

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

Volume 20 Number Four
November 1994/January 1995

AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE INC

The Australian Naval Institute was formed and incorporated in the Australian Capital Territory in 1975. The main objects of the Institute are:

- To encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the maritime profession,
- to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and the maritime profession, and
- to publish a journal.

The Institute is self-supporting and non-profit-making. All publications of the Institute will stress that the authors express their own views and opinions are not necessarily those of the Department of Defence, the Chief of Naval Staff or the Institute. The aim is to encourage discussion, dissemination of information, comment and opinion and the advancement of professional knowledge concerning naval and maritime matters.

The membership of the Institute is open to:

- *Regular Members*. Regular membership is open to members of the RAN, RANR, RNZN or RNZNVR and persons who having qualified for regular membership, subsequently leave the service.
- *Associate Members*. Associate membership is open to all other persons not qualified to be Regular Members, who profess an interest in the aims of the Institute.
- *Honorary Members*. Honorary membership is open to persons who have made a distinguished contribution to the Navy or the maritime profession, or by past service to the institute.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Australian Naval Institute is grateful for the assistance provided by the corporations listed below. They are demonstrating their support for the aim of the Institute by being members of the "Friends of the Australian Naval Institute" coterie.

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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

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SPECIAL FEATURE — *Getting a grip on Navy-to-Navy Co-operation*

Just what is 'regional engagement'? What are its implications for the Navy in the next century, and how are RAN planners and commanders supposed to make it work? How far should relationships with other navies go; how should they be selected and built up? What are the capability and opportunity costs of naval cooperation, and can we make better judgements on the cost/return balance of cooperative activities? These and other controversial conundrums are discussed in *Cooperative Naval Activities: Drawing the Lines* on page 15 and *Whither Australian/New Zealand Naval Co-Operation* on page 35.

INSIDE

Cover photograph:

AURORA AUSTRALIS, one of the entries in the ANI/Film Australia Naval and Maritime Photographic Competition.
Courtesy of Mr David Neumann

Major Articles

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Phone 06 288 5990

FROM THE PRESIDENT

The ANI Council is delighted to have received over 30 entries in the Naval and Maritime Photographic Competition which the Institute has sponsored with Film Australia. Winners will be announced and their entries published in the next issue of the journal, however, Council will endeavour to get cheques to winners shortly, so that Christmas is made just that much merrier for those who took the time and trouble to submit an entry.

The Institute ends 1994 with a number of other 'wins', including the establishment of a more attractively presented professional journal. This was a key Council objective at the beginning of 1994. In fact this objective has been achieved at a reduced journal production cost and, from a financial point of view, the Institute has never had a stronger base from which to further its aims and encourage initiatives.

Council is looking forward to 1995 - the Institute's 20th Anniversary Year - and has resolved to support at least two conferences. The first is THE RAN IN WORLD WAR II, which will take place in Sydney during 25-26 May (06 2666873 for details). This conference will be conducted very close to the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II and should provide an opportune venue to reflect on the Service as it was and perhaps glean a little insight into the present and also the future role of the RAN. The second event is a major international conference called SEA POWER IN THE NEW CENTURY which is scheduled for 28-29 November. It aims to give a practical insight into how Asia Pacific navies plan to link their naval operations and force structures to national interests beyond 2000 and will feature prominent speakers from around the Asia Pacific. Brochures for these conferences will be sent out with journals at least eight weeks prior to each event. Please note both sets of dates in your 1995 diaries. The date and venue for the Vernon Parker Oration will be announced in the February/April Issue of the Journal.

Major challenges for the Institute remain, and coming up with ideas for ways to attract new members remains a priority. At the November council meeting a motion was passed to give RAN members of the 1994 ADFA Graduating Class free 1995 membership of the Institute, and we welcome these officers as our newest members. Also, copies of journals and ANI application/information forms are now being sent to officers and senior sailors on various courses to attract interest in the Institute and assist in meeting our membership objectives. More work needs to be done next year concerning membership and increasing membership will be an agenda item at the 1995 Annual General Meeting. Details for the AGM are given on page 6 and I hope to see you there.

My personal thanks and best wishes go to all members of the 1994 ANI Council who have given of their time and energy to help achieve most of Council's goals for the year. They have made my life as your President just that much easier, and I hope those staying in Canberra will consider renominating for council in 1995. Finally, I join with the other members of Council in wishing all members and readers a merry Christmas, especially the New Zealand Chapter members that made such a valuable contribution to the journal this year. May the new year be happy and successful for all.

Chris Oxenbould

FROM THE EDITOR

This issue offers some good holiday reading for those who need to take a break from drinking, eating and being inundated with gifts and family affection over the festive season. While we have a wide variety of stories, three articles have been commissioned to concentrate on aspects of security and 'engagement' in our region. The first, written by Major Terry McCullagh, deals with the question of whether or not an arms race is beginning to occur in the region. The second article attempts to clarify what should be the nature and extent of RAN 'engagement' with other navies in the region, especially with navies in South East Asia. The third article,by Graham Dunk,looks in detail at the nature of cooperation with one of our traditional allies in considering options for closer defence relations with New Zealand. From our correspondence desk we have a Letter from Canada, courtesy of Commander Peter Jones, as well as a detailed response by David Stevens to an heretical article by New Zealander Athol Forrest who dared to question the continued relevance of the classical maritime strategists (Feb/Apr 94 issue). As a break from things strategic we also have a variety of articles on management of change in the RAN, the Law of the Sea and Australia's maritime strategy and the defence potential of merchant shipping.

Readers will note that the editorial committee has had to get tough with footnotes and bibliographies in terms of ensuring they do not take up too much space. Any one who would like copies of the original articles, including complete footnotes and bibliographies, are welcome to write to the Institute or call me on 062 688454 for their copies.

It was a source of some disappointment - to put it mildly - when I discovered that a still unknown number of the August/October journals ((Vol 20. No3) were produced and distributed with various printing errors. My thanks go to those who rang about the problem and if you have a 'bum' journal contact me on 062 688454; I will do my best to send a good copy. Problems included some smudged pages and repeated sections which probably resulted from incorrect stacking in collation bins. Rest assured that action is being taken to avoid this happenning again.

I thank Council for its support with the Journal in 1994 and in particular the Institute's treasurer, Lieutenant Gerry Gogan, who was a big help in reorganising and rationalising journal financial operations. He is posted to Melbourne next year as a full time student at the RMIT and will be living in one of his houses in Toorak after returning from his well earned world trip. I am sure he has a big future in the Supply Branch.

Please don't forget to be at the AGM on 23 February if you are in the area. There will be limitless quantities of free food and drink, top class entertainment, raffles, meat trays and lucky door prizes including house and land packages....not to mention witty conversation, genial company and the opportunity to talk about old friends and colleagues behind their backs. In the meantime have a good Christmas and consider putting pen to paper for the journal in the new year.

Alan Hinge

PS. **Have you renewed your membership for 1995?**

Your month of membership expiry is indicated at the top left hand corner of the 'address tab' in the centre of the back of this journal (Try to work that one out!). If this number is **12/94** please renew, and keep in mind the $65 three year membership 'deal'. One year is $25 and two years is $48.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Greetings to the ANI from Thailand!

During Exercise AUSTHAI 94 a number of intrepid adventurers from HMAS MELBOURNE forsook the delights of the coast and visited some World War II POW sites. After an exhausting but adventurous trip we arrived at 'Hellfire Pass', and in the stillness of the tropical jungle viewed the recently erected memorial plaque for Sir Edward 'Weary' Dunlop and the remains of the 263 mile long 'Death Railway'. This was 'hand cut' through a rocky gorge one half a century ago by Australian POWS.

We then visited the historic steel bridge over the river Kwai which was built in 1942-3 and followed where the original wooden supports were still in view. During the visit we became much wiser to the true story of the famous bridge which was incorrectly depicted in the Pierre Boulle novel and subsequent movie.

A short drive through the nearby town of Kanchana Buri brought the group to a war cemetary built on the grounds of the Chung Kai POW Camp. This cemetery is well maintained by the Commonwealth War Graves Commission and is the final resting place for 6982 allied POWs who built the notorious Burma-Siam Railway. The 1,362 Australian graves included those of several RAN sailors.

We returned to the ship that day grateful for the sacrifice of these men and the others who managed to return to Australia.

M. Richardson, S.Gregg, N.Zillman, G.Irwin,
J.Watson, M.Moran of HMAS *Melbourne*

Tobruk Visited Vietnam

My apologies go to those *Tobruk* rats 'seen off' by an ommission I made in my article,' Showing the Flag: Naval Diplomacy to Saigon 1956-63 (JANI Vol 20, No 1). I failed to document a visit by HMAS *Tobruk* (Captain R.I. Peek, OBE, DSC, RAN) to the Republic of Viet Nam in December 1957. In a later edition of this journal I will provide a brief reference to acknowledge what would have been the second such visit. To those other HMA ships which followed, dress right and fill up the numbers!

Mike Fogarty

Manners Please!

It seems like navy office have adopted a policy of not answering letters directly, rather the tendancy is to pass a truncated answer through their 'branch offices'. It is as well to remember that if a 'branch office' reply was required, then that's where the query would have been directed in the first place. Perhaps the policy should be adopted by the community to send all letters, in the first instance, to the Minister's Office. At least some acknowledgement would be expected, if not a comprehensive reply!

And the ANI seems to have adopted the same rudeness. There is no branch offfice to take the blame, just no acknowledgement or reply! Seems to me that old fashioned politeness is kept for corporate sponsors whereas the lesser mortal members are ignored. Pity.

Robin Pennock

(Ed. I am guilty as charged Robin! My apologies for not acknowledging your submission, and a belated thanks for your excellent book review. The only mitigation I offer is that this journal is worked on in 'own time' by members of Council who hold down very busy day jobs. Some things fall through the cracks).

Despatch from Canada

by Commander Peter Jones RAN

This article is the first in a series of reports from Canada by Commander Peter Jones who is on exchange at the Canadian Maritime Warfare Centre.

Canadian Maritime Command Awaits the 1994 Defence White Paper

Just like the RAN the Canadian Maritime Command (MARCOM) awaits with expectation the release of their Defence White Paper. It would be fair to say that the Canadians are waiting more expectantly than their Australian counterparts. This is because unlike the RAN, MARCOM has still to set in place key force structure elements.

As many readers will be aware in recent years successive Canadian governments have cancelled the 12 boat nuclear submarine programme and the EH-101 helicopter project. On that basis there is considerable uncertainty about whether Canada will get new submarines at all and how capable the new helicopters will be.

In terms of the submarines there have been various offers made to Canada such as sale of the surplus RN Type 2400 boats. It would appear if the Canadians are to retain their submarine arm it will be with three boats. Indeed there is optimism that the members of the parliamentary defence review have been impressed with the value of submarines. MARCOM for its part has tried to promote the utility of the Oberons by employing them in such diverse activities as fisheries protection and drug surveillance operations.

Over the last year there have been a number of accidents in the ageing Seaking fleet, including one in which the two aircrew were killed. There is now consensus that a new helicopter is urgently needed. The cost of cancelling the EH-101 programme probably ran into the hundreds of millions of dollars, although the exact sum has either yet to be calculated or has not been made a matter of public record. The EH-101 saga will affect the shape of the future helicopter. The successor will have to be less capable and considerably less expensive.

It is felt in naval circles here that the aborted nuclear submarine and helicopter projects will have put the Canadian Forces (CF) in a poor light with defence industries and may affect the nature of future contracts. This maybe overly pessimistic as it is still a buyers market.

A final aspect of the forthcoming Defence White Paper is possible changes to the higher echelon of CF organisation. Currently the single element three star chiefs (MARCOM, LANDCOM and AIRCOM) are located away from Ottawa in Halifax, Saint Hubert and Winnipeg respectively. It would appear this may change and that they will move to the national capital. This is part of the process to increase jointery.

Turing to the Canadian Fleet it continues its impressive renewal. The planned fleet structure once current programmes are complete is detailed in Table 1. Three Tribal class destroyers have completed their TRUMP modernisation and only *Huron* awaiting completion. The new Halifax class frigates are entering service in rapid succession and as of September there were eight in service with four running trials or building.

UNIT TYPE	MARLANT	MARPAC
TRUMP 280 DGH	2	2
HALIFAX FFH	7	5
SUPPORT SHIPS AOR	2	2
SUBMARINES	UP TO 3	UP TO 3
COASTAL DEFENCE SHIPS	6	6
HELICOPTERS	TO BE DETERMINED	TO BE DETERMINED
AURORA MPA	13	5
ARCTURUS MPA	3	0
COASTAL MPA	7	3

Table 1: Future Composition of the Canadian Fleet

The graduation from a ASW fleet with only guns and an early mark of Seasparrow to one that has Standard SM-2, vertical launch Seasparrow and Harpoon is nothing short of a revolution. There is a growing appreciation in MARCOM of the full implications of this leap. Great efforts are now being made to fully integrate these systems and maximise their effectiveness.

From an operational viewpoint MARCOM and the whole CF for that matter is sorely stretched with UN activities. Its commitments are an order of magnitude higher than in the ADF. Canada has a proud record of participating in every UN peacekeeping operation. Over recent years this has become a rod for their own back. The Canadian Army with major commitments in Bosnia and Africa, as well as smaller ones scattered around the globe, are probably stretched to an unsustainable level.

MARCOM for their part are providing a ship (currently the new *Toronto*) in the Adriatic (Operation SHARPGUARD). This ship is part of the NATO Standing Naval Force Atlantic which in concert with the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean, Western European Union forces and US, French and British carrier groups are maintaining UN sanctions in the Bosnian conflict. This is a particularly complex operation with very real AAW and ASW threats overlaying the boarding operations.

The other major commitment is the UN sanction enforcement off Haiti (Operation Forward Action). This consists normally of one of the older steam ships (currently the old *Terra Nova*) from either coast. The prospect of the invasion of Haiti will probably see further CF elements involved in a subsequent peacekeeping role. Interestingly enough Air Command will be given responsibility for this activity because of the Army's existing commitments.

Finally, turning to an organisational aspect, MARCOM have reorganised their Fleet structure in mid-94. The new structure has replaced the Destroyer Squadrons with Operational Groups. This functional grouping places the AORs in with operational surface combatants. It also places shore and auxiliary afloat assets into other Operational Groups. The reform has potential to give greater focus to core activities and improve task group cohesion.

An outcome of the fleet reorganisation is that the tankers have reverted to a Commander's 'drive'. The Tribals are already commanded by Commanders. This means that future Canadian Flag officers will in all likelihood only get one drive in their career, as a Commander. It should be noted though that in MARCOM the OPSGRUs are considered sea billets. The Commanding Officers of each OPSGRU are Captains and OPSGRU 1 and OPSGRU 2 (the operational ships of each coast) go to sea on an as required basis. There is also a rotational billet for a Commodore commanding the Standing Naval Force Atlantic in the Adriatic. The last Canadian incumbent was Commodore G.R. Maddison whose flagships varied from a USN FFG to the Italian aircraft carrier *Giuseppe Garibaldi*!

In subsequent despatches this correspondent will examine the implications of the Defence White Paper and look at the Canadian experiences with 'jointery' and two ocean basing.

NOTICE OF ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING

Notice is hereby given of the 1995 Annual General Meeting of the Australian Naval Institute Inc

LEGACY HOUSE, 37 Geils Court DEAKIN, ACT on Thursday 23rd February at 7.30 for 8.00 PM

Please submit all agenda items in writing to the secretary by Friday 10th February 1995. Department of Defence (NAVY OFFICE) Russell Hill ACT 2600. Attention: Lieutenant Wendy Bullen, D-3-01

IS THERE A STRATEGIC JUSTIFICATION FOR THE INCREASE IN SOUTHEAST ASIAN MARITIME CAPABILITIES?

By Major Terry McCullagh

'In the aftermath of the Cold War, while defence budgets are declining in most of the Third World and on both sides of what was the Iron Curtain, defence spending - and arms imports - are increasing rapidly throughout most of the Asia-Pacific....States throughout the region are acquiring new combat, surveillance and early-warning radar (AEW) aircraft, sophisticated missile systems, air-to air refuelling capabilities, surface combatants and submarines.'[1]

Strategic change has swept across the world since the end of the Cold War calling for a peace dividend as the end of superpower rivalry and the threat of global nuclear war appears less threatening. As the European and North American nations make substantial reductions in their defence forces, Asia is paradoxically increasing its military capabilities. Southeast Asia,[2] on the doorstep of Australia now has a greater offensive capability than it did ten years ago. Maritime capabilities, in particular, have received a significant increase in defence funding, enabling regional countries to increase their maritime surveillance and strike capabilities.

Southeast Asia has always had a strong maritime focus. Since the early maritime empire of Srivijaya in central Sumatra, the waterways of Southeast Asia have provided the nexus of the major trading routes between Europe, the Middle East, South Asia and East Asia. The Chinese, Dutch, Portuguese, French, British and Spanish have all, at one time or another, dominated a part of Southeast Asia, recognizing the strategic importance of the region as the cross roads on the maritime highway.

WWII saw a dramatic change in the maritime environment within Southeast Asia. The maritime influence of the British was put to rest with the sinking of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse in January 1942. It was the enormous maritime capabilities of the United States that provided the amphibious craft to enable Australians to retake Borneo in June-July 1945. Since then American maritime power has rarely been challenged, even with the eventual establishment of the Soviet forward based base at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. Southeast Asian countries had other concerns, fighting wars for national liberation in Malaya, Indonesia, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and the Philippines.[3] Absorbing the majority of defence resources, the naval arms of the military remained under-developed.

With the end of the Cold War, the Soviet influence in the Pacific has been significantly diminished and the United States no longer has a permanent naval base within Southeast Asia. Despite having substantial armies and land-based paramilitary forces, Southeast Asian countries find themselves without the credible capability needed to protect the increased maritime responsibilities incurred under the UNCLOS III and the perceived decline of American naval capability. Accordingly, there has been an increase in the volume of defence spending as countries enhance their military capabilities in a self-reliant environment. Major elements of defence budgets are being set aside for maritime and air elements at the expense of land elements of a country's military.

This essay will examine whether or not there is a strategic justification for the increase in Southeast Asian maritime capabilities. The methodology used will establish the broad framework of the Southeast Asian strategic environment, the extent of the Southeast Asian maritime capability increase, the broad range of reasons for the increase, and then finally consider the strength of the strategic justification factor.

THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Southeast Asia is a sub-set of a complex Asia-Pacific regional matrix of relationships involving South Asia, East Asia, North Asia and the United States.

Contrary to Europe, in the post Cold War era, the Asia-Pacific strategic environment is uncertain. The old defined relationships have departed, and ideology is no longer a driving force in the relations between countries. The end of the Cold War signalled the commencement of a new era with new rules, challenges and outlooks. The evolution from the certainty of old to a new environment will involve a transformation which will require a delicate understanding of the

scope and magnitude of the problems that are likely to confront the Asia-Pacific region. The uncertainty of this transformation is shaped by two overriding factors: the end of the Cold War and the remarkable economic growth of the region. As a result, the region is witnessing the emergence of new powers as each state embarks on a course of nation-building by integrating new-found economic, political and military strengths. Geo-politics has been replaced by geo-economics as each state increases its focus on economic growth and nation-building.

The Asia-Pacific region is far from clear and orderly. The balances of power are being adjusted as new regional powers such as Japan, China, India and Korea emerge and the United States decreases in military and economic strength. Many Southeast Asian countries are suspicious of the growing economic, political and military power of these countries. Japan has the second largest military budget in the world, and although she lacks a power projection capability and displays no outward signs of hostility, the memories of WWII still linger in the minds of many Southeast Asians. China, with her 1.2 billion people, rapid economic growth and emerging democratic movement is facing one of the greatest challenges of change. A smooth transformation of power after Deng Xiaoping and the peaceful integration of Hong Kong may ease the minds of many Southeast Asian countries. India, has never declared her intentions through a White Paper on Defence, and has a formidable navy with power projection capabilities. Although defence expenditure has decreased in recent years, as efforts are focused on internal nation-building, there is uncertainty surrounding the reasons for such a large Indian maritime capability.

There are still potential regional flashpoints: the Korean peninsula is a latent time bomb as North Korean leaders toy with the International Atomic Energy Agency over the nuclear issue. The conflicting territorial claims within the South China Sea, and the assertiveness of China in pressing her demands, continue to present the potential for regional misunderstanding. In addition, as shown on Table 1, there is a wide range of conflicting territorial claims remaining within Southeast Asia.

TABLE 1: CONFLICTING TERRITORIAL CLAIMS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA[4]

Conflict	Location
Claims over Malaysian state of Sabah	Philippines and Malaysia
Competing claims to the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea	China, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan and the Philippines
Boundary dispute on the demarcation line on the continental shelf in the South China Sea, near Natuna Island	Indonesia and Vietnam
Border disputes	Vietnam and Cambodia
Boundary dispute on the off-shore demarcation line	Vietnam and Malaysia
Dispute over ownership of the island Pulau Batu Putih, 55 km east of Singapore in the Straits of Johore	Malaysia and Singapore
Competing claims to islands of Sipadan, Sebatik and Ligitan, in the Celebes Sea, 35 km from Semporna in Sabah	Malaysia and Indonesia
Border dispute	Malaysia and Thailand
Border conflicts	Thailand and Burma

There are emerging threats to regional security due to differing perceptions over a wide range of issues originating from ethnic, religious, economic and cultural concerns. Problems confronting the relationship between individual countries within the region range from the trans-migration of illegal immigrants and refugees, differing outlooks as to the management of the rapid economic growth of the region, health issues such as AIDS and the environment.

However, the suspicions within Southeast Asia are abating and regional security is firmly on the agenda. Using the 25 year old Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a platform, a multi-dimensional web of relationships is being developed. Economic interdependence and arrangements such as APEC and EAEC provide a binding force for nations to concentrate on making money instead of war. The ASEAN Regional Forum reflects that Southeast Asia is aware of not only the opportunities for increased security dialogue but also the growing need to manage the challenges of strategic change. Regional confidence-building measures employing multi-dimensional instruments of influence will continue to be pursued, however confidence is not developed overnight, and in a fluid strategic environment, regional countries may never fully accept the regional assurances of collective security.

