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JOURNAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE



AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE INC

The Australian Naval Institute Inc was formed and incorporated in the Australian Capital Territory in 1975. The main objects of the Institute are:

- a. to encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the maritime profession,
- b. to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and the maritime profession, and
- c. to publish a journal.

The Institute is self-supporting and non-profit-making. All publication of the Institute will stress that the authors of articles express their own views and opinions and that these are not necessarily those of the Department of Defence, the Chief of Naval Staff or the Institute. The aim is to encourage discussion, dissemination of information, comment and opinion and the advancement of professional knowledge concerning naval and maritime matters.

The membership of the Institute is open to:

- a. Regular members. Regular membership is open to members of the RAN or RANR and persons who having qualified for Regular membership, subsequently leave the Service.
- b. Associate Members. Associate Membership is open to all other persons not qualified to be Regular members, who profess an interest in the aims of the Institute.
- c. Honorary Members. Honorary membership is open to persons who have made a distinguished contribution to the Navy or the maritime profession, or by past service, to the Institute.

CONTRIBUTORS

In order to achieve the stated aims of the Institute, all readers, both members and non-members, are encouraged to submit articles for publication. Preferably, submissions should be typed, double spaced, on A4 paper; the author's name and address must be shown clearly, even if a pseudonym is required for printing purposes; to be eligible for prizes, original articles must be accompanied by statements that they have been written expressly for the ANI; and short biographies will be welcomed. The Editor reserves the right to reject or amend articles for publication.

DISCLAIMER

Views expressed in this journal are those of the authors, and not necessarily those of the Department of Defence, the Chief of Naval Staff or the Institute.

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Cover:

Two of the RAN's three HMAS Stirling-based destroyer escorts, HMAS DERWENT leading HMAS SWAN during exercises off the West Australian coast.

Photo: ABPH P Kalajzich, RAN

FROM THE PRESIDENT



The Institute faced significant challenges in 1988, but I believe your Council took appropriate action and I look forward to 1989 with enthusiasm. I specially hope that I can launch the Vernon Parker Oration in the style that the founding president would appreciate. In this regard I have made overtures to two possible speakers and am hoping for a favourable response.

The Council has produced a small brochure which details the aims of the Institute and the Journal. It also includes a membership application form. If you believe you can help distribute these forms amongst potential members please contact Lieutenant Tom Frame on (062) 65 6959.

At the Annual General meeting on 23 February I announced that Commodore Alan Brecht has accepted honorary life membership of the Institute. This honour reflects the Council's belief that Commodore Brecht has given sustained and distinguished service to the Institute over 13 years. I thank him most sincerely for this effort.

Captain Chris Skinner has found it necessary to resign as convenor of the Sydney Chapter, following his retirement from the Service. Chris activated the moribund Sydney Chapter and used his drive and enthusiasm to ensure that it was a success. I wish him well for the future.

I have received a letter from Lieutenant Andrew Brown RANR of the Sydney Chapter, asking if I could help him find a "reasonably senior officer" to act as convenor. How about it Sydney?

At its last meeting your Council agreed to a proposal that the Annual prizes for articles and letters be abolished. Instead it will pay the authors of articles, specially written for the Journal and accepted for publication, \$10 per 1000 words commencing from the August 1989 edition of the journal. An annual prize of \$25 for the best book review will continue. These payments will not be made to the authors of articles such as staff college prize essays and Peter Mitchell competition entries.

Sincerely,

Ian Callaway

VERNON PARKER ORATION

ADMIRAL David Jeremiah USN, the United States Commander-In-Chief Pacific Fleet, has agreed to give the inaugural Vernon Parker Oration at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Military Theatre on Monday 1st May 1989 commencing at 2000.

This will be an auspicious occasion for the Institute and should set the standard for future orations. Support of the membership will be crucial to the success of this event.

FROM THE EDITOR

You will have noticed from the President's Report that this is the first issue of the journal printed by Pirie Printers Sales Pty. Ltd. of Canberra. I am hopeful that future editions of the magazine will be despatched to you during the due month.

Congratulations go to the recipients of the ANI annual awards for the best articles and book review contributed to the journal during 1988. For those that contributed but missed an award I assure you that I am appreciative of your efforts and the standard of submitted articles.

The three articles in this issue concerning the subject of Sea Lanes of Communication are published courtesy of VADM M.W. Hudson, Chief of Naval Staff, and Michael O'Connor of the Australian Defence Association. I am sure readers will enjoy these articles and future 1989 issues of the Journal will contain a selected article relating to this important subject.

It is always a pleasure to publish the ANI medallion award essay, and this issue contains the RANSC 20/88 winning essay by Lieutenant Commander R.J. Sherwood, RAN and I extend my congratulations to him for such a fine work.

Regards

Don Agar

ANI PRIZE AWARDS FOR 1988

Best Major Article: (\$200)	Commander Trevor Ruting, RAN. "The Potential For Advanced Hull Types For RAN Ship" (February Issue).
Best Minor Article: (\$100)	Ray Jones. "Forgotten Policy, Forgotten Ships" (November Issue).
Book Review: (\$25)	Lieutenant James Goldrick, RAN. "Work Hard, Play Hard" (November Issue).

There was no award for **Best Letter To The Editor** as the standard was not considered sufficiently high to warrant it.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Dear Sir,

I am writing to express my disappointment that our journal has allowed itself to be drawn into lobbying on behalf of one of the competitors for the ANZAC Ship Project. I refer to your November 1988 edition and the article therein by Commander P.J. Shevlin, AM, RAN, (rtd), a consultant to Australian Warship Systems.

Amongst many distortions he makes, the central distortion that must not go unanswered is that the AMECON design offered for the Project — the Blohm + Voss MEKO 200 ANZ — will not attract parent navy support from West Germany. This is untrue. The following points should be noted:

- The West German F123 frigate contract has been awarded to Blohm + Voss.
- This order for 4 ships will run in parallel with the ANZAC Ship Project. The ship to be ordered although larger than the MEDO 200 ANZ is none the less a MEKO with a high degree of commonality in design, equipment and ILS with the 200 ANZ.
- The West German Navy has several MOUs in place with the RAN and the Department of Defence guaranteeing technology transfer, collaboration and exchange of information on all aspects

of ship design and through life support arrangements. Specific agreements unique to the ANZAC Ship are expected in the near future to supplement the foregoing.

I would also like to point out the inaccuracy of the claim that the Blohm + Voss MEDO 200 ANZ is an old design. While the MEKO concept is mature and proven, it is continually evolving and the MEKO 200 ANZ itself is the very latest generation (1987) warship available from one of the world's foremost designer/builders incorporating all the lessons learnt from the Falklands and the Persian Gulf. Our offer to the RAN and RNZN, incorporates the most advanced warship technology and options available today.

The MEKO 200 ANZ will meet or exceed all the performance requirements of the RAN and RNZN. The extensive use of containerised weapons, sensors and electronics in our ship makes it easier to repair, upgrade and maintain than a ship designed along conventional lines. Finally, we will make no comments about our competitor. That, surely, is an assessment best left in the hands of the Project Office.

B.C. Clark
Managing Director

BLOHM + VOSS (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD



WASHINGTON NOTES

by

Tom Friedman

No one ever went broke underestimating the good taste of the American public. After last November's general election, you could safely say that no one would ever go broke underestimating the intelligence of the American electorate.

Neither presidential candidate deserved to win. Vice-President George Bush, the ultimate winner, seized the initiative from his bumbling opponent, Governor Michael Dukakis of Massachusetts, over such pressing issues as whether the Pledge of Allegiance should be recited in public schools (Bush wants it despite the fact that the Supreme Court says no one can be forced to say the Pledge) and whether work release programs for prisoners should be abolished (Bush wants them abolished and helped make his point by using advertising that included a ever so subtle racist appeal).

And what **didn't** the voting public hear much about? The campaign rhetoric scarcely ever mentioned the budget and trade deficits . . . the rampant drug problem with its attendant increase in the crime rate . . . lack of affordable housing for the poor and middle class . . . the need to upgrade the nation's educational system to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century . . . the surging tide of bank closures which result in more banks going under last year than at any time since the Great Depression of the 1930's . . . the multi-billion dollar collapse of the savings and loan industry (savings and loan associations are like banks) . . . and the need to expand and enforce laws to protect the environment.

Early on "Duke" Dukakis was dubbed a "softie" on defence. How "soft" he actually was remained dubious, because he refused to formulate a coherent defence platform. Instead, his campaign staff opted for photo opportunities like one at the General Dynamics M-1 tank plant where they had the Governor take a few turns around the back lot with his head sticking out of the turret of an M-1. In the end, the pictures only advanced the cause of these photographers who delight in taking pictures of candidates making themselves look

like jackasses (or in Dukakis' case, donkeys) in public.

Vice-President Bush was not much better. Although he asserted that he wants a defence budget that will increase only with inflation, he has yet to tell us where he intends to find the money to support even this modest growth. Even for those who are most adept at reading George Bush's lips, one thing is certain: Bush will not be able to "charge" his purchases because Reagan's two trillion dollar budget deficit will not allow him the luxury.

But the candidates' ducking critical issues throughout the campaign did not mean that they did not merit public debate. One of the many issues that really needed a public airing was how the Department of Defence spends its money. It is interesting that this problem has become so acute that it appears to have acquired a life of its own since the elections. While it now seems that everyone is jumping on the defence reform bandwagon, two groups are particularly amusing as they profess their conversion to the cause. The first group are former secretaries of defence and the second are members of Congress.

For the last several years, the Public Broadcasting Service has televised a "year in review" type program with a panel consisting of past secretaries of defence going back to the Kennedy administration. This year, the former secretaries wrung their hands over the sad state of military procurement and called for reform. While they were in office, during their respective "watches", these men were among a highly select group who actually could have influenced the workings of the American defence establishment; yet they did precious little to streamline procurement practices.

Even more laughable are the many members of Congress who are lining up on behalf of defence reform. "Born again" hawks as well as traditional doves now seeking to look pro-defence "see the light" of two-year defence budgeting, the establishment of a specialised acquisition corps within the services, and an end to protracted disputes between the

executive and legislative branches. The hawks see their conversion as the only alternative to stem the expected backlash from indictments which will almost surely follow in the wake of the Pentagon procurement scandal. For their part, the doves see an opportunity cut the defence budget in a patriotic manner.

This call for reform, whatever the reason, sounds great, but we must remember that these are the same people who were so lacking in political courage that they had to establish an independent federal commission to draw up a list of obsolete military installations rather than taking the political heat themselves. Congressman Les Aspin (Democrat-Wisconsin), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, believes that the closings will be approved because just "*14 Democratic congressmen and 12 Republicans (are) affected by the closures.*" Lucky for us 15 Democrats and 13 Republicans weren't affected!

The defence procurement debate seems to have resolved itself into two main areas, namely waste and the legitimate allocation of funds in the Defence budget. Graft and corruption at the Defence Department continue unabated. The Department's inspector general found \$2.1 billion in probable overcharges during the fiscal year ending on September 30, 1988, a 50 per cent increase over the previous year. Despite proclaimed efforts to stop fraud and abuse, the only result is that the means of graft have become more creative. (Example: 10 military and civilian workers at a Navy shipyard created fictitious companies which were awarded \$986 000 in contracts. Nine of the 10 have been sent to prison for up to five years.)

Despicable as these illegal transactions are, in the long run they are virtually insignificant compared to the process of how legitimate decisions on the procurement of big-ticket defence items are made. The projected costs of numerous programs are so huge that even people favoring a strong defence force are now questioning whether those programs provide anywhere near the advertised "bang for the buck."

While questionable programs can be found in each of the armed services, the United States Air Force has produced two planes that exemplify the devastating results of technology run rampant. Any debate over military priorities over the next two years will certainly include the B-1 and B-2 bombers at the top of the list.

One hundred B-1 bombers have been built since the aircraft was resurrected by the Reagan Administration. The President and the Air Force convinced Congress and the public that, in the age of advanced intercontinental

ballistic missiles, that we still had to have a manned strategic bomber. And so the plane was built. But despite a price tag of a **quarter of a billion dollars per copy**, the plane has never functioned as designed and will not be able to so function unless another **five to seven billion dollars** is spent to correct the defects — if the defects can be corrected.

Now we are being asked to foot the bill for the B-2 bomber with the new Stealth technology. It sounds great to have a plane that will be "invisible" to enemy radars, but each aircraft is now estimated to cost **\$516 million**, enough to run the school system of Seattle, Washington for three years! And the same people who told us the B-1 would fly right are now telling us to have faith in the B-2. And the Strategic Defence Initiative. And Aegis. And on and on and on.

The appointment of former Texas senator John Tower to be the new secretary of defence was not greeted with overwhelming approval in the Capitol. Many had hoped that a hard-nosed business executive would be named to that position (it is said that Tower never met a defence program he did not like). But the President-elect has great faith in his old political friend and believes that this hawk of hawks is just the one to clean up the mess at the Pentagon. Only time will tell.

There are developments, however, which give rise to cautious optimism. Brent Scowcroft, national security advisor-designate, has taken the right first step in calling for a review and clarification of America's strategic and military objectives. In doing this he will fill the void that was present in the Reagan build-up, namely a lack of strategy. Once this is done, the new President will be able to look at the weapons systems in the pipeline, decide whether or not to continue them, and if they are to be continued, at what pace. Once this point is reached, the fundamental changes in the procurement system that are desperately needed should be easily coaxed from a willing Congress.

No matter what, the public's faith in the Defence Department's operation is at a low ebb. American history eloquently testifies that, when it comes to funding the military, it is a short step to go from lack of faith to outright opposition. George Bush must establish strategic goals for the United States and stick to them while simultaneously cleaning up the organization that is instrumental in helping make the attainment of those goals possible. His job will not be easy.

AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE

1988 PRESIDENTS REPORT

The objectives for 1988 were to:

- produce a professional journal;
- promote new membership;
- stimulate chapter activity;
- establish an office for the management of the Institute; and
- issue an updated version of the constitution.

These objectives generally were met, some with a greater degree of success than others. Production of the Journal has not been easy during 1988. Editorial responsibilities, and the management of the printing contractor used for the production of the Journal, changed during the year. Consequently, the existing close understanding between the two was lost, resulting in production delays which were unacceptable. I was also disappointed in the number of suitable articles submitted for publication. Your Council has addressed both problems and taken measures which it believes will make 1989 a better year for the Journal.

Your Council also addressed the problems caused by a long list of unfinancial members during the year. Some of the overdue fees were of long standing. A final reminder despatched in July was very effective and the membership list now realistically reflects those who are prepared to remain financial. The membership consists of 553 individual members, and 86 other subscribers. The introduction of credit card facilities for the payment of fees and 1, 2 and 3 year subscriptions rates is expected to ease past problems caused by overdue fees.

The strength and vitality of the Institute clearly rests with the number of new and younger members we can attract. Accordingly a small brochure which details the aims of the Institute has been produced. It includes a membership application form and is suitable for wide distribution throughout ships and establishments.

Good liaison was established with the Chapters especially those in Sydney and Melbourne. The efforts of the Sydney Chapter Convenor, Captain Chris Skinner, are specially noteworthy, as this Chapter was moribund before his arrival. Both chapters have held regular meetings.

The Office Manager, Commodore Daryl Fox RAN (Retd) took up his duties at the beginning of the year, although initially he could not be provided with suitable office accommodation. The assistance of the Commanding Officer *HMAS HARMAN* was sought and he generously provided the Office Manager with an office in the establishment's Administration Block in September. The assistance provided by *HMAS HARMAN* is appreciated.

Updated versions of the ANI Constitution have been produced and will be issued to the 1989 Councillors.

ANI Silver Medals

During the year ANI Silver Medals were presented to Lieutenant Commanders M. Brice and R.J. Sherwood. Their winning essays have been published in the journal.

Financial Status

1988 was a satisfactory year financially, but the results can be improved. The new membership fees which were announced at the last Annual General Meeting and which also will improve the financial position, became effective on 1 January.

Council Activities

In June your Council agreed to the establishment of the Vernon Parker Oration. The Oration will be a most appropriate way of remembering its founding president. It will be an occasional address, by an eminent speaker, and on a topic relevant to the principal aim of the Institute. To signify its importance, the Oration will be a public and very special event. It will be arranged only when a distinguished speaker is available, and the speaker will be presented with an appropriately engraved ANI Silver Medallion. The Chief of the Defence Force, and the Chief of the Naval Staff have offered their support for the oration and I have made a formal approach to two potential speakers for 1989. I am constantly on the lookout for more. I believe the Oration has the potential to make a very significant contribution to the aims of the Institute.

The wives of the late Commodore Vernon Parker and George Jude passed to the Council their husbands' collection of Journals. Neither collection was complete. However, by combining the two and filling in the gaps from the Institute's holdings a complete set was made up. This was presented to the RAN Staff College as the Parker/Jude collection, in July.

After discussing ways of increasing the support for the Journal your Council has endorsed a proposal to abolish the annual prizes for articles and letters. Instead the Council will pay the authors of articles specially written for the Journal and accepted for publication. A payment scale of \$10 per 1000 words was agreed and payments will commence from the August 1989 edition of the Journal. An annual prize of \$25 for the best book review will continue. These payments will not be made to the authors of articles such as Staff College prize essays and Peter Mitchell competition entries.

The Retiring Council has proposal objectives for 1989 for the consideration of the incoming Council. In summary they believe the new Council should:

- enhance the standard of the Journal;
- promote new membership especially among officers, sailors and wrans;
- promote the inaugural Vernon Parker Oration;
- decide on the concept of Life Membership fees;
- develop a Corporate membership policy;
- revise Chaplain Vivian Thompson's draft "History of Garden Island 1788-1922";
- support Chapter activity.

I believe the enhancement of the standard of the Journal and the development of the Institute membership is critical to the well being of the organisation. The promotion of the Vernon Parker Oration will support both these important objectives. From it may flow greater credibility for the Institute as a professional body, and provide greater incentive for new members to join. The revision and possible publication of Chap-

lain Thompson's history has long been of interest to the ANI. Lieutenant Tom Frame has agreed to carry out the necessary work on this very interesting document with a view to making it more readable and widely available. Financial support for the project from industry is being sought.

