1. The Australian Naval Institute has been formed and incorporated in the Australian Capital Territory. The main objects of the Institute are:
   a. to encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the Maritime profession.
   b. to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and the Maritime profession.
   c. to publish a journal.

2. The Institute is self-supporting and non-profit making. The aim is to encourage discussion, dissemination of information, comment and opinion and the advancement of professional knowledge concerning naval and maritime matters.

3. Membership of the Institute is open to:
   a. Regular Members — Members of the Permanent Naval Forces of Australia.
   b. Associate Members
      (1) Members of the Reserve Naval Forces of Australia.
      (2) Members of the Australian Military Forces and the Royal Australian Air Force both permanent and reserve.
      (3) Ex-members of the Australian Defence Forces, both permanent and reserve components, provided that they have been honourably discharged from that force.
      (4) Other persons having and professing a special interest in naval and maritime affairs.
   c. Honorary Members — A person who has made a distinguished contribution to the Naval or maritime profession or who has rendered distinguished service to the Institute may be elected by the Council to Honorary Membership.

4. Joining fee for Regular and Associate members is $5. Annual Subscription for both is $15.

5. Inquiries and application for membership should be directed to:
   The Secretary,
   Australian Naval Institute,
   P.O. Box 18,
   DEAKIN, A.C.T. 2600

CONTRIBUTIONS

As the Australian Naval Institute exists for the promotion and advancement of knowledge relating to the Naval and maritime profession, all members are strongly encouraged to submit articles for publication. Only in this way will our aims be achieved.

DISCLAIMER

In writing for the Institute it must be borne in mind that the views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Department of Defence, the Chief of Naval Staff or the Institute.

The Editorial Committee reserves the right to amend articles for publication purposes.

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*The front cover: Armed Trawler similar to that discussed by Mr Michael Thwaites.*
CHAPTER NEWS

The Canberra Chapter has attempted to maintain a consistent level of activity this year. Regrettably, our March meeting had to be cancelled at short notice when our speaker — Mr Don Fry, Managing Director of North Queensland Engineers and Agents — was unable to attend.

However, Mr Michael Thwaites addressed a combined meeting of 20 members of the Institute and Naval Historical Society on 27 April, his subject being 'A Small Ship View of the Battle of the Atlantic'. Rear Admiral R.W. Paffard, CB, CBE, RN Ret'd, shared some anecdotes of naval life in the 1920s and 1930s at a similar meeting on 25 May, and Captain T.J. Holden RAN addressed the Chapter on 'Developments in International Law Affecting the Conduct of Naval Warfare' on 3 August.

Articles based on these addresses will be published in the Journal.

Regrettably, attendance at Chapter Meetings has averaged slightly less than 10% of Institute members in the Canberra area. This proved to be an expensive disappointment, as preparations for each meeting had included the mailing of letters to 60 members who could not be contacted through a circular within the Department of Defence.

Notice of meetings through the post has ceased, as the cost involved did not produce any increased attendance at meetings. Notice of Chapter meetings will now normally be provided only in the Journal, which is inexpensive but allows little planning flexibility as all the arrangements must be finalised several months in advance.

The Chapter will convene next immediately after the Annual General Meeting of the Institute on 22 October, in Legacy House, Allara Street, Canberra City. Our speaker is planned to be Mr Don Fry, who has indicated his willingness to travel to Canberra to address the Institute on the subject 'Naval Shipbuilding in North Queensland'. This promises to be a most interesting meeting, and we look forward to the attendance of members from both the ACT, and interstate.
First Naval Members and the RAN, 1931-1948

Dear Sir,

Captain Bateman in his discussions of the loss of the SYDNEY raised the question of whether or not the British Flag Officers, who served on loan to the RAN as First Naval Member and Chief of the Naval Staff, may have experienced a conflict of loyalties between the Australian Government on one hand and the Admiralty on the other.

This issue hitherto has received little attention from historians but is one of such importance in the development of the RAN that it deserves full treatment.

The fact is that there has also been a definite tendency to play down the great work done by senior RN officers on loan as well as that of those who transferred to the RAN from the RN and RNR in the very early days. This particularly applies to four First Naval Members:

Vice-Admiral Sir George F. Hyde KCB CVO CBE RAN 1931-37
Vice-Admiral Sir Ragnar Colvin KBE CB 1937-41
Vice-Admiral Sir Guy Royle KCB CMG 1941-45
Vice-Admiral Sir Louis Hamilton KCB DSO 1945-48

It should be realised that the Admiralty did its best to select the very best of what could be described as the 'Second Eleven' Admirals; that is those who were not slated for command of one of the two major fleets or in the running for appointment as First Sea Lord.

Colvin, for example, had served successively as Chief of Staff in the Home Fleet, Rear Admiral Second Battle Squadron and Admiral President at Greenwich. Royle had been Naval Secretary, Vice Admiral Aircraft Carriers and Fifth Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Air Services. The real problem was that many Flag Officers didn't want to come. Sir Max Horton refused the job before World War I and Sir Harold Burrough (among others) in 1945. They saw the appointment of First Naval Member as being one with little power and great responsibility. The RAN was run on a shoestring and with the RN was Sir Francis Hyde who as a Rear Admiral J.W M. Eaton DSO, DSC as FOCAF in the early 1950's The only RAN Flag Officer to have served on exchange was Sir Francis Hyde who as a Rear Admiral commandeered the Third Battle Squadron in 1930-31.

Of the three RN officers, Sir Guy Royle had the most difficult time, clashing with the Government over the AUSTRALIA Court Martial in 1942 and again in 1945 after the abortive attempt to secure the loan of HMS OCEAN and two 6” gunned cruisers. Forewarned, Sir Louis Hamilton left the United Kingdom with the stated intention of establishing a Fleet Air Arm in the RAN based around at least two light fleet carriers, whatever the cost and whatever the means. The approval by Government of such a programme before he left Australia is purely a tribute to Hamilton's tact and powers of persuasion.

One other matter which deserves mention is the appointment of Sir John Collins as First Naval Member. Admiral Collins had been considered the prospective first RAN graduate CNS since at least 1941 and the Admiralty were in wholehearted agreement with this selection. They made the point, however, that Collins could do with more experience in Flag Rank before his appointment as First Naval Member was the most internationally Australian Squadron and the Imperial Defence College course Sir John, for one, was hardly likely to disagree, since early appointment to the post meant almost certainly, eventual premature retirement.

In informal discussions the Admiralty proposed a variety of posts, including a year in Whitehall as an additional ACNS followed by an appointment as C-in-C East Indies. An essential requirement for these appointments to be made was the selection of another senior RN Flag Officer to relieve Hamilton. (The latter refused to extend his time more than six months past his original two year term). This, unfortunately, the Labor Government would now allow.

The affair probably ended forever the chance of RAN Flag Officers serving in the RN in exchange posts, as distinct from RN senior officers serving on loan to make up RAN members. The last loan British Flag Officer on loan to the RN was, I believe, Rear Admiral J.W M. Eaton DSO, DSC as FOCAF in the early 1950's. The only RAN Flag Officer to have served an exchange with the RN was Sir Francis Hyde who as a Rear Admiral commanded the Third Battle Squadron in 1930-31.

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Yours faithfully,

James Goldrick
Lieutenant, RAN

Put the Wool on our Backs

I must take issue with BRASDACIER's comments Pulling the Wool Over Our Eyes in the February 1982 issue concerning RAN uniform and the woolly pully. One can only imagine that he must bear some grudge against the Navy that he left after 35 years to make him commit one of the most internationallyfavoured items of Royal Navy uniform as 'impracticable', 'inappropriate', 'uncomfortable' and 'sartorial folly'.

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I wonder if he is aware that the RAN, far from automatically aping the RN as he suggests, has been rather late in the day adopting one of the most practical, comfortable and economical items of uniform sponsored by either the Admiralty or the Admiralty Board.

While the British Army may be given credit for the original woolly pully as an item of combat kit, its use has been considerably widened. The crimson woolly pully of 11th Hussars has no denim pockets and neither has the bottle-green pullover of 8th Hussars, where officers wear it with a tie. The Royal Netherlands Marine Corps has adopted this British design and, without their caps, are hard to distinguish from British forces, the same applies to the United States Marines who have also adopted the same garment. I am not sure whether they are official or not, but in the NATO area a number of USN officers have been observed in black dyed woolly pullys. The Australian Army and RAAF beat the RAN in getting their officers into this popular rig. This garment is now a favoured worked uniform of many Services of many nations.

If BRASDACIER were to take a trip around RN training establishments he would, I think, be surprised to see how many foreign officers discard their official national uniforms and don the RN woolly pully with the addition of their national rank badges — not always distinguishable from RN badges. How widespread has been this popular reaching for the woolly pully by RAN officers is apparent from the numbers being worn throughout the Fleet and in shore establishments. In a recent RAN recruiting film one ship has no officer visible without a woolly pully on his back.

As one such RAN officer who has for several years worn an RN woolly pully on appropriate occasions at sea or on shore, I have found it comfortable, tidy, economical on one's uniform upkeep allowance, and cozy in chilly weather. It is an incomparably smarter and more generally useful garment than the old Coastal Forces jumper that BRASDACIER recalls, one which really was only appropriate as a cold weather item of sea kit.

The Australian Army used to have a Vee-necked jumper not unlike that of some Pakastani regiments, which was another BRASDACIER recommend, but they abandoned it in favour of the more attractive woolly pully. So, fellow members, do not be misled by BRASDACIER's harking back to scruffy Coastal Forces jumpers and Pakistani Army vee-necks. Enjoy the year round comforts and savings on gold braid that will come with investing in the long awaited RAN woolly pully.

Re-Tread Too

WHO SANK THE SYDNEY?

Dear Sir,

It was with a great deal of interest that I read the letter by Joseph Porter (Journal of May 1982) in which he proposed that action be taken to locate the wreck of HMAS SYDNEY as a fitting event of the 75th birthday year of the Royal Australian Navy.

To reinforce his case let me remind members that the Japanese have recently located the wreck of their battleship YAMATO sunk during World War II. They have not released plans of any further action, but no doubt they have something spectacular in mind.

HMS EDINBURGH was located in the not too distant past and a very satisfactory salvage operation carried out at 600ft in the Barents Sea. That operation was a commercial venture — perhaps that's the reason for its success.

Not to locate SYDNEY and use some part of her in the proposed RAN memorial in Canberra could be construed by some as an admission of either a lack of technical skills or just plain apathy.

Circe

FALKLAND ISLAND LESSON

Dear Sir,

The recent Falklands conflict confirmed my belief, expressed in my letter "The Protection of Shipping" (Vol 6 No 1 February 1980), that modern, air delivered weapons are unsuitable when employed against merchant vessels. This is particularly the case when considered in the context of convoy operations where the aim is to ferry large quantities of war materials between two points.

It was interesting to note that the only ship to be sunk by a weapon was the GENERAL BELGRANO which sank approximately one hour after being hit by a submarine launched torpedo. The remaining vessels were struck by air weapons and remained afloat for days before being scuttled by their own crews. The ATLANTIC CONVEYOR, a container ship, was struck by two Exocet Missiles and whilst being severely damaged, her cargo of Harrier Aircraft, and aircraft spares was largely salvaged.

The most effective unit to deploy in anti-shipping operations is the submarine. Surface and airforces have a limited capacity only in preventing merchant vessels arriving at their destination with their cargoes largely intact.

Lt Cdr Frank Allica
NOTICE OF
ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING

The Annual General Meeting will be held at 2015 on Friday 22 October 1982 at Legacy House, Allara Street, Canberra, A.C.T.

AGENDA:
1. Confirmation of Minutes of the Annual General Meeting held on 20 November 1981.
2. Business arising from the Minutes.
3. President's Report.
5. Election of the officers of the Institute and the Ordinary Councillors.
6. Appoint an Auditor and fix his remuneration.
7. Other Business.

ELECTIONS:
Office Bearers:
The Office Bearers of the Institute are:
   a. President
   b. Senior Vice President
   c. Junior Vice President
   d. Treasurer
   e. Secretary
   f. Journal Editor

COUNCIL:
The Council of the Institute consists of:
   a. The Office Bearers
   b. Ten regular members known as Ordinary Councillors

QUALIFICATIONS:
Only regular members may hold office.

NOMINATIONS:
Nominations of candidates for election are to be signed by two members (regular or associate) of the Institute and forwarded to reach the Secretary no later than 6 October. Nomination forms are available from the Secretary.

VOTING:
Only regular members may vote and voting must be in person at the Annual General Meeting.

HONORARY SECRETARY
FROM THE SECRETARY’S DESK

As you will see elsewhere in the Journal, the AGM is planned for Friday 22 October at Legacy House, Canberra, the meeting to be followed by a function organised by the Canberra Chapter. All members in Canberra, or who can arrange to come to Canberra, are urged to attend — remember that the Constitution allows personal voting only, with no postal or proxy votes. Those not able to attend may nominate Office Bearers or Ordinary Councillors, but please ensure first that your nominees are prepared to serve and are likely to be in Canberra for at least 12 months after the AGM. We have had a fair degree of turnover of Councillors this year. More stability next year is most desirable. Please note also that the Council is not a retirement village for brass hats — we would be delighted to see more nominations from both male and female sailors and junior officers. I will be pleased to discuss the functions and responsibilities of Councillors with anyone who may be interested. Nomination forms are available from me on request.

Subscriptions are due for 1982-1983, so please pause to write your cheque this very moment. The Membership Sub-Committee is expecting a record to be established this year, with all subscriptions paid before the new year commences. Please write your cheque before you read any further.

Now that you have paid your subs, I can tell you that the Council has been looking actively at the administrative capacity of the Institute with a view to future needs as our membership expands; it has established a system of objectives to be achieved/amended/renewed each year; and has given considerable assistance to two chapters as part fulfillment of one of this year’s objectives. More details will be given in the President’s Report at the AGM.

My phone has rung several times since I published my name and number in the last edition and I have had a couple of letters from old friends — but the editor has been disappointed in the number who have contacted him. We published a list of ideas for articles in the last journal, so how about scribbling something down and sending it in an envelope with your cheque?

Geoff Cutts

CHANGED YOUR ADDRESS?

Did your last Journal turn up late, or come via another ship or establishment? If it did, then perhaps you have moved and forgotten to tell us. Similarly, if the rank was wrong then perhaps you may have forgotten to amend that too.

During the rush to distribute the Journal to members, a great number of the distribution team make comment on the obvious incorrect addresses that they are aware of, but in their efforts to get the job done they do not have the time to alter the address labels.

If you have changed your address, or rank, or intend to do one or the other, or both, before the next edition please let us know. Just drop a note to the Membership Secretary and advise him of:

- your name,
- membership number (top of the address label);
- new address (or new title).

The Editor
NEW MEMBERS

Commander R.D. Poulton RANR
2 Milbong St
Sunneybank QLD 4109

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HMAS BETANO

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Surgeon Commander P. HABERSBERGER
RANR

Lieutenant K.B. JONES
Russell Offices
Canberra ACT 2600

Lieutenant P.M. MAY
HMAS JERVIS BAY

Lt Cdr R. PRIEST RANR
Brisbane Port Division
HMAS MORETON

Lieutenant I. SCHARNBERG RANR
Adelaide Port Division
HMAS ENCOUNTER

Lieutenant R.J. SHERWOOD
HMAS CANBERRA

Lieutenant M.J. SINCLAIR
HMAS SWAN

Lt Cdr K.V. TAYLOR RANR
Sydney Port Division
HMAS WATERHEN

SUBSCRIPTIONS

Members are reminded that subscriptions for 1982/83 are due on or before 1 October 1982. Early payment would greatly assist your council. A format to assist you in the payment of subscriptions is enclosed with this edition of the Journal.
During 1980, I was fortunate to pay a long visit to Britain, partly holiday, but mostly to indulge my retirement pursuits of genealogy and history generally. In planning my trip, I decided, as I had designed Naval Operations Rooms in Melbourne and Canberra, that I would like to see the British Cabinet War Rooms underneath Whitehall, in London. I had heard much about this complex of rooms where Winston Churchill and other Second World War leaders met and made historic decisions, so I wrote to the British Government accordingly, and duly received a polite reply inviting me to attend on a specified time and date.

