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The front cover. HMS INVINCIBLE, the shape of things to come.

— Defence Public Relations
CHAPTER NEWS

SYDNEY CHAPTER ACTIVITIES

At the first meeting held by the Sydney Chapter on Wednesday 2 December 1981, 31 members heard Professor Glenn Withers speak on ‘Personnel Attraction and Retention Issues’. This presentation provided useful background for subsequent discussions by two syndicates on the perceived issues but whereas many problems were identified not many solutions were canvassed. The value of Professor Withers address was evident throughout.

For 1982 a more ambitious programme of activities is envisaged with details to be provided in due course. In the meantime members of the Institute in the Sydney area can contact the Chapter Secretary on 9600 437 if necessary.

C A BARRIE

Correspondence

MEMORIES OF FND

Dear Sir,

Thank you very much indeed for the copy of the ANI Journal for November last. It is nice to think that the RAN is going so strong and is so active and alive. I hope that my memories which you have so kindly published convey the deep regard that I have always held after all these years for the RAN and for the many good shipmates and friendships I made at FND.

Looking through some notes I made years ago I came across an item which although not perhaps strictly relevant to FND is of some Naval interest.

Captain H.P. Cayley RN was Captain Superintendent (of FND) for a short period between S R Miller and R Wykes-Sneyd. He told me that one day pottering round Melbourne he noticed a couple of medals in a junk shop. He bought them for a small sum being interested in the unusual ribbons and their age. After some research he finally established that one was a medal commemorating the Battle of the Nile in 1797. He was certain that it had belonged to Admiral Nelson. How had it got out to Australia?

Some years later I came across a possible solution. I was reading A Sailor’s Nelson. In 1801 Nelson went to Honiton in Devon on purpose to call on the mother of Captain Westcott of the MAESTIC who had been killed at the Battle of the Nile. The purpose of his visit was to offer his condolences and to enquire if Mrs Westcott had received the pension to which she was entitled. (A typical Nelson gesture).

Westcott came of humble stock and had risen from the Lower Deck to command a ship of the line by sheer merit. Nelson wrote ‘I visited Captain Westcott’s mother, his brother is a tailor, but had they been chimney-sweeps it was my duty to show them respect’. He invited the family to breakfast at the inn and asked Mrs Westcott if she had received the Nile medal. Finding it had never been sent to her, he gave her his own, which he was wearing, remarking ‘I hope you will not value it the less because I have worn it.’

Captain Cayley thought that probably some descendant or member of the family had emigrated to Australia later on and that was how the medal finished up there.

An interesting story don’t you think?

Yours sincerely
Brian de Courcy-Ireland

WHO SANK THE SYDNEY?

Dear Sir,

I have read both Michael Montgomery’s book, Who Sank the Sydney?, and Arthur King’s review of it in the last ANI Journal with interest. My overall assessment is that the definitive study of the loss of the SYDNEY has still to be written.
Montgomery’s analysis shows evidence of considerable research and is full of ‘plausible’ ideas but there is little real ‘meat’. Whilst some of the scenarios he conjures up are feasible, albeit remotely so, there is scant explanation of why the incident should have occurred in the way he appears to be suggesting.

The idea of a naval cover-up of the ‘true’ story of the sinking is particularly hard to accept. For what earthly reason would the RAN wish to perpetuate — even to the present day — a patently fictitious account of the incident? How would Detmers, the captain of the KORMORAN, who only died a few years ago, have been able to keep the lips of the 300 odd survivors of his raider sealed for so long? After all, some migrated to Australia after the war and may still be alive here. In his preface, Montgomery infers that at least one survivor sent him anonymous correspondence which appeared to confirm that there was another story to uncover. Surely though the financial rewards associated with the ‘scoop’ of the ‘true’ story of the sinking of the SYDNEY would have out-weighed the remote possibility of war crimes prosecutions many years after the event.

Although Montgomery’s bibliography includes an impressive collection of official sources, his book seems to me to be unsatisfactory in that it sticks mainly to events associated directly with the sinking and does not get to grips with some broader, but equally as important, aspects of Australian naval history during World War II. For example, what was the higher level reaction to the sinking — at Navy Office in Melbourne and from the Australian Government in Canberra. Apparently there was no Board of Inquiry, surprising as this might seem to the contemporary naval reader. A key question at an inquiry may well have been why there was such a delay in mounting a search for the SYDNEY after it was feared missing. Questions of command and control, organisation and administration and operational policy spring to mind but Montgomery deals with none of these subjects.

