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(INCORPORATED IN THE ACT)

AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE INC

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   b. to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and the maritime profession, and
   c. to publish a journal.

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      (4) Other persons having and professing a special interest in naval and maritime affairs.
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5. Inquiries and application for membership should be directed to:

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CONTRIBUTIONS

In order to achieve the stated aims of the Institute, all readers, both members and non-members, are encouraged to submit articles for publication. Preferably, submissions should be typed, double spaced, on A4 paper; the author's name and address must be shown clearly, even if a pseudonym is required for printing purposes; to be eligible for prizes, original articles must be accompanied by statements that they have been written expressly for the ANI; and short biographies will be welcomed. The Editor reserves the right to reject or amend articles for publication.

DISCLAIMER

Views expressed in this journal are those of the authors, and not necessarily those of the Department of Defence, the Chief of Naval Staff or the Institute.

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Cover:
FFG 01 HMAS ADELAIDE on patrol

FROM THE PRESIDENT

Advocates of a strong maritime element in the Australian Defence Force will have been encouraged by the award of contracts in late May this year for the construction of new submarines for the RAN. Built by the Australian Submarine Corporation to a design by Kockums of Sweden these submarines represent a quantum leap in technology, particularly for the combat system, and will greatly enhance the Navy's capability for underwater warfare. They will be faster, have more endurance, improve surveillance, and provide better capabilities against surface shipping and against enemy submarines. Importantly, they need fewer crew members than the OBERON submarines they replace.

This boost to Australia's defences comes at an opportune time. I am sure it is welcomed by members of the Institute for the reasons described above but recent instability in our geographic region provides added food for thought. The Kockums submarine makes a substantial contribution to improved Australian seapower and it is this element which should now be elevated in the debate. Readers of Mahan, Corbett, Roskill, and indeed Gorshkov will be familiar with the theme that strong seapower enhances the State, a fact which the recent coup in Fiji emphasizes only too well.

Without seapower, opportunities open to the Australian Government would have been fewer. Seapower guaranteed an ability to evacuate Australian citizens, to demonstrate a presence without direct interference in the affairs of another nation, but most importantly the capability of immediate reaction by Australian forces at the scene should our government have deemed that circumstances warranted this. The ANI believes Australia's response to the Fijian incident to be a classic example of the use of seapower as a means of influencing peacetime events and I encourage members to challenge or support this contention through debate in this journal or in other ANI forums. Discussion of such issues is the *raison d'être* of the Institute and I hope we will seize this opportunity with relish.

Chapter interest continues to increase. I commend the concept of lunch time meetings where Chapters see this as feasible; details of arrangements used by the Canberra Chapter will be provided to those who would like them. These short but frequent meetings have provided real stimulus to ANI activity in Canberra and I acknowledge the efforts of the organisers and speakers. The Editor intends to publish the presentations as journal items, in due course.

Council activity has centred upon the forthcoming Seminar, still topical but no longer a prelude to an end of year Federal election. As we get closer to the event so the work increases and I again extend an invitation to those members who would like to help on the days, or beforehand. Commodore Ian Callaway (062) 655270 is the point of contact. I urge members to attend if possible as the event has potential to be one of the most important seminars on maritime matters yet held in Australia.

Consideration is being given by Council to the content and frequency of our journal, life membership of the ANI and other membership issues, administration of the Institute and our need to grow. Ideas or comments are welcomed upon any or all of these matters. I shall report upon them in due course both in the journal and elsewhere as these subjects are fundamental to the life and future of the Institute. Volunteers are needed for the 1988 Council and I ask those interested in serving the Institute to contact me or any of the Councillors.

To end on a bright note I am pleased to report that the ANI Press looms as an increasing probability. I hope to announce details soon but, for the present, we are working towards publication of Admiral Joseph C. Wylie's work *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control*. This would be a reprint, arranged through the active support of one of our members, and intended for release as soon as possible. Optimistically, this will be the first of many, leading to establishment of the ANI Press as a viable and self supporting venture.

Sincerely,

ALAN BRECHT

FROM THE EDITOR

This issue of JANI brings the good reader much that is interesting and new, even if I do say so myself. Action, suspense, keen insight, humour in various guises, comprehensive strategic analysis and for the first time ever in JANI... sex!

Our correspondence section includes a light hearted look at training a 600-man Chinese cruiser crew just after World War Two and, for those few of us who haven't done this, tips are given on how to 'save face'. The flavour of our publication then changes as Commodore Adrian Cummins, Director General of Naval Warfare makes a sortie into the slightly different topic of 'Discipline, Leadership and Command Skills for Combat'. In fact, the Commodore's article is not really an article! It is an essentially unchanged copy of his leadership speech which was presented to the RAAF Staff College under Chatham House rules. The ANI council thank Commodore Cummins and the Commandant of the RAAF Staff College for their kind permission to print it.

On reading the Commodore's presentation I was tempted to make a submission on leadership and social change and, since I frequently yield to temptation, I did make a submission. One of the few advantages of being editor is that you rarely knock back your own submissions no matter how limited their quality. I leave it to the reader to judge on the question of quality.

Our third article is one that I am sure will be of interest to many but perhaps distasteful in patches to some. It deals with the wartime reminiscences of my friend (some years my senior and better) Neil Grano, a veteran merchant navy man of World War Two. Neil served under the Australian, British and US flags and, among many other exploits, picked up the survivors of the Raider *Kormoron* and is a veteran of Convoy PQ17.

The first instalment of Neil's story appearing in this issue starts when he was a 16 year old in Melbourne and Neil has generously allowed us to print his story over a number of issues, if we *'tell it like it was'* and not edit too much real life vulgarity out of his original manuscript.

One cannot edit a journal like JANI without consistently good copy from men like Vic Jeffery and our man in America, Tom Friedmann. Vic has given the journal solid support for years and has a writing style that most of us admire. Unfortunately, I have not had the pleasure of meeting Tom or Vic as yet but I look forward to the day (unless they don't approve of my editing and are predisposed to violence!)

Strategy has not been neglected in this issue and Lieutenant Commander Mark Rutherford considers the increasingly important implications of defending our offshore resources. Like Mark, I believe challenges may arise against our national claims upon what some see as a disproportionate share of the planets resource wealth. Mark takes a realistic look at how we can best maintain sovereignty given our limited defence resources.

In accord with the JANI policy of 'keeping the bounders honest' we have not forgotten the 1987 White Paper, nor will we. The debate must be kept alive and complacency will not prevail. 'Cyclops' and Commodore Alan Robertson, RAN (retd.) give some keen insights into this very important document and its implications in a section called 'Candid Comments on the 1987 White Paper'.

The theme for the November issue is 'RAN Missions towards 2000' in which readers are invited, indeed urged to submit copy. So, find a little time, relax and put pen to paper. Full marks are awarded for lateral thinking and new ways of solving old problems or old ways of solving new problems. Whatever works best under the circumstances.

Deadline for copy is 30th October and illustrative material is always appreciated. I would like advice as to the nature and size of submissions as soon as possible but beggars cannot afford to be choosers and I am always grateful to receive copy at any time.

Finally, special thanks must be given to the delightful June Wallace, who works at the Australian Counter Disaster College at Mt. Macedon, Victoria. I was there for two 'journal critical' weeks in July and June was a great help to me in avoiding disaster. June's beauty and charm is only matched by the flavour of her genuine Indian curries. Thanks again June.

ALAN HINGE
(062) 66 2267

CORRESPONDENCE

My Chinese Connection

Sir,

The article by Commander C.G. Rogers RAN, 'Exchange Postings: Another Boring Story' in your February 1987 edition brought back to me memories of an exchange posting which I survived some years ago.

I qualified as a Long 'G' in 1942 at a time when the whole of the Western World was under considerable stress from the Germans and at a time when Radio Direction Finding was just coming into common use within the Fleet. Towards the end of our course we were told of this new range — finding marvel but were allowed to refer to it in our notes only as 'X', so at the end of WWII I requested Exchange Duty with the Royal Navy mainly to improve my knowledge of RADAR as it had become known. The first year of my two year exchange period was spent at various technical schools and colleges pulverising innocent radar sets and then trying to re-assemble them with varying degrees of success. With the second year of my Exchange still available I was asked what I should like to do, and I said 'Go to sea'. This was not too popular with my RN colleagues as I had already taken up one of their billets in the Experimental Department at H.M.S. Excellent and sea billets for 'G' types were not readily available at that time. However the Royal Family was about to go to South Africa in the battle-ship Vanguard and I was offered the number 3 'G' billet for the voyage.

Before I could accept or refuse the invitation the Powers that be must have suddenly realized that I was not R.N. and the invitation was withdrawn. However they were kind enough to offer me another sea-going job which nobody else seemed to want — to go as 'G' of the 6 inch cruiser *Aurora* which the R.N. was about to turn over to the Chinese Navy.

As I had spent 2 years in the R.A.N. cruiser *Sydney* I was familiar with the class of ship and thought that even going to sea with a ship full of Chinese people would be better than fooling around ashore. Little did I realize what this decision would mean to me over the next twelve months.

Aurora was finishing a very extensive refit in Portsmouth Dockyard when I joined. The R.N. Captain and twelve R.N. officers and about twenty senior sailors joined at about the same time. As the Training Group we fitted in quickly and harmoniously as we faced up to the problems of how to train just over 600 Chinese officers and sailors in not more than one year.

We specialists spent some time at *H.M.S. Drake* in Plymouth arranging shore training in gunnery, T.A.S., communications, navigation, and engineering. We agreed that seamanship would have to be learned 'on the job'.

I was Officer Of The Day when the Chinese crew was marched down to the ship from Portsmouth Barracks. 'Marched' is rather flattering to this manoeuvre, but in any case most of the sailors turned up within 15 to 20 minutes of arrival of the main body. We settled them in and I met my three Chinese counterparts — a senior Lieutenant who had been nominated as the Gunnery Officer, a junior Lieutenant who had been nominated as the Gunnery Officer, a junior Lieutenant as Second 'G' and a Gunner. None of them had ever seen a naval gun before!

I found out that officers had been 'recruited' or told to volunteer for the Navy from various universities throughout China, the seaman sailors had been told that they were now in the navy and the Engine Room staff were removed from various merchant ships when they called at English ports.

We started shore training without delay and it was quickly noted that in each class there had to be not one but two interpreters, because some of the sailors came from the north of China and some from the south and they had no common language. This was to be a saving grace over the next twelve months as the only common language was English. I am certain that this fact saved some of our lives, including mine.

The Dockyard had given the ship a first class refit firstly because they were short of work and secondly because money was no object and the Admiralty was keen that the ship should be a good advertisement for the U.K.

Ammunitioning Ship was a bit of a problem as the Gunner would keep on slipping in additional Demand Notes without telling anyone else and so trucks laden with all sorts of explosives would turn up at all hours of the day and night. The other officers in the Training Group were having similar problems with their stores but it was difficult to know what to do about it. In the end I sent for the Gunner and in the presence of the other two 'G's asked him to keep to the approved allowances. A short altercation ensued at the end of which he stood up and threw his ledger at me. He was not a very good Gunner as he missed his target.

This incident was my first personal experience of 'Loss fo Face' for the Gunner to be spoken to concerning a fault in his duty in front of two of his officers. This 'Loss of Face' was to rear it's ugly head time and time again in the months ahead. A glaring example of it was that the Chinese Captain would not go on to the Bridge at sea if the R.N. Captain was there. Of course that made things difficult for everyone and was only resolved when C in C Portsmouth asked the Chinese Captain and some of his officers for a drink and spoke to the Captain privately, thus saving everyones 'face'. Subsequently the Captain appeared on the Bridge at the required times but took no part in the ships movements or activities. We were never to find out how good he was at handling the ship because he never did it whilst I was there.

The Chinese Engineer Officer presented his own problems as he wore three stripes whilst the R.N. engineer was only a Lieutenant Commander, thus the Chinese officer could not possibly be present in any of the engineering spaces when our (E) was giving instructions there, in case the staff thought that the Commander (E) might be listening, thus admitting that he did not already know all about the boilers, main engines and auxiliaries. On each occasion of the ship preparing for sea the Commander (E) would put on his sparkling white overalls, his clean cap and a new pair of gloves, then sit in his cabin whilst steam was being raised. Our answer to this problem was for our Captain to give our 'Chief' an extra days leave on a day that only we of the Training Group knew that we were going to sea. On our return to harbour that evening the Chief returned on board and then spent the rest of the night sorting out the mess that had been created during the day. In the meantime our friend came up with the proposal that if we altered the hydraulic systems so that salt water were used instead of fresh water in the Heads there would be a great saving in fresh water. It was a tactful person who explained that this was just what had been done since the first days of steam propulsion.

I sent my three opposite numbers to the Gunnery School for a quick 'brush up' on our equipment, whilst I scouted around for one of those modern torture machines called The Six Inch Instructional Loader', probably first used at the time of the Spanish Inquisition as a substitute for The Rack. It was a simple horror which I had first come across in H.M.A.S. Sydney which effectively taught the gun loading numbers how to lift the 85 pound projectile from the shell hoist on to the loading tray and ram the shell by hand into the gun. It sounds simple but has been known to make strong men weep. When we started training the Chinese gun crews on this monstrosity they thought for the first three minutes that it was great fun, but gradually the Oriental smiles began to fade and with the appearance of copious quantities of Eastern perspiration I realized that we had at our disposal *a unique machine for the dissuasion of crime.* The word was passed amongst the Training Group and from thereon the Ship's Company had a source of entertainment in watching their naughty colleagues of all Departments working out at the machine. We soon had an ample reserve of gun-loaders throughout the ship.

I was the senior un-married officer in the Training Group and volunteered to 'sub' frequently for the married members. By spending so much time on board and doing Rounds five or six evenings a week I came to know many of the Chinese personally, and I think that eventually they were able to distinguish me from the other white personnel — 'You all look alike to us'.

After about four months the Dockyard started *to get sick of the sight of us and our 'friends'* started to get into too much trouble ashore. We had one murder on board, one ashore, and a number of serious attacks on women. It became obvious that the Chinese were far more seriously affected by alcohol than we had realized at first. There was one night when I was nearly asleep when I heard a loud scuffle outside my cabin and a lot of muffled Chinese chatter. I waited a while then went outside to be greeted by one of our senior sailors who told me that he had intercepted a drunken Chinaman who had a bayonet and was intent on wiping me out. From thereon I broke Naval Regulations by keeping my cabin door locked. The Captain concurred. Our R.N. Captain was a highly decorated Submariner but Aurora was the first large surface vessel he had commanded and I must say that he handled her very well which was good for the 'face' of the Training Group in the eyes of the Chinese.

Finally we got to sea in a tentative sort of fashion and for the next couple of months

worked up in the Channel being based on Portland but doing a 'race-track' run between the English and French coasts. This was invigorating, refreshing and at times scarey, especially as we, as 'stand-by' Officers of the Watch had instructions not to interfere with the Chinese watch-keepers unless they looked as though they were about to place the ship in jeopardy. This happened two or three times a watch to start with depending upon the amount of shipping in our vicinity, but gradually things settled down except at night when our friends seemed to lose all sense of distance and relative speeds, but interference by us then didn't matter so much because there were not so many people about to see that corrective action was necessary. By day there were several occasions when the Chinese OOW would just walk off the Bridge and sit in his cabin if he thought that he had been criticised.

At first we found this a little disconcerting but after a while we found that if we took no notice and carried on as usual the gentleman would normally quietly appear at the back of the Bridge and take over the Watch when asked to as if nothing had happened. For the first few weeks we kept as close to the English coast as possible, frequently anchoring for the night so as to give us a little time to recover from what can only be described as a slightly nerve-racking experience, mainly because we never knew what was going to happen next. We always anchored at a considerable distance from the shore so as to dissuade anyone from trying to reach dry land as it was realized that a considerable number of the Engine Room staff had been 'Press-ganged' into the Navy and were beginning to miss their civilian rates of pay and many other amenities which they had previously enjoyed in the Merchant Navy.

Once a month the Chinese officers would entertain the officers of the Training Group to a Mess Dinner. In preparation for these dinners they would send their Chefs ashore and scour the south coast of England for succulent chickens, porkers and all of those other delicacies which go to make up a first class Chinese meal. We would assemble in the Wardroom where the Chinese officers would act as hosts and serve us warmed sherry which they said tasted very much like their favourite drink of (I think) saki. At the second of these dinners I was cad enough to make certain that the Chinese 'G' had a few more of these lethal drinks than was good for him and for the rest of the evening I was able to ask him all sorts of tricky questions which had been bothering me for some time but which could not be raised in the normal course of conversation. Prior to the first of these dinners I had raised with our Captain the question of honouring the Loyal Toast. Neither of us knew to whom we should drink as far as the Chinese were concerned as their country was in a state of turmoil at the time. We asked the advice of the Chinese Captain but in accordance with his normal routine he shrugged his shoulders and said: 'We will do whatever you say', so we settled on 'The Leader of the Chinese Republic and her people' and in the event that seemed to satisfy most people because by that time in the meal the effects of the sakis were all too evident, and I really don't think that they were very worried about the whole thing. We had six of these dinners at the conclusion of which I considered myself an expert in Chinese food and had amassed considerable information on many subjects of interest to us — for instance the Gunner was a senior Communist officer and had been instructed to obtain as many small arms and as much small arms ammunition as possible. No wonder he didn't love me.

I cannot recall who started it but I suddenly found myself given the job of training a Ship's band and taking the Ship's Company on route marches round Portland Bill. I found a co-operative Royal Marine musician who agreed to try and impart some musical capability into a group of sailors who had been told to volunteer for the band.

After a couple of weeks The Royal Marine suggested that we might like to try out his band and that as a result of his efforts he would not refuse a posting somewhere east of Suez, a long way from Portland but not too close to China.

On our next stop at Portland I landed with the band and about 200 Chinese sailors armed with rifles and bayonets, not knowing that I was plotting to take them on a nice long walk in the south of England.

We didn't get further than the first half-mile. Every time I gave the order to march we would step off bravely at the regulation pace of 120 steps per minute and to the faintly recognisable tune of 'Hearts Of Oak'. However within seconds the bass drummer would get carried away with his own enthusiasm and the beat would increase and increase until the whole formation would be on the verge of doubling. I would call a halt, the Royal Marine would whisper a few well-chosen Royal Marine sayings into the ear of the drummer, by which time the rear ranks would have caught up with the main body, and away we would go again with the same inevitable result. Time and time again we tried but it was no good — the drummer liked the way he was doing his job and nobody was going to make him change. I couldn't make him keep quiet and let the rest of the band play — that would have been an awful 'loss of face' (you see I was learning), so I turned

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them for home, told the Royal Marine to start up the band, let the mob go and walk back with me. By the time we got back to the ship everyone had disappeared and I suggested that we did not repeat that exercise. All agreed. Two final points stand out in my memory — the day of C in C's Inspection and the 'Hand Over' of the ship to the Chinese Navy. On the appointed day C in C Portsmouth arrived alongside and was received with all due ceremony as interpreted by our Chinese colleagues. The R.N. Captain took the ship out of harbour and then was told by C in C to leave the Bridge. He did not go very far away. After the Admiral had carried out an inspection below it was time for us to rendezvous with the tug and battle-practice target in preparation for a full calibre firing. We had done this several times before but always with close supervision at all quarters. This time the Chinese were on their own. I had arranged for the tug to steer a very steady course with the target on as long a tow as possible and we would be at a range which would give the maximum safety angle between the tug and target. All being ready the Admiral ordered 'Training Staff clear the Bridge', so off we trooped, until C in C called out; 'Guns you stay here', and as I recall that was the first time a full Admiral had winked at me. As luck would have it, and possibly in answer to several prayers which I offered up, all went well except for the fact that towards the end of the firing a fog began to close in over the Channel, which was bad luck as we were scheduled to carry out a full power trial on the way back to Portsmouth, in order to demonstrate to the Chinese Government that the ship would reach her designed speed.

We worked up to close on 30 knots and still increasing speed when a vague report came from one of the radars that they had some sort of contact somewhere. Even after nearly twelve months it was still difficult to understand a Chinese talking English over a sound-powered telephone. The next thing that we saw was a very large tanker right in our path. The remainder of the Training Group had still not been allowed to return to the Bridge and I was now keeping well clear of the Chinese OOW. True to form he took one look at the tanker and then started to walk off the Bridge. C in C was not accustomed to this sort of behaviour, but to us it was old hat by now, and so I gave the order 'starboard 20' and thought 'Hang protocol and "face", lets get to hell out of here' which is just what we did. In seconds the tanker was out of sight, I think before they knew what was happening. Our Captain was hastily summoned back to the Bridge, but we still kept thrashing through the fog at well over 30 knots for the next hour, which I, for one thought was a little excessive, even if the U.K. was keen to sell the ship. Finally we made it back to Portsmouth and the Chinese captain took the ship approximately alongside. Two tugs finished the job for him, and we made final preparations to hand the ship over to our colleagues. They had asked that our Captain, Navigating Officer, and Engineer Officer accompany them to China but in the event they were off-loaded in Hong Kong before the ship entered Chinese waters.

There was a short 'Handing Over' ceremony in the afternoon and then the Training Group disembarked. In the evening we returned for a farewell party by which time *Aurora* had become Chinese Ship *Chung King* and as we were now foreign officers each was piped aboard.

It had been a strenuous, illuminating, and sometimes frightening experience, but I think that on the whole we learned a great deal from it. It is not often that one is given the opportunity to live cheek by jowl with over 600 Chinamen, to see and talk to them morning noon and night, and to find out that the average Oriental is not nearly as inscrutable as he is made out to be.

The one lasting benefit to me was that during that year I met the WREN who in a few months after leaving the ship became my wife. She says that this story brings back a lot of memories for her too.

After landing the RN officers in Hong Kong the ship proceeded towards Shanghai but was sunk at the entrance to the river by Communist aircraft.

Nineteen years later in the Spring of 1967 when I was the Head of the Australian Joint Services Staff in the United States, my wife and I were at a diplomatic Party in Washington when, almost as the song says, I looked across the crowded room and saw a familiar Chinese face. The recognition was mutual. Quickly we moved towards each other and there standing before me was Rear-Admiral Chen, my opposite number from *Aurora*. It was from him that I learned how she had been lost.

Take it from Commander Rogers and me, there is a lot of fun to be had out of an Exchange posting!

Rear Admiral G.J.B. Crabbe

CBE DSC RAN (retd)

Commodore Adrian Cummins AM, RAN.

Adrian R. Cummins was born at Sandringham, VICTORIA in 1936 and was educated at the Hampton State School and Wesley College Melbourne, entering the Royal Australian Naval College on 31 January 1950. He was awarded the Otto Albert Memorial Prize for Seamanship on graduating in 1953.