Before proceeding further, I must hark back 40 years to war-torn London. At the western end of Whitehall there is a large office block which then housed many ministries. Its side facing Whitehall was the Home Office; that facing Parliament Square, the Treasury (bombed out of its office on the far side of Downing Street); that facing King Charles Street, the Operations Rooms of the Air Ministry; and that facing St James Park, the offices of the War Cabinet. On the 3rd and 4th floors of this block, many sets of rooms were occupied by various Ministers, with small staffs.

To the right of the great bronze doors opening on to St James Park, the ground and 1st floor rooms had been given over to Mr Churchill and his personal entourage because No 10 Downing Street was 200 years old and, having no steel girders, was vulnerable to air attack. Indeed bombs had exploded in the back garden and kitchen there. The Prime Minister ate, and often held meetings, at No 10; but he slept and spent much of his time in this block, in a part known as the ‘10 Downing Street annexe’. His secretaries, Martin, Peck, Rowan and others, worked in the ground floor rooms adjacent to his bedroom, and he also had a private Map Room run by Captain Pim, RNVR, a most necessary facility.

On the floor above, were the offices of his P/A, Major Sir Desmond Morton; his ADC, Commander Thompson RN; his scientific adviser, Prof. Lindemann; and also a mess for his entourage. Below the PM’s own rooms, and extending to the north west corner of the block, was the fortress basement in which worked and lived the Cabinet Secretariat, the JPS and the JIS. So, night or day, he only had to phone and an aide could be with him in 2 minutes.

The famous War Rooms in the basement comprised a warren of narrow passages and over 150 rooms. I understand credit for its existence belonged to two men, General Sir Leslie Hollis, Churchill’s deputy CSO in the War Cabinet offices, and a messenger named Mr Rance. What happened was that, long before it was occupied, the then Colonel Hollis had seen the need for such a headquarters. He, and Office of Works messenger Rance, set to work on their own in the greatest secrecy, to prepare this underground headquarters for its ultimate use. All their materials arriving at the imposing St James Park entrance were, despite raised eyebrows, consigned to ‘Mr Rance’s room’, a cover for the project. A charming old gentleman in the War, Rance had once been a Warrant Officer in the army unit garrisoning the Indian Penal Settlement in the Andaman Islands and was, by all accounts, a shrewd operator and ‘cutter of corners and red tape’. It was he who went around the offices with a chronometer adjusting all clocks to GMT, on the direct order of the Prime Minister. It had been the practice of the JPS to keep their clocks 10 minutes fast so they would never be late for meetings. One day, Churchill had suddenly decided to attend a D of P’s conference. On arriving, he looked at the clock and apologised for being late. Then, glancing at his watch, he saw that he had arrived dead on time. Most annoyed, he ordered steps to be taken to see that ‘this never occurred again’.

The basement was designed as a retreat for the War Cabinet in the event of a landing by enemy parachutists. There was an office, a bedroom and a small dining room for the PM; bedrooms for Attlee, Bevin, Beaverbrook, Eden, Sinclair and other members of the War Cabinet, who used them on nights of heavy raids; and bedrooms for Sir Edward Bridges (secretary of the War Cabinet), General Ismay (the PM’s principal Staff Officer), Brigadier Hollis RM (his deputy), Colonel Jacob (Communications),
Brendan Bracken, Harvey Wyatt and other members of the War Cabinet office. There was also a big room where the War Cabinet met on nights of air raids; a similar one for the Chiefs of Staff; accommodation for typists; a large Map Room staffed by 12 Officers of the 3 Services; and an Army mess where a snack or lunch could be had. Behind a curtain in one corner, Royal Marine orderlies could heat soup or produce a dish of hams, tongues, biscuits and cheese. It was a ‘no frills’ time.

It was with some excitement that I approached the St James Park entrance at 1000 on Wednesday 19th June 1980, having walked several miles from my flat in Chelsea, and saw half a dozen people waiting. Our guide, Mr C. Truter, then escorted us inside, relieved us of all top-coats, umbrellas, hats, sticks, briefcases and handbags, and gave us each a torch. After a description of the history of the War Rooms, he said ‘Now follow me closely, and mind your heads.’ Our descent reminded me of the lower deck of a battleship. White paint was everywhere, and along the ceilings of the narrow passages ran a mass of cables carrying light, heat, telephones and air-conditioning to the numerous rooms, many of which resembled ships’ cabins. It was ‘mind your heads’ indeed. There was a special telephone exchange here during the War, from which GPO engineers had laid deep underground lines to the headquarters of the various Commands outside London and to Edinburgh, Glasgow, Cardiff, Birmingham, etc., so that, should all London exchanges be destroyed, lines to these centres would be unaffected. The basement was fire and flood proof and had a 4ft thick layer of concrete between it and the ground floor of the block. It had held ample medical stores and was provisioned for 3 months. So even had German paratroopers temporarily seized central London, the fortress would have closed up like a mussel, and the PM and his advisers would have been able to continue to direct the war effort.

As we filed through this labyrinth, we saw rooms of interest, in which once slept or worked cabinet ministers, generals, admirals, air-marshals, and one little cubicle where Mr Churchill spoke to President Roosevelt almost daily by transatlantic telephone. We then entered the PM’s bedroom-cum-office, not large, with a single bed at one end and a desk with a microphone at the other. I sat in the chair in which Churchill made many of his famous wartime speeches. Then to the Chiefs of Staff conference room, and the rooms where that most secret committee, the London Controlling Section (which handled Deception) worked under the brilliant Colonel John Bevan. Next came the Map Rooms where teams of officers toiled 24 hours a day to show the higher-ups the latest War situation.

I saw maps, charts, message chutes and document trays, all ready for immediate use, and was astonished to see messages dated 1945 still on desks and in trays. Here elderly or wounded officers stuck pins on maps to show the position of troops on all battle fronts, the position of every ship in the Navy, and every RAF squadron. They produced a daily report based on signals from Commands, ship sinkings, enemy aircraft shot down, and it was the duty of a Lieut-Colonel Weber-Brown to take a copy of this summary every morning to the King at Buckingham Palace.

Finally we reached the climax of our visit, the War Cabinet Room where they would sit at a large table around the room in the form of a hallow square. We were allowed to sit down and, as the original place-names were still on the table, I became ‘Sir Stafford Cripps’. While thus seated, we were told more of the history of the basement, which was created mainly from the old wine cellars of the original mansions within the old Palace of Whitehall. Then came the most moving time of our inspection. Mr Truter played for us records of Winston Churchill’s wartime speeches, and it was an unforgettable experience to sit there, under busy London, and hear that inimitable voice in his secret headquarters, and in the very room in which he presided. I then sat in the PM’s chair, after which we filed back to our starting point where we retrieved our belongings.

Up on the ground floor, with high ceilings and wide corridors to greet us again, we passed the spot where once stood the famous hat-stand. On it on most days during the War, only 4 hats hung; but what ‘brass hats!’ They belonged to the Chief of Naval Staff, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the Chief of Air Staff and Lord Louis Mountbatten. Surely no hat-stand in the kingdom ever had to withstand such a weight of brass.

About midday we emerged into the street and the peaceful world of Westminster in 1980, our minds full of the history we had seen underneath the streets, the convoys dotted on the seven seas, the armies rolling across Europe, the bombing missions. For my part, I shall never forget my journey back in time in that Churchill ‘shrine’, the Cabinet War Rooms, which are now to be preserved forever by the British government’s Department of the Environment.
SEAPower '81 — Revisited

There will be no ANI Seminar in 1983. This will be a disappointment for most members so perhaps we should take the opportunity to investigate whether any lessons were learnt from SEAPower '81.

The February '83 edition of the Journal will be devoted to articles based on the topics discussed at the last Seminar. In the light of the Falklands crisis, does some of our thinking need to be updated?

For those who did not attend the seminar now is your chance to express your point of view on any of the subjects discussed. For those who attended but were not heard, now is your chance to ask questions or put forward a point of view. Those who presented papers may care to add to, or revise the opinions and judgements presented during SEAPower '81.

Copies of the Proceedings are still available at $12 per copy and these contain the papers presented at the Seminar.

SEAPower '81 Proceedings are available from the Treasurer whilst articles and other contributions should be forwarded to the Editor by 20 December 1982.

Contributions

Production of the Journal is no easy task. The Editorial staff rely on contributions in the way of major and minor articles, letters and snippets of humour, to keep the journal interesting and professional.

One does not have to be a professional author nor a Member of the ANI to submit an article. If you have something to pass on to Journal readers, but you are worried about your literary ability, then send it in with a note granting permission for the Editor to use his Editorial licence.

The choice of the subject is yours. There will be no recriminations, nor adverse comments. Use your own name or a nom de plume. Photographs appropriate to the article are a help, but we can assist in the provision of these if needs be.

In case you need a starter, here are some ideas we would like to see developed, but do feel free to write on any other subject:

- Articles from members of ships companies of our newest — or oldest — vessels, on technical and/or habitability aspects.
- Articles of historical value — ships, places, events, personalities.
- Briefs on the roles and functions, current tasks of (small) establishments such as AJWE, AJASS, SAMR, RANTAU, RANSTT . . .
- Far more short pieces on shiphandling, Technical topics or, if you wish to make the point that no one listens to, Nobody Asked me, But . . .
- Articles from non-RAN members on the latest moves in their own Services or Organisations.
- Some general pieces on, say, maritime/military strategy, seapower, old/new weapons, training and education, organisation of the RAN/Defence structure, role of chaplains, recruiting policy/practice, feeding/drinking/sporting habits in the RAN, management/leadership etc., etc., etc.
Royal Swedish Navy has taken delivery of Hugin-class patrol boat no. 14 in a series of 16.

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AUSTRALIA’S NAVAL STRATEGY
FOR THE NEXT DECADE

By Squadron Leader D.K. Palmer

Australia’s current, short term economic outlook is gloomy. Low building project approvals and business and consumer confidence, high unemployment and interest rates, and trade and balance of payment deficits have led to the largest quarterly increase in the Consumer Price Index for five years \(^1\) and suggest that a recession, at least, is imminent. This will require the Government to be even more stringent in its future budgetary planning. At a time of no perceived external threat to Australia, nor it seems, the likelihood of one developing in the short term, political pressure will make expenditure on defence extremely hard to justify over other more electorally acceptable items.

Unco-ordinated and contradictory policies which result from the lack of a clearly defined and enunciated national aim, which has the overwhelming support of the population at large, could be contributing to the gloomy economic outlook. The exercise of determining a national aim, based on a consideration of Australia’s vital interests, would at least consolidate thinking and compel the appropriate decision makers to think through the problems confronting Australia. In addition, such an aim would help to unify a society which is currently polarized and lacking in consensus, \(^2\) and provide the basis for the development of a national strategy and subordinate and supportive strategies, of which economic strategy is but one.

Another subordinate strategy is naval strategy, which is one factor in the determination of defence expenditure. The determination of a pertinent naval strategy is the first step toward ensuring that essential naval capabilities are acquired without pecuniary waste.

This essay aims to determine an appropriate naval strategy for Australia for the next decade. To achieve this, the nature of strategy, in particular naval strategy, will be examined and applied to Australia’s defence environment. Although the essay is concerned with the formulation of naval strategy, some consideration of the commercial element of maritime strategy will be necessary. \(^3\) Also, given the decade under consideration, the place of air power in sea power is considered proven, thus naval strategy encompasses the full use of the air above the sea. \(^4\) Finally, for the purpose of the essay, Australia’s assumed National aim is that Australia aims:

- to remain a democratic country
- to protect the sovereignty of her mainland, islands, offshore resources and protectorates
- to avoid war and to promote peace
- to provide a steadily increasing standard of living for her citizens
- to maintain cordial relations with other nations
- to provide support to poorer nations.

Nature of strategy

Despite (or perhaps because of) many informed writings on the subject, there is confusion over the meaning of strategy when used in a military context. One reason for this is the increasing use of the word in business. Confusion occurs when elements of these definitions, which may be adequate in business, are used in the military arena. \(^5\) Another reason, helped by the fallacy of equating strategy with destruction, \(^6\) is the failure to isolate equipments and tactics from discussions on strategy. These are aspects which must necessarily support strategy, but are really ‘instances of, or plans formed according to,’ strategy. \(^7\) The final source of confusion to be mentioned here is the popular usage of the word to mean ‘intercontinental’ or ‘surpassing borders’ thereby introducing the concept of distance into consideration. This may not necessarily be a valid qualification of strategy.

A useful starting point to help clear away some of the confusion is a look at the place of strategy in the order of things. Strategy fills the gulf between the national aim and doctrine. To gain further perspective, doctrine is defined as:

‘Fundamental principles by which military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.’

As a concept, strategy should be considered as a system of hierarchical, inter-related tiers. Each tier contributes to the achievement of the
national aim but is subordinate to the tiers above. To illustrate this concept, consider terms such as 'grand strategy' which is immediately subordinate to the national aim and whose role is:

'to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war — the goal defined by fundamental policy,' and 'military strategy', subordinate to grand strategy and defined as:

'The art and science of applying the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force.'

To complete the concept as it applies here, maritime strategy is an integral part of military strategy, while naval strategy is an integral part of maritime strategy. The concept and definitions require further refinement and clarification.

Firstly, because strategy is concerned with attaining objectives, the objectives must be attainable with the power and resources available. Bearing in mind that 20th century war is fought in four dimensions — operational, logistical, social and technological — the relevance of the power available in each dimension must be carefully considered before strategies are determined. Not only must the national aim and strategies selected serve the nation's vital interests, they must have the full support of the population and be technically, operationally and economically achievable.

The fallacy of 'equating strategy with destruction' has a more serious consequence when it veils the thought that the 'essence of strategy is control, that is to establish control ... strategy seeks to establish control, not necessarily to destroy.'

Although the attainment of objectives is cited in the definitions of grand and military strategy already given, on some occasions all that may be necessary is to deny an objective to the enemy. Instead of winning, all that may be necessary is not losing. Liddell Hart believes that the 'perfection of strategy would be, therefore, to produce, a decision without any serious fighting.' Thus strategy has to do with deterring an enemy as well as actually fighting him.

The notions of control and deterrence as a part of strategy have been well recognized in traditional naval strategy. Three aspects of naval power have been sea control, projection and presence. An examination of these, reveals that sea control keeps the seas open for commercial and military traffic of all kinds, projection makes the application of military power overseas possible, and presence enables pressure, short of actual force, to be brought to bear. Sea control is easier to deny than maintain because lines of communication can be cut at any point (sea control denied) but they must be maintained throughout their entire length (sea control maintained). This does not mean that sea control must be maintained all times in all places, but that it must be maintained when and where necessary. Without sea control, projection and presence are impossible.

Deterrence is achieved by naval presence. Typically during periods of heightened international tension or outbreaks of limited war, nations despatch naval forces to the area to signal intentions and interest. 'Gunboat diplomacy' as it is sometimes called, is often effective because naval forces can provide a flexible response without necessarily escalating these situations or producing undue demands on the resources of the protagonists: should the situation then deteriorate, forces are available if required.

A country's strategy must be determined after a full consideration of the enduring features, such as geography, and the changing features such as intelligence assessments, economic trends and new technological developments. Thus strategy is not a static concept but one which is continually evolving. Throughout, the principle of maximizing the advantages and minimizing the disadvantages inherent in the features under consideration is pertinent. Should there be no discernible external threat when viewed from within, a view from the standpoint of a potential enemy, must be taken. Should this disclose potential weaknesses which might be exploited militarily, there is a requirement to develop a countering strategy.

