

Registered by Australia Post
Publication No. NPB 0282

ISSN 0312-5807



VOLUME 18
FEBRUARY 1992
NUMBER 1

JOURNAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE



AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE INC

The Australian Naval Institute was formed and incorporated in the Australian Capital Territory in 1975. The main objects of the Institute are:

- a. To encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the maritime profession,
- b. to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and the maritime profession, and
- c. to publish a journal.

The Institute is self-supporting and non-profit-making. All publications of the Institute will stress that the authors express their own views and opinions are not necessarily those of the Department of Defence, the Chief of Naval Staff or the Institute. The aim is to encourage discussion, dissemination of information, comment and opinion and the advancement of professional knowledge concerning naval and maritime matters.

The membership of the Institute is open to:

- a. Regular Members. Regular membership is open to members of the RAN or RANR and persons who having qualified for regular membership, subsequently leave the service.
- b. Associate Members. Associate membership is open to all other persons not qualified to be Regular Members, who profess an interest in the aims of the Institute.
- c. Honorary Members. Honorary membership is open to persons who have made a distinguished contribution to the Navy or the maritime profession, or by past service to the institute.

DISCLAIMER

Views expressed in this journal are those of the authors, and not necessarily those of the Department of Defence, the Chief of Naval Staff or the Institute.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Australian Naval Institute is grateful for the assistance provided by the corporations listed below. They are demonstrating their support for the aim of the Institute by being members of the "Friends of the Australian Naval Institute" coterie.

Australian Defence Industries	Stanilite Electronics
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Computer Sciences of Australia	Scientific Management Associates
GEC Marconi	Westinghouse Electric
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Nobeltech	Ansett Australia
Rockwell Ship Systems	



JOURNAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE

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February 1992

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ANI ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING

PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS

The objectives for 1991 were to;

- encourage debate on maritime defence matters, by sponsoring a Seminar titled "Maritime Power and its Place in the New World Order" at XMAS WATSON, on 15 May 1991.
- produce a professional Journal.
- maintain the Friends of the Naval Institute coterie and expand it if possible.
- host at least one Vernon Parker Oration.
- host a Naval Institute Dinner.
- arrange a sea day for the Friends with the Fleet if possible.
- support Chapter activity.
- promote new memberships.

All these objectives were met successfully except for the final two. Chapter activity languishes in all states and although I hope that the Sydney Chapter soon will restart, there were in effect no chapters for the Council to support during 1991. Membership continues to decline and will I understand be a high priority interest for the 1992 Council.

I was specially pleased with the high standard of the HMAS WATSON seminar in May. Attendance by Fleet Officers was very good and will encourage future Councils to repeat the exercise when opportunities present themselves. The papers delivered the seminar were published in the Journal and did I believe ensure that the second objective could be met handsomely. The new publishing arrangements are now producing dividends but I would like to see a greater number of quality contributions from serving personnel. The Naval Institute Journal should reflect the thinking of its members on professional matters. Some might argue that the evidence suggests there is not too much of this going on.

The Council has gained great satisfaction from its association with the Friends of the Naval Institute. Despite the hard economic times they face, they have remained steadfast in their support.

In November, the Friends were the Institute's guests at a dinner and the Fleet Commander's guests for a VIP Sea Day. Thirteen corporations, currently are members of the coterie. This is an increase of one during the year. The Friends are; Australian Defence Industries Rockwell Ship Systems

Blohm and Voss
Stanilite Electronics
Computer Sciences of Australia
Thomson Sintra Pacific
GEC Marconi
Scientific Management Associates
Jeumont Schneider Division
Westinghouse Electric
Krupp Atlas Elektronik Aus.
Ansett Australia
Nobel tech

The Vernon Parker Oration for 1991 was delivered by Commodore Teo Chee Hean, Chief of Navy, Republic of Singapore on 17 September. Although the numbers attending the Oration were reduced at the last minute by an untypical Canberra downpour, the Oration maintained the very high standards set for this event.

There were several highlights in the year, but one of the most pleasurable was the dinner on Friday 1 November to honour Sir John Gorton and the Friends of the Institute. Sir John was the friend in high places the Navy needed in the late fifties, although few people nowadays seem to realise this. Perhaps the dinner was able to rectify the situation a little.

The state of the Chapters is a sorry story. The Melbourne Chapter is torn between continuing at XMAS Cerberus or XMAS Lonsdale or both. I have been advised by the Convenor, Commander Nekrasov, that he intends to close the chapter books and return them to the Council. I have assured him that when Melbourne again wishes to activate its chapter, or even host an Institute

event, they will have the financial and moral support of the Institute.

I have written to a possible volunteer Convenor in Sydney and believe that a Sydney Chapter at XMAS Penguin will soon start up again. I hope so.

The Chief of Staff, New Zealand has agreed to the formation of a New Zealand chapter. The Council has offered to provide some financial support for the running of the Chapter and a decision to proceed appears imminent.

The Way Ahead for the ANI

At last years Annual General Meeting, Lieutenant Commander Peter Jones and Lieutenant Tom Frame presented a discussion paper on the way ahead for the ANI. There have been several developments on this subject during the year and I specifically invited several people, with interests in the advancement of maritime matters, here tonight. The response I got from them was very positive. I thank them for it and I hope the discussion which will follow later will be productive.

ANI Silver Medals

During the year ANI Silver Medals were presented to Squadron Leader T.C. De La HUNTY, for his paper titled "A Maritime Strategy in Support of Australia's Regional Foreign Policy for South East Asia" and Senior Chaplain G.N. ADSETT, for his paper titled "Australia's Comprehensive Engagement with South East Asia". I congratulate both officers.

Financial Status

The financial strength of the Institute has improved dramatically of the past two years as the result of the financial support provided by the Friends. During this period I have moved from a position of deep concern about the financial viability of the Institute to one of optimism and great confidence for the future.

Public Officer

Capt. L.G. Fox RANEM has resigned as Public Officer for the Institute. Commodore A.X.R. Brecht RANEM has agreed to take over. I thank both officers for their support.

The Council

I wish to record my appreciation for the enthusiastic support I have received from the Councillors over the past few years. They have continued to come back for reelection and their efforts during a particularly busy year have gone unrecognised by all but a very few. This is unfortunate but with an increasing Institute profile I hope the situation will change.

I am about to step down as President. My term has given me great satisfaction. By establishing the Friends Coterie, I have seen the Institute placed on a sound financial footing and able to function effectively. With the degree of official support which I believe will be forthcoming in 1992, I am very confident that during the coming year the Institute will be very successful in its endeavours to encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the Maritime profession.



Guide for Authors

General

All readers, whether members or not, are invited to submit articles for publication. Articles should deal with interesting recent developments in maritime matters which have a direct or indirect bearing on naval matters.

Contributions from overseas are welcome.

Articles specially written for the ANI, and accompanied by a statement to that effect, may be eligible for prizes from time to time.

The Editor reserves the right to reject or amend articles for publication.

Articles from 2500 to 6000 words are welcomed and the Institute will pay for original articles at \$10 for each 1000 words published.

Long articles should be subdivided appropriately and accompanied by an abstract of up to 75 words describing the scope of the article.

The Journal's established style is for impersonal, semi-formal, prose. Where a published work, whether serial or book, is directly quoted, due acknowledgement should be given. Specific numbered references should be used where appropriate and a suitable bibliography appended to the article.

Illustrations, photographs, graphics etc.

While glossy black-and-white prints are preferred, colour prints with good contrast are often acceptable. Attach caption and other information to the back of the print with a small piece of tape. A width/height ratio of about 5:4 is ideal. The Editor likes to include a mix of vertically (portrait) and horizontally (landscape) oriented photographs. Tables, diagrams and graphs should, if complex, be carefully drawn in black on white paper and treated as photographs. Simple tables can be reproduced in the typesetting process, but it is the author's responsibility to ensure the clarity of the information presented.

The typescript


As much of the journal as possible is entered from computer disk or via an optical scanner. The preferred disk format is Macintosh but popular MS-DOS packages are welcome. If in doubt, submit ASCII text format. The preferred typescript format for scanning is laser or daisy-wheel printer output, single-spaced on A4 paper. High-quality dot-matrix (24-pin) output may be acceptable. Lesser quality (9-pin) which might need to be entered by hand, should be double-spaced. Three hard copies of the article are required whether submitted on disk or otherwise.

Copyright and clearance to publish

In submitting material to the Journal, authors are granting the ANI a non-exclusive licence to publish. It is the responsibility of authors to obtain from the appropriate source permission to publish material that may be regarded as sensitive in any way. If an author ventures a personal opinion, the context should make it impossible for any reasonable person to infer official sanction for that opinion.

The cover sheet

The author's name, address, telephone number, present position and brief biographical particulars. If an article has been previously published, a publication history should be included. Any outside assistance accorded the author in research or preparation should be acknowledged.



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FAX (06) 239 1167

From the Editor

This issue of the Journal reminds readers that 1992 is the 50th anniversary of the Battle of The Coral Sea and provides details of some of the activities commemorating the event. In the next issue of the Journal there will appear an article describing the events before, during and after the Battle of the Coral Sea.

I would like to pay tribute to CDRE Ian Callaway for the effort, encouragement and leadership provided to ANI councillors during his term as ANI President. The support of the *Coterie* has provided a better financial base for producing a higher quality journal in addition to the improved communication between the RAN and Defence industries in Australia.

Congratulations go to Senior Chaplain Adsett who received the award of the ANI Silver Medallion for the best Maritime Strategy essay from those submitted during the RAN Staff Course 26/91. The essay examines Australia's engagement with South East Asia and is very topical.

During 1991 the ANI councillors have discussed the future and way ahead for the ANI. Last year an article appeared in the Journal which proposed a way ahead. Unfortunately few readers responded with a view. The perennial problem of the ANI attracting the younger members of the RAN, particularly those at ADFA, remains. This should not be surprising as it is likely that midshipmen perceive no real advantage to them in joining the ANI.

Regards

Don Agar

Garden Island — A History

T. R. Frame

Garden Island has been the focus for all naval activity in Australia's quarter of the globe for over two centuries and has been the home of the Royal Australian Navy since its establishment in 1911. Yet its history has never been written.

This book describes the use of Garden Island for naval purposes by the First Fleet in 1788, its seizure by Governor Lachlan Macquarie in 1811, the protracted negotiations that led to the navy's return and its subsequent development as one of Australia's most important and strategically valuable naval facilities. Set within the context of the waning fortunes of British naval power, the growth of the city of Sydney and the creation of the New South Wales Government, this comprehensive and in places controversial account analyses the forces that led to the formation of an Australian navy, the difficulties it encountered in operating as an independent naval unit and the problems faced by the navy with its Fleet based in a city with enormous urban pressures.

Garden Island has had a wonderfully varied and colourful history. Today it is one of the most important historic sites in Australia and the most strategically important naval base in the Southern Hemisphere.

Proudly sponsored by the Australian Naval Institute, 210 x 102 mm hardback, 240 pages.

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18 February 1992

The President
The Australian Naval Institute Inc.
P O Box 80
CAMPBELL ACT 2601

Dear Sir


Please find enclosed various Operating Accounts, Income and Expenditure Account and Balance Sheet of the Institute which relate to the twelve months ended 31 December 1991.

In my opinion the enclosed accounts are properly drawn up so as to give a true and fair view of the state of affairs of the Institute.

The rules relating to the administration of the funds of the Institute have been observed.

All information required by me has been obtained.

Yours faithfully



P O Reis

Australian Naval Institute**Balance sheet as at 31 December 1991**

1990		1991
	ACCUMULATED FUNDS	
41158.22	Balance as at 1 January	43600.50
2442.28	ADD net profit/(loss) for the year	(9193.34)
	Adjustment book stock 31/12	3056.44
43600.50	Accumulated funds 31 December 1991	37463.60
	REPRESENTED BY:	
	Assets	
685.00	Debtors	685.00
35.94	Commonwealth Bank	1133.25
50365.57	Defence Credit Co-op (Aust) Ltd	38157.85
1081.44	Stock on hand: Insignia	1287.60
814.55	Medals	475.30
1.00	Medal die	1.00
339.60	Books	935.35
		2699.25
	Cash on hand	1620.30
	Australian Taxation Office (withholding tax)	1098.15
2490.00	Computer @ cost	2490.00
(138.00)	LESS Accumulated depreciation	968.00
		1522.00
55675.10	TOTAL ASSETS	46915 80
	DEDUCT LIABILITIES	
5563.40	CREDITORS	5787.00
	SUBSCRIPTIONS PAID:	
	Advance 1992	2233.20
	1993	624.00
	1994	91.00
	1995	17.00
5811.20		2965.20
	PROVISION FOR:	
400.00	Legal fees	400.00
300.00	Replace medals	300.00
		700.00
12074.60		9452.20
43600.50		37463.60

Australian Naval Institute

Profit & loss statement for the year ended 31 December 1991

	1991	1990
INCOME		
Corporate sponsors	10000.00	25000.00
Subscriptions	9747.00	11562.00
Seminar refunds	1433.00	—
Miscellaneous receipts	187.00	214.35
Interest received	5321.92	6514.05
	26688.92	43290.40
LESS EXPENDITURE		
Journal operating cost	23258.22	30464.31
Insignia operating cost	46.34	—
Medal operating presentations	339.25	135.80
Book operating loss	879.19	3702.65
Bank merchant fees	65.56	—
Bank FID fees	61.46	140.77
Bank interest	8.03	—
Postage	14.86	—
Donation — Legacy	200.00	—
Advetising — AGM	18.86	11.92
Refreshments — AGM	73.89	48.97
Post Office box rental	35.00	30.00
Depreciation — computer	830.00	138.00
Loss on disposed computer	—	540.00
Travelling & corporate sponsors' expenses	5038.20	4373.23
Seminar dinners & expenses	3944.85	—
Audit fees	490.00	390.00
Sundry operating expenses	578.45	2.00
Printing	—	540.00
Repairs — computer	—	89.00
Insurance	—	176.70
	35882.26	40848.12
Net profit/(loss) transferred to accumulated funds:		
	(9193.34)	2442.28

Australian Naval Institute

Proposed Budget 1992

EXPENDITURE	Achieved 91	Budget 91	Budget 92
Operating expenses	127.85	230.00	200.00
Journal printing	21888.73	25000.00	25000.00
Journal postage	1190.67	1400.00	2000.00
General postage	14.86	100.00	100.00
Stationery	71.00	400.00	400.00
Printing		400.00	400.00
Advertising	18.96	100.00	50.00
Chapter subsidies		350.00	500.00
Audit	490.00	490.00	560.00
Legacy	200.00	200.00	200.00
Medals	220.00	220.00	220.00
Insurance		200.00	220.00
GI history	1841.35	2000.00	
Prizes/Articles	576.45	1000.00	1500.00
Corporate sponsors	5038.20	10000.00	10000.00
Bank charges	134.61	200.00	200.00
Depreciation	830.00	630.00	500.00
Computer		200.00	200.00
Provision for Seminar	3944.85	2500.00	2500.00
Insignia	448.50		
Reflections	660.00		330.00
Provision for medals			750.00
Provision for printer			600.00
Provision for ADM Smith oral history			2500.00
	37698.05	45690.00	48930.00
INCOME			
Membership	7031.00	11000.00	8000.00
Subscriptions	1657.80	2000.00	1600.00
Corporate sponsors	10000.00	27500.00	30000.00
Advertising		nil	nil
Interest	5321.92	5000.00	4500.00
Insignia profit		50.00	20.00
Miscellaneous	590.00	200.00	1000.00
GI History	1101.15		
Reflections	1210.40		
Tax refund			1100.00
ADM Smith oral history			2500.00
	27212.27	48750.00	49220.00
PROFIT	(10485.78)	3060.00	290.00

THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE - THE WAY AHEAD

Discussions and Deliberations at the 1992 Annual General Meeting

By Lieutenant T.R. Frame RAN

A discussion paper on the future of the ANI prepared by Lieutenant Commander P.D. Jones and Lieutenant T.R. Frame was tabled at the 1991 ANI Annual General Meeting (AGM) and subsequently published in the *Journal*. The paper was further considered during 1991 by the Institute Council and also prompted a constructive *Journal* article by the Reverend M.J. Head.

The issues addressed in the discussion paper were brought before the Institute again at the 1992 Annual General Meeting by Lieutenant Commander Jones who highlighted the continuing decline in membership and the challenge this represented for the Institute. The number of members has fallen from 512 in 1991 to its current figure of 492. He also reported on a meeting held on 5 September 1991 under the auspices of the Australian Centre for Maritime Studies (ACMS) proposing the formation of a confederation of 'kindred maritime associations'. Representatives from thirteen maritime bodies, including the ANI, considered the creation of a loose association supported by a maritime secretariat; the publication of a Maritime Intelligence Digest; and, the possible pooling of effort and resources in the convening of forums and conferences. Lieutenant Commander Jones offered a number of recommendations at the meeting, including agreement in principle that the ANI belong to the ACMS's loose association of kindred maritime organisations.