Yet despite a wider range of security endeavours by regional countries, a balance of power approach is still favoured by most Southeast Asian nations, with the United States seen as a regional balancing wheel. Tow states that:

> 'it must be recognised that until truly effective confidence-building measures are devised, agreed upon, and implemented, it is essential to the security of the Asia-Pacific region that the United States and its regional allies maintain a balance of naval power adequate to protect their national security and vital economic interests.'[5]

In summary, the Southeast Asian region is in a period of transformation from the certainty of the past to a new future as relationships are re-aligned. The new strategic environment presents a more complex and elusive task in the arranging of regional security priorities.

WHAT HAS BEEN THE EXTENT OF THE INCREASE IN REGIONAL MARITIME CAPABILITIES?

Increases in regional defence expenditure are measured in a variety of ways, however, the most common indicator is the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) figures for defence spending. SIPRI indicates that the major increases in defence spending within the Asia-Pacific region have been in Northeast Asia rather than Southeast Asia. Furthermore, some of the Northeast Asian figures should be treated with suspicion as SIPRI believes that the figures for both China and North Korea are considered to be underestimated by at least double.[6] However, the volume of defence spending in these countries will not give a complete indication of military expenditure; for example, the cost of personnel in China and North Korea will vary greatly in comparison with countries such as Japan.

Although there are some indigenous defence industries in countries such as the Koreas, Taiwan and China, the majority of regional nations have increased their modernisation by importing highly technical military equipment. The success of high technology armaments, such as precision guided weapons, global positioning system receivers and unmanned aerial vehicles in the Gulf War, has increased the desire of many countries to acquire such systems. Figure 1 shows the major importers of defence equipment. The leading supplier of defence equipment was the United States.

FIGURE 1: THE LEADING ARMS IMPORTERS 1979 - 1988[7]



The major focus of regional defence spending is an improvement in maritime capability. Tables 2 and 3 indicate the significant differences in the current sizes of the naval forces within Southeast and Northeast Asia.

TABLE 2: SOUTHEAST ASIAN NAVAL FORCES[8]

Country	SM	PSC	PCC	MW	Amp.	S&M
Malaysia	0	4	37	5	2	3
Philippines	0	1	42	0	7	12
Singapore	0	0	30	1	5	1
Thailand	0	8	65	7	8	7
Indonesia	2	17	48	2	16	18
Brunei0	0	6	0	0	0	
Vietnam	0	7	55	11	7	19

(SM=Submarines; PSC=Principal Surface Combatant; PCC=Patrol & CoastalCombatant; MW=Mine Warfare; AMP=Amphibious; S&M=Support & Miscellaneous)

All ASEAN countries are transforming their coastal navies to meet a wider range of maritime requirements. The enhancements to maritime capabilities within Southeast Asia involve the modernisation of the maritime capabilities for countries such as Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand and to essentially develop a maritime capability for countries such as the Philippines.[1] Current enhancements are mainly defensive as no Southeast Asian navy has a significant power projection capability. However, Thailand is acquiring a small aircraft/helicopter carrier and there are plans to order a second carrier in 1997 to support a naval role of protection of the sea lines of communication (SLOC) and sea patrol in the outer reaches of the Gulf of Thailand and the South China Sea. There is speculation that Malaysia and Singapore continue to consider establishing submarine forces and Indonesia is close to a contract signature for an additional two submarines.[2] However, capabilities are more than just equipment. They involve a wide range of factors such as training, doctrine, facilities and organisation, and it will be many years before the new naval acquisitions within Southeast Asia respresent a significantly increased regional naval capability.

Japan currently conducts maritime operations out to 1000 nm and although it has limited power projection capabilities, Tokyo is planning the acquisition of defensive aircraft carriers and airborne refuelling aircraft. China, traditionally a coastal navy, is modernising her maritime capabilities to extend her strategic reach to reinforce her claims in the South China Sea with the acquisition of airborne refuelling and Soviet Su-27 aircraft. Although she plans to be a major blue water navy by the first decade of the next century, the steps of modernisation are progressing slowly. However, the sheer weight of numbers and the southward deployment of some units, makes China a maritime force of growing concern to many Southeast Asian nations. Grazebrook cites the Chinese naval developments as one of major factors influencing regional naval defence developments.[4] Taiwan and South Korea, supported by a healthy ship-building industry, are also increasing their capabilities with planned expansions to their principal surface combatant fleets.

Finally, India's maritime intention appears uncertain, reinforced by the lack of public defence policy and a formidable maritime power projection capability. Although impeded by funding and support issues, India still has the sixth largest navy in the world, patrolling a coastline of over 7600 kilometres and 500 islands.[5] However, Pakistan and internal reconstruction are still likely to provide the major influence on India's foreign policy.

WHAT ARE THE REASONS FOR THE INCREASE IN SOUTHEAST ASIAN MARITIME CAPABILITIES?

Pundits are unaminous in their agreement that Southeast Asia has been enhancing its maritime capabilities. The reasons for this capability enhancement are various, ranging from increased regional economic wealth, a decrease in internal concerns and a concen-

TABLE 3: NORTHEAST ASIAN NAVAL FORCES[3]

Country	SM	PSC	PCC	MW	Amp.	S&M	
Japan	17	64	11	43	6	18	
North Korea	26	3	379	23	0	7	
South Korea	4	38	81	10	14	11	
China	47	54	860	130	61	150	
Taiwan		4	33	93	13	26	28

tration on the external factors which shape the strategic environment. Other reasons include: a growing need for self-reliance, the impact of the Law of the Sea, the need to protect the sea lines of communication and finally the prestige associated with the acquisition of advanced military technology. Jorgensen-Dahl argues that:

'The effects of the much extended responsibilities following from the law of the sea, the growing importance of the seas in this region to world trade and commerce, and more generally, the growing utility of the seas and oceans as a source of food, energy, and raw materials are likely to require that much greater emphasis be put on military capabilities suitable for the protection of seabed economic and commercial rights and activities.'[6]

Rapid Economic Growth

The Southeast Asian economies have grown at a remarkable rate in the last decade as shown in Table 4. Sound macroeconomic policies and political stability have been the hallmarks of sustained economic growth over the last decade. Southeast Asian countries have embraced export-oriented industrialisation, combined with more open and liberal trade, and solid investment policies. Supported by investment from Japan and Taiwan, most ASEAN countries have achieved well over 7% average growth in recent years.[8] Led by the emergence of the newly industrialised countries (NIC) of Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea, the Southeast Asian countries have made an essential transition from their traditional commodity-based sources of revenue to technology-based exports. Countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand will join other regional NIC, supporting the claim that Southeast Asia is the fastest growing region in the world.

This economic growth is also reflected in the increased container traffic through Southeast Asian ports indicative not only of the growth of maritime trade within the Asia-Pacific region but also with Europe.

TABLE 4: SOUTHEAST ASIAN ANNUAL GROWTH RATES IN REAL GDP[7]

Country	1988	1989	1990	1991
Singapore	11.1%	9.2%	8.3%	7.0%
Malaysia	8.9%	8.7%	9.8%	8.6%
Thailand	13.2%	12.0%	10.0%	7.5%
Philippines	6.3%	6.1%	2.4%	-1.0%
Indonesia	5.8%	7.5%	7.4%	6.4%
Brunei	1.7%	14.9%	4.8%	-
Vietnam	6.1%	7.1%	4.5%	3.8%
Laos	-1.8%	13.5%	6.6%	4.0%
Cambodia	16.2%	2.4%	-0.1%	13.5%
World	4.4%	3.3%	2.2%	0%

TABLE 5: TRENDS IN CONTAINER THROUGHPUT IN SELECTED SOUTH-EAST ASIAN PORTS (expressed in '000 TEUs)[9]

Country	**1981**	**1985**	**1986**	**1990**	**1981-90** (%+)
Bangkok	242	400	511	982	306
Manila	324	632	677	1411	335
Penang	56	104	112	222	296
Port Kelang	148	245	242	497	236
Singapore	1065	1699	2203	5220	390
Tanjung Priok	140	376	449	1101	686
Total	1835	3080	3745	8332	

Defence spending has also increased, however, although nowhere near the rate of economic growth. Although Southeast Asian economic growth has averaged 7% in recent years, defence spending has only grown at an average of 1.61% since 1986. Northeast Asia has attracted the greatest increases in defence spending over the last decade, as the vestiges of the Cold War and Communism still remain. Dur-

ing the same period, defence spending in Northeast Asia increased 3.31% led by Japan and China. Hence defence spending has declined markedly as a percentage of national GDPs. Tables 6 and 7 give an indication of these trends.

TABLE 6: DEFENCE SPENDING WITHIN SOUTHEAST ASIA IN CONSTANT 1988 PRICES ($US)[10]

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Indonesia	2596	2505	2451	2410	2116	2163	1960	1877	1882	1661	1714
Malaysia	2132	2075	1604	1211	1065	1601	1406	1434	1488	1508	1316
Philippines	815	854	851	550	422	463	487	520	705	673	600
Singapore	816	866	845	1107	1258	1218	1230	1321	1381	1426	1648
Thailand	1806	1895	2031	2174	2240	2182	2181	2161	2146	2301	2505
Total	**8165**	**8195**	**7782**	**7 452**	**7101**	**7627**	**7264**	**7313**	**7602**	**7569**	**7783**
% Change		0.37%	-5.04%	-4.24%	-4.71%	741%	-4.76%	0.67%	3.95%	-0.43%	2.83%

TABLE 7: DEFENCE SPENDING WITHIN NORTHEAST ASIA IN CONSTANT 1988 PRICES ($US)[11]

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
China	7600	7800	7700	7600	7200	7100	6800	6900	5800	6400
Japan	20628	21291	22400	23504	24672	25924	27289	28521	29491	30483
North Korea	1349	1454	1583	1713	1765	1783	1781	1743	1821	2003
South Korea	5103	5318	5535	5675	6135	6593	7195	7865	8057	7827
Taiwan	4432	5000	5043	5007	5526	5704	5891	6348	6282	6562
Total	**39112**	**40863**	**42261**	**43499**	**45298**	**47104**	**48956**	**51377**	**51451**	**53275**
% Change		4.48%	3.42%	2.93%	4.14%	3.99%	3.93%	4.95%	0.14%	3.55%

to replace obsolete weapons systems, and there is limited indigenous weapons manufacture within Southeast Asia to support complete self-reliance. Accordingly, the economic growth within the region could be seen in terms of providing the means for Southeast Asian countries to make the step from early post-WWII technology to state-of-the-art weapons.[12] Furthermore, it could be concluded, that because the increases in defence spending within Southeast Asia are not at a rate comensurate with economic growth, the acquisitions are more in line with defence modernisation rather than an economic ability to pay for advanced military equipment. Furthermore, complete self-reliance is not seen as necessary in the current strategic environment.

Decrease in Internal Threats and Increase in External Focus

In the early post-colonial era, most Southeast Asian countries were engaged in internal struggles against insurgency elements. Living as they did under the security umbrella of the United States, defence resources of these regional nations were focused towards combating these troubles. The armies and police forces received the bulk of the defence funding, navies receiving only a minor share. The armies of Southeast Asian countries were considerable, and maritime forces limited to coastal or brown water duties performing mainly constabulary tasks. Due to the importance of fighting a land-based insurgency battle, the functions of Chiefs of the Defence Forces were always headed by the Army. Consequently, the naval elements of Southeast Asian countries were under-developed. When the Malayan Communist Party, led by Chin Peng, laid down their arms in December 1989, one of the last vestiges of the post-colonial era of insurgency disappeared from Southeast Asia. Although there is an increased awareness of the regional maritime environment, there still remains substantial internal land-based unrest in many Southeast Asian countries necessitating continued funding for a large land-based defence force. Table 8 gives an indication of these remaining concerns:

Drayton cites four distinct activity periods for arms procurement: heavy reliance on foreign military assistance, acquisition of large quantities of second-hand equipment, advanced weapons systems and finally self-reliance. He concludes that ASEAN is in the process of the acquisition of advanced weapons systems

TABLE 8: MINORITY GROUPS DISPUTES AND SECESSIONISTS MOVEMENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA[13]

Conflict	Location
Armed Communist and Muslim insurgencies	Philippines
Shan, Kachin, Karen secessionist, Communist insurgents and pro-democracy rebellions	Myanmar
Fighting between government and resistance forces	Laos
Communist guerilla operations along border in northeast Thailand	Thailand and Laos
Continuing conflict	Cambodia
Separatist movement	Sabah, Malaysia
The continuing resistance to rule in East Timor	Indonesia
Aceh independence movement in northern Sumatra	Indonesia
The Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) resistance movement	West Irian/Irian Jaya, Indonesia

Need for Self-Reliance

Since WWII Southeast Asian countries have lived under the protection of the United States anti-communist security umbrella, allowing states the opportunity to concentrate resources on economic growth and fighting an internal insurgency battle. Now that the security and certainty of the Cold War has passed, America has re-examined its role as the remaining super-power and, under pressure from the domestic front, has commenced a process of draw-down, contributing to the global peace burden of this new era. With the end of the Cold War, the necessity for forward bases to support operations within the Asia-Pacific region declined concurrently with the base renewal negotiations in the Philippines.

When the United States eventually withdrew its maritime forces from the Philippines in 1992, the former was at pains to state that it would not leave a power vacuum in the Asia-Pacific and was still committed to the security of the region. However, the withdrawal reinforced the perceived decline of the United States as a hegemonic power. Regional countries, fearful of a isolationalist United States which might open the way for the emerging regional powers such as India, Japan and China to fill a vacuum, generally support a continued United States presence as a balancing wheel during this period of re-adjustment and transformation. However the regional relationship with the United States is one of ambivalance: a keeness to maintain an American security purpose within the region and at the same time concerns about interference in the domestic politics of human rights, democracy and the environmental issues.

The United States is likely to remain strategically engaged in the East Asia region, if not just for economic reasons. American trade with the region is greater than her trade with Western Europe or Latin America. The rapid development of the regional economies has accelerated the economic interdependence between the United States and the other countries of the Pacific basin area. The SLOC through the Asia-Pacific region are vital to the United States as any threat to these lines would restrict trade and deny vital American access to raw materials. Furthermore, the United States is a Pacific nation and as such its security depends on Pacific security. The cornerstones of this security are the alliances and treaties with regional countries, including the Japanese-American Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and ANZUS. Many Southeast Asian countries see an engaged United States presence providing a counterweight to fears of a Japanese military resurgence.[14]

Despite American reassurances and rhetoric however, there is a perception amongst regional powers that they will have to increasingly rely on their own resources for security. The United States expects greater burden-sharing with regional partners, particularly Japan, thus increasing the need for self-reliance. The Japanese-United States security relationship is often considered to be the key element to regional security. The relationship is increasingly under pressure on the economic front, as Americans are less willing to support the economic growth of a country that has prospered under the American security umbrella. The Japanese-American relationship is a paradox: the two nations are allies in security matters, but adversaries in world trade. Yet, despite trade frictions, the security relationship between the two countries is sound, particularly with the strategic concern about North Korea.

In response to this, regional countries feel that they can no longer rely on an American-led security umbrella and need to develop their self-reliance capabilities. The United States is likely to be more selective and intervention is likely only when United States' interests are directly affected.[15]

Self-reliance is often linked to regional resilence and enhancing the security interdependence within the region. Teo supports the idea that national resilience will seal the weak regional links, developing regional

resilience to face the unknown.[16] There is some merit in this argument, however, the strength of regional resilience is not always a product of national resilience. Southeast Asia is not a homogenous region, but has a wide variety of cultures, religions and economic standards. Even the security policies of the Southeast Asian countries differ. For example, Singapore supports forward defence, Indonesia defence-in-depth, Malaysia focuses on maritime security and Thailand, until recently, was concerned with land-based threats and the Philippines is still fighting with insurgents.[17]

Most Southeast Asian countries have had security and political troubles with their neighbours. For example, over the last 40 years, Malaysia has had disputes with Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines and even Brunei. Southeast Asian countries often harboured insurgents along common borders with neighbours deepening the suspicions between states. The traditional balance of power paradigm still strongly exists within the region. Mack supports this position when he argues:

> 'Transparency - military openness - is not the norm in the region. No Southeast Asian state, for example, publishes defence White Papers; none publish the sort of lengthy analyses of various aspects of defence policy which are common in European states, in the United States and in Australia.'[18]

Self-reliance should be seen more in terms of national resilience rather than regional resilience. However, the regional economic forum, ASEAN has provided the platform to launch the developing security dialogues between countries and the more contemporary alternative approaches to security are gathering support. The economic interdependence that is developing with the region is providing the most powerful imperative to a stronger security community.

In conclusion, in a perceived environment of decreasing American military presence within the region, self-reliance is a powerful motive for Southeast Asian countries to modernise their defence forces, particularly their navies, which have been the under-developed arm of many nations' military during the Cold War.

Law of the Sea

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea fundamentally changed the maritime outlook in Southeast Asia. UNCLOS III, by attempting to balance the competing demands of the rights of passage for the major maritime powers of the world against the creeping jurisdiction of coastal states' concern for security and territorial integrity has significantly increased the responsibility of regional countries towards their maritime environments.

All Southeast Asian countries have claimed a territorial sea out to 12 nm, except Singapore which only claims three nm. Singapore, very dependent on maritime trade for her existence, is enclosed within the territorial seas of Malaysia and Indonesia. UNCLOS III provides for countries like Singapore via the provisions guaranteeing transit passage through straits.

All Southeast Asian countries except Singapore have proclaimed a 200 nm EEZ. The EEZ of Indonesia and the Philippines are in addition to their proclaimed archipelagic waters.[19] The extended EEZ has provided an invigorated regional naval mission and a wider range of countries now have borders with one another, eg Vietnam and Brunei, and China and Malaysia. The conflicting territorial claims in the Spratlys and Paracel islands of the South China Sea are a mark of these common borders. Interestingly, the majority of the conflicting territorial claims within Southeast Asia listed earlier in Table 1 are within the maritime environment and involve disputes usually over resources. Enhanced surveillance and policing of significantly increased areas of responsibility requires naval forces capable not only of detecting and identifying illegal activity within a states EEZ but also the potential to react and if necessary apprehend an adversary. Such tasks require significantly enhanced maritime surveillance and protection capabilities for all Southeast Asian countries.

Increased Need to Protect Sea Lanes of Communications

Coastal, intra and inter-regional trade depend on the lifeblood of the SLOC as road and rail transport systems within Southeast Asia are poorly developed. The sea has historically always been the major avenue for trade. Furthermore many Southeast Asian countries are not self-sufficient in key strategic and economic commodities.

This lifeblood needs to be protected. Although to some, threats to the SLOC are a paradox as there currently is no threat to the SLOC in the short to medium term, there are certainly non-military threats within the seas of Southeast Asia. Piracy and environmental pollution, particularly in the Straits of Malacca, are not only a concern for Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, but every flag carrier that transits these waters. Despite attempts by regional countries, the threat of piracy has risen in recent years, particularly in confined waters. Maritime pollution and safe maritime passage will increasingly be of concern to the straits and archipelagic countries of the region. Maritime assets capable of monitoring and protecting the SLOC are necessary as the volume of regional trade increases and the risks of non-military threats increase.

Prestige

> 'Within the military establishments of various ASEAN states there is also a considerable element of 'prestige' arms racing in the weapons acquisition process which has little to do with the 'modernisation' rationale of military technology transfer.'[20]

In most Southeast Asian countries the military plays an important role in government, particularly in Indonesia, Thailand and Myanmar. Modern defence acquisitions often provide credibility to military leadership, such as the resource-limited state of Myanmar making a $US 1.2 billion arms purchase in 1990 from China.[21] Furthermore, kickbacks associated with major arms purchases in some Southeast Asian countries are often in the order of 15-20% of any deal.[22] The prestige and corruption associated with the acquisition of state-of-the-art defence capabilities are often more important than any rational analysis of threats and capabilities.

WHAT IS THE STRENGTH OF THE STRATEGIC REASONS FOR THE INCREASE IN SOUTHEAST ASIAN MARITIME CAPABILITIES?

The strategic utility of maritime power can be assessed using two different definitions of maritime power. In a narrow sense, maritime power can be defined as the ability of a country to impose its will on another in the maritime arena. In a broader sense, maritime power can be viewed as the aggregate of a country's ability to make use of the sea in order to fulfil its national, economic, security and other goals.[23] In the post Cold War era, security is increasingly being seen not only in military terms, but in terms of maintaining the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of a nation and the advancement of national interest. Accordingly, a balance of power paradigm is more than just military might, but the aggregate of a nation's influence to contribute not only to her security but also the security of the region. Economic interdependence is the major binding force for national and regional security which is increasingly being seen as security with, rather than against, neighbours. Australia's multi-dimensional understanding of security espoused in the Ministerial Statement on Regional Security of 1989 conforms with this wider understanding of security.

The diplomatic role of navies is being recognised as an important task in this era of peace and economic prosperity. Maritime influence, as an instrument of national influence, must be capable of meeting a wide variety of threats to a state's national interest. Combined with the growing strategic importance of not only Southeast Asia, but also the Asia-Pacific region to the global economy, Hill maintains that:

> 'The use of maritime forces to safeguard the national maritime economic or strategic interest is an activity of long pedigree. So is the use of maritime forces to exercise suasion in situations where other national or allied interests are involved.'[24]

There is always concern that enhanced naval forces are considered destablising to regional security. This notion is not supported, as naval forces should be seen as just one component of a nation's military. Furthermore, they do not act independently but rather operate as part of a coordinated national response. Naval diplomacy can only be considered threatening when the force has some power projection capability. Power projection, in terms of the ability to deliver munitions ashore or against foreign vessels, must be balanced against the likely response of a state to provide a measured reaction to a situation of increased political tension between countries. Power projection in terms of a capability to place military forces ashore to hold national territory or to rescue nationals could be seen as a legitimate element of military power. Finally, surveillance technologies have enabled strategic and tactical surprise to be less likely, particularly within the maritime environment. Wallen concludes that:

> 'naval forces per se cannot be considered as destabilising or threatening in peacetime. On the contrary, in a growing regional or local conflict they can be a stablising element because of their ability to be rapidly deployed to the area concerned and there demonstrate the possibility of flexible application of military force.'[25]

Hill proposes five principal characteristics of the Asian maritime environment: the majority of states have a primary interest in the sea, being islands or coastal states; the countries of Southeast Asia benefited greatly from the UNCLOS III, which comes with additional maritime responsibilities; the resources of the sea are in many cases the subject of contending claims within Southeast Asia; population pressures will increasingly cause states to look to the sea for resources; and finally the interests of most Southeast Asian states are primarily economic rather than ideological.[26] The increasing importance of the sea within Southeast Asia will require protection of the sea and its resources, and is a responsibility that will demand military and diplomatic resources of every state.