**Australia’s defence environment**

Australia is a vast island continent, isolated from the major world powers and has a wide range of climatic conditions and terrain. It has extensive maritime resource areas which are gaining in size and importance, and strategically important offshore territorial interests. Any approach, apart from the north, involves a long, ocean transit. The country is underdeveloped with the exception of urban, industrial concentrations in the eastern, south-eastern and south-western coastal fringes where the small population is situated. The national communications network of road, rail and telecommunications is not well developed in the north and north-west, nor are there many large airfields or ports in these areas.

Australia depends heavily on seaborne trade of which less than five percent is carried in its own flag carriers. Huge deposits of minerals located in the north and west must be transported overseas and to the processing centres in the industrialized portions of the country. Australia’s principal trading partners are the United States of America (US), Japan and the European Economic Community, while a major proportion of
petroleum products are imported from the Middle East. Australia has limited capability to process raw materials into munitions and defence equipment nor is it fully self-sufficient in all the resources required. The dependence on seaborne trade is not likely to diminish in the foreseeable future.

In its use of military forces, Australia has traditionally supplied support to larger overseas forces rather than operated independently. In the last 10 years, Australian doctrine and procedures to enable more independent operations have been developed, bearing in mind the requirement to maintain interoperability with allies. In 1975 a major defence reorganization was effected when a single department replaced the then existing three service departments and a Chief of Defence Force Staff (CDFS) was appointed to command the Australian Defence Force (ADF). By Ministerial directive, CDFS commands through Single Service Chiefs of Staff, or if he so chooses, directly by the appointment of a Joint Force Commander. However, as yet, CDFS has no permanent, suitable staff or facility through which to command and control the ADF in time of hostilities.

Concurrent with these changes came the acknowledged realization that, given its economic circumstances, Australia is a regional, rather than a world, power. In comparison to regional countries, Australia's Gross National Product (GNP) and GNP per capita are still significantly higher than those of many neighbouring countries. However, the percentage average GNP growth of the ASEAN countries for the decade 1970-80 was higher by a factor of two in all cases but one; a factor of 4.6 applies in Singapore's case. Should this continue, Singapore's GNP per capita may challenge Australia's by the middle of the decade.

Other changes in the economies of regional countries which have implications for Australia's defence are the industrialization of ASEAN countries, particularly Singapore and the Republic of Korea (ROK). The ROK claims that it is capable of constructing all its military equipment under licence. Singapore is starting to develop high technology industries and could pose a serious challenge to Australia's current technological advantage by the mid-1980s. These changes are relevant because Australia's industry currently has a limited capacity to support defence and will require massive financial investment to match the ASEAN countries. Allied to these changes are the future, likely developments in technology which will exert considerable influence in the military sphere by increasing the capability of sensors and weapons, and improving automatic data processing and communications. Real challenges to Australia's economic, technological and industrial advantages will occur during the next decade.

Australia is a member of the United Nations Organization and a signatory to several treaties and agreements. Major treaties are the ANZUS and the Five Power Arrangements which are consultative military alliances; the former is between Australia, New Zealand (NZ) and the US; while the latter includes the United Kingdom, Australia, NZ, Malaysia and Singapore. The Radford-Collins agreement is a major agreement which provides for the Allied Naval Control and Protection of Shipping. A changing feature which must be carefully monitored is intelligence. As stated previously there is no discernible, external military threat to Australia, nor in the short term, the likelihood of one developing. In order to promote stability, and prevent war, Australia provides support in the form of training and equipment to regional countries, and contributes to international peacekeeping forces.

To sum up the defence environment, several features require emphasis. Firstly, Australia is an island continent. This may be regarded as the central and most important factor in Australia's defence, and because it is an island, Australia is vulnerable to two threats, invasion or blockade. All other possibilities are lesser variations of these two. These are universal and permanent factors in any strategy which may be developed. In the short term, Australia will be unable to reduce her economic or technological dependence on seaborne trade; her strategies will be constrained by budgetary considerations; no external threat is apparent, but her regional technological, economic and industrial leadership will be challenged.

**Proposed naval strategy**

On close examination, Australia's aims assumed earlier appear contradictory. Protecting sovereignty could conflict with avoiding war, while providing increasing standards of living could conflict with maintaining cordial relations and with supporting poorer nations. Putting aside third parties, these aims can be translated to a military strategy of deterring a potential enemy, and, should the deterrent fail, winning the ensuing war. To develop this military strategy into a naval strategy for the next decade will require a closer examination of the nature of deterrence and the implications should it fail.

An effective deterrent will have to convince a potential enemy that the effort required to achieve an aim which is contrary to Australia's interests is not commensurate with the likely gain. The perception of the potential enemy is of paramount importance in this concept, because ultimately it is he, who decides whether the deterrent is effective. To this end deterrent forces are usually highly visible and have a demonstrable capability.
During periods of low defence spending, the economists' law of comparative advantage can be usefully adapted to deterrence by not only maximizing advantages and minimizing disadvantages, but utilizing the concept of disproportionate response. Disproportionate response in this context means progressively incorporating into the ADF those capabilities which will require a potential aggressor to respond disproportionately in cost terms, in one or more of money, time, material or manpower, in order to gain an advantage. Ideally, because it is cheaper than entering some sort of arms race, it is cheaper than entering some sort of arms race, or conflict with another nation, the deterrent should prevent a threat from developing rather than be a reaction to a perceived threat.

That it is cheaper to prevent, rather than to react to threats is often overlooked, but within reasonable limits is obviously true. If a threat is perceived where none previously existed, the deterrent has failed to some extent and, more importantly, the threat must be countered. This requires the allocation of more funds or a diversion of funds from other areas which may expose an additional exploitable weakness and encourage a new threat.

Deterrence is basically a defensive strategy. History cautions against a static defence, as does Liddell Hart:

'Economy of force and deterrent effect are best combined in the defensive — offensive method, based on a high mobility that carries the power of quick riposte'.

This needs to be taken further. Being vulnerable to blockade as well as invasion, Australia must be able to deter a potential enemy by being capable of both gaining and denying sea control. If deterrence is to be successful the potential enemy must be convinced that Australia possesses capabilities to control the sea it needs to control and to deny the sea it has to deny. These are the fundamental, naval, deterrent requirements; they may, however, require capabilities to project power or presence.

If the enemy is not convinced that Australia possesses the capabilities to control the sea it needs to and deny the sea it has to, deterrence will fail and conflict ensue. In this event Australia would require a wide range of capabilities to provide options in dealing with the same fundamental threats by maintaining or denying sea control. These almost certainly will require capabilities to project power and presence. The implementation of these and the necessary superior, strategies for the coming decade requires careful planning, in particular for the acquisition of the capital capabilities which require long lead-times to introduce into service.

The strategies must be achievable within the total resources available. Australia must commit enough resources to defence to deter, and if necessary to win. The temptation to underspend on defence, particularly capital investment, in an effort to ameliorate the effects of the economic recession must be resisted. If reductions in current expenditure are absolutely necessary and providing the current threat assessments allow, they should be achieved by reducing operating costs. Capital expenditure now is necessary to safeguard the future. Delicate judgement must be made because too little defence expenditure might encourage adventurism on the part of an aggressor, too much might hinder economic recovery.

Treaties are valuable sources, both quantitatively and qualitatively, of additional resources, but absolute reliance upon them is foolhardy. Treaties are particularly relevant to deterrence, but Australia must strive for self-reliance. Australia requires accurate intelligence in order to monitor threat developments and make the fine economic judgements necessary. Accurate intelligence requires adequate surveillance and reconnaissance, some of which is at present supplied through treaties and may not be available in times of conflict. A greater self-sufficiency in high technology, surveillance and reconnaissance should be a goal for the decade.

Command and control capabilities must be improved by the provision of a permanent facility and staff for CDFS. This requirement is particularly pertinent for the command of naval forces as they are often employed as deterrent forces, in times of heightened tension, when strict control is essential. Effective command and control, combined with accurate intelligence ensures that forces are at the right place at the right time and is a significant force-multiplier.

In order to accomplish the aim of promoting peace and to support the stance for regional stability, Australia should look to closer defence links with regional countries. Provision of training facilities should continue, while more combined exercises would provide an opportunity for better assessment of their military capabilities (and for them to assess ours), experience in working together, and a signal to other, more distant countries.

As for specific capabilities, the strategy calls for forces capable of performing the entire range of naval operations from open ocean defence and offence in all three mediums, (sub-surface, surface and above surface) to inshore sea denial, along with the logistical and technical support to back them up. The platform from which each capability is provided, the numbers of platforms and weapons are matters for continual assessment and are not pertinent here, but some guiding
tenets are. Mobility is one such tenet and requires adequate afloat support. Versatility is another, and implies multi-role, multi-environment capabilities. Inter-operability both within the ADF and with allies is another, and finally Australia must place more emphasis on self-reliance in both operations and support.

Conclusion

Strategy is a multi-tiered concept which fits between the national aim and doctrine. It is continually evolving as changing features are assessed against the more enduring features of the defence environment. To be achieved, sufficient power must be available; thus when resources are limited, strategy must be carefully devised in order to prevent waste. Naval strategy designed in order to prevent waste. Naval strategy is concerned with control, that is maintaining or denying sea control, projection and presence.

Australia, as a vast island continent, is vulnerable to only two threats or lesser variations of them. The dimension of the threats is at present imponderable but suitable strategies can be defined which accord to national aims. These are, simply, to deter enemies, but, if necessary, to beat them in war. The specific quantity and quality of equipments and capabilities is a matter of judgement not strategy, but that is much cheaper to deter than to have to fight, must be acknowledged. In the current defence environment, Australia's naval strategy must be:

'to control the sea it needs to and to deny the sea it has to'.

NOTES AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

2. Cowan, Sir Zelman. Australia Day Address, 26 January 1982. In this address Sir Zelman made a plea for consensus which he described as 'agreement on fundamentals'.
4. This is consistent with the definition of Seapower put forward by, Bull, H. 'Seapower and Political Influence' in Adelphi Paper 122, p 1.


17. Recent OECD rating of GNP puts Australia eighth. See 'Australia at a Glance', op cit.
19. Moon, K. Sung. During a presentation at RANSC on 16 April 1982 by Colonel Moon, (the ROK Defence Attache) this point was repeatedly made.
20. Several Speakers at RANSC have made this point.
21. This assessment was used as the basis for the 1976 Defence White Paper and has been re-affirmed repeatedly since.
22. Rusbridge, P.J. op cit p 45.

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A SMALL SHIP VIEW OF THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC

By Michael Thwaites

This article is based on an address to the Canberra Chapter on 27 April 1982.

In March 1943 while on passage from Recife, Brazil, to Freetown, West Africa, HMS WASTWATER, of which I was First Lieutenant, picked up 66 survivors in two boats from the torpedoed refrigerator-ship SS CELTIC STAR, on her way to collect a cargo of Argentine beef. One of the survivors was a Sergeant of Marines bound for the Falkland Islands garrison. Another was a British diplomat who had actually had Christmas dinner in our wardroom in Iceland more than a year before. Posted to South America, he had lost all his kit except the green silk pyjamas he was wearing when the torpedo struck. As he stepped onto our deck, he remarked "The last two days have given me an idea that will make my fortune when we get back to peace — upholstered seats for ship's life-boats." The cheer we got from the two boats in mid-Atlantic was unforgettable.

Such rescues were among the functions performed by trawlers. WASTWATER, a converted whale-chaser, was equivalent to the many larger trawlers which gave valuable service not as minesweepers but as anti-submarine and patrol vessels throughout World War Two. They could, and did, stay at sea in weather that forced destroyers to retire. Smaller and distinctly less Naval in appearance than corvettes, they were useful work-horses in all sorts of ways. The first German U-Boat I sighted, the captured U-550, was being escorted back from Iceland by a trawler. My first ship, the trawler NORTHERN DAWN, had been in the Norway Campaign, and when I joined her, was escorting convoys 500 miles into the Atlantic from Northern Ireland. I spent a whole year on convoy escorting, in the Atlantic and North Sea, before seeing any enemy action. Then the attack had similarities with recent actions in the Falklands. At sunset, off Aberdeen, German sea-planes from Stavanger, Norway, coming in at mast height, bombed and set fire to the Commodore's ship SS FORTHBANK. The bridge and all its personnel were blown over the side — the plane itself was hit by Lewis gun fire, and dived into the sea. As the FORTBHANK's pumps had been damaged, we went alongside (not without apprehensions) and supplied hoses which succeeded in putting out the fire.

After the fall of France and Dunkirk evacuation, we and other trawlers were among the meagre forces posted to defend the Channel against the projected German invasion of England. I recall idyllic summer days in the picture-book harbour of Dartmouth. By night we patrolled, prepared to sell our lives dearly, armed with a four-inch gun and fifty rounds, two Lewis guns, and boxes of grenades for use against landing barges. Fortunately the RAF's devastation of Göring's daylight bomber fleets, and Hitler's belief that he could do a deal with isolated Britain, caused him to call off the invasion plan (Operation 'Sea-Lion').

We returned to the Atlantic, and to what Churchill confessed to be the one thing that really frightened him throughout the war — the U-boat campaign to cut Britain's vital supply link with the USA. Doenitz agreed. Starting with only 40 operational U-boats, he claimed that with twice that number he could have brought Britain to her knees in the early stages of the war. Several times subsequently Germany seemed very close to achieving that aim.

My title, A Small Ship View of the Battle of the Atlantic, is a deliberate choice. I would sum up our situation through most of those six years as an intimate acquaintance with particular aspects and situations, and a profound ignorance of the broad sweep and strategic progress of the campaign. No doubt the full facts were known to relatively few at the time. Many vital secrets have only been disclosed recently. For the general picture we were almost as dependent as the civil population on BBC reports. It was the BBC news that reported dramatic incidents like the Battle of the River Plate, the loss of the ROYAL OAK, the sinkings of the HOOD and the BISMARCK, the self-sacrifice of the JERVIS BAY which saved most of Convoy HX84 from destruction by the pocket battleship ADMIRAL SCHEER. (However, in writing my ballad on this gallant action I was later allowed access to Admiralty records.)

Perhaps the most striking example of the ignorance of active participants about vital developments affecting the whole future of the campaign occurred in the Intelligence War. On 8 May 1941 the U-boat U110 was captured with her code-books and ENIGMA cypher machine intact. This event was successfully concealed from the Germans; and from that time onward U-boat Command signals remained an Achilles heel for the German war at sea. It was also quote
unknown to most operational personnel like ourselves. Indeed the "Ultra" breakthrough remained a secret from most of us for another 30 years.

Trawlers played a vital part in a sector of the anti-U-boat campaign which is not widely appreciated, although its advent was publicly announced on the other side of the Atlantic. Early in 1942 the American press reported the arrival of "thirty-five rusty British trawlers" to help defend America's east coast. WASTWATER was among these 35 (though, even after a winter of Arctic convoys around Iceland we indignantly rejected the accusation of "rusty"). They had been lent by Britain to the USA to meet a truly alarming situation. When the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbour projected America into the war, almost every anti-submarine vessel in the US Navy was hurried to the Pacific. With no effective deterrence, German U-boats revelled in a "happy time". One U-boat surfaced and sank a ship by shell-fire in sight of crowds bathing at Virginia Beach. Nearly 200 ships were sunk in the first year, including many tankers coming from the Caribbean with fuel vital to Britain's war effort. We and our sister-ship BUTTERMERE were sent from Iceland and found that we were to be based in New York. As we steamed up the harbour with Battery Point skyscrapers gleaming in crisp Spring sunshine, our 18 year old "Guns", polishing his veteran 4 inch gun, exclaimed to an unheeding continent 'Courage America; help is on the way!' His flourish had truth as well as poetry. Heavy sinkings continued, until the reluctance of US Admiral King to introduce a convoy system was overcome. By the end of June convoys, operating in stages in daylight hours, with the British trawlers as the main escorts, had been organized to cover America's east coast. The figures told their own story — 128 ships sunk in the first quarter of 1942, 21 in the second quarter, and no losses for the rest of the year. As far as I know only one trawler claimed an actual U-boat sinking; but the U-boats moved to other areas; and at least that section of the supply route ceased to be a happy theatre of operation for them.

