to fully exploit information is less clear. Computer databases and electronic communications can permit dispersed databases to be as effective as that achieved by putting all the relevant personnel together in the one building.

With databases, the efficiency of integration is often powerful in appearance, but needs to be looked at in terms of the data involved. The notion of an integrated geographic database, combining topographic and hydrographic data, appears attractive. In reality, they are quite different and serve different purposes. Hydrographic data being used to prevent ship groundings, having differing sounding densities, are being stored in vector format.

There will be continuing efforts to integrate information. The 1994 Defence white paper notes that:

> The collocated joint force headquarters will be supported by a Joint Command Information Support System which will be acquired progressively over the next few years. This will interface with the Australian Defence Force Distributed Intelligence System and single Service command support systems, such as the Australian Army Tactical Command Support System, which are currently being developed.

Logistics

Logistic functions have often been suitable for reorganisation on a joint basis. Here, the term logistics is

used broadly to encompass supply, storage, acquisition, transport, medical support, maintenance and engineering. Reorganisation of these services on joint lines is a common facet of structural change.

Reorganisation of logistics functions on a joint basis has been a common feature of previous reorganisations, with the objective invariably being greater efficiency. A view which the 1994 Defence white paper sees as continuing:

> The implementation of an increased level of joint logistics support capabilities and commonality of systems, procedures and components between the three Services will improve the efficiency of support.

An alternative approach to rationalising support functions has existed for some time as Single Service Logistic Management. Here one Service accepts the responsibility for managing a logistic function, often management of a particular item of equipment, for another. The arrangements, including any resources transferred, are negotiated directly by one Service with the other.

While ostensibly simpler than use of joint structures, SSLM entails at least one Service surrendering some of its autonomy; and disputes over SSLM agreements are not necessarily easily solved.

Serving the Environment

The Services have traditionally held a strong identity with the environment in which they served. For navies, it was the American naval theorist, Alfred Thayer Mahan, who systematised relationship with his concept of seapower - a notion which includes "...all that tends to make people great upon the sea or by the sea..."

Mahan saw navies as just one element of use of the sea, and dependent on the use of the sea. "The necessity of a navy... springs, therefore, from the existence of peaceful shipping, and disappears with it, except in the case of a nation which has aggressive tendencies, and keeps up a navy merely as a branch of the military establishment."

Mahan was a powerful influence on naval thinking, and through a process of osmosis became part of naval thinking, as much in Australia as elsewhere. Navies thus saw themselves as part of a broader maritime community; industries such as merchant shipping, fishing, and (less clearly) offshore hydrocarbon development.

Jointery challenges these traditional concepts:

> ...concepts like air, land and sea power contribute little to *operational* thought. They are of small value to the field commander whose assigned mission is to *employ* those forces.

The issue becomes whether abandoning the operational thinking associated with notions such as seapower can adversely affect the way the Service identifies with that environment, and the links that identity provides with those parts of the civil community that also use that environment. Vice Admiral Taylor argues that this has not happened for Navy. Rather, some of the liaison with the maritime community which had previously been performed at the Navy Office level is now performed by the commands.

People Management and Esprit de Corps

Jointery is increasingly entering personnel areas. In Australia, personnel policy, housing and some training are managed jointly. Other areas retain their separate Service identities, such as postings, promotions and personal services. It is in the field of people management where Service identity is developed and maintained.

Australian commentators, such as the former Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal David Evans, are likely to single out the Canadian unification experience as a model not to follow:

> Admirals became Generals, Wing Commanders became Lieutenant-Colonels, all personnel changed to the green uniform of CDF... Morale hit rock bottom and personnel resigned in large numbers. *Esprit de corps* is far more difficult to attain in this amorphous mass of green uniforms. Indeed, the Canadians were unable to recapture the spirit that existed in each of the three separate Services. Joining one of the Services of the Defence Force is often more a vocation than the simple act of taking a job. The choice may depend on many factors, ranging from the appeal of the uniform to an attachment to the traditions of the Service - or even a unit of the Service.

This proved to be the area of the greatest division of opinion on the merits of jointery. One captain surveyed commented that:

> Under the current hierarchy "jointery" means it has to be done the Army way! This is myopic in the extreme and is causing disquiet and is not efficient. The Services are distinct entities operating in different *environs* that need to cooperate and work together in achieving a concerted aim. There is almost no similarity between a "sailor" and a "soldier" except that both serve their country. Our push to jointery

> has been at the expense of the identity of the single Services. Little wonder we have the current "personnel" crisis.

Others were much more positive. One contrast was provided by a commodore who observed that "to fully implement [jointery] to the extent whereby the potential benefits in effectiveness and efficiency are realised requires a cultural change". This perhaps was the closest expression of the opposing view, that the "Service identity" needs to change to embrace jointness.

