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AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE INC

The Australian Naval Institute was formed and incorporated in the Australian Capital Territory in 1975. The main objects of the Institute are:

- a. To encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the maritime profession,
- b. to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and the maritime profession, and
- c. to publish a journal.

The Institute is self-supporting and non-profit-making. All publications of the Institute will stress that the authors express their own views and opinions are not necessarily those of the Department of Defence, the Chief of Naval Staff or the Institute. The aim is to encourage discussion, dissemination of information, comment and opinion and the advancement of professional knowledge concerning naval and maritime matters.

The membership of the Institute is open to:

- a. Regular Members. Regular membership is open to members of the RAN or RANR and persons who having qualified for regular membership, subsequently leave the service.
- b. Associate Members. Associate membership is open to all other persons not qualified to be Regular Members, who profess an interest in the aims of the Institute.
- c. Honorary Members. Honorary membership is open to persons who have made a distinguished contribution to the Navy or the maritime profession, or by past service to the institute.

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JOURNAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE

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The Australian Naval Institute recently honoured former Prime Minister (and long-serving Minister for the Navy) Sir John Gorton. Sir John was Guest of Honour at a major function and was presented with a framed photograph of one of the DDGs he was instrumental in introducing to the RAN. See President's column, Page 2. Pictured are (from left) LCDR Peter Jones, CDRE Ian Callaway, Sir John Gorton and LEUT Tom Frame. (Photo by LEUT AJ Nelson)

In This Issue:

From the President	2	Letter to the Editor	16	Advertising	60
Guide for Authors	4	ANI Council Members	42	Membership	61
Washington Notes	7	Newsbriefs	58	ANI Insignia orders	62

ARTICLES

Maritime Power in South East Asia — The full text of the 1991 Vernon Parker Oration, by CDRE Teo Chee Hean, Chief of Navy, Republic of Singapore. *Page 9*

The New World Order and the future of Naval Power — by Ken Booth, Professor of international politics, University College of Wales, Aberystwyth. *Page 17*

Quo Vadis - The Australian Naval Institute — Micheal Head, Rector of St Leo's College, University of Queensland, takes up some previously-made points. *Page 29*

Maritime Power in the New World Order — The Young Turk's View — by LCDR James Goldrick. *Page 35*

Naval Power and Alternative Security Postures in a "Post-Cold War" Asia-Pacific Order — by William T Tow, University of Queensland. *Page 43*

From the President



The dinner on Friday 1 November to honour Sir John Gorton and the Friends of the Institute was most successful. The support of the Friends of the Institute over the past few years has been of major significance. I hope the day at sea with the Fleet on 6 November, and the other functions to which they have been invited during the year, have made their relationship with us worthwhile.

On 10 December 1958 Senator John Grey Gorton became Minister for the Navy. The Ministry was a junior one, but one that offered opportunities. The Navy in 1958 was not in good shape. Indeed it was at its lowest ebb since the great depression. Money was short, there were manpower shortages and many ships were old and worn out by war service.

The Fleet flagship was the relatively modern aircraft carrier HMAS *Melbourne*, but already there was talk of the need to replace its aircraft. The nuclear submarine was revolutionising naval warfare and in the eyes of some was threatening the future of the surface warship. Because of advances in technology the RAN was facing the need to embrace the new families of weapons systems being introduced into service in the world navies. A high priority for defence was essential if the RAN was to continue as a credible force.

The Government of the day saw defence as a low priority however, as the *Melbourne Age* reported at the time,

"Cabinet have decided the senior Service should be reduced to a collection of small escort vessels. Naval plans for the acquisition of one guided missile destroyer and a submarine force have been rejected. The Government has also ordered the abolition of the Fleet Air Arm and the retirement of the aircraft carriers *Melbourne* and *Sydney*."

The Navy in 1958 truly needed a friend in high places and one with a range of skills. It found one in its new Minister, Senator John Gorton. At first the Navy was taken by surprise by him. No Navy Minister had ever been so energetic, so enthusiastic about his portfolio. No Navy Minister had ever been so robustly gregarious in mixing with the people for whom he was responsible. The obvious enjoyment Sir John gained when with the Fleet, and the interest he took in all aspects of the Navy, was a great tonic.

But Sir John's contribution was not confined to making the Navy feel good about itself. He worked very hard in Canberra winning the battle which mattered most - in cabinet. He had an unconventional style. As Robert Hyslop described in his study of naval administration, Sir John was "cheerfully unconstrained; precedent, practice and convention did not weigh much with him."

A study of the Naval Board minutes of the time shows that Sir John was an active participant in Naval Board deliberations, often offering a politician's view of what was possible and which approach would bring the best results in cabinet. Thankfully for the Navy, Sir John's efforts did not take long to bear fruit. The life of Fleet Air Arm aircraft was extended along with that of the carrier *Melbourne*. The other carrier *Sydney* was saved from the scrapyard and placed in reserve from where she would soon be retrieved to give noble service during the Vietnam War. Most importantly, Cabinet agreed to the Navy acquiring guided missile destroyers. Here again Sir John's low regard for established practice and precedent was to be a key factor. The Navy would in the normal course of events have bought the British County Class destroyers then about to enter Royal Navy service. But Sir John was able to convince Government, and a Menzies Government at that, of the merit of the American alternative Charles F Adams class. There was considerable opposition to the idea including from within the Navy. In a letter defending his stand, Sir John summed up his attitude to his job as Minister by saying:

"My responsibility as the Minister for the Navy is to get the fighting men of Australia who join the Royal Australia Navy, the greatest amount, of the most modern equipment, in the shortest possible time and at the lowest cost, so that they will be able to do their work with the greatest safety to themselves and with the greatest benefits to the country they serve."

The DDG decision was a milestone. The ships brought with them a myriad of new procedures and ideas, new weapons and capabilities.

They are arguably the most successful ships ever to enter RAN service. They have served the Navy well from the gunline in Vietnam to the waters of the Arabian Gulf. They are more capable today than they were in 1964 when first delivered and they have many more years of effective service left in them.

Sir John Gorton took the helm at a time of great crisis for the Navy. He helped it enter the missile age. He made it look to its own long term interest for guidance and not precedent. He served in the Navy portfolio for longer than anyone else — five years — and his achievements are not widely enough recognized.

I intend to step down as President at the Annual General meeting on 20 February 1992. My term has been rewarding. By establishing the Friends coterie, the Institute has been placed on a sound financial footing; with this security it is now able to function effectively and publish a high quality Journal. The precedent set by the very successful seminar in May, at HMAS *Watson*, will be repeated as opportunities present themselves; the Vernon Parker Oration will continue on a regular basis and with the same very high standards. The most recent Oration by Commodore Teo Chea Hean, Chief of Navy, Singapore is included in this Journal.

I ask that you consider attending the ANI Annual General meeting at Legacy House, 37 Geils Court, Deakin at 1930 for 2000 on Thursday 20 February 1992. I look forward to seeing you there.

Sincerely

Ian Callaway

Guide for Authors

General

All readers, whether members or not, are invited to submit articles for publication. Articles should deal with interesting recent developments in maritime matters which have a direct or indirect bearing on naval matters.

Contributions from overseas are welcome.

Articles specially written for the ANI, and accompanied by a statement to that effect, may be eligible for prizes from time to time.

The Editor reserves the right to reject or amend articles for publication.

Articles from 2500 to 6000 words are welcomed and the Institute will pay for original articles at \$10 for each 1000 words published.

Long articles should be subdivided appropriately and accompanied by an abstract of up to 75 words describing the scope of the article.

The Journal's established style is for impersonal, semi-formal, prose. Where a published work, whether serial or book, is directly quoted, due acknowledgement should be given. Specific numbered references should be used where appropriate and a suitable bibliography appended to the article.

Illustrations, photographs, graphics etc.

While glossy black-and-white prints are preferred, colour prints with good contrast are often acceptable. Attach caption and other information to the back of the print with a small piece of tape. A width/height ratio of about 5:4 is ideal. The Editor likes to include a mix of vertically (portrait) and horizontally (landscape) oriented photographs. Tables, diagrams and graphs should, if complex, be carefully drawn in black on white paper and treated as photographs. Simple tables can be reproduced in the typesetting process, but it is the author's responsibility to ensure the clarity of the information presented.

The typescript

As much of the journal as possible is entered from computer disk or via an optical scanner. The preferred disk format is Macintosh but popular MS-DOS packages are welcome. If in doubt, submit ASCII text format. **The preferred typescript format for scanning is laser or daisy-wheel printer output**, single-spaced on A4 paper. High-quality dot-matrix (24-pin) output may be acceptable. Lesser quality (9-pin) which might need to be entered by hand, should be double-spaced. Three hard copies of the article are required whether submitted on disk or otherwise.

Copyright and clearance to publish

In submitting material to the Journal, authors are granting the ANI a non-exclusive licence to publish. It is the responsibility of authors to obtain from the appropriate source permission to publish material that may be regarded as sensitive in any way. If an author ventures a personal opinion, the context should make it impossible for any reasonable person to infer official sanction for that opinion.

The cover sheet

The author's name, address, telephone number, present position and brief biographical particulars. If an article has been previously published, a publication history should be included. Any outside assistance accorded the author in research or preparation should be acknowledged.

From the Editor

This year has proved an eventful period for the RAN and the development/confirmation of maritime strategies. This issue of the Journal contains several contributions arising out of the RAN participation in the Gulf War and in some cases are a further development of papers presented at the ANI Seminar, held earlier this year at HMAS Watson.

The Journal quality is, I believe, improving in both layout and content. This issue has a changed **Contents** page and I intend presenting to the ANI committee a proposal which if approved will enable the incorporation of a **Freepost** type of form in future Journals. Hopefully this will encourage new membership applications, and enable members to order ANI products and/or forward amendments of their posting address at no postage cost.

I wish to take this opportunity to thank John Filler for his assistance in compiling the Journal to camera ready stage prior to printing. A considerable saving in production cost has resulted.

Articles have been recieved for the February issue but more are required. Those readers who feel the urge to pen an article should forward them to the **Editor** before the end of January 1992. Guidance on the article format is contained at page 4 of this issue.

This is the last Journal over which the current **President** will preside. His encouragement and enthusiasm has been appreciated by all of the ANI committee and we wish him all the best in his future activities.

Seasons Greetings,

Don Agar

NOTICE OF ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING

Notice is hereby given that the Annual General Meeting of the ANI will be convened in Canberra on Thursday 20 February 1992 at 7:30pm for 8:00pm.

The venue is Legacy House, 37 Geils Court, DEAKIN, ACT.

Items for inclusion in the agenda should be forwarded to reach the Secretary no later than 8 February 1991.

Garden Island — A History

T. R. Frame

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WASHINGTON NOTES

from

Tom A Friedmann



Over the years you may have noticed the all but total absence of any discussion in this column of the possibility of a first-strike nuclear conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. The reason is simple — I never thought it would happen.

I have always believed that even if the Soviets, or for that matter some of the Americans, who had their fingers on the nuclear buttons were ideologues, they were also sane, rational or at least pragmatic people. A sane, rational or pragmatic person would know that no-one could win such a war. Even putting sanity, rationality and pragmatism aside, the powers that be in the two countries had too much at stake in the maintenance of the *status quo* to risk nuclear annihilation.

But I do believe that nuclear war is still possible. The most likely scenario remains what it has always been, a conflict arising out of a conventional war that escalates through the use of progressively more potent weapons of mass destruction. But another and equally dangerous scenario is a conflict initiated by a developing country with an unstable leader or government that has no qualms about unleashing weapons of mass destruction. Does the name "Iraq" ring a bell?

The failed military coup in the Soviet Union resulted in 15 independent republics, each with a call on its share of Soviet nuclear technology if not the Soviet nuclear arsenal. The instability in the country as it seeks a new political and economic equilibrium puts the safety of that arsenal, as well as the stockpile of Soviet chemical and bacteriological

weapons, in question. The unrest since President Bush's call for a cut in nuclear weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union all the more important in moving us toward a safer world.

One would have to go back to Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes' opening address to the Washington Naval Conference of 1922 to find a more important disarmament proposal from an American leader. But the difference between Hughes' proposals and those of President Bush is that Hughes offered to abandon a battleship-building program — the MIRV/ICBM program of its day — that was equal to if not greater than those underway in the United Kingdom and Japan, as well as scrapping existing warships to form the famous 5:5:3 parity with those powers.

The Bush proposal echoes the Hughes proposal in calling for the cut-back of existing armaments. The President unilaterally took steps to withdraw all ground-launched, short-range nuclear missiles and artillery to the United States where they will be destroyed; to destroy or deactivate all tactical nuclear weapons, including cruise missiles, currently deployed on naval vessels and aircraft; to order the strategic bomber and missile force to "stand down" from alert for the first time since 1957; to accelerate the deactivation of the ICBMs scheduled to be eliminated under the START Treaty; and to halt development of short-range attack missiles and ICBMs.

On the other hand, Mr Bush did not match Mr Hughes in the breadth of his proposal because he seeks to maintain what he sees as the keys

to the modernisation of our strategic force where we may have the lead, namely the B-2 Stealth bomber, the Trident II submarine-based ballistic missiles and a reduced version of the Star Wars anti-missile defence system. The Soviets, on the other hand, were asked to reduce their MIRV/ICBM stockpile, areas where the Soviets hold the edge.

But the President did get the ball rolling. Within two days Britain announced that it would dismantle all nuclear artillery rounds and remove nuclear depth charges from ships of the Royal Navy.

Not to be outdone, Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev upped the ante by increasing the number of MIRVs that the Soviets would destroy under the Bush proposal as well as unilaterally suspending nuclear weapons testing and proposing the removal of nuclear weapons from aircraft in Europe.

Lest you think the messianic age is really upon us, it appears that Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States have now given up just about everything they intend to give up without some hard negotiations. This is probably a good thing. Precipitous disarmament by only three of the world's nuclear powers could be a destabilising factor in itself.

An interesting feature of the President's speech was that he believes that his proposals will not affect the modernisation of our strategic forces. The surprise here is that Mr Bush really believes it.

In justifying its actions, the administration says that the Soviet threat has "evaporated". If the Soviets were our primary adversaries and the threat from them is gone, should we not reassess the validity of our vaunted nuclear triad?

We are now told that the B-2 can be seen by Soviet radar. The B-2 was built to be invisible to Soviet radar. Is that the very reason for its existence. If it can be seen by radar, why build it?

What is a "partial" Star Wars plan? KI have asked before and will ask again: What President could remain in office if he did not fully retaliate against any country that waged nuclear war against the United States? Only one missile needs to get through the so-called defence shields to force a president's hand.

But these arguments are for the future. For the present George Bush has been truly innovative in his approach to nuclear disarmament and deserves the praise he has received. Any person who can push the doomsday clock as far back as he has deserves the thanks of a safer world.



MARITIME POWER IN SOUTH EAST ASIA

The full text of the 1991 Vernon Parker Oration

by

Commodore Teo Chee Hean, Chief of Navy, Republic of Singapore

INTRODUCTION

First of all let me thank you for the invitation to speak to the Australian Naval Institute. It is a great honour to be invited to speak to such a gathering of persons brought together by an interest in maritime and naval affairs.

When I first received this invitation, I asked myself what an officer from a small country, with an even smaller navy, with hardly any experience, could possibly say to such a gathering of wise and experienced people.

The approach that I will take tonight is therefore a simple one. I will attempt to look at the subject - "Maritime Power in South East Asia" - from the point of view of a small country. If I may use an analogy from economics, we are a "price taker" rather than a "price fixer"; we have practically no ability to change the geo-strategic environment in which we live and must accept what comes and try to do the best we can in the given set of circumstances.

I will begin tonight therefore with a historical survey of South East Asia. I will attempt to demonstrate that the history of South East Asia is really the maritime history of South East Asia. Of course, I have picked my examples deliberately and in the most unacademic way to support this assertion and I hope you will excuse me for doing this as I lay no claim to being an academican. This survey will help us to appreciate how we got to where we are, and will enable us to pick out constants and trends that will help us in our analysis of maritime power in South East Asia today and in the future. Let us begin.

GEOGRAPHY AND EARLY HISTORY

South East Asia can be divided into continental South East Asia — the Indochinese countries Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia, and Burma and Thailand — and maritime South East Asia which includes Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Brunei and Singapore. Continental South East Asia lies between the two great Asian powers that have influenced this region - India and China. In continental South East Asia, the two powers have vied for power over the centuries as they attempted to expand their own influence and counter the influence of others. In the colonial period, the various occupying colonial powers superimposed their interests on the region. But even then the fault lines imposed by geography could still be seen. British and French rivalry resulted in Thailand being accepted as a neutral buffer state between British Burma and French Indochina in the 1800s. Attempts by India and China to gain influence in this area continue into the present day. China for example is quite pleased to assist Burma, and India has remained one of Vietnam's most constant friends.

But I touch on continental South East Asia only so that I can shift away quickly to what we are more interested in tonight — Maritime South East Asia.

Maritime South East Asia consists of more sea than land. There is the Malay peninsula, several large islands and tens of thousands of small islands. It is not surprising therefore that from early times, power in South East Asia was associated with maritime power. One of the earliest documented maritime empires was the Srivijaya Empire centred near Palembang

in central Sumatra. Srivijaya rose rapidly to power in the latter part of the seventh century and it extended over both coasts of the Malacca Straits, West Sumatra and western Borneo. It commanded the major trading routes within South East Asia as well as the Malacca and Sunda straits — the key routes between the Indian Ocean and the China seas.

But Srivijaya was not without its competitors. It had to face rivals from South Thailand and from as far away as India. Its influence and power eventually declined and by the early fourteenth century Srivijaya had been surpassed in maritime South East Asia by the Majapahit empire based in east Java and the Sukhothai kingdom. Both exerted claims on the Malay Peninsula and the area was in considerable turmoil. Also, by the eleventh century, Chinese trading ships had started to appear in greater numbers in South East Asia.

Out of this turmoil grew the great trading port of Malacca which was founded at the beginning of the fifteenth century. Malacca grew to become the major trading port in South East Asia. The Chinese under the Ming dynasty had decided that they would establish direct trading links in the region, and on the first of his seven great voyages to the Indian Ocean, Admiral Cheng Ho, the famous Chinese admiral, called at Malacca. China extended its protection to Malacca and this helped to deter other regional challenges to its power.

Islam, another major influence in South East Asia today, arrived with traders from India in the late thirteenth and fourteenth century, and its influence had spread to the extent that by the mid-fifteenth century Malacca, the pre-eminent trading port in South East Asia, was a Muslim sultanate.