In addition, the strategic benefits of an enhanced regional maritime capability are being recognised, particularly if the region develops a more pronounced sense of security confidence building. Combined maritime surveillance patrols against pirates, pollution control and monitoring of fishing activities will not only increase confidence among regional nations, but also provide synergism of a number of regional countries contributing to shared regional concerns. Combined maritime exercises will increase the levels

of interoperability endowing regional countries with the potential to contribute to United Nations Peace Keeping Operations.

In conclusion, there are four primary reasons supporting a strategic justification for the increase in Southeast Asian maritime capability. Firstly, the drawdown of the United States military and the uncertainty surrounding a continued American presence is interpretated as a need to enhance regional self-reliance. Secondly, the increased economic importance of Southeast Asia and the sea as an essential trade route requires these routes to be protected not only from the distant probability of military interdiction, but more importantly from the non-military threats of piracy, maritime pollution and navigational safety. Thirdly, the increased responsibilities associated with the Law of the Sea, particularly the extension of the territorial seas and the proclamation of EEZ requires the navies of Southeast Asia to develop the maritime surveillance and reaction forces necessary to police these extra territorial responsibilities. Finally, there is still strategic uncertainty within the region in the post-Cold War as countries weather this period of transformation. China's proclaimed desire to become a major maritime nation by the first decade of the next century and the continued unrest on the Korean peninsula only fuels the strategic uncertainty that exisits within the Asia-Pacific region.

Concurrent with this, is the remarkable increase in economic growth that has given countries the means to meet the needs of this changing strategic environment, although the growth of military spending falls short of the increases in economic growth. This further supports the position that the enhancements to maritime capabilities are being driven not by economic means but by other more significant factors.

CONCLUSION

Historically, maritime power has always been important within Southeast Asia. The region has settled and attracted traders from many parts of the world due to its geographical location as an important maritime trading route. After WWII, as the former colonial powers left the Southeast Asian states to independence, the importance of national maritime concerns declined as countries were engaged in combating insurgency and independence movements and at the same time living under the security umbrella of two superpowers. Since the signing of UNCLOS III in the early 1980s and the end of the Cold War, the importance of the maritime environment of Southeast Asia has dramatically changed. UNCLOS III gave regional countries a greater maritime responsibility, the end of the Cold War saw the end of the superpower rivalry and the effective end of any guarantee of a security umbrella, and the emergence of a number of regional powers into the regional security equation. The importance of self-reliant security of the sea is now an issue facing Southeast Asian countries and as such there is a strategic imperative for Southeast Asian maritime powers to modernise and face the challenges of the future within this dynamic and uncertain region.

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Cooperative Naval Activities: Drawing the Lines

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Notions of comprehensive regional engagement have met with a wide variety of responses - from enthusiastic embrace through to qualified acceptance and even cynicism. While few can argue with the philosophical appeal of improved engagement with regional countries, conspicuous difficulties remain with putting the practical 'meat' on the concept's rhetorical 'bones', especially when specifying the nature and degree of practical naval engagement. Furthermore, the fundamental question of whether Australia in general and the RAN in particular are getting the best 'return' on time, energy and resource investments with other navies should be asked. Answers to this question should go well beyond hackneyed 'motherhood statements' suggesting that any opportunity to work with our neighbours is by definition good in that it evokes mutual understanding, respect, entree, better diplomatic/trade relations etc. More concrete indicators of cost and benefit can and should be developed to help RAN planners determine just where to draw the lines of regional engagement activity, and every RAN commander should be able to explain to his crew or establishment just how a particular cooperative activity contributes to Australian interests. Consequently, the aim of this article is to suggest practical guidelines to assist RAN planners improve the nature and extent of cooperation with other navies

Due to a major expansion in the agenda of maritime interests, activities and responsibilities of most countries in the region, and by virtue of the geography of the archipeligo to our north, the RAN has become a key instrument in the practical implementation of the government's policy of regional engagement. And this role is bound to increase as the maritime estates of regional countries are better regulated and defended by improved navies and air forces. Yet RAN cooperation with regional navies has often been ad hoc, poorly focussed and sometimes even half hearted. Therefore, a more systematic approach to the selection, balance and conduct of Cooperative Naval Activities (CNAs) is needed, especially given that 'defence of Australia' priorities, regulation of the world's second largest EEZ and the odd UN commitment are likely to increasingly compete for scarce resources.

To help make informed judgements on the relative value, priority and future direction of cooperative activities, RAN planners could start by attempting to:

- Clarify the reasons why the RAN engages in cooperative naval activities and the overall objectives it wants to achieve;
- identify key criteria which can help RAN managers judge the relative benefits and costs of current and proposed CNAs,
- suggest priorities for current and future CNAs, and also consider the case of dealing with offers of cooperation made by other navies; and
- outline guidelines for better management and monitoring of CNAs.

CNA OBJECTIVES

The Australian government's reason for being is to promote the social and economic progress of the Australian people, and a key foreign policy goal is to be accepted as a legitimate partner in regional security matters and make a proactive contribution to regional security. This is to be achieved through a policy of comprehensive engagement in South East Asia and a policy of constructive commitment in the South West Pacific. In the 1989 Ministerial(Foreign Affairs and Trade) Statement on Australia's Regional Security the four key principles for implementing these policies were suggested to be:

- Developing a deliberate regional focus,
- being sensitive to regional perceptions,
- exercising creativity and persistance, and
- effectively presenting the benefits that working with Australia can provide.

The RAN's part in implementing government's policy of comprehensive regional 'engagement' is to tangibly demonstrate Australia's interest in promoting regional security and stability by:

- Promoting contacts between the RAN and the navies of regional countries which are important to Australian defence interests;
- improving international relations through maritime activity links;
- enhancing access and entree for policy, diplomatic and economic purposes;

- improving the ability of neighbours to protect their sovereignty; and
- gaining operational and training familiarity in the region.

Therefore, the RAN's effectiveness in cooperative naval activities is gauged by just how well it can align its activities and operations with these objectives, bearing in mind that the RAN's five main types of CNAs have traditionally been exercises, courses, official visits, exchanges and participation in various projects. But who decides on the nature, extent and priority of these activites, and do these decisions take place within the framework of a clear engagement strategy?

Setting the baselines of RAN engagement

The broad policy aims of government are translated by respective ministers and their departments into programs. In the defence context the International Policy (IP) Division is, among other things, charged to manage international defence relationships and coordinate the implementation of government policy on the use overseas of Defence resources. For example, IP Division runs the Defence Cooperation Program (DCP) which is a defence sub program complementing other regional defence arrangements including FPDA, bilateral exercises, ADF ship and aircraft visits and senior level personnel exchanges and consultations. Its Sub Program manager is First Assistant Secretary International Policy (FASIP) who is responsible for developing DC policy as well as providing administrative and financial oversight of DC activities.

The IP Division DCP manual (SIPMAN 2) gives some guidance on the objectives, management and procedures of the DCP. In particular, Chapter 2 deals with financial and other administrative details including approvals, costings, expenditure monitoring and contact points. Subsequent chapters cover overseas visits, visits to Australia, training and support facilities, combined exercises, attachments and exchanges as well as projects and allowances. Another significant reference document is the 'Grey Book', or Defence Cooperation Corporate Plan, which details activities and projects conducted in the current financial year and the subsequent four years. For most countries in the region it provides information on budget and FYDP allocations for individual activities under the headings of training, attachments and exchanges,visits and projects, as well as other activities.

IP Division is obliged to develop and maintain 'robust' sub program performance statements which are to clearly and comprehensively specify:

- The objectives of the cooperation and its components, together with sub objectives or goals against which performance can be measured;
- priorities;
- consistent strategies to achieve objectives; and
- costed activities which are planned to be initiated or continued.

Satisfying these requirements in the field of defence cooperation is extremely demanding and much remains to be done. Navy has an important advisory role in terms of offering consistent, high quality advice to IP Division, and arguments for or against cooperative activities need to establish exactly why an activity is being suggested/asked for and what is trying to be achieved in the long term. They should also weigh the interests and capabilities of the other party as well as the value of the current and prospective international political relationship. But most importantly advice should be consistent, logically framed and involve cost/return criteria that can be firmly linked to Australia's national interest.

DETERMINING CNA COST/RETURN

Weighing CNA outcomes against objectives and costs involves sound professional judgement in that issues often cannot be handled quantitatively. In fact, 'intangible' aspects of international relations and foreign policy often have an overriding influence on more practical considerations. Nevertheless, some sort of discipline should be imposed on CNA managers at all levels and, to help identify the cost/return implications of current and potential CNAs, the following criteria could be used:

- Benefit to Australia,
- maintaining the RAN's operational edge,
- capacity of the other party to benefit,
- cost (direct and opportunity), and
- Third Party considerations

Criterion 1.— Benefit to Australia

Nations characteristically assess costs and benefits through the prism of their own self interest, and they seldom feel the need to apologise for this. This characteristic is certainly true of other countries in our region and ,'...What's in it for Australia?' should be the fundamental question when deciding on the nature and extent of cooperative activities.

Specific objectives and benefits should be identified after establishing that a current or proposed CNA clearly fits in with priorities based on Australia's strategic and defence interests. These priorities are broadly outlined in the 1994 Defence 'White Paper' and the Defence Cooperation Corporate Plan ('Grey' Book). In particular, assessment of significant benefits for Australia should be made in terms of 'burden sharing' arrangements being established in the long run. Like most medium powers, Australia will probably have greater difficulty in maintaining a relatively large, sophisticated naval force so identifying areas where

joint activities and role specialisation can lead to cost saving is of obvious benefit.

Benefits for the RAN of cooperating in traditional military naval missions, in carefully selected operational areas, with particular nations, do exist and will be addressed later. However, the RAN must also strive for a balance between its traditional military activities and the demands of a broadening maritime security agenda which will figure prominently in the region's security 'equation'. Common maritime interests that will promote naval cooperation of direct benefit to Australia are security of trade routes and offshore activities, control of unregulated population flows, reducing traffic in contraband, disaster relief operations and preserving environmental security. Cooperation in these activities imply working to generally enhance regional capabilities in maritime surveillance and patrol, and each activity is discussed briefly below.

Security of Trade Routes is high on Australia's security agenda and is prominent on the agendas of the other export oriented, market economies 'Up Top'. Sea borne trade comprises three quarters of regional GDP and trade affects everyone as the region's engine of economic growth and long term security. Freedom of navigation is a common interest that should be guaranteed not only by law but by regional consensus backed up by professional and preferably standardised surveillance and patrol procedures. Regular naval interaction in surveillance and patrol activities promotes habits of communication and common practise which form the best bases for building uniform interpretation of the law of the sea (for example, concerning rights of innocent passage). The advantages of greater cooperation in surveillance and patrol should become even more pronounced as increased transit densities in the region's confined areas lead to 'traffic' problems, which may be further exacerbated by larger numbers of low standard ships with poor bridge teams and crews (so called 'ships of shame'). Prospects for piracy and perhaps even maritime terrorism may also grow with traffic density.

Control of Unregulated Population Flows is another mission that invites a cooperative approach. In 1989 the International Conference on Indo-Chinese Refugees was held in Geneva and a Steering group, of which Australia is a member, was charged with the implementation of acomprehensive plan of action to deal with the problem. This recognises a growing regional problem that may be exacerbated as some countries could face domestic instability arising from not being able to satisfy the growing expectations of their populations. We live in a region where the rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer at a considerable rate, and growth in poverty and hunger could lead to much larger migrations of the poor to richer areas. Estimates by the UN and other authorities indicate that the world's population will approach 10 billion by 2025. Asia's population is expected to increase from 3.1 billion to 4.9 billion by 2025, with India and China alone having to feed an extra 340 million by the year 2000 - only five years from now. Australia is seen as an attractive place to live and could become a prominent destination for illegal immigrants.

Cutting the Flow of Contraband, Illegal Drugs and Armaments into and out of regional countries is another international maritime problem that is on the increase and which most nations have a common interest in containing. Instead of the current piecemeal approach, effective control of drug trafficking and smuggling can be magnified by coordinated international efforts to attack at each phase of the supply cycle: at the source, in transit and during distribution. This mission may involve widened visit and search on the high seas in years to come, and the RAN could share valuable experience picked up in the Gulf War which involved 1000 ship boardings between September 1990-93.

Security of Off-Shore Activities Most countries in the region have a growing reliance on their offshore estates and a direct interest in the sustainable development of their marine resources. As a case in point Australia, as the owner of the world's second largest marine territory, expects an income of $30 Billion per annum from its newly declared EEZ by 2000. The fishing industry is expected to triple its income, and large oil and gas reserves are believed to exist inside the EEZ and on six of the eight continental shelf areas extending beyond. Furthermore, oceans are becoming major sources of substances used to manufacture pharmaceuticals, and this is expected to contribute to Australian pharmaceutical exports rising above $5 Billion per annum within five years.

Other countries in the region will derive substantial benefits from their maritime estates, however, as the number and nature of off-shore activities gets more and more complex in the confined waters of the archipelago, the probability of disputes is likely to get larger rather than smaller. The RAN could assist in building up the expertise of neighbours to regulate their marine economies. Otherwise, attempts at regulation may well degenerate to gunboat diplomacy.

Disaster Relief Operations The RAN could see a broadened humanitarian assistance role in regional areas of little infrastructure. This is a high visibility role which engenders a disproportionate amount of goodwill and entree for the effort involved. These operations are usually less liable to political or legal injunctions on uses of forces abroad.

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of coastal populations of the region are leading to extreme environmental degradation through deforestation and marine pollution. Increased density of traffic flow in the region, together with the increased age of ships and decreasing skill levels of crews, indicates an increasing potential for disastrous oil spills in international waterways. These factors reinforce future prospects for improved engagement in terms of building up regional expertise in patrol and surveillance missions.

Criterion 2.— Maintaining the RAN's operational 'edge'

Given Australia's small population, Defence's huge geographical area of responsibility and the limited number of defence platforms available to cover what amounts to 10% of the earth's surface; substantial technological, operational and training 'edges' are essential in achieving the RAN's prime directive of maintaining 'defence of Australia' capabilities. In particular, capability margins in the entire array of targeting technologies, combat C3, EW, ASW, and MCM must not be compromised by engagement in CNAs. Combat oriented cooperation should only be tailored to specific mission areas with particular countries who have a demonstrable need for it, or where a direct long term benefit to Australia exists.

Even the smallest navies in the region have a desire to improve their abilities in combat operations and pick up clues on how to perform traditional military missions. This will continue to be a major attraction in working with the RAN, however, given the diversity of interest and lack of cohesion in the region the practical need for traditional naval combat skills, interoperability and integration is slim. Furthermore, a security dilemma exists in sharing and building up the combat/interdiction skills of neighbours. On the one hand it provides entree to cooperation and builds up links that can be broadened into other areas. On the other hand it can be counter productive because increasing combat capabilities may well reduce regional security rather than enhance it. By increasing combat capabilities the disposition to use them during periods of tension could be stimulated; the threshold of violence could be lowered and the results of action can be more dramatic and escalatory. Of course, this situation is contrary to Australia's aims of promoting a safe regional environment, and a careful balance must be maintained between cooperation in traditional combat operations and the demands of the new maritime agenda which centre around constabulary (surveillance, patrol and search) missions.

Ultimately, every sovereign state must be careful to preserve the value of its 'capital' and its capability advantages relative others, including even its friendly neighbours. This is largely because of the great time and expense spent in acquiring modern naval capabilities and the even greater expense involved should capability margins need to be reacquired. Nevertheless, an 'all or none' approach to cooperation in combat areas should be avoided, that is, an 'extent' of cooperation can usually be given rather than a simple 'no go'. Consequently, an acceptable margin of 'superiority' could be determined and assistance given up to this level.

Some neighbours will enjoy more cooperation and sharing than others, and the RAN should anticipate capability margins in five to ten year time frames. Of course such exercises are quite difficult, but assessments can be made of the other party's ability to thrive in an area and if a margin is likely to close anyway in a five year period, current cooperation could be a good bet for the future. Furthermore, if a regional navy is likely to show significant improvement in MCM,for example, substantial 'up front' investment from the RAN may be worthwhile. Similarly the maturity of the navy to navy relationship may develop to the stage where some role specialisation could exist as a hedge against declining capabilities.

It should be remembered that the issue of sharing naval combat expertise does not boil down to a simple matter of trust or the lack of it; to give away too much for too little is to be seen a fool, especially in Asia. Until the maturity of an international relationship has reached a certain level - a situation that will be discussed shortly - it's OK to say no!

Criterion 3.— Capacity of the other navy to benefit

The RAN must also be careful to avoid disproportionate expense arising from overtraining or over specification of equipment and procedures in its dealings with other nations - the *form* of a CNA must always follow its *function* and go no further. For example, some maritime elements of south west pacific nations have a learned preference for operations, equipment and tactics which are of little value at the margins for essentially coast guard/police forces.

Consideration should also be given to whether a recipient navy has the capacity to absorb a particular cooperative activity, and whether the activity is structured so that it may eventually be repatriated or done 'in country'. Repatriation may reduce a continuing and probably costly obligation of Australian involvement. On the other hand, it should be established whether it is desirable to have the activity repatriated at all; it may be advantageous to cultivate a degree of capability and skill dependence on the RAN.

Criterion 4.— Cost

The following factors should be considered in determining the cost side of a CNA's cost/return 'equation':

- A firm estimate of how much the activity will cost in the long term (over the FYDP at least) is most important.
- Determining how CNA costs affect the conduct of other cooperative activities, as well as other RAN missions directly linked to the defence of Australia imperative, is important (ie. What are the 'opportunity costs'?). For example, will significantly more time and effort spent operating with regional navies reduce opportunities to hone 'technological edge' skills in exercises with the USN? By the same token, thought has to be given to the issue of whether a particular activity's financial cost is outweighed by the judged 'cost' of not encouraging better relations with a country generally through cooperation. In this judgement international trade costs and benefits may enter the equation. For example, can increased engagement with another Navy be linked with increased prospects for Australian arms sales?
- Given the economic vitality of many states to the north, together with their sometimes stridently independent rhetoric, serious consideration could be given to conducting CNAs on a cost share or even a full fee for service basis.
  Training activities in particular may lead to fee for service commitments and the purchase of Australian made equipment or even platforms.
- In some training and operational contexts, it may be cheaper to undertake activities in the other country using mobile training/operations teams.

Criterion 5.— 'Third Party' considerations

The sensitivities of traditional allies and other regional nations should be carefully taken into account in proposed CNAs. Cooperation cannot involve the sharing of information, procedures or equipment which our allies would not like to see disseminated or used and, in some cases, sensitive commercial implications can be involved - such as intellectual property rights in high tech transfers. Also, if the RAN were to move closer to one state than another, resentment could be aroused and cooperative actions may even be seen as threatening or discriminatory by a neighbour.

The region is disparate and plagued by many rivalries and resentments, and the RAN must be sensitive to persistent gaps between declaratory position and action from some of our neighbours. ASEAN countries exhibit large discrepancies in terms of size, location, vulnerability, economic strength, ethnic make up, religion, ideology and political system. Threat perspectives are varied, interpretations of defence cooperation can be skewed and security relationships are frequently ambiguous, diffuse and laden with suspicion. These nations are very broadly split into two camps: While Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines tend towards preferences for external security linkages, Malaysia and Indonesia do not. Indonesia leads the non aligned movement and, like Malaysia, is heavily committed to ZOPFAN - some aspects of which are seen as too idealistic by the others. Indonesian relations with Thailand are not close and are sometimes tense; the Thais have not forgotten that Indonesia failed to offer military assistance if Thailand was ever attacked by the Vietnamese. Also, Thailand tends to have a 'bandwagon' alignment with China; and sometimes does not toe the line with ASEAN. Distrust and suspicion also exist between Malaysia and Singapore. Malaysia is sometimes seen as being resentful of Singapore's success and independence, often expecting to be consulted as a 'big brother'. From Malaysia's perspective, Singapore's reliability and good faith are often suspect.

Criterion 6.— Dealing with offers of cooperation

To date, because of the RAN's substantial capability margins, cooperative naval activities have been largely 'one way streets' with the RAN providing the bulk of material, information, skill and experience. However, most regional countries are steadily expanding in capability and confidence. For example, the maturity of our defence relationship with Singapore has developed particularly well in recent years, and opportunities for the RAN to burden share and become involved in 'balanced benefit activities' will probably increase.

Generally, in cases involving offers of partnership with or assistance to the RAN it is important to ask the following questions:

- Is the proposed activity demonstrably in support of shared security interests, and does cooperation have the potential to yield a significant capability increase to both sides in the longer term through burden sharing and cost saving ?
- Will refusal to accept assistance get the offering country 'off side' to an unacceptable extent? Is refusal to accept worth the possible 'aggravation' associated with rejection?
- What is the likely attitude of neighbouring countries and/or our allies to acceptance of the proposed cooperative activity ? Could the cooperation destabilise rather than improve regional stability?
- Does the particular cooperative activity 'fit' into the context of a long term relationship management strategy for the country in question?

The need for the RAN to have just such a strategy of 'investment' will now be considered.

