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## **JOURNAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE**



# **AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE INC**

The Australian Naval Institute was formed and incorporated in the Australian Capital Territory in 1975. The main objects of the Institute are:

- a. To encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the maritime profession,
- b. to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and the maritime profession, and
- c. to publish a journal.

The Institute is self-supporting and non-profit-making. All publications of the Institute will stress that the authors express their own views and opinions are not necessarily those of the Department of Defence, the Chief of Naval Staff or the Institute. The aim is to encourage discussion, dissemination of information, comment and opinion and the advancement of professional knowledge concerning naval and maritime matters.

The membership of the Institute is open to:

- a. Regular Members. Regular membership is open to members of the RAN or RANR and persons who having qualified for regular membership, subsequently leave the service.
- b. Associate Members. Associate membership is open to all other persons not qualified to be Regular Members, who profess an interest in the aims of the Institute.
- c. Honorary Members. Honorary membership is open to persons who have made a distinguished contribution to the Navy or the maritime profession, or by past service to the institute.

## **DISCLAIMER**

Views expressed in this journal are those of the authors, and not necessarily those of the Department of Defence, the Chief of Naval Staff or the Institute.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

The Australian Naval Institute is grateful for the assistance provided by the corporations listed below. They are demonstrating their support for the aim of the Institute by being members of the "Friends of the Australian Naval Institute" coterie.

Australian Defence Industries  
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Pacific Dunlop Batteries

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Thomson Sintra Pacific  
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Westinghouse Electric  
Krupp Atlas Elektronik (Australia)



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*(Above) The then DCNS, RADM (Now VADM) Ian MacDougall, accepts the best wishes (and 2000 music cassettes) from rock musician Jimmy Barnes. The gift was from the Australian Recording Industry Association for Australian servicepeople in the Gulf.*

*COVER PHOTOGRAPH: Loading the Phalanx close-in weapons system aboard HMAS Brisbane, Persian Gulf, 1991*

## FROM THE PRESIDENT



When discussing Australian defence policy, the Minister for Defence, Senator Ray said recently that .

"The 1987 Defence White Paper precisely anticipated the type of naval contribution we are now making to allied operations in the Gulf .

It may be that as the post Gulf order becomes clearer, some change of emphasis in our security approach might be needed. I would not wish to rule that out, but I am of the view that this will be more at the margins than fundamental. "

In the United States President Bush is calling for a "new world order" and the proposed 1992 Defence Budget just released calls for reductions in the force structure. Secretary of Defence Cheney has however indicated that the US still wants to maintain its system of alliances, the forward deployment of US forces, and the ability to control the world's oceans.

It is difficult to gauge the long term effects of the war in the Middle East, the possible disintegration of the Soviet Union and the clamour for a peace dividend and the form of the "new world order". It is apparent however that the strategic environment has changed and defence policies will need to be reviewed to see if they are still relevant.

In the hope that it will improve the standard of the debate as these issues are addressed, your Council will arrange a seminar at HMAS WATSON on Thursday 16 May 1991. The seminar will address the subjects of "Maritime Power and its Place in the New World Order".

I hope to recruit some of the speakers attending the "Naval Power in the Pacific" seminar at the Australian Defence Force Academy on 13 and 14 May; and the RAN experience in the Gulf will be discussed. So far the planned program is as follows:

- "Were Sanctions Given Enough Time and What are the implications for their Future Use"  
Richard Leaver (Australian National University)
- "The Enforcement of Sanctions by the Multi-National Force - An RAN Perspective" - Captain  
R. E. Shalders RAN
- "The Gulf War and its impact on Seapower"  
Eric Grove (Foundation for International Security)
- "The Gulf War and its impact on Naval Warfare"  
To be confirmed
- "Developments in the Middle East and the Soviet Union and the Long Term Implications for the  
USN Presence in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean"  
William Tow (University of Southern California)
- "The Place of Maritime Power in the New World Order, a Young Turks View"  
Lieutenant Commander J. V. P. Goldrick RAN
- "The Place of Maritime Power in the New World Order, an Academic View"  
Ken Booth (University College of Wales)
- "Maritime Operations in the Gulf War"  
Commodore C. J. Oxenbould RAN



The seminar could indicate the way ahead for the future ANI and if it is successful I intend other such initiatives. To facilitate planning for the seminar would you please complete the registration form in this journal. I look forward to seeing you there .

Sincerely

Ian Callaway

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## FROM THE EDITOR

This issue contains several articles of interest to the reader, some of which have been held over from earlier issues, but in particular I would like to commend to you the article addressing the future of the ANI at page 25 *et seq.* This paper was delivered at the Annual General Meeting and it is important that members of the ANI have the opportunity to comment on this issue.

As a result of the ANI sponsored seminar in May in Sydney it is anticipated that the August issue will be completely devoted to the Gulf War issue. Receipt of articles from readers who have recently returned from the Gulf would be greatly appreciated. I would like to thank those readers who have submitted articles for publication and reassure you that payment will be forwarded to those authors meeting the criteria detailed at page 4.

You will note that the Annual Index is not inserted in this issue. Due to the need to copy the index onto another database the issue of the database has been delayed.

Issues such as the current Force Structure Review should provide a catalyst for articles in the Journal and would be a pleasant change from the normal maritime strategy articles received.

Regards,

Don Agar

## GUIDE FOR AUTHORS

In order to achieve the stated aims of the institute, all readers, both members and non-members, are encouraged to submit articles for publication. The following guide outlines the major points most authors would need to know in order to publish a quality article in the journal. A more comprehensive guide is available from the Editor.

### TYPES OF ARTICLE

Articles should deal with interesting recent developments in the maritime area which directly or indirectly impinge upon the naval profession. Overseas contributions are also encouraged. To be eligible for prizes, original articles must be accompanied by statements that they have been written expressly for the ANI. The Editor reserves the right to reject or amend articles for publication. The ANI will pay the authors of articles specially written for the Journal and accepted for publication \$10 per 1000 words. An annual prize for the best book review will also be awarded. Payments will not be made to the authors of articles such as staff college prize essays and Peter Mitchell competition entries.

### LENGTH OF ARTICLES

As a broad guide, articles should range from 2500 to 6000 words. This is between 9 and 21 pages of typing on A4 sheets. Short articles are also welcome.

### SUBDIVIDING THE ARTICLE

Readers will note that boldface capitals, boldface lower case, underlined light lower case and plain lower case letters are used in descending order for headings (down through sub-headings etc.) Because as much text as possible is entered by optical scanner (which has trouble with bold and italic), Authors are requested to avoid bold and observe a hierarchy that has UNDERLINED CAPITALS representing major headings, CAPITALS as the next level, underlined lower case next and plain text at the fourth level.

### ABSTRACT

An abstract of 75 words at the most is desirable when the article is proposed. It should state the scope of the article and its main features.

### THE TEXT

The style should be impersonal and semi-formal. Consistency is essential in such matters as spelling, headings, symbols and capitalisation.

### REFERENCES

References should be numbered consecutively and listed at the end of the paper. The preferred format is:

1. Smith R & Jones A "Marketing Videotex", Journal of Marketing in Australia, Vol 20 No 3, June 1985, pp.36-40.

### PHOTOGRAPHS

While glossy black-and-white prints are preferred, sharp colour prints with good contrast are acceptable. Captions must

be provided. Figure numbers and captions should be on a separate paper taped to the back of the photograph.

### TABLES, DIAGRAMS AND GRAPHS

Tables, graphs, line illustrations should be supplied on separate pages so that they can be incorporated by the printer in a similar manner to photographs. Use figure numbers consecutively for all illustrations.

### COPYRIGHT

Authors must complete a "Copyright Declaration" and attach with the final typescript.

### CLEARANCE TO PUBLISH

If articles contain sensitive information (costs, unapproved policies, critical statements etc) authors should obtain clearance from their employers. There is no objection to authors stating their personal views even if these are at variance with a corporate view, but such viewpoints must be put into perspective so that readers in Australia and overseas do not gain a false impression of the status of the subject.

### THE FINAL TYPESCRIPT

In order to reduce production costs and streamline production, as much of the journal as possible is loaded into a computer through an optical scanner as plain text and edited and formatted electronically. The use of italics, boldface and special characters can reduce scanning efficiency. The ideal document for scanning is in 12 point and 10 pitch (the larger of the two basic typewriter sizes) one-and-a-half spaced on an A4 sheet with at least 25mm margin all round. The higher-quality dot-matrix printers (rated NLO or LO) are acceptable for scanning.

Three copies of the typescript should be sent to the Editor, PO Box 80, Campbell, ACT, 2601. The complete package will comprise, on separate sheets:

- \* Cover sheet - title of article - author's name (or pseudonym) and qualifications - present position - telephone number - address
- \* Recent photograph and biography of the author (less than 200 words)
- \* Abstract (less than 75 words)
- \* The text
- \* Tables, each on a separate sheet
- \* Illustrations
- \* Photographs, clearly identified
- \* List of captions for tables, photographs and illustrations

### FOR MORE INFORMATION

The Editor can be contacted either via the aforementioned postal address or by phone (06) 265 2020

### COPYRIGHT DECLARATION

If your paper has not previously been published, either in whole or in part, you are asked to assign a non-exclusive licence to the Australian Naval Institute as a condition of publication. Such assignment would not restrict you from publishing the paper elsewhere as long as acknowledgement of the original source is given. If your paper has previously been published, either in whole or in part, you are reminded that it is your responsibility to bring this to the notice of the Institute so that full acknowledgement may be made.

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## ANI ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING - PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS

The objectives for 1990 were to: produce a professional Journal; further develop the Friends of the Naval Institute coterie; publish the book, "The Garden Island"; sponsor at least one Vernon Parker Oration; host a Naval Institute Dinner; support Chapter activity; and promote new membership.

These objectives generally have been met.

The problems associated with the production of the Journal have been reduced to some degree. In order to cut rising production costs and streamline production, as much of the Journal as possible is now loaded into a computer as plain text using an optical scanner. The text is then edited and formatted electronically. Although the situation is improving some papers being submitted for inclusion in the Journal have not been prepared in a format which allows efficient scanning, and errors have crept in. The quality of the items submitted for the Journal has been high throughout the year. I anticipate that the production standards will soon be able to match this.

I am pleased to report that the strong relationship between the Institute and the Friends of the Naval Institute, which began last year, prospered during 1990. Several functions were organised to enable the Friends to meet the officers and sailors of the RAN. These included a dinner at HMAS HARMAN on 11 May and a day at sea in HMAS STUART on 31 October. I thank the Commanding Officers HMAS HARMAN and HMAS STUART and the Fleet Commander for their assistance in arranging these functions.

Twelve corporations have joined the Friends coterie for 1991. These are:

- Australian Defence Industries
- Blohm and Voss
- Computer Sciences of Australia
- GEC Marconi
- Jeumont Schneider Division
- Pacific Dunlop Batteries
- Rockwell Ship Systems
- Scientific Management Associates
- Stanilite Electronics
- Thomson Sintra Pacific
- Westinghouse Electronic
- Krupp Atlas Electronic (Australia)

The Friends remain enthusiastic about

their relationship with the ANI. I thank them for their support and look forward to meeting their representatives during 1991.

The ANI sponsored book "The Garden Island" by Lieutenant Tom Frame was well and truly launched by His Excellency, Rear Admiral Peter Sinclair AO, RAN, Governor of New South Wales on 7 October. The Honourable Peter Collins MP, Minister for Health and the Arts, representing the Premier of New South Wales also spoke to the occasion. Garden Island has played a major part in the history of our nation and in the lives of many members of the Institute. It will continue to play a similar part in the careers of naval persons in the future. Sales of the book have been good to date and the Institute will benefit financially from them, especially those sold through Service outlets. I commend the book to you.

Unfortunately I was unable to arrange a Vernon Parker Oration during the year. The speakers I had in mind were not available for a variety of reasons. This was most disappointing because I firmly believe that if the Institute is to prosper and have a meaningful role it must be more active in encouraging the exchanged of ideas concerning naval and, maritime matters. We must challenge the general complacency and lack of interest which exists and we must do more than just produce a journal. I have in mind a higher profile in 1991 for the pursuit of the ANI objective of encouraging debate on maritime defence matters.

The Naval Institute Dinner at HMAS HARMAN was most successful. Some 35 people attended and the Friends of the Naval Institute enjoyed the occasion.

### CHAPTER REPORT

The Melbourne Chapter remains the only active state chapter. There is considerable discussion among Victorian members about the way ahead and the need for a greater concentration of activities in HMAS CERBERUS.

Interest has been expressed by several Royal New Zealand Naval representatives about the possibility of establishing a New Zealand Chapter of the ANI. The Council is supportive of the idea and awaits developments.



## THE WAY AHEAD FOR THE ANI

Lieutenant Commander Peter Jones and Lieutenant Tom Frame have prepared a discussion paper on the way ahead for the Institute. The paper will be discussed during tonight's meeting and it will be addressed by the 1991 Council. The paper makes some perceptive observations concerning the state of the Institute and offers some stimulating possibilities concerning the future. These include amalgamation or confederation with other like minded organisations, incremental reform of the Institute or maintenance of the status quo. A decision to endorse the final option would I believe be very shortsighted and a most unsatisfactory outcome for the review. Your Council will address these matters early in their term of office.

## INTENTIONS FOR 1991

The retiring Council has proposed objectives for 1991 for the consideration of the incoming council. In summary they believe the new Council should

- encourage debate on maritime defence matters by sponsoring a Seminar titled "Maritime Power and its Place in the New World Order" at HMAS WATSON on 15 May 1991.
- produce a professional Journal.
- maintain the Friends of the Naval Institute coterie and expand it if possible.
- host at least one Vernon Parker Oration.
- host a Naval Institute Dinner.
- arrange a sea day for the Friends with the Fleet if possible.
- support Chapter activity.
- promote new memberships.

I am specially looking forward to the WATSON seminar in May as it has the greatest potential to satisfy the Institute's need to demonstrate its claim to be a professional body.

The success of the Friends of the Naval Institute concept is very important to the well being of the Institute. During 1991 I intend that the Friends

- be invited as guests to the HMAS WATSON seminar on Wednesday 15 May; and a Naval Institute Mess

Dinner at HMAS HARMAN later in the year, and all other ANI public functions.

- be recognised in the Journal and at other ANI functions.
- be offered a day at sea in a Fleet Unit.

## ANI SILVER MEDALS

During the year ANI Silver Medals were presented to Lieutenant Commander L A Cocks RZN for his paper titled "An Essay on the Maritims Strategy for a Strategic Backwater" and Lieutenant Commander Steve Baker RAN for his essay titled "The Impact of the Law of the Sea on the development of Australia's Maritime Strategy." I congratulate both officers.

## FINANCIAL STATUS

1990 once again has been a most successful year. The continuing injection of funds flowing from the Friends of the Naval Institute will enable the Council to sponsor an active program of activities during 1991. The Acting Treasurer will brief you shortly in greater detail on the financial situation.

## CONCLUSIONS

I wish to record my appreciation for a job well done by all Councillors during 1990. It was a particularly demanding year. We were all hard pressed to attend to Council business because of the crisis in the Middle East.

I particularly wish to recognise the effort of Commander Tim Bloomfield and Lieutenant Annette Nelson who did do much to make the "Friends of the Naval Institute" idea work and Lieutenant Tom Frame who gave a great deal of his own time towards the writing and production of *The Garden Island*.

I also wish to place on record my appreciation of the long service Commander Sid Lemon has given to the Institute. He resigned from the Council when leaving to join HMAS *Brisbane* in August. He served the Institute as Councillor, Secretary and Senior Vice President from 1984.







## WASHINGTON NOTES

by

Tom Friedmann

By the time you read this column, the United States may be at war.

Looking back on the remarkable political events of 1990, we should have known that things were too good to be true. Germany was reunited. Democratic governments replaced the disintegrated Soviet empire in Eastern Europe. Superpower military rivalry was largely supplanted by concern about stabilising the Soviet government during its evolution into a democratic society with a market economy. A time of sustained peace looked to be at hand.

But then Iraq invaded Kuwait and we were given a brutal reminder that the world was still a very dangerous place. No matter how much the world changes it seems to stay the same.

Americans can be proud of the role that our country, and particularly the President, have taken in rallying the opposition to Iraq. Our diplomatic efforts to counter Iraq's aggression are arguably some of the finest ever undertaken by the American government.

Our rapprochement with the Soviets plus some pragmatic "horse trading" with China enabled us to put the problem in its proper forum, the United Nations, and to win 10 votes in the Security Council condemning Iraq for its flagrant violation of international law and isolating it economically from the rest of the world.

On the military side, operation "Desert Shield" has been a remarkable logistical achievement. In less than 6 months, we have put in the Persian Gulf area 1,300 tanks, 900 combat aircraft, 6 aircraft carriers, 2 battleships and 400,000 ground troops with their attendant supplies including 40,000 uniforms and 2,800 tons of mail per week.

In its first major test, the "total force" concept of integrating reserve and National Guard units with regular forces has worked very well. During Vietnam, the reserves, with limited exceptions, were not called-up because of attendant negative political

consequences. One of the hard lessons the military learned from Vietnam was to never fight a war without political support strong enough to bear the mobilisation of reserves. Hence the "total force" concept was created: there could be no major deployment of the armed forces without mobilizing reserves and reserves could not be called-up in the face of domestic political opposition. Therefore, any major deployment of force could take place only with firm political backing, particularly in the Congress.

During the initial phase of "Desert Shield" the planners of the "total force" seemed to be vindicated. Although the President acted without congressional authorization, he had strong support in the polls and Congress did what it often does best — nothing.

But the forces initially deployed were mostly regulars and the public and the press were in a "gung ho" mood. It was only after the President ordered the increase in forces in November, which required extensive reserve mobilisation and even brought about talk about renewing the draft, did public opinion begin to shift from a "ride'em cowboy" response to a more thoughtful public discussion of the possible consequences of war in the Gulf.

At the Australian Defence Attache's annual reception last month, William Crowe, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, spoke for many Americans when he questioned expending American lives to re-establish an absolute monarchy in Kuwait and to defend societies that are, in many ways, the antithesis of our own.

Admiral Crowe and another former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, retired Air Force general David Jones, had recently stunned official Washington by testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee that time was on our side in the Gulf and that the U.S. economic sanctions should be given more time to work. Admiral Crowe said that he agonized over whether or not to testify *and*, once he made the decision,



over what to say. Not only did he not want to appear disloyal to the troops he had commanded only a short time ago, but he also has a son in the Marine Corps on duty in the Gulf.

Some Americans are not convinced that a war to protect economic interests can be justified. But even many of those who can justify defending Persian Gulf oil supplies have questioned the refusal of most of our allies to commit ground forces to the multinational force despite the fact that they have a more direct interest in keeping 40% of the world's known oil reserves out of Saddam Hussein's hands than we do.

The impressive public support for economic sanctions has not translated into approval to send our forces into combat. The latest polls show that the public is evenly split between those supporting immediate military action and those who want to give the sanctions more time to work. Only now, as we stand on the threshold of war, has the President asked Congress to join him in countering Iraqi aggression.