Subsequently he served in *HMS Triumph*, *HMAS Sydney* and *HMAS Queenborough*. As a Sub Lieutenant he was awarded the Ian MacDonald Prize for Communications. He was the Navigating Officer of *HMAS Quickmatch* from 1958 to 1960, after which he qualified as a Gunnery and Air Weapons Specialist at *HMS Excellent* Portsmouth UK in 1960 and 1961, followed by exchange service as Gunnery Officer of *HMS Corunna* to 1963. He was awarded an Admiralty Commendation for brave conduct in 1962. On return to Australia he commanded *HMAS Ibis* taking part in the Indonesian Confrontation 1963 to 1965. From 1965 to late 1966 he was Officer-in-Charge, West Head Gunnery Range, and subsequently the Project Officer and Executive Officer of the newly formed RAN Trials and Assessing Unit and Project Officer for the Jervis Bay Missile Range. In 1968 he qualified at the Royal Naval Staff College London, and was the Executive Officer of the new destroyer escort *HMAS Swan* in 1969/70, after which he qualified in Military Operations Research and Systems analysis at the Royal Military College of Science UK. He was promoted Commander in 1970 and served at Navy Office as the Director of Surface and Air Weapons to 1973 when he was posted in Command of *HMAS Swan*. From 1975 to mid 1976 he was Head of the Fleet Training Group, after which he studied at the Joint Services Staff College, Canberra. He was promoted to Captain in 1977 and was made a Member of the Order of Australia in that year, serving as the Director Naval Manpower Planning until the end of 1979. In 1980 and '81 he was in command of *HMAS Perth* and saw service in that ship in the North-west Indian Ocean on the first Australian independent patrol of the area. He was promoted to Commodore in January 1982 and served as the Director General Service Conditions in the Department of Defence (Central Office) until January 1984 when he was posted to his present position as Director General Naval Warfare at Navy Office.

AUTHOR'S NOTE

I recently sought and was kindly given approval to publish my speech to the RAAF Staff College on 'Leadership, Discipline and Command Skills for Combat'. It has now been delivered in the same form on two occasions at that college, under the Chatham House rules. Recently the Commandant asked if he could have copies for the students and this was done, so in practical terms the text is now in the public arena.

It would be normal for such a speech to be re-written in a form more suitable as an article in a prestigious publication like the ANI Journal. I pondered this, but decided that some of the feeling and intent would be lost if this were done. So, my speech is essentially published as spoken.

One must always, as an officer in the military, tread carefully and with humility when daring to talk on leadership and command. There is no presumption on my part to espouse an authority, expertise or reputation in this field. I leave that to those much more qualified, senior, and experienced.

It was a requirement, on request, to give the address, and as I said in the penultimate paragraph "I have sought to generate some controversy and hopefully provoke some searching questions", and, "We can *all* be better leaders, we can all apply the disciplines of our profession more thoroughly". This I sincerely believe, and I hope the wider audience of the ANI will respond vigorously and thoughtfully. Let us all continue to '*dare to be wise*'.

Adrian Cummins

Commodore, RAN
Navy Office
1st June 1987
(The Glorious First of June)

A PRESENTATION TO THE RAAF STAFF COLLEGE

DISCIPLINE, LEADERSHIP AND COMMAND SKILLS FOR COMBAT

by COMMODORE A.R. CUMMINS AM RAN

Group Captain Montgomery, Lady and Gentlemen,

Thank you for again inviting me to address this forum on leadership. I was somewhat surprised and honoured to be invited last year and delighted to be able to make this presentation this year.

The subject you asked me to talk about was 'Discipline'. Of itself it is a little dry and leads to some odd perceptions. As a sailor, you would all gain from me a view of naval discipline which could start with the 18th Century Naval Discipline Act and such luminaries of its application as Captain Bligh, who must have been well thought of by the Admiralty as he was eventually promoted to Vice Admiral.

What I thought I'd do is talk about 'Discipline, Leadership and Command Skills for Combat'.

In developing this theme it is useful to start at the purpose of our profession. Clausewitz states 'War is only a continuation of state policy by other means' and further, 'An act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will'. We collectively are the people our Government would use to manage that application of violence should policy require it. We are the professional experts of our nation in all the gradations of the use of violence for the pursuit of international objectives; and also, should law and order break down, to support and aid the civil power of the State in restoring the peace at home.

SETTING THE SCENE

As we all know, the cost and destructiveness of modern conventional war let alone any nuclear option has become extremely high. Other means of conflict such as subversion and terrorism are becoming attractive options for many nations and groups. In this area acceptable weapons are misinformation and disinformation. Bribery and religious fanaticism are used in a calculated way along with the usual terrorist instruments of indiscriminate attack on any suitable target.

The central source of resources of all kinds for these attacks is almost invariably the Soviet Union and the principal intelligence arms of the Politburo, the KGB and the GRU. Whilst it is true that there are some other mainly religious sources of propaganda and terrorism, the Soviet and Eastern Bloc origins of terrorism prevail but let me return to the problems of propaganda and terrorism later.

To further set the scene let me quote from General Fuller, from his famous book 'The Conduct of War 1789 to 1961':

> 'The conduct of war, like the practice of medicine is an art, and because the aim of the physician and surgeon is to prevent, cure or alleviate the diseases of the human body, so should the aim of the statesman and soldier be to prevent, cure or alleviate the wars which inflict the international body. Unfortunately this has been little appreciated, and while in recent times the art of healing has been placed on a scientific footing, the conduct of war has remained in its alchemical stage; worse still, during the present century it has reverted to its barbaric form of destruction and slaughter.'

Fuller goes on to say:

> 'Brutality in war seldom pays, this is a truism with few exceptions. Another is never drive your enemy to despair, for although it may win you the war, it will almost certainly prolong it to your disadvantage.'

And now, here are some more points which I see as important:

- Those who must use violence in the service of their Government, must be the most controlled and disciplined of men, and
- Those who are responsible for the management of conflict must primarily be aware of the nature of conflict as Clausewitz states 'The first, the greatest, the most decisive act of judgement which the statesman and general exercises is rightly to understand the war in

which he engages, not to take it for something, to wish to make it something, which by nature of its relations it is impossible to be.'

Leaders must have a thorough and very wide ranging knowledge of the nature of conflict, and of its causes and its effects. It is strange indeed that most of the recent writers on the theory of war and on the psychology of our profession have not reached the highest ranks within it, or should I say been allowed to. This tells us something important. Norman F. Dixon in his famous work 'On the Psychology of Military Incompetence' devotes considerable space to this phenomena — anti intellectualism.

THE FIRST DISCIPLINE

Our first discipline therefore is the one of acquiring the knowledge of our complex and vital business. A broad education in the arts *and* sciences, and a detailed study of conflict in all its manifestations must be the ongoing intellectual pursuit of the military profession.

Let me now shift tack a little, and talk about the development of leaders. I was reminded in the reading to prepare this talk, about our own revered naval college as it was in *1950* and of some research I recently did in preparing a talk about Nelson for Trafalgar Day. I joined at 13, and have now served in the RAN for half of its existence. The basis of the education and training in 1790 and 1950 were alarmingly alike. The routine for midshipmen, the punishments, the chain of command, and the term of service (12 years past the age of 18 or your parents were not allowed to let you take up your place 'on board'). The food had improved in both quality and quantity in those 160 years, but was exactly the same as that of a Borstal institution as I subsequently found when taken on a escorted tour of such a place.

Each Sunday we were solemnly paraded at divisions and sent to Church. It was an offence for our senior officers not to do so. On occasion we were read the articles of war and part of the Naval Discipline Act. The Act had been left largely unchanged in substance since 1790 but the delegations to apply punishments had been substantially lessened. However it was somewhat of a shock at 13, and a proud officer and therefore gentleman, to find out that for many acts of neglect or commission, one was liable on the face of it, 'to suffer *death* or any other punishment hereafter mentioned'.

The naval college seemed to run like a combination of a second class boys high school and a slightly easier version of a 1790 frigate of the line. The continuing personal battle to survive in the early years there was

The Naval College: a combination of a second class boys school and a slightly easier version of a 1790 frigate of the line (AWM 225)

more preferable than the punishment for daring to make any suggestion of change. Fortunately times have changed.

Underlying the routine of the place was harsh discipline by immediate seniors, a rote style of learning, an emphasis on sport, and a cruel application of fitness training, combined with obsessions about neatness, drill and a code of privileges. The basic aspects of the qualities and disciplines required at sea were all in those routines but they had been distorted in the means of application. The line between the obsessions of 'Bulldust' and the need to train for a safe life at sea were muddled. We were not to see this until much later in life.

The needs of life at sea are quite different to those ashore.

- If you don't provide it for the voyage you can't get it later.
- If you don't secure it, it will break loose and damage something.
- If you don't notice something you could go aground or have a collision.
- The weather is always an overriding factor, constant attention to it is vital.
- Maintenance and replacement of gear is essential for safe sailing. And
- Cleanliness prevents disease. You don't get replacements for those who get sick.

You will excuse me if I use the sea environment, I'm a sailor. The sea is a harsh and unforgiving environment, for both small craft and larger ships. On top of all that, add the intense demands of any level of combat at sea.

Instant reactions to orders, the perfect execution of drills for the use of equipments, as an individual and as part of a team, in daylight, darkness, fair weather or foul are some of the basics for safe and effective duty at sea.

In addition, you have to live in cramped and often wet quarters even in modern warships. It is a young man's business. You learn, as a midshipman, the realities of life at close hand in all of its human and professional reality. There is no place for the lazy, slow, untrained or incompetent. The professional skills of the seaman, engineer, navigator, gunner etc, are ingrained as part of life. For some, these basic professional skills become the limit of their world. The characteristics ascribed to the majority of naval officers last century were 'reliable, well trained, stubborn and dull'. Resistance to change, obsession about neatness and cleanliness prevailed. Some would say that elements of these characteristics remain. Brute force was seen as the route to victory. I have set a broad scene on the environment in warships.

THE SECOND DISCIPLINE

The second discipline is more complex. It is made up of many components. I suppose it is the discipline of perfectly using our vehicles of war for whatever the purpose of the moment. Key features are:

- It is a 24 hour a day business.
- Training, maintenance and hotel services *run on a continuous* basis.
- Whilst structured and hierarchical it is a family — a ships company.
- A warship is a true matrix management system.
- All sailors share the domestic tasks, and,
- The navy's basic man management system, the divisional system, is built in. Accountability runs upwards within working groups, to petty officers to divisional officers to heads of department to the Commanding Officer.

There are a couple of other points worth noting. The Commanding Officer of a warship is in a unique personal position of authority and responsibility. He is suitably backed up with disciplinary powers. How he uses these powers is pivotal to the morale and effectiveness of the ships company. Their average age is around 21 to 22. Let me illustrate some things that attract severe penalties in the navy:

- asleep on watch,
- drug taking, and
- offences on shore, particularly abroad.

Our warships are kept at a high readiness state, they are ammunitioned, provisioned and manned for war. This is the front line of our national deterrent. Thus wherever those warships are, the Government of the day has the *option* of their actual operational use at whatever level required. Further, warships have to be ready to respond to unexpected attack at any time.

100 PERCENT IS THE PASS MARK!

So you see, there has to be a thoroughly trained, practiced and totally disciplined team of people who are confident in their own capabilities, the skill of their officers, and in particular the capability of their Commanding Officer. There are two key elements to remember in my professional business:

'You can win as many weapon exchanges as you like, but you can only ever lose one',

And, concerning the way in which your ship is operated:

'100 percent is the pass mark'.

Now I would like to talk about some of the leadership factors that make the difference between a '*properly*' run command and a happy,

'You can win as many weapons exchanges as you like, but you can only ever lose one'.



(DDG IKARA firing above, DE SEACAT below)

wholly effective and fully productive one. You can see that the training processes produce a competent corps of officers who are reliable, well trained and keen. Referring again to Norman F. Dixon:

> 'The ideal military leader is, of course, one who manages to combine excellence as a task specialist with an equal flair for the social or heroic aspects of leadership. Since the traits required for these two aspects of leadership are rather different, these so called 'Great Men' leaders have been comparatively rare. Amongst the best examples are Wellington, Nelson, Lawrence and in recent years Field Marshal Slim. Such leaders manage to combine extreme professionalism in the realizing of military goals with a warm humanity which earned them the lasting affection and loyalty of their men.'

Know your men, visit them, understand their jobs, their way of life, fears and ambitions. In those books on the pursuit of excellence by Peters and Partners, the modern concept of 'management by wandering around' was 'invented'. It's an old and well known quality of the leader. Further, the men at the 'coal face' can best suggest how things can be better done or the dangers that could appear. Closely allied to these aspects of leadership are a genuinely felt concern for conditions of service, and rigorous follow up on problems, and this includes all matters concerning the families of our men. Careful planning, forethought, and carefully nurtured communication systems are essential. Concerning communications, tell it how it is, tell it now, and as far as you can, tell what can be expected. Say what you want achieved, broadly how it is to be done and insist that all officers do the same. Report grievances where you cannot resolve them. State problems in clear unequivocal but polite terms, and be unconcerned about the touchy sensitivities of higher commanders as a result.

In the final part of my talk today, I would like to discuss aspects of higher command in the management of conflict. Many who can pass muster as unit commanders, fall hopelessly further up the line. I hope I will not be looked upon unkindly if I assert that examples of such officers abound in peacetime defence forces.

The higher management of conflict is the most complicated enterprise of all. Risk, uncertainty, stress, complexity, speed of action, distorted communications and human error all prevail. Recently I found a definition of leadership in an unlikely place — Regency Magazine of the Hyatt Hotels Corporation, as reprinted in Engineers Australia, August 24 1984 Edition.

- Leadership is about vision, imagination, flexibility and innovation all in the interests of charting the future. It relies on a clear understanding of objectives and an ability to translate these objectives to the rest of the organization.
- Leadership cannot be based on or rely upon luck, whim, fancy, hope or adhocism. It is also not something which can be turned on or off like a switch, it is a way of living.
- It involves an appreciation of the big-picture concomitant with an ability to motivate people to exceed even their own personal expectations. To succeed as a leader, a person must understand people and be sensitive, concerned and caring.
- A leader motivates first and foremost by example. He/she is a communicator and an initiator, an action-oriented person who is neither prevaricator nor presider. He/she is results-oriented and never makes excuses.
- A leader looks for solutions while delegating authority and responsibility and seeking expert advice and help from whatever source makes sense. However, the leader is always the one who carries the can — the person of final responsibility.
- It is impossible to be a leader without imagination or a sense of vision. A leader has to possess an ability to chart the future from the past, building upon what has gone before to set goals for the future. Above all, a leader must have the ability to create a social structure that channels olther's energies and abilities.
- Leadership is not a part-time job and relies upon an extensive knowledge and appreciation of the strength and weakness of people within the system. This information cannot be easily obtained second-hand.

'GREY STAR' GENERALS

Let me now look at some of the problems of leadership according to Norman F. Dixon. These are:

- 'A serious wastage of human resources and failure to observe one of the first principles of war — economy of force,'
- 'A fundamental conservatism and clinging to outworn tradition. Inability to learn from the past. A tendency to misuse available technology,'
- ' tendency to reject or ignore information which is unpalatable or which conflicts with preconceptions,'
- 'A tendency to underestimate the enemy and overestimate the capabilities of one's own side,'
- 'Indecisiveness and a tendency to abdicate from the role of decision maker,'

HMAS PERTH works up in the East Australia Exercise Area. June 1980.

Transfer of the Arabian Sea 'Camel' which was held by the Australian Unit deployed in the Gulf of Oman, May 1981. Captain A.R. Cummins (PERTH) hands over to Captain J.S. Dickson (BRISBANE).

- 'An obstinate persistence in a given task *despite strong contrary evidence*,'
- 'A failure to exploit a situation,'
- 'A failure to make adequate reconnaissance,'
- 'A belief in brute force,'
- 'A predilection for frontal assaults,'
- 'A failure to make use of surprise or deception,'
- 'An undue readiness to find scapegoats for military set backs,'
- 'A suppression or distortion of news from the front, usually rationalised as necessary for morale or security,'
- 'A belief in mystical forces — fate, bad luck, etc.'
- **In the combat of Russell Hill and concerning some of the Civilian Central Divisions (the 'Grey Star Generals'), I would be tempted to award high marks against these examination factors, or do I myself succumb to 'an undue readiness to find scapegoats for military set backs?'**

However, as I have limited myself to 'discipline, leadership and command skills for combat' I must exercise the discipline of no further comment on the bureaucratic monstrosity which is our Defence Department.

COMBAT MANAGEMENT

It is useful to look at some basic guidelines for combat management. First and foremost in the mind of the leader is the strategy of the nation and the overall campaign. May I point to the record of success for those who have embraced a campaign strategy of the indirect approach, and a national security strategy of offensive action and projection of power. Then there are the first principles of war:

- Selection and maintenance of the aim,
- Concentration of force,
- Co-operation,
- Economy of effort,
- Security,
- Offensive action,
- Surprise,
- Flexibility

DDG 38 — HMAS PERTH during Exercise SEA EAGLE 81. A ship at a very high state of operational readiness.

- Administration, and
- Morale.

I have already referred to intelligence, and the failure to use intelligence information. The technical means of providing information is now so advanced that the problem becomes the sorting out of the important and timely from the less accurate and irrelevant. Throughout history the successful military commanders have invariably been those who had a very finely tuned appreciation of intelligence, its gathering, dissemination and its strategic and tactical use.

The need for security, and for long term protection of sources and methods has made this aspect of military leadership a poorly publicised part of the study of military performance. Let me highlight but a few who were masters of intelligence:

- Ghengis Khan,
- Wellington,
- Nelson,
- Nimitz, and
- The modern leaders of the Kremlin

Highly developed security and intelligence systems and, in particular, higher commanders experienced in the intelligence business are vital factors in the exercise of military leadership in modern war. This applies particularly to guerilla war and to terrorist and subversive warfare. I said I would return to this important aspect of combat leadership. Essential to success against these forms of intimidation and violence are the mental disciplines of open mindedness, tact, flexibility, innovation, patience, unconventional solutions and expert use of intelligence assets. All these coupled with an acute understanding of psychological warfare factors, consistent with sound administration and the other principles of war. Let us not believe that terrorism and other forms of unconventional combat are new. Earliest accounts come from 3000 B.C.

CONCLUSION

In talking briefly about discipline, leadership and command skills for combat I have sought to outline the disciplines which are essential ones for a military leader in *all* forms of combat. These are:

- Knowledge of war itself.
- Outstanding professionalism, in the performance of military tasks.
- A genuine humanity and understanding of people.
- Observance of the principles of war.
- The use of intelligence.

Commandant, lady and gentlemen, I was surprised once again and delighted to be asked to join in your leadership panel. I have sought to generate some controversy and hopefully provoke some searching questions. Personally, I have enjoyed the research necessary to prepare this talk. I have benefited from the books read and re-read. We can *all* be better leaders, we can all apply the disciplines of our profession more thoroughly. Admiral Nimitz, who had the biggest military command in history from 1942 to 1945, had a sign above his desk:

'1. Is the proposed operation likely to succeed?
2. What might be the consequence of failure?
3. Is it in the realm of practicability of material and supplies?

In our endeavours today let us '*Dare to be wise*'.

SOCIAL CHANGE, LEADERSHIP AND THE SERVICES

by Lieutenant Commander A.J. HINGE, RAN

In 1915 scores of thousands of young Australians flocked to induction depots throughout Australia to fight and if necessary die for God, King and Country. Yet, barely five decades later many grandchildren of the original ANZACS refused to fight in Vietnam and effectively said, like their American cousins: 'Hell no. We won't go!'.[1]

What happened during the half century 1915–65 to so drastically change the attitude of our young toward authority? Were these changes for the better or worse of society and the services which defend it? Even more importantly, what will young Australians do when called on to fight again, especially in a situation where we cannot afford to lose! Obviously these questions must be asked and answers found now. We simply cannot wait to find the answers on a future battlefield.

Many would argue that refusal to fight for one's country and failure to exhibit unquestioned loyalty and obedience to authority is symptomatic of a decadent, spoiled generation of permissive youths — the 'Gimme' generation — which have no respect for the traditional virtues of honour, discipline, self-sacrifice and sense of duty. Others may suggest that freedom to dissent is a good thing and youthful challenges to authority, tradition and discipline are not only healthy but highly desirable. This school of thought might argue that a modern youth cannot be as easily deluded by authority as his grandfather and is capable of serving every bit as well as his ancestor if the cause is right. There is some truth in both these views of modern youth. However, as is often the case in such matters, the best description of today's young probably lies somewhere between these extremes. But where?

This article investigates the effect of social change on the performance of the disciplined services. It looks at the important social changes which influence tomorrow's recruit and today's veteran. Moreover it aims at providing the reader with a framework by which to determine just how decisive or indecisive social change can be in terms of maintaining service performance in time of war and peace. The methodology used to achieve these aims first involves treatment of the following questions;

What is the function of the disciplined Services?

What is *the* major social change affecting the Services?

Who is the recruit of the 1990's? What will he or she be like and how can the Services best train the new recruit?

What are the technologically derived social changes affecting today's military personnel and what of the repercussions of these changes on the future Services?

Finally, we must ask ourselves: Have we got to the heart of the problem? Just how decisive are social factors in influencing military performance and what contribution can good training and leadership make to mitigate the effects of detrimental social change?

THE FIGHTING FUNCTION

A military organisation's overwhelming function is to fight. Consequently the ability of a disciplined service to come to grips with the enemy and dominate him is as good a measure of service effectiveness today as it ever has been. Whichever way one chooses to define a disciplined service the very hallmark of discipline must remain the ability to maintain cohesion under extraordinary stress and act as a highly motivated team dedicated to organisational goals. In short, a military organisation can seldom impose its 'will' on an enemy in combat unless it has cohesion. Cohesion will be a fundamental measure of military effectiveness in this way since maintaining material and morale cohesion in a time of lessening social cohesion presents the real challenge to the disciplined services.[2]

Cohesion makes disciplined service effectiveness greater than the sum of its individual parts during peace and war. Cohesion is the ability of a unit to stick together and maintain operational effectiveness despite heavy combat stress involving enemy violence, fear of death, injury and the extreme uncertainty inherent in war. In peacetime, cohesion can be challenged by a number of factors including breakdown of the traditional military ethos *and* erosion of material benefits — salary, conditions of service etc. — which sociologist Frederick Herzberg identified as social 'hygiene' factors.[3] The ability to maintain military cohesion under pressure in peace and war is probably the single most important attribute of successful military forces throughout history.[4] The requirement for cohesion in the services is paramount since it bestows a resilience which enables the organisation to survive against the most bitter moral and material challenges.

