



Journal
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AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE INC

The Australian Naval Institute was formed and incorporated in the Australian Capital Territory in 1975. The main objects of the Institute are:

- To encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the maritime profession,
- to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and the maritime profession, and
- to publish a journal.

The Institute is self-supporting and non-profit-making. All publications of the Institute will stress that the authors express their own views and opinions are not necessarily those of the Department of Defence, the Chief of Naval Staff or the Institute. The aim is to encourage discussion, dissemination of information, comment and opinion and the advancement of professional knowledge concerning naval and maritime matters.

The membership of the Institute is open to:

- *Regular Members.* Regular membership is open to members of the RAN, RANR, RNZN or RNZNVR and persons who having qualified for regular membership, subsequently leave the service.
- *Associate Members.* Associate membership is open to all other persons not qualified to be Regular Members, who profess an interest in the aims of the Institute.
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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

Volume 21 Number 2 May/July 1995

SPECIAL FEATURE

This issue provides readers with full details of the international conference SEA POWER IN THE NEW CENTURY which will be held at the Novotel Brighton Beach in Sydney during 22-23 November. It focuses on the whys and wherefores of naval operations beyond 2000, and our Institute is a major sponsor....Support your Institute and come along for an enjoyable and informative time.

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Cover Photograph: Training a Seaman's Eye - even in the satellite age, a solid grounding in the basics has big payoffs: professional pride, patience, discipline, an eye for detail and it produces an affinity with past generations of sailors.

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FROM THE PRESIDENT

The big event for the Institute in 1995 is the SEA POWER Conference to be held in Sydney on 22 and 23 of November. This conference will do much to promote the key objectives of the ANI, and this issue of the Journal gives full details including a registration brochure. Our institute is a major sponsor of the conference and members of the Council have been heavily involved in assisting the Maritime Studies Program with 'designing' and organising the event. All the ingredients for success are now in place: outstanding international and Australian speakers; an impressive, well appointed venue and a theme of particular interest to our members. A 12% discount on the registration fee - a saving of \$30 - has been negotiated by Council for Institute members, so, please take advantage of this arrangement to ensure that a large contingent of ANI members is present. I also hope to see some of our New Zealand members make the trip across the Tasman and be there in force too.

Another highlight for the Institute was the RAN in World War Two conference that took place in Sydney during May. Attendance was good and the presentations were excellent. Coinciding with the conference was the delivery of the 1995 Vernon Parker Oration at HMAS WATSON by visiting international speaker, Eric Grove. Again, this was thoroughly enjoyed by members and their guests.

Most members will agree that 1995 has proceeded at a 'great rate of knots' and the pace shows no sign of letting up. Personally, as many of you are aware, one of the many challenges I have experienced this year was a job change and a move to Sydney from Canberra to become the Maritime Commander. Now that I am located in Sydney I have been ably represented at monthly Council meetings by Vice President Terry Morgan, and I extend my thanks for a job well done.

I feel arrangements for a Canberra based President need to be made. The Council is in the process of making the necessary arrangements for succession, and members will be advised of my successor in the next issue. I have enjoyed the best part of two years as President of the Australian Naval Institute and I thank members of the 1995 Council for their support. Many of this years Council members served in 1994 and the team has worked well - our objectives have been furthered and the Institute continues to prosper and grow. The Australian Naval Institute is now supporting more conferences and the standard of the journal has improved substantially. From the financial point of view, we are on a very sound footing and this gives every indication of continued growth. Membership is also on the rise, although attracting younger members will continue to be a priority objective for Council.

I look forward to seeing you at the SEA POWER Conference in November. The Institute and its new President will take a high profile there and this is entirely appropriate in our 20th Anniversary Year.

Chris Oxenbould

FROM THE EDITOR

This issue of JANI has it all! Current maritime issues and developments, modern naval strategy, rarely looked at 'corners' of maritime history and even a hair raising trip through Frederick Reef in the Coral Sea for the seaman types among us!

'Illumination Rounds', our new column, includes some hard hitting comment on keeping up fitness standards in the



RAN, the fatal effects of political incorrectness on career prospects in the modern military and the insidious proliferation of 'defensive staff work'. Following Illumination Rounds, Grant Hewison, Fellow with the Centre for Strategic Studies in New Zealand, gives an update on current issues in ocean law, policy and regional management addressed at the SEAPOL Tri-Regional Conference.

In this issue it is my privilege to publish material from three 'discoveries' who have already made a big impact on JANI's readership - Mike Fogarty, Graham Wilson and Geoffrey Bewley. Many remember Mike Fogarty's outstanding article on ship visits to Vietnam in the Feb/Apr 94 issue - which I consider the outstanding JANI article of 1994 - and have enjoyed his regular contributions in the 'Book Review' department. In this issue he reviews two works. Graham Wilson is another outstanding writer whose research skills and writing qualities shine. He has been invited to make two contributions in this issue: the first being on 'Press Gang's' and the second on the fascinating story of the history, organisation and operations of the corporation of Trinity House. We also have a refreshing commentary on the naval side of the American Civil War by Geoffrey Bewley who impressed us all in the last issue with his piece called 'Ramming Speed'. In an age where elegance in writing and disciplined analysis is sadly on the wane, these three authors set the standard and JANI is fortunate to have them on 'the books'.



Another excellent writer and regular contributor is Greg Swinden who, in this issue, tells the story of the RAN's little known but significant role during the Gallipoli Campaign. However, lest readers think JANI is going too far down the historical track, Commodore Sam Bateman RANEM keeps us on the straight and narrow with some modern maritime strategy. Rick Leahy then considers the topical issue of whether UN commitments should be Australian force structure determinants. Yours truly then weighs the argument of whether civilianisation and commercialisation are killing the Navy.

Commander Peter Jones gives us another welcome update on the Canadian Defence White Paper and he correctly points out the advantages at looking at the Canadian Defence experience, which in many ways parallels and frequently precedes our own. Working closely with our Canadian cousins can save us time and money. Also, from Canada is a letter from Lieutenant Commander J. R Stocker BA RN who is currently on course at the Canadian Forces Maritime Warfare Centre. He gives valuable feedback on LCDR Scott's article on Maritime Strategy and the Law of the Sea (JANI Vol 20 No 4).

The President has highlighted SEA POWER IN THE NEXT CENTURY as the premier event for the Institute in its 20th Anniversary Year. There's no doubt that the Novotel Brighton Beach in Sydney will be THE place to be during 22-23 November, so get your priorities right ... ignore your boss, contracts, anniversaries, your job and interfering family members. Come along because you deserve it! I certainly plan to be there - but don't let that deter you - and other Council members both past and present are coming in force. It will be a time for getting insight into key criteria for, and constraints on, the conduct of naval operations post 2000. For those in industry this is a rare opportunity to get a solid insight into what navies in the Asia Pacific need to do and what they need to buy in the first decades of the Twenty First Century. Ten 'hired guns' from overseas - internationally recognised experts in maritime strategy and technology - are being flown in to ensure that you are given representative, up to date assessments and developments from the region.

Council is making every effort to support the Maritime Studies Program to ensure that this event is conducted in the finest traditions of the SEA POWER conferences which the ANI has been associated with in the past. However, be warned: bookings are coming in thick and fast, so don't be disappointed; send off your registration form *and* book your accommodation TODAY.

Regards
Alan Hinge

ILLUMINATION ROUNDS

WITH "ODDBALL"

FITNESS TESTING AND THE RAN

Whatever happened to fitness testing in the Navy? A few weeks ago I was speaking to a young midshipman who has just graduated from ADFA who was telling me that at ADFA you must pass your fitness test, otherwise you don't graduate. Sounds good I remarked, but now he is disenchanted seeing all the 'porkers' wandering around in rig, knowing that their fitness will never be tested by the Navy.

How did a fighting service get itself into such a situation? Obviously the weight surveillance program is not working. The evidence is throughout all Navy Commands, and let's not disguise this fact - there are many mid-seniority officers and sailors that are not 'undertall for their weight' - they are FAT!

Just spending a few moments to pen this letter prompted me to think of just three benefits that would result from the Navy introducing a fitness test. These are:

1. **Reduced Medical Costs:** Better fitness would result in reduced costs in treating our people for colds and other minor ailments. It may even reduce the threat of heart disease and other serious illnesses. Perhaps a flow-on effect of a healthier lifestyle would prompt Navy personnel to avoid smoking and other drug use. I realise that these benefits would be hard to quantify without the medical system putting together an all-encompassing database, but once this was done we could even compare the (presumably) increasing costs associated with sports injuries with the (almost certainly) decreasing costs associated with other ailments.
2. **Increased Productivity:** As well as reducing the amount of time personnel spend away from their workplace on sick leave, I know that I have read in many places that a general level of fitness increases our capacity to think and work. A healthy body keeps a healthy mind.
3. **Public Image:** In this environment of declining budgets, our public image is very important. How bad does it look on a freedom of entry march to see a mob of portly chaps, buttons and collars bulging, waddling down the street? If we are serious about being a combat force, then we must also look the part.

The Maritime Commander monitors ships' readiness states with various measures. By extending this concept a little further, the Maritime Commander and Ships' COs could monitor their crew's fitness as another measure of a ship's progression on the road (channel?) to OLOC. Fitness isn't everything, but no one could argue that a reasonable level of individual strength, flexibility and aerobic fitness is not going to improve the combat capacity of each sailor or officer. If an individual can't pass the fitness test, he/she is

not maintaining that level of capability that means they are ready to be sent in harm's way. If a ship fails its workup, it is given extra training and assessed again. That policy should be extended to each member of the ship's company. If they are not up to scratch physically, then they should not be at sea.

How do we implement such a policy? Any fitness test must assess strength, flexibility and aerobic condition. We do not need to return to the dark ages and insist on heaves and a 3 km run. Some people simply cannot do heaves and others cannot run. This doesn't necessarily mean they aren't fit. For instance Deeks may not be able to lift his body weight, likewise Arnie Schwarzenegger would struggle running 3km in 12 minutes. No one could say they aren't fit. We have plenty of talented PTIs who could put together a test that assesses each of these three areas by a selection of exercises. For example you could run 3km, swim 1km, or ride 10km in a certain time.

We can't expect our people to keep fit in their own time. If it is a Service requirement to be fit, we must provide the time. The Army do it, why can't we? It only requires three hours a week.

As one final thought, how's this for an incentive to get fit and stay fit? If an individual fails a fitness test, he or she is deemed as not militarily ready for service in any area that the Navy may assign them to. By not being 'fit for sea' they narrow the Navy's options for postings, and reduce the Navy's flexibility to meet different contingencies. If they are physically unfit for sea - they are no more ready for combat or other military duty than a public servant or defence contractor - stop their Service Allowance!

'Jane Fonda'

FORMULATING AN RAN FITNESS 'STANDARD': TESTING TIMES

Let me begin by asking a fundamental question. What is the Royal Australian Navy's principal reason d'être? Simply put, it is to fight and win at sea. How do we achieve this objective? By putting to sea ships which, as a result of the symbiotic relationship between well trained personnel and effective and reliable military technology, are superior to those of our enemy. The most important element of this symbiosis is, unarguably, personnel. Without a core of well trained personnel who are fit to undertake sea service, fleet units become little more than dockside adornments.

In order to access these well trained, 'sea-fit' personnel, the RAN must recruit, retain and regularly monitor its members. The first two of these functions are not the principal concern of this paper, although the

conclusions reached will have implications for them. It is the contention of this piece that the RAN must conduct regular health and fitness checks on its personnel. Such testing will ensure that a quorum of 'sea-fit' members is maintained.

The issue of testing to achieve a common RAN fitness standard has long been mooted but never effectively enacted. It would, however, appear that the issue has once again raised its (oft perceived ugly) head, given initial impetus by last years Townsend report titled 'Operational Fitness Standard'. Latest developments in dealing with this issue would indicate that the RAN has at least recognised that a Naval Fitness Policy (NFP) is required. This policy will be broadly aligned to work currently under way in SGADF on developing a common ADF fitness standard.

If the current (acknowledged embryonic) principles forwarded to form the basis of the NFP are accepted, the policy will be inherently contradictory and largely pointless. It is envisaged that a Naval Physical Fitness Standard (NPFS) should be set (based on age and gender) by conducting tests of muscular strength and endurance, flexibility and aerobic fitness. Testing should be conducted in a cost effective way, using commonly available equipment. Where this initially sound ideal loses all credibility, is in the notion that testing should be conducted on a voluntary basis with members encouraged to take the test at least annually and particularly when posted to a sea billet. To argue that voluntary testing will establish a standard is to completely misinterpret the definition of standard. The Collins Dictionary defines a standard as "... an accepted or approved example of something against which others are judged or measured". To this end, the NFP can establish the accepted example of the NPFS (expressed in terms of a 3.2km run, X pushups, Y situps, etc); but a voluntary format can never enforce the measurement of personnel against this example and hence never establish a true Standard.

What is the basis of the standard? While intricacies of detail are beyond the scope of this piece, arguments for the type of standard required can be expounded. It is my contention that a single NPFS be applied to all Naval personnel. All members, whether ashore or afloat, should be at a level of fitness which will enable them to serve, at short notice, at sea. It is implausible to give a member time to 'work up' to an operational level of fitness. As such, 'basic' and 'operational' fitness should be a single entity.

Who should be tested? If a true Standard is to be established, all members should be subject to the rigours of a regular (preferably annual) fitness test. If testing is voluntary then we do not have a capital 's' Standard; we have an, essentially useless, little 'g' guideline.

What consequences will this testing have for individual members and the RAN as a corporate entity? In its initial stages of implementation, members must be given a grace period in which they will have time (six months, but preferably twelve) to 'work up' to

the required fitness standard. At the end of this 'grace period', all members should be able to achieve the minimum NPFS for their age and gender. Failure to achieve this standard will result in administrative censure and impact on career progression and retention prospects.

Emotive counter arguments and disagreement with this proposal will abound. Members who, due to seniority or any other multitude of reasons (excepting medical grounds), will have only a slim (or no) prospect of returning to sea, will undoubtedly argue that the NPFS should not be applied to them. To my mind, this becomes a matter of leadership rather than posting prospects.

Implementation of the NPFS and the censure of individuals who fail to meet its requirements will also have considerable consequences for the Navy as a corporate entity. These consequences will be manifest in both time and resources: 'work hours' training time for individuals, personnel wastage, etc. Indeed, it would seem to be these costs which are foremost in the mind of policy makers and their adoption of a voluntary fitness 'standard'. It is my contention, however, that these costs will be short term in nature, and the initial outlay will see a far greater return in terms of a Navy which, because of its access to well trained, sea-fit personnel will have a higher state of operational readiness. In addition, yet more intangible and eclectic, the Navy will benefit from having members who enjoy a healthier lifestyle.

The proposals forwarded in this piece do not constitute an unreasonable ask; for members to reach a level of fitness which will allow them to serve at sea at short notice. This level of fitness should be monitored and maintained by a compulsory Standard. In the final examination, what we must ask ourselves is this: Do we really want an RAN fitness Standard or merely another lip serving DI(N) that will be a sibling to the RAN Weight Management Program; serving no real purpose but at least to which we can point and say "Yes, we've got a (fitness) policy"?

G. A. Cox

LEUT RAN

ANOTHER 'CHICKEN AND EGG' STORY.

Firstly, may I congratulate you on (yet another) excellent issue. I always enjoy reading my copy of JANI, and from my first quick glance I'm sure this issue (February/April 1995) will be no exception.

However, there had to be a another reason I'm writing, and there is. Your "centrefold" *Ships Sail for the Top End* (pages 28/29) lists the ships leaving Sydney in order as HMA Ships *Hobart*, *Canberra*, *Sydney*, *Newcastle* and *Success*. Now, I was never very good on pennant numbers, but (in order) 39 is *Ho-*

bart, 03 is Sydney (not Canberra), and I'll wager the next ship that is sporting an illegible black painted number well down the hull and a radar array that looks suspiciously like that of a Leander class frigate isn't 'HMAS' anything. Like the chicken and the egg, what came first, the caption or the photograph??

Lieutenant Commander A. S. Brown RANR

Ed — Congratulations LCDR Brown!

You are our inaugural prizewinner in the "Pick the Intentional Error" competition which will be run in each issue of JANI. Your \$15 prize will be forwarded in due course...

'DEFENSIVE' STAFFWORK

by 'Oddball'

On 30 March, 1995 an intriguing interview appeared in the *Australian* with the CEO of Asea Brown Boveri - a multinational corporation with annual revenue exceeding \$35 billion dollars. The CEO, Percy Barnevik was quoted as saying:

"I try to tell my people, to encourage them to speed up decisions, that they have a right to be 30% wrong. They should not be afraid to stick out their neck ... There is sometimes the attitude within companies that if you do not make a bad mistake, you are safe. But I don't hesitate to remove a person who has missed opportunities. He need not have done anything wrong but, if he has missed opportunities, that is bad."

I pondered this interview for a while, considering how distant this attitude was to that in the Navy. I glanced at some recent correspondence from the 'Head Shed' and a proposal I was in the process of staffing within my own organisation, and threw up my hands in despair.

I am convinced that the Navy, and indeed the Services and the the Public Service in general are obsessed with the minutiae of minutes, discussion papers and draft proposals to the extent that the key issues are often ob-

scured by a senior officer's insistence on the correct post-nominals, seniority order or the use of the 'inoffensive' passive voice. Often, I am sure, we cannot see the wood for the trees. Our current system seems to encourage incredible duplication and waste, and to sponsor the success of the bureaucrat over the innovator or the achiever. The emphasis is on not getting anything wrong: it should be on getting something right.

Now before I am felled by the traditional criticism that the Navy is not a business, let me say that we do need good staffwork. JSP 102 is a reasonable guide to the conventions of Service Writing. It is not however, a bible. By striving to ensure every piece of correspondence is 100% correct - dotting each 'i', crossing every 't' - we tend to miss more important issues. Every officer, I am sure, has an apocryphal tale to relate of numerous drafts being returned for minor alterations. In this sense, the introduction of wordprocessing technology has not reduced staffwork - it has increased it.

To describe this characteristic, I have coined the expression 'Defensive Staffwork' to emphasise the difference between a slavish adherence to doctrine compared to a more creative and productive focus on issues. We need only to remind ourselves of the principles of war to consider what approach we should adopt. Yes, attention to detail is important, but not at the expense of missed opportunities.

I am reminded of Norman F. Dixon's study *On the Psychology of Military Incompetence*. He identified this 'defensive staffwork' - although he failed to name it as such - as a telling symptom of military incompetence. To Dixon, this sort of person is "uncreative, unimaginative, narrow-minded, security-seeking, prestige-oriented, parochial and anti-intellectual." How many of our peers and superiors do we see about us focusing on orderliness, cleanliness and punctuality as the definition of efficiency? It seems that too many of our number are cautious to the point of indecisiveness. To them it is a case of 'it is better to make no decision than the wrong one'. I guess it is a fear of failure that subconsciously drives these bureaucrats, and a desire for success that drives the achievers - which are you?

CONTROVERSY CORNER

From the *Canberra Times* on 21 May 1995 comes this Associated Press story headlined "Politically Incorrect View Ends a Career."

A United States Navy board voted unanimously yesterday to recommend an honourable discharge for a helicopter pilot whose religious beliefs keep him from leading women into combat. The recommendation by the three navy captains to dismiss Lieutenant Commander Kenneth A. Carkhuff, based with an anti submarine unit at Mayport Naval Station, now goes to the Secretary of the US Navy, John Dalton. The navy veteran and graduate of the US Naval Academy was accused of failure to support and carry out Pentagon policy. "I think the Bible clearly teaches that we should not subject women to violence," Commander Carkhuff, 35, who attends an Episcopal church, said. "I think combat is probably the most extreme violence one can undergo in society."

If Mr Dalton approves the board's recommendation, Commander Carkhuff can appeal to the federal court, his lawyer, Stephen Gallagher, said.

"I am confident of my abilities as a naval officer," Commander Carkhuff said after the ruling.

Commander Carkhuff's squadron leader, Commander Douglas Beeks, testified that in August Commander Carkhuff had told him that after months of consideration and prayer, he had decided he opposed the policy allowing women in combat.

At the time, Commander Carkhuff's helicopter detachment, which had two women pilots, was preparing for possible assignment in the Haiti military operation.

Commander Beeks and his successor, Captain Michael Orfini said they never considered letting Commander Carkhuff lead the detachment after his views were known because they feared he might put himself or others in danger to protect the women.

Commander Carkhuff testified that he had been misunderstood and that he would have taken the detachment if he had been ordered to do so.

He submitted a letter of resignation in September, but withdrew it later and said he would fight to stay in the navy.

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THE SEAPOL TRI-REGIONAL CONFERENCE

CURRENT ISSUES IN OCEAN LAW, POLICY AND MANAGEMENT: SOUTH-EAST ASIA, NORTH PACIFIC AND SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

by Grant Hewison

One hundred and fifty seven participants from 22 countries in the Asia-Pacific region, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cambodia, attended the SEAPOL Tri-regional Conference on current issues in ocean law, policy and management in South-east Asia, the North Pacific and South-west Asia, held in Bangkok. Grant Hewison, fellow with the Centre for Strategic Studies participated as the only New Zealander, delivering a paper on the precautionary principle/approach, another on behalf of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, and acted as a commentator and participant in a number of other sessions.

Although the Conference covered a wide range of issues, of particular focus were maritime security concerns in the South China Sea, fishery management problems, the transportation and disposal of nuclear and other hazardous wastes, trends in coastal zone management, maritime boundary claims, offshore hydrocarbon development and trade/environment conflicts. In addition, an oceanographic forum, with around 20 scientists participating, considered aspects of marine scientific study in the region.

The South-East Asian Program in Ocean Law, Policy and Management (SEAPOL), one of the first regional associations of its kind, began in the early 1980's just before the conclusion of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. SEAPOL functions as a non-governmental network of scholars, government officials, members of the private sector and other individuals with an interest in ocean affairs in the South-east Asian region. It acts as a network and confidence building forum for associates in South-east Asia to meet and exchange information and views on current national and regional problems in ocean law, policy and management. SEAPOL has hosted a number of conferences, workshops and training sessions, as well as supporting research and study both at the national and regional levels for the past decade.

The SEAPOL tri-regional conference examined a number of issues concerning ocean policy and law over three days. The first day was devoted to a keynote speech given by Professor Edward Miles of the University of Washington and two parallel panel sessions. Professor Miles considered the transformations

in governing regimes, patterns of state practice, the development of national capacity, as well as the policy formulation, implementation and compliance that will be necessary to bring about sustainable development. He concluded that while the diplomatic arena had been successful in creating and transforming regimes, as well as in conflict resolution and consciousness-raising, it had not been as successful in implementing international regimes or at terminating practices considered harmful. Professor Miles also offered some suggestions for how these compliance/implementation problems might be overcome, such as the use of international reporting mechanisms combined with independent reviews. Not only could his observations be usefully applied in the area of sustainable development, but also in other areas such as regime building for security purposes.

Two parallel panel sessions were also held on the first day. One examined security issues in the South China Sea and the other, the precautionary principle/approach in ocean management.