No doubt training for senior positions, for positions that genuinely involve contact with the other Services, and for specialist functions can be performed more effectively and efficiently on a joint basis. In contrast, the time of entry into the Service is one where training has a role in shaping the individual to his or her new career, and inoculating with pride in the traditions of the Service. Separation here seems to have some merit. Thus the decision to form the Australian Defence Force Academy for training junior officers of all three Services proved to be controversial.

The idea of forming a tri-Service military academy had been studied from the 1960s. In 1974, the Minister for Defence announced that the Government was planning to have such an institution commence operations in 1979. In stating the reasons for this institution listed, as its prime advantage:

> The existing Colleges can not do as much as is desirable to develop, in young men seeking to be commissioned officers, a sense of belonging to a single Australian Defence Force working together in the specialist areas of sea, land and air warfare. Since the Colleges are organised entirely on a single-Service basis... the zeal and enthusiasm of young officers is channelled towards loyalty to the particular Service which they joined. This adds to the difficulty of developing, in later years, the spirit of co-operation which is desirable.

In 1979, one of the greatest challenges to jointery was mounted by the Public Works Committee of Parliament. Its conclusions included:

> The Committee rejects the view that association at cadet level will significantly foster inter-Service co-operation and understanding... Each Service has differing requirements and tri-Service arrangements can lead to unsatisfactory compromises. The Committee believes that each Service should be free to determine its own method of educating officers and there should not be enforced uniformity of education. The Committee further concludes that consolidation of the officer production facilities of each Service is more desirable and justified than the consolidation on a tri-Service basis of the tertiary training of the three Services.

The government rejected this finding, pushing through with the Academy, although now the emphasis was on the cost savings integration would provide.

While one of the functions of the Australian Defence Force Academy is to provide an appropriate environment for instilling military ethos, a recent review was unable to assess whether this was achieved appropriately. It observed that "the Evaluation was unable to find a Defence definition of the 'military environment' that the Academy is required to establish". Thus it is unclear whether it is the Service identity or the Joint identity that should be fostered.

Despite the criticisms of the Australian Defence Force Academy, Vice Admiral Taylor believes that it has worked well; although he noted that there could be advantages in pursuing the Army approach where on completion of their academic training officer cadets gain exposure to their Service environment at the Duntroon Royal Military College.

CONCLUSION

Attitudes towards organisational jointery by senior naval officers have generally been positive. It is recognised that operations and policy formulation in particular require members of different Services working together towards a common goal, under common direction. However, it is less clear whether this change to more integrated structures has not involved some loss of Service identity or esprit de corps.

Organisational change is likely to continue to be a feature of the Defence Organisation, some of which will inevitably involve proposals for new joint structures. While most proposals for new joint structures appear carefully considered, the danger appears that in some minds jointery has become an ideology and the property of zealots. As Vice Admiral Taylor observed: we should not change for the sake of change, but where the merits of further organisation change can be demonstrated he is happy to sign up.

Part of demonstrating the benefits of change must involve an examination of why the Services are different. As one commodore observed "Too often, in the interests of jointery, we assume that similar activities, functions, etc, are identical when often this is only superficial, the basis being quite different."

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THE FIRST SALUTE FOR "OLD GLORY"

THE U.S.S. *ANDREW DORIA* AT ST. EUSTATIUS

by

Graham Wilson

Some years ago, while leafing through a book on the history of the United States Navy, I came across mention of the first official salute to the American flag by a foreign power. This was stated as having occurred at Quiberon Bay (on the Atlantic coast of France) on 14 February, 1778, when the salute fired by USS *Ranger* under the command of John Paul Jones was returned by the French line-of-battle ship *Robuste*, flagship of Admiral Lamotte-Picquet. A well known painting of this incident hangs in the museum of the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland and many authorities cite the event as the first official salute to the American flag.

As far as I was concerned, that was the end of it and I simply tucked the information away as a useful nugget of trivia to drag out as the occasion demanded to bedazzle American acquaintances with my knowledge of American history. Recently, however, while perusing a very old nautical magazine, I came across a reproduction of a painting commemorating the firing of a salute to the American flag on an American warship on 16 November, 1776, well over a year before *Ranger* received its salute at Quiberon Bay. The caption for the illustration stated that the salute had been fired by the guns of Fort Oranje on the island of St. Eustatius in the Dutch West Indies, in reply to a 13-gun national salute fired by the Continental armed brig *Andrew Doria* on its arrival in the bay below the fort.

The discrepancy in the dates and places piqued my historian's interest and I decided to delve into the matter a bit more deeply. The results of my research form the basis of the following article, an account of the first official salute fired by a foreign power to the American flag being flown on a warship.