With a top speed of 13 knots, WASTWATER, and trawlers like her, were far from ideal U-boat hunters. Nevertheless her armament of one 4-inch gun, ASDIC equipment (SONAR) and fifty depth charges (sufficient for 10 diamond-pattern attacks) and her manoeuvrability and sea-worthy qualities, made her useful for anti-submarine escort and patrol duties. These qualities did not qualify us for Fleet operations, but did lead to interestingly-varied assignments, including escort of a floating dock under tow, escort of a cable-repair ship, showing the flag in Santo Domingo, patrolling off Trinidad, two months in Recife, Brazil, and convoy escort out of Freetown. In a year and eight months absence from home waters we almost circumnavigated the Atlantic.

With a total complement of thirty-two, including four Officers, very much obviously depended on the capacity of such a small wandering company to maintain its cohesion and morale under the most varied circumstances. In this area, the extraordinary variety of our company, from all quarters of the British Isles, speaking what were almost different languages, proved an asset, and a source of much merriment, as various 'Characters' became recognized, and very little occurred that was not known round the ship. Morale tended to slump when, as once happened, we were four months without any mail from home (far nearer to the situation of 19th Century migrants than to modern astronauts in radio communication from the Moon).

Perhaps the greatest concept in any small ship's company — one concept which technology has not outdated — was the realization, too obvious even to need mentioning, that whatever happened we should all sink or swim together. We also discovered a human heart-beat buried somewhere among the masters of our fate in the distant Admiralty. In response to letters of appeal from our two Captains, pointing out the length of our overseas service, and the effect on morale if this continued even longer, relief crews for WASTWATER and BUTTERMERE arrived at Freetown, and we travelled back to Britain, as passengers, for leave with our homes and families, before posting to our next various assignments in the struggle that only ended with the defeat of Germany and Japan.
THE RELEVANCE OF GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY IN THE 1980s

By Commander R. Burgess RAN

"We have no more reason to believe the days of "gunboat diplomacy" are over than to believe that the threat of force will not be used on land or in the air."

Throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Royal Navy served as the major instrument of foreign policy for successive British governments. In an era when political significance was attached to any naval development, be it that of a single ship or of the whole Grand Fleet, the use of naval forces to exert political pressure gave rise to the term gunboat diplomacy, a term which was to become firmly associated with Victorian imperialism and all that it represented.

Millar's statement in the epigraph of this essay not only supports the notion that gunboat diplomacy is alive and well but it also considers that its use will continue. However, his decision to place the term in quotation marks perhaps reflects some of the uncertainties and controversy inherent in its use. A mixed reaction is evoked from writers and students of naval strategy and international diplomacy whenever the label is applied to twentieth century naval activities. Reactions vary from outright rejection of the term on the basis that gunboat diplomacy is an anachronism, partial rejection based on the range of activities now being associated with the term, to full acceptance of the term in its broadest sense.

Despite the objections to its use, the underlying concept of using sea power for diplomatic purposes lives on, sometimes retaining the gunboat diplomacy label (with or without quotation marks) but often appearing under the banner of naval diplomacy or naval suasion, terms which are, on closer inspection, basically synonymous with gunboat diplomacy.

Was gunboat diplomacy merely a nineteenth century aberration, or does it live on, either under its own name or that of an alias? If the term naval suasion is accepted as being synonymous with gunboat diplomacy then evidence suggests its continuing existence. Luttwak claims that the United States Navy alone has used naval suasion on more than 70 occasions since 1945. Cable, a strong advocate for the retention of gunboat diplomacy as the descriptive term, lists over 60 occurrences in the 1970s. However, the mere existence of the practice is insufficient justification for considering that its continued use in the 1980s is relevant to the conduct of international diplomacy.

The Nature of Gunboat Diplomacy

Definition

Preston and Major very successfully encapsulate the principal characteristics of gunboat diplomacy in their concise definition, which states: "Gunboat diplomacy is the use of warships in peacetime to further a nation's diplomatic or political aims." The three essential elements of gunboat diplomacy contained in this definition are the tool (warships), the time element (peacetime) and the purpose (achieving diplomatic or political aim). These three elements are similarly demanded in the more complex definition by Cable, who states that:

"Gunboat diplomacy is the use or threat of limited naval force other than as an act of war, in order to secure advantage, or to avert loss, either in the furtherance of an international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the territory or the jurisdiction of their own state."

The only additional element in Cable's definition is the requirement that the 'victim' of gunboat diplomacy be a foreign national and the site of the action be on the foreigner's home grounds.

A major difficulty in applying the definition is in assessing what specific uses or threatened uses of warships (limited naval force) constitute gunboat diplomacy. One reason why the term has fallen into some disrepute has been the tendency
to include virtually all peacetime naval activities relating to foreign nationals or territory. Although ‘show the flag’ visits to foreign ports may be motivated by diplomatic or political factors, the lack of ‘threat’ involved in most of them should determine their exclusion from consideration. However, as Admiral Gorshkov points out, warships are an extension of the state, operating with the full authority of the state, and as such, any action will have diplomatic connotations.

The vehicle of gunboat diplomacy

Less difficulty is experienced in accepting the vehicle or tool of gunboat diplomacy. Ready acceptance is given to the lack of restriction on class of ship used, or the number of ships used, and the fact that action by a gunboat does not necessarily constitute an act of gunboat diplomacy. That gunboat diplomacy may be carried out by vessels other than those designated by class as gunboats is well illustrated by McGwire when he quotes Nikita Krushchev as saying on a visit to Egypt in 1964: ‘... the imperialists want, with the aid of aircraft carrier diplomacy, to restore reactionary regimes in the countries of Asia and Africa.’

In the days of ‘true’ gunboat diplomacy, a single gunboat was generally considered sufficient to influence the course of events. The single vessel was interpreted as merely a representative of a greater force which could be brought to bear if circumstances demancted it. In more recent years, the rule, rather than the exception, has been to employ a task force rather than a single ship when pressure was considered necessary. Cable cites the US as being not only the most frequent user of gunboat diplomacy in the 1970s but also the most lavish user — of 12 incidents involving the USN as assailant, 10 involved the use of a one-carrier task force.

Although most authorities recognize that armed diplomacy can be carried out by land based forces as well as naval forces, they also acknowledge that naval forces possess several advantages over the other Service arms, advantages which make the employment of naval forces in a diplomatic role more likely than that of land based forces. Admiral Gorshkov attributes several properties to naval forces which enhance their ability to carry out the diplomatic role. These include a constant state of readiness, mobility, ability to concentrate force, and their state of neutrality while on the open sea. Other characteristics favoured by Luttwak include flexibility and operational range. Naval forces have a greater ability to ‘draw back’ if the situation demands such action. Withdrawal of land forces, particularly if lodged across other than a common border, poses severe restraints on their use.

Gunboat diplomacy as a peacetime activity

The purpose behind an act of gunboat diplomacy must be to apply pressure to further the foreign policy objectives of the home country or those of an ally or client with compatible foreign policy objectives. Booth, to whom current usage of the term gunboat diplomacy is an anathema (he prefers the term naval diplomacy), presents the functions of a navy as a trinity of roles, one of which is the diplomatic role. He defines this as follows: ‘The diplomatic role of navies is concerned with the management of foreign policy short of actual employment of force.’ This association between the navy and foreign policy is echoed by Gorshkov: ‘The growing sea might of our country ensures the successful conduct of its foreign policy.’ Gorshkov gives further recognition to the political aim of naval diplomacy when he states:

‘Demonstrative actions by the fleet in many cases have made it possible to achieve political ends without resorting to armed struggle, merely by putting on pressure with one’s own potential military might and threatening to start military operations.’

Nature of the victim

In his definition of gunboat diplomacy, Cable insists that the victims must be foreigners within their own territory or in territory under their government’s jurisdiction. Such an inclusion in the definition ensures the exclusion of civil war situations involving the use of naval forces against one’s own nationals.
Recent Examples of Gunboat Diplomacy

Despite objections to the continued use of the term, activities which might be termed gunboat diplomacy have occurred throughout the first seven decades of the twentieth century. For example, 6 July 1977, the British Government despatched a single warship, the destroyer HMS ACHILLES, to the Central American British colony of Belize. The deployment was in response to a massing of Guatemalan troops on the border with Belize in support of a renewal of Guatemalan claims to Belize. These claims had previously led to a breakdown of diplomatic relations between Britain and Guatemala in 1963 and to two previous occasions (1972 and 1975) when RN warships were sent to Belize. As in 1972 and 1975, the 1977 deployment resulted in a reduction in the seriousness of the situation. Renewed demands by Guatemala in the weeks leading up to the granting of independence to Belize (September 1981) has resulted in yet another RN deployment to the area. The symbolic nature of the deployments, with their inherent promise of support in depth, has previously succeeded in quieting Guatemalan demands. All of the ingredients of gunboat diplomacy — use of warships (HMS ACHILLES) in peacetime to achieve a diplomatic objective (defusing of threatened military action) against a foreign power (Guatemala) — were present in this occurrence.

On 12 August 1981, at the height of the Polish dissident crises, the largest Soviet naval manoeuvres ever conducted off the coast of Poland got underway. The exercises, involving 17 major surface ships, culminated in a large scale amphibious landing on the Soviet side of the border with Poland. Although both the Soviet Union and the US Department of Defense have claimed, or expressed the view, that the exercises were unrelated to events in Poland, speculation has occurred that the massive show of naval force and amphibious capabilities was intended, in part at least, to influence the deliberations of the leaders and rank and file members of the Solidarity trade union movement. However, propositions considered, and resolutions passed, by the Solidarity Congress in mid-September suggested that the pressure had had little effect.

On 20 August 1981, elements of the US Sixth Fleet were conducting exercises in the Gulf of Sidra, an area claimed as territorial waters by Libya but considered by the US to be international waters. The reported Libyan response to this presence was for two of its fighter aircraft to open fire on patrolling F-14 aircraft from the USS NIMITZ, a response which resulted in the downing of the Libyan SU-22 fighters. Since the event, speculation has been rife\textsuperscript{14,15} that the US Fleet exercises had been deliberately planned for the disputed area to reinforce the US contention that the territorial claim was absurd and not binding on the US. What began as speculation, assumes considerable credibility when the words of Vice Admiral W.H. Rowden, Commander of the Sixth Fleet, are added. He was quoted in the New York Times as saying that the exercise was intended to counter Libya's eight year claim over the Gulf of Sidra and was designed 'as a demonstration of our ability to employ freedom of navigation in international waters.'\textsuperscript{16} Once again, the ingredients of gunboat diplomacy, on a grander scale, were in evidence. Naval forces, in this case a carrier task force, were employed in peacetime against foreigners (Libyans) to pursue a limited diplomatic objective (demonstrate US resolve).

The Future of Gunboat Diplomacy

The actions of the USN off Libya and the Soviet Navy off Poland add support to Millar's contention that gunboat diplomacy will continue to be used. He is supported in this view by Preston and Major who, in the context of future use by Britain claim that:

'Despite gloomy predictions for the Royal Navy, the principles of gunboat diplomacy will remain valid for the future. Gunboating will last as long as any power continues to adopt a maritime strategy in peacetime.'\textsuperscript{17}

Recent acts suggest that there is a future for gunboat diplomacy — what remains in doubt is the nature of that future. Are acts of gunboat diplomacy more likely to result in failure than success? If failure becomes the more common outcome, the resulting loss of face which accompanies failure may result in a reduced frequency of application and a consequent reduction in its relevance in international relations.

Constraints on gunboat diplomacy

In its formative years, gunboat diplomacy was applied with few restrictions. The navies of the European colonial powers and the US were able to carry out acts of naval diplomacy with impunity. In the second half of the twentieth century, however, there are increasing constraints being placed on its potential perpetrators. No longer can gunboat diplomacy be considered as the most logical action to implement when an international dispute arises. Now, the possible consequences must be weighed carefully against possible gains before a decision can be taken.

Perhaps the most effective constraints on the 'muscle-flexing' activities of the major powers have been the post war changes in political balance. These changes have included decolonization, polarization into East and West camps; the growing influence of the Third World bloc and the formation of the United Nations.
With the processes of decolonization all but complete, the most common victim of Western imperialist gunboat diplomacy is fast disappearing. To some extent, Western imperialism has been replaced by Soviet imperialism, and its need to keep its satellites under control has added a new dimension to gunboat diplomacy, eg Poland in August-September 1981.

The polarization of nations into two relatively equal armed camps has further inhibited the action of many countries in their application of naval diplomacy. Action directed against a client or ally of one of the major powers is certain to result in a call for help, and a response from, the appropriate big power sponsor. An example of this can be seen in events associated with the secession of Bangladesh in 1971. US concern over possible escalation of the resulting Indo-Pakistan conflict led to the deployment of a US Task Force in the Bay of Bengal. India, interpreting this deployment as undue pressure on her, called on the Soviet Union for support, which was subsequently provided in the form of a Soviet naval task force. The possibility of such confrontations between the major powers must serve to inhibit the application of gunboat diplomacy in circumstances likely to bring about a call and response for assistance. It also serves to inhibit the response of the major powers to a call for help.

Although polarization has been the major factor in establishing the present power balance, the emergence of the Third World bloc as an influential force in international politics cannot be ignored. Although not able to always (if ever) provide a unified front, the Third World does have the potential, through its combined voting power in world bodies such as the United Nations, to provide support for individual members who may be confronted by acts of gunboat diplomacy or other political pressure. The limitations to the influence of this group are, however, evident in its failure to have any effect on the Soviet Union following the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

The creation of the United Nations in 1945 provided an international forum to which aggrieved parties could appeal for assistance against, or condemnation of, an assailant responsible for acts of aggression such as those associated with gunboat diplomacy. The effectiveness of the UN to respond to such appeals has been effectively curtailed by the veto provisions applying in the Security Council.

Added to the constraints imposed by post World War II political changes are a number of physical constraints. The effectiveness of gunboat diplomacy has often been dependent on the characteristics of rapid response and surprise. To achieve the former, there needs to be either a fleet of sufficient size to permit both a continuous and widespread presence or conveniently located forward bases which would permit a limited number of ships to exert influence over a wide area. Only the US and Soviet navies possess either or both of these requirements, so only they have the capability to project their influence on a global scale.

Successful gunboat diplomacy can often be attributed to the element of surprise which minimizes the time available for the victim to marshal an effective response to the threat posed by the gunboater. Improvements in detection equipment have now reduced the possibility of surprise being achieved. In addition, the availability of relatively cheap defensive weapons (mines, coastal artillery and missile carrying fast patrol boats) has increased the hazards to the would-be assailant after he has been detected.

**The achievement of diplomatic aims**

The future use of gunboat diplomacy is likely to be determined less by a nation's capability to project diplomacy through its naval forces than by its effectiveness in comparison with other means of achieving the objective. The most simple means of solving a dispute between two countries is for one of them to withdraw from the dispute. Such a decision would be based on economic factors (what is it worth) and political factors, both internal and external, eg loss of face both home and abroad.

If, after considering the cost, the decision is made to pursue the claims underlying the dispute, several options present themselves as paths to the solution. At one extreme is the pursuit of a solution through direct bilateral negotiation between the parties in dispute; at the other is all out war. Between these two extremes are the alternatives of third party involvement in negotiations and the application of military force short of war.