Security issues in the South China Sea centre around overlapping claims being made to the Spratly Islands by Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. The recent discovery of oil deposits around the islands and relatively rich fishing grounds has intensified these claims. In addition, the islands straddle important navigation routes in the South China Sea. Dr. Hasjim Djalal of Indonesia regards the Spratly Islands claims as the "most potentially explosive conflict in the region at this time." The potential for conflicts exists at several levels. The first is a potential bilateral conflict between the claimants and in particular between China and Vietnam. At another level, there is potential for conflict between members of ASEAN and Vietnam as well as between members of ASEAN and China or Taiwan. Finally, there is also the potential for conflict between members of ASEAN itself. A question has arisen about whether the Spratly Islands issues could be resolved through bilateral rather than regional negotiations. However, concerns exist about the role of China and the pairing off between China and other individual claimants if solutions were sought through bilateral agreements. It seems a regional solution is at present the one in most favour. Dr B A. Hamzah of the Malaysian Institute of

Maritime Affairs has also argued that the need for confidence building measures is very real at this stage, particularly before the expected wealth from oil exploitation further complicates matters. The six claimants have already participated in a number of confidence-building workshops that have explored non-sovereignty issues, such as navigation, biodiversity, scientific research and resources. An approach similar to that negotiated between Malacca and Singapore over the Straits of Malacca, where strict sovereign rights over the straits were put aside in favour of dealing with the immediate problems of pollution and navigation, has been seen as a useful model to emulate. While ways of resolving the issues are not immediately foreseeable, topping the list is a joint development zone or zone of co-operation in the South China Sea between all claimants.

William Burke of the University of Washington introduced the panel examining the precautionary principle/approach, by focusing on application of precaution in the United Nations Conference on High Seas Fisheries Management. It was within this conference, argued Professor Burke, that the precautionary principle/approach has received most detailed attention to date. He was particularly supportive of the FAO's interpretation of the precautionary approach and rejection of the United Nations application of precaution in the resolutions on driftnet fishing.

The FAO paper submitted to the U.N. Conference distinguished between the precautionary principle and the precautionary approach, favouring the latter as a more moderate position. The precautionary approach took into account the diversity of ecology as well as socio-economic circumstances, whereas the former, argued Professor Burke, was fraught with "slack usage leading to extreme interpretations regardless of economic or social costs. Professor Burke's main objection to the resolutions on driftnet fishing were that the moratorium did not provide the means of obtaining information so that it might in future be lifted. Indeed, both Professor's Burke and Miles have argued strongly that the decisions of the United Nations on driftnet fishing were wrong and that the moratorium should be lifted.

On the second and third days, the conference broke up into three parallel panel sessions. The first consisted of an oceanographic forum attended mainly by scientists from within and outside the Asia/Pacific region. The second panel examined current law of the sea issues and development, while the third examined integrated coastal management and fishery management, as well as sustainable ocean and coastal development.

The oceanographic forum began by examining regional and local circulation patterns in the Asia/Pacific region and their relationship to forcing functions

and continued with a discussion of marine environmental and biological issues. The panel was also charged with establishing a research framework for the region. The panel began this work by reviewing existing international co-operative oceanographic research programs in South-east Asia and the Pacific, and then went on to discuss and draft a framework for the next stage of oceanographic research for the region. Participants agreed that while there was a considerable amount of scientific work being undertaken in the region, there was a need for greater integration and co-operation. It was suggested that joint studies of the Gulf of Thailand would be a useful place to begin, with possibilities for future collaborative work in the South China Sea.

The second panel discussed current law of the sea issues and development. This discussion included an examination of the consequences of non-acceptance of the revised Convention on the Law of the Sea, post-Rio perspectives on sovereign rights and environmental responsibilities in the exclusive economic zone, transportation and disposal of nuclear and other hazardous wastes, prospects for the settlement of law of the sea disputes, environmental and trade policy impacts on fishing and shipping industries, and approaches to co-operation in offshore hydrocarbon development.

Of particular note were the sessions concerning transportation and disposal of nuclear and other hazardous wastes, and environmental and trade policy impacts. Dr. T Mensah of the Law of the Sea Institute provided an overview of the international instruments concerned with the transport and disposal of nuclear and other hazardous wastes. Of most concern, in his view, were the problems of state responsibility, liability and enforcement. He suggested following the approach that was being taken in the Draft Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances at Sea, where the emphasis was on the responsibility of the carrier and owner of the cargo and where provision was being made for compulsory insurance. Professor R. Beckman recommended that the states in South-east Asia act on a regional basis, reviewing the various conventions and determining whether it would be in their interests to ratify them, and whether their particular interests were being represented adequately at the international level. Here the panel were divided over the conclusions of a recent paper by Professor Jon Van Dyke of the University of Hawaii that the transport of nuclear wastes through the Tasman Sea and the Pacific Ocean were contrary to international law. The Japanese commentator, Kazuomi Ouchi, as well as other commentators disagreed with Jon Van Dyke's conclusions, while commentators from those coastal states most affected by the transport of wastes tended to affirm his views.

This issue remains controversial and important within the SEAPOL context and is also becoming a significant ocean policy issue for Australia and New Zealand. The Panel suggested that those international organisations concerned with the transport of nuclear waste needed to consider the rights of coastal states over the transport of nuclear wastes and whether these rights should be strengthened.

Controversy over trade and environmental issues also appears to be of increasing importance in the region. The panel focused on driftnet fishing as an example of a trade/environment conflict. Here the threatened use of trade sanctions by the United States to achieve an international environmental outcome came under some scrutiny. The involvement of the United Nations General Assembly in the case of driftnet fishing again came under criticism from a number of commentators, including Professor Miles. Indeed, increasing pressure from several leading experts from the University of Washington for lifting the moratorium on driftnet fishing should be taken seriously by those concerned with maintaining the moratorium.

The third panel undertook a tri-regional review of current trends in coastal management and fishery management, and sustainable ocean and coastal development. This included a review of the impact of mineral extraction and tourism, on coastal waters, as well as high seas and enclave fishery management problems.

Commentators in this panel noted that many Asian nations are facing incredible pressures on their coastal environment, with expectations that this will increase in future. Massive urban migration and its associated infrastructure overload, industry-based sources of marine pollution, tourism, as well as inadequate planning and management have created serious problems for almost all Asian nations. While it is clear that New Zealand and Asia differ significantly in terms of the kinds of pressure on their respective coastal environments, from the discussion taking place in this panel, there still appears to be opportunities for Asian countries to benefit from New Zealand's experience in integrated coastal resource management. Indeed, many Asian nations are at present undertaking considerable investment in developing more adequate infrastructure. There appears to be important opportunities for

co-operative ventures between New Zealand and these nations.

On another issue, this panel also concluded that high seas fisheries managers worldwide appear to be facing a general failure of their programs. There are increasing numbers of stock collapses, too many fishers chasing too few fish, overcapitalisation of the fishing industry, disputes concerning jurisdiction and failed institutional mechanisms. In some instances this has led to conflict, although there are hopes that the present United Nations Conference on Straddling Stocks and High Migratory Fish Stocks will alleviate many of these problems. Although much of the discussion remained at an international level, Mr. Plodprasop Suraswadi of the Thai Ministry of Fisheries provided a very forthright national and regional perspective. Overlapping jurisdictional claims between countries within the region, for instance, were leading to arrests of fishing vessels, although of equal concern were renegade Thai fishers who were ignoring new restrictions. Thai officials were facing severe difficulties in controlling the extensive Thai fishing fleet, with the government on occasion distancing itself from responsibility for illegal fishing activities. This policy was itself causing Thailand diplomatic difficulties, in particular between its Asian neighbours, but also with countries further afield.

Opportunities also arose during the final session of the conference for reports on other conferences held in 1994 and forthcoming conferences in 1995. Of note is the Law of the Sea Institute's 27th Annual Conference, focusing on marine pollution problems in Asia and the Pacific, to be held in Indonesia.

Through SEAPOL, there appear to be a number of opportunities for New Zealand academics, government officials and members of the private sector to participate in or initiate projects in their region. For example, there appear to be significant opportunities for New Zealand to participate in developments in fisheries management, coastal zone management, as well as in mediation or confidence building in the area of maritime security. As the South east Asian region takes on increasing importance for New Zealand in trade terms, it has also become essential that New Zealand participate actively in other regional activities, such as those organised through SEAPOL.



Old Wine In New Bottles?

MARITIME STRATEGY IN THE ASIA PACIFIC

by

Commodore Sam Bateman AM RANEM

Admiral Richard Hill of the United Kingdom introduced the expression medium maritime power to describe a country which has the capability to exercise some autonomy in its use of the sea. In this context, 'medium-ness' implies a certain level of development and size (economy, population, geographical area, military strength, etc), as well as the state's perception of itself. 'Maritime-ness' is based on the state's dependence on the sea and this is an amalgam of factors such as maritime tradition, size of navy and merchant fleet, dependence on seaborne trade, size of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), value of offshore resources, and the capabilities of the domestic shipbuilding industry.

Using this terminology, there is an increasing number of medium maritime powers in The Asia Pacific. Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, South Korea, Taiwan and Australia have some claim to fall within the category each with extensive maritime interests, a significant dependence on the sea, both strategically and economically, and capable maritime forces. Japan, China and India are perhaps 'out of the bracket' and worthy of being termed major maritime powers.

The Asia Pacific is a region where there has been no 'peace dividend' and maritime capabilities, in particular, figure prominently in regional defence budgets. Some navies, which previously had only limited Coastguard-type functions, are building up enhanced offshore capabilities - not only highly capable surface combatants and submarines but also significant numbers of aircraft for both maritime strike and surveillance. The regional sea control capability is growing markedly and there has been, what one commentator has referred to as, 'the re-emergence of the importance of seapower' in the region. There is 'old wine in new bottles' here as the new navies of The Asia Pacific lift their strategic horizons and seek inspiration from the writings of the classical maritime strategists. It could well be said that Mahan is alive and well but living in Tokyo, Seoul, Taipei, Beijing, New Delhi, Bangkok and Jakarta!

SECURITY IN THE REGION

At a conference in 1993, the Australian strategic analyst, Professor Paul Dibb, presented a paper which attracted considerable attention in the media due to his somewhat pessimistic view of the security out-

look for the The Asia Pacific region. He identified 'very worrying military trends and developments' and saw prospects in the longer-term shift in the balance of power in Asia, which may not be favourable to Australia or other middle powers in the region'. Primarily Dibb was referring to China which has markedly increased military spending in recent years and continues to display potential for a destabilising role in The Asia Pacific. China will undergo a major political and economic transition which will affect regional security, and probably even global security. China has the potential to emerge in the future as a major hegemonic power with a significant strategic nuclear arsenal and powerful projection forces. In specific naval terms, and as a Chinese author recently noted, 'Now it is no longer a question whether China will have a carrier, but what will be its characteristics and when will it enter service.'

While economic growth and social improvement in The Asia Pacific should lead to a regional security environment of peace and prosperity, there are also greater tensions and uncertainties. Wherever one looks across the region, there are pairs of long standing rivals - India and China, India and Pakistan, Vietnam and China, China and Korea, Korea and Japan, Russia and Japan, and Japan and China. A 'peace dividend' is not apparent in the region simply because regional defence budgets, except that of Japan, were never determined by considerations of the Cold War.

The role of the United States, as the world's only superpower, should be pivotal in reducing bilateral tensions and ensuring stability. But it is unfortunate that the present relationship between China, Japan and the United States has never been worse, or more inherently unstable, for decades and American prestige in Asia is at, what one leading Australian writer on foreign affairs claimed earlier this year, 'an all-time low'.

The ASEAN countries are concerned that instability persists and regional conflict between the major players is a possibility. Thus uncertainty is the threat against which they are developing their maritime strategies and expanding their maritime force. At a lower level, there are the specific concerns of maritime security, including maritime boundary disputes, conflicting claims to offshore territories and resources, and problems with piracy, drug smuggling, refugees, marine safety and illegal fishing. The overall strategic

interest lies in the maintenance of a stable maritime regime in the region and the preservation of law and order at sea. Given the types of forces in the region and the possible causes of conflict, any conflict in The Asia Pacific is likely to have a significant maritime dimension. Aggressors will identify the vulnerabilities of their opponents at sea, particularly shipping, off-shore resource installations and fishing fleets, and conduct operations accordingly.

The most rapid expansion of naval forces in The Asia Pacific is now occurring in Northeast Asia although these developments seem to be largely escaping the attention of Western maritime strategic analysts. Japan is placing less reliance on the umbrella of the military power of the United States and, with its heavy dependence on imports of energy and other strategic commodities, must inevitably look beyond the limit of one thousand nautical miles as the currently expressed extent of Japanese interest in capabilities for the protection of sea lines of communication (SLOCs). With the benefit of rapid economic growth, South Korea and Taiwan are both expanding their naval capabilities. China has already been discussed.

It is now conventional wisdom to acknowledge that there is a process of fundamental change underway in the global strategic balance. The notion of a Western strategic community is losing its relevance in a global sense although perhaps not in the European context. International alignments and centres of power competition are becoming more diffused and the global strategic balance more complex, fluid and less certain in its structure. Regional powers, particularly in The Asia Pacific, are increasing their power and influence and much will depend in the future on how this power and influence is exercised.

The implications of these changes may be appreciated more fully in The Asia Pacific than they are in Europe. Security assessments from a European viewpoint still appear heavily influenced by the past while in The Asia Pacific, one cannot help but look forward. There is so little in the past that has any relevance to the future. The regional 'world' is changing far too quickly.

The prolonged economic downturn in industrialised countries must be contrasted with the ongoing economic dynamism of East Asia. The economic predictions are mind-boggling. Within the next twenty years the largest economies in the world, with the solitary exception of the US economy, will all be in Asia and the Indonesian economy, for example, will be larger than that of any European country, including Germany. The staggering economic growth of East Asia may ultimately be much more challenging to strategic thinking in the West than was the military power of the Soviet Union. There is no reason to doubt that the maritime power of the region will not grow broadly

in line with its economic power. This will be a particular challenge to contemporary maritime strategic thinking in the West. The need for sea power in the future, and particularly in The Asia Pacific, can be construed in the light of these factors rather than in the light of any perceptions of the diminished utility of military power or in any atmosphere of defence budget cuts now confronting most Western navies.

It is not too hard to see the long-term strategic implications which flow from this contrast of economic performance. In the words of Professor Robert O'Neill: 'There is also a backlash in most countries against the growth of economic influence from abroad. Nationalism is becoming more strident as attempts to decrease trade barriers encounter greater resistance. Calls for protection and the advocacy of various degrees of self-sufficiency or autarky are heard in national policy debates the world over. The clamour is all the louder in the states which are suffering the sharpest rates of decline or the greatest frustration of what were seen as high prospects.'

There are other contrasts to be drawn. Bob O'Neill has also observed a 'decline of the use of force as the ultimate arbiter of conflicts of interest between great powers' because 'It has simply become too expensive, counterproductive, for the major military powers to think of using their weaponry vis-a-vis each other for any purpose other than deterrence'. However, this is a view very much from the West. It does not necessarily apply to the East where perceptions of the utility of force are affirmed by, for example, North Korea developing ballistic missiles and China's disclosed military spending doubling in the last five years.

This may seem to be a somewhat pessimistic view of security in The Asia Pacific but there are rays of sunshine. The first is the encouragement by ASEAN in particular of substantial security dialogue in the region. This includes the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) and Senior Officials Meetings (SOM) involving the seven ASEAN dialogue partners, and the ASEAN Regional Forum, which also draws in China, Russia, Vietnam, Laos and Papua New Guinea (PNG).

There are also some significant 'second track' initiatives, including CSCAP (Council for Security Cooperation Pacific) which is designed to focus the research activities of non-governmental agencies working on security issues in The Asia Pacific and to provide linkage between these activities and official regional security cooperation processes. CSCAP is likely to establish a working group to look specifically at maritime security cooperation. All these developments are significant achievements in the development of multilateralism in the region.

The ASEAN states clearly perceive the potential for maritime threats and are developing maritime forces (ships, aircraft, and to a lesser extent, submarines) - with a potentially powerful capability to detect and destroy an adversary's forces in their maritime approaches. Furthermore, the platforms and weapons they are acquiring are capable of operations over wider areas and longer ranges than was the case with previous generations of systems. No longer can the maritime forces of ASEAN be regarded as 'brown water' navies capable only of inshore operations in coastal waters.

The maritime strike capabilities being acquired by the ASEAN countries can be interpreted in a broader strategic context. The key straits states of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore (and possibly even Thailand as well) are well aware of the potential strategic leverage they acquire from sitting astride or proximate to major waterways that are essential, first to both their economic well-being and to that of countries beyond their immediate region, and second, to the strategic mobility of countries that may wish to pass naval forces between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. This mobility was a clear consideration for the superpowers and remains a major consideration for the United States. It could also be a significant consideration for both India and China, which could wish to deploy forces in the future between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

In an address to the Australian Naval Institute in 1991, the then Chief of the Singapore Navy noted that 'within South East Asia, the exercise of power and influence depends on being able to make use of the seas within South East Asia' and that 'this is clearly illustrated by the long succession of competing powers who have sought to impose their will on maritime South East Asia. Indeed all the ASEAN states would share a view now that external maritime powers should never be allowed to hold this position of power and influence again. This was apparent in the sensitivity of the straits states to any involvement of external countries in activities such as combating piracy in the region and would probably also be a factor in mounting naval peacekeeping operations in the region.

The free movement of shipping in the region is an important consideration for all regional states. Seaborne trade has truly been the "engine" of the phenomenal economic growth of the region. Singapore, Kaohsiung and Hong Kong are now the world's largest container ports and container traffic through several other Southeast Asian ports, especially Bangkok, Tanjung Priok, Port Kelang and Manila, has grown enormously in recent years. Major factors here have been the growth of intra-regional trade, the lack of any significant land transport infrastructure (other than within individual countries) and the 'hubs and spokes' approach to container shipping. It is also relevant that

ASEAN flag merchant fleets have grown significantly over the last decade. Against these developments, it is not surprising that the ASEAN states, as well as the countries of Northeast Asia, are showing increased interest in capabilities and arrangements for the protection of shipping and the security of SLOCs. SLOC security is now a major factor in maritime strategic thinking in The Asia Pacific.

SLOCs

This growing regional concern with the security of seaborne trade can be seen in the wider strategic context of the drawdown in US forces in The Asia Pacific. Other factors include the greater economic interdependence between countries and the lack of self sufficiency among regional nations, which are variously dependent on imports of energy, foodstuffs, raw materials, and particular manufactured goods. As over half its overseas trade now crosses the Pacific, the United States itself has a major interest in the free movement of shipping in the Western Pacific.

There have been several developments in the region in recent years which highlight the changing emphasis on the security of SLOCs. During the 1980s there were a series of conferences around the region hosted, in most cases, by a non-government organisation in the host nation. The fundamental rationale of these conferences was the problem of re-supply of Northeast Asia in the event of confrontation between the Superpowers and key players in the initial round of conferences were the US, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. The ASEAN countries, Australia and New Zealand subsequently became involved.

At the SLOC conference held in Bali in 1993, a clear shift in emphasis was apparent from concern with the oceanic protection of shipping typical of the Cold War years to a greater focus on focal areas, straits transit issues and broader problems of the safety of merchant shipping. This was largely driven by the ASEAN participants who have become more sensitive about the transit of foreign vessels through their archipelagic and territorial waters. It is perhaps also significant that many of the ASEAN participants come from organisations which are closely associated with their Governments.

It has been frequently argued in recent years that naval roles are changing with the war-fighting role losing its utility and the constabulary and diplomatic roles likely to grow in importance. Ken Booth, for example, has spoken about 'New Times for Old Navies' concluding that 'Turning warships into lawships is a rational way ahead for future international society'. He believes that 'Navies do not have a great future, if "great" is meant in a Mahanian sense as expansive, shaping history, engaging in decisive battles, and providing a life of Nelsonic heroism', and that, while deterrence at sea will remain 'the bottom line of na-

val policy', power projection and coercive diplomacy will be of declining utility. Cooperative naval diplomacy and constabulary functions will increase in importance, he suggests.

Similarly, Geoffrey Till has written that less 'glamorous' roles of navies are likely to be areas of significant growth. He believes that constabulary duties, naval diplomacy and the sealift mission are all likely to become more important in the future. The sealift mission enters consideration largely because of the experience of the Gulf War and the demonstrated dependence of allied operations on logistic support by sea. This point is particularly relevant to The Asia Pacific where the geographical operating environment underpins the importance of sealift capabilities and amphibious forces to most regional navies.

For most Western navies, oceanic sea control is attracting less attention and much contemporary maritime strategic thinking is directed towards naval support of land operations, ranging from the direct projection of power ashore (as demonstrated most extremely by the USN's *From the Sea* doctrine) to the support of UN peacekeeping missions. For example, Jan Breemer has observed recently that the pre-occupation of the US Navy 'in the foreseeable future will be land control, not sea control'. As part of this apparent demise of the oceanic sea control mission, major Western navies, in particular, appear to be attaching reduced emphasis to the protection of SLOCs.

The coastguard or constabulary role is a familiar one and includes combating drug smuggling and piracy, controlling illegal immigration, and generally enforcing the creeping jurisdiction of coastal states over littoral waters. The trade in illegal immigrants is growing and becoming more sophisticated requiring greater resources for its monitoring and prevention. A particular concern is the possibility of greatly increased numbers of Chinese refugees should the economic growth of China falter.

Because of the incidence of these activities in East Asian waters, it is easy to jump to a conclusion that this changing role of navies is particularly evident in the Asia Pacific. However, while it may well be true in an absolute sense that the constabulary task is growing it is not true in a relative sense. If anything, the relative importance of the war-fighting role may be growing in this part of the world.

This point is well illustrated in the case of the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN). The Malaysian strategic analyst, J N. Mak, has described how the RMN, like virtually all the navies of maritime ASEAN, is now caught on the horns of a dilemma in terms of finding a proper balance between the coastguard function and the warfighting mission. During the years when the USN provided the overall maritime security umbrella

for The Asia Pacific and the main threats to national security were perceived as land-based, the RMN was able to concentrate its attention on constabulary missions. But now times have changed and Mak perceives there is a need for the RMN to get back to basics and concentrate on its primary warfighting mission and, if need be, hand over its lesser patrol vessels to another agency responsible for coastguard roles.

Although coastguard-type tasks, sovereignty protection and EEZ policing are part of the justification for the expansion of Asian navies, these navies see much broader strategic justification for the forces they are acquiring. This lies in those underlying tensions and uncertainties referred to earlier in this paper and perceptions of the importance of sea power which have much in common with the writings of the classical maritime strategists.

Over time, theories of maritime strategy and sea power have revolved around command of the sea, projection of power and economic warfare (ie, anti-trade and protection of trade) as principal functions of sea power. During the Cold War, the maritime strategies of the West were unequivocally about sea control and power projection while the Soviet Union never lost sight of economic warfare considerations. As Gorshkov observed, anti-trade operations are 'the most important constituent part of the efforts of a fleet aimed at undermining the military economic potential of the enemy'.

Now as we enter a period when national security, power and status in world affairs will be determined increasingly by economic success, it seems likely that there will be a swing back to economic factors as a large determinant of naval functions. This is despite the current attention in USN doctrine on power projection ashore and the interest in the West in redefining naval roles.

Already there is a significant economic dimension to maritime security in The Asia Pacific with maritime forces seen both as important elements of national prestige and as necessary to support and protect economic activity. To some extent this is an inevitable consequence of the economic growth which, on the one hand, provides the resources to support the development of maritime forces and, on the other, creates demands for the protection of national economic interests many of which lie offshore.

