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RAN MISSIONS TOWARDS 2000.

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In order to achieve the stated aims of the Institute, all readers, both members and non-members, are encouraged to submit articles for publication. Preferably, submissions should be typed, double spaced, on A4 paper; the author's name and address must be shown clearly, even if a pseudonym is required for printing purposes; to be eligible for prizes, original articles must be accompanied by statements that they have been written expressly for the ANI; and short biographies will be welcomed. The Editor reserves the right to reject or amend articles for publication.

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HMAS CANBERRA

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FROM THE PRESIDENT



The highlight for the Institute during this past quarter has undoubtedly been Seapower 87, our successful seminar which looked at the relationship between maritime defence and Australian industry. All of the work by the many organisers and other helpers turned it into a high calibre event of which the Institute can be proud. From the first presentation by Dr Coral Bell on the Strategic Outlook through to the final Open Forum the seminar was marked by the quality of the speakers and the response by delegates. Media coverage was good and the reputation which the ANI has gained in such ventures was undoubtedly enhanced. All in all Seapower 87 fully met the objectives set by the Institute and showed that this means of stimulating the Australian debate on our maritime defence is one which gets results and is therefore worthy of repetition by the ANI in the future. Although it is early days yet, I believe that the Council will look at staging another seminar around 1989/90.

Elsewhere in this journal you will see advice from Council of the next Annual General Meeting, scheduled for February 1988 in Canberra. Important business will include proposed amendments to the constitution aimed at changing membership rules and consideration of our running costs and how they relate to fees. I urge all members to attend the meeting or to provide their views in writing if unable to be present.

Current Council activity now centres upon the seminar proceedings, the AGM and membership issues. Suggestions for increasing the latter are welcomed so that we are able to take account of all the options seen to be available. An immediate initiative will be to interest young naval servicemen by a series of talks to be given at training establishments and the Defence Academy.

The life of the present Council is drawing to a close and postings will undoubtedly create vacancies for 1988. Members are urged to consider service as a councillor during the next twelve months and if interested, to contact the Secretary, any councillor, or me.

Sincerely
Alan Brecht

NOTICE OF AGM

Notice is given that the Annual General Meeting of the ANI will be held in Canberra on Friday 12 February 1988 at 8:00pm. Venue is Legacy House, 37 Geils Crt, Deakin, ACT.

Items for inclusion in the agenda should be forwarded to the Secretary no later than 15 January 1988. The Council of the Institute has resolved to put amendments to the ANI Constitution at the AGM which seek to alter the eligibility for Regular and Associate membership. Broadly these will propose that:

- Regular membership be open to all serving members of RAN or RANR, and Naval Reserve Cadet officers, and persons who, having qualified, subsequently leave the service.
- Associate membership be open to all other persons professing an interest in the aims of the Institute who are not qualified to be regular members.
- Notwithstanding the rules for membership, the President of the ANI must be a serving member of the RAN.

A motion will also be placed before the AGM to amend the fee structure of the Institute from 1 January 1989 as follows:

- abolish the \$5.00 joining fee.
- raise the annual subscription to \$25 for members and \$27 for non-members and,
- introduce multiyear subscriptions.

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
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FROM THE EDITOR



Who said there wasn't a Santa Claus?

This bumper, 96 page issue of JANI is brought to you at no extra cost and with the Council of the Australian Naval Institute's best wishes for 1988. However, the Good Reader is subtly reminded that the time is coming to renew subscriptions and prompt payment will ensure another year of cheap, top quality, professionally edited reading as well as an illustrious place on the Honour Roll of paid up members!

The Editorial Committee was delighted to receive plenty of feedback concerning Mr Neil Grano's article ZIG ZAG — Starting Life as a Young Merchant Seaman, which appeared in the August issue. Some letters are reproduced in the Correspondence segment of this issue and I was impressed by the diversity of backgrounds of people making comment. However, one reader remarked that the article was needlessly vulgar in places but Neil insists that his story be told just the way it happened and that the degenerate perversion and disgraceful conduct of his dissolute youth be accurately recorded for the edification and perhaps the entertainment of posterity!

In response to the substantial interest expressed in Neil's article he has been invited to prepare further narratives of his wartime experience for this issue and has obliged us by telling of his experiences as a survivor of the Convoy PQ 17 massacre. This experience included the sinking of his ship (PAULUS POTTER) and spending the subsequent eight days in the Barents sea in an open lifeboat. Neil then tells us of his months spent recuperating in Russia before returning to England. The Institute is grateful to English author Mr David Irving for permission to reproduce several photographs from his excellent book, THE DESTRUCTION OF CONVOY PQ 17, to support Neil's article. Also, the Institute is indebted to Captain Baron Von Lederbur, Naval Attache, Embassy of The Federal Republic of Germany for the trouble he took, at very short notice, to obtain photographs which assisted in the layout of the article. It is good to see that German efficiency is alive and well!

The theme of this issue is 'RAN Missions Towards 2000' in which we take another look at RAN missions and areas of increasing RAN responsibility and future activity. *Viking* asks the unforgivably heretical question . . . Is the RAN a GO outfit or a SHOW outfit? — Can the RAN *guarantee* a high probability of success when performing the missions it may be called on to do? The article takes a fresh, though impertinent look at important national interests and the fundamental RAN missions which should derive from them and presumptuously suggests better ways for ensuring mission success. Squadron Leader Ian Scott then presents his prize winning article dealing with a strategy for an area of increasing, if not prime, naval strategic responsibility — the South West Pacific.

Lieutenant Commander Greg Kildey examines another potential area of increasing RAN commitment when he looks at the Antarctic and Southern Ocean. This article is timely because the Antarctic Treaty comes up for 'review' in 1991 and Australia has claimed over forty percent of the continent. Several nations have firmly expressed the view that the Treaty is inequitable and consequently Australia must be prepared to do more to reinforce its claim. This may include a consistent naval presence in future.

Senator Brian Harradine has also made a welcome contribution in the form of a paper on defending Australia's sea lanes and Vic Jeffery, our stalwart supplier of naval narrative, delivers

another excellent piece titled *The KOOMBANA Mystery*. Tom Friedmann has also delivered more first class Christmas reading in the form of an ANI Special Report on Lobbying. We have even produced a picture of a youthful Tom Friedmann in the report and, though the picture is rather dated (pre war), the resemblance is still there!

This will be my last issue as editor since I am soon posted to a southern clime which will be beneficial to my physical and professional health. I have enjoyed editing the journal during my all too brief tenure and regret not having had sufficient time 'in office' to tackle more issues. However, I will continue to submit second rate copy which may be of interest to readers and I wish the very capable ANI Editorial Committee all the best in 1988.

The deadline for the February issue is 22nd January and submissions are always welcomed. In particular, photographic support for articles is always appreciated. It saves lazy editors like me a lot of legwork!

Finally, as editor I still believe in Santa and on behalf of the ANI Council I wish all paid up readers an enjoyable and reasonably sober Christmas and New Year . . . May fair thoughts and happy hours attend you all !

AL HINGE
(059) 83 7214



JANI NOTEBOOK

LYNDON'S LEGACY

January 22nd 1988 marks the fifteenth anniversary of the death of Lyndon Baines Johnson who was President of the United States in the turbulent, change filled years 1963 — 1969. The name Lyndon Johnson and the word Vietnam have become inextricably linked and, with the benefit of hindsight, it has been easy for some to pass a harsh judgement on LBJ and his Administration. But Lyndon Johnson was an often misunderstood President who continually sought good advice and acted with courage and conviction. He tended to personally shoulder much of the blame for the consequences of being President in an era of American overconfidence, in which the US was lacking maturity in what amounted to leadership of the Western World.

He invariably had the best interests of his country and democracy at heart. Johnson well understood the use of his Presidential power and, though much more dextrous with the handling domestic policy, he gave foreign policy his best shot. He met the complex challenges of a new type of war in a new age with often unappreciated flexibility and demonstrated to the Chinese and Russians that the United States would fight communism with unexpected resolve and consistency over a long period of time. This determination was to deeply affect and surprise the Russian and Chinese leaderships and, by making them wary of an incalculable American doggedness under extraordinarily difficult domestic and foreign conditions, LBJ made a critically important contribution to world peace which has endured for many years.

It was almost certainly a mistake to involve American ground forces in Vietnam and certainly the war was mismanaged at numerous levels but LBJ remained to the end a President who could not be pushed around and, though the price paid in Vietnam was unnecessarily high, a less resilient and committed President could have given the wrong signals to the communists and this may have eventually led to far more deaths world wide. For this Lyndon Baines Johnson is remembered by many as a great US President.

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ANI OBITUARY

William Owen Chellew ROBERTS — A Tribute.

1923-1987

The August '87 issue of this Journal had two extremely interesting articles on discipline, leadership, command skills for combat, and the effects of social change. I think it is appropriate therefore to follow them up and offer some recognition of the life of 'Woc' Roberts, whose personal example embodied the best of all the qualities the authors of those articles suggested were needed.

And Woc's life embraced all the social changes from 1940 to the present day.

Anyone who was present at Woc's Memorial Service, held in the *Watson* chapel on Monday 21 September this year, cannot fail to have been impressed by both the number who came to pay their last respects and the wide range of ranks, from Admirals to AB's and every rank in between. It was abundantly clear that everyone admired his outstanding personal qualities; they are summed up in that overworked phrase, an officer and a gentleman. So far as Woc was concerned that was no empty cliché.

His former shipmates from his service in *Quiberon* in WWII wrote an affectionate poem which the Chaplain read at the service. I suggest that anyone who can evoke that sort of loyalty from those he led is in a class on his own. And it was not that he set out to make himself popular; he was firm but very fair. One of his shipmates from *Murchison* said after the service. "He tempered the Naval Discipline Act with christianity and commonsense".

One of the foundations of Woc's discipline was his own self-discipline which he wore very lightly. For instance, as a Divisional Officer he kept the best set of divisional papers I have ever heard of. He got out his division's 264s each day and made sure they were written up to date. Not for Woc were the all-too-common spurts of effort interspersed with long periods of neglect. The result was that he knew his people better than any of the rest of us. It was not because it was a duty; he was genuinely interested, and his sailors knew it. Yet he made no great show of his diligence, it only became apparent after a long association.

The Distinguished Service Cross he won in *Murchison* during the Korean War was, among other things, for "coolness under fire". I believe it. I remember one day when he had just taken over as Officer of the Watch of the First Dog in the flagship. *Shropshire* was at No. 2 buoy that day in 1946. As was all too often the case the boats were broken down or had been sent off by the afternoon watchman and had not returned — whatever — there were no boats. The Quarterdeck was packed with officers waiting to get ashore, led by their Commanders, the Heads of Departments. In those days Commanders were very close to being Gods. They were angry, and angry sergeants could strike fear in any Lieutenant's heart. The libertymen were also getting pretty restive, and a Southerly Buster was obviously not too far off, so the quarterdeck awning urgently needed to be sloped and frapped. But the duty watch was already occupied securing ammunition lighters. It was the sort of situation no one should have inherited. Woc walked over to me and said very calmly, "I know what the bastards are trying to do; they're trying to panic me". And he then proceeded to sort out the problems, one by one, with the sort of cool efficiency that made it look effortless. But panic? You simply could not panic Woc!

These small fragments suggest that Woc's personal example embodied virtually everything that Commodore Cummins and Lieutenant Commander Hinge were writing about as the ideals to be aimed for. Whence comes another Woc? He will be sorely missed.



CORRESPONDENCE

ZIG ZAG FANS



Sir,

My husband and I recently had the opportunity to read the August edition of your magazine. We found the articles very interesting and informative. In particular we enjoyed ZIG ZAG by Neil Grano so much that we felt compelled to write to you and express our appreciation.

Having seen almost as many summers as Mr Grano and having lived through WW2 (although much less eventfully I hasten to add) we found his easy style very readable and his adventures absorbing. We look forward to further episodes which, we trust, will follow.

W and V Avent

CAP TALLIES

Sir,

I refer to a photograph which was used to illustrate Neil Grano's interesting article ZIG ZAG which appeared in your August 1987 issue (page 66).

Wartime security, at least in the RN, precluded the use of ships' names on cap tallies during World War Two. RAN connections assure me that the same regulations applied in the R.A.N.

So, it would appear that although the sailors are unmistakably Australian, it is doubtful if the photograph was taken in 1941.

Danny Hannigan

Editor's Comment: I take your point Danny and wonder if any of our readers recognise the sailors pictured or can shed some light on when the photograph was taken?

Sir,

I read ZIG ZAG — the biography of ex-Merchant Mariner extraordinaire, Neil Grano — and found it a rewarding experience. The imaginery conjured up is powerful and the events were entertaining.

Mr Grano is unfortunately not a natural story teller. Few people are. But he has produced an interesting story which, while lacking great literary merit, is geared for the enjoyment and education of the reader.

Eventual novelisation must see the biography re-worked but as it stands ZIG ZAG is the colourful, nostalgic and entertaining story of an exciting man in an exciting period of history. I await the next issue.

Ilias Mastoris

Sir,

I enjoyed the article 'ZIG ZAG' which appeared in your August issue and am interested in obtaining copies of all the issues of your Journal that have articles by Mr Neil Grano.

Mr Grano is known to me and I am particularly interested in his history of employment with the Snowy Mountains scheme.

Would you please let me have details of the cost of all the issues of your Journal so that I can purchase these from you.

Manfred Claasz



LEADERSHIP AND THE RAN

Sir,

Although I have gained something from reading most of the articles in the August 1987 issue of your Journal, the article I found most thought provoking is "Social Change, Leadership and the Services" by Lt. Commander A.J. Hinge, RAN. It is a penetrating assessment of the cause and effect of inadequate leadership in the modern era and if the RAN, along with the other Services, is to select the right people for the right jobs, train them to be effective leaders and most importantly retain them, Lt. Commander Hinge has provided guidance for achieving this.

Bearing in mind that what he suggests does at times get on a collision course with traditional ways of doing things then perhaps the planners of the RAN should take a hard look at what they are doing and consider alternatives that are being proposed ie. the Hinge perspective on Leadership and its essentials, before they run out of lead time.

The obvious research that supports his article and the professional way in which it is presented leave very little to be guessed, so I have no hesitation in adding my name to the list of those recommending that the concepts outlined be seriously studied and implemented if the RAN is to cope well with these changing times and maintain its position.

Neil Grano

*Trust no future however pleasant!
Let the dead past bury its dead!
Act, — act in the living present!
Heart within and God o'erhead.*

RETHINKING RAN MISSIONS

LEARNING TO FIGHT SMARTER... NOT BRAVER!

by Viking

The purpose of the Royal Australian Navy is to conduct sustained maritime missions in the national interest. But exactly what are these missions and can the Navy *really* sustain them? Is there a danger that the Navy will sail into the next century with plans and materiel selected on the basis of false or obsolete assumptions? Are we still enslaved to a 'follow on replacement' syndrome which equips our Navy to fight the last war well but not the next one?

Many in the Navy would no doubt staunchly defend the Navy's ability to conduct missions in the national interest and could draw attention to the Service's proud record of professionalism over the past seventy-six years. However, to be perfectly frank, the combat record of the RAN has not been studded with numerous victories at sea or the use of much independent strategic imagination.¹ The Navy remains a professional but still highly conservative institution which will probably come under increasing pressure to justify the billions consumed, directly and indirectly, in its budgets.² Consequently the Service may be forced to lift its game in terms of combat cost effectiveness and the development of creative, low cost methods of serving national security interests. Such methods may go against the grain of traditional Australian naval practice and privilege but they must be seriously considered if the RAN is to be transformed from an outwardly impressive SHOW outfit to a GO outfit.

METHODOLOGY

To logically consider Naval missions towards 2000 it is necessary to look at essential national

interests and the policy objectives deriving from them. Appropriate Naval missions, calculated and co-ordinated to harmonise with these objectives, will then be formulated. These missions should then take on a distinctly 'Australian flavour' as the enduring realities of Australia's geostrategic, economic and demographic situation become built into the defence equation. This process moulds missions into achievable objectives.

The economic conduct of these uniquely *Australian* missions then needs to be examined in some detail, and with an open mind. For without an open mind we may repeat the mistakes of the past and lose the opportunity to *invent our own future*.

BACK TO BASICS

The great majority of international dealings occur without intimidation and certainly without the use of military force. It is also true that non-military means are increasingly valuable tools in the conduct of international relations and that total military solutions are increasingly difficult to implement. However, force is not obsolete and it remains an unpalatable but necessary obligation of governments to cater for the possibility of war and intervention.

The contention that Australia requires a defence capability is open to little serious argument. Competition for scarce resources in a world whose inhabitants have not yet evolved into paragons of selfless virtue makes the issue of maintaining a defence force non-negotiable for the overwhelming majority of Australian citizens. Similarly, for the purposes of this article,

it will be assumed that Australia, as an island continent, requires a Navy of some sort to form part of its defence and to conduct missions in the national interest. But problems arise at this point when concepts of operation and force structure must be formulated. In other words, when the specifics have to be worked out and hard currency has to be handed over for tangible hardware. The reason for this difficulty is quite simple. There will never be enough money for defence expenditure as there are always more individual viewpoints on which defence options should be taken up than the national fortune could possibly provide for. Therefore, hard compromising and choices must be made. Cost effective options *have* to be taken up and the level of cost effectiveness is gauged, often intuitively, by how the equipment and doctrines under consideration will serve the national interest.

NATIONAL INTERESTS AND NAVAL MISSIONS

A national interest can be considered a political, economic, defence or ideological concern of significance to a country. Important national interests sometimes, but not very often, change and can compete with each other. They range in importance from a VITAL interest, which is of such central importance that a country would risk total war in the maintenance of its integrity, to lesser interests where actions short of war would be taken. One of the fundamental and most vital interests of any nation is the maintenance of national power and dignity. History gives numerous examples of the alacrity with which nations will go to war in order to save the national 'face'. Major and costly expeditions will continue to be mounted for very little tangible gain since attacks on national prestige remain, for many, the deepest cuts of all. For example, the 1982 Falklands conflict was a recent instance of a nation's complete willingness to incur massive costs in manpower and materiel to maintain national prestige and 'face'.

A state's drive to maintain national power and position is historically so strong that it seems only to be superseded as a vital interest by the primary needs of national survival. Both these needs stem from a need to maintain sovereignty, a sort of territorial imperative where 'territory' can often include entitlements in the ideological realm. Ideological 'territories' include fundamental principles of national belief embodied in expressions such as *democratic*, *self determination*, *individual freedoms* and *Christianity*, to mention but a few examples.

The fundamental responsibility of the Australian government and all other governments is

to ensure the territorial integrity; that is the physical security, of their country. This responsibility is generally considered the basic prerequisite to maintaining the social and economic progress of the Australian people. From this fundamental, almost collective 'biological' need for national security stems the fundamental Naval mission: COUNTERING OF ATTACK. Attacks against the continent can take the form of armed incursions for purposes of lodgement or political intimidation. Alternatively, attacks against population centres, resource rich areas and military facilities may occur for more limited purposes. In any case Australian territory and sovereignty are threatened and challenged. While it is widely recognised at this time that there is little likelihood of a major hostile inroad into Australia, the consequences of such an event could be so disastrous that the ability to forestall invasion remains the fundamental government responsibility regardless of the likelihood of the event.

Directly associated with the need to maintain sovereignty is Australia's obligation to control the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) it has claimed. This represents a sea area approximately equivalent to that of continental Australia. Given the increasing recognition of the value of sea based resources, the ability to regulate the EEZ is a significant reflection of national power and resolve to maintain some form of non 'ad-hoc' sovereignty. This implies another major naval mission in the national interest: that is, CONTROL OF THE EEZ.

Defence of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) is also of interest to Australians as their social and economic progress is critically dependent on access to world markets. To illustrate this point, eminent economist Dr H.C. Coombs has concluded that '... there is now no autonomous national economy in any comprehensive sense, but an economy composed predominantly of aspects of the world economy located in Australia.'³ Clearly, despite very questionable statistics sometimes presented to prove the contrary case, Australia's economy is so heavily integrated with world markets that maintaining the integrity of SLOCs is crucial. Once again, and perhaps even more importantly, the ability of a nation to guarantee safe passage and international communications is a significant measure of national power. It would seem to be the case that the Australian electorate would not take kindly to being made fools of on the world stage and even less kindly to have 'to tighten their belts' if SLOCs were harassed and the Australian government of the day, which *will* bear ultimate responsibility for the embarrassment, was perceived as not having catered for

such a logical contingency. DEFENCE OF SLOC's is therefore another primary naval mission against an enemy effort of economic harassment.

Also, since Australians have friends and allies in South-East Asia and the South-West Pacific region the Australian government may be called on to provide some sort of supportive intervention in the interest of helping friendly nations and their legitimate governments. Besides economic aid, military aid may be called for. This may involve a Naval capability to perform the FORCE PROJECTION ASHORE and the NAVAL PRESENCE missions.

The purposes of such missions include supporting friends against external threat, affecting the balance of an internal power struggle, coercing an unfriendly regime or securing the safety of Australian citizens, property and interests overseas. While the Naval Presence mission deals mainly with the vagaries of transmitting national diplomatic signals of resolve, Force Projection Ashore can be a direct punitive (coercive) operation as well as a supportive operation. Force Projection ashore, particularly in its coercive mode, is a diplomacy of violence which does not seem to have lost its utility in the modern age. General Galtieri and Margaret Thatcher could give ample testimony in support of this assertion.

Despite the assurances of what has been taken by many as the conventional wisdom

concerning the obsolescence of these two Power Projection missions it seems that 'Gunboat Diplomacy' and the use of *appropriate* force maintains its place of prominence in the international world order and conduct of international relations. James Cable, in his book *Gunboat Diplomacy: 1919-1979* even goes so far as to say that '... the one outstanding regularity that emerges from this survey of sixty lawless years is the continued and frequent use, in one form or another, of limited naval force as a supplement to diplomacy and as an alternative to war.'⁴

THE MISSIONS

From the 'national power' perspective we now have five Naval missions which may serve vital and important Australia national interests. In summary, these missions are:

- COUNTERING OF ATTACK.
- DEFENCE OF SLOC's.
- CONTROL OF EEZ.
- FORCE PROJECTION ASHORE, and
- NAVAL PRESENCE.

The ability of the Navy to execute those missions in the national interest is constrained by a number of factors which affect operational concepts and resource use in Australia's somewhat unique geo-strategic environment. We must now clearly recognise fundamental constraints and their effects on the missions before developing new operational concepts.



'Gunboat Diplomacy Practice' — A Harpoon Missile firing

MISSION CONSTRAINTS

Several factors, including many constraints, influence the practical adaptation of the means placed at the Navy's disposal to achieve its mission capabilities. All mission capabilities exist within a framework of first posing a deterrent and then, if deterrence fails, to warfight. Both deterrent and warfighting capability aspects of the missions are heavily influenced by geography, demography, economy and technology. Though many other factors can be 'thrown in' these are the critical few and relentless concentration on the implications of these factors for operational purposes can give the best chance of mission success.

Australia's geostrategic situation is the vital determinant of the nature of missions and likelihood of their successful execution and completion. Geographic Depth is Australia's essential geostrategic characteristic and can be, as the Soviets would testify, the decisive factor in a war against even the best equipped, most efficient and crafty enemy. 'Depth' is also a liability in that Australians are far from allies, sources of equipment/spare parts and other war-sustaining resources. Geographic depth has successfully and traditionally been exploited by planning a DEFENCE IN DEPTH in which the opponent is confronted with the possibility of resistance over large distances before reaching his/her objective. This is in contrast to a single line of defence where many different types and number of platforms are concentrated for a decisive 'Showdown'. This is in essence a CONTINENTAL DEFENCE concept of operations.

Another essential and enduring aspect of Australia's situation is the very small population which can be drawn upon for actual land operations and the limited number of platforms and weapons which can be applied in combat. These factors give rise to a paucity of SURGE CAPACITY available to defence planners in time of crisis. The main implications of this factor is that combat operations of all types should not incorporate campaigns of attrition as our nation neither has the resources nor inclination to sustain heavy losses in either equipment or manpower. Also, interdiction at sea prior to any hostile lodgement would be a major factor in a successful defence since Australian land units would require conventional forces outnumbering the lodged attacker by at least three fold in order to dislodge the opponent.

To a significant extent technology can compensate for lack of population and can be used to exploit Australia's geographic advantages but its value should not be overrated. Since Moltke (the elder) grasped the implications of the 'new'

technology (i.e. major improvements in mobility and firepower) in the mid-nineteenth century, his fundamental conclusion that such technologies favoured the tactical defence and strategic offence remain valid. Technology can provide platforms of high endurance, mobility and fire power which can cover large distances rapidly and spend substantial time on task. These characteristics are often claimed to be essential if geographic depth is to be employed so as to give Australia's policymakers military-political bargaining power under the best possible conditions. But, as will be further discussed, numbers of platforms and weapons available to apply at the decisive scene of action may be as important or even more important than state of the art technology in the Australian defence context.

One very important point to be aware of is that modern technology is highly unlikely to provide a reliable means of giving large surface and air platforms a low degree of targetability without enormous expenditure on elaborate self defensive systems. But by the same token the undersea dimension of the naval battlefield will probably remain relatively impervious to the inroads of modern detection technology. Advantage should be taken of this situation since remaining untargeted will be the key to the twenty first century warfighting game.

The two most difficult to target weapons are men and mines. Both weapons are of considerable value in the surgical and selective operations of modern limited war and modern technology can provide undersea means of applying these 'untargetables' at the right place and time in response to a wide range of contingencies. Australia's future use of the 'untargetables' will be discussed in more detail below.

Besides making use of the relative weakness of tomorrow's technology in the underwater realm we can make use of technology's growing utility in the surface/air realm. This involves the increased firepower available to non purpose built civilian platforms through the use of 'clip-on' offensive and defensive weapons systems, sensors and support facilities. Examples of these systems will be described but suffice it to say that technologies of tomorrow should encourage a shift in Navies from platform orientation to weapons orientation with a consequent increase in the utility of civil sector air and surface platforms as force multipliers. These developments should have the potential to give Australia a degree of surge capacity which would otherwise not be possible. They should also provide an ability to replace battle losses and reduce the demands on our relatively few high capability units.

However, even the properly used advantages and disadvantages technology do not give Australia the resources to favour the pursuance of a total military solution (ie. Victory) in any but the most limited scenarios. Consequently, operations must be planned which develop a favourable military situation in which to negotiate a better state of peace. Such operations will yield success to those politicians who can mould effective doctrines of deterrence and military commanders who can implement effective war-fighting doctrines, all of which are compatible with the factors discussed in this section. The root of future Australian military failure will rest in defence planners and politicians not sufficiently catering for these strategic and technological realities.

DISCREPANCIES!

On balancing the feasibility of conducting successful naval missions against the constraints affecting them, there exists a clear discrepancy between the sustainability of missions the Navy *may* be called on to perform and the actual capabilities it currently has in train to undertake them. This remains the case for Naval force structure envisaged to be in place at the end of the century.⁵

To illustrate the point, consider the unlikely and quite hypothetical case of the Australian government being pressed into a military intervention in Fiji. The reason for this may be to stabilize a deteriorating situation or even to put an end to a civil war. Intervention may simply be to secure the safety of Australian citizens and properties in the country or even to restore a duly

elected government. However, reasons for intervention are not important in this exercise. The fact is that the Navy has nowhere near the necessary resources to mount such an operation at short notice with any *guarantee* of success.

Using the oft quoted Army maxim of needing a favourable ratio of 3:1 before engaging a 'dug-in' opponent, a formation (Brigade) size contingent of Australian infantry would be needed to effectively *guarantee* success against Fiji's single but well trained and disciplined infantry battalion consisting of some 900 men. This calculation neglects important factors such as a large degree of popular and extremist support for the military regime and a possibility (albeit unlikely) of French intervention of a moral and perhaps even material nature in support of the Fijian military regime.⁶

The bottom line is that the Navy could not adequately support a Brigade sized intervention at short notice and, without this degree of Army intervention small numbers of Australian troops would be exposed to grave danger in being so far from our shores.⁷ This case remains valid for supportive interventions elsewhere in the South-West Pacific including New Guinea. Consequently, in not being perceived to be able to influence a situation militarily, the Australian government would once more be left speaking loudly and carrying a small stick!

The observation that Navy *means* do not necessarily match policy *ends* is not a new one. In 1984 the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence indicated that, in relation to the Navy's stated missions, '... Australia's Maritime Defence forces are thinly spread



What you see is what we've got! Over three quarters of RAN surface combat strength is pictured. Do we tie up too many resources in a few large, expensive platforms?

and they have inadequate protection against air and submarine attack.' Also, the Committee stated that:

'...The Committee is not satisfied that the ADF can quickly deploy sufficient men and material to meet low level threats, nor can it sustain them for long enough in operations. Its capacity to deal with higher level threats crucially depends on receiving sufficient warning of the threat and being able to expand in time to meet it.'