I wish to record my appreciation for a job well done by all councillors during 1988. I have especially appreciated the enthusiasm they have displayed and lateral thinking abilities they have demonstrated. Because of these attributes some long standing matters have been cleared up. Membership of the Council is not a high profile task and councillors efforts go unrecognised by most. It is therefore important that those who continue to serve the Council and the Institute for long periods be recognised. Commander Sid Lemon had distinguished himself more than most in this regard. He has served the Institute as Councillor, Secretary and Senior Vice-President since 1984. He has agreed to continue serving as a Councillor in 1989. I thank him for his support.

In late 1987 Commodore Alan Brecht stood down as President for health reasons. He was a foundation member of the Institute. He was first elected to the Council in 1975 and subsequently served on it whenever posted to Canberra. He was Junior Vice-President in 1985 and Senior Vice-President in 1986 before succeeding to the Presidency in June of that year. His careful early planning for the Sea Power '87 Seminar ensured its success and his advice during the many Council meetings he has attended, was always sound. He is the author of some 10 articles published in the Journal. After taking cognisance of his outstanding service over 13 years, the ANI Council endorsed a proposal that the honour of life membership of the ANI be offered to Commodore Brecht in accordance with Article 6(7) of the Constitution. He has accepted the offer. He has my personal thanks for his service to the Institute and I congratulate him on behalf of you all.

Paul Reis A.A.S.A. F.T.I.A.

CERTIFIED PRACTISING ACCOUNTANT

Correspondence to:
P.O. BOX 91
WODEN, A.C.T. 2606
Telephone:
(062) 811566

ROOM 207
2ND FLOOR
MLC TOWER
PHILLIP, A.C.T.

17 February 1989

The President
The Australian Naval Institute Inc
PO Box 80
CAMPBELL ACT 2601

Dear Sir

Please find attached various Operating Accounts, Income and Expenditure Account and Balance Sheet of the Institute which relate to the twelve months ended 31 December 1988.

In my opinion the attached accounts are properly drawn up so as to give true and fair view of the state of affairs of the institute.

The rules relating to the administrationn of the funds of the Institute have been observed.

All information required by me has been obtained.

Yours faithfully

P.O. REIS

AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE INC
BALANCE SHEET FOR 12 MONTHS ENDING 31 DECEMBER 1988

1987		1988
	ACCUMULATED FUNDS	
23605.11	BALANCE AS AT 1 JANUARY 1988	20892.47
(2712.64)	LESS LOSS FOR YEAR	(1021.44)
<u>20892.47</u>	BALANCE AS AT 31 DECEMBER 1988	<u>19871.03</u>
	 PROVISIONS FOR	
300.00	REPLACEMENT MEDALS	300.00
400.00	LEGAL FEES	400.00
540.00	DEPRECIATION	1080.00
<u>1240.00</u>		<u>1780.00</u>
	LIABILITIES	
	SUBS IN ADVANCE :	
900.00	1988	-
60.00	1989	1093.00
-	1990	66.00
-	1991	135.00
<u>13861.00</u>	SUNDRY CREDITORS	<u>6180.14</u>
<u>14821.00</u>		<u>7474.14</u>
<u>36953.47</u>		<u>29125.17</u>
	 REPRESENTED BY	
-	CASH ON HAND	187.59
1570.00	SUNDRY DEBTORS	3480.00
3588.49	COMMONWEALTH BANK CHEQUE A/C	482.44
28329.73	DEFENCE CREDIT UNION	20019.14
	STOCK IN HAND :	
1104.25	INSIGNIA	1563.75
200.00	MEDALS	1231.25
1.00	MEDAL DIE	1.00
2160.00	COMPUTER AT COST	2160.00
<u>36953.47</u>		<u>29125.17</u>

AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE INC
INCOME & EXPENDITURE ACCOUNT FOR THE 12 MONTHS
ENDING 31 DECEMBER 1988

1987	EXPENDITURE	
	INSIGNIA OPERATING LOSS	41.50
9433.59	JOURNAL OPERATING COSTS	13640.82
79.92	POSTAGE	583.18
250.00	AUDIT FEES	285.00
2.00	COMPANY FEES	4.00
100.00	DONATION TO LEGACY	-
-	ADVERTISING — AGM	166.16
159.80	STATIONERY	795.72
-	HONORARIUM	1000.00
36.39	BANK CHARGES	89.31
100.00	PRESENTATION MEDALS	100.00
170.00	CHAPTER SUPPORT	412.00
-	ENTERTAINMENT	181.46
-	PRINTING	115.83
109.54	OFFICE SERVICES	24.74
137.54	COMPUTER SERVICE	-
-	INSURANCE	262.25
-	P O BOX RENTAL	23.00
540.00	DEPRECIATION — COMPUTER	540.00
7535.38	SEAPOWER OPERATING LOSS	-
<u>18654.16</u>		<u>18264.97</u>
	INCOME	
	POSTAGE RECEIVED	44.85
71.48	INSIGNIA TRADING	-
215.00	JOINING FEES	130.00
11366.00	SUBSCRIPTIONS	11566.00
4289.04	INTEREST	3134.51
—	DONATIONS	75.00
—	AGM SALES	18.00
	SEAPOWER OPERATING PROFIT	2275.17
2712.64	OPERATING LOSS TRANSFERED TO ACCUMULATED FUNDS	<u>1021.44</u>
<u>18654.16</u>		<u>18264.97</u>

AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE INC
INCOME & EXPENDITURE ACCOUNT FOR THE
12 MONTHS ENDING 31 DECEMBER 1988 (Continued)

SEAPOWER

INCOME	1988	1987
CASH FLOAT REBANKED	—	200.00
ADVERTISING	2065.00	—
REGISTRATION	—	17390.00
DONATION)	200.00
INSIGNIA SALES	<u>304.50</u>	<u>197.00</u>
	2369.50	18087.00
NET OPERATING LOSS TRANSFERRED	—	7535.38
	<u>2369.50</u>	<u>25622.38</u>

AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE INC.

JOURNAL OPERATING ACCOUNT FOR 12 MONTHS ENDING 31 DECEMBER 1988

EXPENDITURE	1988	1987	INCOME	1988	1987
PRINTING	22827.37	23775.00	ADVERTISING	8270.00	13694.64
POSTAGE	871.34	926.06	SUBSCRIPTIONS	1693.89	2062.03
EDITORIAL EXPENSES	—	139.20			
PRIZES	356.00	350.00			
			NET OPERATING COST		
			TRANSFER TO		
			INC & EXP A/C	13640.82	9433.59
	<u>24054.71</u>	<u>25190.26</u>		<u>24054.71</u>	<u>25190.26</u>
INSIGNIA OPERATING ACCOUNT					
STOCK ON HAND 1/1/88	1104.25	1086.12	SALES	207.00	253.00
PURCHASES	708.00	540.50	SEA POWER	—	353.00
POSTAGE		12.15	STOCK 31/12/88	1563.75	1104.25
PROFIT TRANSFER TO			LOSS TRANSFERRED TO		
INC. & EXP A/C	71.48		INC. & EXP A/C	41.50	
	<u>1812.25</u>	<u>1710.25</u>		<u>1812.25</u>	<u>1710.25</u>
MEDAL OPERATING ACCOUNT					
STOCK 1/1/88	200.00	300.00	PRESENTATIONS	100.00	100.00
MEDALLIONS	1131.25		STOCK 31/12/88	1231.25	200.00
	<u>1331.25</u>	<u>300.00</u>		<u>1331.25</u>	<u>300.00</u>

INCOME & EXPENDITURE ACCOUNT FOR THE 12 MONTHS ENDING 31 DECEMBER 1988

SEAPOWER

EXPENDITURE	1988	1987
CASH FLOAT	—	300.00
ADVERTISING	—	3908.08
HALL HIRE	—	420.00
CATERING & ACCOMMODATION	—	8691.65
PROCEEDINGS TYPESETTING	—	1215.00
PUBLISHING — PROCEEDINGS	—	5000.00
PRINTING	—	1072.00
SPEAKERS GIFT — INSIGNIA	—	353.00
RECORDING	—	2000.00
POSTAGE	94.33	248.20
BANKCARD/MASTERCARD FEES	—	77.50
STATIONERY	—	21.95
REFUNDS	—	665.00
SEMINAR PACK	—	1650.00
	<u>94.33</u>	<u>25622.38</u>
NET OPERATING PROFIT TRANSFERRED	<u>2275.17</u>	<u>—</u>
	<u>2369.50</u>	<u>25622.38</u>

A RESPONSE TO COMMANDER SCOTT'S "THE GALLIPOLLI CAMPAIGN — NAVAL ASPECTS"

by

Midshipman JASON STEPHEN SEARS, RAN

I wish to respond to CMDR Scott's article "The Gallipoli Campaign — Naval Aspects" and, in particular, his assertion that "*Hindsight has shown that, had the Navy rushed more ships through the Dardanelles, they would have reached Constantinople.*"¹ While this belief that the Navy could have succeeded where the military subsequently failed is quite attractive to a naval officer (such as myself), considering the situation confronting the Navy in the Dardanelles, a naval attack never really had any chance of success.

Churchill, and consequently CMDR Scott, base their assertion that had the naval attack been pressed then it would have succeeded, on comments made by the Fleet Commander's Chief-of-Staff Commodore Roger Keyes. Keyes on the night after the attack of the 18th of March wrote "*I had the most indelible impression that we were in the presence of a beaten foe*"² as it only remained for the minefields to be cleared. Prior, however, provides figures that show that the Turks could indeed repulse at least two, if not more, British attacks of the March 18 scale, with the ammunition they had available. He concludes that "*the immediate resumption of the naval attack would have had no dramatic effect*" and that "*if similar casualties had been suffered, very little of the British fleet would have remained at the end*"³ It seems clear then, in spite of Keyes' re-organised sweeping force, the naval attack could not have been continued. As Wilson writes "*Beyond the line of mines that 'changed the course of history' on 18 March lay other mines which the naval force at that moment lacked the capacity to remove*"⁴

Marder takes the point further than Keyes by arguing that had the attack been pressed using fast fleet sweepers and *Beagle* class destroyers, under the command of "*a Nelson*" after 18 April, then the minefields would have been eliminated.⁵ Nineteen battleships with ample ammunition could then have swept up the Dardanelles, cut the Turkish Empire in two, bombarded Constantinople and forced the surrender of Turkey. Even had it failed, the loss

would only have been "*half a dozen old battleships*" — the risks were certainly worth the possible payoff. Of course he admits that the plan was "*no certainty*" and I definitely agree that it was just a "*poignant might-have-been*"⁶

It seems to me that Marder ignores some important points in his scenario. Had the Fleet even broken through it would have been unsupplied as the batteries would have still been intact and able to sink supplying vessels where they might not have sunk battleships. The British Fleet still had to destroy the Turkish Fleet. The Turks at Constantinople may not have surrendered and without military support the Fleet could not have taken it. The "ifs" are endless. Indeed, the best way to solve the problem would be to look at the actual events of the attack and then draw conclusions.

The Turkish defences of the Dardanelles consisted of four basic elements. These were the forts, minefields — guarded by mobile artillery, floating mines and torpedoes.⁷ The floating mines were never effective. The Turks had sent down 16 of their 35 Ramis-type mines on March 1, 7 and 17 without success — the British finding that they could easily sever the lines attaching the mines to their floats and so, sink them. The torpedoes were never fired and the Mitchell Report found that even the threat of their use did not deter the Fleet from carrying out operations.⁸

This left what Laffin calls the "*vicious circle*"⁹ The minefields were the principal defence, being protected by the guns. To clear the minefields the guns had to be silenced. To effectively attack the Narrow's forts the ships had to sail over the minefields. To compound the problem, the Turks used mobile batteries to keep the ships moving and so, reduce the accuracy of their fire. These batteries also attacked the sweepers causing them to turn back. To destroy these batteries the ships required an accurate spotting force — something they never had. Thus, to force the Dardanelles the British would have to break the circle.

The naval attack began on 19 February 1915 when Carden ordered the bombardment of the Outer Defences. James says that *"from a military point of view it was a fiasco, as warships kept moving while they fired, and caused little or no damage"*.¹⁰ Further action was delayed by bad weather until 25 February when the bombardment was resumed. This time the forts were silenced, with marines being landed and destroying 50 guns by 3 March.¹¹ Much was made of this initial success, however the Fleet had had a number of advantages. They had been anchored in open sea with no danger from minefields and able to shoot from any angle.¹²

In attacking the intermediate defences, Carden found himself confronted by a much more difficult situation. Initially, it was planned that the forts would be overcome by gunfire, the mines then swept up, and the Fleet would sail to Constantinople.¹³ However, the Turks used their 36, mainly 5.9 inch, mobile howitzers and 24, mainly 8.2 inch, mortars to attack any anchored ship, thus forcing the Fleet to fire whilst moving and so making accurate firing difficult. This, when combined with the knowledge that most of the ships were old with out-of-date machinery and worn guns, their crews inexperienced, especially when conducting shore bombardment, and the fact that to destroy a gun they needed a direct hit, the chance of which was estimated by the Mitchell Committee as being 2-3 per cent,¹⁴ meant that ammunition expenditure would be much greater than that allowed for.¹⁵ These difficulties were further multiplied by the problem that the naval guns had only a flat trajectory and consequently, unlike the heavy and high-angled howitzers, they had only a comparatively minor effect upon the forts.¹⁶ It also meant that the process of reducing the forts would be lengthy, difficult and by no means assured.

The alternative was indirect firing over the Gallipoli Peninsula. This, it was found by the Mitchell Committee, would be *"about four times as favourable"*.¹⁷ This was indeed attempted by *Queen Elizabeth* off Gaba Tepe on 15 March. Firing 15 inch shells at a range of 14 000 yards she *"demoralised the Turks"*.¹⁸ The reconnaissance aircraft, however, were ineffective. They were unreliable, easy targets for Turkish rifles, had only inexperienced observers and were poorly utilised by Carden throughout the attack.¹⁹ By the next day the Germans had moved a battery into position to bombard her. Thus, she was forced to move outside her effective range. This caused Keyes to conclude *"that it was obviously a waste of*

time and energy to persevere with indirect bombardment without observation".²⁰

Meanwhile, the sweepers had been carrying out operations inside the straits. These had begun on 1 March but little progress has been made.²¹ Marder presents four reasons for the sweepers' failure. Firstly, the minefields and their associated defences were formidable. There were 10 main lines totalling 387 mines and protected by 48 guns and five searchlights.²² Despite this, no trawler was sunk by gunfire and only one was badly hit.²³ Secondly, the trawlers themselves were not suitable for sweeping. Only seven could operate in the straits simultaneously, and as their sweeping speed was only five knots, less two to four for the current, they had to get above the minefield and sweep down with the current. This not only exposed them to gunfire, but as the draught of their vessels was greater than the depth of the mines, morale could hardly have been high.²⁴ Thirdly, Marder finds that *"the system of sweeping developed in British coastal waters was never intended for use in narrow waters under fire"*.²⁵ Thus, the batteries had to be mastered by the ships. To achieve this either effective reconnaissance or a better firing position (the ideal one being in the middle of the minefield) had to be gained. The alternative was a military landing to secure the passage but this had been blocked by Kitchener. Fourthly, the trawlers were manned by civilians with little training or discipline. Little wonder then that on March 2, 3 and 10 the raw civilian crews, led by an officer with no experience of sweeping operations, fled after finding themselves near stationary targets subjected to heavy, close-range gunfire.²⁶ Even when Keyes re-organised the sweeping force, manned it with naval volunteers, and launched a determined attack on the night of 13 March, it failed after 27 died, 43 were wounded, four of six sweepers were badly damaged and the cruiser *Amethyst* was crippled for 20 minutes.²⁷

Thus, the situation had developed in a stalemate. Churchill, worried by the lack of progress began pressuring Carden by suggesting that *"a point has now been reached when it is necessary . . . to overwhelm the forts at the Narrows at decisive range"*.²⁸ Consequently, on 14 March, Carden decided that the time had come when *"vigorous sustained action [would be] necessary for success"*.²⁹

Events however, proved too much for Carden and on 16 March, owing to poor health, he relinquished command to deRobeck. On 18 March deRobeck began the major attack on the forts. He aimed to silence both them and the batteries for long enough so as to enable

the sweepers to clear the minefields.³⁰ The Fleet had an overwhelming firepower superiority against the forts. The battleships could load a 12 inch gun in 45 seconds, and a six inch gun in 10 seconds. By comparison, the most modern Turkish guns were Krupp 35 calibre made in 1885 that took between four and five minutes to load by hand.³¹ Eighteen battleships supported by cruisers and destroyers were involved in the attack. In reality, however, all that Churchill had done was to commit the Fleet to exactly the same methods of attack that had already failed, only on a larger scale.³²

By 1400 the attack was seen to be going well for the Fleet. They had temporarily put out of action four of the 19 heavy Turkish guns,³³ fire from the forts had slackened and deRobeck was ordering the sweepers forward. In fact, the official account from the Turkish General Staff stated that "the situation had become very critical".³⁴

At this point the *Bouvet* had begun to withdraw when she suddenly exploded and quickly sank.³⁵ The forts again opened fire, the naval bombardment continued from 10 000 yards and by 1600 the forts were again silent.³⁶ Again the trawlers were sent in but in the face of fire from the mobile batteries, they turned and fled even though they were manned by naval volunteers. Shortly afterwards, at 1611 *Inflexible* was severely damaged by a mine and a few minutes later *Irresistible* struck a mine and was disabled. Uncertain of what had caused the losses and fearing more, deRobeck recalled the Fleet. At 1815 the *Ocean* aiding *Irresistible* also struck a mine and both foundered during the night.³⁷

Thus, the attack had been halted by an undetected line of twenty mines. However, deRobeck cannot be blamed for failing to discover the mines. Seaplanes had declared the water free of mines from 14-16 March. Trawlers had swept the area on the nights 15 and 16 March, having exploded four mines. Yet, the sweeper commander reported the area clear and did not inform deRobeck of the exploded mines until the day after the attack.³⁸ It was later confirmed that the mines had been laid as early as 8 March.³⁹ Thus, sweeping operations were in no way effective but as has already been shown, much of the blame rests with the planners who failed to provide both adequate aerial reconnaissance and sweeping abilities for the forcing of the Dardanelles.