Some background — political, military and geographic — is in order before describing the event in detail. Firstly, very few readers would not be aware of the fact that the thirteen American colonies rebelled against the British crown in 1774, largely over economic questions, and declared their independence on 4 July, 1776. Britain dispatched large naval and military forces to the Americas in an attempt to force the rebel Congress to surrender and thus return control of the rich North American territories to the Crown. At the same time, Britain engaged in hectic political and diplomatic activity, aimed at denying the Americans international recognition.

Part of the military activity was a naval blockade of the American coast which was instigated by the Royal Navy, operating out of bases in America not yet taken by the rebels, e.g. Boston, and from British possessions in the Caribbean. At the same time that the blockade was mounted, the British ports in the Caribbean were closed to rebel shipping, again in an attempt to force the rebels to surrender. The British were not the only colonial power in the Caribbean, however, with Spanish, French, Danish and Dutch islands and ports offering numerous havens for rebel shipping. While not all of these powers were necessarily pro-American, they tended to be anti-British and thus prepared to ignore British protestations and carry on dealing with the rebels.

One of the colonial powers in the Caribbean at the time was the Netherlands whose main holding was the Dutch West Indies, today known as the Netherlands Antilles (Nederlandse Antillen). The Netherlands Antilles consisted (and still consist) of two widely separated island groups, about 800 kilometres apart. The southern group of islands, comprising Curacao, Aruba and Bonaire, lies less than 100 kilometres off the South American (Venezuelan) coast. The northern group, which geographically lies within the Leeward rather than Antilles Islands, includes the islands of St. Eustatius, Saba and the southern part of Saint-Martin or Sint Maarten (the northern part is today a French dependency).

The islands were first settled by the Spanish in the early 16th century, but they were soon replaced by the Dutch who acquired and settled St. Eustatius and Saba in 1632; Curacao, Bonaire and Aruba 1634; and their portion of Saint-Martin in 1648. As an aside, Saint-Martin was a POW camp during the Thirty Years War, with a large number of French and Dutch pris-

oners held there by the Spanish. When the Spanish quit the island in 1648, they left the prisoners to their own devices and it is alleged that the ex-POWs divided the island up between them on a proportional basis, with the larger French contingent claiming most of the island and relegating the smaller Dutch party to a small (but rich) portion of the southern part of the island.

In November of 1776, the Dutch settlements in the West Indies were booming economically. With the Royal Navy striving to enforce its blockade of the American ports and with the British Caribbean ports closed to American shipping, the northern Dutch islands of Eustatius, Saba and Sint Maarten were serving as clearing houses for ships trading to and from the Americas. The islands, especially St. Eustatius, capital of the northern group of islands, were also rife with political intrigue as agents of His Britannic Majesty vied with the appointed agents of the United States and the individual colonies for the favour of the representatives of the Dutch States General.

The newly commissioned governor of St. Eustatius, Johannes de Graaff, who took office early in 1776, was well aware of the events in the American colonies, including the American declaration of independence enacted earlier in the year. At the time, The Netherlands were neutral, but definitely anti-British. Ancient allies, the British and Dutch were also just as much ancient enemies and competitors. De Graaff was a "native", having been born on St. Eustatius in 1729 but spent his youth in the Netherlands. He returned to the Indies when he was 23 and entered the service of the Dutch West Indies Company, being appointed Secretary of St. Eustatius in 1752, a position he was to hold until his appointment to the governorship 24 years later. The new governor was very pro-American, having ardently embraced the Republican spirit which was much in vogue in the Netherlands of his childhood, and it is possible that his appointment to the governorship of St. Eustatius actually stemmed from his pro-American sentiments.

There are a number of eye-witness accounts to the events described in the article. The best of these are contained in affidavits compiled and signed by two British merchant captains, John Dean and John Spicher. Dean and Spicher were in command of vessels which were anchored in the roadstead of Basseterre at St. Christopher or St. Kitts, approximately 20 kilometres from St. Eustatius. With their vessels safe at anchor and some time on their hands, the two British captains had decided to make the short crossing to St. Eustatius, probably in search of some recreation.