It seems that presidents never learn. Despite my overall support for his Gulf policy, I believe that President Bush should never have undertaken the deployment of U.S. forces on such a massive scale without the prior consent of the Congress. His premier responsibility was to make sure he had support for his policy at home before he sought the support of foreign governments. Instead, he faces a divided Congress that, even if it approves a resolution of support, may do so by only a razor thin margin. And if such a resolution is not passed, the President has threatened to do what he deems appropriate anyway, thereby setting the stage for one of the greatest constitutional crises in our history.

The President cannot authorize the expenditure of Federal funds to purchase a paper clip without Congressional approval. He cannot appoint a person to his cabinet or to the Supreme Court without senatorial confirmation. Why should he be able to send a half million Americans to their deaths without the consent of Congress?

Regular readers of this column will not be surprised when I say that it is my belief that the authors of the U.S. Constitution never intended for the president as

Commander in Chief to be able to respond to a situation like that in the Gulf without the consent of Congress. They divided the war powers between the two branches of government precisely because they did not want one man to be able to take this country to war.

That is how it should be in a democracy. When Australian ships sailed for the Persian Gulf, they were sent off by the Crown: the Sovereign's representative, the Prime Minister, and the Leader of the Opposition. The men of the RAN knew that they were backed by the entire political establishment of their democratic government. Certainly our forces deserved to receive the same support.

If the U.S. faces a protracted combat situation (and the promise by air power enthusiasts that air power will carry the day is enough to scare any student of military history into contemplating just how protracted the fighting could become), George Bush may find that the failure to give his policy a firm political foundation may spell the doom not only of that policy but also of his presidency.

Meanwhile, Congress is not blameless in this matter. It did nothing while we poured men and supplies into the Gulf. Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell was disingenuous when he pleaded that the 101st Congress could not have acted because it was leaving office. Did he really mean for us to believe that members of Congress are not bound by their oaths just because they are in an election year? Congress had five months to act before any deadlines set by the U.N. Its failure to do so reflects yet again the inability of the Democratic Party to develop strong, independent leaders.

The country is in a resigned but determined mood. If Iraq does not withdraw from Kuwait, the United States will fight for its liberation. And whether the President unilaterally commits us to war or does so with the consent of Congress, the American people are united in their support for the armed forces and will back them to the hilt. At least in this aspect, a war in the Persian Gulf will not be like Vietnam.

If we fight, we will fight hard. And we will fight to win. Pray God we don't have to fight.







*The Guided Missile Destroyer HMAS Brisbane moves away from the destroyer wharf at the Fleet Support Facility at HMAS Stirling to the best wishes and cheers of a large group of family and friends as she departs for the Gulf of Oman – 20 February 1991*

*Photo: Navy Public Relations, WA.*

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# Reflections on the RAN: The Proceedings of the Inaugural Australian Naval History Seminar

T.R. Frame, J.V.P. Goldrick and P.D. Jones

This anthology is one of the most significant publications in the written history of the Royal Australian Navy. For the first time, a wide selection of authors, including distinguished historians from Britain, Canada and the United States, examine the development of the RAN within the context of Australian and Commonwealth defence and diplomatic history.

Chapters range from colonial naval defence through the RAN's involvement in two World Wars, the Korean war and the Vietnam conflict. Other contributors examine courts martial, naval administration, command at sea, individual campaigns, the fleet air arm, imperial naval strategy, and the contributors of individual commanders and politicians. The breadth of the subject matter will appeal to both the specialist and general reader and to anyone with an interest in the Navy, ships and the sea.

This volume — the first in a series — makes an enormous contribution to the written history of the RAN and will bring naval history from the periphery into the mainstream of Australia's national history.

Proudly sponsored by The Australian Naval Institute. 210 x 132 mm hardback, 420 pages.

## ORDER FORM

### ANI Special Price Offer (normally \$49.95)

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## BOOK REVIEWS

by

Vic Jeffery

*The U-Boat Offensive 1914-45* by V.E. Tarrant Published by Arms and Armour Press, London and distributed in Australia by Capricorn Link (Australia) Pty Ltd, Lane Cove, NSW. Recommended Retail Price \$59.95.

The first chapter of this well-researched book sums it all up - "A weapon of uncertain value" referring to the first months of World War One when the German U-boat was originally conceived as a coastal defence boat and later developed into a major weapon of global warfare.

Containing much previously unresearched unpublished archival material, both British and German, in order to chronicle the strategic and tactical evolution of the U-boat offensives it clearly demonstrated that the weakness of the U-boat arm at the beginning of each war was numerical and the hesitant stance of the political leadership with regard to their maximum use.

How long could have Great Britain have resisted the attrition offensive of the U-boats in 1939 had Admiral Doenitz had the 300 U-boats at his disposal which he considered necessary to defeat Great Britain?

This excellent account of the history of the German U-boat during two World Wars shows the fierce courage and resourcefulness exhibited on both sides. It also exhibits the absolute futility of war and the terrible losses.

During the two World Wars German submarines sank 8,209 merchant ships grossing more than 27 million tons. So effective a menace did the U-boats become that they came close to bringing Britain to her knees in 1917 and again in 1941-42.

In the 1914-18 war a total of 346 U-boats were completed plus another 18 finished after the Armistice. The 1939-45 conflict saw 1,113 U-boats completed plus a further 18 foreign boats captured.

Containing 117 photographs and 24 charts and diagrams, the first photo

included is that of the historic U-I, now preserved in the Munich Museum. Another shot I found particularly eye-catching was the hulk of the World War One UB-77 moored in Portsmouth Harbour with Nelson's flagship HMS Victory (then still afloat) moored in the background, generations apart.

One can spend a great deal of time perusing and digesting the fascinating collection of information and statistics contained in the superb series of appendices, tables, charts and diagrams supporting the text. Amongst the information contained are accurate statistics of cause of loss details of every U-boat sunk in each year.

I found this an excellent reference work and worthy of serious consideration for inclusion on every naval bookshelf. A superb insight.

*The Imperial Russian Navy* by Anthony J. Watts Published by Arms & Armour Press, London and distributed in Australia by Capricorn Link (Australia) Pty Ltd, Lane Cove, NSW. Recommended Retail Price \$85.00.

I must admit that other than the Battle of Tsushima in 1905, my knowledge of the Russian Navy prior to World War Two was extremely limited.

The release of "The Imperial Russian Navy" is a tremendous boost in filling the void on this subject and is worthy of study by serving officers, naval historians and all maritime enthusiasts.

This book covers three centuries of naval development showing Imperial Russia's constant need to control its ports and precious narrow exits to the surrounding oceans, as well as its pursuit of access to the Mediterranean.

Russia's navy made early use of torpedoes and submarines and was at the forefront of advances in design, armament and strategy.

Supporting this reference work is a



within everyone's reach at \$85, hopefully it will be available in libraries allowing the widest possible use of the comprehensive contents.

A most engrossing and informative book.

**P&O's Canberra — The Ship That Shaped The Future** by Neil McCart Published by Kingfisher Railway Productions, Southampton, England and distributed in Australia by Thomas C. Lothian, 11 Munro Road, Port Melbourne, Victoria. Price \$14.95.

This soft cover book is a tribute to the P & O liner CANBERRA soon to celebrate her 30th year of proud service on May 31, 1991.

The 45,000 tonne *Canberra* was the largest British liner at that time to be constructed since World War Two. First known by her yard number, 1621, she was laid-down in the yards of Harland & Wolff in 1957.

Her unusual design surprised the shipping world with the concept of her propulsion machinery being placed aft of the accommodation being developed to take the fullest advantage of this layout.

The choice of the ship's name was to symbolise the part P & O had played in the development of Australia's overseas trade over 100 years, and the growing importance in world affairs of both the country and her capital city.

Supported by 76 photographs, six in colour, this book expertly covers *Canberra* through the initial luxury afloat years, shifting trade patterns, cruising in the early years, requisitioned for war and cruising in her twilight years.

One historic moment in her illustrious career was in January, 1982 when *Canberra* was enroute to Australia, when off San Diego, California she met her namesake, the RAN's new guided-missile frigate HMAS *Canberra* which was running trials.

P & O's *Canberra* won undying fame after being requisitioned by the British Government as a troopship and later as a prison ship during the Falklands War of 1982. The "Great White Whale" as she was affectionately known drew one of the largest flotillas of small craft ever seen in the Solent area. The weather-beaten rust-

streaked CANBERRA was a proud and memorable sight as she made her triumphant entry.

Now in her twilight years, this magnificent ship has proud links with Australia and the price of this book puts this record of her career within the grasp of all shiplovers. Vic Jeffery

**A Coast Too Long:Defending Australia beyond the 1990s** By Ross Babbage (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1990); pp.231; Notes; Figures; Tables. RRP \$18.95 (paperback).

In this timely, stimulating and well-written book, the author examines in a dispassionate manner the various scenarios relating to the handling of a range of possible threats, in the coming years, to the security of Australia. The narrative, which is backed up with forty excellent Figures illustrating the defence significance of the various aspects of the northern Australia environment in relation to possible threats coming from the north and the west, is divided into six Chapters: The Need for Change; What Australia Needs to be Defended Against; The Evolution of Australia's Strategic Concepts; Towards a New Defence Strategy; Managing Offshore Contingencies; and: The Need for New Approaches.

He notes that the '...redefinition of Australia's defence priorities in the early 1970s was a watershed. The long succession of forward defence operations with major power allies had come to an end.

The demands of preparing for the direct defence of Australia were dramatically different to those of the past and there was a pressing need for policies, force structures and activities to be reviewed and reformulated.' Further, he notes that 'It continued to be important for Australia to do what it could to encourage a sense of strategic community in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific.' Dealing with the various contingency priorities to be faced, he rules out both global war, and serious conventional military threats in the foreseeable future as deserving priorities in force structure planning.

*Continued page 63*



# TERRORIST USE OF SEAMINES IN THE 1980s

by

Lieutenant Commander A J Hinge RAN

## INTRODUCTION

During the 1980s Seamines were extensively used by terrorist and revolutionary groups in the Middle East and Central America. This article examines how and why the 'weapon that waits' has been used successfully by these groups.

## WHY THE SEAMINE IS USED

The years 1967-72 marked a watershed era in sea mine warfare. Prior to this period, the mine was seen as a highly escalatory weapon which could only be used during extreme conflict situations involving declared war. This was shown not to be the case. Between 1967 and 1970, the US Navy funded a major mine warfare research study known as Project NIMROD - The Present and Future Role of the Mine in Naval Warfare. The US Mine Advisory Committee of the National Academy of Sciences published parts of the report and found that military and civilian planners consistently knew little about the use of mines and assumed that they could only be used in long strategic campaigns when the reverse is true. This lesson was reinforced during President Nixon's extremely successful mining of major North Vietnamese harbours in 1972. But terrorists and other 'rogue groups' have also learned that the mine offers unique advantages in terms of politico-military leverage.

The sea mine is important because it is used. During the past twenty years seamines have been used for a wider range of purposes by a larger diversity of groups. These groups have ranged from the navies of Sovereign States to terrorists, guerillas and revolutionaries who have realized the disproportionate military leverage offered by the 'weapon that waits'. Table 1 summarises the major uses of seamines since 1967 when the United States, after several years of hesitation, successfully commenced mining the rivers of North Vietnam in a highly constrained political environment. The mine is increasingly used because it is unique. It offers advantages

given by no other weapon. The seamine, by definition, is an underwater explosive device which waits to sink or damage targets or deter them from entering an area (it should always be remembered that the seamine has completely succeeded in its mission if the opponent refuses to challenge it). Ultimately mines are unique in that they can pose a persistent threat without any other forces being present.

The mine is not 'hurled' like directed or missile weapons (bombs, missiles, bullets etc). Directed weapons increase the potential for escalation because they are active weapons launched with the intent of destroying material and people shortly after release from human control. They are often carried by highly visible and specialized platforms which add to the inherently escalatory nature of 'eyeball-to-eyeball' contact. The mine completely eliminates escalatory eyeball-to-eyeball contact and thus direct confrontation between adversaries. This makes the mine particularly attractive to weak maritime powers and covert groups.

Mines are increasingly valuable to some terrorists, for example, because they are passive, undirected devices which are the only form of weapon which can be used (deployed) without necessarily killing or injuring people, or damaging property. They can perform their sea denial task without ever firing and they do not cause overly adverse international reaction since the mine can be portrayed as a relatively 'humane' weapon. The onus is often on the opponent to make a decision to challenge or withdraw from the field. Meanwhile, media attention and the embarrassment of target Governments and authorities has been achieved at low cost and with little risk. If the opponent elects to challenge the field, he can be portrayed as having decided to risk sinking or damage and it may be argued that the consequences should be borne by him. Mines essentially limit violence to those that make a conscious decision to challenge them and civilian populations are attacked



with various shortages and higher marine insurance rates rather than with bullets,

bombs and other forms of escalatory missile weapon.

**TABLE 1**  
**SUMMARY OF MINELAYING ACTIVITIES 1967-1989**

Year(s)	Conflict	User	Motive	Numbers	Platform
1967-71	Vietnam	U.S.	Logistic interdiction	240,000	Aircraft
1971	India/Pakistan	Pakistan	Sea Denial	1,000	Surface ships
1972	Vietnam	U.S.	Blockade	11,000	Aircraft
1973	Yom-Kippur	Egypt	Blockade	--	Surface ship/aircraft
1974-75	Cambodia	Khmer Rouge	Guerilla	--	Sampan
1982	Falklands	Argentina	Sea denial	100	Surface ship
1984	Red Sea	Libya	Terrorist	200	RO-RO Ferry
1984	Nicaragua	DRA*, NDF*	Terrorist	200	Speedboat
1987-89	Persian Gulf	Iran**	Terrorist	50	Landing craft

\*DRA - Democratic Revolutionary Alliance: (Costa Rican based)

\*NDF - Nicaraguan Democratic Force (Nicaraguan based)

\*\*Figure relates to offensive mines only and not 'drifters' from large defensive fields in the northern Gulf.

#### THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARHEAD

Mines are 'low profile' weapons in terms of their lack of 'obviousness'. Consequently, direct involvement of the deployer in deaths and damaging property is harder to prove. In addition to the 'anonymity' provided by the mine, terrorists use the 'psychological warhead' of the mine to great advantage. The essence of the mine's psychological warhead is the increased stress placed on the opponent who will develop an exaggerated fear of the unknown, invisible mine threat. The mine is a hidden, automatic device capable of near infinite patience and instant attack. It cannot be fought like aircraft, submarines or surface combatants since the minefield will lie quietly, only revealing

itself in spasms. The psychological impact of mines is thus quite different to that of other weapons.

Terrorists are those who attempt to coerce through violence or the threat of violence and, as will be seen, they have recognized the value of the mine's psychological warhead and its value as a weapon which can make a point almost 'anonymously' and not necessarily lead to escalation. Most importantly, it isolates the terrorist from the threat for enough time to enable things to 'cool down' and avoid the immediate wrath of sovereign states.

The psychological warhead was recognised by researchers at the US Centre for Naval Analysis who found that:



'Stress and uncertainty are at the heart of mine warfare. Mine fields are like twilight zones - they work more on human minds than on ships themselves. We can use our knowledge - of exaggerated forms of the unknown - to our advantage, by exploring mine warfare's full psychological potential'.<sup>1</sup>

Unfortunately, terrorists and other rogue groups have begun to explore the mine's full potential.

### LIMITED WARFARE

In limited warfare between nations the mine has also proven itself increasingly useful. An essential point to remember is the mine's ability to pose a persistent threat which is politically adjustable in terms of area, intensity, timing, target and duration of effect. They can therefore be made more selective than missile weapons. Minefields are also excellent tools for use in a system of graduated response as they can literally be 'set' at the lowest level of violence and eliminate escalatory 'eyeball to eyeball' confrontation as previously discussed.

Mines are also increasingly used because they are easily available, easily maintained, versatile, cheap and easily deployed. The mine is a non-vehicle-oriented weapon. It needs no purpose-built platform for deployment. Indeed, the less conspicuous and military 'looking' a vehicle the better, given the usually covert nature of mine warfare. For example, in 1984, mines were deployed by the NDF and DRA using speedboats in the Nicaraguan ports of Corinto, Sandino and El Bluff. Fifteen vessels were attacked by these mines. Similarly, a Libyan ferry deployed about 200 mines in the Red Sea in 1984 and nineteen vessels were attacked. More recently, in 1987, an Iranian Landing Craft deployed about 50 mines in the Persian Gulf and five vessels were attacked in 1987-1988 and one vessel in early 1989.<sup>2</sup>

Therefore, in 1984 the seamine became the newest tactic of international terrorism. A comprehensive analysis of the Red Sea and Nicaraguan minings is useful in gaining an insight into the growing utility of the mine as a tool of tomorrow's terrorism.

### LIBYAN DEPLOYMENTS 1984

During July/August 1984 nineteen ships under fifteen different flags were damaged to varying extents by mines in the Red Sea. Maritime mining had emerged as the newest

tactic of international terrorism. Despite the intensive efforts of a large international minehunting/mine-sweeping force, only one of the mines responsible for the damage and confusion was recovered. It was located on September 12th by the British Ton Class Minehunter HMS *Gavinton* in 50 metres of water, about 15 miles south of the entrance to the Suez Canal.<sup>3</sup>

The mine (Serial Number 99501 NG63), as mentioned previously, was of recent Soviet manufacture (1981) and was capable of pressure-magnetic-acoustic actuation combinations. Though capable of housing 1500 pounds (680 kg) of explosive it only contained up to one third of this amount (approx 500 pounds).

Experts concluded that it was laid within the last three months (June/August 1984) and was charged to scare off or slightly damage surface vessels. It was 10 feet long, 21 inches in diameter and was suitable for deployment from submarines or any surface craft. It was set for activation on 27th July but had malfunctioned.<sup>4</sup>

Iran was initially suspected to have laid the mines so as to embarrass moderate Arab states such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. This possibility was soon discounted. On July 31st, three weeks after the first underwater explosion, the Islamic Jihad terrorist group claimed responsibility for the mining and stated that their frogmen had laid 190 mines in the Suez Canal and its Red Sea approaches to 'punish the imperialists' for 'encouraging the expansion of the Iran-Iraq War'.<sup>5</sup> This group was also discounted from being directly involved in the mining.

Evidence, albeit circumstantial, eventually pointed very strongly to a Libyan involvement in this indiscriminate attack against neutral shipping. The Libyan Roll On-Roll Off cargo ferry *Ghat* entered the Suez Canal on July 6th 1984 while making a return trip from Tripoli, Libya to the port of Assab in Ethiopia. *Ghat* entered the Suez Canal on July 6th and should have been back at the canal by the 14th. However, she did not arrive until the 21st. Seven days were 'lost' and to complicate the issue further no record exists as to how long *Ghat* spent in Assab. No other port calls were made.<sup>6</sup>

Prior to departing Tripoli, *Ghat* changed crew and took on a group of military personnel including a man of colonel rank known to be head of the Libyan Minelaying



division. Coals were further added to the fires of suspicion when it was reported that on their return to Tripoli (July 23rd) members of the crew were given military decorations for the 'ferry trip'. Reinforcing this purely circumstantial evidence, the *Ghat* was inspected by French authorities in Marseilles during August and damage to *Ghat's* aft ramp was discovered. It was concluded by French authorities that the '...ramp had appeared to have been damaged by waves, presumably because it had been lowered at sea'<sup>7</sup>.