The major social change which has tended to destabilize general community cohesion and military cohesion in the Western world has been a fundamental change in our social value system. A value system is an order of principles and standards accepted and generally practiced by society. The change in our social value system is largely derived from the transformation of society from one with conservative, conformist values — which existed at the beginning of the century — to one adopting a value system based on pluralism and the individual. Individualism, in itself, is not a bad thing but if non-conformism merely becomes an excuse for the mass pursuit of self gratification, society will suffer. It is necessary to take a good look at the origins and implications of this value system change.

SOCIAL VALUES

A certain sense of 'permanence' which characterized the pre World War One era has faded.

Albert Jacka. Highly decorated Australian hero of World War One. (AWM A2868A).

Previously, practically everything had a name and a place but nowadays we are swamped with new definitions of work, family and sexuality. (See Table I for a comparison of the 'new' and 'old' values). Respect for authority and desire to maintain the status quo has been replaced by an acceptance of widespread dissent, challenge to established institutions and social transformation. Uncritical acceptance of rules is no longer the norm as we move from an industrial society steeped in the protestant work ethic into an age of ambiguity. Our once clear and rigid value system has become blurred.[5] Such substantial shifts in western community values have had the net effect of transforming the western 'ethos' from one of a uniform, conformist authoritarian character to one based on a pluralistic value system oriented to change. Thus it comes as no surprise that the challenge of militarily 'socializing' the recruit of the 1990's will be far different than that of socializing his father or grandfather.

Developing an insight into the problem of social change and its effect on the disciplined services involves looking at the attitudes of the new recruit and noting above all that individualism is very important to him. He must 'seem' to be different and is far less happy with apparent conformism than his grandfather was. In large measure he will have been exposed from earliest childhood to the cult of the 'anti-hero' — a maverick tough guy who doesn't play the game by the rules but always comes out a winner in the end![6] Service traditions will be questioned and it will simply not be enough to tell him to do as he is told. Reasons for action will be increasingly called for. He will be a product of liberalism and

Table 1
VALUE CHANGES IN ECONOMICALLY DEVELOPED WESTERN NATIONS

Old Values	Emerging Values
Based on the unitary and uniform values of an accepted "establishment"	*Based on the pluralistic, pragmatic values of a diverse society*
1. Respect for authority of position and traditional dogma, sanctified by religion	Respect for social consensus based on open inquiry and participative decision-making
2. Acceptance of the *status quo*	Acceptance of dissent and social transformation
3. Acquiescence and resignation to one's lot in life; conformity to established social norms; ideal of service to others	Emphasis on personal fulfilment, self-realisation, human potential and self-expression
4. Absolute moral principles, including sexual fidelity	Situation ethics, moral/ethical relativism and pluralism; judgment of action by results on self and others, including a rejection of sexual "ownership"
5. Sanctity of property ownership; exploitive materialism; economic "progress"	Sanctity of individual consciousness, awareness; emphasis on access to resources rather than ownership; emphasis on quality of life and ecological ethics
6. Clear hierarchy of group-based loyalties: "God, ruler, country, family"	Unclear loyalties; existential responsibility and situation ethics
7. Rugged competitive individualism within bounds set by group loyalties	Interdependence and collaboration by autonomous individuals
8. Maintenance of stability and routine performance	Innovation, change, and flexibility
9. Ends orientation — postponement of immediate rewards for long-term outcomes (heaven, superannuation, promotion)	Process orientation — "live now"; work and leisure must provide immediate satisfaction
10. Economic security	Personal growth

has been brought up in a permissive society which has developed a high tolerance to radical and deviant behaviour.

NIHILISM

In many ways today's recruit has been raised in an age of increasing nihilism. Nihilism involves a rejection of traditional beliefs in religion, morals or ethics. [7] It is the practice of negative doctrines embodying a scepticism which finds little to approve in the established order of things. Essentially, in its extreme, nihilism involves a lifestyle based on the view that nothing is good or bad, right or wrong, and represents an almost complete inversion of the so-called protestant work ethic which characterized the western ethos during the first half of the twentieth century.[8] The results of increasing nihilism in the young is manifested in hedonistic, self indulgent tendencies which seem to be taking an increasing toll of society at large. Nihilism ultimately gives rise to boredom, apathy, dejection and despair. The nihilist is simply not accountable to his society, a God or in the final analysis to himself.

An age of nihilism ultimately encourages the development of sloth within the community. Sloth in the full sense of the word is not merely laziness. It is acedia — a lost, apathetic melancholy — a form of profound dejection which leads to spiritual death. To the individual affected by sloth, life becomes an arid waste of hopelessness. It is little wonder that from earliest days sloth was listed among the seven deadly sins. (9)

Of course, nihilism has by no means reached full bloom in western society and perhaps it never will. Yet few among us would dispute that nihilism is affecting the community and increasingly infecting the young. The services cannot go back to the 'good old days' and count upon recruits coming into military organisations with something approximating a protestant work ethic and a sound 'Christian' or even pseudo Christian upbringing.

The loyalty of the new recruit will be more difficult to earn than has previously been the case. Formal rank will not automatically breed respect since today's eighteen year old recruit rightly believes he is basically equal, as a person, to any senior officer. There is no such thing as a 'station in life' for him. How then can he be successfully inducted into an almost purely hierarchical chain such as a military organisation and be happy with his lot?

Perhaps in this age of encroaching nihilism the services may have an unexpected advantage in the very traditions which many see as weaknesses. The increasing numbers of recruits from broken homes and single parent families may in fact be looking for a firmer framework for their

Today we cannot even expect pseudo-christian values from our recruits (AWM 5709)

The advanced SONAR concept

Integrated Sonar Systems

for Submarines

for Surface-Ships

for Mine Counter Measure Systems

KRUPP ATLAS ELEKTRONIK

lives. In many ways service comradeship, affiliation and so called esprit de corps may displace nihilistic tendencies and act as increasing incentives to join the services. But this can only be the case if the services market these assets effectively in the years to come and offer a career and training package to the recruit which will appeal to deeper needs of individuals. These needs will be treated in detail later.

TECHNOLOGY AND CHANGE

The driving force behind much post World War Two social change has been the accelerated pace of technological development. Rapid technological development has had a major effect on western society in particular and has been treated in great detail by authors such as Alvin Toffler — FUTURE SHOCK and THE THIRD WAVE — and John Naisbitt — MEGA TRENDS.[10] Though these authors tend to overdramatize the effects of technological change they also seriously appear to under-estimate human adaptability. Despite the pace of change in modern times it is hard to seriously envisage industrialised man being under any more stress than his neanderthal ancestor struggling to survive or the medieval serf fighting hand to hand for his lord on a brutal battlefield.

Social changes arising directly from technological change involve increased leisure time, increased opportunity for women, wider general educational access and a broadening of social values through mass media dissemination of information. These technologically derived social changes can have considerable effects on the services.

Broadening of social values and attitudes through the media has generally made consensus more difficult to achieve and has encouraged the development of a pluralistic society. There is far less emphasis on a policy of social integration than there has been in the past. The 'White Australia Policy' of the 40's and 50's was displaced by the principle of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism was an inevitable consequence of the post World War Two change in Australian population composition and has been largely developed through the media.

Pluralistic attitudes which stem from multiculturalism encourage the development of the so-called egalitarian society. Australia has been described as the most egalitarian or classless society in the world and it is worth bearing in mind that the transition from a relatively classless society to a set military hierarchy will become even more marked in the 1990's.[11]

Increased opportunity for women will also have a considerable impact on the services. Certainly women will take up an increased proportion of positions in the services but this is only one side of the coin. As women become more educated they will increasingly seek their own careers and perhaps be less happy to move where their husbands have been posted. In 1948 only 8% of married Australian women were in the Australian workforce but in the early 1980's this percentage had risen to 42%. Similarly, in 1950 only 20% of all females over the age of 15 participated in the workforce while the figure increased to 45% in 1980.[12]

Growth in female work participation arose from a period of rapid economic growth, increased control of fertility and a general technological contribution of making women less confined to the home. A byproduct of the growing capacity for female independence, coupled with certain government policies leading to the devaluation of the institution of marriage, has been the effective undermining of the basic family unit. The Family Law Act (1975) for example led to a long term doubling of the per annum divorce rate from 23,000 to about 45,000. It can be argued that this result is good, in terms of allowing many unhappy couples to part. However, despite the arguments for or against the Family Law Act, the bottom line of the argument is that in 1986 over one half million Australian children lived with one parent. It is from this pool that a high proportion of 1990's recruits will be drawn.[13]

Technological change has also been largely responsible for increasing community leisure time. The 35 hour week is here for many and this figure will almost certainly decrease toward the end of the century. This has several implications for the services and our personnel managers must begin to ask the following questions: How does a service officer working some 55–60 hours per week feel about the 35 hour week? How does he feel when other groups in the community are developing increased negotiating power with employers while his conditions of service and salary are being eroded because of his inability to collectively bargain? Certainly he is a professional and prepared to make sacrifices but for what?... to be exploited by his society and political leaders because he cannot withdraw his labour?... to be kept working by a system stuck in 'auto', a system unwilling or unable to make a stand and reduce commitments?[14]

Given the widening gulf between military and civilian working conditions together with a major, continuing real erosion in salary it is little wonder that an organisation such as the Armed Forces Federation of Australia (ArFFA) was formed. ArFFA is not currently a union as such but its establishment is an outgrowth of the now socially accepted right of collective bargaining. This right is widely practiced throughout Australian society

Nineteen year old military medal winner on the Kokoda Trail. 1944. (AWM 74369)

and it may take on an increasing importance to servicemen as they witness continuing erosion of their quality of life.[15]

The services are becoming less and less competitive with other organisations in terms of attracting the most highly talented of the young. Furthermore, unless this situation is corrected not only will recruiting continue to be very difficult but the retention of skilled personnel already within the services will become an ever increasing problem. While military personnel are generally held in less esteem nowadays, remuneration and conditions of service must nevertheless offer relative advantages to that of workers outside. However mercenary this reasoning may sound to a dyed in the wool military professional, most servicemen will not see their families disadvantaged beyond a certain level regardless of love of service.[16]

CIVILIANIZATION

Yet another change induced by technology has been what sociologist Morris Janowitz describes as the 'civilianizing' of the services and military institutions. Progress in technology has led to a commensurate demand for trained technologists throughout the services. Janowitz states that:

> '... the complexity of the machinery of warfare and the requirements for research, development and technical maintenance tend to weaken the organisational boundary between the military and the non-military, since the maintenance and manning of new weapons systems require a greater reliance on civilian oriented technicians.'[17]

Naisbitt also deals with the growing power of the technocracy and outlines how we are moving from a centralized, industrialized, economically self contained world to an ill defined one in which the technician will be supreme. The transformation will involve a major leap in general skill levels within the population and it is suggested that the computer will become the decisive element in our civilization. Widespread use of computer technology is said ultimately to lead to the abandonment of hierarchies which worked so well in the centralized, industrial era. Naisbitt claims:

> '... The computer will smash the pyramid. We created the hierarchical, pyramidal managerial system because we needed to keep track of people and things people did; with the computer to keep track, we can restructure our institutions horizontally.'[18]

Military hierarchies evolved in order to keep track of large numbers of people and what they were doing. The computer may indeed have a 'flattening' effect on the traditional hierarchy with repercussions on group leadership styles and unit size.

Civilianizing of the services can lead to a degree of convergence in which military condi-

tions of service may eventually duplicate civilian conditions. Civilian elements of the defence structure will have an increasing impact on service attitude and identity as their influence continues to expand. The autonomy of military leaders will decrease as they become more accountable for their decisions, all of which will come under increasing scrutiny. Since the Vietnam War there has been a substantial rise in the level of critical distrust of military motives, competence, integrity and rationale for secrecy. The Freedom of Information Act, for example, will probably be used with more frequency as both civil and military personnel of the various Departments of Defence in the Western World choose to exercise their rights against the numerous 'closed' systems which have for so long been used by the military.[19]

Up to a point there are certain advantages to be had from the increasing-civilianization of the military. An increase in political and economic awareness can broaden and improve an often narrow and escalatory military approach to problems. This allows the uniformed services greater scope to constructively reflect and accommodate the society which they serve. Nevertheless, at the same time a definite danger exists involving the compromise of service efficiency and cohesion as a result of non-selective absorption of a civilian work ethic and attitude. This is not to say that there is anything wrong with a civilian work attitude and ethic — the so called 9 to 5 syndrome. This is usually entirely appropriate to civilian organisational objectives but not to military organisational objectives.[20] Ultimately, the important sense of unique service identity, as we will soon see, can be adversely affected by civilianization of the services with grave repercussions on service performance.

THE DECISIVE FACTOR

Several major effects of social and technological change on the services have now been examined and it is evident that these factors must be increasingly taken into account by the personnel management organisations of the services. Increasing nihilism within the community, breakdown of the family unit, civilianizing of the services, poor 'hygiene' factors and a fundamental change in the value system of society are all formidable problems in terms of their long term effect on service performance. But are their effects decisive? If not, what are the decisive factors in maintaining excellent service performance? How can the military's own socialization process, or training, contend with detrimental results of social change in the wider community? In considering these questions we must now look at the 'forest' after having seen the 'trees' of social change.

The answers lie on the modern battlefield. If we return to the military quagmire of 1960's Vietnam we will see that the political and social disarray of a generation may *not* have been the decisive factor in poor military performance.

An excellent scholarly examination of the breakdown of a modern military service — the US Army in Vietnam — is found in Gabriel and Savage's book, CRISIS IN COMMAND: MISMANAGEMENT IN THE ARMY. This treatise was commenced in the mid 1970's after two US Army War College reports indicted US Army performance in Vietnam under conditions of relatively low combat stress. The first study was commissioned by General W.C. Westmoreland, MACV Commander Vietnam, who restricted its distribution to officers of general rank only.[21] The second study fully endorsed the findings of the first.

Gabriel and Savage argue that:

> '... Our data suggest that the Army in the field exhibited a low degree of unit cohesion at virtually all levels of command and staff... The data indicate a very high rate of drug use among US field forces in country, repeated attempts to assassinate officers and senior non-commissioned officers, combat refusal that bordered on mutiny, skyrocketing desertion rates in the Army as a whole... the Army began to border on an undisciplined, ineffective, almost anomic mass of individuals who collectively had no goals and who, individually sought only to survive the lengths of their tours.'[22].

What was the cause of this disciplinary collapse? Drug addiction, desertion and mutiny were seen by all researchers as the symptoms and *not* the cause of the disintegration of the US Army in Vietnam. Was it the low quality of troops which the generals had to work with?

Gabriel and Savage state that dozens of high ranking officers had a tendency to blame the disciplinary breakdown on society at large. The officers complained that they could not develop good soldiers from a 'drug ridden' and 'openly permissive' society. It was argued that traditional military values such as honour, sacrifice and responsibility were all but impossible to maintain in the military if they did not receive support form the wider society value system.[23] Yet the three studies convincingly argue that there is *no* historical basis for this charge.[24] Similarly they argue that the US Army breakdown of 1969–71 was not significantly influenced by the ordinary soldier recognising the 'immorality' of the war and a stirring of 'true consciousness'.

Gabriel and Savage concluded that:

> '... We know, however, that military cohesion

exists quite apart from issue politics and ideologies in the civilian political system. Specifically, a sense of active patriotism, nationalism, or other ideologies are not demonstrably central to military discipline and cohesion. Responsible scholarship on the subject of military cohesion heavily discounts the conventional psychological elements often assumed so important to military spirit. It appears that a continued sense of 'cause', at whatever level of saliency is not very important to military cohesion. Contemporary literature further calls into question any sense of mission on the part of the soldiers other than the immediate tactical mission.'[25]

The finding that events external to the military organisation had relatively small influence on the cohesiveness of the US Army in Vietnam is supported by the two official US Army War College reports. Bearing in mind that both War College reports are cases of the Army 'Looking at itself' we note the interesting finding that:

'... There is no significant evidence to suggest that contemporary sociological pressures — which are ever present — were primary causes of the difference between the ideal and actual performance climate in the Army; the (disciplinary) problems are for the most part internally generated... Neither does the public attitude to the Vietnam War, or the rapid expansion of the Army, or the current (civil) anti-military syndrome stand out as a significant reason for deviations from the level of professional behaviour the Army acknowledges as its attainable ideal.'[26]

So, what went wrong? According to all three studies and others, the breakdown in cohesiveness was primarily attributable to the failure of the officer corps to provide the leadership necessary in a combat Army. It is suggested that the loss of officer professionalism was derived from a legitimate civilian concept called 'managerial careerism'.

The managerial careerism which dominated the US officer corps in the 1960's had its origins in General Marshall's rapid expansion of the US military in the early days of World War Two.[27] A halcyon age of managerial careerism prevailed in the civilian dominated McNamara Defence Department through the decade of the 1960's. A new set of values began to replace the traditional military ethos as the tools of financial and personnel management were indiscriminately applied to train personnel and win wars.

Gabriel and Savage suggest that the officer corps began to evolve into business executives in uniform interested in getting their 'tickets punched'.[28] In short, the Army began to resemble an entrepreneurial structure based on a modern business corporation. Officer attitudes, according to the US Army War College reports, began to be dominated by self interest and the military

Does todays officer training equip men to lead in the 'field where the crosses of iron grow'?

ethos was degraded by a sort of industrial ethic. It is little wonder that American soldiers often refused to be 'managed' to their deaths![29]

While many civilian business practices satisfied the technical, scientific and administrative requirements of the Vietnam episode, they did not take into account the basic and unique social and psychological needs of the troops. Failure to satisfy these needs was decisive in terms of accounting for the root cause of the US Army disciplinary breakdown in Vietnam.

If, as the evidence suggests, socio-political factors outside the military had little effect on the performance of the US Field Force in Vietnam, and poor leadership was of primary importance in the disciplinary breakdown — What aspects of leadership can make the crucial difference in maintaining the cohesion of a service under stress in war and, perhaps even more importantly, peace?

For an insight into the answer to this question we must avoid delving into the hazy world of psycho-social conjecture and consider what *counts; that is, military performance.*

FIGHTING POWER

The Israeli historian Martin Van Creveld, in his book FIGHTING POWER: US AND GERMAN ARMY PERFORMANCE 1939–45, pinpoints *several critical differences between respective* Army performances in World War Two. These differences remain very relevant today.

Van Creveld first establishes that the German Army managed, man for man, to outfight its opponents under all circumstances. Citing Colonel T. Depuys' (US Army retd) quantitative study of German performance he notes:

> '... (The) record shows that the Germans outfought the far more numerous allied armies that eventually defeated them... on a man for man basis the German ground soldiers consistently inflicted casualties at about a 50 percent higher rate than they incurred from the opposing British and American troops under all circumstances. This was true when they were attacking and when they were defending, when they had a local numerical superiority and when, as was usually the case, they were outnumbered, when they had air superiority and when they did not, when they won and when they lost.'[30]

Van Creveld then asked the question: Were socio-political factors responsible for the incredible cohesion and fighting power exhibited by the Germans? Like the sociologists Shils, Janowitz and many others he rejected the view that national character made the German soldier any better a fighting man than an American soldier.[31] *This conclusion is adhered to despite the* plethora of theories explaining German superiority in terms of social factors. These theories ranged from the belief that Germans were better soldiers because their mothers 'potty' trained them at an early age, to theories dealing with the effects of Nazi propaganda.[32] Van Creveld convincingly argues that propaganda had only a marginal effect on German Army — as opposed to SS — fighting performance. Drawing also on his own experience as an Israeli Army intelligence officer in the 1960's and 70's he states:

> '... Except where the propagandists are men of very high calibre and conviction, the dish ladled out by them will be regarded by the recipients as anything between mere entertainment and another load of bullshit. It may even be counterproductive... it does not matter much what is said, but by whom.'[33]

Ultimately Van Creveld attributes the fighting power of the German Army in this war, and in its other wars from 1870 onwards, to a better Army organisation which was built around the basic social and psychological needs of the individual fighting man. The decisive importance of the individual was clearly emphasised throughout German military literature and the Army's doctrine, command technique, organisation and administration was geared accordingly.[34] A critical priority of the German Army was to keep men in a primary group of individuals who developed affiliative ties with their immediate peers, particularly at the section equivalent (10 man) and platoon level (up to 40 men).

*Van Creveld's research, which used numer*ous other studies to support it, suggests that the extraordinary cohesion of the Wehrmacht was also largely dependent on an extremely high quality of leadership exhibited by German officers who reinforced the primary group organisation. *German officers were carefully selected* and trained throughout the war despite losses which led to a 13,000 officer shortage in 1944.[35] Officers tended to lead their men by example and develop role model ties with them. German officer casualties were well above the proportionate number of ordinary soldier casualties. The ability to live and if needs be die with the troops is accepted by Gabriel, Savage and Van Creveld as a crucial and eternal aspect of morale and unit cohesion. Indeed, during the early years of World War Two a German officer stood twice as much chance of being killed as that of an ordinary soldier.[36] It was only due to a refusal of the German High Command to replace numerical officer deficiencies with second rate personnel that the proportion of officer deaths to enlisted deaths decreased. There were simply

less officers available to die. During the Second World War one third of all German field generals were killed in action and 30.8% of all German field officers shared the same fate. The proportion of enlisted men killed was 26.1%.[37] These figures stand in stark contrast to officer deaths among allied units and it is interesting to note that the Vietnam war studies mentioned previously indict the US Army officer corps for their lack of visibility in forward areas while 'falling over themselves' in the rear echelons.[38]

It is not for a moment suggested that the German style of military leadership be emulated by modern officers. Indeed, that style would generally be inappropriate to modern needs. However, the example of officer leadership and involvement in the daily lives, risks and problems of the individual serviceman is very appropriate. Good leadership is a critical, if not *the* critical factor in the behaviour of military units under pressure. The US officer corps in Vietnam did not develop within their troops dedication to organisational goals, loyalty or sacrifice. The responsibility for this failure appears to lie at the feet of the officer corps, not society or the so called 'drug-ridden, permissive youth' of the nation.

Now it remains necessary to place socio-political factors in their proper context since the previous discussion may have left the reader with the impression that troops will fight and die if *only* good leadership and primary group affiliation is present. The nexus between these factors is probably best crystallized in Charles Moskos' theory of Latent Ideology. This theory suggests that to maintain cohesion a serviceman should have an underlying commitment to the worth of the larger social system from which he comes. However, this commitment need not see eye to eye with the specific purpose of the war![39]

We are then left with an indication that, despite the inexorable advance of technology and the social changes inevitably associated with it, the cohesion of the services are much more heavily influenced by good leadership and supportive organisation than by the specific social factors external to the military.