At the beginning of the sixteenth century rivalries over control of the sea trade were once again to bring dramatic changes to South East Asia. In an effort to break the Arab monopoly on trade between Europe and Asia, the Portuguese decided to establish direct

trading links in Asia. The potential riches from the trade persuaded them to embark upon a series of expeditions to gain control of the trade by force. In 1511 the Portuguese attacked and captured Malacca.

But political changes in Europe in the 17th century and rivalry over who would control the Asian trade reared its head again and the Dutch became the fierce rivals of the Portuguese in South East Asia, eventually conquering Malacca in 1641. The English were not to be left out and they too attempted to set up their own trading ports to rival Malacca.

Even as the European powers sought to control the Asia trade, various South East Asian states too were struggling to gain supremacy in South East Asia. Sometimes they competed with and fought the Europeans, but at other times they sought alliances of convenience with which to strengthen themselves against their rivals. Aceh in North Sumatra, Johor in South Malaya and Bugis in Sulawesi were some of these rival maritime based powers.

The English gradually built up their position by establishing themselves in Benkulen in West Sumatra, Borneo and Penang; and in 1819 they established a trading post in Singapore. Dutch and English rivalries intensified, and in 1824, in the Treaty of London, the English and the Dutch established their spheres of influence using the Malacca Straits as the demarcating line; they exchanged Benkulen and Malacca. The results of this treaty of 1824 are still evident today and manifest themselves in today's Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei. Dutch dominance in South East Asia was to continue until the mid twentieth century.

Elsewhere in maritime South East Asia, the Spaniards had gained control of the Philippines from the late 16th century, passing control to the Americans in the late 19th century after the Spanish American War.

During the First World War Japan was an ally

of the British. But it soon became clear that Japanese and British interests were diverging, and naval strategists in Tokyo and in London began to look at what might need to be done in the event of war.

Once again South East Asia was to be drawn into centre stage. The British constructed a great naval base in Singapore to support a main fleet that would sail east to defend British interests against Japan. Likewise the Japanese calculated that in order to succeed, they would have to destroy the American fleet in Pearl Harbor as well as wrest control of Singapore from the British. In both of these the Japanese succeeded. But as Admiral Yamamoto himself foresaw, the Japanese soon overextended themselves, and the industrial might of America carried the war to Japan and defeated them.

Following the end of the second world war, the exhausted British, Dutch and French had little choice but to allow their colonies in South East Asia to become independent. The British withdrew their forces from "East of Suez" in 1971 and left the Five Power Defence Arrangements with Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, and UK to provide a consultative framework for security in Malaysia and Singapore.

The United States was left as the strongest military power in South East Asia, and turned her attention to keeping the dominoes in South East Asia from falling to communism. The war in Vietnam did buy the other fledgling countries in South East Asia a few precious years to get on their own feet. South East Asia is now enjoying one of the fastest economic growth rates in the world.

Let us pause here for a moment to see what lessons geography and history have to offer us about the place of maritime power in South East Asia.

LESSONS FROM GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY

From our quick survey, I would just like to

make three points. Firstly, within South East Asia, the exercise of power and influence depends on being able to make use of the seas within South East Asia. This is clearly illustrated by the long succession of competing powers who have sought to impose their will on maritime South East Asia. Each state that flourished succeeded in controlling the sea and the trade that flowed across it. As its power waned, control of the sea and of trade passed on. In the modern context, maritime power is necessary to protect the territorial integrity and other maritime interests of the South East Asian states. Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia clearly have a need to do so in order to retain cohesion among the different parts of their countries widely separated by sea. All the ASEAN states depend on the sea to carry the trade — internal and external — that powers their economies.

Secondly, South East Asia lies between the two major Asian powers, India and China. While the land route between India and China is shorter, there are many natural obstacles. The seas provide a more convenient route. Over many centuries, these two countries have left their mark on the culture, religion, language, population and politics of the region. In relatively recent times, China had been the main supporter of communist revolutionary movements throughout South East Asia. In 1979 China attacked Vietnam to "teach it a lesson" for invading Cambodia, and China has considerable influence over the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. India and China have recently been preoccupied with their own internal problems, but the sheer size of these two countries relative to South East Asia means that they must always remain a factor to be considered. As I mentioned earlier, the Chinese take pains to cultivate Indian ocean states such as Burma, and the Indians likewise cultivate South China Sea states such as Vietnam. And one can think of a variety of scenarios where the seas in South East Asia will become vital to both countries if their rivalry were to be heightened. Even if the two powers were to cooperate the main

thoroughfare would pass through South East Asia.

The third point about geography is that South East Asia is of interest to countries well beyond the region. It is rich in natural resources and its sea routes are vital for maritime traffic. The Europeans first came to South East Asia not only to secure the spices and other trade here, but also to secure trade routes to China. Today, the commodities and the countries may be different but the region is still a major source of strategic materials such as rubber, tin and oil. Japan, Europe and America depend on the routes in South East Asia for the movement of fuel, raw materials and finished products. This is true also for Australia and New Zealand especially since trade with the rapidly growing economies of Japan, Korea, China and South East Asia must all transit South East Asian waters.

What we can conclude from geography is that regardless of what South East Asian nations themselves may wish, Asian and other maritime powers do have important interests in South East Asia; and they will continue to want to assert themselves in order to ensure that their interests are not jeopardised. We cannot wish them away even though their presence here may not always totally conform with the desires of regional states to preserve their territorial integrity and security within their waters.

CONTEMPORARY FACTORS

While a study of the major historical trends and geography provide some useful insights on maritime power in South-East Asia, there are also more recent occurrences which impact on the subject. I will deal specifically with two major ones: the changing world geo-strategic situation and UNCLOS (the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea).

THE CHANGING WORLD GEO-STRATEGIC SITUATION

The last twenty to thirty years has been a period of relative stability and growth for the

countries of maritime South East Asia. While war raged in Vietnam and Cambodia, the countries of maritime South East Asia were largely insulated from its bad effects.

When viewed against the global setting, these were only part of the post World War II struggle between Communism and the Free World from which South East Asia was not exempt.

One consequence of this struggle was that regional conflicts got subsumed into the bigger game. Neither superpower was prepared to allow too great a change in the power alignments in any region, and neither superpower was willing to allow a regional conflict to escalate uncontrollably into a direct confrontation between them. This meant that regional conflicts were allowed to simmer and sometimes reached boiling point, but no major upheavals would take place.

But now the struggle is over. The world order frozen in place for 40 years has started to unravel. In maritime South-East Asia, what this means is that a question mark now hangs over the US presence which has provided the security umbrella under which the South East Asian states have prospered.

The United States finds it increasingly difficult to find the resources to maintain its force presence in South East Asia at current levels.

The medium powers also will not feel as constrained as before by the need to remain allied to one or the other of the superpowers, and can now pursue their own national interests.

While the superpowers have been locked in their struggle, things have not remained unchanged. Japan has emerged as an economic giant. In the era of the superpower nuclear rivalry she was quite content to remain a military midget as her history compelled her to eschew nuclear weapons. But now that the nuclear stand-off is over, her considerable conventional forces and sizable build-up plan,

mean that Japan is in a position to adjust her military profile to one more in keeping with her status as an economic superpower.

How can we in South-East Asia, especially the small countries, respond to this new situation? Singapore, for example, became independent only in 1965, and has lived her entire 26 years of independence within the structure of this cold-war US security umbrella. We have no direct experience of any other regime.

There are a few principles that will guide us. Firstly, as any traveller who sets out onto a journey into the unknown will tell you, prepare yourself well. This is the reason that Singapore has, since independence, been steadily investing in building up our own defence capability. The Singapore Armed Forces today is a source of strength and provides Singaporeans added confidence to face the future. Other ASEAN neighbours, particularly Indonesia share the same view - that the ASEAN countries should build-up their national resilience. With national resilience in each country, there will be no weak links in the region to exploit, and by working together, there will be regional resilience and the region will be better prepared to face the unknown.

Secondly, travel with friends - people that you know well, with whom you share common interests, and who have shown themselves to be reliable friends in the past. This is the reason why the Five Power Defence Arrangements are so important to us. FPDA provides us not only with the psychological confidence that we have friends, but also provides opportunities for us to constantly train with each other so that we can work together if we ever need to. This is the reason also, that Singapore supports a continued US presence in South East Asia. We have offered the US the use of facilities in Singapore for US fighter aircraft and naval ships. A continued US presence will provide stability in South East Asia in a period of dramatic global changes.

Thirdly, seek out on your travels new friends.

We need to seek out and constructively engage other powers that are benign and whose interests are coincident. We need to explain ourselves and try to understand them. We need, for example, to constructively engage Japan so that her foreign and security policies will evolve in a way which are mutually beneficial.

Let us shift now to another recent development that has had a significant impact on maritime power in South East Asia.

UNCLOS

UNCLOS has also dramatically changed the map of South East Asia. Or it might be more accurate to say that the technology of modern methods of exploiting the resources of the sea - living and non-living - have dramatically changed the way that states look upon the seas. UNCLOS attempts to balance two sets of competing demands. The first set relates to rights of passage for international shipping versus rights of coastal states to protect their territorial integrity and security. We have alluded to the tension between these two demands in the earlier discussion on geography. I believe that the UNCLOS has come to a reasonable compromise when we apply its provisions to South East Asia. While archipelagic states like Indonesia and the Philippines have safeguards for their territorial integrity and security in the archipelagic waters provisions and in the extension of the territorial sea to 12 miles, maritime states like Singapore have safeguards for passage through straits used for international navigation and archipelagic sea lanes.

To illustrate the balancing of competing demands I will use the Singapore situation as an example. The extension of the territorial sea limits to 12 miles by Malaysia and Indonesia means that Singapore, and her territorial waters are completely surrounded by Malaysian and Indonesian Territorial Waters, and that we have no access to the high seas other than through the territorial waters of our neighbours. For Singapore the access to sea

routes is particularly critical. Singapore's annual trade value is some three times her GDP, and most of it goes by sea. Compared to similar figures for Korea (75%), Australia (33%) and Japan (25%) this trade dependency is one of the highest in the world.

If not for the provisions guaranteeing transit passage through straits used for international navigation, Singapore would literally be in dire straits.

The second set of competing demands refers to the claims for exclusive economic exploitation for the coastal states. In maritime South East Asia, this means that states which never previously had boundaries with each other suddenly find that they do, and that these boundaries are not at all well defined. Who would have thought that Brunei and Vietnam have a common border, or China and Malaysia. Disputes over EEZs have already started and are likely to accelerate. The potentially mineral rich Spratlys and Paracels are the subject of competing claims. Six countries have laid claim to various parts of the Spratlys with China claiming the entire group. The claimants have backed up their claims in several cases with the deployment of military forces. Despite the efforts of Indonesia during the recent conference in Bandung where for the first time all the claimants were brought together under one roof, no resolution of the conflicting claims is in sight.

MARITIME POWER DEFINED

Thus far, I have been deliberately using the term "Maritime Power" somewhat loosely without properly defining it. If one were to take a narrow interpretation then it would mean the ability of a country to impose its will on another in the maritime arena. This definition implies that maritime power is associated with contention. One country's exercise of will over another means that one country is more powerful than the other, and that countries seek to maximise their power in this narrow sense.

I find this interpretation too narrow. I prefer to think of maritime power as the aggregate of a country's ability to make use of the sea in order to fulfil its national economic, security and other goals. This interpretation allows for a rather more cooperative way of looking at maritime power. Instead of imposition of wills, countries can cooperate to mutually increase their maritime power by making use of the sea in a way which they could not before.

If we were to interpret maritime power in the broader sense then there are cooperative efforts of many different types. For example, combined patrols could be conducted by maritime forces to ensure security. Combined exercises could be conducted to ensure that forces will be capable of working together should the need arise. Much is already being done in this area, with the FPDA being a good example.

But besides security related efforts, other things can be done to increase the use of the sea. The development and maintenance of a good network of ports will lead to increased trade; and a negotiated agreement on joint exploitation of mineral deposits in areas of overlapping claims would allow each country to enjoy some of the benefits rather than none of the countries being able to do so. The arrangements reached between Australia and Indonesia for joint exploitation are a good example.

WHAT CAN AUSTRALIA DO

Let us shift focus just slightly - towards Australia to see where Australia fits in and what Australia can do. Australia has many important interests in South East Asia. We are your nearest neighbours and an important trading partner. Your trade routes to the rest of Asia pass through South East Asian waters.

Australia has had a long history of contributions to South East Asia. In the Second World War, the Malayan Emergency, and the Vietnam War, Australian forces played important roles. Without your contributions I

am certain that the picture before us today of South East Asia would be quite different. You continue to show a strong commitment to the FPDA. We in Singapore and, I am sure also in Malaysia, very much appreciate this commitment. As partners in FPDA, it is also encouraging to note that Australia has shown a willingness to contribute forces to international operations, such as those in the Persian Gulf, to contain aggression and promote peace even in areas quite distant from Australian shores. This surely is a clear signal that Australia can be counted on as a partner to oppose aggression and preserve peace in the South East Asian region.

It is important for Australia to maintain these strong relations in South East Asia. To do so effectively, Australia needs to make use of the entire range of tools at its disposal, to build up a good network of economic, political, cultural and military relations. In this way Australia sends a clear signal that it intends to be very much a part of and a major player in the Asia-Pacific community of states; and Australia will be well positioned to influence South East Asian nations to embark on projects that are mutually beneficial.

MAIN CONCLUSIONS

Before I end, allow me to sum up. From our survey of geography and history, we concluded firstly that maritime power is important within the region for regional countries themselves in order to maintain their territorial integrity and secure their sea lines of communications.

Secondly, because of South East Asia's location between India and China these two countries cannot be ignored in the long term even if they are preoccupied with internal problems in the short term.

Thirdly, because of the importance of the South East Asian sea routes to the world trading system, and the value of the natural resources that can be found there, the major

powers in the world will always want to be able to influence events in the region. From our analysis of the changing world geo-strategic situation, our conclusion is that the US security umbrella will give way to a more uncertain situation. South East Asian countries would do well to develop national and regional resilience, to build upon old friendships and alliances like FPDA and with the US, and to seek out and develop an understanding with new players like Japan so that their foreign and security policies will develop in a mutually beneficial way.


In considering the effects of UNCLOS, we concluded that UNCLOS has made a positive contribution by balancing competing demands. But the competing claims that result from the extended territorial and EEZ regimes open new areas of potential conflict. Countries should look at Maritime Power in its widest sense, avoid contention and confrontation, and seek cooperation in order to maximise the aggregate ability of a country to benefit from making use of the sea to fulfil its national economic, security and other goals.

Finally, Australia has much to gain from being a major player in South East Asia and the larger Asia-Pacific community. Australia should use the entire range of tools at her disposal to build up a good network of economic, political, cultural and military relations.

It remains only for me to thank the Australian Naval Institute once again for this invitation and to thank you for being such an attentive audience. I shall be glad to expand on any points, and also to hear your views on this subject so that I can learn from your wisdom and experience. Thank you very much.

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Letter to the Editor

The Editor,
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute,

Dear Sir,

Most Torres Strait islands with populations either have now, or will have soon, a landing ramp and a wharf.

It is easy to see that these things needed to be built to give the Islanders a chance for an improved lifestyle.

What is not so easy to see is that they do not represent hope for the future to the islanders at all.

It's all very fine to have them, but there is no reason to use them to anything like their capacity.

The contractors who built them came from far away, and they brought all their material and skilled and unskilled labour with them.

When they left, they took all their remaining material and the skilled and unskilled labour.

There are plenty of wharves and ramps, but not many people around who are trained to repair them, let alone plan them or build them.

The Islanders are looking for lasting benefits to their own people, not a 1991 "trinket trade" deal where the all the lasting benefits go to the members of the society who have the trinkets to trade.

In this case, the trinkets are wharves, ramps, power houses and buildings. These things do not have any lasting meaning to the islanders unless they are accompanied by the human trinkets of training in their design, construction, maintenance, and economic management.

The entire question of aid to the Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders must be looked at in balance, in the same way as Australia's defence acquisitions are looked at in balance, to ensure ongoing benefits to the society actually receiving the equipment and material.

The aid needs to be tied to a similar type of offset package, to ensure that all aid received has a lasting effect on the future and long term ability of the recipients to deal with the equipment and material provided.

This means more long term aid/grant packages, with much more professional planning and preparation before the final aid/grant package is worked out. The time scales for these projects should be measured in five, ten, and twenty year increments, with acceptable projections and good on track project management.

The two services of the Royal Australian Navy and the Australian Army already appreciate the simple but critical strategic significance of the Torres Strait Islands and Cape York Peninsula.

For these reasons now is the time for both these services to begin planning to establish permanent bases and training units on the islands. They will be welcomed by the population as offering a chance of training and some sort of local career, and the establishment and ongoing costs could be tied into the offsets for aid/grant packages, thus reducing the ADF share of the economic costs associated with the projects. The ADF should set itself up as project initiator and manager, with economic and other input from other interested departments.

In effect, the ADF could lead the way in this area of permanent offset packages in the Torres Strait to the significant advantage of the ADF, the Islanders, and the nation.

Bruce Parr.
Mackay,
Queensland.

THE 'NEW WORLD ORDER' AND THE FUTURE OF NAVAL POWER

by

Ken Booth

Professor of International Politics, University College of Wales Aberystwyth, UK

This is an edited version of a talk given at the ANI seminar at HMAS WATSON, 16 May 1991, on the 'Gulf War and Maritime Power and its Place in the New World Order'.

INTRODUCTION

It is difficult these days to hear a speech by a leading politician about world affairs, or to read a newspaper article about the subject, without coming across the phrase 'new world order'. It is usually capitalised into New World Order, and talked about as if it clearly exists, as if it has some objective reality. Since I think the term is ambiguous, and does not have objective reality, I will make a grammatical protest by continuing to refer to it in inverted commas and lower case, except when it is associated with President Bush's thinking: but 'new world order' it will remain to me, until I see something different.

Over the last year or so the phrase 'new world order' has been used in two broad senses, and I want to argue that they are not necessarily related. First, 'new world order' (or rather 'New World Order') is the label given by President Bush and his supporters to the grand strategy of the United States, following the success of containment after the collapse of the Soviet military and ideological challenge to the West. Second, 'new world order' is the shorthand term many people are using to describe the changed situation after the end of the Cold War. People — understandably — cannot yet think of a handy term for the new situation, so they grab what appears serviceable.