Libya also had a motive for this attack on Suez canal shipping.

Relations between Libya and Egypt had been very strained for several years and the mining was probably viewed as a low risk means of seriously affecting Egypt's economy, which gained a major portion of its foreign currency revenue from canal toll receipts<sup>8</sup>.

A number of lessons have been learned from the Red Sea mines. It is evident that the mining of vital sea routes in peacetime was easier than had been thought and that clandestine mining remains a low risk method of inflicting damage which cannot easily be prevented or punished. In addition, the perpetrators of such acts can rarely be implicated more than circumstantially due to the very covert nature of most minelaying operations.

Authorities in the United States seem to have little doubt of Libyan involvement in the mining. Yet, all the State Department was able to say was 'there is no conclusive proof...there is persuasive circumstantial evidence indicating that Libya was involved in mining the entrances to the Red Sea'<sup>9</sup>.

Another critical lesson, with ominous implications, is that mines must be set to sink or seriously damage ships in order to deter vessels and seriously disrupt shipping. Terrorists may well take this lesson to heart and no longer be content with 20-30 percent scare charge loads of explosive in their mines.

1984 also witnessed the participation in minewarfare by other clandestine groups, namely the Costa Rican based DRA (Democratic Revolutionary Alliance) and the Honduran based NDF (Nicaraguan Democratic Force). Using mines apparently supplied by the United States these anti-Sandinista groups mined the Nicaraguan ports of Corinto and Sandino on the Pacific

coast and El Bluff on the Atlantic coast. A dozen vessels flying the flags of several nations were damaged with a number of injuries to crew reported. The mining campaign was stopped in the end by a May 1984 ruling of the World Court that the US had acted improperly by assisting in the mining of the three ports and, though the US did not accept World Court jurisdiction over its activities in the area, US mining assistance ceased in late April of that year.<sup>10</sup>

## IRANIAN DEPLOYMENTS 1987 - 89

Both Iran and Iraq have used moored contact mines in large defensive fields in the upper reaches of the Persian Gulf since the early 1980s. Besides a modest supply of probably unreliable US Mk.55 Bottom or Ground mines, the Iranian stockpile consists of Soviet moored switch-horn contact mines which were designed in Czarist Russia after the Hague Convention relative to the laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines (1907). These mines were used offensively in 1987 when the Iranians deployed a few small fields in the Persian Gulf using a small Landing Craft capable of deploying approximately 50 mines.<sup>11</sup> Prior to commencement of its second laying operation the Landing Craft was intercepted by U.S. Forces.

The objectives of the Iranian operation appear to have been to destroy/damage U.S. Warships, and generally harass Persian Gulf shipping.

Casualties of the Iranian minelaying operation were as follows:

- USS *Samuel B Roberts* (FFG) seriously damaged, cost estimated at \$US96m.;
- US Medium tanker *Bridgeton* suffered major hull damage, cost between \$US2m and \$US4m;
- oil rig support vessel (OSV) was destroyed, value \$US7m

Note that the 'attack-ratio' was about 1:10. However, most Soviet moored mines are capable of delayed rising, and all 50 mines may not have been active at the time. Therefore an attack rate in excess of 1:10 may have existed: This is approximately the same rate as occurred with the Persian Gulf deployments in 1984, though these deployments took place in a different area, with different mines and probably different



objectives. The rate of 1:10 is very 'good' given that the best achieved in World War II was 1:8 for very precise submarine deployed mine-fields in the confined waters of the South West Pacific.

These operations would undoubtedly be seen as major successes by the Libyans and Iranians in terms of drawing a completely disproportionate response from U.S. Forces. Major US and Allied MCM forces were committed to Gulf operations and the USN was seriously embarrassed by its incapacity to guarantee the safe transit of shipping (*Bridgeton* struck a mine on 24 July 1987 and was then used as a 'guinea pig' hull to lead three USN Warships through suspected minefields).

The USN had completely failed to anticipate the threat posed by the very few mines in the Gulf and completely underestimated the Iranians. This was despite a number of other vessels detonating mines prior to the *Bridgeton* incident. Therefore, US official response from Secretary of Defense Weinberger was surprising when he stated after the *Bridgeton* incident '....we weren't looking for mines there because we had never seen a mine in the area'.<sup>12</sup>

An apt appraisal of events in the Gulf was given by Captain J.F. Tapley USN (Retd) who stated: 'Clearly the historical record confirms that mine warfare is an integral element of naval power. It illustrates that maritime nations are vulnerable to mining in both home and distant waters. It shows that less developed nations and rogue political groups can wage effective mine warfare. And it demonstrates a record of interwar neglect of mine warfare in the US Navy that culminated in the Persian Gulf crisis of 1987 - when the world's foremost power failed to counter with any celerity the antique mines of a minor power despite knowing beforehand that mines would certainly be laid'.<sup>13</sup>

The poor record of success in dealing with the mine menace continued into 1988 with the successful mining of a US warship.

#### THE USS SAMUEL B ROBERTS INCIDENT

In mid-April 1988 the US Guided Missile Frigate (FFG) *Samuel B Roberts* was mined in the Persian Gulf and certain aspects of the incident are noteworthy.

First, the mines were deployed in

relatively shallow depths and could readily be seen below the surface. This is a similar situation to that of the delayed US major landing at Wonsan, Korea in 1950 when moored mines were visible beneath the surface and helicopters were used to physically spot them. Evidence exists that the US FFG was in fact attempting to avoid the mines through a violent manoeuvre when it was hit. The mine was probably pushed away and downwards by the wash of the warship. Consequently, the mine bobbed up against the keel almost directly below the engine room and exploded, reportedly throwing the vessel's keel 3 metres upwards.<sup>14</sup> As a result of this explosion, drastic flexing occurred and major rupturing of the keel, hull and superstructure resulted. The engine room flooded immediately and the engines were dislodged from their beds, forcing the vessel to 'limp away' using a retractable auxiliary 'get home' propeller. The ship then had to be towed most of the way to Bahrain and was literally knocked out of the conflict in terms of acting as a viable convoy escort for many months. Damage done to the hull, engine room, superstructure and systems was estimated at \$US 96 million.

It is remarkable that simple countermeasures were not employed against the moored contact mines despite a number of detonations during the previous nine months. The *Samuel B Roberts* had no bow sonar dome fitted and could therefore have been protected to a substantial degree against such mines by a simple paravane rig. Paravanes are torpedo shaped floats towed at an angle from the bows of ships by cables which divert and cut contact mine anchor cables. They are inexpensive, relatively easy to manufacture and fit and can be used at higher speed though ship manoeuvrability is moderately affected. The paravane lost favour and usage as the bottom mine became the predominant combat mine type in the latter stages of World War II. However, as the Americans had discovered during the Korean War at Wonsan and many years later in the Persian Gulf, failure to re-adopt old, simple but effective countermeasures costs dearly. Paravane fitment in the *Samuel B Roberts* incident would almost certainly have protected the vessel to a substantial degree against contact mines and may have obviated the need to conduct a drastic (and unwise) manoeuvre which exacerbated the damage



considerably.<sup>15</sup>

Another deficiency was revealed in this particular mine attack. Since WWI sudden changes of course when traversing minefields goes against Standard Operating Procedures for exactly the reason which led to the FFG being so badly damaged. The fact that the readily seen mines were not detected earlier also casts serious doubts as to whether efficient lookouts were posted and if the vessels two helicopters were used effectively for mine visual reconnaissance. The inference being that the crew of the vessel may have failed to learn and apply basic self-defensive measures and may have simply underestimated the mine threat.

As mentioned earlier, the Iranians were known to have limited stocks of air-laid US MK 55 bottom mines but few, if any, are known to have been laid.

These mines were early 'mods' or versions and employed dual channel magnetic induction firing mechanisms. The MK 55 contains a 1300 pound HBX-1 warhead which is quite formidable from a victim's perspective. Iranian stocks of these mines, besides being small in number, were probably poorly maintained. Yet if they had been deployed their potential for damage would far exceed that of the contact mines actually used. Consequently, the Iranians apparently chose to concentrate on deployment of more easily maintained, highly reliable and available contact mines. Water depths in many parts of the gulf are also too deep for effective use of bottom mines which, depending on the nature of the sea bed, charge weight and structure of target, have an effective range of 60-80 metres.

A further very significant lesson drawn from the attack on the FFG is that the serious damage done to the vessel invited nowhere near the magnitude of US retaliation which less harmful events such as attempted Iranian armed 'speedboat attacks' did. US response to the 'eyeball to eyeball', but impotent, speedboat attacks were severe because the enemy was close in terms of time and distance.

The mine attacks removed a provocative enemy in time and distance, and US response was attenuated once the initial shock was over and an enemy was not found in the vicinity.<sup>16</sup> This lesson would not be lost on other "rogue" groups in terms of the mine protecting them from observation, detection

and immediate reprisal.

## IMPLICATIONS FOR AUSTRALIA

The following conclusions, many of them not new, can be made concerning the implications and character of mine use in the 1980s:

- Mine warfare is now effectively waged by terrorists and other 'rogue' groups. Mines could be used as a first stage of a graduated terrorist/ dissident response against the Australian Commonwealth in preference to directed or missile weapons.
- Terrorists have access to an array of mines ranging from modern multi influence bottom mines to antiquated moored contact mines. Therefore a widespread ability to covertly acquire these weapons and possibly deploy them in Australian waters exists if ever an intent is developed.
- Mine laying operations by terrorists remain very hard to detect and are easily undertaken. After the success of the Middle East and Central American mine-lays, "rogue" groups may increasingly see mines as a low risk/high return tactic.
- There now exists more pressure to orchestrate mine 'demonstration effects' in terms of damage and destruction. (The old 'bluff' of only having to say that mines have been laid may not necessarily work nowadays, especially in areas with a high threshold of violence already existing).
- Mines draw a disproportionate response at least equal to that drawn in previous conflicts. They are therefore as cost-effective as ever and usage may become widespread.
- Despite advances in MCM technology, the immense difficulty in recovering and sweeping mines remains at a probably higher level than ever before, given the predominance of bottom mine use. A more comprehensive range of MCM techniques than ever before is required. (I have argued elsewhere that Australia currently lacks an appropriately comprehensive MCM capability).<sup>17</sup>
- Mines continue to be seriously underestimated by Western navies and



Defence Establishments. (This is historically true for the RAN and remains the case for reasons which will be discussed in a future article).

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15 Ibid

16 US retaliation against the Iranians in the speedboat attack included major air attacks against Iranian oil rigs.

17 See Hinge A *The Seamine as First 'Strike' Weapon against Australia - Then and Now* Journal of the Australian Naval Institute May 1987 pp19-38

<sup>1</sup> Gear W and Bartholemew J: *Psychological Aspects of Minewarfare* United States Naval Institute Proceedings (USNIP) February 1986, p58: See also, by the same authors, *Psychological Aspects of Minewarfare* Centre for Naval Analyses, Virginia, USA, Professional Paper 365, Oct 82.

<sup>2</sup> Media reports on Friday 13 January 1989 indicated that a vessel had been badly damaged by a mine in the Persian Gulf (Melbourne Channel Ten 6pm News)

<sup>3</sup> Traver S *Mines of August: an International Whodunnit* USNIP Naval Review edition May 1985 p109

<sup>4</sup> Ibid

<sup>5</sup> Ibid

<sup>6</sup> Ibid pp 111-112 gives an account of Ghat's voyage.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid p112

<sup>8</sup> Ibid p97

<sup>9</sup> Jane's Defence Weekly, 13 October 1984, p103

<sup>10</sup> Frump R *The Maritime World in 1984* USNIP, Naval Review Edition, May 1985

<sup>11</sup> Media film reports depicted the Iranian landing craft after capture in 1988. A capacity for about 10 MO8 sized contact mines existed.

<sup>12</sup> Traver S *Weapons that Wait...and Wait...and Wait* USNIP February 1988 p22

<sup>13</sup> Tarpey J F *A Minestruck Navy Forgets its History* USNIP February 1988 p47

<sup>14</sup> See Friedman N *US Frigate Mines in Gulf* in world naval developments section of USNIP June 1988 p119



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# THE ROLE OF BRITISH SEAPOWER IN THE DEFEAT OF NAPOLEON

by

Commander S J Hyland RAN

## INTRODUCTION

In his introduction to *The Influence of Seapower Upon History 1660-1783*, Mahan wrote that "the study of sea history of the past will be found instructive, by its illustration of the general principles of maritime warfare, notwithstanding the great changes that have been brought about in naval weapons."<sup>1</sup> What better introduction for what follows.

The role of British seapower in the Napoleonic wars was multi-faceted: the Royal Navy prevented Napoleon's armies from invading England; it blockaded France and her allies and attacked their warships whenever they ventured from the safety of their ports; and, together with the British merchant marine, it enabled Britain to survive the Continental System (of which, more later), by providing the means for British trade to ply northern European ports - until they too were closed - and by opening new overseas markets.

In addition, to paraphrase the words of Sir Francis Bacon, made famous by Corbett in his *Principles of Maritime Strategy*<sup>2</sup>, the supremacy of British seapower enabled Britain to take as much or as little as it wished of the land war on the Continent.

At times, the Royal Navy provided the only impediment to Napoleon's schemes for European domination, but it is important to keep in mind that it did not defeat him. That could only be achieved on land, where Napoleon's "centre of gravity" lay<sup>3</sup>.

## BRITISH SEAPOWER AND THE THREAT OF INVASION

In 1801, after nine years of continuous war, the exhausted British elected the Addington government with a mandate to make peace. Napoleon also appeared keen for peace, and he responded readily to secret British overtures. A preliminary agreement was signed on 1 October 1801 - and the British government began immediately to disarm. The final peace treaty was signed at Amiens in March 1802.

The desire for peace was so deeply felt in Britain that the government assumed that

Napoleon's motives were as trustworthy as their own. In fact, there is evidence that all he wanted from peace was time to build a fleet large enough to challenge the Royal Navy. Indeed, almost before the ink was dry on the Treaty of Amiens, he called for 25 ships of the line to be built annually.

Some have suggested that Napoleon wanted a large and capable fleet only to prevent any future British blockade of his overseas lines of supply<sup>4</sup>; others have countered that overseas trade was not as vital to France as it was to England<sup>5</sup>, and consequently, the need to protect it did not provide the motivation for the shipbuilding program.

With the benefit of hindsight, it is reasonable to conclude that the shipbuilding program was tied to his plans to dominate Europe. Napoleon recognised that his plans could only be achieved if Britain were defeated militarily - and the quickest way to do so was by invasion. He also understood that invasion would not be possible unless British seapower were overwhelmed, at least in the Channel.

There is a consistent theme in many of his personal letters which support this view.

As early as 1797, in a letter to the Directory<sup>6</sup> announcing the Peace of Campo Formio, the then General Bonaparte said "Let us concentrate all our activity on the side of the navy, and destroy England; this done Europe is at our feet"<sup>7</sup>. On 23 April 1798, again to the Directory, he wrote "To effect an invasion of England, without having mastery of the sea, is the boldest and most difficult operation that could be imagined. The only possible way would be to make a surprise passage..."<sup>8</sup>.

Although this letter appears to regard as extremely risky any attempt to invade England without having control of the Channel, the possibility resurfaces in a letter written on 28 November 1803 to the Maritime Prefect of Toulon: "Given eight hours of night and propitious weather, and we can be masters of the world"<sup>9</sup>. Perhaps Napoleon saw this as his only option: when this letter was written, the Peace of Amiens



had already been shipwrecked by his aggression towards Switzerland; the Royal Navy had recommenced its blockade of French ports — and the fleet intended to challenge it had not yet been built.

Despite this, however, Napoleon did not shelve or significantly alter his invasion plans. On 2 July 1804, as these plans were nearing fruition, he wrote to Admiral Latouche Treville (the commander of the Toulon fleet), "Let us be masters of the Channel for six hours, and we are masters of the world"<sup>10</sup> The necessity of controlling the Channel, if only for a short time, appears to have been re-established. Less clear was how this was to be done, given the overwhelming superiority of British seapower in the Channel.

These letters are interesting for a number of reasons, but most obviously, they demonstrate that the possibility of invading England, as an essential step to European (and even world) domination, appears to have occupied Napoleon for a considerable time; and that he saw the Channel and British seapower as his greatest — and perhaps insurmountable — obstacle to the achievement of this aim.

It was fortunate for the British — and for the rest of Europe — when the Peace of Amiens was broken, that British capital ship strength (and quality) still exceeded that of the French Navy, despite premature disarmament.

Soon after the war re-commenced, Addington was replaced as Prime Minister by William Pitt, who recognised that the British army was too small, scattered and inexperienced to take on the veterans of the French army in direct attacks on their invasion staging ports<sup>11</sup>. Accordingly, on 15 March 1804, at the height of the invasion threat, he advised Parliament that "Our Naval defence is that on which we should chiefly rest our hopes..."<sup>12</sup>

In fact, the threat of imminent invasion passed almost without notice. Admiral Latouche Treville, who was to command the invasion force, attempted only once to escape from Toulon, but turned back as soon as he realised that Nelson's loose blockade was intended to draw him into a trap. Soon after, in August 1804, he became ill and died. As there were no flag officers who were sufficiently knowledgeable of the invasion plans to replace him, an invasion in 1804 was no longer possible.

His successor, Admiral Villeneuve, finally managed to escape from Toulon in March 1805. After joining up with a Spanish fleet off Cadiz, he sailed to the West Indies (in an attempt to draw the British fleet — or elements of it — away from the Channel). He was hotly pursued there and back by Nelson, and was finally caught off Cape Trafalgar on 21 October 1805. Napoleon's hopes of invading England were dashed forever by the results of that battle. Thereafter he turned his thoughts to waging a trade war against Britain.

## BRITISH SEAPOWER AND THE TRADE WAR

Apart from blockading the enemy's fleets in port and controlling the Channel, British seapower provided the only means of conducting an offensive campaign against the enemy's colonies and seaborne trade<sup>13</sup>, and a defensive campaign to protect her own overseas trade. Although these operations would not provide a decision in the war, they could satisfy the demands of the moment — to deprive Napoleon of the produce and resources of French colonies and to protect British external possessions and trade from the depredations of the French navy.

However, as already noted, imports from French colonies were not vital to the French economy, which had the resources of continental Europe to draw upon. But it was essential to Britain, without allies for almost two years from May 1803, that her European and colonial trade remain free and safe from French attack.

Napoleon understood this, and in 1806, he established the Continental System to exclude the entry of British goods into Europe, while continuing to permit exports to Britain. In this way, he aimed to upset the British balance of trade, thus undermining Britain's financial capacity to wage the war<sup>14</sup>.

Although some European ports, not under French control, remained open and acted as a conduit for British imports into Europe, Britain's economic ability to oppose Napoleon had taken a decided turn for the worse. The stranglehold on Britain tightened in the years following 1806, as Napoleon's control over Europe was expanded. The British government took a number of retaliatory measures, such as requiring all neutral ships carrying trade into Europe to be licenced, but it became increasingly important that new trading opportunities be



opened elsewhere to offset the economic damage caused by the Continental System.