In a near perfect world, international differences would be resolved by the opposing parties reaching agreement through bilateral negotiation. However, the same factors, economic and political, which were considered when deciding whether or not to pursue the claims, serve to inhibit the reaching of a solution in this way. Such failure can, and often does, lead to the presentation of the problem to international bodies such as the United Nations Security Council, General Assembly or International Court of Justice. However, even if the problems of polarization and veto provisions could be overcome and a decision reached, implementation of the decision is determined by the willingness of the parties involved to accept the decision.

The rejection of negotiation as an option, or its failure to resolve the problem, places the participant seeking to gain from the dispute in a position of reduced options, one of which is to
engage in a full scale military conflict. Even the most irresponsible state would be reluctant to take this step because of the ever increasing cost, in both physical and human terms, of war.

The remaining option is to walk a diplomatic tightrope and seek to apply sufficient military force to achieve an advantage in subsequent negotiations without inducing an escalation in the level of military input either from the victim or a third country. For reasons outlined, the application of limited force to achieve a diplomatic objective is best left to naval forces. Such an application is clearly gunboat diplomacy.

Conclusion

The term gunboat diplomacy was coined in the latter half of the nineteenth century to encompass peacetime acts carried out by naval vessels seeking to achieve diplomatic or political objectives. To some naval strategists the term, and all it stood for, lost its relevance with the passing of Victorian imperialism; to others it became a convenient heading under which to list all peacetime naval activities; others supported continuance of the concept but preferred alternative terminology such as naval diplomacy and naval suasion; and yet another group sought to retain the original term for a specific range of naval acts committed in peacetime.

Even those who seek to relegate gunboat diplomacy to the annals of history acknowledge a continuing role for military forces in general, and naval forces in particular, in international diplomacy. This role continues despite increasing obstacles to its use, obstacles such as international polarization, pressure through international forums, and a growing capability of even small nations to deter potential assailants.

Despite the increased constraints being imposed on the use of any form of military diplomacy, there has not been any significant decrease in its application. Nations in dispute are increasingly faced with the prospect of failure to reach solutions through either bilateral negotiation or negotiation in international forums, and with the prospect of widespread condemnation or possible escalation if they resort to limited warfare to achieve their aims. Under such circumstances, the actions of nations with the capacity to achieve their objectives by exploiting naval force short of war is very understandable. Condemnation may still follow but at a lesser intensity than that which would follow a full scale military operation.

For as long as the options remain as limited as they are, gunboat diplomacy will remain an important means of achieving diplomatic aims and, as a consequence, will remain relevant throughout the 1980s.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

6. Cable J. Gunboat Diplomacy ... p 39.
9. Cable J. Gunboat Diplomacy ... p 19.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Sea Harrier can be airborne within two minutes of alarm with the latest state-of-the-art weapons. With ski-jump it can launch with substantially greater range and armament loads. Ongoing advances in Sea Harrier technologies ensure performance improvements to take it into the 1990s. Sea Harrier's sortie performance is already impressive.

In high level air combat patrol Sea Harrier armed with two 30mm guns and air-to-air missiles can loiter for 1½ hours at 100 n.mi. from ship with reserves for 3 minute combat.

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In shipping strike it has a radius of action to missile launch point of 280 n.mi.
oes almost without saying that the protection of Australia's sea lanes is basic to its security.

ost of the world's energy, minerals, manufactured goods and commodities are carried by sea.

ith Sea Harrier, small ships as well as small carriers, and platform ships previously limited to helicopter operation, can now have fixed wing V/STOL craft capability.

reater numbers of smaller, less expensive V/STOL ships can disperse and can situate tactical air power where it's needed to protect Australian interests both at a and at locations beyond the effective range of land-based air power.

w, and in the decades ahead, Australia's best forward defence is Sea Harrier ed-wing tactical airpower at sea.

V/STOL IN SHIPS  SEA HARRIER
MV NORLAND, Falkland Force. — Courtesy James Goss

ST HELENA, Falklands Force. — Courtesy James Goss
GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY AND THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT

The Relevance of Gunboat Diplomacy in the 1980s was written before the long running dispute between the UK and Argentina over the Falkland Islands erupted into physical confrontation. I have since been asked to relate the conclusions reached in the essay to events in the Falklands.

In the section headed ‘The Achievement of Diplomatic Aims’ I proposed a series of steps which might be taken by disputing parties in order to find a solution to the dispute. One proposed option was for one party to withdraw from the dispute after due consideration of the economic and political cost of both pursuing its claim and withdrawing from it. There have been reports that the UK may have eventually conceded sovereignty of the Falklands to Argentina but such a move was pre-empted by the Argentine invasion.

If neither party is prepared to withdraw its claim, continued bilateral negotiations need to proceed to overcome the differences which brought the dispute into being. Such negotiations have been carried out since mid 1960 following a UN General Assembly request for the two parties to discuss the problem. These discussions were intensified after 1977 and they canvassed several alternatives involving transfer of sovereignty. One alternative, a ‘Hong Kong’ solution, in which sovereignty would pass to Argentina with a lease-back arrangement, appears to have gained some acceptance by the two parties, but was vetoed by the Falkland Islanders.

When bilateral negotiations remain deadlocked, a further avenue for resolving disputes is to refer the dispute for arbitration by an international body such as the International Court of Justice or the United Nations. Argentina repeatedly refused invitations to take its case to the ICJ and it is doubtful whether she would have abided by any unfavourable decision if that body had considered the matter. This assumption is borne out by Argentina’s refusal to respect UN Security Council Resolution 502 which ordered the withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Falklands the day after occupation of the islands.

The failure of negotiations may result in either maintenance of the status quo or resort to military force. An event which precipitated the Argentine choice of the latter option was the British reaction to the action of Argentine scrap metal workers in raising their country’s flag in South Georgia. This action resulted initially in what might be termed an example of gunboat diplomacy when the only British ship in the area, an ice-patrol vessel, was despatched to South Georgia to ‘show the flag’ and warn off the Argentinians. The significance of this act was apparently lost on the Argentinians who either failed to interpret the single vessel as a token of the British force which could be brought to bear or underestimated that potential threat. Either way, the attempt at gunboat diplomacy failed.

Following the invasion and the refusal by Argentina to accept Resolution 502, the marshalling and later despatch of the British task force represented a further example of gunboat diplomacy, albeit on a very large scale. The initial purpose of the task force was to apply considerable pressure on Argentina while firstly, US Secretary of State Haig, and later UN Secretary General de Cuellar, attempted to negotiate a settlement. The failure of negotiations represented a further loss of credibility of gunboat diplomacy as a diplomatic tool. Once again, the failure may be attributed to an inaccurate assessment of the resolve of the victim to continue with its chosen course of action.

Does the failure of gunboat diplomacy in the Falklands serve as an indication that it is no longer relevant? I think not. What it has served to do is to reinforce the need for more realistic assessment of the likely reaction of the potential victim. In both of the affected nations, political and economic factors dictated that there could be no backing down once a course of action was proclaimed. In other circumstances, with other nations involved, the threat inherent in the application of gunboat diplomacy may have proved sufficient to force the victim to reconsider its stand. Gunboat diplomacy is not a panacea to disputes defying negotiated settlement, it is merely a tool which can be used when circumstances indicate it has a fair chance of success.
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS TRAINING FOR MIDDLE RANKING OFFICERS IN THE RAN — INTRODUCTION INTO THE RAN STAFF COLLEGE

By Mr C. Evans

(The Editorial Committee would welcome members’ views on the subject of Industrial Relations Training of all RAN Officers, not just those attending the RAN Staff College).

It is a popular opinion of Navy Service personnel that industry and in particular the Dockyard are in the grips of the unions. What is of more concern is that the answers to our industrial problems are frequently seen as ‘bashing’ the unions or undertaking tasks with uniformed personnel when civilian staff withdraw their labour, slow down or disrupt work rates for various reasons.

The western industrialised world is now experiencing a period of rapid social and technological change and if managements in civilian or the Service environment are to maintain effective control, there is a need to understand and anticipate changing policy initiatives in ‘employer-employee’ relations, and not simply react to external pressure.

A prime vehicle for preparing the future senior officers of our Navy is the RAN Staff College (RANSC) where a current and comprehensive industrial relations appreciation should be introduced for middle ranking officers. The Chief of Naval Technical Services in question time following his address to the RAN Staff College on 13 May 1981, referred to the need for naval officers to gain a better understanding of these matters. The present General Manager of Garden Island Dockyard has also expressed firm opinions regarding the need for improved training of naval officers in industrial relations matters.

Traditional needs

The training of Service officers has reflected the concept ‘If you want peace, prepare for war’. This preparation has meant procurement of equipment and logistic support, the provision of skilled manpower, the motivation of this manpower with purpose and a will to win, and the development of operational plans and tactical doctrine.

Training for war has emphasised efficiency in the immediate operational task and the training of subordinates for effective command if the commander is killed or removed as a result of military action. Military organizations reflect a wide range of training needs which are complicated by changes in technology and bring together both skill and collective operational needs, geared for differing emphasis on both government and higher military commands as they pass from a peace to a war footing.

There is a danger, however, in restricting training to the acquisition and use of military skills. The need for drawing on the experience and skills of other professions is being recognised, but care is needed to ensure lessons learned are properly exercised. It is not sufficient to apply new skills and experience only to military matters: the military must learn and apply new skills in their dealings external to the Service, and one such area is the field of industrial relations.

Service officers are primarily concerned with the leadership of fighting men which calls for qualities of command. At the more senior level, an officer is involved where military affairs, politics, science, social and industrial matters overlap and he becomes a manager of resources rather than a leader of men. In this aspect, ‘influence’ is more important than ‘command’ and although the management training offered by the Navy prepares in part for this, it fails to provide fully for dealing with increasingly difficult industrial affairs which are bound to impinge more on the military in future.

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The imperatives of change

The relationship between the military and society have been historically fundamental to the structure of our society. The military has had close links with the head of state and supported political power through patronage and force. Today, the military role is a specialization amongst many in our industrialised, technological and highly turbulent social democracy and has little or no influence on political matters. The role of the armed forces in our society is basically to deter attack, and defeat it should it occur. It is necessary in war to maintain stringent discipline, which affects civilians as they become more aligned with military type authority in form if not content through an ideology of common purpose.

In the current environment of rapid social and technological change, there is an increasing need to ‘reverse’ the ideology of common purpose in time of peace. The Services take their manpower from a more emancipated and dialectic society and return their manpower to a society which is continuing to change more rapidly than the Services. There is a clear need to ensure that the Services are in organisation and quality, a reflection of the society which they serve. Above all else, there is the need to manage change and the inevitable conflict which it brings; to achieve revolutionary change at an evolutionary pace, reconciling planning with democracy, the rule of law and legal ‘reform’. To foster this aim, there is a need to know why things are done in industrial relations, as well as knowing what to do.

The orientation of Australian defence administration reflects the roles of both Service officers and civilians in the machinery for keeping in touch, and up to date with circumstances as they change. It is both the rate of change and economic pressures in our society which demand flexibility and understanding in order to operate efficiently, and this is pertinent in the field of industrial relations. Inflation creates middle class discontent and it bends and sometimes breaks institutions; the Conciliation and Arbitration system is such a potential victim. Unemployment presents serious social, political and industrial problems; technological change exacerbates this situation. There is continuing turbulence and we must not confuse industrial passivity at times with industrial peace. The real challenge is through understanding, to find valid ways of reasserting human labor is engaged in the enhancement of human beings and that conflict is not seen as a solution to short term disruption.

Current industrial relations (IR) training

No specific IR training courses are currently conducted by the RAN for middle ranking officers posted for duty in dockyards or as commanding officers where they will interact with industrial areas. Facilities exist through Department of Defence New South Wales Regional Office for a one hour introduction to industrial relations for prospective commanding officers and executive officers in preparation for civilian work force contact, and a four day course for both Service and civilian personnel.

Garden Island Dockyard also runs industrial relations courses either utilising Regional Office, through the Dockyard Training Officer, or by utilising consultants. None of the foregoing schemes, however, attempt to incorporate IR training within a comprehensive management course where it can take its place within the many factors which interrelate for effective management today.

The RANSC charter objectives require students to ‘Comprehend the concepts and practices of modern management as applied to both industrial and defence resources’. Within the RANSC Study Area Two, the management techniques segment is programmed for 209 hours of study, some 28 per cent of the course total and the largest single element. This segment, however, does not display sufficient emphasis on understanding the industrial machinery which impacts more on the Services today and will increase in future for a number of reasons, these being increased militancy amongst a wide range of blue and white collar unions, changing technology and social attitudes, and a planned increase in Australian defence industrial participation which will result in increased civilian/Service interaction and mutual reliance.

Means for improved IR training

The RANSC aim is to ‘... increase the professional knowledge, judgement and competence of selected officers normally of the rank of lieutenant-commander, thereby broadening their professional background and preparing them for command and higher staff appointments in both peace and war’. The foregoing arguments indicate the need for senior Service officers to manage resources and operate more through ‘influence’ than ‘command’. It is inappropriate to expose officers bound for senior positions to an overview of IR in isolation from related aspects of management through which ‘influence’ can be achieved. Indeed Defence Regional Office (NSW) stress that far from creating experts in this field, regions training has the following objectives:

- In the one hour introduction, the training aims ‘... to create in local supervisors an awareness of industrial relations, which it is hoped, will assist them in their day to day supervisory and time management activities’;
- The four day course aims ‘To provide Service and civilian personnel with;"
• A basic understanding of civil industrial relations as part of the total management framework.
• The basic knowledge and skills required to deal with industrial matters arising in normal day to day functions of units, bases and establishments.

Meaningful IR training must occur at the right time and be complemented with the relevant supportive subjects. In the introduction to their book ‘Australian Industrial Relations’, Plowman, Deary and Fisher point out that there is some disagreement regarding the scope of industrial relations studies. Clearly the environment within which the system operates includes the state of technology, the prevailing economic conditions and the constitution which determines the division of industrial powers between Federal and State Government.

Consideration of these elements shows that industrial relations focus on the vitals of living in an industrial society and that it takes its place within management studies as a branch of sociology. Careful selection of the situation for meaningful training is thus evident.

Training content

In his book ‘Study of Industrial Relations’, A.J. Geare offers the following definition:

The field of study of industrial relations is thus defined as the study at either plant, firm, industry, national or international level of the interaction among and between three actor groups:

• managers and their organisations;
• workers and their organisations; and
• the government as a legislative body and as government agencies, concerned with obtaining and regulating the formal and informal rules that regulate the work environment for the purpose of:

• improved ‘labour related’ productivity,
• improving job satisfaction, and
• achieving increased power in the work environment and how this interaction is affected by external variables (such as technology, economic conditions, power groups within society, personalities and personality differences).

Clearly this basis for study will fit well into the Management Principles’ segment of the RANSC course. Incorporation of the additional IR training will complement the main aims of the management section which does not at present complete the scope of matters defined by Geare. Variations to the present course profile should include study of topics such as environmental influences, conflict, parties, processes and rules.

Environmental factors influence industrial relations largely as external inputs to the system and will include economic influences, the political context, the social setting, the legal environment, historical influences, the ecological context and the state of technology. Economic influences are important, as the contract of employment represents an economic transaction. This factor is the basis of job regulation and an important component of industrial conflict. With the ebb and flow of resources in the labour market, economic conflict is inevitable and this factor has resulted in machinery by which control is achieved. Economic conditions can create conflict regarding job security and result in union demarcation issues as each union tries to make the best of reduced employment opportunities.

In this sense, the political context refers to the distribution of power in society and within political institutions as they are influenced by pressure groups (women’s liberation movements, anti-sex discrimination in employment legislation etc). Also, the division of political parties into labour and non-labour parties has seen legislation which achieves employment conditions not gained by industrial action (for example, shorter working hours, long service and recreation leave). Technology is an important external and internal influence, as workers have to accommodate their practices to technology. The substitution of capital and automated plants can reduce the power base of major craft unions. Technological change undermines existing craft systems and may introduce a new technological elite with even greater bargaining power.