So ended the naval attack upon the Dardanelles. DeRobeck, in spite of the War Council's decision on 19 March to authorise another attack, had decided that military support was

needed.⁴⁰ Consequently, on 23 March he informed the Admiralty that combined operations with the military would begin in mid-April.⁴¹

Basically then, the attack on the Dardanelles had not been conducted effectively. On the operational side it had failed because of poor leadership and planning, the inability of the sweepers to clear the minefields or detect the Kephez minefield, which, in turn, was caused by the inability of the ships to dominate the forts and batteries. These problems were compounded by the lack of effective aerial reconnaissance, limits to supplies, such as ammunition, and by the pressures placed upon the forces by their political overlords in the War Council.

On the broader strategic level it failed because a naval attack upon the Dardanelles never really had any chance of success. Britain was already committed to fighting the war on the Western Front. Consequently, the Dardanelles campaign could never be more than a minor campaign. In reality, all that Church and the War Council were doing was trying to utilise the navy, whose heritage they associated with victory, to win the war on the cheap. Going further, I am inclined to believe that it would have failed with or without military support. After all, the military tried for eight and a half months, sustained 265 000 casualties and achieved nothing.⁴²

Notes and Acknowledgements

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- 40 Prior, *op. cit.*, p 95
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AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND POLITICAL AND SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS IN THE NEW ANZUS ERA. THE IMPLICATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES TO AUSTRALIA IN TERMS OF ALLIANCE RELATIONS

by

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The principal driving force, in the development of a foreign policy is national self interest. However, resource constraints, differing priorities, cultural, ideological and philosophical disparities between nations demand levels of compromise. The harmonious management of the security, economic, political and cultural dimensions, with viable levels of compromise indicates the success of foreign affairs in the pursuit of national self-interest. As relationships evolve and mature, each party develops unstated expectations within the framework of the understood psychological contract. Deviation from the contract may result in the offended party reacting in an unrelated dimension, to correct the deviation of the offending party. Dynamics of the relationship escalate and levels of conviction and commitment cause the psychological contract between the parties to form.

The ANZUS alliance will be examined on the basis of this premise. Recent action by New Zealand to effectively withdraw from the ANZUS alliance, from a United States and Australian perspective requires an assessment of Australia's possible evolution. To be considered is the contribution that Australia may make to its' geo-political and strategic environment to satisfy its' self interest. This will be balanced with Australia's ongoing commitment to both the United States and New Zealand in its contribution to the Western alliance.

Self interest as a concept is used to explain the behaviour of an international actor. The concept has a series of dimensions that are to be considered in the statement. These include security, economic, political and cultural objectives. National resources will be diverted to these objectives on a priority basis. Figure 1 offers a diagrammatic representation of a pyramid of precedence in the pursuit of

self interest. It suggests that the initial priority is the development of a satisfactory security environment, secondly the satisfaction of economic priorities, followed by political and cultural pursuits.

This is not to suggest that these national interests must follow a strictly linear progression or that severe demarcation exists between the dimensions. No individual level will ever be entirely satisfied. Resource constraints, for example, will limit the level of satisfaction that may be achieved in a particular dimension. Additionally, each of the levels of the pyramid represents a dynamic process with opportunities being taken or forfeited with some incurred opportunity cost. Decision making elites work from a particular perspective with varying priorities and objectives, which introduces an additional dynamic.

The dynamic process of international relations and flexibility of lines of demarcation shown in the model allows one dimension to influence another. Political pressure may be brought to bear on a nation, who has violated the psychological contract associated with security considerations. Alternatively, political pressure may be used to further economic pursuits or vice-versa. The relative power that may be exerted in the variety of dimensions available causes the asymmetry within the relationship and the level of influence that may be exercised.

Figure 2 is an extension of the model. It demonstrates the levels that the model may

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be considered at, varying from the individual to global considerations, it indicates that the sum of the parts equals the whole. As was discussed, in pursuit of each of the levels of self interest, compromises and consensus

must be achieved for stability. For further clarification, individuals with a particular self interest influence national interest which in turn affects international pursuits forming the global balance.




Figure 1: The Pyramid of International Relations at the ANZUS Level.



Figure 2: The Pyramid of International Relations.

The ANZUS Treaty

The ANZUS Treaty was established to satisfy the security requirements and objectives of the three partners. Worded loosely it states that:

"The parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific".²

It goes on to declare that "it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes". ANZUS was born out of military necessity with Britain's inability to provide adequate resources for regional security during the Second World War.³ Since then, the relationship has matured into the economic, political, and cultural dimension guided by national objectives.

The development of Australian foreign policy has had two periods of rapid evolution. New Zealand's withdrawal may represent a third period of maturity. Dr H.V. Evatt and Prime Minister Whitlam⁴ contributed greatly to Australian foreign policy in respect to the prevailing international environment of the period. Australia shifted its principal relationship from Britain to the United States to preserve Australian security. Whitlam's response to the Guam doctrine was not as the United States would have expected.⁵ Whitlam established a maturing influence in fashioning a more independent foreign policy. The management of Australian foreign affairs in the present environment presents opportunity for additional maturity with improved credibility in Australia's development as an international leader.

When considering the South West Pacific region, Australia is a nation with an abundance of natural resources, a well educated larger population, a more powerful military and economic force operating in a stable domestic political environment. This presents Australia with an opportunity to develop significant regional leadership. Relative power must be exercised with sensitivity in dealings with regional neighbours.⁶ A posture of complementary guiding leadership within the framework of the Western alliance should be adopted. This may be achieved by representing regional concerns to larger and more powerful nations with regional interests. This posture will allow Australia to develop legitimate power within the region as well as complement its connection power available through the ANZUS alliance. Pursuit of regional leadership within the constraints of self interest, — while avoiding neo-colonialism, demonstrates Australia's acceptance of its responsibilities to the

Western Alliance. Simultaneously, Australia's status as an international actor will be enhanced.

It is in the self interest of the regional states to accommodate Australia's leadership role. Each of the states political sensitivities have a Western orientation, while economically, the mini and the microstates may benefit from an Australian contribution and Australia's security capability offers stability.⁷ Australia has geopolitical and strategic concerns which validate its interest. Accommodation and encouragement of an Australian based regional leadership is in the interest of the region and in the self interest of Australia. Self interest requirements having been satisfied, opportunities for peace⁸, co-existence and development should be pursued and encouraged.

An Australian based leadership should satisfy United States interests in the region. Australia has enjoyed, and contributed to a close relationship with the United States in a variety of dimensions. National intent, culture, and the history of both parties are understood and, to varying degrees, remain integral. United States concerns pivot about the Central Balance. Resource limitations are making it increasingly difficult for the United States to satisfy its objectives. It may be in the self interest of the United States to facilitate Australia developing a more significant regional leadership role.

Resources of the United States that will become available if the United States delegated some of its regional concerns to Australia may be used elsewhere. Delegation would allow the United States to concentrate on other interests of greater sensitivity, thereby allowing the United States to consolidate its international leadership role. The United States will have some comfort in the knowledge that the general principles of its interest in the South West Pacific region will be satisfied. Other nations, such as the Soviet Union, are aware that Australia's leadership is supported by the United States through the ANZUS relationship. It would be expected that this connection power will moderate the pursuit of regional interests by other powers.

Australia has been developing an independent foreign policy since the Whitlam period. However, it has had little experience in a leadership role. This opportunity would give Australian elites experience in managing the more difficult decisions inherent in leadership responsibilities. Leadership development would give some insight and understanding of the dilemmas that face the United States as it assumes its international responsibilities.

Australia would develop its international status as it assumes greater responsibilities within the Western Alliance. A more formidable and consolidated alliance would develop between the United States and Australia. This development would be useful in foreign affairs of mutual concern, in the global context.

New Zealand's reassessment of its role within the framework of the ANZUS Alliance is forcing Australia to adopt a bilateral as well as regional leadership role. In the security dimension Australia is assuming greater defence responsibilities.⁹ Economically, the relationship is evolving within the guidelines of Closer Economic Relations, Australia being the dominant market. Australia's access to United States intelligence and leadership, global linkages, the historical and cultural similarities, as well as economic integration, would suggest similar political leadership. Even if Australia is reticent¹⁰ in its regional leadership role, that role will, by degrees, be developed by New Zealand's changing role within the ANZUS Alliance.

The Development of Australian-United States Relations

Australian relations with the United States have matured from security dependence to independent action based on self interest cognizant of United States sensitivities. Dependence during the Second World War has progressed through the Menzies period of "great and powerful friends", to an independent less security oriented relationship of the Whitlam period. Recently, Australian leadership saw the development of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone without the United States acceding to its protocols.¹¹ These developments demonstrate Australia's maturity and independence in foreign affairs.

The desire for an independent foreign policy based on geo-political and strategic interests was established as early as 1918. Prime Minister Hughes suggested breaking close ties with Britain, but recognized the inadequacies of Australian resources when he stated:

"America, Australia and New Zealand have common interests in the Pacific. And Australia looks to you, her elder brother to stand by her around the peace table as well as on the field of battle. For if we are to continue to be a commonwealth of free people, we must have guarantees against enemy aggression in the future."¹²

Considerations have varied little since this statement was made, except that the reliance on external power is shifting to self-reliance with increasing self-determination.

Survival guided Australia to the United States during the Second World War. The failure of the Singapore strategy as a result of Britain's resources being committed to the European theatre, demanded that Australia seek assistance from other sources. The United States was a viable option. The decision to seek United States support demonstrated Australia's willingness to break historical ties in the pursuit of self interest. It was in the United States self interest to allocate resources to preserve its interests in the South Pacific. Security requirements culminated in the development of the ANZUS Alliance, which was to become the corner stone of Australian strategic and defence planning.¹³ Access to resources to satisfy national security requirements guided the shift from Britain to the United States. A logical progression is for Australia's independent pursuits to continue and mature.

Australia's involvement in Vietnam was in response to United States pressure at political, diplomatic, and service levels with little concern for Vietnam's wishes and national sensitivities.¹⁴ Menzies viewed the commitment as an insurance policy instalment with the United States for the preservation of Australian security. The commitment demonstrated support for the international role of the United States. A secondary reason for Australian involvement was to deter the threat of communism. Menzies successfully balanced self interest against international commitment and considered that he had invested in Australia's future security.

Whitlam believed the investment that Australia made to its insurance policy was too high, that the whole concept was inappropriate, and that Australia should pursue a separate foreign and defence policy. This policy was to be attuned to those issues Australia should perceive as important and not dictated by a foreign power. This was to be a difficult task for Whitlam. Alteration of the mechanics of Foreign policy were not difficult to achieve, however overcoming Australian attitudes was. Former governments carefully nurtured fears of communism to implement foreign policy, immigration policy had largely been guided by the White Australia Policy. Whitlam considered it "time for change" and implemented his policy based on a co-operation, egalitarian, non-racist, and humanitarian platform. The luxury of Whitlam's perspective had become affordable as a result of the efforts of former leaders in satisfying Australia's security requirement through the development of relations with the United States.

Whitlam was responsible for implementing the principles of the Guam Doctrine. It encouraged United States allies to develop an independent defence capability.¹⁵ This was not an abdication of alliance responsibilities but was designed to free United States resources for the maintenance of the Central Balance. Nixon's stand focused Australian attention on its self defence. Australia was still able to request military assistance from the United States in an escalating environment. Independent self defence capability and attitude has allowed Australia to develop its regional leadership since the Guam Doctrine.

The Fraser Government by offering Cockburn Sound to the United States for the development of a naval base made a significant political statement. The offer was made out of concern for Soviet expansionism in the region. The United States declined the offer because the Labor Party stated that it would refuse access if elected to government. A United States Naval base would have benefited the development of Australian defence infrastructure. The offer demonstrated to the United States that Australia was a close ally and thereby made a major statement to the Soviet Union of Australian alliance. This action may have served to moderate Soviet intent.

Australian leadership in the development of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone demonstrated a willingness to pursue independent policies. The treaty was worded with United States sensitivities considered.¹⁶ However, the United States did not accede to the protocols. This treaty established Australia's commitment to regional responsibilities and its willingness to provide political leadership. It would be expected that the South Pacific Forum with increasingly consider economic, security and cultural dimensions of regional development.¹⁷ The leadership role of Australia should be supported and encouraged by the United States. The recently demonstrated commitment to the ANZUS Alliance by Australia should allow the United States to support and encourage an Australian leadership role.

Australia and New Zealand's determination to pursue independent defence and foreign policy may offend some American critics. Consideration should be given to the positive benefits to United States policy direction. Sovereignty and self determination are the lynch pins of the democratic process as long as these principles are pursued cognizant of United States sensitivities, independent action should be supported. As discussed, the fabric of the United States, Australian and New Zealand societies are not significantly different.

These underlying features guarantee that there will not be major discord between the parties although minor deviation can cause considerable short term animosity.

Implications to the Central Balance

The South Pacific offers new soils for the management of the Central Balance. This opportunity should not reflect the military based management that has characterised the Euro-centric approach to Central Balance questions. Super power capacity for global destruction should be adequate to satisfy the security dimension of the economic, political and cultural dimensions of self-interest. This regional microcosm may provide a useful forum for the de-escalation of military power characterizing the central balance.

At Vladivostok the Soviet Union suggested a re-assessment of the development of its self-interest and the desire to pursue interests in the South Pacific.¹⁹ Implementation of the principles of the statement should be viewed with wary enthusiasm. Foreign Minister Hayden said in 1984 ***"that the West needs to make active efforts to encourage (the Soviet Union) to overcome the dangerous effects of its own, often self-imposed isolation"***. Australia, he also said, ***"was seeking to draw the Soviet Union into productive relationships with the rest of the world rather than shun or isolate it"***. The United States may choose to manage its interests in Soviet involvement in the region through the ANZUS Alliance.

If the United States were to manage its interests in the region through ANZUS, confrontation between the super powers would be minimised. The Soviet Union has stated that it enters the South Pacific with ***"good will and out of justifiable self interest"***. United States response should be similar or else a further development of the European environment will result. United States self interest may be better served by allowing Australian management of the region with close observance of the Soviet Union's actions. This approach may satisfy other regional nations that they are not becoming directly involved in the management of the Central Balance.

It is in the global self interest as well as the United States and Soviet Union's self interest to develop a new approach to the management of the Central Balance. A re-thinking of issues may be tested in the South Pacific. With the United States facilitating an opportunity for implementation of the principles of Vladivostok, reciprocal goodwill may allow a re-assessment of military arrangements between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Australia, as a developing regional leader and a member of the ANZUS Alliance may have a useful role to play in balancing global superpower interests.

The Nuclear Disarmament Issues

The development of the nuclear disarmament issue represents a conflict between the security and political dimensions of self interest. Both Australia and New Zealand have lobby groups maintaining that national security requirements are satisfied by geographical isolation, its perceived minimal threat, and local defence capability. The presence of a nuclear capable warship or defence installations represents an unwarranted negative in the security equation. This is a result of a perception of inherent danger and the possible targeting by another force for destruction. This, of course, represents the strongly emotive issue of personal survival. The intelligence²⁰ or political justification for retaining United States bases on Australian soil is significantly less emotive because, relatively, personal survival is not at stake. It is increasingly difficult to balance the emotive and less emotive issue. Differing security²¹ and political perceptions have caused the Australian and New Zealand governments to embark on diverging paths.

The breakdown in relations between the United States and New Zealand, within the framework of the ANZUS Alliance, has required the Australian Government to balance its priorities with increasing sensitivity. Alliance and global responsibilities are being balanced against domestic and regional constraints. Besides obvious implications in the security and political dimensions there are ramifications in the economic and cultural dimensions. The Australian Government's global, regional, and domestic pursuits rely on its management of the ANZUS Alliance and more particularly its relations with the United States. The ANZAC ship project has demonstrated this government's ability to optimise conflicting priorities.

The ANZAC Ship Project

The joint Australian and New Zealand purchase of the ANZAC ship satisfies all dimensions of Australia's self interest as well as those of New Zealand and the United States.²² The constraints of New Zealand and the United States sensitivities may in the longer term provide Australia with global opportunities in the political, economic and cultural dimensions, while satisfying security requirements. Presently, two ship designs are being considered. These are the German Meko Class and the Dutch M Class designs. The contract

to be let is worth \$A5 billion for the successful consortium. While both Navies desire to purchase the best ship available, political and economic sensitivities will guide the final decision.

The designs being considered are to NATO specification which has implications on the weapons and communication equipment to be used. NATO equipment is compatible with United States equipment. The Australian and New Zealand navies may exercise together, as well as with the United States Navy. The joint purchase also gives Australia and New Zealand equipment commonality, thus permitting them to share training and logistic support.²³ The joint purchase satisfies Australia's commitment to self defence, regional defence, and alliance responsibilities. This purchase satisfies Australia's self interest in the security dimension, as well as increases Australia's visibility in the Western Alliance.

In the economic dimensions, the purchase is in Australia and New Zealand's interests. Domestically, the governments have adopted a policy to maximise Australian and New Zealand industrial involvement. This policy is commensurate with the development of CER between Australia and New Zealand.²⁴ It also maximises domestic economic development resulting from a major defence purchase. Access to European markets is increasingly difficult for Australia and New Zealand with the development of the European Community. This European purchase will provide the governments with leverage in the development of European markets. Technological transfer from Europe may also be useful to Australia and New Zealand.

Political sensitivities of Australia, New Zealand and the United States are satisfied with the purchase. Australia wishes to re-affirm its relations with the United States and this requirement is satisfied with a NATO purchase. Sensitivities of the United States and New Zealand relations are also satisfied. New Zealand is seen as pursuing its ANZUS responsibilities, while being removed from United States political influence, that may have resulted from a United States purchase. Additionally both Australia and New Zealand pacify the anti-nuclear and anti-ANZUS lobby in the domestic political environment. Globally, both nations are seen to be satisfying their responsibilities to the Western alliance. Therefore the NATO purchase satisfies the political dimension of self interest.