As we look to the future, there can be little doubt that the navies of The Asia Pacific will continue to develop, both quantitatively and qualitatively. The idea that the strategic rationale for these developments lies to some extent in classical principles of maritime strategy leads to the observation that history could be repeating itself. Just as Mahan and subsequent writers drew strength from the Industrial Revolution and the

rapid expansion of world trade last century, now The Asia Pacific maritime strategy is being formulated in

the context of rapid economic growth and increased regional trade.



REMEMBERING THE...

VICTORY OVER JAPAN!

August 15th 1945

*'BRAVO ZULU' TO THE MEN AND WOMEN OF
THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY WHO 'DID THEIR
BIT' TO ACHIEVE COMPLETE VICTORY OVER A
RUTHLESS ENEMY.*


*'STAND EASY' AND WE WILL MAKE SURE YOU
CAN ENJOY THE REST OF YOUR
RETIREMENT!*

...NAVY '95

Read on! The next story takes us back to the great year of 1945.

In JANI's 20th year we have been revisiting some of the 'Ripping Yarns' of past issues. This one is taken from the May 1977 issue — Ed.

Shiphandling Corner



The Second World War was over and we were gliding gently back to civilisation over the placid waters of the Pacific. It seemed a good idea to 'keep clear of the putty' by fixes from the light-house on Frederick Reef. But suddenly we had an uneasy feeling that all was not well...

Every year throughout the world hundreds of ships go aground; or in the polite naval way of phrasing it, 'touch the bottom'. In every case there is subsequent heartburn and investigation, and often legal action, be it a Naval court martial or a civil damages claim, and eventually some sort of a reason for the grounding is arrived at to the satisfaction of the majority of those concerned.

The story I am about to tell is not one of a grounding. Consequently it never became public, and only three or four of the participants know the details, such as they were. In the art of navigation there are dozens of well tried principles. Additional lessons are always being learnt by navigators, but it is normally safe to generalise to the extent of saying that every situation begins with known facts. The only trouble is that sometimes the fact is wrong. So it was in this case. I tell this story because I think it holds a lesson which may be new to some seamen.

Necessary risks only

The middle watch is always a lengthy period in a ship by herself in the middle of an ocean. The middle watch of my story was no exception. In our destroyer, at the end of 1945, we were gratefully steaming away from the Pacific battleground after the completion of a successful war. In the preceding few years we had many times taken navigational risks in badly charted waters and got away with it. Our Captain was an able and reliable seaman, who, whilst taking these necessary risks, had always stuck by the rather sensible maxim of keeping as far away from the putty, as he put it, as he possibly could. This even gave rise to the invention of one or two nicknames for him which I shan't record.

When the dust of Hiroshima had settled (which, incidentally, we had seen in the distance from the ship), there followed the peace and the occupation. In Tokyo we had wandered, with interest, through the desolated bombed ruins and had taken part in a victory parade at the British Embassy (miraculously still standing and still kept immaculately clean by the same caretaker who had looked after it for twenty years before the war). Now, with all this behind us, we were hurrying south through the Coral Sea with high hopes of being in port for Christmas. The Coral Sea, as every seaman who has been in that part of the world will confirm, is a dangerous place. Mostly the depth of the water is in the region of one or two thousand fathoms, but every now and again there suddenly rises from the sea bottom a towering mountain, atop which a coronet of coral has thrust itself to the surface, giving rise to the well-known lagoons and atolls of this area. The average atoll (I won't say typical because no one case is the same as another) is therefore rather like the top of a submerged volcano. The rim either breaks the surface, forming little islets which may even have vegetation growing precariously in their sandy crevices, or lurks menacingly below the surface at a depth, one would think, designed especially to trap the unwary mariner. In places a deep channel may exist between the sunken reefs or the visible islets. Inside the rim the lagoons usually have sufficient depth of water for a ship to navigate, provided she dodges the Nigger Heads and knows the way in and the way out.

Turtle and sea-fowl eggs

Quite good charts exist of the majority of the Coral Sea reefs, many of which reveal safe havens and anchorages. These plans, as one of the Admiralty charts explains, will, 'with the help of a masthead lookout, enable a ship to round-to under the lee of the reefs where she may caulk topsides, set up rigging, and obtain turtle, fish and sea-fowl eggs. On some of the salient reefs, beacons have been erected and, for the sake of castaways, coconuts, shrubs, grasses and every description of seed likely to grow have been sown in the sparse soil to promote the super-structure; and it is most desirable that these refuge spots should be held sacred for universal benefit and not ruthlessly destroyed.'

In latitude 21° 01' 46" South, longitude 154° 23' 29" East, there exists just such a coral atoll.

This is Frederick Reef.

Oval in shape with the longer axis lying north and south, Frederick Reef is as near to being a typical coral atoll as one could wish. Right across the southern end, and halfway up the eastern side, the reef is just above the water. In the centre of the southern part, in fact, there is a small islet called Observatory Cay, which rises

FREDERICK REEF

Observ^y Cay Lat 21°14'6"S Long 154°23'26"E


Magnetic Variation 9°50'E 1988 (0')

Natural Scale $\frac{1}{72636}$

For Linear Scales see Plan of South Bellona Reefs

(A smooth-water Anchorage

230



eleven feet above low water. The south-western part of the reef is called Danger Ridge, and here the reef varies in depth from five fathoms to nothing, with one or two rocks that just break the surface. Needless to say this area is labelled on the chart as an unsafe passage for ships. At the northern end of Danger Ridge, which is half-way up the western side of the atoll, lies Ridge Rock, over which the sea is always breaking, and northward of this the water deepens and is safe for ships. Halfway up the eastern side another safe entrance exists, but north of this, on the north-eastern corner of the atoll, the reef again rises to the surface and sand cays and rocks are just visible. At the northern part of the atoll, or the 'top of the egg', and in the whole of the lagoon inside, measuring about six miles by three, there is clear water with a depth of between ten and thirty fathoms. All round Frederick Reef the sea-bottom drops sharply away, down the steep-to sides of the sunken mountain, to depths of many hundreds and even thousands of fathoms.



We planned to keep clear

As we approached this lonely speck in the Coral Sea that middle watch, we had few worries and certainly no premonitions, for on the south-western corner there existed an unwatched lighthouse which we knew we would see at least ten miles away. Our course was set to pass four miles to the west of this light, steering due south. Sure enough, the light was raised on time, and although we found as we approached that we would pass rather closer to the light than the planned four miles, the water was clear to the west of it and we were not worried. Being a dutiful officer of the watch I informed the Captain and the Navigator and the latter came up to the bridge. There we shared a cup of cocoa together as we watched the light draw nearer over the moonlit sea. By running fixes and later by a small radar contact, it soon became apparent that we would pass two miles to the west of the atoll.

At about this stage the Asdic Operator, whom we still had closed-up in case there were any Japanese submarines who had not heard that the war had ended, reported indications of a deep reef ahead. This interested me, but gave no cause for alarm even when he later reported that the reef was fairly shallow. Knowing that we were in deep water, I successfully persuaded myself, with the Navigator's concurrence, that what was being picked up was a tidal eddy sweeping round the southern end of the reef across our path. Sure enough, as the light drew aft towards the beam we passed over the alleged sunken reef and were then certain that it was, in fact, tidal effect.

The night, as I have said earlier, was a brilliant moonlit one, and as the lighthouse came abeam to port we could even see the rocks and strips of sand on which it was constructed. One of the officers on the bridge commented at this stage that he thought the sea had become very calm. Admittedly there had only been a gentle swell and a light breeze previously, but the Navigator and I had to admit that even the swell seemed now to have departed. As the light drew abaft the beam, we knew that we were well clear of all dangers, because the light was situated on the extreme south-western corner of the southerly reef.

Imagine my surprise, therefore, when the Starboard Lookout awoke from his reverie to report, in a rather startled voice, his sighting of a small island broad on the starboard bow. Sure enough, at first glance it did appear to be a small island or rock, but knowing there was no rock there we persuaded ourselves successfully that it was a whale spouting on the surface. I should point out, perhaps, that the visibility to westward was not as good as in other quarters, and our supposition about this object can therefore perhaps be forgiven.

An odd effect

We have all read in meteorological books of that 'uneasy feeling that all is not well' that often attends the approach of a tropical revolving storm. This feeling, as many seamen know, also appears at other times. Perhaps it was a slight attack of this feeling that caused me to sweep the horizon a little more carefully through my binoculars at this stage (though, of course, I knew I would see nothing). The calm sea was producing many lines of light from the reflected moon, and right across the horizon directly ahead of us was one of these. As it drew nearer, however, I could not help likening it, as perhaps explorers in the Sahara have often done with mirages for which that desert is famous, to something more materialistic: in this case it looked for all the world like a reef!

We discussed this odd effect for a few minutes during which we were also busy in preparing our second cup of cocoa. When I again looked ahead through the binoculars, the uneasy feeling suddenly turned into one of early fright. Leaping into action I (a) called the Captain and told him there seemed to be a reef ahead, (b) ordered an operator to close up in the echo sounder (just, of course, to confirm that we were in deep water), and (c) suggested to the Navigator that it looked as if we were on the point of discovering a hitherto unknown reef. As the Captain appeared on the bridge, the mysterious broken water was by now only a few cable-lengths ahead, and there even seemed to me to be in the air around us that roar of breaking water that one always hears when close to a real reef in the open sea.

Hard a'starboard

The Captain, I think, felt much the same as I was beginning to do, and let loose in his best stentorian voice.

'Hard a'starboard'.

'Hard a'starboard, sir'. The Navigator repeated the order almost gratefully down the voice pipe.

'What's the depth?'

'Echo sounder just closing up, sir. No report yet'.

'Show me the chart, pilot'.

'Steer 240'.

'240, sir'.

'Bridge. This is echo sounder'.

'This is bridge'.

'No bottom at two thousand fathoms, sir'.

At this moment I was leaning over the port side of the bridge watching with horror the broken edge of a very realistic reef sweeping down along our port side at a range of about ten yards. Still no bottom with the echo sounder, so the Captain, after a quick examination of the chart with the Navigator, ordered the ship to resume her southerly course, and stumped off the bridge with a remark to the Navigator as he left. 'Looks like you've found a new reef, pilot. See me in the morning about making a signal reporting it'.

Still slightly unnerved and troubled in our minds, the pilot and I discussed the odd phenomenon as some length, and eventually were equally divided in our minds on two possible answers. Firstly, that it was a new reef (but we could not quite believe that somebody had not seen it before); secondly, that our tidal eddies which had caused us some concern earlier in the watch, had grown to even bigger proportions under the influence of, perhaps, some subterranean volcanic disturbance. Anyway, all was well and the pilot trudged off to bed, leaving me to the loneliness of the Coral Sea.

Ten minutes later a white-faced apparition appeared silently at my elbow and motioned me

to come to the chart table with him. Even in the moonlight I had to admit to myself that I had never seen the pilot look quite so ashen-faced or worried, even in the face of kamikaze suicide bombers or typhoons off the Japanese coast. Within half a minute I think my own face had probably assumed the same hue and for the rest of that night, even after I had left the bridge on being relieved at four o'clock, I found my imagination playing over a vast array of frightening possibilities.



On the mat

At 8.30 sharp the following morning the pilot presented himself nervously at the Captain's door.

'Yes, pilot. Come in. I suppose we'd better get that signal away about the reef. Is that what you came to see me about?'

'Well . . . er . . . Yes, sir.'

'Right. Let's see what you propose.'

'Well . . . er . . . Sir, you see . . . it's like this.'

'Well? Come on, come on.'

'Well, sir, I don't think we ought to make a signal.'

'Good God, why not? That was definitely a reef and we don't want some other poor blighter to go up on it!'

'No, sir. But . . . well . . . you see . . . I found a notice to mariners last night after you turned in . . .'

'Well, what was it?'

'It's one I seem to have missed, sir. It appears they've moved the light on Frederick Reef from the south-western corner to the north-eastern corner. We must have gone right down the centre of the lagoon and, as far as I can see, we went out over Danger Ridge in between that rock there, and this rock here, with about a yard to spare each side, and a foot or two underneath.'

There was silence for a few moments, although no doubt the pilot felt that the knocking of his knees was readily audible.

'Hmmm. Well . . . All right, pilot, it looks as if we were lucky, but now perhaps you realise why I never like going too close to the putty!'

D.H.D.S.

POWER OF THE PRESS

The Royal Navy And The Impress Act Of 1793

by

WO2 Graham Wilson

Australian Intelligence Corps

During the Napoleonic Wars, the inhabitants of coastal areas of the British Isles lived in constant fear of the sight of a French invasion fleet. But a sight they feared even more was that of a party of Royal Navy tars, armed with cutlasses and cudgels and under the command of a junior officer, roaming the streets and fields in search of prey — the dreaded “press”.

Throughout that twenty odd years of global warfare referred to as the ‘Napoleonic Wars’, Britain relied on her ‘wooden wall’, the Royal Navy, to defend her shores, keep the sea lanes open for commerce, and transport her armies to the battlefields of the world. The Navy of those days was, of course, wind powered, and unfortunately the ships of the day were awesomely labour intensive. A ship the size of Nelson’s famous *Victory* needed a crew of about 1000 to sail and fight her; of these, 200 or so were the officers and non-commissioned and enlisted specialists (surgeons, sailing masters, master’s mates, gunners, boatswains, shipwrights, coopers, sail makers, carpenters, marines etc) needed to command, maintain and run the ship. The remaining 800 odd were seamen and they were always in short supply. The main reason for this of course was that service in His Majesty’s navy was not an attractive prospect. It offered low pay, savage discipline, atrocious food, appalling living conditions, unceasing hard labour and long years at sea (sailors drafted to the West Indies Station faced anything up to ten years away from home waters). It is not surprising, therefore, that few men were prepared to volunteer for such a life and even less surprising that the Royal Navy was constantly chronically short handed. In the past, to make up its deficit in personnel, the King’s Navy had been wont to press men into service, that is, take men forcibly off the streets and place them in the King’s service against their will. Prior to the end of the 18th century, despite the wide spread nature of this practice, there was little legal justification for it, the navy relying on the protection offered by time honoured custom and various letters patent issued from time to time. The pressure of global warfare meant that the Royal Navy must have men to crew its ships. On the other hand, 18th century developments in civil rights meant that the King’s men could no longer rely on custom and questionable legal documents to take men by force. To remedy this, the British Parliament passed the *Impress Act* of 1793

which authorised the Admiralty to ‘impress’ able-bodied men for service.

The Impress Act basically made it legal for the navy to recruit by force able-bodied men as it needed to crew its ships. Oddly enough, the Act applied only to the Royal Navy. While the British Army had its own manpower and recruiting problems, it used other methods, some just as unscrupulous as the press, to fill its regiments. One probable reason, however, for the Army’s greater success at recruiting was the attraction of a ‘red coat’; the Royal Navy did not bother to issue uniforms to its lower ranks until 1857.

In order to implement the newly legitimised press, the Admiralty was authorised to establish ‘press depots’ as bases from which the press gangs could operate. At the beginning of the 19th century, there were over 40 of these depots scattered around Britain. The ‘depot’, almost always located in a port town, was in actuality usually just a prominent building, often an inn or public house, which the press gangs made their home base and from which they roamed in search of victims. Pressed men could also be brought to the depots by private citizens in exchange for a government bounty, usually with no questions asked. To expedite the work of its press gangs, the Admiralty regularly placed advertisements in the local papers, as for example this illuminating extract from an East Yorkshire newspaper of 1807:

“Wanted immediately, an ordinary seaman, or able-bodied landsman in the form of an impressed man, thirteen guineas will be given, for further particulars, apply to Mr. H. Grey, Sign of the Ship, High Street, Hull”.

The “Sign of the Ship” in all likelihood refers to an inn or pub and “Mr. H. Grey” was very likely the innkeeper or publican, doubling as a “press agent” in exchange for a fee from the Admiralty and a percentage of the bounties.

The law stipulated that a press gang had to be under the command of a commissioned officer (often a pre-adolescent Midshipman, too young to shave) and be in possession of a “warrant of impressment”. This latter was the legal instrument empowering the press gang to kidnap innocent citizens into government sanctioned near-slavery and it was issued by a magis-

trate or justice of the peace, who was more often than not the press agent whose premises were utilised as a press depot.

The press gangs themselves were invariably made up of the toughest, most brutal sailors available, with one or two even tougher and more brutal boatswains mates to keep the tars in line and to prevent them from using the opportunity of being ashore as a chance to desert. To add to security, press gangs were often reinforced with detachments of marines or soldiers. The red coats were there both to protect the gang from angry locals and to shoot down any members of the press gang or any newly impressed men who tried to escape.

When selecting its victims, the press gang did not have to be very choosy. Although seamen were preferred, and thus at greatest risk, any reasonably healthy, reasonably fit man was liable to be taken. Who knows how many innocent young craftsmen or farm labourers found themselves unwillingly recruited into the King's service and doomed to a life of unremitting toil in a bewildering and alien world.

The only legal way for a man to avoid the press was to be in possession of a 'protection ticket'. This document granted exemption from the press and was issued at Customs Houses in the name of the Lord High Admiral. Tickets were routinely issued to ship's carpenters, shipwrights and merchant seamen employed in key trades. They were also issued to discharged soldiers and to seamen, both merchant and members of the Naval Service, employed by the Honourable East India Company. Protection tickets did not, however, guarantee immunity. Many, if not most, press officers and agents, under extreme pressure to fill quotas, routinely ignored tickets and impressed their holders anyway. When it is recalled that each pressed man was a source of revenue for the press agent, it is obvious that the average agent would not be likely to let a piece of paper stand in the way of turning a profit.

The Impress Act was not restricted in its enforcement to the land. Merchant seamen were also in danger of impressment at sea. Guardships often stopped inbound merchantmen and took members of the crew by force. Patrolling ships of the Royal Navy would do the same on the high seas, usually with complete disregard for the flag flown by the merchantman. This arrogant and high-handed British habit was one of the direct causes of the War of 1812. In that year the Americans, tired of, amongst other things, British refusal to heed diplomatic protests at the Royal Navy's habit of stopping American flag vessels and impressing their crewmen, declared war.

It may appear so far that the activities of the press gang were simple and straightforward. Nothing could be further from the truth. Of course, more than one

employer was happy to rid himself of a lazy or incompetent worker by turning him over to the press; as melodramatic as it may sound, it was not unknown for the father of an attractive daughter to rid himself of an unwanted or unsuitable admirer by having the hapless swain impressed; and there were always unscrupulous people ready to turn unsuspecting victims over to the press in exchange for the bounty. But, on the whole, the work of the press gang was not easy.

No man wanted to be taken by the press, not only for their own sakes, but for that of their families as well. Men taken in the streets would struggle mightily to escape, often as not assisted by family and friends, even by total strangers. More than one riot resulted from the activities of the press. One of the most famous occurred in Hull in May, 1815, when the Hull press gang took a young seaman as he was walking down a main street leading to the docks. While he was being dragged away the intended victim managed to slip out of his jacket and took to his heels down the street with the impressmen in hot pursuit. Reaching the dock area, the seaman was assisted by a gang of workmen and angry townspeople who fought a running battle with the press gang. When the press officer appealed for assistance from the mayor it was refused and the press gang was forced to retreat empty handed under a shower of stones and mud. That was not the end of it, however, as the by now thoroughly aroused mob descended on the "Spurn Lights" inn, the local press depot, and demolished the premises.

Impressing yokels in the countryside was rarely a simple task either. Local people were always on the lookout for the press gang and when it was sighted women and children would rush to warn the men of its approach. On being warned, workmen would scatter in all directions and go to ground in barns, haystacks, horse stalls, cellars, church crypts, in fact anywhere in an attempt to avoid impressment. A contemporary account records the action of a Yorkshire farm labourer who hid from the press gang in a pig sty, shielded from view by its inhabitants, and who eventually emerged some hours later, stinking and filthy, but free.

The intended victims of the press were often assisted by local newspapers as well. Happy enough to take the King's silver to place press advertisements, newspapers were also quick to publish warnings of the presence of the impressmen in the neighbourhood. These warnings would usually result in most able-bodied men making themselves scarce for a few days.

Seamen not in possession of a protection ticket and who made it home after a voyage would often remain indoors for the whole of their time ashore in order to avoid the press. When setting out to report to their ships at the start of a new voyage, they would usually travel late at night when the impressmen were abed. Alternatively, they would travel in a group, as large

as possible, the better to fight off the press gang. One novel dodge was that utilised by Thomas Hawkins, skipper of the merchant vessel *Eventhorpe*. When he was home between voyages, the captain would dress as a woman to enable himself to move about safely with his wife and family.

The navy did not always have its own way at sea either. Merchantmen could rarely hope to outrun the swift frigates and sloops employed as guardships but nevertheless, even when their ships hove to in response to a guardship's signals, or even a warning shot, crewmen would often fight back against the press gang rather than be taken.

An early and notorious case involved the crew of the whaling ship *Sarah and Elizabeth* in July, 1794. The ship was returning home after a season in the Greenland whaling grounds when she was stopped by the frigate *Aurora*. Knowing full well their probable fate, the whaler's crewmen promptly barricaded themselves into the hold. Two boat loads of sailors and marines from the *Aurora* boarded *Sarah and Elizabeth* and eventually managed to prise up a corner of the hatch cover, but the armed whalers refused orders to come on deck. The bosun of the *Aurora* received permission from his captain to throw a grenade into the hold to persuade the whaling men to come on deck but was dissuaded from carrying out this lunatic action by the horrified captain of *Sarah and Elizabeth* who pointed out that his ship's highly volatile cargo of whale oil would be ignited by the grenade's explosion. Putting down his grenade, the bosun again called on the crewmen to surrender but was answered by a bullet which wounded him in the leg. The captain of *Aurora*, thoroughly outraged at the wounding of his bosun and at the whaler's refusal to obey his commands, now ordered his marines to fire into the hold and number of shots were fired, killing one man (the carpenter) and seriously wounding three others.

The whalers then came up and surrendered and most of them, including the wounded, were transferred to *Aurora* and placed in irons. The *Sarah and Elizabeth* was then allowed to proceed as best she could. When she reached port, her owners immediately instituted proceedings for murder against the captain of the *Aurora*. The resulting outcry was so great that the Admiralty ordered the *Sarah and Elizabeth's* men to be discharged and released and posted Captain Essington of *Aurora* to the West Indies.

Essington returned from the West Indies as an admiral in 1810 and the case against him was re-opened. But the case lapsed, doubtless much to the relief of both Admiral Essington and the Admiralty Lords, as the report of the coroner's inquest into the death of the unfortunate ship's carpenter had been lost — surprise, surprise.

Another case, again involving a whaling ship, occurred in 1798 when the *Blenheim*, inbound from the Arctic, was intercepted by armed boat's crews from the Humber guardships. Determined not to be taken, the *Blenheim's* crewmen locked their captain and the Humber pilot into the ship's cabin and set out to take the ship into port themselves. Unfortunately, they ran aground on a mud bank and the navy boats closed in and attempted to board. They were beaten off by the whalers who had armed themselves with whatever lay at hand, including huge flensing knives. Shots were fired by both sides and two marines were killed, whereupon the erstwhile boarders withdrew. *Blenheim* was floated off on the next tide and eventually made port, where the crew scattered to safety.

For the lack of anyone else to blame, the Navy had the hapless captain of *Blenheim* arrested and arraigned for the alleged murder of the two marines. He was acquitted when the navy's farcical case was thrown out of court by an unsympathetic judge.