Commodore H.J. Adams, as a representative of the ACMS Executive and an ANI member, explained the purposes of the 'kindred maritime associations' body and advised the meeting that the first forum presented under its auspices would be held on 29 April 1992. Commodore A. Brecht spoke in favour of the ANI supporting the concept of the 'kindred maritime associations' which he stated was an opportunity for the ANI to broaden its outlook while making its corporate purposes more obvious and inspiring to its existing and

potential constituency.

Commodore M.J. Clarke, as a representative of the Naval Association Executive and an ANI member, commented on the success the Naval Association had achieved in bringing many of the naval ex-service associations together and the benefits to be gained from drawing upon a larger membership body. However, he pointed out that in bringing many diverse groups together there was a fear among the smaller organisations that their special interests might be neglected or ignored by an 'umbrella' organisation. It was for this reason that many groups would continue to operate even after they had joined a confederation.

The Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral I.D.G. MacDougall, suggested that the Institute ought to concentrate on improving the quality and relevance of the *Journal* as the primary means of raising the status of the ANI and building a more comprehensive forum for the exchange of ideas.

Captain Noble moved that:

The ANI members agree in principle to belong to a loose association of kindred maritime organisations.

This was seconded by Commodore Brecht and the motion was carried unanimously.

Having made a resolution concerning the external operations of the ANI, the meeting discussed the Institute's continuing problem of declining membership. Commodore I.A. Callaway spoke of the ANI's failure to attract new members from among the ranks of junior officers. Commander R.J. Sherwood commented on the Institute's lack of profile at both the RAN College and the Defence Academy and suggested that the incoming council prepare a list for dissemination within both RANC and ADFA of 'naval professional problems or areas of interest' which might serve as the basis for *Journal* articles.

Commander L. Roberts mentioned the Institute's need to establish and build its presence in the sailor training establishments and schools. Both Commodore Brecht and Captain Noble contended that the ANI had to increase its influence and prestige if it were to become a more powerful and effective organisation within the naval profession.

Commodore Brecht moved that:

The ANI Council address with priority the invigoration of debate and the raising of the ANI's profile so as to encourage membership

through the outcomes of the Institute.

The motion was seconded by Commodore Callaway and carried unanimously.

[Editor's note: Lieutenant Frame acted as secretary at the 1992 AGM. This article is not a formal statement of the proceedings of that meeting. The minutes of the meeting are the official record and will be accepted as an accurate version of that part of the proceedings at the 1993 AGM].



*A rare view of the Improved-Town class light cruiser HMAS ADELAIDE I pounding through a swell. HMAS ADELAIDE served in the Royal Australian Navy between 1922-1945.
(Photo by courtesy of Vic Jeffery)*

WASHINGTON NOTES

from Tom A Friedman in the United States

As a nation that prides itself on looking forward rather than back, Americans tend to down play historical commemorations. America's entry into World War II, however, was a turning point in the life of the nation and merited the ceremonies that were held to mark the 50th anniversary of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor December 7, 1941.

Located on a memorial that, spans the width of the sunken battleship *Arizona*, the service of remembrance at Pearl Harbor began at 7:55 am., the exact time the attack began. As the band crashed into the National Anthem five minutes later, it was easy to imagine what it was like on the quarterdeck of the battleship *Nevada* that morning as the ship's band and marine detachment survived the strafing that shredded the ensign, as it was raised yet missed them. The words to "The star-spangled Banner" took on renewed meaning for new generations.

The anniversary gave me a reason to reread President Franklin D. Roosevelt's speech to Congress requesting a declaration of war against Japan.

Yesterday, December 7, 1941 — a date which will live in infamy — the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan.

I always have considered this speech to be one of the finest in the history of American oratory — short and to the point, (it comprises only one and a half pages of printed text and took less than seven minutes to deliver) the speech is unusual for a political address for several reasons. First, while rich in eloquence, it is devoid of rhetoric. Second, the President actually imparted emotion to his listeners. And, finally, the mood of the country has seldom, if ever, been expressed as well it was by the President that day 50 years ago.

The United States was at peace with that nation, and, at the solicitation of Japan, was still in conversation with its government and its Emperor looking toward the maintenance of peace in the Pacific.



The attack yesterday on the Hawaiian Islands has caused severe damage to American naval and military forces. I regret to tell you that very many American lives have been lost. Yesterday the Japanese government also launched an attack against Malaya. Last night Japanese forces attacked Hong Kong.

Last night Japanese forces attacked Guam. Last night Japanese forces attacked the Philippine Islands.

Last night the Japanese attacked Wake Island. And this morning the Japanese attacked Midway Island.

Japan has therefore undertaken a surprise offensive extending throughout the Pacific area. The facts of yesterday and today speak for themselves. The people of the United States have already formed opinions and well understand the implications to the very life and safety of our nation.

If Americans were taken unaware by the "surprise offensive" it was not because of a lack of historical precedent. Japan was in discussions with Russia when its navy sank the Imperial Russian Pacific Fleet at Port Arthur in 1904. War with China began without declaration after the Mukden Incident in 1931.

During World War I, Japan acted more as an extortionist than as an ally.

No Japanese army arrived on the Western Front and the Kongo class battle cruisers were not at Jutland in 1916 to turn the tide against the Imperial German High Seas Fleet. The seizure of Germany's Pacific territories and the issuance of the infamous Twenty-One Demands on China were not enough for Japan. In 1917, after America's entry into the war, Viscount Ishihara came to the United States and threatened that Japan might go over to the Central Powers unless its "special interests" in the Pacific were

recognised They were. A generation later this would be called appeasement.

As Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, I have directed that all measures be taken for our defense.

Constitutional experts have argued that a declaration of war was not necessary in this case. As commander-in-chief the President was constitutionally obligated to use the armed forces to defend the country.

Always will we remember the character of the onslaught against us.

President Roosevelt did not know how "on target" he was with this prediction. President John F. Kennedy once said that people of his generation would always remember — there they were when Pearl Harbor was attacked and when President Roosevelt died. Only a short while later, our whereabouts when we heard of President Kennedy's death would be added to that list as well.

The surprise nature of the attack had given rise to one of the "great" American conspiracy theories, i.e. that the Japanese couldn't have possibly planned a successful surprise attack against the United States unless someone in the American government (that "someone" usually being President Roosevelt) knew of the upcoming attack but kept it secret so that we would be forced to enter the war.

I can think of at least four reasons why the "conspiracy theory" is preposterous.

First, the conspiracy theory is built on the premise that the Japanese could not have executed a "surprise" attack without the collusion of the American government. A cursory study of Japanese history from the Meiji Restoration refutes that presumption.

The Japanese opened themselves to the West but remained the only Asian nation except Thailand that escaped the stigma of colonialism. After defeating Russia at the turn of the century Japan forced the other Great Powers to recognize it as one of them. Washington may have hesitated to

assume the mantle of a world power but Tokyo did not.

It took the Allies almost four years of war and two atomic bombs to subdue the Japanese military machine. Japan's post-war recovery is already legend. From this perspective executing a multipronged attack against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands without the collusion of others was well within the capacity of the Japanese.

Second, if President Roosevelt was really the warmonger he is made out to be, he could have had a war with Japan over the sinking of the gunboat *Panay* on the Yangtze in 1937.

A newsreel crew just happened to be aboard the *Panay* at the time of the attack and recorded the attack itself as well as the crew's three day struggle to reach safety. The film clearly refuted the claims of the Japanese flyers that the American flags that had been painted on the ship's awnings as well as the one flying from the gaff were not visible. President Roosevelt, fearing that the film would inflame the country to war, forbade distribution of the newsreel until this part had been edited out.

Third, adherents of the conspiracy theory allege that President Roosevelt and his advisers should somehow have known that a blow was aimed at Pearl Harbor. We now know that the President and his senior advisers expected a Japanese strike but thought it would come almost anywhere else in the Pacific except Pearl Harbor. Of the seven places enumerated in the President's address — Pearl Harbor, Malaya, Hong Kong, Guam, the Philippines, Wake Island and Midway Island, only Pearl Harbor qualified as a surprise to government leaders. Finally, in the half century since the attack, neither various civilian, naval, and military commissions nor extensive Congressional hearings nor private historical research has turned up conclusive evidence that either President Roosevelt or his senior civilian and military advisers knew that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor. We were surprised — it happens in war just as it does in peace.

Famed CBS radio commentator Edward R. Murrow attested to the surprise felt by senior members of the Government. Invited to the White House for lunch that Sunday, Murrow was asked by the President to stand-by while he met with officials. This gave Murrow the opportunity to see and talk to the leaders of our government as the first reports of the disaster became known.

Murrow wrote that he was able:

To observe at close range the bearing and expression of (Secretary of war Henry L.) Stimson, (Secretary of the Navy Frank) Knox, and Secretary (of State Cordell) Hull. If they were not surprised by the news from Pearl Harbor, then that group of elderly men were putting on a performance which would have excited the admiration of any experienced actor.

Last, but not least, such a cover-up would require the collusion of hundreds if not thousands of people throughout the American government. And our government doesn't — and never has — worked that well. It is hard to believe that all of the people who have looked for a "smoking gun" over the last half century would not have found it if it was there.

No matter how long it may take us to overcome this premeditated invasion, the American people, in their righteous might, will win through to absolute victory.

I believe that I interpret the will of the Congress and of the people when I assert that we will not only defend ourselves to the uttermost, but

will make it very certain that this form of treachery shall never again endanger us.

The lessons learned from appeasing dictators, including the attack on Pearl Harbor, influenced two generations of American leaders to ensure that we did not isolate ourselves from the world again. It was — and is — a wise policy. Hopefully; The American public will repudiate neo-isolationist politicians who have recently raised the discredited standard of "America First."

Hostilities exist. There is no blinking at the fact that our people, our territory, and our interests are in grave danger.

With confidence in our armed forces, with the unbounding determination of our people, we will gain the inevitable triumph. So help us God.

I ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, December 7, 1941, that a state of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese Empire.

We gained the triumph. And we won the cold war that followed against new adversaries. We have gone a long way in winning the peace, too, but the ultimate "battle" of that war, namely whether we can adjust our economy to the world that we in large part created, has yet to be decided. With proper political leadership and the same determination to meet economic challenges as we met the challenge the attack on Pearl Harbor thrust upon us, the result should be the same.



CORAL SEA 50 COMMEMORATION

and related events

1942

Rabaul bombed	4	January
Singapore surrenders	15	February
Darwin bombed	19	
HMAS <i>Perth</i> and USS <i>Houston</i> sunk in Battle of Java Sea	1	March
Broome and Wyndham bombed	3	
HMAS <i>Vampire</i> lost to Japanese air attack	4	April
Battle of Coral Sea	4-8	May
Battle of Midway	4-7	June
Sydney shelled by submarine	7-8	
Japanese capture Kokoda	29	July
Townsville bombed	26	
Guadalcanal offensive	7	August
Japanese forced to withdraw along Kokoda Trail	27	September
Kokoda reoccupied by Australian forces	2	November

1992

Darwin commemorative service	19
Katherine commemorative service	22
Anzac Day services	
Fleet entry, Sydney; ceremony, Townsville; ecumenical services Darwin, Cairns, Townsville, Brisbane, Gold Coast, Newcastle, Wagga Wagga, Sydney, Melbourne, Launceston, Hobart, Adelaide, Perth.	
Anniversary of bombing of Fenton/Brocks Creek.	6
75th anniversary of formation, Darwin RSL.	3
Remembrance Day ceremony, Adelaide River War Cemetery	11

50th ANNIVERSARY OF THE BATTLE OF THE CORAL SEA AND RELATED EVENTS

Under the joint patronage of the Prime Minister and American Ambassador the *Australian-American Coral Sea Commemorative Council* has been set up under the Chairmanship of Sir Eric Neal. The Council, supported by a small executive staff, is the coordinating body for all 50th Anniversary activities that fall between the initial air attack on Darwin on 19th February and Remembrance Day on 11th November 1942.

The range of 1942 events against some of the commemorative events in 1992 is shown in the accompanying timetable.

The Council is an umbrella organisation which seeks to help coordinate and allocate scarce resources without impinging on the arrangements or responsibilities of the many organizing bodies such as the RSL/Naval Association/Australian-American Association/City Councils, etc.. Membership of the Council is very broad and encompasses national officials from most participating organisations.

To date there are some 200 programmed events ranging across ecumenical services/combined services-US and Australian veterans marches/ship visits/a "troop train" tourist trip from Brisbane to Cairns/an air safari around World War II airstrips in the Northern Territory/a shipborne commemoration service in the Coral Sea/and hopefully the marathon race of the year, the "Kokoda Epic Race" in five daily stages over the Kokoda Trail.

The Council is financially supported by a number of large companies and one of its major items of expenditure will be an educational project with, hopefully, several versions designed for schoolchildren/tertiary students/mature-aged persons. The package is being professionally produced and will consist of a video supported by written material and assignments.

A considerable number of US veterans are expected to visit Australia and participate in events. Overseas tourist outlets have been kept fully informed.

The best source of information for local events will be your local Naval Association/RSL/Australian-American Association, the state offices of which hold copies of the Australia-wide programme. However the office of the Coral Sea Council will be only too happy to help and can be contacted at Westpac Banking Corporation, Level 23, 60 Martin Place, Sydney, 2000. Phone 02 226 1302 or Facsimile 02 226 3105.

A FEW MEMORIES

by

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with a foreword by

General P C Gration AC OBE, Chief of the Defence Force

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CORAL SEA LESSONS

by

Cdre P H James RANEM

Australians who have some knowledge of maritime history, or are of an age to remember 50 years ago, will recall the events leading up to the Battle of the Coral Sea, and be aware of their significance. However they are the minority, the majority do not seem to know, nor perhaps accept that history repeats itself, albeit with minor variations, and that there are lessons to be learnt for the future.

This article summarises the salient points and lessons learnt from The Battle of the Coral Sea, without going into detail. Further knowledge can be gained by reference to the Bibliography.

By May 1942 the scenario was:

- The Battle of Britain and the Battle of the Atlantic had been fought and won but the European War still raged furiously.
- HMAS *Sydney* had been lost with all hands in November.
- Pearl Harbor had been attacked in December and the US was fully mobilised.
- HM Ships *Repulse* and *Prince of Wales* had been sunk south of Singapore.
- Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia) had been captured.
- HMA Ships *Perth*, *Yarra* and *Vampire* had been sunk.
- Darwin had been repeatedly attacked by carrier and land-based aircraft.
- The Australian Territory of Papua and New Guinea had been invaded.
- An immediate threat of attack hung over Northern and Eastern Australia, Port Moresby, Fiji, and New Caledonia.

In March Prime Minister John Curtin had made an historic broadcast to the American people stating "Australia is the last bastion between the west coast of America and the Japanese. If Australia goes, the Americas are wide open...Be assured of the calibre of our national character. This war may see the end of much that we have

painfully and slowly built up in our 150 years of existence. But even though all of it go, there will still be Australians fighting on Australian soil until the turning point be reached, and we will advance over blackened ruins, through blasted and fire-swept cities, across scorched plains, until we drive the enemy into the sea." Shortly after, General MacArthur arrived in Australia as Supreme Commander of the South West Pacific Area.

Suffice to say that the Battle of the Coral Sea involved several Japanese forces attempting to capture Tulagi in the Solomon Islands and Port Moresby in what is now Papua New Guinea with the aim of consolidating there before pushing on southwards. In essence the two fleets of warships, although operating in widely dispersed groups, comprised:

JAPANESE

2 Large Carriers
1 Light Carrier
7 Heavy Cruisers
2 Light Cruisers
15 Destroyers
2 Oilers
142 Aircraft*
*No of Serviceable aircraft on morning of 8 May

ALLIES

2 Large Carriers
7 Heavy Cruisers**
1 Light Cruiser
15 Destroyers
2 Oilers
122 Aircraft*
**Includes HMA Ships *Australia* and *Hobart*

The final outcome appears to be about equal on the scorecard, with the following losses:

JAPANESE

1 Light Carrier
1 Supply ship
1 Destroyer
97 Aircraft

ALLIES

1 Large Carrier
1 Oiler
1 Destroyer
77 Aircraft

However to this it must be added that:

- The sinking of the USS *Lexington* was significant as she carried 72 aircraft whereas

the *Shoho* was a small carrier with only 28 aircraft.

