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(INCORPORATED IN THE ACT)

AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE INC

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   a. to encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the maritime profession,
   b. to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and the maritime profession, and
   c. to publish a journal.

2. The Institute is self supporting and non-profit making. The aim is to encourage discussion, dissemination of information, comment and opinion and the advancement of professional knowledge concerning naval and maritime matters.

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CONTRIBUTIONS

In order to achieve the stated aims of the Institute, all readers, both members and non-members, are encouraged to submit articles for publication. Preferably, submissions should be typed, double spaced, on A4 paper; the author's name and address must be shown clearly, even if a pseudonym is required for printing purposes; to be eligible for prizes, original articles must be accompanied by statements that they have been written expressly for the ANI; and short biographies will be welcomed. The Editor reserves the right to reject or amend articles for publication.

DISCLAIMER

Views expressed in this journal are those of the authors, and not necessarily those of the Department of Defence, the Chief of Naval Staff or the Institute.

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Cover: HMAS Stalwart pictured during her recent Antarctic re-supply mission to Macquarie Island. The Silver Medal Essay (page 19) deals, in part, with defence and the South. Photograph by POPHOT R.H. Ferrall, provided by Command Photographic Centre.

FROM THE EDITOR

Let me re-assure historians and other observant readers of Alan Brecht's report on the salvage of *Vasa* in the November 1985 edition, that Nelson's Flagship was indeed 'HMS', not 'HMAS' as I allowed her to be described. I accept full responsibility for this error and apologise to Alan, to the Force Development commentators who became hysterical and to the reader who rang me thinking he would win the prize for spotting the deliberate mistake — the mistake was not deliberate, there was no prize and yours was the seventeenth call anyway.

This issue was no specific theme. Rather it offers a wide variety of general maritime material. In major pieces the account of *Sirius'* 1788–89 voyage is completed, Sub-Lieutenant Tom Frame presents a thought-provoking article on Christianity and the RAN, Captain Haydn Daw reports upon Joint Services Staff College, our prize-winning Washington correspondent describes his sea-time with the RAN and Major Gordon Johnstone presents his views on maritime strategy in an essay which won him the Institute's Silver Medal for RAN Staff College Course Number 2/85.

You may notice how I have solved the problem of having no letters to the editor, mentioned in my previous editorial. My solution though caused a further problem. I considered concealing the extent of my ruse by using a pseudonym but my personal view against them prevented me. You need not feel the same constraint — Journal policy is to publish over a pseudonym should a contributor wish to use one, provided that he does identify himself to the editor.

The October 1985 edition of the *Naval Review* included a most complimentary piece about our Journal. It commented upon the ten years of ANI Journals and other Institute activities, making special favourable mention of our seminars of the 'lively, thoughtful, distinguished' Journal's high standard, coverage of non-military maritime matters and publication of the views of comparatively junior contributors. Such approbation has been richly deserved by the management and membership of those first 10 years ; however, the maintenance of the reputation is a challenge for us, the present management and membership.

Your response to this challenge in the form of the submission of your views, ideas, observations and reservations is awaited. Neither the May nor August edition will have any specific theme so scope for your response is unlimited. The November issue will be built around the theme 'Management'. I hope that with this long notice you will be moved towards preparing a thorough and timely contribution on some aspect of this wide and critical area.

The deadline for submissions for the May edition is **21 April**. Note that there is no prescription of format. However, new contributors are encouraged to use articles, pieces and letters published previously as a guide if necessary. Inclusion of a short biography, relevant illustrative material (or possible sources) is appreciated. Early advice to me of your intention to contribute would also be appreciated since this allows the progressive shaping of the edition.

John Hyman
(062–676656)

REVIEW OF ANI MEMBERSHIP PROVISIONS

The response to the call for views on amending ANI membership rules, made in the November 1985 journal, was very disappointing.

Apart from councillors and on recently retired councillor only five responses were received.

With a membership total of about 630 this response, whether for or against change, was not sufficient for Council to proceed on the matter and thus no Special General Meeting is to be held.

If, in the future, there is more interest expressed by the membership at large in a chnage to the membership rules, either from Chapters or individual members, the Council will consider calling such a meeting to decide the issue.

WRANS COMMEMORATIVE WINDOW

The Women's Royal Australian Naval Services ceased to exist on 7 June 1985, women now serving as members of the Royal Australian Navy.

To commemorate the WRANS' 40 years of service, a committee of ex-members has determined to raise the funds necessary to commission a stained glass window in the entrance to the Naval Chapel, Garden Island. With Garden Island the very heart of the Navy and the Chapel listed as an historic precinct by the National Trust, the completed window should provide a fitting permanent memorial to the Service.

The proposed window is an arched design 8' × 3.5' and is one of a set of four to be executed by the talented young artists, Peter and Leigh Campbell. Already suggestions are being received as to how the achievements of both the war and peacetime Service can be captured in stained glass. It is expected that figures portraying both periods will be included, with category badges showing every phase of duty performed. It is hoped that the final work will be one of significant expression with which every Wran can identify.

The estimated cost is $12 000. The committee hopes to have the window installed in 1986, the RAN's 75th Anniversary Year.

All contributions may be forwarded to:

WRANS COMMEMORATIVE WINDOW
PO Box 27
COOGEE NSW 2034

Because of high postage costs, receipts will be written but not forwarded unless by special request. Further details may be obtained from Mrs Jess Doyle (nee Prain) at the above address or on telephone (02) 665–1631.

CONFERENCE
MARITIME AUSTRALIA 86

The Australian Centre for Maritime Studies is conducting a conference, **Maritime Australia 86** in Canberra at the Canberra Club on the 14-15 March, 1986. The Centre was established to generate greater awarness of maritime affairs in the Australian community and the Conference is designed to further this aim.

The Conference features papers on Australia's Overseas Trade, Change in the International Shipping Scene, Coastal and Offshore Engineering, Marine Science and Technology, Cultural Aspects of Australia's Maritime Tradition, Human Resources in our Maritime Potential and concludes with an Industry Overview Paper by the Chief Executive of ESSO, Dr Stewart McGill. In addition, during the Conference a Panel Presentation will address a number of Public Policy Issues in the Management of Maritime Resources and Interests. One of the Panel Speakers will be Rear Admiral Kennedy, Chief of Naval Operational Requirements and Plans. All of the speakers are experts in their fields and the Conference promises to be a very worthwhile experience.

Brochures, which contain registration forms, may be obtained from the Centre at PO Box E20, Queen Victoria Terrace, ACT 2600 or by phoning Margaret Sykes on 062 917864.

CORRESPONDENCE

A GREY LADY'S BELL

Sir

Your readers may recall that in Volume 9 No 2 of the Journal I traced the history of *HMAS Melbourne's* second ship's bell which had been presented to her predecessor in 1916 for services rendered to *SS Taff*, aground on rocks at St Lucia in the West Indies, in April of that year. The bell became available for disposal when the aircraft carrier paid off and I posed the question as to its future.

After removal from the ship the bell was taken to the Spectacle Island Repository where it has been kept since. Although the Australian War Memorial could be deemed to have a claim based upon correspondence between 1924 and 1928, I have now discovered that the bell is to be transferred on loan to the Australian Defence Force Academy where it will be accorded a place of honour, and used on ceremonial occasions. I also understand that the loan follows the 1924 Naval Board opinion that this particular bell should always adorn any *HMAS Melbourne* in commission, thus ADFA might have to seek a replacement at some time in the future.

For the present the bell will serve as a centrepiece of interest at ADFA where the seamanship skills of the Captain and officers of the first *HMAS Melbourne* will be remembered. In this respect it is perhaps a fitting home for this important naval relic which hopefully will remind future RAN officers of the deeds and traditions of their forebears.

Alan Brecht

RAN Staff Training

Sir

The effectiveness of the RAN's present staff training effort is difficult to quantify. However, three indicators make me suspect that it is deficient.

Subjective yes, but too often to be ignored do Service, Government and civilian officers criticize the quality of our efforts to justify our share of the cake. A significant number suggest that ineptitude in formalizing and presenting the case cost us a carrier. The point here is not whether or not we should have a carrier; but we said we did and could not justify it.

Subjective too, but there is a weight of anecdotal evidence, often first person, that middle-ranking Staff officers come inadequately prepared to Staff appointments. Some report being unable to draft any but the most simple correspondence and many have no comprehension of Single-Service or Defence management and little developed skill to apply to achieve their purpose.

The third ground for my concern is again circumstantial and concerns the Institute's Silver Medal presented for the best essay on maritime strategy submitted on each course at RAN Staff College. I take winning the Medal to indicate the highest skill in that course to select a position and defend it, to say what should be said, and say it well — the essence of good staff work. That non-RAN students, who constitute less than 25% of the aggregate of personnel to graduate from RANSC, have won six of the 13 medals awarded may indicate a comparative weakness here in RAN officers.

There certainly is smoke! Therefore, I find the rumours that only one course may be conducted at RANSC in 1986 — that this could be even considered — alarming.

Our having a Staff College presumably indicates that the Service recognizes a need for Staff training. Given this need, again presumably, we train either:

- as much as we need to, or
- as much as we can.

From the 13 courses until June 1985, 221 RAN Officers have completed RANSC. The comparison of this round annual figure of 35 to the round annual figure of 70 who are promoted to Lieutenant Commander each year invites the conclusion that we are not training as much as we need to — and that therefore we are presently training as much as we can.

The RAAF, with an officer corps only 50% larger than the RAN's, does considerably better. It supports two attendance Staff Courses, one for Lieutenant — equivalents of six week's duration with an annual output of 144; and one for Lieutenant Commander and Commander-equivalents of 12 month's duration with an annual output of 42. Its members are also required to undertake two correspondence Staff courses each of approximately one year's duration. RAAF Officers cannot be promoted to Lieutenant Commander-equivalent until they have successfully completed both the initial correspondence course and the shorter attendance course. They cannot be promoted to Commander-equivalent until they have completed the second correspondence course. (The RAN does use both the correspondence courses. However, graduation rates are very low and enrolment is voluntary. In the main, RAN students get little support for their effort and no real corporate reward for their success.)

The RAAF justifies 27 established officer billets for the direction and administration of its Staff training programmes. The RAN has only justified 12, including two tutors borne at RAAFSC for correspondence tutorial duties. Whereas the RAAF's 42 students on each 12 month's course are established, RAN's Staff students do not occupy billets. They must be spared from within established manpower limits — hence, presumably, the reason for considering conducting only one course in 1986.

The question here is why the RAN cannot establish any staff training students billets when the RAAF can justify 42, presumably to the same people? How can the RAAF justify a total of 69 billets dedicated to staff training when the RAN with its officer corps two thirds the size can only arrange 12? Joseph Heller may conclude that they can get better staff training because they are better staff – trained; and that the RAN cannot organize a better staff training commitment because it is not well staff – trained.

John Hyman

ANNUAL PRIZES

The sub-committee tasked with selecting contributions from Volume 11 of the ANI Journal to receive annual prizes has reached the following decisions:

- Best major article ($200)
  Lieutenant Comander D.A. Francis — Ashes to Ashes — Vol 11 No. 2
- Best minor articles ($65 each)
  Tom Freidmann — Washington Notes. Vol 11 No. 4 in particular but also for consistent informative and lively contributions to each journal.
  Tom Frame — Australian War Memorial and Naval History — Vol 11 No. 2.
- Best Book Review ($25)
  Lieutenant J.V.P. Goldrick — The Education of a Navy Vol 11 No. 1.

The sub-committee were again disappointed by the small number of letters and these largely from regular letter writers to the ANI. Also the major article runner-up prize was not awarded in preference for two prizes for minor articles.

The President, Council and the Editor congratulate the winners.

(Part 1 of this account of the ship's 1788–89 voyage was published in the previous issue)

HMS SIRIUS VOYAGE TO THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE 1788–1789

PART 2

by Ray Jones

The first part of this article described the voyage of *HMS Sirius*, under Captain John Hunter, RN, from the new penal colony at Port Jackson to the Cape of Good Hope in 1788–89 to collect food after crop failure at Sydney. After a speedy passage of four months from Port Jackson, *Sirius* had arrived in Table Bay at the Cape of Good Hope on 2 January 1789 with the crew dying from scurvy and the ship leaking badly. Enroute from Sydney, *Sirius* had pioneered a safe and fast route eastward across the Pacific at latitude 55° South and had shown the best route for a ship planning to sail from Port Jackson to Europe. Now Hunter had to return to Port Jackson after repairing his ship, refreshing his crew and loading the stores needed in the colony at Sydney.

Sirius sailed from Table Bay on 20 February 1789 carrying a year's provisions for her crew, flour for the colony at Port Jackson and other stores for the settlement. Every nook and cranny was full.

Hunter planned to sail south from the Cape until he encountered the westerlies which had brought *Sirius* from New South Wales but southerly gales for three weeks forced slow progress. By 10 March *Sirius* was only 550 miles south-east of Table Bay, nearly to 44° South, but that day she began running eastward with '... fresh gales ...' from north-west or south-west. Thereafter she made between 100 and 200 miles a day eastward on most days (i.e. 4.2 to 8.3 knots).

On 22 March a gale struck with a heavy,



Table Bay, Cape of Good Hope, based on a print by Wm Daniel.

confused sea and she shipped many large waves. Hunter was thankful that the flush deck allowed the water to flow away easily. His main concern was at the boats filling up and being damaged; after the gale he had them turned bottom up. He also found *Sirius* was now leaking as much as she had when she arrived at Table Bay. *Sirius*' leaking condition before she reached Van Diemens Land should be kept in mind when reading of the trials ahead of her.

By mid-April *Sirius* was approaching Van Diemens Land. Astronomical observation on 16 April gave her position as 44°45' South, 135°30' East; if she continued east from this point she would pass 60 miles south of Van Diemens Land after another 480 miles. Weather for the next few days was the worst so far on the voyage and Hunter had to rely on the log and compass to establish his position — a procedure known to be full of errors but he allowed for these. By 20 April he estimated *Sirius* was 100 miles south-west of Van Diemens Land and well clear of hazards. That day a strong southerly wind sprang up but Hunter was sure he still had ample sea room to sail across the southerly then use it to speed *Sirius* north to Port Jackson.

During the night of 20 April the gale increased '... to a mere tempest, attended with thick hazy weather, and a most astonishing high sea; ...'[1]. *Sirius* reduced sail to a minimum. Comparison of the sails set by Hunter with a modernised copy of the Beaufort Scale indicates the wind speed was at least 50 knots.[2]

At daylight, three stay sails split in the violent wind as it grew stronger still. Then the wind direction backed to slightly east of south; this was an unhelpful direction but Hunter was still confident *Sirius* was far enough south of Van Diemens Land to clear it safely. He had been unable to observe a lunar distance since 16 April but had snatched an occasional altitude of the sun which he regarded as confirmation of his belief in being safe.

At 1530 on 21 April Hunter's confidence in being safely clear of land was shattered when land was seen close ahead to the east through a slight clearance in the mist, rain and spray. *Sirius* turned west. With wind now from the south-south-east, still blowing violently, *Sirius* headed south-west but was blown bodily nearly due west. Three hours later land was sighted close

Hunter from a portrait by W.M. Bennett. Hunter served as the second Governor of New South Wales (1795-1800) and was promoted to Vice Admiral in 1810.

1792 Chart showing extent of knowledge of Australia's coast at the time of Sirius' voyage.

ahead to the west, land which she could not clear on that tack. Hunter turned back to the east knowing there was land in that direction but prevented by the southerly gale from making any headway to the south away from the land.

Sirius was probably at the southern entrance to the D'Entrecasteaux Channel having first sighted Bruny Island then the main part of Tasmania near Recherche Bay. But these features were then unknown and Hunter was relying on an incomplete chart. The coast as he understood it (from the descriptions and distances in his journal) is shown at Figure 1. Hunter believed *Sirius* had inadvertently entered the Storm Bay on this chart which, to his knowledge, offered no refuge. Ironically, he was desperately trying to get away from sheltered, accessible water.