But riots, warnings, hair's-breadth escapes, ruses, disguises, even pitched sea battles were not enough to deter the press. Despite all that their prey could do to escape their clutches, the press were awesomely efficient. They had to be. When the American War of Independence ended in 1783, the Royal Navy had a strength of 100,000 men. Ten years later when war broke out with France, this had dropped to 18,000. The Royal Navy had 12 ships of the line in actual service and 113 in reserve. Ships in reserve were brought back into service as soon as they could be overhauled, refitted and, most importantly, crewed. With no volunteers forthcoming, the Navy had the Impress Act passed and turned the press gangs loose. The fact that 54 ships of the line had been commissioned within weeks of the outbreak of war bears witness to the brutal efficiency of the impressmen. This 'efficiency' continued throughout the Napoleonic Wars as the press gangs scoured the length and breadth of the kingdom trolling for sailors to man Britain's 'wooden wall'.

Viewed dispassionately, the press was a necessary evil for, while few men in their right minds would voluntarily join the Royal Navy (incredibly some did), the ships still had to be manned. It was the job of the impressmen to ensure that they were.

On the other hand, the press was to a great extent counter-productive. Those men who had voluntarily chosen the Royal Navy as a career were tough, proud professionals who resented the great mass of pressed men, regarding them as dirty, clumsy and thievish. In truth, the vast majority of the pressed men were little more than flesh and blood robots. The skilled work of sailing His Majesty's ships was carried out by the sprinkling of professional seamen, with the pressed men merely supplying the brute muscle power needed

to haul on ropes and shake out canvas. The pressed men were also, understandably enough, unwilling, unruly, ill-disciplined and mutinous. It is probable that the only reason the Royal Navy prevailed at sea over its foes was that those foes had the same manpower problems and resorted to the same means to resolve them. In fact, when the Spanish squadron under Don Jose de Cordova sailed out of Cartagena in February, 1797 to join the French fleet which was sailing out to meet the British squadrons under Admiral Sir John Jervis and the then Commodore Horatio Nelson off Cape St. Vincent, the Spanish crews had been brought up to strength by sweeping the streets and prisons of Cartagena and Alicante. Out of the 950 or so men in the crew of Cordova's flagship, the colossal *Santisima Trinidad*, probably only 80 or so were real seamen. The French were, to pardon the pun, in the same boat.

In the end, as the old saying goes, one volunteer is definitely better than ten pressed men.

The press was suspended in 1815 with the defeat of Napoleon and the start of that period of European history sometimes referred to as 'The Long Peace'. With the wars over the Royal Navy no longer needed its vast mass of men and ships and within three years strengths had fallen from over 700 ships in commission and 140,000 men to 130 ships and 19,000 men. Those men no longer required were simply discharged and put ashore to fend for themselves. Most of course were delighted to be free. Those in good health generally drifted back to their previous jobs and homes. But if they were sick or wounded, very little was done

to help them and former Royal Navy seamen reduced to beggary were a common sight in the sea ports of Britain for many years.

Although suspended, the press was not entirely abolished and the impressment of seamen into the Royal Navy is recorded as late as 1835, in which year the Act was graciously amended to limit an impressed man's period of enforced service to five years; prior to that of course, service was for life, unless a man lost an arm or leg, or suffered some other disablement, when he would be unceremoniously discharged and 'beached'.

Despite my best efforts and enquiries as far afield as the United Kingdom, it has not been possible to ascertain if the Impress Act of 1793 has actually been abolished. On the other hand, I have ascertained that the Act was still in force in the mid-1960s, so, as strange as it may seem, as little as thirty years ago it was still lawful to impress men into Her Majesty's Navy.

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DESPATCH FROM CANADA

by **Commander Peter Jones**

In December 1994 the Canadian Defence White Paper (CDWP) was tabled in Parliament. This followed wide-ranging public hearings by a parliamentary Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy.

The CDWP is an attempt to provide a balanced and flexible defence force within a very tight budget (about \$C10 billion). The CDWP is a candid document which states,

"The Government's broad program for political, social, and economic renewal is focused on preserving the values that make Canada one of the most fortunate countries in the world. At the present time, however, our prosperity - and with it our quality of life - is threatened by the steady growth of the public sector debt."¹

The accumulated federal and provincial government

debt is about \$C750 billion. To give an idea of the effect of this burden the annual debt servicing payments for the federal government alone (1994-95) will be \$44 billion. This is about 27% of the total federal budget. The pressure on defence spending is therefore immense.

Since the end of the Cold War there have been substantial personnel cuts and these will continue. In 1989 the total uniformed permanent strength was 88,800. This has been cut to around 74,000 today and will be reduced further to 60,000 by 1999. Even more drastic are the cuts to defence civilians which numbered 36,600 in 1989 and will be fewer than 12,500 by the end of the decade.

The dramatic personnel and financial cuts have led to a variety of reviews and decisions to reshape the CF infrastructure. As an example, a waterfront review is

The RCN in action



Courtesy: Canadian Forces

underway which is looking at the entire support organisation.

I gave an impromptu presentation to the waterfront review team on the ADF/RAN structure. At the brief many heads nodded in recognition as I went through such initiatives as total quality management, program management and budgeting, defence administration centres, devolution, dockyard privatisation, defence housing reviews etc. The ensuing discussions revealed the extent of our shared reforming experiences. Many of the initiatives discussed have been implemented or are under active consideration by both defence forces. I would commend any ADF/RAN administrative review team to study what Canada may have tried in that field.

There are a number of aspects to the CDWP that have interest to Australia. A key one is the commitment to UN operations. CF is heavily involved in many UN related missions. As alluded to in my previous despatch the level of commitment, especially in the light of defence cuts, is probably unsustainable. It is therefore significant that the CDWP stated,

"Although this general (UN) commitment is clear, under more normal circumstances Canada must be selective if it is going to remain in a position to play a meaningful role. Our resources are finite."²

This is a turnaround from earlier days when Canadian defence analyst Peter Haydon commented,

"it has become nationally impossible to refuse an opportunity to join a peacekeeping operation no matter where it is."³

The Canadian position is of course closely mirrored in the 1994 Australian Defence White Paper. Both documents clearly articulate criteria on which future peacekeeping requests will be assessed.

Turning to the Canadian maritime force structure, the CDWP emphasises the need for two Canadian Task Groups, one on either coast. Each would consist of 3-4 destroyers/frigates, a support ship and possibly a submarine. The extremely busy operational tempo of the surface fleet in the Adriatic and off Haiti over recent years probably ensured that force numbers were

maintained in the CDWP. Less lucky is the useful diving support ship *Cormorant* which will prematurely pay off in 1997.

On the matter of the Oberon Class submarine replacement, the CDWP authorised investigation into acquiring the British Upholder Class, if the price was right. It is clear that the Canadian defence hierarchy are committed to a flexible balanced force and they see submarines as very much part of that force.

It is certainly an anxious time for the submarine community because if the Upholders are not acquired then that is the end of the line for the submarine arm. The question would only remain whether the Oberons would pay off straight away or continue on for a few more years to the end of their lives. On a positive note the Canadian-Spanish fish dispute on the Grand Banks can only help the submarine cause as the Oberons have been effective in fisheries surveillance.

Finally the CDWP stated that Canada's interest in the Pacific and Asia is growing. It noted the country's more active role in regional security dialogues. The CDWP concluded this point by stating,

"...as our economic stake in the region grows, Canada will play a more active role in its security. To this end, we will expand the current program of bilateral military contacts we maintain with a variety of Asian countries, including Japan, South Korea, and members of ASEAN."⁴

On this basis the RAN and RNZN can expect to see more of the CF in the Western Pacific. Indeed the visit by a Canadian Task Group to SE Asia, Australia and New Zealand this year should be viewed in this light. There is tremendous scope for closer ties to our mutual benefit.

NOTES

1. Canadian Defence White Paper, Queens Printing Office, Ottawa, 1994.
2. Ibid. p.31.
3. P T. Haydon, *Naval Peacekeeping: Multinational Considerations*. A paper given to Peacekeeping '94, Washington, 14-16 November 1994, p.7.
4. Canadian Defence White Paper, op.cit. p.37.



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COUNTING THE COST

Are traditional values and culture being unnecessarily sacrificed on the altar of economic rationalism in a modern navy?

by Lieutenant Commander Alan Hinge RAN

Naval personnel have no difficulty in accepting the constitutional imperative of civilian control over the service and the advantages of rationalising inefficient personnel, training and logistics systems. However, it is our obligation, even duty, to be concerned by changes that affect the navy's ability to achieve its national defence mission. Therefore, the number and nature of economically driven reviews and rationalisations, especially during the last five years, have become legitimate causes for concern.

Some naval personnel feel that readiness, discipline, esprit de corps and cohesion are being buried under cost effectiveness and productivity criteria by myopic civilian and military bureaucracies that draw simplistic, dollar driven conclusions. They see the naval ethos - comprising the navy's unique values, traditions, identity and culture - as being under serious threat, with the result that operational performance will decline. The counter argument, which we will call the rationalist view, is that if the navy wants to keep its 'toys' in the next century it has to consistently come up with substantial savings by thinking with its 'head' and not with its 'heart', that is, by being open to change and putting away some of its inefficient, hidebound ways of doing business.

A conspicuous advocate of the rationalist view is former Deputy Secretary Wrigley, who suggested that some traditional, value driven ways in which the military does business are inordinately expensive; that greater efficiency and effectiveness can be achieved by rationalising activities throughout the ADF. Key features in his recommendations were 'commercialisation' and 'civilianisation'. Commercialisation involves contracting out practically all non-core activities, and civilianisation is another process of rationalising expenditures by converting a large number of military billets to civilian positions. Indeed, the momentum of the Commercial Support Program (CSP) - which is probably the most conspicuous example of change driven by economic rationalism - is testimony that the military is less and less considered a 'special case' cushioned from economic pressures.

But does a 'zero sum game' relationship (...when you win, I lose and vice versa) have to exist between gain-

ing economic benefits of rationalisation and retaining the navy's traditional values? Hopefully not, and the aim of this essay is to determine whether traditional naval culture or ethos is really being eroded by economically driven rationalisation and, if so, where and how should the limits of rationalisation be drawn. To achieve this aim we should first attempt to outline the traditionalist and rationalist positions and trace their origins. We will then investigate the presence (or absence) of a causal link between economically driven rationalisations and consequent deterioration of military values and performance. Finally, it is necessary to identify the nature, extent and consequences of this causal link as it affects the Royal Australian Navy.

The 'Traditionalist' case

For the purposes of analysis, the terms 'traditionalist' and 'rationalist' as used in this essay are stereotypes and represent extremes. However, most naval personnel will take positions somewhere 'in between' the extremes at various times and on various issues. Nevertheless, most of us are usually closer to one 'pole' than the another.

Military traditionalists suspect that economically driven rationalisations are adversely affecting the value system and culture of the navy, which in turn causes a deterioration in cohesion and operational performance. A value system is an order of standards of conduct and performance developed, accepted and practised by most members of a group over a long period of time. Values help define a culture, whether that culture is ethnic, ideological or corporate. A culture - being the sum of inherited ideas, values, beliefs and knowledge - gives rise to traditional ways of doing business in the best interests of the organisation and the individuals that make it up. Over time an 'ethos' springs up and is transmitted to govern acceptable models of interaction, behaviour and performance.

The naval ethos defines membership by reflecting values, habits and rituals which the navy has learned to hold dear. Inherent in the naval ethos is a requirement for close living and everyone being stakeholders against common danger. Crew cohesion and camaraderie



THIS IS WHERE THE NAVAL ETHOS COUNTS:

To conduct sustained maritime operations in the national interest our navy must have superior ships manned by superior people.

Superior people have a willingness to take on unusual responsibility and accept high levels of risk.



derie are essential. The naval ethos has traditionally been that distinctive organisational spirit and identity which separates being in the navy from any other profession; the mental disposition to perform in a unique way; that attitude of preparedness to work longer and harder under bad conditions as well as the willingness to take on unusual responsibility and accept extremely high levels of personal responsibility and risk. Consequently, a 'Can Do' attitude has been an integral part of the naval ethos, both to our credit and detriment.

The more extreme traditionalists often interpret reviews and changes imposed by government in negative terms, such as the 'emasculatation' of naval discipline because of civilian pressure, or the 'Brass's' preoccupation with popular political programs geared to woo politicians and the public, rather than to improve the cohesion and discipline of the service. They also sense a steady undermining of conditions of service, lowering of pride in uniform and believe that naval personnel are being treated as second class citizens. Moreover, many see the biggest nails in the coffin of service uniqueness and cohesion as being the commercialisation and civilianisation of a growing number of traditionally service activities. Some traditionalists would argue that continued commercialisation and civilianisation will infect naval personnel with a '9 to 5' attitude, the 'profit motive', slovenly work to rule habits and 'up or out' approaches to promotion. Consequently, servicemen so affected cannot feel unique and will not have the capacity to perform with uniqueness and distinction when it is time to 'stand up and fight'.

It could also be argued that drawing the lines of civilianisation and commercialisation is impossible, because naval operations and their close support simply cannot be reduced to economic models; no one knows for sure where the fighting will get down too. In combatant or potentially combatant situations service men and women simply have to know how far the person next to them is prepared to go. Civilians are only responsible in accordance with their job descriptions or contracts, and the negative consequences they face are sacking, profit loss or transfer. They are simply not 'stakeholders' who are directly responsible for the defence of our country and they face no major consequences - they are not paid to. Their commitment cannot, and should not, be counted on when it involves possible risk to life and limb.

Traditionalists believe that many of today's rationalisation decisions are being made by those who will never be at the receiving end in time of conflict, and that 'Malfunction Junction' seldom appreciates the limitations and difficulties of the men and women at the 'sharp end'. They remain confident that the navy knows best what it needs and economic considerations must come second to the imperatives of cohe-

sion and having the very best equipment and lots of it....no price is too high to place on national security! However, this tendency towards self sufficiency in all things; in an era of skyrocketing costs, competing social priorities and constrained allocations has come under intense 'rationalist' scrutiny in recent years. But just what is rationalism?

The Rationalist case

Philosophically, 'rationalism' is the doctrine that knowledge is acquired by objective reason and without regard to often subjective interpretations of experience. Economic rationalism is the doctrine that most decisions about an organisation, including its structure and the nature of its resources and activities, can be made almost purely on economic grounds and under the saliency of market forces. In the defence context, economic rationalism is reflected in the widespread use of cost benefit and cost effectiveness analysis as the primary tools for evaluation and decision making, as rationales for saving through reductions in resources and personnel, and as methods to eliminate inefficient work practises. Rationalists tend to give little weight to professional military judgement that cannot be backed up by objective criteria and measures of effectiveness.

Before looking at the possible impact of economic rationalism in the navy, we should take the time to look at the American experience of economic rationalism in defence and its effect on military culture for two reasons. First, the ascendancy of economic rationalist views in defence can be traced back to the reorganisation of the Australian Department of Defence during 1973-76, and these reforms were in turn modelled directly on the reorganisation of the US Department of Defence during the Johnson and Kennedy Administrations in the 1960s. The second reason is that many in the United States considered that a direct causal link existed between the imposition of economic rationalist principles on the US military and degeneration of military values and performance in Vietnam. Consequently, seeing how much there is to this belief could have direct relevance to the Australian experience of the possible impact of rationalism on military culture.

Why economic rationalism in defence management?

The tools of economic decision making were firmly established in the US Department of Defence and military during the Kennedy Administration by Defence Secretary McNamara, his Comptroller Charles Hitch and the head of the Office of Systems Analysis, Alain Enthoven. The new 'regime' demanded a systematic, rationalist approach to defence planning and management, and aimed to establish clear budgetary links between national defence ends and means.

The economic rationalists – with good reason at the time – argued that Army, Navy and Air Force budgets were not clearly linked to defence policies and planning, which took place from year to year and were essentially ambit claims. Therefore, the rationalists introduced five year rolling programs together with the PPBS (Planning, Programming Budgeting System) from which our Program Management and Budgeting (PMB) system is derived.

Hitch, in his seminal 1960 work, *The Economics of Defence in the Nuclear Age* summarised the new economic rationalist approach to defence decision making and operations:

‘...The essence of economic choice in military planning is not quantitative analysis; calculation may or may not be necessary or useful, depending upon the problem and what is known about it. The essential thing is the comparison of all the relevant alternatives from the point of view of the objectives each can accomplish and the costs which it involves; and the selection of the best (or a ‘good’) alternative through the use of appropriate economic criteria (my emphasis)’.

McNamara insisted that all defence problems were to be approached in a rational and analytical way, and then resolved on the basis of the national interest. He insisted on integrating and balancing the nation’s defence policy, military strategy, force requirements and defence budget. Proposals were to be examined from a broader perspective than that of the organisation proposing them; economic choices had to be made between real alternatives, economic points had to be ascertained indicating when further spending on a given activity resulted in incremental gains so small that it was no longer justified. He also established the Office of Systems Analysis to assess service proposals and review service ways of doing things on cost/benefit grounds. In Enthoven’s words, ‘... Understandably, an office with the responsibility of looking at the entire defence program, independently of service interests, was disliked by those that felt threatened’. Cost effectiveness and cost benefit analyses were institutionalised as dominant tools for defence decision making during this era, but while costs could be measured quite objectively, effectiveness had multiple and often intangible measures in the defence context. This difficulty led to much argument from many who considered that simple economic analogies were inappropriate to most military organisations and situations.

The Australian Experience

The Australian Department of Defence picked up many economic rationalist ideas from the US and, according to a departmental summary of the nature and impact of defence reviews up to 1991, ‘...review activity in recent times has focussed on developing

and implementing leaner and more cost effective organisational strategies and structures, and the need to redirect resources to higher priorities in order for the Australian Defence Force to maintain capabilities’. While the number and nature of reviews have been considerable, we will concentrate on economically driven reviews and specifically those dealing with commercialisation and civilianisation, because they are the most conspicuous examples of the rationalist approach as it affects the navy.

The Wrigley Report suggested that the ADF has often demonstrated wasteful approaches to doing things, and maintaining its traditionally high level of personnel and material self sufficiency was at odds with corporate efficiency. He also suggested that, despite changed strategic circumstances, the ADF remains organised as an expeditionary force which habitually seeks self sufficiency in all manner of support skills. He argued that the dividing line of activities best done by the military and those best done by civilians is artificial and commercial style defence work should be open to the private sector, with military personnel concentrating on combat and combat related jobs. Wrigley made many good points in his report: Personnel costs do make up about two thirds of defence expenditure; costly military personnel should be used wisely and he cited the example that expensively trained military technicians spent, on average, 50% less time in their trade function. Nevertheless, he did emphasise the importance of keeping enough military presence in support echelons to manage and control, as well as keeping posting ratios to acceptable levels.

Many in the services could agree with some of Wrigley’s principles, but the rub really came when deciding just *how far* the rationalist/corporate analogy could be safely applied. In particular, how does one ‘draw the line’ by specifying the nature, location and extent of rationalist/corporate practises in the military environment. To begin to answer these questions in the Australian context we must look for empirical evidence which establishes or disproves that rationalist/business values can actually lead to a decline in military culture and performance.

Vietnam

A comprehensive examination of the breakdown in culture, values and cohesion of a modern military service, the US Army in Vietnam, is found in Gabriel and Savage’s book, *Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the US Army*. This treatise was commenced in the mid 1970s after two authoritative US Army War College reports indicted US Army performance in Vietnam under conditions of generally low combat stress. Gabriel and Savage concluded that:

‘... (the army) exhibited a low degree of unit cohesion at virtually all levels of command and

SEA


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Jeff Kees

staff..The data indicate a very high rate of drug use among US field forces in country, repeated attempts to assassinate officers and senior non commissioned officers, combat refusal that bordered on mutiny, skyrocketing desertion rates in the Army as a whole...the Army began to border on an undisciplined, ineffective, almost anomic mass of individuals who collectively had no goals and who, individually sought only to survive the lengths of their tours'

Many in the Army came up with simplistic explanations. It was argued by many senior officers that the traditional military values of honour, sacrifice, discipline and responsibility were all but impossible to maintain in the military if they did not receive the support of the wider social value system; that they could only do so much with a 'drug ridden and permissive generation'. They also tended to blame civilian interference and the impositions of the rationalist 'whiz kids'. Nevertheless, both US Army War College reports concluded that:

'...There is no direct evidence that external fiscal, political, sociological, or managerial influences are the primary causative factors of thisclimate.... Neither does the public attitude to the Vietnam war, or the rapid expansion of the Army, or the current(civil) anti military syndrome stand out as a significant reason for deviations from the level of professional behaviour the Army acknowledges as its attainable ideal'.

So, what really did go wrong? According to all three studies problems with morale and performance were for the most part *internally generated*, and this conclusion is backed up by other researchers covering other conflicts, with different participants under different pressures. According to the Army War College studies, the breakdown in cohesion and commitment in Vietnam was primarily attributable to the failure of the officer corps to provide the leadership necessary in a combat army to maintain primary group cohesion. Furthermore, it was suggested that the loss of officer professionalism was largely derived from 'managerial careerism' and the non selective absorption of corporate work ethics and attitudes by the officer corps - the Army began to resemble an entrepreneurial structure based on a modern business corporation. Moreover, according to the reports, officer attitudes began to be dominated by self interest and there was a corporate failure to exhibit 'presence' and leadership values in the field. A new set of values began to replace the traditional military values of honour, sharing risk, involvement in the daily lives of subordinates and insistence on discipline, as the new tools of financial and personnel management were indiscriminately applied to train and manage military personnel. Consequently, a link between exposure to a civilian/corporate management ethos and erosion in military values and performance can exist, but the link

is not in itself causal. It is a condition. Cultural degeneration in the military is more likely to be internally generated by non selective absorption of practices and values contradictory to a military ethos. And this is only likely to occur if military leadership itself does not stand firm in reinforcing and exhibiting its own traditional values.

Implications for the Navy

Navies are in the fortunate position of being able to fill ships, which are ideal vehicles for building teamwork, maintaining esprit de corps and developing cohesion. Ships become areas for focus and refreshment of personnel, but as our shore 'tail' increases fewer and fewer people will go to sea for shorter and shorter periods of time, and naval leaders will probably have to work harder and smarter to maintain traditional teamwork, commitment and culture ashore. Blaming our difficulties in motivating people on civilianisation, commercialisation, other forms of rationalisation or even a degenerate society is to take the 'soft cop'. Indeed, many in the navy could say that posting turbulence, erosion of pay and conditions of service, promotion bottlenecks, undervaluing of military skills, lack of government support or the reluctance of some leaders to take on responsibility all reduce the pulse of endeavour in a modern navy.

To suggest that contracts and civilians somehow infect naval personnel is erroneous. Exclusivity or even significance of economic rationalisations as causes of deteriorating cohesion and performance has simply not been established. After all, the navy has had very little difficulty in tolerating diversity of values; for a long time before CSP one in every four of the naval 'family' were civilians, and the navy has always had far less difficulty than the other services in stacking its logistics tail with them. In fact, many highly committed civilians could teach some members of the service a lesson or two! Furthermore, to assume that values such as honour, duty and responsibility are exclusive to the military and are not reflected in and supported by the wider community is preposterous. Without them our society could not exist.

Effective leadership and management of personnel in times of change seems to be the decisive factor when it comes to maintaining or losing our naval values and traditions. Whether we like it or not, change has become the norm and it is often poorly handled. It is poorly handled because naval management often has not been good at understanding the nature and extent of change. If it had really understood, adequate time, resources and allowance would have been made for change. As a case in point, at the end of a major CSP 'lessons learnt' symposium in October 1993 the key lessons were summed up as:

- Tier 1 reviews were rushed and not approached in

a proper way.