In the cultural dimensions the NATO purchase provides both Australia and New Zealand with opportunities for cultural

exchange. Australian domestic culture is a combination of American progressiveness and a British sense of traditionalism. An opportunity for cultural exchange with the Netherlands or West Germany will continue Australia's cultural development. The importance that both countries place on the purchase is demonstrated by recent visits by Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands (also visited in 1986) and Dr Helmut Kohl, chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, in October 1988. Additionally, both nations sent representative vessels for the Naval Bicentennial Review. Cultural development is more difficult to define, there are indications of the satisfaction of the cultural dimension of Australian self interest.

The ANZAC ship project represents an opportunity for Australia to pursue its self interest in every dimension. In addition to the ANZAC Ship Project the Navy is also undertaking to purchase a new Submarine from Sweden. Arguments of self interest associated with the ANZAC ship project may be extended to the purchase of the New Construction Submarine. It satisfies Australian self interest in the security, economic, political and cultural dimensions, with differing emphasis. Military purchases of this magnitude have implications on every level of the pursuit of critical concerns.

Conclusion

The development of international relations is a dynamic process. The ANZUS Alliance was born in the security dimension and has matured into the economic, political and cultural dimensions. Recent developments in alliance relations, as well as changing regional interests demand that Australia re-assess and continue the maturing of its foreign policy. Each dimension of foreign affairs cannot be considered in isolation, for actions and perspectives in one dimension affect all other dimensions of the relationships.

The ANZUS Alliance has been the corner stone of Australian and New Zealand defence planning. New Zealand and United States disagreement and the consequent breakdown in relations has caused concern, but has also created opportunities for Australia. New Zealand's withdrawal has come at a time of regional instability demonstrated by the military coup in Fiji,²⁵ Soviet involvement in Kiribati, and the United States handling of the Solomon Islands regarding fishing rights. International attention is being focused on the South Pacific, in which Australia has an opportunity to develop a significant leadership role.

Australia has valid geopolitical and strategic reasons for pursuing regional leadership. The Australian entree into the South Pacific creates an opportunity for management within the guidelines of the Western Alliance while not directly involving the Pacific States in Central Balance concerns. Euro-centric security, economic, political and cultural concerns are shifting to South East Asia and the Pacific region. The development of Australian leadership in the South Pacific must be sensitive to charges of neo-colonialism.

The courage of New Zealand's conviction to nuclear disarmament has served to focus United States attention on the ANZUS Alliance. The United States will consider the sensitivities of its Australian partner more closely²⁶ as a result of New Zealand action. Internationally, the United States management of the ANZUS difficulties will be viewed closely. It is in United States interest not to have a secondary rupture in its alliance relations.

During this difficult period in the development of the ANZUS Alliance Australia has managed its bi-lateral relations with the United States and New Zealand effectively.²⁷ Australia has managed to balance and reconfirm its relations with the United States and maintained its regional relationship with New Zealand.

The United States will benefit with the development of Australian leadership by freeing its resources and by not escalating superpower involvement in the region. An experienced and maturing Australia will prove a more useful ally than a considerably junior member of the Alliance. Increasing regional responsibilities will highlight to the Australian government some of the difficulties and sensitivities of international leadership.

The ANZUS Alliance, born out of military necessity has matured beyond the security dimension. The relationship must now be allowed to develop in a moral and justice oriented framework. This development will be guided by self interest with sensitivity to regional and alliance responsibilities.

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
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MARE LIBERUM OR MARE CLAUSUM: AN ESSAY ON THE IMPACT OF THE LAW OF THE SEA IN DEVELOPING A SUTTABLE MARITIME STRATEGY TO SUPPORT AUSTRALIA'S ROLE AND INTERESTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION

by

Lieutenant Commander R. J. Sherwood, BA, RAN

'We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal, and those it is our duty to follow.'

Henry Temple (Lord) Palmerston¹

Introduction

The history of mankind is one of conflicting interests and there is nothing in the present world that suggests there is likely to be any change to this type of human behaviour in the future. As noted by Lord Palmerston, the interests of a nation remain eternal, although allies and adversaries may change. This is particularly so when one considers the short history of Australia and especially our relationships with other States who have parallel and or conflicting interests in the Indian Ocean region.

The question of what are a nation's interests has in recent years been the matter of some debate. This is in part due to the fact that governments rarely document those interests in a definitive manner. Yet as Admiral Hill so rightly points out, 'the irreducible ones are shortly expressed in the UN Charter: Territorial Integrity and Political Independence'.² These may be further expanded to include the continued development of a nation's economic, political and cultural well-being, and are generally reflected in the way a nation conducts its affairs in the world arena. Today, these affairs are increasingly subject to internationally accepted conventions and regulations, with organisations established to provide third party arbitration for nations whose interests come into conflict.

Just as each State has its own legal system (municipal or domestic law) which governs the relations between individuals of that State,

there is a system of international law which regulates the conduct of independent States between themselves. This law has derived from customs which have sprung from expediency in international affairs, or from long practice between nations, or propositions stated by jurists, such as Hugo Grotius whose doctrine of 'mare liberum' (freedom of the seas) was written in 1608 to counter claims for exclusive rights to the Indian and Pacific Oceans by Spain and Portugal. In more modern times a corpus of international treaties and conventions, as well as a corpus of case law, have built up. This has been particularly applicable to international maritime law and following a series of conferences held over the last three decades, a comprehensive and definitive Law of the Sea (LOS) Treaty emerged in 1982. To some it is seen as disregarding the doctrine of Grotius and allowing the re-emergence of a doctrine of 'mare clausum' (closed seas) through its sanctioning of wider territorial seas, exclusive economic zones, archipelagic state rights and efforts to regulate deep sea mining.

Lieutenant Commander R. J. Sherwood was awarded the ANI medallion for the best essay on an aspect of Australia's Maritime Strategy on RANSC Course 20/88.

The medallion was presented to LCDR Sherwood by Rear Admiral G. R. Griffiths, AO, DSO, DSC, RAN (rtd) on 8 December 1988.

The implications to Australia as a signatory (not as yet ratified) to this convention, are many and varied. This essay will assess the impact of the law of the sea in the development of a suitable maritime strategy in support of our national interests and roles in the Indian Ocean region.

Strategic Importance of the Indian Ocean Region

The Indian Ocean is the third largest of the world's oceans. It and its adjacent seas cover more than 70 million square kilometres and wash the shores of four continents; Africa, Asia, Australia and Antarctica, all of which contribute to its geostrategic and geopolitical importance. The region comprises 36 independent littoral and 11 hinterland States encompassing a wide range of political and economic systems at varying levels of development. The region is richly endowed with both natural and commercial resources which add to its strategic importance and it accounts for more than 50 per cent of the non-Communist world's oil, in excess of 60 per cent of uranium production as well as 30 per cent of its gold output. The ports of the littoral States handle 25 per cent of the world's trade.³

Living and Non-living Resources of the Indian Ocean

Although the yield per unit surface area of the living resources of the Indian Ocean is small in comparison to the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, this is due more to methods of extraction, which are traditional in nature and usually labour intensive, than to the quantities available for exploitation. The marine resources of the region represent an important factor in the lives of many of the coastal communities, providing them with much of their animal protein needs. Over the last few decades non-regional powers have introduced more modern techniques to extracting these resources, and this is of concern to the littoral states.⁴

In addition oil and gas are exploited from a number of continental shelves including Australia's north-west shelf and the Sahul Shelf lying between Australia and Indonesia. Modern exploration techniques coupled with an increased world demand for oil has led to rapid development of offshore facilities. The continental shelves of the region are also rich in a variety of placer deposits and the central Indian Ocean basin is known to contain large quantities of polymetallic nodules rich in copper, cobalt, lead, nickel and zinc.⁵

Sea Lines of Communication

Of greater importance is the fact that the Indian Ocean comprises a vast network of maritime highways which provide the sea lines of communication connecting the nations of the Atlantic Ocean with those of the Pacific Ocean. It is bordered by several strategically important gateways or choke points. In the west is the Cape of Good Hope, in the north-west the Suez Canal, Red Sea and Bab-el-Mandeb Strait; in the north-east the Malacca and Singapore Straits; in the east the straits of the Indonesian archipelago and the straits leading north of Australia and in the south Cape Leeuwin. Additionally, there is the important gateway of the Hormuz Strait providing access to the Persian Gulf and finally the focal point at the southern tip of the Indian sub-continent.

International Straits

As the majority of points of access to and from the Indian Ocean are international straits, it is essential that they be kept open to avoid them becoming bottlenecks for navigation and communication between the States of the region and their trading partners. The fact that passage through these straits saves time, cost and distance for both military and commercial users, makes them strategically important. In some instances (eg Hormuz) there is no alternative; for others, it is matter of convenience. They are all important gateways of international maritime traffic and keeping them open has been an essential element of the doctrine of 'mare liberum'.

Australia's Interests in the Region

Australia's broader interests in the Indian Ocean region are best summarised by the following:

*'Australia is a member nation of the Indian Ocean littoral and as such is dependent on the viability of the Ocean and the region for sea and air communications links, trade, cultural and political relations, and regional progress to ensure our own development. Any disruptions to the security and development of the region will have repercussions in Australia.'*⁶

This statement reflects a growing awareness in Australia of our national interests and how they are reflected in our regional interests. Although historically, a high proportion of our population has lived along the eastern and south-eastern seaboard, changes in both the composition and the direction of Australia's trade (essential to our economic development)

have occurred over the last two decades. This has had the effect of directing our attention to the north-west and the waters that wash those shores. Australia's trade comprises over one third of the nation's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and over 60 per cent of this crosses the Indian Ocean, passing at some stage through one or more of the important international gateways. This important national interest, with its relationship to maritime law, is recognised at the highest governments levels as reflected in the following statement by the Minister for Defence to the media in December 1987:

'as a major trading nation Australia has a clear national interest in upholding the principle of supporting safe civilian shipping and of freedom of navigation on international waterways'.⁷

In more recent times there has been the identification of a wealth of natural resources, primarily petroleum based products in the seas abutting this north-western and northern coastline of Australia (eg the Rankin natural gas field with national investment in development exceeding \$12 billion).⁸ Added to this are the living resources of Australia's 200 nautical mile Fishing Zone (AFZ), containing some species rare and highly valued by foreign nations (eg *Trochus* shells and giant clams).

There is also a need to combat against the intrusion of foreign nations onto Australian soil and the dangers to the nation's rural industries through the introduction of plant and animal diseases. In 86/87 rural products comprised 7 per cent of GDP and over 35 per cent of exports by value.⁹

The Law of the Sea

Maritime Boundaries

For many centuries the maritime boundaries of the world were in accordance with the classic principles laid down by Hugo Grotius, which in essence restricted national sovereignty of the oceans to a narrow band of territorial sea one marine league (three nautical miles) in width. This was seen as sufficient to allow coastal States to protect and secure their coastlines and allowed them scope to enforce their customs, health and fiscal regulations. As a result, the vast expanses of the world's oceans remained free for the use of those nations who relied on them for their economic, political and cultural development. However, the exploitation of the world's oceans by the more powerful, coupled with the emergence of many independent but maritime weak coastal States

during the last century has heralded a gradual move away from this doctrine.

Territorial Seas. By 1974, 76 countries were claiming territorial sea boundaries ranging from 12 to 200 nautical miles from their coastlines. By the time the Third United Nations Conference of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) was in session in 1982, Australia was one of only 23 (of 135) of the world's independent coastal States still only claiming the traditional territorial sea limit of three nautical miles. The new LOS Treaty has prescribed that:

'Every state has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea limit up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles'.¹⁰

The territorial sea, the air space over it and its bed and subsoil are under the sovereignty of the coastal State. It is entitled to enact laws in regard to navigation, customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary matters, with the right to police and punish offenders of those laws within a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial seas out to a maximum of 24 nautical miles from its coast. Notwithstanding this, ships of all nationalities are entitled to the right of innocent passage through a coastal State's territorial seas.

Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). There was also the creation of the EEZ extending out 200 nautical miles. Within this zone the coastal state possesses sovereign rights for the conservation and management of the natural resources and the exploration and exploitation of those resources. In the Indian Ocean region this could place approximately one third of the maritime environment under some degree of national jurisdiction.¹¹

Archipelagic Straits. Another important concept recognised by the new law, is the right of archipelagic states (eg Indonesia) to draw territorial sea baselines along the periphery of their outer fringe of islands and functionally classify the waters within as territorial. However, sealanes are established within these waters and convey a right of transit passage as opposed to innocent passage to vessels of all nationalities.

Innocent Passage

Inherent in the new laws, which extend the territorial seas of the coastal States at the expense of the high seas, is the right of all vessels regardless of flag, to enjoy innocent passage through territorial waters. 'Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State(s), and would be in conformity with the rules of international law and the provisions

of the Convention'.¹² It does however require submarines to navigate on the surface and show their flag. It further defines those activities considered prejudicial:

'weapons practice; spying; propaganda; launching or taking onboard aircraft or military devices; embarking or disembarking persons or goods contrary to customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations; wilful and serious pollution; fishing; research or survey activities; and interference with coastal communication or other facilities'.¹³

Although States maintain the right to negotiate with each other in relation to the conduct of such activities in the other's territorial seas the law recognises the right of individual States to suspend passage through their waters in the interests of security. The protection of a State's security vis-a-vis the right of innocent passage has in the past been a cause of regional tension (eg the interception of a Malaysian merchant ship by an Indonesian patrol vessel off the Celebes in 1963).¹⁴

Transit Passage

In addition to that of innocent passage, the convention provides for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of a strait. This is not to be subject to any requirement of notification or authorisation, and no distinction is made to categories of vessel or aircraft, nor is there any mention made with regard to the submerged passage or otherwise of submarines. It does not confer on vessels or aircraft the same unrestrictive manoeuvre available on the high seas. Whilst exercising any right of transit passage they are bound to comply with the following:

- proceed without delay,
- refrain from any threat of or use of force,
- refrain from any activities other than those incidental to their normal mode of continuous and expeditious transit, and
- comply with generally accepted regulations with regard to safety and the prevention of pollution.

Archipelagic Transit

The rights of ships to have passage through archipelagic waters is a new concept accepted under UNCLOS III. It provides for the setting of sea lanes of up to 50 nautical miles in width and includes all normal international maritime traffic routes. Restrictions applying are those as for transit passage.

The Deep Sea-bed

One of the most controversial issues to arise out of UNCLOS III was the new provisions dealing with the mining of the deep sea-bed. This issue had its origins at a plenary session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1970, when it was declared: *'the sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction as well as the resources of the area, are the common heritage of mankind'*.¹⁵ It resulted in the establishment of a new international organisation, the International Sea-bed Authority (ISA), tasked to control and license mining of the ocean floor under a collective system, for the benefit of all nations.

Unfortunately it is these provisions that are seen by the traditional maritime powers as being about a return to the doctrine of *'mare clausum'*. It was quoted as the primary stumbling block to the United States of America signing the treaty and their attitude is best expressed in a statement by President Ronald Reagan when declaring that nation's EEZ: *'Deep seabed mining remains a lawful exercise of the freedom of the high seas open to all nations'*.¹⁶ More importantly to Australia, it has caused a degree of resentment among developing coastal States (some in the Indian Ocean region) with threats of withholding transit passage to those nations who do not accept the Treaty in full.

The Nature of Maritime Strategy

In the technologically innovative 20th century, the term strategy has been applied in a variety of ways by many writers; not all of them in a traditional military sense. We often hear of election strategies from politicians and strategies for launching a new product from business, yet the Oxford Dictionary still gives strategy very much as a military connotation:

'Generalship, the art of war, management of an army or armies in a campaign, art of so moving or disposing troops or ships or aircraft as to impose upon the enemy the place and time of conditions for fighting preferred by oneself'.¹⁷

Whilst not suggesting that all reference to strategy must implicitly relate to military matters it is considered that the use of force is the implied bottom line of any strategic thought. From this, and as mentioned earlier a desire of nations to protect their eternal interests, one can develop a national strategy. This may well be the management of national resources to ensure the maintenance and growth of those political, economical and cultural conditions preferred by the nation as

a whole. A maritime strategy would involve those aspects of the national strategy that are related to matters maritime including commercial trade, overseas possessions and dependencies, offshore resources and the protection of the nation's maritime sovereignty. In essence it involves two aspects of what modern military strategists call Sea Power:

- **Sea Denial.** The means by which a nation denies other nations the opportunity to interfere with its vital interests.
- **Sea Assertion.** The means by which a nation guarantees the use of sea for its own purposes.

Thus, in developing a maritime strategy for the Indian Ocean region, Australia must take into account all the economic, diplomatic, political and military means available to support its roles and interests in the region. In this respect the new LOS Treaty has a significant part to play in that it not only expands the nation's interests but is also an element of the strategy that protects those interests.

The Law of the Sea and Maritime Strategy

Regional Impact of the LOS Treaty

Since Grotius' time, the freedom of the seas (*mare liberum*) has usually been guaranteed by a predominant superior maritime power and when such a power has not existed the world's oceans have to varying degrees been closed (*mare clausum*). This is so of the Indian Ocean region, which since the 15th century has had a sort of strategic unity or cohesion imposed upon it by a succession of European maritime powers of which the British reigned the longest. However, in the latter half of the 20th century no single power has been predominant and this has led to an emerging new order which is promoting a new maritime doctrine for the region. It is as expressed in the wishes of the developing coastal States at UNCLOS III. A doctrine that whilst accepting the rights of the world's trading nations to ply the waters of the region, desires some control in relation to safety of navigation, pollution, the exploitation of the ocean's resources, and the violation of customs or immigration laws that may form a threat to the security of the coastal States concerned. It recognises the rapid improvements in technology both in military and commercial sense and the fact that what the oceans have to offer mankind are no longer inexhaustible, as they may have seemed at the time of Grotius. As a nation heavily dependent on the maritime environment of the region, all

of these interests are of vital importance to Australia.