In the years which followed, Britain faced enormous difficulties. Between 1806 and 1808, for example, British exports actually fell by about 10 percent. Cotton and grain imports were disrupted, resulting in shortages, high prices and unemployment. During the period, there was a five percent fall in industrial productivity; the number of bank failures increased; British workers agitated for peace and improved wages and on several occasions troops had to be used to disperse demonstrations<sup>15</sup>.

The situation was at its worst in 1811, when Sweden came under Napoleon's control. Exports to northern Europe fell by about 80 percent, reducing British exports overall by about a third. This created a monetary crisis in which the pound was depreciated and reserves fell to dangerously low levels<sup>16</sup>.

Despite these enormous difficulties, however, the trade war did not produce the result Napoleon expected. British seapower opened new markets for British exports in the Caribbean and in the Indian Ocean (including French colonies) — so successfully, in fact, that the value of British exports at the end of the Napoleonic Wars was greater than in 1806, when the Continental System was instituted. Indeed, the economy of Europe, including France, which was geared to British trade, suffered greater long-term damage. Even in the short-term, the French suffered: the finance needed by Napoleon to conduct the war was seriously reduced as a result of the trade war — and in spite of increased taxes, the French national debt increased<sup>17</sup>.

As Mahan has pointed out, Napoleon's trade war was doomed because Britain's navy and merchant marine could offset the losses in one area of the world by opening up opportunities elsewhere.

#### SEAPOWER AND THE WAR ON LAND

The British government realised that the war against Napoleon could not be brought to a satisfactory conclusion until Napoleon had been defeated on land. Britain attempted on a number of occasions to conduct raids and "amphibious" operations against French forces, the best known being the assault on Aboukir on 8 March 1801. Although this assault was a brilliant success, most writers agree that the British government had come to the conclusion that the risks

associated with small scale landings far outweighed the possible benefits.

In 1808, however, a popular uprising against the new French King of Spain spread to Portugal and provided the long-awaited opportunity for British troops to undertake large scale land operations on mainland Europe. The British acted quickly, sending 17,000 troops by sea to Portugal, with orders to support the Spanish. Soon after they landed, the British government decided to commit its entire army.

Napoleon crossed the Pyrenees, determined to give the Spanish and British a sound lesson. After quickly defeating the Spanish, he was ready to overwhelm the outnumbered British forces. The only option for the British army was to attempt an evacuation by sea from the port of Corunna. Although Napoleon was closer to the port, the British conducted a forced march of just over 300 miles in a little more than three weeks — losing about 5,000 troops en route and were successfully evacuated by the Royal Navy.

Within two months, the Royal Navy returned the troops to Lisbon, from where a combined British and Portuguese army under Wellesley commenced a campaign that was to eventually drive Napoleon's armies back through Spain. They were still outnumbered, however, and to offset this disadvantage, Wellesley decided to exploit the advantages offered by British seapower.

He used British seapower to supply his own army from as far afield as the United States<sup>18</sup> — and to interdict French supply columns which, because of the mountainous terrain in central Spain, were forced to use the coastal routes from France<sup>19</sup>.

Although this placed a heavy burden on the already overstretched Royal Navy, it placed the French logistic system in even more difficult circumstances. The acquisition of food, in particular, created serious problems for Napoleon's armies. The normal French practice was to requisition food from local sources, but in Spain this was almost impossible. Spain was barely self-sufficient in food, and the practice of requisition antagonised the local population, strengthening their determination to resist; and even worse from a French viewpoint, it drove many to join the guerilla forces.

At the outset of the campaign, the British had little to be optimistic about. They had fewer than 40,000 British and allied troops facing over 250,000 French troops on the



Peninsular. However, by skilfully using the advantages conferred by British seapower, they and their allies were able to drive the French back through Spain and into southern France, leading eventually to the defeat of Napoleon.

## CONCLUSION

Although British seapower did not defeat Napoleon, it did make his defeat possible by protecting Britain from invasion; by permitting overseas trade to be conducted in the face of a continental blockade; by denying Napoleon access to French overseas colonies and resources; and by permitting land forces, which were needed to defeat Napoleon, to be landed and supported wherever and whenever the possibility permitted.

I began this paper with Mahan's statement that study of the history of seapower "will be found instructive, by its illustration of the general principles of maritime warfare". For those readers who struggle to see the relevance of such history, perhaps it is worth concluding it with a word of caution from the same source: that a "...vague feeling of contempt for the past, combines with natural indolence to blind men even to those permanent strategic lessons which lie close to the surface of naval history".<sup>20</sup>

Clarendon Press, Oxford 1946, p176 .

<sup>6</sup> A body of five "directors" forming the executive government of France from 1795 to 1799.

<sup>7</sup> Mowatt R. B. "The Diplomacy of Napoleon". Edward Arnold and Co, London 1924, p53n.

<sup>8</sup> Nicolay F. "Napoleon at the Boulogne Camp". John Lane Company, New York 1907, p378 .

<sup>9</sup> Nicolay, *ibid*, p3 82 .

<sup>10</sup> Stanhope P.H. "Life of the Right Honourable William Pitt". John Murray, London 1879. Vol 3, pp 261-262.

<sup>11</sup> Richmond, *op cit*, p218.

<sup>12</sup> Stanhope, *op cit*, Vol 3, page 194.

<sup>13</sup> Richmond, *op cit*, p219.

<sup>14</sup> Ross S.T. "European Diplomatic History 1789-1815 ". Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, Florida 1981, p269 .

<sup>15</sup> Ross, *op cit*, p276.

<sup>16</sup> The statistics in this paragraph were taken from the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1989 ) Vol 18, page 768 .

<sup>17</sup> Potter, *op cit*, pp170-171

<sup>18</sup> Glover M. "The Peninsular War, 1807-1814" Archon Books, Hamden Connecticut 1974, p29.

<sup>19</sup> Potter, *op cit*, p177.

<sup>20</sup> Mahan, *op cit*, p11

<sup>1</sup> Mahan A.T. "The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783 " . Dover Publications Inc, New York 1987 Edition, p2 .

<sup>2</sup> Corbett J. S. "Some Principles of Maritime Strategy" Longmans, Green and Co, London 1911, pS 5 .

<sup>3</sup> Clausewitz C von. "On War". Princeton University Press, Princeton New Jersey 1984 . Book Eight (War Plans), Chapter Four (Closer Definition of the Military Objective), pp 595-596 . The "centre of gravity" is defined by Clausewitz as "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends .That is the point against which all our energies should be directed".

<sup>4</sup> For example, see Potter E.B. (ed) "Seapower: A Naval History". Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1960, p150

<sup>5</sup> Richmond H. " Statemen and Seapower " .



# AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE IN 1991 - A DISCUSSION PAPER ON FUTURE OPTIONS

by

Lieutenant Commander Peter Jones and Lieutenant Tom Frame

*This paper was presented to the Annual General Meeting on 21 February 1991 for discussion.*

## INTRODUCTION

As the Australian Naval Institute (ANI) enters its seventeenth year it is an appropriate time to consider its performance while perusing options for its future. This discussion paper will look at the stated objectives of the ANI and propose some far-reaching changes and new directions for the Institute.

## PREFACE

Practically every writer on naval strategy and the use of the seas for national purposes has identified the importance of a state possessing what has been variously described as a 'maritime people'. In describing the elements of sea power, Mahan remarked that: "In the matter of sea power, the most brilliant successes have followed where there has been intelligent direction by a government fully imbued with the spirit of the people and conscious of its true bent".

He concluded that Britain had achieved her maritime Empire partly because her people saw the use of the seas as an integral component of their economic enterprise and as a means of overwhelming competitors and, not unexpectedly, their foes.

Half a century later and to illustrate the extent to which it had been a truism, Gorshkov included the possession of a maritime people as one of the five most important constituents of the State's sea power.

The standard descriptions of sea power given today all affirm the importance of a nation having a population versed in the uses and potentialities of the seas; for national prosperity and for security. Without such a national attitude, something Geoffrey Till describes as a source of sea power, a nation is bound to remain a marginal player within international maritime affairs.

Seeking to achieve a greater awareness of maritime affairs as a means of improving and expanding Australia's performance in that area has fundamental significance for an island nation such as ours. Conversely, a

lack of solid public support for the Navy will invariably lead to its decline.

Two Australian writers, Paul and Frances MacGuire, writing nearly fifty years ago recognised this in their book *The Price of Admiralty*.

"It (the Navy) must be fed from the blood and marrow of a people accustomed to the sea; but as an instrument, it is shaped by skill and wisdom enduring and enlarged from generation to generation of seamen and statesmen who understand the sea. A Navy cannot be created on the occasion of a crisis. A Navy cannot be improvised. It must have continuity."

The aim of the Australian Naval Institute and every other like-minded organisation should be to work towards the attainment of a maritime people. It is only when the Australian people and their political leaders understand the untapped potential of the seas for national prosperity and international stability that they will be inclined to commit greater resources to maritime activity, including naval defence.

## ANI OBJECTIVES

The stated objectives of the ANI are:

- to encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the maritime profession;
- to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and the maritime profession; and
- to publish a journal.

Simply stated, the ANI fulfills these objectives in 1991. But any evaluation of the Institute's total performance must go beyond simply "ticking the boxes".

The first objective - of encouraging and promoting the advancement of knowledge of naval and maritime matters - does not specify a target environment or group of people. Are they to be promoted within the general Australian community or within narrow naval professional circles? If not formally stated within the objectives, it should be determined and endorsed by the



Council.

The second objective, that of providing a forum, has been tackled through a mix of Seapower symposiums, journal articles, orations and chapter meetings. Although a forum has been continually provided, the level of debate and interest fostered by the availability of the forum has varied over time and between each of these activities.

The third objective is curiously worded.

One would not expect the production of the Journal to be an objective in itself but more properly considered a function of the first two objectives.

#### ANI ACTIVITIES

The activities of the ANI are defined as in Diagram 1. It is considered that the Chapters only augment the essential activities of the ANI.



DIAGRAM 1: ANI Activities

#### THE ANI IN 1991

Since the ANI was formed in 1975, its membership and activity has experienced not unexpected peaks and troughs. In the first instance, the creation of the ANI established a membership base, the first journal was published and the inaugural Seapower Symposium was staged.

A period of consolidation and refinement followed. Once a pattern of ANI activity was established, a routine and standard procedures were promoted with little rigorous assessment of their success or changes in their target audience. In other words, the ANI has changed little over 15 years although the environment in which it has operated has altered significantly.

The ANI has been, in our opinion been in a period of stagnation for the last five years.

A large part of this stagnation is a product of deficiencies in ANI structure.

#### MEMBERSHIP

ANI membership stood at 264 after its first year. This figure grew steadily through the 1970s so that by 1982 there were 576 members. The membership peaked in 1988 with 600 members but slipped back to 512 last year.

Of particular importance is the changing profile of the ANI. Taking the figures for 1982 and 1988 (at Table 1) it is clear that the membership is becoming progressively more senior. This "rank creep" is not just a product of the increased numbers of retired senior officers but, there is an actual decline in the number of junior officers.

RANK BREAKDOWN - NUMBER [PERCENTAGE]

YEAR	TOTAL	CAPT & ABOVE	CMDR/ LCDR	LEUT-MIDN	SAILORS
1976	264	-----NOT AVAILABLE-----			
1982	576	129 [22]	188 [33]	96 [17]	10 [1.7]
1988	600	153 [26]	220 [37]	68 [11]	16 [2.6]
1990	512	158 [31]	187 [37]	57 [11]	8 [1.5]

TABLE 1 - ANI Membership

Note: Total membership does not include institution subscriptions



The importance of and reason for a "rank creep" are open to discussion. One school of thought suggest that junior officers are not interested in the "weightier" issues of naval affairs although this changes mid career when they do join. In any case, it could be argued that a large number of junior officers have contact with the Institute through the Journal which they can read in their Wardrooms. For them, there is little real incentive to join when they already receive some of the benefits of membership.

This view, while somewhat reassuring, does not take into account a number of factors. First, the actual number of junior officers in the ANI is declining. Second, for the ANI to be a true forum of the RAN it must reflect the profile of the whole service. Third, the stereotype of the junior officer being uninterested in naval affairs is dated and inaccurate. An increasing number of these officers are tertiary educated and possess enhanced capacity to deal with strategic and policy issues. Finally, the notion that the junior officer will at any rate read a copy of the Journal misses the point. Besides being rather optimistic, it encourages a passive relationship between the officer group and the ANI. Thus, if it is acceptable for officers not to join as junior officers will there be any incentive to join later?

In terms of total service membership, it is difficult to determine the maximum level the Institute could hope for. However, and by way of comparison, the Royal Naval Review subscription equates to approximately 8% of the officer corps, this compares to 3.8% for the ANI.

It is clear that the static membership numbers compounded by "rank creep" is having an effect on ANI activity. This is particularly the case within the Chapters.

## CHAPTERS

Over the life of the ANI the state chapters have provided a forum for meetings of ANI members where papers could be given and general discussions held on naval matters. Over recent years the frequency and attendance of chapter meetings have dropped so dramatically that some chapters are either non-effective or essentially moribund. The reasons are probably a compound of:

- "rank creep",
- lack of a clear objective for chapters, and

- increased worklevels within the officer corps leading to a reluctance to be involved with naval extra-curricular activities.

The state of the Chapters is such as to ask are such bodies worthwhile or should the chapter structure be abandoned. If the chapters are to be retained then a clear purpose of such meetings should be established. Chapters could be tasked, for example, to study particular aspects of Australian naval affairs as means of making a positive contribution to the ANI's overall knowledge base.

## THE JOURNAL

The ANI Journal is most tangible product of the ANI. Its format has remained largely unchanged since 1975. Despite recent print and typographical shortcomings, the ANI Journal compares favourably with other national professional publications.

The Journal does, however, lack focus and some content discipline. The purpose of the Journal is its production, with the success of the Journal measured by the number of articles received by the Editor.

In reviewing its contents, few articles in recent years invited debate among members or have proposed any ideas or measures to benefit the RAN. The main issues affecting the RAN are not generally addressed or discussed within the Journal. There are very few articles on manpower problems, shifts in operational and warfare practices as well as project management. Similarly ignored is any discussion on the RAN's future. In their place, a large number of articles have originated as either staff college or ADFA assignments. This is not nearly good enough. While the academic essay style of article is no doubt erudite and possibly stimulates learned discussion, they do not drive other members of the ANI to put pen to paper. Thus letters to the Editor are virtually non-existent.

## VERNON PARKER ORATION

The Vernon Parker Oration provides for a distinguished speaker to address the Institute. While it was the intention for the oration to be an annual event this has been achieved with some difficulty, mainly due to the problems of identifying suitable speakers who are also available to speak.

## FRIENDS OF THE INSTITUTE

The concept of the "Friends of the



Institute" was based on the Institute's need to secure sufficient funds for its financial viability. This concept has succeeded in its aim and the existence of the ANI is accordingly less dependant on the size of the membership.

## **SYMPOSIUMS**

The ANI have staged Seapower Symposiums in Canberra. The aim has been to hold these events every two years but this has not always been achieved. Since the inaugural Symposium, there has been considerable change. First, there are many more Symposiums being held by a range of defence and academic bodies. Second, the general notion of "Seapower" is dated, being seen today as too narrow in concept and application. The term "Maritime power" which incorporates maritime airpower is now more commonly used. This is more than semantics. Its implication is that any symposium should involve not only air force but also merchant marine bodies.

We need also to ask what purpose do the Symposiums serve? Does the symposium genuinely increase our understanding of maritime issues? There is a risk that Symposiums become aims in themselves and serve to justify the existence of the sponsoring organisations.

## **ANI — THE WAY AHEAD**

In looking at the future the ANI must be mindful of the changes that have been taking place within the RAN and overall defence policy. Increasingly the RAN is being seen as part of the greater Australian national security framework. This includes the importance of the sea to Australia for trade and offshore resources.

Another important aspect is the vital role the RAN is playing through its naval construction programme in revitalising Australia's industrial base.

There is a clear trend in Australia towards a more "maritime" and less specifically naval outlook and there is a growing demand for information on maritime matters. We therefore must ask not only how can the ANI best serve the RAN, but also how can it promote this broadening process?

As outlined above, the ANI looks to the future in a sound financial state but with a steadily ageing membership. To be frank, the number of active members in the ANI are confined to occasional contributors and

council and chapter office holders. Quite clearly, things need to change with the Institute.

This paper proposes a number of options for the ANI to consider.

They are:

- Amalgamation,
- Confederation,
- Rationalisation, and
- Status Quo.

## **OPTION ONE — AMALGAMATION**

The Amalgamation Option is based on the premise that the ANI manpower constraints will remain severe although membership will support broadening the focus from naval to maritime affairs. This option would involve negotiating amalgamation with other maritime organisations sharing a similar constituency. These groups would include:

- The Navy League,
- The Naval Historical Association of Australia,
- The Naval Association,
- Australian Maritime Federation,
- The Australian Centre for Maritime Studies,
- Australian National Maritime Association, and
- Master Mariners of Australia.

## **Option One - Advantages**

This option recognises that there are numerous small organisations with separate but overlapping interests. None of these groups really has sufficient resources to achieve a truly national profile with paid full-time facilitating staff. With amalgamation, a paid staff is possible and well worth the investment. Additionally, the new body would be able to:

- Produce a monthly journal to be sold commercially with a significant print run.
- Establish a publishing house and mail order service.
- Provide an information resource centre.
- Stage maritime seminars and conference.

Due to their size, none of these things is possible for these groups acting separately or independently.

## **Option One - Disadvantages.**

There are a number of disadvantages. They include:



- The demise of the ANI and a number of other long-term associations.
- The possible loss of identity for individual members as the new body will cover a large range of interest groups.
- The new body may not be able to meet the peculiar needs of individual groups, such as the members of retired ship associations.
- The considerable practical and legal difficulties of effecting the amalgamation.

## OPTION TWO — CONFEDERATION

Option Two would involve the establishment of a confederation (for the purposes of this paper the "Australian Maritime Confederation [AMC]) of like minded maritime bodies under an "umbrella" organisation. Each body would retain its original structure but would be represented with the AMC Executive Council. The President of the AMC would be elected from within the Executive.

The purpose of the AMC would be the same as that outlined for the amalgamated body at Option One. A single journal would replace the existing journals and would have provision for contribution from all affiliating bodies. This would relieve each group of the requirement to produce their own journal/newsletter, something that has become too much for the Naval Association for instance.

It would be possible for the affiliating bodies to enclose a copy of a leaflet style newsletter within the Journal if particularly required. The establishment of a publishing house and mail order service would be an important initiative of the AMC. Through member price reductions, an added financial incentive for membership of one of the affiliated bodies would be provided.

The staging of seminars could be undertaken at a number of levels.

The AMC would sponsor conferences, seminars or workshops on subjects of broad or specific interest (beyond Canberra). It could also offer expertise to individual bodies should they wish to stage a small conference. The AMC could also sponsor research or fellowships on maritime matters but this would have to be a longer term project which would have to await a suitable financial endowment.

## The Umbrella Organisation

It is proposed that of the existing bodies, the Centre for Maritime Studies is best placed to act as the embryo for the AMC. It is centrally located in the national capital; its charter is already maritime based; and it specifically seeks to avoid the functions of other maritime bodies.

## Financial Arrangements

The financial arrangements would be an important element of any Confederation. Each affiliate would have to subscribe funds for the operation of the AMC. It is proposed that the necessary arrangements would be implemented as part of a staged process under an agreed timetable.