This proposition makes sense if we assume that, despite entering the service with a number

In August 1966 this national serviceman performed every bit as well as his grand father did in 1915. A veteran of the Battle of Long Tan. (AWM CVN. 66.700. VN)



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of 'permissive' characteristics — both good and bad — our new recruit has much more powerful drives. These drives, or higher needs run much deeper than ephemeral social trends. They include basic drives for power, affiliation and achievement. Researchers such as McGregor and Maslow emphasise the depth and permanence of these higher needs which are associated with the ego and individual self actualization.[40]

The implications for the military socialization or training process are clear. If the recruit has a basic bias in favour of wider society, service training can continue to appeal to his basic drives and satisfy them. Commitment to the services and their organisational goals can still be engendered through a training programme offering affiliation, achievement and the prospect of getting 'on' in the organisation.

Commitment is a function of psychological satisfaction and by neglecting the human dimension of leadership and substituting for it exotic forms of personnel management we compromise some of the prime attractions of service life such as comradeship, responsibility and tangible achievement. Indeed, in an increasingly nihilistic world the offer of these things under the aegis of superior leadership can become a great drawcard for the youth seeking direction and a sense of belonging. Such psychological gratification may be particularly sought by the huge numbers of children from single parent families in the future.

Sound military training is instrumental in developing commitment and training is not merely a technical process. First class training is indeed the best form of welfare for the troops and it can transform experentially diverse groups into cohesive, disciplined units. New values and 'traditions' can be assimilated through the militarys' own adult socialization process which *is* military training. Recruits can be taught to obey orders, harness anger, develop patience, manners and responsibility if leadership is sound. Leaders must be role models for their subordinates and not merely managers.[41]

In view of our considerations regarding cohesion and leadership it would be remiss not to test our findings and look at a modern Australian service such as the Royal Australian Navy. In terms of leadership and cohesion we can't but help note that we are doing some vital things wrong! We are increasingly building our Navy around ships and technical packages rather than the basic social and psychological needs of our officers and sailors. The hallmark of our posting system is still chronic personnel instability. Even for married personnel, postings are ridiculously turbulent and this not only affects marriages and children's education. It also allows relatively superficial working relationships to develop within the service.

In terms of the Officer — Sailor relationship we traditionally overcommit our junior officers and NCO's to such a degree that they have inadequate time to invest in maintaining a strong divisional system. Modern sailors live in a far different, option filled world than did their fathers and more needs to be explained to them.

THE FUTURE

The future is not a dark, unknown world into which we are destined to stumble and over which we have no control. Today's political-military leadership can 'invent' a bright future for the services if the will exists. The road to well developed, disciplined services begins with getting the 'hygiene' factors right. Some higher level leaders have tended to dedicate too much attention to the instrumental factors of war preparation during peacetime at the expense of morale factors. There is no use having a capacity to fight if there is no will to fight!

Men and *their families* cannot be expected to serve efficiently under increasingly lousy conditions of pay and service. Continued erosion of these service benefits relative to the rest of the community is inimical to service morale. There is an increasing onus on higher level leaders to make a *visible*, united and determined effort to be more heavily involved in the defence of service salaries and conditions, for example. No doubt this will be politically difficult but such efforts must be made. Only then can we reach the base line of sound motivation and start to build an excellence of service morale and performance for the future.

After satisfying the basic needs of the individual serviceman and his family the military organisation must ensure a quality of leadership and supervision second to none. New recruits, regardless of their social background, can be socialized into the services through a first class training system directed by sound leaders. The training system must make a particular allowance for the ego needs of the individual and affiliate the recruit in a primary group structure. Coupled with the provision of job satisfaction after training, the serviceman's efforts can then be fully directed towards organisational goals.

CONCLUSION

The leadership challenge of today is probably greater than ever before because formal rank has probably meant less than ever before to a new recruit. The new recruit's social tradition of tending to challenge authority has seemingly become just as legitimate as the services'

tradition of expecting automatic obedience to authority. One thing leaders at all levels must not do is fall for the 'soft cop' of blaming poor performance on decadent social values or assuming that today's recruit is any less of a 'man' than his father was. Despite the emergence of nihilism as a force to be reckoned with as we enter the next century, our recruits will all have deep rooted ego needs which run far deeper than ephemeral social trends and the values they produce. Often, the very fact that a person applied to join a service is a strong indication of desire to accept the military ethos. Also, as long as the military can offer job satisfaction and a sense of personal worth and importance it is likely that high retention will be achieved in future.

The new recruit is no less capable of exhibiting the values of loyalty, honour, sense of duty and elan which his forebears have demonstrated for thousands of years. It is the height of presumption for the military to consider such values exclusively as military virtues. These values are still present throughout society and have evolved as a result of the need for human societies to survive and maintain cohesion. Society could simply not survive without the widespread practice of these values and the trusts they produce. It is most unlikely that late twentieth century aberrations such as nihilism can overwhelm their dominance.

In the face of increasing nihilism and a general social assault on the concept of authority, service leaders now and in the future must remain even tempered. Traditional ways of doing things will come under increasingly close scrutiny and stumbling blocks must be removed. As T.S. Eliot said '... A tradition without intelligence is not worth having'.[42] But, by the same token the services must never fail to enforce discipline since a situation will otherwise be created in which anti-social behaviour, violence, personal animosity and larceny will abound. If such a compromise is made the title of 'disciplined service' becomes a misnomer.

The arguments and case studies put forward in this essay indicate that, despite the accelerating pace and often unfavourable direction of social change, the art of leadership remains the decisive factor influencing military performance. We observed that the effects of social change on the services tends to lead to low military performance only if leadership and the traditional military ethos is diluted by non-selective adoption of modern 'business' practices and ethics.

Leadership must provide first class training which develops a serviceman's identification with organisational objectives. An enduring basis for disciplined service is then formed within the individual. Good leadership transcends social change and remains the very cornerstone of military success in peace and war.

Thank God some things never change!

NOTES AND ACKNOWLEDGENENTS

1. This expression was commonly used on US College campuses during the late 1960's in protest against the draft.
2. See Sarkesian. S. (Ed) Ch 7 and 8 for a comprehensive discussion of military cohesion.
3. See Vroom and Deci (Ed) Ch 7 for a resume of Herzbergs' Motivation — Hygiene Theory. A full treatment of this theory is given in the Herzberg, Mausner, Snyderman work.
4. Gabriel and Savage, pp. 31–40.
5. See Dunphy, Chapter 1 entitled "The Organisational Vortex' for an excellent discussion on the social values. Also, by the same author, see, 'The Challenge of Change', Boyer Lectures, Australian Broadcasting Commission, Sydney 1972.
6. Heroes of the modern screen are often of the 'Rambo' and 'Mad Max' ilk, both of which epitomize the anti-hero. 'Rambo' emerges victorious over the establishment represented by the Police, National Guard and Army.
7. *The Concise Oxford Dictionary*, p 737.
8. The Protestant Work Ethic is basically represented by the 'old values' in Professor Dunphys' table. (See Table 1). Also, a part of this ethic involved a high degree of justification by work. Work was seen to have a redemptive power. See May, p 192.
9. May. W, p 195
10. In the authors' opinion all three books tend to contain overstated cases and this results in drawing sensational conclusions.
11. Horne, p 17.
12. The Year Book of Australia 1986, p 139.
13. Ibid, p 113, indicates that in 1975 the number of divorces granted under the Matrimonial Causes legislation was 23,000. In 1976, under the FLA, divorces reached the 65,000 p.a. level and then stabilized at the 40-45,000 mark. In 1984, 43,012 marriage dissolutions affected 50,603 children. The average number of children affected has been about 50,000 since 1976. This compares with an average of 24,850 p.a. in the 1971–75 period. (p 114). The number of ex-nuptial births has averaged at over 30,000 p.a. since 1980 (p. 107).
14. The so-called 'Can-do' attitude still prevades the services. Given reduced manpower ceilings and lower relative value of resources at service disposal, it should follow that Parliament be informed of a commensurate reduction in capability. This is not done for reason of saving service 'face'. The services still want to do more with less.
15. ArFFA has a membership of approximately 3,000 persons. It has made representation on behalf of servicemen to the Remuneration Tribunal on a number of occasions and enjoys the provisional support of the Minister for Defence. See 'View Point', February 1986 and January 1986 editions for statements by the Minister and CDF respectively.
16. The most up to date and comprehensive discussion of service officer attitudes towards their

services, careers and conditions of service is found in the Jans Report (See Bibliography).

17. Janowitz, p 16. See also O'Neil et al Ch 7.
18. Naisbitt, p 282.
19. An example of a 'closed' military system is that of the Royal Australian Navy Officer Reporting System as described in Defence Instruction (Navy) 52-2. Each year the number of officers within the service seeking access to reports under the FIO has increased. At the time of writing no application had been successful. Applications from officers having already left the service have also increased.
20. Janowitz (p 18) specifies the unique character of the services as follows, '... The unique character of the military establishment derives from the requirement that its members are specialists in making use of violence and mass destruction. In the language of a soldier this is recognised as a commonsense basis; military mission is the key to military organisation... The consequences of preparation for future combat and the results of previous combat pervade the entire organisation.'
21. Gabriel and Savage, pp 164–165.
22. Ibid, pp 8–9.
23. Ibid, pp 25–26.
24. Ibid, p 40.
25. Gabriel and Savage, pp 40–41. The authors draw on an impressive series of post World War Two reports which are listed in the notes section of their work (pp 197–236).
26. Army War College Study, 1970, p 55.
27. See Gabriel and Savage, p 18-21.
28. Having one's 'ticket punched' involves manipulating the system by getting the 'right' assignments for promotion. A combat command is a 'right' assignment.
29. Gabriel and Savage, p 54.
30. Depuy, pp 234–235.
31. Van Creveld, p 15. See also Rodnick, p 18.
32. Ibid, p 13.
33. Ibid, pp 83–84.
34. Ibid, p 165.
35. See Gabriel and Savage, P 33–39, for a description of the extraordinary cohesion exhibited by the Wehrmacht during World War Two.
36. Van Creveld, p 156.
37. Gabriel and Savage, pp 35–36.
38. Moskos p 147.
40. See Vroom and Deci (Eds), Chapters 22 and 2 respectively.
41. See Katz. D and Kahn. R, Ch 12 for a very good discussion on the psychological requirements for organisational effectiveness and the importance of leaders acting as role models.
42. This quote is from Eliots' 'After Strange Gods' (1934), and is cited on p 980 of the Penguin International Thesaurus of Quotations.

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WASHINGTON NOTES

by TOM FRIEDMANN

Once again death's flag flew above that of the United States in May as President Ronald Reagan decreed national mourning for the men of the USS STARK who were killed when the ship was attacked by Iraqi aircraft in the Persian Gulf. These deaths brought home to Americans that the President was once more stumbling into a foreign policy morass without either prior consultation with Congress or taking the time and effort to build solid public support for his actions.

This failure to secure both congressional and informed public support flies in the face of what the secretaries of state and defence concluded were necessary to justify American military intervention after the Lebanon debacle, namely that: (1) our goals had to be clear; (2) the relationship between those goals and our military commitment was understood; and (3) that those goals and the level of military risk were supported by the Congress and the country. To date, there is a clear lack of support in both the Congress and the country except for the general affirmation of the concept of freedom of seas.

What is most perplexing about the build-up of American forces in the Persian Gulf is that there is no apparent reason for that build-up. Iran and Iraq have been at war since 1981 when Iraq decided to take advantage of the chaos brought about by the Iranian Revolution. Some 540 ships have been attacked in the Gulf since the war began. Of these ships, some 320 have been attacked by Iraq and 220 by Iran. In 1986, some 100 ships were attacked by both parties with a 3:2 ratio in Iraq's 'favour'. Some other points to consider are:

- The United States sent arms to Iran then tilts its neutrality toward Iraq.
- Iraqi missiles struck the USS STARK.
- The United States receives only 4% of its imported oil from the Persian Gulf states.
- Our allies, who receive a far larger amount of their oil from the region, have, for the most part, not been convinced that it is in their vital national interests to send warships to protect shipping in the Gulf. Those allies with ships in the area, namely France and the United Kingdom, have not been persuaded to work in concert with American forces.
- No mention has been made as to why Kuwait has not armed its ships since they continually ply the waters of a war zone.
- This is clearly a war where it is in the best interest of the United States that *neither* attains a military victory. Instead of exhibiting our normal Pavlovian response to Kuwait's request for assistance from the Soviet Union and China, some creative diplomacy with interested parties (including the United Nations) might have been (and may yet be) the most plausible response to a dangerous situation.
- The administration is *again* engaging in one of its favorite pastimes, of 'speaking loudly and carrying a small stick'. What right does the United States have to threaten retaliation against Iran if it *deploys* Silkworm missiles? Do we really intend to make a preventative strike against a nation that appears to have taken leave of its senses? Was Lebanon not enough?

* Regarding the deployment of the *USS Missouri* to the Gulf, is it not irresponsible to commit a capital ship that does not carry anti-aircraft missiles into such an environment? As to the selection of the *Missouri*, what could be a more prestigious target for Iranian fanatics than the ship on which the Japanese Empire surrendered, thereby ending World War II? And what about the risk of terrorist acts against Americans and American interests around the world?
* The idea of reflagging the Kuwaiti tankers makes absolutely no sense. If the United States is truly a superpower, the President should be able to make a valid case for escorting those ships while under the Kuwaiti flag. It is as though the administration is purposely trying to create a *causus belli* by running up the American flag. We are not putting our flag on ships flying flags of convenience, ships in which a direct, valid American interest actually exists. Ships of other nations are not, to be best of my knowledge, being denied the protective cover of the United States Navy simply because they do not fly the American flag. Why reflag the Kuwaiti ships?

Part of the problem the administration has in generating support for its Gulf 'policy' is that it has 'cried wolf' so often in the past by labelling too many foreign policy questions as being 'vital' to the national security. When a truly vital national security situation actually arises, such as assuring the freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf, the administration lacks credence and is unable to generate the sense of urgency and determination required to meet such a threat.

The fact that the United States has been unable to generate more support amongst our allies to back our Gulf policy is partially our fault. The arms for hostages deal with Iran will haunt us for years to come. Britain, Italy, and France sent troops to Lebanon at our request and we abandoned them after the destruction of the Marine barracks. I am sure those countries remember what we did and so should we.

On the other hand, assuring the supply of oil from the Gulf is an absolute necessity for the preservation of the economies of the Western alliance. Since other nations are far more dependent on oil from the Gulf states than is the United States, the American public is (and this time I think with some justification) going to ask why we are putting American lives at risk when others with a more direct interest are not doing the same.

I do not ask for fleets but rather for ships. Our major allies are all capable of deploying at least one ship in the danger zone. And I include West Germany and Japan in this request. The time has come for these countries to play a more active role in providing military protection for their commerce. World War II is over and it is time for these major industrial powers to assume their full share as alliance partners. Regarding the Gulf states themselves, the time has come for them to prepare their populations to accept western military support, including basing, if they intend to survive.

The war between Iran and Iraq is truly a 'no win' situation for the United States and its allies. As Senator Brock Adams (Democrat — Washington) pointed out recently:

> 'No one wants to abandon the Persian Gulf. But no one should want to be sucked into widening hostilities without a realistic analysis of the threats we face and what it may cost. The only thing worse than walking away from that region now would be to walk into it without fully considering the consequences of our actions'.

To date, the administration has refused to declare that hostilities are imminent which would require the invoking of the War Power Act, a fiction belied by the attack on the STARK and the dispatch of more naval forces to the Gulf. Congress has thus not been formally consulted and it and the country have thereby been denied the opportunity to question the wisdom of our intervention and to make a definitive statement as to the nation's willingness to take the risks associated with our intervention in the Persian Gulf.

The time for straight talk and for setting clear policy objectives in the Persian Gulf is now, not after the deaths of more Americans. It is the very least that the nation should expect of the President and the Congress.

NOBODY ASKED ME, BUT...

Nobody asked me but... there is a lot involved in the apparently straightforward statement by Allen Behm in his article ('Australian Defence Policy: The Game and the Players') in the November 1986 Journal that a key advantage of the Australian administrative system has been 'independent assessment and policy advice and appraisal of military proposals'. Despite the rhetoric of 'jointery' in Allen's article, his clear implication is that the Department of Defence should sit apart from the Defence Force on the policy high ground.

The concept of the independent policy role of the Department means different things to different people. The role had its first clear expression in the Menzies Directive of 1958 but that assumed the existence of the most senior ADF officer and a joint military staff integrated in the Department exercising a role 'independent' of the (then) separate Service departments. It seems to me to be anachronistic to apply the Menzies Directive to the current situation of a basically civilian Department with military officers serving only in departmental positions (as opposed to HQADF positions) of relatively little influence in terms of policy formulation. Also, present organisational arrangements do not make clear how CDF's (and HQ ADF's) position is to be rationalised with that of the Department in fulfilling a role independent of the Services.

The Utz Defence Review Committee (DRC) glossed over this subject resorting instead to the rather ill-defined concept of the 'joint process' which to some extent is inconsistent with the idea of the independent role of the Department because of the 'them and us' confrontational situation which that role implies. Perhaps, it is not surprising that no clear statement of the independent role of the Department will be found in the DRC Report. Presumably this would have conflicted with the Report's pious declaration of the requirement for a close 'collaborative and consultative relationship' between the military and civilian sides of the house.

There is an argument that the 1975 Defence Reorganisation was deficient in that the established working practices by which the three single Services and their respective Departments did their business were destroyed without ensuring that similar procedures were in place for the Australian Defence Force. A former Minister for Defence, Mr Jim Killen, in his memoirs, *Killen — Inside Australian Politics*, refers to 'the widespread view among the services that they were now dominated by civilians' and that 'the service-civilian conflict of 1975 had all the features of permanence, and that would have been disastrous for the country.' *(Killen*, p. 262).

The Killen solution to the apparent gap in the organisational arrangements was to establish the Council of Defence to resolve any difficulties that might arise. However, the Council now meets infrequently. Similarly, less use is being made of the Defence Committee which formally has a central responsibility for advising the Minister on defence policy. It would seem that not only is the Department exercising a defence policy role independent of the ADF but also independent of the other departments (i.e., Prime Minister and Cabinet, Foreign Affairs and Treasury) which historically have had a key involvement in defence policy, as reflected by their membership of the Defence Committee.

Without the 'checks and balances' provided by the two most Senior Defence Committees to reconcile military and civilian views, much more dependence devolves onto the largely informal 'joint process' for resolving difficulties. That is not necessarily a bad thing. However, the anomaly remains that any strong expression of the independence of the Department implies that the Department is more equal — that is the Department can be independent of the ADF and reject military positions whenever it sees fit but the ADF can *never* be independent of the Department.

Even with regard to the command responsibilities of CDF, there is scope for the Secretary to impose his views over those of the CDF, because inevitably 'policy and resources' are involved and they are at the root of the justification for the independent role of the Department. From the military viewpoint there are many unsatisfactory aspects of this situation, particularly the implications for CDF's command of the ADF in war or hostilities when the Department could still seek to exercise the right of providing independent advice to Government on how operations should be conducted. The DRC recognised the potential problems when it sang the praises of the 'joint process' but clearly stated that the military must be something more than the mere implementers of policy.

Against this background, it is not surprising that institutional difficulties arise. The Dibb Review notes that 'Defence planning is not made easier by adversarial attitudes that exist within the Defence Community' (Dibb, p. 2) and later observes the tendency 'for military and civilian advice to be developed separately' (Dibb, pp. 28-29). Indeed, one could argue that these outcomes are inevitable under current arrangements.

Despite all the goodwill in the world on the part of key players, the situation is unlikely to improve without the introduction of organisational arrangements which serve to institutionalise the 'joint process' and are based on a more co-operative approach to policy-making. The Defence Staff in the UK, a fully integrated civilian and military organisation, jointly responsible to the Chief of Defence Staff and the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for formulating policy on operations, force development and strategy provides a model. A similar system could readily be designed for Australia which would still achieve the advantages of the current arrangements as identified by Allen Behm. Clearly there is scope for reducing the potential for unnecessary and institutionalised conflict which exists at present.

Perhaps, and even more importantly, organisational changes are possible which would allow military officers to lose the feeling that the cards are stacked against them. They could then feel that they have a proper input to policies which after all play a vital role in determining their own career futures. When they lose, they will at least be able to accept that they lost fairly rather than in a match in which they were playing not only against another team but also the umpire... and some omnipotent being with the right of moving the goal-posts around the field!

SAM BATEMAN

JANI NOTEBOOK

SERVICE ADDRESSES PLEASE!

In terms of administrative convenience it is preferable to send the ANI Journal to your service address. If you have a service address please advise CMDR Stuart Tapley of it on (062) 65 5034 and keep him updated. Thank you.

MINEWARFARE PRESENTATION

LCDR Alan Hinge will talk about '*Using the Weapon that Waits*' at 8.00 p.m. on October 15. The presentation will be given to the Lismore, Victoria Sub Branch of the Australian Defence Association. Further information on (062) 66 2267.

'HELP WANTED'

It is intended to write the history of the RAN Radar Plot Branch and all ex Naval Personnel (male or female) who were associated with the R.P. Branch are requested to assist by forwarding any diaries, letters, documents, stories or photographs to the Co-ordinator, Warrant Officer R.P. Bob MacGregor, *HMS WATSON, WATSONS BAY 2030.* All material will be returned to the owners. Any enquiries should be directed to W.O.R.P. MacGregor Phone (02) 3370243 or Keith Graham (ex RDF/R.P.) Phone (02) 8094451.

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CHAPTER CHATTER

The Canberra chapter meetings are becoming more and more popular. Although it wasn't so in the beginning.

Perhaps the most original talk was given by Commander Martin Smith, the Towed Array Sonar Project Director, on Underwater Strategic Surveillance. He provided a comprehensive survey of the development of all forms of underwater surveillance, complete with visual aids in the form of gold fish and bowls of water in varying sizes.

I only regret that the word had not got around enough to drum up an audience of the size deserved by this excellent presentation. Hopefully it will appear in written form in this journal in due course, so more people can appreciate it.

Lieutenant Commander Caroline Brand's excellent paper on Career Aspirations for Female Naval Officers was very well received by nearly forty people including many young women from the Academy. Her paper again showed very impressive research. Perhaps most impressive was the masterly way in which she grappled with this topical and important subject without crossing the unwritten line into a debate of current Navy policy. It was pleasing to hear Personnel Division officers in constructive discussion with Lieutenant Commander Brand following the meeting.

The theme of the talk by Commander Max Smart 'On Surface Combatants' was skillfully developed from fundamental strategic principles to cover force structure tradeoffs and finally the effects of new technology. It was readily comprehended by the large audience who raised a number of pertinent questions, many of which will be taken into account in Commander Smart's written paper.

Further meetings will be held on the last Tuesday of the months of September, October and probably November.

Please call me on 66 2984 for further details.