Night was closing in. Wind and sea showed no sign of abating. Hunter saw no alternative to setting as much sail as the ship would stand, to sail as close to the wind as possible and to have everybody on board looking out for land ahead so *Sirius* could turn away — if there was enough time. He could do no more but the unknown nature of the coast and the likelihood of offshore ledges and rocks convinced him that '... we had every moment reason to fear that the next (moment) might, by the ship striking, launch the whole of us into eternity. Our situation was such that not a man could have escaped to have told where the rest suffered'...[3]

Sirius carried the excessive sail better than anybody expected. A second stroke of good luck was a slight shift in the wind enabling her to make a little headway to the south. But Hunter was still not optimistic, '... still the weather was so thick, the seas so high, the gale so strong, and so dead upon the shore, that little hope could be entertained of our weathering the land...'[4]

At about midnight on 21 April, when Hunter calculated they were back to where it had been sighted at 1530, land loomed through the mist already on the beam. This land must have been



Fig 1. *Courtesy of author*

The south-eastern corner of Van Diemens Land as Hunter understood it. This chart was prepared in February 1792 by Bligh after Sirius' *had returned to Sydney but major features, and their names, correspond the description given in Hunter's journal. Bligh's chart is probably based on one prepared by Furneaux in 1773 or Cook in 1777 which Hunter did have with him.*
(Chart is reproduced in The Life of Vice-Admiral William Bligh *by George Mackaness, Angus and Robertson Sydney, 1951 edition.)*



Fig 2. *Courtesy of author*

The south-eastern corner of Tasmania from a modern chart. The misidentification of the D'Entrecasteaux Channel as Hunter's Storm Bay is clear.

extremely close for it to have been seen on a stormy night without the luxury of artificial light and they could have done nothing to avoid shipwreck had the land been in their path. The small gain in distance to the south, which allowed the ship to clear the rocks, was attributed to the slight wind shift earlier in the evening.

Hunter stood on, hoping the most southerly outcrop of land had been passed but two hours later a high and very steep rocky point with high seas breaking heavily on it loomed out of the mist and spray. Once again, this land was seen far too late for avoiding action.

The weather cleared a little as they passed this head which Hunter believed, probably correctly, was Tasman Head. Then the wind changed and *Sirius*' track altered from south-east, which just cleared the land, to north-east; '...had this change taken place a little sooner, it must have proved fatal to us...'[6] His next concern was to clear Tasman Peninsula (he called it Maria's Island, see Fig 1) which *Sirius* passed at 0800. The weather had closed in again and hazardous rocks were not seen until too late to avoid them; in this case the land was first seen on the quarter.

Had *Sirius* been unable to clear Tasman Peninsula (but assuming he saw it in time to turn away) Hunter had intended to sail west until he reached the land north of Tasman Head and make his way along that coast to Adventure Bay (an anchorage used by Cook) and there to trust in the anchors.

By the morning of 22 April Hunter was seriously concerned at ensuring the survival of his crew. Not only was the weather still bad and pushing the ship relentlessly into what he believed was a shelterless bay but the ship herself was suffering damage. The pumps had been manned continuously during the night and Hunter knew that damage had been sustained forward. Apart from the high risk of running onto the rocks, it looks as if Hunter was becoming concerned at the ability of his ship to survive much longer. Had *Sirius* dragged her anchors in Adventure Bay she would have gone ashore on a beach and some, even most, of the crew may have survived. There was very little chance of survival if she went on rocks or foundered in the gale. But *Sirius*' main trial was over when she cleared Tasman Peninsula and Hunter did not need to attempt making Adventure Bay.

Contributing to Hunter's concern was the knowledge of considerable damage around the bow. *Sirius* was of common eighteenth century construction with a bluff bow and an open platform around the bowsprit base outside the hull of the vessel. This platform, surrounded by railing, was completely exposed to the sea. The figurehead, at the forward end of this platform, was even more exposed to wave damage which had been aggravated by excessive sail carried. Hunter wrote that, when passing Tasman Head at 0200, '... The ship was at this time half buried in the sea by the press of sail, since she was going through it (for she could not be said to be going over it) at the rate of four knots...'[7] Waves pounding into the exposed region has washed away the figurehead of the Duke of Berwick as well as the rails, and had weakened structural members supporting the bowsprit and the upper foremast. Strain on the bowsprit was reduced by not using any sail secured to it or to the upper portion of the foremast.

On 23 April Hunter recorded an observed position more than 60 miles east of Van Diemens Land but was not confident enough of the position found to comment on time keeper accuracy. On 2 May he was able to take enough lunar distances to have confidence in the resulting position and to tentatively decide the time keeper was one degree of longitude in error. He attributed the error to violent motion of the ship near Van Diemens Land.

After re-plotting altitudes and log readings Hunter attributed the navigational error which had nearly resulted, several times, in the loss of his ship and crew to errors in carrying on log readings.

Certainly the chart in use cannot, despite vague or incomplete coastlines, be held responsible for the unexpected encounter with land. Positions of the most southerly points of land were known by Hunter to within four miles of their correct positions. He writes that they had been observed by Cook and Furneaux (in the 1770s). Since he had intended to clear Van Diemens Land by far more than four miles the small errors in the chart were irrelevant.

Had *Sirius* been wrecked the primary cause would have been the navigation error which put her dangerously close to land in the first place. But poor charting would have been a contributory factor because an accurate chart would have shown accessible sheltered water.

The southerly gale which had caused *Sirius* such trouble was replaced shortly afterwards by a northerly then an easterly and her progress towards Port Jackson was slow. She moved offshore searching for suitable winds and when she closed the coast again she was north of Port Jackson and beset again by southerlies. At first light on 8 May the entrance to Port Jackson was in sight and *Sirius* entered the harbour next evening and was anchored in Sydney Cove by nightfall. She had travelled 7625 miles in 69 days from Table Bay, covering an average of 110 miles per day (4.6 knots); her best day's run had been 188 miles (7.8 knots) on 26 March in a

north-north-westerly fresh gale.

HMS Sirius achieved several things by her voyage around the world. She brought back flour for four months at full ration in the settlement and had victualled herself for twelve months. She performed the useful additional task of taking Phillip's official despatches to the Cape for onwards passage to London. These despatches contained dire news of crop failure in the colony and advised of impending starvation if provisions were not sent from England.

During the voyage navigation problems common in that part of the world at the end of the eighteenth century were experienced. The time keeper providing longitude information had twice developed undetected errors and the landfall at the Cape of Good Hope had been made by the older navigational technique of running down a latitude. *Sirius'* experience with scurvy was a little unusual in that onset was quicker than would occur in a ship leaving a fully developed port but the consequence of the disease with the crew dead or disabled was only too familiar. The necessity of sending sailors out to bring a ship into a port was not an unusual event. Nor was *Sirius'* experience with charts particularly novel. Much of the coast in more remote regions was known only to the extent of major points being charted with the intervening coast generally unknown.

The major contribution of *Sirius'* 1788–9 voyage lay in pioneering the fastest route from Port Jackson to the Atlantic Ocean and its better known shipping routes. For the first time, a ship leaving Sydney made use of the prevailing westerly winds at 50 to 55 degrees South latitude to make a rapid passage across the Pacific Ocean eastward to Cape Horn then around the Horn into the Atlantic.

When he returned to England, Hunter wrote to the Admiralty on the possible routes by which a ship could return to England from Port Jackson. The western route, across the Indian Ocean, he still held in low regard saying it had never been attempted and '...I think, whenever it is tried, that it will be found tedious, and fatiguing to the ship's company. The ship which pursues that route should be strong and well found, and her crew healthy and capable of bearing much blowing, and some cold weather...'[8]

He had experienced the northern route himself when, for reasons outside his control, Hunter had returned to England via Batavia and had taken six eventful months to sail from Port Jackson to Batavia. His assessment of that route was that, '...the dangers, currents, calm and other delays to which we are liable in these little known seas, ...(shows) the very great uncertainty of an expeditious voyage to Europe by that passage...'[9]

Hunter remained strongly in favour of '...the southern route via Cape Horn. This passage has been frequently tried, and never yet failed of being safe and expeditious...'[10]

News of the routes from Port Jackson reached a wider audience when Hunter published his journal in 1793. This included accounts of *Sirius'* voyage to Table Bay, an equally detailed account of his voyage to Batavia and his letter to the Admiralty summarising the routes. But his experience was already well known in Sydney.

When *HMS Supply* left Sydney bound for England in November 1791, she unhesitatingly set out from Port Jackson for Cape Horn via the high latitude route. A plot of both routes (*Sirius* and *Supply's*) is convincing evidence that *Supply* deliberately followed *Sirius'* route to Cape Horn becoming one of the earliest ships to follow Hunter's track across the Pacific.

When sea traffic between Australia and Europe increased considerably in the nineteenth century the Cape Horn route was heavily used. Pioneering this standard route was the major achievement of HMS *Sirius* in her 1788–89 voyage.

Notes

1. Captain John Hunter., *Transactions at Port Jackson and Norfolk Island*, John Stockdale, London. 1793. Facsimile edition, Adelaide, 1968, p119.
2. D.K. Brown., It's Rough Out There, in *Warship* No 30 of April 1984, pp90–1.
3. Hunter, op cit, p121.
4. Ibid.
5. Hunter records this time as 1400 but 0200 is cosistent with the remainder of his account and agrees with a letter by Midshipman Southwell describing the same event. The letter from Southwell is quoted in part in *The Naval Pioneers of Australia*, Loris Becke and Walter Jeffrey, pub John Morrow, London, 1899.
6. Hunter, op cit, p122.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid, pp282–3.
9. Ibid, p284.
10. Ibid, p283.

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THE JOINT SERVICES STAFF COLLEGE

WHAT IS IT AND WHAT IS IT LIKE?[1]

by Captain Haydn L Daw RAN

WHAT IS IT?

Introduction

I had just finished Joint Services Staff College (JSSC) course 32/85 last December when the Editor rang me to ask for an article for this edition of the Journal. Although there were a number of possible subjects which would have been suitable, I felt that there would be sufficient interest in an article on JSSC which examined the aims and structure of the course, and provided some remarks from a recent course graduate on impressions of the experience.

The College was established to commence instruction in 1970 as a wing of the proposed Australian Services Staff College which was to conduct all staff training for the Services. The temporary location of the College has become permanent. It is a very attractive site too, on the edge of the suburb of Weston in the ACT and sufficiently far away from Defence and other distractions to promote the sort of atmosphere expected for a staff college.

JSSC Aim and Charter

'The aim of the JSSC is to provide selected military and civilian officers of lieutenant colonel rank or equivalent with an advanced education in preparation for senior appointments in the Department of Defence and in the Services. Military officers attending will desirably have completed a single-service staff college course or have staff experience.'[2]

Since 1972 a number of foreign officers have attended the course. On Course 32/85 the ASEAN countries were well represented as were the US, Canada, UK and of course New Zealand which has been represented from the opening of the College. The number on Course totalled 44 of whom 26 were from the Australian Defence Force (ADF) including one reservist. About seven were from the Australian Public Service, four from New Zealand and the remainder from the other countries mentioned. The 44 course members were divided into four syndicates of eleven. Syndicate membership was revised after each Study Period.

The Charter of the College was quite obviously developed before the systems approach to training gained a strong footing because it requires graduates to:

- comprehend Australia's national objectives and the major factors which influence the formation of Australia's defence and foreign policies;
- apply those aspects of Government policy which bear upon the defence of Australia;
- comprehend the machinery for the preparation of Australian defence policy and the process of Government decision making in defence matters;
- comprehend the defence administrative and operational organisations and their responsibilities for executing defence policy;
- comprehend the activities of the three arms of the Australian Defence Force, and the Government and non-Government support upon which they depend;
- evaluate Australia's present and potential defence capabilities;
- evaluate alternative methods of command and control, organization, logistic support and concept of operations in joint activities at both the national and combined sense at various levels of hostility; and
- comprehend modern management concepts.'[2]

The use of the word 'comprehend', which is difficult to define, would not be accepted today in a charter objective but the Charter does give a good idea of the thrust of the Course and I have included it for that reason.

Organization and Administration

The College is commanded by a one star officer who is responsible to the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), through the Assistant Chief of the Defence Force (Policy), for the operation of the College. The College has an administrative support section and an academic wing, which is controlled by the Director of Studies, a Colonel equivalent. For the first two study periods the eight Directing Staff (DS) are

The Author

Captain Daw completed the JSSC Course during the latter half of 1985. A meteorologist, he was Director of Oceanography and Meteorology in 1983–84. In November 1984, he was appointed Director of Naval Education, a post to which he has returned after the JSSC.

divided into an implementing group and a planning group (for study periods three and four). At the halfway point their roles are reversed into planning and implementing, respectively.

The College Library is staffed by a librarian and an assistant. It is part of the Defence library system and contains a good selection of material as well as providing a very useful service in relaxed surroundings.

Clerical support, typing, graphic design and printing support is available at the College. A number of sports can be played on the College grounds and the Mess enjoys a pleasant outook over a small lake which nearly always provides a topic of conversation for the new visitor. The food is also a feature with morning and afternoon teas the norm, and lunch a very satisfying meal served by friendly and obliging staff.

Educational Philosophy

The College educational philosophy encourages a frank interchange of ideas among visiting lectures, Staff and Course members. Many of the exercises require Course members to consider policy issues at a departmental or government level and hence they are expected to pitch their thinking accordingly. Key arguments only should be considered and logical decisions made based on them. Individual research and reasoned conclusions, including those which are fresh and independent, are required from members if possible.

The Syllabus

The syllabus as presently structured is divided into four study periods:

- Government, Defence and Strategy.
- Influences on National Security Policy.
- Australian Defence Policy.
- Joint and Combined Operations.

The Course includes three visits:

- Services visit (five days). Designed to introduce members to each of the Services.
- Industrial visit (five days). Designed to introduce members to a cross section of Australian industry in one geographic location.
- Overseas visit (ten days). Designed to introduce members to a country in Australia's region of strategic interest.

The programme includes activities conducted in syndicates (or sub syndicates) and as a complete group. There were many lectures/ presentations to the Course followed by discussion. These were presented by a variety of eminent people from the Minister for Defence to members of peace groups. Some spoke very well! Panel discussions and presentations by Course members, which were critiqued by suitable visitors, were also regular features. In syndicate rooms, discussions, exercises and tutorials were held.

So far,I have put before you the party line from College documents without comment or evaluation as a student. I would like to move now into the section of this article where the 'What is it like?' question is answered.

WHAT IS IT LIKE?

Being the senior Australian student on the Course I was appointed as the Senior Course Member by the Commandant. I think this is worth mentioning, because it did give me a special involvement with Course members and Staff.

Good Features

Looking back, I have an overall impression of worthwhile experience. I can recall occasions when I did not have this feeling during the time I was at JSSC but any bad memories have faded already.

One feature of the Course was the privilege of meeting a large number of peers in the Services and the Department. Not only were they pleasant company but substantial learning occurred simply by interacting with them for the five month period.

The social programme resulted in some memorable events. You haven't lived until you have consumed sate with 'moose milk' which many of us did at the International Night. The inclusion of spouses in the social programme and other semi-social events of the Course meant that involvement was more complete and satisfying than in most other postings. When you add the cricket match, golf day and various other planned and impromptu functions, the level of participation that occurred can be imagined.

The industrial visit to Brisbane was an extremely interesting experience and I felt that members found this experience more valuable than the Services visit. The range of industries in the transport sector visited by my syndicate resulted in a great deal of information which was extremely useful later when we considered the transport industry's capacity to support the Australian Defence Force in an emergency. I should add that the Services visit, which occurred fairly early in the Course, besides giving a brief snapshot of the three Services, did result in the members becoming welded together into a group.

A free overseas trip should always be gratefully accepted even if you are invited to travel by C-130. On this occasion the Course travelled to Java with my half of the Course going on to North Sumatra and then Singapore. The College was well received in both countries and we were particularly honoured to have the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr Mochtar, spend two and a half hours with us in Djakarta. There were too many presentations on the trip and

virtually no free time for our group. Besides being saturated with information, and in some cases having the content of presentations duplicated, there was little time for informal activities or sightseeing. However, in providing an opportunity to develop an understanding of a nation in the region, the visit was a very valuable experience.

I feel that the Course programme contained many useful exercises with the final exercise series providing a good finish to the Course. This exercise required the syndicates to come to grips with joint and combined operational concepts and included exercises to develop proposed responses on a threat arising to Australia's sovereignty. On most occasions there was a requirement for syndicates to prepare a briefing on the proposed response to be given to appropriate ADF officers in each phase of the exercise. This exercise might have been more interesting and rewarding if one or two of the syndicates had acted as the enemy. That would have reduced repetition and added variety when syndicates came together as a group for presentations.