In the Bush version of 'New World Order' we are asked to look forward to the prospect of a

kinder gentler world, kept in order by the tough but benevolent leadership of the United States. In the more general version we see a more complex and confusing world than the one with which we became familiar in the first 40 years after the ending of the Second World War. Both these notions of a 'new world order' raise questions about the global role of the United States and about the utility of military power — and hence the future role of warships. I will speculate about the latter having first tried to clarify the context by discussing this beguiling phrase 'new world order'. In doing this I hope to give the 'fat lady of politics' the chance to sing her song: in the May issue of the Institute's *Journal* Richard Leaver rightly pointed out that in the aftermath of the US-led Coalition military victory in the Gulf War there had been a rush to drawing historical 'lessons', without observers having stood back to look at the political factors which — as Clausewitzians — we believe gives military power its ultimate significance.¹

BUSH'S 'NEW WORLD ORDER'

On 16 January 1991, announcing the start of hostilities with Iraq, President Bush described the opportunity it presented for building a New World Order 'where the rule of law governs the conduct of nations' and 'in which a credible United Nations can use its peacekeeping role to fulfil the promise and vision of the UN founders'.²

On 3 March Bush told the US Congress that

the Gulf War was the 'first test' of a 'new world coming into view, a world in which [there was] the very real prospect of a new world order'. With military victory achieved over Iraq — at least to the extent of the 'liberation' of Kuwait — President Bush continued to claim that the first test of his 'New World Order' had been well and truly passed. His claims were invariably accompanied by considerable triumphalism, and where the setting made it possible, a good deal of traditional American razzamatazz.

Bush's triumphalism went down very well with most of his domestic audience. It was meant to. The US public was relieved that the Gulf had not turned into another Vietnam, while for the President himself the beating of the drum about his 'New World Order' represented the opening music for his 1992 presidential re-election campaign. However, the triumphalism and razzamatazz did not go down so well elsewhere in that first period after the ending of the war. For sometimes different reasons, many observers in the Third World or in Europe and other parts of the developed world — and in pockets of US opinion — the triumphalism and razzamatazz was at best embarrassing and at worst offensive. It was embarrassing because it was so out of proportion to what turned out to be such a one-sided war (about which more later) and it was offensive because it was juxtaposed in our minds (via our TV screens) with the heart-rending pity most of us were feeling towards the Kurds, who were fleeing to the mountains from the supposedly defeated forces of Saddam Hussein. The Kurds, tragically, had read Bush's lips, and they became among the first victims of the first test of his 'New World Order'.

The 'New World Order' is President Bush's Big Idea in foreign policy. Traditionally, US presidents like to go down in history having given their name to an important (and preferably successful) set of principles in foreign policy: the Monroe Doctrine, the Truman Doctrine and the Reagan Doctrine came readily to mind. Bush was the lucky

inheritor of the end of the Cold War, and he and his staff hit upon the idea of a 'New World Order'. It is a beguiling phrase, though from the President's point of view it unfortunately did not have his name attached to it. Nevertheless, he presumably hoped that if he repeated it often enough, the identification in the public mind would stick — like tennis players and the commercial logos on their shirts. That Bush's audiences did not know what the 'new world order' actually meant, and that the President himself did little to elaborate it, did not seem to matter in the course and aftermath of what was portrayed as a great victory in the Gulf. Like the advertising of beer or soap suds on TV, what matters in the short-term is not so much the actual quality of the product, but getting people to buy it through repetition, an attractive grand image and up-beat presentation. The selling of Bush's 'New World Order' was quite successful, never mind that the inter-agency team which was set up in Washington to put some substance in the flashily-labelled bottle still have not come up with the goods, as far as I am aware.

In its capitalised version used by the White House, what 'New World Order' ideally seems to imply, in the comments made by the President and senior advisers like Brent Scowcroft, is an international posse of deputies, led by a US sheriff, moving against the deviants in international society — those committing what Bush has called, in an interesting phrase, 'lawless aggression'. This characterisation of a 'new world order' matches the pure theory of 'collective security', which first saw light of day with the founding of the League of Nations at the end of the First World War. Collective security was unsuccessful in the interwar years, and it failed again at the end of the Second World War, when the founders of the United Nations tried to revive it. During the Gulf crisis the White House seemed to see the end of the Cold War as providing the society of states with its third chance this century to make collective security work. Under US leadership,

with the Soviet Union at least passive, and other states actually helping, it was hoped that the UN (implicitly a pliant pro-US UN) would finally live up to the Charter and deter and if necessary defeat 'lawless aggression'.

CRITICISMS OF BUSH'S 'NEW WORLD ORDER'

President Bush's Big Idea in foreign policy sounds fine in theory, but there is less to it than meets the eye. It has been widely — and I think justifiably — criticised. In a nutshell, it has been criticised because its conception is flawed, it is believed to be unworkable in theory and in practice, its details have not been thought through, it has been characterised more by propaganda than by analysis and its 'first test' was not the historic success which has been claimed by Republican triumphalists and their supporters in other countries. The criticisms stretch as long as one of President Bush's infamous sentences. Let me list a few:³

The 'new world order' is merely a cloak for US interests. This is the argument that Bush's notion of a 'New World Order' does not represent a principled stance against aggression. Over the years the White House has supported a variety of 'aggression' across borders and has also engaged in the activity itself. I need only mention its support of Israel, its failure to act against South Africa and the US military action in Panama (the first military intervention of the post-Cold War 'new world order'). This is why I earlier drew attention to the phrase 'lawless aggression': clearly, some 'aggression' is not 'lawless', and is therefore acceptable to the White House. The latter should not be surprised, therefore, if some observers are cynical, and see the 'New World Order' essentially as a cloak, a means of legitimizing the use of force only against those countries disapproved of by the US government itself.

The White House is hypocritical about the UN. The UN seems destined to play a central role in Bush's strategy, in the sense that it is the arena which will be used wherever possible to generate support (and therefore

legitimacy) for US-desired actions. It seems that the White House has been 'born again' when it comes to the UN. But how serious is the conversion? Is the change only because it appears that the world organisation might be used as an arm of US policy in the years ahead? But if, in future members, of the UN become awkward, would US support be dropped? When we examine the record we have plenty of reason to be sceptical. It was not long ago, let us not forget, that the Reaganites (of whom Bush was a very prominent member) were expressing extreme hostility towards the UN (President Reagan, for example, contemptuously dismissed the General Assembly vote condemning the US invasion of Grenada with the comment that it had not disturbed his breakfast. And when it comes to Security Council vetoes in the last twenty years, most have been cast not by the Soviet Union, but by the United States and Britain). We must understand US governmental attitudes towards the UN, therefore, entirely in terms of how that government sees US interests. The UN will be supported, if the past is any guide, only to the extent the organisation can be used as an arm of US policy.

The 'new world order' concept is vague.

Since the concept has not been carefully elaborated by the White House, it is not surprising that it seems in the eyes of many observers to be a slogan rather than a strategy. Among the unanswered questions troubling observers, the following have been particularly prominent: What role are Germany and Japan to play in the 'new world order'? Is their role to find money for US (and British, Australian etc) mercenaries, or should they develop their own global military power commensurate with their economic power? Are either roles acceptable? How long can Soviet and Chinese compliance be expected to a UN which is an arm of the State Department? What price will the State Department have to play in order to ensure that compliance? And what happens when the Soviet Union and the Chinese cease to be compliant? So far, President Bush's

slogan-strategy has stimulated more questions than answers.

The 'new world order' is no more than nostalgia. To some critics, the vision of President Bush and his supporters represents a harking back to a past which cannot be recovered. Bush and his senior advisers learned about the world in the 1940s and 1950s when the United States was the undisputed Number One in international politics. There have been signs in the Bush Administration of the hope that in the 'one superpower world' which now exists, following the collapse of Soviet power and prestige, US global authority can be restored. But critics point to the differences between the 1990s and the 1940s and 1950s; they doubt whether the United States in the 1990s will have either the dollars or the determination to restore the *Pax Americana* of the past.

Bush's strategy will exacerbate North-South differences. As envisaged, President Bush and his advisers seem to be looking towards a grouping of essentially status-quo countries and regimes, comprising the governments of the industrialised world and pliant Third World elites. This is the grouping which has been and is doing well out of the present structure of international order. But such a grouping will only solidify the differences between the 'North' and 'South': maintaining the status quo will maintain injustice in many places. And where this is injustice there is potential for disorder.

Bush's 'New World Order' rests on dubious standards of behaviour. From the Gulf experience it appears that the international future Bush would seek to manage would not be the kinder and gentler one his lips suggests. What occurred in the Gulf crisis of 1990-91 seemed to have little to do with democracy or human rights for example. It is only necessary to look at some of the key members of the US-led Coalition. Assad of Syria, for example, ranks only marginally better than Saddam Hussein in his record of terror and oppression.⁴ Assad courted and was courted, and has now

become a central figure in the game of Middle Eastern international politics. The 'liberation' of Kuwait led to the restoration of the al-Sabah family, not democracy and social tolerance. Cynics have pointedly been asking the question: were US and other troops sent to the Gulf merely to save the 'new world order' for feudalism? The Gulf experience suggests that state sovereignty and the integrity of borders will remain a higher value than the spread of democracy and human rights.

The Bush strategy over-militarizes the problem of achieving world order. Some critics argue that by emphasizing the global policeman role, the White House's conception of a 'New World Order' misses the point. If there is to be a 'new world order' worth its name it is believed that it will be created not by a global police force but by addressing the basic problems of inequality, oppression and poverty. There will be no lasting order until justice has been achieved at acceptable levels across the globe.

I could go on, but space prevents me. If we push aside the massive public relations operation which paralleled the military side of the Gulf crisis, we see other problems: some opinion in the Third World has seen Bush as being as fanatical a leader as Saddam Hussein; some in the industrialised world have expressed unease about a *Pax Americana* and all it might imply; some in troubled regions regret the passing of the Cold War since it helped to keep the superpowers in check; and there has been a widespread view that a return to US global hegemony is unrealistic and beyond America's means.

Having listed these criticisms, it should at the same time be emphasised that Bush's strategy and vision have many supporters, and that the 'first test' was widely applauded. Among the supporters are the following: pro-American elites in the Third World; those governments which see themselves as small and exposed (potential Kuwaits) like that of Singapore; voices in many countries which want collective security to work and which believe

that there is now a historic opportunity for it to do so; and there is a substantial body of opinion across the world which thinks that the creation and conduct of the US-led Coalition in the Gulf will have a real deterrent effect on would-be aggressors in future. But is this the case? And even if it is, is it the only or even main lesson?

THE 'LESSONS' OF THE 'FIRST TEST'

The conduct and outcome of the Gulf War tells politicians and students of international politics a number of interesting things. But I do not think that the words of the 'song of the fat lady' will, at the end, be the same as the 'lessons' which are being incanted in tune with the triumphalist drums. What does the Gulf War signify for:

The United States and 'aggression'? There is no reason, as yet, to suppose that the experience in the Gulf, 1990-91, will mark a decisive shift in US attitudes towards aggression, and that from here on the White House will oppose by force every state which crosses an international boundary. As in the past, there will be invasions or interventions the US will not oppose in the United Nations (by friendly states, or obviously by itself) and there will be those invasions and interventions the United States will oppose ('lawless aggression')

Collective security? UN collective security was impractical in the 1940s, and it will continue to be impractical in the 1990s. As generations of students of international politics have learned, the pure theory of collective security (the global sheriff with his internationalist posse of deputies) has always been a delusion.⁵ It requires, for example, that all the major powers agree upon a particular status quo to defend, and for situations to have such moral clarity that they will all be able to agree who is the wrongdoer, and be willing to act against that state. Most conflicts do not have moral clarity; nor do situations often attract a strong consensus among the mighty. Who could imagine collective security

'working', in a positive sense, in situations such as an Israel invasion of the Lebanon, a Turkish invasion of Cyprus, or an Indonesian invasion of East Timor — let alone any Soviet subjugation of a 'sovereign' Baltic republic or a US invasion of Panama? Yet if collective security is to become routine, as opposed to a rare event produced by an unusual combination of factors, this is what the pure theory requires. Thankfully, the Security Council veto prevents collective security getting out of hand: and long may it operate!

3. **Detering would-be aggressors?** What Saddam Hussein's forces had to suffer in the short air and land war against the US-led Coalition might deter future aggressors in other parts of the world. However, they might just take some comfort from the fact that Saddam and his Republican Guard survived substantially intact, despite the devastation. More important, however, is the likelihood that few would-be aggressors would surely repeat Saddam's major blunder of committing blatant aggression in an area of vital interest for the industrialised world. As a result, the Gulf crisis is likely to remain a special case, unlikely to be repeated.

The utility of force? There has been a substantial body of analysts who have argued now for over twenty years that military intervention was losing its utility.⁶ This was because the costs of intervention were increasing while the benefits were decreasing. Despite the decisive military victory in the Gulf, I see no reason to question the historical trend. We need to look at the rising costs and declining benefits of the Gulf War in the perspective of the whole of the twentieth century. On the issue of costs, therefore, we need to compare what relatively little effort was needed by Britain to keep Iraq 'controlled' in the 1920s and 1960s with the enormous effort mobilised and expanded by the United States and its 37 allies in 1990-91. And let us remember that all this effort was required to achieve only a limited military victory (securing the 'liberation' of Kuwait) against a state with a GDP about 120 times

less than the United States alone, and with a population less than that of California. And what does the balance sheet say about the benefits of the war? Is the Middle East a significantly better place as a result of the conflict? The first point to make, of course, is that it is still too soon to say. Even so, when we look at the level of intolerance being displayed in Kuwait, the environmental damage in the region, the troubles of the Palestinians, the strengthening of Israeli hardliners, the elevation to importance of Assad and other tyrants, the sorry plight of the Kurds and Shias in the south of Iraq, the devastation of Iraq's infrastructure and its likely effect on the coming generation in that country, the new arms bazaar that has been created, and the continued grasp on power of a wounded Saddam — all these and other consequences of the war surely lead to the conclusion that this was yet another war in which military victory and political success are not synonymous. None of the underlying problems in the Middle East have been solved by the war — though promises were made in the runup to the war that the United States and other interested parties would try harder in the region — while some new problems have been created. The balance sheet of the war does not present an encouraging picture of costs and gains. It would be a foolish leader who now believed, on the basis of this experience, that large-scale military intervention into the Third World was now vindicated, and that the lessons of Afghanistan and Vietnam could be forgotten. (History suggests, regretfully, that we can always anticipate a few foolish leaders; there are always some who are slow to see which way the waves of history are moving).

The 'new world order'? As several distinguished former policymakers have argued (Henry Kissinger, Denis Healey and Zbigniew Brzezinski for example) the Gulf War was a 'one off' situation in the way it was possible for the United States to mobilise such an impressive group of states against one aggressor. The circumstances, as was argued earlier, are unlikely to be repeated, since

Saddam's invasion and annexation was such a blatant act of aggression in an area of such vital interests for the industrialised world. Despite the 'perfect' conditions of this case for collective security, it was nevertheless necessary for the White House to engage in a variety of somewhat dubious diplomatic manoeuvres in order to ensure that several key members of the Coalition climbed aboard the military train, or at least did not threaten to derail it. Financial rewards (critics would say 'bribes') were given to some governments, while the Coalition in general was manipulated into supporting a military offensive against Iraq by the tactic of getting them to climb half aboard the train, believing that sanctions was the destination, and then being nudged in by military degrees, and finally having the waggon door closed in November by the massive increase in US forces which gave the Coalition offensive potential. It was not an easy coalition to get together; as this brief description suggests, it needed Machiavellian skills. But even once everybody was on board the White House could not be confident that certain key parties would not jump off. Even in this most clear-cut case of aggression, as Kissinger has argued, the Coalition was so fragile that one sovereign state, Israel, had to be pressed (and bought?) into not defending itself — the right of all — against terror missile bombardment for fear that the Arab allies would leave the Coalition.⁷ So, if it was a shaky Coalition in the perfect test, who will be the future agents of the 'new world order' in more ambiguous conflicts in less vital areas?

'NEW TIMES'

The discussion so far points to the conclusion that President Bush's 'New World Order' is less than meets the eye. It is less a Grand Strategy for the future of the world than patriotic and electioneering rhetoric. Even Bush's supporters in the Conservative Government in Britain, who tend to be uncritical of most aspects of US foreign policy, have somewhat distanced themselves from the recent triumphalism and overblown

expectations. Overall, Bush's 'New World Order' is simply the United States pursuing its interests, while the Bush Administration itself is motivated by 'old thinking' about world politics. In President Bush's conception, therefore, what we have is simply an Old World Order defined by the New World.

In the Introduction I said that there was a second usage of the phrase 'new world order'; it is sometimes now being employed simply as a shorthand term to describe the post-Cold War situation. Since the post-Cold War world has not yet settled and developed its historically unique character, and since there is much in the present period which is disorderly rather than orderly, 'new world order' is a misbegotten term to use as a general description of the era. The label I prefer to use is one coined by a British magazine a few years ago: 'New Times'. This reminds us that fundamental change has taken place and is continuing in world politics, but it does not foreclose discussion of the essential characteristics of the age. In any case, the characteristics are so numerous and complex that they cannot easily be encapsulated in a brief description, like 'Cold War'.

Our New Times are being shaped by a number of inter-acting trends which will significantly affect the way governments and peoples think about security. These trends will create both constraints and opportunities for navies in the years ahead. I would summarise the salient features of the 1990s as follows:

1. The collapse of communism and the triumph of capitalism. Both have created, and will create, casualties and instabilities. However, the triumph of capitalism has led to a truly global economy and the sharing of an increasingly common global destiny (including inter-society transparency).
2. The end of the Cold War. This will result in further disarmament and the tendency to define conflicts locally rather than globally.
3. The end of bipolarity. For better or

worse, the end of Cold War regimentation gives regional powers more geopolitical space. On the other hand, it also constrains their ability to play off one superpower against another in order to bargain for better military capabilities.

4. The rise of new powers. Power has been diffusing in international affairs. The rising economic importance of Japan and the European Community have global impact while newly industrialising countries (NICs) in East Asia and elsewhere have more regional significance. Although the United States remains the first power in economic and military terms, it will not in the future be able to exercise the same dominance of affairs as in the past.

5. The changing geopolitical map. Nationalism remains a powerful force, as do ideologies and religions. The brew they can create has led to changing identity patterns — and changing geopolitical maps. The collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation is one example; tensions in the Balkans another. The Soviet Union is only the biggest state threatened with breakup.

6. The growth of interdependence. While some states are threatened with breakup, all feel the impact of the increasingly dense pattern of economic, social, cultural and political ties which are the result of easier communications and a shrinking planet. Interdependence creates vulnerabilities between countries, and so can be a cause of strain; but it also creates mutual responsiveness, which tends to lead parties to try to settle problems peacefully.