For most people, strikes and industrial conflict are one. It is important to properly understand conflict by examining the range of behaviour and attitudes in the industrial situation. The purpose of an industrial relations system is the regulation and control of industrial conflict and so it is necessary to look at the various forms conflict may take, review and major explanations of industrial conflict and look at strikes.

The major actors or parties in the industrial situation are trade unions, employers and, more particularly, the Government, both as an employer and as a ‘rule maker’, and the arbitrators, both the Public Service Arbitrator and the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission. An understanding of the interplay is important to see industrial relations in proper perspective. A range of processes or forms of interaction available for settlement of industrial problems from unilateral decision making by employers to workers’ control exists. The arbitration system converts a bilateral into a tri-lateral interaction should negotiations break down.

Underpinning the IR system is a set of rules which regulate conflict. These rules may take the form of statutes, orders and directions from
industrial tribunals, the rules of organisations, awards, agreements, and custom and practice.

The present RANSC course offers some consideration of environmental influences through a study of the following subjects:
- Human motivation.
- Management styles.
- Understanding human behaviour.
- Computers in management (technology).
- Understanding organisations.
- Environmental factors in management.
- Practical management.
- Personnel reporting.
- Management of change.
- Contemporary Australian society.
- The trade union movement.

To reinforce the learning process, these management aspects are supplemented by syndicate tutorials, case studies, industrial visits and management projects, by the all important exercise of integrating these aspects with the major issues of industrial relations is not attempted. It is important to remember Ruskin's dictum that 'not only is there but one way of doing things rightly, there is only one way of seeing them, and that's the whole of them'.

Procedure for achieving IR training

Recognising that the essence of senior management is 'influence', it will be appropriate to introduce the required balance of training not on demand but as a coherent part of staff training for middle ranking officers who will aspire to 'influence'. Some support and advice can be solicited from DOD Regional Training Centre.

The foregoing information should be used as a guide for incorporation of additional lectures and exercises into the RANSC. This additional training should be incorporated during the management segment of the course and in view of the time available, at the expense of less valuable lectures or by combining with other areas in the management segments of the course. The IR component should come towards the end of the management segment and would require about 10 hours of lectures focusing on the broad headings:
- Overview of Industrial Relations in Australia Today.
- Aims and Resources of Major Unions.
- Mainstream Issues in Conciliation and Arbitration.
- Industrial Relations in the Public Service.

The additional training would best be carried out by visiting lecturers, either current or new to the RANSC, with an appropriate industrial background, supplemented by a visiting union leader of national standing, an arbitration commissioner, and the public service area through Regional Office.

A need exists to introduce current industrial relations training into the Navy for middle ranking officers. This training will by necessity have to complement an appreciation gained of modern management concepts as applied to both industrial and defence resources.

An appropriate venue for this training is the RANSC where with minimal addition of new material the necessary training can be implemented. The additional lecture time would be some 10 current programmed hours of the management segment.

Key areas which are not adequately covered by the RANSC are: environmental influences, conflicts, parties, processes, and rules.

Assistance can be given by the Regional Training Centre Industrial and Compensation Officer with the course content but the burden of lectures should be handled by visiting speakers representing: manufacturing industry, dockyards and academics; the trades union movement; conciliation and arbitration commission experience; and the public service area.

Australia may well be proud of her great war effort since the war came to her doorstep. Without such a stimulus, a similar worthy effort was made in the Great War (1914-1918). But to finance her socio-economic problem in the post-war reconstruction period Australia yielded to the temptation of rifling her insurance account, the defence services. Repatriation of soldiery was made at the expense of defence services which, in a series of reductions, were ruthlessly cut almost to vanishing-point.

Australia should beware lest history repeat itself. She will not get a third chance to save herself from annihilation.

Rear Admiral H.J. Feakes CBE RAN
(White Ensign — Southern Cross)
True-to-Life Simulation

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When is a ship like a camel? — when it’s designed by a committee.

In 1936 it occurred to the Admiralty that the tugs manned by Royal Navy crews were just about at the end of their useful lives. Built, and well-built, for the First World War, they were mostly of the ‘Saint’ class — single screw, coal-burning, with a speed of twelve knots, one funnel and smart-looking vessels.

Some of these ships had been sold to foreign navies or to dockyards on the far side of the world and it was thought that they could be replaced by a class of tug which would be capable of salvage work as well as towing — but the idea of double purpose seldom, if ever, works.

With an extra engine, twin screws, and some extra 1,750 horse power, which pushed speed up an additional four knots, the new vessels would be oil-fired. Optimistically, they were said to be fitted for salvage work, which was a big laugh — or perhaps the inclusion of a Royal Navy Boatswain, was what they meant?

Names were to be fanciful — HMS BUCCANEER, BRIGAND, BANDIT, FREEBOOTER — ever so jolly.

It used to be said that a camel was a direct result of a committee being asked to design a horse of a superior type. Every member of the committee got his pet feature in — like Achmed, who wanted slobbery jaws capable of chewing desert thorns as an economical food source; Deli, who wanted the animal to oscillate fore and aft as well as athwartships, in order to keep the rider awake and Ben Rach who arranged for poisonous breath, to deter strangers, etc.

By the time the designed had tried to satisfy the Board of Trade, the Admiralty, Lloyds, and a few other authorities, my Captain and I joined the vessel, and pronounced it a Camel, well-built mind you, but a Camel all the same.

The ship had some good points and they say that a special band of idiots can always be found who are willing to be put to sea in a vessel designed by a different group of idiots.

Whilst building, certain requirements by one authority, had negated the requirements of another, and when we commissioned the ship we set about altering it to suit purely Royal Navy requirements. Some requirements could not be met without taking the ship to pieces and starting again, so the ship put up with them. These included — if you hoped to steer from a position in the wheelhouse, you were unfortunate, because a 3in HA/LA gun obscured the view forward, and our lack of complement did not allow officers and men both on the bridge and in the wheelhouse.

The charthouse was under the bridge. The seas that poured from a bow apparently specially constructed to throw water vertically, continually washed down the bridge (which was open) so at no time could we use the chart table on the bridge. A run down a ladder, and a climb up again was therefore necessary.

Entering the charthouse from outer darkness, we were blinded by light; returning to the bridge meant we could not see a thing until our eyes got accustomed to the lack of light. Codes of stamping feet on the bridge by the man at the wheel had to be arranged if we were wanted up top when we were working on the chart. The helmsman was well washed down and had to use the same compass as the Officer of the Watch.

A bridge complement of one AB who has to double as lookout is not good, especially if the O.O.W. is working on the chart.

One of the major drawbacks of these tugs was their obsolete system of steering, which had been condemned by every navy in the world, and most shipping companies too. Nevertheless, the 1937 class of RN tugs had it — chain and rod steering. It was not only obsolete, it was

THE AUTHOR

Mr Jack Philip-Nicols joined the Royal Navy on 26 August 1920 and served until 1945. He served in a variety of ships including the last of the K Class submarines. He describes these boats as beautiful, safe, fast, comfortable and happy. In his own words: ‘I joined the Navy as a 2nd Class Boy and due to my unquestioning disobedience got no further than being a Commissioned Branch Officer’.
dangerous, and, on trials, the steering engine was found to be connected incorrectly at the after steering position. A movement of the wheel to port meant that the ship moved smoothly and swiftly to starboard — disconcerting, but remedied soon after trials.

The accommodation for the small crew was not bad so far as the messdecks were concerned, but the plumbing was terrible. Every officer and man in the ship had to rely on one little Ideal boiler for baths and washing, and laundry — the sort of coal-burning boiler that serves a small bungalow badly. If the Captain wanted a bath, the cook saw to it that no water left the boiler in any direction but Captain-wards — he controlled the taps. Stokers, artificers, seamen, and the dog Towser, could, and did, wait. Towser didn’t mind waiting! The WCs flushed only when we had steam on the fire-main. In harbour when not lit up, the sanitary tank, so-called, was pumped up in the same way as in Nelson’s Navy — by hand pump, called by sailors the ‘handraulic’ method. The fresh water was pumped up in just the same way to fill up the galley copper to a tank on top of the bridge — so our glass of water, if we wanted one, was first pumped up twenty feet, then ran down by Newton’s gravity.

A different handpump elevated the salt water to another tank, also on the bridge, so the designers of the camel had arranged that the water to flush the WCs had to travel by a long route with infinite waste of labour up on to the bridge, before gushing down the lavatories. A little too long pressing the button made a lot of work for the AB of the Watch.

An AB of genius worked out that the long overhead journey could almost be eliminated, so he got a tin bucket and a length of thin rope. Then people of modest rank would fling the bucket overboard and flush the toilet with ease. This, in 1937? Oh yes, in less than ten years we were to have the atom bomb.

Never was the Ideal boiler, ideal, it was too small so we reverted to the method of washing and bathing in the 1920 destroyers. A visit to the ship’s cook, a man worthy of many medals (his gear was little advanced on a tripod and an iron pot) and he would give a measured half bucket of hot water from the cooking copper.

The navigational methods were also crude. Until we made and rigged a short boom on the boat deck, we had towed an old-fashioned log astern, and the OOW had to take the wheel as the Helmsman ran down aft to read the log. Equally crude were the sounding arrangements. We had a lead and line and a glorious old electric sounding machine that must have been the first ever made. No echo-sounding for ‘Buccaneers’ or ‘Bandits’.

The compass was magnetic. I had been years in submarines and had had the luxury of a Gyro compass for years. The boats might have passed unnoticed in a Maritime Museum — two Merchant Service boats with oars and sails, that would sail about 60° off the wind and made infinite leeway. We would have been glad to have had two Montagu Whalers, good boats with drop keels, but, Achmed or someone had decreed otherwise. With all respect to the Merchant Marine, they could have ‘em, I think that in any real emergency, they would have gone down with the ship. The design of the davits was pure Harry Tate at its worst. There was a little Merchant Navy skiff, a clumsy boat about thirteen feet long, with no sailing gear, but by a system of gentle persuasion, we managed to manufacture a mast and rigging and the sailmaker of the ROYAL SOVEREIGN made us a suit of sails. It sailed fairly well round Scapa Flow carrying a bicycle and an officer and one man foraging for food during the 1938 crisis.

The ship’s towing gear was ludicrous, though, on paper, it was considered to be the latest thing. We had a self-rendering winch with a drum of 500 fathoms of 4½ inch extra special steel wire rope. As a constant companion when towing Battle Practice Targets, it was a pain in the neck.

The engines worked beautifully, the Chief ERA, a Scot, had stood by the ship, and nothing short of perfection passed him. The boilers, after some teething troubles, became very good under his expert eye. But we could not cope with built-in design defects. A tug ought to have a single screw deep down in the water. HMS BUCCANEER had twin screws which, naturally, had to be shallow. Moreover, the rudder was of the same shape as the rudder on the old paddle tugs of the time of Turner’s FIGHTING TEMERAIRE. There were times when, at certain speeds, and certain helm angles, it made you believe you were riding a roundabout, the proximity of the heavy target hulls to the screws and the risk of wires wrapping themselves round the shafts, made me grey before my time.

The wireless, I am glad to say, worked, and worked well. The Leading Telegraphist was one of those keen types who shine so well in a position of trust and responsibility. The Signalman too, might have been picked from a top class of candidates for Yeoman of Signals; during WWII he became a Yeoman aboard a crack destroyer. The Coxswain was a good sailor, and a good Seaman. There was one regular drunk aboard, but he was sober at sea.

Stirring up Old Wrecks

Down in the hold lurked hundreds of fathoms of large manilla rope, great for long sea towing, but the Battle Practice Targets were towed on
wire on the self-rendering winch of uncertain habits with five hundred fathoms out. This meant that when on some of the firing grounds at slow speed, the wire would be along the bottom stirring up old wrecks and older rocks.

We went up and down and in and out. Admirals took enough notice of us to find out what we could carry in the way of this and that; we fired our 3in HA/LA gun, which was, of course, a laugh. There's no doubt we could have hit something with it, if shell and target happened only, by chance, to occupy the same place for a fraction of a second, and the range was not too long. The gun was designed about 1914, once again a double-duty thing — it was supposed to fire at submarine guns. I suppose its real reason on projecture, modified by estimate, and applied as experiment.

In keeping with our ancient build and design, I suppose our gunnery was of the same type as that of Nelson's gunners, which was roughly — 'Look along the barrel; if the enemy is in the way, fire, we have plenty of ammunition'. The gun went off with a lovely bang. Gunnery was not an exact science of Nelson's gunners, which was roughly — 'Look along the barrel; if the enemy is in the way, fire, we have plenty of ammunition'. The gun went off with a lovely bang. Gunnery was not an exact science then; I doubt if it is that yet.

The ship was reasonably happy. The only sports gear I remember was a football and two pairs of boxing gloves, but we had the distinction, sportwise, of having a Royal Naval footballer in our crew. People used to speak the name of "Buster Brown" with great respect.

No-one went sick, no-one deserted in my two years. We dashed about at economical speed and during the 1938 crisis we pulled HMS FURY off the rocks at Scapa. We towed the original big carrier HMS ARK ROYAL out of Gibraltar, towed HMS RESOLUTION out of the Scapa Boom Defence into which she had got stuck. We recovered a seven-ton anchor and a long cable left behind by a German battlecship in 1919 when they scuttled. We pushed and pulled HMS NELSON and we 'acted'. In this work we represented a cruiser or large raider on large scale manoeuvres. We kept a bright eye on Franco's large cruisers off Gibraltar with our pop-gun loaded, and we behaved ourselves.

The chain and rod steering let us down in rough weather in the Bay of Biscay. The weather threw us about, the chain came off the rudder cross-head in the traditional way, and steering became impossible. Great waves struck the rudder and the rudder brake proved useless. The twin screws, by a mistake of the first magnitude, could occasionally turn us a point or two. We looked to the boats, recalling that, a 'Saint' class tug had gone down a few years before in this area due to stress of weather.

Two ERAs stood by the engines, the Coxswain stood by the useless wheel and made telegraph signals trying to put our bows to the high seas running. Most of the crew and all the officers on the aft deck were knocked down as the waves came over. I rigged the self-rendering winch to pull on the rudder head, captain, Chief ERA and everybody floundered about in deep water and slid with every roller.

The Chief ERA was lying under the cross head which was slashing to and fro, a Leading Seaman sitting on his legs, jumping back every time a giant sea hit the rudder, which was flapping about like a Jew's overcoat. Chief ERA Cowie was rolling about with whole seas dowsing him, spitting, but not losing sight of the chain which lashed at him.

A Stocker PO manned the steering engine, ready to lay the rudder over if the chain could be replaced, which we doubted. The Telegraphist appeared reporting the starboard boat had been provisioned and asked for orders. The captain told him, "Get back in your hutch," and he went gladly, with only one Tel we knew his importance if we had to abandon.

The struggle lasted a long time; Cowie's arms were lacerated, but he got the chain back on to a feeble cheer. It remained on, we steadied on course, and the Chief had a lie down and a dressing with iodine from the Coxswain. We tautened up the boat lashings and cursed the chain and rod steering that had got us, and lots of other ships, into trouble.

When my two years in HMS BUCCANEER had elapsed I wrote a report on what I considered to be the shortcomings of the ship and sent it to the Admiralty. The Admiralty then sent me to Shetley on a teaching job.