As a rule the administration of the Course was of a high standard. The lecturers all turned up, generally addressed the scope required and were prepared to answer questions. For the most part guidance to Course members for exercises was clear and the Course ticked over fairly well.

Bad Features

I hesitate to mention bad features, having made friends among the Directing Staff and really enjoying the opportunity to complete the Course but most courses of this type have room for improvement and this one is no exception.

I was annoyed on a number of occasions by the shallow treatment of some of the topics or exercises. The opportunity to analyse carefully an issue of interest, or a challenge, could often not be taken because of the deadlines imposed. Having to produce an answer to an extremely complex problem in a few hours often meant that writing the solution had to commence almost immediately. Perhaps that is reality in most jobs, and hence good training. There is always this dilemma for any course manager; whether to include everything and hence restrict the level or depth that can be achieved, or to reduce the content and allow a more thorough treatment of fewer topics. Personally I think there is more return if subjects are treated in some depth. To pursue a topic in greater depth means something would have to be omitted. In this respect I believe that the management component of the Course could be deleted. JSSC Course members have demonstrated that they are competent managers and many of them will have considered this subject matter before, in previous Staff or other courses.

A number of the exercises showed signs of needing fine tuning even regarding time

Joint Services Staff College *Photo Courtesy of JSSC*

allocated. This was surprising in an institution where courses are repeated twice a year.

I also have some comments to make on the subject of feedback. Apart from the two individually assessed exercises, which occur early in the Course, there is no formal method of telling members how they are performing.

In the case of the two written exercies, DS comments took too long to be given to the authors. In a course of this type, and where the feedback may be relevant to subsequent exercises, DS comments, which took up to one month, should be returned to Course members within a week.

There are two reasons for arguing that more feedback should be given to Course members. First, he is being assessed during the Course, despite the claim that it is non-assessable. We all know that this is so, because certain recommendations are made in the Course Report and these must be based on evaluation of performance over the Course. Secondly the Course member is at the College to learn. Learning only takes place if behaviour is changed. One of the best means of having students of this age, experience and intellect learn, or change their behaviour, is to provide them with information about their performance so that they can change their behaviour for the better on future occasions.

I suspect that this problem of feedback is easily overcome. I assume that at the end of each study, some report or assessment is made on each Course member by the relevant DS in order that a composite picture may be built up by a number of assessments over the Course. If that is the case, then it is only fair that the DS advise the Course member of the substance of this assessment so that he can use the information in the manner described above. I am not suggesting that each performance be evaluated by DS. That would probably inhibit Course members participating in the Course when they were not sure of their ground. I'm not proposing any more evaluation than occurs now. What I am suggesting is that the Course member be informed of what the evaluation is. This is consistent with the principles of the officer reporting systems in the three Services and is in tune with modern management theory and practice.

I see a need for formal feedback to Course members and recommend that the relevant DS counsels each of the syndicate members at the conclusion of each study. This will avoid the possibility of a Course member being handed his Course Report on the last day and receiving a surprise at the contents of it.

For the first individual written exercise, syndicates were briefed on the requirement by their Syndicate DS and the exercise was, in many cases, marked by another member of the DS. This created a problem as the marking DS often had a different interpretation of what was required from the briefing DS. This resulted in marking which some Course members saw as being too subjective.

At times I was conscious of a 'them' and 'us' attitude between some of the DS and students. It was not pervasive but it did surface and was accentuated when we were away on trips. For example the staff had single rooms and the students had to share. This was the case regardless of rank and seniority. There were also occasions when Course members were made conscious of the fact that they were in a different group from the staff. We all knew that and the reminders should not have been necessary. This was not a major issue, not always observable and not relevant to all DS, but at times it was irritating.

From the Navy's perspective, I thought there were a couple of points to emerge. The first was the fact that only one of the Navy contingent had ever been to a single-Service Staff College, compared with most of the remainder of the ADF. This meant that some Navy members had to start from scratch in some exercises but in other instances the lack of a prior staff course was compensated for by experience in a staff posting. The second feature was the lack of Navy representation in the visiting speakers. Where the topic required a purple suit it almost always turned out to be light blue or khaki and I felt that RAN speakers were under-represented. This was explained as a quirk of programming but I believe that careful programming could result in a better spread of representation among the speakers.

Conclusion

JSSC was an interesting and worthwhile experience. The range of speakers, the breadth of the material covered, the activities and exercises completed and meeting 43 peers, all contributed to a very rewarding experience. There are some weaknesses in the Course which could be overcome fairly easily.

If you have not been there and you are offered the opportunity to attend, then I suggest that you seize it. As one of my predecessors remarked, 'It sure beats working for a living!'

Notes and Acknowledgements

1. I am grateful to Patrick Regan for reading the first draft of this article and commenting constructively on it.
2. Joint Services Staff College Handbook, Course 32/85. p2.
3. Ibid p2–3

The author was awarded the ANI Silver Medal for this essay submitted during his attendance at the RAN Staff College

THE PACIFIC ISLANDS AND SOUTH: A STRATEGY IN TIME

by MAJOR GORDON JOHNSTONE, ROYAL AUSTRALIAN ENGINEERS

'The condition upon which God hath given
liberty to man is eternal vigilance ...'

John Philpot Curran 1750-1817

Alistair MacLean described Captain James Cook's second voyage (1772-1775) as the 'greatest voyage of exploration in history'.[1] That epic journey took Cook's ships deep into Antarctica waters and then opened the final chapter of discovery in the Pacific Ocean. Although Cook failed to find the great island of Antarctics, he did open the routes through the two oceans that wash our southern and eastern shores, the Southern and South Pacific Oceans. Since that time these two oceans have played a vital role in the history of Australia, but have developed in very different ways.

By the time Antarctica was first sighted in 1820, the Pacific Islands and Australia were on the first steps of colonisation. The South Pole had barely been reached by Amundsen in 1912 before that colonialism reached its zenith. While World War I virtually ignored the South Pacific, the most significant event being the passing of the German colonials, World War II was harsh and dramatic leaving long lasting scars. The same periods saw a slow but determined increase of scientific interest in Antarctica, which was accelerated by the technological spin-offs from the wars (particularly aviation). The post war period saw the demise of colonialism, the emergence of the new Pacific Islands states and a more independent but American biased Australia. The pace of scientific research in Antarctica increased with many nations taking an active interest.

These two regions (the Antarctic and the South West Pacific — hereinafter called The South), which cloak our most populous and industrial shores, seem to have been neglected in recent strategic thinking. The problems in the areas to our north have gained notoriety. While the Indian Ocean littorals and South East Asian region are vitally important to Australia's security and prosperity, it should be remembered that the Pacific and Southern Oceans are our front door step and contain the paths and gateways to our very heart — the south eastern states.

The threats to Australia and her neighbours have been considered by many military observers and writers. The most realistic and serious threat is the prospect of Australia becoming involved in an altercation between the superpowers.[2] A prelude to such an exchange could be the build up of superpower influences in our immediate region. Recent history has proved that where and when one superpower builds up an influence the other will make a counter move (especially the arms race). It is in Australia's interests to prevent such an event in The South. Clearly the best course of action for Australia to follow is to promote and create an area of peace, stability and security around her, such that the superpowers can not gain or even desire a foothold here.

This essay addresses the problems which may arise from superpower presence in The South and seeks ways to avoid instabilities which may arise from that presence. Specifically the essay will propose a naval strategy which aims to avert superpower influence and rivalry in that part of the world. To achieve that end it is necessary to discuss the nature of modern strategy and to consider the factors which will determine the shape of national strategies. These strategies will be directed toward the attainment of national objectives. Although national objectives are not clearly enunciated in this country, we can determine from various policy statements what Australia's interests are. These interests can be compared with the strategic importance of The South and then an

The Author

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overall military strategy can be proposed. From this a relevant naval component strategy may then be composed.

It would appear that Australia is tardy in developing effective regional influences. Unless she takes action to exert a more positive influence in her region, a much more serious situation may arise — she must maintain *eternal* vigilance.

THE NATURE OF STRATEGY

Two thousand years ago, strategy — the art of the General — was concerned with winning battles. Clausewitz described strategy as 'the art of the employment of battle as a means to obtain the objective of war'.[3]. However since Clausewitz, strategy has taken on a much broader and complex meaning. Strategy is now a tool of government and business alike and is applied in political, economic, commercial and social areas as well as defence. In broad terms strategy is now concerned with the direction of resources to attain objectives. Thus a national strategy in modern day terms will involve a complex intertwining of many aspects of national functions to achieve a national objective(s) involving all internal and external interests. Whether a nation has aggressive intent or not, the national objective, whether stated or not, is dependent on how national resources are directed and managed.

When developing a naval maritime strategy to achieve the national objective, it is necessary to ensure that the selected strategy is in harmony with all other strategies. The national objective and its supporting strategies can be likened to a fine chronometer in which many wheels, springs and gears have been designed, crafted, balanced and fitted to ensure that the correct time is always displayed. The display dial (the national objective) is achieved by the correct interplay of the gears and wheels (national strategies) which in turn are driven by regulating springs and forces (the national will, internal and external influences). Each component is dependent on the others and if one component is dysfunctional, then the whole is either out of phase or ineffective. Each part plays a distinctly vital role; small wheels may be regulators and large ones instruments of power. No longer is it possible to evolve a purely military strategy which discounts all other aspects. Strategies must also be aware of the global effect of a selected strategy. While our strategic clock may be correct for Australia it may well be incorrect from another perspective. We must be aware that a strategy acceptable to Australia may be viewed very differently by the Kremlin or Washington.

The starting point for construction of a naval strategy is to determine just what is the national objective.

NATIONAL INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES

The student of military strategy may well lament the lack of stated national interests and objectives in this country. A discussion of the reasons for this short-fall are well beyond the scope of this essay.[4] However, it is necessary to find some guidance (regulators and driving forces) on which to construct relevant strategies for our areas of concern. A review of a number of papers and speeches by senior government ministers[5] gives the following guidance:

- Australia is concerned with continental defence, ie the defence of her mainland and territories.
- In accepting the Guam doctrine Australia must be prepared to 'go it alone' in self defence, at least in the early stages of the conflict.
- Australia has a vital interest in regional stability.
- Non-military solutions should be pursued in solving problems first.
- Australia wishes to remain in and retain the western alliance.
- The South West Pacific is gaining increased importance to Australia.

Using the above policy statements as guidance and assessing the needs of the Australian people, the national objective can be described as: the attainment of prosperity for, and the security of, the Australian people.[6]

AN AREA DESCRIPTION

Geography

The area known as the South West Pacific (see map at Fig 1) covers an area of some 35 million square kilometres (excluding New Zealand) of which only about half a million square kilometres are land. Papua New Guinea accounts for some 83% of this area, leaving about 93 thousand square kilometres to 22 island nations. Only Papua New Guinea, the Solomons and New Caledonia have substantial agricultural bases. The remainder of the South West Pacific islands have fairly infertile soils and therefore no substantial agricultural base. Land-based natural resources are scarce and confined to some mining in Papua New Guinea (Bougainville copper) and the phosphate mines of Nauru. The sea holds the greatest promise of resources for the South West Pacific islands, particularly fishing.[7]

Antarctica, the highest, coldest, windiest, loneliest and most inhospitable continent in all the world, is greater in area than the Australian

mainland. Australia lays claim to permanent leases at Mawson, Davis, Casey and on Macquarie Island; about 43% or approximately six million square kilometres. It is constantly freezing and almost wholly covered by ice up to 4,000 metres thick. Animal and vegetable life on land is almost non-existent, although the seas, like the South West Pacific, promise vast resources (fishing and mining).[8]

On land, traces of hydro-carbons have been located (an indication of possible oil) as have a number of other mineral resources. At this time technology for the release of these resources is not quite ready.[9]

A circle described with Canberra as its centre and a 2000 nautical mile radius (see map) would embrace: Learmonth in the west; Papua New Guinea and the Solomons to the north; Tuvalu, New Caledonia and New Zealand to the east, and to the south a small part of Antarctica (and almost Heard Island). At a 3000 nauticial mile radius the circle includes; Nauru, the Samoas, Tonga and a significant chunk of Antarctica. The significance of this geography should not be lost to us. Antarctica is just as close as Learmonth, ie within easy reach of the RAAF's medium range aircraft. Most of the island states in the Pacific are within less flying time than Perth, while a sea voyage from Darwin to Melbourne is twice as far as a crossing from Sydney to Tuvalu.

THE SOUTH

FIGURE 1

Exports and imports accounted for $50 billion of Australia's annual trade in 1983/84.[10] Of this about 95% is carried by sea. Apart from the Pilbara's iron ore, the vast majority of the shipping has to traverse the Southern and South Pacific Oceans. These two sea lines of communication are very important to Australia. However, consider how much more important they would become if the sea passages to our north were denied. Recall also that the Bass Strait oil fields are enclosed in the overlap of these Oceans. Any force controlling or influencing The South can bring great pressure to bear on this island.

Politics

Many of the nations in the South West Pacific are relatively new, having gained independence in the past forty years. There were no independent nations before World War II while there are now nine with another 13 enjoying a fair degree of independence from their former colonial masters. Expectations for a totally independent South West Pacific are high.

Ideologically, the countries of the area share the same aspirations and freedoms as Australia. The political systems are of the democratic style, although the 'Melanesian way'[11], is indicative of an easier going and less aggressive political style. The participation of all South West Pacific countries in the South Pacific Forum is an indication of the desire for all member countries to achieve stability and security.

Politically the area is fairly stable. There are four major regional areas of concern; New Zealand's stand against nuclear armed and powered ships, independence for New Caledonia, the French presence in the Pacific (particularly her nuclear tests) and the Papua New Guinea/West Irian border problem. While these areas are of concern they are not potential problem areas which seem to be being handled well by existing political manouevres. New Zealand's anti-nuclear stand is alienating her from the US and has put ANZUS under some pressure. Australia's view is that alliances will continue in a bilateral fashion; certainly the close relationship with New Zealand will continue. There is a case to argue that due to this Australia now has a greater stake in the South West Pacific and therefore should adopt an even higher profile.

Australia's claims to Antarctica are not recognised by the superpowers or a number of other countries. These claims, passed on from the Britishy in 1936 have been upheld by successive governments. The Antarctic Treaty declares that the region be used for only peaceful purposes for the betterment of mankind and so far ther has been only scientific presence on the continent. However there are many nations which are interested in the continent and have voiced a desire for a share of the spoils. Already the USSR, US, Japan and Argentina, to name a few, have a greater capability to exploit these frozen lands. Australia needs to make a permanent mark on this land if she is to uphold her claims in years to come.

Potential political troubles may be maturing in both regions. The review of the Antarctic Treaty in 1991 may well alienate Australia from a number of currently friendly nations. There could be substantial pressure for Australia to relinquish some Antarctic claims. The stability of the South West Pacific could well depend on the events currently happening in Papua New Guinea, New Zealand and New Caledonia. It would not be the first time that a superpower has taken advantage of a troubled situation.

Economics

Economically the area is poor with GNP per capita ranging from $A 304 in Western Samoa to $A 6 699 in New Caledonia.[13] External aid is vital to the area, with Australia, US, Britain and France being the major contributors. The existing industries are either of a limited life span (phosphate mining) or have little scope for expansion (industries such as copra etc). Most South West Pacific nations look to the sea as a source of economic prosperity.

Trade between the South West Pacific countries and Australia is relatively insignificant to Australia, but highly significant to most of those countries. Conversely Australian imports represent a highly significant proportion of GNP to the South West Pacific. Although Australia has established a special tariff system for these regional neighbours it is hardly enough to encourage development of home industries to help these new nations to prosperity. In fact if the ideas of Professor Wolfgang Kasper are accepted, this nation's trading attitude toward our neighbours is introspective and short sighted. Professor Kasper and his colleagues[14] claim that the only way to prosperity is through totally free trade. It is in Australia's interests to ensure that the nations of the South West Pacific do gain economic prosperity and thus security. Trade is a vital vehicle to regional prosperity.

Economically the Antarctic is as yet of little interest. Fishing is the main source of income from the area with the only other industry, tourism, having died in the Air New Zealand crash in 1979.