They sailed across the straight in a small sloop and dropped anchor below the bluff overlooking the town of Oranjestad upon which stood Fort Oranje. As they were preparing to row ashore a strange ship was sighted entering the roadstead. According to their affidavits another Englishman with them, James Fraser, stated "There comes the tender of a man-of-war". To this, Dean was said to have replied "No by God. She's an American privateer, for do you not see the flag of the Continental Congress with 13 stripes?" The three Englishmen watched as the stranger, a brigantine flying the Grand Union ensign, rounded to and came to anchor close by the port side of the sloop. As soon as the anchor was set the stranger's sails were smartly clewed up and furled, a Dutch standard was hoisted to the main truck, a second Grand Union ensign was hoisted at the fore, and a striped jack bearing a snake crawling with the motto "Don't Tread on Me" was raised above the bowsprit. As the three men continued to watch in amazement, from the sides of the brigantine erupted the white smoke bursts of a 13-gun national salute. From the flagstaff at Fort Oranje the Dutch standard fluttered down in acknowledgment, but there was at first no answering gunfire in return. The three stunned observers now entered their boat and pulled for the shore. They had not reached the landing-place when the guns of the fort above sent their delayed answer — 11 guns.

The strange vessel which had formally announced her arrival in the Dutch port, and been honoured in return, was the US brigantine-of-war *Andrew Doria*, one of the first five warships to fly the American flag.

When the Continental Congress decided to form a navy to fight the British, responsibility for the task was vested in the Marine Committee chaired by John Adams. The committee arranged the purchase of five merchant vessels and their conversion to and commission as warships. In order of their commissioning, the five ships were named *Alfred, Columbus, Cortez, Andrea Doria* and *Providence*. It should be noted that the ship which sailed into St. Eustatius roadstead was originally intended to be called *Andrea Doria* and John Adams' letters to the Marine Committee make it quite clear that his intention was to have the ship named after the great admiral who had founded the Genoese Republic. However, there was apparently a clerical error at the shipyard and the "a" at the end of the first word became a "w" in the yard records. It is actually possible that the "error" was intentional, with an overly-patriotic clerk deliberately "Americanising" the name. Either way, it was as the *Andrew Doria* that the new ship was commissioned into the naval service of the infant American republic and that was to be her name until the end of her days.

Andrew Doria had been converted for war by reinforcing her bulwarks and piercing them with ports for 14 double-reinforced 4-pounders and mounting 12 swivel guns along her rails. Her precise dimensions are unknown but she was said to be slightly larger than *Cabot*, one of the other merchantmen taken up

for conversion, and thus was probably a little over 75 feet long and with a beam something over 25 feet. During her conversion, provision was made for a crew of 130 officers and men, including a 30-man marine detachment (quarters must have been cramped).

Originally commanded by Capt. Nicholas Biddle, *Andrew Doria* took part in the successful raid on Nassau in the Bahamas in the spring of 1776 as a unit of Commodore Esek Hopkins' small fleet. On the return voyage from the Bahamas, she took part in an inconclusive fight against the British frigate *Glasgow* off Brock Island on 6 April and later made three independent cruises in which she took 10 prizes, including two fully laden troop transports. At the end of the third cruise, Biddle was promoted to the command of the frigate *Randolph* (in which he was to lose his life when she blew up during a night encounter with HMS *Yarmouth* on 7 March, 1778) and *Andrew Doria* went into a yard overhaul prior to coming under command of Captain Isaiah Robinson. At the end of her overhaul, *Andrew Doria* set sail for the Dutch Antilles on the mission which was to see the firing of salutes described above.

The exchange of salutes by *Andrew Doria* and Fort Oranje was fraught with political implications. While a gun salute to a merchant ship, even one flying the ensign of the rebel colonies, could be passed off as simple diplomatic "good manners", a salute to a warship, even by a reduced number of guns, could be construed as nothing less than a formal recognition of the rebel's flag. Fort Oranje's salute was obviously viewed in this light and had an immediate effect. On reaching shore, Captains Dean and Spicher hurried to the government offices to register a complaint but were turned away. While the two English captains were trying to get their complaint heard, they were mortified to watch the captain of the American privateer receive a rapturous welcome from the citizens of St. Eustatius as he came ashore. When they realised that the local authorities were not interested in hearing from them, Dean and Spicher, in company with James Fraser, rowed back to their sloop and set sail immediately for St. Kitts.

Robinson's mission in Statia (as St. Eustatius was and is commonly referred to) was to take on board a cargo of military supplies. Additionally, he carried with him a copy of the Declaration of Independence which he was to deliver to the Governor. This latter task was obviously a diplomatic mission which in fact called for a salute on arrival. The commandant of Fort Oranje had not been warned of *Andrew Doria's* arrival and the firing of a salute by the American left him nonplussed. The decision to return the gun salute with a salute of his own was one well beyond his authority and after ordering his flag dipped in reply to *Andrew Doria's* salute he hurried off to find the governor. Fortuitously he encountered Governor de Graaff hurrying towards the fort and was ordered to return and fire an answering salute, but with two guns less than a national salute.