- Of the two Japanese Large Carriers the *Shokaku* was so badly damaged that she had to return to Japan and the *Zoikaku* had depleted her air assets to the degree that both ships were not available for the Battle of Midway. This, no doubt, swayed the odds for that battle in the favour of the undoubted winners, the US Navy. (Conversely the USS *Yorktown* returned to Pearl Harbor, was quickly repaired and took part at Midway.)

The salient points and lessons learnt include the following:

- The battle proved, for the first time, that the Australian and American navies could operate together as an effective tactical unit.
- It was the first sea battle where the ships did not see each other.
- It was the first carrier versus carrier battle.
- It was the first time that the Japanese had been set back.
- An air attack on the group that included *Australia* and *Hobart* was assessed as intensive as that which sunk the *Repulse* and *Prince of Wales*, but there were no losses.
- The Landing Force destined for Port Moresby was forced to turn back.
- The Japanese were forced into a land battle up and over the Owen Stanley Ranges, the Kokoda Trail.
- This land battle caused the first of their logistic overload problems.
- The Japanese got no nearer to the East coast of Australia.
- The planned invasion of Pacific islands was halted.
- The US build-up of forces in Australia was able to continue undeterred.
- MacArthur's island hopping concept had time to get set.

Analysis of the conflict has also revealed the unforeseen debits and credits such as:

- The frequent mis-identification of ships by carrier and land based aircraft, their exaggeration of damage caused and ships sunk.
- The problems of communications delays, coding errors and misrouting of messages.
- Some Japanese carrier aircraft were so disoriented that they tried to land on the USS *Yorktown*.
- The US knowledge of the Japanese intentions, having broken their signal cypher.
- The bombing of own forces (B17's from Townsville bombed a group of ships, including *Australia* and *Hobart*, from 25,000 feet just after the Japanese air attack).

Overall the Battle of the Coral Sea has long been recognised as a strategic victory for the Allies and the turning point of the war in the Pacific. What has not been widely acknowledged is that it was also the genesis of the Australian-American alliance as we know it today. Surely this is an undeniable fact that should be known by all Australians.

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ANI SILVER MEDALLION WINNING ESSAY

AUSTRALIA'S COMPREHENSIVE ENGAGEMENT WITH SOUTH EAST ASIA

BY

SENIOR CHAPLAIN G.N. ADSETT, RAN

INTRODUCTION

Senator Gareth Evans suggests in his 1989 Ministerial Statement on Australia's Regional Security that 'comprehensive engagement' is an appropriate umbrella description to present Australia's policy approach to South East Asia.

In part he says:

'Our long-term goal in South East Asia should ...a comprehensive engagement with countries in the region: "comprehensive" in that there should be many elements in the relationship and "engagement" because it implies a mutual commitment between equals ... The essential elements of the concept of comprehensive engagement might be stated as ... participating in the gradual development of a regional security community based on a sense of shared security interest¹

The full text relating to 'comprehensive engagement' stresses the importance of the evolution and reinforcement of a diverse array of linkages with South East Asia, such that there will develop sustained interaction to produce a confident and natural partnership in a common neighbourhood of remarkable diversity. The policy encourages continued support for the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the possible development of additional regional organisations or arrangements, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the working for the involvement of Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar in the cooperative arrangement of regional affairs.²

The Evans' Statement gives a 'multi-dimensional' approach for the implementation of the 'comprehensive engagement' policy. He

discusses seven 'instruments' that can be employed to achieve Australia's regional security: military capability, politico-military capability, diplomacy, economic links, development assistance, 'non-military' threat assistance, and exchanges of people and ideas.³

This essay will give due heed to all of these 'instruments', but will pay particular attention to military and politico-military capabilities, diplomacy and economic links. It will be argued that strategic factors go beyond military capabilities in the 1990s. When discussing Australia's strategic environment, the stress will need to be increasingly upon economic links if a creative equilibrium is to be achieved between Australia and South East Asia, not to mention the wider Asia-Pacific region.

There are several forces at play in this rapidly changing strategic environment. These include the influence of the end of the cold war which has brought with it both the development of forces of integration and fragmentation; the invigorated role of the United Nations illustrated in the Gulf War and currently in the proposed Cambodian settlement; the adjusting regional role of the United States in the Pacific region; and the growing economic and military dynamism of the countries of North East as well as South East Asia. Each force will be examined to assess its relative importance to regional security in relation to Australia.

It will be argued that the development and reinforcement of this diverse array of linkages proposed by 'comprehensive engagement' is not really a new concept with respect to the region of

South East Asia. However, it will become apparent that linkages since 1970 have been forged as a result of a 'self-reliance' perspective. The more balanced stress between regionalism and globalism will be examined and judged as a positive development. The proposed development of regional organisations in addition to ASEAN and the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) will be considered as a potential initiative which will require careful, sensitive consideration over time if appropriate military balances between states are to be achieved. The notion that Australia should be more vigorous in pursuing its security interests in the region will be assessed as laudable, but will be possible only if South East Asian countries allow such confidence and assertiveness to be manifested.

As Evans suggests it should be a 'gradual development of a regional security community'. This emphasis on a 'gradual development' will be an important feature of this discussion to acknowledge the time factor required for the merging of cultures, and to ensure that a firm foundation is laid down for a natural, rather than an imposed, 'sense of shared security interest'.

This essay will assess the strategic aspects for regional security of Australia's 'comprehensive engagement' with South East Asia.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

'Comprehensive engagement' describes Australia's current policy approach to the ten South East Asian countries: the six ASEAN countries of Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei; the three Indochinese countries of Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia; and Myanmar.

Australia and South East Asia

To understand the 'linkages' that have developed between Australia and South East Asia, an examination of the forces operating in the Asia-Pacific region post Second World War is necessary. The United States has been a key player from the conclusion of those hostilities. There were two concerns that had to be considered

- the containment of Japanese imperialism in the long term, and the stemming of the southern march of communism from the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, Vietnam - through Indochina, Malaysia and Indonesia.

To oppose these movements, an array of defence alliances and political alignments was developed by the United States with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand. In counter response, the Soviet Union established bilateral agreements with North Korea and Vietnam. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1950 led to Chinese involvement in the Korean War (1950-53). The French were defeated in Indochina in 1954. The 1960s saw the beginning of the protracted fight against Communism in Vietnam, led by the United States. As in Europe, the Cold War had taken firm hold in the Asia-Pacific region. The South East Asian countries were not only politically weak and economically underdeveloped, but also non-aligned and very vulnerable to the influence of communism.

Forward Defence

Until the Second World War, Australia's security outlook was shaped by its dependence on the United Kingdom. Forward defence had become the normal approach. In support of the British forces, Australians served in four distant colonial wars (New Zealand Land Wars, Sudan, Boxer Rebellion, and the Boer War), and in the overseas theatres of the two World Wars. After the fall of Singapore in the Second World War, Australia went 'forward' with the United States to defeat the Japanese. Babbage suggests that 'this long and deep tradition of Australian forward defence commitments with major allies had a profound impact on Australian security thinking and habits'.⁴ The impact is evident covertly in Australia's current defence policy and structure, and will be examined later.

The Cold War in the post-World War Asia-Pacific region caused Australia to view Asia, and South East Asia in particular, as divided into those countries which supported an Asian version of Western nationalism and those countries which had embraced, or were in danger of embracing,

communist nationalism. As an ally, Australia saw the same strategic picture as the United States did in the early stages of the Cold War, that is, bourgeois-capitalist nationalism opposed to revolutionary-socialist nationalism. ANZUS, a security pact comprising Australia, New Zealand and the United States, signed in 1951, grew out of this common strategic concern. Australia has valued, and still values, this pact with the United States for policy consultation, intelligence and technology exchange, logistic support, service-to-service cooperation, combined exercises and equipment purchases.⁵

The Communist Threat

In the 1950s, the communist threat to South East Asia was serious. The creation of the Australia, New Zealand, and (the British military organisation in) Malaya informal agreement (ANZAM) which guaranteed defence support to British colonies in Malaya, Singapore, and the Borneo territories, was the response. As a result, Australia served with the British during the Malayan Emergency. It committed forces to defend Malaya and Singapore during the Indonesian Confrontation, and was part of the allied operations in Vietnam.

It is evident that it was the communist threat to South East Asia that generated the momentum for Australia to develop early 'linkages' as the foundation for a comprehensive strategy of strengthening regional security through development.⁶ The South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), comprising the United States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines and Pakistan was formed in 1954. Through this organisation, Australia had the mechanism to provide the region not only with military assistance, but also with economic and technical assistance.

The Colombo Plan has provided technical, educational, and development assistance through bilateral arrangements. This Plan was the ideological, philosophical and humanitarian basis of all aid policies Australia has put in place with South East Asia since. Two other multilateral arrangements in which Australia was involved

were important during the middle Cold War period - ASPAC (Asian and Pacific Council) and UNDP (United Nations Development Programme).

While the 'linkages' with South East Asia were surprisingly 'comprehensive' at this time, they were forged out of the fear of the communist menace. The 'engagement' side of the formula, however, was not 'a mutual commitment between equals'. Latent, if not overt, paternalism was the basis for development programmes which showed sympathy for the underdeveloped and poverty-stricken people of Asia. After all, Australia was in an economically dominant position and in a confident mood in the 1950s and early 60s as it 'rode upon the sheep's back'. The situation was to change drastically after two decades.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF RELIANCE

South East Asia

When the British withdrew their forces east of Suez in 1967, and the United States promulgated the Nixon Doctrine in 1969⁷, Australia and South East Asia were forced to re-evaluate their defence needs. At first, there was some reluctance to dispense with the comfortable security of the United States' guarantees. The Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) was endorsed by ASEAN members in 1971, giving birth to the belief that regional security would be best served by detachment and self-reliance. There was some attempt to achieve a balance of powers in the region when Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines established diplomatic relations with China. Relations with the Soviets were also pursued warily. Confidence in their ability to develop their own national defence capabilities was given a boost when the Sino-Soviet arrangement fell apart, thus fragmenting communist solidarity. Bilveer believes that ZOPFAN still has great potential to generate peace in the wider Asia-Pacific.⁸

Australia

Australia has taken almost twenty years to formulate and make operative, albeit tentatively,

its 'self-reliance' policy. It was Defence Minister Beazley's, 'The Defence of Australia', presented to Parliament in March, 1987 (DOA 87),⁹ and Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister Evans', 'Australia's Regional Security' statement, presented in December, 1989¹⁰ that has given the policy some shape and direction.

What has developed can be described as a doctrinal contradiction. 'Self-reliance' is promoted but in the context that United States military support would be given in the event of a fundamental threat to Australia's security.¹¹ Also, there is an unwritten assumption that Australia would support its ally in a distant theatre if required. This was borne out when Australia promptly answered the call to stand with the United States in the Gulf War of 1990. What Australia has in place is not 'self-reliance' per se, but a modest 'self-sufficiency' towards its own defence. Problems relating to availability of munitions and spare-parts are but two areas where Australia falls outside of 'self-reliance' parameters.

Military Linkages

Australia's first attempt at a defence cooperation 'linkage' with South East Asia in the era of post-Nixon Doctrine was the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) set up in 1971 by Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and Britain. It attempted to continue what ANZAM had commenced, to go some way towards protecting Malaysia and Singapore from the communist threat. It is noteworthy that, in FPDA, the 'engagement' began to reflect more of the 'mutual commitment between equals' that Evans was to stress later. Nathan expresses it this way:

*'Australian security assistance and defence cooperation with South East Asia evidence both continuity and change - continuity in the sense of focusing assistance to traditional recipients (Malaysia and Singapore) under FPDA, and change in the sense of commitment to the Nixonian principles of burden-sharing, partnership, and recognition of regional resilience, capabilities and sensitivities.'*¹²

Australia has continued to use FPDA as a vehicle to strengthen 'comprehensive engagement' in the defence sphere. Today, Malaysia and Singapore still recognize and appreciate the contribution of the FPDA to their stability and prosperity.¹³ As the threats to national and regional security have declined, and Malaysia's and Singapore's defence capabilities have strengthened, Australia now maintains a rotational rather than a permanent presence in the South East Asian region with its F/A 18 Hornets, F-111 fighter aircraft and PC3 reconnaissance aircraft. More regular air and naval exercises have been staged under the FPDA to augment the Integrated Air Defence System (IADS). There is now 'a growing emphasis on service-to-service training and exchange of personnel to reflect changing security needs and requirements, as well as mutual interests and aspirations'.¹⁴

Post-Cold War Dynamic

With the end of the Cold War, existing security relationships such as the FPDA may need to be realigned, or even disbanded, to accommodate regional changes. In this regard, the expected Cambodian settlement can be cited. Australia and ASEAN, along with the UN Permanent Five and the Paris Conference, have been the primary mechanisms seeking this political settlement. With China playing a constructive role and with Soviet cooperation, there is hope for an optimistic outcome. If the national interests of all Cambodians are realised, and the legitimate interests of Laos and Vietnam are guaranteed, it may be possible to consider eventually a wider ASEAN membership to integrate Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia to share the fruits of economic growth.¹⁵

Because Australia has developed good relations with Vietnam and Laos, even Myanmar, over a long period prior to the Cambodian settlement, it should be placed in a better position for 'engagement' if an augmented ASEAN does eventuate. If this wider association does come about, it could be argued that FPDA may no longer be appropriate. It may require renaming and reconfiguring. Already, Indonesia has shown

that it is suspicious of FPDA which it views as too exclusive.

Instead of a formal alliance or pact like FPDA, firm, but flexible, informal security arrangements may better serve the members of the regional community - ones that could be reviewed easily.¹⁶ This creative diplomacy would include, on a regular basis, defence consultations and intelligence exchanges, reciprocal visits by defence units, and combined exercises. Although not referring specifically to FPDA, Senator Evans' letter to Prime Minister Hawke on 24 September, 1990 supported such a concept. He indicated that the projection of current arrangements and existing alignments would not necessarily equip Australia to handle the complex and increasingly fluid Asia-Pacific strategic environment. He went on to say that Australia should look ahead for new institutional processes that might be capable of evolving in Asia as a framework for discussion and the handling of security issues. He stressed that he was not proposing a new institutional structure, but rather adding substance and resonance to the present framework which might or might not evolve in time into some institutional structure. In essence it was a gradual, step-by-step approach he was proposing, one which would encourage greater dialogue and a freer exchange of views.¹⁷

Asia-Pacific - A Multipolar Threat Environment

The discussion about the end of the Cold War must be pursued further because it has a bearing on any military arrangements between an augmented ASEAN and Australia. The bipolar superpower threat may have passed but what exists now is a potential multipolar threat. No longer is it a rivalry between democracy and totalitarianism, but a contest between forces of integration and fragmentation. Gaddis expresses it this way: '...the problems we will confront in the post-Cold War world are more likely to arise from competing processes - integration versus fragmentation - than from the kinds of competing ideological visions that dominated the Cold War'.¹⁸

In this multipolar threat environment with a propensity for fragmentation are found the largest armed forces in the world. The United States is there, and will remain with a reduced commitment. The 1990 United States Department of Defence Document states that it will be United States policy to maintain a strong presence, that is, forward deployment, overseas bases, bilateral security arrangements, in order to maintain regional stability, deter aggression, and preserve United States interests.¹⁹ United States Ambassador to Australia Mel Sembler said there would be no return to fortress America. United States' forces are in the Pacific for reasons that go beyond the Soviet threat. It is a matter of meeting global responsibilities and maintaining security ties that should become more not less important in the decades ahead.²⁰ South East Asian countries strongly endorse the maintenance of this United States presence. An example of this was Singapore's offer to the United States of military facilities when the decision not to extend the US-Philippine arrangement was announced.

The Soviet Union still has interests in Asia and is beginning to play an increasingly constructive role. However, it has instigated military cutbacks in East Asia - from the Sino-Soviet frontier, from Mongolia and from Vietnam. With the significant reduction of Soviet naval operations in the Pacific, there is no current threat for South East Asia from that source.

However, China is always a concern to South East Asia because of its size, proximity and nuclear capability. Even though its foreign policy is cooperative and constructive at the moment, and it has diplomatic relations with all South East Asian countries except Brunei, it can be unpredictable. China's expanding blue water Navy and its new off-shore defence doctrine have been noted. South East Asia is well aware that China has used force in the recent past - in the Paracels in 1974, and in the Spratlys in 1988 - to have its way. It may well resort to force again.

With India's rapid naval expansion in the 1980s South East Asia has a feeling of unease.²¹ The

region considers that there is the possibility of a Sino-Indian conflict if a naval build-up competition develops.

Japan poses questions for the region that cannot be answered with any assurance. Will Japanese power be translated into military power? In the immediate future, the strong pacifist sentiment in Japan should be a significant moderating influence. In fact, military power could be counter-productive to its economic hegemony. Will the US-Japan Alliance be maintained? Economic disputes could escalate into a trade war, but, at this time, the relationship is generally sound. Will Japan eventually take an independent security role in the region? Even though there is no tangible evidence at present that this is being seriously contemplated, any South East Asian security considerations must include a powerful and potentially overbearing Japan.