In summary, The South at this stage is not a significant economic market for Australia. The future seems to hold a different story. The nations of the South West Pacific are keen to



Defence in the South poses special problems. This photograph depicts MV Nella Dan under tow from the Japanese Ice-breaker Shirase in December 1985. The tow was required to break Nella Dan free after she had been trapped in ice since 23rd October.
Photograph by Rowan Butler, provided by courtesy Antarctic Division, Department of Science and Technology.

develop and need assistance to do so. Australia's moves to that end are still insufficient and will not ensure either regional prosperity or a more intimate association than that of the superpowers.

THE SUPERPOWERS

Before considering the influences and aspirations of the superpowers in The South, it is prudent to recall the development of relationships between the US and USSR since World War II. The superpower relationship is marked by two important characteristics; Soviet expansionism and the arms race. The Soviets have continued to expand and extend their influence on a global scale since 1945. This expansion has been deliberate and aggressive and is exemplified by her incursion into Afghanistan in 1980 and an increased presence in Vietnam today. At every turn the US, backed by most of the western world, has moved to counter the Soviets. The most worrying aspect of course is the apparently unstoppable build-up of nuclear weapons, which have escalated to a terrifying proportion.

The Pacific Island countries accept that if one superpower were to enter a region, then surely the other would do likewise.[15] The fear is primarily that the nuclear arms race would follow such an ingress. There is also concern that a significant Soviet presence would bring with it anti-democratic restrictions and loss of political and civil freedoms. This is one event that our naval strategy must attempt to avert.

The USSR

In the South West Pacific Russia has had an interest in whaling and other forms of fishing for many years, but until recently there were no indications of territorial interests. The Russians still conduct a good deal of fishing in the region and are prepared to negotiate the purchase of fishing rights in the region. Recent moves to gain fishing and fishing support rights from Vanuatu have met with some scepticism from other regional nations which are generally opposed to a Russian influence in the region. If this move into Vanuatu is successful, it will be a first for the Soviets, who have generally had such approaches rejected.[16] The effects of a Russian presence in Vanuatu are hard to predict, but if she has territorial intent and wished to exert a military presence, it has been estimated that a small but substantial force could be established on the island.[17] The reaction of the Americans is also difficult to assess. However, there would most likely be a counter move with the establishment of a US force close by.

While the USSR has relatively little interest in the South West Pacific the same cannot be said about her presence in the Antarctic. The Russians have had a long standing interest in the Antarctic and have established bases on the continent. It is noteworthy that some of these bases are on territory which is claimed by Australia. The Russian scientific interest is more than just a passing one. It should also be remembered that the Soviets are cold weather experts and that their expertise and abilities in those frozen wastes far exceed any that our nation could develop in a long time.

The United States

The American presence in the *North* Pacific is very extensive. There are US bases and forces across the entire region from the US west coast through Hawaii, the Marshall Islands, Guam, Philippines, South Korea and Japan. In addition the US maintains the 3rd and 7th Fleets in the North Pacific. American influence extends down into the South West Pacific in American Samoa and the US is considered to be the major ally of most nations in the region, including New Zealand.

In the South West Pacific however, US policy seems to be to keep a low profile. The US does provide a significant amount of aid to the region but through her low key policies she seems to be content to let Australia and New Zealand remain the major forces (both economically and militarily) in the area. The problems involving the US are few and relate to New Zealand policy of banning nuclear armed and powered ships, and clashes over tuna fishing rights in some of the EEZs declared in the region.[18] Her actions in ignoring declared fishing zones has infuriated some Pacific island nations and has caused a minor diplomatic row or two. It is interesting to note that the Russians have agreed to abide by the declared zones and are prepared to pay. While the US attitude has been described as a little heavy handed[19] '... the area's routine diplomatic contacts are almost exclusively with non communist states and ... are predominantly Western.'[2]

The American presence in the Antarctic is similar to that of the Russians. The US does not recognise Australian territorial claims and also has a significant scientific interest in the continent.

In summary the interests of the superpowers in The South are at this time low key but very real. The factors which may increase their influence are the increased presence of one pursued by the other and an interest in the resources of the regions. Strategically The South is of little interest but the potential for conflict over resources is of some concern.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SOUTH TO AUSTRALIA

The importance of the South needs to be

Reef-clearing Defence Co-operation Project in the Solomon Islands. The photograph above shows divers from Clearance Diving Team 1 setting demolition charges. The results are pictured below.

Photographs Courtesy CDT 1

assessed in terms of how it relates to the national objective. How does the geography, politics and economics of The South affect Australia's security and prosperity? Further, how do established policies relate in terms of national strategy and how is a military strategy related to these? In addressing these questions, are our aims in the regions affected by the aspirations of other nations, particularly the superpowers?

The region of concern presents a paradox for Australia. The South West Pacific's importance relates in the main to its geographic location. Unfriendly nations in the Pacific could wreak havoc on our sea lines of communication. Loss of passage through Papua New Guinea, the Solomons or the islands out to the Cook Islands could create problems. If the region to our north, ie South East Asia, became embroiled in some turmoil, and sea access through that region to Japan and the US was lost, the Southern and Pacific Oceans would assume great importance as the only alternative routes. Interest by all nations in The South would increase. This nation needs to have a firm grip on the seas adjacent to her shores before any such interest arises.

The second factor of importance in the South West Pacific is that the islands in that region would be the second best approach by a force intent on attacking Australia (the first being through South East Asia). World War II showed that it was very difficult to launch an assault on Australia and that massive resources would be needed. Even with these resources the final assault would have to be launched from a relatively close logistic base — the Pacific Islands. One could wonder whether an enemy would land in North West Australia and then attempt to assault the east coast across this vast desert nation. It may be better to attempt an all out assault from the sea on the east coast to where the spoils lie. Australia should guard those approaches with a passion. Prevention is better than cure and it is in our interest to be the significant power in the Pacific and repel the aggressor far from home.

The final factor affecting our interests in the South West Pacific is the fear of superpower rivalry. What would happen if the superpowers were to enter the area? As indicated above the fear is that once one entered, then the other would follow. Most nations in the area are friendly toward the US. The involvement of the US would normally cause no concern except that the Russians would follow. A Russian presence could mean a number of things for Australia and South West Pacific nations; an insertion of land based nuclear weapons or weapon support systems and thus the creation of nuclear targets, the possibility of military exclusion zones around sensitive installations, and further Russian expansion in the area. The final and most important point is that the whole area could become involved in a war between the superpowers.

The problems to the south are very different. The Antarctic may well be a source of massive resources both on land and in the sea. As a nation which is heavily dependent on exhaustible natural resources Australia should be actively seeking new supplies. The continent to our south could be our saving grace in years to come. Should we continue content with only low keyed interest, our claims on the continent may be lost at the renewal of the Antarctic treaty?

To meet our very broad national objective, Australia needs to ensure absolute stability in the regions. As the major power in the South West Pacific this country is in a good position to exert a great deal of influence. Australia has the upper hand in that the US is content to let Australia lead in The South and the Russians are generally not wanted. This country should take advantage of this unique position and extend its influence in three main ways:

- Politically. Strategy of cooperation, friendship and leadership, through the South Pacific Forum and other associations should continue.
- Economically. Australia must continue to actively support the commercial and industrial initiatives of these countries. Attempts by third party nations to interfere in the region should be challenged through suitable economic manoeuvres. Free trade between all countries of the region must be encouraged.
- Militarily. This country, along with New Zealand, has the most impressive military power in the region. This power must be applied through peace and war to achieve our national objects.

To the south in Antarctica the problems are very different. Neither US nor USSR recognise Australia's Antarctic claims. When the Antarctic treaty is due for renewal in 1991, it may well be that Australian claims are rejected by a majority of nations. One important facet will be the amount of presence and development that this country has on that continent. At this stage Australia's presence in Antarctica is minimal and is far surpassed by the superpowers. There is an urgent need for Australia to exert her territorial claims and establish them to support future claims.

Having now determined in broad terms what our national and regional objectives are and the forces which will regulate and drive our strategies, it is possible to develop a more detailed military and from that, our naval, strategy.

THE NAVAL STRATEGY

Before proposing a naval strategy for The South it will be helpful to summarise the discussion so far. In the absence of a stated national objective a simplified aim of security and prosperity for the Australian people was proposed. Next an outline of current national and regional strategies was discussed which gave the driving forces for our proposed naval strategy. Australia aims for regional and world stability through peaceful means, adheres to a concept of continental defence and acknowledges it may have to go it alone, at least in the initial stages of any conflict. Within The South it was determined that the superpowers have little interest in the South West Pacific but have a much more significant presence in the Antarctic than Australia. The main areas of concern were the possibility of superpower rivalry in both the South West Pacific and Antarctica. The early conclusion reached was that to avert superpower influence in the South West Pacific Australia should attempt to become the predominant force and that in the Antarctic, Australia should clearly demonstrate her territorial claims by a firm presence and some form of territorial development.

In support of national and regional objectives a military strategy for The South should aim for:

- Defence of mainland Australia and territories including Antarctic claims.
- Continued membership of the western alliance.
- An ability to engage any potential enemy at maximum range.
- An attitude which gives other countries in The South justifiable reason to recognise Australia as the most significant and reliable power.

Our support naval strategy is concerned with two aspects of military strategy: 'one is to prevent the enemy, real or potential, from using the sea for his purposes; the other is to be able to use that part, or parts of it, which you need for your own purposes. It's as simple as that'[21] In other words, sea denial and sea assertion. In this case the concept of sea denial is extended to include a naval presence and sea assertion is extended to include power projection. Let us look in turn at the elements of naval strategy proposed for The South and how they can be developed into the overall strategy.

A naval presence involves the physical presence of naval ships in the area of concern. To achieve the required impression, such ships must be highly visible. In the South West Pacific a naval presence should be used to support those policies which have been proposed above in the areas of politics and economics. A naval presence will indicate to the nations of the South West Pacific that the resolve of Australia to act as a defender of the area is real. Good will visits, training exchanges and low level aid programmes are all ways of demonstrating good intent. Apart from this, the very existence of ships of war in an area should compound the stability of the area. Such a presence should be of a higher profile than that of the superpowers, or other nations in the region. Thus once again Australia can gain preferential treatment and thereby deny the use of supporting facilities to potential adversaries.

In the Southern Ocean and Antarctica an Australian naval presence is considered vital. The quickest and most impressive way of demonstrating a presence in support of territorial claims is to insert warships into the region. Admittedly there will be some new skills to learn in conducting protracted operations in cold waters, but that presence may be vital to our long term survival. A land air presence is also vital and may be obtained through Defence Force assistance to regional development.

The strategy of sea denial requires a force to be able to intercept, turn away or destroy an enemy force at sea. While such an event is not the favoured option, particularly a conflict with the USSR, the need to adopt such a strategy is needed for three reasons. First we must project an image of competence to those countries in the region which we wish to protect. The preferred Great and Powerful Friend must be Australia not a superpower. The proven ability to deal with potential enemies will enhance that prospect. Second, in the Antarctic a solid resolve to protect territorial interests must be shown. The ability to dislodge an intruder by force is necessary in support of such a policy. Finally should all else fail, this country needs a force to police and protect those sea lines of communication vital to international trade by denying an enemy freedom of movement in our waters.

The final component of this strategy is sea assertion (including power projection) and is an all-embracing military strategy. To woo the nations of the region and thus appease the Americans and thereby discourage the Russians, we need to be able to conduct offensive operations in The South. Should an island neighbour find itself confronted by an attacker we must demonstrate an ability to project power across the oceans to engage that enemy. Should we really wish to exert positive territorial rights in the Antarctic it will be necessary to operate in that region also. Thus, as implied above, it will be a total military strategy requiring sea, land and air operations in polar conditions. The final aspect of sea assertion is that we must be prepared to engage a potential

enemy a long distance from Australia. The ability to project power so far out will again counter any weaknesses that the superpowers may exploit.

CONCLUSION

To avert superpower influences in The South, Australia should adopt a strategy of establishing herself as the preferred friend and ally in the South West Pacific. In the Antarctic the national strategy is a little different and involves projecting a significant presence into claimed territories. In both instances action is required now! The superpowers have entered the South West Pacific (with adverse results) and are well and truly lodged in our claimed territories in the Antarctic. Of course the strategies should not be purely military and must first adhere to the principles of non military solutions, peace and friendship. Political, economic and social strategies must be redesigned to ensure a great Australian profile in The South. The naval strategies proposed are broad and will be difficult to implement. They will require greater effort and new skills on behalf or the RAN as well as the other two Services. The task of course is not beyond us and we should remember that one of the first naval captains to patrol the waters of The South did so over 200 years ago in wooden ships without engines. The sound traditions established by Cook should be followed by our Navy today. Captain Cook's courage and dedication is our heritage; his time is history; our time is today.

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NAVY 75th Anniversary 1911–1986

PRESERVING PEACE

Fleet units participating in Ceremonial Entry to Sydney Harbour 24 January 1986. Photograph courtesy Command Photographic Centre.

Celebration of the RAN's 75th Anniversary Year began with the Fleet Entry and Flypast in Sydney Harbour on 24 January.

The next major event, and probably the most significant planned for 1986, will be the unveiling by Her Majesty of the National Naval Memorial on 3 March.

As reported in the February 1985 Journal, the idea for the Memorial came from the original 75th Anniversary Steering Committee, and an approach was made to Government to seek approval and funding. When this was received, the National Capital Development Committee, as managers of the project, established an Australian-wide competition to select a design. A two stage selection procedure was adapted by the assessment panel, which included naval representation both from the present service and from the naval veteran movement.

In June 1984, the assessors selected the design submitted by Mr Ante Dabro, of Canberra, as the winner. The sculpture consists of cast figures representing the brave, dedicated and highly trained personnel of the Service, and geometric shapes representative of the ships, aircraft and equipment of the Navy. The juxaposition of these elements conveys the message of the dependence of the one upon the other. Water moving over the sculpture will provide a further symbolic effect.

The sculpture will be sited on the memorial plaza, which will also incorporate the crest of the Navy, the Battle Honours earned by its units and an inscription tablet. Two illuminated flagpoles will continuously fly the Australian National Flag and the Australian White Ensign.

The ceremonial unveiling will be the focus of a major ceremonial parade, the largest and most important staged by the Navy for many years.

A subsequent major national event is to be held on Thursday 10 July. This, the actual Anniversary day, will be marked by a nationwide, ecumenical, commemorative religious service, which will be programmed to commence and proceed simultaneously in all HMA Ships and Establishments.

The National Naval Memorial under construction
Photo by ABPHOT Lewis Courtesy 75th Anniversary Project Directorate


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IN SPIRIT AND IN TRUTH

An historical critique of the RAN, its Chaplains and religion

"But what experience and history teach is this, that peoples and governments have never learned anything from history"

— Hegel, *Philosophy of History*

by Sub-Lieutenant T. Frame RAN

INTRODUCTION

I have argued elsewhere that military chaplaincy has long been neglected as a field of research in either the general areas of military or religious history.[1] There is yet to be written an exhaustive account of the history of RAN chaplains,[2] while it has only been recently that Dr Michael McKernan completed two works which in any way tackle the problem of analysing the historical relationship shared by the various Christian denominations and the armed forces in Australia.[3] From my own research I have found it necessary to conclude that,

> '. . . very little has been written about chaplains. What has been written is mostly descriptive and narrative, that being mostly scanty and shallow. The treatment of chaplains [in the extant body of Australian history] is incomplete and disorderly in presentation.'[4]

Is this such a bad thing? I believe it is and this belief is stated in the same article:

> 'It is probably true that the absence of a detailed account of chaplains in the Armed Forces of Australia during times of war [not to mention occasions of peace] this century has led to faulty perceptions of Australia's Armed Forces chaplains and personnel, and precluded a fuller understanding of what wars 'were like', the influences Australian servicemen had to contend with and the overall impact of military chaplains upon the services and the war effort . . . For while men continue to act as service chaplains, it is inevitable that many mistakes will be made which could have been avoided if they had been able to learn the *lessons of history*.'[5]

In this article I want to move on from the neglect of the past to the neglect of the present and attempt to being some informed discussion, cum debate, on the range of issues raised. Though a sensitive topic and rife for subjective speculation, I believe action taken at the present time with respect to the RAN and the religious aspect of its culture has the potential to avert a crisis of identity and purpose for both those involved in 'naval' religion and its leaders; the naval chaplains.