- Imprecise instructions and directions were given throughout the process.
- There was too much external interference and conflicting advice given.
- Resources, expertise and training were inadequate; and
- Difficulties with civilian employment and industrial relations issues were not foreseen.

These problems are all too familiar and are for the main part internally generated. A supply officer who was intimately engaged in the process stated, '....Nightmare or what? Yes, a nightmare due to inadequate training and experience'. To this could be added inadequate consultation, a failure to anticipate consequences and insufficient skills and patience in evaluating activities, alternatives, costs and benefits....Unfortunately, most of our 'nightmares' seem to be self inflicted! Surely, this kind of sloppy management 'tradition' is one that the navy culture can do without, and a dose of economic rationalism has forced us to think about what our objectives are, why we have them, how we have been achieving them and what our alternatives are for meeting them tomorrow.

Conclusion

The tools and policies of economic rationalism have come in for more than their fair share of criticism. Some 'Old and Bold' traditionalists have found economic rationalism a convenient scapegoat for resisting change and have blamed it for deficiencies in naval performance. Yet there is no convincing evidence that decisions *employing* economic criteria have a significantly negative effect on naval performance, values or morale if the navy takes the time and trouble to get a comprehensive handle on the costs *and* benefits of proposed rationalisations. Furthermore, most naval personnel do not appear to see the Traditionalist / Rationalist debate in defence as simply an 'all or nothing'

dilemma. They correctly assume that there is no inherent contradiction between the use of economic criteria *to inform* decision making and the preservation, indeed improvement, of our unique naval culture. Indeed, most of the problems we blame on external pressures are largely internally generated, and could be managed much better.

Nothing can compel naval personnel to accept so called civilian values and practices if traditional naval values continue to be exhibited, encouraged and rewarded by naval leaders. Many principles and tools of economic rationalism can and have been successfully applied to navies, and they need not hinder the development of highly cohesive, disciplined and effective naval forces. However, this remains the case only if naval leaders lead by example, manage change intelligently by doing their 'sums' properly and then logically establish a clear divide between core and non core naval activities.

Ultimately, the only altar on which our values can be sacrificed is the altar of self betrayal

About the author

Alan Hinge is currently the RAN's Visiting Fellow at the Australian Defence Studies Centre (ADSC), Australian Defence Force Academy. He holds an MA in Strategic Studies (ANU) and also a BSc in Physics and Applied Mathematics. In 1984 he became the first junior officer in the ADF to be awarded a Defence Fellowship, and in 1993 was the inaugural Rockwell Scholar in Strategic Studies. To date he has produced thirty seven articles for publication in Australian and international professional military journals and is the author of a seminal work on mine warfare. He is also a contributing author to the Australian Dictionary of Biography. His most recent publication, with Dr Stefan Markowski of the Centre's Defence Industry Program, is a defence project management handbook which is produced by and available from the ADSC.



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Letters to the Editor

The Editor,
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

Maritime Strategy and the Law of the Sea

Sir,

I enjoyed LCDR John Scott's article 'An Essay on Australia's Maritime Strategy and its Links With the Law of the Sea', in the Nov 94/Jan 95 issue of The Journal. It gives a comprehensive coverage to many of the 'new' factors which we, as naval officers, have to consider as a result of UNCLOS III. Most are, of course, not unique to Australia. He makes out a compelling case for the formulation of a national Non-Military Maritime Strategy. Such arguments apply equally well to the United Kingdom. Our admittedly much smaller, but busier, and for its size perhaps more complex EEZ, is subject to the activities of a host of government agencies that are probably in need of greater coordination and rationalisation. A US-style Coastguard, subsuming the activities and responsibilities of several existing bodies may be a logical development for both our countries, especially as the concept of an 'Oceans Policy' becomes more widely accepted.

I would strike a cautionary note, however. As LCDR Scott rightly points out, Canada does have such a policy, formulated and executed by a Department of the Oceans. This has not stopped Canadians all but destroying their Atlantic fish stocks and continuing a range of controversial environmental practices. Such 'strategies', subject to the lobbying of special-interest groups and beset by the constraints imposed on any government bureaucracy, are not a panacea for all the problems of ocean management.

The specific implications for navies of the Third UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) fall into two broad categories:

- a. Additional duties and obligations imposed upon navies; and
- b. Constraints placed upon the activities of naval forces.

Scott provides us with a good overview of a., most, though not all of which, originate with the adoption of 200-mile EEZs. Greatly increased requirements for

surveillance and law-enforcement will provide much new work for navies, especially as states become ever-more jealous of 'their' resources. When it comes to b., however, he paints an inaccurately gloomy picture and some of his assertions, left unchallenged, may give a misleading impression. Without wishing to be over-critical, the following points are worth making:

- a. Foreign warships are expressly not required to seek the permission of the coastal state before entering the Territorial Sea, now expanded to twelve miles from the traditional three. This right of 'innocent passage', previously part of 'customary law', is now enshrined in the Law of the Sea and applies to warships and not, as Scott states, to merchant ships whose activities are subject to greater, not lesser, control.

- b. The expansion of the Territorial Sea involves the inclusion in coastal states' jurisdiction of over 100 straits previously in international waters. Notwithstanding the rights of Innocent Passage, which do not apply to aircraft and submerged submarines, foreign military rights in these straits (such as Dover, Gibraltar, Hormuz and Singapore) have been extended through the introduction of 'Transit Passage' which imposes fewer restrictions than does 'Innocent Passage'. For example, submarines may remain submerged and warships may continue to operate aircraft. With most states having already extended their territorial claims to 12 miles or even beyond, UNCLOS in this respect actually represents a reversal of 'creeping jurisdiction'.

- c. An EEZ is just that - an Exclusive Economic Zone. Its scope does not extend to the 'traditional' uses of the oceans - namely for navigation and military purposes. EEZs remain international waters. It is therefore a little misleading to talk of "some 32 per cent of the world's oceans now ... under coastal state control", for this is certainly not the case. The United States and other major maritime powers played an active role in the negotiations on the territorial provisions of the Convention, and their interests are clearly reflected in the maintenance and codification of traditional rights of navigation.

- d. SCOTT is right to note that the seabed mining provisions in Part XI were the reason that few of the industrialised nations signed or ratified the original Convention. However, this Part had been re-negotiated by July last year and as a result Australia was one of the first western countries to ratify, in October last year. Most others have now either done so, or intend to. The notable exception to this new trend is the United States, for reasons to do with the new Republican Congress. Although the President, State Department and Department of Defense all support US ratification, the future of UNCLOS III in the

(Continued page 50)

An Age of Peacekeeping?

Should Possible UN Commitments be Force Structure Determinants?

A Peter Mitchell Prize winning essay

by

Lieutenant R.C.A. Leahy, RAN

It has been variously suggested that we [are] facing an era characterised by ethnic violence, by unrestrained nationalism, by the challenges of fundamentalism, by the 'end of history' and by a clash of civilisations. The contemporary world is yet to take any clear shape and so far has no better name than the nondescript 'post-Cold War era'. Is it possible that it will become the 'age of peacekeeping'?

Australians have made a proud and distinguished contribution to peacekeeping operations around the globe. However, at least in force structure terms, over recent years peacekeeping has always been something that soldiers, sailors and airmen do when they are not preparing for war. Successive Labour Governments in the 1980s and 1990s have continued to encourage the Australian Defence Force (ADF) in their contribution to worldwide peacekeeping, recognising that there are a number of operational benefits to gain from such 'warlike' exposure, but emphasising that such exposure is no substitute for proper training. Therefore, the argument goes, peacekeeping can be a valuable adjunct to justifying the defence forces in a time of relative peace, but peacekeeping will never be a force structure determinant in itself.

The aim of this essay is to examine this approach in the light of Australia's wider security interests, rather than from the more traditional and confining view of the 'Defence of Australia'. This essay will briefly look at Australia's contribution to peacekeeping forces in a historical context, before examining the arguments behind maintaining the force structure status quo. I will then suggest an alternative means of looking at the security question by force structuring for peacekeeping. The essay will conclude by postulating a course of action that will see Australia lead the world into a new era of peacekeeping.

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

[1995 is] the fiftieth anniversary not only of the end of the Second World War, but also of the establishment of the United Nations (UN). After a relatively quiet first forty years of its life when the UN oversaw the creation of some 13 peacekeeping missions, the last five years have seen peacekeeping missions blossoming across the globe with a further 13 missions being established, and there has been a variety of missions that Australian service personnel have been involved in over the past four years.²

Interestingly in force structure terms, defence planning documents have been slow to pick up on this trend towards peace. For instance, the 1986 Dibb Report³ did not discuss UN commitments in force structure terms at all, while in the resultant White Paper, the *Defence of Australia* in 1987, UN commitments rated only a passing mention. However, the end of the Cold War and the consequent demand for a revision of strategic thinking worldwide was not lost on Australia.

The dramatic decrease in tensions resulting from the end of the Cold War seemed to result in renewed optimism toward peacekeeping. General comments were expressed by a variety of commentators that the emasculating effect of the superpowers vetoing UN Security Council resolutions may now be a thing of the past. The Gulf War in 1991 seemed to be testament to this fact, with the Soviet Union, although not contributing directly to the US led coalition war with Iraq, at least providing tacit support by not unduly obstructing the workings of the UN.

It was in this environment of cautious optimism but heightened uncertainty that the *Force Structure Review* was published in 1991. Interestingly, this document emphasised that Australian peacekeeping forces would only be drawn from the existing force structure - peacekeeping would not be a determinant in itself. It stated:

'Defence Strategy is designed to capitalise on Australia's geographic advantages, and to ensure that any aggressor would face major obstacles in an attack on this nation. It also ensures that Australia can make a contribution to operations further afield and, when required, support friends, allies, and activities sanctioned by the United Nations.'⁴

The Department of Defence's current standpoint on the importance of peacekeeping commitments as force structure determinants is summarised in *Strategic Review 93*:

'Defence's commitment to peacekeeping and



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peace enforcement operations has increased markedly in recent years. Forces structured for the defence of Australia have proved sufficiently versatile for us to meet our commitments to international security operations on time, well-trained and properly prepared, without requiring fundamental change to our force structure. Some operations have necessitated adjustments to peacetime unit structures, equipment acquisition priorities and operating costs, but they have not caused major force structure changes. The funding of such operations should not place in jeopardy our capabilities for the defence of Australia.⁵

Force structuring for Defence

These statements serve to highlight the significance that defence strategists place upon the perceived need to 'defend Australia', and the relatively insignificant role that they foresee for Australian contributions to peacekeeping. Indeed, I would argue that this sort of thinking exemplifies the status quo of defence strategy over the past ten years.

Strategic Review 93 categorises peacekeeping along with disaster relief, defence assistance to the civil community and defence aid to the civil power as "other defence roles". The Review goes on to argue:

'These roles can influence training and the organisation of materiel for specific missions, but they do not determine the ADF's overall force structure'.⁶

Now this seems very much like 'hedging bets' and 'sitting on the fence', rarely a good indicator of a decisive strategy. It seems that our strategic thinkers are keen to continue Australia's commitment to UN operations for the international kudos it provides, but they are not prepared to dedicate resources solely to achieve these objectives.

These attitudes filter down through our command structure and perpetuate the thinking that regards peacekeeping as a sort of 'Clayton's role' for the ADF. Generally speaking, the argument that we do not need to force structure specifically for peacekeeping, as our current defence organisation and training program prepares our men ideally for such operations, tends to hold sway. Colonel Mellor, the Commander of the Australian contingent sent to Somalia in early 1993, had this to say on his return:

'The most fundamental reason for our success on Operation Solace was the commitment and professionalism of the officers and soldiers of all ranks. With very few exceptions, the men and women on Operation Solace approached their task with enthusiasm and energy. The compassion and understanding displayed by the average digger for the plight of the Somali people were somewhat surprising at first, but

given the humanitarian nature of the mission, entirely appropriate. At the same time the digger's aggression and determination in contacts were not lacking. I believe we can take a great deal of confidence in the standard of our officers and soldiers who made up what was arguably the best national contingent in Somalia.'⁷

Now, not wanting to take anything away from the Australian soldiers' achievements in Somalia, Colonel Mellor's comments really do beg the question. Yes, Australians do have a fine record as international peacekeepers, but do we want to maintain this 'gifted amateur' status, or should we develop a concerted, professional approach to training forces specifically for peacekeeping?

Aside from the strategic nonsense it makes of a 'defence of Australia' policy to deploy our Operational Readiness Force overseas, it would seem that the time has now come to look closer at force structuring certain parts of our defence forces specifically for peacekeeping. Realistically, it will not be easy to change the status quo. However, to continue our current policy will only ensure that the performance of one task, whether peacekeeping or the defence of Australia, must only detract from the other - particularly in resource terms. In the words of Dr Hugh Smith:

'At the level of national policy armed forces are still employed to promote the traditional goals of national defence but they are increasingly being asked to contribute to the broader goals of international peace and security. These two sets of goals do not always sit together comfortably. National security is certainly assisted in the long term by greater international stability but nations will also remain concerned about their security in the short to medium term. As the demands of peacekeeping activities around the world rapidly expand, the challenge of balancing these priorities will be a difficult issue for many governments.'⁸

Towards a Security Force Structure

Revealingly the keystone of recent Australian defence strategy was entitled the *Defence of Australia*, and not the *Security of Australia*. The terms are not interchangeable, and an essay published by Graeme Dunk entitled 'Security or Defence? Force Development in the Absence of a Direct Military Threat'⁹ earlier this year spells out why. Of course any strategy termed a 'defence strategy' implies that there is an enemy, otherwise it is a defence against what? Graeme Dunk's argument is that such a strategy is in conflict with Australia's broader foreign policy initiatives such as closer ties with Indonesia and the so called 'comprehensive regional engagement' policy espoused by Paul Keating and Gareth Evans. I would like to extend this argument by suggesting that force structuring specifically for peacekeeping operations, is force structur-

ing more for security than for defence. If we are serious about developing closer ties within our region, such a policy will send out less ambivalent signals to our neighbours, whilst promoting our wider international image as a country firmly committed to global security issues and the development of other nations. These would seem to be significant benefits.

These issues are recognised by the defence establishment. *Strategic Review* 93 states:

'Australia has a major strategic interest in the effectiveness of global security mechanisms. We have important political and economic interests at stake in promoting global order. By constraining unfavourable strategic developments beyond our nearer region, our own neighbourhood is less likely to be affected.'¹⁰

Significantly, the importance of our involvement in regional disputes is given prominence:

'Australia gains international standing and influence because of the good reputation of its forces in multinational security operations ... Participation ... can provide valuable individual and collective training benefits, with useful 'operational' experience that the ADF would not otherwise obtain.'

Our high profile involvement in Cambodia, and our more recent, but perhaps less successful, involvement in Bougainville are evidence of the support that the Government and the ADF are giving to this current policy. It all makes perfect sense, as Gareth Evans, widely recognised as the 'broker' of Peace in Cambodia, explains:

'Australia's foreign policy - like that of every country - is based on our perception of our own national interests, and we saw - and continue to see - these as very much involved in Cambodia. While the war continued, it was the single greatest source of instability in our region. It fed tensions and hostility between regional countries who could and should be friends. It drew in great powers and perpetuated divisions between those who supported them ... While the war continued, the great potential of our region for new levels of economic co-operation and development could only be partially fulfilled.'

Sadly, these benefits — greater regional security and improved economic development amongst our neighbours — are not given the importance that they deserve. For while we retain a 'defence' policy per se, we will perpetuate a 'them and us' attitude amongst the defence establishment. While our diplomats are thinking 'comprehensive engagement', our defence analysts will be thinking of 'just in case' scenarios. In this environment, the ADF will continue to force structure to reduce Australia's vulnerability if a threat appears, instead of force structuring to reduce poten-

tial threats. In medical terms we will be treating the symptoms, not the cause. This has serious implications, as Graeme Dunk hypothesises:

'A defence posture based primarily on distrust and on the need to maintain a substantial military capability may become a self-fulfilling prophecy, with that posture intimidating and ultimately provoking other countries to similarly reduce their perceived vulnerabilities. A situation of no direct military threat should therefore allow real policy alternatives with respect to security and force development to be considered.'¹¹

But if these are the benefits to be gained by force structuring for security, will it require massive change within the ADF? I would argue that no, it will not require a massive restructuring of the ADF, although it will require a fundamental change in the way that our leaders see the future role of the military. No longer will our service chiefs and senior strategists be able to think solely in military terms, because a strategy of security and not of defence assumes social, political, economic and cultural dimensions. The military will become just one level of a cooperative venture for security, with other critical roles being played by diplomats, economists, and indeed virtually all Australians. Gareth Evans, in a Ministerial Statement entitled *Australia's Regional Security* published in 1989¹² argues that there are seven contributing factors that promote Australia's security interests:

- a. Our military capability.
- b. Our politico military capability (military diplomacy).
- c. Diplomacy.
- d. Economic links.
- e. Development assistance.
- f. Non-military threat assistance (Assistance with health, pollution, population control, etc).
- g. Exchanges of people and ideas.

These then are the areas that we need to focus on at the strategic level, but what do the Services need to do to force structure for security?

The answer is to force structure specifically for peacekeeping. This does not mean in the semi-token fashion that we have gone about it in the past, where we attempt to 'get the best of all worlds'. Despite what Robert Ray and other senior analysts may suggest, a defacto approach to peacekeeping, whereby we force structure for the defence of Australia, and then cobble together peacekeeping units on an opportunity basis, is not completely successful. Brigadier John Wilson, on his return from Bosnia, commented on this approach, and remarked that:

'As far as training is concerned, the Army has relied on the general professional training provided for our officers and men in committing forces to UN operations. This has not been misplaced confidence as from my own experience Australia's

officers have performed well as military observers and are highly regarded by their peers and commanders ... Nevertheless, there are techniques commonly used in peacekeeping operations which require adaption from our normal operational methods ... We thus need to look clearly at the particular demands of peacekeeping and incorporate them into our regular training. Field exercises with peacekeeping scenarios would not be wasted. We have also started to look at peacekeeping doctrine - a long overdue and positive initiative.

'From the Australian Army's view, peacekeeping service provides invaluable experience under operational conditions. But if we are to continue to contribute to international order then we must seriously consider using peacekeeping as a resource determinant and introduce appropriate training for our soldiers for the special demands of peacekeeping.'¹³

This advice, from one of Australia's most experienced peacekeepers, is sound. As the complexity of peacekeeping operations increases, i.e. from the relatively simple provision of military observers in Lebanon, to the dangerous and unpredictable Bosnian conflict, the less likely a 'gifted amateur' is to succeed. Troops sent on such operations need to be specifically trained, equipped and prepared for peacekeeping.

The United States' recent experience in Haiti indicates that combat-ready troops are not always the most appropriate to send into such situations. Troops trained for, and expecting to, encounter strong opposition flounder when these expectations are undermined. The traditional requirements of soldiering, namely controlled aggression, concentration of force, use of surprise, etc arguably become subservient to the skills of neutrality, diplomacy and tact. The graduates of various staff courses find that the tasks they are assigned are quite different to those that they have been trained to undertake. Gone are the categorical 'seize this objective' and substituted instead are the more ambiguous tasks of:

- a. Maintaining ceasefires,
- b. Inspecting demilitarised zones,
- c. Repairing civil infrastructure,
- d. Protecting relief convoys,
- e. Resettling refugees,
- f. Providing medical aid, and
- g. Coordinating operations with non-Government organisations.

However, in naval terms, peacekeeping requirements would not be so different from the operations we currently undertake. Although there are fewer UN operations with a naval component to relate to, it appears that many of the roles expected of our Navy would remain the same with a peacekeeping oriented military stance. The protection of Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) and convoys would remain, as

would the need to retain a demonstrated anti-submarine, anti-air, anti-surface and mine warfare capability. Areas where we would need to direct more attention would be in our sealift capability (to deploy our peacekeeping troops to where they were needed), in anti-piracy operations, and most importantly, in operations best defined as 'confidence building measures'.

To a limited extent, Australia is beginning to force structure for peacekeeping. The establishment of the ADF Peacekeeping Centre at Williamstown in 1993 is a step in the right direction. The Centre conducted its first course in mid 1993 and held an international seminar in early 1994. The focus of these courses is on pre-deployment training for Australian contingents being despatched on UN operations, and on the operation of UN Headquarters for higher-ranking ADF personnel taking up senior positions with the UN.

However, if we are to embark on such a concerted voyage toward peace, we need to consider carefully the arguments aligned against force structuring for security. Understandably, the military establishment see force structuring in this way as a dangerous trade-off - greater security, but weaker defence. Major General Robert L. Ord III, an American infantryman, sounds this note of caution:

'As we move into this era of increased coalition operations, some may suggest we make fundamental changes to our force structure specifically for peacekeeping operations. But many who have commanded peacekeeping operations have told us that the best peace enforcement forces are those that are organised and trained for war ... In simple terms peacekeeping operations can be seen as war fought within a different set of ROE [Rules of Engagement]. We must not be fooled into believing that peacekeeping is anything other than war because the word peace appears in the name.'¹⁴

This is an important point to make, and it highlights the importance of training and equipping our peacekeeping forces for the potential wide variety of roles that they must fulfil in modern day peacekeeping operations. Obviously, to implement such change will require a paradigm shift in the way that Australians, and particularly our senior strategists, view our military forces. Such an approach will challenge our traditional military values, and may in fact be too ambitious an undertaking to contemplate at this point in time. But we should not reject this approach out of hand. The future of the world could well lie in the success of the United Nations to bring about, if not worldwide peace, then at least sustained economic growth and a reduction in global suspicion and uncertainty. Australia's geographic, cultural and economic position in South-East Asia and the Pacific means that we are in a unique and enviable position to influence the development of our region. Even

though a shift from a 'defence policy' to a 'security policy' would require a fundamental change in the way we perceive our military's roles, this shift in policy would not require such great change at a force structure level. Fighting wars and keeping peace are not mutually exclusive in force structure terms, indeed many of the requirements overlap and contend. Many of the Navy's current roles would remain the same, with the biggest change coming about in train-

ing and the increase in 'confidence building measures'. Importantly in a time of widespread peace, at least regionally, when Australia does not foresee any direct military threat, a military establishment structured for peacekeeping operations would be more easily justified to the general public. It is time that we stopped paying 'lip service' to the ideals of global security, and took some practical steps to lead our regional neighbours on a voyage in search of peace.

- ¹ Smith, Hugh 'Prospects for Peacekeeping' in *Building on the Cambodian Experience* p213.
- ² *Strategic Review* 93 p15.
- ³ Dibb, Paul *Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities*.
- ⁴ *Force Structure Review 1991*, p36.
- ⁵ *Strategic Review* 93 p46.
- ⁶ *Ibid* p46.
- ⁷ Mellor, Bill, Colonel 'The Australian Experience in Somalia' in *Peacekeeping: Challenges for the Future* p66.
- ⁸ Smith, Hugh *Peacekeeping: Challenges for the Future* pxi.

- ⁹ Dunk, Graeme 'Security or Defence? Force Development in the Absence of a Direct Military Threat' *Journal of the Australian Naval Institute*.
- ¹⁰ *Strategic Review* 93 p15.
- ¹¹ Dunk, Graeme *opcit* p5.
- ¹² Evans, Gareth *Australia's Regional Security* p15.
- ¹³ Wilson, John, Brigadier, 'Lessons from UN Operations in Yugoslavia' in *Peacekeeping: Challenges for the Future* p121.
- ¹⁴ Ord, Robert L. III, Major General 'The US Army Approach to Peacekeeping Support Operations' in *Peacekeeping: Challenges for the Future* pp141/144.