7. The new significance of non-state actors. Although some states clearly remain the major actors on the world stage, less and less of the transactions that shape world politics are in the control of governments. One writer has called this 'post-international politics'. Agendas these days are more often set in the boardrooms of multinational corporations, in the bureaucracies of organisations like the EC

or NATO, or in the ambitions of social movements concerned with political, economic or environmental change. It is unlikely that any of the latter will agitate for big navies.

8. The rising salience of economic power. Increasingly, it is evident that it is economic power which determines who gets what in world affairs. It was always so, up to a point, but in the past military power could compensate, or at least help (through colonial conquest) in the growth of economic power. Today, big defence spending is seen to be counterproductive. The currency of power is the power of currency.

9. The changing security challenge. The decline of the fear of nuclear war or of a catastrophic outbreak on Europe's Central Front has helped reveal how far the daily lives of so many people across the world are threatened by political oppression, economic incapacity, terrorism, drugs, human rights violations, mass population movements and the spread of modern weaponry. As a result, what is thought appropriate for the security agenda is widening. Military power, including naval power, will be relevant to some but not all these security challenges.

10. The continuing crisis of development in the Third World. While the NICs have been very successful in their economic development, and have helped muddy the meaning of the term 'Third World', there are still many parts of the latter where state systems are overloaded by over-population, debt, inefficient agriculture and so on. There is considerable scope for violence.

11. The accelerating technological revolution. Some of the amazing technological advances in recent years have helped shrink the planet even further, and have thereby encouraged a sense of 'one world'. However, some changes create social problems (such as unemployment) within countries, and help separate even further the Haves and the Have-Nots. Fortunate is the region which has more

Haves, for security as well as lifestyle, since there have been no wars between any of the 44 richest countries since 1945.⁸ The momentum of technological change will, inevitably, lead to the modernisation of military hardware, including warships. The latter will create new problems for the naval contingency planners of neighbours, but modernization does not in itself indicate a growing 'threat' in politico-strategic terms. What may appear as a growing threat at the level of the contingency planner will not necessarily present a problem to a foreign policy planner.

12. The increased salience of environmental issues. Again, this is a trend which helps create a sense of one planet, and of the desirability of cooperation. Alternatively, the sense of environmental limits lead governments increasingly to feel the pressure to protect what they believe to be theirs by right, and to exploit it. The salience of environmental issues will create more jobs for navies as coastguards, but it will also put pressure on some navies, notably those with nuclear warships and weapons.

13. Finally there is the declining utility of the use of military force in international politics. Although military force is still seen as an integral part of interstate politics, and the deterrent utility of military power has grown enormously, the utility of using force is declining, as the costs go up and the benefits go down. The wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan are the symbols of this for the superpowers, and it was argued earlier that even the massive military victory in the Gulf War could be seen as part of the same pattern, when compared with what it took to defeat Iraq in the past, and the likely benefits of that success. 30 or 60 years ago, Iraq was subdued or deterred at little cost; now, after a campaign which was expensive for all, it is left as a dangerous regional power searching for weapons of mass destruction. President Bush, in the aftermath of victory, triumphantly announced that the United States has finally kicked the 'Vietnam Syndrome': But he knows well that neither he nor the public has

forgotten that war. This was evident in the unwillingness of the United States to become embroiled militarily in Iraq's domestic affairs, and in its determination to disengage as quickly as was diplomatically polite from the Kurdish tangle — a problem in which the White House did not want to become involved in the first place. So, in terms of the US projection of force in the Third World, there is more to be learned in 1991 from US behaviour in the mountains of Kurdistan than on the plains of the Euphrates.

A level of military power will be seen as crucial for all states for deterrent purposes (as ever military power remains most useful when it is not actually being used) but the utility of using force continues to decline. This is not to say that it will not happen, or that the successful wielding of force is impossible: it is only to say that in all situations, compared with the past, governments will incur higher diplomatic, economic and military costs, and will, in return, find fewer benefits at the end of a war.

THE INFLUENCE OF HISTORY UPON NAVAL POWER

Finally, what does all this mean for the future of naval power? Several general points are clear. First, it looks like being a world in which there will be even greater pressure than in the past on resources for navies. Justifying each defence dollar will be tougher. Second, there will be more constraints on the exercise of force. Third, there will be fewer opportunities for warship engagements at higher levels of violence, but there will be plenty of room for warship employment at lower levels. Turning to particular navies or groups of navies, the picture looks as follows:⁹

1. Small navies. As the exploitation of, and maintenance of good order in offshore zones grows in importance, the smallest navies (which might be described as 'coastguards-plus') will have least problem of all in justifying their existence. They will be kept busy.

2. Medium navies. The term 'medium naval powers' covers a wide field, so what follows is necessarily very general. It almost goes without saying that there will be plenty of work for medium naval powers, like their smaller counterparts, under the heading of 'constabulary functions'. This includes such tasks as managing sometimes huge EEZs, combating drug traffickers and patrolling against illegal entry (of which there will be much in future). However, there will probably be decreasing scope for the employment of warships in high-threat environments. Indeed, with good sense the world's oceans should generally constitute a low-threat setting, except for localised trouble-spots, such as the Gulf or the Spratlys. If this is the case, the countries with medium navies will find it difficult to justify naval expansion. As warships become lawships, medium power navies will tend to become more like coastguard-plus navies. The obvious exceptions will be those with traditionally wider interests, such as Britain or France, or those with regional pretensions, such as India. The tendency for most medium naval powers will be for fewer but more capable warships.

It is not difficult to imagine scenarios where a medium power might find it useful to have a big friendly warship on hand (to rescue nationals during civil disturbance for example). However, providing the resource wherewithal to create the numbers of ships necessary to have a significant out-of-area presence (whatever the 'area' happens to be) will be another matter. Vague insurance policies will look decreasingly attractive to hard-pressed governments with elections looming.

One use of warships which will be attractive to several medium naval powers, and which has already been in evidence, is that of cooperative rather than coercive naval diplomacy. This involves the use of warships as symbols of international solidarity. Recent examples include the group of warships under the aegis of the WEU which has operated in the Gulf at various times, or the Coalition warships

supporting UN resolutions in or near the Gulf in 1990-91. Likewise, at a lower and more functional level, useful navy-to-navy cooperation can be achieved between more advanced and newer and smaller navies; this might involve help in modernization, assistance in national offshore development, technical training and so on. In less warlike times cooperative naval diplomacy will become an important function, given the easy symbolism of warships.

3. The Soviet Union. It is now past the time when the Soviet Union can be considered a 'superpower' in a political or ideological sense. Strapped economically, its leverage on world affairs is limited. It could and probably will revive in international influence (perhaps in the shape of 'Russia') but it is difficult to imagine it reaching former heights. As the Soviet Union presently struggles at domestic reform, and indeed struggles to remain a union, its blue-water navy built up over the preceding quarter of a century is in the process of being pulled back into traditional continental waters. It was predictable that the blue-water Soviet Navy would not prove cost-effective either in terms of 'countering' the US Navy or in exercising successful diplomacy in the Third World. The Soviet Navy never had any hope of rescuing an increasingly bankrupt foreign policy. Furthermore, the blue-water Navy was also an important economic burden on a state which could not afford any luxuries. These points are equally pertinent to those medium naval powers — notably India — which are now acquiring what anxious neighbours see as worrying power projection capabilities. Regional blue-water navies are not likely to prove any more successful. The Indian government has already felt the sting of a costly and failed venture in regional power projection in Sri Lanka. It might try elsewhere, but outside the confines of another war with Pakistan, it is difficult to see what positive as opposed to deterrent utility India will achieve as a result of its naval extravagance.

4. The United States. It is almost axiomatic that the number one naval power in the world

at any time will look with suspicion at the number two, and vice versa. This, together with the legacy of the memories of the Cold War, will ensure that a degree of suspicion will operate between the US and Soviet Navies for some years to come. Furthermore, both navies have a great material inheritance (which the US Navy is determined to keep, as is evident by its opposition to arms control at sea). Consequently, both the US and Soviet Navies will have a direct navy-to-navy mission as long as a security dilemma exists between the two states.

Apart from the task of deterrence in relation to a declining Soviet threat, the US Navy will also be exploring its future in relation to President Bush's 'New World Order'. However, as was suggested earlier, the United States has been learning the limits of superpower since the late 1960s, and the post-Gulf War triumphalism has to be read against the announcement of the deep cuts in defence which were announced in Washington at the start of 1991, some of which would affect the Navy. This, together with the President's determination to expedite US ground troops from trouble-spots in the Gulf area as quickly as possible, does not indicate an Administration determined to stand patiently in harm's way wherever peace is threatened. In the years ahead US military involvement can be expected in traditional areas — the Gulf because of oil and Central America because of the Monroe legacy — but not in areas outside, except, perhaps, for the odd punitive strike where no long-term involvement is necessary. For all the major powers in future, the prospect of politically-complex ground wars in jungles, mountains or cities (a Vietnam, an Afghanistan or a Beirut) will still remain very different from the prospect of a video-game war in a desert against a blatant aggressor.

CONCLUSION

I would summarise the future roles and utility of navies as follows:

1. **War at Sea.** The danger of conflict at

the highest levels of violence are receding. States will procure fewer major warships but those which are produced will be more capable and flexible. The perceived utility of nuclear weapons on surface ships will continue to decline for political, strategic and environmental reasons.

2. **Deterrence at Sea.** Detering potential threats will continue to be seen as the bottom line of naval policy. This will be a less demanding task in a world where the costs of the offensive use of force are increasing.

3. **Power projection.** Power projection from the sea, for the largest as well as medium naval powers, will become more costly and difficult. It will therefore be of declining utility, though this is not to say that it will not be occasionally employed.

4. **Coercive naval diplomacy.** The attempt by states to achieve political influence by the threatening movement of warships may be effective in those disputes which have a maritime focus (law of the sea disputes for example). However, coercive naval diplomacy will be less effective more generally because of the growing costs of military intervention.

5. **Cooperative naval diplomacy.** The expression of international solidarity and navy-to-navy cooperation for national development purposes will become an increasingly attractive option for medium powers in search of a role.

6. **Constabulary functions.** These will offer an increasingly busy set of roles for warships, as the trend of 'creeping jurisdiction' over the oceans continues.¹⁰

If these points represent an accurate forecast of the general pattern of naval roles in the decades ahead, it means a future with a rather more restricted set of roles than in the past for most navies. Nevertheless it represents a future (globally) in which a smaller number of people and warships will be concerned with what will generally be considered to be a range of

worthwhile functions. Rational policymaking for navies will seek to avoid turning a generally low-threat maritime environment into a high-threat environment by paranoid naval arms competition; it will seek to turn warships into lawships wherever possible; it will work for common security (security with others) rather than security against others; and it will take into account the need of all national societies to save as much money as possible in order to help them deal with the manifold problems the future is already dumping upon us.

¹ Richard Leaver, 'The Gulf And Its Implications For Economic Sanctions', *Journal of the Australian Naval Institute*, Vol. 18 (2), May 1991, p.23.

² The quotations in this section are taken from James Walsh, 'Global Beat' *Time*, 1 April 1991, pp.21-5.

³ For a further discussion of these criticisms see Walsh, op. cit., and the series of articles on the 'New World Order?' published in *The Guardian* 22, 25 and 27 March; 1, 3, 8 and 13 April 1991.

⁴ Charles Humana, *World Human Rights Guide* (London: Pan Books, 1987) drew up a scheme for calculating the 'Human rights rating' of all countries. Iraq scored 19% (p.130), Syria 29% (p.262) and Kuwait 49% (p.161).

⁵ The classic analysis is Inis L. Claude, *Swords into Ploughshares* (London: London University Press, 1964) especially pp.227-38.

⁶ See, for example, Klaus Knorr, *On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press 1966) and Michael McGuire, 'Changing Naval Operations and Military Intervention', *Naval War College Review*, Spring 1977, pp.3-25.

⁷ Henry Kissinger, 'America cannot police the world forever', *The Times*, 12 March 1991.

⁸ For an expansion of these points see Ken Booth (ed.) *New Thinking About Strategy and International Security* (London: HarperCollins, 1991) Introduction.

⁹ This is the theme of James N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics. A Theory of Change and Continuity* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990).

¹⁰ John Naisbitt and Patricia Aburdene, *Megatrends 2000* (New York: William Morrow, 1990) p.29.

¹¹ This argument, and the following section, is expanded in Ken Booth, 'The Role of Navies in Peacetime: The Influence of Future History Upon Sea Power', paper presented at the conference on 'Naval Power in the Pacific: Towards the Year 2000' at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 13-14 May 1991. The papers are being collected into a book and published by Dr Hugh Smith, the Director of ADFA.

¹² This is expanded in Ken Booth, *Law, Force and Diplomacy at Sea* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1985) especially Ch. 3.

An Era is Ending...



With the listing for disposal of Seaward Defence Boat 1325 (originally HDML 1325) the RAN's last veteran of World War II is finally retiring. Her future is uncertain as she waits at the small craft facility at HMAS Stirling. There are proposals to make her a static or mobile museum exhibit, with her appearance restored to the 1943 original. She has been based in WA since 1956.

QUO VADIS - THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE

A RESPONSE TO THE PAPER PRESENTED BY LCDR PETER JONES AND LEUT TOM FRAME TO THE AGM OF THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE - 1991

by

MICHAEL HEAD - RECTOR, ST. LEO'S COLLEGE, UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND.

LCDR Peter Jones and LEUT Tom Frame's excellent position paper for the ANI General Meeting filled me with some dismay, although it possibly did not contain much I hadn't known already from reading the Journal for about fifteen years¹. It is just that I never took time to reflect upon the problems affecting the Australian Naval Institute as an organisation. Now faced with membership difficulties and "rank creep", perhaps it's time to take another look at the functions and the sociology of the Institute.

TARGET GROUPS

I suspect the most critical observation the writers of the discussion paper make, is the lack of a specific "target environment or group of people", laid down in the objectives of the ANI, although it could possibly be presumed from the type of organisation it is.² A target group is a necessity for writers to the Journal to home down their papers and tighten their presentations. It would also help the editors in selecting articles for inclusion in the Journal.

TOPICS FOR TARGETS

In the following observations I restrict my comments to the Journal of the Institute and not to the excellent work done in organising the various seminars and orations.

The discussion paper lists a number of suggestions for the type articles needed in the Journal.³ But that vital question, who is the target audience, needs to be considered again here. Who are the authors addressing? The very good February edition is a case in point. LCDR Alan Hinge has two very good articles, one on terrorist use of mines and the other on

keeping the peace.⁴ They both deserve wider exposure to the general public than the Institute Journal can give. I expect that future ADFA students trying to prepare assignments in these areas will find them very valuable, but I would hope that senior officers would find little in the articles that was unfamiliar to them. The question is therefore raised again, who is the target audience for the articles. Both articles could constructively be passed on by naval officers to well intentioned civilians seeking further information. Commander Hyland's similarly excellent article on Napoleonic Seapower raises the same question. Who is the target audience here? I have to say, that I found all three articles, competent, valuable and pleasant to read, but the ANI Journal does not exist for the likes of me.

A possible exception to this run of articles is LEUT Tom Frame's presentation on "The Ship History"⁵, which might serve as a timely reminder to some officers of the importance of keeping accurate records of their ship's commissions. As a part time historian I am constantly frustrated by the inadequacy of some primary source documents and applaud any efforts to encourage writers to take more care.

STRATEGY

If the target audience is clearly identified then the development of topics suitable for inclusion in the Journal is not so difficult. For example one area of crisis facing the RAN is the development of strategies for the future. It seems at times that defence strategies are developed through a series of political compromises by the Government between

pressure groups which are generally opposed to defence spending, -much of the peace movement, conservation lobbies, social welfare lobbies who see defence budgets as a source of easy money for their projects, confronting defence lobby groups with a strong dose of treasury. Against this background the service bodies develop their strategies.

Since the Dibb report and the Defence White Paper, government public announcements on strategy have been couched in terms of defending the north against low level raids. It makes sense in many ways, but the difficulties of defending 40% of Australia (ie. north of the Tropic of Capricorn) containing less than 3% of the population where the attacks would largely be aimed at civilians seem beyond solution. The strategy runs the risk of warping the army as the capacities needed for insurgency style operations may not be those for more conventional campaigns. It's a politically salable strategy and appeals to people who are frightened of any involvement in "other peoples' wars." But if its allowed to proceed totally unhindered it may warp the RAN and the RAAF in the same way as it could be affecting the army. It could lead to the loss of front line units such as the DDG and submarines, and the long range air strike capability that do not really fit the low level conflict in Northern Australia pattern.

The basis of the Defence White Paper itself seems to be under threat or at least development in a number of ways, in spite of government statements to the contrary. The past decade has shown increasing willingness by government to deploy army and naval forces overseas in support of political objectives. (cf LCDR Hinge's article for examples)⁶ Second, well known military political commentators such as Dr. Desmond Ball and Denis Warner are again raising the question of collective regional security agreements. "Forward Defence" is being looked at seriously again.⁷ Third, RAAF official or unofficial spokesmen are publishing strategies in the "Air Power Manual", and

"Defence Force Journal", that seem to argue that the RAAF has three basic air campaigns to prosecute, control of the air, air bombardment, and support for combat forces. The authors have claimed that the RAAF has the capability to undertake the first, to a lesser degree the second, but little left over for the third.⁸ Perhaps the ANI Journal might be a suitable vehicle for some RAN officers to express their views on new developments for the strategies of the 1990s.

FINANCE

A second area critical for all services is how the RAN is going to deal with increasing financial stringency. I suppose there is a temptation not to deal with it at all, because of a "what's the use" attitude. There is no point in trying to do more for less money if in a year or so, the next financial problem the government is facing will result in yet another round of cuts and then another. The benchmark of about 2.9% of GDP in the post Dibb White Paper of 1987 has moved from a minimum recommended expenditure, to a maximum which could be hoped for in good years. The financial history of the services in peace time, is that the good years rarely come.

However the financial crisis has to be met, and met with creative combinations of suggestions. For instance the movement of army forces to NT will help in the speed of their response to conflict in that region, but for North Queensland or WA deployments, perhaps the soldiers may as well be at Holsworthy. Perhaps the money spent on new bases in the north might be better spent on the Darwin-Alice Springs railway and a couple of transport ships operated and maintained by ANL but fitted with davits for LCMs and manned by reserves for a month a year. Commercial operations would meet the maintenance cost of the ships and possibly the capital cost as well. An additional dozen Hercules could be commercially operated on the same principle by the RAAF.