The non-acceptance by the major maritime powers of the wishes of the coastal States of the region, as expressed in the Treaty, can only be a growing source of tension. The fact that only 4 per cent by value of our trade is carried in Australian flag ships makes it important to Australia that the major sea lanes and international straits in the region remain open to vessels of all nationalities. The recent announcement of the closure of the Lombok and Sunda Straits by Indonesia, reflects some of the regional tensions and the protestations by nations such as Australia, West Germany and the USA may have had more weight if these nations had been ratified signatories to the LOS Treaty.

The LOS Treaty and Australia's Maritime Strategy

Traditionally, Australia has pursued a strategy that tied her to one or other of the predominant powers in the region and this has allowed us to experience continued growth while expending comparatively little effort or money in the region or in the protection of our regional interests. Although still friendly to our interests in general, times are changing (as reflected in the USA's Guam Doctrine) and these allies may not be so willing to take on so much of that burden in future years. This has been recognised by the present Government and is reflected in the Defence White Paper of 1987:

'Australians' have a right to expect their nation is able to defend itself . . . The exercise of authority over our continent and offshore territories, our territorial sea and resource zones, and airspace and the ability to protect our maritime and air approaches, is fundamental to our sovereignty and security'.¹⁸

The LOS Treaty allows Australia to extend this sovereignty and jurisdiction over a wider sea area and onto the continental shelf, allowing for wider flexibility in ensuring our security; militarily, economically and ecologically. Some of this we have already done with the declaration of the Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ) and more recently through agreement with Indonesia on oil and gas exploration of the continental shelf in the Timor Sea. This extension of sovereignty necessarily entails a means of defending it and this must be central to any maritime strategy. It involves a strategy that implies denial by the possession of adequate national resources. These include the ability to explore and extract the resources

of the area and to then transport them to the world's market places, and most importantly the possession of an adequate surveillance and policing infrastructure. Only with the existence of adequate facilities can one provide the deterrent effect so necessary in a policy of denial, and our present inadequacies in this area have been highlighted by incursions on our north-west coast in recent months by foreign nations be they fishermen or illegal immigrants.

In the broader sphere the extent of our interests in the Indian Ocean region makes it seem a daunting task for a nation of only 16 million people to protect. Some pundits believe this can be best achieved by pursuing a policy aimed at turning the region into a 'lake of neutrality' through the declaration of a zone of peace. This is in fact the policy of the Australian Labour Party as reflected in the following extract of a speech given by Bill Hayden, as Foreign Minister in 1984:

'An Indian Ocean zone of peace has been an ambition of the states of the region for the past 13 years. The Australian Government is a committed supporter of the concept. Indeed, the platform of our Party expressly demands that the Government (and I quote) "engage in effective collective action" to establish such a zone . . . We must look to alternative ways to keep the peace and maintain the stability of the region. We can't opt out of the security business altogether. We can't do it all ourselves. We don't have the capability. In any case he who defends everything defends nothing. And the only other course contains elements that are part of the reason why a zone of peace proposal was put forward in the first place'.¹⁹

Although having much to commend it, a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean will not exist until such a time as all regional States can be confident no one will cheat on it. Present rivalry suggests that we cannot be certain of that in the immediate future. Instead the best approach for the littoral States to take in protecting their vital interests is through a strategy of regional co-operation. The LOS Treaty provides one avenue in this regard and a golden opportunity exists here for Australia to play a leading role. We may therefore have to apply some of Lord Palmerston's philosophy and reassess who are our allies and enemies (real or potential) and perhaps move more strongly towards accepting the LOS Treaty as an essential part of our own maritime strategy. A maritime strategy that aims at working more closely with the other coastal States of the

region in promoting a modified doctrine of 'mare liberum' and at other methods of international agreement that will assist in reducing tension and conflict in a region so vital to our national well-being.

Conclusion

Protecting the nation's vital interests is an essential part of any national strategy, of which maritime strategy, is that part of the overall strategy concerned primarily with interests maritime in nature. It does not necessarily imply the exclusive use of military means, but also embraces matters economic, political and diplomatic in nature. As Australia slowly awakens to the extent of her vital interests in the Indian Ocean region and comes to the realisation that they may not in future be protected by a large and powerful ally, then there must be a move towards self-reliance and the development of a maritime strategy that is more interdependent with regional States rather than with predominant maritime powers. In achieving this change the direction of Australia's diplomatic efforts will require change in the same way our trade direction has changed over the last two decades.

There now exists an opportunity for closer co-operation with the regional States, by fostering a guarantee of freedom of the seas for all, not in the traditional sense of Grotius but in a way that allows the emerging littoral maritime nations to exercise some control over their expanded sovereignty. Closer co-operation both diplomatically and militarily is a key to keeping the trade routes of the Indian Ocean open to all. Australia should move quickly to ratify the LOS Treaty and openly encourage all littoral and other States with interests in the area to do likewise. Acceptance of the Treaty would extend the rule of international law, including an agreed means for third party settlement of disputes, over the region as a whole. It would provide a powerful encouragement to pursue other rational accommodations of the more complex issues in existence today resulting from the realities of the inescapable interdependence of the modern world. The LOS Treaty 'offers a new instrument for enhancing economic development, ensuring protection of the environment, advancing disarmament, creating new forms of scientific and industrial co-operation between developed and developing nations in the most comprehensive and binding global text ever devised'.²⁰

Notwithstanding the importance of promoting the acceptance of the Treaty among

interested regional parties, it also brings with it a need for Australia to pursue a greater security element as part of our maritime strategy. The extension of our sovereign territory will necessarily involve the build up of resources to use that territory for our own purposes. It will require elements capable of surveillance of a large area over protracted periods, providing a presence, and an ability to project that presence further afield into the region in protection of our vital interests. We must also possess the political will to project and protect our economic, political and cultural well-being as a means of deterrence to any would-be aggressor. Alfred Mahan said, in 1911: 'Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. This ocean is the key to the seven seas. In the 21st century the destiny of the world will be decided on its waves'.²¹ Australia has a vital interest in being a party to that control and acceptance of the LOS Treaty would be a step in the right direction. It will have a significant impact on the development of Australia's maritime strategy in support of our roles and interests in the Indian Ocean region.

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The Author

LCDR R.J. Sherwood joined the RAN in 1969 and completed a Bachelor of Arts at the University of New South Wales. He specialized as a Navigator in 1981 and has spent 13 of the last 14 years at sea. Lcdr Sherwood served in almost all RAN ship types during this period, DE's, DDG's and FFG's, including HMAS Ships SUCCESS and JERVIS BAY. On completion of his RAN Staff Course he was posted to Maritime Headquarters as the Fleet Navigating Officer.

KOCKUMS MARINE AB PRESS RELEASE

12, 13 December 1988

The last of four Swedish submarines of the **A 17/Västergötland** class was launched on December 9, 1988 at Kockums Marine AB and named **ÖSTERGÖTLAND**.

After the launching, units from the 1st Submarine Flotilla were open to the public and an impressive demonstration was carried out with submarine activities in Kockums' 400 m long building dock.

Two submarines dived in the dock including

the submarine **Näcken** (see Nov 88 JANI), which on November 23 started sea trials with its full scale Stirling-AIP (Air-Independent Propulsion).

Kockums is presently designing the Type 471 submarines for the Royal Australian Navy and the Type A 19 for the Swedish Navy. Construction of the Type 471 is planned to start in early 1989.



The launching of the **ÖSTERGÖTLAND** was followed by an impressive demonstration of submarines diving in Kockums' 400 m long building dock.



The submarine on its way to the ceremony to be named ÖSTERGÖTLAND.



On November 23 the Stirling-Nacken started the sea-trials with its full scale Stirling-AIP system.

A SAIL TRAINING SHIP FOR THE RAN

by

Commander F.A. Allica, RAN

Early in 1988 the people of Australia witnessed the spectacle of a visit by several tall ships which had sailed from many parts of the world to participate in various Bicentennial activities around Australia. Many of these vessels are government owned and operated by merchant or naval academies and are used as an integral part in the training of their officer corps to man and operate the sophisticated vessels at sea today. Obviously, in these countries at least, there is a strong body of opinion which believes that sailing and crewing a square rigged vessel is still very relevant in training the man; even for the high technology ships serving both the naval and merchantile fleets.

Not all countries operate sail training ships as a means to train those persons who aspire to a life at sea, but many do. The Soviet Union, India, Germany, Spain, Uruguay, Ecuador, Oman, Chile, Canada, and Indonesia all operate naval sail training vessels. Poland, Japan, Italy, and many others operate very large sail training vessels as part of their merchant marine academies. Even the United States Coast Guard undertakes a major portion of its officer cadet training at sea in a sailing vessel. Of interest however, neither the Royal Navy nor the US Navy operate sail training vessels. They do have however have many large yachts and foster a strong interest in sailing.

Many other countries operate vessels engaged in sail training or other adventurous activities at sea in sailing vessels. These schemes are primarily to aid in the personal development of young people, but also have a secondary aim of fostering an interest in the maritime environment.

The United Kingdom has several vessels engaged in these roles, the **Malcolm Miller** and **Winston Churchill**, operated by the UK Sail Training Association, the **Lord Nelson**, operated by the Jubilee Trust for handicapped people, and the **Royalist**, by the Sea Cadet Corp. The Spirit of New Zealand Trust operate two vessels and in Australia there is growing interest and an increasing number of vessels. The **Leeuwin** in Western Australia, the **Alma**

Doepel in Victoria, **Faile** and the **One And All** in South Australia, the **Lady Nelson** currently under construction in Tasmania and of course, since January 88, the **Young Endeavour** operated by the Royal Australian Navy.

Operation of the **Young Endeavour** by the RAN is somewhat unique. The RAN is the only naval service in the world which operates a sail training vessel not to train its own personnel, but for the benefit of the youth at large. This aspect has been a little confusing to the general public, who on seeing the white ensign flying at the gaff, have assumed the contrary. However, as the ship becomes more widely known, so does her role.

But perhaps the RAN should be using a sail training ship for the training of its naval personnel. It is apparent that many other nations consider this form of training to be valid. So why not here?

Training Perceptions

The RAN has never had a sail training vessel as until comparatively recently, officer training was conducted in the UK by the Royal Navy. Over the past 20 years this training has been phased out in favour of training in Australia which has been developed to meet the different requirements of the RAN fleet. The RAN force structure has changed from an almost total British design, to ships and equipments sourced in the USA, and at the same time Australia's strategic circumstances have changed. Both these shifts in emphasis have resulted in the formulation of officer training programmes to meet the peculiar needs of today's navy. Notwithstanding, junior officer training programmes are still based on very similar lines to the RN.

It is probable that no serious consideration has ever been given to the RAN acquiring a sail training ship. Our mentors, the RN, never had one and it was probably considered to be an expensive option. There may also have been a feeling that the RAN did not have the resident expertise to man and operate a square rigged vessel. For top long it has been considered an art which possessed a mystic which only an old sea dog could understand. This clearly

is not true. Whilst a measure of experience is required in the command, a lesser expertise is acceptable for officers of the watch and watch leaders since these personnel gain confidence quickly with practice. The operation of **Young Endeavour** is providing this resident skill in the RAN. In a training role, it is far preferable to have keen young persons who relate to young people and are good ambassadors for the Navy, rather than the old and bold who do neither very well.

Training Ships

Until recently, it has been RAN practice to use old destroyers or frigates in their final years before disposal as training ships. In the past 25 years HMA Ships **Swan**, **Anzac**, **Queenborough**, **Duchess**, **Vampire** and **Yarra** have been employed in this role prior to paying off. These ships were normally decommissioned after 20-25 years of service. Weapons and systems were either removed, not maintained, or put into care and maintenance and crews depleted, reflecting the reduced roles of the ships. Whilst it could be stated that these ships formed an operational reserve, a major refit of their weapons systems would have been necessary in the event that a contingency arose which required these vessels to be operational. The time to achieve this poses the interesting question on the validity of this stance.

In general the continued operation of these vessels was expensive in terms of manpower, maintenance and operating costs. Even excluding weapon systems, the manpower required to operate and maintain the steam propulsion systems was very high. Defects were common and maintenance costs increased significantly with age. **HMAS Vampire** when converted to her training role still required a complement of approximately 220. Her complex propulsion system required constant maintenance and on-going expensive refitting. Whilst the ships role was primarily for junior officer training, she did undertake training of MTP (marine technical propulsion) and ET (electrical technical) sailors. The equipment however was outdated and whilst some techniques may have been transferable, these sailors were unlikely to encounter similar equipments again. In general the ships were a manpower sponge and did not produce a cost effective training throughput.

HMAS Jervis Bay

In 1977 the RAN acquired **HMAS Jervis Bay** as a full time training ship. The decision was largely political. Australian National Line (ANL) had a ship excess to requirements and Navy

had a shortage of bunks at sea to train young seamen officers. The acquisition cost was low and it was argued that the acquisition of the then **Australian Trader** would enhance Navy's heavy lift capability and provide more training billets at sea.

The ship is quite large and requires considerable ship husbandary resources to maintain her appearance. Her engineering plant however is not complex and is minimum staffed. Nevertheless she still requires a permanent crew of 111.

Jervis Bay has been used primarily for junior officer training, both common course and navigation training. She is fitted with a second bridge and other facilities which allow junior officers to conduct their navigation training unimpeded.

Training in **Jervis Bay** is however more akin to service in a passenger liner rather than the more spartan conditions of an old destroyer. Common course training is the first time junior officers experience life at sea. One aim is to work and live in a similar manner to, and alongside, junior sailors. It is, or should be an intensive learnign period in which basic seamanship and shipboard skills are imparted, whilst at the same time viewing life as seen from the lower deck. Unfortunately **Jervis Bay** is not an ideal platform for this form of basic training. Until quite recently, Midshipmen were accommodated in two berth cabins rather than the messdecks used in destroyers. Recently modifications have been carried out to provide messdecks for common course trainees to rectify this deficiency. The problems of messdeck living; three tiered bunks or slinging a hammock, turning out smartly for divisions when allocated only a two foot square locker to stow all your gear and, living under the watchful eye of a messdeck leading hand are very important factors in this initial training phrase.

For basic sea training **HMAS Jervis Bay** is not a challenge. Life is comfortable and the experience of being at sea in all the elements of wind, weather and sea are not so identifiable in a large vessel. This could lead to a sense of complacency of the sea instead of an awful respect.

Jervis Bay's alternative role of heavy lift has no tactical application and is limited by the need for dedicated roll-on roll-off facilities in port. This capability is seldom used and if required is readily available in contingent circumstances from ships taken up from trade.

Recently **HMAS Tobruk** has been conducting common course training for junior officers from the Defence Academy. Like **Jervis Bay**,

this ship is also large and for the same reasons is not entirely suitable as a training ship.

Perhaps it is time Navy looked for an alternative training platform. It is submitted that a sail training vessel would undoubtedly ideally fulfill Navy's requirement.

Young Endeavour

Young Endeavour was given by the government and the people of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the youth of Australia as a gift to celebrate Australia's Bicentenary. As such she will continue in her sail training role of Australian youth. Navy's experience with **Young Endeavour** since her handover in January 1988 has been very much a success story. At the end of August 1988, 14 ten-day voyages had already been completed and over 300 young people, male and female aged between 16-18 had undergone an intensive but rewarding period at sea. Feedback from the youth crew has been spontaneous and enthusiastic. There is every reason to believe that for many this time under sail has contributed significantly to their development. For some, it has been a time of reflection and a turn in life direction.

The broad aim of the Young Endeavour Youth Scheme is to aid in the personal development of young people in the areas of self discipline, team spirit, pride in accomplishment and leadership. Sail training is the means by which these goals are pursued. Naturally there is a strong emphasis on seamanship and the maritime environment.

It is quite extraordinary how quickly young people adapt to life at sea in a tall ship. **Young Endeavour's** youth crew are drawn from all sections of the community and undergo only a very limited selection process to ensure that they are medically fit for the voyage and can swim. Yet in 10 days these persons are transformed from a group of untrained, undisciplined individuals to an enthusiastic team. In the final days of the voyage they elect their own captain, executive officer, navigator, watch leaders and cooks and operate the ship, usually quite successfully, for a 24-hour period underway. There are many holes in their knowledge, but given more time and some selection of the individual, the training process would be more than proven.

Applicability to RAN

On great advantage of undertaking common sea training for junior officers in a sail training vessel or a relatively small ship, is that trainees can be given considerable responsibility. In **Young Endeavour**, trainees fill billets of

assistant navigator, (or assistant officer of the watch) and watch leader of the day, where they are responsible for, the employment of their watch during the day, and to the OOW for the setting and handing of sails. Trainees also assist in the galley, act as messmen and are responsible for all communal duties. For longer voyages, they would assist in upperdeck maintenance, rigging and sail repair and participate in astro-navigation.

Because of the size of the vessel, trainees quickly identify with and are proud of their ship and their contribution onboard. Navy sometimes has a general reluctance to give real responsibility to inexperienced junior personnel. In **Young Endeavour**, even with only 10 days onboard, it has been proven that many young people accept and thrive on the challenge when given the responsibility.

The adventurous environment of a sail training vessel if acquired by Navy, would provide an additional training bonus. Young officers would be put under significant pressure to perform in adverse and challenging conditions. The environment is spartan and all trainees are required to keep physically fit. Handing sail aloft on the topgallant in heavy weather tests the mettle of a trainee and it is often a yardstick for performance in other stressful circumstances. Trainees gain considerable confidence from the experience and achievement aloft which is transferable and applicable to other areas of naval service.

The skills in seamanship to be gained in a sailing vessel are many and varied. Whilst not all may be directly appropriate to today's navy, seamanship is the development of a general set of commonsense principles and experiences, many of which are drawn from throughout a career at sea. Sail training provides the sound rudimentary seamanship knowledge and a sense of oneness with the environment.

Navigation training in a sailing vessel is most appropriate, particularly if she is designed and equipped for this role with additional chart tables and fixing facilities. Navigating a sailing vessel makes one very aware of the environment of wind, weather, tide and leeway. Most of these also effect the choice of sails and the amount of sail carried. There are many other factors to consider in making an ETA and flexibility of action and lateral thought are additional attributes gained in a tall ship.