Stage One would involve both a loose confederation with small

one-off grants from affiliates necessary for establishment. Staff would be both volunteer and paid part-time.

Stage Two would involve the establishment of a mixed full and part time implementing staff funded by contributions from all affiliates.

It is recognised that the relative wealth of each body varies greatly and a scale of contribution would have to be calculated.

Similarly, individual membership fees for each body would need to be examined. This would be to ensure fees cover subscription costs.

## Option Two - Advantages.

There are a number of advantages of Option Two. They are:

- It offers promise of providing an effective body to promote maritime issues within the broader Australian community through publications, information resources and political pressure.
- It will not infringe on the existing bodies or "vested interests".
- It will allow "grass roots" activities of existing bodies to continue while releasing them of the burden of producing publications.
- Confederation could be used as a conscious step towards Amalgamation if desired.

The specific advantages to the ANI are:

- It would reinvigorate the ANI membership with greater incentives for all to join, and
- Give matters of ANI interest much wider distribution through the AMC



Journal.

The adoption of the Option would need the endorsement of the Chief of Naval Staff.

#### **Option Two - Disadvantages.**

The disadvantages of this option are that:

- It will reduce the profile of the ANI,
- It will involve substantial time and effort to establish.

#### **OPTION THREE — RATIONALISATION**

Option Three would involve the incremental reform of the ANI, tackling the perceived weaknesses of the body in a step by step manner. There is no time scale for the implementation of this option and would rely on for the main part on human resources being made available.

The components of Option Three are:

##### **Membership.**

- The boosting of membership through: complimentary membership to officers on commissioning;
- advertising campaign in "Navy News";
- sponsoring of prizes or awards during junior officer courses;
- establishment of an ANI Medal for naval strategy or affairs at the Faculty of Political science, ADFA; and
- establishment of a Membership Drive Committee.

**Chapters.** Reform the Chapter concept by:

- providing clear objectives for chapters;
- encourage interaction between ANI chapters and other naval/maritime organisations; and
- tasking chapters to undertake specific studies or articles to be published in the Journal.

**Journal.** The suggested reforms to the Journal are:

- establish a proactive editorial policy by setting themes some issues and asking/tasking individuals to write articles;
- establish a photographic competition to improve the photographic content of the magazine;
- obtain the services of a graphic designer to provide drawings and a cartoonist to provide humorous sketches for much needed variety;
- examine options to streamline the

distribution of the magazine, such as a mail order service.

**Seminars.** The objectives and value of seminars should be discussed further but it is suggested that should future seminars be entertained they be done so in association with other interested bodies such as the RAN Staff College, ADFA, Navy League and the Centre for Maritime Studies.

#### **Option Three - Advantages.**

The advantages of Option Three are that it can improve the state and performance of the ANI and it can be undertaken in a flexible way. It should be stressed that the success of the Option is largely dependant on a growth in membership to provide the manpower and interest in these reforms.

#### **Option Three - Disadvantages.**

The disadvantages of Option Three are:

- it does not address the larger maritime issues and provide for a maritime based organisation that would have national impact;
- it does not provide for the financial incentives for membership through a publishing house;
- it does not allow for material of interest to be published in a more accessible medium i.e. commercially sold journal;
- the success of the Option depends on an increase in membership, to achieve that greater work will need to be undertaken by the existing council; and
- should Option Three fail then valuable time has been lost in adopting another option.

#### **OPTION FOUR — STATUS QUO**

The final Option is to maintain the status quo, or to put it more simply to do nothing. The implication of this course are detailed below.

#### **Option Four - Advantages.**

The advantage of Option Four is in the short term is that no additional work and resources would have to be expended.

#### **Option Four - Disadvantages.**

The disadvantages of Option Four are:

- Membership would continue to experience "rank creep" with the



number of junior officer declining in real terms. This could lead to fewer active members and a smaller board.

- The broader maritime issues would not be tackled by the ANI.
- The relevance of the ANI would come into question with organisations such as the Centre for Maritime Studies
- becoming more attractive to serving naval officers. This trend is already in evidence.

## CONCLUSION

The ANI is at an important stage at its life faced as it is with a static but ageing membership base, and functions that have remained constant in the face of a changing environment. The activities of the Institute centre almost exclusively on the work done by the Council members. This situation is not unique to the ANI and other naval and maritime organisations are experiencing similar problems.

Part of the problem is of course the size of such organisations in Australia and lack of any economy of scale or professional

organising staff. The other related aspect in the growing awareness that the well being of the Navy is linked to broader maritime issues. Clearly there is scope for greater co-operation with other bodies, and this could extend from amalgamation to confederation or undertaking joint ventures as part of the rationalisation process.

It is considered however that in deciding the future direction of the ANI, that a long term view should be taken mindful of the broader implications of that choice. For that reason Option Two is our considered choice.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that:

- this paper be tabled at the Annual General Meeting and be reproduced in the Journal for discussion;
- that member's views be sought through a questionnaire on what direction they would like ANI to take and what activities it should undertake. that other maritime organisations should be sounded out on their views of Option One and Two..





*PERSIAN GULF, 1991: RAN Clearance Divers pose in front of HMAS Westralia during a brief port visit.*





# NAVY — KEEPING THE PEACE

by

LCDR Alan Hinge, RAN

*Wise are the people who, in peace, prepare their fleets  
and armies for battle,  
Who ne'er in treaties and conventions absolutely  
trust,  
nor leave the sword, though sheathed, to rust*<sup>1</sup>

Aesop once told the fable of the fox and the boar. It goes something like this — As a boar was whetting his teeth against a tree, up comes a fox who says: Pray, what do you mean by doing that? I do it, says the boar to be in readiness in case of an attack by an enemy. But, replies the fox, I see no occasion for it. The forest is now at peace and no enemy is near. Well, says the boar, I see occasion for it: sharp teeth keep my peace and when I come to be set upon it will be too late for me to be whetting when I should be fighting!

There is no record telling us whether the urbane fox accepted the boar's sage advice that the price of peace is vigilance and readiness. But, with the rapprochement of the Superpowers, increasing numbers of Australians are tending to share the fox's world view that peace has broken out and we can now beat our rifles, missiles, warships and aircraft into ploughshares! It has even been argued that, as part of this superpower peace dividend, maintaining our current defence force levels may not only be expensive but even escalatory.

Looking at the Royal Australian Navy in particular we should not take our continued existence in this rapidly changing world for granted. We must be able to clearly explain our relevance to the Australian people in terms of our unique value to them.

## AIM

The aim of this essay is to demonstrate how the Navy protects the interests of Australians and thereby keeps their peace.

To achieve this aim we must remind ourselves of how the mechanism of peace and war is balanced. Then we may begin to see how Navies can work for peace. First, looking at navies in general we must recall how navies have traditionally promoted peace. Identify changes which affect these traditional peacekeeping missions and

determine how such changes impact on the way navies should go about their business in the 1990s. Our second task involves looking at the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) in particular to specify the interests that Australians have in using the sea and to judge how well Australian naval missions serve these interests and hence keep our peace.

## KEEPING THE PEACE

Unfortunately peace is not the normal state in human affairs. If a visitor from another world were to undertake an analysis of the period we humans spend at war he (it?) may consider war and strife to be our favourite planetary pastime — as opposed to living in peace.

Peace is also no accident. It is a relative state of harmony between two or more nations or, simply, the absence of overt armed conflict. In a world of limited supply and unlimited demand, together with some 160 countries fretfully sharing a dozen major religions, armed conflict could easily be the norm and, in some places it is the norm.

Professor Geoffrey Blainey in his excellent book *The Causes of War* puts forward a simple and, I think, correct view of the essential mechanism of war. He suggests that wars (ie, absences of peace) usually arise when nations disagree concerning their relative strengths<sup>2</sup>. The corollary to Blainey's argument is that peace may be kept if a perception is produced that a nation can handle itself in terms of having sufficient strength to uphold its interests and place uncertainty into any estimate of relative strength existing in the minds of potential challengers. This is the essence of deterrence. Troublemakers, whether of the international or home-grown variety, must be deterred in order to keep the peace.

Navies have been used to dampen the mechanism of war by creating the perception that a nation can handle itself. This has been done by forcing the opponent to review his initial estimate of relative



strength. In several cases this has caused sufficient hesitation to reduce the warlike confidence of an adversary. Actions were then moderated and the peace was kept.

### NAVIES AS PEACEKEEPERS

Navies are expensive - very expensive. Annual running costs of the Royal Australian Navy for example amount to about \$1.2 billion<sup>3</sup> This figure is known as the Navy Defence Function Outlay, but if several other indirect support costs are taken into account the RAN effectively costs the long suffering Australian tax payer the best part of \$2.3 billion each year. Furthermore, the RAN re-equipment programme has commitments during the next decade costing \$10-12 billion.<sup>4</sup> Therefore the burden is heavy in terms of supporting the RAN and the tax payer should know what return he or she is getting for such a heavy investment.

Navies began and will continue to exist because they are useful. They have preserved the peace, interests and sovereignty of their people. Twelve centuries ago, when Alfred the Great founded the humble beginnings of what was to become the Royal Navy, his intention was not to develop a ceremonial status symbol. His aim was simply to survive by stopping marauding Vikings or Berserks butchering his people. The Royal Navy, like other navies, served the interests of its people by signalling their resolve, saving their lives and keeping their peace. By the twentieth century things had not much changed. British historian, Sir James Cable, in his comprehensive treatise, *Gunboat Diplomacy 1919-1979: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force* argues that: *the one outstanding regularity that emerges from this survey of (sixty) lawless years is the continued and frequent use, in one form or another, of limited naval force as a supplement of diplomacy and as an alternative to war.*<sup>5</sup>

Similarly, in 1989, James George, an American maritime studies expert, presented a detailed analysis of the US Navy's contribution to maintaining stability and hence peace through supplementing national diplomacy. He assessed 215 post World War II international incidents and showed that US naval forces had pivotal, if not decisive, roles in 177 cases.<sup>6</sup> Consequently, four out of every five

instances relating to the military serving the national interest involved the use of the Navy. Professor Edward Luttwak of the US Naval War College concluded that this was because *...the familiar attributes of an oceanic navy - inherent mobility, tactical flexibility and wide geographic reach render it particularly useful as an instrument of policy, even in the absence of hostilities.*<sup>7</sup> As we shall see later in this discussion, Luttwak may well have added *...especially in the absence of hostilities.* The traditional use of Navies as supplements to diplomacy is well documented<sup>8</sup>. The Naval Presence in support of policy argument is essentially that the unique features of blue water Navies, as detailed above by Luttwak, allow a government to signal a high level of national commitment and resolve through a tangible, sustained and visible show of force. This is effectively adding a coercive but controlled dimension to diplomacy. Shows of force, or resolve, in literally hundreds of well documented cases during the twentieth century have persuaded the other party to modify warlike plans and navies have frequently dampened aggressive behaviour. A cautionary naval presence, more often than not, emphasised the attitude and will of a people and enhanced the users bargaining power by causing the other party to revise his initial estimate of relative strength. The cautionary naval presence helped to preserve the peace.<sup>9</sup>

### HAVE TIMES CHANGED?

Can navies still keep the peace? In the 1990s some may argue that things have changed; that the days of naval diplomacy are over and such diplomacy, while effective in the past, is now *...outmoded and ineffective*<sup>10</sup>. Perhaps they are right. Times do change. Let us look at the arguments for and against.

Three factors are often cited which are said to reduce the effectiveness of modern Navies in performing their traditional military, constabulary and peace-keeping roles. These factors are:

- Changes in the Law of the Sea (LOS) The impact of new military technologies, and
- the changing fabric of international relations.<sup>11</sup>

### CHANGES IN THE LAW OF THE SEA

Until the 1960s small territorial seas



and some small Contiguous Zones were the only limits to total freedom of the high seas for Navies. This customary framework functioned *...reasonably well until the intensity and diversity of the use of ocean space began to produce conflicts over ocean resources and access to ocean space.*<sup>12</sup> Maritime property rights therefore began to be an issue and, in 1982, with the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), a codification of maritime rights was generally agreed to reflect a *...growing sense of territorialism among the coastal state community.*<sup>13</sup>

Claimed maritime areas rose phenomenally from 27% to 42% of the world's high seas by the end of the Conference, mainly due to an increase in the territorial seas (3 to 12 miles), establishment of 56 Exclusive Economic Zones, 36 Exclusive Fisheries Zones and numerous archipelagic claims.<sup>14</sup>

It was thought in some quarters that reducing the freedom of passage and mobility of Navies as a result of UNCLOS III would have three adverse effects on Navies: Inhibition of naval mobility, increasing vulnerability to surveillance (and consequently interdiction) and limitation of the ability of Navies to gather intelligence. Together with the impact of new military technologies it has been argued that Navies will be far more vulnerable and more inhibited in the influence they can bring to bear. These circumstances are said to reduce the effectiveness of naval activity since *...any limitation on the access of warships to (foreign) waters will significantly diminish the usefulness of Navies as instruments of policy short of war.*<sup>15</sup>

## IMPACT OF NEW MILITARY TECHNOLOGIES

In many ways modern blue water Navies are certainly becoming more vulnerable tactically in coastal areas. The superpowers no longer have exclusive use of advanced precision guided munitions, detection equipment or intelligence gathering capabilities. Admiral C.A. Trost, Ex-US Chief of Naval Operations suggested that *...today the trouble makers of the world are armed with high-tech weapons, in quality, although not in number, nearly as good as our own.*<sup>16</sup> Ship capabilities have also changed with the times. Many naval warships are suited to *...swift and sudden*

*combat on, or beneath, the open seas, not lingering off shore...these are tactics ill adapted to the use of limited naval force.*<sup>17</sup> Technology is therefore likely to increase the cost of naval intervention and constabulary activity and limit its application to the high seas only. Increased maritime territorialism may also inhibit naval activity as the tapestry of international relations undergoes a revolution in the post Cold War era.

## A BRAVE NEW WORLD?

Governments feel the need to protect national sovereignty at any cost and international relations are emerging from a Superpower dominated bipolar environment to a multipolar strategic environment since reduced tension between the Soviet Union and USA has thawed the Cold War. All strategic bets are now off. Strategic goalposts have shifted and power relations have become much more diffused and even confused, as many relatively newly-formed, developing nations jockey for their place in the sun.

Developing nations have entered the multipolar world environment with more relative power, even if we only use the number of United Nations seats occupied by them as a crude measure of their collective effectiveness. The traditional application of limited naval force by developed nations may therefore come under increasing scrutiny and condemnation. Thus the threshold for the use of Navies may have significantly increased. These factors - along with changes to the law of the sea and the new military technologies available to developing countries - are said to have seriously eroded the usefulness and influence of modern navies.

## IMPLICATIONS FOR TODAY'S NAVIES

Have these political, technological, strategic and legal changes of the last two decades really so altered the maritime environment that the use of Navies in support of national diplomacy may now be regarded as redundant? Ex US Secretary of State, George Schultz, attempted to answer this question when he observed, after many years of international firefighting in the 1980s, that *...there will always be instances that fall short of all out national commitment... the need to avoid no-win situations (like nuclear war) cannot mean*



we turn automatically away from hard-to-win situations that call for prudent involvement<sup>18</sup> A need for limited naval force projection for the purposes of prudent involvement continues to exist in the modern world. Shultz clearly indicates an increased need for graduated response in handling today's limited confrontations. Strategic analyst, Professor Thomas Schelling, shared this view when he spoke of a new type of war, the War of Risk: *...this new species (of war) is the competition in risk taking, a military-diplomatic manoeuvre with or without military engagement but with the outcome determined more by the manipulation of risk than by the actual contest of force...*<sup>19</sup>

Navies, as instruments of national policy, give their governments suitable and flexible options for graduated response in wars of risk. A Navy's main advantages of mobility, flexibility and sustainability give it decisive characteristics for the appropriate use of limited force in today's wars of risk. Warships are versatile platforms capable of performing a variety of jobs on a sustained basis, while varying their response from a remote, cautionary presence to the selective naval bombardment of shore facilities. They can maintain station for months if necessary under adverse weather conditions and seastates. Also, they have a long shelf life, ranging from 30-40 years, and are very amenable to modernisation. These vessels can house extensive command/control/communications (C3) equipment capable of supporting activities ranging from collective military intervention to immediate evacuation of nationals.

The supplement to diplomacy and military presence roles of a Navy cannot be undertaken by other national military assets. In Sir James Cable's words *...Air forces cannot be employed on their own without at least the threat of extreme violence.*<sup>20</sup> Shore-based aircraft are highly visible and very useful once high-level conflict has commenced but are unduly escalatory in the critical, lower echelons of conflict. Aircraft also lack the necessary endurance to remain on station for weeks or months. Their combat range is relatively low, maintenance levels are high and no immediate access to reloads exists since they have no high capacity magazines.

An aircraft's strength lies in rapid response time and application of firepower but, ultimately, its pilot has a very limited number of conflict limiting options at his disposal. These options are basically to either pull the trigger or back down. He would rarely have more than an hour on station to make this decision. Wars of risk cannot be waged on this basis as an ability to maintain a sustained military presence in a war of risk/ battle of nerves situation is often decisive.

A naval commander has numerous options at his disposal but above all he has time. Only on the sea can we concentrate forces close to an opponent without being totally committed or blatantly provocative. Rapid or gradual withdrawal and advance of naval forces is also possible. These are the adjustable, graduated options which able national leaderships require to keep the peace - not escalatory all or nothing dilemmas.<sup>21</sup>

Besides the increasing utility of naval flexibility, mobility and endurance, it is suggested that in the modern era the political, strategic, legal and technical changes of recent decades may in fact enhance the utility and effectiveness of Navies in keeping the peace.

## PEACE AND THE ALTERED ENVIRONMENT

Reduced maritime access under UNCLOS III has been seen as putting a limit on naval utility but tactics have already pushed Navies further out from coastlines. Extended boundaries, according to Ken Booth, the author of *Law, Force and Diplomacy at Sea*, set up important psycho-legal boundaries at sea. Even with 200 nautical mile limits *...out of sight warships can be just as threatening and just as politically visible, but at much less political and physical risk*<sup>22</sup>. The other party will be well aware of their long weapon range. The real benefit of increased jurisdiction is a very valuable peace bargaining spinoff which Booth describes as *...the greater the distance from which naval diplomacy is exercised, the smaller will be the escalatory steps before a face to face stand off ... small steps make it easier for the target state to compromise, but also easier for the stronger power to accept some loss.*<sup>23</sup> More time and options are therefore available to signal, negotiate and keep the peace by applying pressure in



notches and giving both sides more room to manoeuvre.

The new laws of the sea, in giving more political awareness and sensitivity to oceanic boundaries, may therefore become a boon to the judicious use of limited naval forces. Booth continues his argument that the new sea laws give *...more meaning to both supportive and coercive gestures of naval diplomacy. They will provide another rung on the escalation ladder, but (still) without the awful consequences of failure which exist on land. They will assist in the transmission of (political) signals, which is one of the greatest problems facing those wanting to engage in naval diplomacy.*<sup>24</sup>

Navies in general, with their flexibility of motion and sustainability of action, still provide an almost infinitely adjustable tool for escalation and, even more importantly, de-escalation strategies. But how will Navies be used to promote peace in Australia's region of primary interest - the Asia-Pacific Basin?