CHRIS SKINNER

SEAPOWER 87 UPDATE

Have you signed up for SEAPOWER '87 yet? The ANI will be presenting its fourth national seminar dealing with the theme 'The Maritime Challenge to Industry Beyond 2000', in Canberra during 16-17 October. If you haven't decided to attend as yet do so now otherwise miss out on a high powered team of speakers each of which is hand picked to stimulate and challenge YOU! Our 'star studded' line up includes, among many others:

Mr Bob Ansett (Budget Transport Industries)
The Honourable Kim C. Beazley
Vice Admiral MW Hudson AC RAN
Mr John Halfpenny (AMWU)
Mr Henny D'Assumcao (Chief Defence Scientist)
Dr Coral Bell (SDSC)

Good food, drink, company, discussion and good times in general is unconditionally guaranteed by the ANI as you enjoy SEAPOWER '87 on the grounds of Australia's most beautiful springtime campus (ANU).

Ring our hardworking registrar (Joe Straczek) on (062) 65 2238 to secure two days of joy and enlightenment at SEAPOWER 87!

It's cheap at thrice the price!

CANDID COMMENTS ON THE 1987 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER

Like the proverbial curate's egg, Mr. Beazley's Defence White Paper was good in parts. The two most notably good parts which differentiate it from Paul Dibb's 1986 trial balloon are, the very strong support the White Paper gives to the American alliance, and the acknowledgement that developments in the South West Pacific, particularly the Soviets' and Soviet surrogates' activities, call for action by Australia.

The Dibb Report was off-hand about the American alliance except as far as Australia benefitted from access to US Intelligence and military equipment. Dibb said, effectively, "Australia can't expect US help, so the US shouldn't expect ours"; further, hosting Pine Gap, Nurrungar, and NorthWest Cape, allowing USN ship visits and giving B52's overflying access were adequate Australian contributions to ANZUS. When this cavalier interpretation of the treaty was combined with the bogus "threat from the North", the Dibb Report upset members of the ASEAN considerably. "Why", they asked, "was Australia singling out Indonesia as a threat? In ASEAN's view that was nonsense, and insulting too. Furthermore, Australia's military attractiveness to ASEAN was not in any actual military assistance Australia could give; rather, it was because Australia's membership of both ANZUS and the Five Power Agreement provided a link to America without the need for an overt defence treaty — at least, so far as Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, and Indonesia were concerned.

The White Paper's strong endorsement of the American alliance, extending as far as public disapproval of New Zealand's action, can only be beneficial as far as both the American alliance and Australian–ASEAN relations are concerned. In addition, the new defence initiatives in the SouthWest Pacific — pre-released a month before the White Paper — will have undone a lot of harm done by the Dibb Report. And, contrary to Dibb's implied suggestion that America was not a reliable ally, the White Paper has made the very sound observation that the mere fact of the alliance has to create serious doubts in a potential aggressor's mind about the wisdom of attacking the Australian mainland.

Mr. Beazley's 20th February announcement of the SouthWest Pacific initiatives also included some quite revolutionary remarks in the way that they flatly contradicted so much of the conventional defence wisdom routinely enunciated by the department and repeated by Dibb. Whereas Dibb once again reassured the public that Australia's sea lines of communication were only at risk inshore and in focal areas off major ports (citing reasons plainly at odds with daily evidence from the Persian Gulf), Mr Beazley has acknowledged the potential dangers and outlined a programme to combat them. As well, his acknowledgement of the advantages to be gained from military presence is in sharp contrast to statements by senior Defence bureaucrats in the past who asserted that presence was of no value at all.

At the same time, the SW Pacific defence initiatives also revealed a curious ambivalence in strategic philosophy. Whereas the "defend the North" strategy is based on detecting and beating a hypothetical attacker's forces — about which more later — the SW Pacific strategy is aimed at unsettling an enemy strategy, a much more sophisticated concept. Now, of course, there could be good reasons for different threats to require different strategic approaches; but the idea of defeating the enemy strategy is almost certainly better.

The White Paper's so-called "layered defence" of the north is really just Mr. Dibb's "strategy of denial" under another name; and, for all its claims to be a new and different concept using modern technology (Jindalee, Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft, a hundred strike aircraft armed with Harpoon anti-ship missiles and so on) it is really the same strategic concept outlined by Lord Kitchener in 1910. Indeed, this supposed need to defend Australia from an enemy bent on landing raiding parties on our exposed northern coasts was raised again officially in the mid-1930's in a appreciation commissioned by the Defence Department. So, like a Tibetan prayer wheel, there is this cyclic resurrection of a theme of self-reliance, and defending Australia against some form of inva-

sion. The 'invading' forces are to be attacked in the water gap with the Army left to clean up the remnants that do escape the maritime strike forces. It runs all through Australia's defence thinking since Federation; only the technologies have changed over the years. It is, of course, also quite bogus.

Mr. Beazley's White Paper raises the question of a full scale conventional invasion; and, like every other public discussion of this possibility, convincingly explains why such a threat does not exist now, nor can develop without a very considerable warning time. But then, we are informed that Australia will be able to detect and defeat an aggressor in the sea-air gap with 100 Harpoon firing aircraft, 6 Harpoon-firing submarines, 9 Harpoon firing destroyers/frigates etc. To put it midly it is an overkill capacity of massive proportions for a non-existent threat.

The hypothetical threat from the north to be countered, as the White Paper identifies it, lies in low level attacks — a sort of Confrontation revisited scenario. That is to say, small parties of some unspecified enemy's soldiers engaging in typical unconventional warfare attacks on remote settlements and industries in the north and northwest. Presumably these forces are expected to come by sea because the national air defence system should surely be a considerable deterrent to attempts to insert invaders by air. But, if small parties of desperadoes crossing the 300 mile water gap are to be interdicted, it hardly needs a a high technology force of 100 Harpoon firing aircraft (and all the rest) to deal with such a modest threat; for this sort of contingency it would surely have been quite adequate to have retained the now-discarded Navy Trackers and Skyhawks to detect and sink small boatloads of guerillas. These aircraft would not only have been adequate enough, they would have been cheaper by a factor of ten times at least. To use high-tech F 18's and Harpoons to sink small boatloads of guerillas seems like overkill on a prodigous scale.

But the strategic reality is that even low level incursions against the Australian mainland, are not the "credible hypothetical threats" they are claimed to be. Anyone who has more than just a superficial understanding of Indonesian Confrontation in 1964-5 should know why. Even so, supposing such threats were credible, the pedestrian idea of providing forces to deal with each individual attack as it attempted to cross the sea-air gap would be a pretty sure way to lose, as Britain was finding out over twenty years ago. Indonesia was achieving its aim quite well and Britain was feeling the pinch, with no clear strategic idea of how to bring the war to a satisfactory conclusion. To everyone's surprise and relief, Aidit and the Indonesian Communist Party tried to stage a military coup in Djakarta. Confrontation collapsed. Britain was lucky; this outcome owed nothing to Britain's strategy. From this example it should be clear that an Australian strategy to attack the enemy strategy would be a much more intelligent and profitable approach. But that option has not been considered. Why?

The plain fact is that armies of democracies have always suggested invasion threats to provide what they hope is an acceptable reason for their existence when there is no perceived direct threat. History is full of examples. This is unfortunate for Australia because it leads to structuring the Defence Force to face this most improbable contingency. At best Indonesia will merely find Australia's action and the stated reasons for them laughably amateurish; at worst our actions may sow the seeds of a lasting distrust — the very sort of hostility we have dreamed up out of no evidence whatsoever. Australia needs an Army, but not for bogus reasons.

And, while there is no question that Australia needs to be able to control its own airspace, the prospect of an enemy sending conventional bombers to attack Darwin and other northern settlements is a bit hard to swallow, especially in these days of cheap cruise missiles. By the time all the permanent airfields have been built, the command and control systems installed, and all the aircraft provided with the weapons to make them effective, Australia will have invested at least $7 Billion and probably nearer $10 Billion for its national air defence system. Yet its main function will surely be to act as an aerial coastguard to prevent smuggling of all kinds, and illegal entries and departures by air. This could have been achieved much more cheaply than the system outlined in the White Paper; but, no doubt, Mr. Beazley could not get off the juggernaut set in train by his predecessors. Though, to judge by his public statements, perhaps he did not want to anyway.

The maritime content of the White Paper is very much the classic maritime doctrine of a land power, reflecting the continuing dominance of continental strategists in Australia's defence establishment. The planned replacement of the Oberon class submarines with six new boats is welcome, but six boats hardly represent a significant operational force. It is fortunate that there is no real invasion threat.

While the proposed light frigate programme has pleased the Navy, it has eerie resemblances to the light destroyer programme which Mr. Beazley's former colleague, Mr. Barnard, cancelled in 1972. It is to be hoped that this project does not meet the same fate, but in the light of Australia's economic problems it would come as

no surprise to see it changed, if not cancelled altogether, to save reduced resources for continental, rather than maritime, forces. In this connection, it is notable that the White Paper, released in March, is not nearly so forthright about the security of Australia's sea lines of communication as given in Mr. Beazley's speech of 20th. February, outlining Australia's defence initiatives in the South West Pacific. It would be of considerable interest to know which was written first; whether the White Paper represents some retreat from the refreshingly bold remarks of a month earlier.

For all the enthusiastic comment it has drawn, the notion of a two ocean Navy is not fulfilled by splitting an already understrength force and putting half on each coast. And the need for a much more effective amphibious force to provide tri-service mobility and adequate logistic support in Australia's archipelagic circumstances is not addressed at all. This is well shown up in the light of the Fijian coup. The impotence of the ADF was exposed most painfully. Whether military intervention was appropriate is not the point; the point is, the ADF could not provide that option if the government wanted it!

Furthermore, what the White Paper does not do is show how many of the alarming weaknesses identified in the Cross Committee Report of 1984 are to be rectified. Nothing is offered to make good the Navy's "inadequate protection against air and submarine attack". Land-based air defence is still only available 100 miles from Williamton. No trials have been conducted to prove or disprove confident assertions made for the last fifteen years; it can hardly be claimed there has not been enough time. It is a lot further to Fiji than 100 miles from Williamtown, for instance. Fifteen years ago, the ADF could have had air cover from the MELBOURNE and the SYDNEY could have ferried helicopters and a battalion-sized force.

The availability of adequate close air support, battlefield air transport and local air defence for the Army is still questionable. And the Operational Deployment Force still takes a week to field an infantry company, while a force as small as a brigade will take a month. The F111's still only have 'iron bombs', and, for all the huge resources poured into the F 18 programme, the Air Force is, and will remain, a forty hour a week organisation. This is by no means a comprehensive list of the defence Force's deficiencies which the White Paper either does not address at all or glosses over.

Mr. Beazley has made a strong and confident case that there will be enough money. It is curious though, the White Paper is at once more ambitious and apparently needs less resources than Mr. Dibb believed he needed for his more modest proposals. We shall see, particularly now that Mr Beazley's expectations have been even further reduced in the May mini-budget.

It is very much to Mr. Beazley's credit that he has achieved much greater efficiency in a

A4 SKYHAWK AIRCRAFT



The 'outrageously top heavy management structure at Russell Hill' is admirably described by Dean Martin in his classic ballad '... too many chiefs and not enough Indians... around this town!'

number of management areas, freeing funds for capital acquisitions. It is to be hoped that he will now turn his attention to the outrageously top heavy management structure of Russell Hill, both civilian and Service. Some very necessary drastic pruning could release resources to more useful ends.

The 1987 Defence White Paper has been widely applauded in the media; the improvement on the Dibb Report has probably stilled many potential critics. As well there will be those with reservations but remain silent for fear of upsetting the Minister and possibly losing some part of the programme which is dear to their hearts. Certainly, the appalling cause of mismanagement exposed by Dibb (in effect an admission that the Department could not, for fifteen years, define its objectives) has now been removed. At least there are now some clear objectives for Defence — even if some of those objectives are highly questionable for the reasons stated above. So, while the White Paper will probably make many Australians feel comfortable about Defence, more critical observers will not be unaware of some serious limitations. It is a sad reflection of the quality of government in Australia that Mr. Beazley is far and away the best informed, most intelligent and energetic Defence Minister the country has had since 1945 — and yet, after two years hard labour we still can not get it right.

CYCLOPS

THE 1987 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER

MOVING FROM CLAUSEWITZ TO SUN TZU?

Sir,

For the last forty years, at least, Australia's conventional Defence wisdom has been dominated by the concepts of continental strategy. That is to say, the Army has been the de facto Senior Service attracting the lion's share of Defence budgets while the principal motif in our strategic thinking has been Australia's ability to fight in land wars. During the years of Forward Defence, for example, the main objective was to be able to contribute an expeditionary ground force, supported by tactical aviation, to take part in wars in Asia. The outward manifestations were Australia's ground force contribution to the United Nations' armies in the Korean War; the Army as Australia's main component in the British Commonwealth Strategic Reserve; the Army's combat role in the Malayan Emergency; Australia's ground force commitments to various SEATO plans; the eventual commitment of a battalion to Borneo operations during Indonesian Confrontation; and, the provision of a Brigade Group of four and a half thousand soldiers to the Vietnam War from 1965 to 1971.

After the collapse of the Forward Defence strategy in 1971, and the subsequent turn to self-reliance, the continental cast of Australia's Defence thinking has become even more pronounced. While there has been a shift in the budgetary allocations to the Air Force, to provide a continental air defence capability, maritime forces, and the Navy in particular, have had their capabilities and personnel ceilings reduced, presumably to be able to allocate an even greater share of the budget to land-based forces.

Of course, it is predictable that the Defence Establishment would not agree with this interpretation of the facts. No doubt the official line would be that the multiple use of Air Force assets, especially arming the P3 Orions, the F111's, and the FA 18's with Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and the approval for a submarine replacement programme, represents a shift towards a maritime strategy. Indeed, there have been those who have so described it.

What such spokesmen appear to be blithely unaware of is that their so-called "maritime strategy" is, in fact, the basic maritime strategy of a continental power. Examples from history are given by Theodore Ropp in his essay, "Continental Doctrines of Seapower", quoting maritime strategic policies adopted by continental powers such as France, Germany and Russia. The irony, then, is that those who would describe Australia's changing strategic posture since 1971 as a maritime strategy are, in fact, describing a typical continental power's maritime doctrine.

The point of all this is that the evidence of the dominance of continental strategic thinking in Australia is overwhelming.

The Dibb Report was obviously in keeping with this emerging justification for transforming a continental expeditionary force into a continental home defence force. Accordingly there was a lot of approving comment that Dibb had crystallised the way Australia's Defence had been moving for fifteen years.

This dominance of continental strategic con-

cepts in Australia is perhaps not surprising. The Gallipoli campaign of 1915, it is said, gave Australia its nationhood; the subsequent participation in the continental war of attrition in Europe for the rest of World War I; the fact that the Army was Australia's principal combat contribution in World War II, Korea, Malaya and Vietnam; all of these provide powerful historical and emotional reasons. It is understandable. And, in a more general sense, it can be argued that, ultimately, war becomes a matter of holding territory, and, for that, the traditional infantryman with a rifle in his hand is indispensable; hence, say the continentalists, it is only right to emphasise the need for ground forces.

One of the more important consequences of this dominance by the continentalists of Australia's conventional defence wisdom has been the way the precepts of Clausewitz have influenced our approach to strategic analysis. One example is the way the lack of a perceived direct threat to Australian territory has been seen to be a major difficulty in deciding the national military strategy to be adopted. To get over this difficulty the response has been to devise hypothetical threats. This was proposed in Dr. Ross Babbage's Ph. D. thesis, published in 1980 as "Rethinking Australia's Defence". It was followed up a year later with the Katter (Parliamentary Joint Foreign Affairs and Defence) Committee's report, "Threats to Australia's Security — Their Nature and Probability". And, in 1986 Paul Dibb used hypothetical threats identified by Katter as the basis for his proposals for the future development of Australia's defence strategy.

At about the same time as Dibb was reviewing our Defence capabilities his paper on Soviet strategy in the South West Pacific was published. This is an interesting document for the light it sheds on Dibb's way of thinking. Among other things, Dibb said that the Soviet Union's activities in the South West Pacific presented no threat to Australia and New Zealand at present, or for the next decade. And, in the sense of a perceivable direct threat — a Soviet military presence in the South West Pacific with a combat potential to mount a direct attack on the Australian mainland — clearly, he was right.

It was interesting, too, that the ex-Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir Phillip Bennett, made a public statement (reported in "The Australian" in February '87) that he agreed with Dibb's assessment about the absence of a Soviet threat in the SW Pacific. And, from the evidence that there were no Soviet forces based in, say, Vanuatu, that was indisputably true too. But, like Dibb's views, the General's comments revealed his Clausewitzian line of strategic thinking. This line is exemplified by this extract from a 1950's edition of the US army's Field Service Regulations which says this: "The ultimate objective of all military operations is the destruction of the enemy's armed forces and his will to fight". Wylie's excellent "Military Strategy" quotes this revealing sentence, and then goes on:

"It is axiomatic to the Clausewitz theorist that the aim of war is defeat of the enemy's armed forces. This theme runs all through Clausewitz and all through his successors and his interpretors. After that is done, after the enemy is met and defeated, then all the other things needed will fall into place... In no way is any judgement implied that this (is) good or bad. It is cited to shed light on the soldier's concept of warfare. It is focussed directly on the enemy army, and is just as direct and clear as the soldier can make it".

Obviously the Dibb Report was strongly influenced by the continental strategic outlook derived form Clausewitz. There are no armed forces of any consequence in the SW Pacific so there can be no threat from that direction. On the other hand Indonesia does possess significant armed forces, so, it is from or through Indonesia that an attack must come. The Dibb Report then went on to outline the sort of armed forces Australia needed to defeat the supposed enemy's most likely form of attack.

Against this background it was a considerable surprise that the Minister, Mr. Beazley, in February 1987, announced a series of new Defence initiatives in the SW Pacific; activities which make a striking departure form the Dibb Report and Australia's conventional Defence wisdom for the last forty years. Whether Mr. Beazley has thought it out in these terms, or not, does not matter too much. The fact is that the new activities proposed represent a marked shift away from Clausewitz to something more closely approaching the strategic advice of Sun Tzu.

For all its long history as a continental power, Soviet Russia has adopted an approach to grand strategy which owes more to Sun Tzu than to Clausewitz. The author, James Clavell, in a foreword to a recent reprinting of Sun Tzu's "Art of War" asserts that "Sun Tzu is obligatory reading in the Soviet political-military hierarchy". Vladimir Volkoff in his 'political novel', "The Set-Up" shows how a fictional (KGB/GRU?) General employs the subtleties of Sun Tzu's advice to implement Soviet grand strategy. The fact that the book is written as a novel is no reason to dismiss it as of no consequence. Volkoff demonstrates an acute perception of how it is done. For example, "Supposing I want to attack a large empire; I don't attack it directly; I discredit it among its Allies, its clients, all those on whom it bases its world power. You will see how, before long, the very existence of the under-developed countries will give us extraor-

dinary opportunities for anti-American influence." And, today, many in the West are increasingly guilt-ridden, and so morally subverted, by the constantly repeated assertion that the capitalist West is entirely responsible for the poverty of the Third World. Volkoff shows how this sort of strategic advantage can be achieved by following Sun Tzu's advice.

Perhaps two of the Chinese sage's most important sayings are these, "To win without actually fighting is the acme of skill" and, "The highest form of generalship is to baulk the enemy's plans (rather than defeating his forces in battle". These ideas are quite different from, indeed almost contrary to Clausewitz, and his emphasis on defeating the enemy army in the field.

It would be presumptuous to claim to know what Soviet strategy in the South West Pacific actually is, but we do know that it is an article of Leninist faith that there can be no peace between Communism and non-Communists, "so long as one Imperialist lives." Kruschev said, "We will bury you". It is unwise not to believe Communist leaders who have been making these threats for sixty years; it is most likely that they mean what they say. Soviet financial support for the New Zealand Socialist Unity Party is an established fact; and the influence of that party in New Zealand Labor circles is widely acknowledged. In turn, the anti-nuclear policy of the New Zealand Labor government, which has so weakened ANZUS, is surely no accident. While the Soviets undoubtedly want to fish and trade wherever they can, it is also observably true that they behave as Churchill once said of them, "They will knock on every door and bang on every window until they find one open; they will then invite themselves in for dinner". And, of course, there is ample evidence from KGB and GRU defectors that every Soviet organisation, including the fishing fleet, provides cover for Soviet intelligence agents; not just for gathering intelligence either, but for recruiting locals as spies and as agents of influence, to destabilise the target country and hasten its absorption into the Soviet bloc.

For these reasons it would have been irresponsible of an Australian government to let these potential risks grow in the SW pacific without doing something about them. And that is just what the proposed new activities announced by the Minister on the 20th. February are all about. These changes are central to the 1987 Defence White Paper.

On the face of it the new Defence initiatives are not all that remarkable. Assisting our neighbours in the small nation states to improve their maritime surveillance systems; increasing R.A.N. ship deployments in the area; defence co-operation including training, advice, and technical support; assistance with both hydrographic and land surveying tasks; and, doubling the RAAF P3 Orion patrols from 5 five day deployments to 10 five day deployments each year, are not, of themselves, much to get excited about. What gives them their significance is their sharp contrast with the Dibb Report's strategic philosophy.

Where Dibb follows Clausewitz, concerned with combatting a supposed enemy's armed forces, Mr. Beazley's Defence initiatives follow Sun Tzu's advice about combatting the enemy strategy. Where Dibb followed the conventional Defence wisdom that Australia need not worry about potential threats to its sea lines of communication, the Minister refers specifically to the fact that "the island countries lie across important lines of communication between Australia and Japan — our major trading partner — and the United States — our major ally. They also lie across important trade routes and approaches to Australia's east coast, where many of our major population centres are located. An unfriendly maritime power in the area could place in doubt the security of overseas supply to Australia of military equipment or other strategic material". This volte-face about sea lines of communication is the stuff of revolution in its flat contradiction of Katter, Dibb, and repeated public statements by Defence for the past decade. The implication, too, that an Australian military presence in the SW Pacific is now seen to be strategically advantageous is also a flat contradiction of views expressed by such senior contributors to Defence policy in the past as Mr. Bill Pritchett, a former Secretary of the Department. Whereas Dibb's maritime strategic doctrine is essentially of the continental school, the Minister's initiatives acknowledge the need for sea assertion, not just sea denial. Above all, though the Minister's SW Pacific programme is designed to counter Soviet strategy, to prevent the situation from deteriorating to where it could become a shooting war; in comparison Dibb is primarily concerned about being able to combat enemy forces when, and if, they appear.