A STRATEGY OF INVESTMENT: 'BUILDING MATURITY'

Government strongly endorses continued development of a network of bilateral and multilateral (FPDA) partnerships with South East Asian countries. But CNAs relate to a variety of countries with extremely wide ranges of naval capabilities, interests and abilities to absorb training and experience. Therefore, proposed activities should be looked at on a case by case basis, and flexibility of approach is needed to determine the benefits - to each party - of particular cooperations. In the long term management of its navy to navy relationships, the RAN should resist the temptation to move too quickly in trying to translate some aspects of western security 'architecture' or ways of doing things into the region, or be seen as trying to impose its preferences for cooperation with undue haste. Also, it should be borne in mind that the region is extremely diverse in terms of the 'maturity' of navy-to-navy relationships. Building up the 'maturity' of selected navy-navy relationships should be the cornerstone of any RAN 'engagement strategy'.

The 'Maturity' of a navy-to-navy relationship is determined by many factors including commonality of strategic interests and outlook, similarity of objectives and tasks, practical history of maritime cooperation, together with compatibility of operational capabilities and procedures. Five broad levels of 'maturity' exist in Australia's naval relationships, ranging from developed relationships with traditional allies such as the US, UK and NZ to that existing with potential security associates like Japan.

Appropriate navy-navy management mechanisms should be matched to the existing level of maturity, with the aim of bringing selected navy to navy relationships up into the next higher maturity level. A general description of the characteristics at each level, together with guidance for CNAs and management at each of the five levels is detailed below. Note **that maturity level does not necessarily equate to priority level.**

MATURITY LEVEL 1 - TRADITIONAL ALLIES

This level is marked by a long track record of association, a wide network of working level cooperations, substantial convergence of strategic interest, a high degree of equipment interoperability and many common operating procedures. Continued cooperation with traditional allies is firmly endorsed by strategic guidance which emphasises maintaining 'vigour' and 'good working relationships' in our alliances, as well as maintaining interoperabilty. Our relationships with traditional friends and allies (the United States, New Zealand and the United Kingdom) have consistently been viewed as mutually advantageous. Relationship management has, for many years, been highly formalised under the auspices of ANZUS, the ANZAC Pact (Canberra Treaty 1944) and especially the Armies of America, Britain, Canada and Australia (ABCA) arrangements.

While many recognise ANZUS, which is a 'general' treaty, ABCA arrangements form the real ties that bind and cover the whole spectrum of naval operational, technical and research activities. ABCA was a functional cornerstone of the Western Alliance during the cold war and commenced two years before the establishment of NATO. ABCA's aim continues to be to '...cooperate closely in all defence matters...discussions should deal not only with standardisation (and interoperability), but cover the whole field of cooperation and combined action in the event of war'. ABCA standardisation programs have proliferated to include a multitude of areas of defence operational, logistical and scientific cooperation. For example, of the seven major ABCA programs five have direct relevance to the RAN. These are the:

- ABCA Navies Quadripartite Standardisation Program
- AUS-CAN-NZ-UK-US Naval Communications Organisation
- ABCA Combined Communications Program
- ABCA Combined Exercises Agreement, and the
- Technical Cooperation Program(TTCP)

By remaining firmly committed to ABCA, Australasia keeps abreast of the latest developments in military doctrine, operations, tactics and scientific research despite geographical isolation and limited resources. For example, a link with NATO developments is forged through ABCA. NATO STANAGS (Standardisation Agreements) are converted to ABCA NAVSTAGs for use by the RAN under RN sponsorship. This is only one example of the extensive and valuable information exchange through ABCA's Information Exchange Project.

The ABCA agreements are both symbolic and extremely practical. The key to successful international cooperation between the partners was born of a general convergence of interest, ideological solidarity and essential unity of purpose. Increasing association in the interests of cost effectively maintaining capability margins - especially in tactics,C3 and EW - remains highly desirable for Australia in the post cold war period.

Maintaining close defence ties with the US and encouraging continued US engagement in the region remain important objectives for Australia and other countries, especially Singapore and Thailand. Very high priority should still be accorded to maintaining

and improving existing naval links with the US, and this in no way contradicts Australia's policy of maintaining a deliberate defence focus on Asia. Most countries in the region are content to be linked, indirectly, with an ally of the United States. This was expressed by an Assistant Minister for Defence (L. Hsien Loong, Singapore,1990) who highlighted the importance placed on Australia's traditional relationships when saying that, '...To take the (pro FPDA) argument a step further, some sort of reaction, or at least some visible displeasure, from the partners' allies, linked to it through other alliances, cannot be ruled out. It is these imponderables that make the FPDA an important factor for stability in the region'. Though not as forthcoming as Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia desire an 'arms length' US engagement in the region which is encouraged by the Australian connection.

It should be remembered that the USN and RN remain the most operationally experienced and best equipped navies in the world. Maintaining or even increasing entree, exchanges and attachments with these navies continues to be highly relevant to cost effectively maintaining RAN operational and organisational competence. Ultimately, the entree of the RAN with regional navies is determined by its level of professionalism and this in turn is bolstered by extensive contacts with the USN and RN. Maintaining strong links with both navies through exchanges, attachments and numerous ABCA working level arrangements and panels remain of major practical advantage in implementing an engagement strategy. Similarly, the special relationship between Australia and New Zealand continues and closer cooperation with the New Zealand Defence force is desirable, especially concerning maritime surveillance in the South West Pacific and prospects for some role specialisation as a hedge against declining capability.

Some features of the Level 1 maturity relationship may be aimed at over time with selected regional nations; in particular our ASEAN FPDA partners. This should be a key element of the RAN's relationship management strategy.

MATURITY LEVEL 2 - FPDA PARTNERS

Australian defence relations with FPDA partners Singapore and Malaysia are entering a phase of increased maturity and diversification. Features of this maturity level are increasing diversity of cooperation, formalised bilateral management arrangements and a movement away from training of Malaysian and Singaporean personnel as the main cooperative activity.

The FPDA was instituted in 1971 after the demise of SEATO, but close cooperation between Australia, Malaysia and Singapore existed throughout the 1950's and 60's under British patronage. The three countries still belong to the Commonwealth and have inherited many British administrative, organisational and military traditions. These factors remain significant facilitators to cooperation.

FPDA gives Australia well established, legitimate entree into the region and this traditionally robust defence relationship can be built on. Long term advantages of selective cooperation with Singapore and Malaysia are:

- Provision of operational and training experience in the region for the RAN.
- Coordination of information gathering and sharing, with emphasis on non military 'targets' such as illegal immigrants and contraband.
- Improvement of Malaysian and Singaporean capabilities to monitor, detect and regulate their offshore estates. This may involve promoting interoperability of some systems as well as common doctrine and training experiences to ensure joint constabulary operations can proceed if and when necessary.
- Signalling of regional defence 'solidarity'. This is in line with Australia's national defence strategy of defence in depth and extends 'depth' to a regional level.
- Reduction of costs of tasks in the long term, or reducing the burden of taking on additional tasks through pooling of knowledge and some capabilities, eg. cooperation aimed at surveying, mapping and collecting data on the physical environment.

Substantial progress has recently been made in formalising bilateral management arrangements with Malaysia and Singapore with the formation of the Malaysia Australia Joint Defence Program (MAJDP) and the Joint Australia Singapore Coordination Group (JASINGCG) during 1992. These forums and their working sub committees can be used for the structured identification and coordination of CNAs with Singapore and Malaysia if the RAN ensures that its views are properly represented.

Malaysia

All bilateral cooperative defence activities with Malaysia come under the MAJDP which coordinates FPDA, various projects, navy-navy cooperation , bilateral logistics, defence industry agreements and maritime surveillance cooperation. MAJDP was formalised in February 1992 and can provide a more structured framework for the conduct of CNAs by systematically ensuring activities are directed towards mutually agreed priorities and timetables are set for regular monitoring of performance. MAJDP can in some ways serve as a template for cooperative defence activity (CDA) coordination, and some details of the program will now be considered.



HMAS COLLINS and her five (perhaps seven) sisters will be the most capable conventional submarines in the Asia Pacific region. RAN professional and technological capability margins in war fighting roles should not be eroded. These margins are dearly bought and maintained, and are instrumental in achieving the navy's primary mission of maintaining 'defence of Australia' capabilities.

Policy and management oversight of the MAJDP is exercised by the MAJDP Review Committee which meets annually to direct, coordinate and evaluate all activities carried out under MAJDP. This Committee is chaired by the Under Secretary Policy, Malaysian Ministry of Defence, and is supported by the following three sub committees:

- The Projects Sub Committee reviews and, as required, issues directives to on-going projects as well as assessing and endorsing new project proposals.
- The Training, Attachments and Exchanges Sub Committee establishes priorities for training, reviews ongoing attachments and exchanges and endorses new proposals.
- The Bilateral Exercise Sub Committee reviews exercise activity for the previous year, determines the schedule for the current and following year and assesses new proposals.

Policy issues that cannot be resolved by the MAJDP Review Committee may be addressed at the Malaysia Australia Policy Discussions.

Singapore

Australian and Singaporean cooperative defence activities are now coordinated through the Joint Australia Singapore Coordination Group (JASINCG) which was established in September 1992. JASINCG is tasked, '...to provide guidance and review the development and implementation of CDAs less intelligence matters'. Singapore has shown itself as probably the most agile, independent and dynamic political entity in South East Asia. A conspicuous indicator of this was seen after the closure of US Bases in the Philippines when the US was invited to use Singapore's maintenance facilities. Indonesia and Malaysia, after initially strong criticism of Singapore's initiative, followed suit.

Besides having probably the best trained and equipped navy and air force in ASEAN, Singapore offers advantages in collaborating with Australia in a number of areas, especially defence science cooperation and logistics support. Particular attention could be paid to possible collaboration in maritime surveillance/ information exchange and mine counter measures.

The JASINCG and MADJP are obvious forums for clarifying objectives and improving CNA coordination with Singapore and Malaysia respectively. Consequently, given the value of Australia's defence relationship with Malaysia and especially Singapore, a determined effort should be made to ensure adequate navy representation at MAJDP and JASINCG gatherings. In the longer term these types of arrangement may be models for formalising management and monitoring arrangements with nations like Indonesia and Thailand, who are at level three of maturity in terms of naval relationships.

MATURITY LEVEL 3 - INDONESIA AND THAILAND.

The third level of relationship maturity applies to Thailand and Indonesia, where cooperation is improving but lacks the track record of experience gained with FPDA partners.

Improving defence relations with Indonesia is an important policy objective. Indonesia remains a special case which will have to be carefully managed along strictly bilateral lines and with due sensitivity. Indonesia considers itself the de facto 'leader' of ASEAN and the prime manager of South East Asian security. However, this perception is not shared by its neighbours and ASEAN partners, especially Malaysia and Singapore, who still tend to hold lingering suspicions of Indonesian intent. Of course, these suspicions are important factors in the enthusiasm of the Malaysians and Singaporeans in maintaining a robust FPDA, and both countries have far more to lose from the loss of the FPDA in terms of practical benefit to their security than does Australia.

Advantages for Australia of closer navy-to-navy interaction with Indonesia include:

- RAN operational familiarisation with the immediate archipelagic environment;
- improving Indonesia's capability to work with Australian forces to control unregulated population flows, reduce illegal fishing and interdict illegal drug and arms shipments.
- burden sharing by developing bilateral approaches to maritime information exchange, marine pollution, piracy, ship safety and search and rescue.
- promoting uniform and agreed interpretation of the law of the sea, especially on rights of innocent passage.
- Involvement in combined constabulary exercises and extra, short term personnel exchanges.

Thailand

Thailand is essentially a 'pro western' neighbour and remains friendly towards Australia, despite occasional setbacks. While the degree of naval cooperation with the Thais will remain limited - mainly for reasons of distance - the political dividends of more cooperative naval activities are important. The Thais have been very helpful in assisting Australia's entree into the region by being a consistently 'friendly voice' in ASEAN and refraining from being too "ASEANocentric" in outlook. Furthermore, the growing sophistication of the Thai economy offers growing potential in defence science and logistics cooperation.

Building maritime patrol/surveillance/search skills should develop the bilateral navy-to-navy relation-

ships with Thailand and Indonesia to the point where structured management and monitoring arrangements similar to JASINCG and MAJDP can be introduced. In the meantime, annual working visits to both of these countries by the Maritime Commander and selected fleet staff should continue to be used to demonstrate a high level commitment to these developing bilateral relationships, and provide focus for detailed coordination discussions at the navy-to-navy level.

MATURITY LEVEL 4 - PNG /PICs

The fourth level of maturity deals with PNG and the Pacific Island States (PICs) which include Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Western Samoa, Kiribati, Cook Islands, Tuvalu, Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands and Fiji. 'Security' often has a broader meaning among the island states, with economic and internal security imperatives having immediate demands. As the 'biggest' South West Pacific nations, PNG, Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands are given a relatively high priority and response to natural disaster emergencies will remain an important though rarely drawn on element of naval engagement in the area. Also, regular Australian ship visits to these countries in support of national surveillance tasks are expected by both Defence and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

While the maritime capabilities and objectives of these nations are quite modest, the requirement to formalise and monitor cooperation still exists.

The Australian Government aims to encourage PICs to be more self reliant in protecting national sovereignty, and tangibly assists through the Pacific Patrol Boat (PPB) Project, training assistance, enhanced communications capabilities and by developing a regional maritime surveillance and reporting system in partnership with regional authorities such as the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA).

CNAs with PNG and the PICs should focus on improved fisheries and sovereignty protection and surveillance, because oceanresources have a potentially disproportionate impact on national income and hence internal stability. These capabilities can also be enhanced by improving support infrastructure and leadership through encouraging better management, planning and operational skills. Continued efforts should be made to maximise the potential of the Pacific Patrol Boat (PPB) and provision has been made for a regional Maritime Surveillance Communications Network (MSCN) to PPB operators coordinated through the FAA Headquarters in Honiara. This network has the potential to assist with maritime surveillance, search and rescue operations as well as customs and immigration enforcement between PICs.

MATURITY LEVEL 5 - JAPAN

This maturity level features a currently low degree of cooperative experience. Yet Japan is our largest trading partner and potential difficulties with security of our SLOCs are shared. It is in Australia's interest to engage Japan constructively in view of her potential to exert substantial economic leverage which may be used to Australia's advantage - the 1988-93 Japanese aid program expended $50 Billion, of which $10 Billion went to ASEAN countries.

Guidance encourages initiating consultations with Japan to explore possible avenues for defence cooperation, and security of SLOCs in terms of ensuring freedom of navigation and rights of innocent passage are possible starting points. Cooperation in the fields of defence science and technology may also prove particularly advantageous.

MANAGING CNA's

Selected relationships can be diversified and developed so that the maturity level of a bilateral relationship rises. For example, with the institution of the MAJDP and JASINCG, bilateral relationship management processes have become more structured and productive development at the working level/sub committee level is likely to occur. Benefits of cooperation are already becoming apparent and the Malaysian Defence Minister, Mr Najib, has said that he saw MADJP as a model for future Malaysian defence relations with both New Zealand and the UK.

The maturity level of our navy-to-navy relationships with Indonesia and Thailand is at level 3 and the aim could be to develop them to maturity level 2 over time. But, most importantly, regardless of the current level of maturity of a navy-to-navy relationship, common features of all CNA management and implementation should be:

- clear and informed communication channels,
- careful selection, documentation and maintenance of agreed aims, through establishment of genuine performance indicators, statements and progress monitoring mechanisms, and
- ensuring that the RAN is consistently and competently represented at all levels.

Communication

Improved formal and informal communications processes can be developed to oversee and coordinate bilateral navy-to-navy relationships, and regular forums for consultation and information exchange are absolutely necessary for productive cooperation. Barriers to informed communication and action at the Australian 'end' should be minimised and the first step is to ensure good communication between Navy, HQADF and the IP Division.

NAVY-TO-NAVY COOPERATION SHOULD FOCUS ON BUILDING UP REGIONAL EXPERTISE IN THE CONSTABULARY TASKS OF SURVEILLANCE, PATROL, SEARCH AND ARREST. THE NEED FOR COOPERATION IN COMBAT ORIENTED ACTIVITIES IS SMALL AND COULD BE DESTABILISING

The two HMAS STIRLING based patrol boats HMAS BUNBURY (217) and HMAS GERALDTON (213) seen at speed off the West Australian Coast.



It is no secret that in the past relations with the IP Division have sometimes been strained; criticisms from some navy desk officers have included:

- Navy not being represented at a number of IP sponsored policy talks.
- Inadequate consultation. For example, SIPMAN 2 was not presented for navy comment when many directives in the manual have to be implemented by the service. Also, the Division neglected to seek navy briefs prior to talks with participating countries when navy representatives were not included.
- Awareness of navy restructuring among IP Desk Officers was poor - activity and resource constraints affect the potential nature and extent of RAN cooperation.

Of course, Navy itself has not been without sin in terms of lack of priority traditionally assigned to DCP activities and staffing, as well as occasionally sloppy communications. Moreover, staff turnover in both Navy and IP Division has not been conducive to consistently good management of international cooperation.

Selection, Documentation and Maintenance of Objectives

Extensive consultation between IP Division, HQADF and Navy is necessary if CNAs in general and the Defence Cooperation Program in particular is to fall into line with Program Management and Budgeting principles, as they are obliged to do. IP Division and Navy must work together to develop and maintain performance statements which clearly and *comprehensively* specify:

- The objectives of CNAs and their components, together with sub objectives or goals against which performance is measured;
- priorities;
- a description of each activity;
- strategies to achieve objectives; and
- a list of costed major activities which are planned to be initiated or continued.

In view of these requirements there appears to be no good reason why some principles of Navy Quality Management (NQM) cannot be adapted to specific aspects of navy-to-navy cooperation management. NQM is the RANs approved management philosophy and applications of NQM techniques may be highly effective in dealing with the specific capability development in surveillance, maintenance and training. While management terminology and procedures may change, the underlying principles of NQM can be used to ensure that some of the requirements above have the best chance of being achieved.

At the working level, Navy-to-Navy Quality Groups (QG) could be set up to develop and coordinate activities and set up Process/Project Action Teams (PATs) which would deal with specific problems/processes. For example, a Bilateral Navy Quality Group (BNQG) could:

- Identify performance improvement projects and their goals in, say, surveillance or ship availability;
- prepare a mission statement which specifies the objective, constraints, resources and authority of the PAT; and
- arrange any necessary training and resources.

The BNQG would select a PAT team leader to deal with a specific problem. It would also select a cross section of 'hands on' and 'management' personnel to work on the problem, and the team should be located as close as possible to the site of the problem or process. Other activities include:

- Identification of solutions and preparation of plans to solve problems or improve processes, including selection of control points and measures of effectiveness for review; and
- presenting options to BNQG with recommendations to improve situations.

The BNQG would then have a firm basis on which to monitor implementation and document process improvement and results. Comprehensive involvement at the working level could strengthen national abilities to protect maritime resources, and improve support infrastructure and leadership through the practise of better management, planning and operational skills. Consequently, this 'tailored NQM' approach would be of particular value in lower maturity relationships, especially with PNG and the PICs.

Representation

Navy must assiduously work towards ensuring expert navy representation on bilateral working groups and in various sub committees. Furthermore, Navy's views should be adequately represented at policy talks by its own subject matter experts, or at least an effort should be made to gain observer status. Failing this, any representatives present from HQADF must be adequately briefed on naval criteria and constraints, especially if they are wearing 'green or blue suits'. Similarly, DAs and HADS who are green or blue suited should have access to dedicated maritime advisers who are not juggling line and advisory jobs.

The RAN should continue to make the most out of opportunities for navy-to-navy talks and ensure that all exchange positions are filled with carefully selected representatives. Fleet staff visits overseas are particularly valuable, and these activities represent a relatively small investment which can have a disproportionate impact on effective selection and maintenance of policy aims.

CONCLUSIONS

The RAN is called upon to develop and diversify a web of bilateral defence relationships throughout the region through participation in cooperative naval activities. Reasons for engaging in cooperative naval activities (CNAs) should be clear and agreed by both parties, however, CNAs have often suffered from a failure to carefully select and maintain objectives. This leads to lack of focus and low 'investment return' for cost.

Cooperative activities should be looked at on a case by case basis and proposals to initiate, accept, enhance or reject cooperative activities should, in the first instance, address the six cost/return criteria described above. These offer general criteria for analysis only and may generate other case related considerations resulting in a well considered, 'full implications' approach.

Importantly, cooperation in combat activities should be carefully considered as this can work against the government's objective of promoting regional security. RAN cooperation should, in the main, be limited to constabulary oriented activities such as helping to build up uniform regional patrol, surveillance and arrest skills.

RAN approaches to bilateral relationships with neighbours have been looked at in terms of 'maturity level', and five levels of maturity have been put forward in this article. As the 'structuredness' and comprehensiveness of a relationship increases so does the maturity level. The Maturity of our relationships with traditional partners such as the USN, RN and RNZN remains high, with well developed working relationships and formal management processes existing. The 'returns' on investment in maintaining these relationships are very high and do not contradict Australia's increasing Asian focus. In fact, the opposite applies: Paradoxically, maintaining and even enhancing our strong links with traditional allies is a key to continued entree with regional navies.

As part of its deliberately Asian focus the RAN should also look at gradually improving the maturity level of our navy-to-navy relationship with Japan and identify shared areas of interest such as security of SLOCs, freedom of navigation and clarification of rights of innocent passage. Japanese influence and leverage can be constructive and very effective in our immediate region.

Australia's relationships with Malaysia and Singapore are developing in terms of diversity and mutual benefit, leading to more structured and formalised management processes to focus objectives and coordinate effort. The MAJDP and JASINGC reflect these developments, and Singapore stands out as a conspicuous target for RAN investment, particularly in defence science cooperation, software engineering and logistics/maintenance support.

In the longer term, our relationships with Thailand and Indonesia - now at level three maturity - could be developed using MAJDP / JASINGC type processes in time. Emphasis on the relationship with Indonesia should be in terms of constabulary missions: in particular, security of SLOCs, control of illegal immigration and contraband and the regulation of maritime estates.