THE BROADER CONTEXT OF THE DICUSSION

Military chaplaincy and religion generally have a strange, somehow undefined, position within the working culture of the navy. The Christian religion itself is complex and difficult to define. Its interpretation is nearly always controversial. And just as its founder struggled to have people understand his teaching and grasp the true worship God the Father delighted to receive, so it is true now that our understanding of, and response to, the Christian gospel will vary and result in a range of religious expression. To others the Church is irrelevant, confused, divided and not worth examining. Its moral claims have lost their edge to provoke our conformity, its theological debates and proclamations absent of a crispness to challenge our spiritual state. These views of the Christian church in all its denominational manifestations are not peculiar to the RAN, they are reflections of the community's declining participation and interest in the development of the Church.[6]

The Author

Sub-Lieutenant Tom Frame BA (Hons), RAN, joined the RAN in January 1979 as a Junior Entry Cadet-Midshipman. After completing his matriculation and first year of tertiary study at RANC, the author was posted to *Watson* to complete his degree in modern Chinese history. While at the University of New South Wales he was elected Vice-President of the campus Christian Union and commenced part-time theological studies with the Australian College of Theology. After acting as Parish Secretary in the Anglican parish of Kensington in Sydney during 1983–84 he was made a Sydney Diocesan Lay Reader. In late 1983 he was licenced by the Anglican Primate of Australia as the first Primate's Lay Reader to the RAN and served in the GID naval chapel as assistant to the Principal Anglican Chaplain. He is currently serving in *HMAS Cerberus* and plans to finish his Licentiate in Theology (Th.L) later this year.

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

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What, however, puts the Navy in a different position to the community with regards to religion is that it has paid chaplains, financially sponsored chapels and religious ministrations attached to most of the significant events which take place within the life of the Navy, both in its development and more recent decline. This is significant because whereas Mr and Mrs Civilian Citizen can totally ignore and escape the propagators of religion, its buildings and activities, in the Navy this is simply not possible. The Navy is officially a 'Christian' organisation. It does not officially recognise Islam, Buddhism, the Rajneeshi movement, spiritism, the occult, humanism, polytheism or paganism though it does recognise that people have a desire to wrongly label themselves as 'atheists' rather than 'agnostics' which is the description of someone who doesn't have the arrogance to say that he (or she) knows everything and therefore cannot believe. It is this almost unique situation and the somewhat 'fuzzy' relationship which it has called into being between the Church and the 'State', that is often misunderstood by chaplains, religious adherents, administrative authorities, commanding officers and the religiously nominal which *requires* comment, *deserves* criticism, but *needs* open discussion if religion is to remain a positive personal and corporate influence within the RAN.

I intend to begin by acknowledging the Christian tradition of the Royal Navy, its inheritance by the RAN, and the significance of this historical entity to the many aspects of service life.

THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION

The fathers of the RN and its Commonwealth contemporary the RAN have always had a desire to make religious affirmations about the institutions into which they feel they have been 'called'. This has been seen as an honourable yet necessary practice. The preamble to the old Articles of War of Charles II is often quoted or inscribed upon our chapels:

> 'It is upon the Navy, *under the providence of God* that the safety, honour and welfare of this realm do chiefly depend.' (my emphasis)

To stress the historical continuity of the Christian tradition in the Royal Navy, the preamble of the Articles of War of Queen Victoria (1866 as amended) sound very similar:

> '. . . the government of the Navy, whereon, *under the good providence of God* the wealth, safety, and strength of the Kingdom do chiefly depend.' (my emphasis)

Both of these statements require some interpretation.

Charles II states that the safety, honour, welfare of the realm of England is dependent upon the navy but that the navy is under 'the providence of God'. Thus for a period extending over centuries, English monarchs have chosen to include a very strong religious affirmation in connection with the primary function of the navy; to protect the welfare of the State. It should be noted that these affirmations are found at the outset of the Articles of War as if to imply: 'This is the basis upon which everything remaining is founded'. They are bold, uncompromising with straightforward intentions and indicative of the broad religious aspirations on which the state was governed. These affirmations remain with us today. Their historical meaning is enshrined in the Queen's Regulations and more contemporary articles of naval engagement. The task of the navy has therefore been historically exercised under the 'good providence of God'.

A working definition of the phrase 'providence of God' is required at this stage of the discussion. What is the 'providence of God'? What does it mean to be under this characteristic or quality which belongs to God? Andf how does this phrase relate to the intention of the affirmations cited above? Each of these questions requires an answer if we are to understand the nature of the religious principle implied in some of our historical documents.

THE RAN AND THE 'PROVIDENCE OF GOD'

This is not the time nor the place to become involved in a theological discourse on a complicated component of Christian doctrine. Neither will readers be subjected to a homily on the spiritual significance of the providence of God as it is and can be experienced by humanity. Yet it would be sufficient to define the concept of the 'providence of God' as that characteristic of God,

> 'in which He preserves all His creatures, is active in all that happens in the world and directs all things to their appointed end.'[7]

An example of God exercising this quality is in the time of Nehemiah when the people of Israel return from exile in Babylon around the fifth century B.C. and find that God is abundantly meeting their enormous needs. Nehemiah reflects on God's promise to the Israelite people *after* they had been fulfilled:[8]

> 'Thou didst provide bread from Heaven for them for their hunger,
> Thou didst bring forth water from a rock for them to thirst,
> And thou didst tell them to enter in order to possess the land which thou didst swear to give them.'[9]

According to God's unchanging and eternal word to man, the Bible, the providence of God

continues to operate in the world today. Therefore, we assert, when stating that we are *under* providence, that God has a characteristic which He exercises in this world to know the earth's needs and subsequent development from which He actively directs human events to meet these needs and achieve His purpose of assisting humanity reach its full potential. To do this He is motivated out of His all embracing desire to show His love and compassion on those whom He has created. Though we may not perceive the action or providence or be sure with hindsight when and where it has influenced events, we imply that God will work within the free will man retains in determining his actions to affect the outcome of even mundane expressions of human choice.

In answer to the second question posed, an individual or the Navy as a whole will be under the 'providence of God' as God orders the progress of human interaction, personal choice and environmental change to permit the operation of providential care and concern. We may seek as individuals or a group to acknowledge providence as a positive force, indeed a desirable one in itself, and petition God to allow his '*good providence*' to influence every aspect of our existence.

How the Navy performs its task will also directly depend upon the operation of God's providence. God will therefore choose to use the Navy to achieve His providential objectives where they relate to the wealth, safety and honour of the realm. This provides the answer to the third question posed.

IS THERE CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE?

Is it fair to ask in 1986 how fully we understand the full implications of what we may *read* in the Articles of War, what we may *quote* from the Articles of War or what we may *inscribe* on our chapels from this same document? Are these words a vivid description of the Navy's perception of its own basic function-to go to war to protect the State-or platitudes drawn from a romantic groping into the past? We could even ask whether the Christian heritage passed on through generations of Anglo-sailors has been tacitly rejected. This would be to suggest that we no longer ascribe to the basic premise of God's providence being an integral component in determining the exercise and success of naval power. No-one has come forward to reject the Christian past, it has somehow slowly faded away.

Yet I believe it is justified to claim that the place of these general religious affirmations remains unchanged and unchallenged though quite open to reasoned refutation or condemnation. Until there is a repudiation of the old Articles of War, the religious injunctions of Queen's regulations and the visible observation of religious statements on naval buildings, the apparent conflict between what is officially prescribed and its reflection upon reality will persist.

THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT

Some may find it difficult to agree that a conflict exists at all. In my opinion, and it is offered as that, for the greatest part no-one can state with sincerity of the Navy in the 1980s that it is a God-fearing institution made up of righteous men who together seek the embodiment of the Christian gospel in what they do. Indeed I would argue that the Navy is a secular, materialist institution made up of the few Godly men who do what they can to stem the flow toward further irreligion. True, the Navy has chaplains, chapels, conducts divine service, sponsors character guidance and character leadership courses and prescribes the saying of grace before and after mess dinners. Further still, when a ship commissions it is the subject of a religious ministration. The same occurs at a decommissioning. Services of commemoration are held for those who have died in war and contingents are normally provided for mandatory Anzac Day ceremonies; occasions of undisputed and unsurpassed religious nominalism.

But it is difficult to say of the Navy that as an institution it is dedicated to the achievement of corporate religious objectives or the development of spiritual strengths amongst individuals. Could we say the Navy is keen to see its members carry out the perceived will of God? Does it strive for a more Christian and equitable society through its interaction with the civil community? Are Christian principles the framework of our discipline system or the fibre of our moral code? Perhaps it is unfair to ask questions such as these of the Navy as an institution and to some extent I would agree. It seems to me as though the on-going wholesale abandonment of the Christian religion in the RAN, (evidences of which I will present) began at a much lower level. This predominantly inadvertant turning away from a conscious projection of Christianity towards insipid humanism and rampant materialism (no-one should ever imagine that we now exist in a world free of philosophies; the two mentioned, humanism and materialism, being highly developed and aggressive, though subtle, in propagation)[10] has occurred and remained unchecked at the level of individual ships and establishments. It has not been for want of Flag rank leadership, direction, support or policy that Christianity in the RAN (and the whole ADF for that matter) has slowly lost its high public profile to the detriment of both the Service and the individual serving person. But the outcome I

have described is not merely the consequence of sins of omission.

Religious activities sponsored by the Service have, on occasion and possibly accumulatively, resulted in a down-turn of interest in religion and an obscuration of the essential meaning of Christianity. I will return to the Articles of War to commence my case.

SINS OF COMMISSION?

The *first* Article of War of Queen Victoria states:

> 'All officers in command of Her Majesty's ships of war shall cause the public worship of Almighty God according to the liturgy of the Church of England established by law to be solemnly, orderly and reverently performed in their respective ships and shall take care that prayers and preaching, by the Chaplains in Holy Orders of their respective ships, be performed diligently, and that the Lord's Day be observed according to the Law.'

By all accounts this was the practise observed in the time of Victoria. From my admittedly limited experience, commanding officers have not always chosen to act in accordance with the requirements that have been traditionally laid down for religious observance in ships. Instructions in ABR 5016 and Queen's Regulations serve to amplify the obligations of the commanding officer in this area. It would not be out of place to query the number of commanding officers who have strenuously carried out these instructions as they have others which relate to comand. Is it because they are not considered important? This opens the issue of divine service. How many commanding officers have organised a modified divine service at sea and when no chaplain is borne? How many when alongside at GI actively commend Divine Service conducted in the dockyard naval chapel? Or when in another port seek to ensure that arrangements are made for personnel to be made welcome at local churches? Many do take these responsibilities seriously; just as many decide not to devote as much interest.

THE OFFICE OF CHAPLAIN

The role of the chaplain must now be considered. As the leaders of nearly all religious services in the Navy and the responsible officers for the remaining ministrations, the place of the chaplain has invariably been affected by the changes in attitude towards religion described above. Drawing upon findings of research conducted amongst the community to assess its general attitude towards God, religion and the Church, Anglican Bishop Bruce Wilson believes that religion is arguably in a poorer position in the Navy than in the civil community as a consequence of the Navy's efforts to employ its chaplains. In his provocative book, '*Can God Survive in Australia*,' he argues that the whole relationship between the chaplain and the Navy is in need of drastic review:

> 'The Navy draws its ranks from the same general population that no longer looks to the clergy in times of crisis but, unlike the general society, the Navy has institutionalised a clerical role that society has come to ignore or reject. Conversations with Chaplains to the Australian Army and Air Force indicate that they are facing a similar problem. In fact one would expect it to occur wherever Chaplains are employed as official functionaries of *what are now 'secular' institutions* . . . [my emphasis]. The armed forces' Chaplains are in the invidious position of being employed on the basis of a world belief that is shrinking beneath their feet. Unless there is a reversal of Christian decline, the ideology of 'secularism' will continue to seep from the outside society into the hearts and minds of both the defence forces' hierarchy, who employ the Chaplains, and the rank and file, whom the Chaplains are meant to serve.'[1]

The above paragraph implies some expectation of the chaplain but this creates a dilemma. It will always be difficult for serving personnel to know what to expect from their chaplains. From another angle, it is unfair to expect chaplains to ascertain for themselves their role in the ship or establishment, to determine how they can better equip themselves for their employment, to perceive the needs of the unit and its members and then to adjust their style to best meet these needs, or even to know how they are performing and developing if they are not given feedback, direction or assessment by interested and concerned personnel serving around them. Most of the time we expect the chaplain to 'simply get on with it'. But what is 'it'? Current demands on chaplains often go only as far as the requirement to conduct Sunday services. For the remainder of his time the chaplain is required to find plenty to do, remain motivated and entirely dedicated to those who he is committed to serve. Yet at the same time social workers have increased their presence in the Navy and challenged one major traditional role of the chaplain, that of personal confidant and counsellor. To some degree the growth of social workers has been a consequence of the 'secularisation' of the RAN. This development may not be bad in and of itself. However, the effect is to have the role of the chaplain officially challenged. We are similtaneously offering both

a secular and religious counselling service but not providing a commentary on the need for two options or guidance on the choice individuals should make when seeking assistance. The problem is eliminated by the presence of Christian social workers who tend to dissolve the distinction.

It seems tragic that the Navy appears to be losing its perception of the benefits that come with having a chaplains department. Historically, chaplains have been considered vital to the overall functioning and welfare of the ship. Admiral Sir John de Robeck while Commander-in-Chief of the British Atlantic Fleet (1922–24) commented that:

> 'Provided a ship has a good Commander and a good Chaplain you will never find anything much wrong with her.'

The Church of England has historically had a high regard for the office of naval chaplain. Archdeacon John Owen, Chaplain-General to the RN in 1811 stated:

> 'There is perhaps no order of men upon whom the labour of an intelligent clergyman could be bestowed with greater prospect of success than on seamen.'

NOMINALISM AND THE NAVY

It is possibly an even greater tragedy that the Navy may have lost an appreciation of how valuable the Christian religion is as a philosophy, a lifestyle, a purpose, a cause and moral code to be embraced by the Service as a whole. To this we can look beyond the chaplains — the full time representatives of Christianity — to those who have maintained a lively Christian faith and have sought to further the Christian message while continuing to offer naval service.

PART-TIME PADRES?

The RN and the RAN have had a long historical tradition of informal Christian worship and fellowship among their members who may be drawn together without a chaplain to preside. This is because individuals from the highest ranks to the lowest have embraced the 'Way of Life' offered by the Son of God; Jesus who is called the Christ, the Chosen One. Associations and societies have been formed by laymen dedicated to living out and sharing this 'Way' in the armed forces. They are motivated to do this by a conviction that Christianity equips them for better service in the Navy and because they feel it has a corporate use in bringing men and women together with a sense of unity and purpose unsurpassed within this domain of existence. Within the Royal Navy there is the Officers' Christian Union, the RN Lay Readers Society and the Naval Christian Fellowship. Closer to home there exists the Military Christian Fellowship of Australia (formed last year from a merger of the Officers' Christian Fellowship and the Australian Services Christian Fellowship) which has a membership list fast approaching 1000 members who profess a personal commitment to the teaching of Jesus Christ.

To these people going to church (or chapel) is the expression of their desire to meet with other people who share a faith in the truth of the Bible and who feel compelled to affirm the 'worth' of God in what is called 'worship'. It is a voluntary act which arises from a belief that God is real, that He discloses Himself in His word, the Bible, that He is active in the world, that He has dealt with the problem of sin, guilt and death in the crucifixion and resurrection of his Son, Jesus, and that the gift of forgiveness and life beyond the grave is offered to those who believe in the truth of God's Word and put their trust in the meaning of Jesus' death and resurrection. These people will also meet together to pray to God for His 'good providence', for His protection, for the outpouring of His love. This type of motivation to hold a service of worship in a church should be placed in juxtaposition to that which results in many of the 'occasional' naval services that chaplains are called upon to organise and conduct, and the remainder to attend.