#### KEEPING THE PEACE IN AN AGE OF PROMISE AND PERIL

The international power shift from a bipolar, Cold War oriented world to a multipolar, diffused basis for international relations is a development laden with both promise and peril. Despite many favourable strategic developments in the last decade the world, in many ways, is a less safe place. While the threat of global nuclear war has receded, the possibility of conventional destabilisation and less restrained limited warfare may well have increased.

In the view of US Defence Secretary, Mr Richard Cheney, regional flare-ups are likely to be more dangerous in a decade from now because more countries are acquiring chemical, biological, nuclear and even ballistic missile capabilities. In 1990, Mr Cheney noted the following developments and possibilities which give rise to concern over the future stability of the Asia-Pacific Basin.<sup>25</sup> The Soviet Union is, and will remain, a major military power and its Far East capabilities far exceed what are needed for defence. The Soviet Pacific fleet is still the largest of the four Soviet fleets and the future of the Soviet Union and its currently cooperative regime remains unclear. North Korea still poses a serious threat to South Korea and remains almost totally unpredictable.

China, North Korea, Burma (Myanmar)

Vietnam and Cambodia are unsettled and may undergo drastic internal change during the 1990 s because of the age of their leaders and many other reasons. How this will affect the region in the next century is unpredictable. Both India and China continue to develop vastly superior capabilities as regional powers. Many countries in the region have territorial claims and counter claims that periodically flare into violence. For example, at least twelve island/atoll groups in the South China Sea are contested by five nations.<sup>26</sup> These factors each have scope for causing a medium to long term deterioration in Australia's strategic environment. Australia should be able to tangibly contribute to the collective defence of the relative peace enjoyed in the greater Asia-Pacific region as well as in its own immediate neighbourhood.

#### OUR NECKLACE OF INSTABILITY

Closer to home, in Australia's immediate area of interest, a strategic necklace of instability has arisen as a result of disturbing developments in Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Vanuatu and New Caledonia. All these countries and colonies face instability and an uncertain future. Australia must retain the capability to assist in their development and orderly transition to independent states. An effective Navy has a supportive role to play in our neighbourhood. Consequently, we should examine the Royal Australian Navy's practical contribution to keeping the peace. In so doing it is emphasised that actions speak louder than words as we depart from the theory to the practise of keeping Australia's peace.

#### WHAT HAS THE RAN DONE FOR ME LATELY?

This is the bottom line question all Australian taxpayers are entitled to ask. But, Australians are not seafarers, and they know little of the sea. Certainly many like the beach, a sea view, fishing, some boating and fresh seafood, but this is about the limit of the average citizens involvement in matters maritime. Yet the average Australian has a profound material interest in the sea. The economic and social progress of all Australian families depends directly on free use of the sea and satisfaction of the following maritime requirements: Ensuring the free passage of Australians and their trade goods across the sea. This maintains



our standard of living, as our market economy is almost completely dependant on international trade;<sup>27</sup> protection of Australians and their property overseas; exploitation of resources in and under the seas in our claimed 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ); and assisting our allies and neighbours from the sea if they request and warrant our support.

If the RAN cannot keep the peace by protecting these Australian interests then it does not deserve to exist; at least in its present, very expensive form. The mission of the RAN is to conduct sustained missions in the national interest. Is the RAN performing these missions for the Australian people?

The Royal Australian Navy has protected these interests and is maintaining the peace which Australians enjoy. Looking specifically at this last decade alone the RAN has protected several Australian interests and has proven its worth. Consider the following three cases of the RAN recently performing sustained missions in our national interest, thereby keeping our peace:

#### **CASE 1 - 1980-82 INDIAN OCEAN DEPLOYMENTS**

With the fall of the Shah of Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the Western World was confronted with a radical and adverse shift in the middle eastern power balance, together with a resurgence of the spectre of Soviet expansionism. Western nations, including Australia, were called on to signal a collective resolve. In 1980 the Australian Government announced the purchase of an additional Oliver Hazard Perry class frigate (FFG) to signal Australia's resolve to support the Western Alliance, contribute to a collective defence and the maintenance of stability.

In 1980 the first of a sustained series of North Indian Ocean deployments was undertaken by RAN Fleet units ranging from the aircraft carrier HMAS *Melbourne* to individual destroyers. These actions helped maintain Australia's place of respect and influence with its allies. They also protected the long term interests of the Australian people by contributing to the cohesion of the Western alliance. This cohesion helped deter possible escalation threat from the Soviets or Iranians at the time.

#### **CASE 2 - 1987 FIJIAN COUPS**

On the morning of 14 May 1987 Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka, supported by Fijian military personnel, entered the Fijian Parliament and declared a military takeover. Four RAN units were either alongside in Fiji or in the immediate vicinity of the islands.

According to an Australian Army assessment of the situation ... *On the morning of the military coup a number of RAN ships were in the South West Pacific on routine operations. HMAS ADELAIDE, was berthed at Queen's Wharf, Lautoka, HMAS SYDNEY (another major and well equipped Fleet unit) was berthed at King's Wharf, Suva, HMA Ships WOLLONGONG and CESSNOCK were at sea to the west of Fiji, HMAS STALWART, with the High Commissioner of Australia embarked, was at sea off Funafuti, Tuvalu and HMAS PARRAMATTA was in Whangarei, North Island, New Zealand. In the 48 hours following the coup, WOLLONGONG and CESSNOCK berthed alongside ADELAIDE in Lautoka and STALWART arrived off the South Western coast of the main island of Viti Levu.*<sup>28</sup>

The Army commentary goes on to state:

*It was apparent within HQADF that if, as a result of the coup, civil order in Fiji was to break down, the Australian Government would wish to take appropriate steps to safeguard Australian citizens... Advantages were also seen in maintaining the Naval Presence in Fiji. In the event of disruptions to civil communications, RAN ships berthed alongside could maintain backup links. In addition, they would have provided a rallying point for Australian nationals in the event of violence and they represented the only means of evacuation should Nadi and Nausori airports have been unavailable at any time.*<sup>29</sup>

This strong Australian naval presence was no accident. Even though the coup came as a complete surprise, the RAN had kept a deliberately strong naval presence in the South West Pacific, in accordance with government policy, since the early 1980's. The RAN immediately provided the Australian Government with numerous options covering the entire spectrum of graduated response; from providing a discreet surveillance/intelligence-gathering capability to providing the ability to strike military installations if necessary. Though the use of the latter option was



extremely remote, it still existed and was available to the Australian government if the situation seriously deteriorated. The sophisticated command/control/communication (C<sup>3</sup>) facilities and, if necessary, the firepower of Australian vessels were at the scene of the conflict and could have been used as leverage if the lives of Australian visitors, embassy staff or expatriates were threatened.

Media stories concerning the alleged impotence of the Australian Defence Forces during the crisis are hard to give much credibility to if the following facts are accepted: At the moment the Coup occurred, each of the two major fleet units alongside at Lautoka and Suva respectively had approximately 200 highly trained servicemen on board. Sufficient small arms and trained personnel existed on board to provide armed protection to Australian civilians as well as provide immediate security assistance to the Australian High Commission if necessary. Each vessel was capable of immediately evacuating a large number of Australian citizens. Between them the ships could have taken on board and evacuated hundreds of Australian citizens in an emergency. Each vessel was a floating command/control/communications centre with the capacity to wage warfare under the most pressing tactical conditions. A direct and reliable link with Australia was therefore immediately in place and used when all other transmission practically ceased. The Army commentary states *...with SYDNEY alongside at the time, together with other RAN ships in the area, reliable, secure HF communications existed from Suva from the time of the coup.*<sup>30</sup>

In a worst case scenario, Australian naval gunfire support from these vessels was capable of inflicting selective, sustained and accurate fire against any specified military target within several miles. These vessels had the capability of imposing an immediate naval blockade if necessary. Therefore the immediate naval options available to the Australian people and their government were many. That many of these options were clearly disproportionate or inappropriate to the situation is quite immaterial. The important thing is that they were available. They were at the scene; at the time: not tomorrow or the day after! And these naval options were kept available throughout the crisis.

Some ships were asked to leave Fijian

waters and they did; only to stay in the immediate vicinity of Fiji — Naval flexibility in action. The situation was not escalated by a refusal to leave, but the naval presence was still felt. These vessels also stayed in the area for as long as they were required by the Australian government — naval sustainability in action. Six vessels were in the immediate vicinity of the crisis area within 48 hours — naval mobility in action: End result the Australian people got their moneys worth from the RAN in 1987 in terms of giving them, through their government, immediate options ranging from passive surveillance to direct and devastating punitive measures, if needed, in an emergency.

RAN follow-up actions throughout the Coup were salient successes of Operations MORRISDANCE, as the Australian Defence Force (ADF) operation was known. *...The loading of TOBRUK, SUCCESS, DUBBO, TOWNSVILLE, TORRENS, and CANBERRA prior to possible departure on 20 May was carried out rapidly and efficiently with enthusiastic co-operation from both uniformed and civilian personnel, ranging from Naval Support Command forklift drivers and dockyard crane dogmen to Fleet and Ships staff*<sup>31</sup>..., according to the HQADF Director of Joint Operations. Army sources were also delighted with the success of the integration of soldiers and sailors on board as well as the characteristic initiative shown by ship's companies in transferring soldiers from vessel to vessel at sea when helicopters were unserviceable.<sup>32</sup>

Naval flexibility, utility and readiness to protect Australian interests and keep our peace was also demonstrated in a more far-flung theatre during 1990, when the Middle East erupted after the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq. Once again, this was a situation where important Australian interests were at stake — Australian naval endurance on task, flexibility and mobility were again the order of the day.

### CASE 3 - 1990 GULF CRISIS

When Iraq's President, Saddam Hussein, annexed the emirate of Kuwait he probably did not expect the almost universal condemnation of not only the Western world but also that of many Arab nations as well. The United States took the lead in attempting to check any further expansionism and called for the endorsement of the United Nations and the assistance of its traditional



allies.

The Australian Government publicly undertook to tangibly support the UN stand in the Middle East in early August and within four days an Australian task force, comprising two frigates and a supply vessel, had sailed out of Sydney Heads and towards the Gulf. The Navy was again ready and able to serve the national interest and contribute to peace in a way determined by government and also agreed by the Federal Opposition. Once again, the Navy presented the government with a range of options — the ability to adjust rules of engagement, geographic position and intensity of action to almost any degree over a period of months, even years, if necessary. The RAN provided the Government with an instrument capable of a significant show of support to the United Nations. The only other way of tangibly showing such support would be the sending of ground troops which the Australian government would rightly be reluctant to do. Sending fighter aircraft and crews to Saudi Arabia would have been equally unpalatable.

Six hundred officers and sailors of the Royal Australian Navy contributed to enforcing the UN sanctioned blockade of Iraq in the interests of the peace of, not only Australians, but perhaps ultimately of the rest of the world. Thousands of other officers and sailors directly supported them at home and many more thousands of Australian citizens agreed that their Navy was in the Gulf to basically keep their peace and protect their interests.

Australians know that protecting their peace often boils down to standing up against bullies, whether the bullies are called Hitler, or Hussein. To stand up to stand-over men is an Australian tradition. Australians have not, and will not, sit back to see how things work out and then act. They have never been afraid to commit themselves to an ally or friend in the interests of deterring aggression and keeping the peace and this commitment goes beyond rhetoric. It is tangible and tenacious. In many cases this commitment has involved the deployment of military forces and the Navy, more often than not, has borne a major share of any Australian commitment.

To stand up to a stand-over merchant you need strength as well as commitment. National strength demands an element of military endurance, range, flexibility, mobility and punch. For nations range and punch often add up to a Navy which can

handle itself. The RAN, in the case studies considered, has clearly proved its worth to the taxpayer. Indeed, we have here taken little account of literally millions of manhours of effort put into coastal surveillance, Bass Strait oil rig protection, apprehension of illegal fishermen and immigrants and the charting of coastline conducted by RAN personnel and assets routinely every year.<sup>33</sup> These less high profile activities certainly lack glamour but they are nevertheless another dimension to the RAN's role of keeping the peace.

The Royal Australian Navy is important because it is used. It is used to keep our peace by protecting our interests and maintaining our security.

## CONCLUSION

Our enjoyment of peace as Australians is no accident. Peace has its price and that price is vigilance and commitment — a heavy commitment of a physical, moral and financial kind.

Australians are not hegemonists, expansionists or paternalists. We are not militaristic, but many bitter wartime experiences have taught us to accept the high price of peace, and part of that price is maintaining a strong blue-water navy which can help our friends, support our interests and physically reflect our will and resolve. Through an active and capable Royal Australian Navy, Australia maintains the respect of its friends and allies and helps promote peace.

Our Navy is no substitute for a good foreign policy and must never be relied on to make up for a bad one. However, despite many recent, favourable global strategic developments, the world, and especially the Asia-Pacific Basin, still remains a dangerous place. It is too early to beat our rifles, missiles, ships and aircraft into ploughshares. To do this would be to invite danger by making impotence a declaration of Australian government policy.

Navies in general provide their people with the flexibility, mobility and endurance for conflict limiting, graduated response. Navies provide options for conflict resolution which are simply unavailable from other sources. As Sir James Cable said, naval forces can, and have frequently been used as supplements to diplomacy and as alternatives to war. Navies have kept the peace and; given the revolutionary political, legal and technical changes



currently occurring, the roles of Navies in keeping the peace will expand.

Ultimately, we Australians should probably side with Aesop's rather wary boar, who featured at the beginning of this essay. We should keep our naval teeth sharp in a still uncertain world and perhaps be like Aesop's neighbours, the Spartans, of whom the Greek Historian Thucydides said: *For they had learned that true peace was to be found in long previous training and not in elegant exhortations uttered when they were going into battle.*

Australians understand this ancient and practical lesson. After all, most Australians know that the cost of maintaining our Navy will be far outweighed by the costs of not having a strong Navy when it is needed.

#### NAVY — KEEPING YOUR PEACE!

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<sup>1</sup> Goldsmith, O, *Treasury of Aesops Fables* (Avenel Books, New York, 1973), p 67. This unattributed quote prefaced the fable of the Boar and the Fox.

<sup>2</sup> Blainey, G, *The Causes of War* (Sun Books, Melbourne, 1973) p 207.

<sup>3</sup> *Defence Report 1989-90*, p 196-198. See Department of Defence Program Statement for Year ended 30 June 1990, Item 1.2 - Navy. Total military Defence Function Outlay, which includes direct costs of maintaining Navy, Army, RAAF and HQADF was \$4.5 billion in FY 89-90. The balance of the \$8.9 billion defence budget related to expenditure on procurement of capital equipment, procurement of capital facilities, DFRDB costs, Australian Industry Involvement costs and various other outlays. On a service pro-rata basis, over one billion dollars annually would be expended on Navy in these indirect outlays, in addition to the Defence function outlay (totalling \$A2.3 Billion)

<sup>4</sup> Major RAN projects include the New Construction Submarine and the ANZAC Frigate Project, each costed at approximately \$4-5 billion each (\$A

1990). Other costly projects include the Seahawk helicopter project and several minor vessels projects.

<sup>5</sup> Cable (1981) p 16.

<sup>6</sup> George (article) p 49. James L George is editor of the Institute of Public Policy Research's book, *Problems of Sea Power as We approach the Twenty First Century* (American Enterprise, Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington DC, 1978)

<sup>7</sup> Luttwak (1974) pl

<sup>8</sup> See extensive bibliography in K Booth's book *Law, Force and Diplomacy at Sea* which is detailed as a reference.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid. See Chapter 8, 'The Utility of Warships' and Chapter 9, 'Naval Policy' deal at length with this theme as do the McGruther and McNulty articles appearing in the Sep-Oct 1974 issue of Naval War College Review. (See references)

<sup>10</sup> Mandel (article), p 62.

<sup>11</sup> Cited from unpublished paper by Sub-Lieutenant S. Dean titled *The future of Gunboat Diplomacy* p4. This Australian Defence Force Academy undergraduate paper was an excellent source of references for this essay.

<sup>12</sup> Knight (article) p32

<sup>13</sup> Booth (1985) op cit, p 139

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. See Appendix commencing page 217 for a breakdown of Territorial Sea Claims (Table 1), States with 200 - Mile Exclusive Economic Zones (Table 2), States with 200 Mile Exclusive Fisheries Zones (Table 3) and States with Archipelagic Claims (Table 5). The figure of 42% of the high seas seems impossibly high until Booth's chart between pages 220 and 221 is observed. It clearly displays the magnitude of global oceanic claims.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, p 138

<sup>16</sup> Trost (article) p 9

<sup>17</sup> Cable (1981) op cit, p 98

<sup>18</sup> Mandel, p 60

<sup>19</sup> Schelling, T, (1966), pl6

<sup>20</sup> Cable, J. (1981) op cit, p109. This comment by Cable should not be interpreted as being critical of the utility of Air Forces. Air power is unquestionably a decisive element of modern warfare. However, Cable is interested in the use of military forces in pre-conflict scenarios, ie situations of war avoidance rather than war fighting.

<sup>21</sup> See Bell, C (1971). Even in crises, certain military/diplomatic 'conventions'



may be followed to increase the chances of a relatively peaceful resolution. Bell derives a number of such conventions from several case studies dealt with in her book. 'All or None' options are not conducive to timing, resolution and bargaining by governments.

<sup>22</sup> Booth. K, ( 1985 ) op cit, p 146

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Mr Cheneys' remarks are cited from 'Washington Report' by Mark Berent, 'US Plans for the Asia-Pacific', *Asian Defence Journal*, July 1990, p 93. Cheney was outlining accepted conclusions of a report titled 'Strategic Framework for the Asian-Pacific Rim'. The report was also discussed in the *Australian* 'Pentagon Warns of Volatility in the Pacific', 21 April 90, p13.

<sup>26</sup> Nations with competing claims in South China Sea atoll/island groups are SRV (Vietnam), ROC (Taiwan), PRC (China), the Phillipines and Malaysia. Several islands have forces from up to three nations occasionally stationed on them.

<sup>27</sup> The standard of living of Australians is clearly dependant on our national ability to import and export large quantities of materials. Over two thirds of Australian imports are from the US, Japan and the EEC. Over 50 percent of these goods are critical requirements of Australia's industrial base. These items include capital machinery, petroleum products, transport equipment and chemicals not manufactured in Australia. This dependence on more complex overseas manufactured equipment is increasing. The Australian economy is also closely integrated with the rest of the world - on integration which has been intensified in recent years by deregulatory policies making the economy more dependent on world market forces. Authoritative commentators have even suggested that '...there is now no autonomous national economy in any comprehensive sense, but an economy composed predominantly of aspects of the world economy located in Australia' (See H.C. Coombs in 'The Economic and Social Consequences of Nuclear War', *NATUNI*, The Journal of the Australian National University, September 1983, p8).