De Graaff's intention in ordering a reduction in the number of guns was to allow him to claim, in the event that he was called to account for his actions, that the salute was merely a "courtesy" which could be rendered to any vessel and held no special significance. It appears, however, that de Graaff had prior knowledge of *Andrew Doria's* approach and had decided to render a salute come what may. Whatever the facts, the British government's representative in the region, Christer Greathead (President of St. Kitts) was less than pleased at the Dutch action and not deceived by de Graaff's excuses. To add insult to British injury, even while Greathead was collecting affidavits from Dean, Spicher, Fraser, Trottman (a young British subject who had been press ganged aboard *Andrew Doria* and who had used the arrival of the ship at St. Eustatius to make a successful bid for freedom) and others, the Continental privateer *Baltimore Hero* sailed out of the roadstead at St. Eustatius on 21 November and took as a prize the British merchantman *May* in the very mouth of the harbour of St. Kitts. After putting a prize crew aboard the merchantman, *Baltimore Hero* returned in triumph to St. Eustatius and dropped anchor.

This was too much for Greathead who immediately penned an outraged letter of protest which was delivered to St. Eustatius by the St. Kitts solicitor general and a delegation of the President's men. De Graaff refused to see the delegation but sent them back two days after they arrived carrying a letter of reply in which he denied any compliance in supporting the American rebels, demanding proof of such charges from Greathead, and defending his action in ordering the gun salute to *Andrew Doria*, while pointing out that the only persons able to call him to task over the incident were his own political masters.

President Greathead sent a second, milder, letter on 26 December but still maintained his stance, demanding an explanation from de Graaff for his actions. Receiving no reply, the President bundled up his correspondence, added affidavits from witnesses and victims, and sent the lot off to London for the attention of His Majesty's ministers. In due course, Greathead's account of the affair resulted in a menacing note from Whitehall to The Hague. Not yet prepared to challenge Albion's might, the Netherlands found it diplomatically expedient to recall de Graaff to Holland to give a first hand account of the affair. Dutch claims to Britain that this recall constituted a disavowal of de Graaff's action were unconvincing at the time and appeared even more so a year later when de Graaff was reinstated as Governor of St. Eustatius, a post he was to retain until 3 February 1781, the day the British Admiral Sir George Rodney sailed into the

roadstead at St. Eustatius with a powerful fleet and informed the governor that Great Britain had been at war with the Netherlands since 20 December 1780 and that he, the governor, was now a prisoner of war.

Captain Robinson, meanwhile, had completed his mission to St. Eustatius by April 1777 and then hove anchor for Delaware. On the home voyage, Andrew Doria encountered *Racehorse*, a 12-gun topsail schooner, off the eastern end of Puerto Rico. *Racehorse* was tender to the Flagship of the Jamaica Station and had been sent to intercept *Andrew Doria*. In a two hour running fight with *Andrew Doria*, however, *Racehorse* found herself outgunned by the American and eventually struck her colours. She was successfully taken to Philadelphia by a prize crew and was joined there later by *Andrew Doria* which had stopped to take another prize (a small merchantman) on the way. Both ships were above the chevaux-de-frise on the Delaware River when Lord Howe attacked Philadelphia in October 1777. After the fall of Fort Mifflin, both ships were burned to prevent their capture by the British.

This ends the story of the first *official* salute by a foreign power to the American flag on an American warship. It does raise the interesting question, however, of when the first salute to the American flag at sea was made. Although no one knows for sure when this occurred, there is strong evidence to suggest that it happened at St. Croix in the Danish Virgin Islands on 25 October 1776. A certain Mr Kelly reported to the admiral commanding the Jamaica Station that he had observed the departure of an American merchant schooner laden with powder from the Danish island that day and that "the vessel went out under American colours, saluted the Fort and had the compliment returned the same as if she had been an English or Dutch ship."

Come what may, however, and despite Governor de Graaff's protestations of innocence, it is obvious that the salute fired by the guns of Fort Oranje at St. Eustatius on 16 November 1776 was the very first official salute by a foreign power to the American flag on an American warship. The fact that the Dutch salute probably went a long way to ensuring war between Britain and The Netherlands only adds to the historical significance of the event.

While this fairly obscure event has been largely forgotten by most of the world, it has not been totally forgotten by the United States or the Netherlands or, especially, the people of St. Eustatius. In 1939, a bronze plaque, a personal gift to the people of St Eustatius from President Franklin D. Roosevelt of the United States, was erected at Fort Oranje to commemorate the salute of 1776. The inscription on the plaque reads:

"In Commemoration of the Salute to the flag of the United States Fired in this Fort on 16 November 1776 by order of Johannes de Graaff, Governor of St. Eustatius In reply to a National gun salute Fired by the United States brig of war, *Andrew Doria* Captain Isaiah Robinson of the Continental Navy.