More importantly possibly is the area of

micro-economic reform. Does the Navy need to do all the jobs it is actually doing? In my own office we have spent many thousands of dollars over the last few years on computer hardware and software. We can now generate information and do things we never could before. But I have to remind the staff to ask whether we are doing these things simply because we have the capacity to do them, or because we really need to do them. We suffer from a computer driven expansion of the workload and I ask is it really necessary? Often it's not. These questions have to be asked at every level of administration.

"YES MINISTER!"

The recent cuts in defence personnel included a much smaller shedding of civilian jobs. I haven't seen the figures, but I would suspect that quite a few of the lost civilian jobs will be from the closure and sale of bases such as Laverton. But defence department has close to 25,000 employees, while the next largest department, Social Security, is just over 16,000, and DEET is the only other one with more than 10,000.⁹ There is a difficulty here for military personnel to be seen to, if not quite bite the hand that feeds it, at least to be biting the hand which controls the tucker bag. But compared to the defence departments of non-socialist countries such as Israel, Singapore and possibly even Japan, our departmental establishment does seem bloated. I am sure that the people in the department are working hard, but are they all doing jobs which in this time of recession, actually need doing? Unfortunately no government seems to be capable of controlling the rising numbers in government departments for reasons which writers such as Durkheim and C. Northcote Parkinson, and the TV serial "Yes Minister," have made clear.

PERSONNEL CATEGORIES

A second area of micro-economic reform is the area of defence personnel categories. Are the men and women in the services well deployed. On May 7, Senator Ray delivered a

detailed reply in the Senate listing the various categories of defence personnel. It is not possible to make a perfect comparison between the various services, but a rough comparison raises a number of questions. The most difficult questions were raised about the RAAF which has more dentists than doctors. In addition the RAAF has 40 tailors and the Navy none, 11 cinema operators and the Navy none, and 331 "General Hand" cleaners etc, while the Army and the Navy do not have the category at all. On the surface it looks pretty awful for the RAAF but presumably it's as much a question of categorisation as it's reasonable to presume that RAAF cinema operators do other things than project movies, and some other category in the Navy shows the ships' movies. Perhaps a case can be made for some savings at this level, but if not a more standardised system of personnel categories could perhaps be usefully discussed.¹⁰

Another area of financial concern is to be aware of future difficulties before they arise. The recent shedding of personnel has been on the cards since the projected funding figures of the Post Dobbie era appeared. It seemed to me the amount then allotted to salaries was static. Therefore there was either going to be no increase in salaries over the five years of the projection, or numbers were to be cut, or the figures were wrong. We know what happened. It seems that a future crunch time could come from the F/A18 which service life seems to be about 25% less than was hoped for when the planes were ordered. In addition the lack of a high performance advanced trainer means that these fewer available flying hours are being consumed at an even faster rate than would normally be the case, therefore bringing forward the time when the F/A18s will need an extensive overhaul or to be replaced. In either case it might precipitate yet another crisis in the equipment procurement projections. There are rumours around that an advanced trainer may be obtained for the RAAF which would relieve this particular problem but changing priorities may insure

that complications such as this are part of the landscape and they have to be foreseen and perhaps discussed in advance.¹¹

INTERSERVICE RELATIONS

Another area of the journal to examine could be a radical re-assessment of Australia's defence force structure and inter-service relations. Discussions in this area have the potential for treading on more feet in a single edition of the *Journal* than most of us would care to do in a lifetime. It is a reflection of the high level of commitment amongst the personnel of the Services. But inter-service competition is sometimes bitter and damaging. The RAAF defeated the RAN over the aircraft carrier question, according to Canadian observer Jim Boutilier, in spite of the best efforts of men of the calibre of Admiral Sir Anthony Synott. Boutilier raised the issue at the Naval History Seminar in July of 1987 and claimed the RAAF "were more adept at working the corridors of power" and they filled their billets in Canberra with "the *creme de la creme*, the best and brightest who ensured that the initial premises, on which a study like NAP/TAWS stood or fell, favoured the air force".¹² Boutilier's claims amount to saying the RAAF out manoeuvred and outplayed the RAN and they were not well received by some senior retired naval persons at the Conference.

Perhaps now we could examine the possibility of a force structure without a separate air force. The flying elements would suffer an enormous blow to morale, but possibly not a fatal one. There is a risk that some basic air campaign scenarios, notably the air bombardment function might be deleted by greater emphasis on the more parochial demands of the other services, and there would probably be some lessening of the present high standards of the RAAF. However there may be considerable savings to be made in reductions in command structures and committees. I don't think this idea would find much support in the RAAF and I certainly would not like to be the person charged with implementing it,

but perhaps it's worth examining even if the only result was the rejection of the idea.

SOCIOLOGY

Perhaps the sociology or psychology of the defence forces could be examined more closely. Naval postings seem relatively stable and naval personnel are able to spend the majority of their postings based from the Sydney, Canberra and Fremantle areas with shorter deployments in Cairns, Darwin, overseas or smaller reserve establishments. Some of my army friends find Townsville very isolated in spite of it being in the centre of a major tourist area. I fear there may be even more family stress on the soldiers to be moved into the Northern Territory with a consequence of falling retention rates. The services seem far more conscious these days of the stresses on families of movements about the country, so this may be an area of discussion. A second sociological question at the moment is the integration of women into more sea going positions in the Navy. That topic can generate heat in far wider circles than the services. A third area in the light of the German government's decision to prosecute former East German border guards, could be an examination of legal and ethical rights and responsibilities of the modern day service personnel. A fourth area might be ongoing education for naval officers. They all receive an outstanding professional education, but could there be some encouragement to undertake further courses on a more voluntary basis. For instance further graduate or post graduate study in politics or history, or developing foreign language skills. The range and opportunities are far greater than most officers' free time.

THE TARGET OF THE JOURNAL

It is my suggestion therefore that the *Journal* of the ANI should continue to concentrate primarily on serving naval personnel as its major target audience, and to a lesser degree, the civilian defence decision makers. Once the decision is made, it brings in its trail a

number of consequences.

First, the membership drive really has to concentrate on ADFA cadets. These young men should be encouraged to publish, publish, publish. This encouragement must come from the very top, if possible from CNS downwards. It doesn't matter if writers for the Journal make fools of themselves, tread on sacred cows or sacred feet. At least they have had a try. It is difficult but necessary to overcome the natural reticence that many feel about publishing their ideas or experiences. Every decade has to produce its own generation of "young Turks", as we cannot go on living one's life for the pension. Most of the things I regret in my life are things I haven't done.

Although the Council of the ANI is largely Canberra based I imagine they are too busy to spend much time stirring up support among cadets at ADFA. Perhaps a few invitations to an Institute Dinner might help. But the best source of encouragement should come from the teaching staff at ADFA who have to be convinced that the ANI is an effective institution worthy of support.

Another interesting development was the launching in 1990 of the Maritime Strategic Studies Project. This project has aims which are similar, almost parallel to the ANI. Already there has been some cooperation on seminar presentations between the two bodies.¹³ Perhaps the Journal could become a regular vehicle for MSSP publications for Naval consumption.

Although the shared seminars, seapower symposiums and Vernon Parker orations are for the widest possible audience, perhaps the time has come for the Journal to narrow its target audience. Leave the public relations side to organisations like the "Australian Navy

League", "Australian Defence Association" or the "United Services Institute" and encourage naval personnel to contribute to these organisation's journals as well. It would mean a move away from the concepts of the *USNI Proceedings* more towards the style of the *Royal Naval Review*, perhaps even to making the Journal a classified publication.

I was impressed by Peter Jones and Tom Frame's presentation to the Annual General Meeting. I believe that the ANI has a leadership role to play in these rather difficult times for the Australian armed services, and I believe the present Council can provide that leadership. I hope many members of the ANI take up the editor's challenge to comment on this important issue.¹⁴

¹ LCDR. Peter Jones and LEUT Tom Frame, "Australian Naval Institute in 1991 - A Discussion Peter on Future Options," *Journal of the Australian Naval Institute* Vol 17 No 1, p 25

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.* p. 29.

⁴ LCDR A.J. Hinge RAN, "Terrorist Use of Sea mines in the 1980s," and "Navy - Keeping the Peace," *ANI Journal* Vol 17 No. 1. p. 13 & p. 33.

⁵ LEUT Tom Frame, "The Ship History - Recording or Distorting the Navy's Past," *ANI Journal*, Vol 17 No 1. p. 45.

⁶ *Ibid.* footnote No. 4.

⁷ Denis Warner, "Astray on the Birdsville Track" *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, August 1991 p. 27. Harry Gelber, "Defending Australia", *IPA Review* Autumn 1991 p. 21.

⁸ Michael O'Connor, "Air bombardment and the Law of Armed Conflict", *Defender* Winter 1991, p. 31.

⁹ *Round-a-bout Ryan* July 1991. p. 1.

¹⁰ "Defence Manpower Usage" *Defender* Op.Cit., p. 18.

¹¹ John Stackhouse, "Bottoming the Barrel" *The Bulletin* July 23 1991. p. 82

¹² James A. Boutilier, "Get Big or Get Out," *Reflections on the Royal Australian Navy Papers from the Naval History Seminar of 1-3 July 1989* ed. by T.R. Frame, J.V.P. Goldrick, and P.D. Jones Kangaroo Press Sydney 1991. P. 397-8

¹³ Commodore S. Bateman, "The Maritime Strategic Studies Project," *Journal of the Australian Naval Institute* Vol 17 no. 1. p. 51

¹⁴ Don Agar, "From the Editor" *Ibid.* p. 3.

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MARITIME POWER IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER — THE YOUNG TURK'S VIEW

by

Lieutenant Commander James Goldrick, RAN

INTRODUCTION

My theme this afternoon concerns not so much the Gulf but the consequences of the Gulf and the other geo-strategic changes which have been taking place since 1988. My concern is with the consequences for the RAN and its future as an instrument of national policy.

Everything we have heard today demonstrates two points. The first is the ease with which RAN units operated with American and NATO units, largely the result of equipment, procedures and communications interoperability which were themselves the result of long and close links at operational, technical and planning levels.

The second is the underlying theme of the "New World Order" — the fact that the bipolarity of the Cold War is being replaced by a multi-polar world in which the conflicts of interest will stem from many other reasons of self-interest than ideology. And, despite the overwhelming success of United States power and technology, there is an increasing consciousness, foreshadowed by the historian Paul Kennedy in *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, that the present pre-eminent role of the United States as the world policeman is a short-term manifestation. The position of the United States must decline, if not absolutely, then relatively. This is a hard economic fact.

We can see it happening now in Asia. The rapidly developing economic strength of the region is bringing with it the dividend of increased stability and a greater recognition of both individual and collective security interests. Where twenty-five years ago the naval strength of the Association of South East

Asian Nations' members could be summed up as twenty small Malaysian patrol boats, a partly stripped Russian built cruiser in Surabaya and an elderly Japanese built sloop aground in the Bangkok River, ASEAN naval strength now takes up a good many pages in *Jane's Fighting Ships*.

SMALL NAVIES IN THE MODERN WORLD

So what does this mean for Australia and the RAN? Nothing much alarming in the short term but a great deal in the long. It means that we will, increasingly, be one smallish navy amongst many others.

Most of all it means much change in our justification for what we do. What do I mean by this? My thesis is this: the change to a multi-polar world with a host of sophisticated nation states means parallel changes in the nature of naval power. The few powerful major fleets and the limited number of client navies with which they co-operated are now being challenged by the creation of capable maritime forces by nation states which have not before possessed either the means or the inclination to operate navies on any scale.

THE RAN IN THE MODERN WORLD

The RAN has hitherto been one of the privileged client navies. In 1991 it faces the prospect of profound changes in its relationships with the major naval powers at the same time as it faces the challenge of no longer being a pre-eminent influence in the regional maritime environment. How the RAN — and thus in many ways our national security interests — will fare must depend upon how we deal with these two problems.

THE RAN AND 'BIG BROTHER'

Let me start with our relationship with our "Big Brother". To do this it is necessary to go back in history to the foundation of the Australian Navy. First, the RAN was established at a time when, despite much emergent national consciousness and a diverging strategic interest from Britain, Australia was not an independent power and had no legal facility to develop independent foreign policy. In reality, any military forces possessed by a Dominion were elements of the British Crown forces. Both sentiment and law ensured that they would be employed as such come a war — and so they were in 1914.

But there was a second fact. The founders of the RAN wanted an efficient Navy. They knew that the RAN could not be a really effective force in the short term without extensive support from Britain. And this could not operate properly unless the RAN was created in form as a miniature of the RN. I do not say that there was not some element of the fact that the "British way was the only way". There was. But, more importantly, it is and has always been true to say that small navies are fundamentally less efficient than large ones. There are very few exceptions to this rule in the present day. The efficient smaller navies in the modern world are those which have sustained close links with the largest navies.

The difficulty is that this policy, which was sustained consciously right up until the late 1950s (you could not be promoted in the RAN, for example, unless you had served with the RN in the previous rank and been recommended for promotion according to RN standards in that time), clashed with the emerging elements of national sentiment and national interest. I separate these two deliberately because confusion as to their conflict with the navy's relationships with other navies has done much damage.

THE IMAGE PROBLEM

Let me give examples of the two. The Navy

often seemed un-Australian in the past because its officers served so long with the Royal Navy that they metamorphosed to a greater or lesser extent into what were viewed by other Australians as RN "clones". The fact that they were instantly recognisable to the British as Australians with very much their own identity was beside the point. The problem lay in their style as perceived by other Australians. An instance of the effect of this misapprehension on the determination of national interest came in the debate over the Singapore question. The Navy supported the British "main fleet to Singapore" policy and developed its forces in order to integrate with the RN. The Army and RAAF viewed the whole approach with disquiet and argued for additional expenditure on local defence.

In hindsight the argument has been made that the RAN officers were sacrificing the Australian interest to the British. They were not, of course, they simply had a different approach. The fact that both groups before the Second World War may have been right is rarely mentioned. In this case, the British style of the RAN was presumed by its critics and opponents to imply an uncritical British line when this was not the case.

AN ADOLESCENT NAVY

This was one problem for the Navy that continued to dog defence decision making for the next thirty years. T.B. Millar's work on Australian defence policy written in the 1960s makes specific mention of this syndrome. The real difficulty, however, was that RAN officers began to forget the motivations for their client relationship with the Royal Navy and fell into what was very much an adolescent way of thinking — we sought independence without responsibility and the right to criticise without ourselves having full knowledge of what we were criticising. We all know the sort of thing that I mean — the cheerful acceptance of a prescriptive right to criticise British methods while using their training, their equipment and their Books of Reference. We did not start from first principles in determining what it

was that we were doing at sea and why we were doing it. The tendency was to take the operational procedures and concepts of the larger navy and force them into whatever shape was demanded by the forces we possessed.

The entry of the Americans into the picture meant little improvement upon this syndrome. We adopted the DDGs and their associated systems with enthusiasm and took our pick of the United States' training courses while sustaining a cheerful contempt for many of the Americans' procedures. Any Australian DDG was better than any USN DDG. The fact that the Americans had other concerns and saw fit to devote the cream of their talent to other purposes such as nuclear power and aircraft carriers passed us by. What also passed by many was the realisation that without the free admission to the USN systems and procedures, the quantum leap which the DDGs implied in operational capabilities would never have been achieved as early as it was.

I think that the higher administration of the Navy has always been clearly conscious of the anomalies of such a client relationship in relation to the major navies. But I do not think that the appreciation of our position always existed at subordinate levels.

To give you an instance. In 1950 and 1951 we commissioned the Australian built destroyers *Tobruk* and *Anzac*. These had been constructed to a modified design based on the 1945 British *Battle* class. The most important difference was that *Tobruk* and *Anzac* carried the brand new 4.5 inch Mark VI turret — which was not due to go to sea operationally in the Royal Navy until the first of the much delayed British *Daring* class commissioned in 1952. Now it seems to me that it is a glimpse of the blindingly obvious that, if there is a new system available and a big navy is buying it and you can afford it — you'll fit it. And so we did. *Tobruk* was the first operational unit in the World with the Mark VI. Being a brand new design, it had lots of teething troubles — as all novel gunnery systems do. But did we

accept this as something natural? No — I have heard it seriously suggested that the British "set us up" so that all the problems would be out of the way by the time the *Darings* entered service. Yet what would have been said if the British had fobbed us off with the obsolete Mark IV turret of the older *Battle* class? This is what I mean by an adolescent attitude.

CONSEQUENCES

As a result of this immaturity, we found great difficulties in thinking about what Australia's strategic situation required of its navy. We suffered, to use a term beloved of the present Naval Attache in Washington, from "delusions of adequacy". Anything the big navies could do we could do better; anything that the big navies needed we needed as well. We had little idea of the real infrastructure requirements of multi-purpose naval services because so many of those infrastructure requirements represented such a long term investment of funding which had permutated into standing expertise that no amount of budgeting could provide for them without the lapse of decades. We were, until only the last fifteen years, effectively operating squadrons of the Royal Navy and the United States Navy, modified for local conditions but in almost every respect indistinguishable from their own ships. The British Flag Officer Second in Command Far East monitored the operational standards of RAN frigates and destroyers in the Strategic Reserve in the 1960s. No one thought this odd. And where did we look to revive our MCM capability and create a submarine force in 1960 — where else but the Royal Navy?

It was a comfortable enough system. It actually served Australia's strategic needs pretty well. But it did allow us to avoid uncomfortable decisions. And it did not prepare us mentally for the vast changes in our situation which became inevitable with the withdrawal of Britain from East of Suez and with the American debacle in Vietnam. Much has been said about the difficulties of changing the shape of Australian strategy to meet the new requirements. I do not propose here to

attempt to deal with the strategy itself. What I am more interested in is the Navy's reaction to those changes and its response as an entity.

THE DELUSION OF ADEQUACY

In most ways that reaction reflected another stage in our adolescence. Although I understand Rear Admiral Richard Hill's doctrine of the medium maritime power, find his analysis lucid and relevant and agree with most of his conclusions, I cannot help but think that the term "medium maritime power" did a certain amount of harm in Australia because it was applied in a sweeping and over confident manner and, in conjunction with the term "self reliance" came to mean something which it never could, particularly in a country which has no intention of ever spending very much on defence if it can avoid it.

What happened was that we entered a period when we thought that the Australian answer had to be the best answer. We tried to do too much and failed to recognise that what "self reliance" is all about is a recognition of where this country's best interests lie, not necessarily doing everything ourselves or attempting to create a core of expertise in all subjects. Some of the problems of recent years, have I think, been directly attributable to this syndrome. We were not ready — and I would suggest that we could not be ready — to meet the demands of all the novelties with which we were dealing. I am unsure that we are ready now because our tendency is to oscillate between "If we are doing it by ourselves, it must be wonderful" to "Don't look now but everything has turned to shit."