One more thing about HMS BUCCANEER. After the war, she was towing a target for a Canadian destroyer to fire at. By accident she was hit by a salvo of non-explosive shells right on a bulkhead dividing the Engine Room and the after Boiler room. With these two compartments flooding fast, her 180-ton per hour salvage pump was helpless. She sank to the bottom of the sea and, as far as I know, she is there yet, with all her Camel-like features open for inspection to the fish. I was proud to have served in her and, even now, I sometimes run into shipmates of the old 'Bucc' with welcoming smiles.
While it is too early to fully assess the results of the battles for the Falkland Islands, it is certain that massive reappraisals of the effectiveness of modern armaments and ship building are underway all over the world. The first combat mission for a nuclear submarine, the vulnerability of modern ships to fire, the devastating damage caused by surface skimming missiles, and the heavy use of all forms of electronic warfare will continue to change modern strategy and tactics. For the United States, however, it was the success of V/STOL aircraft in the form of Harrier and of the V/STOL carrier that may have the most wide reaching impact on military planning.

There is no one particular reason behind the slow development of the V/STOL concept in the United States. It is, after all, a logical evolutionary development combining the benefits of the helicopter and conventional aircraft. V/STOL would provide the ability to put more highly capable aircraft on a larger variety of ships than ever before and would allow aircraft to follow ground forces without elaborate airfields, two concepts military and naval planners have supposedly been striving to achieve since the Second World War.

Although serious V/STOL work has taken place in the United States since the middle 1950's, with Bell Aircraft proving the tilt-rotor concept with its XV-3 in the early 1960's, no successful V/STOL aircraft has yet gone into production in this country. It is fair to say that, were it not for the persistence of the United States Marine Corps, V/STOL would be far less advanced in both concept and actual aircraft than it is today.

As early as 1957, the Commandant of the Marine Corps informed the Chief of Naval Operations that V/STOL characteristics 'were the ultimate requirement of all Marine aircraft in support of amphibious operations in the future.' In the 1960's, the Marine Corps selected a version of the Harrier, the AV-8A, for use as a close air support aircraft to cover Marine assault forces. The Harrier gave the Marine Corps an aircraft that would fit what it considered to be a necessary three phase operational doctrine.

In the first phase, Marine Harriers would operate from aircraft carriers or assault ships in support of a Marine landing. In the second phase, facilities would be 'roughed in' ashore to keep aircraft near the troops (a lesson of modern warfare dating back at least as far as Guadalcanal and repeated in the Falklands). The final phase would be to establish full support facilities ashore, including concrete runways. But despite the Marine Corps' satisfaction with the AV-8A, and the satisfactory deployment of those aircraft at sea, the Navy has consistently fought Marine requests for more Harriers. The reasons are many.

First, and foremost, the Navy committed itself to the A/F-18 attack fighter aircraft. The Navy command has felt that it would be better for the Corps to purchase the same attack craft as the Navy following previous procurement policy. Second, it continues to be noted that the Harrier had a very high accident rate. The emphasis here is on the past tense, for as soon as the Marines ordered stiffer training and pilot standards for Harrier pilots, accidents dropped to a point where the Harrier is now one of the safest aircraft in America's military arsenal. Thirdly, since the Harrier was replacing the A-4 Skyhawk, it was expected to do all that a conventional aircraft could do. Many military planners were unwilling to make a start on V/STOL aircraft which, conceivably, might in some ways be inferior to its CTOL predecessor thus ignoring the benefits provided by the V/STOL concept. Fourth, and far from least, Lt. General T.H. Miller, USMC (Ret.) has noted that the foreign design and construction of the Harrier met stiff opposition from within the American aircraft industry and on Capitol Hill.
Luckily, the Marine Corps' well known reputation for tenacity was proven again as it has slowly convinced many in the Pentagon and in the Congress that V/STOL is a concept that cannot be ignored and should be encouraged. Funds for V/STOL development, cut from the defense budget in the late 1970's, have now been restored and at least 4 V/STOL aircraft and 3 ship concepts are currently being developed in the United States which could change the face of both aircraft and the ships that carry them by the end of this decade.

AV-8B Harrier II
For its second purchase of V/STOL aircraft, the Marine Corps decided on a major modification of the Harrier. The redesign and construction of the Harrier II has been undertaken by McDonnell Douglas. The substantial changes over the AV-8A are a larger wing span, 50% more internal fuel capacity, 7 versus 5 ordinance stations, a raised cockpit for greater visibility, structural and aerodynamic changes that will allow the AV8-B to carry twice the AV8-A payload over the same distance, and more "fighter characteristics" with a 25 millimeter gun system and the AIM-9 Sidewinder missile. The experimental version of the Harrier II has already flown and it is expected to be in production within the next few years. The improvements represented by the AV8-B represent major strides for V/STOL and should go far in promoting its acceptance by all air forces.

Bell XV-15
Congressman Dan Glickman (Democrat-Kansas), Chairman of the Subcommittee on Transportation, Aviation, and Materials of the Science and Technology Committee of the United States House of Representatives, considers the XV-15 an aircraft that "has the potential to provide the United States with a revolutionary advance in aviation technology with both civilian and military applications. This technology could provide all U.S. armed services with a common aircraft for a variety of different missions such as high speed rescue, long range troop transport, forward air control, reconnaissance, and high speed cargo delivery. The XV-15 technology could also be used for an efficient commuter transport since it has both long range capability and precision hovering for intracity operations."

A joint project of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the United States Army and the United States Navy, the XV-15 is the only other V/STOL aircraft currently under consideration for long term production that has actually flown. Simple in concept, the craft has a stationary center wing and two large rotors which tilt to shift the craft from the hovering mode to the forward flight mode.

The projected assault size tilt rotor, known as HXM, could have undertaken the 1,600 mile round trip Teheran embassy raid from dusk to dawn without refueling. It is estimated that the craft will have a 2,250 mile range without refueling after a short take off roll and will have the ability to
use auxiliary fuel tanks or inflight refueling facilities. This great range would allow self-deployment of a V/STOL craft thereby freeing C-5A and C-141 transports for carrying other weapons and equipment in times of emergency.

The potential that stems from the versatility of the XV-15 is tremendous. It can replace the CH-53, and C-130 and for special operations and rescue; the C-7 Caribou for intertheater transports; and several aircraft performing in AEW, ASW, COD/VOD, and SAR functions at sea. While the commonality of using one aircraft for many missions is valuable on land it is particularly valuable at sea where fewer people will be required for maintenance, as well as a smaller spare parts inventory and less diagnostic and maintenance equipment. This will allow more combat aircraft on a COTL carrier and give greater flexibility to V/STOL carriers.

**Grumman Design 698**

A joint development project of the United States Navy, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and Grumman Aviation, Design 698 has been in development since 1976 and has reached the full mock-up stage. Grumman has placed great emphasis on economy in building the aircraft. The nose module, wing and fuselage assemblies are the same as the Mitsubishi M-2 transport. The engines are General Electric GE-34 turbofans currently in use on the latest commercial transports and on the United States Air Force A-10A attack aircraft.

The concept emphasizes simplicity in the fact that the only part of the aircraft that moves are the engines. The twin tilt nacelle airplane is controlled to transition in hover primarily by means of horizontal and vertical veins in the slip stream of the engines. Besides the ability to take off and land vertically, the Design 698 should be able to land as a conventional aircraft and take off conventionally with a full cargo load in less than 200 feet. It is projected to fly at 500 knots with a 50,000 foot ceiling and the ability to rise from sea level to 30,000 feet within 2½ minutes.

Requiring less room than in Lamps III helicopter to land, the 16 foot wing span of the Design 698 can fit in any hanger in the U.S. fleet today. The Navy is looking for the aircraft to provide AAW, ASW, ASuW, AEW, OTH-T, and EW capabilities for the fleet, so tragically absent at the Falklands, replacing at least the E-2C Hawkeye and S-A3A Viking.

**ADEN**

One of the more interesting concepts under development is the combination of the highly
successful Grumman A-6E Intruder with modifications in the form of augmentor deflector exhaust nozzles (ADEN).

The concept combines the use of one of the most successful planes in the Navy’s inventory with General Electric two dimensional non-axymetrical nozzle to vector engine thrust. Actually a STOL concept, the A-6 ADEN reduces take off from 1,500 feet to 400 feet with a 10 knot wind over the deck and allows landing at speeds just slightly over 100 knots. The Navy could continue the use of the basic A-6 in its attack role or in a transport mode, allowing it to carry up to 10,000 pounds of stores to ships at sea.

**LHDI attack air augmentation platform**

As Australia well knows, American development of smaller aircraft carriers has atrophied since the end of World War II. Admiral Elmo Zumwalt’s sea control ship is now the CANARIAS of the Royal Spanish Navy. The RAN’s plans to build a smaller carrier in the United States based on the IWO JIMA class assault ships escalated in cost so rapidly that the INVINCIBLE became the accepted alternative. However, interest in the smaller carrier concept has recently been pushed in Congress as an augmentation to the CVN’s and Navy studies show that V/STOL development makes platforms in the range of 20,000 to 40,000 tons attractive.

Current Navy thinking is toward this size vessel, based on a modification of the LHA-5 class. The ship will be a fully capable V/STOL carrier with a smaller superstructure, ski ramp and reinforced flight deck.

**DGV guided missile aviation destroyer**

Grumman and Litton/Ingalls have come together to provide a ship specifically designed for the development of the Design 698 but one that could be readily adapted to any V/STOL aircraft.

Based on the hull of the CG-47 TICONDAROGA class cruiser with a ski jump off the bow, the vessel is scheduled to carry 10 Design 698 V/STOL aircraft and 128 multi-purpose verticle missile launch tubes. The latter would give the ship the greatest ship offensive capabilities of any American aircraft carrier since the 8-inch guns of the LEXINGTON and SARATOGA of the 1920’s. The ship’s aircraft would be used to provide surveillance at ranges of up to 700 nautical miles and target the over-the-horizon weapons beyond the ship’s radar range.

**ARAPAHO**

ARAPAHO, a concept that has been under development in the United States for well over a decade, is a pre-fabricated, portable aviation facility, designed for fast deployment aboard modern containerized cargo ships. The idea of using a combined merchant ship/aircraft carrier is not new, however, as the Royal Navy used several ships during the Second World War that were grain carriers below decks and aircraft carriers above decks.

It is estimated that it would take only 12 hours to fit the modules (which are similar to regular ship containers) on board ship at which time the vessel could then move from dock side to another.
anchor for the other 12 hours necessary for Navy personnel to secure and hook up the ARAPAHO system.

ARAPAHO is self sustaining in regards to power, heat, air, communications, housing and messing facilities for its projected 75 to 85 naval personnel. Using only the on deck cargo space, approximately 25% of a modern commercial vessel's cargo area, ARAPAHO is predicted to be able to use over 100 different helicopters in the NATO inventory and possibly the AV8-B or the British Sea Harrier.

Funding for the ARAPAHO concept, erratic at best, was included in the Navy's fiscal year 1982 and 1983 budgets at the behest of Senator Gary Hart (Democrat-Colorado). Although only $US11 million has been spent to date on the concept, it is arousing great interest in many countries, particularly Australia, Canada, West Germany, and the United Kingdom.

The Armed Forces Journal International cites recent press reports that the Royal Navy either used or tried to secure an ARAPAHO system during the Falklands conflict. However, the closest ARAPAHO has yet gone to sea is being assembled on a deck mock-up at the Lakehurst Naval Air Engineering Center. Its first sea tests are scheduled for October of this year.

ARAPAHO is one of the most interesting concepts being developed as it gives every container ship the potential capacity of being a small aircraft carrier able to protect itself and other nearby ships.

V/STOL has proven itself in battle. It provides an unprecedented means by which naval and merchant ships can protect themselves while taking war to the enemy. The time for debating the idea is past. The time for construction and deployment is now.  

Tom A. Friedmann

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*Submarine Weapons Update Programme*
This is a tale which occurred in a destroyer escort in the dying days of the strategic reserve commitment based in Singapore.

The Captain of this particular vessel was a very precise person and had a leaning toward a certain pedantry of manner. Whilst this and other traits endeared him to his sailors as a mild eccentric, the effect on his officers was one of some frustration.

Now the good Commander, as are all our Commanding Officers, was eager to be seen to be doing well. He therefore courted assiduously the reigning area Admiral (COMFEF) and his staff to gain control of a practice seacat missile which was allocated to the reserve pool. Unfortunately he was unaware that the Royal Naval Target Services Group had just been sent home as part of the cut-backs; so having secured the missile he now had nothing to fire at.

After much badgering he managed to cajole the WEED and Gunnery Officer into allowing the missile to be fired at a mesh covered Met balloon. Accordingly the ship made her way to the local exercise areas and began the tribulations that would make an Easter Island statue weep. First the 'system' was down, then the camera, then there were ships in the way, then the sun was in the wrong place; and so on in a convoluted spiral of inane logic. On the bridge the level of controlled exasperation was such that the yeoman was ducking for cover, the Officer of the Watch staring fixedly ahead, the bosun's mate was whimpering in the corner and the Captain was speaking in slow pedantic tone on the armament broadcast; a sure sign that all was definitely not well. Finally all was in readiness and in stiff 20 knot breeze the balloon was released and flopped straight into the water and scudded off downwind.

There followed a flurry of manœuvring as the Captain, never a good shiphandler at the best of times, valiantly tried to match the drift of the balloon. At last it came within range and away went the Swimmer of the Watch to effect the recovery. The OOW posted a shark lookout and the swimmer grabbed the balloon and started back.

Just then up alongside the swimmer popped a banded seasnake. To cries of 'Snake, Snake' from the assembled crew, the swimmer did a creditable exhibition of water walking and was inboard in a twinkling, without of course, the balloon. The shark lookout drew a bead and with superb shooting knocked the snake into the air with one shot and cut it in half with the next. The Captain watched the wild west show with dismay, as by now the balloon was racing off to find its mate and he could see another half hour of manœuvring coming up. He grabbed the bullhorn microphone and said, very deliberately, 'Thank you very much Able Seaman . . .' and turning to the Executive Officer said 'Now get the balloon Number One'. The gunner, flushed with pride from his sharpshooting heard, 'Thank you very much . . . now get the balloon' and did just that — and fired a shot straight through it!
ADDRESS BY
HIS EXCELLENCY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
SIR ZELMAN COWEN, AK, GCMG, GCVO,
KStJ, QC, GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, ON
THE OCCASION OF THE LAUNCHING OF
THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY — AN
ILLUSTRATED HISTORY
ON BOARD HMAS MELBOURNE, AT SYDNEY,
WEDNESDAY, 21 APRIL 1982

I have had no experience of naval launchings, except as a spouse. My wife, who saw HMAS TOBRUK into the naval world, is the only repository of such specialist skills in our family.

Like so many dates in the naval calendar, this is a historic day. On 21 April 1770, Lieutenant James Cook, RN, in HWS ENDEAVOUR, discovered and named Bateman's Bay: 48 hours earlier had had made a landfall on the east coast of Australia during one of history's most noteworthy voyages of discovery, exploration and navigation. On this day three years ago, Admiral Synnot was appointed Chief of Defence Force Staff.

These events, and very many others in the intervening period of two centuries, are all covered in picture and word in Mr Odgers' book, and I shall have more to say about that later. Today also marks Admiral Leach's assumption of the high office of Chief of Naval Staff and I warmly congratulate him on that distinction. I also congratulate Admiral Hudson on his recent promotion to flag rank and on his appointment as Fleet Commander. As we all know, the Navy is undergoing a great transition with a massive and costly capital acquisition programme, and both the CNS and his Fleet Commander will have busy and challenging times ahead.

Included in this transition is the passing from service of this ship, HMAS MELBOURNE, on whose quarterdeck we now stand. MELBOURNE is symbolic of the Navy: she has served the nation splendidly for more than a quarter of a century and she has a special place in our naval history — naval aviation history particularly — and, I would hope, in the affections of the thousands who have sailed in her. I am amongst that number. Two years ago, I went to sea in MELBOURNE off Jervis Bay and it was for me a most instructive and memorable experience. It was also calm sailing.