One issue which possibly could have been illuminated by an in-depth study of the loss of the SYDNEY was how the Naval Board of the day, and most particularly the Chief of Naval Staff, resolved their potentially conflicting loyalties to the Australian Government on the one hand and the Admiralty on the other. Military history records the many difficulties experienced in similar regard by Australian Army commanders but those officers were Australians and no doubts would have existed in their minds about where their responsibility lay. In the RAN’s case, the senior officers were still RN. The Chief of Naval Staff when SYDNEY was lost was a very senior and distinguished British naval officer, Vice-Admiral Sir Guy Royle, who had only arrived in Australia in July 1941 after serving for over two years at the Admiralty as Fifth Sea Lord.

We know that in March 1939, Admiral Royce’s predecessor as CNS, Admiral Sir Ragnar Colvin, made a personal approach to the then First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Roger Backhouse, regarding the possible loan of a capital ship to the RAN but this was rejected somewhat brusquely by the First Sea Lord expressing the hope that there may be no hasty decisions taken at your end (Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-49, Volume II, documents 37 and 41). Is it possible that even in 1941, the CNS saw himself as serving some higher master than the Australian Government and may even have made available to the Admiralty details of the sinking of the SYDNEY which were not available to the Australian Government of the day? Interestingly, Peter Fikins in his history of the RAN, Of Navies and Eagles, records (p.124) that Admiral Royce sailed for Singapore for talks with the RN on 29 November 1941 — one day before the loss of the SYDNEY was officially announced.

Another possible clue to the full story of the SYDNEY concerns the position of her sinking. Montgomery gives a lot of consideration to this aspect, reaching the conclusion that the location of the wreck is much further inshore than claimed. There must be a possibility that the wartime press releases shifted the action further offshore to reduce public alarm and I recall reading somewhere that this was so although Montgomery does not mention anything about it. This would certainly explain some of the inconsistency regarding the position of the wreck although any decision to purposely deceive the public should have been recorded in archival records. It also begs the question of what area was actually searched by air when the SYDNEY was known to be missing.

There are certainly many questions which remain unanswered about the loss of the SYDNEY — far Australia’s greatest single naval tragedy. It is a pity that Montgomery did not get to grips more with some hard historical research rather than letting his imagination run riot with circumstantial evidence and wild conjecture.

Arthur King’s suggestion that a search could be conducted even now for the wreck of the SYDNEY has much to commend it.

Yours faithfully
W.S.G. BATEMAN
Captain RAN

JOHN WHITTAKER
Li Cdr RAN

A NAVAL REVIEW

Dear Sir, in the November 1981 Journal ‘Agamemnon’ suggests that we have a Naval Review during the Bicentenary in 1988. A Committee in Navy Office is planning projects to celebrate 1986 (the RAN’s 75th Birthday) and 1988. The Minister has already approved in principle that we hold a Naval Review in 1986. Activities in 1986 are being co-ordinated by the Australian Bicentennial Authority and because of our maritime heritage the Navy will be involved in a number of important events including an International Naval Review. Section 18 of Plan Green contains some more information.

Yours sincerely
IAN KNOX
Commodore RAN
A.Y.O.

Sir.

Plus Ca change. Sub Lieutenant Goldrick's contribution (May 1981) vindicates the adage that the more it changes the more it remains the same, certainly as far as getting on is concerned.

However, he does not mention one method. This used to be called by the sailors (who always had a happy turn of phrase) fluking your way to fortune. In other words marrying a rich man's only daughter. (Like the judge in Trial by Jury.)

This particular method was not peculiar to any particular branch, but somehow seemed to be especially favoured by Navigators.

It did not always result in the possession of a rather nice flag of St. George with two or less balls in the inner cantons, but two were certainly necessary if the successful A.Y.O. used this method.