Altogether, then, the Minister's announcement has major implications in the way it runs counter to the continental doctrines of Clausewitz whose heirs have dominated Australia's conventional defence wisdom for the past forty years. And, although the measures, of themselves, are not all that startling, the signal they convey to Australia's friends and enemies alike is a very important one. At the same time, those of us who have been convinced for a long time that

Australia's continental strategic pre-occupations have not been in the country's best interests, should only be cautiously optimistic. It is unlikely, for instance, that this important change has been thought out in terms of strategic theory; it is much more likely to have been a pragmatic response to Soviet probes. Furthermore, the essence of much of the Dibb Report's recommendations have remained intact in the White Paper. The permanent deployment of a sizeable Army force to the Northern Territory and the further development of a string of air bases in the north are to go ahead to meet the non-existent threat from Indonesia. One can only hope that Australia's actions do not result in some sort of self-fulfilling prophecy. As well, it is improbable that the continentalists who still have the numbers to dominate the Defence Department will accept any erosion of their position. So that, with the mini-budget's, financial constraints requiring some reduction in Defence expenditure, it is likely that the activities in the SW Pacific will be more at risk than "northern defence" projects. It is perhaps significant, too, that an Army officer, General Gration, succeeded General Bennett as C.D.F., the Government's principal military adviser, while the Navy has missed its "turn", had the more usual rotation of the Services been followed.

Despite these reservations, the fact is that Mr. Beazley has made a significant departure from Australia's longstanding devotion to Clausewitz. It remains to be seen whether these changes are a nine day wonder, discarded at the first opportunity, or whether they are the first steps in a necessarily slow change from Clausewitz to Sun Tzu; from a continental maritime strategy to a maritime strategy more appropriate to Australia's maritime circumstances; from a security policy after Dibb which has the objective of actually fighting an invasion force in the water gap or on Australian soil, to a security policy which aims to head off the need for combat.

The vital question is this, which is strategically more advantageous, to plan to defeat an unknown enemy's forces in the field; or, to win without actually fighting?

Alan Robertson
COMMODORE, RAN (rtd)

A BRITISH VIEW ON

'THE DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA'

In March 1986 the Australian Government Publishing Service published a *Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities*, by Paul Dibb, who was chosen to do the job by the Minister of Defence in 1985. Now, a year later, the Minister has published a Policy Information Paper which is intended to be 'the basis for responsible defence planning in future years'.

At first sight the one seems to stem pretty directly from the other. Both stress self-reliance and independence as guiding principles of Australia's defence policy (though these, in turn, stem from earlier official strategic guidance and the notion of self-reliance dates from the late 1970s). Both stress levels of conflict as an important planning tool, and there is an implicit assumption that at the highest levels support from great and powerful friends, on which Australia has always ultimately relied, will be available. Both Dibb and the Policy Paper, moreover, define an area of military interest from the Cocos islands to New Zealand and from the Indonesian Southern Island Chain to the Southern Ocean. Finally, among the essential elements, both put great stress on the Australian North as a vulnerable area and the sea approaches as proper (if difficult, because of their enormous extent) places for surveillance and interdiction of threat.

If the similarities are so numerous, where then lie the differences? Mostly they are in emphasis and detail, but there appears to be one most important philosophical divergence. This relates to what Dibb, in his *Review*, called a 'Strategy of Denial'. It was, as he stated, 'essentially a defensive policy' giving a low priority to power projection and strike against enemy infrastructure, and it is clear that the Australian Defence Forces fought hard against this. For the *Policy Paper* says there may be a need 'for strike and other offensive measures against the adversary's military bases and infrastructure' (p. 27) and envisages various options both now and in the longer term (p. 41).

This adding-back of plans for higher-level and broader-ranging operations appears to be carried into the maritime field in several ways. First, the reliance on the Jindalee Over the Horizon Radar (OTHR) implicit in Dibb is shaded by a more firm commitment to Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW and C) systems in support. Even though the need for these is accepted 'in principle' only, evaluation will go ahead.

Second, one can detect a certain change of emphasis on higher capability surface ships. Dibb says all larger surface vessels do not require 'high levels of air defence, surface strike and ASW capabilities' (p. 72); the *Policy Paper* puts stress on these ships' having 'a wide range of capabilities and a high degree of survivability' (p. 44). Such differences of wording can have significant outcomes in terms of capacity and expense, as any Ministry of Defence tiddleographer can tell you. In fact, this difference apart, the planned three-tier surface force — destroyer/patrol frigate/patrol craft — is very close to the structure and enhanced numbers envisaged by the Dibb *Review*, and the *Policy Paper* will probably have been well received by the RAN on that account.

Nevertheless, the Australian naval establishment has clearly not realised the whole of its ambitions, for nowhere is there any mention of an aircraft carrier, foreshadowed — well after the reversal of the *Invincible* decision — in Navy Plan Blue of 1983 'in the event of a significant improvement in economic circumstances together with a marked improvement in VSTOL aircraft performance'. The option thus seems to be foreclosed *sine die*. Airborne ASW, therefore, is still to be limited very largely to shorebased aircraft, with all that that implies in the Australian context.

Six new submarines are to be acquired during the 1990s and will be built in Australia. A proportion of the submarine force will be based in the west 'closer to priority operating areas'. A glance at the map, thoughtfully provided at the end of the *Policy Paper*, shows what is involved.

It also shows the vast distances involved in any defence strategy for that great continent: so sparsely populated, so difficult to attack, so hard to defend. In facing this perennial dilemma the *Policy Paper* expresses more confidence than Dibb; but then it is an official government document and such papers have to show confidence. It also lacks Dibb's spare intellectual elegance; but in adding-back, no doubt at Service insistence, options beyond those strictly required by the 'Strategy of Denial', it may well hedge its bets in a realistic way.

RICHARD HILL

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A MARITIME STRATEGY FOR OFFSHORE RESOURCE AREAS

'The notion that the sea itself is now an area to be defended conflicts with established naval doctrine... the maritime strategists have no advice to offer on this and other matters connected with the protection of the offshore estate'.

Geoffrey Till [1]

by LCDR M.A. RUTHERFORD, RAN

That Australia rides on the back of a sheep may once have been true. It is not so today. As a middle power and a major trading nation Australia relies on a great many industries for economic prosperity. Principal amongst these are the exploitation of natural resources to service the growing population of the nation and to provide export income. Australia's reliance on natural resources, and the vulnerability of the nation to any attack on these resources — military or economic — is demonstrated by the current economic plight or by the world crisis caused by the 1973 oil shortage.

The majority of natural resources are contained within continental Australia and any strategy for the defence of Australia will be applicable to the defence of these resources. However Australia lays claim to the continental shelf and a 200 nautical mile fishing zone. By international convention Australia is entitled to all resources within the undeclared Economic Exclusion Zone of 200 nautical miles. These claims are well established and largely undisputed internationally. They comprise 1.6 times the land mass of continental Australia.

Within this established area Australia has a number of offshore industries. By far the most strategically and economically important is the recovery of oil and natural gas from the Bass Strait and North Western Australia. These industries represent a near self sufficiency in those vital commodities until at least 2005 with a 50 percent chance of discoveries that will extend the period of exploitation. In economic terms this represents internal and export revenue of $4 billion per annum.[2] A more traditional and long standing offshore resource is in fisheries. Fishing takes place in all waters around Australia the major areas being in the south east where fish and crustaceans are caught by a variety of means, and in the northwest where foreign licensed fishermen harvest by gill net or demersal pair trawling. These two areas are the largest productive areas in economic terms representing nearly half of a $500 million industry. The remainder comes from prawn trawling in the north and exploitation of all other waters, particularly those off South Australia. Of the $500 million industry, $350 million is as the result of foreign fishing or export.[3] Australia is a relatively small consumer of fish products.

Future offshore industries could include the harnessing of tidal energy using the 11 metre tidal range common in the north west of Australia, or mining of mineral resources from the ocean bed. Manganese nodules are known to exist to the southwest of Australia.[4] Not to be forgotten are the substantial reserves of protein in the form of krill, and the as yet unproven mineral potential of Australia's Antarctic Territory.

Loss of all or part of the offshore resources available to Australia will result in severe strategic and economic consequences. Australia's trade deficit in October 1986 was $1.6 billion and cause of great concern. Loss of oil and natural gas resources would quadruple this figure. It is essential to plan a strategy of defence for those resources currently being exploited with the capacity to adapt to the development of future offshore resources.

The aim of this article is to develop a strategy for the protection of important areas of offshore resources. In developing the strategy consideration will be given to the enormity of the problem, the need to have a strategy in harmony with continental defence strategies, the threat to offshore resources, the applicability of classical maritime strategies and precedence and finally we must determine how to implement the strategy.

THE THREAT

The defence of Australia is a problem as enormous as the country itself. To develop an additional strategy to encompass an area 1.6 times the size of Australia represents a gargantuan task. Having identified the offshore resources it is necessary to identify the threat to these resources. A number of studies have been conducted on threats to Australia including that of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence in 1981.[5] That report, and others on similar subjects analyse threats to Australia in three scenarios; high level, medium level and low level. The threats to Australia's offshore resources fall into the same categories and are an extension of threats to continental Australia. Accordingly they will be dealt with in a similar fashion.

High level threats to offshore resources include an attempted invasion of the country and global conflict involving Australia. High level contingencies are the least likely to occur, but should they occur, have far more serious consequences. In global conflict, nuclear or conventional, Australia could expect to be a minor participant of little strategic consequence — assuming the war is fought in Europe. In the event of a protracted conventional global conflict however, Australia's resources would become attractive to the protagonists. Offshore industries could be subjected to attack either to deny their use to allies, or gain their use for enemies. The probability of such an event taking place is extremely low, and if it did occur, any threat to offshore resources would be only one of many threats and would be dealt with in concert with allies and as part of a greater strategy.

Similarly the threat of invasion is very low and covered by bilateral treaties with the USA. The enormity of the problem of defending Australia is only matched by the enormity of the problem of invading the country over thousands of kilometres of sea and land.

Medium level threats to Australia or Australia's resources include the lodgement of forces or raids against specific targets such as offlying territories and oil rigs. The tactic of blockade is another medium level contingency whereby interdiction of shipping and attacks against offshore resources are designed to weaken the economy and morale of the people. A third threat is an attack against a regional ally or strategically important neighbour. Whilst this third threat is a medium level contingency for Australia's forces it could be expected to have little effect against offshore resources.

In many cases, medium level contingencies could be expected to provoke response from the USA as part of its commitment to come to Australia's aid if an attack is conducted on Australian territory. Some medium level threats however may not evoke such a response. Just as the Falkland Islands fell outside the umbrella of NATO so too do the Cocos Keeling Islands and Christmas Island fall outside the bilateral agreement with the USA. Though a digression from the argument, it is worthy to consider offshore natural gas platforms and ponder whether those in Australia's northwest come under the auspices of the bilateral agreement. Reading the ANZUS treaty suggests that they do, but there is a loophole there for use by a reluctant ally when weighing the consequences of a natural gas facility to Australia against a superpower's political goals and requirements. In the unlikely event of the USA not assisting Australia against attacks involving offshore industries it is necessary to have a maritime strategy that anticipates the problem.

Finally, in considering threats — the low level threat. This is the highest probability threat with the least consequences to the nation. In terms of threats to offshore resources however it is the most worrisome due to the vulnerability of those resources and their distances from forces devoted to serving a national strategy.

The problem with low level threats is that they can be perpetuated by a hostile state, a terrorist organisation, a covert political organisation, a commercial rival or from within by an internal extremist group. Such threats require minimal resources, little training and can be launched with relative ease. Consequently there is a multitude of variations of low level threats to offshore resources that compounds the problem of planning a maritime strategy to counter them.

To conclude the discussion on threats to offshore resources consider the lead times or warning times for each level of threat. High level threats will involve superpowers and will be preceded by growing tension and international posturing over a lengthy period of time, possibly years. Providing this lead time is recognised for what it is Australia will be able to build on forces and prepare for defence. Similarly medium level threats are most unlikely to be pre-emptive. Only a few nations in the world have the capacity to mount a medium level attack on Australia and therefore on her offshore resources. To mount

such an attack would require some grievance and development of the grievance should develop over a lengthy period, again possibly years. Recognition of the grievance and potential threat, with the appropriate response in mobilising forces to counter it, will be instrumental in a strategy against the threat.

Low level threats pose quite a different problem. If politically motivated there may be considerable warning time given by the aggressor arguing his rights in international fora. Extremist organisations, terrorists and commercial rivals may be less inclined to give warning other than a general threat that does not identify those areas needing the most defence effort. The difficulty lies in identifying the threat and the motives of the aggressor who may be trying to damage Australia's economy, influence international or national opinion, or merely cause outrage and terror.

For all these reasons — the nebulous threat, the nuclear motive and the simplicity of mounting attacks against offshore resources — the low level contingency is the greatest threat to offshore industries.[6]

Before considering what sort of strategy is required, one last loose thread needs to be tied up. Throughout the above paragraphs threats to Australia's offshore resources have been linked to Australia. The two cannot be separated. Any threat to an offshore resource represents a threat to Australia's sovereignty over that resource, and any attempt to damage an offshore industry is an attempt to inflict hardship on Australia. This is very obvious in high or medium level threats where an attack is more than likely part of an overall offensive strategy by an aggressor. In some low level contingencies this is less obvious. In such cases the attack may be designed for political influence, to create temporary hardship, for personal or national gain, or, in the terrorist instance, purely to create horror. In all these cases however the offshore resource will have been targetted for reasons of some greater gain at the expense of Australia. Perhaps the most difficult low level threat to define in this context is that of commercial rivalry similar to the case of the Icelandic Cod War which could develop over Indonesian traditional fishing grounds within the Australian Fishing Zone. In cases of this sort however it is still a challenge to government policy and authority, and represents a threat.

Defence of offshore resources is part of the overall defence of the nation and a maritime strategy for the protection of these resources must be compatible and complimentary to a maritime strategy for national defence.

THE BASIS OF THE STRATEGY

The opening quote identified the difficulty of forming a strategy for the defence of the offshore estate. In contemplating strategies for the defence of nations it is possible to study history and the writings of other eminent strategists, but in the case of developing a strategy for the protection of offshore resources there is little historical precedence and a paucity of learned comment.

The topic is not entirely without precedence however.

In the North Sea Britain controls substantial offshore oil resources and fisheries and so is confronted with a similar problem to Australia, though on a lesser geographic scale. Britain, in days of Empire however, presided over offshore resources many thousands of miles from home in the form of colonies which were principally kept as reserves of raw materials or for strategic benefit.

One may eagerly look to this precedent — valuable resources scattered over great distances requiring defence — when contemplating a similar defence for Australia's offshore resources. There is a considerable difference between the two circumstances. When Britain owned scattered colonies she also 'ruled the waves' and was largely unchallenged by maritime forces. Britain was able to exercise sea power and command the sea in regions of interest effectively deterring action against her colonies. That cannot be compared to Australia's circumstances of limited forces, population and resources when confronted by a high level

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The Fremantle Class Patrol Boat HMAS WHYALLA. Surveillance is the main function of this type of vessel of which 15 units are in service.

threat. Against lower level threats however there is a comparison.

Some lessons of this historical precedent are relevant. The first is the value of a naval presence or force in being; the means by which Britain demonstrated her sovereignty over her maritime colonies. This presence is still used today by that nation in the area of the Falklands and around North Sea oil and fishery resources. The counter lesson — that of having no presence — can be learned from some notable British defeats. The small forces in the Far East during World War II were unable to prevent Japanese victories and indeed were vulnerable themselves to superior forces and, more recently, the muted withdrawal of naval presence from the South Atlantic presented the Argentine government with an opportunity to invade the Falkland Islands.[7]

The use of Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV) by British in the North Sea is the best contemporary example of a nation confronting the problem of protection of offshore resources and can be compared again to naval presence. The OPV's have not been proven against a military threat but have been successful in fisheries protection against commercial rivals. As with Gunboats in days of 'Gunboat Diplomacy', the OPV's are showing a presence, albeit one that is easily overcome by relatively weak maritime forces. Though poorly armed they act as a demonstration of resolve and a deterrence to any threatening nation which must consider the greater naval might represented by these vessels.

This lesson of history and current practice is to protect offshore resources, dedicated forces are required — that is, a fleet in being.

The classical principles and concepts of maritime strategy, expounded by Mahan, Corbett, Richmond, Grivel, Wegener and many others, address strategies designed to win wars between nations. Much has been written about strategy for powerful nations and strategy for nations of lesser maritime power. Many of these concepts are applicable to Australia when contemplating medium or high level threats, but in the case of a low level threat the classical strategies have little relevance. Perhaps the reason for this is that most classical concepts involve some form of offensive action, whereas defence of offshore resources against a low level threat is very reactive to events and defensive by nature.

The classical writers on maritime strategy centre about three concepts for maritime strategy. Mahan and similar strategists advocate the decisive battle to gain command of the sea by destroying the opposition's ability to oppose.

Confronted with such strategy a weaker maritime nation must develop a strategy that avoids decisive battle whilst still exercising a limited command of the sea. Such a strategy was expounded by strategists of the 'Jeune Ecole' who relied on technology and small forces to interdict the enemy's trade and attack his major units thereby denying him the use of the sea that he seeks to command. A variation of the 'Jeune Ecole' can be seen in the Strategy of Denial expounded by Dibb.[8] The third concept and probably the most accepted is that put forward by Corbett, Richmond and other more current strategists. This revolves around the idea of collective security, use of joint forces closely coordinated, and the exercise of maritime strategy as a part of other strategy. It relies on selective use of either the strategy of the decisive battle or of trade interdiction or of small scale raiding; whatever is appropriate to the overall strategic position.

In all these positions on maritime strategy the emphasis is on offensive action, either decisive battles, limited attacks or joint operations. There seems to be little thought given over the centuries to a *strategy of reactive defence* such as required against a low level, difficult to define, threat to offshore resources.

Looking at history and the writings of classical strategists there is little encouragement to develop a distinct maritime strategy for the protection of offshore resources. Rather as mentioned earlier, the threat to these resources represents a threat to Australia, and any strategy to cope with that threat must be a part of Australia's overall maritime strategy. With this as a basis to form a strategy some help comes from classical concepts. Both Corbett, and more recently Gorshkov, in developing ideas on maritime strategy as a part of a joint strategy, have supported the concept of defending what you need to defend at a particular point in time.[9] A national strategy based on the principles of Corbett, one that allows the flexibility to use all forms of warfare, the decisive battle if on your terms, or interdiction if it suits your purpose, is a strategy that allows for the protection of offshore resources. Such a strategy gives the flexibility to present a deterrent face towards a threatening force considered inferior to Australia's defensive capacity. Similarly against a superior force there is the flexibility to adopt a denial or 'Jeune Ecole' approach. Concentration of effort using joint operations allows Australia to dictate the terms of battle, be it in protection of resources or continental defence.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STRATEGY

The key element of Australia's maritime strategy and therefore strategy to protect offshore resources is **'defend what you need at the time'.**

The size of the defensive problem must first be reduced. In earlier paragraphs it can be seen that the bulk of offshore resources are concentrated in the northwest and southwest of Australia. There are many other important resources in other parts of Australia but economically and strategically the bulk exist in these two areas. The key to a maritime strategy to protect these resources is to aim to command the sea, land and air in those areas and be able to mount joint operations to drive off an aggressor. To do so will mean accepting a loss of sea control in other areas of Australian maritime interest, but fulfils the requirement to defend what is needed with the limited resources at Australia's disposal.

The final flexibility in such a strategy of defence of areas of interest is to establish forces to implement the strategy that are not based on a 'Maginot Line' concept; one that precludes attacks on any other resource or part of Australia. The strategy requires the establishment of a force in being with the flexibility to deploy to other threatened areas at short notice whilst primarily maintaining a presence in those key northwestern and southeastern areas.

The force in being needs to be a joint force representing all arms of the military. It requires versatile armed naval vessels with endurance and sea keeping qualities necessary to cover the vast areas. Such need not be heavily armed, as they represent a resolve in much the same way as the Royal Navy's OPVs. The ideal vessels however need to be able to represent an overall strategy for defence of Australia and as such should not be purpose built for offshore patrol and protection duties, but rather should be a general purpose naval vessel of moderate armament able to deter low level threats to offshore resources and able to act as part of a force in the defence of Australia against higher level, less credible contingencies.

These utility naval vessels are the key to the strategy in that they are visible as a deterrent and have the capability to enforce the strategy. Even though the size of the problem has been reduced, the navy could not effectively patrol the areas involved without an effective form of reconnaissance. To implement this, air force assets could be employed to perform routine

Oceanic survey vessels gathering 'intelligence' in our maritime environment. Much of our offshore estate still remains to be chartered.

reconnaissance missions thereby locating intruders and also emphasising the deterrent presence to an onlooker. Over the horizon radar such as 'Jindalee' will assist in reconnaissance to the northwest and a further extension of the coverage of the two areas can be achieved using ground based radar on the coast or on offshore platforms. Technology allows such systems to be automatic and linked by landline to a central control station, alleviating the requirement to provide specialised operators.[19]

The final part of the strategy requires the third arm of the military, the army, to provide a strike force against a potential aggressor that may have succeeded in eluding the patrolling naval vessels and air force reconnaissance. As the ultimate deterrent a force of Special Action Force soldiers needs to be available to engage in the 'decisive battle'. This force needs to be of such skill that any aggressor can be assured of sustaining total defeat at their hands, swiftly and decisively.

Such a strategy, using all arms of the services and establishing a force in being in areas of strategic offshore resources, is designed to deter low level threats against those resources. The problem of defence against higher level threats has not been addressed. Against an escalating low level threat the forces described above are credible and could be augmented with larger numbers, more capable units, defensive minefields, and, assuming warning time is heeded, the necessary expansion of forces. Against a high level threat however, as described in the second part of this essay, the defence of offshore resources becomes a lesser consideration and forces required for their defence may well be required elsewhere. In this unlikely event a strategy for defence of offshore resources becomes less important, overtaken by concern for defence of the nation as a whole. In this case, the resources become extremely vulnerable and indefensible with existing forces or without outside assistance.

HMAS WOLLONGONG aground off Gabo Island. May 1985.

CONCLUSION

Australia owns substantial areas of offshore resources. These are currently exploited with potential for growth and represent a significant economic and strategic asset. Threats to these assets are linked to the continent of Australia, and a strategy to protect these resources must reflect overall national strategy. Unlike threats to the nation however, the low level threat posed by terrorism, commercial rivalry or disputed claims is the most dangerous to offshore resources. A successful low level attack or harrassment could deprive the nation of these immensely valuable assets. The probable short lead time to such a low level threat necessitates that any strategy to protect offshore resources must be in place at all times. We will not have the luxury of time to develop one during a crisis.

Historical precedence and the works of classical maritime strategists give little guidance on protection of the 'maritime estate' except to demonstrate the value of a force in being to demonstrate both a resolve and the wherewithal to combat a threat. Even a limited presence is of some value particularly if that limited force is a credible match for a low level contingency. Sound advice comes from more recent strategists who advocate the need to defend what is possible at the time, using forces available, and strategies suited to those forces.