I think that this is the occasion on which to announce that I have been pleased to approve the name of MELBOURNE's successor. She is to be called HMAS AUSTRALIA. There has been a certain inevitability about that selection. It is a distinguished name and one which has been proudly carried on the seas and oceans of the world in war and peace by two other Flag-ships of the Australian Fleet. I hope that the new AUSTRALIA will carry the nation's name to the satisfaction and with the approval of all Australians.

For those who wish to know more about the first and second AUSTRALIA, I can do no better than to refer you to 'The Royal Australian Navy: An Illustrated History'. In fact, on page 35, there is a splendid photograph of the first and a marvellous painting of the second reproduced on page 133. Let me say at this stage, if you detect early evidence of the heavy hand of commercial endorsement, that the royalties from this book go into consolidated revenue.

In 1893, an American admiral endorsed an unfavourable fitness report on Mahan, the great naval historian. The admiral wrote 'it is not the business of a naval officer to write books'; and the admiral certainly picked the wrong man. I am reminded of the German schoolmaster who said...
to his pupil: ‘Einstein, you will never amount to anything’. Maybe we should learn from this. It is unfortunate that so many Australians with naval experience seem to share that philosophy of reticence — the silent service, one might say — and we are the poorer for it. Relatively little Australian naval history has been written. To be sure, there have been some noteworthy exceptions; the great war historian C.E.W. Bean probably began the process as long ago as 1913 with his prophetic book, *Flagships Three*. We have had Admiral Collins’ autobiography, and the excellent official *World War 2* histories by my friend G. Hermon Gill. Peter Firkins published his very good *Of Nautilus and Eagles* a few years ago, and in recent months we have seen Admiral Gatacre’s *Reports of Proceedings* and Lew Lind’s fascinating *Historic Naval Events of Australia Day-by-Day*. Then, there has been a series of elegant and very useful little publications from the Naval Historical Society and the Australian Naval Institute. But for a sea-faring nation with such a rich maritime and naval heritage this is not a good and sufficient record, and it is a sad fact that a naval chronicler would be hard pressed to compile an Australian naval bibliography of more than two dozen titles.

Not least for this reason, Mr Odgers’ book makes its welcome appearance. Mr Odgers is singularly well qualified to have written the history. He was educated at the Universities of Western Australia and Melbourne, graduating with a Master of Arts degree and with a Diploma in Journalism. He has served on “The Age” and “The Argus” in Melbourne, and he was Head of the Historical Studies Section of the Department of Defence from 1975 until his retirement last year. Retirement is a word which can only be applied loosely to Mr Odgers. He remains active and, by way of example, is currently involved in an association with the University of Queensland’s project in re-printing the official Great War histories. I suppose I had better say that this reference to a former haunt of mine is not a commercial, but I am pleased.

To his academic and journalistic background, he has added an extensive practical experience with the Armed Forces. He served with the A.I.F. during World War 2, and then, changing allegiances, he saw active service with the RAAF in Korea, during the Malayan Emergency and in Vietnam. He is an author of a volume of the official history of the RAAF during World War 2 and his other published works have covered Vietnam, Cyclone Tracy and more Air Force history. He has a fine record of dedication, service, scholarship and achievement, and he richly deserves our commendation.

I looked at the proofs of his new book a few weeks ago and I was most impressed. As I said earlier, the history begins in the eighteenth century and runs up to the present day. So it is that 200 years of naval events, the ships and the people who shaped them, and sailed in them, have been recorded and described.

Founded on the history and tradition of the Royal Navy, the RAN owes much of its background and development in the last century to the RN, and particularly to the Australian Squadron and the colonial navies. Although the RAN was not established until 1911, in the seventy years since then it has developed rapidly and has achieved a magnificent record of service to the nation. Let me quote from the dust jacket:

‘This record has become part of Australia’s heritage. We can all be proud of the action of the first SYDNEY off Cocos in 1914, of the submarine AE 2 in the Dardanelles on the first Anzac Day, of the second SYDNEY’s brilliant performance at Cape Spada in 1940, of the gallant sacrifice of YARRA off Java and the magnificent last fight of PERTH in Sunda Strait early in 1942, of CANBERRA’s last action at Guadalcanal, of AUSTRALIA’s stubborn courage in the Lingayen Gulf, of the bravery of MURCHISON in the Han River in Korea in 1951, and, in more recent times, of the skill and courage of the RAN ships and units in the Vietnam conflict. However these are only a few of the wartime actions fought by the RAN. As the service responsible for the protection of the shores of our island continent, the Navy’s continuing peacetime role is also vitally important.’

I think that has been well said.

This book has more than 250 illustrations, including maps, contemporary colour photographs, and historical drawings. There is a substantial text and a comprehensive index.

As an insignificant cog in the war-time navy, may I speak of some things which have special meaning to me. I was in Darwin on February 19, 1942 and the account of the Japanese air attack and the names of the ships involved are familiar to me. I remember seeing the PEARY go down and hearing the NEPTUNA go up. Only a short time ago, on the occasion of the commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of that attack, I sent a note to Darwin of my recollections of the day at the request of the Lord Mayor. It was pretty much a ‘worm’s eye’ view and for a complex of reasons not a day I remember with pleasure. In giving his account of the events which led up to the raid Mr Odgers refers to USS HOUSTON which I remember very well from my Darwin days. She was lost, with HMAS PERTH, in the Sunda Strait later in the month. Late last year I attended and spoke at the 1981 national ex-prisoner of war reunion in Sydney and an American group from USS HOUSTON was there as special guests. That fine
ship has its special links with Australia and with the RAN.

Then I note the reference to the coast watchers and, in particular, the reference to Lieutenant Paul Mason whose picture appears on page 126. I never met Mason, but I shall never forget him. Late in 1942 and early in 1943 when I was in COIC in Brisbane when it was Headquarters South West Pacific Area, the reports which came in from Mason in the Buin-Faisi area remain vivid in my mind. He and his colleagues captured and still capture my imagination and command my admiration.

Then there is reference to the Bathurst Class corvettes. In October 1980 I unveiled a memorial window at the Garden Island Dockyard Chapel which commemorated those ships and those who built and those who served in them. It was an outstanding wartime performance by Australian shipbuilders who, for the most part, came to their task with little or no experience. And I shall never forget the great gathering of those who, 25 years and more ago, had sailed in those ships, and came from far and wide to this great commemorative event.

There are those present today who will remember these things and many others besides, and it is good that the history is recorded in these pages. No doubt there are others present today who were not born, or who were very small fry, when the second world war events took place.

Credit must go to the publishers who have evidently made a great effort to produce an attractive book. Mr Odgers rightly points out that no book has yet appeared on the bookstalls as the result of the sole efforts of one person. He pays generous tribute in his acknowledgements to many individuals and organisations who helped in the production of his book.

The idea of the book was born when two years ago, the publishers, Child & Henry, approached Mr Odgers. I am pleased that the Department of Defence recognized the merit of the project, and the Secretary, Mr Pritchett, gave approval for the resources of his Department to be mobilised.

A similar production published a few years ago, 'The Pictorial History of the RAAF', has, I am told, sold more than 30,000 copies which is a significant Australian publishing achievement. I hope that sales of this book will match or exceed that figure. I should think that this book will have an immediate appeal to a wide market ranging from the serious historian to the young enthusiast. An authoritative text backed by excellent illustrations should provide a recipe for publishing success.

I congratulate the author, Mr Odgers; the publishers, Child & Henry, and the sponsor, the Department of Defence.

At this stage of the launching, my wife would have pressed the button which heralded the destruction of a bottle of champagne. Were I do so in this case, a good book would also be destroyed. I declare "The Royal Australian Navy: an Illustrated History" to be well and truly launched. With a change in spelling, I wish it good "SALE-ING".


To the reviewers knowledge, this is the first book of its type published in Australia about the Australian Armed Forces. Contributors were Ross Gillette, Brian Alsop and Mike Melliar-Phelps. All three are well versed in defence matters and the result of their labours is an informative, well presented book.

In his acknowledgements, Ross Gillette states that this book is the first edition. He does not state when the next (or updated) version will be published; one hopes that it will be in no more than two years time.

Australia's Armed Forces is well set out, easy to follow and profusely illustrated in both black and white and colour. The lack of an index does however, detract from the book.

Published in 1981, the book contains inaccuracies but not of the Editors' doing. He details the replacement for HMAS MELBOURNE as either a US or Spanish vessel but does lay-off the odds by mentioning INVINCIBLE. These facts may eventually be correct in the light of recent political decisions.

Whilst the book uses the standard PR hand-out photographs, Ross Gillette is to be commended for the imaginative use of private photographs by service personnel and civilians.

There is a noticeable bias towards the RAN in the size of the sections but that is to be understood. The RAN seems to have the greatest collection of 'one of a type'. Whilst the sizes of the three sections do differ, the subject matter — the principal characteristics of each piece of naval, military and air force hardware — is well covered. Wherever possible, the authors have traced the history of the equipment to its acquisition decision.

Australia's Armed Forces is a must for the bookshelves of those interested in their own trade whether it be Navy, Army or Air Force. It is a must for all students of the military and reference to it by critics of the military arts, is also recommended. I have searched many bookshops for copies of this book but it is conspicuous by its absence.

For those wishing to purchase a copy, I would recommend a direct approach to the publisher at 56 The Corso, Manly, N.S.W. 2095.

Richard Humble has excellent credentials for writing the book under review, being an Oxford graduate in military history who has previously worked published on the subjects of both sea- and land-warfare. Furthermore, he edited the seven-volume illustrated edition of Churchill's 'History of the ESP'.

In this book his expression is clear and I found few errors of fact. The book is well laid out. It progresses from the conception of the submarine, via the rudimentary operational boats of 1914 to the Battle of the Atlantic and the 'Doomsday Ships' (sic) of today. There are a few tables and charts that I found hard to follow; photographs, however, are numerous and the best I have seen in any one volume on the subject. The many I had not seen before were made the more interesting by being interspersed with old friends, both submarines and submariners.

I experienced a sense of deja vu as I progressed through the book. Like so many other books on the subject its emphasis is on the U-boat campaigns of 1917 and 1942 with only fleeting reference to other countries' activities during those and other periods. US/Japanese operations in the Pacific unpleasantness are grudgingly given two pages of print! Only the sketchiest statements are made on Soviet submarine developments other than in the SSBN field.

My feelings were mixed when I had finished reading this book, so I read it again. This confirmed for me that, with its splendid photographs, at $28.95 the book would make an excellent gift for a favoured nephew. Due to its lack of comprehensive coverage and occasionally lightweight approach to the subject, I cannot recommend it to the serious student of underwater warfare.

A.M.F. SUMMERS

SO ENDS THIS DAY, Captain Sir John Williams Globe Press

So Ends This Day is the autobiography of a man who has packed more into his life than ten other men. In his lifetime he has been a sailor, master mariner, stevedore, freight line owner, salvage consultant, salor, gold miner and farmer.

Born in Wales 1896, John Williams went to sea as a boy seaman in the steamship KING JOHN. He soon tired of steam and signed aboard the barque INVERNESS. He remained in sail in vessels such as TERPSICHORE and ANGELO BOLIVIAN until qualifying for his Second Mates Certificate. ST MIRREN came next and was accompanied by his first sinking when that vessel was sunk by a U-Boat. NEOTSFIELD came next, she was sunk by a U-Boat too! Undeterred John Williams joined JUTEOPOLIS as Second Mate and ventured into the Chilean nitrate trade in her and WRAYCASTLE.

Obtaining his Masters Certificate in 1921, Captain Williams sailed for Australia as Second Mate of the steamer ERA (ex MARIA LUZ). Married the same year to a lady he met in Newcastle NSW, he served in various coastal steamers out of Melbourne. A brief spell ashore was followed by service in the steamer KURANDA out of Townsville. Ashore once again he became relieving manager of a shipping company in Townsville and then back to Melbourne as a Wharf Manager for AUSN. Within a short time he had started United Stevedoring Pty Ltd, Fleetway Express and Fleet Forge (Ship fitters). In the years to the outbreak of World War II his life was far from dull. In his own words:

"For them, the lot were going at the same time: stevedoring, the timber trade, horse fitting, gold mining, ship fitting, road transport, salvage, the mechanical grabs; and any other damned thing calculated to turn an honest penny..."

Joining the Navy two weeks after the outbreak of war Captain Williams was employed in Melbourne in the 'Routing Service' but this failed to provide any stimulus. Two of his companies (Fleetways Transport and Fleet Forge) had wartime contracts and so he resigned his commission to get on with the war effort. The result of his resignation could only have come from a bureaucracy.

"The result? A letter saying that the date of my demobilisation then to apply, has been put back to the date of my mobilization and instructing me to collect my pay, one hundred and twenty pounds odd. In other words I hadn't been in the Navy at all and could go where I liked."

Sir John continues:

"The pay office at Port Melbourne had only sixteen pounds (of his £120 odd) so I took that and gave it to my mates in the control services to buy lottery tickets, and thus my Naval Service ended for a little while and a good job too!"

The next stage in the authors career came when he was appointed a Captain in the 7th Division AIF. After an interview with Admiral Sir Ragnar Colvin he became a Lieutenant RANR (S), was sent to FND for two weeks and then seconded to the Bank of England to head the salvage attempt to recover the gold from the sunken RMS NIAGARA in the Hauraki Gulf of New Zealand. Despite frustrations and tribulations his team recovered gold worth £2,301,000.
His share was a paltry £5,752 and an amount of abuse from the (then) Prime Minister.

Well established in the salvage business he became involved in salvage work in Darwin, Victoria, New Guinea, the Barrier Reef and the Pacific in general as Executive Officer and Chief Salvage Officer of the Commonwealth Marine Salvage Board. 1944 saw him (and his family) in Calcutta salvaging the B.I. Company steamer SANTHIA as head of his own salvage company. Other jobs were carried out in Burma and Thailand.

1946 saw another venture started, Wilco Paints of Melbourne. A succession of mergers took place and so it was back to gold-mining in Western Australia. The salvage consultancy of J.P. Williams and Associates was formed in 1947. Although Fleet Forge had continued to prosper it could get no work from the Australian Shipping Board. SS RIVER BURNETT changed all that when she touched the Corsair Rock in 1956 and thus began an association with the Menzies Government, ASB and Senator Shane Paltridge.

From the ASB came the Australian National Line. Sir John Williams became its first Chairman and his tenure of office lasted 15 years. Towards the end of those 15 years the scene changed.

Various ministers for Shipping and Transport had let ANL control its own destiny but the 1968 elections brought changes. A Mr Ian Sinclair succeeded Gordon Freeth as the Minister and during its politising ANL and the Commission went into the red for the first time. When the Hon P.J. Nixon succeeded Sinclair in 1971 Sir John decided it was time to retire.

Although he gave up his seat as Chairman of various companies and enterprises the urge to 'keep his hand in' was strong. The salvage attempts of WAHINE and SEAWISE UNIVERSITY (ex QUEEN ELIZABETH) came under the auspices of this remarkable man. Sir John was still involved with aspects of salvage work up to 18 months before So Ends This Day, was published in 1981. He was then 85 years old.

So Ends This Day is a book begging to be read time and time again. For the dreamers it conjures up exotic ports and a lifestyle long gone and for the realist it shows what can be done by hard work and initiative. The book must be read.

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Back copies may be purchased from the Institute at $2.50 each ($7.00 for Vol 1 No 1), which price includes postage. Write to the Treasurer, Australian Naval Institute, PO Box 18, Deakin, ACT, 2600.
The Council of The Australian Naval Institute advises that cuff-links and mounted crests featuring the badge of the Institute are now available for purchase by Members.

The cuff-links are robustly made and are attractively finished in gold and black. They are epoxy-capped to ensure long life and are packaged in presentation boxes. The price is $7.00 a pair, which includes postage.

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