> "Here the sovereignty of the United States of America was first formally acknowledged to a National vessel by a Foreign Official.
>
> Presented by Franklin Delano Roosevelt, President of the United States of America".

In 1961, the United States government suggested to the government of the Netherlands that a special celebration would be in order to commemorate the 185th anniversary of the Fort Oranje salute at St. Eustatius. Following agreement from the government of the Netherlands, a United States Navy destroyer escort, USS *Krause* (DDE 849) was detailed to proceed to the Netherlands Antilles in time to arrive in the roadstead at St. Eustatius to fire a 13 gun salute on 16 November. *Krause* arrived off St. Eustatius on 15 November and the next morning steamed into the roadstead, dropped anchor about where *Andrew Doria* had, raised a Dutch tricolour and at 11 am fired a 13 gun salute, using black powder to ensure plenty of smoke. The salute was promptly answered with 11 "honour shots" from Fort Oranje, the fort's ancient guns being manned for the occasion by sailors from the Dutch frigate HMNIS *Van Amstel* which was already at anchor in the roadstead. Following the exchange of salutes, ceremonies in commemoration of the events of 1776 were conducted ashore at Fort Oranje. In memory of the occasion, telegraphic messages of felicitation were exchanged between President John F. Kennedy of the United States and Her Majesty Queen Juliana of the Netherlands.

Unfortunately, for reasons which I have been unable to ascertain, no special celebrations were held at St. Eustatius in 1976, the year of America's Bicentennial. Dutch involvement in the Bicentennial was restricted to the inclusion of the frigate HMNIS *Tromp* in the International Naval Review in New York harbour on 4 July 1976.

I find failure on the part of the two governments to formally mark the 200th anniversary of the Fort Oranje salute at the site most strange.

Acknowledgements

I gratefully acknowledge the generous assistance of Mr S. Martijn, Director of the Central Archives of the Netherlands Ministry of Defence and Dr P.C.van Royen, Director of the Institute of Maritime History of the Netherlands Ministry of Defence, both of whom provided me with extremely valuable source material

not readily available here in Australia and which I would not otherwise have had access to.

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Graham Wilson, who was born in 1953, is the son of a retired Commander in the RAN. Enlisting in the Regular Army in 1971 following a short period of service with the CMF, he was orginally an infantryman, serving in Australia and overseas with the 7th and 5th/7th Battalions, The Royal Australian Regiment and then as an instructor, in the rank of corporal, at the Infantry Centre. In 1979, while serving at the Infantry Centre, he corps transferred to the Australian Intelligence Corps and was posted to Canberra where he worked as Operations NCO in the Joint Military Operations and Plans Division. Further postings were to the Directorate of Military Intelligence as the Operations Sergeant and then to Headquarters 1st Commando Regiment as the Intelligence Sergeant. In 1984, he was awarded warrant rank and posted to Headquarters 1st Division in Brisbane as the WO Analyst in the Intelligence Section. This was followed by postings to Headquarters Field Force Command and Headquarters Land Command in Sydney and the Joint (later Defence) Intelligence Organisation in Canberra. He is currently posted to the Directorate of Security — Army in Canberra. Graham is married with three children and combines a life long interest in militaria and military history with a love of writing.

Brown Water Coasties *from page 47*

to run the blockade near the DMZ. Although the operation was successful, the drawing off of forces to carry out the operation had left a number of sectors unprotected, highlighting the need for more patrol craft. As a result, the navy asked the Coast Guard to provide more ships.

With the memory of the March operation fresh in their minds, mindful of the increasing strength of armed resistance being encountered, and loathe to deploy any more of their valuable 82 foot WPB, the Coast Guard decided to provide five High Endurance Cutters (WHEC) in response to the navy's request.

Coast Guard Squadron Three

The five cutters allocated were among the oldest ships on the Coast Guard inventory. They were among the survivors of eighteen former seaplane tenders, all built in the early 1940s, which were transferred to the Coast Guard from the Navy following World War Two.

Despite their age, however, the five cutters were all extremely well maintained, had good sea keeping qualities and each mounted a very capable 5-inch gun as well as carrying torpedoes and ASW weapons. Just over 300 feet long, the ships had all been modernised with up-to- date radar and communications gear and had a crew of 215. Additionally, their relatively shallow draft allowed them to operate quite close in to the shore.

The five ships steamed from home ports in the US to Pearl Harbor where, on 24 April, 1967, they were officially commissioned as Coast Guard Squadron Three (RONTHREE). The five ships of the squadron were USCGC *Barataria* (WHEC 381); *Bering Strait* (WHEC 382); *Gresham* (WHEC 387); *Half Moon* (WHEC 378); and *Yakutat* (WHEC 380).