Yours faithfully
R.J. BASSETT
Commander RAN (Rtd)

TONGAN DEFENCE SERVICE

The RAN has two representatives with the Tongan Defence Service (TDS), a Warrant Officer MTP and a Chief Petty Officer MTH. The Warrant Officer is in charge of the Marine Engineering Section at Touliki Base at Nuku'alofa. The Chief Petty Officer trains the Army carpentry apprentices at Talaii Camp some 23 kilometres from Nuku'alofa. Of the seven apprentices who commenced training in 1981, six have been selected to undergo further training by the Army in New Zealand in March 1983. They will return to Tonga for further on-the-job training under the watchful eye of an RAAF Warrant Officer carpentry instructor. This Warrant Officer is responsible for building maintenance at the TDS Headquarters and at Touliki Base.

Progressively, both Australian carpentry instructors will be spending more time at the TDS base at Neiafu, the capital of the Vava'u Island Group. At some time in the future there is a possibility of a 300 tonne slipway being built to take small craft including yachts, fishing vessels and landing barges. An LCM 3 is also expected in the future to supplement the two small TDS Patrol Boats.

The fourth Australian serviceman in the area is an Army Warrant Officer Electrical Instructor. New Zealand provides an Army Warrant Officer instructor in mechanical engineering.

The carpentry apprentices achieved much in their first year. Apart from theoretical training they have had much practical experience in both woodworking and brickmaking. Work projects have also been carried out within the Talaii Camp and at the local centre for the handicapped. Three of the apprentices were also selected to take part in a United Nations boatbuilding course of 6 weeks at Nuku'alofa.

Chief Petty Officer Geoff Volmer

'LOFTY' FIFITA, TOP CARPENTRY APPRENTICE 1981.
THE VOYAGE OUT

by Captain S.B. deCourcy-Ireland RN (Rtd)

Captain deCourcy-Ireland's article on the early days of Flinders Naval Depot was well received. Although out of sequence, this article contains his impressions of the voyage to Australia at the start of his loan service with the RAN.

I sailed for Australia in the TSS SOPHOCLES (11,000 tons) of the Aberdeen White Star Line, leaving Torbay on 2nd March 1922. The ship was on her maiden voyage, and called in at Torbay after leaving Tilbury, for a ceremonial luncheon party given by the Directors to wish her success. The Mayor and Corporation of Torquay and other dignitaries were invited; and the passengers embarking in the tender were asked if they would mind waiting until the official guests had been received on board.

It was at this point that my cabin mate first made his presence felt. Lieutenant Medway was an ex-Mate and ex-Submariner; a large rubicund faced extrovert of I suppose about 35. He had intended to join the ship at Tilbury, but due to a slight over-indulgence at a farewell party, had missed the ship. His friends succeeded in depositing him in the boat train to Torquay however, and he had recovered sufficiently to board the tender. On arrival at the ship, Medway, still somewhat confused, joined up with the Mayoral party for the official reception. I think the Corporation thought he was one of the VIPs, and the latter one of the Corporation. Anyway Medway was soon the life and soul of the party and it was not until he decided to make a speech that his identity was revealed. I was unpacking when he was projected somewhat unceremoniously through the cabin door by a posse of breathless stewards.

As a cabin mate Medway has his limitations. He had been allocated the top bunk — or to be more accurate I had appropriated the lower one. He never succeeded in getting up to it, and after one or two ineffectual efforts gave up the struggle and thereafter slept on the cabin settee.

His major problem however arose out of his failure to label his luggage correctly. Everything he wanted in his cabin he had stuck HOLD labels on, and vice versa. Thus, other than the contents of a suitcase he carried with him, his wardrobe was severely limited.

He had arrived onboard dressed in a very loud suit of 'plus fours' and a cloth cap; and to the best of my recollection the only alternatives he was able to muster were a bowler hat, a pair of cricket boots and a white scarf. I remember the bowler hat well; he sometimes slept in it — said it stopped him catching cold.

It must have been hell for him going through the tropics, but he never complained. He managed to borrow a shirt or two, but as his collar size was about 18 he was never able to do them up. However, the scarf did duty for a tie at meal times. It was not until we reached Capetown that the Chief Officer would open up the Hold and he could sort out his gear.

He was the most good natured chap imaginable and very kind. Spent most of his time (when he wasn't at the bar) chatting up old ladies. 'That's one thing I can do old boy' he said to me; 'brighten up their lives, cheer them up'. Some of the old ladies found the smell of whisky a bit overpowering, but on the whole they appreciated his well meaning efforts.