Cost Effective Considerations

In cost effective terms, the acquisition of a sail training vessel for the RAN would be very significantly cheaper than the continued operation of **HMAS Jervis Bay** or the use of

an aging escort. Whilst the acquisition cost of approximately \$6.5M would be required, this would be a one time cost amortized over 30-40 years life of type. Of special note is that the capital cost of this major item of training equipment could be contained in the Minor Capital Equipment programme.

Maintenance and refit costs would be relatively low, especially in comparison with older and larger vessels, as the asset would be new and unsophisticated. Equipment would be available off the shelf from commercial sources. No new additional maintenance or shore support facilities would be required as the ship could be maintained and supported totally by contractor in a similar manner to **Young Endeavour's** contract for a ship's agent with ANL. Administrative and operational support could be provided by a suitable naval establishment, say **HMAS Creswell**, or alternatively by the Operations Director, **Young Endeavour**, who could have dual hat responsibility. In this later instance, no additional short support staff would be required.

With the exception of rigging and sails which can largely be repaired onboard, sailing vessels require little maintenance. The vessel can be operated for extensive periods with only short periods of downtime for essential maintenance. **Young Endeavour's** planned availability is for 23 ten day cruises per year plus several weekend cruises. This is considerably in excess of the operational time of other RAN fleet units.

Very significant manpower savings would be achieved. A naval sail training ship would require similar manning to **Young Endeavour**, i.e. 9 persons. (Possibly up to 3-5 more if it was planned to operate the ship intensively on a similar cycle to **Young Endeavour** and to account for the slightly larger number of trainees embarked). Compared to **Jervis Bay** (complement 111) or a destroyer escort (more than 200), manpower savings alone make the proposal most attractive. Recent dealings with the directorates of officers and sailors postings would indicate that navy has manpower shortages and savings would be very welcome. This article proposes a positive, innovative and cost effective way ahead.

Fuel savings also are considerable. **Young Endeavour** fueled only three times in the first six months of operation and used only 13 tonnes of diesel. Similar operation of a **De** or **Jervis Bay** would have used several hundred tonnes of fuel.

Training Requirement

The size of the vessel would be determined by the estimated usage or number of trainees to be embarked annually. This may result in the need for a slight rescheduling of class size and course programme but that has always been a factor in arranging sea training.

Navy's requirement for a training vessel relates mainly to the throughput of officers from the Defence Academy and **HMAS Creswell**. Nevertheless, this should not exclude the training of junior sailors who would have much to gain by a period at sea under sail. At present **HMAS Creswell** requires two four week common course training cruises of up to 60 persons, for both direct entry and supplementary list stream officers. The seamen officers come to sea again later to undergo training in terrestrial and astro navigation. Up to 90 officers from the Defence Academy also undergo common sea training each year. This is an approximate training throughput of 1000 training man weeks.

The ship could be available for other training. A ten day sea familiarisation voyage for new entry officers into the Defence Academy would be most appropriate. This could serve both as an introduction to the maritime environment, but also could be used as a period of assessment of the officer's suitability and potential to succeed in a stressful environment. As such it could serve as a means to weed out those who may not be suitable to the service before a large amount of money, time and effort has been expended on their training. This early period at sea may enable the common sea training course to be reduced in length.

As the ship is relatively unsophisticated, but has simple engineering and electrical distribution systems, it might be appropriate to conduct junior technical sailor training in the basics of engineering plant and electrical systems. For junior seaman sailors they would gain from the environment in a similar manner to young officers. In addition, training in the basics of steering the ship, acting as lookout, seamanship, part of ship, anchorwork and boatwork, could all be carried out onboard. The ship could also be used for adventurous training including, if desired, a land component.

Sail Training Ship Requirement

Whilst a sail training ship is most suitable for training in coastal and astro-navigation seamanship and other basic maritime skills, she would not be suitable for the more advanced training, such as manoeuvring in company. The RAN long navigation course would still have to embark in a destroyer.

Nevertheless some useful stage 4 seaman officer training could be conducted onboard. In addition facilities would be available for female officers to participate and study for the award of a watchkeeping certificate. In a similar manner, there is no reason why an avenue for promotion to higher level billets could not be implemented.

Young Endeavour carries facilities for 24 trainees. On her present operating cycle this provides for 1100 man training weeks. Without significantly increasing her size, 12 additional bunks could be fitted if the galley and the cafeteria were sited on the upper deck (albeit reducing clear deck space). The **Spirit of New Zealand**, which carries 36 trainees, is probably the right size of vessel particularly if other wider forms of training were implemented. This would provide ample scope to cater for all officer common course and navigation training. It would also provide additional capacity for other additional training outlined above, particularly having regard to limited maintenance requirements and long operational availability.

The **Spirit of New Zealand** was designed by users after 8 years of operation of the **Spirit of Adventure**. She has many attractive design features which would be more appropriate in a naval sail training role. These include a second chart house for trainee navigation and an auditorium for lecture and instruction periods.

Construction of the ship would be low risk. Similar vessels have been constructed both in Australia and New Zealand in the past two years. The RAN has resident expertise to oversee the build and to operate the vessel. Given appropriate priority and project approval it is estimated that the vessel could be in service within two years.

Public Relations and Presence

During foreign regional deployments, a sailing ship is likely to attract much more interest than either a "car ferry", painted ship side grey, or one of the RAN's latest guided missile frigates. A traditional rigged vessel would demonstrate Australia's peaceful intent and interest, but without a pretence of threat or power projection. Given the appropriate facilities the ship might also be made available for voyages of goodwill or as a platform for diplomatic discussions abroad.

The acquisition of a sail training vessel for the RAN would be a significant but relatively cheap training asset. It would provide the potential for the RAN to participate in tall ship events overseas if desired. Like **Young Endeavour** the ship would soon become an excellent public relations vehicle which in most circumstances would attract wide interest and favourable public comment. As such it would be a valuable aid in recruiting.

Conclusion

The practice of converting ageing escorts to the training role is not cost effective. **HMAS Jervis Bay** is not a suitable ship for the training of junior officers. The successful operation of **Young Endeavour** indicates that the sail training is a most suitable and cost effective means of training. It is relevant not only to junior officer courses but also to a variety of other naval training courses. The early acquisition of a sail training vessel as the RAN's training ship is an innovative and cost effective means of doing the job differently but better.

The Author

Commander F.A. Allica, RAN was the first Commanding Officer of the Sail Training Ship **Young Endeavour**. He has since been posted to Navy office as the Patrol Craft Project Director.

SECURITY FOR SEA LANES OF COMMUNICATION

by

Vice Admiral M. W. Hudson, AC, RAN, Chief of Naval Staff

[The opening address at the International Sea Lanes Security Conference held in Melbourne on 10-12 October 1988.]

It is appropriate that the Navy should be closely associated with the Sixth International Sea Lanes Security Conference given the essential responsibility we have for defending the sea lanes and those merchant mariners who ply them.

Since the first conference, in San Francisco in 1982, attention has focused on the sources of threat to sea lanes security, and on the nature of the threat. Much has been achieved in both fields, during and between conferences and the presence of delegates from some thirteen countries testifies to this.

Nevertheless, I welcome the change in emphasis which has us concentrating now on specific organisational and operational problems involved in responding to threats to our sea lanes. I hope too that the theme of this conference will allow those of us in uniform to make a bigger contribution than has previously been the case.

While participants will gain a clearer understanding of how to respond to threats to our maritime trade, I would also like to think that, especially here in Australia, the conference proceedings will heighten awareness and understanding of these issues among the wider community.

Having made this point, let me turn now to a fundamental issue; the importance of trade, both to Australia and to the other nations represented here today.

While the RAN has been diligently expounding the importance of trade, we have sometimes failed to notice that our audience hasn't always been listening. Realistically, we should not be surprised. Sea lanes security and protection of trade are important, but so are many other aspects of defence, and in times of spending restraint we must recognise that there are other equally legitimate claims on the defence purse and that priorities consistent with strategic perceptions will have to apply.

Yet it may still surprise many to learn that our annual exports are worth about \$A31 billion, and imports about \$A28 billion; and


more to the point, that 99.9 per cent of this trade by volume is carried by sea.

Of course Australia is not the only nation for which trade is important. Japan and the Republic of Korea are two that come to mind readily. Japan, for example, relies on overseas sources for over 90 per cent of oil, iron ore, copper, coal, aluminium and wool; and in almost all cases is dependent for them on lengthy trade routes. To put Japan's problem in perspective, in time of emergency, she expects to have to import about 33 per cent of present levels of raw materials, some 200 million tonnes annually, to maintain living standards. She would also have to import about 70 per cent of peacetime food levels.

Korea too, relies heavily on trade for her growing prosperity. Like Japan, she imports raw materials and exports manufactured goods, to the extent that in 1985 the Republic imported some 133 million tonnes and exported about 32 million tonnes; accounting for about 3.5 per cent of the total world trade by volume.

In concentrating on these two nations I am mindful of the value of trade to other countries in the region, and the potential for others to grow in importance as traders. I am aware too that not only major economies rely for their standards of living on reliable trade: smaller economies, dependent on a very few exports, may be even more susceptible to interruptions to trade.

How does Australia's defence policy relate to seaborne trade? Following a period of reassessment of our defence policies during the 1970s and early 1980s, the White Paper of 1987 provided some welcome clarity and realism; particularly in its acknowledgement that Australia is part of a dynamic region, some of which at least may not remain free of instability. To this end the White Paper noted the importance to Australia of South-east Asia, the South-west Pacific, and the Eastern Indian Ocean. It also articulated Australia's willingness to assist friends and allies in these areas,



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within the limits of our capabilities — sentiments that have been repeated by Defence Minister Beazley several times since.

Emphasizing the sense of realism which it brought to Australia's defence policies, the White Paper acknowledged the importance of trade and its susceptibility to interruption. While it asserted that our trade routes would be comprehensively interdicted only in protracted global conflict, it also conceded that our trade could be disrupted in a range of circumstances applicable to lesser forms of conflict. In such circumstances, the White Paper saw disruption as being more likely to occur in coastal waters, focal areas and ports.

Because the White Paper recognised the demanding nature of even low level disruptions to trade, and for other reasons, it confirmed the need for significant maritime forces. You will be aware of the building programme we now have in place for surface ships and submarines, which will take us into the twenty-first century confident of coping with maritime contingencies that may occur in the region.

I want to mention some recent moves which should emphasize Australia's commitment to the region. Firstly, we have increased our patrols of the South-west Pacific, involving both maritime patrol aircraft and surface ships.

Secondly, with the basing of ships in Western Australia we are giving the Eastern Indian Ocean a higher priority, and at the same time we are renewing our interest in South-east Asia with the resumption of ship deployments to Singapore and Malaysia.

Thirdly, in line with the special relationship we enjoy with Papua New Guinea, and our commitments to her external security, Navy will shortly begin regular patrol boat deployments to New Guinea waters. And finally, the ability of our maritime patrol aircraft to cover important trade routes will be extended as a result of their capacity to operate from the airfields which have been built in the north and north-west recently.

We in Australia are well aware that our intentions could be misinterpreted, or in fact misrepresented. But, I can assure you that these activities are designed to support regional defence cooperation, and the needs of some of our friends and allies. They are not intended to be interventionist, and they continue subject to the needs and wishes of the nations concerned, which may of course change.

Although I don't propose to examine the nature of the threat, which has been examined in previous conferences, I believe it is appropriate to focus on what we might need to protect.

Australia's main trade routes are:

- a. Across the Indian Ocean; to and from the Middle East and Europe — including the USSR.
- b. Through the Indonesian Archipelago; to and from Japan, the Republic of Korea, the People's Republic of China, and Taiwan, and other parts of East Asia.
- c. East of the Archipelago; primarily to and from Japan from our east coast ports. This is our most valuable trade route.
- d. Across the Pacific; to and from the USA.
- e. A small but important two way flow of trade across the Tasman Sea with New Zealand.

It won't have escaped your notice that while these may be Australia's most important trade routes, they also include, in whole or part, some of the routes most important to the western world.

How might Australia respond to a threat? In any major conflict we would try firstly to ensure the safe passage of shipping in our approaches and focal areas. This task alone could very quickly soak up all our maritime forces, leaving shipping in the open ocean reliant on others for its protection. Were we able to concentrate our efforts in particular approaches and focal areas, we would be able to give some protection further afield. Coordination of our efforts with those of regional nations could be achieved in various ways, and would ensure the best results from our combined national efforts.

Those familiar with Australia's recent defence White Paper will be aware that much of our defence planning is predicated on the basis that the most likely kinds of threat, in the short term at least, will be limited to lower levels of conflict. Nonetheless we are not ignoring the potential for more general hostilities: we simply do not see them arising without sufficient warning for us to be able to react appropriately. Nor are we suggesting that the recent thawing of superpower relations provides sufficient reason for us to relax our guard just yet: on the contrary we must retain the capacity to identify unhealthy changes in our region and to respond accordingly.

Given the length, and consequent relative ease of interdiction of our sea lanes, however, Australia could not expect to defend them all in any major conflict. We would hope for help from our ANZUS partners, but we would also expect to cooperate with our regional allies and friends for whom these sea lanes are also important. Australia's defence policy is founded on self-reliance, but not total self-sufficiency. We recognise readily that our self-

reliance must be founded on a framework of alliances and agreements, not least those with regional countries.

I have spoken at some length about the need for regional cooperation: as have others from time to time. And without wishing to playdown the importance of such discussion which indeed is vital before any more concrete steps can be taken, maybe the time has come to make some practical moves towards cooperation. At the same time I acknowledge that our military forces do engage in exercises, both minor and major; but they tend to be relatively few, fairly infrequent and low key. For these reasons too, they do not provide the full value that would accrue from regular exercising, with particular achievements in mind.

If the time is right for a more practical approach to regional naval cooperation then I believe that this conference, and its theme have given us a perfect opportunity to bring it about. But, lest I might appear to be pushing the issue, let me say that I am acutely aware of the sensitivities applying to my proposal, and that they may cause some of your real concern. If I do push, it is only because of my belief in its importance, and I readily accept that the pace at which we might be able to progress could be quite slow, especially at first.

At the same time we must not forget that the United States expects regional nations to take a greater share in the responsibility for defence matters; we should need little reminding of the over commitment facing the US Navy in particular. So while circumspection will undoubtedly be needed as we seek closer cooperation, let us not ignore the very real incentives which almost seem to beg for it.

From my perspective, the way ahead is clear, if not necessarily easy to accommodate. I believe we need:

- a. an assessment of shared regional interests,
- b. an assessment of regional capabilities which could form the basis of a coordinated response to trade protection problems,
- c. a determination as to how to achieve regional cooperation within this framework of shared interests and combined capabilities, and
- d. probably most difficult of all, the inspiration to take the first step.

Without wishing to claim any monopoly on inspiration in this company, I would like to offer the RAN's services in coordinating our efforts to improve cooperation. In doing so I admit that there is a need first of all for the navies involved to discuss their ideas at the highest

levels, before working level discussions take place. This should ensure that any reservations or potential problems do not affect efforts at the working level.

We hosted the first Western Pacific Naval Symposium in Canberra during early October 1988. This occasion proved to be an excellent opportunity for making a start on improving regional cooperation, and determining the aspects of shipping protection in which most progress can be made. Together with the chiefs or their representatives from the navies of the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, South Korea, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the People's Republic of China, Indonesia and the United States, we made our first tentative steps.

The symposium proved to be extremely successful, and on behalf of my colleagues I am very pleased to be able to announce the following initiatives:

- a. We agreed to investigate the means of getting the best value from our existing exercise programme, and to determine how to improve the exercise programme, noting that the needs and capabilities of our navies vary markedly.
- b. We also agreed to investigate the potential for our various navies to provide training in relevant aspects of maritime operations to those among us with particular needs. Where possible, this will be conducted under existing defence cooperation arrangements.
- c. There will be an examination of the means whereby we as friends and allies can develop procedures which will assist in the protection of shipping within our region. This could involve producing arrangements for the sharing of information on shipping movements, and putting in place arrangements for coordinating our forces so as to gain the greatest value from what inevitably will be limited capabilities. As a start we hope to issue invitations to our colleagues to observe next year's naval control of shipping exercise.

These are just three of twelve issues which we undertook to examine for their potential to improve regional naval cooperation. Naturally, we hope for progress on some or all of them before we meet again in two years.

Of course, progress will be slow, particularly at first. But the important point is that we have begun: we have decided to cooperate on an issue of importance to all of us. Some quite tricky issues remain unresolved, and to be frank there is no point in avoiding the fact that

national attitudes will undoubtedly temper the enthusiasm which we carried away from last week's symposium. Still if we are prepared to be patient I believe the rewards will be rich indeed.

In concluding, I want to make three points:

- a. Firstly, those of us for whom the Indian and Pacific Oceans are major trade routes know the importance of keeping them open, and the difficulties that will be involved if they are threatened.
- b. Secondly, even though some of the nations represented here have bilateral or multilateral arrangements involving their navies, there is scope for developing more effective regional cooperation aimed at keeping open our sea lanes of communication and protecting our shipping.

- c. And finally, I would like to think that this conference will continue the encouraging progress made at last week's symposium, and will make a valuable contribution to the building of regional cooperative measures to ensure the safety of our sea lanes.

In declaring this conference open, I congratulate the organizers for their continuing and successful efforts at focusing international attention on this most important subject — the security of our sea lanes. Much has already been achieved as a result of the five previous conferences, so I trust that the subject of this conference, responding to threats to sea lane security, will prove a fruitful topic for discussion. Certainly, it is in the interests of all of us that it should.



AF 05 under construction at AMEC (Dec 1988)

Above: Port Quarter General View

Below: AFT END Superstructure (helicopter hanger)



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
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THE SIXTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE

on

SEA LANES OF COMMUNICATION

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

by

General R. G. Stilwell, USA (Ret.)

As its designated spokesman, I extend the warm greetings of the United States delegation to all other participants in this, the Sixth Annual Conference of our organization. We are grateful to our Australian colleagues for the excellent preparations that have made possible this assemblage; and, through them, congratulate the entire Australian population on the occasion of their great nation's bicentennial.