'IN SPIRIT AND IN TRUTH'

In the early portion of Jesus' three year ministry he encounters a Samaritan woman. The meeting is recorded by St. John in his gospel. In the discussion that follows the woman emphasises her ethnic background as a Samarian and points to the debate between the Jews and Samarians as to where God should be worshipped, the Jews believing that 'Jerusalem is the place where men ought to worship'. The response of Jesus is significant because he focuses attention not on external factors of worship; the place and the ritual, but on internal factors; the state of the heart, the inward disposition of those who come to praise God. He says,

> 'But an hour is coming, and now is, when the true worshippers shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth; for such people the Father seeks to be His worshippers. God is spirit, and those who worship Him must worship in spirit and truth.'

Often Naval divine service or special services are held because they were held the same time last week or last year rather than meeting a specific need of serving or ex-serving personnel. Annual memorial services are the greatest offenders. I would argue, and with some trepidation, that from a religious standpoint these types of services have little or no religious value. Their primary purpose, from what I perceive they

are attempting to provide, is to offer a rallying point and stage for activities around which serving and ex-serving personnel can gather to recall some significant events in naval history. Their form is often very similar from year to year.

Often held at the naval chapel in Garden Island Dockyard or a major Sydney church, annual services are for many people the only occasion on which they will enter a church outside the traditional periods of compulsion: Christmas, Easter, baptisms, weddings and funerals. Those ex-serving members who attend will wear their ship association blazers and their medals if they can be found. The association flag will be draped over the Lord's Table and the senior ranks within the association will sit towards the front of the chapel. Senior officers, either retired or serving, will be asked to read a lesson and prayers will be offered for those who still mourn the loss of loved ones. The chaplain will utter words of thanks for those who 'have laid down their lives for their friends'. These types of services can have a tremendous feeling about them. The sense of comradeship and the feeling of belonging coupled with a reverence for sacrifice make many of these events solemn and memorable.

However, these sensations only last an hour. The following Sunday all is nearly forgotten. Medals are put back into the bottom of drawers to be misplaced once more. The associations' flags are returned to the RSLs for next Anzac Day and the veterans decide to spend Sunday morning in a secular feast of television football replays and newspapers. What was the point of holding the service in a church? Most people probably felt uncomfortable there anyway. What was the religious significance of the proceedings? I have gained the impression after attending a number of these services that people begin to feel as though the church is suitable, and sometimes only for and because of, the once-a-year ritual, that it is not in touch with everyday life, that it is synonomous with the theatre while allowing more audience participation. Such an attitude seems far removed from worshipping God 'in spirit and truth'.

Religious occasions organised purely by and for the Navy are little different. Special drill that has everyone scurrying for parade and ceremonial manuals is rehearsed for displaying the Ensign, senior officers are sat toward the front (the Epistle of St James, chapter 2, comments) while disgruntled conscripted sailors are ushered in towards the rear of the church. While the liturgy gropes for meaning we are wont to ask what religious significance do these services have? To many the seating of senior officers towards the front and the invitation to them to participate has an alienating effect from Christianity itself. It can seem to be the province of officers, that it is at their behest that these services be held and that only they possess an understanding of the apparently esoteric purpose behind the event. Could it be that the Navy Day service and any ceremonial divisions leave a sailor with a similar impression of what is required from him: attendance, a clean uniform, silent attentiveness and a co-operative disposition. Christian notions of equality before God on the spiritual plane are hard to accept when the temporal appears to contradict every suggestion of this being true. Naval services can be the source of unity within our Navy being the proclamation, with one accord, of the determination of all personnel to see God have His way in the world with the RAN as one of His instruments.

This leads us to the problem of nominalism and tokenism. While I will reserve my judgement on how valuable I believe nominalism is to the cause of Christianity, I feel very strongly about the damage that tokenism can do to the Navy and the individual. To promote token gestures of religiousity is to ask the chaplains to undertake what they rightly should refuse, to generate the greatest offence to the Church and its sincere members, promote indifference to that which requires the greatest consideration by every living person — the Christian gospel, and to deter those who might find their home within the Church if it were not for gestures which make its membership appear worthless. Tokenism and patent lip-service to Christianity are an abhorrance to Him who accused the Scribes and Pharisees of hypocrisy; having an outward show of religion but rejecting its power. If anything is to come of this paper it is for concerned personnel to examine and arrest the possible decline into these dual evils.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The purpose of this paper was to examine some issues related to the RAN, its chaplains and religion. An historical overview was introduced to provide a perspective from which trends could be defined, located and critically assessed. Their significance to the contemporary Navy has been discussed with some comments and suggestions offered on how these trends will affect the Navy as an institution in addition to its individual members. The most-crucial aspect of this exercise has been to analyse the various contradictions which are associated with the interaction of the secular post-Christian society and the remaining vestiges of the old Christian Australia which persist within the RAN at a time when church attendance is not high and Christianity is not the

undisputed guide to moral judgement and ethical conduct. This is the heart and the source of the problems faced by chaplins and religion today. The Navy's failure to arrive at an adequate understanding of the role of the chaplain and the place of the dedicated Christian (now made obvious by the decline of nominalism) make it imperative for fundamental debate to take place at this time.

The Navy's 18 chaplains, numerous very expensive chapels and a number of committed Christian personnel makes me keen to open a discussion of how these resources can be best utilised for the good of the Navy and its personnel. With respect to some of the practices I have described it would seem such a discussion, or at least some inflexion and reflection by concerned people, is mandatory if Christianity is to remain 'viable' within the Navy as its organised religion. I say this because I belive chaplains, Christians and Christianity itself have provided something very fundamental and worthwhile to the Service over the years and can continue to do so if given the opportunity and support.

Though aggressive in some of the points I have made, I belive it was necessary to be so when one understands the claim of Christianity to provide an answer to the ultimate question in life and that concerns the significance of death and what follows its coming. All the Navy can hope to do is to create and sustain the opportunity for each person to find that answer and make a choice. I hope this paper in some ways serves that end.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

1. see T.R. Frame, 'An Historiographical Critique of Armed Forces Chaplains in the Official Histories of Australia at War in the Twentieth Century', Intercome; no.32, June 1985, pp. 11–29.
2. Though there are short accounts of chaplaincy to be found in general histories of the RAN and military chaplaincy, basic facts and fundamental issues are yet to be examined in a scholarly account of any substance.
3. M. McKernan, The Australian People and the Great War, (Nelson, Melbourne, 1980)
   M. McKernan, Australian Churches at War, Studies in the Christian Movement: Vol. 6 (Catholic Theological Faculty and the AWM, Canberra and Sydney, 1980)
4. Frame, *op. cit.*, p.18
5. *ibid.*, p.29
6. For discussions on the general trend towards secularisation in Australia since 1965 see H. Mol, *Religion in Australia*, (Nelson, 1971) and Ronald Conway, *The Great Australian Stupor*, (Sun Books, Melbourne, 1971)
7. L. Berkhof, *A Summary of Christian Doctrine*, (Banner of Truth, Edinburgh, 1978); p.55.
   The presence of the 'providence of God' in the world is discussed by Canon D.B. Knox, *The Everlasing God*, (Evangelical Press, Hertfordshire, 1982)
8. F.F. Bruce, *Israel and the Nations*, (Paternoster, 1964)
9. The book of Nehemiah, chapter 9, verse 15.
10. F.A. Schaeffer, *Death in the City*, (Inter-Varsity Press, Chicago, 1969) discusses the development of these philosophies in direct conflict with Christianity.
11. B. Wilson, *Can God Survive in Australia?* (Albatross Books, Sydney, 1983); pp. 139–140.

NOBODY ASKED ME, BUT.....

The following saga is unsigned and anonymous, as much as anything else to protect long suffering seagoers from the slings and arrows of unkind fate. In the heart of every commanding officer this tale must echo the beat "There but for the grace of God, go I."

The Chairman
Asiatic Line Ltd

Dear Sir,

RECENT MISFORTUNES AND EVENTS

It is with deep regret and haste that I write this letter to you. Regret that such a small misunderstanding could lead to the following circumstances and in haste in order that you receive this report before you form any preconceived opinion from reports in the Press. I am sure that the Media tend to over-dramatise in their reports on such casualties.

We had just embarked the Pilot and the Deck Cadet had returned to the wheelhouse after changing the 'G' flag before stowing it. I therefore proceeded to instruct him on the correct method of rolling up a signal flag. Coming to the last part of this instruction I told him to 'let go'. The lad, although willing enough, was not too bright and this necessitated my having to repeat the order in a somewhat sharper tone.

At this moment the Chief Officer appeared from the chartroom, having been plotting the vessel's

progress and, thinking that it was the anchors which were being referred to, repeated the 'let go' order to the Third Officer who was on the forecastle. The port anchor, having been cleared away but not walked out, was promptly let go. The effect of letting go anchor from the pipe whilst the vessel was proceeding at full harbour speed proved too much for the windless brake. The entire length of the port cable was pulled out by the 'roots'. The braking effect of the port anchor naturally caused the vessel to sheer in that direction, right towards a swing bridge which spanned a tributary to the river on which we were navigating.

The swing bridge operator showed great presence of mind by promptly opening the bridge to my vessel. Unfortunately, he did not think to stop the vehicle traffic. The result was that the bridge partly opened and deposited a Volkswagen, two cyclists and a cattle truck on the foredeck. (My ship's company are, at present, rounding up the contents of the latter, which from the noise, I would say are pigs.) In his efforts to stop the progress of the vessel, the Third Officer dropped the starboard anchor — too late to be of any practical use as it fell on the swing bridge operator's control cabin.

After the vessel had started to sheer, through the accidental letting go of the port anchor, I gave a double ring of Full Astern on the Telegraph. I also personally rang the Engine Room to order maximum astern revolutions. I was informed that the sea temperature was 53° and was asked if there was to be a movie that night. My reply would not add constructively to this report.

It is strange, but at the very same time the port anchor was dropped there was a power cut ashore. The fact that we were passing over a cable area at the time may suggest that we might have touched something on the river bed. It is perhaps lucky that the high tension cables which were brought down by the foremast were not 'live', possibly having been replaced by an underwater cable. Owing to the shore blackout it is impossible to speculate where the electric cable pylon fell.

Up to now I have confined my report to the activities at the forward end of my vessel. Down aft they were having their own problems. At the moment the port anchor was let go, the Second Officer was supervising the making fast of the after tug. The sudden braking effect of the port anchor caused the tug to 'run under' the stern of my vessel — just at the moment the propeller was answering my double ring of Full Astern. The prompt action of the Second Officer in securing the inboard end of the towing spring delayed the sinking of the tug by several minutes, thereby allowing the safe abandonment of that vessel by her crew.

It never fails to amaze me — the actions and behaviour of foreigners during a moment of minor crisis. The pilot is huddled in the corner of my dayroom crooning to himself after having drunk a bottle of whisky in a time worth including in the Guiness Book of Records. The tug skipper, on the other hand, reacted quite violently and had to be forcibly restrained by the steward. He is at present handcuffed in the ship's hospital where he is telling me to do impossible things with my ship and my person.

Enclosed herewith are the names and addresses of the drivers, and Insurance Companies of the vehicles on my foredeck. These particulars will enable you to claim for the damage which they did to the railings in the way of No 3 starboard tank.

To conclude this report I wish to point out that, had the cadet realised that there was no need to fly the pilot flag after dark none of this would have occurred.

Yours faithfully

The Chairman's reply would make interesting reading.

Alan Brecht

WASHINGTON NOTES

by Tom Friedmann

My readers will probably not be surprised by the disclosure that this column is not written with an eye toward retiring on the compensation I receive for my literary efforts. However, what amounts to a deficit on my personal financial statement does not mean that I have not received many important benefits from being the author of 'Washington Notes,' not the least of which was a cruise last summer on *HMAS Hobart*.

Captain Sam Bateman, my first *Journal* editor, invited me to spend a week on board his ship when it visited the United States on the way to Vancouver as part of the celebrations in honor of the 75th Anniversary of the Canadian Naval Forces.

The Captain's intent was to give us a chance to meet as well as for me to meet more Australians and to observe them in action. More importantly, however, it would allow me to fill in a gaping hole in my background. That void, I am loathe to admit, was that prior to August 19, 1985, I had never been to sea.

Never having been to sea, however, did not mean I had not wanted to go to sea. Circumstances simply seemed to conspire against it. Meanwhile, I had haunted docks and shipyards on both coasts and had been *on* many ships, from a Matson freighter, to the *Queen Mary* before and after the Atlantic run, to the *USS Iowa*. But a ship tied up in harbor is simply a somewhat peculiar steel building. Only at sea, when they are alive with men at work, do ships assume personalities all their own.

Despite my burning desire to make the trip (fuelled in part by the glow many Americans get when reminiscing about liberty with Australians) it was a close run thing.

I became a defence analyst for the Democratic Policy Committee of the United States Senate shortly after the invitation arrived. I therefore had to receive permission from the Senate Ethics Committee since a gift from a foreign government was involved.

My case was determined to be one of first impression (my luck!) and promptly rejected. Only after an obscure statute was located that would permit me to travel with the consent of the Director of the United States Information Agency if the trip was determined to be in the 'national interest' of the United States was I given oral permission for the trip.

The trip exceeded my greatest expectations. I came home with an enhanced appreciation of Australians, the RAN, the naval profession, new friends, a full picture album, 55 typed pages of notes, as well as enough sea stories to bore anyone within earshot for at least the next 20 years.

I joined the ship in San Diego before 0700, the *HMAS Hobart's* green—*not* gray— paint glistening in my eyes despite the unusual overcast sky. I was ushered on board with suitable formality which, I am happy to say, rapidly gave way as I came to know the officers and crew. By the end of my time on board, I had been the recipient of such an outpouring of Australia's justly famous hospitality that I felt 'at home' everywhere I ventured on the ship.

Living with Australians for a week was not quite the culture shock I had anticipated. I noticed my ear picked up the accent fairly well and the sense of adventure kept me plowing forward despite the distinct possibility of committing numerous faux pas. But the best way to describe the trip is to set out some of my observations in no particular order of importance.

Before the ship left port I had to sign several waivers of liability to protect the Commonwealth in the event of any untoward occurrences. As a lawyer, I am usually on the presentation side of these waivers and can now understand the reluctance of some parties to sign them. But I would have signed anything to take the cruise so sign I did. I only wish my abandon ship station

would not have been assigned at the same time and would have been to a life saving device somewhat larger than an oversized vitamin capsule!

The RAN still uses salt cellars in officer's country. I noticed this within 30 minutes of arriving on board when I put two spoons of salt in my first cup of good, strong Australian tea. Imagine the look on the face of our steward, Greg Heskins, who was tactful enough to not double over in laughter after my first sip (for which I was *most* grateful). He replaced the tea as if such things happened every day and became a great guide and help during the voyage.

I never thought that the best gin and tonic I have ever had would come on a warship. And *how many* cases of beer? When *HMAS Hobart* left Sydney, beer must have been everywhere except the gun barrels and engine room! And American officers, the spirit of Josephus Daniels not-withstanding, really *do* head toward HM's ships (Canadian, Australian, or whatever) as soon as possible when reaching port to relieve the effects of prohibition.

I had never seen so many adults working in shorts outside of the Olympics! But, and I hope my shipmates will forgive me for saying this, there weren't many Olympians on board. Admittedly this style of uniform pant must be great in the tropics (which the suntans everyone sported attested to) but once we were at sea the temperature dropped. Even when 'woolie pullies' were broken out, the shorts stayed. Only one officer (who shall remain nameless to protect his career) admitted that the USN custom of wearing long trousers had some benefits. This rational, albeit heretical, observation was made in hushed tones as if the officer involved was discussing a state secret!

There is a malicious rumor abroad in the land that I suffered from seasickness while on board *HMAS Hobart*. This is *not* true. I had what an American rear admiral (lower half) (can you believe it?) who works in the Pentagon and is well versed in 'Pentagonese' called 'ocean flu.' However, since the symptoms of 'ocean flu' apparently resemble those of seasickness, the RAN gave me a full dose of its standard anti-seasickness remedies: food, work, and fresh air. It was administered through a unique combination of understanding, tolerance, and humiliation.

How does the RAN programme work? Early on one is suckered in by sympathy, i.e., 'Nelson was seasick all the time, you know,' or 'Everyone feels a bit queasy the first few days.' That I was the only one suffering did not affect this solicitous attitude. However, I did notice that the Captain seemed perplexed about my frequent questions regarding the force ratings of the sea. He never was able to find one low enough to describe the equivalent of 'a ripple in a water glass.'