It was my first experience of a liner and I thoroughly enjoyed it. We played deck games and liar dice; and there were all the usual shipboard activities such as sports, cricket matches, fancy dress and ordinary dances. And in my case what Michael called 'dalliance' with a maiden. She was returning to Rhodesia from finishing school in England, accompanied by her mother, and we had quite a shipboard romance which lasted all the way to the Cape.

The only other incident of note in the passage to the Cape concerned the Ship's Doctor. He turned out to be a drug addict, and having consumed all the stocks of morphine etc. in the Sick Bay, has to be landed on arrival in a pretty poor way.

After a short stay in Cape Town and a tearful farewell from the young lady (whom I never heard from again!), we went on to Durban. There we stayed for four days while the ship coaled. There was a whaling station there in those days and in fact a very dead whale was being processed when we arrived. The stench was so overpowering that the passengers had to be disembarked and accommodated ashore during our stay; the first class being put in the King Edward VII Hotel on the sea front which was very comfortable.

The second leg of the voyage from South Africa to Australia took 2½ weeks, and was remarkable for only two events. The first was a boxing match between the crew and the steerage, at which Medway, who had been a boxer, was the senior judge. Neither skill nor the Queensbury rules were much in evidence. In one match a...
fireman got a half Nelson on his opponent and proceeded to punch the daylights out of him. His unfortunate opponent retaliated in the only way open to him, sank his teeth into his leg. And was promptly disqualified by Medway. There was nearly a riot. Medway, who was full of whisky, was summoned before the Captain and orders were given that he was not to be served with anymore drink for the rest of the voyage.

The second event concerned the Ship’s Doctor. There had been great difficulty in getting a replacement in South Africa, but at the last moment one was found. He claimed a distinguished Army career during the 1914-18 war, with a DSO; and was very charming. All went well until he told a far from young spinster, who complained of a tummy-ache, that she was pregnant. She created a mighty scene and went to the Captain. The ‘Doctor’ finally confessed that he wasn’t one.

We called at Fremantle in WA and on 9th April arrived at Melbourne.

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AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE PRIZES

Australian Naval Institute Medal

The Australian Naval Institute Silver Medal for the best essay on maritime strategy submitted during each course at the RAN Staff College was awarded as follows:

Course 1/81 — Lieutenant P.C. Johnson MBE RAN
Course 2/81 — Lieutenant Commander J.M. Leak RAN

Journal Awards

The ANI Council is pleased to award the following prizes for articles printed in the Journal editions in 1981:

The Best Major Article written for the Journal
$75 to Sub Lieut P.D. Leschen RAN for his article Ice Patrol Ship Operations in the Antarctic in Volume 7, No. 1 (February 1981).

The Best Minor Articles
$10 to Master Ned for his ‘Nobody Asked Me, But’ article The RAN and the Racetrack Syndrome in Volume 7, No 3 (February 1981).
$5 to Lieut Cdr W.N. Swan OAM RAN (Rtd) for his article Masts on the Horizon in Volume 7, No 3 (August 1981).
THE APPLICATION OF SOME CONCEPTS OF DETERRENCE TO
AUSTRALIA’S MARITIME STRATEGY

by Lieutenant Commander J.M. Leak RAN

‘Our force needs to include many capabilities, but principally it should have a clearly visible
deterrent capacity . . .’

Sir Anthony Synnot

The author was awarded the ANI Silver Medal for this essay submitted during his attendance
at the RAN Staff College.

Our force needs to include many capabilities, but principally it should have a clearly visible
deterrent capacity.

Sir Anthony Synnot

The Chief of the Defence Force Staff, Admiral Synnot, in a national magazine article enunciated once again the thrust of Government decisions on the concept of national security which, in part, governs the size, shape and future of the Australian Defence Force (ADF). He went on to say that ‘there should be elements of our force which are capable of counter-action against an enemy’s vital interests; threat of counter-action which would move him from the consequences of any aggression by him, and so deter him.’

The principle of deterrence as the foremost element of our security policy is a relatively recent, yet none-the-less fundamental change in Australia’s perception of national security interests. The change coincides with the demise of American military influence in South-East Asia and the South-West Pacific area since the end of the Vietnam conflict in early 1975.