Some 16 months ago, at the outset of our outstanding conference in Seoul, events in the strategic Persian Gulf underscored the criticality and dynamics of our study agenda. The United States had made a commitment, subsequently backed by major naval force deployments, to uphold the principle of unrestricted transit of international waters by the commercial traffic of all nations. Today, a cease fire has supplanted the mindless killing of the Iran-Iraq war; the Persian Gulf is relatively placid; and US naval forces are phasing down. We may never know the degree to which Iranian decision-making was influenced by the strong resolve of the United States and other European allies; but, to be sure, it was substantial. The lesson is clear. Short of that far-off day when the external conduct of all nations is governed by a universally accepted regimen of international law, diplomacy must be backed by power and the willingness to use that power, as needed, to protect one's people, institutions and values.

The dramatic — and essentially favorable — developments of the past year have removed the Persian Gulf from center stage in world affairs — at least for the nonce. In the same time frame, there have been events of great moment elsewhere in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. Those events attest to the volatility of the regional and global environments; they attest, likewise, to both the complexity and the strategic significance of the areas we have again assembled to discuss.

The entire world is attentive to the pronouncements and initiatives of Secretary General Gorbachev as they relate to both Soviet foreign and domestic policy; and the challenge is to determine whether they do, in fact, signal sea change in the posture of that communist superpower. It is evident that the Soviet leadership has reached the firm conclusion that its economic system is fatally flawed and must be overhauled as completely as possible without jeopardy to the political control of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

But if real change is afoot inside the Soviet Union, there is still no evidence that the Soviet Union has in any way modified its long-standing foreign policies. What we have been witness to is much greater sophistication in the conduct of external relations and in the exploitation of international communication means. Thus, our current estimate is that Gorbachev aims to revitalize, not revolutionize, the Soviet system, to the end of enhancing its ability to pursue its expansionist goals in the decades ahead.

As forecast in Gorbachev's widely heralded address at Vladivostok two years ago, the Soviets have focussed much greater attention on East Asia, and for multiple reasons. The Soviet leadership has belatedly recognized the steadily increasing economic power and therefore the strategic significance of the Pacific basin; appreciates that much augmented trade with the free nations of Asia can accelerate the economic development of Siberia; appreciates also that the Soviet Union must better posture itself to counter the rapidly changing and now outwardly looking China; and sees new opportunities to improve the "correlation of forces" in the zero-sum competition with the United States for influence in the Third World.

Recent Soviet diplomatic, commercial and psychological initiatives have been notable for their number and diversity, as contrasted with any past period. In the diplomatic arena, the most notable have been the strenuous — although thus far unsuccessful — efforts to improve Soviet-Japanese relations primarily to acquire advanced industrial technology and financial resources; the equally strenuous efforts to gain Chinese acceptance of a Summit meeting as precursor to re-establishment of Communist Party ties and resolution of key foreign policy differences; a barrage of arms control proposals (a freeze on nuclear weapons deployments in Asia; a multi-national naval conference with the same general objective; simultaneous deactivation of Soviet and US bases in Vietnam and the Philippines, respectively; and tongue and cheek accession to the protocols of the Treaty of Rarotonga which brought into being the South Pacific nuclear-free zone); and the official visits of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and other high-ranking members of the Soviet hierarchy to the Southeast Asian states and the Southern Pacific region.

As my colleagues know better than I, the Soviet merchant marine (MORFLOT) aggressively seeks larger shares of intra-region and inter-region oceanic cargo contracts; and has the diversified fleet and rate structures to be a serious contender for bulk, general and containerized cargoes. Moscow is reputedly ready to invest in the Philippines for appropriate quid pro quo while its continuing attempts to conclude fishing agreements and berthing rights in Micronesia and the Australian subcontinent have been well documented by Michael Danby and other experts. Complementing these initiatives, the International Department of the CPSU has skilfully orchestrated cultural and informational activities to drive home the peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union and its anti-imperialist stance. The principal target audience, quite logically, is the youth — too unread to be familiar with the seventy-year history of the Soviet regime.

All this proceeds under the shadow of formidable Soviet military power and its support of allies who continue to destabilize the western Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. There has been no diminution of the massive ground and air forces in the Soviet Far Eastern Theatre of Operations; the targets of the soon-to-be deactivated SS-20s will be assumed by SS-25 mobile missiles deployed farther westward; the Soviet Pacific Ocean fleet has been upgraded qualitatively and quantitatively, and its out-of-area operations have increased;

North Korea has been provided advanced air and ground weaponry and, in return, has greatly facilitated Soviet intelligence and other operations; Camranh Bay has been developed into the largest Soviet naval deployment base outside the USSR while, in return the Soviet Union has upgraded the Vietnamese armed forces and provides the wherewithal to sustain the occupation of ill-fated Kampuchea. The Indian-Soviet relationship must also be noted with concern, particularly as regards Soviet advisory and materiel support to an Indian navy expanding in size and reach. As the publication "Soviet Military Power" reports, Soviets have leased a cruise-missile-equipped nuclear attack submarine to the Indian navy — the first time that any country has transferred a nuclear-powered warship to another.

Clearly, the military capabilities of the Soviet Union and its operative support programs constitute the primary threat to the security of Sea Lanes of Communication in this critical region. But there are other threats afoot. And the most worrisome centre on the Philippines, guarding the eastern flank of the South China Sea.

A year ago, I signalled impending crisis in the Philippines; and developments in the intervening months provide scant basis for optimism about the restoration of stability and progress in that beleaguered nation and, concomitantly, its role in protecting lines of communication through the South China Seas. The incumbent government has been unable to make any measurable inroads against a well-entrenched, externally supported insurgency; indeed, the political — and the more dangerous — activities of the Philippine Communist Party continue to increase in effectiveness and expand in scope. One has reason to ponder whether the events of February 1986 did, in fact, constitute a revolution; or were simply the first stage of an upheaval that would eventually lead to the demise of democracy in the Philippines.

Subsumed in all this is the future of US bases in that country. The ongoing review of the modalities governing the current agreement have had a tortuous course. The communists and the non-communist left have found common cause in the base issue; and, principally via the media, have fanned anti-American sentiment particularly in Metro Manila. Given these dynamics, the unreasonable expectations of the Aquino government on compensation and the political orientation of the Philippine congress, the prospects for a satisfactory base agreement beyond September 1991 are not good. The United States

is, per force, seriously considering previously unthinkable options for maintaining its strategic posture in this critical region.

If the involving stance of the Philippines will significantly shape the future environment of the South China Sea, so, too, will the orientation and policies of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). My trip to that country this past summer was in the immediate wake of the Chinese-Vietnamese imbroglio in the Spratleys. The extent to which the Chinese heralded that incident, and moved aggressively to resolve it, may well have been indicators of an increasingly prominent role in the maritime affairs of the Western Pacific. Several imperatives would, in Chinese eyes, justify a modernized, multi-purpose naval arm of greater capability and reach. These include rapidly expanding foreign trade, particularly subsequent to the absorption of Hong Kong; intensified exploitation of subsurface resources of the adjacent seas and, notably, in areas subject to conflicting territorial claims; a predictable increase in Soviet Pacific Ocean fleet transits to/from the South Pacific and Indian Oceans; and the sheer logic of a great world power having a contingent capability for forced protection and pursuit of its self-enunciated interests. Our collective hope must be that such augmented PRC naval power as may eventuate will contribute to overall security of sea lanes and contiguous land areas.

My concentration on the Western Pacific does not imply that that area weighs heavier in the balance than the Indian Ocean. As the gateway to the energy and mineral resources of the Middle East and Africa, it merits sharing

centre stage in our discussions. Recent developments along the northern littoral present both challenges and opportunities. On the one hand, there is a reasonable prospect that a re-oriented Burma, now in a state of chaos bordering on anarchy, will emerge as a cooperating member of the free world community and a *de facto* extension of ASEAN. But to the west, there are reasons for concern. Sri Lanka continues in turmoil; the Indian Army appears there to stay; and the question remains: what foreign naval powers, if any, will have access to the deep water port of Trincomalee. Pakistan, following the sudden demise of President Zia, is in considerable foment. And, finally, while we can measure the growing capability of the Indian naval and air arms, we have yet to diagnose the national objectives those forces are intended to support.

This geopolitical survey — its cursory and disjointed nature notwithstanding — serves one modest purpose. It is to underscore the high significance and multi-faceted nature of the subjects we have assembled to deliberate. But I submit we must do more than deliberate. As our distinguished colleague and architect of this forum, Ambassador Han Li Wu, exhorted a year ago, it is imperative that we synthesize, record and promulgate our findings of the past several conferences. Additionally, I urge that we commission the preparation of a compendium which would detail what the Sea Lanes are all about, to include pertinent maps and statistics. With the imprimatur of our organization to establish its authenticity, I am confident that such a volume would be a very valuable and much sought reference.



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NOBODY ASKED ME BUT — IS SEAGOING ALLOWANCE A FAIR GO?

*"You'll be wet, homesick and frightened,
But the pride of the Fleet will be you."*

RAN jingle.

I have finally got around to reading the judgement in the 1987 Seagoing Allowance Case. (Yes it's a long time, but I've been away at sea, haven't I?) The case covered a lot of important ground, and achieved significant gains, but I don't think it produced a fair result.

It seems to me that it has two flaws. The first is that it does not deal with family separation. Yet separation is, for many people, the pre-eminent difficulty of seagoing life. I understand from a recent visit of the Personnel Liaison Team that there is no intention to review the separation component. I find that extraordinary.

The second flaw is that the case does not address comparisons with similar civilian employments, even though appropriate comparison is a basic principle of Defence Force remuneration. It is particularly important that comparisons are made, since the labour market recognises not only the tangibles of skills and conditions, but also the intangibles such as attitude to lifestyle and separation. I think it would be fair to say that contemporary society values the intangibles of employment more than the tangibles.

However, a welcome feature of the case is the trend towards on-occurrence payments, found in the lower rate of allowances for ships in refit.

I would like to propose my own figure for the value of Seagoing Allowance, based on the worth of the individual components for which it provides compensation. The extra hours component should be valued at the hourly rate of pay, and be paid for every day at sea. The unpleasant conditions component has half the value of the extra hours component, following the precedent for refitting ships, and is paid for 45 weeks of the year. The separation component equates to separation allowance, and is paid for every day out of base port. The leisure restrictions component is difficult to value, but I suggest about half the separation component, payable for every day at sea.

Applied to a ship spending 125 days at sea and 150 days out of base port, these components add up to \$10 000 per annum, after tax

at a notional 30 per cent. Averaged over a year this is \$200 per week. (See footnote 1).

If you think this looks a bit high, just recall how your lifestyle changes when you go to sea. Remember that we are not discussing why you joined the Navy, nor are we discussing how things were in the old days. We are discussing a fair rate for the job in 1989. Let me give you five rough but relevant comparisons from the outside world as food for thought.

The first is the Seagoing Allowance for Commonwealth Public Servants. This is paid for extra hours and unpleasant conditions, but not for separation. For 125 days averaged over a year this is worth \$156 per week after tax.

The second concerns the site allowances paid to building workers. These are paid for unpleasant and dangerous conditions. Such things as heat, cold, wind, rain, heights, noise and risk of life and limb, all of which you find in ships. In the final stages of the new Parliament House construction, workers on the site were drawing about \$100 per week after tax in site allowances. This does not include overtime paid for extra hours, which could be worth another \$100 per week after tax.

The third comparison is drawn from a recent advertisement for a person to run the pay office at a mining site 600km outside Alice Springs. Accommodation on the site is unaccompanied, and no alcohol is allowed. Conditions at the mine would be unpleasant. The employee spends 240 days a year on the site, returning to Alice each weekend. The salary is \$40 000 per annum, plus subsidised housing in Alice. The salary for a similar job in a southern capital city would be about \$30 000. The difference is \$200 a week after tax. The company told me that their salary particularly recognised the difficulties of conducting a normal family life in this type of job, and the need to attract and retain good people.

The fourth and in many ways best comparison is the Merchant Navy. The Marine Superintendent of the Department of Transport told me that he would be unable to get anybody to man the Department's ships on Navy wages!

The basic annual salaries of merchant seamen employed by the Commonwealth are much the same as those in the Navy. However, the Merchant Navy gives a day of leave for each day at sea. On this comparison salaries for Navy seagoers should be doubled. I venture that this is not unreasonable, since the Merchant Navy award recognises intangible as well as tangible aspects of seagoing.

The last comparison is the Army Field Allowance, which the Tribunal considered to be very similar to Seagoing Allowance. The important point is that those in receipt of Field Allowance also receive the on-occurrence rate of Separation Allowance. This is worth \$84 a week tax free, compared to the consolidated Navy rate of \$7 per week.

I like the following quotation on the concept of Comparative Wage Justice:

"assessment of fair wages is guided by the evidence of what reasonable employers of competent labour have found it desirable to pay, and what competent workmen have been willing to accept for any particular class of work" (see footnote 2).

You might think that this would apply to ships crews, as it does to aircrew.

I have a few other suggestions about seagoing allowances. In the short term we could deal with the separation component by abolishing the consolidated rate of Separation Allowance, paying instead the daily rate for 125 days per year. This would yield \$2000 per annum.

In the longer term we should perhaps pay a higher rate for each year of seagoing service, as the Canadian Navy does. This recognises

the cumulative nature of the difficulties of seagoing service. We already apply this concept to disturbance allowance for successive removals.

We should consider moving fully to an on-occurrence basis. The 125 sea days average figure used in the recent case must represent a spread from 50 to 200 days at sea, and possibly as much as 250 days out of base port. Payment on-occurrence would get the rewards to the right people without blowing the budget.

We should pay the separation component to single members. They also have strong attachments to those they leave ashore. None of the organisations that I have mentioned above enquires whether its employees are married or single.

Future reviews should invite submissions from individuals. These provide a view of what *"competent workmen are willing to accept"*. They also inject an element of tears and sweat into the sanitised atmosphere of the court.

Well, nobody asked me, but I do not think that the present value of Seagoing Allowance is a fair go. In particular, the application and value of the separation component is in urgent need of review. I recommend that you read the judgement and form your own opinions.

JACK THE BEAN COUNTER

Footnotes

1. In computing the extra hours component I have used a figure of 4 hours per day at \$10 per hour.
2. Justice Kelly, South Australian Industrial Court, 1924; quoted in 'Wage Fixation in Australia', Ed. J. Niland, Allen and Unwin, Sydney 1986, p.86.

THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION SECURITY INTERESTS AND STRATEGIC ISSUES

by

Commodore I. A. Callaway, RAN

Background

From at least 2500 BC, civilizations from around the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and parts of India and Indonesia conducted ocean going commerce and at times maintained vast maritime empires in the Indian Ocean area. The Europeans, starting with the Portuguese in the 16th Century, were able to gain footholds in the region. Their struggles with each other marked the beginning of the use of the Indian Ocean as a theatre where rivalries among foreign nations were played out and where extra regional wars and alliances could affect local security.

The maritime strategy pursued by the European nations was not necessarily aimed primarily at territorial conquest but at the deployment of naval power to control trade routes. The strategy entailed establishing a main base, building strongholds at the maritime gateways controlling access to the Ocean, and making alliances with rulers of territories important for trade. In this manner the British were substantially able to control the Indian Ocean from 1814 to 1942.

World War II affected the Indian Ocean states not so much by involvement in actual battles but in the changed political and military environment that followed the war. Defeat brought Japanese and Italian colonial administrations to an end and weakened the French, Dutch and British holds over their empires. One after another, colonies pressed for and achieved independence.

In the postwar era Britain had neither the ability nor the inclination to restore or maintain sufficient forces and equipment to ensure that major threats to British hegemony could be contained. However, the British position was not seriously challenged. France kept mainly to the Western half of the ocean and the United States kept a three-ship force in Bahrain. Military capability among the littoral nations for the most part remained land-oriented and the Soviet Union did not have the naval capability to support operations in the region.

During the 1960s and 70s several developments began to turn the attention of the superpowers to the Indian Ocean. The possibility that ballistic missile submarines were present was discussed in world forums and Soviet Navy units began regular deployments. The British government which had established the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), signed an agreement allowing the United States the use of Diego Garcia within that territory, for defence purposes, and withdrew its forces from east of the Suez Canal. In 1971 the Soviet Union signed a treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with India, and during the Indo/Pakistan war of that year a United States carrier battle group made a dramatic entrance into the Bay of Bengal in a show of support for Pakistan. In 1973 the oil-supplying states of the Middle East raised the price of their oil and began to develop an awareness, along with others, of just how vulnerable the West was to disruption of its oil supply.

By the late 1970s the growing Soviet presence presented the West with a new threat to political stability and their continued access to the area's resources. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 increased the Western perception of a Soviet threat. Consequently President Carter announced a commitment to use United States military force if necessary, to repel any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region, and he began to deploy US forces accordingly.

The rivalry of the superpowers has had a significant effect on the region and the states. In their pursuit of strategic advantage they have made use of diplomatic and military power to persuade others to their point of view. Many nations, resenting this state of affairs, have in response sought the creation of a Zone of Peace so that the superpowers influence can be minimised. Others, have been more wary about supporting such a zone of peace as they believe superpower influences might be replaced by the less desirable prospect of a

regional nation with the power to influence events.

The presence of outside military forces in the Indian Ocean today is a continuing reminder of its importance in global strategic terms. Many littoral states have geographic potential for control of sea lanes and as ports or military bases. This lends them strategic importance to the external powers jockeying both for global and littoral influence and for positions of strategic advantage vis-a-vis each other. The onshore and offshore oil deposits in the region have the potential to figure in attempts by major world powers to secure access for themselves or to foreclose access to others. About 60 per cent of the world's known oil reserves come from the Persian Gulf region. Moreover about 25 per cent of Australian, 40 per cent of West European and 65 per cent of Japanese oil consumed is carried through the Indian Ocean.