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THE UNIVERSITY OF
NEW SOUTH WALES



Not what you thought...

In what is more than a book review, GEOFFREY BEWLEY looks at a work that sheds new light on the naval side of the American Civil War.

History is not what you thought," 1066 And All That tells us. "It is what you can remember. All other history defeats itself."

This is sadder, harder, truer than anything Professor Manning Clark ever pushed at us. Lots and lots of history, more and more all the time, and most people don't remember nearly enough of it. Worse still, some of the stuff they do remember was never true in the first place.

Often even the best intentioned historians aren't much help. Take the long, serious rather good TV series on the American Civil War, shown here on SBS a couple of times. Maybe it gave a bit too much time to the thoughts of anxious wives at home, not quite enough to the thoughts of chaps like Lee and Grant. Still, it looked to be well researched and pretty much on the level.

Then it showed the naval actions in Hampton Roads. South and north, shipyards raced to complete the ironclad steam battery *Virginia*, rebuilt from the burned steam frigate *Merrimac*, and the ironclad turret ship *Monitor*. *Virginia* made her first sortie while *Monitor* was still struggling southward, and she smashed up the Union's blockaders. Next day *Monitor* arrived, and the ironclads fought their clumsy but historic duel.

"Both sides set to work building more ironclads," the narrator told us, "while Europe watched in worried fascination. From the moment the two ships opened fire that Sunday morning, every other navy on earth was obsolete."

Confident, conclusive, and wrong all through. It's what most people, most non-experts, perhaps even most experts think. There's a mistake in every line, though.

Actually, at the time of the Hampton Roads match, both sides were already building more ironclads. Europe watched in fascination, but not too worried, because at that date the European powers already had six sea-going ironclads completed, nine more launched and more than thirty still under construction. Nearly every one of them outmatched *Monitor* and *Virginia*. The Europeans had already made their own wooden fleets obsolete.

So, *Monitor* and *Virginia* weren't the first ironclads, by a long shot. Nor were they the first ironclads to see action. These were French floating batteries that at-

tacked Russian forts in the Crimea in 1855. What they were were the first ironclad ships to fight one another.

Why didn't the makers of the TV series get this right? Because they were general historians, not naval specialists. Why didn't they check? because they didn't think they needed to. They'd seen it told that way so often before. Wrong every time, but they'd never been told that.

It's not surprising Americans are happy to believe their countrymen built and fought the first ironclads. Most of them are still happy to believe Charles Lindbergh was the first man to fly the Atlantic. It is a bit surprising, though, that the rest of the world is happy to go on letting them get away with it.


History is what you can remember, and the naval side of the American Civil War isn't actually very well remembered. Everybody's at least heard of the *Monitor* and *Virginia*, even if they wrongly think of the *Virginia* as the *Merrimac*. Readers of naval history in bulk will know of the Confederate raiding cruisers and primitive submarines. Americans will recall somebody or other saying, "Damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead." And that's about it.

Nobody remembers the other actions, nobody knows much about the ships. *Conway's All The World's Fighting Ships, 1860-1905*, does well by the Union's monitors, cruisers and gunboats, but it rules out nearly all the other ironclads on both sides as river craft, outside its scope. *Monitor, Virginia* and the submarines are the only vessels to rate much technical description.

General histories by non-specialists tell us even less. Writers mention paddle steamers, gunboats, rams, ironclads, without ever describing them, without ever explaining that sometimes a single ship can be classed two or three different ways. It makes for confusing reading.

Not if you have *Warships and Naval Battles Of The U.S. Civil War*, by Tony Gibbons, however. This book covers the actual fighting fairly briefly, although it still tells more than most other books. It covers the technical side in detail, with more than 250 illustrations, and with notes treating any fighting craft bigger than a rowing boat.

Tony Gibbons is an artist, and this book is all illustration, no photos, not many plans. It may sound a bit




USS Rattler, ex Florence Miller, 165 tons, two 30-pounder Parrot rifles, four 24-pounder smooth-bores. She was a river steamer converted into a "tinclad" gunboat, with thin iron plating over thick timber on the bow casemate. In September 1863, her captain and 16 crew were captured while ashore attending church. Later she went aground, and the Confederates burned her.



CSS Milledgeville, tonnage not given, 135 ft. by 35 ft. 3 in. by 9 ft. Four guns, not specified, perhaps never installed. Like most Confederate ironclads, she was a reduced copy of the famous Virginia, with shallow draught for coastal and river service. Milledgeville was launched at Savannah, Georgia, in December 1864, just before Union troops captured the city. She was burned at anchor, still unfinished, so she wouldn't fall into their hands.


Dunderberg, Harvest Moon, Kalamazoo, Kickapoo, Qzark, Spuyten Duyvil, Tallapoosa, Winoski, Yazoo) and the South (names like Beauregard, Florida, Georgia, General Lee, Stonewall, McRae, Velocity.)

It turns out the *Monitor* and its family were just the tip of the iceberg, as far as the North's fleet was concerned. Mr. Lincoln's commanders could also deploy a handful of broadside ironclads, a staggering assortment of armoured and unarmoured shallow-draught gunboats, a weird collection of armoured paddle



Two Confederate blockade-runners. Stag, top, belonged to the Confederate government. She was bought on the stocks at Liverpool, but too late for any major alterations.

Banshee, below, displaced 500 tons, and measured 214 ft. by 20 ft. by 8 ft. She was good for 11 knots, not awfully fast, but enough to see her through eight successful passages before she was caught. Later purpose-built blockade runners were reputed to be good for 20 knots.



CSS Pioneer, submarine boat, 4 tons, 34 ft. by 4 ft. by 4 ft. Launched as a privateer in 1862, to try to sink Union ships for a bounty offer. Ran trials, but scuttled to prevent capture before she saw any service. Now in the Louisiana State Museum.

steamers, a couple of even weirder craft perhaps best counted as stern-wheel monitors, and a couple of armoured gunboats with turrets.

The South's navy, reputedly more makeshift, actually looked more uniform. This was because Southern naval architects went for simplicity first, and steam casemate battery ironclads like the *Virginia* were the simplest type around. Otherwise they fielded a handful of odd paddle ironclads and an assortment of sketchily armoured paddle gunboats. The South's best

ships were those they ordered abroad in England and France, and only a few of them ever actually came to fly the Confederate flag.

The South was always short of armour plate, and Southern builders made do with boiler plate and railroad iron. The North sometimes seemed to have too much. The twenty 1175-ton monitors of the Casco class came out 300 tons or more overweight. They were designed for a freeboard of 15 inches, 3 inches less than the original Monitor. When *Chimo*, the first of them, was launched, she floated with a freeboard of just 3 inches, even before her turret and stores were aboard. More than a million dollars went on hasty reconstructions, but the class never saw any serious service.

The Southern builders sometimes used cotton for protection, because they could get hold of cotton a lot more easily than they could get hold of iron. The *Governor Moore* of the Louisiana State Navy had cotton bales piled amidships to cover her engines and boilers. The *Stonewall Jackson* was a slightly more scientific design, with cotton bales compressed between pine bulkheads and a 1-inch armour skin over her bow.

A few of the North's big side-wheel gunboats had rubber armour. A coat of inch-thick India-rubber was fixed over the wooden shell of the casemates, with a shell of 1-inch iron plating on top. Perhaps it was meant to make rebel shot and shell bounce off. It soon rotted, however, and apparently it was never tested in action.

When you read of Civil War fighting afloat, you find lots of ironclads and gunboats mentioned as rams. When you see them illustrated, you realise that's the loosest possible use of the term. Any odd steamer was likely to be built up with iron and timber about the bow, even if it actually steamed at a walking pace and steered like a pig on ice.

But there are side, plan and bow views of the CSS *Manassas*, a serious sort of ram and a great influence on later designs everywhere. She was a converted tug, a former icebreaker, cut down and plated over so she looked like a huge iron cigar floating low in the water with a huge funnel on top, and one gun firing forward from a single narrow port. She fought at New Orleans, ramming the steam sloops USS *Richmond* and USS *Brooklyn* but failing to sink them. She blew up after running aground, disabled by gunfire.

There are other weird ships. The ironclad USS *Benton* was 202 feet long with a 72-foot beam, built out of a catamaran-hulled snag boat. Her big stern wheel turned in the gap between the hulls. The USS *Roanoke* was a cut down screw frigate with six big guns in three turrets, two odd guns in each, no two turrets

armed alike. The USS *Osage* was a sort of turtle-backed stern wheel monitor, with a big twin turret right forward and a huge armoured housing like a flat-topped cone covering the paddle wheel right aft.

Apart from the *Manassas*, the South's ironclads weren't so imaginative. Southern designers had no time for extravagant experiments. They had enough trouble getting ordinary ships ready. They had to battle shortages of armour plate, heavy guns, engines and boilers, and skilled labour to bolt it all together. Lots of half-built ships had to be blown up or burned when the North's forces overran the yards. The South's people deserve great credit for getting as much done as they did.

Nearly all the monitors, casemate ironclads, gunboats and rams were slow, tubby, shallow-draught, low-freeboard harbour and river craft. It's true that at the end of the war, the reconstituted U.S.A. had more ironclad ships than all the rest of the world put together. It's just as true, though, that nearly all of them were ships that would have had trouble getting safely from Circular Quay to Manly on a blowy day.

The seagoing cruisers and gunboats of both sides look more like ships as we know them, and they're mostly shown in profile. There are the famous Rebel raiders, *Shenandoah*, which visited Melbourne, and *Alabama*, sunk in a duel off Cherbourg. We find the corvette *Louisiana*, ordered from a French yard by the South for a commerce raider, but never delivered, sold instead to Prussia, and going on to serve as a Prussian raider against the French in 1870.

A few pages at the back are given to a selection of blockade runners. At first all sorts of merchant ships tried to run the North's blockade, with military supplies and other needs from Europe for the Confederacy. The slower and the less handy tended to be nabbed by patrolling Northern cruisers. As the war went on, specially long, narrow, shallow-draught, high speed cargo ships were built in Britain for this service.

The blockade runners aren't nearly as well known as the monitors, the raiders and the submarines. But they were a fascinating exercise in evolutionary steamship design, driven by the rule of the survival of the fastest. They may have done more for technical progress than all the unseaworthy makeshifts and experimental false starts in the fighting fleets. The light-draught paddler *Lizzie*, for instance, was 230 feet long with a 22-foot beam, near the proportions of a new destroyer 30 years later. She was said to be good for 20 knots, at a time when a fast cruiser might have made 15.

Gibbons shows four Civil War submarines. Two are famous, CSS *Hunley* sank a sloop with a spar torpedo, after drowning several of her own crews in training, and CSS *David* nearly did the same for the broadside

ironclad USS *New Ironsides*. Then there's the North's experimental *Intelligent Whale*, and the South's privateer submarine *Pioneer*.

There are a few tiny lapses. *New Ironsides* is shown with differently formed upper works in different illustrations. maybe she was rebuilt between battles. The curious spar-torpedo vessel *Spuyten Duyvil* is briefly described in the end list, but she's not actually shown. Maybe no plans or views of her have survived.

The notes also cover the Stevens battery, a steam ironclad laid down as early as 1854 but never completed. The work went ahead very slowly, the designer Stevens died, the design was changed, enlarged, changed and changed again. Even the panics of the Civil War didn't speed things along. The builders ran out of money in 1874, and the hulk was broken up on the slip in 1880.

The Stevens battery saga seems to have been a case of everything that could go wrong, going wrong. The story of its failing struggle toward salt water is probably worth a book on its own. We should all hope some keen American will have a shot at it one day. It's a pity Tony Gibbons didn't put in a picture of at least one of its proposed incarnations.

The Stevens battery seems to have been the deadeast of evolutionary dead ends. Most of the other Civil War ironclads weren't much better, though. The North's ships routinely failed to make their designed speeds, by margins of up to 50 per cent. *New Ironsides*, designed for 9.4 knots, made about 6.5. The nine Canonicus class monitors, designed for 13 knots, made 8 or 9. The double-turret monitor *Onondaga* was designed for a more realistic 9 knots, but she still only managed 6 or 7.

Nobody seemed to mind much. The South's ironclads were mostly even poorer performers. The big casemate

ironclad *Tennessee* had exceptionally weak, primitive engines. Some of the gears connecting them to her propeller shaft had wooden teeth. The best ships of the war were those built for the South in England and France, but most of them were never delivered.

So, American writers on the naval side of the Civil War generally overstate their case. At least, where they state, they overstate. On the other hand, there's much, much more that they generally don't get round to stating at all. Gibbons' book does a solid job on the stuff everybody knows already. It sheds a blaze of light into the maze of deep, dark, forgotten corners.

The most surprising part is, Gibbons is English, not American. All the naval writers and artists in America have had more than a century to tackle something like this. Apparently they've never got round to it. Great credit to Gibbons. Great shame to them.

Gibbons' book is splendid, but it's not exhaustive. It covers the technical side apparently as far as the often sketchy surviving data will allow. It doesn't cover the operational side in great detail. There's still room for a large-scale Civil War naval history covering policy, strategy and tactics. It should treat the fighting afloat as an issue in itself, not just as a sideshow to whatever Lee and Grant were up to. That's probably a job for an American. A job for an Englishman would be a large-scale account of the Crimean steam batteries, which has been overdue for even longer. Maybe Tony Gibbons will take care of that too, presently. Meanwhile, *Warships And Naval Battles Of The U.S. Civil War* is something to be grateful for.

Geoff Bewley found his copy in a Sydney city bookshop, but it is not stocked very widely. The publisher is Dragon Works, of Surrey, UK. ISBN 1 85028 094 0. — Ed.



Letters to the Editor (from page 38)

Senate remains uncertain. Whether the United States will continue to be able to exercise rights, previously part of customary law but now enshrined in the Convention, if it is not a signatory to that Convention, is a moot point.

e. We are probably a very long way from an obligation for warships to seek permission to enter an EEZ (see a. above). Because, as Scott points out, UNCLOS III is a very comprehensive agreement, it took over 20 years of tortuous negotiations before it came into force. Significant amendment is likely to take just as long, and the leading maritime nations will be no more ready in the future than in the recent past to surrender their traditional rights of unhindered navigation. For as long as any of us are serving, this concern is liable to remain a purely academic one.

The actual limitations placed upon naval forces by UNCLOS III are therefore relatively modest. Indeed, in some areas the Convention represents a reversal of the trend of 'creeping jurisdiction'. There is little doubt, however, that several states will be tempted to claim rights in their territorial waters and EEZs for which there is no legal basis in the Law of the Sea. (Some, for example Iran and Libya, already make such claims). The navies of the advanced industrialised nations such as Australia (much as it pains a Pom to call Australians 'advanced'), may well find themselves being obliged to pose a physical challenge to such claims.

LCDR Scott is to be commended on his thorough coverage of the implications for a navy of UNCLOS III. I hope he will take my points as they are intended, as a clarification and not a refutation of his conclusions. I wish more RN officers of our seniority were as thoughtful about our profession as the pages of the Journal indicates RAN officers are.

Lieutenant Commander J R Stocker BA RN
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The Editor
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
Dear Sir,

I have just read the February/April 1995 edition of the Journal and as always found it interesting and informative. Of particular interest to me with my well-known (to the editor at least) fascination with things

off-beat in nautical history was Geoffery Bewley's excellent article on 19th Century steam powered rams.

I confess that I had never heard of the Dutch ships covered in the article and thus was delighted with the article. On the other hand, I know quite a bit about another ram which Mr Bewley mentioned in passing, the former Peruvian and now Chilean ironclad ram *Huascar*. This ship deserves an article of its own but in capsule she was purchased for the Peruvian Navy in 1866, became a pawn in various internal Peruvian power struggles and was eventually captured by the Chileans in an epic battle on 8 October 1879 during the Pacific War. She is today both a museum ship and a commissioned vessel of the Chilean Navy, flying the flag of the officer commanding the Chilean naval base at Talcahuano, in much the same way as the Port Commander at Portsmouth flies his flag aboard HMS *Victory*.

Of particular interest are a couple of lasts and one first connected with *Huascar*, namely:

a. she carried out the last recorded successful ram attack by a purpose built ram ship in history when she rammed and sank (after three attempts) the Chilean sloop *Esmeralda* on 20 May 1879;

b. she fought an engagement with the British ships HMS *Shah* and *Amethyst* on 29 May 1877 which marked the last occasion that a wooden ship of the Royal Navy (*Shah*) fought an iron clad and in which a Royal Navy wooden ship equipped with muzzle-loading trunnion guns (*Amethyst*) went into action; and

c. she survived the first torpedo attack in history when HMS *Shah* fired a Whitehead torpedo at her in the first (unsuccessful) recorded use of this weapon in history.

Huascar is part of the proud naval traditions of both Peru and Chile. She is inextricably linked with the memories of the two great naval heroes of those countries, Commandante Arturo Prat (Chile) and Almirante Miguel Grau (Peru) and joint commemorative ceremonies are held on her decks every year.

I do not forward this information to detract in any way from Mr Bewley's first class article, but merely to add another dimension to the tale which I am sure Mr Bewley would have put in if he had the space.

Graham Wilson
Warrant Officer Class Two
Australian Intelligence Corps



NAVY BLUE ANZACS

The little-known involvement of the RAN in the Gallipoli campaign.

by

Lieutenant Greg Swinden, RAN

Mention Gallipoli to any Australian and they will immediately think of bronzed ANZAC's storming ashore at ANZAC Cove on 25 April 1915, Simpson and his donkey evacuating wounded, or the heavy fighting at the Battles of Lone Pine or the Neck. Few, if any, think of the RAN's small but significant role in this campaign.

The RAN had two units involved in the Gallipoli campaign. These were the submarine AE2 and the Royal Australian Naval Bridging Train (RANBT). Both served with distinction and ironically the AE2 was the first Australian unit to go into action at Gallipoli and the RANBT the last Australian unit to leave the Peninsula.

On 24 April the Australian submarine AE2 under Lieutenant Commander H.H.G.D Stoker RN was ordered to penetrate the Dardanelles, a narrow heavily mined strip of water separating the Gallipoli peninsula from the rest of Turkey. Stoker's orders were to create havoc behind the Turkish lines whilst the ANZACs were landing and "to run amok generally". Although AE2's officers and senior sailors were on loan from the Royal Navy the majority of her crew were Australian born.

At 0230 on the 25th AE2 began her approach to the Dardanelles and after several tense hours including being fired at by Turkish shore batteries and snagging the mooring wires of several mines the AE2 made it through to the sea of Marmara, thus becoming the first Allied submarine to breach the Turkish defences.

AE2 began to run amok generally and fire her torpedoes at a variety of targets. At one point a Turkish battleship was bombarding ANZAC positions when AE2's periscope was sighted approaching the ship. The Turkish ship ceased firing and ran for safety just at the time its shelling was becoming most effective. Meanwhile, ashore on the peninsula, things were not going to plan. The Turkish defence was particularly strong, the Australians had suffered heavy casualties and many troops were lost or disorganised. Serious consideration was being given to evacuating the ANZACs.

The British Commander, General Hamilton, was considering the potential evacuation when news of AE2's penetration of the Dardanelles was received. Hamilton immediately discarded all thoughts of evacuation

and immediately sent the following signal to the troops ashore: "Your news is indeed serious, but dig yourself in and stick it out. It would take at least two days to re-embark you. Meanwhile the Australian submarine has got up through the Narrows and torpedoed a Gunboat at Chanak. Make an appeal to your men to make the supreme effort to hold their ground. You have got through the difficult business. Now all you have to do is dig, dig, dig until you are safe"

What could have been a short three day raid became an eight month campaign and cost over 8000 Australian lives. If not for AE2's actions it is highly likely that the ANZACs would have been evacuated and the legend of Gallipoli would have been still born.

AE2 continued her attacks on Turkish ships but on 30 April was attacked and sunk by the Turkish torpedo boat Sultan Hissar. Her crew of 32 survived the sinking. However, all were taken prisoner. During the next three years of captivity four men from AE2 died from disease and ill-treatment.

Although the RAN's presence at Gallipoli had ended with the loss of AE2, it was not to be long before it was back in a role that was just as unlikely and just as unexpected.

The Royal Australian Naval Bridging Train was formed in Melbourne in February 1915 under the command of Lieutenant Commander Leighton Seymour Bracegirdle (later Rear Admiral Bracegirdle). The Bridging Train consisted mainly of Naval Reservists who could not be employed in RAN warships. They wore Light Horse uniforms but with anchor badges replacing the Army rising sun badges and Naval badges of rank. The Bridging Train was organised as a horse-drawn engineering unit and it was originally planned they would serve on the Western Front in France with the British Army. Like their ANZAC cousins they were diverted to the Mediterranean theatre of war.

Embarking in the troopship *Port Macquarie* in early June 1915 the RANBT arrived at the Greek island at Mudros in late July. The unit's horses were left behind and on 8 August they landed at Suvla Bay (a few miles north of ANZAC Cove) with the British IX Army Corps.

For the next five months the 400 men of the Bridging Train carried out a variety of engineering tasks at Suvla. These included building and maintaining wharves, unloading stores, salvaging vessels that had run aground, control and storage of engineering equipment and control of water supplies for the British forces. They also ran a blacksmith and carpentry workshop and were prominent in assisting with the evacuation of wounded. Based at "Kangaroo Beach" Suvla Bay the Bridging Train came under regular heavy Turkish shell fire; four men were killed and over 60 wounded.

Several sailors went Absent Without Leave and went up to the front line to assist the Tommies fight Johnny Turk. Two sailors from the Bridging Train rescued a British soldier pinned down by Turkish sniper fire, but when returning him to his unit requested that no one be told as they would get into trouble for being absent without leave.

During their five months on the Peninsula many Bridging Train men came down with illness including jaundice, paratyphoid, pneumonia and pleurisy. Others sustained injuries and blood poisoning caused by the essentially heavy and dangerous engineering work they were involved in.

During November the weather at Gallipoli began to deteriorate and heavy snow fell. Trenches were flooded, and men and equipment were washed away. Many British soldiers came down with pneumonia and frostbite and had to be evacuated. The Bridging Train sailors became stretcher bearers carrying the sick to the beach for evacuation.

By December 1915 the decision had been reached to evacuate the peninsula. On 17 December the bulk of the RANBT left the Peninsula after destroying stores and equipment that could not be removed.

Fifty men of the RANBT under Sub-Lieutenant Charles Hicks RANR remained ashore to assist the evacuation of the British rearguard. Several days of heavy shelling by the Turks preceded the evacuation and the Bridging Train detachment spent many hours repairing the wharves.

At 0430 on 20 December the last British troops filed over the wharves into waiting lighters. Hicks and his men joined them, and as the lighters pulled away from Suvla Bay their departure was silhouetted by the fire from the petrol soaked stores burning ashore. The Bridging Train and RAN's service at Gallipoli had come to an end. The last ANZAC's had left the Peninsula at 0400 on the 20th, thus the Navy had been "first in and last out".

Lieutenant Greg Swinden is co-author of "First in! - Last out! — The Navy at Gallipoli", the story of RAN's involvement in the Gallipoli campaign.



LEAD KINDLY LIGHT

The History, Organisation and Operations of the Corporation of Trinity House

by

WO2 Graham Wilson

Australian Intelligence Corps

In the very early hours of June 6, 1944, a fleet of mine sweepers departed British ports and headed for the French coast, their task to sweep the seas clear of mines for the following invasion fleet. Hard on the heels of the mine sweepers came, not the invasion fleet, but a small flotilla of eight specialist merchant ships.