The policy usually described as ‘forward defence’ which had involved Australian forces in wars, not necessarily of popular choosing, since the beginning of the century has given way to use of ‘defence of Australia and Australian interests’ as a national concept. With this change has come a recognition that greater self-reliance is a predominant requisite of the newly-styled ADF, not necessarily a self-reliance based on self-sufficiency, but one where the nation should have a capacity to operate as a unified Australian force. This force should be provided with local logistic support backed by a national repair and modernisation capacity. Australia should be capable of assisting neighbouring countries militarily and be able to join with allies if that is the Government’s decision.

These concepts of self-reliance, centralised control of the ADF and the projection of an independent responsibility for our own security are without dispute. The author’s concern is with the deterrent aspects of our defence policy. What is deterrence? How should we apply deterrence? What are the consequences of a predominantly deterrent posture?

The idea of deterrence is as old as war itself, however its emergence to a pre-eminent position in most modern nations’ defence strategies dates only from the early 1950’s and the awareness that global nuclear war is now an everyday reality and possibility. Deterrence is a strategy for peace, designed to convince a potential enemy that aggression is the least attractive of all options available to him.

The definition given above is essentially the same as that accepted by the ADF and promulgated as doctrine. But where the author, Collins, goes on to emphasise the central issue of

THE AUTHOR

Lieutenant Commander John Leak joined the RAN in 1959 as a Cadet Midshipman. He is a helicopter pilot with wide experience in anti-submarine warfare and instructional flying. His naval experience includes duty with the RAN Helicopter Flight Vietnam 1967-68, flying instructional duties with No 5 Squadron RAAF and cadre staff duties on Joint Force Headquarters for Exercise Kangaroo 3. From 1978-1981 he was Staff Officer (Navy Operations) at AJWE and is a graduate of 6/81 RAN Staff Course. He is currently posted as Staff Officer Joint Warfare in the Naval Plans and Policy Branch.
psychological restraint as part of a deterrent strategy in his book, the ADF doctrine centralises on force structure, intelligence and industrial base aspects in explanation of deterrent strategy.

This apparent obeisance to the technology aspects of the ADF as the national deterrent, without due regard to other elements which combine to deter potential aggressors permeates every public airing of defence issues. Parliamentary, media and public concern is over aircraft carriers, fighters, budgets and defence installations. Few people concern themselves with the fundamental issues of our strategy of deterrence and its meaning.

This essay is an attempt to identify those aspects of deterrence which, if acted upon totally or in part, could comprise a deterrent maritime strategy. The concepts proposed form only one part of maritime strategy, however. They are essentially a peace-time strategy since, should hostilities commence, then deterrence has failed.

In hand with a deterrent capability we must always have an ability to wage war offensively. As Rear-Admiral H.E. Eccles has said, 'Deterrence is certainly a very important aspect of strategy, but it by no means is its only element. But since it is a negative element, undue concentration on it may easily detract from the essential aspects of strategy.'

The author can take no credit for the concepts of deterrence espoused in this essay. The concepts are drawn from papers published in the USA over the past six years. The papers reflect a growing concern that, despite the emergence of nuclear global holocaust as a distinct possibility, the proponents of deterrence as a grand strategy have failed to analyse deterrent theory since the days of the Cold War. Development of deterrent concepts for the prevention of conventional war or insurgency have been similarly neglected. My belief is that Australian experience is no better than that of the Americans.

Credibility and Preparedness

Nothing encourages potential enemies quite so conclusively as a nation with its guard down. Low force levels and low operational readiness standards are but two of the factors which can precipitate adventurism in the camp of a potential aggressor. Coupled with preparedness is the aura of credibility which must accompany the international image of a nation’s military power.

In Australia, the vanguard of our national defence capability is maritime power. Despite our military alliance with the U.S., our credibility as a regional maritime power can only be established by an independent maritime strategy backed by a supportive maritime force.

Australia must therefore have a maritime force with a capability of not only deterring potential aggressors, but one which can conduct operations to control our vital sea and air lines of communication. This concept recognises that the two most vital aspects of defence are the preservation of our sea-borne trade and the protection of the relatively densely populated and highly industrialised areas of our continent.