This situation has mainly developed because of an endemic failure of Australia's defence planners and military leaders to come to grips with Australia's unique geostrategic characteristics and use these enduring characteristics to advantage. We remain a European culture, with a NATO style force structure, in Asia!

MATCHING MISSIONS AND MEANS

Looking at the Navy's predicament we can better match mission ends to material means in our region by:

- increasing the number of 'good enough' platforms available for operations in our *decisive* geostrategic area (ie the sea-air gap out to about 200nm.)
- increasing our capability for *sustained* operations generally, and
- developing tactics tailored to *our* environment and budget.

The first two of these points relate directly to what will be called 'Combat Stamina'.

BUILDING COMBAT 'STAMINA'

A cardinal virtue in any type of military conflict is to have *lots* ... lots of platforms, weapons,



Phalanx fights smart! It also puts into practice some vital principles of war. It is a cheap, 'clip-on' anti-missile defence which spits out 3000 x 20mm titanium tipped shells per minute. Rather than rely on a single shot anti-missile missile it relies on the principle of having 'lots' of cheap shots. This is a principle we should apply more to our defence thinking.

ammunition, food, spares and people. This is because *Murphy* is alive and well and only a fraction of our combat resources will ever be able to be simultaneously applied and sustained in an emergency. The reasons for this are many and varied. Refits, mechanical faults, shortage of spares, sickness, unprofessionalism and accidents are but a few factors involved in causing about 50-60% of any given capital asset pool to be fully operational.⁹

The Australian Defence forces have tended to invest in small numbers of very high performance, very high cost vehicles and weapons systems, it being argued that we need the force multiplication effect of high technology to make up for our small population base. **There is some merit in this argument but the fact remains that the sheer inability of the ADF to sustain casualties limits our tactics, strategy, imagination and basic mission competence. We need to develop cheap ways of getting more platforms to sea for longer periods so that we can cultivate the all important combat trait of being able to 'hang on', take losses and win.**

Looking first at increasing the number of 'good enough' or adequate platforms and consequently expanding our capability for sustaining operations we cannot help but be surprised at the Navy's supine neglect of resources available from the Australian civil infrastructure.

For many professional service officers the best has always been enemy of the 'good enough'! This situation results from a fascination with the 'big guns' of naval warfare and a corporate obsession to always have the best (and most expensive) items of kit on board.¹⁰

The Navy must begin to get the message that it cannot always insist on Mercedes standard vessels while the rest of the nation subsists on a Holden budget! It is time to take a hard look at what the civil sector can offer the Navy in terms of force multipliers and, because of Navy's apparent failure to take civil sector mission enhancement seriously, we must go into detail to make the point. Otherwise, we fall into the trap of doing what many others do in relation to using the civil sector; that is, paying its military potential lipservice and precious little else.

CIVIL SECTOR MISSION SUPPORT

The last twenty years have witnessed a major rundown in Australia's shipbuilding capacity, particularly in the manufacture of vessels over 5000 tonnes.¹¹ Nonetheless, Australia's current trading fleet can make a substantial contribution to the performance of the five naval missions.

The Australian trading fleet consists of approximately 105 vessels over 150 gross tonnes with 75 of this number dedicated to overseas trade.

Tables 1 and 2 give an overall picture of the civil fleet structure.

Of the 61 General cargo and tanker vessels on the Register a total of 44 have been identified as having defence potential.¹² This is a more than ample resource from which to draw *basic platforms* to support permanent naval forces in carrying out their basic missions. After all, even during the Falklands crisis — which represents a conflict of greater scale than Australia is likely to become involved in — only 58 vessels over 150 grt were taken up from trade.¹³

The question of availability of civil sector vessels is not a particularly difficult one. Crises *should* have a tendency of forcing quick and decisive action in terms of ship requisitions even in Australia. Moreover, with the current and envisaged depressed state of Australian shipping about 10 vessels are currently laid up. Also, most of the civil shipping support necessary for naval missions could come from the Australian National Line (ANL). ANL is controlled by the Australian Shipping Commission which is directly responsible to Federal government by Act of Parliament, all Commissioners being appointed by the Governor General for periods up to five years. ANL currently has a fleet of 33 vessels including 14 Vehicle Deck/Cargo ships, 4 Cellular Container ships and 15 Ore/Bulk Carriers.¹⁴ About 20 of these vessels have a high defence potential and could be taken up in an emergency.

TABLE 1

| Tonnage | Number of Vessels |
|---------------|-------------------|
| 150-5000 | 26 |
| 5,000-10,000 | 13 |
| 10,000-20,000 | 32 |
| 20,000-50,000 | 19 |
| > 50,000 | 14 |

TABLE 2

| Vessel Type | Number of Vessels |
|------------------|-----------------------|
| General Cargo | 44 (incl 19 RO-RO) |
| Tankers | 17 |
| Bulk Carriers | 43 |
| Tugs | 240 |
| Offshore Support | 60 |

Source: Richard Q. Agnew et al. *Australia's Defence Resources: a compendium of data*, Pergamon 1986, Sydney.

Civil manning of ships taken up from trade (STUFT) during crises is an important issue which needs to be addressed by Government legislation. It may, for example, also be necessary to train civilian crews in their naval support roles and involve ship's masters in naval reserve training so that familiarity with naval requirements is achieved in peacetime.

While the Countering of Attack and Naval Presence missions could be largely handled by a naval force in being with a lower level of civil support, other missions such as Defence of SLOC's, Force Projection and Control of EEZ could profit greatly from civil sector support. We can now look at specific examples of civil support for these missions in particular.

CIVIL SUPPORT FOR THE DEFENCE OF SLOC MISSION

A series of overseas trials have clearly demonstrated that a standard container vessel can be rapidly converted to a basic ASW platform which is capable of carrying about 75% of its normal cargo load. In late 1982 a US Container ship of 18,000 tonnes (EXPORT LEADER) outfitted with a \$US20 million ARAPAHO Helo-Support Kit underwent trials in which six different types of helicopters were operated at sea. In a forty eight hour period almost 200 helicopter landings and take offs were logged.¹⁵ The data below outlines the basic characteristics of the system.

VESSEL TYPE REQUIRED:

- (1) Container type ships 20-50,000 tonnes
- or (2) RO-RO Vehicle Carriers 17,000 plus tonnes

Suitable vessels from ANL *alone* are:

| | |
|-----------------------|------------|
| Australian Advance | 35,000 dwt |
| Australian Exporter | 27,978 dwt |
| Australian Emblem | 23,467 dwt |
| Australian Escort | 23,617 dwt |
| Australian Explorer | 18,425 dwt |
| Australian Enterprise | 18,575 dwt |
| Australian Venture | 39,450 dwt |
| | (leased) |
| ANRO Australia | 22,213 dwt |

CREW SIZE:

30-40 Civilians/65-90 Servicemen.

AIRCRAFT:

6 Seakings/Seahawks

KIT SPECS:

Flight Deck — 60 × 20 m (twin landing spots)
 Hangar — 30 × 13 m (with Sprinkler system)
 Aviation fuel module — 13 × 20 m containing 100,000 gal in 5,000 gal increments.

Fueling — pump/real module and flight deck fueling station. Also, a deck fire-fighting vehicle

Power — 2 × 250 kw Diesel Generators for aircraft starting and servicing.

Cost — \$US20 million (excluding aircraft).

Weight — 1100 tonnes.

SHIP MODIFICATIONS:

Minor deck fittings and tie downs.

INSTALLATION:

12 hours loading using standard 30-50 tonnes pierside gantry crane.

Hook up and check (6 hrs), can be under taken at sea in an emergency.

Kit can be conveyed by road (60-70 commercial tractor trailers), rail (30-35 flatcars) or air (C130).

SPACE TAKEN UP:

Kit takes up 25-30% carry volume and 10-20% of cargo weight.

OPTIONAL EXTRAS:

- (i) Phalanx CIWS.
- (ii) Chaff Launcher and/or Anti-ship Missile system such as WINNIN.
- (iii) Containerized IKARA Kit manufactured by British Aerospace. This kit comes complete with a Command/Control/Communications container incorporating a data link facility for submarine targetting.
- (iv) Shipborne Containerized Air Defence System which provides full VSTOL aviation support facilities and point defence missile systems.¹⁷

Note that a very important aspect of the ARAPAHO concept is that the system drastically lowers the cost of maintaining a sea based air deployment potential by keeping the host vessel in private hands for most of the year. Perhaps one week annually would be employed for practice in installation, operations and dismantling. Adoption of such a system would provide a cheap but potent capability to escort convoys or offer substantial self defence in addition to providing a vertical replenishment (VERTREP) capability to support other vessels and naval escorts.

CIVIL SUPPORT FOR THE FORCE PROJECTION MISSION

The Australian merchant trading fleet is also well placed to support Force Projection operations if provision is made for this contingency during peacetime. These provisions include:

- fitting anti-ship missile decoys and chaff launchers.
- fitting Replenishment at Sea (RAS) gear.
- strengthening of decks for helo operations

- fitting selections of the growing number of 'clip-on' weapons/sensor systems capable of transforming any seagoing platform into an auxiliary warship.
- legislating for the rapid requisitioning and manning of vessels.

If we take a supportive force projection scenario we might consider having to support a formation size deployment of Brigade strength to Lae in Papua New Guinea, for example¹⁰. The force may amount to about 5,000 personnel including Headquarters staff, Engineering group, Artillery and Armour with perhaps 30 days high intensity resupply carried. Obviously, a variety of civilian vessels would be required to supplement the limited sealift capacity of HMA Ships *Tobruk*, *Success* and *Jervis Bay*. Let us assume the following quantities of ordnance and personnel must be transported.

- 2,600 Infantry/SAS
- 800 HQ/Support
- 1200 Armour/Artillery/Signals
- 400 Engineer
- 48 Main Battle tanks.
- 4 Medium Arty Batteries (24 Guns)
- 100 × APC.
- Bulldozers, Graders etc (Engineering)
- Several thousand tonnes of POL, rations, ammunition.

The following vessel types could lift, transport and sustain such a force and its naval sea escorts.

- × 1 ARAPAHO Style Assault Helo Ship (Australian Escort)
- × 1 ARAPAHO Style ASW/VERTREP Ship (Australian Emblem)
- × 1 Vehicle/Passenger (500) ship (Empress of Australia) ANL, 2725 dwt
- × 1 Self Discharge Cargo Vessel (Lake Barrine) ANL 16297 dwt
- × 1 Vehicle Deck Ship with hatches (Brisbane) Trader ANL 4305 dwt
- × 1 Heavy lift Ship (Kimberly SS Services WA)
- × 3 RO-RO/Converted for carrying passengers as well as cargo. (ANRO Australia, ANL 22200 dwt Sydney Trader, ANL 4493 dwt Melbourne Trader, ANL 7207 dwt)
- × 2 Tankers (1) Shell Convus (It undertook a successful RAS with HMAS Adelaide in 1982)
- (2) Express (Howard Smith).

Other support tasks

Existing civil support infrastructure can also be employed in a large number of ancillary tasks



HMAS TOBRUK. To 'safely' deal with regional emergencies we would need another five just like it . . . unless we use the civil infrastructure.

HMAS ADELAIDE in the shadow of USS CONSTELLATION. Have the years of operating with (and under) great and powerful friends left us with a replacement mindset based more on interoperability with distant allies than on our own immediate regional interests?



such as wreckage removal, battle damage repair, hydrographic services, casualty evacuation and a plethora of engineering tasks.

Surveillance is also an area in which the civil sector can actively and extensively assist naval forces. Control of the EEZ mission can be enhanced by giving selected seagoing civilians limited constabulary powers including powers of arrest. Civil maintenance of harbour security and regulation of shipping would also tend to relieve the Service of minor burdens during a defence contingency and allow the Navy to concentrate on the essential warfighting aspects of its missions.

TAILORING TOMORROW'S TACTICS

Having specified a quite viable means of using the civil infrastructure as a force multiplier to increase the number of operational platforms and increase overall combat sustainability, we can now look at concepts of operation which may contribute to maximizing mission effectiveness in our region.

NAVAL TACTICS: Australian Style

Years of operating with (and under) the British and Americans has had an understandably profound effect on the Australian Navy's approach to operations. Our selection of vessels and equipment has often been governed by a replacement mindset based on interoperability with high flying allies and acquisition of state of the art, imported equipments. This has remained the case to the extent that we could possibly be more successful fighting Soviet units, NATO style, in the North West Pacific than dealing with much different and perhaps 'dirtier' combat in our own archipelagic back yard.

We remain the only nation in South-East Asia doggedly trying to develop a twenty first century blue water fleet based around fifteen relatively large, easily targettable surface vessels, each almost certainly destined to cost in excess of \$500 millions when total project cost is averaged out.¹⁸ A substantial part of the through life cost of each vessel is consumed in self defence equipments and maintenance of relatively large, exposed crews consisting of from 150 to 200 men.

However, this is not the place to debate the utility of such units! Government has decided to integrate them into the post 2000 force structure and so be it. But have we neglected other approaches to naval defence in our fascination with the 'big guns' of naval warfare? Can we use our geographic depth more efficiently by producing larger numbers of platforms with more limited operating ranges and tailor our tactics to suit?

Limiting operating ranges often leads to less stringent design criteria for platforms and hence far less per unit cost. More platforms could, in theory, be produced with more attention paid to weapons fit and weapon numbers than expensive, platform oriented self defence measures. Less self defence cost would be a consequence of limiting operating range to about 200 miles offshore and hence operating under fairly effective shore based air cover.

These smaller naval units, whether they be 500-800 tonne submarines, Fast Missile Patrol Boats (FMPB) or ASW Corvettes would in many ways have the security of effectively operating on internal lines. But not only this. They would be operating in relatively large numbers in the decisive combat zone of Australia's sea-air gap, this being the sea area out to approximately 200 nautical miles which encompasses the EEZ.

The ability to concentrate relatively large number of 'good enough' platforms in the EEZ not only intensifies our day to day surveillance and regulation mission capabilities. It is within this 200 mile distance that any substantial enemy lodgement or raiding force would shift from transit to assault formation, which is the time when it will be most vulnerable. Soft skinned assault craft or their equivalents become main and relatively easy targets for ADF units, it being imperative to bear in mind that each platoon of opponents not getting ashore is a full company of Australian diggers *not* needed to dislodge them!

The combination of large numbers of fast, easily concentrated naval platforms operating under the air superiority of land based maritime strike aircraft would have a decisive influence on any major attack on the continent. Besides this our surveillance capability would be concentrated, co-ordinated and drastically improved and regardless of the likelihood of attack, surveillance is a problem we have to live with every day. The taxpayer could not fail to see and get tangible value for his tax dollar by Navy shifting its emphasis somewhat more to highly co-ordinated joint operations in the EEZ. Certainly there is far less glamour associated with this type of work but it does represent the best



The sun sets on DDG HMAS PERTH. This class of vessel is due for retirement in the late 1990's. What will replace it and will the price be affordable?

means of making the most important part of our sea-air gap a very tough nut to crack. And, after all, isn't that what deterrence is all about?

Having secured our 'perimeter' and made the EEZ a highly defended, easily regulated sphere of influence we can then start thinking of possible operations farther afield. But are we going to be charging through the 'electronic undergrowth' of the twenty first century in large, easily targetted destroyers or surface combatants as we do today? Perhaps we will, but at any rate it may be smart to have a few 'untargettable' tricks up our tactical sleeve as a form of strategic insurance policy!

A shift in the direction of Australian naval operations as we enter the third millenium may involve learning to adapt to and practice a form of warfare which, though ungentelemanly, combines the virtues of human courage, resourcefulness and imagination with advanced technology and the most ancient of tactics.

SEAGOING GUERRILLA WARFARE (SGGW)

Since it is highly unlikely that today's decision-makers will be able to foresee tomorrow's threat, it may be wise to develop supplementary concepts of operation and tactics which can be used in our region with almost equal effectiveness against threats ranging from insertions of small boatloads of raiders to major conventional assaults.

Seagoing Guerilla warfare adopts the tried and true tenets of land based guerilla warfare to the maritime environment and it is in the application of SGGW that we can learn much more from Mao than from Mahan, Corbett, Gorshkov or Richmond.¹⁹

If the *tyanny of distance* has been seen as a disadvantage for Australia we can also change it to a major advantage if we use our archipelagic ground in the right way. A seagoing guerilla uses the sea-air gap as a three dimensional battlefield capable of offering numerous mission opportunities if he selects and uses the right platforms and weapons for the job.

The main tenet of guerilla warfare is to avoid presenting a target to the enemy until the guerilla is ready to kill. The guerilla avoids set piece, head-on battles which assaulting enemies try to force and uses mobility, concealment, secrecy and surprise to hit at enemy weak points. His aim is to arrange local superiority over the enemy by the use of surprise and temporary concentration of hard to detect, effectively *invisible* forces. Geographic depth can give him more choice of when, where and how to attack.

The submarine stands out as an ideal platform for such warfare but not only in terms of its low degree of targetability and substantial torpedo/

missile armament. It is also an ideal base for naval raiding operations and assertive minelaying.

NAVAL RAIDS

Submarine inserted Special Action Forces (SAF) can fight hit and run, small and medium scale actions as independent units or co-ordinated bands. They may harass and destroy enemy forces, drain enemy manpower and draw a disproportionate cost and response from a foe. At extremely low relative cost they can be used as political *scalpels* in punishing any regional trouble maker to potentially any degree in response to low to medium level threat situations. Seaborne SAF units could also be trained to assist insurgents or malcontents in countries attempting to threaten Australian interests or friends. The fact remains that, even in this era of ubiquitous high technology applications, a *man* remains the best form of precision guided munition and, while Australia has a current limited capacity to insert such groups, the capacity is nowhere near as large, comprehensive, expert or co-ordinated as it could and should be.

To enhance the mobility and covertness of these operations there may be a valuable and expanding role for pocket submarines and one/two man submersibles in the years to come. Taking but one example from the past, we note that in 1941 an Italian submarine dropped three pocket submarines a few miles off the entrance to Alexandria harbour. These submersibles proceeded to sink the British battleships *Valiant* and *Queen Elizabeth* together with a large Fleet Oiler. This single act shifted the naval balance in the Mediterranean, gun for gun, from the British to the Italian favour.²⁰

We also cannot forget the outstanding exploits of our own KRAIT during Operation Jaywick where six men equipped with canoes and some limpet mines sank 41,000 tons of Japanese shipping in Singapore harbour. This was three times more enemy tonnage than sunk by the entire RAN during World War Two!²¹

Today we can build Goliath killing Davids — two man submersibles which, when deployed off a mother submarine and being equipped with modern explosive devices, and low noise propulsion units could wreak havoc in any port that acts as a regional assault base or is occupied by a power threatening us or our regional friends in any way. We can draw practically any price from such naval raids and the sheer cost of harbour protection against submersibles not much larger than big fish would be high, thus drawing an unattractive, disproportionate response.

Only imagination limits the use of these simple, effective weapons and how they can be



brought within a strike range. Boldness and originality in this sphere of tactical endeavour can offer major dividends for minimal outlay.

PLANTING WARGARDENS — ASSERTIVE MINELAYING

The need to remain untargeted as we enter the twenty first century leads us to examine the unglamorous but very effective seamine. The mine has always been a favourite weapon for use by Guerillas because of the very effective 'psychological warhead' that multiplies its effectiveness. During the Vietnam War for example mines and booby traps demanded a completely disproportionate psychological response from US soldiers despite the fact that they only accounted for ten percent of US casualties.²²

Minewarfare researchers have claimed that:

'Stress and uncertainty are at the heart of minewarfare. Minefields are like twilight zones — they work more on human minds than on ships themselves. We can use our knowledge — of exaggerated forms of the unknown — to our advantage, by exploring minewarfare's full potential.'²³

Minefields are increasingly used as weapons of limited war since they are *politically adjustable* in terms of area, intensity, timing, target and duration of effect.²⁴ In the 1970's a total of approximately 15,000 mines were deployed during the India-Pakistan (1971), Vietnam (1972) and Yom-Kippur (1973) wars as well as during the blockade of Phnom Penh, Cambodia in 1974-75. Seamines were deployed in the 1982 Falklands war and caused concern when deployed in Nicaragua, the Red Sea and Persian Gulf in 1984 and 1987 respectively.

Mines are increasingly important because they are used as a first and least escalatory option in situations requiring a graduated political — military response and their widespread use as *proxies* by a small Australian Navy should not be deemed ungentlemanly!

The success of aerial and submarine laid minefields deployed in South East Asia during World War Two by platforms based in Australia was nothing short of extraordinary. In 1944 a report by the Operational Research Section of RAAF Command stated that:


'When the substantial indirect returns (of minelaying in the Dutch East Indies) are taken into account these sea mining operations have been in the order of 100 times as destructive to the enemy as an equal number of bombing missions against air targets.'²⁵

This result was very much confirmed by Rear Admiral Matsuzaki, Chief of Staff of the Japanese Second Southern Expeditionary Fleet, Surabaya. Matsuzaki was tasked with mine countermeasures in Java, Borneo and the Celebes during 1943-45 and he testified during postwar interrogations that mining had a substantial impact on the exploitation of resources from the Dutch East Indies and that mines sunk ships and delayed convoys. Offloading of cargoes was jammed at Balikpapan and Surabaya until sweeping operations had been completed. He also stated that delays in oil shipments and destruction of tankers was particularly serious and that over 1500 Japanese were maintained on MCM vessels in his area alone as a standing Mine Counter measures (MCM) force. Matsuzaki also cited Japanese estimates that 40% of all vessels under 1000 tonnes which sailed into the Surabaya and Balikpapan areas were sunk or damaged by mines.²⁶

Besides Rapid Aerial Minelays (RAMs), submarine laid fields also achieved resounding success in our regional waters. In fact, submarine laid fields had no greater success anywhere in the world than in the waters of South East Asia. Twenty one small, submarine laid fields consisting of 421 mines sunk 27 vessels and damaged the same number again. The success rate was therefore one ship attack per 8 mines laid. The submarines which laid these fields were based in Fremantle.²⁷

— NAVAL MISSIONS —

A methodology for transforming the navy from a 'SHOW' outfit to a 'GO' outfit.



Based on a spectrum of capabilities and tactics able to deliver a precisely measured graduated response in a wide range of contingencies.

The mine remains a very valuable weapon for cost-effective use in South East Asian waters and should not be underestimated. It can even act as a de-escalatory proxy because minefields eliminate the 'hot war' ingredient of provocative 'eyeball-to-eyeball' confrontation. It is an excellent guerilla weapon which is difficult to target, never surrenders and issues no communiques!

Once again only boldness and imagination limit how these weapons can be brought to bear and it should also be remembered that one of the most valuable spinoffs of becoming proficient in the art of Seagoing Guerilla Warfare is the

searching and cunning mentality developed in its practitioners over years of practice. Such characteristics can be readily adapted to a wide variety of regular and irregular tactical situations and eventually to the formulation of higher national security policy.

Though a naval defence strategy cannot be purely based on unconventional warfare, such tactics can be a valuable supplement to the activities of more conventional naval forces and a balance of both types of warfare offers numerous options to political decisionmakers and military planners.



IN CONCLUSION

During long periods of peace the mental and moral traits which prove decisive in war are often relegated to the background. Consequently, mediocrity of performance and perspective become the administratively entrenched hallmarks of many peacetime Services. Initiative and resourcefulness do not thrive in an over-cautious environment where orthodoxy of practice and principle are bureaucratically enshrined.

Our Naval organisation is based on orthodoxy and traditionalism. This goes far beyond an honest conservative leaning and stems from a fundamental lack of confidence in our ability to go our own way and independently develop uniquely Australian naval strategies and tactics. Orthodoxy feeds on a fear of setting precedents and making mistakes because practitioners of orthodox methods thrive in an environment characterised by political and administrative pressures rather than competitive pressure and output orientation. The emphasis in our Naval organisation seems to lie in not being seen to make mistakes rather than to innovate, take risks and produce outstanding results.

Despite our fondest delusions, orthodoxy of approach is endemic in the higher levels of our defence organisation and this is nowhere better seen than in our corporate attitude to force structure and our mission orientation. We single mindedly persist in adhering to the 'follow on replacement' imperative and continue to build large, expensive and easily targettable surface vessels without concentrating on the decisive requirements of our missions and the key geographical areas in which to conduct them. Years of training with great and powerful allies have bestowed on us a fascination with the 'big guns' of naval warfare and a collective desire to

build floating 'Cathedrals' in which to worship the methods and hardware which may only belong to yesterday's wars.

The Navy does not solely need expensive forms of firepower and intricate technology to achieve its object of conducting effective and sustained maritime missions in the national interest. But the Navy does need to hone its ability to look at the enduring limitations and advantages of Australia's geostrategic position and tailor missions and tactics to overcome limitations and fully use advantages.

In this article I have suggested a methodology to broaden the warfare options open to the Navy and government when carrying out Australian missions. The methodology is represented diagrammatically on page 22. The main aim of the approach is to arrange the best mix of men and appropriate technology to suit Australian mission requirements, especially in terms of ensuring high combat sustainability, versatility and untargetability.

High combat sustainability, military versatility and untargetability are the key features of a successful fighting Service and they are features which the Australian government and taxpayer have a right to expect of our Navy. Some cost effective ways of improving these features in relation to Australian naval missions have been proposed in this article and it is hoped that the higher management of our navy will act on the need for alternative and supplementary approaches to the conduct of naval missions. For without a willingness to change and adapt the Navy will enter the twenty first century as an expensive, vulnerable anachronism rather than a force to be reckoned with.

NOTES

1. Measurement of 'Victory' is open to many interpretations. However, a fundamental measure of effectiveness for a Navy must be its combat performance in terms of number and tonnage of enemy shipping destroyed. For example, during World War Two the RAN destroyed only 13,500 tons of enemy shipping. In contrast to this result a single, Army inspired mission (Operation JAWWICK) sank three times the amount of shipping destroyed by the entire RAN in the war. The originator and driving force behind JAWWICK was Major Ivan Lyon, M.B.E. D.S.O. of the Gordon Highlanders. For a detailed account of Operation JAWWICK see McKie, R., 'The Heroes', (Angus and Robertson, Melbourne, 1967).
2. Naval capital equipment projects involve the commitment of enormous sums. The ANZAC Ship (see New Surface Combatant) Project and New Submarine Project will commit the taxpayer to at least \$A 8.5 billion dollars (1987) between them over the next decade. Given Defence's track record in project management (See Parliamentary Committee for Public Accounts Report) \$A 8.5 billion is probably a very conservative estimate. Modernizations, refits, personnel support costs, maintenance of shore establishments and numerous minor and major projects add many hundreds of millions of dollars to the Navy's annual costs.
3. See 'The Economic and Social Consequences of Nuclear War', NATUNI: The Journal of the Australian National University, September 1983, p. 8.
4. Cable, J., 'Gunboat Diplomacy: 1919-1979. Political Applications of Limited Naval Force' (New York, St Martins Press, 1981).
5. Combat sustainability is based on having sufficient trained manpower, energy resources, spares, munitions and logistics support in general to sustain a sizeable task force in combat for a prolonged period of perhaps thirty to sixty days. Recent wars such as Yom Kippur and the Falklands demonstrated phenomenal ammunition and general ordnance expenditures which surprised the logisticians of all parties involved. It is unlikely that the Navy will overcome its propensity to purchase top quality, complex platforms and weapons in 'penny packet' numbers. This could lead to serious embarrassment during an emergency as would any lack of fuel reserves or spares backup.
The 2000 AD RAN force structure is envisaged to be based around 15-17 major Surface units and 6 submarines. Of this force a maximum of about 10 surface units and 4 submarines would be fully operational at any given time. In terms of numbers alone our ability to sustain casualties is therefore very small. Also, during protracted operations only about one half of the available vessels could be maintained on station at any appreciable distance from the continent.
7. At the height of the May 1987 Fijian Coup it was suggested that an Australian Rifle Company (123 troops) stand by to ensure the security of Australian citizens and property in Fiji. Sending such a force would have been irresponsible and based on the wishful thinking that they would not be engaged by Fijian troops under any circumstances.
8. Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, 'The Australian Defence Force: Its Structure and Capabilities' (AGPS, Canberra, 1984) Section 5.21 p. 76.
9. It is a matter of common knowledge that French relations with Australia and New Zealand have been strained in recent years for a variety of reasons. The French have shown themselves amenable to the Rabuka Regime and shortly after the second Coup of September 1987 demonstrated a willingness to undertake joint exercises with the Fijian Navy.
10. A former US CNO (Admiral Elmo Zumwalt) pinpointed the

essence of this attitude problem when he suggested that his Navy was made up of 'Unions' consisting of the surface warfare, submarine and aviation arms. Members of the three unions were conditioned to the extremely platform and weapon orientated. See Zumwalt, E., 'On Watch: A memoir', (New York, Quadrangle — The New York Times Book Company, 1976).