Although British merchant ships, these vessels did not fly the familiar "Red Duster" of Britain's Merchant Navy. Instead they flew at the stern an ensign consisting of a red field with the Union Flag in the canton and the field defaced by a depiction of four Elizabethan sailing ships. At the head of each foremast proudly fluttered the White Ensign of HM Fleet. The ships were all support vessels of the Corporation of Trinity House. Six of them were Buoy Vessels whose task this June morning was to lay and service buoys marking the swept channels to the invasion beaches. The other two, THV JUNO and KANSAS, were Light Vessels whose task was to mark the seaward ends of the approach channels to the beaches. Trinity House's contribution to the invasion of Europe was to guide and safeguard their fellow mariners, as the Brethren of the Corporation had been doing in peace and war for the previous 430 years. They performed their task so well, at the cost of the loss of one of their ships to enemy action, that the Allied invasion fleet commander, Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, singled the Brethren out for special praise.

Aim

Lighthouses and other aids to navigation have been built and maintained since man first went to sea. Each country in the world has a "Lighthouse Authority", i.e. the organisation which is responsible for the erection, emplacement and maintenance of lighthouses, lightships, beacons and other aids to navigation. Here in Australia for instance, lighthouses are the responsibility of the Australian Maritime Safety Agency. In the USA they are the responsibility of the US Coast Guard.

The aim of this article is to outline the history, organisation and operations of that most unique of maritime organisations, the Corporation of the Worship-



ful Brethren of Trinity House, the organisation which is the General Lighthouse Authority for England, Wales, the Channel Islands and Gibraltar. The article will also look at some of the ancient traditions and prerogatives of the Corporation.

Background

Since time immemorial, landsmen have lit beacons to guide and safeguard those on the sea. We know that the Greeks, Romans, Carthaginians and Phoenicians all set up systems of beacons to mark safe harbours and warn mariners of dangers. The importance of these beacons in the ancient world can be judged by the fact that a lighthouse, the Pharos at Alexandria, was listed by the historian Antipater of Sidon in the 2nd Century BC as one of the Wonders of the World.

The Roman system stretched from Britain to Asia Minor and was the most complex and comprehensive of the ancient world. It was not to be rivalled until the system set up by the Hanseatic League in the 13th Century. As the traders of the League began to spread their activities further and further from their headquar-

ters in Hamburg, they established a chain of beacons with permanent keepers which stretched from Germany, down through Scandinavia and into France and the Low Countries. As these beacons were wood fired and operated year round, provision of adequate stocks of fuel must have represented an immense logistic effort.

The first systematic system of lights in the UK was that of the Romans. Following the Roman withdrawal from Britain, the establishment and maintenance of beacons, light houses and other aids to navigation became very much a local thing with no real system or organisation. As years went by, many, if not most, lighthouses, as well as pilotage services, passed into private hands with the owners operating their establishments more with an eye to profit rather than as a real service to mariners.

Trinity House

This was the situation in 1514 when the Association or Guild of Shipmen and Mariners approached His Majesty King Henry VIII and petitioned him for a charter. The Guild was a semi-religious body with largely benevolent or charitable objects and is believed to have been established in the 13th Century. While this cannot be confirmed, it was certain that the Guild had been established long enough to own a Hall and Almshouses at Deptford, and sufficiently important enough to be able to petition the King.

The Guild's petition was designed to regularise pilotage and training of seamen and advised the king that a scarcity of Mariners was likely to result from the practice of pilotage in rivers by inexperienced young men who were "unwilling to take the labour and adventure of learning the shipmen's craft on the high seas", and drew his attention to the dangers of allowing foreigners, including "Scots, Flemings and Frenchmen to learn the secrets of the King's streams".

On 20th May, 1514, the Royal Charter authorised "oure trewe and faithfull subjects, Shipmen and Mariners of this our Realm of England" in honour of "the most blessed trinitie and Saint Clement Confessor", to "begyn of new and erecte and establysh a Guyild or Brotherhood perpetually of themselves or other persons, as well men as women, whatsoever they be in the parish Church of Deptford Stronde in our County of Kent". Management of the new guild was placed in the hands of a Master, four Wardens and eight Assistants, under the title of "The Master, Wardens and Assistants of the Guild or Fraternitie of the most glorious and blessed trinitie and Saint Clement in the parish Church of Deptford Stronde in the County of Kent".

The original home of the Corporation was near the Deptford Naval Yard and the Corporation's histori-

ans believe that the Yard was entrusted to the direction of Trinity House, with authority for superintendence of Navy Stores and Provisions. Whether this is true or not, it is certainly a fact that the first Master of the Corporation after the granting of the Charter was Sir Thomas Spert, formerly the sailing expert responsible for navigation in the *Mary Rose* in which ship he was Master on commissioning in 1511; Sir Thomas later served in *Henri Grace A Dieu*, Henry's famous "Great Ship". In 1514, the year of the Charter, he was appointed by the King to the office of Comptroller of the Navy — a position he held concurrently with that of Master of Trinity House.

Queen Elizabeth I, in 1566, approved an Act of Parliament authorising the Corporation to erect: "such and so many beacons, marks and signs for the sea in such place or places of the sea-shore and uplands near the sea-coasts or forelands of the sea whereby the dangers may be avoided and escaped and ships the better come unto their ports without peril". In 1594 the Lord High Admiral surrendered to Her Majesty the rights of beaconage, buoyage and ballastage vested in him with the recommendation, duly adopted, that these rights be bestowed on Trinity House.

The rights of beaconage included, of course, lighthouses, but a long interval was to elapse before the Corporation had all major English lighthouses permanently under its control. This was due to the practice of the Crown issuing patents or grants of Lighthouses to private individuals who, on payment of a rent, had a right to collect the tolls. These private lights varied greatly in efficiency and in some cases were poorly organised. Instances are on record of licensees, for reasons of economy, comfort and convenience, erecting the light above their own homes in the middle of town where they were well nigh invisible from the sea. Despite such abuses, as well as general inefficiency, it was not until 1836 that Trinity House was empowered to buy out all those private lights remaining at a cost (aided by a loan from the State) of nearly 1,200,000 Pounds. As an example of the profitability of privately operated lights, when the High and Low Lights in Harwich, built in 1818, were taken over by Trinity House in 1836, the annual port dues amounted to 10,000 Pounds while the annual running costs for the lights, including licence fees, was between 500 and 1000 Pounds — a tidy profit indeed!

The original Royal Charter of 1514 gave Trinity House general powers to regulate pilotage and in 1604 James I conferred on the Corporation rights concerning the compulsory pilotage of shipping and the exclusive right to licence Pilots in the River Thames, that river being as important an avenue of entry and exit to the kingdom as Heathrow Airport is today. The Trinity House Outport Pilot Districts were established by George III in 1808, but many of the districts had existed long before that time.

Subsequent to the original Charter, a number of other Royal Charters effected the Corporation. One of the most important was that issued by James II in 1685 which defined the constitution of the Corporation. This was vital, as by the 17th Century the sphere of the Corporation's activities had become so wide that it would be difficult to isolate any maritime matter in which the Brethren did not have some authority or interest. It was the business of Trinity House to erect beacons, to lay buoys, grant certificates to Pilots, settle Pilotage rates, examine and recommend Masters for the Royal Navy (until 1874 they examined officers of the Navigation Branch, formerly known as Masters and Mates), and occasionally to act as an auxiliary press gang. On top of this, the Brethren also examined the Mathematical Scholars of Christ's Hospital and appointed British Consuls in foreign ports. A very wide brief!

The Brethren were also liable to serve the Crown at sea. Notable instances of this include the meeting of the Spanish Armada when Captain Robert Salmon, then Master of Trinity House, wrote to Lord Burghley informing him that there were "30 sail of merchant ships which might be fitted within four days to join the Lord admiral". He was ordered by Lord Henry Seymour to go with his galley to guard the mouth of the Thames. Captain William Borough, Master in 1585, wrote that a fleet could be sent from Flushing of "30 or 40 good ships" to assist Lord Henry and enclosed a chart of the entrance of the River Thames and Medway.

During the Nore Mutiny in 1797, the Elder Brethren, almost in view of mutinous fleet, removed or destroyed every beacon and buoy that could guide the fleet's passage out to the sea. In 1803, when a French invasion was imminent, the Corporation undertook the defence of the entrance to the Thames by manning and commanding a cordon of ten fully-armed frigates mounting a total of 200 guns moored across the river at the Lower Hope. The cordon was manned with an adequate number of seamen and gunners for the defence of the river and the destruction, if necessary, of all channel marks which might guide the enemy. The ordnance was manned by gunners of the exotically named Trinity House Royal Volunteer Artillery (THRVA). At this time the Master of Trinity House was the Right Hon. William Pitt who held a commission as Colonel in the THRVA; the Deputy Master was a lieutenant colonel; the Wardens were majors; the remaining Elder Brethren were captains; Younger Brethren were lieutenants.

The Corporation continued with its role of providing aids to mariners throughout both world wars, including their contribution to Operation OVERLORD which has already been mentioned. Lightships of the Corporation were popular targets for German aircraft in the Second World War and a number were sunk as

a result of enemy action. As the Corporation's area of responsibility included the Channel Islands, the Brethren were forced to cede control of a number of their lighthouses to the Germans for the duration of the war.

A good example of the Corporation's service to the Crown at sea in time of peace is its involvement with the laying of four pairs of high voltage DC cables in 1.6 metre deep trenches across the Channel in the early 1980s. In 1980 when plans for the project were being finalised the Anglo French Safety of Navigation Committee decided that protection was required for the projects as the entrenchment and laying complexes crossed the busy Channel shipping lanes within a buoyed 3000 m long x 2000 m wide safe haven. Trinity House provided the guardship for the surveying phase in 1982 and then provided two auxiliary buoyage vessels and four guardships, as well as operation and maintenance of buoyage for the duration of the main operation from Feb 1983 to Dec 1985. Vessels used in the operation were chartered (via DIOPTIC LTD., a wholly owned subsidiary of Trinity House) and had their own crews but flew the TH ensign and were commanded by Trinity House officers, the senior one being designated Guard Force Commodore. Although a number of near misses occurred, usually in poor visibility, no accidents ensued and the project was completed in safety.

Organisation. The Corporation of Trinity House has as its prime objective the safety of shipping and the welfare of seafarers. Trinity House is the General Lighthouse Authority (GLA) for England, Wales, the Channel Islands and Gibraltar, providing such aids to navigation lighthouses, light vessels, buoys, beacons and radar beacons, together with a Radio Beacon Service and, jointly with other bodies, control and management of the Decca Navigator System - an electronic NAVAID service. It is also a Deep Sea Pilotage Authority and a charitable body for seafarers and their dependants. Additionally, and at the request of the UK Department of Transport, Trinity House operates and administers Sombrero Lighthouse in the West Indies and Cape Pembroke Lighthouse in the Falklands.

The overall affairs of the Corporation are controlled by the Court of Elder Brethren who are Master Mariners with long experience of command in the Royal and Merchant navies, together with a number of Elder Brethren elected in recognition of their distinguished services to their Sovereign and Country (for example, Field Marshal Earl Alexander of Tunis) or because of their particular experience in maritime business.

The head of the Corporation is the Master, a title dating back to the original Royal Charter of 1514. King James I subsequently made provision for the appointment of a Master's Deputy, more generally known today as the Deputy Master. The Deputy is *ex officio*

Chairman of both of the Corporation's major Boards and, in the absence of The Master, takes the chair at meetings of The Court. In recent times, The Master has always been a member of the Royal Family and the current Master, elected in 1969, is HRH The Prince Phillip, Duke of Edinburgh, KG, KT. Other Elder Brethren include HRH The Prince of Wales, KG, KT (elected in 1974) and HRH The Duke of York, CVO (elected in 1991).

The Elder Brethren may not, by Royal Charter, exceed 31 in number, including retired members as the appointment is for life. Of the present (Feb 95) 30 Elder Brethren, only seven are currently on the fully employed list running day to day affairs; they are supported by about 300 Younger Brethren drawn from mariners who have, with few exceptions, had command experience in the Royal or Merchant navies. Younger Brethren are unpaid and have no executive functions although they give valuable advice and support whenever required, as well as providing a pool from which the future active Elder Brethren are selected.

The day to day affairs of the Corporation are controlled by the Corporate and Lighthouse Boards respectively. The Corporate Board consists of a Board of Wardens and Assistants, all Elder Brethren, who attend to the Corporation's private affairs, including charitable and deep sea pilotage matters. The Lighthouse Board is a separate board to whom the Corporation delegates the responsibility for running the Lighthouse Service; the board is chaired by the Deputy Master and comprises active (i.e. executive) Elder Brethren and an equal number of Associate Members nominated by the Secretary of State for Transport, together with three senior members of the Lighthouse Service staff who are non voting members.

The Secretary of the Corporation is Clerk to the Court and is a non-voting member of both the Corporate and Lighthouse Boards, as well as being the Chief Administrative Officer of the Corporation.

In addition to the Court of Elder Brethren and the Corporate and Lighthouse Boards, the Corporation is divided into a number of Directorates, namely Operations, Engineering, Administration and Finance. These Directorates provide policy advice, command and control, maintenance, training, and general administrative support both to the Corporation and to the Trinity House Lighthouse Service (THLS).

Although the Corporation maintains its headquarters in the Trinity House at Tower Hill, London, most of its operational functions have been decentralised. Day-to-day administration of the Lighthouse Service is carried out from the principal depot at Harwich, where control of Trinity House vessels and stations is handled by an Operations Control Centre which is manned

24 hours a day. The Harwich Depot also houses the Finance and Computer Departments of the THLS. The depot at Great Yarmouth contains the Corporation's central stores sub-depot and the THLS Engineer's Department (subordinate to the Engineering Directorate) is located at the former Trinity House buoy sub-depot at Cowes on the Isle of Wight. First line maintenance is carried out from a sub-depot co-located with the Penzance Depot and at the Swansea and Harwich Depots.

Finance. The Trinity House Lighthouse Service is financed from light dues which are levied on vessels loading or discharging at ports in the United Kingdom and Ireland and are based on net, or net registered, tonnage. Dues are paid into the General Lighthouse Fund which is under the trusteeship of the UK Department of Transport and is used to finance the lighthouse services provided by Trinity House and the other two GLA, namely the Northern Lighthouse Board (responsible for the waters of Scotland and the Isle of Man) and the Commissioners of Irish Lights (responsible for the waters of both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland). All three GLA are mutually supportive and liaise closely at every level. The Lighthouse Fund was created by the Merchant Shipping (Mercantile Marine Fund) Act 1898 and various Orders made under this act lay down the rates and regulations for charging light dues which are applied today. The cost of the lighthouse services for the British Isles (i.e. all three GLA combined) is currently about 50 million pounds per annum.

Operations. A number of historical functions have now ceased to be the responsibility of the Brethren. Most important is that for district pilotage which, under the terms of the Pilotage Act 1987, was transferred to local Harbour Authorities with effect from 1 October 1988. Trinity House formerly licensed approximately half of the 1500 marine Pilots in the UK who handled approximately 60% of the nation's pilot tonnage. Despite transferring district pilotage to Harbour Authorities, however, the Corporation's national responsibility as a Deep Sea Pilotage Authority continues and in this capacity it examines and certifies Deep Sea Pilots and represents the United Kingdom on the North Sea Pilotage Commission.

The Trinity House sea area covers the coasts of England, Wales and the Channel Islands and extends as far north as Berwick-upon-Tweed on the East Coast and to the Solway Firth on the West Coast. THLS is responsible for visual and audible fixed and floating seamarks, together with electronic aids to navigation such as the Decca Navigator System, radio beacons and radar beacons.

Trinity House also has responsibility, within its sea area, for surveying, marking and, if necessary, dispersal of wrecks around the coasts of England and

Wales, except for those occurring within port limits and wrecks of HM Ships. Additionally, while most Port and Harbour Authorities maintain seamarks for local use, these are regularly inspected by Trinity House and the sanction of the Corporation must be obtained before any change can be made to these marks.

Manpower, Equipment and Facilities. Over the past 20 years, Trinity House has reduced its personnel strength from about 2200 to about 620. This has been the result of a combination of the transfer of functions, notably district pilotage, to other authorities, and introduction of new technology, in particular the continuing process of automation of lighthouses, which has allowed the service to operate with a reduced personnel strength.

To carry out its functions, the Corporation has a small fleet comprising two modern purpose built support vessels (THV *Patricia* (1982) and THV *Mermaid* (1987)) and four launches for inshore coastal work (THMB *Satellite*, THMB *Triton*, THL *Farlane* and THL *Vectis*) and operates a small air wing consisting of a single (leased) Bolkow-105 helicopter. From time to time, other vessels will be chartered for the use of the Corporation.

The Corporation currently operates 13 manned lighthouses (including Sombrero Lighthouse in Anguilla) and 62 unmanned lighthouses (including Europa Point Lighthouse in Gibraltar and Cape Pembroke Lighthouse in the Falklands) as well as nine automatic light vessels, two large light floats and three large automatic navigation buoys (LANBY). Other equipment includes approximately 400 buoys, 14 radio beacons and 11 Decca Navigator Stations.

Depots are maintained at Great Yarmouth, Harwich, East Cowes (Isle of Wight), Penzance, Swansea and Holyhead. As previously mentioned, engineering and maintenance support is carried out at the Cowes, Penzance, Harwich and Swansea Depots.

Research. Since its very inception, Trinity House has been involved in research designed to increase the efficiency of its equipment and operations. Over the years, the Corporation has experimented with new equipment and new methods of installation and maintenance. In the early days when wood, coal or candles were the only source of illumination, experiments were carried out designed to improve the amount of light which could be put out. These experiments ranged from refinement of reflectors to development of more efficient bellows! When the oil burning lamp was invented in 1782, the Corporation was quick to adopt it, although the last coal-burning lighthouse, St. Bees Head in Cumberland, did not abandon coal until 1822.

The immense technical developments of the first quarter of the 19th Century convinced the Corporation of the need for a specific research establishment. In 1828, it erected Purfleet Lighthouse on the Thames. Purfleet was never intended for the guidance of mariners but was purely an experimental and research station. At Purfleet experiments were carried out for almost fifty years in an attempt to determine the best combination of light, lenses and reflectors. The experimental light at Purfleet was kept under constant observation by a Trinity House vessel cruising in the Thames, and also from the Corporation's Blackwall Point Depot about 15 kilometres away. By about 1875, when the period of expansion ushered in by Argand's oil lamp was at an end, the Corporation decided that the Purfleet light had served its purpose and the station was closed down.

The closure of Purfleet, however, did not mean that Trinity House was satisfied. Experimentation went on elsewhere and after. In 1862, the first tests of electricity were carried out at the Dungeness light with a view to the adoption of electricity as a lighthouse illuminant. The electric light at Dungeness was in operation for 13 years, but was deemed to be not as efficient as an oil burner. Dungeness used a carbon-arc lamp and it was not until 1922 that the first high-power electric filament lamp was installed in an English lighthouse - at South Foreland.

Fittingly, Dungeness, sight of the first electric powered lighthouse, was also the sight of the Corporation's first fully automated lighthouse. The new Dungeness Lighthouse, commissioned in November 1961 (the first major Trinity House lighthouse to have been built since 1910), was built to replace the existing Dungeness light which was becoming obscured by industrial development in the area. The new lighthouse incorporated a number of innovations in design, construction and equipment, all developed by Trinity House.

The Project Engineering Section of the THLS Engineering Department continues to experiment in an ongoing effort to ensure maximum efficiency of lighthouse operation.

International Co-Operation. Trinity House was a founder member of and continues to play an active and prominent part in the International Association of Lighthouse Authorities (IALA). The IALA, which maintains a permanent secretariat near Paris, was formed to foster technical co-operation between member countries in every possible manner. Apart from regular working meetings, the IALA organises four-yearly International Lighthouse Conferences (at the 1994 Conference held in Hawaii, the Australian lighthouse authority, the Australian Maritime Safety Agency, was elected to the IALA Council for the period 1994-1998). Close co-operation by IALA mem-

bers has enabled a number of difficult and important international projects to be carried out efficiently and expeditiously. Trinity House played a leading part in the development of the IALA Buoyage System which replaced over 30 different systems of buoyage previously in use world-wide.

Charitable Work. In keeping with its roots in the semi-religious and benevolent Guild of Shipmen and Mariners, Trinity House continues to be active in the field of charity. As a Charitable body, Trinity House maintains homes for former officers of the Merchant Service and their dependants at Walmer, in Kent. In addition, Trinity House is responsible for the administration of a number of legacies left by former Elder Brethren and other benefactors of the Corporation. It provides active support to other marine charities, in particular being a strong supporter of the Missions for Seamen, and was a founder member of the Nautical Institute.

Beginning in the Autumn of 1989, the Corporation has been making use of its charitable funds for the Trinity House Scholarship Cadet Training Scheme whereby approved training is provided at the Brethren's expense to Deck and Engine Room Cadets seeking a career in the Merchant Navy or elsewhere in the British marine industry.

It should be pointed out that the charitable work of the Corporation is totally separate from its operational work and funds for charitable work come from the Brethren's own sources, not from the Lighthouse Fund.

Coat of Arms, Flags and Customs. The armorial bearings of the Corporation were granted by Queen Elizabeth I, through her Garter King at Arms, Sir Gilbert Dethicke, in January 1573. These bearings (see illustration) consist of a white shield bearing a red cross of St. George; in each quarter thus formed there is a representation of an Elizabethan sailing ship in black, sailing upon the sea to the observer's left. Surmounting the shield is an esquire's helm with white and red mantling and crest - a demi-lion, crowned and with its head facing the observer in gold, holding a sword in the right paw. Or in heraldic terms and in Sir Gilbert Dethicke's own Elizabethan English words: "argent, a plain cros geules, betwene four ships sable, the fore and top-sayles up, ande underneath on a wreath of theyr colers, a demi-lion rampant, gardat, and crouned with a croune imperiall or, in his right pawe an armyng sword argent, hylt and pomell or, langued and armed azure, mantled argent, doobled geules". The motto "TRINITAS IN UNITATE" (Trinity in Unity) is borne on a scroll beneath the shield.

Elements of the Coat of Arms are worn in the Corporation's flags and uniform badges. Uniforms for Elder Brethren, worn since the beginning of the 19th Cen-

tury and officially authorised by Queen Victoria in 1866, are based on the Royal Navy, while commissioned officers of the Lighthouse Service wear Merchant Navy type uniforms. Badges and buttons feature the coat of arms of the Corporation, while lace is the same as for the Royal Navy. Uniforms for Elder Brethren include Full Dress (last worn at the funeral of Sir Winston Churchill, an Elder Brother of the Corporation), Day Dress (No. 5's), Yachting Rig, Mess Dress and Mess Undress. An amusing incident connected with the Corporation's uniforms is recorded in Jack Broome's excellent book on naval signalling "Make Another Signal". Broome records that the late Field Marshal Earl Alexander of Tunis, an Elder Brother of the Corporation, was embarked aboard THV *Patricia* during the Coronation Naval Review at Spithead on 15th June, 1953. During the Review, he became aware that he had become the centre of long distance and rapt attention by a group of admirals aboard another ship who were obviously scandalised by the combination of Trinity House (i.e. modified Royal Navy) Full Dress uniform and the Field Marshal's "Guard's" moustache (Alex was an Irish Guardsman). Realising the cause of their concern, the Field Marshal signalled:

"Bet I would make a better admiral than you lot would make generals!"