Unlike the WPBs of RONONE which were all painted Navy grey prior to sailing for Vietnam, the WHECs all retained their traditional Coast Guard white paint scheme. Whether this was for reasons of economy or out of sheer "coasty" pride is unclear (but I like to think it was the latter).

The ships of RONTHREE left Peal Harbor for the Philippines on 26 April, arriving on 10 May.

A week later they steamed for Vietnam and by the end of the month were operational with TF 115. Because of their shallow draft, the ships of RONTHREE were assigned to the Gulf of Thailand and worked both outer and inner barrier, carrying out intercepts and providing fire support with their 5-inch guns. The WHECs also provided logistic support for the WPBs and Navy Swift Boats of the inner barrier. Often the WHECs carried a "spare crew" for the Swifts, allowing the deadly little inshore and riverine patrol boats to remain on station almost indefinitely. In their turn, the WHECs turned to the replenishment ships of the 7th Fleet for logistic support and thus also stayed on station almost indefinitely, only putting into port for repairs or to give the crews liberty. Despite these long periods at sea, the morale of the all-regular Coast Guard crews remained high in contrast to the severe morale problems manifested in the draftee crews of Navy ships as the war dragged on.

1967 - 1968

The remainder of 1967 was quiet except for an intercept by the cutter *Point Orient* (WPB 82319) in July when she intercepted and ran aground a 120 foot trawler loaded with arms and ammunition. The other major event of the year was a decision by TF 115 to begin rotating the WPBs into the outer barrier. The reason for this decision was the fact that the new Navy PCFs which had begun to arrive in Vietnam lacked the sea keeping qualities of the Coast Guard vessels and could not handle rough weather. Thus the WPBs were rotated out to the outer barrier in rough weather, allowing the less capable Navy ships to shelter inshore. This decision was not popular with the "coasties" but they accepted it as just one more duty as the professionals they were.

Towards the end of 1967, RONTHREE was reinforced by the deployment of a further three WHEC USCGC *Winona* (WHEC 65), *Minnetonka* (WHEC 67) and *Androscoggin* (WHEC 68). These ships had been built as ASW escorts for the Coast Guard during the Second World War. Originally rated as gunboats (WPG), they were re-classified as WHEC on 1 May 1966. Their deployment to Vietnam allowed the Coast Guard to rotate WHEC through Subic Bay for maintenance and crew rest while still maintaining at least five cutters on station.

The high point of the war for the Coast Guard occurred early in 1968. By the beginning of the year, MARKET TIME had almost completely cut off the sea route for resupply of the south by the North Vietnamese.

Nevertheless, the North Vietnamese made one last concerted effort to force through the blockade as they tried to infiltrate men and supplies at the end of February to support the Tet Offensive. On the evening of 27 February, near Da Nang, USCGC *Androscoggin* (WHEC 68), along with *Point Grey* (WPB 82324) and *Point Welcome* (WPB 82329) and a Navy PCF spotted a large trawler close inshore. When challenged the trawler attempted to escape and was then driven ashore by heavy Coast Guard fire where it was destroyed with explosives by the crew. Further south near Nha Trang, another trawler was spotted by Coast Guard and Navy units and forced ashore. Driven back by heavy small arms fire as they attempted to close in, the US ships drew back out of range and destroyed the trawler with 81mm mortar fire from the cutters. A third trawler was encountered off the Cau Mau Peninsula by USCG *Winona* (WHEC 65), *Point Grace* (WPB 82323), *Point Marone* (WPB 82331) and *Point Hudson* (WPB 82322). Taken under heavy fire by the "coasties", the trawler exploded and disappeared from the radar scope. A fourth trawler spotted by USCGC *Minnetonka* (WHEC 67) just beyond Vietnamese territorial waters decided to play it safe and fled north for safety. During the course of a single night, the US Coast Guard destroyed three trawlers and drove off a fourth in the biggest battle of Operation MARKET TIME.

This was the high point of the war for the Coast Guard. Following their losses in February, the North Vietnamese almost totally gave up trying to run trawlers through the blockade and attempts by smaller craft faded away to almost nothing. For the remainder of 1968, despite intensive patrolling, the WPBs and WHECs had only a few minor contacts. The WHECs did, however, take part in a number of fire support missions for US Army and ARVN troops in the Cau Mau Peninsula region. Apart from these missions, however, the year was so quiet that the Coast Guard cutters reverted to almost a peace time routine with the ships going to the rescue of both downed US aircrew and Vietnamese fishermen in distress, as well as carrying out hydrographic surveys.