Also important in global terms is the area's coal, iron, bauxite, titanium, chromite, vanadium, platinum and manganese deposits, large amounts of which are exported to the advanced industrial nations. Ocean floor nodules containing manganese, together with cobalt, nickel and copper have been located. Although extraction costs are high, and as yet the nodules are unexploited, the deposits are of potential significance, as are various other seabed resources technologically unexploitable at present. The Law of the Sea Convention signed by 127 countries in 1982, but not by the US, established a preparatory commission to develop a regime for the exploitation of deep seabed mining. Of special significance to Third World countries, is the fact that it recognizes such resources as the common heritage of mankind and requires that mining be carried out by a co-operatively run enterprise with only limited private enterprise involvement.

In recent years developments in the Indian Ocean have attracted international public attention. While oil, Persian Gulf issues, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, and famine have been compelling concerns, the forces of nationalism, racism, tribalism and revolution have all contributed to a perception of regional uncertainty and instability.

Regional security perceptions and interests

The Indian Ocean states encompass a wide range of political systems and economic and national alignments. They include the largest island, Madagascar, and the most populous democracy, India, and many are rich in resources. The states share no common threat or security perceptions. Common factors in

many nations are Islam, which stretches from East Africa to Indonesia, the experience of colonization, and poverty. Most are categorised as Third World nations because they are aligned neither with the East nor the West. Independence-oriented political movements frequently have embraced Marxism because it provided their ideological justification, it ensured the support of socialist and communist states, and generally it accelerated the arrival of independence. There are examples, however, of movements which sought ideological, diplomatic and logistic support from the Soviet Union, but which, having assumed responsibility of government, have made the pragmatic furtherance of social and economic development and pursuit of the national interest a higher priority than the maintenance of ideology. Many littoral nations now are prepared to show greater political tolerance as the price for the economic and technological support from the West which they so desperately need. Due to poor national economies and political instability however, some still remain susceptible to diplomatic pressures and the lure of promises of military and/or economic aid.

The Indian Ocean nations have found themselves in conflict on a number of occasions since WWII. These conflicts between Indonesia and Malaysia, India and China, India and Pakistan, Iran and Iraq, South Yemen and North Yemen, Somalia and Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya and South Africa and some of its neighbours, have slowed economic and social development and in many cases have left lingering suspicions and a commitment to military spending. They have also afforded opportunities for superpower involvement in the region.

Some countries of the region have substantial military establishments and by far the largest of these is in India. Only India, Australia, Malaysia, Indonesia and Pakistan have operational open ocean, 'blue water' navies. The Indian maritime force is the most powerful and, currently the only regional maritime force with substantial capability to project power in the region. India also is the only regional nation with a demonstrated capability to explode a nuclear device, although it is suspected that other regional countries have been working towards such an achievement.

For centuries world powers have been involved in the area, and have for extended periods controlled access to and passage over the ocean, sometimes coming close to monopolizing both intra and extra-ocean trade. Many countries continued to rely on British, French

or Portuguese colonial forces to provide external defence and internal security until independence in the post WWII period.

There can be little sustained growth in a country which cannot maintain national and internal security. A factor which dominates the thinking of a number of littoral state governments is the difficulty they have maintaining security because of their small size or lack of national cohesiveness. Because of these factors, these governments tend to be vulnerable to external influence, the effects of internal lawlessness and to coups by well organized rebellious groups which can be small in size and easily recruited. The Indian Ocean island states have had most difficulty in this regard and the November 1988 coup attempt in the Maldives is the most recent example of this.

As long as social and economic injustice exists in the Ocean Indian Region and especially while a form of colonialism is perceived to exist in South Africa, there will be a potential in the littoral states for hostility towards and at times harsh criticism of the West. The attitudes of many of the littoral states are coloured by past colonial experiences with Western countries, Western involvement with South Africa, and the resentment caused by Western achievements in the industrial and economic field which generally are greater than regional achievements in such areas. This potential for hostility does not necessarily imply approval of Soviet ideology, but reflects the positive effects of Soviet support for change and regional independence movements since World War II, and the lack of Soviet involvement with the region before this time.

Regional strategic communities

The problems and circumstances of the Third World provide the inspiration for many of the issues taken up by the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) which is its international forum. Most Third World countries share a desire not to become involved in the confrontation between East and West. Many also share a colonial or quasi-colonial past. The Third World countries seek not to be taken for granted because of their comparative newness to the international scene and their comparative lack of power. They are concerned to ensure that they have a real influence on world issues, particularly to correct the inequalities and inefficiencies they perceive in the existing global economic system dominated by the West.

Despite rhetoric concerning the brotherhood of the Third World, in the immediate post independence period the newly independent

states of the region generally pursued their individual goals in isolation. National policies were oriented towards local issues concerning boundaries, security, communal and economic problems and ideology. More especially though, the experience of colonialism left the states with a very strong desire for independence and self determination. No threat was apparent, which would convince states of the need to sacrifice short term national interest for the good of the region, even when benefit of regional interest would result in amplified benefit to national interest in the long term. This attitude prevented the development of a base sufficient for regional strategic or economic communities to flourish. During recent years, however, the diplomatic, political and economic power potentially that can be wielded by regional communities has become more apparent and several issues have raised the emotions and sense of involvement of regional peoples. This has caused an upsurge in the effectiveness of and interest in regional communities.

The community which is the largest is the Non Aligned Movement. That with the oldest background is the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and the youngest are the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) and South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The most successful has been the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Non-Aligned Movement

The Non Aligned Movement to which all littoral states except Australia and South Africa belong is by and large the international forum of the Third World. The Third World issues it has championed have been opposition to colonialism and racism, the demand for a better deal for Third World countries in the international economic order, support for non-alignment and the maximization of the role of the United Nations system. Historically, since its inception in 1961 it has been riven with factionalism and often immobilized through the perennial self interest of nations.

The political strength of the movement derives from the potential it has as a group of loosely aligned countries who, when they can manage to unite, can alter international agendas and bring about change, and who, if they did commit themselves, could affect the strategic balance between the superpowers. Its international significance derives from its size in an international system which gives more weight than ever before to numbers. It also gains strength, especially vis-a-vis the West,

which generally is concerned with preserving the status quo, from the fact that the movements members are a major force for change in the international system and they can therefore often dictate which and when issues are brought forward.

Non-alignment is not necessarily equivalent to neutrality, which suggests non-involvement in issues associated with the super-power rivalry. Non-alignment means no rigid orientation towards one superpower bloc. Theoretically non-aligned countries consider international issues on their merit and take appropriate action. In practice non-aligned countries have tended to be more critical of Western positions on international issues than they have of Soviet stances. This criticism has focused on almost every aspect of Western strategy as this has evolved, from permanent military basis in foreign territories, through military alliances, to the theory of deterrence and the desire to maintain a balance of power with the Soviet Union. Previously the West was able to ignore such criticism but the political and strategic strengths of the Movement now give the member countries a degree of bargaining power not previously possible.

The Foreign Ministers of the Non-aligned Movement at their meeting in 1985 unanimously selected Zimbabwe and Prime Minister Robert Mugabe to head the Movement until 1989. The choice of Zimbabwe signaled a determination within the Movement to increase the international pressure on the South African Government and to obtain a solution to Southern African issues.

The Organisation of African Unity

Efforts to develop regional solidarity in Africa was a powerful sentiment in the late 19th century. It gave rise to Pan-Africanism which had its adherents in the US and West Indies, who dominated the movement up until the WWII, when its direction was taken over by Africans. In the early 1950s, moves by African states towards establishing political and other associations among themselves generally paralleled the gaining by those states of their independence.

The first meeting of what became the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was held in 1963. The signatories to the OAU charter now comprise the Indian Ocean island states and all continental African states with the exception of South Africa. The aims of the OAU include promoting the unity and solidarity of African states, and coordinating their efforts to achieve a better life and defend their territorial integrity and independence.

Undoubtedly the OAU's main claim to success was the steady eradication of colonialism from Africa, through the pressure it brought to bear on the international community. The OAU has however been much less successful in achieving a better material life for the people of Africa. Intra-African cooperation which could be beneficial, has had relatively little support in practice, and the readiness of some regional states to implement extreme versions of Marxist economic theory, has left their people materially worse off than before independence.

The OAU through the African group at the United Nations, is bringing increasing pressure to bear for the adoption, by the international community, of mandatory sanctions against trade and investment with South Africa. It will not be satisfied with anything less than full independence for Namibia and universal franchise in South Africa. The West's reaction to these pressures will affect relations between the two groups for some time.

Indian Ocean Commission (IOC)

The IOC was established at a meeting in Mauritius in 1982 attended by representatives of Mauritius, Madagascar and the Seychelles. These states became the original members and they were joined by the Comoros in 1984 and Reunion in 1985. The stated objective of the IOC is the fostering of cooperation in economic development, trade and cultural matters. The member nations were encouraged to form the Commission by the example of the South Pacific Forum (SPF).

Many of the problems and issues facing the IOC are similar to those faced by groupings such as the SPF. Trade, transport, economic vulnerability and the effects of superpower competition are common concerns, although the difficulties caused by them in the Indian Ocean generally are greater. A major difference between the IOC and the SPF is the absence in the IOC, of a number of developed countries. France could play a significant role because of its involvement through Reunion; however, France's prime interest in advancing French interests, and its colonial past, may make such a role unwelcome. The United States and Britain also could wish to be involved because of current and past history respectively; however, it is because of this history, that their assistance also may not be welcome.

Despite the similarities between the SPF and the IOC it would be misleading to draw comparisons when assessing the prospects for the future. Unlike the SPF states, those of the IOC lack as yet a strong regional identity and

unity of purpose. The governments tend to periods of radicalism, are influenced by ideas from a wide range of the international political spectrum, and are motivated more by self interest than national or regional interest. The potential for the IOC to develop into a major regional organization therefore, is limited; however, it should have a generally positive effect on the stability and well-being of the member states and thus on the region.

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)

Some six years after first being suggested by the then President of Bangladesh, seven South Asian countries (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bhutan) which jointly form about one-fifth of the human race, formally launched the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation in Dhaka, in December 1985.

SAARC's objectives are to promote the welfare of the peoples of South Asia, to accelerate economic growth, social programs and cultural development and to promote and strengthen collective self reliance among the countries of South Asia.

Due to the bilateral nature of many issues the areas of possible cooperation are restricted. Furthermore the SAARC charter explicitly excludes all *'bilateral and contentious issues'* and decisions at all levels are to be unanimous. This was essential in view of the differences in size and aspirations of the member states and the strong disagreements, not to mention war, that have characterised many of their bilateral relationships.

The inauguration of SAARC was swift once the idea was put forward. Eventually attempts could be made to develop SAARC into an economic and trade organisation such as the European Community or ASEAN, however this is unlikely to come about as quickly. The most recent meeting of the SAARC was held in Islamabad in December 1988. It was noteworthy because of newly elected Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's appearance and the agreements she was able to reach with Prime Minister Gandhi of India.

Regional strategic issues

Two regional strategic issues are common factors in the political life of much of the region. They are associated with the policies of the South African Government and the presence and rivalry of the superpowers. The issues involving South Africa arouse strong emotions in some of the states, especially those in Africa and tend to unite the otherwise diverse peoples.

They concern South Africa's internal security policies and the effect they have on the black population, and external security policies and the effect they have on the security and development of the Front Line States (FLS) (Angola, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia).

South Africa — Internal Security Policies

In September 1984, as part of a mild reform programme introduced by President Botha, an amended South African constitution gave the nation's 850,000 Asians and 2.8 million coloureds some involvement in the parliamentary process for the first time. Previously this process had served the 5 million white people only. Although other aspects of the reform programme gave the black population some benefits, violence exploded in the black townships as many of the 24 million blacks vented their frustration at their continued exclusion from the political power which was the central issue for them. This violence has continued.

Opposition to the Government comes from various quarters. The United Democratic Front (UDF) Coalition was formed in August 1983 as an alliance of opposition groups to oppose the new national constitution and the local Black Councils. The Government accuses the Front of being an arm of the African National Conference (ANC), which is the main guerrilla group fighting to bring down the South African Government. The ANC operates from bases in the FLS and is regarded by many as the most influential black political organization, even though it has been banned since 1960. The largest ethnic group is the six million Zulus. Their leader, Chief Buthelezi, lacks credibility in the eyes of some blacks, for agreeing to become Chief Minister of a black homeland whilst at the same time rejecting apartheid. He heads the powerful Zulu movement Inkatha, which claims a membership of some one million, and he believes in democratic evolution through negotiation. He opposes the violence of the ANC. The black trade unions, legalized in 1979, have surged to a strength of well over 500,000 members and have become an increasingly powerful political as well as economic force. Although the workers generally have been unwilling to risk their employment, they have the potential for wresting concessions from the Government. The clergy currently are influential in the campaign for peaceful change but this may diminish if violence is accepted as being a more potent weapon.

The violence which has engulfed the black townships has been qualitatively and quantitatively different from that during previous periods of unrest. Because of the increased frustration of the blacks, the spread, militancy and intensity has been greater. These factors set against the backdrop of declining government control in the townships have not represented a significant threat to white power to date, but they have undermined the Government's programme of limited evolutionary reform of the apartheid system.

The imposition of a State of Emergency in July 1985 was designed to break the nexus between reform and unrest, and to recreate a climate in which the mild reform programme could continue as a government initiative not as a response to violence.

Although the state of emergency has largely been lifted the reform programme has not provided political power to the blacks, therefore it has not satisfied their aspirations. They have become more politically aroused and are unlikely in the future to be satisfied by offers of better jobs and higher pay in lieu. On the other hand there seems little chance of the white community offering much more than cosmetic reforms in the immediate future. The parties of the right, and the white Afrikaners in particular, are likely to resist, by force if necessary, any genuine liberalization which would erode their privileged economic and political position. They would bring down the government which introduced such reforms and many of them would prefer to stand their ground and fight for their land and property than give in to force. This means that the international community faces an intractable problem which in the long term appears headed towards a clash between the Blacks and the might of the South African Armed Forces.

South African External Security Policies

Faced with the problem of preventing anti-South African organizations using the territories of the FLS as sanctuaries and receiving material support from them, the long-standing policy of South Africa was to use or threaten to use military action and economic policies to destabilize these States. This policy was effective, but internationally unpopular and costly. More recently the South African Government has offered accommodation and conciliation in exchange for withdrawal of such FLS support. It also seems destined to withdraw from Namibia by 1990 and allow transition to independence for this nation,

under the auspices of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435.

Superpower Rivalry

Many littoral governments believe that the superpower presence and rivalry in the Indian Ocean region, which was more intense in the early 1980's than now, increases the danger to their independence and security. Some resent the intrusion because they perceive they have become pawns to wider interests. Others, for example India, resent the intrusion because it reduces their ability to influence matters in their region. Some governments believe that involuntary involvement in the superpower rivalry should be stopped, and they support the proposal for an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace to achieve this.

The proposal for an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace was first raised by Sri Lanka in 1964. Sri Lanka revived the proposal again at the 1971 session of the United Nations General Assembly, which adopted a resolution declaring the Indian Ocean a Zone of Peace. This resolution called for the withdrawal of extra regional military presence from the Indian Ocean and envisaged a zone free of all military installations, logistic facilities, nuclear weapons and manifestations of great power rivalry.

In 1972 the United Nations established an ad-hoc committee which has been attempting to reach consensus on holding a conference to finalize the implementation of the proposal. The latest proposal calls for a conference in Colombo in 1990, however agreement is difficult because it is arguable that a Zone of Peace is not compatible with the defence and security interests of the United States and the West generally and would advantage the Soviet Union. Additionally not all littoral states feel that their national interest will be advanced by such a zone.

The United States perceives it has global responsibilities because of its status as a superpower. In addition to protecting its own economic and investment interests, it also is committed to the preservation of the West's current strategic posture and its oil supplies, the support of friendly governments, the countering of developing Soviet influence, and the sustaining of Western confidence.

Diego Garcia is an important element in US Indian Ocean strategy. Military development of Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago began in 1971 and was accelerated in the early 1980s so that it could support the deployment of US forces to the Indian Ocean. Significant such deployments began in 1980, shortly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in response

to President Carter's commitment to use military power if necessary to repel any attempt by an outside force to gain control in the Persian Gulf.

The withdrawal of the US facilities on Diego Garcia is actively sought by three countries. The Mauritian Government claims sovereignty over the archipelago due to ties with the area before independence and the formation of the British Indian Ocean Territories. India seeks a zone of peace, its own sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean and thus the withdrawal of all US forces and facilities from the region. The Soviet Union would also like to see the continued use of Diego Garcia by the US denied, because of its strategic value to the US.

Outlook

It is unlikely that the typically Third World features which characterize many of the Indian Ocean states will change significantly in the medium term. These features include:

- a. widespread poverty and the social conditions that accompany it;
- b. low levels of national security, political stability and economic growth;
- c. a shared sense of injustice and deprivation and a concern to acquire political respect and recognition.

It is also unlikely that the issues which concern many of these states will be settled quickly or easily, and some states seem bound to retain for the foreseeable future some sense of grievance over what they see as Western interference in regional affairs.



HMAS DARWIN with USS MISSOURI during RIMPAC 88 Photo ABPU Peter Boyd

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Grierson, K.W.
Hall, I.W.
Hermann, F.J.
Histed, G.
James, I.B.
Jervis, G.E.
Josselyn, I.K.
Kemp, W.A.
Knox, I.W.
Lee, N.E.
Loftus, W.B.
Lossli, R.G.

Martin, D.J.
Martin, P.C.S.
Mayson, J.H.
McDonald, N.E.
Macleod, B.D.
Natley, R.J.
Nicholson, B.M.
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Parker, V.A.
Patterson, D.R.
Ralph, N.
Read, B.J.
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Robertson, J.A.
Scott, B.P.
Sharp, W.R.
Shearing, J.A.
Smyth, D.H.D.
Snell, K.E.
Stephen, K.C.
Stevens, E.V.
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Summers, A.M.F.
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Swan, W.N.
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Public Officer: Captain L.G. Fox RANEM

The advanced SONAR concept

Integrated Sonar Systems



for Submarines

for Surface-Ships

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