With these concepts in mind the best strategy for the defence of the maritime estate is to limit the size of the problem to one that is defensible. In the case of Australia's offshore resources this means isolating the two most economically and strategically valuable areas, the northwest and southeast, and building the strategy in these areas.

The strategy requires a force in being, a naval presence, supported by reconnaissance and backed up by a mobile and highly trained attack force. All assets required for this force in being must be suited to the defence of Australia and flexible enough to respond to threats to offshore resources both in the areas mentioned or, with some warning, in other areas.

Finally, the force in being and the organisation for reconnaissance needs to be in place at all times. The vulnerability of offshore resources, the difficulty in identifying the foe and the size of the defensive task means the luxury of warning time may be denied. Our ability to defend our offshore assets must be in place before any potential threat looms.

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OF SHIPS AND THE SEA

THE WEST'S FORGOTTEN FLEET

by Vic Jeffery

Navy Public Relations Officer (W.A.)

The largest number of Royal Australian Navy warships ever seen in Careening Bay at Garden Island in Western Australia, the present day site of *HMAS Stirling*, was in 1948 — some thirty years before the base commissioned.

The commissioning of the new support facility *HMAS Stirling* on 28 July, 1978 in fact heralded the Royal Australian Navy's return to the island.

Between 1945 and 1957 there were as many as eleven RAN warships laid-up in the sheltered water of Careening Bay. Surprisingly most serving personnel are not aware that the RAN had employed this island in the past.

With the end of hostilities in 1945, the Navy quickly set about reducing its numbers as men returned to civilian life. Like all Allied navies, Australia had many fine ships surplus to peace-time requirements, therefore it was decided to place Reserve Fleet detachments at various points around Australia. One was designated to the ideally sheltered waters of Careening Bay at Garden Island.

The detachment was commanded from its formation to its demise by Lieutenant Commander Keith Gibson, VRD, RANVR, a West Australian. After paying the depot ship *HMAS Platypus* off into reserve at Sydney, LCDR GIBSON was posted to Garden Island as Commanding Officer, Reserve Ships, Fremantle. At its peak the detachment had 165 personnel — more than the Fremantle shore establishment *HMAS Leeuwin*, most being artificers and shipwrights.

Now living in retirement in his native Fremantle, Keith Gibson recalls it was a continual battle with authority. 'We had our good and bad times. There was no prestige attached to the job. It was a worry trying to get men ashore. Garden Island was completely isolated in those days with MSL704 running men ashore once a fortnight for leave. I don't know how I stuck the job out for so long'.

The men of the Fremantle Reserve Fleet were very proud of their reputation for having the most well maintained Reserve Fleet Detachment in Australia.

The ships themselves were slipped in nearby Fremantle every two years. They may have looked weather-beaten on the outside but were in A1 condition internally. In an emergency some of them could have been re-commissioned within 14 days, providing they did not have to be slipped.

These ships, awaiting the recall to duty which never came in most cases, were fully maintained until the day they were announced for disposal, there was never any prior warning of their approaching demise.

Apart from the River class frigate, *HMAS Lachlan*, the other ships were corvette minesweepers of the Bathurst class, of which 56 had been built for the RAN and another four for India. The first to arrive was *HMAS Horsham* on 23 November 1945, closely followed by *HMAS Glenelg* on 12 December. It was another twelve months before the third ship arrived, *HMAS Parkes*. She had been at Fremantle since 18 December.

Sailors attached to the Fremantle Reserve Fleet Detachment wore *HMAS Parkes* tally-bands. A posting to the detachment was known as a posting to *HMAS Parkes*. The unofficial title of the detachment was 'Hoot's Heroes', an obvious reference to the Commanding Officer of the detachment.

Ironically one young officer attached to Garden Island in 1948 was Lieutenant Neil Boase who had the pleasure of coming back 30 years later to Commission the magnificent *HMAS Stirling* complex as the Naval Officer Commanding West Australia Area.

The fourth corvette to arrive, *HMAS Benalla* was slipped in Fremantle on 8 January 1947, and proceeded to Garden Island on 16 January.

That same day *HMAS Townsville* was slipped in Fremantle and proceeded across to Garden Island on 24 January.

One year later on 16 January 1948, HMA Ships *Deloraine, Echuca, Katoomba, Lithgow* and *Mildura* berthed at North Wharf, Fremantle. Three of these vessels were together again after the sinking of the first Japanese submarine by the RAN. This occurred off Darwin on 20 January 1942, when HMA Ships *Deloraine, Katoomba* and *Lithgow* successfully depth-charged the large submarine 1.124 of 1,142 tons. After de-storing at Fremantle these five corvettes proceeded to Careening Bay.

The last ship to arrive, the frigate *HMAS Lachlan*, berthed at Fremantle from the eastern states on 22 September 1948. She proceeded to Garden Island where she remained for six months, in which time a great deal of effort went into her maintenance with the view, by the officers and men of the detachment that she was going to make a fine headquarters ship. This was not to be, for she was taken back to Fremantle on 4 May 1949, and transferred on loan to the Royal New Zealand Navy in June.

In 1951 *HMAS Mildura* left Careening Bay after nearly three years in reserve. She was taken to Fremantle where she was re-commissioned as a training ship for national servicemen in the W.A. area in February. She went back into reserve on 15 July 1953 when replaced by a sister ship *HMAS Junee*.

The next ship to leave Garden Island was *HMAS Echuca* in 1952. On 5 April that year she departed Fremantle under tow by the fleet tug *HMAS Reserve*, bound for Melbourne where she was transferred to New Zealand on 14 June. It was another two years before another ship departed, this time *HMAS Mildura* in tow by the tug *HMAS Sprightly*, in December 1954 bound for Melbourne. From there she became

The Fremantle detachment of the Reserve Fleet pictured in Careening Bay, the present day site of HMAS STIRLING, in 1948. HMAS LACHLAN is visible inshore. The corvette/minesweepers are moored in pairs.

HMAS HORSHAM (left) and HMAS TOWNSVILLE aground on a sandbank in Careening Bay on 1 April, 1955. The ships had broken adrift from their mooring that morning. No damage was incurred. Photo by courtesy WA Newspapers Ltd.

stationary Reservist training ship in Queensland before being finally broken-up in 1965.

HMAS Benalla followed three months later, when she was taken in tow by the fleet tug *HMAS Sprightly* on 19 March 1955, bound for Melbourne. *Benalla* was later sold on 20 February 1958, and scrapped in Japan. With the departure of *Benalla*, seven corvettes remained lying in the serene waters of Careening Bay with the small maintenance detachment.

The one time some excitement arose was on 1 April 1955, when *HMAS Horsham* and *HMAS Townsville* ran aground on a sandbank. The two ships had been driven against the bank by strong easterly winds, after having broken adrift from their moorings early in the morning. A diesel workboat placed them back in position about 300 metres off-shore by mid-afternoon. No maintenance crews were onboard and neither vessel was damaged.

When the last seven ships went — they went quickly, all within 10 months.

The front page of 'The West Australian' newspaper of Thursday 10 January 1957, greeted its readers with the news that the former RAN ships *Deloraine* and *Lithgow* had been towed out the previous day by the Dutch tug *Loire*, bound for the shipbreakers in Hong Kong.

Only eight days later the corvettes *Horsham* and *Townsville* were towed out by the Dutch tug *Oostzee*, also bound for the scrap yards in Hong Kong. These four ships had been sold as scrap to the Hong Kong Delta Shipping Co on 8 August 1956. The total price paid for the four vessels was $64,000.

When the Federal Government announced on 2 May 1957 that HMA Ships *Glenelg*, *Katoomba* and *Parkes* had been sold to the Hong Kong Rolling Mills, it was obvious that the end was near.

On 27 November 1957 the tug *Bustler* towed these three ships out of Gage Roads for the last time, thus ending a little known chapter in the history of Garden Island.

On 28 July 1978 the new fleet support facility *HMAS Stirling* was commissioned on the shores of Careening Bay — some 21 years after these silent sentinels had departed.

Telling it like it was!

ZIG ZAG

STARTING LIFE AS A YOUNG MERCHANT SEAMAN IN WWII.

by Neil Grano

Social life for a 16 year old boy in Melbourne during early 1940 was, to say the least, not exactly glamorous. England was at war and by reason of blood ties, commonwealth agreements, and sentimentality, Australia also had declared itself at war against Germany. At that stage it was a very remote war, mostly brought into focus through letters from relatives living in England, complaining about food rationing and petrol shortages or the stories told by the boys from the English merchant ships. They told of bombing and submarine attacks in the Irish Sea and the North Atlantic, also tales of the convoys flying their gas inflated balloons which acted as a deterrent by fouling low flying attacking planes. Or stories of the 'A' frame with the attached paravane and cable which could be lowered over the bow of the ship like a giant hinge. The paravanes then ran out on cables on either side of the ship, fishing for mine cables which, when encountered, would be cut by the metal teeth of the paravane, bringing the mine to the surface. The mine could then be exploded by rifle fire from the ship.

At times I would see the white hulled American Matson Line ships that regularly plyed the Pacific carrying passengers from San Francisco and Hawaii to Australia, U.S. freighters such as the *Yomachichi*, and the *West Honaker* with their white hulls and superstructure and a large U.S. flag painted in colour on either side of amidships to identify them as neutral. I was always fascinated when I saw the American merchant seamen come ashore in their loose fitting, comfortable clothes, but was especially impressed by the wooden matches which they used. In contrast to the local Bryant & Mays, the American ones never seemed to break, they had more phosphorous and burned very brightly.

For the previous 2 years I had been a member of the Royal Brighton Yacht Club, sailing in the 13ft dinghys. They were open decked with a lug main and a jib sail and used a skipper and one man to crew. In the races on choppy days it was always exciting to see if you could avoid a spill on rounding the marked buoy by not jybing or dipping the lug quickly enough. At the end of a race of possibly a few hours duration we would be blue from the cold and the biting spray. On Saturdays and Sundays in the winter season there was repair and maintenance. At a Smoke night during the winter, all the trophies would be awarded to the winners of the races. This Smoke night would be held in the Clubhouse and presided over by a retired Admiral or the highest ranking Naval authority that could be found. Needless to say everyone appeared duly impressed but in reality it was a boring, stiff, stag evening with many speeches, toasts and much formality — a heritage of English custom.

About this time I was filled with thoughts and dreams of life at sea and seeing the world. Originally I had thought of the Navy but it was necessary to take the exam for Midshipman at age of 13 years and I had been too late for them. My Father still had visions of my becoming a lawyer or a doctor but I was certain I did not have the brainpower or the interest for it. The sea was in my blood and my Mothers' cousin — an ex-sea Captain, now a gentleman farmer — had sea stories which filled me with excitement and anticipation to see the world.

As soon as I could I joined the Navy League which met in Port Melbourne one night a week and learned under the tutorship of old Navy men. They taught us the various sea-going skills and I elected to become a Signal yeoman and enjoyed being taught the semaphore alphabet with flags.

Being taught the Semaphore Alphabet with flags.

This one night a week was a high point for me and during the evenings in between, when I could escape from the house, I would wander around the dock areas looking at the ships or spend time in the Seaman's Mission talking with the seamen, filling my head with dreams of far off places and an exciting life. Perhaps it was fortunate I only saw the glamor in the life ahead and not the loss of dignity, the loneliness, the mistreatment and the plain hard work that was to follow. Yet, in retrospect much of it probably helped to forge a more useful person.

A BAD START

Without previous experience it was tough to get the first job. The common statement encountered was 'come back and see me after you've had a trip or two, we may have a berth for you then'. However one day I was in the Seaman's mission talking to 2 Danish seamen who told me they would be sailing to South Africa and were short a cabin boy. They didn't expect to leave for some weeks as it was an old ship and they were having lots of problems with their engines. The name of the ship was the *Panama*, a fourmaster, one of the first motor ships ever built but now requiring frequent engine repair. The next morning I came down to Port Melbourne dock, boarded the *Panama* and asked for the Chief Steward. In a few minutes the Chief Steward bedecked in his silver braid appeared and asked me if I knew how to make a bunk and clean a cabin properly. I replied that 'I know how to do most of these things and what I don't I will quickly learn'. After answering a few more questions I was told to report later that same morning to the Office of the Agent where I would sign articles as a Cabin Boy. Little did I know at the time that within 8 weeks I would desert the ship.

It took longer to repair the engines on the *Panama* than had been estimated due to unavailability of parts. During this time I was getting job experience alongside the dock and liking it very little. I was the lowest 'thing' in the

Stewards' Dept and it was not uncommon for everyone to yell abuse at me, throw kitchen implements at me and kick and punch me as though I were an inanimate object that had been bought and paid for. I was too sensitive for this and was afraid of them. They made threats they were going to kill me and were certainly big enough and nasty enough to do it. Life was made miserable for me. The Danes had been away from their homeland for a long time now since it was occupied by the Nazis and without doubt this was a frustration to them. Quite often they were prone to make anti-British statements and to my immature mind they sounded like pro-Nazi sympathizers and I was scared of what might happen to me once we were at sea. As a result of these fears my mind was made up to jump ship a couple of days before it left for sea and remain hidden for at least a week after it was gone, until the police ceased searching for me or it was impossible to put me back on board. After I knew the ship had cleared Australian waters I went to the Marine Office and applied for a document of release so I could sign on another ship. This release was given without difficulties, probably due to the intervention and character recommendations given me by a Chaplain from the Seamans' Mission in Port Melbourne, who was also an acquaintance of my Fathers' family. At this time I had no personal knowledge but I had heard many stories from young seamen of the Chaplains' perverted sexual interest in them. I later found this out to be a fact but the main thing right then was that I received a Permit to sign Articles. I stated the cause was Desertion but this didn't really matter as it was becoming a sellers market.

NEW EXPERIENCES

I did not have much money and I needed to find another ship as soon as possible. This time however I walked along the docks on the Yarra river and found the Australian coaster the *Allara* of the Adelaide Steamship Co. a coal burning, general cargo ship of about 4,000 tons. They needed a deck boy and the pay was 4 Pounds 16 shillings (Aust) a month. Twenty per cent, or the 16 shillings, being a war bonus. Most of our tripping would be to the South Australian ports in Spencer Gulf; Port Augusta, Whyalla, Port Pirie (the mineral ports) and Port Adelaide then up to Port Kembla near Woolongong and Newcastle to discharge iron ore and take on a cargo of steel. Occasional crossings were required over the Australian Bight to Bunbury, Fremantle and Geraldton. We would pick up timber in Bunbury, general cargo in and out of Fremantle and pick up wheat in Geraldton. The Australian Bight, with its huge swells and violent storms is and was as bad as anything I have seen in the world; where a storm lashing the ship could last for days, where lifelines were rigged over the tops of hatches running fore and aft over the fwd. and aft. well decks to enable the men to hold onto something when going back and forth and prevent the waves which broke across the deck from sweeping you overboard.

For a 17 year old boy this was an exciting experience and Frank Keeley the Bosun was a good teacher. Sometimes he would not be satisfied I had cleaned his cabin properly or I was slow bringing his meal and I would then get a kick in the back end or a punch in the head but if I did things well he was generous in his praise. When the Bosun was angry with me Chips (the carpenter that shared the cabin with the Bosun) who was a little older, and a much kinder and sympathetic man, would talk to me a little and explain things. I lived in a common focastle up forward with 8 of the Deck crowd on one side and 8 of the Engine room on the other. There were 2 A/Bs per watch and 1 O.S. on daywork and myself the Deckboy (or Peggy, as the deckboy was known). My duties consisted of cleaning the cabin for the Bosun and Carpenter, bring their meals, cleaning their dishes and making their bunks. I also assisted in cleaning our own Deck Focastle and the Deck messhall and with what time was left over I worked on deck assisting the ordinary seaman. Once again I was the lowest living thing on the ship but I soon became friendly with one of the A/Bs named Joe Dimmoch, but called 'Maltese Joe' by everyone because he came originally from Malta and talked with somewhat of an accent. Joe had travelled everywhere. He had been a Quartermaster on big ships and had a dark skin and kind eyes. He taught me many knots and other things about seamanship and helped me over the hurdle of home sickness that accompanied the first couple of months away from home.

There were also the exciting times in Port but it always seemed my pay was spent before I received it, even though it was more money than I had ever made before in my life. I used to borrow ahead on my pay but, as inevitably happened, I would go along with the other crew members wanting to appear as salty as possible heading for the closest Pub to the docks. There we stayed drinking beer until the pubs closed or we became so drunk that the publican poured us out of the door. This was my chance to do as I pleased and I was doing just that on these evenings of freedom. One evening we were out on the main street in Geraldton and I needed to have a piss in the worst way. It was 10.00 pm and I could not find a public urinal quickly enough so I managed to hold on to an upright post on the footpath with one hand and with the other I

Young sailors out for a good time. 1941.

cleared my pants just in time, oblivious to all the people passing by. I played 'my stream' all over the main street for what seemed like a never ending 30 minutes but in reality was probably less than 30 seconds. Then it seemed to take another 25 minutes to return it to where it belonged.

Prior to our arrival in Fremantle, the crew had been making fun of the fact that I was a virgin and never having really 'been' with a woman. This was true and I hoped to correct the situation at the earliest opportunity. So, armed with the address of a respectable brothel in Fremantle (where the price was one quid) I went there as soon as the ship was tied up. On arrival there was a line about a block long of men waiting. When my turn came a woman appearing to be in her 30s ushered me into a room which was bare except for a bed and a night stand, the latter supporting a small wash basin with water. This she grabbed with one hand splashing some between her legs, the other hand pulling the top spread from the bed and said 'don't take your pants off love, just down'. I did this at the same time praying for an instant erection. Everything about the operation was inhibiting and not encouraging me. After about 4 minutes of laying there trying to perform I felt her hand in the pocket of my pants and she took 2 Pounds. I said 'I thought the price was one Pound!' She replied 'Well love, you've taken twice as long as the usual time we allow of 5 minutes, but don't worry, next time you'll get it hard, and you'll come love probably next time. Can't keep the boys waiting'.

My feelings of anxiety had been replaced by embarrassment and frustration and a sense of having been cheated. I decided that for the future there must be a better way. At least I had tried and I would go back to the ship a veteran and tell them all how good it had been!

On our visits to Whyalla in South Australia we loaded iron ore from an endless conveyor belt which ran out on a long pier then poured the ore directly into the holds, bulk loading the ship as a thick red dusk settled over the whole vessel. Of course, we had to clean it off. In Whyalla, wine was relatively good and very cheap so it was the practice of the crew to buy a few one gallon and half gallons of wine (enough for everyone), load them in a burlap gunny sack or two and carry them back slung over our shoulders. However, when the sun was warm and the walk was long (about a mile of pier) there had to be frequent stops for a cool, refreshing drink of wine. Usually

by the time we had reached the side of the ship we were in a totally 'fluid state' and any flaggons left in the sacks were usually broken. Crewmen on board would follow through the binoculars the returning path of the men with the wine to see how their investment was coming. The Captain was always glad when we left Whyalla and even happier when the wine did not make it back to the ship.

Once in a while I would chip some paint or holystone some wooden deck but I was not getting much seamanship experience so I decided after a few months on the *Allara* to see the rest of the world. I would never get there on a coaster so I applied for release and was paid off by Captain Sampson in our next port of call, which was Port Kembla.

My pay amounted to 24 shillings and 3 'Very Goods' on my discharge. I decided to go to Sydney and was thrilled by the memory of a visit to that town as a 9 year old boy with my parents. To save my money I carried my seabag over one shoulder with my suitcase in the other hand and walked 4 miles in the dust and blazing sun to Wollongong (pronounced the Gong for short). I bought a ticket on the train for Sydney and on arrival made my way to the Seaman's mission on George Street where I got a mattress on the floor for a shilling a night. There was also a Sailors' Home just a block up the street where, if you were drunk enough, you could hang over a rope they had stretched out and sleep without cost. I was determined to get an overseas ship so my money had to last. Soon I found a Pub close by where for sixpence I could buy a schooner (large glass) of beer and also get a hot plate of meat and potatoes free in the middle of the day. This I did regularly. By living with and talking to the other seamen it was possible to learn most of the cheaper ways to manage.

I was fascinated by the beauty of Sydney Harbour, the ferryboats crisscrossing the water, the slopes of Taronga Park Zoo coming down to the waters' edge and Luna Park on the North shore at night. Many times at night I would longingly look at the lights on the Showboat which was a ferryboat fitted out for dancing and did a 3 hour cruise up the Parramatta river with light streaming from the upper portholes. The music from the band carried by the warm summer breeze seemed to say 'Romance for everyone for just a shilling'.

My position was such that I had to conserve my money sufficiently to last an indefinite time. I went every day to the different shipping companies and decided to get on one of the Cunard Lines large passenger ships which were all running from Sydney as transports to the Middle East. I had also decided, if I had the chance, to work in the engine room to gain different experience and earn more money. Also, they needed more people there and my chance of a job was much better.

The day arrived finally when the 46,000 ton, stacker (smokestacks), *Aquitania* would pick up her crew.

ON BOARD 'AQUITANIA'

I stood on the fringe of a crowd of seamen as officers selected the crew, always looking for the most experienced but often having to settle for some without experience. I was able to ante my deckboy time as sea experience and get myself a job as the lowest rating in the engine room which was that of a 'Cleaner' (Wiper). This time the pay was much better but what a motley crew! Many were the dregs of Sydney, not seamen, not inspired by the sea but looking for a soft way to ride the war out and avoid direct military service and also have a degree of comfort. However these types did not comprise the majority of the crew. There was one degenerate, a former second rate boxer who was looking for an easy quid (but someone else's). Between his bullying of the younger, inexperienced seamen and his sexual perversion (he was a self professed sodomite) he soon gathered many of the Sydney scum around him, people of similar tastes and lack of character. This was a group to be avoided if life was to be tolerable. One of his bullying tactics was to coerce the newer seamen into doing his work for him in the engine room either by beating them or humiliating them.

On board our quarters were below the water line in the forward part of the ship. We each had a bunk and a metal locker and there were probably about 15 men in our focastle. The ship was so large it had all facilities below decks and a person could easily spend a week below without seeing daylight. In short, with all things considered I did not anticipate a pleasant voyage.

After leaving Sydney our first port of call was Wellington, New Zealand. This was my first foreign country and I was excited. Our assignment was to transport N.Z. troops to the Middle East and then transport prisoners back to India. The first night ashore I went to the Seaman's Mission dance and met some nice girls.

Unfortunately it seemed as if it would take longer than the 5 days we were scheduled to stay before I would be able to overcome my shyness and before the girls interest would be aroused for me. However, I had decided in the meantime I had to find a more direct route to romance than I presently practised. This I attempted to do the following evening, having been told about a 'Speak easy place' called the Merchant Navy Club, where you gave a coded

ring on the door bell downstairs. If it was the correct code the door opened and you were also enabled from upstairs to ride the elevator up to ring another bell. A voice would ask over a speaker system 'who sent you', if you gave the name of a known client you were admitted.