<sup>28</sup> D'Hage (article) p 4. Colonel A. D'Hage, ARA was Director of Joint Operations at HQADF in 1987. His unclassified history of the involvement of the Australian Defence Force in the Fiji Crisis of May 1987 appeared in Issue 80 of the Defence Force

Journal (Jan/Feb 90), pp4 - 13.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid, p 5

<sup>30</sup> Ibid, p 11

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, p 12

<sup>32</sup> Ibid, p 10

<sup>33</sup> Besides major war vessels such as frigates and submarines, the RAN also maintains 13 patrol vessels and about four hydrographic vessels. Substantial resources are also involved in search and rescue (SAR) and aid to the civil community during natural disasters. Approximately 700 RAN personnel are dedicated to the Patrol Boat Force alone, this number comprising 300 crew and about 400 personnel in support and administration roles. The Patrol Boat Force essentially performs a constabulary or police role by ensuring the safety of oil rigs and apprehending and deterring foreign fishing vessels and illegal immigrants. Over two million man hours of RAN effort are put into the constabulary role by patrol boat crew and support personnel annually.



## DEFENCE ACADEMY MASTERS GRADUATES IN MANAGEMENT ECONOMICS AND DEFENCE STUDIES :



*After 12 months of intensive full-time study on Masters courses in either Management Economics or Defence Studies at the Australian Defence Force Academy, there were satisfied smiles on the faces of (rear row, 1. to r.), CMDR Warwick Gately (Defence Studies), LCDR Craig Marcombe (Management Economics), LEUT Frank Aldred (Mgt Ec), LEUT Mark Bailey (Def Stud ); (front row, 1. to r.) CMDR Mike Pike and CAPTs Kevin Scarce and Bob Willis (all Mgt Ec). The degrees were conferred by the Chancellor of the University of NSW, Mr Justice Samuels. About 30 RAN officers are engaged in full-time, mid-career training at tertiary institutions at any given time. Many more are part-time students. Efforts are being made in the Personnel Division of Navy Office to make more full-time tertiary training available, but against a backdrop of higher tertiary fees and continuing financial constraints. Another important factor is whether the officer can be spared for full-time study which, in many instances, is not easy with constrained manning levels.*



# THE SHIP HISTORY — Recording or Distorting the Navy's Past?

by

Tom Frame

Fifty years ago the RAN was at war. Although ready for combat, little could prepare the Navy for the substantial losses it would suffer in the early part of the war. The construction of the Bathurst Class corvettes and minesweepers during the war supplemented the RAN's fighting capacity throughout the fighting and introduced many Australians to war at sea.

The Bathurst Class rapidly became the backbone of the Navy. Despatched to undertake a myriad of tasks, the majority of the ships companies were reservists. These men shared the most common experience ordinary Australians had of the Navy in wartime. Thus, histories of these ships provide a means of assessing the performance of Australians as seafarers and how they reacted to the rigours and hardships of naval warfare.

In many ways the naval equivalent of the Army's battalion histories, from which so much has been gleaned about the life of the average soldier, is the corvette's history. As most of the men who served in these ships have now retired and find time to record their experiences, we are bound to see them proliferate. This is a good thing. For many years the stories of J.E. MacDonnell were the only extended accounts of life at sea in RAN ships. But these histories need to be written with an eye for what we already know and with the aim of enhancing our understanding if they are to serve a purpose greater than eulogy. They are difficult to do well, easy to do poorly. The recently released *HMAS ARMIDALE. The ship that had to die* is a case in point.

The title of this book by ex-naval reserve officer Frank Walker on the loss of *HMAS Armidale* in December 1942 is meant to be provocative. It reflects the author's thesis that the loss of the corvette was the result of a wartime operation that was botched up, then covered up. In effect, the coverup is allegedly so elaborate that it requires a conspiracy theory to support it. Given the extreme virulence, destructiveness and outright cruelty of the author's criticisms and jibes at the RAN and

several officers in particular, it must be challenged and tested to a greater extent than less contentious works of history.

The story of the events leading to the loss of *Armidale* will be known to most students of Australian naval history. Briefly: the Japanese had virtually completed their offensive to the south and controlled most of Timor by late 1942. The western half of the island was a Dutch possession; the eastern half Portuguese. The Australian 2/2nd Independent Company had been landed on the Island before the Japanese invasion but a series of ruthless enemy offensives had seen the 2/2nd take to the hills to wage guerilla warfare against the Japanese who were attempting to turn the native Timorese against the Australians.

To make matters more difficult, some of the resident Portuguese resisted Australian efforts to take on the enemy, fearing Japanese reprisals might be directed against them for violating their nation's neutrality. After a year on Timor, towards the end of 1943, it was time for the 2/2nd to be relieved. Returning the unit was a task given to the RAN, more particularly, the Senior Naval Officer in Darwin, Commodore Cuthbert Pope. Pope was a Royal Navy officer who transferred to the RAN in his mid-seniority years. He had spent most of World War I embarked in *HMAS Sydney*.

Working around Timor was inevitably hazardous. The range of Japanese aircraft based on the island made operations under the cover of darkness the only option. *HMAS Voyager* was deployed to Timor in September 1942 with the 2/4th Independent Company which would replace the 2/2nd. But tragically during their disembarkation at Betano Bay *Voyager* was grounded, her propellers becoming embedded in the bottom. The ships company destroyed the ship and managed to escape in the corvettes *Kalgoorlie* and *Warrnambool* which were despatched from Darwin. With the Australian soldiers still on Timor and the need to evacuate Portuguese women and children increasing with fears they would be killed by the Japanese, Commodore Pope



sent the corvettes *Armidale* and *Castlemaine* to Betano Bay with the patrol vessel HMAS *Kuru*.

*Kuru* went ahead of the corvettes and managed to pick up a number of women and children. En route, the corvettes were engaged by Japanese aircraft in an unsuccessful attack. On joining *Kuru* the civilians were transferred to *Castlemaine* which returned to Darwin leaving *Armidale* and *Kuru* to proceed to Betano Bay to complete the operation. Later that afternoon after *Kuru* had detached, Japanese aircraft returned and attacked *Armidale*, sinking her with torpedoes and bombs. The Japanese strafed the surviving ships company as they abandoned the corvette and clung to wreckage in the water.

In the few minutes before *Armidale* sank, Ordinary Seaman 'Teddy' Sheean returned to his oerlikon gun and fired at the Japanese aircraft in order to prevent his ship mates being killed in the water. Although repeatedly hit by machine gun rounds, the young sailor continued to fire until the ship passed the waterline. In what was a macabre site, Sheean's gun continued to fire after it and he were completely submerged. It was an act of spontaneous bravery from a young sailor not yet nineteen years old. Sheean was a hero.

For the next week the survivors cheated death in an ordeal that Walker tells in depth for the first time. It is a gripping account of the power of the survival instinct within the human spirit. This is clearly the best part of the book and it is told with the aid of information provided by the men who suffered severe deprivation, believing they would not survive.

Two groups of survivors were recovered. A Board of Inquiry was convened and a report submitted to Prime Minister Curtin. Both the Naval Board and Commodore Pope submitted that the operation was staged and conducted within the bounds of acceptable risk and that all personnel, especially the corvette commanding officers, were faultless in the execution of their duties.

The author dissents. Walker is thoroughly critical of Pope's decision to send *Armidale* on to Betano when the Japanese reconnaissance aircraft, which observed both corvettes the day before would have been in no doubt that they were headed for Timor. He infers that Pope sent the *Armidale* sailors to their death and shows him no mercy. I think he is very

unfair to Pope.

To say the Japanese knew exactly where *Armidale* was bound; to state that the corvette would inevitably encounter Japanese fighter aircraft; and, to put to one side the fact that air cover was indeed promised (but not delivered) and that it would have doubtlessly altered the prospects of the operation is significantly altering the essential operational problem Pope faced. He realised the risk involved but deemed it acceptable given what was at stake. Perhaps Walker should be critical of the RAAF: After all, the promised fighter support did not eventuate. Curiously, Walker does not say why.

And to further suggest that had Pope used his intelligence he would have requested a destroyer with the speed necessary to make the most of the cover of darkness is again unfair to Pope.

Walker does not confirm that either a Dutch or Australian destroyer was available at the time when Pope sent the corvettes, that Pope did not make such a request or how it was received. In fairness to Pope, it should be said that the extent of the Japanese capability at Timor was only really known when it was clearly demonstrated on *Armidale*.

There are a number of disappointing things about this book. It is unnaturally foreboding and in places the attempted sense of drama is very contrived. There are the questionable statements that corvette sailors had to endure the snobbery of the high seas, that corvettes spent more time at sea than any other warship and that sailors in larger ships lived more remote from the sea. The book is also tinged with hints of racism.

Walker's sarcasm detracts from the book substantially. On one occasion he notes that the ships company of *Kalgoorlie* were unsuccessful in their efforts to recover the *Armidale* whaler which had been earlier salvaged by the survivors. They thought it would have been historically valuable. Walker says: 'As it happened, the Navy would not have wanted it as an historic relic anyhow' (p.93). This is an unworthy remark.

Further, Walker is critical of the way the report of the ship's loss was presented to Curtin. While the Board wanted, as a matter of course, to limit the information it passed to the Prime Minister to that he really needed to know, citing that



MacArthur's staff – as the superior command – were aware of the operation and made no comment, Walker says with the apparent authority of a long-time naval expert 'Passing the buck is a tradition in the services – it rates almost as a sport – but covering up is a different matter altogether'. He then goes on to point out that the Naval Board really is accountable to the Government in a democracy. One can almost hear the eggs being sucked.

Of course, the historian always does well to avoid excessive speculation and theorising, especially when such speculation produces controversy and leads to distressing conclusions. Walker concedes there is no way of knowing what happened to one party of men last seen clinging to a raft. Yet, this does not deter him from concluding: 'The most likely scenario is that one of the Japanese cruisers found the raft party, took the rafts and the pieces of wreckage and the men on board and executed them. This would not have been beyond the Japanese, as evidenced by the execution of 21 army nurses earlier that year on Banka Island, and countless other atrocities that were matters of routine for the Japanese'.

Several distinctions need to be made here. The fact of nurses being murdered elsewhere and in different circumstances does not establish any likelihood that it happened in the Timor Sea. In fact, Professor Arthur Marder in his recently released study of the Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy, *Old Friends, New Enemies*, shows that the treatment of British sailors by regular seagoing Japanese naval officers was fair and reasonable. Using the loss of HMS *Exeter* as a case study, he says the Royal Navy personnel were treated humanely while taking passage in Japanese warships although this treatment did not always extend to POW camps or to later periods in the war.

It does no-one any good to speculate on matters such as this. It incites further anger about the war when, in this case, these sentiments are not justified by fact. Practically anything could have happened to the men on the raft. This should be the conclusion and the matter left at that.

The author makes much of the signal sent by Commodore Pope to *Armidale* en route to Timor. He quotes it upwards of ten times: 'Air Attack is to be accepted as ordinary routine secondary warfare'. Walker takes

this to mean that Pope believed that air attack was 'relatively harmless' and easily repelled. However, I am not now really sure what Pope was intending to say or to imply. The signal is, in my mind, ambiguous and far from clear.

I believe that Pope really believed air attack was unlikely and that the risk it constituted was acceptable. To suggest as Walker does that Pope was full of false bravado and overly imbued with the Nelsonic spirit, is too simplistic an evaluation of the problem confronting him. I would agree that the Allied attitude to Japanese airpower, both land and carrier based, was less than it should have been even after one year of the Pacific War. But to suggest, as Walker does, that Pope was a fellow traveller with Vice-Admiral Sir Tom Phillips (lost in HMS *Prince of Wales* off Malaya) in so underestimating the Japanese airborne capability is like saying that marlin and minnows are the same because they are both fish. Further, to repeat the hackneyed accusation that Churchill banished Phillips to the Far East because the two disagreed about the effect of aircraft on the exercise of naval power, shows a superficial understanding of naval tactical and strategic thinking and the relationship Churchill had with his admirals.

Walker makes three serious allegations about the subsequent handling of the loss of *Armidale*. First, he asks why no medals were ever awarded to *Armidale* survivors. Second, why Sheean was only mentioned-in-despatches, and third, why the commanding officer of *Armidale*, Lieutenant-Commander Richards, did not get another command. His answer to all three questions is that the Navy wanted to cover up the loss.

I cannot answer the questions he raises. For what it is worth, I find what actually happened incomprehensible and very unfortunate. However, to suggest it amounted to a cover-up or that the RAN was actively responsible is unwarranted. Walker seems not to know how decorations are awarded. On page 119 he suggests that the Navy has the power to award decorations, including the Victoria Cross, and that until the present day it has refused. He cites representations to the Federal Government by Merchant Marine Captain Sam Benson (those with long memories will remember Benson as a fierce critic of the Navy when a Labor backbencher in Canberra) for the award of a VC to Sheean.



After again referring to the Navy's decision not to award Sheean a VC he quotes a letter from Benson saying this was a wrong to Tasmania and to those who fought in the Navy.

The RAN, as with the other two services, has only ever made recommendations for bravery awards. It has never had the power to award decorations. As for matters relating to World War II, I do not believe the RAN should take up these cases now 50 years on. If individuals want to take action that is a matter for them. It would be inappropriate for the Navy to take responsibility for such representations which would certainly not be limited to the case of Sheean. With the distance between Britain and Australia growing greater all the time, and the recent end to Australians receiving Imperial bravery awards, it is unlikely Australia would be in a position to lobby successfully British authorities to confer an award from World War II.

Further still, Walker insults the RAN with the inference to be drawn from his remarks that the money associated with the Sheean Award which is presented to QMGs at *Cerberus* comes not from the Navy but from ships' associations and individual ex-Navy men and later that the *Armidale* Memorial in that city was not erected by the Navy or even the City of Armidale. To imply that today's RAN is either mean-spirited or unmoved by the bravery of the *Armidale* men is an appalling remark to make. The current policy, as I understand it, is for any official memorial to be of a general nature remembering all those who lost their lives at sea, in peacetime and during war. To single out any ship would be unwise and create all sorts of unintended and potentially hurtful impressions.

As someone aware of the deliberations that accompanied the naming of the new Type 471 submarines, I can inform Mr Walker that his suggestion that the naming of a submarine after Sheean was a gesture that can be interpreted only as a belated admission that Sheean had suffered a grave injustice and that it was as close as the Navy could go to admitting that Sheean had suffered a grave injustice is totally fanciful. The selection of Sheean was on the basis of his demonstrated heroism and what it symbolised about the sailors of the RAN. There was never a thought given to VCs or any supposed injustice to Sheean. The deeds of the *Armidale* men are an inspiration to

those who serve today. Those who know the history of *Armidale* are moved by what happened rather than how it was (or wasn't) recognised.

The RAN of today has absolutely no reason to protect Pope or to continue with any cover up concerning *Armidale*. In fact, the Navy during the 1950s had no reason to protect anyone. The war was over and had become a subject for historical study. The Royal Navy officers who had led the RAN during the war had returned to Britain and most had retired. Pope was responsible for his own actions – as is every officer – and the Navy would not have made any effort after the war to have defended him other than from unfair criticism. Walker fails to show a motive for subsequently covering up and he fails to prove that there was any concerted or intended retribution on the *Armidale* survivors. The Navy certainly did not look after the survivors well. That much was clear and remains a black mark on the RAN's record. However, it is quite another thing to suggest this shows the Navy in any way blamed the *Armidale* men for the loss of their ship.

Unfortunately, the book contains a number of inaccuracies. To mention a few, the nickname applied to the RAN V and W Class Destroyers, the 'Scrap Iron Flotilla', was bestowed by Rommel not Dr Goebbels as Walker states; SMS *Emden* was beached on 9 November not 11 November 1914; Royal Navy Flag Officers do not use RN as a post-nominal; Captain E.F.V. Dechaineux was killed in 1944 not 1945; the Naval Board is incorrectly referred to as the 'Navy Board', while HMAS *Cerberus* has not been referred to officially as Flinders Naval depot since 1956. Ship names would also have been better typeset in the customary italics or uppercase to avoid confusion in the case of ships named after cities or towns.

My opinion of this book is by now obvious. If nothing else, this book is a guide on how not to write a ship's history. It appears to have been written for the *Armidale* survivors more than a general readership and this largely accounts for its style and tone. This is a major flaw because Mr Walker has forgotten that the historian must approach his subject matter in a detached manner letting the evidence do most of the work. Unfortunately, Mr Walker has written as a polemicist.

It is also a missed opportunity. Mr Walker should have looked at the distinctive



things about *Armidale*. He could have looked at her experience in working up after commissioning, how her captain helped the ships company to face their daunting last mission, whether these men suffered any psychological stresses later in the war or in civilian life, how they were regarded by shipmates with whom they served later in war, and what attitude the City of Armidale has towards the ship named in its honour. Iris Nesdale's *The Corvettes* has described the contribution of these ships from a distance as she surveys the service of the entire class. We are still waiting for a really good history of a single unit which might act as a guide to those that will come later.

Most of all, this book also made me very angry because the RAN deserves better than the shabby treatment it has received at the hands of Frank Walker. Given the strident criticisms he has made of the Naval Service he must expect just as vigorous discussion of their accuracy and validity. This, and saying something in passing about the mode and form of ship history, has been my aim.

Yet for all of the things I believe are wrong with this book, it is nonetheless moving. In opening the book, Walker quotes

Roy Cleland, an *Armidale* survivor: 'Every year, on the day *Armidale* was sunk, I take the day off. I go to Young and Jackson's [Melbourne's most famous pub] and buy two glasses of beer. I drink my own and leave the other one. Sometimes when I am leaving, the barmaid will ask me about the other glass, and I tell her: "My mates will be along to take care of that" ' This would bring a lump to anyone's throat.

I am not sure why HMAS *Armidale* was 'the ship that had to die'. The title suggests an overpowering inevitability about her loss. Yet, the only actual inevitability was the operation being risky. In war, men are put in positions of authority and asked to make judgements and decisions affecting the lives of others. They are open to a range of common human deficiencies and inadequacies. This is not to excuse incompetence. It is, however, to ask for more measured understanding of human nature and the limitations of the mind.

*HMAS Armidale The Ship that had to Die*; Kingfisher Press, Budgewoi, 1990.

Copies can be obtained from Kingfisher Press, PO Box 71, Budgewoi, NSW, 2262; \$20 plus \$5 postage and handling.



# MARITIME POWER AND ITS PLACE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER

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- Date: 16 May 1991
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- Lieutenant Annette Nelson,  
D-3-15  
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CANBERRA ACT 2600
- Phone: (06) 265 1165
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I wish to register for the ANI Seminar on 16 May 1991 at HMAS WATSON. I enclose my cheque/credit card number to cover the registration fee.

Name: .....

Address: .....

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Credit card details

Bankcard                      Mastercard

Expiry date...../.....

.....

Signed



# THE MARITIME STRATEGIC STUDIES PROJECT

A Progress Report on the Project by its Head,

Commodore Sam Bateman RAN

The Maritime Strategic Studies Project (MSSP) was established in the Department of Defence (Navy Office) in Canberra in April 1990:

- to develop a greater level of knowledge within the RAN of maritime issues in general and of maritime strategy in particular;
- to promote greater public awareness of the need for sea power in the defence of Australia and her sovereign interests.

Since its establishment the MSSP has undertaken a programme of seminars and lectures on maritime topics to naval audiences. There has been a particular focus on younger officers in the belief that the study of maritime affairs and of maritime strategy should be a whole career activity for the professional naval officer. It should not occur just at middle and higher rank levels but should be introduced at an early stage of professional development.