11. See 'Shipbuilding in Australia', an address given to the 1985 Industrial Mobilization Course by the Managing Director, Cockatoo Dockyard Pty Ltd (Sydney, 1 Jul 85), also, see Dick Q Agnew et al 'A Compendium of Australia's Defence Resources', (Pergamon Press, Canberra, 1986).
12. Taylor, M., 'The Falklands Operation — Taking up Ships From Trade — Could We do it?' Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, Feb 1983.
13. Ibid.
14. Australian Shipping Commission, 'The Australian National Line Annual Report, 1983', pp 16-17.
15. Mulquin, J., 'ARAPAH Update', US Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1983 pp 16-17.
16. Jeremiah, J., 'Containerized Naval Weapon System for Merchant Ships', British Aerospace Paper (undated).
17. Ambrose, A., 'The Arming of Merchant Ships — STUFT, WAMS, SCADS and DEMS', Navy International, May 1983 pp 282-287.
18. The approximate cost of eight new surface combatants (ANZAC ships) for the RAN was \$A3.6 billion in 1987 dollars. Project costs per ship are therefore approximately \$A 450 million. Real cost overruns of at least twenty percent are common in most defence major capital procurement projects, especially with Australian builds. Thus the price of an ANZAC Ship will almost certainly be over \$A500 million in 1987 dollars. This is roughly twice the price of an equivalent overseas build.
19. See Crossland, R., 'Unconventional Warfare Afloat', US Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1981 pp 37-41 for an argument in favour of the use of guerilla warfare tactics at sea. Also, by the same author, 'Rusty Hand of Steel: The Naval Raid', US Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1979.
20. Ibid, pp 38-39.
21. See 'The Navy. The Magazine of the Navy League of Australia', for a brief account of this inspired operation, October 1983 Issue, pp 29. Also, McKie R. op cit gives a very comprehensive account of the mission.
22. Allen, W et al, 'The Vietnam War', (Landsdowne Press, Sydney, 1981) p. 23.
23. Greer, W. and Bartholomew, J., 'Psychological Aspects of Minewarfare', US Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1986, p 58. For a more comprehensive analysis see the research paper from which the article was derived: 'Psychological Aspects of Minewarfare', Centre for Naval Analysis, Virginia. Professional Paper 365/October 1982.
24. See Patterson, A., 'Mining: A Naval Strategy', Naval War College Review, May 1971 for a discussion of the growing political utility and flexibility of minewarfare. Note that one year after publication of the article President Nixon successfully used the 'political' and psychological warfare of minewarfare when dealing with a major crisis in Vietnam. (The May 1972 mining of Haiphong Harbour to blunt the Spring Offensive).
25. Cited in Duncan, R., 'America's Use of Seamines' (Washington, US Government Printing Office, 1962) p. 164.
26. Odgers, G., 'Air War Against Japan 1943-1945' (Canberra, Australian War Memorial, 1957) p. 363.
27. Duncan, R., Op cit, p 135.
28. See Hinge, A., 'Minwarfare in Australia's First Line of Defence' (Department of Defence, Canberra, 1986) for a discussion of the utility of mine use in a wide variety of scenarios in our region. This paper is unclassified and available through Defence Library Services.

Telling it like it was!

ZIG ZAG PART 2

PQ17

by Neil Grano

In the last issue of JANI Neil recounted his early experiences as a young merchant seaman until December 1941 when he signed onto the PORT MELBOURNE, which was bound for Britain. Having passed through the Panama Canal and having spent a few days in the United States his next port of call was Halifax, Nova Scotia. Little did he realise that, while still a teenager, he would soon be facing the greatest survival challenge of his life. This being literally the massacre of Russian Convoy PQ17.

We headed further north from Virginia toward Halifax, Nova Scotia, still alone and zig-zagging. The weather got colder and I realised I was not equipped with heavy enough clothing for the climate, even though I piled on every item of clothing I owned in an effort to stay warm.

The evening before our expected arrival the whole ship was shaken and awakened by a blast at about 0200 and we thought it must have been another ship hitting a mine in our vicinity, so the carpenter made the rounds checking for leakage and damage in the Deep tanks in which the fresh water was stored. Apparently everything was O.K. and we proceeded into Halifax without further incident.

Halifax was a hilly city and the sidewalks were glazed with ice, making it quite dangerous for a person unused to it. I used my time and money to shop for a warm pair of gloves, a warm fur lined cap with ear flaps and a heavier pair of boots. I then felt I was ready to brave the worst and just as well because on the very next morning I woke up in my cabin shivering. The steam heat had shut off as the pipes were frozen over and the bulkhead in the cabin had a thin glaze of ice over it. This only occurred once but once was enough!

After four days a convoy was formed in Halifax Harbour for the Atlantic crossing. We set out and began encountering choppy seas, cold wind and spray, sometimes sleet, often fog, and very long periods of darkness. Three times we had submarine alarms but none of these resulted in attacks and twice during this passage we had the cold comfort of gunnery practice. Every man had a battle station assigned and my station was to assist with the ammunition for the four inch gun mounted aft.

Our first sight of land occurred about one hour before arrival. We caught a glimpse of land through the fog and a short time later we anchored in Belfast, Northern Ireland where we were quickly outfitted with a degaussing coil which encircled the ship (a protection against magnetic mines). The ship was also outfitted with a barrage balloon and a cable to act as a deterrent against low level air attacks while crossing the Irish Sea. We stayed only about twelve hours in Belfast, there being no shore leave, and proceeded to form a convoy of mostly coastal ships, all flying huge Zeppelin shaped balloons and making good about seven or eight knots for Avonmouth on the Bristol channel where we arrived on 26th February 1942.

The whole ships' crew were now alive with excitement having arrived home after an absence of approximately 6 months. There were telephone calls from the deck and last minute letters written to notify friends or family of the expected arrival time at the house. For me this was the England I had always heard talked about by nostalgic and adoring relatives. Now I was going to find out about it for myself.

Wartime London. . .unique!

It took a couple of hours before we were paid off from the ship and cleared Customs and the medical inspection (the latter being merely a skin & V.D. inspection). We were each assigned a number of days leave based on our sea time. My first task was to be issued with a Seamen's National Identity Card with my photo on it and the number AYA1091721 became indelibly imprinted on my mind. To enable me to leave the dock area I was issued with a temporary pass which

would be converted to a permanent one when I reported in to the Mercantile Marine Office in London, where I was going for my leave. When I reported to the office for my permanent card I asked to undertake the Anti-aircraft Gunnery Course being given to merchant seamen. My request was approved and a date to take the two day course was given and I continued on my leave.

Wartime London was like no other place I could imagine. At that time the Allies were not winning the war but the spirit among the British people was tremendous. There was no doubt left by word or action that they would emerge victorious. For the moment they were down but it was only a temporary setback and the outcome inevitably would be in their favour. It is fortunate that they had an overwhelming optimism because, as history has shown us, they are among the world's greatest muddlers.

My first call was Australia House on the Strand to meet and exchange news with my fellow countrymen or expatriates who happened to be there, and of course there were an ever increasing number of RAAF men arriving in England after completing their training in Canada as part of the Empire Air Training Scheme.

Being a very eager and aspiring social creature, I quickly came to know the Convent Garden Tea Dances and their wooden parquet floor on which I met some lovely English girls. I also managed to visit the dances at the Astoria and Paramount on Tottenham Court road and the New Zealand Forces Club and the Canadian Forces Club over by St James Palace. It was really a fun filled time with lots of kisses but, encounters were of a regrettably brief duration. Everyone it seemed had an appointed time to be on duty somewhere.

My closest possibility of developing a deep and meaningful relationship came one evening with a young English WAAF (Womens' Auxiliary Air Force). We sat or rather lay on the ground in Hyde Park as there was no more private place we could go. I lay there kissing her with one hand unbuttoning her blouse (these military uniforms were always complicated) and my other hand gently caressing her in a humanitarian effort to warm her and fight off the damp English night air. However my enthusiasm was shaken when suddenly a voice said *'What time is it love, you know I am on duty in an hour'*! If you have ever seen a candle melt away then you will understand how I felt!

The next day was a new one and I visited Australia House. They asked me if I would like to visit Kent and stay with an English family there for a couple of days and I was delighted with the prospect. The following morning I arrived at the

station of Tunbridge Wells where I was picked up by Mr Draper, my host, who drove me to his home about 14 miles away in the village of Hawkhurst. It proved a very generous thing for him to do as petrol rationing was quite severe and even 28 miles was a major sacrifice but, as he said, *I wanted you to see some of the prettiest country in England!* He was right. It was very pretty with lots of hops growing and, of course, the traditional flowers surrounding the thatched cottages. When we arrived his wife met us and they introduced me to Gwen who worked for them. She was a sweet 16 year old with blue eyes and dark brown wavy hair. A nice shape and a little shy. In short, she was my type of gal and I knew that I wanted to become much closer friends but at that moment I could not figure out how.

In such small English villages everybody knows everybody else's movements in detail. Naturally, as a perfect gentleman, I walked Gwen home in the evenings but there was nowhere more private than the country lane. So all we indulged in were a few lingering kisses and emotionally choked words of love. I was continually burdened with a feeling of shame for the indecent thoughts I had concerning what I would like to be doing with her and was saved from myself in not finding a place sufficiently dry to lay down or sufficiently free from interruption from the passers by. Eventually I gave up.

Once, as a result of this unconsummated love, the pain in my balls and lower abdomen made me double over as I picked my way in the blackness back to the village. Due to the wartime blackout in the village there was absolutely no light at all to guide me back. When I got back to Drapers' house, Mrs. Draper had the supper all ready and insisted I eat heartily, so I put on the straightest face I could manage and lowered myself into the chair suppressing any sign of the pain I was experiencing. I then bravely ate the meal and determined not to let a situation like this overtake me in the future. After four days with the Drapers I took my leave to return to London to complete my gunnery course. It was with a heavy heart that I left because by this time Gwen had a prominent place in my heart and the feeling was mutual.

Back to Work

The first day of the Gunnery course was on board HMS *Chrysanthemum*, an old sailing ship which was tied up alongside the dock on the Thames river. I had an intensive first day involving enemy aircraft identification, theory of gunnery, optical sighting, simulated firing, and testing on knowledge acquired. The following day we went by bus outside London proper near

the mouth of the Thames to Shoeburyness where the Royal Navy had a gunnery range. Here we fired .30 calibre Lewis, Marlin and Hotchkiss machine guns. We also used Holman Projectors (bomb throwers), racked rockets and the 40 mm Bofors. Finally we used shot guns for sighting and shooting clay pigeons. During this phase, Sir Dudley Pound (Admiral of the Fleet) reviewed our performance and tried his own hand and did very well. He shook hands with us and told us we were the best group that week and invited us all to have lunch with him, which we naturally accepted.

The next day I reported for my next sea assignment and I was ordered to Liverpool to be a crew replacement on the M.S. *Mauretania* as an Ordinary Seaman. At that stage she was troopshipping from South Africa and not returning to England but the replacements were handled through the Cunard Office in Liverpool. After a few days in Liverpool I decided I did not want to go as a passenger out to South Africa to join her, so I accepted to return to London and join the S.S. *Isabella* as an Able Seaman under the Panamanian flag.

All of the officers and most of the crew were Greek. This ship was about 4,000 tons. Originally it had been under the Norwegian flag and had been bombed and sunk early in the war in the Thames; being recently raised, repaired and refurbished (such as it was). We were scheduled to run to Canada for lumber and the watches worked were four hours on and four hours off. Usually only vessels on coastal duty maintained these watches.

There were about six foreigners on board and the living quarters were very cramped. There was also a shortage of bedding and a bare minimum of eating utensils with no hot water and only a pump back aft for cold water. The ship was filthy and we were obliged to clean our plates with a piece of bread. The food was typical Greek, being cold and greasy with a few vegetables and lots of liquor available to wash it down. Live sheep were carried on the foredeck and after slaughter the meat was hung under the wing of the bridge to swing in the breeze. The pay was reasonable but the foreigners and some of the Greeks were unhappy with the conditions of living and working because, compared with most other ships, they were miserable. I asked to get off the ship in London but the Chief Mate would not hear of it as he was having too hard a time in getting men. I determined I would get off the ship one way or the other at my first opportunity and the Mate was just as determined that he would not let anyone get away.

Our scheduled route was to follow the east coast of England and Scotland north to Old Bay,



Admiral Sir Dudley Pound

Northwest Scotland where the convoy for Canada would be formed. What a bucket! She pitched, rolled, yawed and did everything except flip right over. Most of the crew became seasick and before reaching Old Bay we had to pull in at Methill, Scotland for engine repairs which seemed to be a constant problem for this ship, however in Methill we were unable to go alongside the dock and the necessary replacement part was not available, so we pushed on to Old Bay.

Jumping Ship

Before arriving at Old Bay a Scotsman from the Isle of Lewis and I decided not to go on and we would desert in Old Bay, since we reckoned the ship had very little chance of making it to Canada as it was so unseaworthy. When we arrived at Old Bay many ships were at anchor and we dropped our hook while the engine room people went to work again on their eternal engine problems.

The following day some of the crew water tested the motor lifeboat and after finishing they hauled it up on the Falls, level with the boat deck but left it still swung out on the davits. Unbeknown to me they had removed one of the spark plugs and at about 2300, while the Mate of the Watch was drinking his coffee in the galley, the Scotsman and I lowered the boat quietly down into the water and followed it, climbing down the Falls, releasing them once we were in the boat. We then paddled the boat around to the stern of the ship where a Canadian member of the crew lowered our bags as we estimated about two miles to the closest shore.

First we had to dodge the patrol launches that crisscrossed the bay, sweeping the water with their search-lights since the whole area was classified as a protected area. Once we were out of earshot of the *Isabella* it would be safe to start up the motor, so we started using the oars. We also used the stern shadow of another ship

coming slowly to anchor, where we remained hidden until the patrol launch was far past us, then I tried the motor and discovered the spark plug was missing. We searched the boat but could not find the plug and only found one rowlock for the oars, so one man had to use a hand and hold the rowing oar in position. This proved a lot of hard work but, at some time in the early morning, we finally made a landing on the rocky sloping shore which was very steep and the only thing we could find to secure the boat painter was a large rock, around which we tied it to prevent the boat floating away (what we did not know was the very large rise and fall in tide and it was then receding).

By this time a chilling mist was all over the hills and in the darkness with our bags in our hands we stumbled up the rocky slope finally crossing a road. It was then decided to dump our bags in a nearby ditch and find a place to sleep or at least get out of the cold and wet. Fortunately there were some deserted Quonset huts nearby and we headed for the closest one which was dry inside but it had a very cold concrete floor, so we went outside and gathered some of the peat from the ground for a fire. The heat was very meagre and this, together with the discomfort of the hard floor, forced us up and out by 0600 where we shortly found a cold water stream and shaved in the dark. Soon we picked up our bags and proceeded along the road towards where we thought the town of Acknasheen was located. We had heard it was about 40 miles away but, due to erroneous advice we were headed in precisely the wrong direction.

From our vantage point high on the side of the hill we could see all the ships at anchor below. At 0700 we noticed Aldis lamp signals coming from the *Isabella* and this continued for more than one and a half hours before they were acknowledged. We didn't care very much since, if we were caught, we were prepared to stay in prison rather than return to the ship.

Suddenly we rounded a bend in the road and were at the gates of a military camp. The guard challenged us for our passes for the Protected Area which we didn't have but we showed our seamen's I.D. and told a preplanned story about being off the Pool Ship in Old Bay. He asked us to sit down and if we would care for some breakfast, which was simply an offer too good to refuse. Within fifteen minutes a Lieutenant came in and said he had received signals from the *Isabella* demanding that we be brought back and, because it was a Protected Area and possession of special passes for the area where necessary, he had no alternative but to return us to the ship. We explained to him the conditions on the ship and pleaded with him to lock us up as

we would prefer jail rather than a return, but he said "Sorry my orders are that you cannot stay in this area" and we were eventually escorted back to the *Isabella* on a launch under armed guard. Immediately the Army came on board the Chief Mate escorted them to his cabin where he made sure that they had plenty to drink and when they emerged they looked at us and said "there is nothing we can do, you will have to stay on board".

Little did they know that providence and stubbornness was about to take a hand.

Following their departure we refused to work and after six days the Mate refused to feed us but after a couple more days without food we succumbed and went halfheartedly back to work. The engine room crew had been working continuously, trying to repair the engines without success, so the Captain had abandoned the Canadian trip and decided to go to Glasgow for repairs. Once we arrived the Chief Mate knew he could no longer hold us and presented me with a bill for thirty-six pounds (sterling) which included the cost of a broken oar which occurred when they rolled the lifeboat down the hill to the waters edge at low tide. This was a huge amount of money but it was worth it to me just to get off.

While the Mate was working out the pay he put one arm around my shoulders and became 'cozy' saying "lets have a drink together, I think things will be much better if you stay on here" and by this time his other hand had my pants half undone. Surprise of surprises . . . a Queer Mate!

I grabbed my money and put distance between me, the ship and the affectionate mate and discovered a cheap place to stay and the Locarno dancehall on Sauchiehall street. This was where a boy without much money could meet some nice girls.

Still in there . . . pitching!

One of girls, whose name was Julie, agreed I could take her home following the dance and we had a number of dances together. It was wonderful to be in such a festive, cheerful atmosphere again.

There were many Americans about and they were so obvious in their furled jackets, high collars, heavy boots, coloured plaid wool shirts and wool watch caps. Some of these men undoubtedly would be from the ships destined for the Russian convoys. They were always surrounded by girls to whom they gave away liberally their Lucky Strike, Camel and Chesterfield cigarettes which smoked so much differently than the tightly packed English Players cigarette or Craven "A"s.

Julie told me that she worked in an office, was 18 years old and liked meeting colonials "be-



Colonel General Stumpff, commanding the German fifth Air Force in Norway. He had 264 operational combat aircraft for the strike.



Vice Admiral Otto Schniewind, German Commander-in-Chief afloat in the battleship TIRPITZ.

Photographs courtesy: David Irving

cause you talk so differently". On the way home we passed a bombed out house which had the stone stairway still standing, so we walked up to the second floor and went through the preliminaries of love making but stopping when we realized the wind was a bit fierce, so off we went again in search of a more romantic spot. We thought we had found it in a residential area of the older part with a stepdown doorway when suddenly the door opened inward and we both fell in with it. Out of nowhere came a voice asking "Can I help you"? Thankfully there was a blackout and he couldn't see what kind of help I needed. We then picked ourselves up, apologised for disturbing him and mumbled something about a wrong number in the dark and took our leave. In frustration we decided to walk the one and one half miles to Julie's place since we had missed the last bus.

After ten days of careful living in Glasgow my modest amount of money had become dangerously low and I had to find work quickly. I was now accustomed to short vacations and heavy spending and could no longer afford the dances so, for entertainment, I listened to others play the juke box in the Penny Arcade with such songs as "Deep in the Heart of Texas" and "Moonlight in Mexico", which were current hit songs.

While I was listening to the music I met and talked with some Dutch merchant seamen who told me they were on a new ship only seven months old and did not have a full crew yet. They suggested, if I were interested, to come down to Rothesay docks. I was broke and hungry so early next morning I was down at Rothesay docks looking for the S.S. *Paulus Potter*. The ship looked good. It was an Empire built (English

wartime ship, but with riveted and welded plates) and had made one trip under the English flag, then it was renamed after a Dutch painter and put under the Dutch flag. After inspecting it I saw that the quarters and the food were good so I signed on that morning as an A/B. Then I saw that the cargo being loaded was stamped "Archangel". Well, Russia or not I was in no position to choose! At any rate it seemed like the best ship I had had so far.

For armament it had four 20MM Oerliken canon, a number of 30 cal. machine guns, a 4.5 inch anti submarine gun back aft, two racks of Katushka type rockets (one port and one stbd.) all with two inch shells and various types of bomb throwers. Looking back it was surprising or simply that I displayed great ignorance in that I felt reassured by all this armament.

Maturing... the hard way!

After five days we finished the loading and headed out the Clyde river past the mist shrouded green hills of Greenock which had so impressed me with their beauty and which again flooded me with recent memories of happy times and a desire to return there. Once outside the mouth of the river we formed into convoy positions and headed towards Iceland.

At dusk, being a coal burning ship, one of our engineers dumped ashes over board from the Fiddle level. This in turn erroneously activated the newly installed radar which gave a false warning of an unidentified object. We became accustomed to this as it occurred everytime the ashes went over. During this time we had two overflights on the convoy by a Sunderland flying boat which was mistaken for a Blohm Vos, and

these incidents caused a general alarm on the ship until the planes dropped recognition flares. Also, an overflight by a Catalina flying boat during fog the night before our arrival in Iceland led to our enthusiastic gunners mistakenly shooting it down, since it had failed to drop recognition flares.

We anchored in the fjord at Reykjavik for one week until the rest of the convoy had arrived from the U.S. and Canada. The snow was visible on the mountains all around but it was summer and the sun shone brightly — so much so that I was tempted to go over the side of the ship for a swim, which I did. The water was literally ice cold and the sudden shock of entering it seemed to almost cause all systems to stop but it also stimulated me into a flurry of physical activity in an attempt to get warm again and I quickly swam back to the accommodation ladder.

All the crews of the waiting ships had been invited to visit the *Donbas*, a Russian oil tanker also at anchor and have tea and a film on board. A boatload from the *Paulus Potter*, including some of our fifteen Russian passenger seamen returning to the USSR, went over. The film was a diversion without great significance but it was good to meet our Russian counterparts and see the important part played by women in the crew and drink true Russian tea in the huge common messhall where all ranks from the Captain to the deckboy ate.

On my 19th birthday, the 27th of June 1942, Winston Churchill made a radio broadcast that the largest convoy yet assembled was preparing to leave Iceland for the USSR. At this time we did not know we were to be the bait for the German pocket battle ship and cruiser, the *Von Tirpitz* and the *Admiral Hipper*, which were known to be

sheltering in the coast of Norway at the time of the announcement. Churchills' announcement was generally accepted by the crew as being in 'very bad taste' and exposing us to unnecessary danger.

Around the 29th of June we were thirty eight merchant ships assembled and ready to leave with good escort cover. Departing Iceland we picked up quite a few additional cover escorts consisting of cruisers and destroyers. In the heart of the convoy rode two flak ships which were specifically designed with an armament to sustain a very rapid rate of anti-aircraft fire. Their effectiveness was well known and their barrage always gave heart to the seamen in whose convoy they rode, however these ships expended ammunition very rapidly when under attack and, even though they carried a vast quantity, if the attacks were numerous their combat endurance could be brief.

The convoy speed was established at the speed of the slowest ship which was 9 knots while our own ship was capable of attaining a speed of about 11 knots. The Russian passengers on our ship had nothing to occupy their time but to walk the deck, talk or read. I made friends with one who was a Third Mate. His name was Vasilii Nicolayevich Russokof and he was returning to his home in Vladivostock. I do not know if he ever reached home but he was a pleasant man and I tried hard to learn a little Russian so I could better understand him.

During the first few days out of Iceland we used the relative peace for lifeboat and general alarm drills. This proved invaluable as it turned out later and it was fortunate these things were impressed on us as automatic reactions.



PQ17 assembling in Iceland.

Photograph courtesy: David Irving

Off the deep end


After a few days out of Iceland we started to get daily visits from German reconnaissance planes and we began to do as much as we could to prepare ourselves for what was to follow. I was scared shitless throughout this period and was in a continual state of tension. Even during times of low work pressure and low enemy activity there existed a prevailing threshold of stress which was everpresent and which I could not shake.

I did not think of the Germans as individuals. They were to my way of thinking simply the enemy; an indefinable mass which was extremely dangerous and deadly accurate. Their firepower and professionalism were to be respected if one was to stay healthy. At that stage of the war they had an almost unbroken string of impressive victories which could not even be downplayed effectively by the Allied press propaganda.


It didn't take long before we got our first attack by low flying torpedo planes. The planes were usually supported by co-ordinated torpedo attacks by submarines. It was impossible not to have casualties under such well co-ordinated attacks and some of the oil tankers and ammunition ships that were hit were blown completely apart leaving long columns of black smoke in the sky. Where possible survivors were picked up and in some cases these were very few. As we

approached closer to the Norwegian coast the frequency of the air attacks increased and bombers joined the torpedo bombers and supported the submarine attacks which were now just as likely to occur in between air attacks as well as during them. This meant we had to be on alert for attack at all time.

The waves of air attackers seemed to come about every two hours and every man's reserve of sleep had long since been used up. Often meals had to be abandoned in the middle or eaten on the run. I recall one Welshman (Taffy) with one hand on the twin Marlin machine gun sighting on a torpedo plane sweeping across the convoy and in the other hand a half eaten sandwich. After a few days of almost continuous waves of attack by Dornier torpedo bombers and the Junker 88 bombers we received news that the *Von Tirpitz* and the *Admiral Hipper* had left the Norwegian coast and were proceeding ostensibly to attack and destroy our convoy. We were told by the Convoy Leader that the cover escort would leave us in order to intercept them, leaving us with a skeleton escort. But by now we were almost out of range of the torpedo planes and their attacks had dropped off, so we figured by maintaining our heading north we could also outrange the submarines because of ice over the water further north. Our main concern would then be with the bombers.



A Blohm and Voss 138 Spotter Plane takes off to locate PQ17 on 2 July 1942.
Photo courtesy of: Gunter Karweina 'Geleitzzug PQ17'. Wilhelm Heyne Publishers, Munich 1967.



4 July 1942. JU88s of Killer Group KG 30 commence the attack on PQ17. Neil's ship is the merchantman on the far left of the first line of ships.




Photo courtesy: David Irving



Where eagles dare! JU 88 bomber pilots look for an opening in PQ17 defences.

Photo courtesy: Gunter Karweina



Route of PQ17 up to "Scatter"

Although it shone day and night, the sun did not yield much warmth but it did provide constant light for the enemy planes to spot us. It was really a sad moment when the remaining escorts we had notified us that they also would leave to join others in fighting the German surface attackers. We would be entirely on our own and have to make it to Russia as best we could. Having been abandoned to the wolves no choices existed and we continued to head in as northerly a course possible, seeking all possible fog banks for cover from the planes. According to radio messages we were receiving from ships under attack and SOSs from sinking ships, bombers and submarines infested the whole area around us. These were not words of comfort and joy to a teenager whose desire for a life of adventure on the high seas was quickly fading!

On the horizon we could see the bombing attacks on the other ships and we were wondering each moment whether we had been sighted and whether we would be the next victims of the bombers as they come screaming out of the sun at us. It was always difficult when they came at you right out of the sun, if you had polaroid glasses it gave you a chance to see them but without them you could do nothing. We were now cutting through the ice on the surface of the sea, so we were now probably safe from the submarines. All the crew were feeling the strain from

lack of sleep and irregular meals together with the constant noise of explosions, fear of attack and possible death.

We were now three ships steaming close and parallel to each other and had maintained this grouping since the convoy broke, each being separated by approx one quarter of a mile from the other. The other ships were named the *Bolton Castle* (English) and the *Washington* (US). It was cold comfort having them with us as their armament was much lighter than ours and they seemed unable to consistently maintain speed. During the day we sustained surprise attacks by single bombers coming directly out of the sun but fortunately the bombs exploded in the water one hundred yards from the ship.

Our perhaps wishful thinking was that out of respect of our Oerlikon guns (1200 yards range), or fear of being caught in the explosion of our cargo if it went up, the planes saw fit to bomb us from a high altitude of possibly 8,000 feet. Around 1900 that same evening we were hoping that we might be able to hide for another night when there appeared seven JU-88 twin engine bombers, which started circling the three ships and peeled off in ones, twos, and threes.

The first ship to be in trouble was the *Bolton Castle* which sustained a direct hit on the foredeck. Within eight minutes the stern of the ship went up in the air and the ship slid straight

under the surface, there being just barely enough time for the crew to get their two lifeboats free and over the side. We had little time to watch the other ships as we were also under heavy attack. My battle station was normally the bridge, at the wheel of the ship, but when I got to the bridge the Mate told me to go to the boat deck and man the strip Lewis machine gun there as no one was available for that post. As I jumped for the ladder to go down someone on the bridge grabbed me and pushed me to the deck just as our starboard side rocket rack exploded with a roar as fifty rockets flashed simultaneously. I was thrown along the deck by the blast, slamming up against a metal bulkhead and hurting my head and back.