The RAN's relationships with PNG and the PICs are of low maturity in terms of relative capability and shared strategic interest. The maritime objectives of these countries are and will remain modest. They are 'working level' oriented and relate to the areas of basic training, maintenance and the conduct of coordinated surveillance operations. Improvement in these activities is likely to be best handled using a tailored NQM style approach at the working level, where specific problems are identified and simple, informal problem solving and consultation mechanisms are needed. A further advantage of using NQM processes is that they contribute to building up generally applicable management and planning skills which assist 'nation building'.

In summary, the best way to look at cooperative naval activities is through the prism of national self interest and not through a prism of misguided altruism. Current and proposed CNAs involve opportunity cost, therefore, Australia's policy ends must be clearly linked to naval means, and costs must be linked to benefits with similar rigour to that applied to other RAN 'operations'. This approach not only helps the RAN keep track of its ends and means; it also avoids the service being taken for granted by other branches of government and other navies.

(The author is currently the Navy's Visiting Military Fellow at the Australian Defence Studies Centre, ADFA and this article presents some initial research undertaken for a forthcoming ADSC research paper.)


POSITIONS
Positions can be transferred directly on to this chart, which is based on Revised Kertau Datum, from Admiralty charts, and from charts published by the Port of Singapore Authority.
Positions read from Japanese charts, and Indonesian charts 347, 348 and 349, which are referred to WGS 72 Datum, should be moved 0.01 minutes NORTHWARD and 0.11 minutes EASTWARD to agree with this chart.
Positions read from other Indonesian charts, which are referred to Bangka Datum, should be moved 0.03 minutes SOUTHWARD and 0.22 minutes EASTWARD to agree with this chart.
Panjang
rks in progress (1993)
P. Retan Laut
TOWER
PASIR PANJANG FAIRWAY
Pasir Panjang Wharves
PSA BUILDING (185)
Mt Faber
RADIO MASTS
TOWER
PRIMA
PSA TOWERS
Western Reserved
Buoyed channel
T. Berlayer
FLR.5s4M
CRUISE BAY
T. Riman
FLG.5s4M
TOWER
PULAU SENTO
P. Palawan
KEPPEL FAIRWAY
WEST
Western Petroleum
Working Anchorage
Terumbu Selegi
FLR.2
Western Quarantine and Immigration
SISTERS SHOAL
JONG FAIRWAY
(see Note)
LFl.10s Sisters
Terumbu Bukom
Q(6)+LFl.15s3M
Q(6)+LFl.10s6M
Q(9)15s
NW Tengah
Q.5M
Q(6)+LFl15s6M
CHIMNEY
Tanks
TOWER
LAU BUKOM
m Kechil
Q(3)10s4M Jong
(22) P Jong
P. Sakeng
SPOIL GROUND
Fl.5s6m5M Sechirit
CHIMNEY
Pulau Sebarok
Tanks
Q(9)15s4m3M Jambi West
Terumbu Jambi
Q(6)+LFl.15s4m3M Jambi South
FLR.5s7m5M Monggok Sebarok
Obstn
Deep water channel limit
Lts in line 246°-T.
0°15W 1994 (1°W)
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

MAP FEATURE: APPROACHES TO SINGAPORE (see Note)

WHITHER AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND NAVAL COOPERATION?

by Graeme Dunk

Australia and New Zealand are as close as two countries that almost became one could be.

- Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, 1991

The time is not far away when it will be utopian, certainly for smaller nations, to maintain an independent land, naval and air force.

- Leo Delcroix, Belgian Minister for Defence, 1994

The integration of the defence forces of Australia and New Zealand (A-NZ) has been discussed in some quarters as being an option to address the strategic goals of both countries in a more efficient manner whilst simultaneously providing a more effective military force. Given that Australia and New Zealand have formulated their respective defence programmes with special attention to the traditional and sentimental bond of the ANZAC legend, these two countries would seem to be particularly well suited to co-operative measures.

At present Australia and New Zealand are linked through the Closer Defence Relations (CDR) arrangement and currently co-operate on a wide range of defence issues, including participation in regular high level consultation, combined exercises, training and personnel exchanges, logistic co-operation and joint activity in the region involving, especially, co-ordinated air and naval surveillance with South Pacific countries and the Forum Fisheries Agency. The Australian policy approach to CDR is to maximise interoperability, complementarity and cost effectiveness, whilst New Zealand has a stated aim to seek benefits through co-ordinated planning activities in pursuit of mutual interests and responsibilities; and harmonising respective structures where possible but without prejudice to national aims

This article considers what form future naval co-operation between Australia and New Zealand may take. The operational integration of the surface fleets of Belgium and the Netherlands has been recently reported, and could possibly serve as a model for further development. Other more extensive co-operative options will also be examined; against the strategic focus of both countries. (The paper will conclude that, whilst some further development of co-operative naval measures is possible, any move in this direction will be affected by the New Zealand anti-nuclear policy, and the state of New Zealand's relationship with the United States.)

Strategic Considerations

Australia and New Zealand have many similar traits and some important differences. They are both maritime nations, rely heavily upon the sea for development and sustainment, and are both vulnerable to interdiction of their sea lines of communication (SLOCs). The countries share a sense of closeness born of a common European heritage, historical commitments to other people's wars, and the tyranny of distance. This closeness is manifested through the Closer Economic Relations (CER) trade agreement which removes restraints against each others trade and creates a single A-NZ market. A range of other inter-Governmental agreements covering issues such as social welfare have also been concluded.

Australia and New Zealand are both Asia-Pacific nations, although geography dictates that New Zealand is more Pacific than Asian. This Pacific focus was firmly enunciated in October 1987, by then Prime Minister David Lange in a statement that 'We not only accept but celebrate what the map tells us - that we are a South Pacific nation.' This does not imply however that New Zealand's interests lie solely in the South Pacific; for they do not.

Economically, New Zealand has major interests with the European Community, Asia and the United States. From a strategic point of view New Zealand recognises the importance of Asia to its future security, and has become increasingly involved in developments in the Asia/Pacific region The nature and extent of some of these relationships will be covered later.


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HMNZS CANTERBURY TAKES STATION

(Courtesy of Commander Richard Jackson RNZN)

Australia's position cannot be so neatly defined. It is a Pacific nation in that it forms a bound to the Pacific Ocean and has major strategic concerns in this region. Australia's Pacific strategy has been one of strategic denial to influences considered inimical to its interests, although the current approach is variously described as constructive commitment in the South Pacific and strategic commitment to the South Pacific. Irrespective of the policy title, Australia and New Zealand have co-operated closely to address regional security concerns through participation in regional bodies such as the South Pacific Commission and South Pacific Forum, support for regional initiatives such as the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, and provision of assistance and encouragement to the island states as they attempt to come to grips with their particular problems (economic development, diminution of traditional cultural values, social pressures due to development, environmental issues).

Australia is also an Indian Ocean nation with strategic and economic interests in the region, although these have, to a large extent, been ignored by policy makers. The exception is the consideration of the protection of the relatively exposed offshore territories of Cocos and Christmas Islands, and the security of the North West approaches. These are strategic concerns which New Zealand does not share.

Lastly, but no means least, Australia is an Asian country in that its near neighbours form part of South East Asia, and it has been to Asia that Australia has increasingly focused its strategic gaze and directed its efforts.

Australia views developments within South East Asia as fundamental to its security outlook. New Zealand also has concerns in this area, and particularly the referred impact to it from the effect of adverse developments upon Australia. Both countries consider Asia-Pacific economic interdependence, and the involvement of key powers such as Japan and China, as a key foundation for security relationships into the future. Mechanisms that keep regional countries, including the US, harmoniously engaged are therefore to be encouraged.

Examples of common A-NZ activity within Asia are support for regional forums such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) (both countries were original dialogue partners with this group) and more recently for the institution of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), as a suitable structure under which to discuss regional security issues. Both countries have also been active in the formation and ongoing development of Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC), and have both provided military and civilian personnel to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).

In a more military vein, Australia and New Zealand are engaged in South East Asia through the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) with Malaysia, Singapore and the United Kingdom, and participate in the annual Starfish and IADS exercises conducted under this umbrella. Australia also conducts naval exercises with Indonesia and the other ASEAN nations. New Zealand also provides training and advisory assistance to ASEAN countries under its Mutual Assistance Programme (MAP), and has formally stated the preservation of its partnership obligations under FPDA as a defence policy goal. Australian policy mirrors this sentiment by stating that FPDA makes a practical contribution to regional security, and is an example of successful regional co-operation.

The above discussion serves to highlight the overlapping nature of Australia's and New Zealand's strategic outlook. A major policy difference exists however between the two countries with regard to the Australia New Zealand United States (ANZUS) Treaty.

The New Zealand decision to reject the visit of the USS *Buchanan* in February 1985, and its subsequent nuclear ships policy have resulted in the significant deterioration of the previous NZ-US defence relationship. The current NZ Government, whilst not repealing the anti-nuclear legislation, has however placed a high priority on redeveloping the US defence relationship. For its part Australia has endeavoured to continue defence links with both NZ and US separately; to the point of describing the continuation of ANZUS on two of the previous three legs.

The current state of the ANZUS alliance, if indeed it formally exists, presents a security complication for Australia. Both the US and NZ relationships are valued by Australia, although obviously affected by conditions of scale. The US relationship is important as it provides access to intelligence, high technology equipment, scientific research, logistic supply lines, training and education, and for the more problematical effect of keeping the US engaged in the region. The NZ relationship, in comparison, is valued due to shared strategic interests and the contribution that New Zealand can make in the achievement of these goals. The task for Australia has been, and will continue to be, how to balance these two relationships.

The exclusion of New Zealand from the Kangaroo series of exercises, but the inclusion of Singapore and the possible future involvement of Indonesia, emphasises the problems of New Zealand's acceptance in Australia's strategic circle, and demonstrates that, should Australia continue to value its relationship with the US, any moves towards amalgamation with New Zealand must be conducted with this in mind.

The future status of the US-NZ relationship is therefore fundamental to any future development of the Australian and New Zealand force structure or operational co-operation under CDR.

Forms of Future Co-operation

Closer collaboration in the force structure process is already the goal of both Australia and New Zealand. Bearing in mind that Australia has been consulted in all of the capability studies conducted by New Zealand, to ensure the closest possible harmony of future force structures, the question is now what sort of additional co-operative measures could be possible?

A number of enhanced levels of co-operation are theoretically possible. These range from tinkering at the edges of the CDR by considering support arrangements, through the rationalisation of combined operating bases and infrastructure, to integration into a single force with a combined A-NZ force structure.

Tinkering at the Edges. The simplest option for future co-operation is status quo; to tinker at the edges of the current arrangement. Such activity has been, and no doubt can continue to be, conducted without impact on Australia's relationship with the US. Co-operation of this sort will, in all probability, be welcomed by the US as it keeps New Zealand involved, albeit at the periphery, in the affairs of the 'Western strategic club'.

An indication of the harmony that can be achieved in force structures is demonstrated by the New Zealand participation in the ANZAC frigate project (albeit with some political teething problems and arm twisting). Such equipment commonality will inevitably, at some stage, raise the question of support rationalisation and defence planners will therefore have to consider which facilities will be New Zealand based and which will be in Australia. This may involve the splitting of training, warehousing and other support facilities. The answer to this question will in all probability be a politically-contrived compromise.

Co-operative acquisitions and further co-operation under CDR are likely to provide economic benefits for both countries, but the real implication for New Zealand is that its naval force will increasingly resemble a mini-version of Australia's.

Operational Integration. It is worthwhile at this point to briefly consider the model of operational integration of surface fleets provided by Belgium and the Netherlands. In some respects the Belgium/Netherlands pairing is analogous to that of Australia and New Zealand. The countries are neighbours, the fleet of one is much larger than the other, and they have similar strategic outlooks. The first major difference is distance. Belgium and Netherlands share a land border, and the distance between the respective naval bases is only 200 kilometres. In northern hemisphere terms, naval bases in Australia (Perth and Sydney) are located the distance apart of London and Istanbul, and the distance between Sydney and Auckland is comparable to that from Istanbul to Tehran.

The second difference is strategic emphasis. Unlike Belgium and the Netherlands which are both members of a mature military alliance with a defined command structure (NATO), Australia and New Zealand operational co-operation could be best described as 'loose association' rather than as an 'integrated posture'.

Under the Belgium/Netherlands model the respective Australian and New Zealand surface forces would remain in the current bases, and ultimate command would remain with the respective Governments. Operational control would however be consolidated under the Maritime Commander Australia, and the maritime headquarters would be jointly staffed by Australian and New Zealand naval personnel. Such an arrangement could be concluded without any major impact on the Australian-US defence relationship, but would require the creation of 'Australian eyes only' areas within what is ostensibly a combined facility to ensure that US sensitivities regarding US-sourced information are not affected.

Co-operation along lines similar to the Belgium/Netherlands model would therefore require the development of a suitable command structure, and agreement to new lines of responsibility. The Maritime Commander Australia would need to be responsible to the New Zealand Government with regard to the tasking of its vessels, and to ensure that its particular strategic objectives were appropriately addressed.

Base and Infrastructure Rationalisation. One issue that needs careful consideration, and which may be possible without any change to New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy, is that of the rationalisation of bases and supporting infrastructure. The aim of such rationalisation would be to co-locate the naval activities of both countries throughout Australia and New Zealand, and hence to achieve economic benefits through the more efficient use of combined infrastructure and other assets. Command arrangements could however remain unaltered, or could follow the lines associated with operational integration.

At face value it could be argued that any such rationalisation should involve the closure of bases in New Zealand and the relocation of defence assets into Australia. This situation could be supported by arguments that New Zealand is intrinsically a more secure country than Australia, as dictated by geographic position alone, and that New Zealand sees Australia's security as fundamental to its own. Relocation of the New

POSSIBLE BASE AND INFRASTRUCTURE RATIONALISATION

HMAS STIRLING near Perth (pictured) and HMNZS PHILOMEL in Auckland would be the major bases for the Combined AUS-NZ Fleet. Darwin would also be built up, and a combined training and workup area could be established off the east coast of Australia.

Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) into Australia would therefore serve its direct military interest.

Such arguments are however somewhat simplistic, and take no account of the political aspects. Consolidation of the NZDF into Australia is unlikely to be an acceptable outcome for the New Zealand Government or for the New Zealand public. Any moves toward rationalisation are unlikely to proceed if one country considers that it will suffer from higher unemployment or other adverse economic impact. Any rationalisation agreement must therefore be a compromise, no matter how weighty the military and strategic arguments may seem to be.

One option for base rationalisation would be the consolidation of the NZDF and the Australian Defence Force (ADF) initially into two major naval bases; located in Perth and in Auckland. The former would allow easy access to the important area of South East Asia, and also into the Indian Ocean, whilst the latter is ideally situated for activities within the South West Pacific. The current fleet base at Sydney, already under pressure for relocation, could be downgraded to provide support for a combined training and work-up area off the Australian east coast. Combining training activities into this area would be consistent with the current position of naval exercise areas, the availability of air support from the naval air station at Nowra (already host to the NZDF A-4 Skyhawks), and provide ready access to the new armament complex to be sited at Point Wilson in Victoria.

A build-up of the Darwin naval base, already planned to be the site for the basing of the Offshore Patrol Combatant (OPC) helicopters, would then complete the strategic picture for naval activities in Australia and New Zealand. Such a base would be required to logistically support major naval units for an extended time during any defence contingency in northern Australia. Each country would utilise the others bases for national objectives, even to the extent of basing ships there, whilst retaining separate identities.

Naval co-operation with New Zealand along these lines would be consistent with Australian defence policy which seeks to rationalise defence facilities in southern Australia, including the disposal of unnecessary properties. Paul Dibb has also made the assessment that the construction of forward bases in the north and west of Australia is an important element of our strategic planning. Bases in these distant parts of Australia are central to the concept of self-reliance.

Rationalisation and consolidation of naval bases across Australia and New Zealand may therefore be one way in which to gain resource efficiencies and to advance Australia's policy of defence self-reliance. Such a move may however have significant effects on personnel, both on those serving and on recruitment, and this factor would also need to be considered.

Operational Rationalisation. A deeper level of integration could be operational rationalisation. This could see an agreement between Australia and New Zealand whereby naval activity is concentrated in the area of primary strategic importance to each country: Australia into South East Asia and New Zealand into the South West Pacific. The concerns of each would be represented by the other to the countries of the region.

The advantage of this approach would be the most effective use of scarce naval resources, focused into the key strategic areas. One obvious disadvantage would be that regional states could perceive a downgrading of Australia's interests in the Pacific islands and of New Zealand's in Asia. This would be contrary to the Government policy of both countries and may therefore require the commitment of other resources to demonstrate this not to be the case; thus negating any savings from rationalisation. Another would be the difficulty in differentiating between activities conducted for one country and those ostensibly undertaken for the other.

It is unlikely that either country would wish its strategic interests in areas of importance to be solely in the hands of the other; no matter how close the relationship.

Total Force Integration. The ultimate level of integration, constitution of a combined force with a single command and force structure, would be even more difficult to achieve and to administer. An inter-Government agreement on the use of such a force, and the development of combined contingency plans would be required, together with the institution of an A-NZ military council to implement the political wishes of the two Governments, and to report back to them.

It is difficult to perceive however that either country would be willing to sacrifice the sovereignty and independent action that an indigenous naval force bestows. The use of naval forces to support one country's foreign policy may be curtailed by inter-Governmental policy nuances. The result would be a diminution of the flexibility, utility and ubiquity of national naval power.

For New Zealand, being the smaller party, the perception of total integration may be one of capitulation, of relying upon Australia for its defence to a greater extent than both countries have relied upon first the United Kingdom, and then the US, for security. For this reason alone total amalgamation may be deemed unacceptable by the New Zealand Government.

Until the resolution of the New Zealand anti-nuclear issue in a manner favourable to the US, or a significant downgrading of the importance of the US relationship in Australia's defence planning, integration into a single force will not be possible. Neither of these events is likely to happen in the near or foreseeable future.

Economic Considerations

In any significant development past the current CDR agreement there will be a requirement to define and agree on supporting budgetary commitments. Such outlays will be required to contribute to the operation of a combined command structure, to provide and maintain agreed levels of support in any base and infrastructure rationalisation, and more particularly to underpin the structure of a totally integrated naval force. Inter-Government commitment to long term defence outlays will however reduce the flexibility of Governments to frame and manage their individual budgets, and, in the first instance an increase in the New Zealand defence outlay of 1.4% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) would be strongly advocated by Australia. Such financial commitment on the part of Government would mitigate against any significant further development.

Conclusions

The strategic aims of Australia and New Zealand, although overlapping to a significant degree, have differing foci; Australia's in South East Asia, New Zealand's in the South West Pacific. This difference in strategic emphasis will prove important in the consideration of further forms of naval co-operation. The major difference between the two countries, that of the A-NZ-US defence relationship triangle, will severely hamper any co-operative measures.

The total integration of surface fleets will not achieve national objectives, and in fact is likely to restrict the ability of Governments to employ naval forces in support of foreign policy objectives. This is due to the lowest common denominator approach that would inevitably ensue.

Operational rationalisation is similarly not a viable option due to the regional perceptions that would accompany such an agreement. Neither of these two options could be pursued without significant developments in the New Zealand-US defence relationship.

The rationalisation of naval bases and supporting infrastructure across Australia and New Zealand may be an option worth further consideration, and could be pursued without impact on the various defence relationships with the US. The consolidation into major naval bases near Perth and Auckland, the build up of the capability of the Darwin naval base, and the downgrade of facilities in Sydney would be consistent with the strategic outlook of both countries.

Operational integration along the lines of the Belgium/Netherlands model could be a possibility, but would be hampered by the need to develop new international lines of command and responsibility. Some administrative burden would be borne by Australia to ensure that US information was protected.

The most obvious co-operative measure is that of CDR tinkering, of fine tuning the level of co-operation that is currently undertaken. Evolutionary development of force structures through common acquisitions will, however, inevitably lead to the need to consolidate logistic support, training facilities, warehousing arrangements and other aspects of interoperability. In time such moves will lead to the consideration of base and other support rationalisation.

AN ESSAY ON AUSTRALIA'S MARITIME STRATEGY AND ITS LINKS WITH THE LAW OF THE SEA

BY LCDR J. S. SCOTT, RAN

Australia is an island continent surrounded on three sides by large ocean expanses. In addition to mainland Australia are the remote offshore sovereign territories of Norfolk and Lord Howe Islands in the southwest Pacific Ocean, Christmas and Cocos Islands in the northeast Indian Ocean and McDonald, Heard and Macquarie Islands in the Southern Ocean. By its very nature Australia is a maritime country.

Since the days of British settlement, maritime trade has been a major national interest. It has virtually underpinned Australia's rapid development from an isolated wilderness to a vigorous industrialised nation. All of Australia's foreign trade must be carried by ship or aircraft, with shipping performing by far the greater part of this vital task[1].

Australia is fortunate to be rich in natural resources, particularly oil, gas and minerals. These resources are located both on land and in offshore areas. Offshore resource exploitation is focussed mainly on oil and gas recovery and occurs in continental shelf areas, where it is economically viable. The oil and gas industry currently contributes about $7.8 billion per year to Australia's economy[2].

Australia's offshore territories, maritime trade and offshore resources emphasise the strategic significance of the ocean to Australia. They, along with the law of the sea, are some of the key factors which determine Australia's maritime strategy. In 1982, the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) introduced some new laws with far reaching implications, which will pose new challenges for Australia. This essay will:

a. define Australia's maritime strategy in broad terms;
b. review the relevance of this strategy in the context of the 'Strategic Review 1993' (SR 93);
c. discuss how the strategy is linked to the 'new' law of the sea, as embodied in UNCLOS III; and
d. comment briefly on the consequences of these linkages for the RAN.

AUSTRALIA'S MARITIME STRATEGY

The concept of maritime strategy adopted in this essay encompasses both non-military and military considerations. It concerns a country's ability 'to use the sea, in peace and war, commercially as well as militarily'[3]. Australia's non-military and military maritime strategies will now be separately discussed.

Australia's Non-Military Maritime Strategy

Unlike other maritime countries, such as Canada [4], Australia does not have a clearly articulated national, non-military, maritime strategy. The major reasons for this are the traditional focus on the rural and mining sectors, which has tended to make Australia more land-minded than sea-minded, and the jurisdictional arrangements enshrined in the Constitution, which result in many maritime functions being administered in a fragmented manner across different departments and agencies of both federal and state governments[5].