To lend credibility to the protection of Australia’s area of interest outside the continent, close defence ties with our neighbours in South-East Asia and the emerging island states of the South—West Pacific area should be developed. Our traditional defence ties with New Zealand should also be strengthened. The objective of these new regional policies should be to foster regional stability by demonstrating a willingness to exercise and co-operate with our defence partners and to display our will to support these neighbours should the requirement arise.

This objective is not attained by naval means alone. The development of a highly mobile, combat-ready, rapidly deployable task force is required to support the national objective. The archipelagic geography of our neighbouring states and, indeed, the similarity of some industrial and mining areas of Australia dictates that this force be highly conditioned to conducting its business from a sea base. Development of the Operational Deployment Force along US Marine Corps or Royal Marine lines as a fully integrated formation would provide effective evidence to our region that Australia is prepared to back its maritime policies with fire power from the sea, air or ashore.
Concerning deterrence of interference with our lines of communication, the naval and air forces must be equipped to provide visible and powerful evidence of our seriousness of intent. The development of increased capabilities of our F111 strategic strike force and the Submarine Arm is therefore of paramount importance. No country should be mistaken about the power of these weapon platforms. The capabilities of these strategic forces are also of prime importance in the maritime role. Our maritime capacity to strike at distant assembly points or to attack naval forces guarding strategic straits or ocean transit areas is a most powerful deterrent tool. Our ability to project air power at sea with the strategic strike force and aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm are central to control of sea lines of communication. The strategic value of the submarine force is undeniable.

Of equal importance is the quality of our other naval forces. The flexibility of roles inherent in the destroyers and frigates of the Fleet must be continued to provide not only the deterrent qualities of sea power which accompany the role of the RAN in peace-time activities, but also provide for the capabilities required in war of sea denial and sea assertion. This applies to the RAAF fighter force as well. The presence of the F/A 18 in Australia, deployed to protect our coastal shipping and points of entry into this country is a deterrent unto itself. An additional capability to perform maritime strike operations or provide air support for coastal shipping is an advantage which should not be under-estimated.

Credibility and preparedness are vital elements of our deterrent posture. Together, they provide the framework for the force structure required to achieve the national objective. Projection of that objective must be visible and continuous if credence is to be afforded it by regional power. That projection is a matter of national will.

National Will

National power is the product of national will and military force. In a strategy of deterrence the willingness to use that power must be seen as credible by an adversary. A key aspect of national will is the strength of political will to make crucial decisions when important national interests are at stake. This political will can be exercised in several ways. Whereas defence policies are inexorably tied to Australia’s foreign policies and to a lesser extent her trade relations with other countries, our will to deter war or international instability must be backed by concrete intentions of economic reward or punishment should regional stability be threatened. The political proclivity of protecting Australia’s economic
interests at the expense of our relations with neighbours has gained few friends in the area and reflects poorly on our attempts to foster the image of a regional maritime power intent on protecting the region from unhealthy influence. Australia's wheat deal with the USSR in 1980 following President Carter's plea for Western support for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Afghanistan is but one example.

The continuation of a policy which promotes European, Soviet, North American and Japanese economic interests before those of the area in which Australia's defence interests lie can only promote suspicion in the neighbourhood. This suspicion may well be reflected in the future by strained diplomatic relationships, increased bureaucratic stonewalling on warship and aircraft clearances and disinterest in combined exercising. A policy of isolationism as an expression of superiority is counter-productive to regional security.

The will of the people is essential in determining the political expression of national policy. Support for the ADF and particularly a recognition of the importance that the maritime forces play in supporting national interests is vital to the concept of national will.

The level of public debate on defence matters was covered in the introduction to this essay. However, it is fair to say that if national interests, defence policies, defence capabilities and maritime strategies are shrouded in secrecy then the public is unlikely to give its support to a defence force it knows nothing about. Similarly, potential aggressors are unlikely to be deterred if our military capability is kept secret. This leads to the next element — the concept of publicity.

Publicity

The concept of publicity directly opposes the principle of war called surprise. The Government must therefore make important decisions on what intentions and capabilities should be communicated to the public, and therefore, potential enemies and how that information should be communicated.