North and South Korea, and Vietnam have large armies too, and all are deployed in free array. The discussion has shown clearly that Asia is developing towards a multipolar pattern of power relationships with the major players being China, Japan, and perhaps even India. A multiplicity of security concerns vary from one country to another, and from North Asia to South East Asia.

Therefore, if fragmentation is allowed to develop in the North Pacific and the Indian regions, the South East Asian region (including Australia) will be adversely affected. An unhealthy appeal to nationalism could produce the desire for self-determination in the military sense, protectionism in the economic sense, and intolerance and misunderstanding in the religious and ethnic sense. A look back over history will reveal the human propensity for fragmentation rather than for integration. With the sudden removal of bipolarity caused by the Superpower stand-off, fragmentation forces have the potential to grow stronger than at any time since the Second World War.

'There are many uncertainties here, and past history casts a long shadow. If security strategies are not reassessed, the strategic consequences for the region of global

multipolarity may offer more risks to the prospects of peace and security in Asia than the past 40 years of bipolarity. This is especially true in Southeast Asia, which has often in history been a disputed zone of competition between larger outside powers seeking to extend their spheres of influence and economic control'²²

A current worry pertinent to this uncertainty is the dramatic expansion of military budgets in the Asian region. For example, in 1990, China's defence budget was increased by 15 per cent, Thailand's by 16 per cent, Taiwan's by 9 per cent, India's by 9 per cent, Singapore's by 12 per cent, Malaysia's by 20 per cent, the Philippines' by 26 per cent, and Japan's by 5 per cent. Japan's military budget is now the third largest in the world. Only Indonesia and Australia are not spending more on defence in the early 1990s. With the growth of regional economies, more sophisticated military hardware is being purchased. The ASEAN countries have gone from counter-insurgency preparations to conventional war readiness with emphasis on advanced air and naval forces aimed at a greater range and a broader spread of capabilities. For example, Thailand is purchasing a helicopter carrier and is considering the purchase of submarines. All have acquired anti-ship missiles and modern fighter aircraft.

Dr Mack suggests several important reasons for this drive for the development of national military machines:

- a The need for self-reliance on the basis of the view that the United States would become a decreasingly reliable ally.
- b The fear that a combination of declining US economic fortunes, trade frictions between Tokyo and Washington, and US isolationism will, over time, cause a disillusioned America to withdraw from Japan and the Japanese to rearm on a massive scale.
- c Many territorial disputes in Asia remain both unresolved and a potential source of conflict (China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Phillipines and Malaysia all lay claims to the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea).

- d More and more states have established 200 mile exclusive economic zones, giving regional navies a far greater area to patrol.
- e Acquiring modern weapons systems is seen by many states as a technology transfer which contributes to economic modernisation.
- f European governments have growing stocks of surplus weaponry. The pressures to buy are intense.²³

For these reasons 'comprehensive engagement' by Australia must be pursued sensitively and vigilantly to activate the forces of integration. The countries of South East Asia need each other more than ever before.²⁴ To facilitate these forces, honest communication will be essential. The collective approach to security must be seen as advantageous.

The gap between the military capabilities of the South East Asian countries and Australia is narrowing with the rapid development of Asian region military machines. The significant technological edge Australia has at present enhances its national status, and should allow it to exercise leverage in regional military deliberations.²⁵ This certainly justifies Australia's possession of a mix of offensive and defensive capabilities in its force structure. The offensive capability represented by the F-111s and submarines is appropriate in that it commands deterrent respect rather than fear in the region. As well, this capability is available for United Nations' actions. As Senator Evans says:

The capability of Australia's armed forces should be seen as having relevance not only for the defence of Australia, but for the region as a whole. Australia's possession of significant military power contributes to the strategic stability of our neighbouring regions, providing a 'secure south' for South East Asian countries....²⁶

This ability of Australia to maintain a margin of technological superiority in the region will continue to be important. It is imperative that chemical and nuclear weapons, as well as ballistic missiles are kept out of the region. From a position of respect and strength, Australia has already had some success in helping to rid the

world of these weapons. Prime Minister Hawke's chemical weapons regional initiative has been accepted.²⁷

Role of the United Nations

Australia's promotion of international citizenship will encourage a primary and invigorated role for the United Nations in the resolution of conflict.²⁸ This body must be unashamedly venerated in the eyes of nations, to help the world navigate a middle course to achieve a judicious balancing of the pluses and minuses of integration and fragmentation. Perceptive United Nations' statecraft will be required to control appropriately the centripetal and centrifugal forces that are currently shaping the world.²⁹

Australia must continue to support the world body as enthusiastically as it has done in the past, and encourage its regional neighbours to do the same. In his speech to the Australian National Press Club in April 1991, United States' Ambassador Mel Sembler said he found it remarkable that, in a vast and remote nation like Australia with only 17 million people, there is this global vision and a sense of global responsibility. While referring to military and economic topics in this respect, he stressed Australia's role time and time again in supplying peace keeping forces under United Nations' auspices to places like Cyprus and Namibia, and its dogged initiative in seeking to bring peace to the war in Cambodia.³⁰

The New Australian Militarism Challenge

There are several Australian academics who consider that the Government is now promoting a 'new militarism' which will be harmful to Australia's position in its area of strategic interest.³¹ Generally they believe that the policy of the Dibb Report and, to a lesser extent, the DOA of 87 is not being followed. Their arguments are shallow and myopic, and miss the deeper implications of key military factors already discussed.

When Richard Bolt suggests that the Government is now structuring the military to fight in the

region.³² and Graeme Cheeseman and Peter King indicate that our military structure and overarming could undermine relations with South East Asian neighbours,³³ they miss the global implications of Australia's responsibility almost entirely. In fact, they seem to be arguing for a 'Fortress Australia' position. Also, it suits them to impose the narrowest definition possible on the concept of 'self-reliance'.

It has been argued thus far that the Government is reading the regional temperature correctly. South East Asian neighbours are not 'looking at us' as a threat. Rather, as has been discussed, in the current multipolar world climate, buffeted by fragmentational forces, there is a growing desire on their part for Australia to 'look with them' at the potential threats to the region as a whole, that is, those coming from the North Pacific and Indian regions. The corporate hope is that the deterrence factor of Australia's military, together with the growing deterrence factors of regional neighbours will be able, not only to contain possible unhealthy national fragmentation, but also help to establish a wider regional equilibrium of integrative forces.

ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS RATHER THAN MILITARY MIGHT

Power Game to Wealth Game

During the 1980s East Asia led the world economically. The period was marked by the rapid growth of the newly emerging industrial societies of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, while Japan emerged as an economic Superpower. ASEAN, too, has been developing as an strong, modernized, industrialized, economic grouping in the South East Asian region. It should be noted that it was the utility of economic power that finally struck home to the Soviet Union and brought about the end of the Cold War. It came to realise that military might alone could not feed the Soviet people. Also, China began to open-up economically. With reduced military tension, the world, and especially Asia, is rapidly moving from the 'power game' to the 'wealth game'. As Tony Kevin suggests when discussing Australian-

ASEAN relations, 'security interests and strategies should be seen as extending beyond the military security sphere into the whole area of political and economic interaction between countries; that there is no such thing as a separate basket of "security issues" that can be left to the security specialists'.³⁴

Economic Linkages for Australia

It was when the Labor Party came to power in Australia in 1972 that there was a perceived need to extend the concept of national security into greater economic interaction with South East Asia. 'Engagement' which had had an ideological-military orientation to that time was to change to 'one based on more enduring ties such as trade, aid programmes, regional cooperation, economic cooperation, and the development of a network of cultural contacts and agreements'.³⁵

In forging a stronger concept of self-reliance, the Australian-Asian interaction has progressively gained momentum 'from one based on apprehension and dependence to one based on mutual confidence and partnership'.³⁶ In 1974 ASEAN gave Australia dialogue-partner status which has promoted several cooperative 'elements' for 'comprehensive engagement' in the following fields; finance and banking; food, agriculture, and forestry; industry, minerals and energy; transportation and communication; science and technology; social development; culture and information; and drug control.³⁷

In addition, Australia provides development assistance to ASEAN countries through the Australian International Development Assistance Bureau (AIDAB), the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR), and the International Development Program of Australian Universities and Colleges (IDP). While Australian aid is significant, it is less important in real terms as North Asian countries such as Japan are becoming more active in the aid field. From 1983 to 1987 Japanese aid to South East Asia increased from US\$845.32 million to US\$1.87 billion.³⁸ With the growth of ASEAN industrialisation, and some new momentum in

Australia's manufacturing and service industries, trade cooperation has become another major developing 'element' in Australian-ASEAN 'comprehensive engagement'.

Diplomacy

Australia will do well to take every opportunity to promote cohesion in its relations with ASEAN by building patterns of political and economic interdependence. After all, as a group, they comprise countries that have the potential to pose military threats to each other. However, Senator Evans seems to be too urgent when he calls for vigor in pursuing Australia's security interests. Confidence and assertiveness will be appropriate only if it is understood that Asians achieve their regional cohesion by consensus. Australian diplomacy will need to avoid the western propensity for dogmatism and flag-waving. An example of this tendency was when Australia criticized Indonesia and Malaysia about the careless management of their rain forests. Rather than accepting the criticism as a general international comment on the conservation of a scarce resource, both countries strongly resented the attack as an inappropriate challenge to their sovereignty. If ideas are to be accepted and incorporated on a regional basis, the gradual, unassuming, and quiet diplomacy style will need to be learnt and cleverly employed. As Andrew MacIntyre warns, it would be a great mistake for Australia to swing from a position of hesitancy, uncertainty, awkwardness and diffidence right across to one of misplaced assertiveness.³⁹

Three other factors will demand this sensitive, gradual diplomacy on Australia's part. Firstly, Australia has a societal approach to control while generally ASEAN countries have a military approach. For example, the Thai military is the final arbiter in Thai politics. In Indonesia, stability is much valued by the military. The right to criticise cannot be taken for granted. Secondly, the Western way subscribes to processes of reconciliation, while the Eastern style is more confrontational and suppressive. The current violent and suppressive action by the Indonesians in Timor illustrates this fact. Thirdly, Australia believes security comes through education, trade,

welfare and cooperation. South East Asian countries are only gradually accepting the adequacy of this concept.

The APEC Initiative

Prime Minister Hawke's initiative, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is a proposal which has the potential to help the ASEAN countries further develop their concept of security.⁴⁰ Furthermore, this proposal satisfies admirably the criteria for 'comprehensive engagement', notably the evolution and reinforcement of a diverse array of linkages with South East Asia.⁴¹ In his discussion of APEC Richard Solomon suggests that this body is beginning:

- a. to investigate avenues to strengthen economic cooperation in the region based on free market principles,
- b. to explore ways to enhance the economic structure of regional integration in its working group on telecommunications and regional transport, and
- c. to develop a shared sense of the future by honest analysis of the regional economic outlook.⁴²

One of its primary functions is to maintain a global system of open trade and investment, one that will be strong enough to contain protectionist measures. Thus, APEC lends support for the Uruguay Round of trade talks in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). If economic openness is to be maintained, political openness will be required among APEC's member countries. To state the same truth in an equally valid way — for political openness to be guaranteed, economic openness will be essential.

There are significant non-economic advantages in the dynamic of APEC which will encourage sustained interaction to produce a confident and natural partnership and equilibrium in this region of remarkable diversity. APEC has the potential to help keep the United States in the Western Pacific; to help stop the development of two trade blocks, one led by Japan and the other by the United States; to help stabilise US-Japanese relations; and to help prevent the use of military

solutions when there are close multipolar economic relations. Solomon supports this view:

'... over time, APEC will evolve into a new multilateral mechanism reinforcing the sense of collective purpose among the market-oriented economies of East Asia and the Pacific....APEC can build shared benefits through economic expansion. And by emphasizing economic progress rather than defence issues as the basis for regional integration, we can provide a more broadly acceptable framework for assuring security in the Asia-Pacific region in the post-Cold War era.'⁴³

CONCLUSION

Since the Second World War, there has been a growing 'engagement', gradually becoming more 'comprehensive', between Australia and South East Asia. From Australia's view, it has shifted from a patronising and fearful one to one of greater equality and trust as the global military and economic conditions have altered. Once it was 'security from Asia'; now it is 'security in Asia'.⁴⁴ The watershed for change was the late 1960s when the United States imposed the self-reliance doctrine on the region.

Australia's patronising attitude gave way as its economy encountered difficulties at the time when South East Asian economies began to flourish and modernize. The fear of the communist advance and the threat of invasion has given way finally in the post-Cold War period. The equality and trust in both military and economic spheres is being consolidated and extended through mechanisms like FPDA, the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference, APEC, and several informal ones. There are clear signs that culturally different Australia is gradually becoming the 'odd man in' rather than the 'odd man out' in the councils and forums of the region.⁴⁵

Tony Kevin agrees that 'Australia can have no basis now for patronising or condescending to South East Asia in any area of policy; but nor can South East Asia have any basis for failing to recognize Australia's important contribution to

the region's political, economic and security agendas'.⁴⁶

Past history of regional suspicion casts a long shadow that cannot be ignored. Added to this are the many uncertainties that exist now. Therefore, the post-Cold War multipolar situation in the Asia-Pacific region will require careful handling. This will mean that the security strategies of Australia's 'comprehensive engagement' now, and in the future, will require continual, open and honest evaluation.

As a regional player, Australia's current military hegemony must be maintained in an effort to have a strong and persuasive voice to limit regional arms build-up to appropriate conventional levels. However, with gradual, consistent and creative diplomacy in the economic field, Australia will be able not only to maintain but also develop its standing in what hopefully will become an augmented ASEAN regional grouping.

The very successful ASEAN philosophy which has almost institutionalised the value of the collective and united voice for economic leverage should continue to have a stabilising and balancing influence. There is every justification to hope that such stability will have the parallel effect of regulating military stability too.

By implementing the multi-dimensional approach of 'comprehensive engagement' to its full advantage, Australia has the potential to occupy an important place in the strategies of South East Asia. However, it will not be easy, and a cautious, gradual approach with the stress on equality will need to be pursued. Again, Tony Kevin puts it succinctly:

'It is important to note that multipolarity does not necessarily mean an end to alliances of interests and values; but it does mean that those alliances will be more equal, and therefore more difficult to manage successfully, than when led by hegemonic powers. Multipolarity does not necessarily mean a ruthless struggle of all against all, but it may well make the achievement of a peaceful world more rather than less difficult.'⁴⁷

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¹ Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. *Australia's Regional Security.* Ministerial Statement by Senator the Honourable Gareth Evans, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1989, paragraphs 175, 176.

² *ibid.*, paragraphs 174, 176.

³ *ibid.*, paragraphs 57-153.

⁴ Babbage Ross, *A Coast Too Long: Defending Australia Beyond the 1990s* Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1990, p. 2.

⁵ *ibid.*, p. 5.

⁶ Nathan, K.S. 'Australia and South-East Asia: From Cooperation to Constructive Engagement'. *The Round Table*, 1991, p. 337.

⁷ The message for Australia and America's other Asia-Pacific allies lay in the central thesis of the Nixon Doctrine: 'The

United States will participate in the defence of its allies and friends, but ... America cannot - and will not - conceive all the plans, design all the programs, execute all the decisions and undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world. We will help where it makes a difference and is considered in our interest.' (*US Foreign Policy For the 1970s: A Strategy For Peace* [A Report to The Congress, by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, 18 February 1970, p. 6.] - *ibid.*, p. 337.)

⁸ Bilveer, Dr S. 'Southeast Asia and the "New" World Order'. *Asian Defence Journal*, August, 1991, p. 37.

⁹ Beazley Hon K.C. *The Defence of Australia, 1987*. AGPS, Canberra, 1987. 'Self-reliance' was foreshadowed in the 1976 White Paper, but given definition as a concept in DOA 87. It is a goal:

a. set within the framework of Australia's alliances and regional associations,

b. based on a realistic assessment of Australia's strengths, weaknesses and deficiencies, and

c. draws on the skilful mobilisation of Australia's resources - physical, financial and human.

Defence self-reliance aims:

a. to give Australia the level of military capability to prevent an aggressor from gaining territory or concessions through the use or threat of military force, and

b. to meet any credible level of threat in Australia's area of direct military interest with a comprehensive array of military capabilities, both defensive and offensive (defence in depth).