In New Zealand there were very strict rules about closing hours for drinking establishments and these ordinances were enforced by the Police. Inside the club there were many different brands of drink available which were not obtainable on the local market (undoubtedly smuggled in) and all at very inflated prices. The club had no closing time and the furnishings were crude. A phonograph on the floor provided music to dance to and half a dozen girls milled about. The room was crowded and smoke filled, but for an 18 year old boy this was an exciting way of life. It was in here that I met Nancy, an attractive brunette about 20 years old. After we had danced and drank together for a while she told me that I could see her home. In a way I was hesitant to leave the group of men that I knew there but in another way I was stimulated by the prospect of what could happen with Nancy. So off we went catching a bus for a 20 minute ride then walking a few blocks and, about one block from her house, I was rewarded by a kiss and a hug and she was gone. She had promised to meet me 2 nights hence and I had very big plans for that night so I comforted myself with the thought. I decided to also try and hold the girls further apart from me next time when I danced, and lessen the possibility of sexual excitement.

On board ship we had broken watches and were on day work which meant every evening was free. Normally my work watch would have been from 8.00 till 12.00 twice a day every day. During the next 2 days I could not stop thinking of Nancy — the pretty brunette hair so wavy, the blue eyes and the nice curves in all the right places. She was just the right height for dancing and, in my mind, for other things too. So it was with not just with a little anticipation that I went ashore on the appointed evening and made my way to the Club. I must have been early, she was not yet there, so I talked and waited. After about 45 minutes she arrived breathless from running, telling me in gasps between straightening her dress and fixing her hair, that her brother had just come home for a short leave before posting overseas. She had not wanted to let me down because she had promised, 'but would I understand?' Her parents would like her to be there for what would be her brothers' last time with them for a long time. I had known she had a brother in the N.Z. Army but we had not got around to details and, at that moment, I was not filled with brotherly love but I gave in gracefully wishing her goodnight, good luck and goodbye. Then I approached the task of getting drunk in the quickest manner as a couple of work mates related to me the next morning. I had been all right when they walked me between them back to the ship singing loudly. 'It's rumoured a troopship's just leaving Bombay', and finishing up with 'so cheer up my lads F--- em all'.

Until we arrived at the dock they had me under control, but I insisted on going on board the ship by trying to climb the main bow hawser. I might have made it except for a metal ratguard but by that time the Master at Arms had arrived and got me back to the dock and escorted me onboard the ship. The following day the troops finished coming aboard the ship and a fine N.Z. military band played 'now is the hour', the Maori Farewell song from the dock as the ship pulled away. Accompanying the sound of the music was many a wet eye and a silent question 'will I be back again'?

Back in sea watches we set our course across the Pacific to pick up the Australian Bight with choppy seas and blowy weather even in summer, but there was not really a cold wind. The *Aquitania* was a large ship and it rode quite stably. Originally it had been a coal burning ship but was converted over to oil some years ago and had 168 fires. My job was to assist the

Neil Grano, May 1942. Age 19 years.

Firemen (do their dirty work) and other assigned tasks such as the Watch Engineer or the Greaser might give me. Every watch I cleaned all the steel rails with emory cloth and all the steel plates in the decking of the engine room with a diesel fuel mop. On occasion I would be required to go into the bilges under the boilers and clean out the sludge and rags that might block the pumps. The Fireman's task was to watch the fires and maintain a certain steam pressure from his boilers. Occasionally he would change the burners to a different sized tip hole which regulated the spray of the fuel oil and it would be my job to assist by wire brushing the carbon from the used tip and cleaning it with diesel fuel.

My favourite watch partner was the Fireman with whom I worked and became good friends. He was a one eyed Australian named Ted Cottrell (an ex-Australian Navy man) and when he didn't need me he didn't mind what I did as long as he could get a hold of me somewhere. A favourite practice of mine was to take my billycan (which was an empty 1 gallon jam tin with a wire loop for a handle) and fill it with beer at the 'Pig and Whistle' on board before I came on watch, then hang it in a cool place such as half way down the air shaft to the engine room under the ladder, and then go up for nips during the watch. Some of the others kept their beer in the refrigeration room but that all depended on the Greaser in charge.

When we arrived off Fremantle we dropped anchor waiting for two large Dutch transports and the Cunard ship *Queen Mary*. Together we formed a convoy without escorts because of our faster speed (min. 24 knots) and each being very well armed. Between us we carried a total of about 20,000 N.Z. and Australian troops. Our next scheduled stop was Colombo, Ceylon, and our run there was uneventful and weather was warm and calm when we arrived. There was no dock space available so we dropped anchor as it was only a refuelling stop of 2 days. But the soldiers were feeling the effect of their confinement and some of them managed to get ashore without leave which was a big mistake as they almost wrecked the town, their final act being to deposit a small British car on the steps of the Post Office with a couple of halfpenny stamps stuck to it. This, plus commandeering the local tram (street-car) and running it full speed through the centre of town wildly ringing the bell, and terrifying the citizens, must have contributed to the warm send off that the local people gave us.

One of the big attractions there was the semi-precious stones and clothes, all being at very reasonable prices. Also available were fruits and juices which we were not at all familiar with. The weather was so warm now that the shoregoing clothes consisted of white shirt, pants, white shoes, and white pith helmet — all very sporty

Life in an engine room.

looking and British — but not very practical as they became soiled immediately in the humidity, showing right up on white cloth.

To get ashore we had to hail a bum boat, and the boatman would row us the couple of miles to shore. It was hard work but the boatman seemed used to it and was satisfied until we arrived at dock where we all paid him in Australian currency because we didn't have any rupees. He chased us for about 2 blocks demanding we pay him in local currency, which we didn't have, then apparently he became concerned for his boat which he had left behind, leaving us to return to it.

On the last leg of the outbound trip, in the middle of the Red Sea, the heat was almost unbearable, especially down below in the engine room. At times when the oil filters had to be changed the sweat would run in rivulets down my chest and back stinging all the way over the prickly heat which covered my back and chest. Most of the crew working in the engine room had prickly heat (a mass of red inflamation pimples, due to insufficient salt in the body). We registered air temperatures down below in the engine room of 132 degrees F, and when we moved from under one forced cool air draft to another we would run over the hot metal plates almost being unable to breathe as we passed a boiler because of the blast of hot air that would hit us.

Good fortune had smiled on us. The worst experiences we had so far were a few lifeboat drills, a couple of general alarms for suspected submarine sightings and the loss of two of the soldiers, apparently over the side of the ship. One of them a Lieutenant and the other a Sergeant. The rumour had it they had been dumped by their own men but nothing was ever proven. These early soldiers were a rough, tough lot and the story was believable.

We soon arrived at Port Tewfik (the Red Sea end of the Suez Canal), it was late in the evening but we could see the burned out hull of the English transport *Georgic* which had been hit by bombs in an Italian air raid and beached in an attempt to save her and the people on board. It was considered safer for us to cruise around at night and return the next morning to discharge the soldiers. We anchored offshore and the bumboats, laden with their wares, were alongside the ship being made fast to the side by heaving lines. They were stocked with rings, wallets, hummocks, jalapas, hand tooled designs of the sphinx and pyramids on leather bags, sandals and rugs. Everything was sold by price bargaining. When the price was agreed on, the goods would be sent up a line and the money put in a bag on the line and sent down. If they would cheat someone in the exchange, as they quite often tried to do, one of the crew would run the firehose out and turn the water on them so it didn't take many such instances before they got the message quite well and business was conducted properly.

When we had unloaded the troops we started to load the Italian prisoners (1400 total). These men seemed to be happy to be going away from the war and by this time we were getting a little bit tired of the moving pictures on board. It was hot below decks with no air conditioning, just fans. The bar was still the most popular place afloat and one of the Stewards, just as witty as they come, would spend an hour or two playing the piano in the bar.

The Italian prisoners loved to talk and sing and they would offer to make cigarette cases from their aluminium mess kits with hand made designs if we gave them a file to work with and all this in return for a few cigarettes. They were no problem to control and there was one Australian soldier assigned to guard about 400 of them when they were taken above decks for recreation each day. The guard would stand forward of the doorway with fixed bayonet and shout 'Presta' (Italian for hurry up) and the Italians, with their eyes on him, would come stumbling over the raised ledge of the doorway in their eagerness to avoid trouble. Their thoughts never turned to escape, only to food, and that seemed to make them very happy. The crew often laughed at the poor bastards stumbling over that doorstep and the Italians themselves also seemed to catch the humour of it all and they would start laughing.

On anchoring in Bombay the prison ship *El Messina* tied up alongside and we started to transfer prisoners. The whole operation of the transfer and fuelling took about 5 days during which time we had numerous opportunities for shore leave. Because of the food riots which were going on at that time in Bombay the Captain was hesitant for the first couple of days to allow us ashore, being afraid of losing some crew. We overcame his reservations by going to the offshore side of the *El Messina* and hailing a bumboat to take us ashore — no-one could see what we were doing from the *Aquitania*. When we got ashore this time we paid the boat operator in the local currency and a group of us decided it would be very seamanlike to get a tattoo. This would be visible evidence of our saltiness and once the decision had been made we boldly went to a dimly lit shop and looked at the charts of coloured designs that hung on the wall. Each of us selecting the design he preferred. The proprietor went to work transferring a stick on pattern in colour to the arm then went over it partly with a hand needle outlining in the proper coloured inks. He did the

World War Two convoy. 'Zig-Zagging' was a common submarine evasion tactic used by these formations.

bulk of the work with an electric needle, frequently referring to the coloured chart when he forgot the design. The design I had selected was an intertwined flag and anchor with the words 'Merchant Navy' underneath. It caused soreness for a couple of days and a swollen arm for about a week.

Two days before leaving Bombay I came down with German Measles. There were a number of cases on board and I was confined to the ships' hospital for about 5 days with only a curtain separating the measles cases from the Mumps cases. The day I was released from hospital we arrived in Colombo again and I managed to go ashore and buy some jade elephants with ivory tusks, which I believe must be the classic souvenirs that adorn mantlepieces above the open hearth fires in the houses of so many of my friends who had visited the Middle East. Our stay in Ceylon was a short one and we had been given permission to proceed to the large Naval Drydock in Singapore for general maintenance and some repair work both to the hull and the engines. My free time was short, being punctuated by my return to the hospital this time with the mumps, and there I remained until our arrival in Singapore.

SINGAPORE

As soon as we were in position in the Dry Dock at the Naval Base the water was pumped out and the hull of the ship shored up. Chinese workmen seemed to swarm all over the ship. We had broken sea watches and my job was officially to merely supervise the Chinese workmen in our section of the engineroom, one of their main tasks being to scale the condenser coils which were used in the desalination of the water to the boilers. This was a job that the engine room people hated to do but one which had to be done often. There were about 100 Chinese in our section and the white colonial concept was that white must know best, but actually I was rather ignorant of what they were supposed to be doing. Yet it did not seem to matter as they appeared to know exactly what they should be doing.

The area of the Naval Base was surrounded by and half covered with jungle; palm trees, rubber trees, banana plants, all types of tropical flowers and tropical plants in abundance, partly as a result of the heavy daily tropical downpours in the afternoons that usually lasted less than one hour but made the air heavy with the smell of vegetation. These rains would stop as suddenly as they started. I found Singapore very different from anywhere else I had known. I wandered around the Tiger Balm Gardens outside the City looking at the Chinese style Pagodas and loved the bus ride from the Naval Base through rubber plantations into the city. The sights and smells stimulated the romantic side of my imagination. Once in the city the rickshaws, the old women vending their strange foods at the side of the streets, the tinkle of the Chinese glass bells, the mixture of the incense, foods and, at night, the odours due to poor or non-existent sanitation all made you aware you were in a very different land even if the milling crowds of orientally dressed people had not done so. To me it was strange, inviting and wonderful and it did not take me long before I had discovered the Old World, New

World and the Happy World Cabarets (actually each was a large amusement park with different forms of recreation and eating places). In one of these three places a person could eat a very tasty meal at a fine restaurant, see a Chinese opera with all its noise of crashing cymbals and tragedy, dance in the pavillion with the taxi dancers (you would buy tickets ahead for so many dances) or just sit around in the warm air sipping jasmine tea and taking in the sights.

The thing that was uppermost in my mind did not seem to be readily available at these places or, if it were, it was at a price above that which I could afford. I was advised by some other seamen I met to try some of the smaller cabarets which abounded in the streets outside. In these places the contracts of instant love could be readily consumated after the flower peddlers slyly show you a package of condoms in the back of one hand while pinning a flower in your lapel with the other hand. I was led to and looked at the outsides of three clubs and then entered one where, after one drink I found a Chinese-Malayan girl who pleased me. First we agreed on a basic price then she took me home to her small apartment where I was introduced to her Mother and was told it was customary to pay a little more in respect of the Mother. I took a shower and was getting into bed when a 5 or 6 year old boy came into the room who was introduced as her brother. Again it was suggested I pay a little more for the family. I really began to feel like one of the family and with due respect I must say she treated me well as she brought me beer and cigarettes during the night without extra payment and in the morning there was a chicken breakfast ready for me before I returned to the ship. Besides all this I was so inexperienced she had to show me everything, but at least after I had met all the family it became more or less private and I reached an agreeable measure of relaxation with her. I would have enjoyed a repeat performance another evening but by now my money had dissipated and I was forced to confine myself to social activities in the immediate vicinity of the ship.

KORMORON SURVIVORS

It was November 1941 and the dry dock was required for another big ship so after one week we left Singapore bound for Sydney via the Indian ocean and the West Australian coast. This time we were not in convoy but on our own. After a number of days heading on this course I had just got dressed in preparation to go on my watch when there was quite a bit of excitement in the crew. Looking out the port side between decks doors (all of which were left open for ventilation in the warm weather) I gathered with the others at the door and saw a raft still about half a mile away with sharks circling it. When we drew close enough, we saw about 18 men aboard in German Naval uniform, some with the nameband *Kormoran* and one with Pilots' insignia. We hauled them aboard. They were all in apparently good physical condition, very sullen and refusing to have conversation with us even when we offered them cigarettes. They were immediately placed under guard and set to working and cleaning their quarters. We later learned (not from them) that they were part of the crew of the German Raider *Kormoran*, which had been waiting near the shipping lanes for transports and, as luck would have it, the Australian cruiser *Sydney* had encountered the *Kormoran* the evening before with a resultant surface battle and the subsequent sinking of both ships. No survivors were ever recovered from the *Sydney* and the Germans were interned as prisoners of war on our arrival in Sydney.

After paying off the Aqui (as it was called) I took the train direct to Melbourne to see family and friends, distribute gifts and play the prodigal son returning. By this time all the local people were in the Armed Services, Merchant Navy or had become Volunteer workers of all kinds to help the war effort. My sister was in the Army medical corps, my Father and Mother were also active in all kinds of organizations to raise money for gifts to the Armed Forces and provide comfort to servicemen during their leave away from home. This included opening our own home and offering hospitality to those who might be stationed or training in Melbourne.

NORTHWARD BOUND

After one week at home, on December 7th 1941, we got word that Pearl Harbour (I had never heard of the place before) had been attacked by the Japanese with resultant heavy losses to the U.S. Following close on this the Japanese drove down the Malayan Peninsula and I wondered what was happening to the many Australian servicemen I knew who were in Singapore. The city of Singapore fell to the Japanese about February 1942.

Within a week of the Pearl Harbour news I was signed on the *Port Melbourne*, a Port Lines (English) ship of about 9,000 tons. It was a refrigerator ship and most of its' cargo was meat. This time I was an Ordinary Seaman (on deck) and the pay was a little less than the Aqui but it was progression for me on the deck side. Our destination was Avonmouth, England, and our first port of call was Lyttleton, New Zealand which was the port for Christchurch, a few miles away. The weather was considerably cooler there and we stayed in port about 5 days. There existed considerable unrest within the crew because the Captain wanted to leave on

Christmas eve so most of the crew went ashore, got drunk and refused to debark the ship. However, finally they were rounded up by the police all over town, too drunk from their celebrating and too belligerent to help let go the ship. It became necessary for the Deck Officers and Apprentices to let the ship go and the Engineers manned the Engine room, as there wasn't a sober fireman in the crew either. Most of them had been poured onto the deck on their return.

After about 30 days sailing a zigzag course we stopped at our next port of call which was Panama. During this stretch we sighted 3 other ships and had no submarine sightings. I made friends with an old Scots Quartermaster who taught me how to use a palm and needle and make myself a seabag. He also taught me many other things including the word 'Burgoo' which he said was the word used in the Highlands for porridge, said to be always standard in the English breakfast. I also learned to use a wooden fid for splicing rope lines and a marlin spike for splicing wire cable, each of which always seem to need splicing. We arrived in Balboa on the Pacific side and anchored there briefly, then proceeded on to Colon on the Atlantic side for our coal bunkers as we were a coal burning ship. We passed rapidly through the locks being pulled by electric trains (called Mules) on rails running parallel with the locks and attached by steel cables. When we got to Gaton Lake we anchored and waited for some other ships to pass through from the other direction. The weather was extremely hot and sticky so, during the wait, I went over the side of the ship for a swim, but did not swim far from the Accomodation ladder having heard there were many alligators about.

The coal bunkers were situated quite a ways from the town of Colon and public transport did not seem to exist, so most of those going ashore walked to the town through picturesque groves of banana plants. The air was warm and heavy with the smell of the tropical vegetation and coconut palms. We only stayed a number of hours before sailing for Newport News Virginia.

The weather now got progressively colder as we went north. We planned to stay 3 days in Virginia and were given a pay advance and shore leave. As it was my first visit to the U.S. I lost one day waiting for Immigration authorities to provide me with an Alien I.D. card to enable me to go ashore. When ashore I was very excited by everything I saw, from the Parking meters on the streets to the many kinds of foods they had, and their careless way of spending money and their extravagant statement 'You all come and visit me now' which in the majority of cases was not meant to be taken seriously. This was January 1942 and the U.S.A. was in a turmoil of recruiting for the Armed Services.

We headed further north from Virginia toward Halifax, Nova Scotia, still alone and zig-zagging, the weather getting colder and colder, and I realized I was not equipped with heavy enough clothing for this climate, even though I piled on every item of clothing I owned in an effort to stay warm. Yet, compared to what was in store for me in the convoy PQ 17 relatively speaking I was living in the lap of luxury. Little did I know that in the not too distant future I would be spending two weeks in an open lifeboat in the Barents sea after having a ship blown from under me by the Germans. But that is another story. I was well and truly on my way to the much yearned for life on the high seas!

The Author

Neil Jackson Grano was born in Melbourne in 1923. In 1941, at the age of 17 he joined the Merchant Navy serving until the end of 1942 under the Australian and British flags. From 1943 until 1945 he served in the US Merchant Marine and followed this up with a two year tour in the US Army. In 1948 he commenced a 15 year career as an electronics instrumentation engineer employed in the aircraft, missile and space industries. This involved much work on reliability testing during the POLARIS missile programme. During 1962-68 Neil travelled worldwide as a contract systems analyst.

On returning to Australia in the early 1970's he undertook studies at the Australian National University and West Australian Institute of Technology, gaining a BA and Graduate Diploma in Social Sciences respectively. Following this he spent a year in Northern Thailand undertaking post graduate Field Research.

He lives in the ACT and has ex-wives and grown-up children overseas. In October of this year he leaves for one year of research field work in Portugal.

Neil has seen combat during service in the Russian Convoys (in PQ 17) and US island assaults in the Pacific during World War Two.

BOOK REVIEW



WAR AT SEA 1939–1945 by John Hamilton. Blandford Press, Poole, Dorset, England. Distribution in Australia by Capricorn Link (Aust) Pty Ltd PO Box 665, Lane Cove, NSW 2066. $65.00 rrp.

This book contains a remarkable 176 paintings by the author, Mr John Hamilton who is acknowledged as one of Britain's leading painters of the war at sea.

Mr Hamilton's paintings are vivid, exciting and in some cases to a reader who was present at some of the actions depicted, I believe possibly spine-chilling and bringing back many memories.

The author's dedication is very appropriate — 'To those who were spared the horror and who never knew, this book is dedicated.'

I personally am a great critic of maritime artists, believing many cannot capture the immense forces of the sea or record its many moods on canvas. This cannot be said about John Hamilton as his seas are particularly realistic, be it the Flower class corvette *HMCS Snowberry* pounding through a swell, or the battlecruiser *HMS Renown* in a gale in the North Sea in 1940.

This book has been divided into six sections, The Western Oceans — September 1939 to December 1941, through to the Pacific — January 1944 to August 1945.

At the commencement of this book there is an excellent six page chronology of the War at Sea from 1 September, 1939 when the old German battleship *Schleswig Holstein* fired the opening shots of the war at Polish forts at Danzig, through to the Japanese surrender signed aboard *USS Missouri* in Tokyo Bay on 2 September, 1945.

A comprehensive text supports each full-colour painting covering events prior to, during, and the aftermath of each scene depicted.

One valuable aspect of this book is that it is a true perspective of the 'War at Sea'. Mr Hamilton draws no distinction between Allied and Axis successes and failures, treating all sailors who fought for their country as equals.

Containing some truly magnificent paintings there are some which have Australian connections. A few which spring to mind are the Italian cruiser *Bartolomea Colleoni* disabled and sinking after an engagement with *HMAS Sydney;* the German raider *Kormoran* sinking an Allied merchant ship; the destruction of the heavy cruiser *HMAS Canberra* and the disabling of the *USS Chicago;* and two featuring the cruiser *HMAS Perth.*

The first of these depicts *HMAS Perth* veering away at speed to avoid the torpedoed Dutch cruiser *De Ruyter* during the Battle of the Java Sea.

In the second painting which shows *HMAS Perth* and the American cruiser *USS Houston* in their last gallant night action in the Sunda Strait I did note an error. The painting shows *Houston's* after 8 inch turret firing, this was out of action from a previous engagement.

Another mistake I noticed was a scene depicting the Japanese heavy cruiser *Atago* sinking at the Battle of Leyte Gulf. *Atago* carried five twin 8-inch turrets, in the paintaing there is no 'C' turret. However, I do not believe either of these errors detract from this fine work as a reference of something simply nice to glance through when time permits.

One unusual aspect of this extensive work is that Blandford Press chose to print this book on light green paper. Sight unseen I would have criticised this choice, but after viewing the book I am convinced it enhances the quality of the paintings of which the reproduction is a credit to the craftsmen who produced this magnificent book.

Whilst $65 is not cheap for a book, I believe for a reference of this magnitude it is relatively inexpensive. Thoroughly recommended as a reference and an enjoyable book to peruse.

Vic Jeffery

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

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