The project has also conducted research into a range of maritime issues, including Australia's maritime interests, our marine industries, the theory of maritime strategy and maritime strategic developments at the global and regional levels. The results of this research have been presented in a series of lectures and seminar papers to military staff colleges, universities and organisations across Australia such as the United Services Institute and the Institute of International Affairs.

In October 1990, the MSSP co-sponsored a highly successful one day conference in Canberra with the Australian Institute of International Affairs on the theme "Regional Marine Issues - Questions for Australia". The choice of this theme reflected the belief that marine issues, such as offshore resources, maritime boundaries, seaborne trade and transit rights have a much greater impact on relations between countries in Australia's region than they do elsewhere in the world. A particular objective of the conference was to explore the prospects for a co-operative approach to solving the problems which might arise.

The conference was opened by the Minister Assisting the Minister for Defence, the Hon. Gordon Bilney MP. Speakers included Professor Edward Wolfers from the University of Wollongong on the subject "Maritime Cooperation in the South Pacific" and Professor Victor Prescott from the University of Melbourne who addressed the issue of maritime boundaries in the region.

The choice of the theme for this conference was also in line with the idea that the MSSP should take full account of regional maritime issues. These are becoming higher on the agenda of regional countries and countries such as Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia are moving away to some extent from their traditional emphasis on land forces and allocating relatively more resources to maritime capabilities (ships, submarines and aircraft). There is good scope here for building a comprehensive dialogue on maritime strategic issues with regional navies and establishing a community of interest on maritime affairs. The MSSP will play a role in building this dialogue.

Overseas travel will be an important part of the project's activities. One visit has already been made to Thailand, India and Pakistan and others are planned for 1991. These visits will include lectures to staff colleges and strategic studies centres, as well as discussions with naval planning staffs.

In undertaking its activities, the MSSP is pursuing several broad themes. The first is the significance of the maritime environment to the security of Australia and the importance of maritime issues in Australia's defence strategy. This leads on to the second theme that in effect Australia now has a maritime force posture and is pursuing a maritime defence strategy. Evidence for this is provided by the heavy bias towards maritime capabilities in the current Defence expenditure on capital equipment.

Another broad theme is the idea that rather than sea power in the defence of Australia, which has a rather narrow naval



connotation, we should now be talking about the importance of maritime power to Australia. This would properly reflect:

- the common ground between maritime defence and our maritime interests and marine industries; and

- the contribution of both naval and air capabilities to maritime operations.

The idea of maritime power also stands up well in the context of the policies for regional security now being pursued by the Australian Government.

During 1991 the MSSP will continue its programme of lectures and seminars both to naval and non-naval audiences. Additionally there are several major conferences in the pipeline.

The first of these will be at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) in Canberra on 13 and 14 May on the theme "Naval Power in the Pacific : Towards the Year 2000". This conference, which will be co-hosted with the Australian Defence Studies Centre at ADFA and the Australian New Zealand Studies Center of the Pennsylvania State University, will explore the new issues and constraints which will impact upon naval force development and naval operations in the Pacific as we move towards the end of the century.

Speakers who have agreed to speak at this conference include Eric Grove (the author of *The Future of Sea Power and From Vanguard to Trident*), Ken Booth (*Navies and Foreign Policy and Law, Force and Diplomacy at Sea*), Norman Friedman (numerous books on naval warfare) and Captain Richard Sharpe RN, editor of *Jane's Fighting Ships*. This is perhaps the best collection of maritime strategic writers ever gathered together in Australia. Further details on the conference may be obtained from the Australian Defence Studies Centre (ph: 06-2688848/49) or the MSSP (ph: 06-2666116).

To take advantage of having such notable speakers in Australia, the conference in Canberra will be followed by a one day seminar in Sydney using these speakers on

16 May sponsored by the ANI. Details appear elsewhere in this copy of the Journal. It should be noted that the Sydney seminar will focus specifically on the Gulf War whereas the Canberra conference has the wider theme of naval developments in the Pacific.

Another major conference is planned for Sydney on 21-22 November on the theme "Maritime Change : Issues for Asia". This will be jointly sponsored by the RAN and Australian Defence Industries. It will bring together a highly qualified group of people, including senior officers from regional navies, to discuss those important factors that are changing in the maritime environment and assess their implications both for the Asian region as a whole and for individual countries. The dates for the conference have been chosen intentionally to precede AIDEX 91, Australia's largest defence equipment exhibition, to be held in Canberra 26-28 November.

During the first semester of 1991, the MSSP will be associated with a seminar course in the University College at ADFA entitled "Seapower and Australian Security". This will be an accredited unit of the Master of Defence Studies programme. It will run over 13 weeks covering issues such as maritime strategy, the history of Australian sea power, technological change and the future of warfare at sea. Applications for the course have already closed but it is hoped to repeat it in future years.

The wide-ranging activities of the MSSP are making a positive contribution towards showing the importance of the RAN in protecting the nation from threat and in contributing to the promotion of our security interests in the region around us. By helping to promote a maritime strategic concept for the Defence of Australia, it is assisting to provide the rationale for the new capabilities being acquired by the RAN over the next decade.



# Operating Accounts for twelve months ending 31 December 1990:

## EXPENDITURE

1990		1989
<b>Journal Operating Account</b>		
Printing	30,346.00	14,130.00
Postage	1,546.46	763.30
Prizes	325.00	
Article Payments	162.00	
	\$32,469.46	\$14,893.30
<b>Insignia Operating Account</b>		
Stock on hand 1/11,	140.59	1,563.75
Profit transfer to Income		
& Expenditure a/c	3.85	118.59
	\$1,144.44	\$1,682.34
<b>Medal Operating Account</b>		
Stock 1/1	950.35	1,231.25
	\$950.35	\$1,231.25
<b>Book Operating Account</b>		
Promotion	56.00	
Advertising	1,000.00	
Publishing	4,491.00	
	\$5,547.00	



# Operating Accounts for twelve months ending 31 December 1990:

1990		INCOME		1989
Journal Operating Account				
Subscriptions 2,005.15		2,413.36		
Net operating cost transfer to Inc & Exp a/c 30,464.31		12,479.94		
\$32,469.46		\$14,983.30		
Insignia Operating Account				
Sales 63.00		541.75		
Stock 31/12 1,081.44		1,140.59		
\$1,144.44		\$1,682.34		
Medal Operating Account				
Presentations 135.80		280.90		
Stock 31/12 814.55		950.35		
\$950.35		\$1,231.25		
Book Operating Account				
Sales 1504.75				
Stock 31/12 339.60				
Loss transfer to Inc & Exp a/c 3,702.65				
\$5,547.00				



# Income and Expenditure Account for the 12 months ended 31 December 1991

## CORPORATE SPONSORS

1990

1989

### Expenditure

Commission		5,500.00
Travel	2,080.00	1,147.00
Accommodation	1,290.00	520.00
Insignia		123.75
Reception		544.50
Oration		13.20
Postage		15.72
Certificates		180.00
Net Operating Profit Transferred	20,626.77	19,455.83
	\$25,000.00	\$27,500.00

### Income

Membership	25,000	27,500.00
	\$25,000	\$27,000



# Income & Expenditure for the 12 months ended 31 December 1990

1989

1990

## Expenditure

12,479.94	Book Operating Costs	3,702.65
89.54	Journal Operating Costs	30,464.31
340.00	Postage	64.77
4.00	Audit Fees	390.00
150.00	Company Fees	2.00
200.00	Donation to Legacy	
74.88	Donation to Naval History Seminar	
	Advertising – AGM	11.92
	Refreshments –AGM	48.97
414.29	Stationery	
194.61	Bank Charges	140.77
280.90	Presentation Medals	135.80
5.00	Engraving	
604.52	Printing	540.00
9.90	Video Cassettes	
210.00	Computer Repairs	89.00
183.37	Insurance	176.70
24.00	Post Office Box Rental	30.00
540.00	Depreciation – Computer	138.00
	Loss on disposal of Computer	540.00
21,287.19	Operating Profit transferred to Accumulated Funds	2,242.28
<b>\$37,092.14</b>		<b>\$38,917.17</b>

## Income

172.00	Postage Received	195.50
118.59	Insignia Trading	3.85
12,603.00	Subscriptions	11,562.00
4,283.72	Interest	6,514.05
459.00	Donations	15.00
19,455.83	Corporate Sponsor Profit	20,626.77
<b>\$37,092.14</b>		<b>\$38,917.17</b>



## Balance Sheet for 12 months ended 31 December 1990

1989	ACCUMULATED FUNDS	1990
19,871.03	Balance at 1 January	41,158.22
21,287.19	Plus Profit for year	2,442.28
<b>41,158.22</b>	<b>Balance as at 31 December</b>	<b>43,600.50</b>
	Provision for:	
	Replacement medals 300.00	
	Legal Fees 400.00	
	Depreciation 138.00	
		838.00
	Liabilities	
	Subs in Advance:	
4,613.00	1990	
2,816.00	1991 4,770.00	
25.00	1992 896.20	
	1993 71.00	
	1994 57.00	
	1995 17.00	
56.00	Sundry Creditors 5,563.40	
<b>7,510.00</b>		<b>11,374.60</b>
<b>\$50,988.22</b>		<b>\$55,813.10</b>
	Represented by:	
945.00	Sundry Debtors 685.00	
944.28	C'wlth Bank Chq a/c 35.94	
44,847.00	Defence Credit Union 50,365.57	
	Stock in Hand:	
1,140.59	Insignia 1,081.44	
950.35	Medals 814.55	
1.00	Medal Die 1.00	
	Books 339.60	
2,160.00	Computer at Cost 2,490.00	
		<b>\$55,813.10</b>



## INSIGNIA ORDERS

Please forward:

.....pairs of cufflinks @ \$10.00 \$..... .....journal binders @ \$8.00 \$....  
 .....mounted crests @ \$13.00 \$..... .....ties @ \$7.00 \$.....

I enclose my cheque for \$ ..... including \$ ..... postage (if delivery is to be made by Australia Post (delete if alternative means of carriage are arranged

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Inquiries and applications for membership should be directed to: The Secretary, Australian Naval Institute, PO Box 80, Campbell, ACT, 2600.



Crests . . .

Crests are meticulously hand-painted in full colour and are handsomely mounted on polished New Zealand timber. They measure 175mm x 130mm (5" x 7"). The price is \$25.00 each, plus \$2.00 postage + packing.\*



Cuff-links . . .

The cuff-links are robustly made and are attractively finished in gold and black. They are epoxy-capped to ensure long life and are packaged in presentation boxes. The price is \$10.00 a pair, plus \$1.00 postage + packing.\*

Ties . . .

Ties are dark blue with a single ANI badge in gold. Price \$7.00 plus \$1.00 postage + packing.\*



Journal binders . . .

Journal binders are coloured blue, with gold lettering and ANI crest. Each binder holds copies of the journal by means of a metal rod inserted simply through the middle page of each journal and held firmly at top and bottom of the binder. Plastic envelopes on the bottom of the spine enable volume numbers or years to be inserted. Price \$8.00 each plus \$2.00 postage + packing.\*



[\* Can be deleted if alternative means of carriage are arranged]



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Members			
Regular and Associate	25	48	65
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A copy of the quarterly journal is sent free to all financial members. Fees fall due annually on 1 January





# CONFERENCE

## Naval Power in the Pacific Towards the Year 2000

13-14 May 1991

### Australian Defence Force Academy CANBERRA

This major international conference will take place in Canberra to coincide with the celebrations for the anniversary of the Battle of the Coral Sea. Speakers are from North America and Europe as well as Australia.

In keeping with the international nature of the conference it is being hosted jointly by the:

- Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy, Campbell, ACT, 2600  
(Director, **Dr Hugh Smith**)
- Maritime Strategic Studies Project, Royal Australian Navy, Anzac Park West, Canberra, ACT, 2600  
(Head, **Commodore Sam Bateman, RAN**)
- Australia - New Zealand Studies Center, Pennsylvania State University, Pennsylvania 16802, USA  
(Director, **Professor Henry Albinski**)

*For further information contact:*  
Conference Organisers,  
Australian Defence Studies Centre,  
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## ADVERTISING INFORMATION

Size of Journal	- B5 international (Print area 215mm x 145mm)
Printing process	- Offset litho
Full page size	- 50 picas deep by 33 picas wide
Half page size	- 50 picas deep by 16 picas wide - 25 picas deep by 33 picas wide
Material form required	- B&W: Clean artwork or negatives - Colour: Four colour separation negatives
Screen size:	- 133 preferred but 125 - 150 acceptable

### ADVERTISING CHARGES - 1990

	Standard	Discount	Bulk
Colour	\$A	\$A	\$A
Centre double page	800	700	630
Back page	500	450	405
Internal page - single	400	350	315
Internal page - double	700	600	540
Half page	300	275	250
<b>Black and White</b>			
Centre double page	330	330	270
Back page	180	160	150
Internal page - single	165	150	135
Internal page - double	300	275	250
Half page	135	120	110

#### Notes:

1. The Discount Rate applies if a booking is for four or more successive journals with the same advertisement. The Bulk Rate is for the same if the total bill is paid with the initial order.
2. The deadlines for material are: No1 - 21 Jan; No2 - 21 Apr; No3 - 21 Jul; No4 - 21 Oct
3. Payment should be made on receipt of invoice.
4. The above prices do not include any agency commissions.
5. A copy of each Journal will be sent to the advertisers.
6. Two- Three- and Four-colour line advertisements can be inserted. Prices will be supplied on request.
7. Further information can be supplied on request to the Advertising Manager, who can be contacted by 'phone on (06) 265 3194 between 8:30am and 4pm Monday to Friday.

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For those in:	
New Zealand, PNG	A\$ .9.00
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NOTE: Surface/ordinary rates are included in the subscription.



However, lower level contingencies are seen to be less unlikely since '...were political motivations to change markedly, low level contingencies could arise at short notice because the military capabilities needed are already held by many countries, including some in Australia's region.' He concludes that 'The demands of low level contingencies and the force expansion base thus need to be the central focus of defence development. Establishing these clear priorities for managing Australia's threat spectrum provides an important foundation upon which defence strategy and detailed defence policy can be built.'

In Chapter 3: 'The Evolution of Australia's Strategic Concepts', the author provides a valuable and much needed appreciation of concepts such as: continued forward defence; conventional deterrence; nuclear deterrence; disproportionate response; defensive defence; regional influence and control; the defensive concept of denial; and the concept of defence in depth. He concludes that all of the above, save 'denial' fail to provide a clear set of principles to guide force structure development, and urges the '...need for sustained research to evolve a coherent strategy tailored for Australia's unique requirements.'

In Chapter 4: 'Towards a New Defence Strategy', the author makes full use of the views expressed by strategic thinkers such as Sun Tzu, André Beaufré, and B.H. Liddell-Hart, and concludes that the primary objectives of Australia's operational strategy should be: to prevent defeat against the full range of potential threats; be designed to undermine the resolution of the opponent's key decision makers and force an early cessation of operations on favourable terms; be usable politically; be economically affordable; exploit the opponent's weaknesses and avoid his strengths; exploit Australia's strengths and cover Australia's weaknesses — in particular, it must limit damage to Australia and be politically sustainable; be such that the public declaration of its broad principles carries substantial deterrence potential; have sufficient flexibility to meet alliance and regional contingencies; and provide clear guidance for force structure design. The author emphasises the need to

design and implement a persuasive strategy which would 'integrate a potent mix of non-military measures'; a strategy designed '...not only to deny the opponent access to Australia but to prevail on him to desist quickly on favourable terms. New defence capabilities would be chosen primarily for their potential to contribute to this end; persuading an opponent's decision-making elite that operations against Australia are 'not worth the candle'.

In Chapter 5: 'Managing Offshore Contingencies', the author notes that 'The abandonment of Australia's long-held strategy of forward defence did not remove the country's strong interests in its regional surrounds. Australia has an enduring concern to foster a favourable security environment in its approaches and limit the potential for lodgement there by potentially hostile powers.' In this regard, he considers that 'In seeking to further Australia's extensive regional interests, diplomatic and economic instruments are generally of greatest use.'

Attention is paid to Australia's offshore interests in Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, parts of the Southwest Pacific, and New Zealand; and further afield in the Eastern Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia, and especially with Singapore and Malaysia. Similarly, mention is made of contingent commitments stimulated by alliance, United Nations and other diplomatic pressures; and again by periodical requests from the Commonwealth and other groups of nations for defence involvement in regional peacekeeping, civil action and international observer duties in regions far from Australia's shores. Then there are our diplomatic, political, economic and military relationships with all of the ASEAN countries; while the appearance of separatist movements in places like Bougainville poses serious problems for Australian governments, now and in the future. Much attention is given to security matters affecting Papua New Guinea, and in particular to its internal security problems; and again to contingencies in the South Pacific region where internal security crises are seen to be more likely than attacks by a major external power or sub-national organizations such as terrorist or criminal bodies.

Similarly, the strategic significance of the Christmas and Cocos Islands is described



in detail. Overall, the author considers that Australia's offshore contingencies problems would be best dealt with by a mix of political, economic, social and military weapons to attack the willpower of the opponent's decision-making elite.

In Chapter 6: 'The Need for New Approaches' the author considers those incentives for change which are most likely to influence the Australian security system in the coming years. He notes that Australia's security environment is being, and will continue to be influenced on the global level by a change from domination by the USA and the USSR, to one by five or six major centres of power emerging early in the next century: Japan, China, India, together with Western Europe, as well as the USA and the USSR. The author considers that there will be 'A growing incentive for Australia to move gradually to diversify and extend its security contacts with several of the rising Asian powers, particularly Japan, China, India, and some of the ASEAN countries.'

The author notes also the need for a restructuring of the Australian economy to enable defence priorities of the future to be met. In this context, he concludes that 'Effectively, Australia is locked into an export pattern of relative decline and relief will only come when the country restructures itself to become less dependent on commodity exports.' This will mean higher levels of primary product processing prior to export, and an increase in the contribution of manufactures and services to Australia's exports. However, he notes that 'Extrapolating Australia's economic performance of the 1970s and 1980s into the next century reveals a prospect of substantially reduced economic, political

and probably strategic power and influence.

Certainly the financial resources likely to be available for defence in the 1990s and beyond are unlikely to grow in real terms and will most probably decline.'

Supplementing the above, the author deals with the need to clarify strategy and investment priorities; the need for a closer civil-military interface; the need to reform the defence planning process; and, most important, the need for a new defence personnel system.

In his conclusion, the author emphasises that 'Australians need to be much better informed about their national security interests and policies ... A better informed public is essential to overcome the xenophobia of the past, to generate more considered public responses to international crises, to encourage consistent and sustainable levels of defence investment and to build confidence in the country's ability to defend itself. The Department of Defence and Australia's other national security agencies need to develop a coherent strategy for building public understanding in this critically important field.'

This book is doubtless the most vigorous and informed contribution to date to the debate on Australia's coming defence requirements, and as such should be required reading for all persons concerned about the security of the realm. In particular, politicians and journalists should read it carefully, while those members of the reading public who wish to be informed will find it a pleasure to read and easy to comprehend. The very graphic Figures provided are an excellent complement to the compact and well-written narrative. *R.A. Swan*

*This review was first published in Australian Defence 2000 and is reprinted by permission*





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