The gunners released a barrage of the two inch proximity shells but they were limited with the racks to approximately a 40 degree angle of movement in one axis only and it was mostly guesswork as to the aircraft range, speed and direction of heading. However, we always maintained that our gunners scared the enemy pilots with shells even if they never hit anything. They were a new device and highly ineffective for shipboard use against aircraft and were actually more hazardous to the crew than to the enemy, but in those days we suffered as 'guinea pigs' for a number of experimental devices.

I could now see the stbd. side rack was empty of live shell rockets so I picked myself up and raced to the second deck down. Suddenly

there was a roar from back aft on the ship and the whole ship shuddered. Looking aft, I could see a slight pall of smoke where the 4.5 inch had been fired. Intended as an anti-submarine gun it had been elevated to the maximum of perhaps 45 degrees, then the gunners waited until one of the planes would cross their sights and fire. Of course this was wild thinking but anything was worth a try and it probably also kept the planes at a respectful distance. The attack continued as I raced across the main deck amidships, then came the now familiar high pitched scream of bombs growing in intensity. I glanced up but there wasn't time to see anything and the noise was growing intense so I dodged into the main officers' saloon amidships and took refuge there as the stick of bombs burst, just missing the ship on the port side but landing close enough to send a mountain of water over the forward side of the main house and bridge, forcing the forward portholes open and pouring water in and at the same time rushing in knee deep through the open doorway. It was like a tidal wave coming down the passageway.

I thought for a few moments this was the end, that we were going straight to the bottom. We were a group of perhaps nine persons struggling to reach daylight on the deck through rushing, pushing water. In a couple of minutes it had subsided sufficiently to enable us to escape to the deck where I raced across the well deck toward the steel ladder going up to the boat deck.



BOLTON CASTLE receives a direct hit

Courtesy: David Irving



Further south the massacre of PQ17 continued. The commander of U379 orders the firing of a torpedo which destroys the HOOSIER. The 'Ice-devil' pack of six submarines accounted for 12-16 of the 25 PQ17 ships sunk.

Courtesy: David Irving

Suddenly there was a blast of sufficient force to knock me off my feet and back into the hatch coaming. I had forgotten the Holman bomb and the gunners had chosen that moment to electronically release it by remote means. It fired a parachute which deployed a cable from which was suspended a bomb, the theory being that the plane would hit the cable, wrapping it around itself until the bomb destroyed it! I never heard of an instance where a plane was actually destroyed by one and the theory was optimistic.

I picked myself up—a little bruised and shocked but not disabled and continued on my way, scrambling up the steel ladder to the boat deck on the Port side. When I reached the gun someone else was manning it so I turned to loading the circular drums with bullets. It was difficult at first with so much noise around me and my hands shaking so much to load these bullets in, one at a time, but it had to be done.

The machine guns had a range of 500 yards and there would be very few occasions when the planes would be close enough to hit, but psychologically they helped. Above us an Oerlikon 20 mm gun barked away. Then another near miss on the port side which shuddered the whole ship, springing some plates on the port side and collapsing the concrete side on the gun tub above us as we dodged the falling debris. A wall of water swept over and crashed down on the boat, again knocking me off my feet.

I was convinced this was to be the end. I could see no other way and it came to me very strongly


to pray to the God I had been taught about it when I was young. I was going to ask him to allow me to live and experience more of life, as I was sure there was nothing else I could do to stop the inevitable. I then felt the stupidity of it and the frustration. It seemed I would not live long enough to really know any of the true joys of living.

I glanced at the aft deck. The Russian passengers were looking skywards and watching falling sticks of bombs, trying to calculate where on the ship they might hit, then they ran in a direction aimed at putting the furthest distance between them and the bombs at the time of impact. It seemed futile but it was something to do!

I still tried to pray but I had no concept of God. It was only a name. I didn't even know a form of prayer or any adequate way to talk to God and time was running out. I felt it was useless but I still did not want to give up my life, half believing that I really had some choice in the matter, which of course I did not.

My own problems had been occupying me so much that I had not noticed the US ship *Washington* during the battle. As I looked at the *Washington* the American flag which had been flying aft had been replaced with something coloured white, evidently as a token of surrender but this was a shortly hauled down and again replaced by the American flag. Later it was said that the gunnery officer responsible for the attempted surrender was court martialed but I

A near miss on the PAULUS POTTER!



The JU88 attack on PAULUS POTTER, BOLTON CASTLE and WASHINGTON occurred on the evening of 5 July 1942. It was carried out by the notorious Third Squadron of Killer Group 30 (KG30) which was commanded by Captain Hajo Hermann. German war reporter Benno Wundshammer was in one of the aircraft taking pictures of the ships and survivors. Courtesy: David Irving, 'The Destruction of Convoy PQ17', William Kimber and Co Limited, London 1980.

was never able to verify this. Within minutes some near hits disabled the "*Washington*" and it caught fire in the forward part and started drifting and burning. During this time I observed four lifeboats free themselves from the disabled ship and put distance between it and themselves.

By this time we had been under attack for about an hour and I fervently hoped that the planes would be running out of fuel or ammunition and have to return to base in Norway. This must have been the case as I could only see four planes. Every once in a while they would become more daring and make a lower level dive attack, machine gunning the ship, but fortunately nobody was hit by bullets or shrapnel. Then, suddenly it seemed all hell had broken loose with near misses all around the ship. We had been bracketed by bombs which caused further springing of the ships' plates. The engines had been dislodged from their beds and the steam pipes had burst making us a sitting duck in the water.

The Captain then gave the order to abandon ship and there was not time to go back for anything. I had a warm woollen jacket on my back that I bought in Scotland and the solid Canadian boots but I did not have my cap and gloves as I had previously dropped them on the hatch and forgotten them. All my papers were sewn in canvas to protect them in case of immersion and threaded on my belt in case of flight. My lifeboat station was the lowering of the falls of one of the boats. Only after it was in the water and filled with the men assigned did I slide down the man rope provided for that purpose and into the lifeboat. We were a total of four lifeboats from the "*Paulus Potter*" and as soon as the falls were uncoupled from the ship we tried to put as much distance between us and the listing ship as possible to avoid being caught in the blast of an explosion if the ship blew apart as we suspected it could and might do.

Then came the Germans again, making low passes over the lifeboats in the water and firing their machine guns. During these moments we dropped our oars and crouched as low as we could in the boats. As the Ju 88 passed over us I glanced up and saw the large yellow and black insignia painted on each wing and the machine gunner in the bubble in the rear apparently watching us. I was terrified but I had no choice but to stay in the lifeboat and take what came. Years later I saw a book containing LUFT-WAFFE photos of the attack on PQ17 and suspect that the Germans machine gunned close to our boat to scare us and take propaganda photographs.

Out of the frying pan!


After fifteen minutes of alternately picking up the oars and rowing furiously then dropping them

and laying flat in the boat, the planes left to return to base to reload or to attack other ships. Our ship was still dead and listing in the water and we were by this time just a mile away from it. The Germans had not made a direct hit and we assumed it would not be long before they would return.

At this stage it was revealed that the Chief Engineer was missing and the motor lifeboat (there was only one with a motor) was dispatched to return to the ship for him. We waited for what seemed like ages before the motor boat returned with the Chief Engineer who was wrapped in blankets and blue with the cold. He had evidently been shutting down the engines and had missed the lifeboats so he let go a life raft and jumped into the water after it. When the motor boat returned to the ship the crew had also grabbed some loaves of bread and bottles of brandy which were certainly of some help and better than nothing. We now tied the painter of each boat to the stern of another boat with the motorboat in the lead pulling the three lifeboats. The weather was not clement. Although we still had the midnight sun it was without any heat that could be felt.

The Third Mate was in charge of our boat with a total of twenty one crewmen and he was at the tiller and had charge of food and water rationing. He could only roughly assess our position as we had charts for the Indian ocean, the Pacific ocean, and the Atlantic ocean, but none for the Barents sea! We estimated we were about 350 miles due north of Finland and soon made the discovery our compass was highly unstable due to the proximity of the North Pole, so we just crossed our fingers and hoped he was right. When we assessed the rations we found less than expected as some had been damaged by salt water in the supposedly sealed tanks of the lifeboat. We were put on strict rations of one ounce of fresh water every four hours. We also had some bully beef, a raisin pemmican mixture and dried salt biscuits. This was the staple ration which was supplemented for the first couple of days by the bread and brandy obtained from the ship.

Some six hours after abandoning ship we approached the American freighter *Olepana* which had previously been visible on the horizon. We didn't know why the Germans had not attacked it and went alongside where they told us they were expecting to be sunk anytime and that so far they had tricked the Germans by releasing smoke floats and steaming in circles as though hit, but they were certain the Germans would return and, in preparation, they had stocked their lifeboats with rations and had them swung out on the davits. They could not give us a



The abandoned PAULUS POTTER

Courtesy: David Irving



Survivors take to their lifeboats after the JU88 attack.

chart but gave us the direction and distance to the Russian island of Novaya Zemlya (New Land) together with a few cigarettes and a little extra food, as they did not have overly much for themselves.

We continued with the motor lifeboat towing for another 32 hours until the petrol was finished then hoisted sail and, because of the difference in the sailing characteristics of each boat, we soon became separated. The motor boat, with the drag of its screw, now being made the slowest.

Soon we began to see flashes of reflections in the sky which were somewhat similar to the Aurora Borealis which could be expected in that region, but they seemed to reflect the outline of a land mass somewhere ahead, possibly Novaya Zemlya, and we headed in that direction. The sea was not rough, having small waves with frequent fog banks, but we were all suffering from the cold, insufficient food and water and no sleep. I tried to sleep huddled up with my head in my arms or on my knees, sitting up trying to shut out the cold. Sometimes I would drowse fitfully for about an hour then I would come back to the sad reality of shivering with teeth chattering through cracked lips. My thoughts increasingly dwelt on imaginary roast dinners and an incredible variety of thirst quenching drinks. Cigarettes were getting very low and, when there was one

available, it would be impaled on a match or a pin and passed around for as many as possible to get a puff or two. As often as conversation would start it invariably would relate to food, but after a few days the talk grew sparse as it consumed energy and the hope of being rescued was fast disappearing.

Occasionally we would get a light snow and when this occurred we would scrape the sails with knives and put the snow in a metal container but it was never sufficient to really help out in any physical way. Yet it did have some psychological value. On the third day the water ration had been cut to one ounce every 8 hours but some of the men started to supplement this with some sea water and on the fourth day we were completely out of fresh water and most of the men were now wetting their mouths with salt water. I would rinse my mouth with it and then spit it out.

We kept a lookout standing up forward of the mast to lend substance to our hope that something might be sighted. We had arrived at the point where our actions were born more out of desperation than of logic. Almost daily we were seeing flashes in the sky that still appeared to reflect a huge land mass and were prepared to believe that is indeed what it was.

Neil's story continues in ZIG ZAG PART 3 on page 67



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
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
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STABILIZING AUSTRALIA'S EASTERN FLANK:

A Strategic Framework for the Conduct of future RAN Missions in the South West Pacific

by Squadron Leader I.K. Scott

'All we want to do is maintain the proper level of deterrence so that these individual nations can continue to grow and to proceed in a way that they feel is best for themselves'.

Admiral James A. Lyons USN⁽¹⁾

'... we are strongly opposed to the US attempts to extend NATO's competence to the entire world including ... the Pacific ocean.'

Soviet Foreign Minister E. Shevardnadze⁽²⁾

The South-West Pacific is burgeoning as a superpower stadium, with the USA and the USSR manoeuvring for political advantage and verbally jostling elbows in pre-game strategies. It is a game that is unlikely to have any winners – least of all regional stability – and is therefore not in the interests of Australia or any of the other South-West Pacific states. Why is there this renewed interest in a region that is remote from the traditional jousting fields in which East and West tilt at one another?

The Soviet position is straightforward, they are merely taking the opportunity to meet economic and political shortfalls that have developed in the relationships between the smaller nations of the region and their traditional friends. The USA and her Pacific allies are being reactive to the Soviet interest after being very slow to detect that any shortfalls existed at all. To be fair, there was reason for complacency. The independent regional states had all had a peaceful transition to self determination, aid was both welcome and plentiful and the Pacific was aligned with the West.

Being content with the status quo in the area, the West concentrated on domestic affairs and on their relationships in other more volatile regions of the world. They failed to attach enough importance to the effect that economic and social changes were having on the political outlook of the newly-independent states of the Pacific. That complacency began to disappear

with the arrival on the scene of the Russians, Cubans and Libyans, not as tourists seeking the pleasant languor of the tropical islands, but as potential comrades offering economic and political ties. The consequence of these new players showing interest in the region, even if they are not actually exporting terrorism and fomenting unrest (yet!), is that East-West action and reaction threatens regional stability. The unprecedented May 1987 military coup in Fiji demonstrated clearly just how fragile that stability is and how quickly the game plan can change.

This article discusses the implications that superpower interest and rivalry in the South-West Pacific have for regional stability and Australian security. Then, through consideration of social and political factors in the Islands and the threat posed by a Soviet presence, a national strategy will be outlined. Finally, it will evolve a maritime strategy whereby Australia can counter the global 'heavyweights' moving into what was once a relatively tranquil neighbourhood.

Throughout this paper, 'Island states' or 'Island nations', will be used as generic terms for the Pacific nations of the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa. In addition the interest, input and future participation of New Zealand will be taken as being closely aligned with that of Australia and so will not be discussed separately.⁽³⁾

Peaceful Independence

Australia and New Zealand became independent nations well before the rest of the South-West Pacific states, mainly because their populations consisted largely of European colonists. This has led to them becoming developed medium powers in the region and in fact they themselves were colonial powers, or at least had protectorate responsibilities. Being stable economically, politically and socially with capable military forces, the Anzac nations have been the older brothers in the South-West Pacific. It is the sibling sovereign states that have emerged in the last half century that are bringing home strange friends and triggering turbulence in what was a happy post-independence family. This is not to ignore the unsettling effect on the Island states of New Caledonia, a South-West Pacific nation still under French colonial rule. Whilst this issue raises angry voices and the sometimes violent struggle for Kanak independence is a threat to regional stability, it is at odds with the historical record of the area.

Unlike some other parts of the world, the process of decolonization of the Pacific was not marked by violence against the departing power. There were cases of national sectarian violence but generally the proceedings were peaceful. Perhaps it was because the islands had little to offer except sunshine and subsistence economies that the colonial powers had treated the people so well and given in gracefully. Certainly the technology needed to develop land and sea resources did not exist and this may have saved the area from rapacious colonial exploitation. Not that all colonial conduct was free from ignominy.

In the nineteenth century blackbirding was rife in the Pacific and the Melanesians suffered the most. The indentured labour of the Kanakas who were used to work in the sugar cane fields in Australia was practically slavery. Given such a heritage, the good relations that existed between ex-colonials and newly-independents could be hard to explain. Perhaps it was an offshoot of the forced mingling with Allied soldiers (who certainly did not have colonial aspirations), in the Pacific theatre during World War II. Then again, it may have been due to the less than savoury relationship with the Japanese occupation forces in the same conflict. Regardless of the reason, the order of the day when peace had returned to the region was mutual respect and friendliness. The right to self determination was recognised (except for New Caledonia) and de-colonization began.

At the birth of these fledgling nations, PNG was the only one that had the potential to be resource rich, however, the isolated and mostly

rugged countryside meant that exploration and development would take a long time to become cost effective. Nauru had the benefit of phosphate mines but for the remainder copra and other low value exports were the only source of self-generated income. Coupled with the fact that agriculture was mostly subsistence – and barely that for the very small islands – foreign aid was needed to support the fragile economies of the new states.

Aid from the former colonialists has been extensive and indeed the South-West Pacific has one of the highest levels of aid per capita in the world. Some of the aid is drying up, as with British aid to the Solomons, and it must be expected that both temporary and permanent reductions in the level of financial commitment can occur to meet the needs of the donor country.⁴ Australian aid for the period 1983/84 – 1987/88 is planned to be in the area of \$300m for the countries of the South Pacific. Assistance to recipient countries is in the form of:

- staffing assistance schemes which supplement the salaries of Australians working in foreign public services,
- training programmes to upgrade skills needed for economic and social development,
- development import grants to assist certain countries in meeting the cost of Australian imports required for development,
- development import facilities which offer financial packages for the same purpose as above,
- co-financing facilities with the World Bank to support major development projects, and
- food aid and food security development.⁵

Further assistance is given under the Defence Co-operation Programme.

Whilst much of the above-mentioned aid is aimed at development and self reliance, it has not achieved that goal. The reasons why are not easy to determine. It may be due to the inability of the states to properly utilise the aid. As an example of this PNG, with perhaps the most stable economy of the region, still relies on assistance but appears to lack the distribution infrastructure to extract the maximum developmental benefit.⁶ Furthermore, many of the nations lack anything to develop at all! An opposite view is that policies have been misdirected, a point made clear by Dr Tupeni Baba, a Fijian politician, who has criticised Australian aid for ignoring local requirements and expertise.⁷

Whether such charges are accurate or not, the fact remains that the region is far from self-

sufficient. On top of that, recent drops in commodity prices and a generally gloomy economic outlook mean that aid is crucial to most of the Island states.⁸ The new states of the South-West Pacific have a natural desire to pursue their sovereignty, but are being restricted by economic realities. Where once there was a hope that regionalism would aid in self reliance and that members of this close community could act in concert – and yet as sovereign nations – there was a need to act mainly with a view to national interests. The Pacific states sought to bolster their economies through both traditional and new sources of aid to no avail.⁹

The establishment of the right to a 200nm Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) at the United Nations Third Law of the Sea Conference in 1982, opened up new sources of income in the form of seabed minerals and, more importantly for the present, fish resources. The Island states sought agreements whereby they could be suitably compensated for the activities of foreign fishing vessels in their waters. Tuna fishermen from America, which did not recognise the 200nm EEZ, had begun operating in the South-West Pacific at this stage. With the passing of the Magnusson Act the USA was virtually allowing its tuna boat operators free reign in the area, although a fishing agreement with the American Tunaboat Association was entered into by several Micronesian states.¹⁰ Frustrated by arguments over the price of access, one of

the states, Kiribati, pulled out of the deal in 1984.

Committed to attaining economic independence and needing to cover the loss of American tunaboats fees, Kiribati revived some previously unsuccessful overtures by the Soviet Union and negotiated a fishing agreement. News of the deal was met with criticism in the West where it was seen as the thin edge of the wedge for Soviet expansionism. Nevertheless, it goaded a greater interest in the region and did force the USA to adopt a more conciliatory attitude in dealing with Pacific states. The agreement with Kiribati was not renewed when it became due in 1986 as the Russians claimed that it was unprofitable. This was little comfort to those worried about the Soviet presence in the South-West Pacific as a new agreement was made with Vanuatu and this time with the right to make port calls for replenishment. The South-West Pacific nations have responded to Western neglect of the area by playing the 'Russian card'.

The Threat Posed by a Soviet Presence

Reaction to the latest Russian activities in the Pacific has generally been one of disapproval. Western politicians, analysts and the military view the fishing arrangements as the first step by the Soviets in extending their influence in the area and ousting that of the Americans. Not that fishing was the first or only activity the Soviets have pursued. Their cruise ships are operating in



HMAS ADELAIDE shadows the new battle cruiser FRUNZE which is now deployed with SOVPACFLT.

the Pacific again after the lifting of a six year ban, which had been imposed by the South Pacific Forum in response to the invasion of Afghanistan. They have hydrographic ships operating extensively in the area and had sought to assist the Island states in research for development of seabed resources.¹¹ Additionally, they have been seeking to establish formal diplomatic relationships with the South-West Pacific states (beyond their long standing missions in Australia and New Zealand), for some time now. In 1986 the Soviet ambassador to Australia was given responsibility for PNG and diplomatic relations were opened with Vanuatu. In general though, their overtures have met with little success and it may be some time before they have a resident mission in the area.¹²

Apart from the military implications of their hydrographic activities the Soviet activities are valid and legitimate. Nonetheless, Western fears were expressed by the Australian Prime Minister in a March 1987 radio interview when he said, 'I find it difficult on the basis of Soviet activities around the world over the past couple of decades to accept that they would limit their interests to purely fishing ... that could be a cloak for other activities.'¹³ It could well be expected that by striking up economic agreements that are advantageous to the micro-states of the Pacific, Russia could create economic dependence and from that inveigle for itself both a political and military presence.

On their part the Russians deny having ulterior motives, stating that their interests lie in regional stability, using the ocean resources and protecting the environment.¹⁴ That they have a firm resolve to take part in regional affairs is in no doubt after Mr Gorbachev's July 1986 Vladivostok speech, but it cannot be assumed to be benign in view of the strategic implications for Australia. For not only is it extremely unlikely that the Soviets would pass up a chance to erode Western security interests, but the islands of the South-West Pacific sit astride Australia's sea lines of communication (SLOCs).

The 1987 White Paper on the defence of Australia is confident that we would be able to cope with interruption of overseas trade in the event of global war. It further says that disruption to trade by the denial of passage through focal points to the north of Australia, although feasible, would not threaten national survival, and that interdiction in open ocean areas is unlikely.¹⁵ Whilst these views may assist the government in justifying the limits on force structure, the fact remains that Australia is very much dependent on overseas trade for the state of its economic health. The bulk of that trade is seaborne and includes items essential to defence such as

lubricants and heavy military equipment. The Island states themselves of course, rely almost exclusively on sea transport, which is vital to the small amount of trade that they conduct.

The White Paper is confident that, should a credible threat to Australia's SLOCs arise in the region it would be readily apparent. This would allow time for the stockpiling of essential imports. History is full of examples of governments failing to successfully predict the outbreak of hostilities which directly affect them. On top of that, the numerous attacks on merchant vessels in the Persian Gulf are ample evidence of the vulnerability of sea trade, not to mention the difficulties in identifying and apprehending the perpetrators. To obviate the accusation of taking the White Paper out of context, it may suffice to say that many defence writers and analysts hold views similar to Dr Dora Alves who states, 'Australia is heavily dependent on sea trade for its survival, yet there is reluctance to accept that merchant shipping can easily be put at risk'.¹⁶ That risk would most probably be Soviet, or at least Soviet inspired.

The buildup of the Russian Pacific Fleet and the use of facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang in Vietnam, afford the Soviets military coverage of a large portion of Australia's northern and eastern SLOCs. Any access to shore facilities in the South-West Pacific could mean total coverage from the North Pacific to the Strait of Magellan. The importance of this fact has not been lost on Japan, which is striving to strengthen economic and cultural relations with the Island states after an understandable period of absence from the region. Neither has it been lost on Admiral Merino, Commander in Chief of the Chilean Navy, who states 'The Soviet Navy is basically designed and configured to carry out corsair warfare of gigantic dimensions. Its primary mission is to deny the use of SLOCs to the free world'.¹⁷

Australia has a stated interest in promoting stability in the region through which her SLOCs pass. Furthermore, any change in the power balance in the region or usurping of influence at the expense of the United States would be contrary to national interests.¹⁸ What is required then is a national strategy to ensure that those interests are upheld.

A Strategy for the South-West Pacific

National strategies are the schemes whereby national objectives and thereby national aims are met. There is a general reluctance among writers and academics to call strategies plans, but esoterics aside, that is what they are, plans for the future. Strategies are not necessarily very detailed, but they must have a clear direction. A

country formulates aims so that it may go forward or strive onward. It follows then, that national strategies must be positive. Additionally, they must have a certain timelessness in order to guarantee their continuity. National strategies that depend too much on contemporary circumstances or are likely to change with changes in government would not be feasible. They must also be realistic in terms of resources, be they economic, demographic, social or military.

Australia's strategy for the South-West Pacific must be based on her interest in regional stability. Regional stability is achieved by basically having everyone in the region content with his lot. Clearly, that is not the case with all of the above Island states at the moment and they are looking to improve their economic situation. Unfortunately, they are seeking this improvement from the people whose record shows that their behaviour is the very antithesis of that which is liable to promote stability; the Soviets. The ideological and strategic response of the Americans is to oppose Russian influence and this exacerbates the situation.

Australia's strategy then, must meet the needs of the Island states (as well as her own), and thus counter the superpower influence. Such a strategy would have many facets and although they would be hard to distinguish one from another, they could be broken into the two broad groups of aid and diplomacy. The area in which it must work is indisputably a maritime one. It should therefore take full advantage of Australia's seapower which lies in the maritime environment and infrastructure and its seaforce, which is the Navy.¹⁹

As stated previously, there are some difficulties with the present structure of aid to the Pacific. That is to say, it is either misdirected by donors or badly handled by recipients. The categories of aid used by Australia are weighted towards development, which is as it should be. The sooner the states become self sufficient, the sooner they will be able to enjoy their sovereignty to the full. The direction of the development though, must be determined by the states themselves. Furthermore, training of local personnel should be the priority. Ex-patriate Australians with their subsidised pay must be a canker to the locals as disparate living standards not only create high expectations but smack of condescending patronage. Given the importance of the 200nm EEZ, especially to those micro-states with no potential for agricultural development, aid should be directed at the maritime environment and infrastructure.

The development of maritime associated industries such as fishing combines and

canneries, port facilities and intra-regional shipping are not new of course, but emphasis must remain in that area. The means of ensuring that this is done exists in the South Pacific Forum and its agencies. Assistance in formulating agreements on access to marine resources is also important, especially for those countries which could not support any infrastructure for exploiting their own EEZ. Full benefit of their EEZs can only come, of course, if the Island states are able to police them. This would entail surveillance, along with the means of intercepting and apprehending transgressors. These aspects have been addressed in the Defence White Paper with P-3C Orion deployments and the Pacific Patrol Boat project.²⁰

The unfettered and wise distribution of aid to the countries of the Pacific is closely linked to Australia's diplomatic efforts. Australia has generally good relations with all of the nations, although notable differences have arisen from time to time, and should foster the notion of being an older brother.²¹ The value of being seen as a friend and welcome member of the region cannot be underestimated from a strategic point of view. If the Island nations feel that they can turn to Australia (and New Zealand) for advice and assistance, rather than to non-regional powers or superpowers, the influence of outsiders would be minimal. This does not mean to say that the states would be obliged to consult Australia; they have a sovereign right to enter into such diplomatic and trade agreements as they see fit.

As well as having diplomatic representation on the ground, the military can be used to further foreign policy objectives. The Australian Defence Forces, and more particularly the Navy, can be used to support the interests of allies in times of tension, demonstrate resolve, extend influence, bolster prestige and carry out a host of other activities in support of diplomacy.²² Navies are recognised as being admirably suited to this role as they are self contained, highly visible, mobile and flexible. Ship visits demonstrate an active interest in regional defence and friendship, shrinking the neighbourhood and bringing the Island states and Australia closer together.

Furthermore, defence co-operation programmes assist in cementing military – and therefore diplomatic – relations. Training foreign military personnel, both in Australia and at home, forges strong personal and professional military links. A wide range of training and community help activities, from training police bands to ship's crews painting school houses already take place. The importance of defence co-operation is recognised in the White Paper.

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It is important to demonstrate ASW capability in the region.

Additionally, combined exercises and advanced training with the fledgling military and para-military forces of the region would evidence regional defence solidarity. These military aspects of diplomacy need to be based on regional alliances, treaties and understandings, which could be inaugurated under the auspices of the South Pacific Forum.²³ Keeping regional defence 'in-house' will offer little scope for external disruptions to stability in the area.

Regular demonstration of all conventional naval warfare capabilities (especially anti-submarine warfare) in the area, along with a submarine presence and surveillance flights, would demonstrate a firm resolve to keep the SLOCs of Australia and the South West Pacific open. This demonstration, to friend and foe alike, would keep the possible high cost of interdiction foremost in the mind of a would-be aggressor. Thus, the aim of a regular military presence would be to act as a deterrent. The activities of such a presence however, must demonstrate both the ability and the will to use force in the national interest.

This strategy envisages using naval capabilities that are elements of both sea denial; denying the enemy the use of the sea for his own purposes, and sea assertion; using the sea for your own purposes. The only elements missing would be nuclear strike, organic air strike and organic amphibious assault capabilities. Having less than all capabilities and accepting that the size of the Navy is limited by resources, places riders on Australia's maritime strategy for the South-West Pacific. This can now be defined as combining sea denial and sea assertion, both of which would be pervasive in the deterrent sense and limited to specific areas or sea lanes in the combative sense.

Having looked at those activities that Australia must undertake in the Pacific the elements of a maritime strategy have become clear and that strategy defined in contemporary terms. The

strategy agrees with the initiatives outlined in the White Paper, although that document does not place much emphasis on protecting SLOCs. The next step would be for those responsible for military planning and force structure to take the strategy and work back from it. By doing so, concepts which are not immediately apparent or are limited by finance could be identified and planned for. This would allow the strategy to be carried out more completely if required in the future. In order to expand on that point two examples will be outlined.