Notwithstanding, there is evidence to suggest that such a strategy is not far from being developed. In 1988, the federal Minister for Science appointed a review committee on marine industries, science and technology, with instructions to provide advice on what actions government should take to enhance the performance of the marine sector. The committee's report, 'Oceans of Wealth?', was published by the Minister in July 1989.

Based on the report, it is not difficult to predict what Australia's non-military maritime strategy might be. One method of deriving such a strategy (by no means the only method) is to consider data pertaining to the nett value of Australia's marine industries[6]. The rationale behind this being that if the industry significantly contributes to the national economy, then it should be reflected in the national, non-military maritime strategy. Based purely on economic factors[7], the framework for such a strategy would include:

a. The exploitation of living and non-living marine resources ($5b for oil and gas; $935m for fisheries and aquaculture);
b. marine tourism and recreation ($5b);
c. maritime transport and communication, including maritime safety ($3.5b);
d. offshore and coastal engineering, including marine science ($770m); and
e. shipbuilding, both military and civilian ($560m).

Other important aspects of marine affairs and ocean management, that are not economically driven but would need to be included for completeness, are:
a. The management of ocean law,
b. the protection of the marine environment, and
c. the security of offshore areas under national jurisdiction, including sovereign territories.

Together, these eight elements are considered as indicative of factors which determine Australia's non-military, maritime strategy, and will be used as the basis for subsequent discussion. Further articulation of the strategy beyond a conceptual framework lies beyond the scope of this essay.

Australia's Military Maritime Strategy

In contrast to non-military maritime strategy, Australia's military maritime strategy is clearly defined in the Defence white paper, 'The Defence of Australia 1987'.

Military maritime strategy is viewed as an integral part of Australia's overall military strategy. As part of the government's defence policy of self reliance, the military strategy employed by Australia can best be described as layered defence or defence in depth. This strategy dictates that the Australian Defence Force must be capable of meeting any hostile force within Australia's area of direct military interest, with successive layers of forces capable of detecting, identifying and engaging any hostile approach[8]. The aim is to defeat the enemy in the sea-air gap, before enemy forces reach the mainland.

Maritime elements feature in all layers of defence. Consequently, Australia's military maritime strategy can be considered a strategy of layered defence, comprising:
a. An outermost surveillance layer in which maritime elements, including the P-3C Orion aircraft and submarines, aided by the Jindalee Over-the-horizon Radar Network, gather intelligence about military developments in Australia's region;
b. a middle layer in which maritime elements combine to destroy enemy forces in the sea-air gap and protect focal points and shipping lanes; and
c. an innermost layer which comprises a flexible ground force, with air and maritime support, able to react to enemy incursions on the mainland.

Both a military and (unofficial) non-military maritime strategy can be determined for Australia, albeit the military maritime strategy is predicated on a document which is now seven years old. It is, therefore, prudent to review the two strategies for relevance in the light of the government's firm commitment to the Asia-Pacific region, as enunciated in SR 93.

SR 93 GUIDANCE

'Australia's future lies with the Asia-Pacific region'[9]. This short but sweeping statement in the Introduction to SR 93 underpins the government's increasing emphasis on regional relations. Government policy is being increasingly shaped 'by the need for engagement with Asia across the whole sphere of national activity'[10] Australia's maritime strategy (both non-military and military) is an ideal vehicle to facilitate Australia's active participation in the region.

Non-Military Maritime Strategy

Perhaps the greatest contribution towards enhancing regional relations from the non-military sector has been the burgeoning number of non-government activities and conferences focussing on regional confidence building and security cooperation, now generally referred to as the 'second track' process[11].

These forums range from small workshops of several dozen people, usually aimed at addressing specific issues such as territorial disputes in the South China Sea or the security of the sea lanes throughout the region, to all-inclusive annual conferences such as the Asia-Pacific Roundtable, where matters of a general maritime nature are discussed.

In November 1992, the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) was formed in order to provide 'a more structured regional process of a non-governmental nature...to contribute to the efforts towards regional confidence building and enhancing regional security through dialogues, consultation and cooperation'[12]. Its objectives encompass such issues as the management of the marine environment, regional maritime security and conflict resolution, and adherence to law of the sea.

Anticipated outcomes are likely to be a more secure environment for merchant shipping and resource exploitation within the region, greater mutual understanding leading to the preservation of the marine environment and a more cooperative framework to assist in dealing with higher level issues. As such, Australia's non-military maritime strategy, which focusses directly on three of these four issues, is seen as very relevant in the context of Australia's regional relations.

Military Maritime Strategy

Whilst the defence of Australia is central to Australia's defence policy, there is an integral link between the defence of Australia and our increasing defence engagement with regional nations[13]. This statement, paraphrased from the preface to SR 93, signals the government's intent to use defence policies to increase Australia's influence in the region. According to SR 93, the best means to achieve this is through strengthening bilateral defence cooperation with individual southeast asian nations. This would involve participating in strategic planning exchanges, military education and training of personnel, the conduct of passage exercises, hydrographic activities and the surveillance of areas of mutual interest, to name a few[14].

A good example of current regional security cooperation and confidence building from the military sector is the setting into place of regular, formal, regional security dialogue.

The Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), a biennial conference initiated by the RAN in 1988, brings together representatives from a large number of western Pacific navies for frank discussion on a wide range of issues. Anticipated outcomes are a better appreciation of the concerns, interests and perceptions of the participating countries, enhanced mutual understanding and trust, and a prevention of misinterpretations, misunderstandings and suspicions likely to cause tensions, if not conflict[15].

The foregoing two paragraphs suggest that Australia's military maritime strategy, as previously defined, needs to be expanded to include the important (and apparently successful) role played by the military in assisting the government to achieve its political objectives (in this case, engagement in the Asia-Pacific region). Put succinctly and more correctly, Australia's military maritime strategy has two components. Firstly, in support of the government's defence policy of self reliance, it is a strategy of layered defence. Secondly, in support of the government's foreign policy of engagement in the region, it provides many linkages to facilitate regional confidence and security building.

Australia's maritime strategy has now been defined in military and non-military terms, and assessed for its relevance to the latest government defence thinking as embodied in SR 93. Law of the Sea issues will now be addressed; in particular those aspects of UNCLOS III that will have the greatest impact on Australia's maritime interests.

LAW OF THE SEA

The law of the sea is becoming increasingly important in maritime affairs as technological advances expose the enormous hidden wealth of the sea, and make it possible to exploit that wealth. However, 'in the absence of borders marking the sea, questions of ownership and access have arisen'[16]. Problems such as marine pollution and the over exploitation of the seas' living resources cut across national boundaries and can only be solved through cooperative effort. In addition, the growing abuse of the sea as a dumping ground for debris and hazardous wastes is of increasing concern to all littoral nations.

Until well into the twentieth century the essential principle governing international law of the sea was 'mare liberum' (freedom of the seas). This implied a right of freedom of navigation for all shipping and freedom to take the oceans' resources. The exception to this was a small territorial sea, of three [now twelve] miles width, where a 'coastal state exercised exclusive rights, subject to the right of innocent passage for vessels of other states'[17].

This regime, however, was challenged after the Second World War, as coastal states sought greater control over marine resources in their adjacent seas. This resulted in a plethora of claims of varying descriptions, with no apparent underlying system. By the 1960s, international pressure was mounting to resolve the question of how much authority a coastal state may exercise, and over what distance from its shores.

UNCLOS III

Between 1973 and 1982, through a series of conferences, the international community negotiated a new oceans regime to restore stability to the law of the sea. The third such conference, UNCLOS III, was the most comprehensive and provides what some have called a new 'constitution for the oceans'[18]. The treaty came into force in November 1994. Some key provisions of the treaty, of particular relevance to Australia, are summarized below.

Territorial Sea. All coastal states are allowed a territorial sea of up to 12 nm, 'measured from baselines determined in accordance with the Convention'[19] Legally, the territorial sea, the air space over the territorial sea and its sea bed and subsoil remain under the sovereignty of the coastal state. Foreign warships are generally required to seek permission prior to entering this zone, however foreign merchant ships have the right of innocent passage[20].

Contiguous Zone. The contiguous zone extends seaward from the outer edge of the territorial sea to a distance not exceeding 24 nm from the territorial sea baselines. Within this zone a coastal state may exercise the control necessary to prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within the territorial sea [21].

Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ). Coastal states may claim an EEZ of up to 200 nm from the territorial sea baselines. In this zone the states have 'sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the sea column, seabed and its subsoil'[22]. This includes activities such as the production of energy from waves, currents and wind, the installation of structures, protection and preservation of the marine environment and marine scientific research.

Australia's proclamation of an EEZ is imminent. This will create an area of about 2.6 million square nautical miles to manage, roughly the same size as continental Australia[23].

Archipelagic Waters. The concept of archipelagic waters is a new one in international law. An archipelagic state may draw archipelagic baselines along the periphery of its outermost islands and classify the waters within as territorial. Sealanes may be established within these waters, to enable the continuous and expeditious passage of foreign ships[24].

The key provisions of UNCLOS III, which are of most relevance to Australia, have been discussed. A common thread among the provisions is the increased jurisdiction over the oceans. In fact, as a consequence of UNCLOS III, some 32 per cent of the world's oceans now come under coastal state control[25]. The linkages between the law of the sea and Australia's maritime strategy will now be examined.

LINKAGES BETWEEN THE LAW OF THE SEA AND AUSTRALIA'S MARITIME STRATEGY

There are an abundance of linkages between the law of the sea and Australia's maritime strategy. This is not surprising given Australia's inherent maritime nature, the strategic significance of the oceans to Australia and the extent to which UNCLOS III has globally changed the jurisdictional boundaries of the ocean. There is one obvious and direct link, which merits discussion on its own; the remaining linkages will be addressed under the broad headings of 'Creeping Jurisdiction' and 'Maritime Trade'.

The Management of Ocean Law

The management of ocean law appears as one factor determining Australia's non-military maritime strategy. Australia is keen to participate in law of the sea proceedings primarily to promote the peaceful and orderly use of the oceans. This has an obvious flow-on of enhancing global and, in particular, regional security. Secondarily, proactive participation on issues such as law of the sea increases Australia's standing as a good international citizen. This is exemplified by the prominent role Australia is taking in trying to bring about resolution of the deep seabed mining issue, seen by some as the final impediment to many industrialised maritime nations ratifying UNCLOS III.

Creeping Jurisdiction

The term 'creeping jurisdiction' refers to the 'extension of national or international rules and regulations, and rights and duties over the sea, in straits and coastal zones, on and under the seabed, and in the vast stretches of the high seas'[26]. It relates to a concern by some nations that 'mare liberum' is being steadily and systematically replaced by the principle of 'mare clausum' (closure of the seas). In particular, it is of concern to countries, such as Australia, which operate warships in distant waters. For example, there is a perception that, before too long, warships may be required to give coastal states prior notification before entering their EEZs. A similar requirement for merchant ships already exists on the east coast of Canada, albeit for ship safety and pollution control reasons[27]. This section will address a number of linkages related to the consequences for Australia of increased jurisdiction of the ocean.

Control of Shipping in Australia's EEZ. The creation of an EEZ to replace the Australian Fishing Zone will imply two additional tasks for Australia's maritime enforcement agencies (which includes the ADF) over and above fisheries surveillance. These are the control of marine scientific research, and the protection and preservation of the marine environment, both factors affecting Australia's maritime strategy. Whilst the former task will hardly be onerous, the latter task is showing signs of gathering momentum. This is illustrated by the recent DSTO development of a Strategic Maritime Information System[28], which will provide a regional network for surveillance, safety and maritime information exchange. This will assist in the monitoring, amongst other things, of seaworthiness of ships in the region with the aim of preventing similar incidents to that of the Greek ship *Kirki*.

Australia's Response to the Regional Arms Build-Up. Partly in response to the perceived need to acquire surveillance and power projection capabilities over resource rich EEZs, and partly as a consequence of regional tensions now emerging as the result of the post-Cold War thaw, regional nations are presently undertaking significant arms acquisition programs. Whilst this is not regarded as an arms race per se, it is nevertheless of concern to Australia because of the possible de-stabilizing effects on regional security, which would directly affect the passage of Australia's trade into and through the region. This makes it all the more important for confidence and security building measures like the Western Pacific Naval Symposium to succeed.

Operating Warships Within the Region. As part of the government's commitment to engagement with the region, regular deployments of RAN warships to Southeast Asia for the foreseeable future can be anticipated. At the same time there is a perception that the increasing jurisdiction over the seas may lead to restrictions on the mobility and activities of warships. These concerns are of a general nature, but their applicability to the Asia-Pacific cannot be discounted. Concerns over the passage rights of warships through EEZs have already been discussed. Although not of an immediate nature, there are concerns that some governments may seek forms of jurisdiction beyond the 200 nm limit, possibly for pollution control reasons or the exploitation of fish stocks. Further, some may seek to extend their territorial seas out to 200 nm; there are in fact 15 nations presently doing this[29], although none are important maritime powers and none are in the region.

Given the increasing priority to pollution control within EEZs it is feasible that certain types of naval activities, such as missile testing, be it within an EEZ or on the high seas, may come under challenge. Article 88 of UNCLOS III states that 'the high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes'. While there is a degree of rhetoric in this statement, it nonetheless could provide a legal base for challenging certain types of naval activities.

Australia-Indonesia Seabed Treaty. The northwest shelf is emerging as a very important oil producing region for Australia, with the Jabiru field alone already contributing nine per cent of Australia's total oil production[30]. Part of this area, known as the 'Timor Gap', is presently the subject of seabed boundary negotiations between Australia and Indonesia, which have arisen because of the different approach taken by the two countries in determining their limit of seabed jurisdiction. Australia is seeking jurisdiction over the limit of its continental shelf while Indonesia is seeking the 'normal' 200 nm EEZ limit, under UNCLOS III. The dispute has been solved, in an interim manner, by the introduction of a joint development zone, which will see the area jointly managed with a degree of profit sharing for both countries.

The protection of Australia's marine environment, the maintenance of regional security, the ability to operate warships in the region, and the development of natural resources in Australia's EEZ are all aspects of Australia's maritime strategy which have been influenced by the increased jurisdiction of the ocean associated with the 'new' law of the sea.

Maritime Trade

Maritime trade is fundamental to Australia's economic success. In recent years Australia's seaborne trade has represented about 13.5 per cent of world seaborne trade on a tonne-mile basis[31]. Therefore, any disruption to Australia's maritime trade is likely to be of major national concern. Several law of the sea issues have the potential to disrupt Australia's maritime trade within the region.

Piracy. There are significant levels of piracy in the region. Although collaborative efforts by the Singaporean and Indonesian navies have been largely successful in reducing the number of incidents of piracy in the Malacca Straits (107 attacks in 1991 compared with 83 in 1992), piracy remains a concern in the South China Sea, where a total of 26 attacks were reported in the five months to May 1993[32]. Russia has become so concerned at the levels of piracy in the region that in 1993 it deployed a Kara class cruiser to provide escort for Russian merchant shipping passing through the East China Sea.

One outcome of the WPNS in 1992 was the joint development of a Maritime Information Exchange Directory. This directory has facilitated the sharing of 'real time' information on a range of activities, including piracy, by participating navies with a view to further reducing this problem.

Archipelagic Straits. As previously stated, the concepts of archipelagic waters and archipelagic straits are new to international law. Freedom of passage by shipping through Indonesia's archipelagic straits is vital for the efficient conduct of Australia's trade, particularly iron ore, into and through the region. Despite being a signatory to UNCLOS III, Indonesia closed the Lombok and Sunda Straits in September 1988, claiming that the straits were part of Indonesia's territorial waters and not international waters. This caused vigorous protests by many maritime nations, foremost Australia.

Whilst this may be viewed as part of the 'bedding down' process post-UNCLOS III, it nonetheless emphasises the importance of maintaining regional dialogue as a means to prevent these types of occurrences. Forums such as CSCAP and WPNS are ideal methods of enhancing mutual understanding and trust within the region, and respect for law of the sea.

IMPACT OF THE LINKAGES BETWEEN THE LAW OF THE SEA AND AUSTRALIA'S MARITIME STRATEGY, ON THE RAN

Seven linkages between Australia's maritime strategy and the law of the sea have been identified:

a. The management of ocean law,
b. the protection of Australia's marine environment,
c. the maintenance of regional security,
d. the ability to operate warships within the region,
e. the development of offshore natural resources,
f. piracy, and

g.freedom of passage of shipping through archipelagic straits.

From these flow three important consequences for the RAN. Firstly, the declaration of an EEZ has created a vastly increased area over which Australia has jurisdiction. This implies an enormous blue-water surveillance task, which is being reflected (to a large extent) in the RAN's force structure by the development of the Offshore Patrol Combatant.

Secondly, there is likely to be an increased role for the RAN in terms of facilitating regional confidence building. This will be achieved by RAN participation in more multinational naval exercises in the region and by training more personnel from regional countries.

Thirdly, RAN units operating in the region will need to be sensitive to the way in which regional nations interpret the law of the sea, and react accordingly. This may affect areas of ocean over which states claim jurisdiction, or activities which states may declare unlawful (such as missile firings).

CONCLUSION

The broader concept of maritime strategy encompasses both non-military and military considerations.

Australia does not have a clearly articulated, non-military maritime strategy, although there is evidence to suggest that such a strategy is not far from being developed. Based purely on an economic analysis of Australia's marine industries, a framework for a non-military maritime strategy would include:

a. The exploitation of living and non-living resources;
b. marine tourism and recreation;
c. maritime transport and communication, including maritime safety;
d. offshore and coastal engineering, including marine science; and
e. shipbuilding, both military and civilian.

For completeness, these would need to be complemented by non-economic imperatives such as:

a. The management of ocean law;
b. the protection of the marine environment; and
c. the security of offshore areas under national jurisdiction, including sovereign territories.

In contrast, military maritime strategy is clearly defined. As part of the government's policy of self reliance, Australia's military maritime strategy can be considered a strategy of layered defence. This comprises an outermost surveillance layer, a middle layer with a capability to destroy the enemy forces in the sea-air gap, and an inner layer in which maritime units would support ground forces reacting to an enemy incursion on the mainland.

Whilst a maritime strategy can be determined for Australia, it needs to be validated against the most recent government guidance.

Within the non-military sector there are a growing number of activities, such as the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, which focus on regional confidence and security cooperation. Their objectives encompass such issues as the marine environment, regional maritime security and law of the sea.

As such, Australia's non-military maritime strategy is seen as very consistent within the context of SR 93.

SR 93 signals the government's intent to use defence policies to increase Australia's engagement in the region. This is exemplified by the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, an Australian initiative at which is discussed a range of maritime confidence and security building measures. These developments suggest that Australia's military maritime strategy, as previously defined, needs to be expanded to include the role of defence in supporting the government's overall foreign policy.

The law of the sea is becoming increasingly important in maritime affairs because of the enormous economic benefits associated with exploiting the ocean's resources. The traditional principle of 'mare liberum' is being progressively replaced by 'mare clausum', as more and more of the oceans become subject to littoral state jurisdiction. In 1982 the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea introduced some new laws with far reaching implications. The territorial sea, contiguous zone, economic exclusion zone and archipelagic waters are all new or revised terms which will impact on Australia's maritime affairs.

There are substantial links between Australia's maritime strategy and the law of the sea. This is not surprising given Australia's dependence on the ocean for maritime trade and the pervasiveness of the 'new' law of the sea. A particularly strong link is that the management of ocean law appears as one factor determining Australia's non-military maritime strategy, primarily due to Australia's wish to promote the peaceful and orderly use of the oceans. In that sense Australia's maritime strategy and the law of the sea are inextricably linked. Other links are quite diverse and can be grouped under two broad headings, related to the increased jurisdiction of the ocean and the conduct of maritime trade. Examples of the former include:

a. Maritime safety issues, as a consequence of the environmental protection responsibilities inherent in managing a large EEZ;
b regional security issues, given the current level of arms build-up as regional countries seek to project power over their EEZs;

c. uncertainty over Australia's continued ability to operate its warships in the region, given the inconsistency in how the law of the sea is being interpreted and applied; and
d. the joint development of natural resources.

Examples of the latter include law of the sea issues such as piracy in the region and freedom of passage through archipelagic straits.

Whatever their state at present, the linkages between Australia's maritime strategy and the law of the sea are set to undergo further strengthening as Australia declares its EEZ and the UNCLOS III treaty comes into effect later this year. The consequences of this for the RAN are threefold. Firstly, the declaration of an EEZ will result in a vastly increased surveillance task for RAN units, addressed to an extent by the development of the Offshore Patrol Combatant. Secondly, the RAN is likely to have an increased role in facilitating regional confidence building, through greater involvement in multinational exercises. Thirdly, RAN units operating in the region will need to be sensitive to how regional nations interpret the law of the sea, and react accordingly.

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BOOK REVIEW

North of Gallipoli: The Black Sea Fleet at War 1914-1917 by George Nekrasov, Eastern European Monographs, Boulder, distributed by Columbia University Press, New York, 1992, 225 pp, 45 B&W photographs, 12 maps & diagrams.

(Available in Australia at Highlands Bookshop 238 Flinders Lane, Melbourne 3000; $60.00. Phone 03 654 6883)

George Nekrasov has produced an interesting book about the operations of the Russian Black Sea Fleet from 1914 until 1917. It is a fascinating subject about which little has been written and one that was well worth investigating.

Nekrasov endeavours to keep his story and the operations of the Fleet in context. He provides the reader with a background to the situation in 1914 by examining the geography and history of the Black Sea region before going into a brief history of the Imperial Russian Navy and the revival it had undergone since its shock defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. Throughout the book he refers back to the wider operational and political scenes and the impact such external factors had upon the Fleet in the Black Sea.