Thus, self-reliance achieves the four fundamental objectives of Australia's national and international defence policy:

a. It maintains and develops Australia's capacity for the independent defence of its land and interests.

b. It promotes strategic stability and security in Australia's region.

c. It strengthens Australia's ability to meet mutual obligations shared with the United States and New Zealand.

d. It enhances Australia's ability, as a member of the western association of nations, to contribute to strategic stability at the global level.

(The Preface - DOA 87)

¹⁰ Evans, Ministerial Statement, *op cit.*, paragraphs 1-184.

¹¹ Beazley, *op cit.*, 1.24.

¹² Nathan, *op cit.*, p. 340.

¹³ Lague, David. 'Old Defence Pact Gains New Relevance - Malaysia Perspective'. *Financial Review*, 3 May, 1991.

¹⁴ F.A. Mediansky in Nathan, *op cit.*, p. 341.

¹⁵ *The Realignment of World Order: Insuring Indonesia's Security Future.* Address by H.E. Mr Sabam P. Siagian, Ambassador for the Republic of Indonesia at the Royal United Services Institute of Australia 1991 National Seminar, 27-28 September, 1991.

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- 32 ibid, pp 25-72.
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- 36 ibid, p 342.
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- 40 ibid, p 118.
- 41 Evans, Ministerial Statement, paragraph 174.
- 42 Solomon, op cit, p 248.
- 43 ibid, p248.
- 44 Hawke, op cit, p 200.
- 45 Woolcott, op cit, p 307.
- 46 Kevin, op cit, p 31.
- 47 ibid, p 15.



The Royal Netherlands Navy T-class submarine TIJGERHAAI (ex-HMS TARN) under refit on the Public Works Slipway in the Port of Fremantle in Western Australia in July 1946.
(Photo by courtesy of Vic Jeffery)



USS YORKTOWN, a pre-WWII photo. USS YORKTOWN was the flagship of Task Force 17 and was sunk at Midway.



USS LEXINGTON pre-WWII. Sunk at the Battle of the Coral Sea.

JOHN CURTIN AND A MARITIME STRATEGY CIRCA 1941

by CMDR R. J. SHERWOOD RAN

"...there was no greater figure in Australian public life in my lifetime than Curtin. I admired him both as a man and as a statesman.....As Prime Minister he worked unceasingly for Australia and suffered much personally over the wartime decisions he was obliged to make..."

INTRODUCTION

Did the above accolade penned by Sir Arthur Fadden go far enough in describing John Curtin? Was John Curtin not only a much respected political leader, who guided his country through perhaps its most threatened years, but perhaps also a shrewd strategist, who at a time of a changing international strategic power base, ensured Australia's sovereignty and voice on the world stage? As one historian, E.M. Andrews, has suggested; Australian's have tended to look for a strong and powerful protector to oversee their security interests in the broader international strategic arena. This because of a combination of; the vastness of the island continent it comprises, it's seemingly remoteness from the main strategic centres of the world and it's desire to allocate a primacy of resources towards economic development and social welfare.

Prior to the Japanese entry into World War II, the reliance was primarily on the United Kingdom and post 1941 on the United States. Although these have been fairly broad trends, they cannot be seen as being an immutable base on which the nation's foreign and defence policies have been formulated. Alfred Deakin as early as 1907 mooted the idea of greater American involvement in the Pacific, no doubt as a means of ensuring a broader protective umbrella to Australia's interests. From time to time between the wars, it was again raised, as various political and military figures expressed doubts over the strength of the United Kingdom's conviction to fully protect

Australia's interests or if not conviction then at least that nation's ability to do so. Since 1941, questions have also been raised about the strength of the relationship with the United States of America. As Andrews so rightly points out, the policy of relying on alliances with great powers leads to serious external weaknesses, especially if that great power's interests are not fully strategically aligned with those of Australia. History now suggests that this existed in 1941, whereby Great Britain's strategic priorities were at odds with Australia's and placed Australia in a position of having to go it alone in the world strategic arena. This coupled with events that were beyond the nation's control, raised the real possibility of Australia's sovereignty being imperiled.

In more recent times another historian has suggested that this danger didn't exist because the United Kingdom and the United States virtually negotiated between themselves Australia's transfer to an American security sphere. This however may be an oversimplification of what was an important milestone in Australia's history, and especially that of her foreign and defence policies. Perhaps for the first time Australia was able to play a more mature role, in making sure her interests were noted by her great and powerful friends. The question is; how important was the part played by Australia's politicians, diplomats and defence representatives, and more importantly the role of John Curtin as the guiding strategist.

AUSTRALIA'S WAR STRATEGY

At the outbreak of war in 1939, Australia's traditional ties with Great Britain through her cultural, social, political, economic and more importantly defence links were still extremely strong. It is only understandable then, that Australia's considerable commitment (although criticised as insufficient in some quarters) was aimed towards supporting the defence of the Empire as it did in 1914. Nevertheless, the government of the day did recognise that the strategic problems facing Australia were quite different from those of 1914 because of doubts over Japan's intentions.

As the fighting in Europe and the Middle East increased in tempo so did Australia's commitment in support of Great Britain. This was a commitment generally decided on by the Advisory War Council (AWC) of which by October 1940, Curtin was a member, and with the general support of all political parties. Commitment to Europe - or specifically in this instance to the Middle East - was Australia's historic commitment, stemming from its membership of the Commonwealth and its close ties with the United Kingdom. As time passed and war in the Pacific became an imminent possibility, Australian's found themselves so heavily committed in the Middle East that very little of their armed strength-in-being was available for use in the Pacific, or for defence of the home country. This had been a natural policy to follow and was in part due to a belief in the ability of the British Fleet, based on Singapore, to halt any Japanese expansionism the island chain to the north.

This perception, was towards the end of 1940 beginning to change. Australia was represented at a Far Eastern Defence Conference held in Singapore from 22-31 October 1940 and although the general outcome was one supporting earlier British appreciations; that Singapore was the key to the British Commonwealth's defensive position in the event of war with Japan, it had highlighted to Menzies and through him the AWC "the alarming position in regard to the defence of Singapore", and of a need for closer

consultation with British authorities. This was to take Menzies out of the country in early 1941 and leave Arthur Fadden as the Acting Prime Minister.

JOHN CURTIN AND A MARITIME STRATEGY

Remarkably, in what appears to be have been a policy independent of this assessment, John Curtin was embracing a new strategy based on the need for greater Australian naval strength, not only to the north but also in Australian waters. Thus at the AWC meeting of 5 February 1941, Curtin expressed the view:

"that the danger to Australia would come in the first place from the sea and, secondly from the air, while the army would only be brought into full action if both the navy and the air force failed".

Hasluck has dismissed this as Curtin's private brooding over the war rather than the receipt of new information. Perhaps it may have been a greater willingness on Curtin's part to note the advice of senior Australian military officers, rather than be mesmerised by that coming from London, that gave him a keener appreciation of the true situation. It is of significance that although Lieutenant General Sturdee was the only Australian among the Chiefs of Staff, all three deputy/assistants were Australian officers, and who had been the Australian delegates at the October Singapore Conference.

More importantly Curtin was able to win the support of Fadden, and on 12 February 1941 a cable was despatched to the Dominions Office requesting a clarification of the naval defence situation in the Indian and Pacific Oceans and recommending the return of all Australian and New Zealand "naval" forces now serving overseas. These concerns expressed by Curtin and accepted by the AWC were further exasperated by concern over where America stood in relation to a southward thrust by Japan as reinforced by a cable from the Dominions Office of 7 February 1941, and read to the AWC by Fadden on 12 February. As Fadden has subsequently pointed out in writing about the

Council's deliberations:

"We were most concerned and very disturbed about what we could expect America to do in the event of a southward thrust by an increasingly aggressive and pro-axis Japan. America had not committed itself to a firm course of action and showed extreme reluctance to do so."

Additionally, at the 12 February meeting, Curtin stated that he thought that if the war was going against the Allies, the United States might concentrate in the first instance on strengthening Great Britain in the Atlantic and leave until later "to get back the outposts of the Empire." Once again Hasluck expresses doubt about Curtin's knowledge of conversations along those lines, being pursued in Washington at the time, between President Roosevelt and the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax. Contemporary documentation shows that this possibility was raised by the Australian representative (Commander Henry Burrell) in Washington, in a cable to the Chief of Naval Staff on 7 February and shown to Fadden on 13 February 1941. Fadden further postulates that the message referred to earlier from the Dominions Office:

"...advised that President Roosevelt felt serious doubt as to whether the United States would enter the war if Japan attacked only British or Dutch possessions and that the President had also indicated that even if America were involved in a war with Japan, he felt that to fight an active war in the Pacific would be a dangerous diversion of forces from the main theatre of operations - Europe and the Atlantic."

This again raises the question of whether the AWC and or Curtin had access to information either not kept as a public record or not yet found. Of further significance is that in his statement to the AWC on 12 February, Curtin also raised concerns over the possible transfer of American Naval Forces from the Pacific to the Atlantic. This is noteworthy in that it was an American proposal not formally made known to Australia until 3 May by the Dominion's Office, although

the new Australian Naval Attache to Washington (Commander D.H. Harries) had cabled an outline of such a proposal to the Chief of Naval Staff on 1 May. It was a proposal that had been in the planning stage within the United States for some time.

AMERICAN STRATEGIC PLANNING

Whilst during the period from 1921 to 1939 American national policy had been profoundly influenced by an ideology that the United States should not enter into military alliances or maintain an offensive capability, the exchange of ideas between military staff of the US and the UK had commenced in the early 1930's. In fact US and British Staff had been discussing in quite definitive terms the possibility of war with Germany, Italy and Japan and the US Navy's role in such an eventuality since 1934. The outcome of these discussions was a staff presentation to the Joint Board (the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations), of the Rainbow series of Plans on 30 June 1939, which were based on the assumption of the United States not supporting a war in Europe but carrying out allied democratic power tasks in the Pacific.

It would appear that this strategic plan did not have the full support of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Leahy, who was reluctant to commit the US Pacific Fleet west of Pearl Harbour. As 1940 progressed, US military planners certainly became concerned with what they saw as two underlying assumptions in British strategy; that Great Britain was a country relying on rapidly increasing material aid from the US and that British naval planners were hoping to rely on a token commitment of American Naval forces to the South West Pacific. In September 1940 the First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, remarked:

"that it was very much in the British interest, that the United States Fleet should stay in the Pacific".

At about the same time use of the Singapore base was offered to the US Navy.

However, the US had other interests, or at least saw the strategic situation slightly differently. In October 1940 the new CNO, Admiral Harold R. Stark, working on the premise that the defeat of Great Britain and consequent disruption to the British Empire would greatly weaken the military position of the United States not only directly, by exposing the Western Hemisphere to attack, but also indirectly, by its constricting effect on the American economy, proposed a new strategic plan. Known as "Plan Dog" it in essence called for a limited war with Japan (in the eventuality of one occurring) and was essentially the precursor to the Atlantic first strategy. All this occurring at a time, when those already at war, were attempting to get the US involved in military talks not only in Singapore but also in either London or Washington. Casey, as Australia's representative in Washington, was aware of this and arranged for a naval officer, Commander Burrell to be sent to Washington. Unfortunately domestic political considerations in Washington had prevented or at least put on hold talks in that city and US Naval Officers attended the Singapore conference as observers only.

A NAVAL ATTACHE IN WASHINGTON

The arrival of Commander Burrell at least gave Australia first hand contact with US Naval authorities, most notably the Director of Plans USN, who gave him some hint as to US Naval plans to reinforce forces in the Far East in the event of hostilities. Barclay argues that neither Burrell nor Casey were shown "Plan Dog" and were thus unaware of the proposed Atlantic first strategy. It is of note that the official US war historian, notes that this plan had not

been endorsed by Roosevelt at this stage, the President having only authorised the conduct of bilateral military discussions with the United Kingdom which were to take place in January 1941. Vice-Admiral Burrell in his autobiography highlights that he also had discussions with the head of naval intelligence and accompanied Casey for talks with the Secretary of the Navy (Knox) and the Chief of Naval Operations.

As both the official cable from Casey highlights and Vice Admiral Burrell alludes to, his final day of this visit to Washington was spent at the United States Navy Department being briefed on American strategic proposals in the Pacific area. In December, Burrell, on the recommendation of Casey, was appointed as the Naval Attache in Washington to whence he returned, to take up this post, in January 1941. One of his first tasks was at the end of January, along with the Canadian Naval Attache, to be present at discussions held between senior United States and United Kingdom military staff. Burrell reported by cable to Australia and New Zealand in nine progress reports the general thrust of these discussions. As he points out, his first cable of 7 February noted that some portion of the United States Pacific Fleet, based on Pearl Harbour would be transferred for operations in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas. The latter part strongly suggesting that there would be agreement over the "beat Hitler first" strategy.

This period highlights that Australia was not completely left in the dark as to the higher strategic planning being undertaken by her great and powerful friends. In all probability due to the foresight of Casey. Most importantly, the consequences on America resulting from her participation in these conferences, noting that she wasn't at war, were both practical and moral :

"To give effect to the jointly approved strategic conception, warships were moved over the seven seas, planes were shifted between combat points. Scare fighting units and weapons of other countries were distributed in accordance with its term. Had the American government refused to play its part in their execution, loss and trouble would have followed. The British and the Dutch would have felt themselves wronged. The problem is not peculiar to this instance. If a nation (or individual) enters deeply, as adviser or sharer, into the troubles or dangers of others, it must accept the duties of partner or the name of shirker. Public

figures in their public statements and memoirs do not usually enter into subtleties such as this. But the President and Secretary of State were perceptive men and I think it safe to conclude that they appreciated this point."

By early 1941, Australia if still dealing through her traditional links with London, at least now had both diplomatic and military representation in Washington. Both Burrell and Harries dealt through diplomatic communications channels and there is enough evidence to suggest that at least the acting Prime Minister Fadden was seeing some of the information being passed back on future allied strategic directions and appropriate military staff appreciations. As could be expected it was mostly highly classified, undoubtedly limited in distribution and probably much of it destroyed after dissemination. P.G. Edwards has aptly highlighted the problems faced by historians attempting to collect the records of the period, and authors who have looked at the period, in time since, can be excused for having made some assumptions based on either incomplete records or through inadequate access to records.

INTERNAL INFLUENCES

If political considerations were a feature of how public statements and professed policy were not perhaps a true reflection of reality in America, then in all probability the same was applicable in the Australian context. Menzies on his return from the United Kingdom in May 1941 found himself increasingly under attack from both the opposition and within the government parties for the way he had handled Australia's war involvement to that date. Curtin himself was under pressure from within his own party, with views ranging from those of Eddie Ward, who desired stronger action against the government, to those of Evatt, who was advocating acceptance of a Menzies proposal for a national government. Curtin's political shrewdness is shown in these circumstances by advocating a long term view that Labour would govern, and there would be no need to misjudge the dynamics of history by debate. Perhaps also from the knowledge he had gained as a member of the AWC, and perhaps

elsewhere, (reflected in his statements of 12 February and 8 May) he was taking a long term strategic view of Australia's circumstances. It may well have been something more than Hasluck postulates; that Curtin, in the face of an actual threat, was coming round to accept the proposition which he and his party had been denying for twenty years "British sea strength was still of vital importance...and similarly sea strength was the only force on which Japan could rely if she entered the war. From this aspect we should be in a position to counter at sea any action which Japan might take."

This was not just a greater understanding of the dynamics of global strategy, and the deterrent value of sea power, but a realisation that the only real avenue left for Australia was a hope that the United States Pacific Fleet, elements of which visited Australia in early 1941 would assume the role of the Royal Navy in protecting Australia's approaches. Sworn to secrecy as to the proceedings of the AWC, Curtin would have been forced to play his cards close to his chest.

If one assumes that the government shared the same knowledge as Curtin, then the key difference is in the way they continued to pursue the country's diplomacy and defence policy. Notwithstanding the separate entity of Australia's diplomatic and military representatives in Washington, they continued to essentially deal through London, seeking British government and military staff appreciations. In dealing with the problem of Japan, Australia did not seek to bring it's influence to bear directly, but in concert with British diplomats in Washington. The British for their part, after Churchill came to power, left the diplomacy largely in the hands of the United States, so that Australia suffered the disadvantage of acting with a party taking a more passive role. This in an area which was of vital strategic interest to Australia. Additionally, throughout 1941 the government continued to commit forces to the Middle East and Europe, despite their concerns over what appeared to be a non-committal approach from United States leaders to the defence of Australia's northern approaches and the lack of adequate British Naval and Air Forces to defend Singapore.