The capacity of a small nation to exercise sea denial can be greatly enhanced for a relatively low cost. The first example of this is the advent of accurate, simple and cheap surface-to-surface missiles. This means that patrol boats can be fitted with a weapon system that poses a threat to an interloper that is disproportionate to the cost of the system. The second example is a mine warfare capability. Low cost mines boost a nation's sea denial capacity, whilst a mine countermeasures capability, (not so cheap), enhances sea assertion.

The military aspects of the maritime strategy need to be kept in perspective. They are only a part of the diplomatic whole and Australia must continually work at the role of a major regional power with legitimate rights to participate in South-West Pacific affairs. To balance Australia's independent but aligned stance on regional issues with those of every Island state though, is at the best of times difficult. Two examples are; the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (and American nuclear warships), and self determination for New Caledonia (and the rights of both Kanaks and indigenous whites). In stating a position however, Australia must avoid the accusations of neo-colonialism or interference which arise from time to time, especially from the Melanesian 'bloc'.²⁴ Perhaps the memory of blackbirding is not so dim!

Conclusion

The South-West Pacific is in metamorphosis and has been markedly so in the last three or four years. Political maturity, social development and world and regional affairs are forcing the change from a peaceful pro-Western entity to an as yet unknown end product. The independent states are on the horns of a dilemma. Their political development calls for the exercise of complete sovereignty; their economic plight places them in need of aid. **Australia and her allies have been complacent in their attitude, blithely content with the status quo. The Soviets on the other hand have been quick in grasping the opportunity to extend their influence into the region.**

Russia proffered fishing agreements, hydrographic research assistance and made diplomatic overtures in response to the needs of the Island states, with varying degrees of success. A typical response to Western criticism of involvement with the Soviets was that of the Prime Minister of Kiribati, Leremia Tabai who

retorted, 'We want to earn our living. Earning a fishing living from the Russians is better than having to ask our traditional friends to support us'.²⁵ Experience in other parts of the globe though, indicates that the Russians would soon be fishing for more than the pelagic species found in the South-West Pacific.

The somewhat belated response from the Western nations opens up the real possibility of destabilising the region as the superpowers vie to exert their influence in the South-West Pacific. This is clearly not in Australia's interest and she must pursue a national strategy that meets the needs of the region, promotes stability and guards her SLOCs. The strategy must have two arms in which to encircle the Island States; aid and diplomacy. Fortunately, Australia has aid mechanisms already operating and the White Paper generally supports the maritime strategy outlined in this essay. Australia must now pursue the strategy with vigour, tact and sensitivity, obviating the need for superpower activities and influence in the South-West Pacific.



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OPENING UP NEW FRONTIERS: THE NAVAL PRESENCE MISSION IN THE SOUTHERN OCEAN AND ANTARTICA

by Lieutenant Commander G.K. Kildey, RAN

'Australia's defence policy is primarily directed to the development of independent and, within resource constraints, increasingly self reliant defence capabilities to deter and if necessary, defeat military threats against Australia and its direct interests'

Australian Yearbook 1985

Although there is an increasing emphasis on a more self reliant defence posture, priority in defence planning has been directed towards the defence of Australia and its immediate maritime approaches. Australia must also develop and maintain the capability to protect its remote territories and resource zones. Australia's claim to sovereignty over three-sevenths of the Antarctic continent is by far the largest of any nation. Australia should be prepared to uphold its claim to sovereignty.

The potential of the marine and mineral resources of the Southern Ocean and Antarctica will ensure that they are increasingly vital to Australia. As the importance of the Antarctic region grows, Australia will need to ensure that its sovereignty is preserved. In the Antarctic the political and legal framework is a unique and enduring feature which has been successful in protecting Australia's interests. The Antarctic Treaty has resulted in political rather than military solutions to disagreements. However, the potential exists in the future for confrontation over disputed territories and resources.

The aim of this article is to determine a maritime strategy which will protect Australia's interests in the Southern Ocean and Antarctica. First, it will examine the historical development and establishment of the Australian presence. Then, Australia's vital interests in the Antarctic region will be identified and examined briefly. Finally, a maritime strategy to protect those interests will be developed which is based on three components. These are active support of and continued participation in the Antarctic Treaty, the preservation of Australian sovereignty and an independent capability for effective deterrence.

Establishment and Development of Australia's presence

Antarctica is the coldest, highest, windiest and driest continent on earth. It comprises an area of almost 13 million square kilometres and is covered by an ice sheet with an average depth of two kilometres. One million square kilometres of floating ice shelves surround it. There is no indigenous human population. A glance at the map reveals that Antarctica is nearer to Sydney than is Port Hedland.

The Southern Ocean is characterised by near freezing air temperatures, very strong winds and high seas. Navigation is made extremely difficult by icebergs and pack ice which can extend 600 kilometres north of the continent, sudden violent and unpredictable changes in the weather, a large number of shoals rising quickly from deep water, inadequate charts due to a lack of accurate hydrographic surveys; absence of navigational aids and 'white out' conditions during snow storms.

From the time that Captain Cook first circumnavigated the Antarctic continent during his voyage of discovery in 1772-75 the pack ice was the scene of extensive fur sealing and whaling, and the continent was visited by adventurers and explorers. By the beginning of the twentieth century national interests and rivalries amongst the early visitors were substantial. The first two decades of the 1900s became known as the 'heroic era' during which time great progress was made in acquiring geographic and scientific knowledge, and a number of nations sought national prestige in attaining territorial acquisitions. Australians played a significant role in the exploration and

occupation of Antarctica. Sir Douglas Mawson's British, Australian, New Zealand Antarctic Research Expedition (BANZARE) of 1929-31 laid the foundation for the proclamation of the Australian Antarctic Territory (AAT).

In 1933 the British Government formally transferred the present AAT to Australian control. Under the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty Acceptance Act, Australia now claims sovereignty over all the islands and territories situated south of latitude 60 degrees S and between longitudes 45 degrees E and 160 degrees E, other than Adelie land which is claimed by France. The AAT has an area of about 6 million square kilometres and a coastline of about 7500 kilometres. Australia also exercises jurisdiction over the sub-Antarctic Heard, Macdonald and Macquarie Islands.

To give credibility to its territorial claim Australia has undertaken an extensive post war programme of scientific research and exploration. In 1947 the Australian Government established the Australian National Antarctic Research Expeditions (ANARE) which is now co-ordinated by the Antarctic Division of the Department of Science and Technology. The Antarctic Division formulates and develops Australia's policies on Antarctic matters, administers the AAT and sub-Antarctic Islands, organises and provides logistic support for ANARE, and plans and conducts scientific programs. In 1954 the ANARE established the first permanent Australian station, named after Sir Douglas Mawson. Since then stations have been established at Casey and Davis on the Antarctic continent. A permanent station is also operating on Macquarie Island. The stations act as bases for mounting inland programs and provide facilities for weather observation, scientific research and communications. In 1981-82 a ten year program for redeveloping Australia's Antarctic stations began and is now well advanced.

Australia's Interests

The basis of a sound maritime strategy must be a clear identification of national vital interests. Australia has a wide range of interests in the Antarctic region and these are examined in the following paragraphs:

Strategic Significance

Antarctica lies across the southern entrances to the Australian continent and a hostile power located in the Antarctic could dominate shipping lanes on the east and west coast of Australia. German commerce raiders during World War II made effective use of Kerguelen Island as a base for carrying out attacks against shipping on the Australian coast and for mining the sea lane

entrances to the southern ports. Antarctica is also in a dominant position in relation to the great circle routes and could provide a viable alternative route from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean.

Scientific Research

Scientific research is the single most important Australian activity in Antarctica at present.⁽¹⁾ Virtually all the surface terrain of Antarctica has been seen and most regions have been aerially photographed. Surveying and mapping of the continent is continuing but progress has been hampered by the harsh climate. 'The highest priority for research relates to the study of living and mineral resources of the Antarctic continent and off-shore islands, and the environmental effects of their exploration and exploitation'.⁽²⁾ In the future oceanography and marine biology will play an increasingly important part of scientific research and will require a specialised ship to provide support.

Some scientific programs now being conducted also have potentially important military significance. Year round meteorological observations are carried out at the three Antarctic stations to provide part of the information used in daily weather forecasts for the southern hemisphere. One of the objectives of the glaciology and upper atmosphere physics program is to provide an improved basis for long term weather forecasting and monitoring climatic changes. Upper atmosphere and cosmic ray physics programs are aimed at understanding how the earth's magnetic field behaves, which is essential information for maintaining accurate navigation and high quality radio communications.

The Living and Mineral Resources

Whilst the Antarctic continent is scientifically important, in the future the entire region may prove to be economically vital because of its resources. 'There is a growing international interest which has a political and economic, as well as scientific basis'.⁽³⁾ This has been primarily motivated by an awareness of its resource potential.

For many years commercial activity concentrated on the hunting of whales and fur seals. More recently the Southern Ocean has attracted attention as a new fishing ground because of dwindling stocks in the more easily accessible traditional fishing grounds. Biological research has revealed that the sea is well endowed with properties essential for sustaining commercial quantities of fish. The Southern Ocean is bounded by the Antarctic convergence, a biological boundary established by the meeting of cold and warm water currents which provide abundant nutrients. However, a large fish

population has not yet been found and information on their extent, movement and life cycle is scarce. Since 1967 the Soviet Union has conducted largely experimental commercial fishing and in the peak season of 1975-76 it has been estimated that they landed up to 300,000 tonnes of fish. This largely consisted of antarctic cod and herring, southern blue whiting and hake. At present Australia does not possess a distant water fishing fleet with the capability to carry out commercial fishing operations in the Southern Ocean.⁽⁴⁾

Whilst there is potential for exploitation of finfish, shellfish and squid the important marine resource in terms of commercial viability and nutritional value is krill, a red prawn-like crustacean. Both the Soviet Union and Japan are presently evaluating the krill resource and other countries also have plans to harvest it. At present krill is the only fishery resource with good prospects for expansion, although production and marketing problems have been experienced.

'The geology of Antarctica is now well known sufficiently to allow prediction of the existence of a variety of mineral deposits'.⁽⁵⁾ A number of minerals have been found in minor quantities including antimony, chromite, copper, gold, lead, molybdenum, tin and zinc. Because most of the continent lies beneath ice and snow, exploration has concentrated on the exposed areas of rock. The fact that no deposits of significant size have yet been found, apart from large quantities of low grade brown coal, is probably the result of inadequate sampling. Commercial operations may be feasible in near shore regions requiring little or no ice breaker assistance, however mining activities inland would be extremely difficult because of the difficulties of transportation over the terrain.

There have been various estimates of the potential of off-shore oil and gas reserves, however it is believed that hydrocarbons do exist in commercial quantities because of the similarities between the sedimentary basins of Antarctica and the Otway basin, the site of the Bass Strait oil reserves. In 1973 the US oceanographic research ship *Glomar Challenger* detected hydrocarbon traces during drilling in the Ross Sea, off McMurdo Sound. Drilling also obtained showings of methane gas in the same area. A massive exploration effort would be required to determine whether hydrocarbons exist in commercial quantities. Eventually, market forces and improvements in technology could make it economically feasible to move the search for oil to Antarctica and its surrounding seas, despite the formidable practical difficulties involved.

The Political and Legal Framework

The need for some form of international agreement regarding the Antarctic became apparent in the 1940s when armed clashes occurred over territory claimed by the United Kingdom, Argentina and Chile in the Antarctic peninsula and its offshore islands. An American initiative to subordinate tensions caused by overlapping territorial claims in favour of scientific pursuits resulted in what has been called the International Geophysical Year (IGY) of 1957-58. During the IGY scientific research was conducted throughout the continent on the understanding that all personnel engaged in scientific research would be afforded free access to all parts of Antarctica. Perhaps the greatest benefit however, was the spirit of co-operation between scientists of participating nations. With the end of the IGY the threat arose that the political consensus would end, thereby allowing the carefully worked out structure for international agreement to collapse.


The Antarctic Treaty

It was agreed between the nations involved in Antarctica that some more permanent special regime would be desirable and negotiations began which led to the signing of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959 by the twelve nations who had maintained stations in the Antarctic during the IGY.⁽⁶⁾ Of these nations seven, including Australia, had territorial claims resulting from their involvement in the historical development of Antarctica. The Treaty is open to any member of the United Nations which can demonstrate its interest in Antarctica by conducting substantial scientific research, such as the establishment of a scientific station. This requirement has tended to exclude claims by most of the developing countries because of the strain it would impose on their limited resources. Since the Treaty came into force in 1961, 16 nations have joined as Consultative Parties.

The main provisions of the Antarctic Treaty are: Article I which provides for the peaceful use of Antarctica and prohibits measures of a military nature, although it does not prevent the use of military personnel or equipment for scientific research or peaceful purposes; Article II for international co-operation and the freedom of scientific information; Article IV which preserves the position of the Treaty parties who have territorial claims and states that no new claim or enlargement of any existing claim shall be asserted whilst the Treaty is in force; Article V for the prohibition of nuclear explosions or waste disposal; Article IX for the consultative arrangements for Treaty management; Article XI for reference of disputes to the International Court of Justice and Article XII for a review of the Treaty

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by all parties after it has been in force 30 years (in 1991). The Treaty applies to the area south of latitude 60 degrees S, but without prejudice to the high seas rights of any state under international law.⁽⁷⁾

The formulation of the Treaty was permitted Australia to uphold its claim to the AAT, without damage to its relations with the other signatories. Furthermore, there seems to be a growing acceptance that the Treaty is a universal and viable mechanism for dealing with future issues relating to Antarctica. The way that Australia can best protect its interests in Antarctica will be through positive international co-operation within the auspices of the Antarctic Treaty. This method has been successfully used for the protection and management of the marine living resources. A regime for the exploitation of mineral resources, including the hydrocarbons believed to be in the continental shelf, is presently being developed.

Maritime strategy has always been determined in the real world of constantly changing conditions and does not just imply naval forces alone. International agreement is an essential component of maritime strategy and the Antarctic Treaty provides the major legal framework for the protection of Australia's interests in the Southern Ocean and Antarctica.

The Preservation of Sovereignty

Traditionally, the right to exploit resources has been considered an integral right of sovereignty. Those states, including Australia, who claim sovereignty over Antarctica would prefer ownership of the resources which are located within their territory. This position is being challenged in the United Nations by some Third World countries, some of whom have no stake in Antarctica, who maintain that the area should be set aside from national claims as part of the 'common heritage of mankind'. Australia has joined the other Antarctic Treaty parties in resisting these claims. Any subsequent development must preserve the Treaty parties' legal positions concerning jurisdiction and provide a stable basis from which exploration and exploitation of resources can be approached, consistent with the interests of the wider international community.

The final convention of the eleventh session of the United Nations Conference of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was concluded in 1982. Australia has signed but not yet ratified the agreement. The text includes articles on the system of exploration and exploitation of the deep sea bed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, extension of the territorial sea to twelve nautical miles, establishment of coastal state sovereign rights to the living and mineral

resources of an Exclusive Economic zone (EEZ) of 200 nautical miles, recognition of coastal state sovereign rights over the exploration and exploitation of the national resources of the continental shelf, in some cases well beyond the extent of the EEZ protection and preservation of the marine environment, provision for marine scientific research and the mechanism for settlement of disputes.

Application of the Law of the Sea could also have significance in Antarctica. At present coastal waters in Antarctica are regarded as comprising part of the high seas. It has been argued that Australia could legally declare a 200 nautical mile EEZ to the areas of sea adjacent to the AAT. The effect of this action would be to further expand the extent of Australia's interests in the Southern Ocean.

In assessing the development of capabilities to deter, and if that fails defeat, military threats against Australia's interests in the Southern Ocean and Antarctica, consideration should first be given to the level of conflict that is likely to occur. The likelihood of an Australian Government becoming involved in a medium or high level conflict in the Antarctic region is considered to be remote. Both the USA and USSR are capable of conducting military operations in Antarctica and have a demonstrable capacity to provide sustained logistic support on a large scale. Australia does not have the resources to respond to the unlikely threat posed by either of the superpowers, although neither recognises Australia's claim to sovereignty over the AAT. The warning time for intermediate level threats, which might include major raids comprising seize and hold operations or lodgements on Australian territory, are considered to be a matter of years. Most countries would take several years to build up the necessary forces to mount and sustain an attack, and Australia's intelligence assessments would provide the warning time required to ensure an adequate and timely response. Therefore, the capability to conduct operations in Antarctica should be limited to responding to lesser threats or contingencies such as limited harassments, raids and incursions. The British Cod Wars against Iceland in 1958, 1972 and 1975 are recent examples of a low level confrontation. It is conceivable that Australia could become involved in a similar dispute over resources. This could develop with little warning time, necessitating maritime forces deploying into the Southern Ocean for sustained operations. This would be at a considerable distance from main bases and support areas in Australia. At best, operations would be at the extreme limit of land based air cover.



RAN Flagship: HMAS STALWART

Independent Deterrence

'A manifest ability to defend our own territory should be seen as an integral part of a policy of defence deterrence'.⁽⁸⁾ The Navy does not own an ice strengthened ship and has limited experience of operating in Antarctic waters. The relief journey to Macquarie Island undertaken by *HMAS STALWART* in December 1985, was the first visit to the region by an RAN ship for many years. Australia does not possess a nationally owned icebreaker and sea transport is provided by charter of foreign owned, ice strengthened, supply ships in support of the ANARE summer field program. This is in marked contrast to a number of other nations which have a lesser commitment to Antarctica. Furthermore, Australia has developed no permanent airfield on the AAT which would be capable of supporting long range maritime patrol aircraft. The air force continues to conduct regular C-130 flights to transport personnel and supplies to Antarctica but these are destined for the American base at McMurdo Sound.

To demonstrate its resolve to uphold sovereignty over the AAT, Australia needs to acquire the capability to conduct sustained maritime operations in the Southern Ocean and should maintain

a minimum level of competence in the force-in-being. This would best be achieved by the acquisition of an ice-breaker capable of year round, all weather operations. Australian seamen would then receive experience in navigation and ship handling in the Southern Ocean; an area dominated by freezing temperatures, icebergs, fogs and poor visibility. Because of resource constraints and the high priority for acquiring new items of major capital equipment it would probably not be feasible for the Defence budget to fund the acquisition of this ship, unless some offset were found. The Department of Science and Technology is currently undertaking a feasibility study to determine the requirement for an Australian owned and operated ice-breaker. The ship's primary role would be to exercise sovereignty and enforce jurisdiction by carrying out surveillance patrols, therefore it should be manned by a naval crew because Australia does not maintain a civil coast guard to fulfill this function. Its secondary role would be to provide transportation and logistic support to the Antarctic stations. The ship would also have an important role in facilitating and supporting scientific work including oceanographic research, hydrographic surveying and meteorology.

Conclusion

Australia has had a long association with Antarctica which commenced with early exploration and occupation, and will continue to play a key role in its future development. Antarctica's importance is derived from its geographical proximity, the history of Australian involvement there and administration of the AAT. Together, these constitute the basis of Australian sovereignty in the Antarctic region.

Australia has security, scientific and economic interests in the Southern Ocean and Antarctica. In a strategic sense Antarctica and its nearby islands could play a decisive role for control of inter-ocean shipping during times of conflict. A comprehensive scientific research program is maintained and continued freedom of Australian scientific activity is essential. The probability of economic exploitation of the marine living resources of the Southern Ocean, and mineral resources of the seabed and Antarctic continent, will increase as resources are gradually depleted elsewhere.

The Antarctic Treaty was developed in a period when the only significant activities in Antarctica were exploration and scientific research. To date it has succeeded in maintaining

peace in the region; it has removed the potential for disputes relating to sovereignty and guaranteed freedom of scientific activity. The Treaty is due for renewal or expiry in 1991 and Australia should take diplomatic action to ensure its continuity.

The possibility exists that conflict could occur over disputed territories and resources in the Southern Ocean and Antarctica as their potential for economic development comes closer to realisation. The effect on Australia's interests in the Antarctic region of the provisions of the Law of the Sea will be wide ranging. Australia should be committed to developing and maintaining the capability to exercise jurisdiction, with naval forces playing a primary role in the preservation of Australia's sovereignty over its territories and resource zones.

To maintain a credible deterrent to a low level threat against its interests in the Southern Ocean and Antarctica, Australia needs to develop an independent capability to conduct maritime operations in the Southern Ocean. An Australian owned and operated ice-breaker would establish that capability and provide the primary means of bolstering Australian sovereignty, as well as providing support for the ANARE.



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WASHINGTON NOTES

LOBBYING IN WASHINGTON

A GUIDE TO SOME OF THE POLITICAL FACTS OF LIFE IN AMERICA

A SPECIAL REPORT by TOM FRIEDMANN

Lobbying, in one form or another, has been an active part of the American political system since before the establishment of the Republic. Indeed, it has been 'so deeply woven into the American political fabric that one could, with considerable justice, assert that the history of lobbying comes close to being the history of American legislation'.

How important are lobbying efforts? Early in the consideration of what eventually became the Tax Reform Act of 1986, lobbyists were so successful in persuading so many members of the Senate Finance Committee to propose amendments favourable to their positions that Committee members were actually embarrassed at what they had done. In a politically courageous move, then-chairman Robert Packwood (Republican-Oregon) scrapped the first bill that was before the Committee and then proposed a daring alternative that restructured the entire American tax system. Senator Packwood's triumph carried the bill through Senate consideration with few amendments and the initiative carried into the conference committee that drafted the final legislation.

Senator Packwood handed the Washington lobbying corps one of its most stunning defeats. However, only a short time before, the National Rifle Association (NRA), one of the largest and best financed lobbies in Washington, prevailed in its 18 year fight to weaken the Federal gun control laws, which were passed in large part after the assassinations of Senator Robert F. Kennedy and Dr Martin Luther King, Jr. The NRA persevered despite polls which consistently show the public favouring tougher gun control laws, a rise in statistics regarding violent crimes and the opposition of police and sheriffs' departments nationwide.

But these are end results. The purpose of this column is to provide the reader with some background on lobbying, its history, its use, its effect with emphasis on the Congress, and its importance to Australia as the Commonwealth conducts its business with the Government of the United States.

THE HISTORY OF LOBBYING

Lobbying is as old as the right of petition which can, in turn, be traced to the Magna Carta of 1215.

As one commander has described it, 'Doubtless ever since representative assemblies began, citizens have visited them for purposes of persuasion.' Early English parliaments were regular recipients of a wide variety of petitions. As the English government became centralized and developed separate branches and agencies, fewer petitions were made to Parliament. But a residual right remained and came to be described by seventeenth century English judges as 'the birthright of the subject.'

By the late eighteenth century, the right of petition was used by American colonists to express their grievances against the Crown. In the Resolutions of the Stamp Act Congress of 1765, the colonists wrote: 'That it is the right of the British subjects in these colonies to petition the king or either house of parliament'.

Similar language appeared in the resolves of the First Continental Congress. The fact that 'our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury' was one of the basic grievances against King George III enumerated in the Declaration of Independence. And when the Bill of Rights (the first 10 amendments to the U.S. Constitution) was adopted in 1791, the first Amendment included the well-known words: 'The Congress shall make no law ... abridging ... the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for redress of grievances.' As the Supreme Court of the United States would later describe it, 'The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect of public affairs and to petition for redress of grievances'.

Representatives of special interests appeared in the annals of the First Continental Congress, but the word 'lobby' was not recorded until 1808 when it appeared in the annals of the 10th Congress. Tradition says the term was coined because people waited in the Members' Lobby of the House of Representatives to approach Members for their support. By late 1829, the term 'lobby-agents' was applied to favour-seekers at the state capitol in Albany, New York. By 1832, the shortened term 'lobbyist' was in wide use at the U.S. Capitol.

Among the Founding Fathers, only James Madison ('Father of the Constitution', Member of Congress, Secretary of State, and President of the United States) expressed concern over the dangers posed by pressure groups. In *The Federalist* (No. 10) (a series of essays written by Madison, Alexander Hamilton [later secretary of the treasury] and John Jay [later chief justice of the United States] in support of the ratification of the Constitution by the states and one of the greatest bodies of work ever written on representative government), Madison warned against the self-serving activities of the 'factions'. He wrote:

'Among the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction ... By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.'

A strong federal government, Madison concluded, was the only effective counterbalance to the influence of such 'factions'. One can only wonder what Madison thought of the many 'factions' he had to deal with during his presidency and what they would think of the importance of lobbying in the political life of the United States today.

SOURCES OF LOBBYING

Lobbying: Pros and Cons

It is widely recognized that pressure groups, whether operating through general campaigns designed to sway public opinion or through direct contacts with members of Congress, perform some important and indispensable functions. Such functions include helping to inform both Congress and the public about problems and issues, stimulating public debate, opening a path to Congress for the wronged and needy, and making known to Congress the practical aspects of proposed legislation — whom it would help, whom it would hurt, who is for it and who is against it. The spinoff from this process is considerable technical information produced by research on legislative proposals.

Against benefits to the public that result from pressure activities, critics point to certain serious liabilities. The most important is that, in pursuing their own objectives, the pressure groups are apt to lead Congress into decisions that benefit the pressure groups but do not necessarily serve other parts of the public or the national interest. A group's power to influence legislation is often based less on its arguments than on the size of its membership, the amount of financial and manpower resources it can commit to a legislative pressure campaign, and the astuteness of its representatives.

My own experience as both a lobbyist and as the recipient of lobbying is that lobbyist's work had to give the person being lobbied the very best information possible, including an analysis of the opposition's position. Without the help of lobbyists the jobs of Hill staffers would be much harder since lobbyists provide data that would otherwise take weeks for staffers or the Congressional Research Service to generate.

Generally, lobbyists are highly capable individuals who deal on their good word. If a lobbyist cannot be relied upon to provide accurate information, or otherwise deals in a slipshod or dishonest manner, he will rapidly lose his effectiveness by losing access to Hill offices.

Pressure and Who Exerts it.

Pressure has selfish aims — to assert rights, achieve an ideological goal, or to win a special privilege or financial benefit for the people exerting the pressure.

Traditionally, pressure groups in the United States have been composed of people with similar economic or social interests. Classic examples of lobbies are those representing farmers, businessmen and labour unions. Each of these groups has specific interests that draw the support of a large segment of its membership.

Who lobbies Congress? ... Virtually everyone!

- * The Executive Branch: Executive branch lobbying activities, headed by the President, have been described as the most pervasive, influential, and costly of any of the pressure groups converging on Capitol Hill.

All presidents since George Washington have lobbied Congress. President Ronald Reagan is renowned for his lobbying skills, probably the greatest in the White House since the time of Franklin D. Roosevelt. White House lobbying is guided through the Congressional Liaison Office which was established during the Eisenhower administration.

Of the executive departments, the armed services rate as among the very best lobbyists with the Navy currently seen as the most effective service. Gold braid, glittering stars and rainbows of service ribbons are sent to the Hill in staggering quantities. Some of the best advice I received while working for the Senate Democratic Policy Committee was given to me by a retired Air Force colonel who was working on the House Armed Services Committee. He admonished me not to be blinded by all the stars I saw at the hearings I attended. They were specifically to distract the vision of 'lesser mortals,' he said. The current state of defence acquisitions and the backwash of the recent testimony by Lt. Col. Ollie North, USMC, would lead one to believe that many people have gone blind from all that star shine!

Note, however, that the inter-branch pressure works in reverse. Members of Congress exert pressure on executive agencies in many ways, not the least of which is through the making of inquiries on given matters that demonstrate an interest on the part of a member of the body that must pass agency appropriations.

- * Public Interest Groups: These groups are concerned with a vast array of issues and usually have large numbers of individual members. Examples are the League of Women Voters, Americans for Democratic Action, Common Cause and the Conservative Caucus.
- * Groups Promoting a Specific Cause: There are unnumbered organizations and trade associations who seek to influence legislation. Such groups include the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Trust for Historic Preservation and the American Legion.
- * Individuals: The average citizen often makes the very best lobbyist. And individuals *can* make a difference. One example is the mother who formed Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) after the death of her child in an alcohol related accident. In the course of five years, MADD forced the Congress to threaten states that did not raise the drinking age to 21 with a loss of Federal highway funds. Almost all have complied and alcohol related deaths have noticeably decreased.

Personal wealth amplifies the individual's voice in proportion to the size of his fortune. When the House version of last year's tax bill was passed, the congressman representing the Gallo wine making family of California added an amendment at their request that increased the amount of money a person could leave in trust to a grandchild without the payment of the generation-skipping tax (a form of penalty for using a trust) from \$250,000 to \$5 million. Needless to say, the 'Gallo Amendment' would affect very few Americans and was the subject of much adverse criticism. It stayed in the bill but was not in the final legislation.