The story is given a human touch with fascinating descriptions of the main characters such as the Russian admirals Eberhardt and Kolchak and an insight into the politics of the Imperial Russian Navy, the Royal Family, the Headquarters and the Army. Nekrasov's interpretations of events also add colour to his story although at times they appear more based on emotion and his own beliefs than well supported analysis. For instance, he is preoccupied with the belief the Bosphorus was the critical area in the war and that it would be a great strategic (if not war winning) blow to take and control it. He deplores anything that might obstruct such efforts. He is also full of criticism for anything that smacks of the revolution.

That said, the book is essentially an operational history of the Fleet. It is a useful history in that it demonstrates a myriad of naval operations from clashes between Dreadnoughts, submarine attacks, destroyer actions, convoys, amphibious landings, shore bombardment and minelaying and sweeping. Nekrasov uses these operations to draw lessons from history. Many of the 'lessons' which Nekrasov discovers are often stated (but nevertheless important) lessons about the need for good training, preparedness and leadership, the uncertain nature of war and the importance of the human element and leadership in war.

Overall, I enjoyed the book although I feel that Nekrasov has been let down by his editors. The book has a number of minor and annoying typographical mistakes and the type font is not particularly attractive. It provides, however, a good perspective into a subject where there are few sources and many of these are in Russian. If the reader is aware of the nature of Nekrasov's sources (usually memoirs or writings of White Imperial Russian Naval officers) and of Nekrasov's own apparent sympathies for their cause (he was made an honorary member of their Australian club - 'The Wardroom'), then the book can be seen as a valuable addition to the history of a much-neglected subject.

—Jason Sears

REFINE BEFORE REFORM: THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE WITHIN THE NAVY

BY COMMANDER PETER JONES RAN

This article looks at the way the RAN has implemented and managed change over recent years. It will highlight the lessons both good and bad and then propose some initiatives to improve its performance in this vital area. It is acknowledged at the outset that this article is not exhaustive in its research (such a task would probably require several years' full time study and analysis), rather it is intended to be a primer for discussion.

Over the past decade there has been tremendous change in the Navy. Hundreds of reviews and reports have resulted in significant changes to our service conditions, to the Navy's organisation, operation and its relationship to the other services.

Each change has had a different impact on the service and its people. Some initiatives, like the two ocean basing policy have been profound, while others such as the abolition of WRAN rank titles have passed with little or no heartache.

When examining the impact of various decisions or developments it is not always possible to predict their impact; indeed, their effect is often not felt for some time. It was clear almost from the outset of Operation DAMASK, however, that war fighting and damage control in the RAN were going to get a major shake-up. This proved to be the case, to our immense benefit.

The decision in the 1980s to send women to sea in JERVIS BAY had relatively little effect, yet the full implementation of the women at sea policy had a profound impact on the Navy, and this was by no means confined to the Fleet.

In implementing and generally coming to terms with the many changes that have been made to our Navy, it is important to recognise that there has been a large strain put on officers and sailors as well as on the Navy structure itself. This is not something unique to the Navy. It is experienced in any organisation undergoing widespread reform. And, like the people in these other organisations, almost all the officers and sailors in the Navy (and, at times, their partners) have had to deal with a gamut of emotions, from enthusiasm for the change, to stress, disenchantment, anger and frustration.

Some changes only affect a limited number of people, while others are widespread. The decision over which superannuation scheme to select was probably an example of how no one could be immune from the effects of change.

In looking at how we in the Navy have dealt with and administered change, a number of examples will be offered. The object here is to see what lessons we can take from them, both in what we did well and what we could have done better.

Navy Quality Management

No review of change in the Navy would be complete without discussing NQM. While the aims and objectives of Navy Quality Management (NQM) are laudable and some of its achievements are impressive, NQM is viewed by many in the Navy in a very negative way. To say it would make many people's day if NQM was officially 'killed' is not an exaggeration. At face value this is an amazing state of affairs when it is considered that one of the goals of Total Quality Management is to empower the people who undertake each "process" at the grass roots. Yet NQM would have to be one of the most unpopular initiatives in recent years. What went wrong with the introduction of NQM (this is not to say it will not succeed in the fullness of time)?

My belief is that we approached the concept of Total Quality Management (TQM) from the wrong direction. How often has the reader said or heard, when talking about NQM, "but that's how we do it anyway." I believe if you looked at TQM there was much in its philosophy that the Navy had done for years. Any CO or XO who did not take the advice of the Buffer or from a host of other experts onboard was simply not showing good management skills (that is not to say many didn't).

Certainly there are useful ways in which TQM looks at things and the focus on activities orientated towards customer satisfaction is a case in point. It would seem though that the useful and resource efficient approach for Navy would have been to take the good points of TQM that the Navy did not already do and incorporate them into its management programmes rather than establishing a NQM hierarchy with a foreign and in some instances inappropriate jargon into the Navy.

While TQM has many strengths there are also some weaknesses with TQM. For example there is an over emphasis on the creation of Process Action Teams with the attendant time and bureaucratic process this entails. Too often PATs become exercises in ticking the NQM 'box' and a tangible sign that upper management is listening to those involved in the process. Quite often a problem can be solved more efficiently through informal means.

TQM is not the be-all and end-all of management approaches. Already some corporations overseas are moving on from it. For the Navy, however, there may be resistance to modify NQM now that it has been adopted in such a structural way.

This aspect is a real dichotomy for Navy. One of the precepts of TQM is the constant refining of processes to improve quality and reduce variables in performance. Yet on the macro-side of things Navy has locked itself into NQM for the foreseeable future. In addition there is a desire to maintain the purity of the TQM concept. Yet according to the TQM philosophy (rather than its detail) we should be continually incorporating new management practices into the organisation to constantly improve its performance.

Finally, from a cost analysis point of view it would be interesting to calculate the introduction cost of NQM into the Navy. I have no doubt it would be considerable. Perhaps the incremental approach of picking the eyes out of TQM in a low key way would have been a more productive approach.

The Mixed Gender Issue

The second example is the women at sea issue. I should say at the outset that I fully support the introduction of women into sea billets.

For many in the Navy the issue of women at sea and the attendant issue of sexual harassment has been very stressful. Concern about jobs security arising from fear of unfair complaints has been a very real issue. The emotional and hardline attitude about sexual harassment taken by some sections of the Navy hierarchy did little to ally fears and promote the necessary educational process.

To a large extent, even with the Senate inquiry behind us, mixed gender issues remain significant matters that will have to be worked through.

In reviewing the changes to the women at sea policy there are some key issues. First, there is a widely held belief in the Navy that the service was "pushed by politicians" into opening up billets at sea for women. The consequence of this is that people felt disempowered by the change. Yet this was not true; the step was initiated by the Navy. It was determined, probably quite rightly, that it was inevitable that women would serve at sea on warships (for demographic, social and political reasons) so it was best to get on with the process sooner rather than later.

I believe we should see this initiative as one of a series. It followed a proven Naval approach that had worked successfully in the recent past. The approach was that when action had to occur, whether it be arising from the post-carrier "downsizing", the 1987 Defence White Paper or the Force Structure Review, that it was best to implement the changes in a speedy fashion. In this way the Navy would keep the initiative (and therefore have more sea room), enjoy what benefits there were to be had and not be pressured by outside forces. The women at sea issue was seen in the same way.

This plan was fine as far as it went, but there were problems. The first was that the Navy had endured so much change since the loss of the carrier, that this was seen as just another, but it was not. There would be a profound impact. Unfortunately, there was not the appreciation that there was a big difference between having a small number of women on a support ship, as had been the experience to date, and having a fully integrated ship's company on a deploying frigate. The pace, range of activities and pressures are of a different order. In addition, many in the Navy hierarchy were unaware of the fraternisation and other problems that had already occurred on the support ships up to that time.

Another problem was that the pace of introduction was too fast. The goal of having the same proportion of women at sea as there were in the service within a couple of years was totally unrealistic. Yet there was an unwillingness among those who were implementing the policy to tell the hierarchy this fact. Instead, the "women at sea juggernaut" was sent on its way.

Even today there is an unwillingness to slow the pace of posting mixed gender crews to FFGs, despite repeated complaints by ships of the lack of ready reliefs (in the necessary specialisations) ashore to replace the women at sea if required.

There are a number of useful lessons for the Navy in the way it handled the issue and also the problems

arising from its implementation. A key aspect was that there was (and still is) insufficient articulation of what the Navy wants to achieve by introducing women into sea billets. Earlier this year I attended a seminar of middle ranking officers which discussed the mixed gender issue. The hostility to the women at sea policy was amazingly strong and I think part of it was a perception that this change has been thrust upon them for no good reason. I think this is an important point because naval officers and sailors are generally practically minded, and they are much more receptive to change if they can see a practical benefit.

Having served in a mixed gender frigate I am in no doubt that there is a practical benefit of having women at sea. Mixed gender ships have the potential to perform better than single sex ships because:

a. the broader skill base you are picking your people from allows the prospect of a higher calibre group,
b. the greater sense of maturity achieved by a mixed gender ship's company, and
c. the different perspectives to problem solving and management that are part and parcel of a mixed gender environment (e.g. less confrontational approaches, alternate dispute resolution, fuller personnel management counselling and improved communication throughout the ship).

What is equally significant is that in the long term the Navy will benefit from having a more flexible workforce with more of it able to do sea service. This will have financial benefits and lead to a more reasonable sea/shore ratio. But all this is a long way down the track and probably not for another decade will we see such financial benefits come to pass.

In the meantime the Navy should explain the very tangible advantages in the short and long term of this initiative to its people. It should also be candid about the short and medium term problems such as personnel shortages, experience gaps and retention rates.

The other aspect of the women at sea issue is one of a lack of awareness of mixed gender issues in the broader community. The RAN was not the only Navy and not the only organisation in the world grappling with mixed gender issues. In addition, many organisations were a lot further down the track than the RAN. It is somewhat disappointing therefore that we went down some of the same (well publicised) rabbit holes.

Most of these rabbit holes revolved around education. In the wake of the first media reports of the SWAN Incident and the subsequent announcement of a Senate Inquiry, there was considerable stress and heartache. In some sections of the hierarchy things bordered on hysteria. There were various punitive threats muttered to ward off any prospective transgressors and so on. Yet this approach and some of the education programmes that Navy put together had already been tried elsewhere. They were, for example, widely undertaken in corporate America with the same indifferent results we obtained. What is more they were widely reported in specialist journals and the general media.

The messages coming out of corporate America were:

a. Be careful about falsely accusing people and maintain the due process of law. It is not the burden of the accused to prove innocence (e.g. you will get sued for false dismissal).
b. Most sexual harassment issues arise from ignorance and the victim in most cases wants a resolution rather than punishment.
c. Gender Awareness Lectures tend to cause people to switch off and they soon get sick of being talked at.
d. The most successful education programmes are low key workshops that allow people to vent their feelings and discuss the issues.

Certainly some areas in the Navy were aware of these experiences and attempted to use the benefits of these hard won lessons learnt. But it was not the norm and this was unfortunate.

On the positive side of this issue I think the RAN has avoided many of the shoals that have been hit by other navies. The Good Working Relationship Project is an outstanding initiative that offers Navy some excellent long term prospects not only in this area but also in managing change generally. In concept it is a quantum leap from what most other navies are attempting. In implementation of the women at sea policy there is a good level of pragmatism and willingness to let COs innovate to make things work.

Finally, while many people have been wise in hindsight about the lack of preparation for the widespread introduction of women at sea, it is important to accept the notion that quite often the complexities of issues are not always known until you get into it. Certainly, my experience on a mixed gender frigate was that there was a constant learning process as the complexities of various issues became apparent and the situation matured or changed. Even today we are not there by any stretch of the imagination. For example the dynamics of a frigate with a 15% female component in the ship's company will be quite different from a ship in the future with (say) 35%.

Category Rationalisations

The final example of change I would cite is the recent round of sailor category rationalisations. I do so because of their central importance to the Navy but also because of the very useful lessons we can draw from them.

By the very nature of these programmes they are particularly stressful. Sailors suddenly find their expertise questioned and their promotion prospects and sea/shore roster placed in jeopardy. Therefore these programmes have to be carefully entered into. Wide-ranging category rationalisations should only be done as a last resort to incremental change. This is particularly the case if the structure is performing reasonably well.

The introduction of the Principal Warfare Officers (PWO) Course was an example where there was a need for fundamental change to meet the demands of the missile age. Importantly since the 1970s the PWO Course has proved very successful. Its success has been founded on continued incremental refinement.

In the case of the current batch of technical and seaman (including the naval police and coxswains amalgamation) category rationalisations, the short term impact has been a reduction in operational capabilities of ships through severe personnel shortages and loss of expertise. A considerable proportion of this expertise is now residing ashore either being retrained or retraining.

I do not think we have managed this process well. This is because of:

a. the dimensions of the short and medium term impact on operational capability,
b. the immense stress put on the people involved and the Navy itself to digest this change, and
c. in some cases the questionable benefits of the changes.

Where were the problems? I will largely confine myself to the Seaman Category Rationalisation Study (SCRS) because I have had more exposure to it and it has the key lessons imbedded in it.

The major points were:

a. the shortfalls of the "Navy Change culture"
b. the misunderstanding of technology,
c. the lack of resources devoted to implementation, and
d. the lack of almost any resources for review.

The Change Culture

Over recent years there has developed a "Navy Change Culture". This culture involves:

a. identifying a problem and forming a study group,
b. the study group then completes a report, invariably tied by name or association with the leader of the team (with all sorts of career progression implications),
c. the report is tabled to CNSAC and after greater or lesser changes it gets adopted,
d. The recommendations of the report are bundled up as a package (e.g. SCRS, TTP and ROCS) and are sold to the rest of the Navy as a new important initiative, and
e. The changes are implemented by a group separate to the report compilers.

There are some problems with this approach. First, there is a propensity by the study group to want to undertake substantial change. After all, there must be a need for substantial reform because why else was the group formed? In addition a report recommending little in the way of change is likely to viewed as a failure and reflect badly on the members. Therefore, the option of refining existing structures is not fully explored.

Second, there is a propensity for CNSAC to accept rather than reject the report. The report will not be accepted in its entirety because CNSAC is there (among other things) to amend submissions. After all, there must be a need for substantial reform because why else was the group formed?

Third, the implementation of the report by a group separate to the drafters is understandable in terms of career progression and burn-out. But there is the loss in corporate knowledge of the complexities of the issue.

Fourth, I believe that the Navy, like many organisations in the English speaking world, is caught up with the notion that the word "reform" has inherent positive connotations. This does not mean, however, that all reforms are good.

Understanding of Technology

Central to any technology based organisation like the Navy has to be a thorough understanding of technology. This is not just in terms of the developments in maritime warfare, but also trends in the wide variety of technologies associated the service both ashore and afloat. Allied to this is a need for historical perspective so that an appreciation of technologies is firmly rooted. This requirement is a tall order and it has to be embodied in a range of people from the sage-like engineer Admiral with an encyclopedic mind to the young technology information devouring Lieutenant. This corporate understanding has to be harnessed and developed.

Technology and the use of technology is a controversial subject in a technological based organisation. For example innumerable people in the warfare community could be "flashed up" by discussion of the value of sonobuoys in Seahawks and towed arrays in surface ships. Yet, when the Navy makes decisions about putting sonobuoys in Seahawks it has wide-ranging implications. What is more, the understanding of that technology has to be discussed thoroughly so that senior management downward have confidence that we are heading along the right technological path.

This is relevant to SCRS. A key driver of SCRS was the requirements of the ANZACs. These ships, with their smaller ships' companies and their common displays in the Operations Rooms, clearly needed a different sort of sailor. I believe a different view of this technology would have given a different result.

The fact that the operations room sailors were going to be sitting at the same sort of displays is irrelevant. It's the information that counts. There is still going to be above and below water information and electronic warfare data to be managed as well. History has shown that these fields of activity only get more complex and the need for specialisation will remain a strong impetus. As many suspect this impetus will probably ensure that the CSO of the ANZAC will have to specialise.

The second aspect was one of manpower. The assertion that the small number of bodies in the ANZAC demand a re-skilling process must be questioned. Experience has shown that, in the RAN, ships' companies are enlarged -sometimes significantly (e.g. FFGs) - to meet the operational requirements set by the user (Maritime Headquarters). At the end of the day it will be MHQ which will decide what readiness level is required from an ANZAC and have the manning amended accordingly. The ANZACs can accommodate much larger complements although we have done our best to build this out of them.

The bottom line with SCRS is that in a couple of years some of the key drivers to such a radical change may not come to pass. This leads to the question, was such a large change, with its attendant costs and upheavals, required in the first place?

Resources for Implementation and Review

A key to the success of any initiative has to be the resources, both human and financial put into its implementation and final review. Historically this is an area where insufficient resources have been placed. This is not just in the Navy, but in other areas of government and the private sector. Steve Jobs co-founder of Apple Computers was quoted in a recent edition of JANI as saying,

"Leadership is the ability to have a vision; then to clearly articulate that vision so your people will understand it and deliver a group commitment to the common goal".

This was an interesting remark in terms of what it did not say. A vision statement is a laudable thing. But I think what is being missed in today's management philosophies is the notion of seeing the job through to completion. The reasons for this are many. Frequent job changes that senior management undertake as part of their career progression mitigates against worrying if their initiative they were associated with actually will work. The Navy almost institutionalises this situation. To an extent we have been aware of this and the extended tenure of some engineering officers in key projects is a case in point.

Allied to this situation is the lack of review. Rarely are any changes systematically studied to see if they were effective. The reason for this is either a lack of resources or a view that the change has often been overtaken by another. This is a great pity because there may be some useful information we can gather about the issue of change.

Anecdotally, a review of SCRS would be most useful. Unfortunately the lack of attention to the implementation phase has resulted in sailors often undertaking much longer bridging courses than they would require. For a significant number of sailors this has been very stressful, and for some it has been too much and they have either resigned or revised downward their career aspirations.

One of the complications with the category rationalisation process was the impact one reform was having on another. As an example, just as the Navy was introducing former Dockyard Police Chief Petty Officers into ships as whole ship co-ordinators it was removing the regulating gunnery CPO. The result was that the CPONPC had to learn not only the traditional coxswain role but also the whole ship co-ordinating role. The result of course was inevitable, poorly performing whole ship co-ordinators letting ships down, not to mention the stress and despondency felt by sailors put into an alien environment for which they had not been trained.

Fortunately this situation has been recognised and measures have been put into place to allow former Naval Police to get exposure at sea for assessment as to their suitability for the role as whole ship co-ordinator.

The implementation and review phases potentially offer us insights into the tempo of change. A maxim should be that a change should only occur if it can be properly studied, managed and reviewed and give demonstrable benefits for the upheaval incurred.

In Australia one of our impediments to national development has been a shortage of skilled people. The Navy has not been immune from this and our Force Structure over the years has been adversely affected by shortages of skilled people from naval architects and welders to steam trained stokers. Navy has also suffered a shortage of people of sufficient intellectual horsepower to tackle projects. On occasions Navy has come unstuck when we have pressed ahead with a study when there were not the people with the right background and intellect to undertake the job.

One of the common complaints in the Navy when change is introduced is that "this will not work because of X,Y,Z." Unfortunately, such objections may be quite true. The problem is that the people involved in the change have insufficient knowledge of the situation at that particular coal face. This is usually because they may not have been to sea or to an air squadron for years and are relying on dated perceptions of reality.

It is in the Navy's interest to encourage people to get back to sea or to the squadron at least once every two to three years. Besides being updated it would allow people to focus on what the Navy is all about and freshen or enlarge networks. I believe this should be done in an informal way with individuals responsible for organising their own week at sea. I know as an XO, even on an FFG, that if someone rang and asked if they could come to sea that there would invariably be a bunk free due to medical, course or leave requirements. Management must accept that such "re-famils" are important.

What can we do in the future?

It is clear from the examples discussed that we in the Navy have to fundamentally rethink how we view change. Change should be the normal state. What is important is whether large scale reforms or refinements are carried out and how they are tackled. Whatever action is undertaken it has to be undertaken in the context of a broad historical appreciation as well as current factors (within and outside Navy).

A key aspect in selecting the people to study, implement and review these refinements or changes is that they have both the required intellect and a detailed knowledge of the subject.

By way of summary I have distilled the lessons gained from our experiences. I hope that they will serve as discussion points and as a useful check list.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF CHANGE — LESSONS GAINED

- If the structure is fundamentally sound Refine it rather than Reform it.
- The most successful changes are the incremental ones.
- Articulate practical short, medium and long term advantages (along with the short and medium term hurt) of every change.
- Before enacting a reform ensure the broader historical, technological, social and contextual factors are understood.
- Do not start a process that cannot be adequately staffed, implemented and reviewed both financially and intellectually.
- Be pragmatic - listen to warning signs when things are not going to plan and be prepared to modify or stop the change program.
- Be aware of the amount of change that can be competently administered at one time and the possible mutual interference different programs could have.
- Ensure that personnel involved in any changes regularly get to the "coalface" so that they are focused on the purpose of the Navy and kept abreast of the way business is done.

Defence's need for a Merchant Navy?

by Lieutenant R.C.A. Leahy

Traditionally, naval historians will tell us, the merchant navy has played a significant role in support of Australia's Defence Forces. The use of merchantmen was widespread during World War II and, more recently, the Department of Shipping and Transport chartered two vessels — the *Jeparit* and the *Boonaroo* — to ferry stores and equipment from Australia to Vietnam. The experience of the British during the Falklands War would also seem relevant, as Captain Roger Villar highlighted in his work *Merchant Ships at War - The Falkland Experience* .[1] To support their joint operations in the South Atlantic Ocean the British took 54 ships from 33 companies up from trade. More recently we have the example of the Gulf War, and the Americans supplementing their Strategic Sealift shortfall with merchant ships.

Strategically, the argument continues, Australia is a major shipping nation, at least in terms of the total tonnage of cargo loaded and discharged, particularly iron ore, coal, bauxite and refined petroleum products. It stands to reason therefore that we need our own merchant navy ... Doesn't it?

However, the furious debate that has recently ensued regarding the future of the Australian National Line (ANL) has caused a number of commentators to question the relevance of an Australian owned and operated merchant fleet. The economists quite rightly point out that the Australian fleet simply could not compete on the international scene without significant government support, and their domestic livelihood is only tenable with the 'protection' of cabotage. But, as a past president of ANL, William Bolitho, has pointed out, this simplistic analysis tends to ignore too many of the pertinent facts. The purpose of this paper is to examine the relevance of an Australian merchant navy in a defence context. Are the lessons of the past relevant to us any more?