The dynamics of the domestic political situation was undoubtedly a constraint felt by some in power as to what could become public consumption. The Australian population through their government had from 1939 focused their attention on events occurring half way round the world. Their relatives and or neighbours were fighting alongside their forebears in the Middle East and Europe. As one commentator has put it, the foreign policy was Menzies', and what the foreign policy of Australia addressed itself to was the image of the world in the mind of its maker. He had committed Australians to their British heritage and to faith in the Royal Navy to defend their interests. For reasons of his own, but perhaps driven by the economics of the time, he had failed to sufficiently alert them to the dangers faced in their 'own backyard' and from the outset had promoted a "business as usual" attitude to the war. He was unwilling to impose a heavy demand on the Australian population and saw the problem as one of time and patience, to educate the Australian public to the demands of war.

In this atmosphere it is not surprising that both Curtin and Fadden were hounded from all sides when they made elements of their War Council deliberations open for public consumption early in February 1941. Curtin and Fadden were both no doubt perturbed by briefings given by the Chiefs of Staff and the developing industrial troubles in defence related industries. Although the statement released did no more than highlight correctly the gravity of the situation facing Australia and call for greater efforts in preparedness, it was perhaps the shock needed to head off any apathy among the population in general with respect to possible situations facing the nation. Curtin was the author and instigator of the statement and once again, may have here taken the opportunity, to ease some of the burden he would have to deal with as Prime Minister and foresaw as facing

Australia in the not to distance future. Menzies, on the other hand, continued an adherence to the British view, one that the threat of Japan could be neutralised by victory over the axis powers in Europe. A view, in light of Australia's interests,

far too narrow in strategic outlook and one that led him not to make the demands he should have made and did not help to foster his countrymen's confidence. As Hasluck has put it:

"Perhaps the one quality that was lacking was demand - a hard strong, unrelenting demand for sacrifice - a demand that was itself the voice of mutual confidence — a confidence of a leader in his people and an expectation of their confidence in him."

It was to ultimately lead to his downfall and within a short period thereafter the ascension of John Curtin to the position of Prime Minister of Australia.

JOHN CURTIN AS WARTIME LEADER

The assumption of this mantle of leadership in early October 1941 was in all probability made easier for Curtin by his prior membership of the AWC and his awareness of the dangers lying ahead. Yet he did not radically overturn the policies of the previous government, not only implementing the best of Menzies policies but enforcing them quickly, ruthlessly and continuously. Domestically, they were policies implemented by Menzies in July 1941 to increase Australia's war effort and required by now little if any fine tuning.

In the area of strategic policy Curtin continued to support the policy of reinforcing the Middle East and as late as November 1941, considered the movement of the 8th Division and the newly formed 1st Armoured Division to there as well. Perhaps the continued support of these policies may have been the result of more favourable strategic advice been received from both London and Washington. In early September, the Dominions Office had cabled Fadden that the situation with regard to Japan was not only more favourable but as less tense. A view interestingly not shared by Australia's High Commissioner to London, S.M. Bruce, who regarded these views as somewhat over optimistic. It was however supported in a cable from Casey reporting discussions with the Director of Naval Plans, United States Navy, who suggested that Japan

was unlikely to be able to take aggressive action for 3 months and in all likelihood would focus her attention on Russia. This of course did not mean that he gave in to Churchill over the relief of the Australian garrison at Tobruk, which had been ongoing since July nor the provision of capital ships to the defence of Singapore. On both instances he received Churchill's assurances on the 27 October.

AN INDEPENDENT STANCE.

What Curtin did attempt to do was to take a more independent stance for Australia, with the view to greater cooperation with nations outside the Anglo-Australian-American link. Not only diplomatic representation to China set in place by his predecessors, but also an unsuccessful attempt in November to set up a series of quasi alliances involving the Netherlands, British Commonwealth, America, China and Russia as a means of deterring further Japanese aggression. His views on what he saw as Australia's right to have a say in all decisions affecting her own interests were reflected in a speech made to members of his party, in Melbourne, shortly after assuming the role of Australia's leader:

"the real issue at stake in this war. What this country does; must be done by its own consent. We shall not suffer from dictation from without. And to resist it we must have greater strength within. Only by standing together with those who are with us and for us can victory be won."

Through both Casey in Washington and Bruce in London, Curtin attempted to ensure that Australia played a role in strategic developments and that she had her say in the strategy being planned for deterring Japanese aggression. In respect to Casey it was an attempt by him in late November, with the government's approval, to try and play the role of intermediary between the Japanese and the United States. At the same time Curtin was giving the United Kingdom a chance to provide some direction, questioning Churchill with regard to what policy was being pursued. Churchill's response, that it was the United Kingdom's policy

"to march in time with the United States", led Curtin once again to propose an Australian strategy for deterring Japanese expansion. Although it involved close collaboration with the United States, it was not dependent on war between the US and Japan, before the British Empire should take action. Proposing the fullest support for China, occupation of the Kra Isthmus (strategically important for the defence of Malaya) it included a policy of providing assurances to the Russians, Dutch and Portuguese that any attack by Japan on their territories would automatically bring the British Empire to war with Japan or invoke armed assistance. From the Australian perspective it was making sure that Churchill's mind remained focused on not only the Empire's interests but most importantly Australia's.

We now know of the rapid pace at which global events were moving, a pace perhaps because of the communication technology of the period, that was not readily apparent to all players. Yet Curtin showed a good appreciation of the deterrent policies required, and more importantly he was not afraid to be heard on issues vital to the defence of Australian interests. While it can be argued that Churchill did not reply directly to Curtin's proposals, he did move towards a military understanding with the Dutch and on 5 December informed Australia of an assurance of United States armed support in the event of a Japanese southward thrust. The War Cabinet had on 4 December recognised that the primary requirement was to prevent an enemy from reaching Australia and had instigated a review as to whether the navy and the air force could be strengthened by the militia. Although they had access to some degree of intelligence, which was enough to keep Curtin in Melbourne during early December, the surprise attack on Pearl Harbour and the swiftness of the Japanese advance southward, no doubt came as shock to Australia's leaders. What it had done was to get the United States into the war, the only ally by 1941 with the necessary resources to defend Australia's maritime approaches.

AT WAR WITH JAPAN.

It provided the catalyst to bring Australians to action. Curtin's declaration of war, unlike that made by Menzies in 1939, was made independent of the United Kingdom and in a national address he made clear his government's strategy:

"We Australians have imperishable traditions. We shall maintain them. We shall vindicate them. We shall hold this country, and keep it as a citadel for the British speaking race; and as a place where civilisation will persist."

The loss of HMS *Prince of Wales* and HMS *Repulse* on 10 December was not lost on Curtin, nor the fact that the allies had temporarily lost command of the sea in the Indian and Pacific Ocean regions, or that the strategy of the United States was of vital importance to Australia. On 13 December he cabled Roosevelt with assurances that Australia, already playing her part in the defence of Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies as well as in Europe and the Middle East, warmly welcomed the opportunity of cooperating with United States forces in the provision of a naval base at Rabaul and aerodrome facilities in territories under the control of the Commonwealth and in New Caledonia.

It would appear that Curtin was showing shrewd judgement in his recognition of the importance of the north east approaches to Australia through the Coral Sea and the need to keep the minds of United States strategic planners focused on their importance. Earlier events no doubt had highlighted to him, the fact that in Washington, Australia only enjoyed at best a low visibility, and that she was now competing with the "mother country" for the resources of the "older cousin". Perhaps also known to Curtin, was that at this time American Army planners were beginning to recognise Australia's importance as a base from which to consolidate allied defences and ultimately launch the counter-offensive. On 12 December, the Pensacola convoy bound for Manilla, was re-routed to Brisbane and on 17 December, Marshall (Chief of Staff) approved

Eisenhower's plan for the establishment of a base in Australia.

THE ARCADIA CONFERENCE.

Of more importance was that Australia had learned through Casey of an indication from Roosevelt of high level staff discussions between the Americans and the British, to formulate a generally acceptable strategic plan for the conduct of war in the Pacific and Far East. This provoked immediate Australian concern over separate representation, recognising that British and Australian interests were not necessarily the same and that the Government was far from satisfied with the results of the policy of subordinating its requirements to those of others. Australia was however denied representation at what was to be known as the Arcadia talks, and which commenced in Washington on 22 December. Curtin cabled his strategic concerns to both Churchill and Roosevelt on 23 December and again highlighted Australia's commitment to global strategy and her fears about her own interests.

Certainly the Dominions Office cable of the same date, outlining future British naval strategy would have been of grave concern to Australia. It highlighted an Atlantic first strategy, with a second priority of holding the Indian Ocean. It is with these events in mind, that one must look at Curtin's so called "plea to America" published in the *Melbourne Herald* on 27 December. Notwithstanding the key lines: "without any inhibitions of any kind I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America free of any pangs as to our traditional links of kinship with the United Kingdom", it went further and clearly enunciated Australia's position, and highlighted to both "mother and cousin" that Australia in playing her part did not intend to be servile to either and expected to have a voice in strategic decision making. It is of note that the official United States War historian points out that American army planners at Arcadia were surprised at the lack of Australian representation, among others, and it may only be coincidental that following the publishing of comments on the points explored in Curtin's article that the British and American

staffs focused some of their attention onto the security of Australia and New Zealand. As since revealed by the drafter of the article it had been framed in light of efforts to secure additional US assistance and public apprehension in Australia that the UK Government believed that Australia might be lost and recovered later.

CONCLUSION

By the outbreak of war with Japan, John Curtin had only participated in the strategic decision making process for a little over twelve months. Yet during that time he had increasingly exhibited a breadth of vision, perhaps not seen and certainly not articulated by his predecessors. It is perhaps unfortunate that his early death has denied historians the chance to establish the full basis on which his strategic outlook was formulated. Perhaps it may have been just the private brooding of a brilliant man.

Despite its comparatively small size, Australia did have a body of men, both civilian and military, in a position to provide strategic appreciations to their leaders, and Curtin's access to information may have been more than official records now show us. What he most certainly did do, was to develop a more uniquely Australian view, one with a sense of independence, which while not denying the need for strong and powerful friends, made it quite clear that in playing her part Australia also expected to be heard. While history has already shown him to be a shrewd politician perhaps he should also be given more recognition as a shrewd strategist. Despite Australia's low visibility from a political point of view, the campaign waged from 1941 onwards for recognition and acceptance, led to that recognition as a leading small, or middle power, with a primary interest in Pacific affairs and a significant stake in global affairs.

It was a campaign orchestrated by John Curtin. In 1941 he had been quick to recognise the critical importance of defending Australia's maritime approaches by whatever means. A fact borne out in that the crucial operation in the Pacific War, in so far as the safety of Australia was concerned, was the Battle of the Coral Sea.

He had also recognised that Japan's strength could only lie in her sea and air power and once again history has shown us that Japan's defeat was inevitable once she lost control of the sea and the air.

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WASHING THE DIRTY LAUNDRY

by

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A study of literature marking the twentieth anniversary of the capture of USS *Pueblo* 1988-89 —an exercise that achieved little but left a heritage of frustration and ill will. Can we learn from it when writing about other divisive and sensitive issues?

Since 1945 the United States Navy has had a record of almost continual success. The capture of USS *Pueblo* is the one blight on that record and it seems that at least some opinion in the service is still trying to come to terms with the defeat.

In 1988 through to 1990, the US Naval Institute Magazines, *Proceedings* and *Naval History* commemorated the twentieth anniversary of the loss of USS *Pueblo* off the coast of North Korea on January 23, 1968. The articles unleashed a battery of rather bitter of correspondence which spread over two years.

The US had used destroyers and destroyer escorts as intelligence gathering platforms, often equipped with mobile intercept vans. The destroyers *Turner Joy* and *Maddox* in the Gulf of Tonkin were engaged in one of these patrols when attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats, thus unleashing the US bombing of that country.

However the increasing bulk of the equipment degraded the warship's capacity to operate in its designed role and besides cruising warships could under some circumstances, be construed as provocative. Consequently specialist conversions were undertaken.

The first three, *Oxford*, *Georgetown*, and *Jamestown* (AGTR 1-3) were ex Liberty ships, and were followed by two Victory conversions, *Belmont* and the famous *Liberty*. (AGTR 4 & 5) These large and expensive ships were usually taken over for strategic work and not the local intelligence missions which interested the US Navy.

Consequently the navy converted three small freighter types —AKLs— into AGER (Auxiliary General Environmental (or electronic) Research.) The second of this trio was the USS *Pueblo*.

Pueblo had been built as an army transport FP-344 and commissioned in 1944 to see service in the Pacific. Transferred finally to the USN in 1966 she was converted into an ELINT ship at Puget Sound Navy Yard and re-commissioned on 13 May 1967 and designated AGER-2.

As converted *Pueblo* displaced 850 tons standard, 935 full load and was 176'6" in length. More important was the machinery. Two 500 hp GM diesels gave a speed of about 12.5 knots. Two 100 kw generators were in the main engine room, two 60kw generators for the research machinery in an auxiliary engine room, and a further 25kw emergency generator in an auxiliary engine room. The ship carried an armament of two .50 machine guns and some .45 revolvers and M-1 rifles.¹ The crew was five officers and 38 enlisted men, and a security group detachment of one officer and 37 men. During the incident two civilians were aboard to conduct genuine oceanographic research and provide something of a cover story.²

In the Fall of 1988, twenty years after the incident, the *Journal Naval History* ran an article composed of reports from five senior officers involved in various capacities in the drama.³ Four of the five officers were critical of Commander Bucher's actions but they restricted their comments to the particular section of their involvement.

ADMIRAL HOOPER

Vice-Admiral Edwin B. Hooper helped prepare the ship at Pearl Harbor and did his best to meet all Bucher's requests. He says he supported armour for the bridge, but withdrew his support because of top weight difficulties. He said the office of the Chief of Naval Operations turned down the request for explosive scuttling devices, but the chief engineer was shown where sea valves could be readily smashed with a sledgehammer and one hammer was provided. The ship being single-compartment would sink very quickly. One thing both Hooper and Bucher knew the ship needed was a mechanism for destroying classified material, but Hooper claimed that Bucher had looked into it and not followed it up. The matter was to be dealt with in Yokosuka. At Yokosuka the two machine guns were provided for the ship and Hooper ordered some intense training with them. He also directed that some explosive devices be collected from the facility at Sasebo, but for reasons unknown to Admiral Hooper these were not collected.

ADMIRAL HYLAND

Admiral John J. Hyland was Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet at the time of the incident. As soon as he heard of the incident a destroyer was despatched to the scene but was later recalled as it could never reach there in time. He defends himself against the criticism that a defenceless ship was sent into a troubled area without even any planning for rescue should something go wrong, by comparing the situation with the Soviet trawlers off Norfolk and other places. The roles are identical. You can't accomplish this type of work in a destroyer and if a commander doesn't like the job there are plenty of others who do. The captain must know the risks and have worked out what he needs to do in each situation.

Admiral Hyland then comments on Bucher's record, by saying that he was rejected by the submarine service as unsuitable for command and that service is very efficient in choosing their men. After failing there you get a less prestigious ship, so Bucher received *Pueblo*. The most serious criticisms levelled was that Bucher allowed his

ship to be taken without resistance. One man had been mortally wounded and he gave up. He didn't go general quarters until casualties had been sustained and he made no attempt to resist the boarding. The rifles and pistols were not even handed out. Hyland argues with strength that he let the Navy and his country down.

ADMIRAL KENT

The third report came from Vice-Admiral Kent L. Lee who was commanding USS *Enterprise* at the time. The ship had just cleared Sasebo when the message came through, "I'm being attacked. Help Help!" *Pueblo*. Aboard the *Enterprise* no one knew there was such a ship as the *Pueblo* or that she was in the Sea of Japan. They didn't know "who what or where the *Pueblo* was." *Pueblo* was not part of the Seventh Fleet but reported directly to Rear Admiral Frank L. Johnson, Commander Naval Forces Japan. Intelligence forces had let the *Enterprise* down, but then she was not to be stationed in the area but was on route to Viet Nam. Then Admiral Lee points out that there was little that *Enterprise* could have done as she had just sailed from a diplomatic port visit and the planes were being worked on. Perhaps two F-4s on the catapult could have been launched as air patrol, and perhaps two more as back up, but any A-6 support would have been some time, possibly hours away. At any rate, Rear Admiral Horace Epes, the task force commander elected to wait for further clarification of the reports and by the time they came through further intervention was impossible.

ADMIRAL SMITH

The fourth paper was by Vice Admiral John V. Smith, at the time Senior Member of the Military Armistice Commission in Korea and therefore the chief negotiator for the release of the prisoners. Admiral Smith reminded the readers of the background of the situation which included a 31 man attack on the life of President Park Chung Hee which failed in January of 1968. The *Pueblo* incident followed a few days later. It was Admiral Smith's opinion that the North Koreans were attempting to provoke an attack by either South

Korea or the US at a time when US forces were heavily involved in Viet Nam. The charades at Pamunjom between the North Korean and the UN negotiators went on for years and the *Pueblo* was only a minor hiccup in the game. Admiral Smith was to protest about the act of seizure and demand the return of the ship. He denied the ship was within the 12 mile limit. The North had 83 hostages and wanted to get the best mileage they could out of them.