This sympathy and toleration lasted about six hours. The Captain then took a firm stand, all but ordering me to eat the dried bread he had specially brought to me. Protestations of inability to eat anything to the contrary, I downed the bread while gasping for fresh air on the bridge.

Things were somewhat better the next day. I found I could eat grapes if I used both hands to force them between sealed lips. However, it was our executive officer, Commander Derek Caton, who administered the dose of humiliation that finally set me on the road to recovery.

'Well, you know, Tom, most cases of seasickness ('ocean flu') are really self-induced,' he observed, leveling a cool stare at me of a type which I am sure has ruined the day of many a junior officer over the years. It certainly worked on me. By the next day, our last full day at sea, I was bobbing and weaving with the best of them standing behind the Captain's chair as the ship encountered its only brush with somewhat rough seas.

I felt *really* old (at age 34) for the first time while on *HMAS Hobart*. Soon after boarding it became apparent that, had I been a somewhat more precocious youth, I could have been the father of at least half of the crew. The junior officers could have been referred to as the 'kiddie corps.' I was trusting my life to kids wet behind the ears — or so I thought. On our ship, youth was a mask for capable, hardworking *men* exercising authority and responsibility far beyond what their peers in civilian life (at least in the United States) experience at the same age.

One evening in particular remains indelibly imprinted in my memory. I was on the bridge standing my usual after dinner 'watch' when I noticed that everyone who could find a pair of binoculars had them trained forward into the darkness. Soon, however, even the naked eye could discern what appeared to be a solid mass on the horizon. The mass was a dense fog that rapidly enveloped us, blotting out all vision beyond the muzzle of the forward 127mm gun.

Tension heightened as the danger caused by this ancient nemesis of mariners increased. Voices, already at their nighttime whisper, became even more subdued. The bridge population began to increase as several extra officers (seemingly all lieutenant commanders) materialized in the same way the fog had.

Sub-Lieutenant David Johnson had the bridge. He appeared to be completely unruffled by either the fog or the extra 'help' as he kept the Captain informed, issued orders, checked radars, and scanned the void for other vessels and a break in the mist which was not to appear for many hours. And where David was not, Sub-Lieutenant Al

HMAS HOBART in Milford Sound, returning from Vancouver.
Photo by LSPHOT Johnstone.

Carwardine was. (Al and Lieutenant Mike Leach seem to be bearing up quite well under the pressures of entering the 'family business.')

As the order was given to sound the foghorn, I noticed the navigator, Lieutenant Commander Lou Rago, was already on the bridge. I was not surprised. He always seemed to be on the bridge.

'If anything happens, it's me and the Captain,' Lou had explained to me earlier. 'An accident at sea can ruin your whole day' took on a far more sinister meaning now that I *knew* men driving a ship at sea.

'You know, we navigators live on cigarettes and coffee while we are at sea,' Lou told me, and I think that was all I saw him consume during that week. Lou's careful instructions about navigating throughout the voyage only hinted at the responsibility he shouldered and I was greatly impressed.

But this night, although it became a particularly long one, was also a safe one as David and 'Mr. Tense' took us out of danger. I, however, was not able to lend 'assistance,' since my constant touring and an abnormal amount of fresh air had rendered me virtually comatose despite the foghorn which, I was later told, sounded all night.

'Generosity' takes on a whole new meaning when you are assigned to share a cabin on a DDG. Since Lou Rago slept in a cabin off the bridge (and I was assured that he did sleep sometimes), I bunked with Lieutenant Commander Tony Flint, my able tutor for Operations. I was given a berth and six inches of overhead pipe to hang clothes on. Only as the week went on did I realize what a sacrifice it was to give up those six inches! But as to those stories you might have heard about me travelling with several steamer trunks, consider this an official denial. It just *seemed* as though I had several trunks with me...!

The upper berth, I must admit, was the cause for some trepidation since the last time I had faced one was 15 years previously while in college, well before a herniated disc and shredded knee cartilage. And even when I was in college 'athletic' and 'coordinated' were not necessarily words that could be used to describe my physical abilities.

I was determined not to admit defeat. I soon became adept at feeling my way through pitch darkness or the questionable glow of red light to hurl myself into bed. I bounced off the bulkhead once or twice but even that could not diminish the satisfaction I received from simply getting into the berth. And once I was in the berth, I was in for the night because I did not want to risk killing myself getting out for anything short of adandoning the ship. This too aided in the cure of my 'ocean flu.'

I was amazed — and very pleased — to hear what high esteem the 'black gang' was held in on *HMAS Hobart*. I will never forget being told how hard and dangerous their job was by one of the gunnery CPOs while standing in the depths of the after 127mm magazine! Commander Eric Twells' *passion* for steam turbines (the only type of engines worth having, I am told) extended to

all the officers and men under his command and was evident in the pride they exhibited when showing me the machinery spaces during a high speed run. I made my tour in an immaculate set of white overalls that had been sent up to me with my name on them so that I would fit in with the rest of the engineering department.

When the Captain mentions that one of the ships in your squadron is going to be selected for antiaircraft duty, be sure to check later to see if your ship is selected. I did not and I had to be peeled off the bridge roof after the forward 127mm unexpectedly fired off several rounds some 15' from where I was sitting.

We met Surface Squadron 1 of the USN at sea and sailed with them for part of the voyage. On the first day the Captain had carefully described how we were to proceed before taking oil from the *USS Weillamette* (AO 180). There can be few more impressive sights than watching a ship take on oil at sea. Unless it is watching ships pull into formation in line ahead. Shades of Dogger Bank, Jutland, Matapan, and Leyte Gulf.

I loved our formal arrival in Canada. We sailed to Esquimalt via the spectacularly beautiful Strait of Juan de Fuca. *HMNZS Canterbury* joined us at sea and we coordinated our gun salutes. As I stood on the gun deck, swathed in anti-flash gear, representatives of the Queen of Australia and the Queen of New Zealand paid homage to the same person, Her Majesty Elizabeth II, Queen of Canada. Some of the most interesting aspects of the British Empire do, after all, survive.

The cruise I had waited decades to take had now come to an end. My time on shore was spent somewhat more sedately than what I had been lead to expect as I toured Victoria with the Captain and Commodore David G. Holthouse, Australian Naval Attache in Washington and Naval Advisor in Toronto. We were joined for dinner by the rest of the 'over the hill gang' — Derek Caton, Eric Twells, and Commander Doug Stevens. The next day I reluctantly left the ship and, after making my personal contribution to America's balance of payments problem (I received $1.35 Canadian for every $1.00 American — how could I resist?) it was back to the States and the demands of the Senate.

My trip was a valuable experience for me because I was on board the ship for an extended amount of time. The day trips I am told the RAN provides to selected people back home are

The Author with ABQMG Derek Hardy (see text)

Photo by LSPHOT Johnstone

simply not enough to really get the feel of the ship: to become an extra student taking part in the continual learning process that takes place on a warship; to see how hard officers and men work to keep Ikara working; to share Sub-Lieutenant Mark Wright's enthusiasm for his ship and his profession; to learn how to shave with the motion of the ship while holding on to a rail for support; to learn how radars work and what can happen to the ship when they are down; to experience a situation where men work in an environment that moves all the time; to see men live in an amount of space that American judges would find 'cruel and unusual punishment' for prisoners; to see how an automatic 127mm gun works; to behold the vastness of the ocean; to play computer war games and realize this could be the real thing; to hear the collective moan of the officers and crew as it is announced there is not enough hot water for showers; to catch a good dose of the 'ocean flu' and realise men assigned to the ship get the same 'disease' but must stand their watches nonetheless; to see water so blue that it only barely turns green at the bow; to feel the power and excitement of the ship on a high speed run; to hear Doug Stevens speak eloquently on the need for Australia to develop her own defence industry; to partake of the hospitality of the chief petty officers in their mess and be given the advantage of their long experience during the voyage; to have A/B Tim Bowers give a full description of the scuba gear the ship carries and how it is used; to feel the power of a magnificent piece of machinery by taking the wheel of the ship under the supervision of QMG Hardy; to adjust to a world whose dimensions are 134m × 14m; to discover that a ship never sleeps; to have the privilege of sharing the comradeship of the Wardroom with the heirs of Nelson's 'band of brothers.'

To put it another way, the RAN is its own best advertising and it should advertise to the fullest — politicians and their staffs, the press, businessmen and labor union officials should be *regular* guests on board H.M.'s Australian Ships. The RAN *must* 'advertise' since people can relate to the basic elements of the Army and the RAAF because they are of the land and frequently fly, while the RAN must take the lead in familiarizing people of influence with the Navy's basic element because the sea is a stranger to most people.

The greatest gifts I took away from *HMAS Hobart* were generous comments the officers and crew made about my country. It was good to hear good things about the United States, our navy, and American ships — like *HMAS Hobart*. It was particularly gratifying to see how proud everyone was that the ship had received the Navy Unit Citation of the USN for service with the Seventh Fleet during the Vietnam War. The accidental attack on the 'Green Ghost' by an American pilot off the Vietnamese coast (the ship having been mistaken for an enemy *helicopter!*) has become part of the lore of the ship. Signs of that attack remain and were pointed out every time I was near the funnels.

HMAS Hobart struck me as being a 'happy ship,' where even men who were leaving the navy at the end of the deployment were leaving with a positive view of their ship and the navy.

More than that, *HMAS Hobart* is a 'class act.' Several American officers who had joined the ship at sea from the American squadron had made the same observation and the Captain asked me what it meant. I told him that, in *HMAS Hobart's* case, a 'class act' is one 'that reflects such a high degree of training and practice that the difficult appears effortless; that the highest degree of competence is the rule throughout the organization and (is) omnipresent without a hint of boastfulness; that makes drudgery easy to bear, that reflects concern for the people who make up the organization; and functions with style and flair that sets it apart from the norm. In other words, *HMAS Hobart*.' And since my return, I am happy to report that I have heard the term used on more than one occasion in reference to the RAN.

And so I am back to my work in the Senate, trying to figure out what a $2 *trillion* debt really is, how to 'simplify' the tax code in less that 1400 pages, to raise taxes without calling it a tax increase and whether the Gramm-Rudman deficit reduction bill will leave the Pentagon any money to continue our military build-up. The Australian Embassy has me down for 'Prayers' periodically. Commodore Holthouse continues my 'lessons' on Australian and his wife Beechie has introduced me to the joys (?!?) of Vegemite and is helping me through the nuances of Washington protocol (*'informal dress'* on an invitation from the Superintendent of the United States Naval Academy means a tie even if the invitation is one to attend a football game!).

But there are times when all of this becomes too weighty. My eyes drift to my picture of *HMAS Hobart* and I am once again several thousand miles away, well out to sea. I recall one night in particular, when the soft murmur from my shipmates on the bridge rarely competed with sound of the ocean as we knifed through the light swells. The moon bathed everything in a pinkish glow, the ships of the American squadron turning rose gold and platinum in color. Ever vigilant, the ships represent the meaning of sea power to me. I was proud to be part of the crucial work being done by them, if only for a short time, for the freedoms we all enjoy were safe in part because we were at sea.

Those Magnificent

Naval Air. The sequences shows
Top — HM Ships Striker and Searcher alongside Station Pier Melbourne January 1944
Bottom — Corsair after 'Heavy' landing on Striker

Men...

Top — Aircraft completes somersault with barrier wire wrapped around prop. Bottom — Belly is cut open to extract pilot. His only injury was a cut on the back of hand.

Photos Courtesy, LCDR D.A. Francis.

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FREMANTLE'S DARKEST DAY

by Vic Jeffery, Navy Public Relations Officer, Western Australia

Wartime security prevented much public detail of the 1945 fire which could have seen the destruction of the Port of Fremantle.

January 17 1985 was a typical West Australian hot summer's day with the temperature being recorded as 107°F in the shade and a heat haze hanging over the harbour bustling with Allied submarines, depot ships, liberty ships, warships and merchantmen.

The disastrous fire broke out at No. 8 berth, North Wharf around 3.15 p.m. and quickly engulfed the *MV Panamanian*, a 15,575 ton merchant ship, before spreading to the Royal Navy submarine depot ship *HMS Maidstone* tied-up immediately forward of the old freighter.

A tired old ship saved from the ship breakers yard by the outbreak of World War II, the Panama-registered, American built *MV Panamanian* had been first placed in service in 1904 as the liner *President*, later to be sold and re-named *Mongolia* and in her final guise as a merchant ship on the India-Australia run.

Under the command of Captain Alfred Bierman, the *MV Panamanian* had arrived in Gage Roads in the outer harbour on 26 November, 1944, coming into the inner harbour three days later to unload her cargo and then being moved several times before ending up at No. 8 berth on that day loading bags of flour.

By the time of the outbreak of fire the ship had taken on 154,487 bags of flour totalling 10,339 tons all destined to be ruined.

The temperature on the *MV Panamanian's* deck that afternoon during loading operations was estimated at 117°F.

As a protection against the heat emitted from the winch he was operating, a winchman placed a piece of hessian wheat sack over the cylinder. During the afternoon spell it was noticed to be smouldering and one of the stevedore's gang stamped this out and left the hessian on the deck. A minute or two later another of the men, noticing that it was still smouldering, picked it up and, as the 8,149 British freighter *Umgeni* was being berthed alongside, outboard of the ship, he threw the bag over the shoreward side expecting it to fall into the water between the ship and the wharf.

As the smouldering bag fell it burst into flame and was caught by one of the horizontal timbers on the wharf structure where it remained burning for a minute or two. Part of the bag trailed on the water surface where it came into contact with the film of oil there, acting like a huge wick.

There was a burst of flame which shot up and ignited some mooring ropes and paint on the side of the ship. The fire quickly spread to old hessian bags onboard and spread to the bridge as well as under the wharf where it is believed the summer conditions and inflammability of the dry wharf timbers aided the blaze.

Soon the superstructure was ablaze, smoke was billowing out of three holds, the saloon and promenade decks were burning fiercely and ammunition for the single 4-inch gun mounted on the stern and the 12 pounder and eight-20 mm Oerlikons, along with rockets, started exploding. Much gallantry was shown as men threw ammunition overboard.

The double-banked freighter *Umgeni* was rapidly cast-off and towed to safety by a Harbour Trust tug.

Within a short space of time the fire had raced westerly along 350 metres of the North Wharf opposite *MV Panamanian* and aboard *HMS Maidstone* where fire broke out on the bridge.

With flames licking its side *HMS Maidstone* was quickly towed out and its fire extinguished. With its load of torpedoes, ammunition and diesoline the depot ship was a floating bomb.

Two US Navy submarines deport ships had previously been moved out of the harbour, along with the submarines bustled alongside them. The fear of detonation of explosives onboard a ship or submarine was a prime concern. On that day there were 13 United States, six Royal Navy and one Dutch submarine alongside depot ships in the Port.

Aboard *MV Panamanian* the fire continued to rage fiercely and all, other than essential personnel, had to be cleared away from the area when the flames reached the anti-aircraft magazine.

The continuously maintained fire brigade of the United States Navy upon the North Wharf for the protection of its own vessels berthed between Nos. 2 and 5 berths enabled fire-fighting measures to be undertaken rapidly. The US submarine rescue ship *USS Chanticleer* steamed up and down pumping thousands of litres of water at and under the wharf with its big pumping plant and breaking up the oil on the water with its wash.

Metropolitan fire brigades and the Fremantle

Harbour Trust's own volunteer fire brigade were quickly on the scene where the Chief Officer of the WA Fire Brigades Board personally supervised firefighting operations.

The first of the metropolitan fire brigade engines to arrive took up a position on the wharf where, unfortunately, it became trapped in the flames and gutted.

After 6 pm., all efforts were concentrated on extinguishing the fire on board the *Panamanian,* and a little later, with the amount of water used for fire-fighting, the ship commenced to list badly to port, which was in the direction of the harbour fairway, resulting in the mooring lines carrying away and the vessel drifting from the wharf and the streams of hoses. However, tugs were readily obtained and pushed the vessel back on to the wharf. The decision was then made to reduce the delivery of water for the purpose of extinguishing the fire and utilise it for the filling of starboard tanks of the vessel in an endeavour to bring her to a more even keel.