I hope that anyone here who is involved in the submarine project will forgive me making a cynical prophecy. Up until now the new submarine project has been all "hearts and flowers" but, as work progresses, we will start to hear the doom laden buzzes from the after stokers' heads concerning engineering difficulties, stability problems, cost over-runs and, worst horror of all, software problems. By the time she commissions, the first Collins

class will probably have a white cross chalked on her conning tower with "Lord have mercy on our souls" underneath. It won't be until she has been running for a couple of years that people will start to admit that the design is quite a good one. The truth is that any new warship of any sophistication will suffer significant teething troubles — look at the Americans with the Aegis cruisers and the British with their new submarine, the *Upholder*.

LIFE WITH THE BIG NAVIES

And we have not thought through the future of our relationship with the big navies. That it is presently in reasonable repair is seen by the results of the Gulf but we have yet to take a hard line on what it is that we have to do for ourselves and what it is that we will buy, beg, borrow or steal — and I use that term deliberately — from our Big Brothers. I'll leave this part of my argument with one example. Before I came south last weekend, I did a rapid head count of British Books of Reference and other Allied publications carried in my — presently high and dry — ship. In a lone Fremantle class — admittedly British designed — we carried 20 British BRs and 26 Allied publications. Not bad in a 42 metre ship!

If our relationship with the great navies does start to atrophy, what do we have to put in its place? And what resources will be able to do the substitution?

SOUTH EAST ASIA

So we have problems in dealing with the realities of one side of the "New World Order" — but there are others. As far as South East Asia is concerned the Royal Australian Navy is in decline. I do not mean absolute decline — I mean relative decline, which, in realpolitik, comes to the same thing.

Make no mistake. Naval strength is no longer the preserve of the Great Powers and their client allies. It now represents a function of national activity amongst the great majority of

nations of any size and sophistication which have access to the sea. The truth is that the technological edge which the RAN has enjoyed within the South East Asian region has nearly disappeared. Its passing is represented by the commissioning of the sophisticated Singaporean Victory class corvettes, by the acquisition by Malaysia and Indonesia of capable mine counter measure vessels, by the Malaysian project to create a submarine force, by the Indonesian/American project to configure the CN 235 maritime patrol aircraft with the air launched Harpoon missile. I could go on. But as an observer for the last decade I can tell you that these developments are consistent and they are working. Every major Asian power, with the possible exception of China, is — for whatever reason — developing its naval forces and espousing strategic policies which have an increasingly maritime orientation.

I am not arguing that any of these advances in regional capability represent a threat to Australia. They do not of themselves. But what is more important from the aspect of the navy as an instrument of policy is that the relative importance of an RAN presence in South East Asia must inevitably decline. Nations which are capable of operating naval forces of some sophistication are much less likely to be impressed by the national capability implicit in the deployment of major combatants. What these developments represent is a challenge.

ARMS SALES

And we had better get it out of our heads that we are going to be the beneficiaries of any decisive technological advantages from the major powers unless there is something in it for them. If there is one lesson from the Gulf War it is that arms sales are not going to stop. And, the less the importance of ideology and standing alliances, the more part will be played by the almighty dollar, particularly when a country with large scale defence industries is cutting down on its own budget. We may see some interesting rationalisations to justify

arms sales but we are definitely going to see arms sales. From the great power point of view, Australia is no more a "worthy" beneficiary of arms than any other regional power. Our credentials as a maintainer of stability are no better than anyone else's.

And remember, too, that the more sophisticated a navy, the more discriminating it will be in its purchases. Beads to the natives and Old Ming are a thing of the past unless there is some pressing financial advantage to accompany them. Buyer nations will insist on the "top of the range" missile homing head and will not be content with the "export model". They will also be more prone to check that what they are getting matches the specifications and they will be more capable of doing the check themselves. We already have examples of discrimination — the Thais were happy to have frigates built in China but, as soon as possible, they have opted for "bare hulls" with a fit of Western systems.

KEEPING AHEAD

So what will make the difference? In a word, doctrine — the ability to exploit the technology available to the seagoing fleet. And it is here that we return to my earlier point — that small navies are inherently less efficient than large ones. I make a rider to this — they are less efficient in a time of technological change (such as the present) because they lack both the human and the financial resources to derive sufficient operational experience from the equipment they have, analyse that experience and determine what lessons should be applied. This lack is something which we see time and time again in passage exercises with navies which have not enjoyed the same cosy relationship with the leading navies which has been our lot. And it is something of which our regional neighbours are acutely aware. Should it be any surprise that they send so many students overseas to the United States and to the United Kingdom, sometimes at exorbitant cost, to learn what they can from the major navies. Should it be any surprise that there is much interest in seeking assistance

from the RAN?

So the difference in capability in a world in which there are so many navies will lie in doctrine, not technology itself — or, to express it somewhat differently, in the possession of information and the ability to exploit it. And what does that mean for the RAN?

In short we have to decide just how we can access the best sources. The race, ladies and gentlemen, will go not to the swiftest but to the best informed. And here lies the problem for the RAN. On the one hand, we stand a good chance of losing our access to the big western navies — or, more critically, our “privileged” access to them — while we have yet to develop really strong links with the South East Asian navies and possess ourselves only a very limited data base and an equally limited capacity to originate or develop doctrine for ourselves. I hope that you see my line of argument — the future of the navy depends absolutely upon its ability to manage information.

MANAGING INFORMATION

How do we go about that management? The first solution is to recognise our relationships with other navies for what they are. Within the context of mutual strategic interests, we must realise that we are in with the big navies for what we can get. Sentiment be blowed. Every exchange officer, every man involved in a multi-national exercise must be out there to learn and to bring back knowledge about procedures, about equipment and about promising developments. We have to make the learning process formal and we have to develop means by which the invaluable experience of our exchange personnel can be turned immediately into solid information and not retained within the brain of the officer concerned. We have started to move in this direction but I would suggest that a permanent “debriefing and translation” team would be worth consideration, with an accompanying brief to analyse the lessons of major multinational exercises.

SPECIALISING TO SURVIVE

We have to specialise in our attempts to develop unique capacities and this specialisation should be determined not only in relation to Australia’s strategic requirements — there is and should be no way round that requirement — but in relation to what will be of benefit to the navies which have something to offer us. And that does not only apply to the USN and to the Royal Navy but to the South East Asian Navies. The Singaporeans are in the process of acquiring at least four mine countermeasure vessels and have a host of other activities in that field. It is difficult to believe that there are no opportunities there. The efforts in anti—submarine warfare under the Five Power Defence Agreement represent a beginning; we have to capitalise on this.

I’ll make two observations on this subject. The first is that the time is coming when the bigger Navies may welcome links with us because reductions in their own force strength will mean that they themselves will have to pick and choose. We are already seeing this in the Royal Navy. Britain is unlikely to be in a position to afford a new generation area defence missile for the AAW units. Collaboration with the French (of all people) is almost inevitable. So there may be a willingness to take advantage of other nations’ expertise on a *quid pro quo* arrangement.

As a corollary. Having chosen our fields of expertise, we must bury forever the “Not invented here” and “We can do better than that” syndromes. We must decide what we want, write the staff requirement with care, select the right system and write the contract with even more care. If it is not in our designated areas of development then we must avoid at all costs the labels “High Technical Risk” and “Still to Go to Sea”. All this done, we must get on with the job of learning how to use it properly — “Best is the Enemy of Good Enough”. We must content ourselves with the Volkswagen of reality rather than the Mercedes of our dreams.

TALKING TO EACH OTHER

And, above all, we have to achieve a revolution in our internal thinking and in the way that we transmit information around our own system. I suppose that the most important thing here is a change in attitudes. For a small navy, we have a remarkable ability to break ourselves down into small tribal groups between which minor wars often break out. These disputes can be a healthy sign but tribalism is no good thing when it results in the senior members of each tribe concealing their specialist knowledge from the uninitiated. I remember the look of horror on a submariner's face when I told him that we were planning to distribute the submariners' tactical guides to the Principal Warfare Officers' course. You

just don't do that with people from the skimmers — they might read them! And, even though I pick on the submariners, the fact is that we are all guilty of such tribalism. But we cannot afford it.

CONCLUSION

Rather than stupefying you all with a repetition of my points and recommendations, let me conclude with a quotation which encapsulates my thesis. It is Benjamin Franklin's cheerful comment made on the occasion of the signing of the American Declaration of Independence: "Yes, we must, indeed, all hang together or, most assuredly, we shall all hang separately."



Beating the Retreat at Darwin Naval Base

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NAVAL POWER AND ALTERNATIVE SECURITY POSTURES IN A 'POST-COLD WAR' ASIA-PACIFIC ORDER

A development of a presentation to the Australian naval Institute at HMAS *Watson* on 16 May 1991

by

William T. Tow, Senior Lecturer Department of Government University of Queensland

INTRODUCTION

The Persian Gulf War has underscored the increasing importance of regional power balances in the emerging post-cold war international security order. The imminent demise of the Soviet Union as a single political sovereignty can only reinforce this trend.

President Bush justified U.S. and allied military actions against Iraq as necessary to structure a 'new world order'. The coalition forces' effort to reverse Saddam Hussein's military occupation of Kuwait, however, was implemented for much higher stakes than merely restoring Kuwaiti sovereignty. Uninterrupted access to the strategically vital oil fields of Saudi Arabia, combined with thwarting the threat of a formidable, Iraqi-led Arab coalition which could seriously threaten Israel's security were implicit but very real considerations in the Western industrial nations' ultimate decision to wage war against Iraq. Baghdad's challenge to the uneasy regional power equilibrium shaping Middle Eastern security politics could not be allowed to succeed.

In Eastern Europe, the traditionally rigid confines of the Warsaw Pact have been supplanted without any consensual alternative security framework to take its place. Regional anarchy has already become manifest with widespread chaos and violence in Yugoslavia. Other flashpoints abound through what were the Soviet Empire and East European bloc. The extent to which the Conference for European Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) can eliminate the gap in economic

resources and political cohesion between the prosperous states of the European Community (EC) and their tumultuous counterparts in the eastern part of the European continent is highly questionable.

One of the major 'lessons' emerging from both the Gulf War and the demise of the centralised power in the USSR is that precarious regional power vacuums — real or perceived — can lead to strategic miscalculations and to protracted conflicts if left unattended by the policymakers responsible for defining and shaping regional security orders. Despite President Bush's optimistic rhetoric about a revived United Nations Security Council providing the basis for a future consensus on global security problems, collective defence arrangements supported by the great powers appear most likely to remain the predominant means for maintaining peace and stability in an increasingly multipolar world. At present, prospects for an alternative global 'security regime' materialising, within which shared values regarding mutual security and cooperation lead to a peaceful international environment, are remote¹. At this juncture, when both the United States and Soviet Union are experiencing financial crises and are reducing their global strategic commitments, the dangers of regional conflicts are intensifying as new aspirants to regional hegemony multiply.

In this context, understanding what role naval power will have in shaping the future of international security is critical. This is particularly true in the Asia-Pacific where the balance of power has long been shaped by

maritime capabilities. For almost a half century, the United States has maintained a powerful offshore force presence in the Pacific and has thus been a key stabilising force in the region's balance-of-power. Recently, however, U.S. budgetary constraints have led to a decision by Washington to reduce its forces in Asia by 10-12 per cent by the end of 1993.² A streamlined U.S. basing presence in the Pacific also appears inevitable with the signing of an agreement between the United States and the Philippines in mid-July 1992, effectively removing American military personnel from Clark Air Base by the end of the year. The fate of U.S. operations and facilities at the Subic Bay naval installation remains uncertain because the Philippines' Senate has given every indication that it could well reject the new agreement which calls for a ten year extension of the American presence at this site.³ American officials insist that the U.S. will continue to play a strategic role in the region and engage in security cooperation with regional friends and allies through 'cooperative vigilance'.⁴ Nevertheless, evolving geopolitical developments underscore the rising importance of China, India, Japan, and other regional powers in shaping the Asia-Pacific security framework for the remainder of this century and beyond. Any forthcoming alternative security order will need to take these regional powers' security interests into greater account.

How superpower retraction, occurring simultaneously with a gradual strengthening of regional powers' military capabilities, will affect the region's threat environment will be briefly assessed. It is argued here that unless both regional and extra-regional powers move rapidly and decisively to identify and reach consensus on naval arms control and related confidence-building measures as integral parts of any new regional security order in the Asia-Pacific, prospects for peace and stability there will be reduced while the probability of regional conflict occurring will increase.

CHANGING REGIONAL THREATS AND STRATEGIC PRIORITIES

Clearly, planners in most countries which used to comprise the East and West blocs are assigning greater priority to domestic economic challenges and less weight to the maintenance of extensive military deployments abroad and ideological competition. The Asia-Pacific has been slower to accept the waves of political change and reform which have predominated in Europe. However, the region's spectacular economic growth is too important to Asian elites to allow for indiscriminate arms races. Consequently, while the defence budgets of most Asia-Pacific states may rise modestly, any spending increases will be directed toward countering only those regional threats most affecting their own national security.

A brief survey of defence expenditures recently supported by Asia's largest military powers underscores the point. The People's Republic of China (PRC) announced the first real growth in its official defence budget in seven years during March 1990. Nevertheless, the United States Central Intelligence Agency has since concluded that 'the bulk of increased [Chinese] defence allocations will probably not be used to buy weapons to meet an external threat but primarily to meet Beijing's concerns about the ability of the Chinese military to quell any future domestic crisis'.⁵ The Japanese Government's September 1990 Defence White Paper did not describe the Soviet Union as a 'threat' for the first time in a decade. The Kaifu government thus drafted a 1991-92 national budget that envisioned only a 5.1 percent increase in defence spending — the lowest rise in Japanese defence spending in over three decades.⁶ India has also slightly decreased its overall military expenditures between 1988-90, although spending for certain weapons systems has increased. Even South Korea has recently registered its first decrease in military spending relative to its overall gross domestic product (GDP) in eighteen years.⁷ Taiwan, Singapore, and Malaysia have experienced only incremental

growth in their respective defence budgets.

Notwithstanding tighter regional defence budgets, an Asian power vacuum could nevertheless develop, with commensurately higher risks of crises and wars as the global balance of power shifts from bipolarity to a far more complex multipolar framework. A number of familiar Asia-Pacific crises, of course, are still unresolved. Renewed hostilities on the Korean Peninsula are of most immediate concern to U.S. military commanders in the Pacific as North Korea shows little sign of easing its nuclear weapons development program⁸. Future clashes between China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines over territorial rights to the Spratly Islands group in the South China Sea cannot yet be discounted. Despite ongoing and monumental political reform at home, the Soviet Pacific Fleet continues to menace Japan, replacing obsolete military ships and aircraft and still deploying substantial ground and air forces in the Northern Territories which Tokyo regards as their own. Unsettled boundaries in peninsular Southeast Asia may yet threaten the general peace and stability which ASEAN states currently enjoy with one another. A resurgence of factional warfare against fragile authoritarian regimes within ASEAN or Indochina cannot be completely discounted.

Intra-regional disputes, long overshadowed by the rivalries and conflicts among the major powers in the Asia-Pacific, may intensify as great power rivalries decline or shift to other regions. Long simmering Thai-Vietnamese enmities, aggravated by Cambodia's incessant failures to define itself as an independent political sovereignty, are illustrative. So too are both latent Malaysian and Singaporean fears of resurgent Indonesian geopolitical ambitions in the Malay archipelago. These latent antagonisms and concerns are further complicated by the disquieting reality that the ASEAN states have long had a tendency to formulate threat perceptions which are at cross purposes with, and which fuel *de facto* arms races against, each other⁹.

EMERGING MARITIME THREATS

Of most concern to naval planners are those regional tensions which could arise from efforts by Asia's indigenous powers, believing themselves to be less constrained by a reduced superpower maritime presence in the region, to impose the politics of hegemony on their neighbours. To be sure, the American Seventh Fleet will remain powerful in the region, despite U.S. plans to reduce its force presence. Soviet naval power and air support will continue to confront U.S. and Japanese forces with a formidable offshore challenge in Northeast Asia, despite recent reports of cutbacks in Soviet military manoeuvres opposite Japan due to fuel shortages and apparent Soviet desires to normalise relations with Tokyo. Nevertheless, no maritime power appears able to easily dominate this maritime theatre of operations to the extent that the United States prevailed for much of the cold war era. A brief inventory of the major regional navies now operating in the Pacific which could potentially threaten peace and security in that theatre of operations is essential.

The Soviet Union

At the time of this writing, what remains of the Soviet Union continues to deploy, and modernise, a substantial array of military forces opposite Japan and U.S. positions in Northeast Asia. It maintains approximately 90 major surface combatants in the Pacific Fleet. It deploys 135 submarines, 75 of which are nuclear powered and include the highly lethal *Typhoon* and *Delta* strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) in the Sea of Othotsk. These are supplemented by 'state-of-the-art' MiG 29, MiG 31, SU-24 and SU-27 aircraft. A 7000-man strong amphibious unit which could launch substantial offensive operations against neighbouring Asian states is available.

The Soviet offshore forces stationed in the Asia-Pacific, however, are still limited compared to their U.S. counterparts. Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean and in the

South China Sea has been scaled back significantly over the past few years. Although the USSR's military planners have recently announced Moscow's intention to preserve a low-key Soviet force presence at Cam Ranh Bay, the costs of developing that Vietnamese port into anything resembling the extensive U.S. facilities in the Philippines have proven to be far too high for the Gorbachev regime to sustain. Any such base would appear irrelevant to today's Soviet leadership which must concentrate on internal political and economic reforms¹⁰. Although Soviet interdiction capabilities against the U.S. Seventh Fleet's control of sea lanes in Northeast Asia remain worrisome to American and allied planners, in general, the Soviets lack the means and, given recent domestic political trends, the political will to fight a protracted war in the Asia-Pacific theatre against U.S. and allied forces.

China

The Chinese navy is traditionally a coastal defence force that only recently has acquired a limited regional power projection capability. Its naval force modernization programs nevertheless represent a potential threat to other regional powers and even, on a more limited basis, to the United States¹¹. Most notably, 53 destroyers and frigates, along with its 110 conventional, three tactical nuclear, and one strategic ballistic nuclear submarines — while comparatively more dated and less proficient than the superpowers' comparable force assets in the Pacific — give Beijing a limited naval warfighting capability with which to deter future superpower attacks against the Chinese homeland or contest future Soviet or U.S. efforts to impose blockades against Chinese-controlled territory.