Commander Bucher finally admitted to having been within the 12 mile zone which was untrue, but the North had a propaganda field day. Finally Admiral Smith's successor General Gilbert Woodward, had to sign a confession which was how the US finally got the hostages back.

ADMIRAL STEELE

The final report was by Vice Admiral George P. Steele II, who was second in charge of the committee sent to receive the prisoners on their release. He assisted Rear Admiral Ed Rosenberg who was very ill at the time and shortly afterwards died. However Admiral Steele missed the critical first meeting with the survivors in Korea, but he did have access to most of the material up to that time. His last paragraph is instructive. "I didn't treat him like a returning hero; I treated him like a returning prisoner of war. I don't know why the guy didn't go on until his ship was sunk. I know that the North Korean boats were faster, and that he couldn't get away, but he should have let them sink the ship under him and destroy that gear. I was appalled when Secretary of the Navy John Chafee threw out the recommendation of a court-martial."⁴ He spoke from the heart and the way many thought in the US Navy.

THE INCIDENT

The details of the events are well known. In brief the incident occurred on January 23 1968. The *Pueblo* was confronted about noon by three P-4 torpedo boats and one SO-1 gunboat.⁵ Later they were joined by another P-4 and another SO-1. The Koreans asked for an identity and the *Pueblo* raised the US ensign. The next order was "Heave too or I will fire," which was difficult to

understand as the ship already was heaved to, to save fuel. At this point Bucher sent off a "critic" message which should have sent the message all the way through the higher commands, possibly even to the White House.

A P-4 attempted a boarding and Bucher realised that this was not a game of harassment but a genuine attempt to seize his ship, so he started his engines and was soon fleeing at 12 knots. Then after a few last minute attempts at harassment by the P-4s, one of the SO-1s drew parallel with the *Pueblo* at 3,000 yards and opened fire.

Bucher ordered the destruction of the classified information which took a long time as even waste papers baskets had to be pressed into service. Still he hoped that intervention by friendly forces might save the day and he therefore turned slowly towards the port of Wonsan. The ship was not successfully boarded until 1445 and it was 1900 by the time the ship reached port.

BUCHER REPLIES

Commander Bucher felt he could not let the comments and criticisms in the *Navy History* reports go unchallenged and replied in the winter edition.⁶ "I have never claimed to have been without fault in my command of the *Pueblo*. However I know that the incident would never have come to pass as it did had the US Navy done its job before, during and after it occurred."⁷

Possibly what made him bitter were the comments which left the wrong impression behind. Admiral Hyland's remarks how Bucher had failed to get a submarine command leaves an impression of second rateness. Bucher claims that he was appointed to command a diesel submarine. Sixty nine officers were qualified, but the Pacific fleet at that time had only 23 diesel submarines. He was number 23 on the list when the Commander Submarine Force Pacific used his prerogative to appoint one of his former staff officers who had missed out. Bucher had his appointment cancelled and he was moved to command *Pueblo*.

While *Pueblo* was fitting out and preparing for its mission Bucher consulted with the commanders

of USS *Banner*, (AGER-1) which had been operating off Soviet and Chinese ports in the Pacific. The ship was unarmed and frequently harassed by Soviet patrols. They even sent messages such as "Heave to or I will fire." There was a sort of *quid pro quo* with the Soviets about the operations and it was presumed by the Navy that the Koreans would follow suit. The presumption was incorrect.

Bucher says he asked several briefers what would happen if they were attacked. He was assured that each mission would be carefully evaluated by the Naval Security Group, and the National Security Agency right up to the State Department. If there was any doubt or unusual level of risk the operation would be cancelled or continuous protection provided. In light of the fate of the USS *Liberty* in June of 1967 it would seem that Bucher thought this support critical.

Refresher training carried out in San Diego went without hitch and Bucher was told that *Pueblo* was the first ServPac ship to pass all aspects of training at the first attempt in six months. There was no battle training as the ship was unarmed.

Bucher tried to get many things for his command. His request to have the engines overhauled was denied, -lack of funds. The request for a fuel fed incinerator to destroy documents was also denied, lack of funds. The Navy provided a cut-in-half 50 gallon-drum which was all the other ships had. He thereupon spent \$1,300 of the \$4,000 allotted to the crew comfort fund to buy a commercial incinerator. It was not as good as proper naval one, but it was superior to the 50 gallon drum.

Much of the equipment fitted to the ship did not carry a Navy classification at all. The excellent navigation radar was a foreign commercial make. The only classified equipment: "the Mark 10 IFF transponder, two confidential tuners for electronic countermeasures equipment, and the various rotors used in crypto operations." All this equipment was either smashed or thrown overboard during the attack.

The volume of classified paper worried Bucher

and he approached ComSerPac to remove over 400 classified documents. It was denied. Later he requested the Chief of staff for operations, Captain George L. Cassell what he was to do if he was to be attacked. Bucher claimed that Captain Cassell said no attack was probable and if one did occur contingency plans existed for any emergency. Cassell apparently denied the interview had taken place and the only other person present, Lt. Commander Ervin Easton was not allowed to testify in the court of inquiry.

Bucher's efforts to obtain explosives were unsuccessful. He claims there was no TNT with primers available and although thermite bombs were located, regulations prevented them being carried aboard ship. Bucher points out that Admiral Hooper's claims to have authorised the collection of explosives from Sasebo did not surface in the court of inquiry. Admiral Hooper in addition asserted that the *Pueblo* was a single compartment ship, but Bucher asserts she was a three compartment ship with no inter-compartment access below the main deck.

A few days before *Pueblo* departed from Yokosuka, OpNav ordered Admiral Johnson to place two 50 calibre machine guns on board. According to Bucher, Johnson wanted them stowed in the hold but Bucher objected that they were useless there and it was against the spirit of the orders. Johnson relented but ordered them covered with tarps so they did not look like machine guns.

BUCHER ON INTELLIGENCE

Bucher's most telling criticisms were in the area of intelligence. The operation was to proceed only if no risk was involved and he had been advised of this during his briefings. Final approval came from Admiral Johnson the night before the ship sailed from Yokosuka. The approval was given over objections from Commander Richard A. MacKinnon assigned to the Korean Intelligence section. He evaluated the mission as risky but was overruled by Johnson's office. He appealed to the Naval Security Group of CinCPacFlt to have the mission cancelled, but was overruled again, and then to the Chief of

Staff, but was overruled a third time. Following the seizure of the ship *McKinnon* was transferred to the 12th Naval District headquarters. He was denied permission to appear before the Court of inquiry and only gained access when he told Bucher what had happened. His evidence was heard behind closed doors although nothing classified involved. Bucher believes that the incident finished MacKinnon's naval career.

The second mistake was the provision of two marine Korean interpreters who pleaded before departure they didn't know the language and had not used it for years. On the critical day when Bucher wanted to know what the Koreans were saying to their bases, the interpreters could not help.

Third there was a recommendation made by the National Security Agency to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the *Pueblo* mission not proceed. The Joint Chiefs apparently did not receive the message, nor did CinCPacFlt who was supposed to receive a copy.

Finally the "Blue House Raid" on President Park Chung Hee occurred on the 21 January. The *Pueblo* was supposed to receive a daily intelligence bulletin from CinCPacFit and ComNavforJapan but no mention was ever made of the raid. Bucher believed that the failure of the raid was "the trigger that caused the North Koreans to attack the *Pueblo*".

POST ACTION REACTIONS

After the action had started Bucher had to bear in mind Rear Admiral Johnson's order not to involve the US in a conflict with North Korea. The only way resistance could have been carried out was to go action stations before the North Koreans arrived. That would have been against orders. Bucher claims you can't have it both ways. He concludes by commenting on Admiral Hyland's comment that "Bucher got a completely failing grade." What marks should the air force and carrier commanders achieve who failed to intervene when requested if not begged.

Finally the captured officers and crew of the

Pueblo behaved courageously and well during imprisonment, a fact overlooked in the initial articles. After release Rear Admiral Edwin M. Rosenberg recommended Bucher for the Medal of Honor. That report was "lost" somewhere. But the Secretary of the Navy could not have approved a court-martial as no recommendation for one ever reached him. He did overrule a letter of reprimand.

REPLIES AND CRITICISM

Bucher concludes by quoting President Johnson on 18 April 1968: "in the case of the *Pueblo*, the North Koreans had warned and threatened the *Pueblo* for a period of several weeks before they seized her." Bucher asks "why was *Pueblo* not notified in any way shape or form."

One final slight that embitters Bucher was the failure of the Department of Defence to award POW medals to his men on the grounds that they could not be considered "Prisoners of War".⁸

Commander Bucher's replies opened up a rush of replies. In addition the US Naval Institute reprinted an abridged version of Commander Bucher's article in its major journal *Proceedings*.⁹ However the first response came from retired Lieutenant F. Carl Schumacher who had been operations officer in the *Pueblo*.¹⁰ Schumacher was scathing on the first articles, accusing the writers of following the "official line" and basically accusing some of the Admirals involved of "responsibility abandoned". Schumacher outlines a number of points and raises several questions. First, why was *Pueblo* not part of the Seventh Fleet? Lack of communication between the various departments of the Navy delayed Admiral Lee from deciding to respond. Second, the issue of the .50 machine guns was never clearly resolved. Schumacher makes the interesting claim that they were still stowed below and not mounted at all. He believed there was no way they could have brought the guns to action.

Third no indication of any support came from the Navy. From 1030 a series of messages had been sent, most of the them "Flash/Critic" the highest

priority. Captain Lee chose to wait, though the Fifth Air Force in Okinawa scrambled planes but these were held up in Korea after they had refuelled. Even some encouraging message that help was on the way might have effected the result. Four, the Court of Inquiry believed the failed "blue house" raid should have been enough for Commander Naval Forces Japan to recall the ship, but not even information about the incident was passed on. Fifth the ship itself offered little protection as the superstructure was aluminium. By the time the ship was boarded, 29 crewmen had been hit including one mortally and six seriously. Finally scuttling the ship was difficult as the shallow depth of water offered no guarantee that vital equipment would not be salvaged. "In fact, most of the weighted bags we threw over the side were recovered."

Schumacher argues that the first shot fired by the North Koreans destroyed the assumption that the US could use unarmed surveillance vessels against a hostile country. The whole programme was terminated after the capture of the *Pueblo*. What continues to bring the incident into the public eye is the appalling way Bucher and his crew were treated after the incident. The official line was that Bucher was totally responsible for the failure whereas Schumacher says that while Bucher may have made mistakes, there were many "terrifically poor decisions" made throughout the command structure.

Schumacher summarises well the options facing Bucher.

1. "He could bring out the machine guns, lose some more men, and go down in glory.
2. "He could scuttle the ship, lose some more men, and go down in glory.
3. "He could do the best he could in terms of destroying equipment and documents, stall for time, and hope something good would happen."

He chose the third option, and in Schumacher's opinion as a man on the spot, it was the correct the option.

The same issue of *Naval History* published two other correspondents. Commander Calvin T.

Durgin USN (Retired) took the opposite line pointing out that Bucher was the first US Navy captain to surrender his ship without firing a shot. He picks up Bucher's point that he does not consider himself a hero and demands that in this situation a hero was just what was needed.¹¹

The third letter came from Harry Iredale, one of the civilian oceanographers on board *Pueblo*. He supports Bucher's action, which probably is not surprising. But his other comments are important. He believed the *Pueblo* trip was dangerous enough for him to leave important personal items at home. Iredale as a twenty four-year old civilian was worldly wise enough to see the mission was dangerous.¹²

PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE

The re-publication of Bucher's defence in *Proceedings* stimulated letters to that journal. In July 1989 Captain Paul R. Schratz USN (Retired) wrote possibly the most inciteful letter of the whole dispute. While admitting that *Pueblo* was a victim of failures to co-ordinate US intelligence gathering ships with the regular naval local commands, he argues that the responsibility still lies with the captain on the spot. He quotes the Nuremburg trials that said a commander cannot hide behind the chain of command.

Schratz's letter repeats many things said in other documents and enlarges on a few. He says that Bucher should have been better informed. The North Korean legation at Panmunjom had been protesting about an armed spy ship since November 1967. Tensions were rising along the boarder zone. In December a battle resulted in the death of 131 US and Korean military personnel and the wounding of 294 others. South Korean fishermen were captured at sea and a South Korean patrol boat sunk.

More protests about these surveillance ships were made to the US government on January 6 and January 11. The later being the day *Pueblo* sailed. Another protest followed on the 19th and then the "Blue House" raid on the 21st. During this time the North Koreans were engaged in

trying to provoke the *Pueblo*, but in fact they were trying to gauge a likely response. Schratz argues that although vital information was not passed on to Bucher, he had plenty of intelligence to realise things were going wrong. Bucher says he did not unwrap the machine guns as that would have been a provocative act. In the end, "failure to attempt even a show of defense became the most provocative act of all". Finally Schratz claims that there was no priority for the destruction of equipment or classified information, even though the ship was loaded with so much unnecessary classified material.

Schratz' insight was that the North Koreans only proceeded to seize the ship when they knew that Bucher would not resist. They had tested this theory over a period of time and verified each step as they went. "The CO of the *Pueblo* had convinced the enemy he would not resist and his dereliction brought disaster."¹³ The second letter in the August Proceedings was by Lt. Michael J. O'Donnell USCG commanding the CGRU vessel *New Castle*. He described the initial presentation in *Naval History* as demonstrating "a remarkable degree of finger-pointing and an operative command philosophy of 'It wasn't my fault!'" O'Donnell further comments it doesn't inspire confidence in the men whose orders he has to follow. "The oral history retrospective has introduced doubt in the integrity of the givers of orders, raised by those very officers who issued the commands." He has the feeling that the Admirals involved did not understand the difficulties of commander Bucher's position, and didn't much care. "The US reaction, with the Navy in the lead, was a total wimp-out, except to find the scapegoat sacrifices necessary to appease the gods of flag selection boards."¹⁴ Pretty tough language!

The December issue saw a letter from Chester Kimball, the army liaison officer at the debriefing of *Pueblo*'s crew after their release. He had access to detailed reports and interviews about the affair and is appalled at the continued criticism of the Bucher and his crew by uninformed naval officers. Kimball put the whole tragic affair down to the poor planning of Bucher's supervisors, "boarders

on criminal negligence."

He says that Bucher's decision to surrender under protest had to be an emotional one, and a type of decision not faced frequently in any service. Much of the criticism was emotional too. Kimball takes a rather pragmatic picture of the whole affair and says any intelligence information or equipment that may have been captured didn't change the world but the men whose lives were saved have continued to contribute to their families and their country. He is particularly bitter about the 1988 failure to award the crew of the *Pueblo*, the POW medal.¹⁵

Master Chief Crypto Technician C.D. Wallace USN (Retired) wrote in the January edition a plea from the heart to treat the crew for what they are, service men devoted to their country and their navy. He comments that the *Pueblo* was in appalling shape, could roll 10 to 15 degrees in dead calm seas and the electrical steering system failed almost daily. He further maintains that the well-trained and experienced Naval Security team sensed that this mission was ill-conceived and badly planned. Many said so before the ship sailed. "Commander Bucher did not place the *Pueblo* in harm's way; he just took the blame for a series of blunders after all others had ducked any responsibility."¹⁶

The final damaging blow in this interchange was a critical letter in the March *Proceedings* by Rear Admiral Horace H. Epes USN (Retired) himself, the commander of *Enterprise*'s carrier group. Epes had two purposes in writing. The first was to clear his name of the criticism that the *Enterprise* did not launch a carrier strike. At 1440 on January 23 Epes was handed a message from Kamiseya Japan that *Pueblo* was being harassed by North Korean patrol craft. Subsequent investigation proved it was received an hour and forty minutes after it had been sent by *Pueblo*. At 1448 a second message came from Kamiseya saying *Pueblo* was being boarded. The ship had been successfully boarded at 1432.

At 1440 *Enterprise* was 500 miles from Wonsan. It had air combat planes ready but it would take an hour and half to prepare a strike. The crews

had no briefing material for the area, no rules of engagement and no definitive mission. As the US Air Force was a lot closer Epes decided to adopt a 'wait and see' position. At 1550 he was ordered south by the commander Seventh Fleet.

Second Admiral Epes then summarizes the incident in the way he sees it.