1969 - 1971 Vietnamization

From the beginning of 1969, the decision was made to hand over a greater part in the conduct of the war to the South Vietnamese, the process of so-called "Vietnamization". As part of this process the Coast Guard was instructed to begin a program of training to enable Vietnamese crews to take over the WPBs of all three divisions of RONONE. By the spring of 1969, this program was so well advanced that the Coast Guard was able to hand over *Point Garnet* (WPB 82310) and *Point League* (WPB 82304) to the Vietnamese.

At about this time the first of a new class of High Endurance Cutters, USCGC *Hamilton* (WHEC 715), arrived off the coast to relieve the World War Two vintage cutters. *Hamilton* was later joined by *Sherman* (WHEC 720), *Morgenthau* (WHEC 722) and *Rush*

(WHEC 723). With more modern armament, radar and flight facilities, the new arrivals soon showed how superior they were to the older vessels. The *Hamilton* Class, extremely attractive ships which still form the mainstay of the Coast Guard's blue water fleet, are 378 feet long and at the time of their deployment to Vietnam were armed with a 5-inch gun, two 81mm mortars and two .50 cal machine guns as well as two ASW hedgehogs and two triple tube torpedo launchers and a helicopter (the 5-inch guns have since been replaced with a 3-inch OTO Melara Mk 75 gun while a PHALANX CIWS system has been added and all ASW equipment removed), and carried a complement of 179.

With the arrival of the *Hamilton* Class cutters, the decision was also made to transfer a number of the High Endurance Cutters to the South Vietnamese Navy to give it more flexibility in off-shore patrolling. As a result of this decision, in early 1970 the USCGC *Bering Strait* (WHEC 382) and *Yakutat* (WHEC 380) were selected for transfer. Eventually two more cutters of this class, *Castle Rock* (WHEC 383) and *Cook Inlet* (WHEC 384), were also transferred.

The End

Transfer of the 82-foot cutters continued throughout 1970, with the last of the boats handed over in August. This date also marked the formal disbanding of Coast Guard Squadron One. The larger cutters, however, remained on duty for a while longer and were involved in two more battles with trawlers. On 20 November 1970, *Rush* (WHEC 723) and *Sherman* (WHEC 720) sank a trawler when it failed to stop. A few months later, on 11 April 1971, *Rush*, in company with *Morgenthau* (WHEC 722), sank a trawler near the Cau Mau Peninsula. These, however, were the parting shots for Coast Guard manned cutters. By the last quarter of 1971, only one Coast Guard ship, *Cook Inlet* (WHEC 384), was patrolling off Vietnam under Coast Guard control, albeit with a mainly Vietnamese crew. It was formally handed over to the South Vietnamese Navy on 21 December 1971.

Within a week of the hand over of *Cook Inlet*, Coast Guard Squadron Three had been officially dissolved, thus closing another chapter in the annals of Coast Guard history. As in past wars when they had been called upon to "go in harm's way", the performance of the US Coast Guard had been outstanding. That performance had not been without cost - seven Coast Guardsmen lost their lives and a further fifty-three were wounded.

Operation MARKET TIME was an outstanding success. Prior to its inception, supplies and men flowed unchecked over the sea route from the north to the south. By 1967, that flow had been almost totally choked off, forcing the North Vietnamese to turn to the longer, harder and far more hazardous land route over the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The Coast Guard contribution to Operation MARKET TIME was out of all proportion to both the size of the forces committed and the Coast Guard itself. The Coast Guardsmen carried out their assignments to the best of their abilities in all condiditons. When the shooting stopped, even though they were still in a war zone, they turned to their almost 200 year tradition of protecting and saving life at sea.

The Tyranny of Jointery *from page 57*

While organisation can be a powerful influence on how well Defence operates, it cannot gain an importance far above the systems it uses or the people within it. A captain surveyed put this succinctly: "To create a 'joint' organisation is easy. To think 'joint' and act 'joint' is very hard."

One study of what made up a "coherent, effective defence organisation" came up with five characteristics:

- Strong administrative departments for each Armed Service;
- A powerful central policy and planning staff (with Service officers and civilian administrators and scientists) to plan defence policy, the budget and weapons projects;
- A planning, programming and budgeting system with functional categories or programs directly related to specific tasks of the armed forces;
- A long-term or multiyear budget system to provide as stable an environment as possible for future plans; and
- A full-career civilian bureaucracy of administrators and scientists to operate this system in equal partnership with their Service colleagues.

Australia is not far from this ideal, and is getting closer. But no doubt the future will be characterised by endless tinkering to find that little bit extra.

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JOURNAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE Inc.
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PRINT POST APPROVED
PRINT POST PUBLICATION No. PP 229 219 000 20

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