China's military technology deficiencies remain the achilles heel of its defence modernization program and these weaknesses appear unlikely to dissipate over the near future. In regard to naval power projection capabilities, the PLA Navy has been described by respected Western analysts as technically backward and operationally immature¹².

China's most advanced *Luda*-class destroyers are stationed in the North Seas fleet, within easy striking distance of both superpowers and vulnerable even to a far more modern Japanese navy. The *Ludas* and *Jianghu* frigates are reported to experience incessant problems with on-board weapons, equipment, and powerplants — drawbacks which have not been completely overcome with sporadic infusion of both indigenous and foreign systems and engines¹³.

While Chinese marines have clashed intermittently with Vietnamese forces deployed on the Spratly Islands, Beijing's ability to reinforce its limited ground force presence there during a protracted conflict against a determined opponent is suspect. Assessments offered by U.S. Department of Defence analysts estimate that the PLA Navy has a sealift capability to move one infantry division with tanks to the Spratlys for a 30 day maximum deployment. Even reconnaissance aircraft stationed in Hainan can only spend a few minutes over the Spratlys because Chinese in-flight refuelling capabilities are extremely limited¹⁴. While China has reportedly agreed to purchase 24 state-of-the-art Soviet Sukhoi Su-27 'Flanker' all-weather jet fighters, the aforementioned lack of aerial refuelling capability will at least for some time preclude their coverage of fleet operations and limit their attack radius to around 400 nautical miles.

India

The extent to which Indian maritime power constitutes a regional 'threat' is unclear. India's own coastline stretches over 7600 kilometres and 500 islands into the Indian Ocean. Its growing naval capabilities can thus be justified as necessary for protecting India's extensive sea lanes of communication and exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The heightened Indian maritime profile has been justified on the basis of New Delhi's right to pursue a so-called 'South Asian Monroe Doctrine.' This posture of regional security is founded on India's strong opposition 'to

outside intervention in the domestic affairs of other South Asian nations, especially by external powers whose goals are inimical to Indian interests.¹⁵

What concerns other Asia-Pacific nations is the extent to which India will become inclined to move beyond a merely *defensive* regional maritime posture to one more *offensive* in orientation with the intent to create or enlarge strategic 'buffer zones' at their expense.

Australian defence analysts are particularly concerned that, since most shipping lanes and trade lanes originating from the Persian Gulf/Middle East and transgressing the Malacca Straits pass near both India's southwest coast and the Bay of Bengal, any signs of Indian maritime assertiveness must be taken very seriously. Thailand and other ASEAN states are also wary about Indian naval and air facilities which have become operative in the Andaman and Nicobar islands area less than 100 kilometres from the shores of Myanmar (Burma) and Thailand. India's 18 submarines, eight Bear-F maritime reconnaissance aircraft, and two carrier battle groups comprise one of the few existing naval forces capable of projecting power well into the easternmost reaches of the Indian Ocean and potentially into ASEAN's western maritime passages. Indian military analysts advising their government have speculated that their country's strategic cooperation eventually must extend into ASEAN to block Chinese naval encroachments into Southeast Asia. Understandably ASEAN policy planners are concerned that their proposed Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) could be crushed in a vise of Sino-Indian naval confrontation.¹⁶

To an even greater extent than China, however, India's political turmoil and economic weaknesses combine to impede its strategic aspirations. At present, the central Indian government is nothing more than a shaky coalition of long-feuding and disparate factions, each capable of unravelling what little domestic political stability remains in the country following Rajiv Gandhi's

assassination. Ethnic and religious problems in Kashmir, the Punjab, and throughout the country will sap the energies of central authorities for years to come. Accordingly, naval and other military modernization programs have become increasingly jeopardised. A new destroyer construction project has been put on hold, procurement of missiles for deployment on existing naval vessels is stymied and fuel supplies needed to conduct manoeuvres at sea are critically short¹⁷. Indian defence analyst R.R. Subramanian recently summarised India's plight by noting that despite Australia and ASEAN fears,

'India's naval doctrine for operation in the waters of the Asia-Pacific is presently non-existent. There are presently resource constraints that limit the expenditure on further naval modernization. For this reason, the Indian navy can at best operate in the Indian Ocean and not beyond.'¹⁸

Japan

Following the termination of the Gulf War, Prime Minister Kaifu quickly dispatched four Japanese minesweepers to the Gulf to assist in mineclearing operations. He won support of the ASEAN states for this deployment by visiting most Southeast Asian capitals and arguing that Tokyo, as a key industrial — and oil dependent — nation, was merely fulfilling American requests to help stabilise the Gulf with a low-key and non-threatening gesture of solidarity with other Western powers¹⁹.

The extent to which ASEAN, China, and other regional actors will accept future Japanese efforts to assert military power throughout the Asia-Pacific is far less certain. While understanding and sympathising with Japan's self defence programs tailored to check Soviet military power opposite its northern shores, apprehensions over Japan's military *potential* have never really disappeared since 1945. In this context, how would a powerful and independent Japanese navy in the Asia-Pacific relate to the interests of the superpowers, to those of China and India as Japan's most likely

strategic regional competitors, and to other Asia-Pacific states?

In the absence of a continued U.S. security guarantee which Tokyo perceived as adequately protecting its resource lifelines and deterring threats to its politico-economic autonomy, Japan could adopt measures to transform its current Maritime Self-Defence Force (MSDF) which is *not* offensive-oriented to one that is. More specifically, the Japanese could increase their present inventories of nearly sixty destroyers (more than twice the number found in the U.S. Seventh Fleet) and over 200 tactical jet fighter aircraft, and arm them with far more lethal missiles and armaments than they now deploy. Advanced command and control systems (such as AWACs aircraft), air-refuelling capabilities, and light aircraft carriers could also be introduced in far greater numbers. Advanced surface-to-surface missile systems could be developed specifically for sea control missions, while ASW capabilities could be enhanced substantially. Access to regional bases could be negotiated over time, given a combination of funds and military intimidation directed toward various Southeast Asian elites otherwise indisposed to facilitate Japanese strategic interests. Indeed, the Japanese government is already exploring the idea that as American forces are reduced in Asia, Japan should develop a 'security dialogue' with the ASEAN states and with other Pacific powers²⁰.

While any combination of these developments would still leave Japan well short of matching American or Soviet force inventories, Tokyo is more than able to finance and develop regional offensive capabilities which could rival those of China or India at the subnuclear level of conflict and which could independently safeguard and even expand those sea lanes of communication through the Malacca Straits and the Indian Ocean which the Japanese deem to be most critical to their own interests.

ASSESSMENT

The Asia-Pacific's evolving balance of maritime power presages probable increased influence by its regional maritime powers. In the short-term, India appears to be in the best position to dominate its own subregion in South Asia while Japan and China both wrestle with limitations in their maritime capabilities or resolve. Japanese weaknesses are largely self-imposed because of Tokyo's sensitivities about regional apprehensions to its potential military role. China's lack of a formidable military-industrial base constrains clearly visible Chinese intentions to develop the PRC into a great military power and to use the PLA Navy to pursue irredentist agendas.

In the coming decades, however, China's coherent doctrine which embodies the use of military force for attaining national security objectives may reverse the PRC's current technological and economic deficiencies; and Japan's sophisticated techno-economic infrastructure may well be applied to securing strategic footholds throughout maritime Southeast Asia. The eventual status of Indian naval power is less certain, given that nation's growing political uncertainties and economic difficulties²¹.

REJECTING MARITIME POWER POLITICS: Nuclear-free zones, nationalism and budgetary constraints

A second byproduct of American naval retrenchment from the Asia-Pacific has been a tendency of the region's smaller powers to define and implement national security policies diverging from their traditional ties with and dependence upon Western alliance guarantees. The most graphic example of this trend has been New Zealand's break with the ANZUS alliance over the issue of Washington's refusal to modify its 'neither confirm nor deny' policies regarding the presence of nuclear weapons or capabilities on its naval units and military aircraft. At least some of the ASEAN states are also reconsidering the utility of any great power

naval presence in peninsular Southeast Asia, viewing such deployments as impediments to the ultimate realisation of a 'zone for peace, freedom, and neutrality' (ZOPFAN) in their own subregion. Major issues corollary to the intensification of anti-nuclear movements in the Asia-Pacific are the questions of to what extent traditional postwar deterrence still plays a vital role in regional defence and stability and how large, nuclear-capable navies — designed to pursue global strategies — fit into the regional security framework.

New Zealand

The U.S.-New Zealand dispute over NCND (1984-87) has been assessed extensively elsewhere²². Anti-nuclear political movements in the Pacific are nonetheless highly germane to how future naval operations in that ocean will be conducted by both indigenous and extra-regional maritime powers for some time to come. Port access, basing operations, and freedom of naval transit will all be affected by the degree to which future navies are required to disclose their weapons inventories and capabilities. U.S. military officials have remained adamant that being required to publicly disclose such information would irreparably compromise global deterrence by removing any element of surprise the U.S. Navy could employ against an adversary threatening its own forces or the security of its allies, and by jeopardising the effectiveness of overall U.S. global alliance strategy (honouring one ally's refusal to support the nuclear deterrence components of such strategy).

In late October 1990, the Labour government which originally pushed the New Zealand *Nuclear Free Zone Disarmament and Arms Control Act* through that country's Parliament was replaced by a National government far more sympathetic to the American vantagepoint, but still restrained by a New Zealand electorate which overwhelmingly backed the retention of the anti-nuclear legislation. New Zealand Foreign Minister Don McKinnon subsequently noted that as

long as the United States, and, more specifically, the U.S. Defence Department remained adamant in its position that NCND would not be modified in any way, prospects for a full reinstatement of ANZUS remained grim²³. Another analyst, evaluating the dilemma of a government hamstrung by an electorate determined to contest NCND and by a traditional senior ally equally determined to preserve it, concluded that the United States would 'have no wish to deal with a small country [New Zealand] that is going to swing from one extreme to another with every change of government.'²⁴

The Pacific Island-States

How has the anti-nuclear movement in New Zealand disrupted regional security in the South/Southwest Pacific? Throughout much of the postwar era, the newly emerging microstates in Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia relied upon a unified ANZUS to provide a benign security umbrella. New Zealand was often the ANZUS power most sensitive to their individual sovereignty and needs; however, its small military forces could not effectively operate in the region on their own. Wellington had relied upon U.S., prior to the ANZUS rupture, and upon Australian defence resources, to implement a viable collective security posture in support of its economic and development assistance programs.

While the cold war has receded, the microstates' growth pains have intensified and their vulnerability to economic and political encroachment remains high. Events unfolding in Fiji, Vanuatu, and throughout French Polynesia over the past five years are all cases-in-point. France has moved to stem ethnic turmoil in its remaining colonial outposts and to patrol the economic enterprise zones of Fiji and the Cook Islands. Australia and New Zealand have conducted patrolling operations in the South Pacific. Some degree of coordination re P-3 Orion maritime surveillance has been achieved, and New Zealand/Australian military exercises are still

conducted with a South Pacific mission-orientation firmly in mind. The ANZAC frigate project has been hampered by intermittent suspicions entertained in New Zealand that Australia intends to control Wellington's security policy to a greater extent than Washington ever did prior to the severing of most U.S.-New Zealand defence ties during the ANZUS dispute. Feelings are also still strong in New Zealand that the United States tends to dominate Australian views on international security; that New Zealand is now largely overlooked by Canberra in the latter's preoccupation with defending Australia's northern and northwest approaches — a defence strategy which inevitably favours increased Australian defence cooperation with the United States at New Zealand's expense²⁵.

Nuclear Free Zones

Initial American fears that New Zealand's dissent from the United States' extended deterrence strategy would generate disruption in its relations with other allies and friends in the Asia-Pacific, and in other regions, have thus far proven to be unfounded. Such apprehensions could yet be justified if regional anti-nuclear movements become more adept in legitimising NCND at a time when superpower military competition appears to be on the wane. Nuclear-free zones could probably be adopted if the Asia-Pacific's indigenous naval powers — most notably India and China — were to develop maritime nuclear deterrents as instruments for regional coercion. Responding to the first trend and perhaps in partial anticipation of the second development, the South Pacific Forum, consisting of Australia, New Zealand, and eleven other South Pacific nations, signed the Treaty of Rarotonga in August 1985 — establishing the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. While pledging not to introduce nuclear weapons into their treaty area, the signatories failed to challenge NCND directly because it was left to each affiliate to interpret the treaty's application on a 'case-by-case basis'.

ASEAN

The ASEAN states have watched developments in the South Pacific closely and, in December 1987, issued a collective statement supporting the establishment of a Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANFZ). Predictably, the United States dissented. It argued that regional peace and stability throughout Southeast Asia was best achieved by ASEAN continuing to work with traditional external allies and friends²⁶. Throughout the first half of 1991, ASEAN foreign policy elites and analysts have convened on several occasions to discuss how they should proceed toward more extensive regional security cooperation. No real consensus has yet been reached, however, and the question of nuclear-free zone politics has not emerged as a predominant topic in most of these discussions.

The Philippines constitutes a special case within the ASEAN framework. As noted above, the Aquino government has negotiated a renewal for its basing arrangements with the United States for American military access to Subic Bay. However, nationalism and money, not the Philippines' anti-nuclear constitution, were the major negotiating issues. Singapore has also granted U.S. naval and air forces rotational basing rights (in November 1990), facilitating the dispersal of American offshore power in the Pacific under Washington's developing 'cooperative vigilance' strategy. Recent Indonesian proposals for replacing the traditional Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) between Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, Britain, and New Zealand with a more regionally autonomous tripartite pact between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have not been received enthusiastically by the latter two ASEAN states who entertain lingering fears of Indonesian geopolitical ambitions. Moreover, to the extent that Chinese and Indian naval development incorporates a nuclear dimension, SEANFZ is unlikely to be as appealing to the ASEAN states as a continued, if low-key, U.S. naval presence in the area which would be viewed as

a logical 'counterbalance' to any upgraded presence of the Asia-Pacific's 'middle nuclear powers.' Assuming Washington moves forward to implement its envisioned force reductions in the Pacific under the criteria of the East Asia Security Initiative, alternatives to balance-of-power 'politics as usual' for the region may have to be more seriously pursued.

Maritime Reach and Australian Budgetary Constraints

Australia has been an important contributor to regional peace and stability with its maintenance of significant maritime force projection assets. In recent years, however, Australian governments have opted to relinquish that country's traditional 'forward defence' posture for a strategy emphasising defence self-reliance in defending Australia's own territory and contiguous sea lanes in the Indian Ocean and South Pacific.

In late May 1991, the Hawke government continued this policy trend by disclosing a new 10-Year Defence Plan which focused on the security of Australia's immediate northern and western approaches. Under this plan, the Australian Navy would extend its domestic basing network along Australia's west coast to accommodate its procurement of Collins class diesel submarines and the ANZAC frigates. In its parliamentary statement outlining the Defence Plan, the Government justified its approach on the basis of the 1987 Defence White Paper which anticipated no serious or immediate threat to Australia's own security materialising over the near future²⁷.

Opposition spokesmen and independent analysts criticised the government for failing to recognise the Asia-Pacific's 'changing strategic environment' since the Defence White Paper's release. They pointed to continued (if modest) increases in the defence budgets of other regional powers and to the lack of formal regional arms control agreements as necessitating a higher level of Australian defence preparedness and regional power projection capabilities²⁸.

It is not feasible for Australia to field sufficient naval power to compensate for future reductions of the traditional postwar U.S. force presence in South East Asia and the South Pacific resulting from Washington's budget deficit. Prospects are greater for Australian maritime forces to cooperate with their FPDA, New Zealand, and South Pacific counterparts to strengthen joint defence planning and regional maritime surveillance efforts and to better coordinate defence procurement efforts as part of a comprehensive regional collective defence strategy. Such measures can be justified only if there is widespread agreement as to what constitutes a threat to regional security and only in the context of supplementing regional confidence-building arrangements designed to alleviate such threats.

REGIONAL CONFIDENCE BUILDING: OPTIONS AND TRENDS

The politics of arms control and confidence-building measures in the Asia-Pacific is hardly new. In 1964, China adopted a 'no first use' posture in conjunction with its first nuclear weapons test. Five years later, the Soviet Union proposed an Asian Collective Security arrangement which was correctly interpreted by those regional powers declining to join as designed to contain growing Chinese military power. Japan and China were particularly instrumental in pressuring the U.S. and USSR to expand the Soviet dismantlement of SS-20 nuclear missiles to Asia in the superpowers' intermediate nuclear forces (INF) agreement signed in 1987.

Current Approaches

Recently, efforts to promote diverse mechanisms for Asia-Pacific nations for the definition and implementation of new approaches to regional security have accelerated. In July 1990, Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans called for the development of a Conference for Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA) which would be

modelled along the lines of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) founded in Helsinki during 1975. Evans envisioned CSCA as a means for facilitating dialogue and negotiations on unresolved Asian security problems, including outstanding maritime-related issues such as the territorial disputes over the Spratly Islands²⁹. At the same gathering, Canadian Foreign Minister Joe Clark suggested that ongoing tensions in Northeast Asia required an exclusive security forum for that subregion, with Canada, China, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the two Koreas as participants³⁰.

Even more recently, Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir has pushed for an East Asia Economic Grouping with overtones of high politics. As envisioned by Mahathir, EAEG would exclude the United States and Australia as 'non-Asian' powers and instead focus on Japan as a *political* as well as economic regional policy manager. To date, the Japanese have firmly rejected the Malaysian plan. EAEG, however, appeals to those within the region who, following the Gulf War, have become more fearful of a return to a 'unipolar' international system and of American reprisals against those Third World nations who refuse to go along with Washington's vision of a new international security order³¹.

Finally, the United States, Japan, and Australia, as ASEAN's most important 'dialogue partners', support the eventual transformation of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group, initially meeting at Canberra in November 1989, and including 12 founding nations: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, and the United States. The People's Republic of China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan are scheduled to participate by late 1991 or early 1992. The group's organisers believe that economic security will be among the most important determinants of overall regional security politics and that APEC provides a natural umbrella organisation with all the earmarks of a 'common security'

approach that would best fit the Asia-Pacific region: fulfilling the development aspirations and needs for regional stability by all its members without indiscriminately imposing the *status quo* over reform in each crisis or dispute that may materialise within the region³².