As to who the actual lobbyists are, they are frequently attorneys affiliated with traditional law firms. A recent development is the lobbying/public relations firm with specialists who may or may not be members of the bar. Among the most active lobbyists are some 300 former members of Congress who, after leaving office, are hired as lobbyists for private organisations. As the old saying goes, *They come to govern, they stay to lobby.*

The corps of Washington lobbyists has grown steadily since the New Deal (1933-1941) and World War II (1941-1945), but especially since the early 1970s. The growth in the number of lobbyists has paralleled the growth in Federal spending and the expansion of Federal authority into

new areas. The Federal government has become a tremendous force in the life of the nation, and the number of fields in which changes in Federal policy may spell success or failure for special interest groups has been greatly enlarged.

With the drive to reduce Federal spending, the competition for the dwindling supply of Federal dollars has become more intense. Lobbyists must compete with one another to safeguard traditional spending in their area of interest or to gain some portion of the smaller Federal pool of funds. This in itself has been a boon to professional lobbyists and has brought about the creation of many new lobbying firms.

FOREIGN LOBBYING

Since World War II, lobbying by foreign interests and by American groups with foreign members or interests has become an increasingly important factor in Washington legislative and executive decision making. Foreign-oriented lobbying is based on international politics, world trade and American domestic issues, for any action by the U.S. government may have global implications.

Over 700 active registered agents representing the interests of foreign principals (governments, political parties, corporations and individuals) are listed with the Justice Department under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, despite Congress' narrowing of the Act's coverage in 1966. Counting partners and associates who may participate in representing overseas clients, the number of individuals listed as being in the service of foreign 'principals' is well over 7,000. The Japanese Government, it was reported by *The Wall Street Journal*, employs over 100 lobbyists to promote its various interests and this does not include the lobbyists employed by private Japanese firms and individuals. Australia, to the best of my knowledge, only employs lobbyists for its Wheat and Beef Commissions.

The most effective foreign lobby in the United States is the pro-Israel lobby, but it has unique domestic and foreign elements. Connor Cruise O'Brien, in his new book *The Siege*, says that the term 'pro-Israel lobby'

'seems too weak to cover a phenomenon which is unique in its combination of size, emotional motivation intensity and diversity of activity, and ingenuity and efficiency of operation. Other ethnic lobbies (including the Irish) seem puny in comparison...'

Most Americans regard lobbying as a legitimate aspect of democracy; they often belong to one or more lobbies themselves, and tend to admire efficient and determined lobbies, of which the pro-Israel lobby is the archetype.'

Being pro-or anti-lobbying in itself is sort of Gentlemen v. Players game. And in American history, it's a long time since the Gentlemen won a match.

However, O'Brien makes the point that ethnic lobbies do not bring up the reproach of 'divided loyalty' provided their activities are not seen as hostile, or potentially hostile, to the United States. 'This proviso,' O'Brien says, 'is vital.' Hence, successive Governments of Israel have been careful to align their foreign policy with that of the United States — except where Israel's own vital regional interests are involved.

This element of perceived alignment with American foreign and economic policy can, however, be extended to other governments. **The closer a country is to us diplomatically, economically, and militarily, the easier it is to promote its cause on the Hill. And few countries are closer to us than Australia.**

MONEY AND THE CONGRESS

Money talks and there a few places it speaks louder than in Washington and specifically on Capitol Hill.

Bribery of members of Congress was a well-documented occurrence in the 19th and early 20th centuries.

When Congress in the 1830s became embroiled in President Andrew Jackson's battle with the second Bank of the United States (an early attempt to try to give the nation a form of a central bank), it was disclosed that Daniel Webster, then a senator from Massachusetts (and now rated as one of the half dozen best senators in our history), enjoyed a retainer from the bank. Col. Martin M. Mulhall, lobbyist for the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), stated publicly in 1913 that he had bribed members of Congress for legislative favors, had paid the chief House page \$50 a month for inside information from the cloakrooms, and had influenced House leaders to place members friendly to the NAM on House committees and subcommittees. In a subsequent congressional probe, six members were exonerated but one was censured and resigned from Congress.

In the same year, during the debate on the Underwood Tariff (which included the first income tax act under the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution), President Woodrow Wilson issued a serious indictment of what he saw as the 'extraordinary exertions (of) the lobby in Washington to gain recognition for certain alterations of the . . . bill.' Much of the public reaction to his statement was actually unfavourable! It caught the President's own party, the Democrats, unprepared. Senate Republicans, who were in the minority, sensed a victory and introduced a motion to investigate Wilson's charges. Although little actual wrongdoing was discovered, enough was discovered to substantiate the President's charges. Arthur Link, Wilson's biographer, notes that the more important result was that the investigations focused public attention on the Senate while the tariff was being drafted. The changes Wilson sought became law.

Since the end of World War II, direct vote-buying has generally been replaced by more sophisticated techniques.

In the summer of 1986, *The Washington Post* reported that 56 members of the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee, whose members are always known as having the best financed campaigns in Congress, had received \$3.7 million from January 1, 1985 through June 30, 1985 from political action committees (PACs) while during the same period in 1983, the members had received only \$1.2 million. Many of the members of the two committees actively sought the money and the lobbyists were 'groaning at the number and cost of the fund-raisers for which they feel compelled to buy tickets'. PACs, which were an outgrowth of the reforms arising out of the Watergate scandal, have become abusive themselves and legislation is currently pending to further limit the amount they can donate to political campaigns.

Earlier this year, Senate Finance Committee Chairman Lloyd Bentsen (Democrat-Texas) invited selected friends to breakfast with him monthly to discuss matters before the Committee and to provide the Senator with a body of experts from which he could draw. Entire to this subject group was a donation to the Senator's campaign fund of \$10,000. Although Senator Bentsen was doing the same thing his predecessor Senator Packwood had done (albeit for a higher price), the outcry was so great he had to cancel his breakfast plans and return the money he had collected.

A key point to remember is that any piece of legislation a lobbyist supports is desired by constituents of one form or another even if his client is a foreign principal. Laws, contrary to what some members of Congress would lead you to believe, are not made in a vacuum with little effect on average citizens. Rather, they are made in an open political environment and ultimately affect all citizens.

The responsibility of any elected official to faithfully execute his office remains with that official. Former speaker of the California Assembly and state treasurer Jesse Unruh once said of lobbyists: 'If you can't drink their booze, take their money, fool with their women, and then vote against 'em, you don't belong in politics.' Columnist David S. Broder, writing in *The Washington Post* (May 11, 1986) on the Finance Committee's vote on Senator Packwood's tax bill last year, said that the vote proved that the Committee members really were politicians. 'Miraculously,' he said, 'they took from the lobbyists and then said no.'

Foreign governments are prohibited from contributing to campaign funds of members of Congress either directly or through agents. They cannot establish PACs to 'launder' their money for use in political campaigns. This does not, however, prevent a lobbyist from making personal donations to campaigns of members he chooses to support.

An interesting loophole in the campaign finance law is that a foreign company with an American subsidiary can have that subsidiary establish a PAC which can in turn donate up to \$10,000 per candidate during a two year election period. The officers of the PAC must be Americans. This is an important exception by which a foreign government can work through its own citizens to influence American politicians and elections.

WHAT DOES LOBBYING COST?

The cost of lobbying varies and the ultimate amount is very much in the hands of the party seeking the lobbying.

Former Senate majority leader and now Chief of Staff to the President, Howard Baker was reportedly paid \$250,000 per year by the law firm he joined after leaving the Senate to be in the office two days a week. One member of the House of Representatives told me he had been offered a similar amount to lobby for a trade association. Lawyers like former secretary of defense Clark Clifford and former Democratic Party chairman Robert Strauss reportedly charge \$1,000 per hour for their time. Michael Deaver, a former senior aide to President Reagan, was paid \$105,000 by Canada to work on the acid rain question, a contract both parties may now wish he had not

received since he is facing charges of committing lying when asked under oath whether he had lobbied friends in the administration before he was allowed to by law.

These figures are high, but lawyers in Washington generally charge from \$100 to \$500 per hour for their time and most lobbying firms seem to adhere to similar rate structures.

In all cases, expenses are borne by the client and entertainment, so vital to effective lobbying, is very expensive in Washington.

ARE LOBBYISTS EFFECTIVE?

This is a tough question. The best answer is that a lobbyist's effectiveness varies from day to day and issue to issue.

Lobbyists for the Tobacco Institute had every reason to be proud of their work on the 1986 Agriculture Bill. The same government that says smoking can kill you continues to support the growing of tobacco. Those who 'paid good money' for senators on the Finance Committee had cause to regret their 'investment' last year yet they continue to 'invest' at a record pace this year.

It has been estimated that lobbyists win only about half the time, give or take an issue. Even applying this figure to the Hill alone, it is really not a bad win-loss ratio, considering lobbyists must contend with 535 members of Congress, each of whom has his own principality to protect and further considering the fact that lobbyists often have very little room to manoeuvre to achieve their goals.

No lawyer wins every law suit or succeeds in attaining every goal in a negotiation. Results in both situations are frequently compromises. No lobbyist should be expected to win every effort.

LOBBYING AND AUSTRALIA

What follows are some thoughts (in no particular order) about lobbying in Washington and Australia.

A lobbyist for Australia:

- should be looked upon as an American branch of the Australian Embassy, providing a continuing resident corporate memory for the work the Embassy does;
- should be well versed on Australia's politics, history and economic structure in order to represent Australia to Americans while providing the same service to Australians regarding the United States;
- should never *sell* Australia to a member of Congress but rather should sell the member on the United States and what Australia is doing for the United States now and plans to do in the future for the benefit of America and the member's state or district; and
- should not be looked upon as a 'miracle worker' because the pace of official Washington can be remarkably slow. Relationships vital to any lobbying effort must be built and nurtured.

Lobbying is a business like any other. It will take time and money to ensure a lobbying presence for Australia.

- Australia can draw on a virtually bottomless well of good will in dealing with the Congress: ANZUS for example, is more than just a treaty relationship governing military linkage and attitudes toward critical American military bases in Australia. Its *spirit* is representative of a whole gamut of similarities and ties which are based on our common linkages in history and culture. Perhaps Australia's greatest asset is that Americans simply like Australians and are very well disposed towards Australia. **These are all weapons in a lobbyist's arsenal that do nothing for Australia unless they are put to work expanding Australian influence in order to achieve the Commonwealth's political, economic, and defence goals in the United States.**
- **Lobbying and heavy reliance on public relations may be anathemas to political life in Australia but they are integral parts of the American political scene. It is incumbent upon the Australian government to use every means at its disposal to present Australia's positions in all matters in the most positive way possible. In my opinion, this is not always done.**

For example, in the fall of 1985, The New York Times Magazine published a superb cover story entitled 'Being Australia.' It remains my belief that the Australian Embassy should have blanketed the Hill with copies of that article. **If I had been the Australian ambassador, and the money had been readily available, I would have sacked my press attache had he not seen to it that the Monday following publication every member of Congress and selected staff members had a copy at their desk.** If money had not been readily available, I would have sought a special allocation from the Department of Foreign Affairs or Defence, since the article

dealt at length with bilateral defence matters. Had this failed, I would have sought help to defray the cost from major Australian and American corporations. Failing that, if I had a lobbyist, I would have had him provide the articles and then pass on the cost over an extended period of time. **The amount and quality of the publicity 'Being Australia' provided was beyond price — and it was wasted.**

- Also, almost totally wasted has been the political clout Australia's US\$7 billion in arms purchases since the beginning of the decade should have bought the Commonwealth. The executive branch may be insensitive to Australia's problems but you can be sure that senators and congressmen from localities where those purchases were made would be very sympathetic. If the Australian government neglects or refuses to take the greatest advantage possible from the influence it has acquired with its ships and airplanes it is doing less than it can do for its citizens.
- Despite almost a half century of diplomatic relations between the United States and Australia, it is my perception that only recently have Australians begun to fathom the power and influence of Congress on American political life. **While working on the Hill I could not even get Embassy staff to join me at the Capitol for lunch and a tour. My repeated offers to set up a luncheon for Australian Embassy staff members to meet Congressional staffers and representatives of the Library of Congress fell on deaf ears.**
- The concept behind the recent appointment of a congressional liaison minister as part of Australia's diplomatic staff has three main flaws (and here I should mention that I am *not* unbiased observer).

First, no foreigner can exercise the same political influence that an American citizen can when dealing with Congress. Second, the very nature of a diplomatic posting means that the diplomat will be rotated out on a regular basis and all of the contacts he has made (and lobbying is a very personal business) will be lost. Finally, it is cheaper to have a local lobbyist. When the entire package of salary, allowances and other benefits paid to a senior diplomat are considered, it has been estimated that even a fee of US\$100,000 would represent a savings of about US\$25,000 per year over a 3-year diplomatic posting. In addition, this fee would bring more people to work for Australia in the form of the lobbyist's staff than is possible under the present system and a key to success in Washington is having the people to cover as many functions as possible.

CONCLUSION

Lobbying is a legitimate, well recognised means by which private individuals, business, and governments, both foreign and domestic, seek to influence the Congress of the United States. Lobbying can be a long, tedious and expensive process whose success cannot be guaranteed. It does, however, give a country like Australia an additional tool to use in gaining access to the American political system in order to achieve the goals Australia seeks from its relationship with the United States. Australia has worked hard and paid a great deal for assets a lobbyist can use to create political influence for the Commonwealth. Australia should not let these assets go to waste.



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ZIG ZAG *PART 3*

RUSSIAN REFUGE

by Neil Grano

Novaya Zemlya (New Land)

On the fifth day we sighted what appeared to be white peaks in the distance and tried to move the boat faster by rowing but in our weakened condition we could scarcely lift the oars so we just sailed slowly on. Soon we were able to distinguish mountains of ice and snow coming down almost to the shoreline. Surrounding the coast were numerous icebergs which we had to dodge around.

The cold had gotten to all of us and we were suffering frozen and swollen feet, legs and hands. My own legs and feet were turning blue-black and were very swollen as were my fingers. Some of the others were already gangrenous and their flesh smelled like rotten meat. My feet were so swollen that when I removed my boots to try to squeeze the dampness from my socks I could not get them back on again and had to cut them and lash them on with string.

By the time we reached the rocky shore it had been decided we were at the northernmost end of Novaya Zemlya and, if we had missed it, we would have gone on indefinitely in a vast desolate sea towards Siberia. It was without question we could not have lasted, and in my mind I gave thanks to the unknown God that I was seeing land again. The only two things we could see were rocks and snow with ice ledges hanging over the beach. On looking upwards in both directions the mountains were totally ice and snow clad as far as the eye could see.

We removed some of the ballast tanks from the boat and took them ashore. For most of the men this was their first attempt at walking over the rocks with frozen feet and it was a very painful process with many of them being carried by the others. For me it was very painful at first

but my feet were too swollen and numb to feel the rocks and I was with some difficulty able to walk and eventually satisfy my thirst using the melting ice and snow. Despite the fact that the Third Mate had cautioned us against drinking too much melted ice in our condition there were a number of the men who had gorged themselves as their thirst got the better of them and they were very sick and remained so for some time.

About this time a group of four Russian passengers said they knew approximately where the Soviet Radio and First Aid station was located on the island and they wanted to take their chances by walking to it. They were given permission to try and shortly left us, this being the last time they were seen alive.

After three hours the Mate ordered us back into the boat to sail south, following the coast as closely as possible. The sailing was now more dangerous and slow and we had to constantly be on the look-out for large rocks or icebergs. In the fog, which was present much of the time, we could hear the pounding of the surf on the shore and a few times we found it necessary to use the sea anchor to maintain the heading of the boat but we did make some progress and two days later we sighted a wooden beacon marker on the coast and decided to go ashore to investigate. This time we found a lot of driftwood and cut logs on the beaches so we built a fire then climbed the cliffs and noticed wild birds perched on the ledges.

Evidently they did not 'know' people very well and did not move when approached so I immediately got some rope yarn and shoestring and tied a noose in one end then proceeded to dangle it down the face of the cliff and loop it over the heads of the birds which dodged around to

avoid the noose. In a few minutes we were rewarded by pulling one up the cliff and quickly despatched it with a knife to the neck.

By this time the crew had taken one of the ballast tanks, partially filled it with sea water and were heating it over the fire but the fire was very slow to boil the water and we were very hungry, so we succumbed to temptation and tore the feathers from the bird and ate the meat raw. It satisfied the immediate need for two of us who were then able to continue the hunt and deliver the rest of the birds as we caught them to the eager cooks down below. The plan was to boil these birds and what we didn't eat we would take with us when we left Novaya Zemlya to sail across the sea to the Siberian mainland (wild thinking).

We stayed in this desolate place for about twelve hours warming ourselves around the fire and feeling more content in our bellies but suffering more from frostbite than anything else. During this time I avoided too much heat by the fire as I was afraid of worsening my frostbitten limbs. Instead, I walked on the rocks hoping to stimulate circulation. In this period very little was known from a preventative or a curative viewpoint for frostbite so, one form of cure was as valid as another.

Many of the men were for the moment satisfied with the warmth from the fire and were opposed to leaving so soon but we were under an autocratic rule and when the Third Mate said "Let's go" we put the precious meat on board and headed into the unknown, but not without a lot of grumbling from the men.

Again we passed in and out of fog banks and were always in company with the midnight sun which never allowed us to know the true time of day.

Explorers All

It was now the eighth day since we had abandoned the *Paulus Potter* and we were still sailing south on the west coast of Novaya Zemlya. During these days we had had a portable transmitter in one of the lifeboats. It had initially worked then malfunctioned until we landed on Novaya Zemlya, when we managed to temporarily get it working again but none of our S.O.S. calls were acknowledged. We had considered trying to find the Radio and First Aid station but rejected the proposition because nobody knew if the station was an unattended automatic station or only visited once a month. Now our goal was simply to try and make the mainland coast of Siberia. In retrospect I realize we stood zero chance of making it but at the time the ignorance of our true condition gave us something to hope for.

By this time many of the men had reached an advanced stage of sickness and among these was the Third Mate. I was experiencing a lot of pain in my feet and ankles which were now black, bruised, shapeless lumps of inflated flesh. The man next to me with gangrene appeared as though his legs and toes had been charred in a fire. They were black and cracking, even separating from the toe nails with the flesh rotting away and always stinking.

On the ninth day while in a fog bank we thought we heard a distant ship's horn but hope rose and fell again. Then six hours later we heard it again and it was much louder as we strained our ears to establish direction. We had all been issued mouth whistles which were attached to our life jackets for identifying our position if we were in the water so we decided that, as soon as we were close enough for the ship to hear us, we would all blow together on them. The ship's horn was sounding at approximately fifteen minute intervals and after establishing direction we struck with what strength we had and tried to row. As often as not the wind was in the wrong direction or was simply non-existent when we wanted it.

On the tenth day the hull of a freighter took shape in the fog shrouded netherworld which had become our universe. With tears in our eyes and thanks in our hearts we struggled to climb the nets over the side of the ship but, in our weakened condition, we could not make it so the crew sent bosuns' chairs and stretchers over the side and hauled us up onto the deck. It was the 9000 ton American ship *Winston Salem* which had been one of our convoy and had managed, with a lot of luck, to outrun the submarines and the planes. They had run aground half a mile offshore from Novaya Zemlya and were not far from the twenty-five mile long connecting channel that ran between the Barents Sea and the Kara sea. The crew of the *Winston Salem* were in the process of dumping their cargo overboard so, being a lighter ship, they could float loose of the rocks where they were grounded. We had sailed approximately three hundred and sixty miles from where we were sunk to the northern tip of Novaya Zemlya and then about one hundred and thirty six miles south along the coast. Not including our deviations we had sailed about five hundred miles in ten days.

The first thing we did after being brought on board was to have a cup of hot coffee and a little to eat. Then bed — the first in a long time — and an attempt to sleep which proved impossible. I would close my eyes for a few minutes then awake screaming from a nightmare and the pain in my feet. However, for the first time in ten days I was able to have a shit which was nothing to



Survivors of Convoy PQ17

Courtesy: Gunter Karweina

write home about but was important to me at the time, even though it was like dropping small hard rocks. At least the system still worked!

We had only been on board the ship about ten hours when we were told we would all have to leave. There was a Russian boat (Drifter) alongside which would transport us through the channel to another ship anchored on the Kara sea side. We thanked the crew of the *Winston Salem* but words could not convey what we felt in our hearts for them. We were again helped over the side into the crowded Russian boat in which there wasn't even space for everyone to sit down and it was very cold. Shortly, we pulled alongside what was to be our home for the next few days and saw it was an English ship named the "*Empire Tide*" of about 10,000 tons with a catapult plane on the foredeck. Our arrival brought the number of survivors on board to over two hundred and there were no beds available for any of us but I found a place to sleep, back aft under the steering quadrant on the metal deck which was a touch uncomfortable, being noisy and smelly, but at least it was warm. All the ships facilities were overtaxed but the crew managed to give us a couple of rice cakes and tea at midday every day and a cup of tea for breakfast. It took me at least an hour to crawl on my hands and knees to get from aft to amidship since I could no longer walk and there was no medical attention or medical supplies available to remedy the situation. I probably could not have made the trip more often than this.

Each day a German reconnaissance plane flew over us, keeping watch on our movements and reporting to the submarines that we suspected were waiting for us. However, the enemy

planes never made any move to attack us and we figured the deterrent was the Hurricane catapult fighter on the foredeck.

Russia at last

We waited five days for the Russians to get an escort together. It consisted of a destroyer, a corvette and a minesweeper to escort the five merchant ships which had escaped detection and reached the relative safety of Novaya Zemlya. We sailed in the direction of the White Sea and to our surprise suffered no attack, just a couple of Alerts. After nine days on board the *Empire Tide* we arrived in Economia, a small town near where the river Dvina empties into the White Sea.

Although the hospital where we were to go was situated close to our point of debarkation we were unable to walk and were transported by ambulances. On reception in the hospital we were spread all around in a large high ceilinged stone lobby and were given a phonetic form of identification which corresponded in Cyrillic to each of our surnames. Soon the delousing process began and we must have looked quite a mess — unbathed, unshaven, dried cracked lips, emaciated faces which had grown very thin from near starvation, terribly frostbitten and unable to walk unassisted. When they weighed me I discovered I had lost two stone in weight. Then came the Nurses Aides with the hair clippers which made us completely bald and removed all hair under the arms as well as pubic hair. I was shortly carried to a bath tub and placed in a warm bath where I was carefully washed all over by a nurse with a very large, coarse sponge.



Survivors approaching a U-Boat

Courtesy: David Irving

After the bath I was carried upstairs and placed on a bed. The pain from my feet was constant and intense and I could not stand any form of covering touching them. First thing on the following morning we were given sit-up exercises by a nurse leading everybody in the ward and calling out the numbers vigorously. After this breakfast was brought in and on completion we were immediately taken downstairs and loaded into a hospital train that was waiting in the hospital grounds. All the non-walkers were placed in bunks on the train where we were unable to see out of the windows but approximately ten hours later we were told we were in the town of Baccoritz where we would enter another hospital, just for the night. On the following morning we were put on board a hospital ferry boat for the rest of the trip up river to the city of Archangel. From the position I was placed in the boat and due to the lack of mobility I could see nothing of the passing countryside. We were in company with many Russian soldiers who had most likely been wounded on the Finnish front.

We unloaded after a twenty hour trip into plywood sided ambulances with three bunks on either side and which bounded and skidded over the unpaved, slick cobblestoned roads making it easily the worst ride of my life in a four wheel vehicle. Many of the roads were just mud messes with logs placed across them and I felt analogous to the way clothes must feel when they are washed on a wash board. As we passed through the Russian countryside I observed that many of the houses and buildings consisted of eight foot logs sharpened at one end. Timber was obviously the main industry in these parts and extensive use was made of it.

Thankfully the ambulance trip was short and this hospital was larger. I was to spend a month there and the first person I met inside was a survivor from our own ship who had been in one of the other lifeboats that had separated from us. He told me that they had all been saved but many of them were hospitalized and suffering from exposure.

A Different World

Then began the daily experiments (or treatments as they liked to call them) to try and save our feet, legs, hands and fingers and other limbs and organs. So little was known, even in Russia where frostbite and severe exposure were common, that there was no established treatment. I was given what was termed paraffin treatment which consisted of placing my feet and ankles in large rubber sacks and pouring hot, molten paraffin over the top of them and immersing them to well above my ankles. After waiting for

the paraffin to cool sufficiently for it to solidify it was then peeled away from my legs which was a process which hurt like hell but the pain was there anyway, so any chance was worth the effort. At first, when the paraffin was removed, large blisters would appear on my legs and the ankles would turn pink and raw instead of the same persistent black, but my feet were still swollen and shapeless. For the men whose limbs were gangrenous there was no alternative but traumatic amputation. The stench from the gangrene carried right through the ward.

Modern plumbing had not yet come to this hospital and we flushed the toilets with a bucket of water. The exercises in the morning proved a fetish with the Russian staff and was compulsory for us. This torture preceded all other activities of the day and lasted about thirty minutes, all of it done sitting up in bed. My bed covering was simply a sheet but even that was too much if it touched my feet as they felt like they were on fire. Among other things we received a quarter pound package of very coarse Russian tobacco and a couple of packages of Russian cigarettes weekly. These items were on ration but, possibly for propaganda purposes, they treated their foreign visitors more liberally than their own people.

During the week a sprinkling of survivors from outside the hospital would come to visit their friends and bring news from the outside world. As time passed our mobility increased and we could increase our range of activities and after a couple of weeks I could drag myself to the gymnasium and do hand and arm exercises on the equipment or attend the occasional dances they had in the evening. There I could watch the young, rosy cheeked, laughing nurses dancing with the more mobile men. The girls were healthy looking and attractive without the use of cosmetics and by now I was trying to learn enough of the Russian language to defend myself in verbal combat with them. I was making progress.

The food was quite different to anything I had been familiar with but it was certainly not unpleasant. The black rye bread was a little bitter to the taste but the bortsch soup was excellent. I had managed to save my wristwatch when the ship was abandoned and it was very much in demand by the nurses as they would come and ask me if they could borrow it when they took pulses. Watches were in very short supply for the Russians and it was a luxury to have one and they would be so proud to be able to display it to everyone when it was on their wrist. Naturally, the larger the watch and the louder the tick the more they would like it.

After three weeks I graduated to crutches. This was not because my feet looked any different or

that the treatments had improved them at all but simply because I was bored by the lack of progress and the crutches greatly increased my range of travel within the hospital grounds, however it was awkward going up and down the steps. The midnight sun had almost ceased and the periods of darkness were gradually getting longer each night which was bad for us because the Germans characteristically took advantage of the darkness and increased their air raids over the city. The Russians were not using night fighters, even though they received lend lease aeroplanes from the Allies. These were equipped with oxygen apparatus and radar for flying at higher altitudes and being able to locate the enemy in the sky with instruments but the Russians were unfamiliar with the use of radar and would take it out of the planes. Thus, the only night defence we had were batteries of heavy anti-aircraft guns that were located on the perimeter of the city.

At this time the war was not going well for the Russians up on the Finnish front and rumour had it that a German land attack on Archangel could be expected in a couple of days. This triggered great apprehension in the Russian staff and we were all ordered into the yard of the hospital where we were given instruction in the hand throwing of anti tank grenades. This was enough to raise more than just a little fear in all of us.

Shortly after this I learned that we had lost twenty five of the original thirty eight merchant ships that set out in our convoy from Iceland in June and it was later said that one of these ships (a U.S. Liberty ship) had deliberately sailed into the Norwegian coast and surrendered to the Nazis.

After four weeks in the hospital I felt there was nothing more they could do that would improve my condition so I asked if I could be released and this was allowed as they undoubtedly needed the space. I still could not walk without the crutches and would need them probably for at least a few months more. The day following my release a large group of convalescents were transferred from the hospital and put on board fast Navy ships for return to England or Iceland, but I had jumped the gun by a day and literally missed the boat.

Surviving in Archangel

I was now quartered in a school building which was closed to children until a bomb shelter had been constructed for them nearby. At most of the street corners, atop high poles, loud speakers were attached and over these came news, music and air raid warnings (trevolga) as well as the all clear (utboy). Our closest air raid shelters were the slit trenches in the nearby park which were


deep in water but had sand bags overhead as a protection against flying bullets or shrapnel.