The red cross of St. George and the four ships taken from the Escutcheon provides the basis for design of the Corporation's suite of flags i.e. Ensign, Jack, Burgee and personal flags of Master and Deputy Master. The Ensign has a red field bearing the Union Flag in the upper portion of the hoist, the basic four-ship design forming a rectangular panel on the fly. All Trinity House vessels wear this ensign and it is flown at all the Corporation's lighthouses throughout the year - except when special distinguishing flags are flown - and at District Depots, Pilot Stations, and other installations.

The Trinity House Jack comprises the red cross of St. George between four black Elizabethan galleons under sail. Officially the flag of the Elder Brethren, it is flown at the masthead of any THLS vessel when an Elder Brother is aboard. It is also flown at the Trinity House (the Corporation's HQ at Tower Hill in the City of London) on such special occasions as the birthdays of members of the Royal Family. A diminutive of the flag is flown at the jack-staff when Trinity House vessels are moored alongside or at anchor and when ships are dressed.

The personal flags of the Master and Deputy Master consist of the basic four-ship design (of slightly different proportions to the Jack) with superimposed in the centre the full armorial bearings for the Master and a gold lined red disc bearing the Corporation's crest (the demi-lion) for the Deputy Master. The Master's flag is flown at the mainmast head of Corpora-

tion vessels whenever the Master is embarked and at Trinity House whenever the Master is present there. The Deputy Master's flag is also flown at the mainmast head when the Deputy Master is embarked and is also flown at Trinity House installations whenever the Deputy Master is present and the Trinity House on Trinity Monday should the Master be absent.

The Trinity House Burgee (or Cornet) consists of a red triangular flag bearing the basic four-ship design in a rectangular panel similar to that on the ensign. It is flown at the mainmast head in District Tenders when in port and when they are under way with the District Superintendent aboard. All District Depots fly it in addition to the Ensign, providing two flags can be shown simultaneously.

Special reference must be made to Trinity House and the White Ensign. An incident occurred on 21st May, 1894, when the right to fly the White Ensign on board the Trinity House Vessel *Satellite* was challenged by the Commanding Officer of H.M.S. *Mersey*. The Elder Brethren were unable to produce any written authority for their practice of flying the White Ensign in their vessels on all occasions when ships were dressed. The Brethren claimed that the practice was observed prior to 9th July, 1864, when, in accordance with an Order in Council, Squadron Colours were abandoned and the White Ensign was allocated to the Royal Navy, the Blue Ensign to the Royal Naval Reserve, and the Red Ensign to the Merchant Navy.

As a result of *Mersey's* challenge, the Elder Brethren petitioned the Admiralty to grant them a warrant. The Admiralty decided that the matter did not justify a formal warrant but that the required authority could be conveyed by a letter. The Secretary of Trinity House duly received Admiralty Letter No. L. 4608 of 21st June, 1894, which read as follows:

"Sir,

With reference to your letter of the 18th instant, No. 2387, I am commanded by My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to convey to you their permission for the Elder Brethren of Trinity House to fly the White Ensign of H.M. Fleet on board their Steam and Sailing Vessels on all occasions upon which Ships are dressed, and while escorting Her Majesty in company with Royal Yachts and Ships of War.

2. A copy of this letter may be produced as authority for the use of the White Ensign on the occasions referred to above.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Sgd.) EVAN MACGREGOR."

A copy of this letter is always carried on board all Trinity House Vessels in order that the Elder Breth-

ren shall not be found wanting in the event of a similar challenge being made to them!

It would be quite amazing if an organisation as ancient and, to be honest, as odd as Trinity House did not have some time honoured customs and traditions. And such customs the Corporation certainly has, the first being of course the very name of the organisation and the titles for its senior members. Another ancient and curious custom is the Annual Court. The Court is held with much ceremony at the Trinity House, usually in mid-year, and is the occasion when the Master and Deputy Master are elected or re-elected, where new Elder Brethren are elected and where new Younger Brethren are sworn in. At the completion of the Court, a church service is held at the Church of St Olave's.

Another ancient and jealously guarded tradition is the Corporation's right, since time immemorial, to attend the Sovereign on sea voyages. In their buoy yacht they proceed ahead of the Sovereign, embarked in the Royal Yacht, on ceremonial or state occasions such as fleet reviews or when proceeding or arriving from overseas. The Elder Brethren, embarked aboard their flagship THV *Patricia*, exercised this right in May and June of 1994 during various D-Day anniversary ceremonies.

An additional privilege based on tradition is the right of all Elder Brethren to style themselves "Captain", whether they have held a command at sea or not. This ancient practice was confirmed as privilege by King George V, by Warrant under His Majesty's Royal Sign Manual on 20th December, 1912. The Warrant also directed that on all social and ceremonial occasions, Elder Brethren ("Captains") should have place and precedence next and immediately after the place and precedence accorded to Captains in the Royal Navy.

The Elder Brethren also have a traditional, but very real, role to play in the English legal system. As part of the Corporation's ancient responsibility to provide expert opinion in the field of aids to navigation, Elder Brethren are called to sit as Assessors with the High Court of Admiralty. This duty was first conferred on the Elder Brethren by the Charter of King James II in 1685. In judicial terms, the Elder Brother Assessor is known as a Trinity Master and carries out his duties in the Queen's Bench (Admiralty) Division of the Royal Courts of Justice or the Court of Appeals. Elder Brethren may also be called for duty in the House of Lords, High Court of Sessions in Edinburgh, and with the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

Despite recent reductions in personnel strength and divesting a number of traditional responsibilities, the work of the Corporation has in no way decreased. With the increase in the size of ships operating in English and Welsh waters more shoal patches need to be

marked and the boundaries of existing marked channels need to be more clearly defined. As a result of this, the Corporation has increased its workload in the area of buoyage.

Yet in spite of this reduction in strength, coupled with an increase in the workload, a high standard of aids to navigation continues to be provided for all mariners - both to professional seafarers and leisure sailors alike. The Corporation and its smaller staff remains as competent and dedicated as ever before. Trinity House, from its inception in 1514 to the present day, has kept as its objects the safety and progress of navigation and the welfare of seamen and their dependants. For this it was first incorporated and its authority has been confirmed and renewed by successive Sovereigns; as part of the maritime spectrum of the United Kingdom, Trinity House will forever strive "for the relief, increase and augmentation of the shipping of this our realm of England".

Author's Note and Acknowledgement

It might at first glance appear odd that a Warrant Officer in the Army is interested in a subject as esoterically nautical as the Corporation of Trinity House but, in truth, I have been fascinated by lighthouses and light ships since I was a young boy, part of my life long interest in the sea and its ways. I can remember when I was about ten badgering my father until he took us to visit Macquarie Lighthouse in Sydney. My brothers were bored to distraction, but I was captivated. To me, lighthouses rank with clipper ships as the ultimate expression of the romance of the sea — although I am pragmatic enough to realise that my romantic notions would last about ten seconds if I had ever had to punch canvas in the Roaring Forties or tramp up and down the staircase of a lighthouse several times a day, 365 days of the year, to trim and care for the lamp! When I discovered the story of Trinity House some years ago, it was only natural that I delved into the story more deeply. The result of that delving is the foregoing article.

I gratefully acknowledge the generous assistance provided to me by the Corporation of Trinity House in the preparation of this article. In particular, I wish to acknowledge the assistance of Mr H.L. Cooper, Information Officer of the Trinity House Lighthouse Service, who provided me with much up to date information on the Corporation and its work.

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Book Reviews

Hudson, W.J., "Australia and the New World Order", 'Evatt at San Francisco — 1945', Australian Foreign Policy Papers, Australian Foreign Policy Publications Programme, Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University, Canberra, 1993, 158 pages, \$20.

Anzac Day this year was held amid celebrations commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the allied victories in World War II. It was also fifty years since delegates of 45 nations met in San Francisco in 1945 to create the United Nations. Evatt's actions ensured that Australia was recognised as an authentic victor of the second world war and as a nation with a legitimate agenda for a peace so grimly fought for.

Dr Herbert Vere Evatt (1894-1965) was Australia's external affairs minister in a labor government during the war and after. It was through his performance at San Francisco that he was elevated from party politician to international statesman. He was recognised as one of the British Commonwealth's leading constitutional lawyers. Brilliant yet erratic he possessed great intellectual gifts which saw him appointed as a High Court judge at an early age. Yet those very gifts could hardly be contained in a mind which tormented him in its brilliance - as the last declining years of his NSW judicial career so sadly showed. It was left to Jack Gevan to invoke Shakespeare in a summation of a career: 'Evatt lost the fight and, Lear-like, "lost all"'.

For many observers of the period, Evatt was an incomplete man yet when he focused his considerable energies and talents he achieved great things for his country that few of his peers could match. Those diplomats who worked close to him, Waller and Hasluck, held fairly orthodox views towards him. On the road, together with the late Sam Atyeo (not so much a bagman as an urger) they all but suggested it was strictly vaudeville. This is why a sense of proportion is so necessary in any account of Evatt's life and times. Despite his many idiosyncrasies, not the least his diplomatic style, he will and should be remembered as a great Australian who served his country well in peace and war. His triumphs at San Francisco ring down through the years. That his endeavours were not universally supported and drew criticism should not detract from the sense of idealism and those practical results which his demonic efforts achieved. As Erasmus said, "... in all great things, it is enough to have tried".

Sir Keith Waller "... disliked Evatt more than any person he had ever worked for ... but he gave him credit for having generated an Australian foreign policy". Another diplomat, Francis Stuart, stated that "... I found him, quite simply, evil; absurdly enough this did not prevent me from feeling sorry for him". Hasluck remarked that "...Evatt's diplomacy could be likened to 'small boys throwing stones at street lamps'". Roosevelt "regarded Evatt and Madame Chiang Kai Shek as the two burdens that the Lord placed upon him."

While this is not a complete biography, merely concentrating on his diplomatic profile at San Francisco, Dr Hudson reinforces an observation made elsewhere by Katherine West that Evatt, like Menzies, suffered for not having been subject of a major biography earlier in his political-legal career. Dr Hudson in his book triumphs in that he avoids judgement on Evatt's moral qualities preferring to lend historical understanding to his performance as a foreign minister. Correctly, Dr Hudson adjures of us that we should not forget the accompanying demands of a heavy domestic portfolio Evatt had to jointly carry.

To understand Evatt is to also remember the legacy of Australia's role in the peace talks at Paris after World War I. Australia, through Billy Hughes, was rather shrill at Versailles but then the Prime Minister had his reasons - no less than 60,000 diggers who did not receive their unfranked peace dividend on Armistice Day. At San Francisco, Australia was well prepared to preserve and advance her interests without any embarrassment or lack of confidence. Evatt was clearly unawed by the demands of traditional diplomatic behaviour as demonstrated by representatives of the more established services. One participant (Louis) said that "... Evatt was not a gentleman, Evatt lacked personal grace and style, and he was an argumentative colonial". As Greene would have it, if Evatt acted badly, badly may have been the only way to behave. The author notes that, at the time, "... the conventions and customs of diplomacy still owed much to their aristocratic origins". Such an unadorned delivery from this Australian may have been a refreshing tonic to many as it was irritating to others.

Readers of this journal would be interested in the service members of the delegation which included Lieut.Gen. Laverack (Army), Air Marshall Williams (RAAF) and Commander S.H.K. Spurgeon (Navy). The naval representative was a practical person who, after sheathing his sword, at least had the wit to enter his son, a younger Haddon Spurgeon, in the Naval College in the previous year. He possibly acted in the belief that the league of nations had failed to pre

vent the current war so he covered his bet no doubt in the realisation that others would have to fight future wars that the UN would be equally unable to prevent.

As Dr Hudson writes, "... Evatt emerged as a person of stature in the international community such that three years later he could be elected president of the UN General Assembly". Alan Watt, a departmental official who accompanied Evatt, stated that "... Evatt reached the peak of his international influence during the San Francisco conference". Elsewhere, Crockett offers a compelling psychological study of Evatt in noting that "... he was not widely admired for his domestic political career - he was an unsuccessful party leader who never became prime minister, and whose reputation was discredited by the Petrov affair and ALP split." Australians, notwithstanding their admiration for Evatt's ideals, held that no one should be promoted higher than they deserved. That many Catholic labor voters included him in their prayers did not translate to the necessary electoral mandate which would have delivered the prime ministership to him.

Why San Francisco? "The purpose of the conference (was) to prepare a charter for a general international organisation for the maintenance of peace and security". That emerged from Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta. Their mission was to "... devise a system which, while recognising these realities, nevertheless sought to provide mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflict". After all, many countries were cautious of surrendering too many international powers to the UN — especially when it crimped their domestic interests. But still, those talks at least established some checks and balances even though Evatt was not successful in his efforts to control veto powers as big power rivalry later exerted itself within the UN.

Evatt's major campaigns at San Francisco included the Security Council veto, General Assembly powers, domestic jurisdiction, full employment pledges and trusteeships. The author notes that the Australian contribution was formidable in that Evatt attempted to give the world a political structure which would preserve the peace and improve the lives of its people. This is why Evatt put great emphasis on the UN as a collective security system stating that "... there is a direct obligation on all member States to place forces at the disposal of the Security Council." But he did not do all the work alone. Evatt commended those of his staff who included Bailey, Burton, Forsyth, Hasluck and Watt.

It has been said that "... Evatt emerged from the San Francisco Conference with a high and deserved reputation ... (Evatt) was determined to have Australia accepted by the international community as a sovereign and fully independent state." Dr Hudson con-

cludes that "... as a foreign minister formulating and pursuing policy he still ranks as one of Australia's busiest and most innovative; as a diplomat, he could charm on occasion but in general he was a poor performer - strident, loud, unpolished - and he had some extraordinary blind spots." Hasluck noted one observation of him made by an American journalist describing him as "... emotionally simple and intellectually complex". If everyone has to have their Caliban then the delegation surely had Evatt.

"What cannot be doubted is that Evatt at San Francisco achieved for Australia a standing in international politics previously absent. At San Francisco, Australia established itself as a participant in the international mainstream ... following Evatt's example in 1945, Australia used busy participation in its affairs to retain standing in the international community."

Those who pursue political blood sports will acknowledge that his detractors have had Evatt on the cross for three decades. It is time to bring him down from the hill - his arms must be tired, he deserves a rest. His contemporaries await their own resurrection. Besides, if his adherents are to continue to burn a flame in his memory then they will need all the wood they can get. Evatt remains a great man with some ordinary weaknesses. He was not prepared to accept for Australia a subordinate status but only on a position of equality. Nevertheless, his official achievements at the UN will endure - dwarfing us all. Alan Renouf observed that "... Evatt's performance at San Francisco was of virtuoso quality ... there is nothing in Australia's diplomatic annals to surpass it." He seized an adolescent foreign policy and frog-marched it into adulthood. To deny Evatt his proper place in politics and diplomacy is to rob history of its facts and language of its meaning.

One of the difficulties of reviewing any work by author Hudson is that it is hard to fault for the consistently high quality of scholarship he achieves. Here he does what he continues to do best - writing excellent diplomatic history setting a standard others can only aspire to. For this reason, this review is discursive merely serving to survey the literature by other Evatt scholars as this latest work stands by itself. Many of the above comments and assessments draw their attribution from other writers on Evatt who include Crockett, Dalziel, Hasluck, Renouf, Stuart, Tennant and Waller. This work by Dr Hudson is an exemplary addition to the studies. A half-century after San Francisco it allows us to reflect on the UN - its origins, development and its future. It also reinforces Australia's continued optimism for the UN if its original aspirations are to be upheld and realised.

Michael Fogarty

***Diplomasi: Australia and Indonesia's Independence: Documents 1947*, Philip Dorling, Editor, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1994, 545 pages, illustrated, paperback, \$39.95.**

This is a three volume series of historical documents on Australia's diplomatic policy towards Indonesia in the period 1947-49. Containing almost five hundred cablegrams, despatches, reports and other documents, the first volume covering 1947 is not for the faint-hearted - nor was it ever intended to be. Those taxed by their understanding of that era will find much of interest in the series.

Australia's representatives were dealing with some fundamental issues of lasting significance and it was in this context that these papers were drafted. The important decisions taken at the time were evidence of a strongly assertive and independent nation keen to establish her international credentials as an honest broker yet acting to protect and preserve Australia's geopolitical interests in the wider region. While morality is not the law there is a place for it in international relations as these documents attest.

For its serious treatment of these events, this book will find obvious acceptance within foreign ministries, universities, archives, libraries and from specialists in their field. One assumes it will receive keen attention in diplomatic studies courses, Asian history programs and at defence staff colleges. If one was sceptical about Australia's 'independent' role as a middle power in the immediate post-war period, then this volume removes any doubt. The title itself has a reflexive quality confirming Australia's own *independence* in foreign policy initiatives in those troubled days. Many Australians will take quiet pride in the contribution made by our representatives and service officers who contributed so much in supporting the sovereignty of that young republic in a critical phase of its history. For the purpose of the review, the terms Netherlands East Indies (NEI) and Indonesia are used in the same sense.

The themes covered in the book include; Australian reaction to the Dutch 'police action' of July 1947, the first deployment of Australian military personnel as UN peace keepers and Australian participation in the institutional mechanisms which mediated the conflict between the two sides. Australia sought to increase trade with Indonesia and the difficulties which beset those attempts (including shipping bans) are well documented. This work is essential reading for anyone interested in the history of Australia's political and economic engagement in Asia. Ably selected by Philip Dorling, the documents show how Indonesia's independence was an early and critical test of Aus-

tralia's capacity to respond positively to change in Asia.

And what do the documents reveal? Firstly, that they should not be attempted in a single sitting. Many of the issues raised were quite complex and the editor has done well in his attempt to unravel those convoluted skeins. Secondly, it should be remembered that Australian diplomacy was then in its fledgling days and could not rely on well established traditions. In many ways, that experience was to truly test the abilities of our officials chosen to represent Australia. For their successful reporting on Indonesia, those years have now delivered the 'grand old men' of Australian diplomacy to Indonesia - Alfred Brookes, Sir Richard Kirby and Tom Critchley. The achievements attained throughout their professional careers showed that the early faith in them was both deserved and fulfilled.

This review is unable to adequately survey all the documents contained. Nor can it attempt to describe the evolution of policy. The introductory chapter, covering the earlier period 1945-46, provides a fascinating backdrop to the dramatic events of 1947. While earlier Australia had stood on the sideline, an onlooker rather than an active participant, this was not the case in 1947. Indeed, Sutan Sjahrir (Minister of Foreign Affairs) stated in a press conference in Singapore that "...the Australian attitude has always been very friendly towards Indonesia - (we) look to them for assistance". The Dutch also recognised Australia's position acknowledging it in a memorandum (document 438) to Prime Minister Chifley in stating "...the interest of Australia that an orderly state of affairs should exist in the territory of a near neighbour is appreciated because a state of anarchy and chaos has inevitable repercussions on the political and economic life of the South Pacific".

Australia's relations with the Netherlands, in their attitude to Indonesia's political development, were less comfortable. See document 34. One could recognise the motives of the Dutch, no less than any former colonial power, for wanting to return to the *status quo ante bellum*. For many, restoration of authority in their possessions went a long way towards assuaging bitter memories of defeat in the Pacific war. But their very defeat by an Asian nation provided a catalyst for many Asian independence movements. Equally, Asian nationalists were quick to exploit the political vacuum with the sudden collapse of Japanese power at the war's end in 1945.

For the Dutch, Indonesia became a ruinous war as they attempted military solutions to essentially political problems. Both countries were captive to their history as the winds of change came early to Asia and international pressure aided that process. Australia had considerable sympathy for Indonesia's nationalist as-

pirations and our relations with the Dutch were strained for that position - made more difficult as fellow allies during the 1939-45 war. Ballard's reception by Van Mook, the Lieutenant Governor-General of the NEI, was not enjoyable - being received firstly in hostile silence soon followed by anger. See document 27.

The documents also demonstrate that the service of officers assigned to Indonesia had the requisite professional skills which enabled them to both carry and discharge a political brief of considerable sensitivity. The staff paper (document 360) prepared by the Australian Military Observing Officers for Group Captain Eaton in Batavia, being a despatch on the politico-military situation in Java for August-September, could well become a standard reporting guide for any conflict.

The reports to Canberra and from other capitals describe the diffusion of power in the NEI and how the conflict was managed in world councils at the wider political level. Many of the documents are quite prolix as they attenuate Australian policy positions in their incremental patterns. For that reason, this country study will also remain an authoritative text for diplomatic reporting for the use of the technical language involved. But more than anything else, it shows the exegesis of an independent foreign policy by our representatives on station. Gifted they were - amateurs they were not. Despite all the frenetic activity, and the heavy demands placed on staff, one document offers some rare beauty amid the aridity of the exchanges. In document 324, Eaton concludes a letter to Canberra with a remark, possibly intended for an official's wife, observing "... one redeeming feature, there are some lovely orchids in Java."

The reader will be rewarded on arriving at document 376 to note how the French sought support from Australia - making a connection with their own colonial problems and showing a refined grasp of linkage theory. The department advised the Consul-General in Batavia (Group Captain Eaton) that "...the French Consul has hinted that he would sign present draft (report), if he had some undertaking regarding our attitude on French Indo-China". It may have been for this reason, in noting Canberra's instructions, that Eaton replied to the cable (in document 378) regretting that his liquor supply had not arrived - urgently requesting cases of Scotch Whisky. The prospect of impending travel in an RAAF aircraft, configured mainly with bucket seats, only added to his unease.

Document 424 (Kirby to Burton) reinforces the ten-

sions then experienced in Batavia in managing Australia's policy. Kirby felt compelled to advise the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs that "... I did not ask for your opinion as to whether I was correct (and) I am not under your instructions as to the way I perform this Mission". While Kirby qualified his remarks his cable clearly stresses that he was on the spot and needed greater support from Canberra. As well, the key contribution made by secretaries and communicators in the Australian office in Batavia is well documented. They too were vital to the mission if the objectives were to be realised. At one stage, Australia was prepared to offer assistance to the republicans to safeguard their communications so as not to compromise their negotiations with the Dutch. Document 441 refers.

Critchley was Australia's acting representative on the UN Committee of Good Offices from 9-31 December and his negotiations and reporting were of the highest order. See document 468 which was tabled in USS *Renville*. Those negotiations were as protracted as they were tortuous often appearing as much change with little progress. But it was through perseverance and quiet diplomacy that results eventually followed later in 1949 proving that the Indonesian question was not amenable to a 'quick fix'. Indeed, document 498 was a codicil for their work in 1947. Eaton, in his last cablegram for the year, reported on New Year's Eve that "... no political solution to the Indonesian problem had been obtained."

Philip Dorling, with his colleagues of the Historical Documents Project Section, in their selection and careful editing of the primary documents, have produced an original and authentic work of towering scholarship. There is only one thing worse than inventing history and that is ignoring it. Here, Indonesia's political history in year 1947 is refracted through Australian eyes. The work is a material contribution to our knowledge of Australia's advocacy for Indonesia in an eventful period of its revolutionary history and the relationship overall. It explains why we went the way we did. Moreover, it evidences that Australia's affinity with Indonesia enjoys firm foundations which draw their origins from the support and recognition Australia gave to Indonesia in the formative years of the young republic.

Michael Fogarty

(The opinions expressed are solely those of the author and do not reflect any official views - past or present)

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SURFACE
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