Certainly the United States and its Asia-Pacific allies should work to create new instrumentalities which promise to facilitate arms control and stability in the region. Such measures should include aspects of naval arms control which the Americans heretofore have resisted. Admittedly, as a Council on Foreign Relations study group recently observed, 'arms control works best in a two-sided situation when it is clear what is being measured against what.'³³ The Council's argument that 'In multipolar settings, and especially where there are complex sets of overlapping rivalries, such efforts are likely to be both infeasible and undesirable beyond a limited number of confidence-building measures...', however, underrates the forces of change in international relations similar to those which worked for CSCE and which were arguably instrumental in the ultimate political liberalisation of Eastern Europe. While there are geostrategic and cultural differences between Europe and Asia, the Europeans had no less seemingly intractable ethnic and territorial disputes in their region in the years leading to INF and to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in November 1990.

U.S. Positions

With the political disintegration of the Soviet Union more imminent, following the unsuccessful coup attempt of Soviet hardliners in August 1991, a critical roadblock to arms control and CBM in the Asia-Pacific remains the U.S. Navy's strong resistance to discussing meaningful cuts in its seaborne nuclear capabilities deployed throughout the region. Soviet naval modernization programs in Northeast Asia have been highlighted by American naval analysts testifying before the U.S. Congress regarding Soviet-proposed

confidence-building initiatives such as observing naval exercises (exchanges of port visits already have occurred), reciprocal dismantling of Soviet basing facilities in Cam Ranh Bay in return for American withdrawal from Subic Bay and Clark Air Base, banning naval superpower activity in major international straits and shipping lanes such as the Malacca Straits, and establishing sanctuaries for ballistic missile submarines in the Pacific and Indian Ocean to assure the survival of second-strike deterrence capabilities. The U.S. counterarguments have been that observation or arms control verification exercises would be unacceptably intrusive (and therefore dangerous to maintaining the West's own deterrence posture), that relinquishing U.S. bases would distort the current 'asymmetrical' power equilibrium in the Pacific whereby American naval deployments must counter Soviet land force superiority in that theatre, and that the USSR maintains twice the number of nuclear-powered attack submarines needed to underwrite its 'bastion defence strategy' of protecting ballistic nuclear missile submarines (SSBNs) in the Sea of Okhotsk and in other waters close to Soviet shores³⁴. These counterarguments represent the essence of U.S. disarmament politics in the Asia-Pacific because the U.S. navy continues to dominate overall American defence policy for Asia³⁵.

Naval Arms Control/Confidence-Building Strategies

At least four basic types of naval arms control are conceivably relevant to the Asia-Pacific theatre. They are geographical constraints; numerical limits on classes of ships; nuclear weapons reductions; and ensuring 'transparency' — sufficient levels of confidence by each party that it knows the intentions and capabilities of parties with which it is engaging in arms control/CBM negotiations³⁶.

Geographic Limits

The 'sanctuaries' concept for protection of

SSBNs, basing withdrawals, and nuclear-free zone politics are all examples of geographical constraints. Sanctuaries, however, limit freedom of movement for aircraft and for both surface and subsurface shipping. They would thus be antithetical to current U.S. naval doctrine which places a premium on such movements as part of its antisubmarine warfare efforts in the Seas of Japan and Korea, in the Indian Ocean, and elsewhere throughout the theatre. Nor are Chinese and Indian nuclear-capable naval or naval aviation components yet so extensive as to mandate the logic of containing them by treaty to specific zones of operation closer to their own shores. Future consideration of the sanctuaries concept may be warranted, however, if, in their absence, Chinese and/or Indian power projection capabilities precipitate regional apprehensions.

Basing arrangements have recently resulted from 'spontaneous and unilateral disarmament': the relinquishing by outside powers of their basing rights not by formal agreements but by reduced levels of perceived threat and by growing budgetary constraints. At present, it appears that bilateral negotiations between the U.S., the USSR, and their respective regional allies shaped by internal political and economic factors will be more effective than region-wide arrangements in shaping a less confrontational Asia-Pacific basing network. Over the longer term, however, more formal arrangements may be needed to once more limit Chinese, Indian, or even Japanese aspirations to establish their own basing lifelines as part of their naval expansion programs. In particular, to what extent future strategies of 'peacekeeping' constitute a legitimate rationale for the basing permitting rapid deployment of Indian forces to other South Asian locales or the PRC's conduct of amphibious operations in the East or South China Seas may be issues for negotiation under the geographical constraints category of regional naval arms control. Until then, most weaker Asia-Pacific states will continue to be dependent upon their alliances

or friendships with the U.S. or USSR as the only real means of restraint available to check the basing ambitions of emerging regional naval powers.

Ship Limits

Limiting the number of vessels deployed by Asia-Pacific naval powers appears, once more, to be occurring due to unilateral decisionmaking driven by tight budgets rather than by mutual consent. Soviet naval cutbacks will most probably continue in the context of the USSR's political devolution and efforts by individual republics to establish their own military infrastructures. While the Chinese navy is bound to press for more funds to develop and procure surface-to-surface missiles and to extend combat ranges of its naval support aircraft, the degree of priority that service will be assigned relative to maintaining and strengthening China's land-based nuclear deterrent or ensuring the availability of the ground forces needed to guarantee internal security is questionable. U.S., Japanese, and Indian budgetary constraints have already been assessed.

The one arms control/CBM sector where limitations in ship types may be important is in eventual negotiations *linking* land and offshore force reductions. The USSR has attempted to justify negotiations for such arrangements as a *quid pro quo* for its own unilateral initiative in reducing its land force strength along the Sino-Soviet border by more than a hundred thousand since early 1990 and for its accession to force withdrawals from Eastern Europe as part of the CFE Treaty. To realise any such linkage, the USSR or its successor states would need to convince other Asia-Pacific security actors that U.S. naval power in the region was the major impediment to establishing an alternative and more stable regional security structure. This is an argument which few Asian states have yet accepted, but one which is less incredible in late 1991 as Third World states, in general, become more concerned about a 'unipolar global balance of power'. It may be felt that strategic postures

such as ZOPFAN which envision moving toward nonalignment could be jeopardised by a future Asian naval environment dominated by a U.S. force presence.

Nuclear Weapons Reductions

Naval nuclear weapons reductions (as opposed to nuclear weapons prohibition as envisioned by NFZ proponents) are attracting increasingly serious consideration by those in the West concerned with reducing Asia-Pacific tensions. Future directions in U.S. naval nuclear policy are also closely tied to the intentions/capabilities question of achieving satisfactory transparency through reliable verification procedures. Considerable debate has arisen, for example, over the problem of long-range sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). The United States deploys the 'Tomahawk' TLAM/N missile designed for land attack from ships at sea with a maximum range of 2500 kilometres. Soviet naval units carry the SS-NX-21 and SS-NX-24 SLCMs. Both sides are becoming increasingly dependent on these systems to wage tactical nuclear warfare and the Soviet Navy is still highly dependent on shorter-range nuclear SLCMs for implementing attacks against surface units of enemy fleets. Consequently:

Banning nuclear-armed SLCMs might be of greater benefit to the United States than to the Soviet Union. Short-range nuclear SLCMs are the major striking force of the Soviet navy. Eliminating them could help ensure the survival of the U.S. Navy in a nuclear confrontation. And while the United States at present holds a technological lead over the USSR in long-range SLCMs, when the Soviets catch up it could prove disastrous for the United States, which has a much higher concentration of its population and industrial capacity closer to shore where it is vulnerable to attack from SLCMs.³⁷

The probabilities are low that U.S. military planners will support any substantial reductions in the United States' SLCM inventory after their impressive performance

as conventional weapons delivery systems in the Gulf War. Furthermore, many would argue that because the 'Tomahawk' is cost-effective in allowing for a substantial expansion of launching platforms, is uncannily accurate in delivering its payload, and carries a nuclear warhead virtually indistinguishable from a conventional warhead, the costs of submitting this weapons system to arms control verification would be far outweighed by the military benefits of its continued development and deployment. Yet conventionally armed surface vessels, confirmed as such, might be less likely to become targeted for pre-emptive attack by Soviet or regionally indigenous offensive forces in a future Asia-Pacific contingency. Indeed, as the Council of Foreign Relations study cited above noted: 'Conventional weapons are politically more usable than tactical nuclear weapons in any case, and precision-guided weapons, including conventional SLCMs, constitute an increasingly credible deterrent.'³⁸ Somewhat ironically, the United States is currently phasing out its own arsenal of short-range tactical nuclear weapons on land and at sea³⁹. It is nevertheless, at the time of this writing, still resisting the incorporation of SLCMs into regional arms control/CBM discussions.

CONCLUSIONS

The world's attention has been preoccupied with events in the Persian Gulf and in the Soviet Union during the early 1990s. The Asia-Pacific region is, however, certain to demand attention by those structuring international security policies for the remainder of this decade. Japan and the United States, two of the three most formidable global economic powers (along with the European Community) will continue to vie for access to and influence over the rapidly expanding Asia-Pacific marketplace. Strategic naval multipolarity will be tested here inasmuch as China, India, and Japan have some potential for assuming important roles as maritime powers in the region. Finally, as Peter Polomka has observed, despite transformations in traditional security arrangements, budgetary

cuts in both the American and Soviet military infrastructures have been substantial but less so in the naval realm; consequently the Seventh Fleet and Soviet/Russian deployments of a Far East naval force will continue to be important, if not predominant, components in any future Asia-Pacific maritime power balance⁴⁰.

Washington and its traditional Asia-Pacific allies cannot afford to miss what appears to be a historical opportunity for identifying measures which may be effective in facilitating comprehensive regional security negotiations. The timing could not be more appropriate, given real prospects of a more democratic Soviet Union (and/or its respective autonomous republics); the emergence of a more self-confident Japan; the recent decision by China to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty; an ASEAN more prone than before to realistically plan for subregional security; and an Australia sensitive to the need for balancing efficiently its own naval posture between the Indian Ocean and South Pacific theatres-of-operation.

Given the ongoing forces of change in the Soviet Union, it may be possible to reconfigure traditional Soviet and American perimeters of defence in Northeast Asia. It may also be possible to reduce Soviet/Russian offensive force projection capabilities, requiring the USSR to reduce its SLCM and naval aviation capabilities to levels viewed by Washington and Tokyo as legitimately necessary to defend a finite seaborne SSBN deterrent deployed adjacent to Russian shores. In return, the Americans and Japanese might conceivably agree to withdrawal of U.S. carrier-based strike aircraft to positions outside the Seas of Japan and Korea except for their intermittent entry into Japanese and South Korean waters and ports to undergo repair or replenishment. While certainly representing a bold concession in view of their performance in the Persian Gulf War, the U.S. could reciprocate Soviet/Russian dismantlement of SLCMs by reducing or eliminating its own SLCM inventory, perhaps incorporating

similar guidelines to those forged as part of the 1987 INF Treaty for land-based cruise missile systems. American and Russian inspectors would, of necessity, be stationed at various bases to monitor enforcement of any agreements reached; transparency remains a key issue in any U.S.-Soviet arms control agreement.

Any such negotiations could serve as a precedent for subsequent arrangements designed to restrict the quantitative and qualitative levels of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force in return for Soviet/Russian guarantees of force withdrawals from the Northern Territories as a first step toward the eventual return of these disputed islands to Japanese sovereign control. The positive implications of any such limitation on Japanese naval capabilities, easing tensions about potential Japanese maritime power projection to Southeast Asia and beyond, are self-evident. It must be recognised that, until truly effective confidence-building measures are devised, agreed upon, and implemented it is essential to the security of the Asia-Pacific region that the United States and its regional allies maintain a balance of naval power adequate to protect their national security and vital economic interests. Nevertheless, it is also critical that all possible steps be taken to effectuate confidence-building measures which can reduce tensions in the area and permit lower naval defence costs.

Eventually, a broader Asian security negotiating process, whether it be under the auspices of APEC, a CSCA, or some other appropriate forum, could undertake more regionally comprehensive CBMs. These might include prescribed Chinese and Indian constraints in naval power, observance of ZOPFAN, and the codification of nuclear-free zone politics in Southeast Asia and in the South Pacific by all great powers via modifications in their naval deployment patterns and NCND policies. Over time, the current trend of unilateral and voluntary disarmament in the Asia-Pacific could be replaced with a more predictable and more

enduring regional security order, offering its participants greater hope in realising their own aspirations for economic development and political stability in an era of rapid and unpredictable international change.

- ¹ For a definitive assessment of security regimes as they function within international security politics, see Robert Jervis "Security Regimes", *International Organization* 36 No 2, pp 360-362.
- ² US Department of Defense *A Strategic Framework for the Pacific Rim: Looking towards the 21st Century*, Washington DC, USDOD April 1990, pp 12-14. See also William J Crowe, Jr and Alan D Romberg: "Rethinking Security in the Pacific", *Foreign Affairs* 70, No 2, p 125.
- ³ John Mc Beth, "Clark's Curtain Call", *Far Eastern Economic Review* 153 No 3, 1 August 1991 pp 18-19. The ten-year agreement calls for the US to provide the Philippines \$US360 million in military and economic assistance during 1992 and \$US203 million for the ensuing nine years of the ten year agreement. Aside from the extensive damage both Clark and Subic suffered at the hands of Mt Pinatubo's volcanic eruptions, one military source close to the negotiations cited a reduced Soviet military threat in the region and technological change over the past decade as rendering operations at Clark less critical to US strategy and force planning for the Pacific. Subic Bay, according to the source, will be 'leaner and meaner. It will still be capable but the depth of capability will not be there.'
- ⁴ Address by Admiral Charles R Larson, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, Australian Defence Force Academy conference, Canberra, 13 May 1991.
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NEWSBRIEFS

BATTLE OF THE CORAL SEA CONFERENCE, SYDNEY, 7-10 MAY 1992

The Australian National Maritime Museum will hold its first major conference from 7 to 10 May 1992, to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Battle of the Coral Sea.

The conference and a temporary exhibition, to be held in the newly-opened museum in Sydney's Darling Harbour, will be part of an Australia-wide series of Coral Sea commemorative events during the first ten days of May 1992.

Both museum events are being sponsored through the USA Bicentennial Gift, and form part of the public programs of the USA Gallery, which commemorates Australian-American maritime relations.

Only five months after the opening of the Pacific War, the Battle of the Coral Sea was fought between ships of the Japanese and Allied navies from 4 to 8 May, 1942. The battle took place in the Coral Sea, off the coasts of Queensland and New Guinea.

Historically, it was the first naval battle fought entirely by aircraft, without the ships ever sighting each other. Strategically, it was the first check to the Japanese advance in World War 2. Following Japanese air raids on Darwin, it was the first time since British colonisation that Australians lived in real fear of imminent enemy invasion.

Conference sessions will focus on the battle itself, its strategic significance, its effect on Australians, and its symbolic meaning for US-Australian bilateral relations then and since. Speakers are being sought from Australia, the USA and elsewhere.

The full conference program will be available

later this year. For further details, intending speakers and participants can contact:

John Wade,
Senior Curator, USA Gallery
Australian National Maritime Museum
GPO Box 5131
Sydney, NSW 2001
Australia.
Telephone: 02 552 7777
Fax: 02 660 0729

AS GOOD AS NEW...

Guided missile destroyer, HMAS *Hobart* has returned to service after a two and a half year refit and modernisation programme.

The refit, performed ahead of schedule by Australia's largest defence company, ADI, has transformed *Hobart* into a warship with modern attributes and capabilities.

The 25 year old *Hobart* is the third and final of Navy's guided missile destroyers (DDG's) to undergo refit and modernisation. The other two DDG's to have undergone the upgrade programme were HMA Ships *Brisbane* and *Perth*. All the DDG work has been completed by ADI at its Garden Island facility on Sydney Harbour.

The facility, which is equipped with the most sophisticated naval engineering services in the southern hemisphere, is the major modernisation and refit centre for the east coast based vessels of the RAN.

Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff, Materiel, Rear Admiral Tony Hunt, said the refit had shown great flexibility and leadership by all concerned.

"The extensive work carried out in the areas of combat systems, hull, propulsion and habitability will extend the ship's operational

capabilities to the year 2000. These modernised DDG's are indeed most capable destroyers," Rear Admiral Hunt said.

ADI Managing Director Ken Harris paid tribute to the ADI workforce at Garden Island which completed the work under budget and seven days earlier than required by the contract.

"The success of this modernisation demonstrates the importance of the link between defence and industry. Navy and other elements of the Australian Defence Force cannot be effective unless supported by a capable defence industry," Mr Harris said.

The *Hobart* modernisation program included new and far more effective and integrated radar and an upgraded computer based combat system.

Three omnipure systems have been installed to collect and treat all waste water throughout the ship.

The refit included removal, machining and relining of all propeller shafts and the survey and replacement of waste and corroded shell plate as well as complete replacement and upgrade of the ship's communication system. The ship's hull was entirely grit-blasted and repainted. Ship's accommodation has been upgraded, and now includes separate accommodation facilities for females. The ship's air conditioning system has also been upgraded.

AWARD FOR TOP PWO (ASW) STUDENT

The first Captain Darling Award for the top graduate of the Principal Warfare Officer (Anti-submarine Warfare) course at HMAS *Watson* has gone to LEUT Philip Spedding.

The award is endowed by Thompson Sintra Pacific and honours one of Australia's foremost submarine fighters of World War II, Captain Stanley Darling OBE, DSC and 2 Bars, VRD, RANR Rtd.

The award trophy, pictured below, is by Canberra sculptor Kirsten Fitzpatrick and is based on the badge of the anti-submarine Branch during the Second World War. The harpoon and rope motif is cast in sterling silver and mounted on a green nephrite pyramid mounted on a black nephrite base. The Thompson company logo is textured into the nephrite on the back of the pyramid.



The first presentation of the Captain Darling award, HMAS Watson 21 August 1991. (from left) Capt Max Hinchcliffe, RAN (Ret), Capt. Stanley Darling, DSC & 2 Bars, OBE, VRD, RANR (ret), LEUT Philip Spedding, RAN (award winner) Miss Kirsten Fitzpatrick (sculptor), Mr Philippe Odouard (Managing Director, Thomson Cintra Pacific) Leut. Andrew Rourke, RAN, RADM Ron Calder, RAN (ret.), Director, Thomson Sintra Pacific

HMAS SYDNEY FORUM IN FREMANTLE

The Western Australian Maritime Museum is hosting a forum on the disappearance of HMAS *Sydney* and her entire complement half a century ago.

According a statement issued by the organisers, the aim of the forum is to give interested parties such as historians, oceanographers, researchers and scientists the chance to become familiar with or contribute to a proposed search for the cruiser and the German raider *Kormoran*, her adversary in her last battle.

Further information will be supplied by the organiser, Mike McCarthy at the Western Australian Maritime Museum, phone (09) 335 8211 or FAX (09) 430 5120.

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The Los Angeles class submarine USS Chicago (SSN 721) visited HMAS Stirling earlier this year.



(l. - R) Mr and Mrs Culley and Capt. and Mrs Noble

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