During the first raid we raced down the school stairs and found the door locked from the outside. We pounded on the door and screamed, then an armed guard came and unlocked the door. He told us he had his orders which were to keep the door locked and not allow us to leave the building at night. Not being able to argue him out of it and hearing the bomb and the ack ack gun explosions getting closer, we jumped the guard and headed for the slit trench shelters but our problems did not end there. A drunken sailor wandered into the trench brandishing a pistol and without warning randomly fired several shots in the trench, wounding one of the men before he was overcome and turned over to the Authorities. The usual pattern of the German air raids was to start with flares or, if it were dark, drop a few Molotov breadbaskets of incendiary bombs to light the place up and burn what they could. After that came the high explosive bombs for the larger buildings.

On my release from the hospital the raids were occurring every other night but as the period of darkness grew longer the frequency and duration of the raids increased and because the Russians used no night fighters this left the skies over Archangel virtually wide open at night for the Germans, who took full advantage of it with persistent and irritating low level dive bombing at will. Their only opposition was in the form of anti-aircraft guns which were very noisy but not very effective.

The second morning after I had moved into the schoolhouse we were unable to wake up one of the men in our room which was understandable since he was dead. According to a later medical report he had died from drinking bad vodka of which there was plenty available, being peddled illegally by young boys. Two of the convoy survivors died in this way.

After the third night in the schoolhouse I had the routine worked out smoothly. From the time I heard the air raid warning we would get about five minutes warning before bombs began to fall. So, on going to bed, I would lay my clothes out in proper sequence and if needs be get up from the bed in the dark, put on all my clothes and be on my way downstairs all within one minute. After one week however the authorities moved us from the schoolhouse into the Intourist Hotel where the accommodation was considerably better, and it boasted a good though expensive restaurant, located on the ground floor. It was complete with a string group for music — mandolin, balalaika, and violin — playing for one cigarette each or whatever you could afford to give. They would play your favourite selection



The sinking of the abandoned PAULUS POTTER with the last torpedo held by Commander Reche's U-225
Courtesy: David Irving

and they knew from memory an amazing number of English and American songs. In this restaurant I had my first taste of caviar (black and red) but found it too salty for my palate. Underneath the hotel was a large cellar which served as an air raid shelter but I was never sure of its value in the case of a direct hit.

As time went on things in general became progressively worse and many of the seamen chose to spend the nights on the outskirts of the city, sleeping in the sawdust piles from the cut lumber. In this way they could escape the bombs but it was very cold and they were risking pneumonia. I never tried it.

It was not uncommon for the Soviet soldiers to come into the cellar during an air raid and demand volunteers to go outside with them to fight fires or pull furniture or stores out of burning buildings, since stores were more precious and scarcer than people. As soon as I went outside I could hear the pinging of the shrapnel as it sprayed on the galvanized metal roofs around me and I felt particularly naked in my bald, bare head and uncomfortably vulnerable to the possibility of losing it. It did not take very long before I traded my cigarette lighter with a seaman for his steel helmet.

I was amazed at the bravery of some of the Russians during these raids. I saw policewomen continuing to direct traffic and people, even when the bombs and the flak were dangerously close. At times there would be a Russian troop movement through the town and the spontaneous happiness of these men would never cease to amaze me. Also, they would stop at the side of the road, pull a concertina out or a piano accordion and play. The others in turn, or sometimes in unison, would fall on their haunches, arms folded and throw their legs forward in fast cadence to the music and the hand clapping. The object was to outdance the other in speed, skill and endurance and quite often this depended on how much vodka they had consumed. Their dancing was good and their capacity for drinking seemed to be limitless whereas persons not accustomed to it seemed to go out like lights after a very small amount. Many of the Western seamen, once they were drunk and had passed out, were then out for periods of from twenty four to forty eight hours. Wartime Vodka was potent stuff.

It was not at all uncommon for children to approach any person and offer to buy items of clothing they happened to be wearing. Everything was in short supply and I soon learned to say in Russian: "*Ya niechevar imayish prodovart*" which means I have nothing to sell. Cigarettes of course were the greatest medium of exchange and one pack of American cigarettes would fetch

a hundred roubles on the black market which was outrageous given that the bank exchange rate was seven roubles to the American dollar. However, this was not a problem. None of us ever needed to exchange money in the bank as we were lucky if we had one change of clothing. We had been issued one change of clothing from the British storehouse and it was impossible to find anything in the stores in town. They were long since empty of things like clothing and what few were still open sold things such as bear skin coats or other merchandise that was either expensive or not much in demand.

It was not uncommon to see men removing their leather knee boots in the park and placing more wadded newspaper inside the sole, over the hole where there used to be leather, since repair might be a long time away if ever. Newspaper was not only to be read. It was the common medium for rolling a cigarette using the coarse Russian tobacco and it was quite usual to see a person approach another person reading a newspaper, tear a strip off their newspaper and roll a cigarette. Of course, being without a gummed edge it quickly dried out so frequent licking was required.

Discovering our worth

Usually in the mornings our first visit would be to the marketplace to buy wild raspberries, various other berries, eggs and perhaps other vegetables or fruit but the main service the market performed was that you could sell anything you had and usually we had something such as a sandwich saved from our meal, a box of matches or a bar of soap to trade. All had some value and were common items of barter. Also, as a result of the air-raids I would often get a work detail that would result in acquiring a few extra goodies. One evening the British storehouse was hit by incendiary bombs and set on fire. I volunteered to fight the fire and in so doing I pulled half burned boxes away from the blaze and found that they contained large bars of chocolate used for making hot chocolate drink. I cut or scraped away the fire and water damaged parts and saved the rest. Suffice it to say that when I left I had my pockets heavy with a new found medium of exchange.

On one occasion I volunteered to load stores and ammunition on a British ship lying at anchor in midstream of the river. Five of us went out to the ship by launch and joined a number of other volunteers. It was heavy work for about six hours and I left with a couple of cans of fruit in my pocket and a pile of old English newspapers and magazines under my arm. To get back ashore we had to row a boat and, to return to the same point where we left, we had to go a couple of

JOB SATISFACTION IN THE REICH!



Commander Reinhard Reche, commander of U-255, the submarine which sank Neils' ship.



Colonel General Stumpff rewards his pilots.

Courtesy: David Irving

miles upstream. It was hard work and we were about half way there and well out in the river when two Russian soldiers on a dock motioned to us with their sub-machine guns to come ashore. We dared not refuse as none of us spoke sufficient Russian to explain our situation so we headed the boat straight in to the dock and did exactly as they instructed us to do. First we had to empty our pockets then the soldiers confiscated our magazines and newspapers and returned our food items to us and told us that we could go. What a relief! We thought the least that would have happened was that we would go to prison since we had heard of cases where even foreign seamen who had been found sleeping with Russian women had been imprisoned.

My next voluntary assignment was two days work in a logging mill which involved very heavy work pulling lumber on a green chain as the logs came out of the river. They were first cut and trimmed in the forest and floated down the river to the mill for refining and cutting to length. Most of the workers at the mill were women whose muscles were as powerful as any mans. The work was made even more difficult for me as my feet were still very sensitive to any movement, but I tried hard even while slowed down with the crutches.

Occasionally in the market we would be blocked in by a police raid. They would simultaneously come in by boat from the river and on foot from the town side and seal off the market, then demand that everyone produce their "*propusk*" (identification). I suppose the prime intent was to flush out spies or deserters since there were many deserters around. They conducted a public execution for two spies who, it was said had been landed on the coast from a German submarine, however it was not difficult to die in Russia and nobody ever really questioned if a person was really dying for their supposed crime. The Russians were conditioned to a stoic acceptance of death without any reason. The reason had simply ceased to matter.

As long as the weather remained mild and the daylight hours long, the Dynamo Stadium entertainment park was open to the public and there was a raised outdoor platform where lucky seamen could meet and dance with one of the pretty nurses from the hospital, although it was forbidden by regulations for this type of association between foreigners and Russian girls. If they were seen by or reported to the Secret Police or a Commissar it could mean a lot of trouble for them or their family and possible imprisonment. Inside the stadium there were kiosks where they sold *Peever* (Russian beer) and I stood in line with a Russian soldier waiting for our turn to buy some beer. While standing there talking I heard a

rattle over my shoulder and saw my box of matches disappearing from my top jacket pocket. Pickpocketing was rather common, especially by young boys, so my friend and I chased the thief, caught him and my friend kicked him hard in the balls leaving the pickpocket doubled up in pain. However that was not the end of my bad luck because less than an hour later I had my pocket picked again and did not detect it. I lost my wallet with my identification, money and food ration book and, being a new book, it was good for two weeks at three meals a day.

We hunted everywhere and found the wallet on the ground under some bushes but emptied of all its precious contents. About the only safe way to avoid losing things was to constantly keep your hands in your pockets and literally holding your property. This incident naturally caused me some inconvenience and I had to get photographed for a new I.D., however there was a lighter side and it was hard to see anything funnier or more pathetic than the state of my bald head in all its glory, but I survived the ordeal.

One afternoon a friend informed me that he had a date with two Russian girls and we were to meet them at 7.30 pm. I was to bring a sandwich for our supper to pave the way and we were to meet them down by the closest dock on the river. It was not until that evening that I found out she was a fireman (excuse, firewoman) on a coal burning river boat and when we met she was still black from the coal dust from head to boots. However to make up for the dirt she was very good natured and very willing . . . but all that dirt! I psychologically had a difficult time thinking of her as a woman since the feminine content had been literally blacked out. Also, I was physically weakened with my nervous system still in very sad shape so I didn't take the step and probably missed great possibilities.

Archangel Millionaires

Somewhere between early and mid September it seemed that the hours of darkness had increased to about six or at least that's how long the air-raids were lasting each night. What rest we now got was when we were propped up against the wall in the cellar and closed our eyes for a short stretch during an air raid. Sleep was a thing of the past but one night in particular was very bad. Normally I would stand in the cellar doorway listening to the noise and looking at the glare in the sky from the burning fires around the city but this night the high explosives seemed to be coming closer and closer so I moved inside the cellar and sat on the floor. The next thing I knew an explosion of noise and air under high pressure roared into the cellar through the door and a terrific concussion shook the ground

causing the plaster to fall in large chunks off the walls. The whole foundation shook dangerously but held while the building immediately across the street from us had been hit and demolished.

Evidently the high explosive had been headed for us, but had just angled over our roof. We lost all the lower floor windows and the plate glass ones in front but we immediately turned out and went across the street salvaging people and furniture. Fortunately there were not many people in the building at the time but the next morning, looking down from an upstairs window in the hotel, I saw the body of a dead Russian soldier lying in the back of a truck parked there, evidently a victim.

The millionaires of Archangel in those days were the lucky few whose ships had made it intact into port. If they were American they seemed to have unlimited supplies of wonderful cigarettes, all kinds of clothing and bedding, and food for barter or sale, tools, and of course deck and engine room supplies and equipment. If it had been possible I would not have been surprised to see some of those ships lose their smokestacks. Everything had a price and I knew one ship's carpenter who even sold his work tools, evidently figuring he could get home without them. The only competition for these hardcore Rockefellers were some of the survivor traders like Ginsburg of New York who, like an air bubble in a glass of water, quickly rose to the top. Occasionally referred to as the Sergeant

Bilko of Archangel he was always trading and winding up deals in his capelike genuine bear-skin coat which was his pride and joy and which he planned to take home with him when he left.

Despite his fast talking and sharp trading he was really a good friend, big in every direction with a heart to match. He had a streak of generosity a mile wide and was always friendly, his face stretched in a grin, his fat belly rolling when he laughed and his whole frame shaking. He was from Greenpernt, Brooklyn as he said it and wanted to take me around and show me 'da joints' as he put it but I was not in this class. Anyway, there was so little to be bought in the stores that money did not seem necessary but the wealthier seamen had the advantage of using their money for alcohol and gifts for the girls.

Another bite at the cherry

Rumors as to when we would leave Russia were frequent and it was probably the most popular topic of conversation among the seamen but nobody ever knew the truth of it until it happened in early October. The day before leaving we had been addressed by the British and Russian authorities and told we would be going back and that we would be distributed on various ships. It was estimated that we had a fifty-fifty chance of getting back alive, but nevertheless there were about a dozen dissenting



German air-raid on Russia, Murmansk, 1 July 1942.

Courtesy: David Irving

BOFORS



Naval weapons

Bofors has a long and respected history of manufacturing anti-aircraft systems and other naval armament.

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seamen who publicly stated to the authorities that they wanted better than even odds or they would stay where they were. They were in turn informed that they would immediately be placed in the Red Army and go directly to the Front (not passing Go or collecting \$200!) and we had no reason to doubt that is exactly what would happen, consequently I don't believe we left any survivors behind.

The next morning I checked the assignment list and I was to go with the Scottish rescue ship, the "Zaafaran", there was another rescue ship, also Scottish, the "Zamelich". They had been designated rescue ships mainly because of their slightly extra speed, about 13 knots, and their accommodation was much more adapted to passengers than cargo. Their displacement was between 5,000 and 6,000 tons and they were better armed than most of the other ships. Their chief role was to stand by any disabled ship and give assistance and take on survivors while the rest of the convoy kept moving, this being where the few extra knots of speed were useful in catching up again.

Prior to leaving Russia I turned in my crutches for use by the next unfortunate batch that would need them. They were Russian property and by this time my mobility was not bad, my main problem being the extreme sensitivity of my feet coming in contact with anything. On boarding for embarkation we were obliged to turn over to the Russians all of our Russian money with the exception of a few kopeks which we could keep as souvenirs. Some of the men managed to hang on to some old silver roubles, some Czarist money and some of the older bank notes which were no longer in circulation.

I found I was quartered down below in a fore-castle containing about thirty five men. There were three tiered bunks which proved crowded and the place was very warm. I was to live and sweat there for the next thirteen days, only removing my clothes once for a shower.

We moved out of the river singly and formed our convoy when we entered the White Sea. We were fourteen merchant ships and our escorts consisted of corvettes, destroyers and the U.S. cruiser *Tuscaloosa* as well as one British escort carrier capable of carrying about twenty aeroplanes. About the time we sailed between Bear Island and Spitzbergen on the fourth day out, the cruiser and the carrier left us. In passing we sighted Spitzbergen and undoubtedly the Germans sighted us too, so we hated to see the major components of our escort leaving and our morale dropped a little but undoubtedly they had other important assignments.

Although we had experienced no outbound attacks we felt certain we were under constant

surveillance by the enemy. On board ship we were crowded in under very packed conditions having started out with about one hundred and fifty survivors on board. We could not walk around very much so the men took to staying in the warm fore-castle, sitting around on the deck playing cards, reading and talking. After rounding Spitzbergen we made numerous sightings of German reconnaissance aircraft, but so far no attack and we sincerely hoped they had other more important things to do, but no such luck.

Early in the morning on the fourth day out a heavy explosion brought us from our bunks. This was followed by the modulated whining of a destroyer steam whistle siren and then the familiar depth charge pattern being laid down. Simultaneously our own general alarm sounded and as many as had tin hats and clothes on moved out onto the deck to see what was happening. A destroyer had caught a torpedo and was sinking. It had been a submarine attack and the convoy was moving on with our job being to stand by the stricken ship and help. It was still quite dark but we dropped nets over the side and lowered slings to assist the men in the water. There was thick fuel oil in the water making it impossible for some of the sailors to swim out except by diving under it and coming out on the far side and not all were capable of this, consequently forty five men of this crew were lost.

One more nail in the coffin

It was a psychological blow to us to lose the destroyer escort which sank very quickly but we soon caught up with the rest of the convoy. The rest of that day went quickly for us but we were now waiting and wondering where and when the next attack would come. This was the major reason why nobody liked to take his clothes off, not even their shoes, and getting undressed for a shower was strictly out. Experience had shown us to expect attack at anytime.

Just as the sun was setting an explosion occurred on the perimeter of the convoy and immediately our alarm indicated a surface attack involving a Corvette which had been torpedoed and was sinking quickly. Each of the rescue ships covered one side or half the convoy and we moved over to the sinking corvette as fast as we could and almost stopped our engines in the water. It always made me feel like a sitting duck when the convoy moved on and there we would be alone, not moving in the water and presenting a perfect target to an unseen enemy. We always hoped that the Germans considered us of lesser importance than other targets.

The doctor on our ship was being kept very busy with the wounded men and the following

morning we had a burial for one who had died in the night. His body had been enclosed in a canvas bag which had been sewn up by one of the seamen. For added weight, firebars had been sewn into the feet end of the bag and this was then placed on a board resting on the rail with a Union Jack flag draped over the whole thing. The Captain then said a few words from the New Testament then the plank was elevated on the inboard side, the flag and board held tightly at one end and the body slid from between them into the deep, something like losing the meat from your sandwich. Moments like this caused each one of us to wonder if he might be the next to go into the deep permanently.

The depth charging pattern that always followed a torpedoing or submarine sighting was spectacular and awesome. Immediately following an attack or sighting the smaller and faster escorts such as the corvettes, destroyers and any other sub-chasers would go into a course pattern over the suspect area, throwing out their T shaped drums from their side cradles and releasing their cannisters (like 50 gal. drums) over the stern from their rails depending on the pattern they were laying. They were set for exploding at different depths and they always resulted in a muffled explosion. If the explosion was not too far under the surface then a huge geyser of water would plume into the air with the force of the explosion normally shaking the structure of your own ship.

On the night of the burial I slept as if drugged in the extreme warmth of the forecabin, being clothed in everything except my boots. I had a *romantic* dream involving a lovely girl but I was soon awakened to the reality of tobacco filled air and the noise of men talking, swearing, playing cards and rolling dice. Then, feeling the warm wet stickiness inside my pants I suddenly recalled just what a release it had been and what a letdown it was to be brought back to this stinking reality and not only that, I didn't dare take my clothes off to clean up before we reached the relative security of a port to take a shower.

Following the sinking of the corvette we had a couple of days without incident then, at sunset, a vicious series of explosions sent us into action.

Ginsburg's Private War

It was not easy to immediately distinguish which ships had been hit unless they burned or sank right away or they emitted a column of smoke or debris from the explosion. Otherwise we just had to wait until the rest of the convoy slowly moved ahead, leaving the crippled ones sitting in the water. This time three of the merchant ships had been hit, evidently the

German submarines were working in 'pack' and we headed over to stand by as two lifeboats from one of the stricken ships approached us. As we brought the survivors on board I was surprised to find one of them was my fat friend Ginsburg of New York/Archangel, this being the second ship that had gone out from under him in one round trip. For some of the men it happened three times.

As Ginsburg told it the ship in which he had been riding had been hit in the aft section and the ammunition locker had exploded, injuring some of the gun crew. Just as he was about to go over the side and abandon ship he remembered his beautiful bear skin coat in his quarters and he turned around and rushed all the way back on the listing, sinking ship. Having rescued the coat he bundled it up and before climbing down threw it for safe keeping to the sailors in the waiting lifeboat below. By the time he got into the boat and looked around for his precious fur coat they had already rolled it up and placed it under the head of one of the injured men for a pillow to make him more comfortable. It was totally without consideration for Ginsburg that the man bled all over his beautiful bear skin fur and although Ginsburg tried very hard to wash the blood out, it was never the same fur coat again. I had to listen to him repeat the sorry story many times before we got to Iceland.

By the time we did arrive in Iceland we had two hundred and thirty survivors on our ships. We had lost two more merchant ships, one of them being an oil tanker which fortunately was empty.

Licking our wounds

We pulled in to Seydisfjord and I felt it was safe enough to take all my clothes off for a shower but even then I was not sure a submarine could not get inside the harbour, so I did not take longer in the shower than was strictly necessary. During our stop we took on food, water, and fuel and transferred the Canadian and American survivors to other ships that would return them to their countries. The others remained on board our ship which was destined for the British Isles but it was with considerable fear that I left the imagined safety of Iceland for the rest of the Atlantic crossing to Scotland.

The weather was foggy with choppy seas and brisk, cold air; however we were grateful for the fog and the protection it gave because we were now fewer ships. In any case, about four days later we entered the mouth of the Clyde river without further incident and I was happy to see the green hills of Greenock again appearing out of the fog and when we passed Rothesay docks from where I had left a few months before, I almost wept. It had seemed like a lifetime.

NEIL JACKSON GRANO



Neil Jackson Grano was born on the 27th of June 1923 in Melbourne, Victoria and was educated at Wesley College and Melbourne High School. He also studied at the Marconi School of Wireless after World War II.

At the age of 17 he went to sea with the Merchant Navy and served under the Australian and British flags until the end of 1942. During this time he picked up the survivors of the German Raider KORMORON while in the Indian Ocean on board the AQUITANIA. When serving with the British he survived devastating attacks on the Russian Convoy PQ 17 which had 25 of its 38 original ships sunk by the Germans. Neil's ship, the PAULUS POTTER, also went down.

In late 1942 Neil joined the US Merchant Marine and saw service in the Caribbean and the Pacific until the end of the war. At that time Neil had qualified as an AB Quartermaster (Deep Sea) and skippered small boats, up to 65 feet, in the San Francisco Bay area.

In 1946 he joined the US Army and was discharged fifteen months later as a Tech/5 to pursue Commercial Photography studies in Los Angeles but one year later, in 1948, he decided to commence a career in engineering.

Neil's applied engineering career in the US spanned some 15 years during which time he took up concurrent studies and was married. In the early years he ferried test missiles to Cape Canaveral and was involved in pre-flight tests and post flight analyses. He was also engaged as a reliability research engineer during the development of the POLARIS missile system.

During the early 1960's he worked as a reliability engineer for Space Technology Laboratories and helped develop an Alert Readiness Model for the USAF Systems Command for use by the Strategic Air Command in their operational ICBMs. Also, he was the engineer responsible for RF and atmospheric experiment integration in the EGO and POGO Programme office. These were the first satellites launched by the USA and were used to make near earth and cislunar physics measurements.

His last salaried position in the US was as Engineering Specialist for the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of the California Institute of Technology. He was also responsible for instrument reliability in the 1964 MARINER III flight to Mars.

Between 1964 and 1969 Neil worked world wide as a contract systems analyst and, from necessity and interest, grew proficient in one half dozen foreign languages. In 1970 and 1971 he studied the Oppenheimer Institute Course in Company and Financial management and Computer Programming at the University of Madrid but, after some years, decided to change direction and return to Australia to study the Social Sciences.

In mid 1975 Neil came to Canberra to take up an Arts degree course at the Australian National University from which he graduated in 1979, soon to take up further studies at the West Australian Institute of Technology. He graduated from WAIT in 1983 with a Graduate Diploma in Social Sciences and this was interspersed with a year of post graduate research in Northern Thailand.

He wears the British War Medal, the 1939-45 Star and the Atlantic Star. His American decorations include the Merchant Marine Combat Bar with Star, the Pacific Bar and the Atlantic Bar.

Neil maintains his residence at Campbell in the ACT but is currently engaged in research work in Portugal and is due to return to Australia in October 1988. His interests are wide and he hopes to maintain his mobility to the end of this century and see more of the world.



HUMOUR IN UNIFORM

I'll bet you thought the Australian Department of Defence had a monopoly on exhibiting bureaucratic inertia, doubtful competence, gross wastage of national resources and blatantly transparent pseudo sophistication? Well you are wrong! Such corporate traits have been endemic in DODs for millenia!

Even the Romans were guilty of these fatal flaws as the following ANI translation illustrates.

A MEDAL FOR HORATIUS

Rome

II Calends, April CCCLX

Subject: Recommendation for Senate Medal of Honour.

To: Department of Defence, Republic of Rome.

I. Recommend Gaius Horatius, Captain of Foot, O-MCMXIV, for the Senate Medal of Honour.

II. Captain Horatius has served XVI years, all honourably.

III. On the III day of March, during the attack on the city by Lars Porsena of Clusium and his Tuscan army of CXM men, Captain Horatius voluntarily, with Sergeant Spurius Lartius and Corporal Julius Herminius, held the entire Tuscan army at the far end of the bridge, until the structure could be destroyed, thereby saving the city.

IV. Captain Horatius did valiantly fight and kill one Major Pincus of Clusium in individual combat.

V. The exemplary courage and the outstanding leadership of Captain Horatius are in the highest tradition of the Roman Army.

JULIUS LUCULLUS

Commander, II Foot Legion

1st Ind, A.G: IV Calends, April, CCCLX

To: G-III

For comment.

IId. Ind G-III. IX Calends, May, CCCLX.

G.C.

To: G-II

I. For comment and forwarding.

II. Change paragraph III, line VI, from "saving the city" to "lessened the effectiveness of the enemy attack." The Roman Army was well dispersed tactically; the reserve had not been committed. The phrase as written might be construed to cast aspersions on our fine army.

III. Change paragraph V, Line I, from "outstanding leadership" to read "commendable initiative." Captain Horatius' command was II men — only I/IV of a section.

J.C.

IIId. Ind. G-II II Ides, June, CCCLX.

To: G-I

I. Omit strength of Tuscan forces in paragraph III. This information is classified.

II. A report evaluated as B-II states that the officer was a Captain Pincus of Tifernum. Recommended change "Major Pincus" to "an officer of the enemy forces."

T.J.

IVth Ind. G-I IX Ides, January, CCCLXI

To: JAG

I. Full name is Gaius Caius Horatius.

II. Change service from XVI to XV years. One year in Romulus Chapter, Cub Scouts, has been given credit for military service in error.

E.J.

Vth Ind. JAG IId of February, CCCLXI.

To: A.G.

I. The Porsena raid was not during wartime; the temple of Janus was closed.

II. The action against the Porsena raid, ipso facto, was a police action.

III. The Senate Medal of Honor cannot be awarded in peacetime. (AR CVIII-XXV, paragraph XII,c.)

IV. Suggest consideration for Soldier's Medal.

P.B.

Vlth Ind. AG, IV Calends, April CCCLXI

To: G-I

Concur in paragraph IV, Vth Ind.

L.J.

Vllth Ind. G-I, I day of May, CCCLXI

To: AG

I. Soldier's medal is given for saving lives, suggest Star of Bronze as appropriate.

E.J.

Vllth Ind. AG III day of June, CCCLXI

To: JAG

For Opinion.

G.C.

IXth Ind. JAG, II Calends, September, CCCLXI

To: AG

I. XVII months have elapsed since event described in basic letter. Star of Bronze cannot be awarded after XV months have elapsed.

II. Officer is eligible for Papyrus Scroll with Metal Pendant.

P.B.

Xth Ind. AG, I Ide of October, CCCLXI

To: G-I

For draft of citation for Papyrus Scroll with Metal Pendant.

G.C.

Xlth Ind. G-I III Calends, October, CCCLXI

To: G-II

I. Do not concur.

II. Our currently fine relations with Tuscany would suffer and current delicate negotiations might be jeopardized if publicity were given to Captain Horatius' actions at the present time.

T.J.

Xllth Ind. G-II VI day of November, CCCLXI

To: G-I

A report (rated D-IV), partially verified, states that Lars Porsena is very sensitive about the Horatius affair.

E.T.

Xllth Ind. X day of November, CCCLXI

To: AG

I. In view of information contained in preceding Xlth and Xllth Indorsements, you will prepare immediate orders for Captain G.C. Horatius to one of our overseas stations.

II. His attention will be directed to paragraph XII, POM, which prohibits interviews or conversations with newsmen prior to arrival at final destination.

L.T.

Rome

II Calends, April, I, CCCLXII

Subject: Survey, Report of DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE

To: Captain Gaius Caius Horatius, III Legion, V. Phalanx, APO XIX, c/o Phalanx, APO XIX Postmaster, Rome.

I. Your Statements concerning the loss of your shield and sword in the Tiber River on III March, CCLX, have been carefully considered.

II. It is admitted that you were briefly in action against certain unfriendly elements on that day. However, Sergeant Spurius Lartius and Corporal Julius Herminius were in the same action and did not lose any government property.

III. The Finance Officer has been directed to reduce your next pay by II I/II talents (I III/IV talents cost of one, each, sword, officers; III/IV talent cost of one, each shield, M-II).

IV. You are enjoined and admonished to pay strict attention to conservation of government funds and property. The budget must be balanced next year.

H. HOCUS POCUS

Lieutenant of Horse,

Survey Officer

Would our own beloved Department act differently?

(Reproduced from the Canadian Army Journal)

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-

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DEFENDING THE SEA LANES

THE KEY MISSION IN AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE

by Senator Brian Harradine

This article is based on the text of an address given by Senator Brian Harradine to the Australian Defence Association on 17 July 1986 and is published with the Senators' kind permission.

On June 13 1986 I tabled in the Senate a statement on the Dibb Report. In that document I argued that the defence plan proposed by Mr Dibb last year was irrelevant to Australia's real defence needs because it was based on false strategic premises.

My contention was that Australia's main defence problem was its strategic isolation. Because of this, I argued, our national independence could be jeopardised, if not destroyed, by a properly executed indirect attack against us in the form of strikes against our lines-of-communication with the outside world and in my statement I attempted to set down what ought to be foremost in the minds of Australian defence planners.