In the public forum, arguments have been made that government statements on defence aims do little to enhance public knowledge on the issues of the strategic basis for which vast amounts of the public purse are expended annually. Strategists believe that some politicians suffer from the same strategic ignorance and support some form of strategic basis statement being made available to the public from which informed debate might follow and from which public will might be gauged.

Such a statement could include a set of basic aims against which plans could be publicly evaluated. The statement would act as a useful component of preparedness — a statement of intent providing a datum for warning potential aggressors about the conditions which we have established for the use of armed forces.

This form of statement would be particularly useful in the maritime arena. The high cost of maritime capital equipment is inevitably subjected to public and parliamentary scrutiny. Quite often the loudest and most convincing cries come from the least informed — the media. The power of the Fourth Estate cannot be ignored by the Defence establishment and greater efforts should be made to promote a better understanding of the issues involved in the annual appropriation of the defence budget. Only by providing better information can the true nature of national will be reflected in defence objectives.

Controllability

The complexities of selecting the proper courses by which Australia exercises her deterrent defence policy and the subtlety of change and uncertainty which surrounds the prospects of conflict, demand that those forces used to support our defence policy be highly controlled. Those forces most likely to be used initially in protecting our vital national interests are the maritime forces. A successful deterrent maritime strategy will therefore depend upon the orchestration of maritime weight and the mixture of all elements of national power to achieve Australia's security interests.

The restructuring of the ADF and the Department of Defence in 1975, as well as the reallocation of certain command authority from the Chiefs of Staff to the Chief of the Defence Force Staff (CDFS) ensured that command of maritime forces in times of delicate international negotiation is vested at the highest defence level. But what of the principle of 'centralised direction (or command) and decentralised execution (or control)' which is expounded as the philosophy for control of ADF operations?

Recognizing that in extreme cases diplomacy might sway the balance between peace and war, what is the degree of controllability which CDFS has over maritime forces? The answer to these questions lies in the command and control arrangements available to CDFS in Canberra. As military head of the ADF, CDFS must be in close contact with the Cabinet, the Minister for Defence and the operational elements of the ADF tasked with the deterrent mission. Undoubtedly those maritime forces will be constituted as a joint force as this is the only constitutional way in which CDFS can exercise direct command over operational forces.

The command and control arrangements presently available to CDFS consist of access to the Defence Communications Network and the support of staff in the Joint Military Operation and Plans Division (JMOP). Other central Defence support is available for non-operational matters.
whilst the Policy and Plans Division provides the CDFS with ministerial departmental lines at working level.

JMOP is primarily concerned with day-to-day operational policy matters and the maintenance of contingency plans. The Division has little capacity to exercise CDFS command function. In this regard additional staff is required to supplement JMOP staff if operational command is to be exercised.

Whereas any future conflict is most likely to involve the use of joint forces, or at least the conduct of joint operations, it is incongruous that CDFS has no permanent facility to exercise command. Military forces require the highest degree of control in tense situations because of their destructive potential and the attendant risk of escalation if that potential is realised. During crisis situations controlled military force may be the only adequate means of signalling true national interest and intent to allies and adversaries alike.

As part of our national strategy, the capability for the CDFS to exercise control as well as command over deployed deterrent forces is essential. Escalation is a very real possibility if that control is lacking. Uncertainty in a potential aggressor’s estimation of our ability to control forces in any delicate negotiation phase may well cause the aggressor to allow escalation to work to his advantage. On the other hand uncertainty can work for us as well.

Uncertainty and Negotiation

If credibility fails or flags then an aggressor’s uncertainty about our will to fight might be the final wall holding back the tide of escalation to conflict. 
Henry Kissinger in his book ‘The Necessity for Choice’\(^9\) called this phenomenon ‘deterrence through uncertainty’. The concept deals with doubts concerning the probable outcome of any attack. The latitude for over-estimating friendly capabilities, under-estimating enemy capabilities and misinterpreting enemy intentions are contributing factors. Prospective aggressors may therefore be discouraged from adventurism.\(^10\)

In preparing any deterrent strategies, due weight must be placed on the concept of publicity as well as that of uncertainty. The conflict of interests is often removed by parliamentary means. The perceived inability of our national leaders to agree on most matters of national security casts uncertainty in the eyes of most Australians without having to consciously disguise our true intentions from potential aggressors. However the concept of uncertainty cannot support deterrence without a concomitant concept for negotiation.