1. *Pueblo's* crew were ill prepared to meet any hostile action, but they had been briefed not to expect any.
2. There were no contingency plans for assistance to *Pueblo* should the North Koreans become hostile. A clear warning from the National Security Agency to the Joint Reconnaissance Centre in December 1967 was ignored by the planners of the mission.
3. Units which might have helped were unaware of the ships operations or even existence. In addition *Pueblo's* communications were through a special security network which delayed reaction by any forces able to help. Epes hoped that the Navy commanders had learnt from the incident.¹⁷

Admiral Epes' letter seems to have concluded the debate in the pages of USNI Journals. In Australia, John C. Date ex-RANVR reflected on the first two presentations, that the initial planning was poor, the failure to monitor the *Pueblo* and have contingency plans ready was poor and finally Bucher should never have given up the ship. It was not a matter of finding who was right or wrong, three wrongs don't make a right.¹⁸

What can be learnt from this tragic incident? For the moment it seems even the facts are disputed. Were the machine guns mounted or below deck as Schumacher asserts? Was the *Pueblo* a one or a three compartment ship as Bucher asserts? Were 14 or 29 crewmen wounded in the action? Were explosives put aside for the ship at Sasebo or not as Bucher claims? Even in this small number of articles there are inconsistencies about basic facts.

Plenty of people seemed to have been at fault to allow the incident to happen. The planners, especially in Japan, should not have allowed the mission to continue when even 24 year old

civilians and marine-privates could see it was risky. Reports from junior intelligence officers on the spot and warnings from Washington were ignored.

Second there was no back up or contingency plan. Whose fault was this? Not the officers in the Seventh Fleet, or the Air Force in Korea. Neither knew of the ships existence. Perhaps once the emergency started the local commanders could have reacted with more initiative but time delays in passing on the distress messages limited their options to respond. It seems that secret organisations like being secretive and these bodies should have learnt from the experience of the *Liberty*.

Third there is the long standing naval tradition that captains do not give up their ship without a fight. This was the first case in US history and was it the exception?

The five Admirals who began the debate with their reflections all considered Bucher guilty and even allowed themselves a few ad hominum asides during the reports. Commander Bucher considers himself innocent of any misdeeds. Correspondents were divided. Those closely involved, Schumacher, Iredale, Wallace and Kimball, and the only serving officer to reply, O'Donnell, believe that Bucher was justified. Admiral Rosenberg recommended Bucher for the medal of honour. Durgin and Schratz for various reasons believe he was not justified in what he did, while it is difficult to say from Epes' letter whether he considers Bucher guilty of an offence or not.

What is unforgivable is that the incident still causes dispute twenty years after the event. The impression given by some of the Admirals' comments does suggest they have something to hide. This can only harm the status of commanding officers in the service. It is obvious that big mistakes were made and its time they were learnt from, not buried. It is quite unforgivable that the crew should continue to suffer a slander for the actions of their commander and the failure to award the POW medals seems to be petty vindictiveness.

After all the discussions and various points of view can Bucher be exonerated for what he did or not? The failures of the briefers, the intelligence community and possibly of the force commanders in the region are real enough but not over relevant to whether Bucher should have resisted or not. If he had resisted and most or all of his crew of 83 were killed, what then? It is facetious to say he would have been a hero and the navy might have named a destroyer after him. In the wider world picture it's a more serious matter than a naval tradition or temporary security of some intelligence equipment. In 1968 the US was very heavily committed to the war in Viet Nam. It was under pressure from the North Koreans to restart the conflict in Korea. It resisted land incidents and the "Blue House" raid, but could it have withstood the massacre of the entire crew of US warship and its sinking on the high seas? In spite of the anti-war movement of the time, political pressure might well have forced the US into the conflict the North Koreans seem to be trying to provoke. Is it not possible that for the sake of world peace and world history, it was better that Bucher acted the way he did?

In spite of all the discussion it seemed that the debate is still not settled. There is no doubt the North Koreans won the exchange. They embarrassed the United States and kept the ship. The *Pueblo* operated as a coastal transport based at Najin for some years until about 1980. Its current status is unknown. 19

- ¹ mpton, *Warship International* No 1 1991: P 83
- ² L.M. Bucher USN (Retired), "Commander Bucher Replies" *Naval History* Winter 1989 p 44.
- ³ various, "The *Pueblo* Incident" *Naval History* Fall 1988 pp53-59.
- ⁴ Idem p 59.
- ⁵ Roughly, P-4 (22 tons, 42 knots, 2 MG, 2 TT) SO 1 subchaser, (170 tons, 28 knots 4-25mm guns)
- ⁶ Commander Lloyd M. Bucher, USN (Retired), "Commander Bucher Replies", *Navy History* Winter 1989 pp 44-50.
- ⁷ Idem
- ⁸ The above section is a summary of Commander Bucher's article noted in footnote 6.
- ⁹ Commander Lloyd M. Bucher USN (Retired), "Bucher on the *Pueblo*" *Proceedings* February 1989 p38-9.
- ¹⁰ Lt. F. Carl Schumacher USN (Retired), Letter *Naval History* Spring 1989 p2.
- ¹¹ Comm. Calvin T. Durgin, Ibid p 3.
- ¹² Harry Iredale, Ibid p 6.
- ¹³ Captain Paul R. Schratz USN (Retired), Letter *Proceedings* July 1989 p 76.
- ¹⁴ Lt. Michael J. O'Donnell USCG., Letter *Proceedings* August 1989 p 33.
- ¹⁵ Chester Kinball Jr., Letter *Proceedings* December 1989 p 20.
- ¹⁶ Master Chief C.D. Wallace USN (Retired), *Proceedings* January 1990 p 92.
- ¹⁷ Rear Admiral Horace H. Epes USN (Retired), Letter *Proceedings* March 1990 p 24.
- ¹⁸ C. Date, "The Capturing of the USS *Pueblo*", *Naval Historical Review* Vol 11 No.2 p 9-11.
- ¹⁹ V. Frampton Ibid.





BOOK REVIEW

WHERE FATE CALLS. THE HMAS VOYAGER TRAGEDY Tom Frame, Hodder & Stoughton, 1992, 477 pp, \$32.95.

On the night of 10 February 1964 while carrying out night exercises, HMAS *Melbourne* collided with HMAS *Voyager*, slicing her in half. 82 men died, *Voyager* sank, and *Melbourne* was disabled. Two inconclusive Royal Commissions and considerable political debate followed. A festering wound of angst, bitterness, guilt, and cover-up remained which many today have tried to ignore. Why then should Tom Frame seek to open this wound? What could possibly be said after 28 years that would be helpful? Could not the telling of this story again, however masterfully, still bring discredit today on a Navy which had put this inglorious incident well and truly behind itself? Frame believed that an accurate, comprehensive account that was disinterested could arrive at conclusions regarding the cause of the collision and the matters surrounding it that would go a long way to dispelling much of the controversy once and for all. Furthermore, he decided to put his reputation as a naval historian on the line by making this the subject for his PhD in History. "Where Fate Calls" is the distilment of his successful doctoral thesis. He sought and was granted access to Navy Office files on the subject, was given personal papers, including those of Captains Stevens and Robertson, interviewed over 70 people, and ferretted out much new material. The book is thus well researched. There are over 1,000 entries under Notes and References.

Frame frames his subject well, painting the background milieu for the incident: the former hegemony of the Royal Navy over the Royal Australian Navy, the RAN's decline after World War II, the arrest of the decline under Gorton as Navy Minister, the "closed shop" operation of the Naval Board, and the unsympathetic attitude of a general public inured to naval disaster and cover-up.

The collision is described early in the book in a dispassionate, matter-of-fact way which serves the reader well as reference for the plethora of argument, discussion and hypothesis that follow in later chapters.

Says Frame:

"The story of the *Voyager* tragedy transcends the finer points of navigation and shiphandling. It involves the interaction of several interest groups: the Navy, the Federal Parliament, the media, and the legal and medical professions, and involves the interplay of politics, bureaucratic inertia, institutional conservatism and the emergence of spirited public advocacy."

Frame goes into all these areas in painstaking detail, establishing by whatever means the historicity of these events. He approaches each area open-mindedly and with exhaustive fairness. At times this renders the reader somewhat impatient, but at the same time it is reassuring that the author is not jumping to hasty conclusions. The specialist readers (navigators, lawyers, medical officers and so on) will find the technical discussions of points involving their areas of specialization are handled well. In addition Frame seems to be able to get behind the main people involved, sketching for us their characters: their strengths, their foibles, their pécadilloes. This aids understanding of events. Frame's judgements of people and events do appear severe and uncompromising, but each is substantiated. There is no cover-up or favoritism here. The dissection of the conduct and findings of the two Royal Commissions is exacting: one can now appreciate the pathological processes at work that led to their flawed conclusions. Frame's crisp, unembellished style makes for smooth reading.

I will not divulge Frame's conclusions. One really needs to follow the arguments through oneself. The arguments are cogent, and even though one may not agree with the odd one, they

nevertheless present a strong overall case that is difficult to ignore. A convincing construction of the events of the collision is given, along with copious diagrams in the chapter entitled "Why Did the Ships Collide?" Since most personnel on *Voyager's* bridge perished, one has to concede that the remaining information as to what really happened is somewhat exiguous. Thus Frame's scholarly reconstruction may not be correct, but it is as near as we're likely to get.

I will comment on the medical matters covered in the book. The litany of medical woes is disturbing: the cover-up and withholding of vital medical information, the intimidation of medical witnesses, the inadequacies of the post-mortem and blood alcohol tests, the improper management of a Commanding Officer unfit for sea, the ignoring of the possibility of an alcohol problem in a Commanding Officer, the ostensible under-the-counter prescription of amphetamines, and so on. These are sobering pointers for any naval medical officer on the ease of slipping from grace. Frame's research and comments in this area hold together. He goes as far in allotting blame for these medical misdemeanours as the risk of defamation litigation permits. In the end, however, he concludes that the medical matters were irrelevant to the cause of the collision. There is no evidence, according to Frame, to suggest that Captain Stevens's duodenal ulcer or any alcohol which he might have consumed contributed to the incident itself in any way. While I see his point, I cannot fully agree. Captain Stevens's medical condition was a liability to his ship and could have caused operational consequences had he been affected by severe pain or haemorrhage at a crucial time.

The important legacies of the *Voyager* tragedy are put forward in the final chapter. The Navy learned a lot about itself, its way of doing business and its relationship with the rest of Australia. These lessons did not come easily.

Frame's dissertation does much to debride the festering wound that is *Voyager*. Although many of his conclusions are harsh and uncomfortable, they do serve to put much of the controversy, doubt, and concern about continuing cover-up to

rest. This should be of comfort to the general public and the Navy community.

The only major issue which is keeping the wound oozing is the niggardly handling of the *Voyager* survivors. At the time of the incident this statement was made:

"The Naval Board believe that the majority of sailors are sufficiently stable and temperamentally robust to be mentally unaffected by their experience in HMAS *Voyager*, and therefore they may not wish to be subjected to psychological assessment."

Although a well-intentioned attempt was made to look after the survivors in accordance with the knowledge of the day, this was inadequate when one takes the longer term view. Many of these men clearly suffered from post traumatic stress disorder, a condition now recognized which is treated as soon after the traumatic event as possible. That many *Voyager* survivors are now deeply psychologically troubled and appear disenfranchised from life itself and receive indifferent treatment from callous authorities is not a matter for national pride. Let us hope that Frame's book allows the *Voyager* tragedy to be viewed in perspective so these men can be given the recognition they deserve and the help that they need.

Where Fate Calls helps us understand our Naval heritage and just how far we have come. Although the book has no official Navy endorsement, one can only but applaud the two Chiefs of Naval Staff who have allowed its publication. It is a clear signal that the RAN can look at itself and this embarrassing incident in its past without flinching or dodging and that it has finally emerged from hobblydehoyhood into well-seasoned maturity.

Frame is to be congratulated on his courageous book.

Reviewed by Surgeon Commander F.J. Parkes, RAN

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The patrol boat HMAS GERALDTON turning at speed prior to entering Cockburn Sound to return to her base, HMAS STIRLING located on Garden Island, Western Australia. Carnac Island is in the background. (Photo: Navy Public Relations (WA))

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Rank/Title:.....Surname:.....

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*I apply to join the Australian Naval Institute as a Regular/Associate member and enclose my cheque/credit card authorisation for.....as.....year(s) subscription.

*The above library/organisation wishes to subscribe to the *Journal of the Australian Naval Institute* and encloses a cheque/credit card authorisation for.....as.....years(s) subscription. If accepted for membership, I agree to abide by the Constitution and By-laws of the Institute.

(Date)..... (Signature).....

Please debit my BANKCARD/MASTERCARD/VISA (circle one)

Number..... Expiry Date.....

Members or subscribers who join during the year will receive back copies of the current volume of the *Journal*.

*Delete as appropriate

Membership fees are kept to a minimum, commensurate with the need for the Institute to remain self-supporting. As of 1 January 1991 the subscription rates are:

	<i>Annual</i>	<i>2 years</i>	<i>3 years</i>
Members			
Regular and Associate	25	48	65
Journal subscribers	27	52	75

A copy of the quarterly journal is sent free to all financial members. Fees fall due annually on 1 January



INSIGNIA ORDERS

Please forward:

.....pairs of cufflinks @ \$10.00 \$.....journal binders @ \$8.00 \$....

.....mounted crests @ \$25.00 \$.....ties @ \$7.00 \$.....

I enclose my cheque for \$ including \$ postage or:

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All cheques/money orders should be made payable to The Australian Naval Institute Inc and should be in Australian currency

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Crests . . .

Crests are meticulously hand-painted in full colour and are handsomely mounted on polished New Zealand timber. They measure 175mm x 130mm (5" x 7"). The price is \$25.00 each, plus \$2.00 postage + packing.*



Cuff-links

The cuff-links are robustly made and are attractively finished in gold and black. They are epoxy-capped to ensure long life and are packaged in presentation boxes. The price is \$10.00 a pair, plus \$1.00 postage + packing.*



Ties


Ties are dark blue with a single ANI badge in gold. Price \$7.00 plus \$1.00 postage + packing.*

Journal binders

Journal binders are coloured blue, with gold lettering and ANI crest. Each binder holds copies of the journal by means of a metal rod inserted simply through the middle page of each journal and held firmly at top and bottom of the binder. Plastic envelopes on the bottom of the spine enable volume numbers or years to be inserted. Price \$8.00 each plus \$2.00 postage + packing.*



[* Can be deleted if alternative means of carriage are arranged]



*New HMAS MELBOURNE commissions at Station Pier in Melbourne....
(Pictures - Richard Briggs (Courtesy Canberra Times))*

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ADVERTISING INFORMATION

Size of Journal	- B5 international (Print area 215mm x 145mm)
Printing process	- Offset litho
Full page size	- 50 picas deep by 33 picas wide
Half page size	- 50 picas deep by 16 picas wide
	- 25 picas deep by 33 picas wide
Material form required	- B&W: Clean artwork or negatives
	- Colour: Four colour separation negatives
Screen size:	- 133 preferred but 125 - 150 acceptable

ADVERTISING CHARGES - 1991

	Standard	Discount	Bulk
Colour	\$A	\$A	\$A
Centre double page	800	700	630
Back page	500	450	405
Internal page - single	400	350	315
Internal page - double	700	600	540
Half page	300	275	250
Black and White			
Centre double page	330	330	270
Back page	180	160	150
Internal page - single	165	150	135
Internal page - double	300	275	250
Half page	135	120	110

Notes:

1. The Discount Rate applies if a booking is for four or more successive journals with the same advertisement. The Bulk Rate is for the same if the total bill is paid with the initial order.
2. The deadlines for material are: No1 - 21 Jan; No2 - 21 Apr; No3 - 21 Jul; No4 - 21 Oct
3. Payment should be made on receipt of invoice.
4. The above prices do not include any agency commissions.
5. A copy of each Journal will be sent to the advertisers.
6. Two- Three- and Four-colour line advertisements can be inserted. Prices will be supplied on request.
7. Further information can be supplied on request to the Advertising Manager, who can be contacted by 'phone on (06) 265 3194 between 8:30am and 4pm Monday to Friday.

AIR MAIL RATES

Members and libraries overseas who would like to receive their journals by air mail should add the following sums to their subscription orders:

For those in:	New Zealand, PNG	A\$ 9.00
	Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore	A\$ 11.00
	Hong Kong, India, Japan	A\$ 13.00
	USA, Canada	A\$ 16.00
	UK, Europe, South America	A\$ 18.00
	Other countries	On request

NOTE: Surface/ordinary rates are included in the subscription.

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WEST PACIFIC OCEAN

Limit of Japanese
conquests, April, 1942 _____
Proposed extension - - - - -

Allied:
 ○ Naval Base
 ○ do being developed
 ⊞ Seaplane Station
 ⊞ Airfield
 ⊞ Anchorage

○ Pearl Harbor
 ○ Hawaiian Is.