Sea Lanes and Survival

Because Australia depends on the sea-lanes for its economic survival and for military resupply, the areas of greatest strategic importance to Australia are the following:

- our trades routes to Japan;
- the Persian Gulf and our sea communications to that area;
- the narrow waterways between the Pacific and Indian Oceans;
- the lands adjacent to these waters;
- Australia's sea and air links with the United States.

If these waters, or the lands adjacent to them, were controlled by hostile forces for example, the Soviet Union or its regional clients – and if our resupply routes to the United States could be severed, this would amount to an indirect threat to Australia of strategic proportions. If such a development occurred, the enemy who had this advantage over us would not need to threaten our mainland. In such circumstances Australia could lose its power of self-determination without firing a shot.

Today I wish to develop this argument further. I want to set on record the economic importance of the sea-lanes to Australia. In addition, to underscore the high threat potential to which our sea-lanes are exposed, I wish to examine the arguments espoused by critics of a sea-lane strategy and to make some remarks about their alternative "threat scenarios".

It is difficult to imagine how anyone with even a casual interest in public affairs could have failed in recent months to grasp the importance of trade to the social and economic well-being of our country. The immediate cause of Australia's economic crisis is the failure of our trade. Whatever the part played by falling world commodity prices and (or) uncompetitive Australian manufactures, the outcome has been a trade crash. And what this means for Australia has been described aptly by the Treasurer.

The defence implications of present economic problems are clear. If our economic life can be placed in peril by a failure of our trade, then it would likewise be endangered by armed maritime attack. If the collapse of our overseas trade can imperil our economy, then an enemy who can interrupt and destroy our trade at sea can bring enormous pressure to bear on our country without having to contemplate invading it.

More than most countries, Australia relies on the sea. We trade 30% of our GDP and that is more, proportionally speaking, than what either the United States or Japan trades. Our trade, both imports and exports, was worth \$60 Billion in 1984-5. Of this, 86% by value was carried in ships. This required 12,000 shipping movements. Vessels departing Australia carried 200 million tons of cargo worth \$27.5 billion. Around 60% of it was dispatched to Japanese and other north Asian ports.

On the other hand, ships bound for Australia carried materials absolutely vital to the Australian economy. For example, 20% of our oil refining output has to be met from imported heavy crude. According to the most optimistic forecasts made by the Department of Resources and Energy, this degree of dependence on overseas crude could triple by the year 2000.

This growing dependence on oil poses a real hazard for Australia. Major disruption or loss of overseas heavy crude supplies would do serious harm to our economy. But oil is not the only import the loss or disruption of which would do grave damage. In fact, 80% of our imports are intended to supply manufacturing processes.

Furthermore, key Australian industries have lost large parts of the domestic market to overseas producers so that Australia has become increasingly dependent on imported manufactures.

Unless the character of Australian manufacturing and of the domestic market for manufactures, contrary to all expectations, suddenly were to change and Australia were to attain a high level of self-sufficiency in manufactured goods, then it seems clear that an attack on our sea lanes must have a destructive effect on the economy.

To the significance of our sea-lanes and the trade which passes through them, the Dibb report devoted only one of its 176 pages. And then, after admitting that no Defence Department study has been made of the strategic importance of this trade to Australia, the report attempt to play down the issue (and perhaps the omission) by claiming that the role of trade in our national economy has been overestimated. If that is the case, how would Mr Dibb have accounted for our economic crisis?

It is true that, for want of the right kind of data, it is difficult to calculate with absolute precision the economic effects which attacks on our sea lanes would have. But what we do know about the structure of our economy does not permit us to treat this matter with the air of agnostic dismissiveness which pervaded the Dibb Report.

We know enough about our need for overseas markets and overseas manufactures to foresee that sustained and effective attacks against our sea lanes would produce economic dislocation sufficient to exert on the Federal Government political pressure which it could not ignore.

The Dibb Report suggested that because our export income has declined over the last twenty-odd years as a proportion of GDP, Australia has become less vulnerable to sea-lane attack. To prop up this claim, the Report notes that, according to a United States National Defence University study, "even in the event of a 75-percent interdiction of Australia's trade in primary commodities with Japan the economic impact over the first year would be only a 3-percent reduction in our GDP".

It is misleading, however, to focus on the ratio of export earnings to GDP. The important point is the trade balance.

In the financial year 1985-86, Australia so far has run up a \$2.9 billion trade deficit. If this result, with its attendant economic disorders, is sufficient to move the Prime Minister to appeal nationally for a reorientation of national priorities, then no Australian government could ignore naval action against our sea trade which threatened economic consequences no less serious than those we now face.

Take the "75-percent interdiction" of Australian exports to Japan. On 1984-5 figures, this would represent a loss of \$6 billion in export income. Yet, the Dibb Report believes that, faced with this amputation, a Federal government need not flinch. Clearly, the implications of such a loss have not been thought through.

A \$6 billion fall in export earnings would have very considerable ripple effect throughout the economy. The income of exporters would be cut and they would be forced to cut back in turn. This would mean reductions in orders to the businesses which supply and maintain the exporters. It would also mean a loss of jobs in both the export and export-support sectors.

Furthermore, a \$6 billion loss of export income would have to be offset by an equivalent cut in imports. This would cause serious dislocation in the import sector as well as additional unemployment. In other words, whoever had sunk our trade would have succeeded in putting the Australian government under intense political

strain. For the Dibb report, however, these repercussions seem to present no problem.

In time of all-out war and national mobilisation such trade losses would not be critical. However, under conditions of sustained but limited warfare, in which the community and the government would expect to deal with an enemy without putting the whole of national life on a war footing, the pressure generated by attacks on merchant shipping would pose a serious threat to the government's freedom of action.

LIMITED WARFARE

The limited war, moreover, is an option with a lot of appeal, especially for a totalitarian enemy. Controlled and circumscribed military action, taken to focus maximum force on an opponent without provoking a full-scale reaction, is a tempting strategy for a totalitarian regime. It offers which such governments ordinarily have over their human and material resources, but which democratic governments cannot exercise except in conditions of total war.

Small wars waged to exploit the natural political divisions within a liberal democracy, can be an highly effective way for totalitarian governments to achieve their objectives. This is one of the great lessons of this century; but it is one which the Dibb Report has failed to consider.

Limited military action taken against our trade, which was calculated to engender the centripetal political tendencies of liberal democracy, but was not sufficiently potent clearly to threaten our national existence, would place the government in a serious dilemma.

Given the direction taken by our current strategic thinking and military planning, Australia would be in no position to defend effectively with peace-time armed forces against this sort of attack. The government, therefore, would be faced with three alternatives, each of them untenable: to accept unchecked trade losses and a gradual erosion of living standards; to attempt, without full public support, to mobilise for a higher level of armed conflict; or to meet the demands of the enemy. It would be tantamount to criminal negligence if, by our inaction today and shoddy thinking about defence, we were to place a future Australian government in this position.

The Dibb strategy, or variants of it, found very considerable support among our defence bureaucrats and academics, as well as a ready intellectual deference among some media commentators. All sorts of devices and omissions have been employed to pre-empt any counter argument. These need to be dealt with.

DESTROYING SOME DELUSIONS

First, the idea that it would be impossible for an enemy to attack the trade of one nation without *internationalising* the conflict. According to this view, an attack on Australian trade would immediately prompt a reaction from those nations who own the ships in which Australia's goods are traded. In this sense, so the argument goes, it is a positive advantage for Australia to have to rely on foreign-owned vessels.

This is an illusion. So far in the Iran-Iraq war more than 100 ships sailing under neutral flags have been attacked with impunity. Neutral shipping has been threatened or hit in other recent wars too, in the Falklands, Indo-Pakistan, and Vietnam wars. Yet in none of these cases did flag nations intervene on behalf of their shipping interests.

Moreover, 32% of world shipping is conducted under flags of convenience. The purpose of these is to protect ship owners from the political implications of trading under their own national flags. This practice provides a further buffer to "internationalising" naval conflict over trade. About 28% of Australia's trade is carried in flag of convenience ships.

Whatever the flag they trade under, ship owners are interested in one thing and that is doing business. If they cannot do business, or if it becomes too risky and, hence, too expensive, they will sail away and look elsewhere for customers. This is what has happened in the case of Iran. It is true that the oil glut has had an impact; but so have Iraqi attacks. As a result, general shipping insurance rates have gone up and war-risk insurance is impossible to get for ships going into Iranian oil ports. So, buyers of Iranian oil have turned to other suppliers.

The same thing could happen to Australia. Ship owners are not going to continue carrying Australian exports, in the face of attacks, out of a sense of altruism. Nor will those who buy our raw materials feel an obligation of loyalty to us. They are not committed to "buy Australian". What they want is sure and competitively priced supplies. It would be, therefore, in the interests of both ship owners and buyers to turn to safer ports and more reliable sources of supply. Australia has plenty of competitors eager to meet these needs.

The next point is that, once the threat to our trade has been eliminated, our trade will not revert to the *status quo ante bellum*. Australia will have to claw back the export markets lost in wartime. Even low-level interdiction of our trade would have long-term ramifications of an economic kind. The Dibb Report has failed demonstrably to address these issues. To understand the reason for this failure is to grasp the real suppositions behind the Dibb strategy.

Boiled down to its essentials, the argument that our trade is protected by the risks of internationalising naval conflict, really is a claim that an attack on Australian trade would bring in the United States.

What we have here in disguise is the old "great and powerful ally" mentality which, allegedly, has been rejected by those who oppose a sea-lane defence strategy and replaced by a "self-reliant" military posture. Admittedly though, this current position is a refinement of our former thinking about defence. It was founded on a sense of inferiority and weakness. Now we are smug, which is the other side of the coin. Once we thought we could not do without powerful friends. Today we think our powerful friends cannot do without us.

If the Vietnam war taught us anything, it should have taught us that even a fast friend is capable of consulting his own interests and of letting an ally be destroyed. For our defence thinkers and planners to refuse to take this to heart can only be ascribed to a perverse sense of Australia's importance. This, in turn, has led us into the vice of presumption. We believe or at least affect the conviction that others will be obliged to preserve those vital interests of ours which we are not prepared to defend. Such an attitude is contemptible in ordinary human relations. Whoever lives by this rule will not have friends for long. The same principle operates in international affairs.

EVASIVE ROUTING

One of the other dicta propagated by the still active Dibb school is that the best way to deal with attacks on trade is by "evasive routing". It is remarkable that the same people who argued that "evasive routing" could not save an Australian aircraft carrier in combat conditions are now claiming that "evasive routing" will work for trading ships.

Evasive routing is a useful tactic and would be employed, in conjunction with others, in time of war. By itself, however, it cannot solve the problem of attacks on shipping. In fact, to force us into resorting extensively to evasive routing would be a significant tactical victory for an enemy trying to employ economic pressures against us under conditions of limited war. Evasive routing would add to the cost of trade and thereby aggravate the complications created by the loss of cargoes, markets, and carriers. To rely on evasive routing would be to play into an enemy's hands.

There is another disadvantage in evasive routing. This is that, by being longer at sea, the advantages gained by evasion can be offset by the extra time an enemy has to find and attack targets. In the case of Australian trade going to

north Asian ports, the evasive route taken would be no secret.

Should it become too dangerous to attempt the passage of Indonesian waters, which could be closed to us against the will of Indonesia, then those vessels from northern and western Australian ports which normally take that path would have to be re-routed through the Torres Strait into the Solomon Sea and thence northward.

The northern exists from the Solomon Sea would be the focus of enemy intelligence operations. The obvious place for the enemy to attack would be north of these exists and beyond Dibb's "area of direct military interest". This enemy activity would affect, in addition, shipping on the North-Asia-East-Coast run because time and money demand that these ships also negotiate the same waters.

If Australian forces could not reasonably secure a passage through the Timor and Arafura Seas and the Torres Strait for ships from the North-West, then these would have to be diverted south around Australia. This would completely wreck the economics of our trade in resources from this part of Australia and would represent a defeat for us. Attempts by traffic on the North-Asia-East-Coast route to skirt eastwards around the Solomons and Vanuatu would face a similar problem. Clearly, then, evasive routing will not meet the challenge represented by an enemy determined and able to attack our trade.

CONVOYING

The defeat of the Japanese during the last War was in no small measure due to their failure to use the convoy system. Australia would need to use the same method to get its vital exports through to northern ports and to secure its oil imports.

However, on the logic of the Dibb Report, Australia should not, as a matter of principle, contemplate the convoy system, not even in concert with our neighbours and allies. The Dibb Report, if accepted by the government, will provide the setting for an Australian defeat in a limited war against our lines-of-communications.

Because the strategic rationale of the Dibb Report is patently fallacious, one is left with the difficulty of explaining why the Report has become to some an object of veneration and faith. The believers in the Dibb strategy, after all, are not unintelligent people. Intelligent is not, however, a guarantee of practical common sense.

One idea attractive to some defence experts is that Australia should not have to defend its exports because once they leave our waters what happens to the goods is the responsibility

of the purchaser. This notion might be credible if it has the corollary "and, once our imports leave foreign waters, their fate is our responsibility." But no. Not only do we expect our trading partners to protect the cargoes they buy from us, but also the ones we buy from them. What we have here is, in the final analysis, a failure of our duty to ourselves.

It is absurd to expect others to do for us what we would not do for ourselves, let alone for them. Consequently, to encourage our trading partners to stick with us in times when our trade is under attack, demands that we must have the means to assure customers and carriers that we are willing and able to protect our interests, which means — necessarily — being able to defend incoming and outgoing cargoes. Unless we can do all in our power to provide this kind of protection, our customers, our suppliers, and the ship owners, will desert as soon as they realise that we are helpless in the face of attacks on our sea-lanes.

A RED HERRING

At this point a red herring finds its way into the argument, namely that Australia would never be able to guarantee safe shipping conditions. The object of the exercise, however, is not to ensure that no ships and cargoes are lost or damaged. Not even a superpower can provide this sort of protection. The aim is to reduce the chance of such losses and to assure our partners that the risks involved in trading with us are worth taking. Furthermore, Australia should not attempt this role on its own. We would need to act in concert with neighbours and allies. This means that we need not only a capacity to defend our sea lanes, but a foreign policy which dovetails into this security objective.

The tragedy of the Dibb is its determination to subvert in detail the possibility that Australia might be capable of defending its real and vital interests. The Report's effective rejection of the Radford-Collins Agreement highlights how the proponents of this strategy want nothing to do with any kind of international arrangement which would give practical expression to a sea-lane defence policy. More than anything else, it is this which highlights the isolationist instincts which, despite all protestations to the contrary, played a vital generative role in the formulation of the Dibb Report.

If Australia refuses on principle to defend its key strategic interests — interests which demand both an ability to project military force and to co-operate militarily with allies — then this country has, by definition, set foot on the road to isolation.

To rationalise this course, the Dibb Report relied on a range of "credible contingencies": low and medium-level threats in the form of raids and lodgements in remote parts of our coastline. Despite Mr Dibb's intelligence background, his report offered no explanation as to who these raiders might be, what they might hope to achieve, and from hence they might come.

There are, in fact, no grounds provided by intelligence on which to expect threats in the Dibb form. These "credible contingencies" are purely hypothetical. They are contrived scenarios "developed independently of intelligence" and we have this on the authority of a former Secretary of the Department of Defence, Mr Bill Pritchett.

What Mr Pritchett did not say in his otherwise revealing observations on the Dibb Report, (see The Age's 1986 Defence Report) was that these "threats" had to be concocted to replace the actual potential ones to our sea-lanes which the Defence Department steadfastly refuses to think about. Without this set of "credible contingencies", it would have been impossible for the Defence bureaucracy to justify its existence and that of the armed forces.

So while our Defence planners toy with hypotheses, they are oblivious to the points at which Australia can really be threatened and to the maturing of the circumstances in which a threat could prove devastating. As a result, the Dibb Report could not but fail to draw attention to developments which make our sea-lanes more vulnerable, let alone dwell on their inherent importance to us.

CONCLUSION

The shift toward a defence policy still largely premised on the supposed safety of isolation has been made possible by self-inflicted institutional blindness. It is because our geographic remoteness could easily be turned into an Achilles heel that I believe the Dibb perspective on sea lines of communications was courting potential disaster.



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OF SHIPS AND THE SEA

THE KOOMBANA MYSTERY

by Vic Jeffery

The mystery surrounding one of Australia's most baffling maritime disappearances remains intact after a dedicated group of searchers have failed in another attempt to locate the watery grave of the coastal steamer *KOOMBANA* which vanished off the West Australian coast in a cyclone in 1912.

Described as 'the finest and most up-to-date steamer that has ever plied between the Nor-west ports of this State, indeed she can claim to be one of the most popular and best equipped passenger steamers on the Australian coast', by the 'West Australian' newspaper of 26 March, 1912 the *SS KOOMBANA* along with the Royal Australian Navy cruiser *HMAS SYDNEY*, lost off the West Australian coast in 1941, remain Australia's two greatest unsolved maritime mysteries.

In early March 1987, a group of private enthusiasts led by Mr Kerry Thom of Port Hedland, using more than \$1 million worth of sophisticated satellite navigational and seabed-searching equipment, along with a remote underwater television camera covered about 300 square kilometres of the ocean floor. All the equipment, the Port Hedland based Elder-Prince Marine barge *KARAWA*, and the labour were donated for the 72 hour futile search of the seabed.

Built by Alexander Stephen & Sons Ltd of Glasgow in 1908 for the Adelaide Steamship Company, the *SS KOOMBANA* was fitted to carry 188 passengers, 1500 sheep and 219 cattle. She normally carried a crew of 74.

SS KOOMBANA was registered with a tonnage of 4,399 tons and a length of 340 feet. She was capable of 14.5 knots and could steam at 13 knots on 35 tons of coal per day.

First arriving on the West Australian coast in 1909 to service the Royal Mail run to the ports of the north west, *KOOMBANA* left Port Hedland on her last fateful voyage at 10.30 am on 20 March 1912.

Under the command of Captain Thomas M. Allen, *KOOMBANA* was reported to be in very light trim when she sailed. It is reported that she was so light that her propeller was partly out of the water. She carried 76 passengers and 74 crew on her last fateful voyage.

On leaving, *KOOMBANA* had only 260 tons of Broome and Derby cargo properly stowed in her holds, 480 tons of coal, 871 tons of water and some 60 tons of stores.

The *SS BULLARRA* followed the *KOOMBANA* to sea an hour later and steamed into a fierce cyclone which was heading southward that afternoon.


BULLARRA survived the violent cyclone which caused widespread damage and loss of life, raging from Wednesday evening and continuing until Friday morning. *BULLARRA* was a sorry and battered sight when she limped into Cossack three days later with her tall funnel torn away and draped drunkenly over the side, rigging carried away and in a general state of disarray. However, she had survived.

The fearsome wrath of this cyclone was felt from Cossack Island to Marble Bar, a distance of some 273 kilometres. On the mainland a reported 220 mm of rain had fallen, flooding towns, washing away roads and tearing down lines of communication.

First reports on the whereabouts of the *SS KOOMBANA* indicated she had arrived safely at Derby, but a later telegram reached Perth saying she was 72 hours overdue and requesting an urgent search.

Although *KOOMBANA* carried wireless, no SOS calls or messages had been received from her. The British P & O liner *MONGOLIA* and the German mail steamer *GNEISENAU*, both within radio range, tried fruitlessly to contact the missing ship.

By the end of the month, and after a massive search, hopes of locating the *KOOMBANA* were fading. Nevertheless, the scaled down search



The SS KOOMBANA pictured shortly before her disappearance.

continued into April with expenses borne jointly by the Federal and State Governments along with the Adelaide Steamship Company.

At a point 33 nautical miles north-north west of Bedout Island a quantity of wreckage was found by one of the search vessels, the *SS UNA*. This included a mast from one of the ship's boats, and what appeared to be some cabin panels.

In the opinion of the *UNA*'s master the wreckage seemed to be floating up from the ocean floor. The crew had picked up all the floating wreckage visible, and had then proceeded to dinner. More wreckage was subsequently found giving rise to the impression that the woodwork must have been rising from the bottom, depths ranging in this area from 38 to 45 fathoms.

Other search vessels found floating wreckage also. *SS BULLARRA* found wreckage about 60 nautical miles east north east and 20 nautical miles north of Bedout; *SS MINDEROO*, 50 and 70 nautical miles west of Bedout; and *SS GORGON* from Broome, found a state room door 52 and other wreckage some 64 nautical miles west and 25 nautical miles north west of Bedout Island.

SS BULLARRA had picked up one of *KOOMBANA*'S boats. It had the company's crest on it and was ample proof that the *KOOMBANA* had been overwhelmed by the enormous seas and foundered with all hands, presumed drowned. No survivors nor bodies were ever found.

Among the 76 passengers aboard *KOOMBANA* was a pearl merchant, Mr

Abraham Davis who boarded at Port Hedland to travel to Derby. Before boarding Mr Davis is believed to have paid 20,000 pounds for the Roseate Pearl which is said to have been cursed. Whether the pearl is aboard *KOOMBANA*, or is in fact cursed we may never know.

After studying wind charts it was surmised that the *SS KOOMBANA* 'had been caught between two cyclones blowing in contrary directions, in the midst of which no ship could survive'. *KOOMBANA* had the reputation of being able to ride out the roughest seas and this would explain why she foundered without trace.

The subsequent Board of Marine Inquiry held in Perth into the loss of the *SS KOOMBANA* concluded 'The Court simply finds without indulging in useless speculation, that the stability and seaworthiness of the *SS KOOMBANA* were unassailable, and that the competency and carefulness of her master, Captain Allen, beyond question and that after being lost sight of at sea on 20 March 1912, her fate passed beyond human knowledge, and remains a mystery of the sea.'

In 1982 the Adelaide Steamship Company declared its willingness to vest property rights of the *SS KOOMBANA* in the Commonwealth Government. Yet, even with today's modern technology, the elusive *SS KOOMBANA* has once again managed to avoid another group of enthusiastic searchers.

KOOMBANA and her ghostly crew and passengers seem destined to rest in eternal solitude.

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
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BOOK REVIEWS



'UNITED STATES FLEET CARRIERS OF WORLD WAR II'

by **Richard Humble**. Blandford Press,
Poole, Dorset, England.

Soft cover version 1986, 160 pp, quarto.
5.95 pounds sterling

Naval history can be cast and packaged in many forms to appeal to either specialist or general readers. This book has been designed with both in mind. For the general reader it will serve as an introductory text to a specific form or naval warfare. For the specialist it provides lighter reading intended more to entertain than educate. Initially published in hard-back form, the quarto-sized soft-cover version is written in a fast moving journalistic style while forty to fifty percent of the book is made up of black and white photographs which portray the action described in the narrative.

The central thesis of the book is relatively simple and persuasively argued: "If there was a single American weapon which did more than any other to win the Pacific War of 1941-45, it was the fleet carrier whose story is told in this book" (p. 6). Humble further argues that following the Battle of Midway and the destruction of four Japanese aircraft carriers and the ensuing battle of attrition off Guadalcanal, "the fleet carrier became the U.S. Navy's master weapon in the advance across the Pacific to the shores of Japan" (p. 6). The role of the carriers is subsequently described from the time the U.S. Navy was left with only one operational fleet carrier, Enterprise, in October 1942, until thirteen months later when the newly formed U.S. 5th Fleet began the advance on Tokyo through the Central Pacific. The assault was accompanied by six large and five light carriers in addition to six lightweight escort carriers. This is a clear testimony of the immense resources available to the American naval war machine and the capacity of its shipbuilding industry.

The performance of the fleet carriers is then assessed during the major naval engagements of the Pacific War: Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons, Santa Cruz, Guadalcanal, Philippine Sea, Leyte Gulf, Iwo Jima and Okinawa. But while Humble is careful not to be side-tracked, in several places he neglects to provide sufficient

information on the general course of the war to permit the reader to form an accurate perspective of the urgency and significance of the events he attempts to describe. Similarly, he fails to present the origins of the growing dominance and ultimate takeover of carrier based operations from conventional surface actions utilising the once eminent battleships. As a result he gives an incomplete account of the conflict between pre-war force structure planning and capital ship construction, and the imperatives of the conduct of the Pacific Naval War.

Notwithstanding these criticisms, this book is easy to read and succeeds in portraying the crucial nature of fleet carrier operations. The plethora of photographs add superbly to the drama and assist the reader to gain a clear perception of 'what it was like'. They capture the desperation of the American carrier sailors, the tragedy of stricken warships and the tenacity of air group pilots. Although there is nothing new in this book it is still enjoyable reading and useful for those who want an introduction to the Pacific Naval War and the genesis of carrier based warfare to what it is today: the most mobile form of naval combat force that has the potential to deliver enormous firepower with the greatest flexibility.

Tom Frame

'THE COST OF SEAPOWER' by
Philip Pugh. Published by Conway
Maritime Press Ltd of London. 422
pages, \$75. Distributed in Australia by
Princeton Books, Cnr Mills and Herald
Streets, Cheltenham, Victoria.

This is a most thought-provoking book which takes the mystique out of defence costings, budgets and the economic factors which have influenced the spending of money on naval affairs since 1815.

Many of the ongoing issues are addressed in depth. Are small ships really cheap? Is quality preferable to quantity? Is technology the cure or the cause?

The author Philip Pugh, a qualified mechanical engineer, at present works in the British Ministry of Defence's Procurement Executive on cost

analysis and is well qualified to compile such a book. Fortunately this painstakingly researched book is in an easily understandable format for the professional and layman alike.

This book certainly proves the theory that navies in the long run have the resilience to adapt to the economic climate of the day. Caught between rapidly escalating costs and less rapidly increasing budgets, navies have learnt to ride rough times out and remain on course.

A prime example highlighted in this book is the discussion on Britain's declining economic strength and 'defence inflation'. It has frequently been observed that the cost of defence hardware rises more rapidly than other costs.

In 14 chapters there are some particularly important areas covered, including: Limits to Spending, Where the Money Goes, Living With Cost Escalation; Development Costs and Quality, Quantity and the Balanced Fleet.

Chapter 13, which examines development costs, shows that a typical ratio of development to unit production cost varies from 1,000 for missiles, to around 100 for military aircraft to about 0.5 for warships.

The use of 178 figures, each with at least one graph or table, is a useful form of illustration which certainly aids the reader's comprehension.

An interesting comparison is the active and reserve fleets of the Royal Navy postwar. In October, 1950 some 57 per cent of the fleet was in refit or reserve. By January, 1960 this was down to 45%, and in 1970, 39%.

Another table of expenditures between 1885 - 1984 shows (after correction for inflation) that Britain spent some 40% of its Defence Budget during the two World Wars, 8% over the Boer War, Korean War and the Falklands Campaign, and the remaining 52% over the other years.

The decline of the British Merchant Fleet and the acquisition of nuclear weapons has seen a tendency in the U.K. for some defence experts to question the need for spending large sums of money on the Navy. This in itself is a prime example of why defence experts and Naval officers should better understand the influence of financial and economic factors on seapower.

Now and again a book comes along which should be read by anyone involved in naval matters. This is one of them.

Vic Jeffrey



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CHAPTER CHATTER

1988 is set to ring in some changes within the Institute's Chapter organisation.

Canberra's loss is to become Sydney's gain. Captain Chris Skinner has moved to RANTAU in Sydney and is keen to get a Sydney Chapter up and running. He is looking at a start as early as February.

Members who will be in the area in 1988 and who are interested in supporting, assisting or attending are asked to contact Captain Skinner at RANTAU, 02 9297722 and c/-

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54-56 Miller St

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As a result of this the Institute now has a vacancy for Canberra Chapter Convenor. A small dedicated team can, as Captain Skinner and Co proved, provide a thoroughly worthwhile programme of presentations from the wealth of knowledge and opinion residing within the reach of Navy Office personnel.

Please contact either the President CAPT. Alan Brecht (062 655125) or LCDR Ian Weekley (062 653314) to get the ball rolling again.

For those who will be in the Melbourne area, an active cadre of members and interested persons continue regular meetings. The Chapter recently conducted a survey concerning attendance and programme matters with the view to promoting Chapter activity.

For further details please contact Convenor: Lloyd Saltmarsh, 39 Everton Grove, Surrey Hills, VIC, 3127 or LCDR Liz Coles — The Executive Officer HMAS LONSDALE.

In West Australia, LEUT Bjarne Kristensen organised some very well attended presentations during 1987. He can be contacted through HMAS STIRLING, PO Box 228, Rockingham, WA, 6168 — phone 095 270470. Lets build up the ANI in WA as the RAN presence grows.

Finally, as I have been posted to date late January 88, a new Chapter Liaison Councillor will be needed. Canberra area members are requested to consider whether their circumstances will permit them to take this office. Please don't wait for me to contact you.

Ian Weekley

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