Owing to the danger of the fuel oil tanks being likely to give away, in view of the fire then raging fiercely along the whole of the promenade deck of the vessel as well as in the forward hatches, the Naval authorities ordered all warships in the harbour to stand by ready to proceed instantly to the outer harbour. The Harbour Master then gave corresponding directions to all merchant vessels, and thereafter tugs were employed assisting in their removal.

By daylight the next day the fire on the ship had been brought under control and the risk of its loss had then passed; unfortunately, a rather fresh breeze from the eastward subsequently arose and rendered ineffective a good deal of the fire-fighting efforts.

This outbreak led to the one fatality during the fire when a Royal Navy Able Seaman, Kenneth Shooter, fell down a hatchway on *MV Panamanian* while fighting a fire over a hold in which the cargo was on fire.

By 5 p.m. the fire had again been brought under control, and it was then possible to take hose lines on top of the cargo of flour and direct them towards the seat of the fire. At that stage, it was apparent that the fire would burn for several

North Wharf, Port of Fremantle around the time of the 'Panamanian' fire. HMAS Kybra is in the foreground with Royal Navy V-class submarines alongside with T-class submarine to the rear of the V-class. This photo gives some idea of the extent to which the harbour was packed.
Photo Courtesy of Author

days, but that no further danger would ensue; it was a week from the time of the outbreak of the fire until the whole of the fire-fighting equipment was withdrawn. During the same day (Thursday, 18th), vessels which had been taken out of the harbour were returned to their respective berths.

It was considered that the oil that ignited causing the fire was a comparatively small quantity of furnace oil probably recently discharged from the ship and that it had not dispersed, being in the sheltered area between the ship and the wharf.

Being an old ship *MV Panamanian* had many oil leaks in the engine room and regularly pumped its bilges out into the harbour. This, coupled with the surface oil present during the war through Allied submarines emptying and cleansing their diesoline tanks prior to receiving fresh supplies and the furnace oil from the many visiting ships, left a continual film of surface oil in the harbour.

The Harbour Commissioners had expressed concern with this problem and tried unsuccessfully to alleviate it. The fact that more than 600 vessels a year were using the harbour during the war aggravated the problem.

There had been a smaller similar fire onboard the 1,600 ton merchantman *Edendal* in Fremantle Harbour on 1st November 1943, when a cutting plant onboard had ignited gas from volatile oil at No. 10 berth, North Wharf. This brief ½ hour fire caused $110,000 damage.

The damage bill for the January 17 fire was high, including one fatality, more than $1,000,000 to repair the *MV Panamanian* and $50,000 to restore the wharf.

The Eastern Asia Navigation Company Limited lodged writs claiming $1,034,000 for damages to *M.V. Panamanian* and cargo upon the Commissioners of the Fremantle Harbour Trust (today the Fremantle Port Authority). This was defended by the Fremantle Harbour Trust and the court found in their favour.

The Panamanian burns *Photo Courtesy of Author*
The tug in the centre ground helps the freighter Umgemi clear the area. Royal Navy ship HMS Maidstone is shown forward of the burning Panamanian.

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

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PHILIPS

HMAS KATOOMBA — TOUGH SHIP

by Vic Jeffery — Navy Public Relations Officer, Western Australia

No wartime Australian corvette gave a finer account of herself than *HMAS Katoomba*, a ship that spent nearly all of her peacetime life in Cockburn Sound, the present day site of *HMAS Stirling*. This ship, though only a diminutive corvette, had the heart of a destroyer, and was possibly the most famous vessel of this type in the RAN.

The 56 corvette/minesweepers of the *Bathurst* class built for the RAN between 1940 and 1944 were light in tonnage, armament and glamour, yet they served in all theatres of war and gave a stalwart account of themselves.

Displacing 735 tonnes, *HMAS Katoomba* was launched at the Sydney yards of Poole and Steele on April 16 1941 and was commissioned in December of that year. She was armed with one 12 pounder gun, 3–20mm oerlikons and four depth charge throwers.

January 1942 saw *Katoomba* go to sea on her first wartime mission escorting a convoy of merchantmen and tankers from Thursday Island to Darwin. When the diminutive warship dropped anchor in Darwin harbour nobody could have realised that her baptism of fire was not far away.

At about 3pm on January 20, *Katoomba* received the message that an allied tanker had been torpedoed outside the harbour. As soon as she could raise steam she followed her sister ship *Deloraine* out of the harbour. Several miles out a large Japanese submarine fired a torpedo at *Deloraine* which fortunately missed. It then dived and was depth charged by *Deloraine*, followed by *Katoomba*. A third corvette, *HMAS Lithgow* also joined the hunt. The tell-tale oil slick indicated the end of the large Japanese submarine *I 124* of 1 142 tons.

An attack on another Japanese submarine several days later almost ended *Katoomba's* brief career. After depth charging and damaging the second submarine, *Katoomba* was delegated to patrol the area. Around 2am a sudden storm with driving tropical rain reduced visibility to zero. Without warning the *USS Pecos*, a 13 000 tonne tanker loomed out of the darkness and struck the *Katoomba* amidships on the port side, smashing the boiler room and coming to rest with her bows only 10cm from the main ammunition locker. Water gushed into the stricken ship and preparations were made to abandon her. But quick thinking by Cmdr Cousins of *HMAS Katoomba*, and the tanker's captain, saved the corvette to fight again.

Before *Katoomba* lost her buoyancy, two heavy cables were used to lash her to the *USS Pecos*. The next morning *HMAS Lithgow* and a tug from Darwin secured themselves to the *Katoomba's* sides, allowing the *Pecos* to release the cables. She was taken to Darwin where she was dry docked and temporary repairs were made.

By February 19, repairs completed, she was ready to leave dry dock and proceed to Brisbane. But on that fateful day at 10am, 102 Japanese bombers, dive-bombers and fighters attacked Darwin. From her precarious position in dry dock *HMAS Katoomba* opened fire with everything from her main armament to rifles. Though a ship in dock normally does not carry ammunition, Cmdr Cousins had refused to be left defencless.

Only 650 metres away the liner *Neptunia*, laden with ammunition, blew up and showered the *Katoomba* with red hot metal. Fortunately there were no casualties as the captain had ordered all of his crew to take cover when the *Neptunia* was bombed and set on fire.

Some days later the *Katoomba*, listing heavily, sailed for Brisbane at a speed of four knots where she underwent repairs and a refit. She was still at Townsville on the night of July 25 when four Japanese flying boats attacked the town dropping their bombs outside the harbour.

On August 16 *Katoomba* responded to a call for help from the US Submarine *S-39* which ran aground on a reef off Rossel Island while proceeding to its patrol area off Guadalcanal. The tenacious corvette managed to take all 44 submarine crew members aboard without loss of life, and return them to Townsville.

In October, *Katoomba* proceeded to Milne Bay, being one of the first corvettes to do so. From there she was ordered to Buna where Japanese troops were getting supplies and men ashore, apparently by submarine. While in Milne Bay, she rescued the crew of an allied ship somewhere between there and the Solomons.

On November 28 1942, while in company of *HMAS Ballarat*, they were attacked by 10 Japanese dive bombers. Forty minutes after the first bomb exploded in the water a few meters

HMAS Katoomba *Photo Courtesy of Author*

from *Katoomba's* hull, one bomber lay on the ocean bed and another had crashed out of sight. Apart from a severe shaking, the ship was unharmed.

On November 28 at about 6.30pm a Japanese submarine raised its periscope not 100 metres from the Australian warship. It was claimed to have made the quickest crash-dive in Naval history!

HMAS Katoomba was subjected to another Japanese air attack in early 1943 when she was anchored in Oro Bay. This time six dive-bombers roared overhead attacking two merchantmen and the corvette. No hits were scored and the planes broke off the engagement. The rest of the war saw the gallant *Katoomba* involved in convoy work and minesweeping.

After the war *Katoomba* remained in commission until 1948 when she arrived in Fremantle from the Eastern States in company of four of her sister ships. These ships were laid up at Garden Island in the Reserve Fleet Detachment based there.

The old warhorse spent nine years swinging around a buoy in peaceful Careening Bay until the Government announced her sale for scrap on May 2 1957. *HMAS Katoomba* left Cockburn Sound on her last voyage to Hong Kong on November 27 1957 in company with *HMAS Glenelg* and *HMAS Parkes* at the end of a towline.

There is no doubt that the lion-hearted *HMAS Katoomba* added another fine chapter to the proud traditions of the Royal Australian Navy.

BOOK REVIEWS

LAW, FORCE AND DIPLOMACY AT SEA. Ken Booth. Bostone, Allen and Unwin, 1985. 231 pp.

Many readers of the ANI Journal will be familiar with Booth's earlier book, *Navies and Foreign Policy*, which discussed the role of navies in facilitating and ensuring the use of the sea to serve national interests. His latest book is primarily concerned with the implications for naval strategy of the changing law of the sea, most particularly the possibility of increased constraints on naval mobility.

Essentially Booth is pesssimistic about the future. Peering into his crystal ball, he believes that if present trends continue, *mare clausum* (the closure of the seas) is now 'a thinkable prospect' (p. 50). In the face of possible further 'creeping territorialisation' of the seas, predictably Booth comes down very much in favour of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea as an essential step in bringing some order to an area where disorder was growing. Here he refers to 'the irrationality of the Reagan administration' for not putting the signature of the United States to the Convention (p. 212).

There are good grounds for Booth's pessimism. The simple reality of the situation is that many of the rights available under the Convention, particularly certain air and sea transit rights, are not unambiguously available without the Convention (despite the arguments of the US to the contrary). Worse still, if the major maritime powers appear to be picking and choosing as non-parties to the Convention then it would seem inevitable that other nations, particularly less developed ones, will also pick and choose and likely seek wider controls over maritime space.

For the immediate future, the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), now accepted into customary international law, is the subject of greatest concern to Booth. He sees a possibility that the EEZ may be interpreted more and more to the advantage of coastal States, particularly with regard to control over military operations in EEZs. Booth's view of the EEZ seems to me to be unnecesssarily alarmist. Article 58 of the Law of the Sea Convention specifically states that 'Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law apply to the exclusive economic zone'. These articles encompass traditional high seas freedoms, including the right of navigation and the immunity of warships and government vessels. There is a proviso in Article 58 but that relates to the economic purport of the EEZ and there was much delicate negotiation during the long years of UNCLOS III to ensure that residual non-economic rights in the EEZ are reserved for the international community. (I should also add that I believe Booth is wrong when he states that there is 'no special commitment' to 'peaceful purposes' in the EEZ (p.80). Article 88 of the Convention, which reserves the high seas for peaceful purposes, clearly applies to EEZs).

Against this background of uncertainty over the future of the 1982 Convention, *Law, Force and Diplomacy at Sea* is both a timely and worthwhile book. For somebody wishing to gain some feel for the implications of the changing Law of the Sea for maritime strategy, it is essential reading. I know of no other book which has attempted to capture the contemporary situation within the covers of a single publication.

Unfortunately the book is not without its defects. It gives some indications of having been put together rather hurriedly with insufficient depth of research. Some of the references to the 1982 Convention are incorrect e.g. Article 52 and not Article 58, as stated on p. 79, accords the right of innocent passage in archipelagic waters to ships of all States.

From an Australian point of view, Booth is not as useful as he could have been because his perspective is that of the major maritime powers and he gives scant consideration to the great strategic issues in our region which flow from the acceptance of the principle of the archipelagic State. Some of his discussion of archipelagoes is deficient. In particular, I would strongly contest his view that the prospect of problems with overflight and transit in archipelagic waters is not, in general, as great as in straits (p. 108).

Although Article 49 of the Convention clearly states the legal status of archipelagic waters and the sovereignty of the archipelagic State, it is possible that when it comes to specific issues, the major maritime

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powers may be prepared 'to thumb their noses' at such sovereignty. Marine scientific research and arms control measures are examples of such issues (note the large areas of maritime space now virtually excluded from the Seabed Arms Control Treaty by virtue of archipelagic sovereignty).

More significantly from the transit point of view, problems are possible with the designation of archipelagic sealanes, particularly in the situation where the archipelagic State does not designate sealanes. Great difficulties are also likely with air transit rights because of the air defence and identification zones over archipelagic waters which will be regarded as more sacrosanct than similar zones over international straits.

Booth infers that the right of the archipelagic State to suspend innocent passage in some way limits the right of archipelagic sealanes passage, but the two types of passage are quite different. By virtue of Article 44 of the Convention applying *mutatis mutandis* to archipelagic sealanes passage vide Article 54, passage along a sealane through an archipelago (like passage through an international strait under the Convention) *cannot* be suspended.

I was disappointed that Booth did not include some discussion of the possible different interpretations of 'the normal mode' of transit for straits and archipelagic sealanes — does it permit a carrier battle group, for example, to make passage operating *all* aircraft deemed necessary for self-defence? More discussion of the operational implications of issues such as the normal mode, activities contrary to innocent passage listed in Article 19, and the whole question of prior notification of passage would certainly have made the book of more use to both the professional naval officer and the deskbound strategist.

After the earlier discussion of changes in the law of the sea and their possible impact on naval mobility, the last part of *Law, Force and Diplomacy at Sea* considers the implications for naval diplomacy and the utility of warships. Booth dismisses the argument that developments in the law of the sea restrict the ability of warships to perform naval presence missions. On the contrary, he believes their utility has increased because of the more flexible escalation and de-escalation strategies available.

It is an understatement to say that Booth is sceptical about the future as far as the law of the sea is concerned. The 1982 Convention was an essential step to restore order but Booth does not see it as an end. The Convention is less than operational in many respects and in Booth's words, 'the development of a workable law of the sea will require a judicious combination of naval power and diplomacy' (p.212). True words, indeed!

Alhough I found some faults with *Law, Force and Diplomacy at Sea*, these do not detract from the importance of this book. It has much to offer both students of naval strategy who wish to know more about the law of the sea, and international lawyers who wish to understand the naval dimension of the law of the sea. It is worthwhile reading for members of the Naval Institute.

Sam Bateman

DESTROYER MAN, John Alliston, Greenhouse Publications, 1985, pp216, Hardbound format, Price $19.95, Publication Month Nov. 1985.

John Alliston offers us a highly readable book in his chronicling of the ships and experiences which shaped his twenty-two years of Royal Navy Service. The author has had the great good fortune to survive a period, as Sir Anthony Eden would have it 'of slightly exceptional times'.

Twenty two chapters of the book are logjammed with incidents: the pre-war pursuit of Chinese pirates, the seeking out of the destroyed but never captured German cruiser *Konigsberg*, lunch with Admiral Doenitz and his family, the hunting of submarines in tandem with Mountbatten's *Kelly*, the broad involvement in Atlantic and Pacific wartime theatres.

Throughout, the action is vivid yet humanized by its narration through the eyes of a man who witnessed it and was frequently in command. And interweaved runs the thread which the most non-naval person can understand: the love of a man for a particular ship and his responsibility for those who sail in her; whether in his first command, *HMS Decoy*, or in his closest, the beautiful and charismatic, *HMAS Warramunga*.

Commander Alliston's writing craft mirrors his topic; descriptions are elegant yet spare and the words never dwell. His readership receives other consideration. Included in *Destroyer Man* is a thoughtfully compiled glossary of terms, a series of maps which site the action, and the reproduction, in black and white photographs, of the ships which carry his tale.

Peter Clifford

'QUEEN ELIZABETH' AT WAR. HIS MAJESTY'S TRANSPORT 1939–1946

C. Konings. Patrick Stephens Ltd, UK, 1985. 124pp. Sterling price £12.95.

Covers the stirring wartime feats of the largest passenger ship ever built. Completed early 1940, the great liner left the Clyde secretly for New York, and subsequently arrived in Sydney for conversion to her trooping role. She transported thousands of 'Diggers' to the Middle East, and then British troops on the long haul from UK via the Cape. Early in 1942 she rushed American forces across the Pacific to Australia, and then, for 3½ years, *Queen Elizabeth* criss-crossed the North Atlantic over thirty times carrying as many as a Division of 16,000 GIs on a single trip.

The book is well researched and has many magnificent wartime illustrations, including some fine sketches and paintings by Australian artist Oswald Brett, who was a member of her crew.

The *Queen Elizabeth* was one of World War II's great success stories. She and the *Queen Mary*, codenamed 'Monsters', came through all those dangerous voyages unscathed due to their high speed and evasive measures. Some claim that their vast and fast troop mobility shortened the war by a whole year!

I. Nicholson

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



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