The Australian Merchant Fleet

The Current Fleet: As we discussed previously, Australia is a major shipping nation in terms of the total tonnage loaded and discharged, but as William Bolitho has stated recently, only 3-4% of our international cargo is carried in Australian hulls.[2] Just how insignificant is our merchant navy? These figures may help to illustrate the industry's recent decline:

a. In 1967 there were 136 ships on the Australian register;
b. in 1990 there were 94; and
c. in 1994 there are only 77 ships on the Australian register.3

Of these 77 vessels, 30% are tankers, 30% are RO/RO vessels and the remaining 40% are bulk dry carriers.

Defence Utility: Significantly for defence purposes, these vessels are not the general cargo vessels of World War II that were put to extensive use throughout the Pacific. In their current configurations they are not of great use to the Australian Defence Forces. Lieutenant Commander Robert Van Kempen, studying at the Australian Maritime College in 1993, argued that there were only 18 vessels over 4000 tonnes that were useful to the Defence Force. Of these 18:

a. Seven were foreign owned;
b. three were operating on foreign trade routes; and
c. Two were unsuitable for battalion scale operations.

The six remaining ships were *Iron Monarch, Iron Flinders, Iron Prince, Searoad Tamar, Transtas Trader* and the *Spirit of Tasmania*[4] So in times of conflict if the need arose to utilise merchant vessels, in the number of suitable ships alone, the Australian merchant fleet may not be of great use.

Problems associated with using merchant vessels: The insignificance of the merchant fleet is compounded further by a view in some defence circles that the use of merchant vessels is more trouble than it is worth. Indeed the recent procurement of the two tank landing ships from the United States to replace *Tobruk* and *Jervis Bay* was justified, in part, in terms of maintaining sufficient sealift capability to conduct battalion size operations in the area of Australia's Direct Military Interest without resorting to the use of merchant ships. A study conducted by the Navy in 1990, with specific reference to the necessity of enacting legislation to call up ships from trade, concluded that no special legislation would be enacted for what the Strategic Review 1993 termed 'short-warning conflicts'. What this means is that ships could not be called up from trade, they would have to be chartered, and this in itself is a major source of controversy, as the Australian Government discovered with the charter of the previously mentioned *Jeparit* and *Boonaroo*.

Some of the more controversial problems that the Australian Defence Force may face in chartering merchant ships during times of conflict may include:

a. The reluctance of the shipowner to become involved in the 'politics' of the conflict;
b. the reluctance of the ship's crew to become involved, and any associated industrial action that may eventuate;
c. the increase in maritime insurance rates encouraging shipowners to operate on alternative, safer routes (Of course this would be a wider problem than that of Defence, as the departure of even a few foreign flagged ships could have a serious effect on the nation's economy);
d. the interoperability problems of including a chartered vessel as part of a maritime task group (How often are merchant ships involved in Naval Exercises such as this?); and
e. the problems of modifying a chartered vessel to increase its utility as a Defence Asset, for example fitting a helicopter pad, or expanding the communications facilities.

'Defence Power' Legislation: The answer to the chartering conundrum may not lie in the establishment of legislation similar to that enacted in the Second World War to control shipping and call up ships from trade. There may be a negative reaction to increasing the power of the Defence Force, thereby encumbering commercial activities and personal freedoms, particularly in relation to short-warning conflicts. The scope of the 'Defence Power' has never been tested in the context of a short-warning conflict, and at best, ambiguous activities undertaken by enemy forces may be difficult to portray as serious enough to warrant the enactment of legislation. Once again, as William Bolitho has pointed out:

- Clear and explicit legislation covering the varying degrees of 'emergency' and 'hostility' and the respective rights and obligations of Government and shipowners needs to be put in place.[5]
- Difficulties for the Shipowners in co-operating with Defence: However, even if these hurdles could be overcome (and in an emergency very few are insurmountable) the Australian company that charters to the Navy will face some serious commercial difficulties, perhaps including:
  a. The difficulty in chartering a replacement vessel for its own regular business. As part of the contractual arrangement, would Defence be billed? If so, then surely it would be more cost effective for Defence to charter a foreign flagged vessel.
  b. If no replacement vessel could be chartered, the loss of the Australian ship from that particular trade route would almost certainly mean a loss in commercial confidence, and the vicious circle of reduced cargo and reduced revenue that such a scenario inspires.
  c. When the Australian ship returned from 'active service', would the company be able to regain its market share from a foreign flagged competitor? If this trade was taken up by an Australian competitor, would the competitor be prepared to 'do the right thing'?
  d. The potential 'war loss' of the ship, with all the commercial costs entailed, to say nothing of the probable loss of life.

Short-Warning Scenarios: We need to be realistic about Defence's need for a merchant fleet. If we assume that we are planning only for short-warning conflicts, (and let's face it, in the likelihood of a worldwide conflict, there will be a chronic shortage of shipping everywhere) the vessels that Defence are most likely to charter, are tankers to transport Army and Air Force fuel to Darwin, and perhaps to refuel the Navy's underway replenishment vessels - *Success* and *Westralia*.

Chartering Foreign-Flagged Vessels: Another important point made by William Bolitho is: 'The number of ordinary shipowners and hence merchant ships available for hire in Australia is quite limited and, in an emergency, the taking up of ships by Navy for ADF support will be restricted by the fact that most of them will be fully employed in essential industries.'[6]

Bolitho goes on to highlight that if the ADF is forced to charter a foreign flagged ship, then: 'Those [foreign flagged ships] that do turn up in an emergency, will have little or no interest in military control or the survival of Australia. They will be there on war risk rates of pay and at extortionate freight rates, solely to make a fast buck if they can do so without risk to themselves and get out again.'[7]

A 'Realistic' Wartime Role for the Merchant Fleet: You may well ask, what role does the Australian Defence Force see a merchant fleet fulfilling in a time of conflict, and how will they interact with the maritime elements of the Defence Force? Perhaps Lieutenant Commander Van Kempen was closest to the mark when he concluded: 'Much of the small Australian Merchant Fleet is highly specialised and fully-employed in their commercial trade routes. Taking one or a number of these vessels from their normal employment would, in all probability, affect not only the shipowner and charterer, but the civilian infrastructure supported by the vessel.[8]

The 'Economic' Argument

I think this is significant. The Defence Forces will need to consider very carefully the economic effects of removing Australian ships from trade during times of conflict. Government policy, particularly during short-warning conflicts, would be to place the em-

phasis on the commercial sustenance of the country, and to this end I would think it likely that our aim should be, as far as possible, to maintain the normal flow of seaborne trade around Australia.

Australian Shipping - Structure, History and Future stated in 1989:

In low level contingencies envisaged in Australian Defence scenarios the Australian Government would be most concerned to maintain the functioning of the civil community as normally as possible.9

If anything, this is the significant role that a merchant fleet will have to play in future conflicts. It is extremely unlikely that ships will be called up from trade, or even chartered. However Australian shipowners will be expected to help the nation maintain its production levels. Let us be realistic: the disruption to Australia's maritime trade is not an end in itself. As the 1987 White Paper asserted: 'Australia enjoys a high degree of economic self-sufficiency. We are a net exporter of energy and self-sufficient in food ... Australia could survive significant disruption of overseas trade in the event of global war, though at a cost to our standard of living. Most of the essential needs of the civil community could be met without external supply if appropriate measures of conservation and rationing were introduced.'10

The Effect on Trade: It is the economic effects of a potential assault on our trade that we must concentrate on, and indeed the protection of shipping, both coastal and international, and the protection of our offshore territories and resources are potentially the most challenging tasks facing the maritime component of the Defence Force. A 1987 study conducted by a Defence Economist, Martin Dunn, entitled Coastal Shipping: its importance to the economy, calculated that if the iron ore ports at Dampier, Port Hedland and Port Walcott were closed to all shipping for three months, the value of lost production would be 500 million dollars. (This is using 1986 prices!) Dunn argues: 'These costs would manifest themselves in many forms and would permeate all corners of the economy. The most obvious effect is that there would be an increase in the prices of goods previously shipped by sea, and those products manufactured from them. The additional demand for alternative forms of transport would result in increased transport prices more generally, which in turn would flow on to all sectors of the economy. The drop in Australia's productivity and increased costs would threaten the profitability of many companies.'11

Undoubtedly the Navy values the relationship developed with Australian shipping companies through the Australian Defence Shipping Council, and the commitment to Defence that many companies have demonstrated through their co-operation in the establishment of the various Memorandums of Understanding. It is important that both the Navy and Australian shipowners continue to work together on matters of mutual interest, for instance, the conditions of service applicable to merchant seaman if they were to be employed during a defence contingency.

Conclusion

In conclusion the ADF does need a merchant fleet of sorts during time of conflict. However, the role of an Australian merchant fleet is far from clear. What is certain is that our strategic guidance, as outlined in the Strategic Review 93 focuses on the defence of Australia and its key interests. Therefore the role of a merchant fleet is not likely to include the taking up of ships from trade, or the chartering of suitable merchant ships to transport Australian troops to fight overseas. What may have been relevant in the Second World War and Vietnam is not as relevant now. Merchant ships may be chartered to conduct specific tasks in the context of short-warning conflicts, but in all likelihood the most cost-effective alternative for these taskings will be a foreign flagged vessel. The role of Australian merchantmen in any future conflict that we are involved in will be to maintain 'business as usual'.

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THE CLASSICAL MARITIME STRATEGISTS - A Response

By D M STEVENS

"If you want a new idea, read an old book."
— from Ten Pretty Good Rules *by the Naval War College Strategic Studies Group.*

In a recent article published in the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, Squadron Leader Athol Forrest has argued that; "Classical maritime strategy has been largely superseded," that it has "not much to offer," and that "the use of sea power needs to be anchored in contemporary realities.[1] No piece of theoretical writing will ever be immune from criticism, not least because times and attitudes change. However, to argue, as Forrest appears to, that sea power has demonstrated few enduring principles, and that they are unhelpful in the modern context, is taking the point too far. Forrest has managed to ignore the volumes of evidence that exist to contradict his assertion. To take just one current example, the latest USN manual on naval warfare devotes an entire section to the enduring principles of war as they are applied at sea: principles that include, maintenance of the objective, use of manoeuvre, economy of force, unity of command and concentration of combat power.[2] These are enduring principles that would be recognised by the ancient strategist Sun Tzu, as easily as by Mahan, Corbett or Richmond.

Few would disagree that the contemporary world is complex, but that in itself is not a reason to reject the utility of past experience. Every branch of human activity needs some frame of reference, a solid foundation on which to develop constructive thought. In this sense maritime affairs are no different than any other. The principles of war whether they are of a maritime or more general nature are not a checklist. Only the foolish or inflexible would argue that they are applicable to every occasion. The principles must be viewed as guidelines to thought, not prescriptions for specific action. Rather than being superseded, in a world of ever-changing political and strategic circumstances, which offers so little clear guidance, it is even more important that we look carefully at the collective lessons of the past.

The Classical Strategy

In formulating his discussion Forrest has used a very narrow interpretation of what constitutes classical maritime strategy, and has based it almost entirely upon the writings of Mahan. Though this makes criticism easy, it is far too simplistic to pare down the accumulated works of the 'classical theorists' to just three or four sentences. Broad generalisations are just that, and seldom do justice to the original argument. Mahan's work was a first attempt to lay down the elements of sea power. Many of his assessments are rightly debatable, but that does not mean they do not provide insight.

What, for example, forms a 'classical maritime strategy'? The many strategists who have followed Mahan have seldom taken his conclusions at face value. Even Mahan's contemporary Corbett, doubted Mahan's depth of analysis. By trying to make their own work more relevant and accessible to succeeding generations later writers have often provided new and better perspectives on the nature of maritime strategy. As Forrest himself later points out, derivatives and variations are not uncommon. This is a normal process and suggests a maturing of strategic thought, rather than a lack of relevance.

A brief look at Mahan's six principle conditions affecting sea power will show how 'classical strategy', can mature yet remain useful.[3] Contrary to Forrest's conclusion, these elements are not intact, or at least not in the way Mahan originally postulated.

Mahan for instance, believed that certain countries possessed inherent strategic advantages due to their geographical position, and the type and length of their coastline. He also noted, however, that these strengths could be sources of weakness, particularly if a small population meant a long and accessible coastline could not be well-defended. In criticisms of Mahan it is often pointed out that today, in an age of long-range aircraft and ICBMs, geography is much less of a defence than it was in the age of sail. For countries like Britain, on which Mahan based many of his geographical arguments, the sea is obviously no longer the barrier it once was.

However, despite changing circumstances in the traditional maritime powers, other countries continue to see their geographical features and position as fundamental to defence. To quote some familiar examples:

> "Australia's geography provide(s) us with substantial natural defences against major conventional military assault."
> "Australia's northern environment also presents potential vulnerabilities that could be exploited by an adversary." and
> "Australia's geography continues therefore to be a central factor in deciding the characteristics of our military forces and our strategic concepts for their use".[4]

Mahan, also believed that social factors including a tendency to maritime trade, the number of seagoing people and the general national character influenced the development of sea power. These factors, if they do exist, are difficult to measure and are often easily dismissed. Few today, for example, would accept that instinct forms the foundation of economic growth. Modern warships meanwhile, require far fewer crew than in Mahan's day and depend more on technical, rather than purely maritime skills for their function. However, Mahan's elements can still prove useful if allowances are made for the perspective of his time. Today a weak merchant marine may not inhibit the maintenance of a strong navy, yet only nations with a strong economy can still afford to possess modern naval equipment. The equipment may not need an abundance of professional seafarers, but it can still only be manned and operated effectively if a sufficiently well-educated and professional population is available.

Similarly, Sam Bateman has noted how Mahan's three attributes on which sea power could rest, can be readily extended to the present day:

> "Instruments of war now equal the capabilities for maritime operations (including ships, submarines and aircraft, as well as the means of providing appropriate logistic support);
> Seaborne commerce should now be equated to the full range of a nation's maritime interests - shipping, fishing, offshore mining etc; and
> The role of colonies, as perceived by Mahan can be related in the modern world to port access rights, alliance relationships, and a co-operative approach between neighbouring countries to regional security."[5]

Moving on from Mahan, but accepting that there is a 'classical maritime strategy', there are three basic roles that a naval force can fulfil in times of conflict. The first role, to obtain free use of the sea while denying it to the enemy is termed 'sea control'. As Corbett stressed, sea control, or as it is sometimes termed 'sea command', is not an end in itself, it is rarely 'absolute' and instead tends to be temporary and limited to particular localities. The second role, to deny free use of the sea to an enemy without necessarily being able to use it freely yourself is termed 'sea denial'. The third role is the projection of military power, either in support of land and air operations by attacking targets ashore, or the completion of independent action at sea. Despite the impression given by Forrest, these have all been valid roles during the 20th century and all have their foundation in classical theory.

That these roles remain relevant to contemporary maritime strategy was demonstrated as recently as the 1990-91 Gulf War. With the Coalition of nations possessing vastly superior forces, Iraq could not attempt to challenge control of the sea in most areas. The Coalition was therefore able to exploit its control for the duration of the war. Exploitation that allowed the unhindered imposition of sanctions, the transportation of huge quantities of men and materiel and the projection of power ashore. Iraq meanwhile, reverted to a strategy of denial. By laying mines and setting up coastal missile batteries, Iraq sought to protect what it regarded as its most vulnerable flank, the Kuwaiti coast, from amphibious invasion. Strange as it may seem, both sides were successful in implementing these strategies.

Concentration and the decisive battle.

In achieving sea control, Forrest has particular problems with the emphasis that Mahan put on concentration and the decisive battle. He uses the example of the U-boat campaigns of the two world wars to prove the apparent efficacy of a sea denial strategy.

Certainly the concept of a single decisive engagement and the single-minded pursuit of the offensive is open to criticism, and as noted above, sea denial is a perfectly legitimate strategy. An all-embracing maritime strategy is a complex business and blind adherence to simplistic notions has led nations in both world wars to commit some major strategic errors. However, to burden Mahan with the entire responsibility is to misunderstand much of what he wrote. Mahan did indeed believe in concentration. He also saw that a commander could be spread too thin if he attempted to engage the whole of the enemy force at once. Instead Mahan recommended a technique of "so distributing your own force as to be superior to the enemy in one quarter, while in the other you hold him in check long enough to permit your main attack to reach its full result".[6] Conducting an attack against an enemy's critical vulnerability, to upset his centre of gravity is fundamental to the conduct of war. Concentration to achieve this effect is hardly flawed or erroneous.

Thus, when examined from a different perspective the idea of a decisive battle cannot be so easily dismissed. Admiral Dönitz rightly regarded the U-boats as an offensive weapon. He forcefully argued in his memoirs that the decisive battle to cut Britain's sea communications was only lost because Germany failed to

concentrate her forces to achieve this objective. That the U-boats were defeated, was only because Britain rightly concentrated her own forces against the threat.

The Impact of Technology.

It is also simplistic to dismiss the classical theorists by focusing on the substantial dissimilarities that exist between the technology of today and past eras. To do so is nothing new and is something with which all strategists have had to contend. Both Mahan and Corbett took great pains to emphasise that both the differences and the likenesses in history must be kept in view. Because his theories about naval warfare of the future were "almost wholly presumptive" Mahan stressed the need for thorough testing before getting "carried away" by analogy.[7] Corbett, openly observed that there are at least as many dissimilarities as similarities between past and present. The value of historical study, he argued, lay not in producing detailed rules, but instead in bringing to light the permanent characteristics of sea power.[8]

Similarly, Sir Herbert Richmond argued that anyone "who would introduce a new creed" of sea power had to have "reasoned grounds." These grounds must:

> "reside in the principles of war, and those principles are to be discovered in the history of war. Knowledge does not come intuitively in the science of war, nor does capacity in the art. The source of knowledge is experience, either that of one's self or of others. Profiting by the use of such experience as is obtainable, one may begin to consider the use and influence of, and the reactions and adjustments resulting from, the introduction of new weapons;...so that [if another war comes] we may be in a position to make the most efficient, which is another way of saying the most economical, use of the national weapons with which... we are obliged to furnish ourselves."[9]

Forrest ignores these conditioning statements, choosing instead to focus on the vulnerability of the "instruments of decisive battle" at the hands of submarines, guided missiles, aircraft and space based systems.[10] Apparently he is referring here to the vulnerability of the surface battlefleet. If so, he has little conception of naval tactics and the use of a layered defence. It has been over 100 years since maritime forces were restricted to purely surface assets, and Forrest offers no evidence in support of his assertion that new technologies are not accommodated in classical theory. How, for example, does Forrest explain another well known quotation from Richmond:

> "Command of the sea is the indispensable basis of security, and whether the instrument which exercises that command swims, floats, or flies is a mere matter of detail."[11]

Rather than affecting strategy, where its influence is usually indirect, the principal influence of technology is instead on tactics. Strategy in its purest sense has little to do with tactics and this was recognised even by Mahan very early in his writings.[12] A fixation on the revolutionary effects of new technology ignores the fact that whether an explosion is caused by a mine, iron bomb ,guided missile or shell, it is of little relevance if the effect is the same. As noted by the US naval commander during the Gulf War: "Low-technology mines are one of the most cost-effective weapons in existence."[13]

Limited Conflict

Forrest's final arguments focus on how inappropriate classical maritime strategy is for the limited, regional conflicts of the late 20th century and how developments in sea/land and sea/air doctrine challenge the classical maritime theories. Certainly the classical strategists concentrated on the higher end of the conflict scale, but this does not mean that maritime activities at the lower end, or joint operations were ignored. Corbett, for example, thought that one of the great advantages of sea power, as an arm of national strategy, was its utility in situations of limited conflict.[14] He argued that the nation with command of the sea was in the best position to chose how much or how little of the conflict it wanted.[15] In today's world, maritime forces are invariably first on the scene of trouble spots. They are well suited to exert a continuing and powerful influence, whether they remain in sight or just over the horizon.

Similarly, for Forrest to argue that the classical theories value maritime power above all others is to misunderstand much of what has been written. Richmond insisted that the only way to fight a war strongly and efficiently was to require all the armed services to plan and act co-operatively.[16] Corbett meanwhile, noted that sea power on its own had limitations: "how tedious is the pressure of naval action unless it be nicely co-ordinated with military and diplomatic pressure."[17]

Forrest's assertion that the United States Navy has replaced Mahanian maritime strategy with a more relative and limited definition of maritime principles is also open to question. In translating "From the Sea" into doctrinal reality the USN has used terminology very reminiscent of Mahan. To repeat just a few relevant statements:

> "We rely on the oceans to serve both as a defensive barrier and a highway to commerce abroad";
> "We view the world's oceans not as an obstacle but as our base of operations and manoeuvre space which we can either control or deny to an opponent";

"Our ability to project high-intensity power from the sea is the cornerstone of effective deterrence, crisis response and war"; and finally,
"The ability to engage the enemy at sea decisively will always remain paramount to our naval forces."[18]

Conclusions

The basic purposes and roles of sea power have not yet been fundamentally altered. A maritime strategy does not offer panaceas. It is often about slow, boring and thankless tasks that offer few dramatic turns. Maritime power is also about flexibility, unfortunately this flexibility can be wasted if we fail to understand and appreciate how maritime power works.

The lessons gleaned from history and laid down by the 'classical theorists' can still be relevant but only if we have the sense to look beyond the superficial differences of time and recognise the underlying advice. Experience does not offer a blueprint for future success, but simply a pattern of what has succeeded or failed in the past. The enduring principles developed from experience, offer: "A philosophy, rather than a formula - an approach rather than a recipe".[19]

Mahan, Corbett, Richmond, *et al*, were not perfect, the influence of sea power on history has after all varied both in "extent and in type".[20] Nevertheless, that influence has been real and important. The legacy the classical maritime strategists have left us, has endured not simply because they were successful propagandists, but because it provides a useful insight into our situation today. We ignore that legacy at our peril.

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