Bluff or brinkmanship is not dead in the world of conventional warfare. Australia’s credibility at the negotiating table must be backed by military capability and, once again, the maritime and strategic forces provide the power base. 

Gunboat diplomacy in the control of the sea in our areas of interest is an important element in projecting our security policies. This will apply particularly when the Law of the Sea Convention is signed in Caracas in 1982. Where territorial or Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) sea boundaries are in dispute, the subtle and diplomatic use of maritime forces to substantiate our claims for sovereignty or resource control are vital if we are to retain international credibility. However, bluff should never substitute for capability.

Our strategy should be to deploy sufficient maritime forces to those areas where national claims are likely to cause dispute including the Timor Sea, north-west Australian waters and the Great Barrier Reef. Diplomacy may no longer come from the barrel of a gun, however the sole use of patrol boats to conduct sensitive political missions cannot be regarded as a serious attempt to exercise our sovereign rights over these areas.

More muscle is required in the form of major fleet unit or task group deployments to demonstrate our national resolution. To achieve maximum effect in this regard requires a flexibility of employment of forces not previously envisaged.

Flexibility

The concept of flexibility is not new, indeed it is an accepted Principle of War. However, with respect to deterrence, little attention has been paid to what this concept entails.

Apart from the flexibility of employment built into naval ships as a result of lack of unlimited capital equipment funds, there must be an adaptability of employment for maritime forces acting in a static deterrent role. These maritime forces must be capable of switching to an active role should negotiation fail or escalation take place.

The flexibility of weapon platforms is well understood, however the concern lies with the adaptability and flexibility of personnel to perceive where deterrence has failed and where action should commence. The flexibility of strategists, planners and decision-makers, rather than equipment users, is the true problem area.

In the field of maritime strategy, interests usually lie with operational requirements or equipment procurement programmes based on force structure decisions and inter-service rivalry for the defence dollar; training is invariably aimed at the operational requirements; strategic thinking is offensively orientated; staff courses concentrate on management and defence capabilities.

Nowhere, to the author’s knowledge, is the art and strategy of deterrence defined, published or taught. To maintain a flexibility to practise deterrence as a peace-time role of the maritime forces and to convert to an active role when, and if, the occasion arises should be of vital concern to the Government.
It is the maritime forces which will carry the brunt of decisions made in Canberra when the situation demands a military reaction.

In the introduction, the question was raised about the consequences of Australia adopting a principally deterrent posture. The question is only applied to changes which should take place in our maritime strategy if we are to pursue deterrence as a national security policy. To this end the consequences relate to Australia’s foreign policy, public statements, ADF organisation and force deployment strategy.

**Australia’s Foreign Policy**

In analysing foreign policy matters only broad issues will be discussed. The principal concern is that our foreign trade and diplomatic policies are seemingly not aligned to our stated defence policies. We seem to give more credence to nations outside our area of strategic interest than to those within it.

If we are to assert ourselves as a respected maritime influence in our region then bi-lateral trade and defence agreements should be brought into closer harmony. The consequence of not doing so is the loss of international standing in a regional community which believes in what it sees, not what it hears.

**Public Statements**

The Government has not shown any alacrity to widening informed debate on defence issues since the criticisms levelled at it over the general nature of the 1976 White Paper and the 1979 Ministerial Statement on Defence by Mr Killen. If deterrence is a key factor then the will of the people must be sought to gauge the degree to which the nation supports our defence policy.

Only by expressing national will can the Government pursue the deterrent line with any conviction that the nation is behind its policy decisions. Only by opening the debate to include comment on the strategic basis for the costly development and maintenance of a defence capability can this support be determined. The consequence is the loss of credibility as a nation which backs its security decisions with national will and potential force.

**ADF Organisation**

The delicacy and diplomacy which accompany a deterrent national security policy requires that the highest order of control be held over those forces which represent the national policy. These are most likely to be maritime forces — particularly in peace-time.

The present ADF capability to successfully control these forces seems inadequate on two counts. Firstly, command and control arrangements are not geared to give the CDFS a permanent facility to exercise his command should the occasion be warranted. Secondly, the forces most likely to be involved in deterrent maritime operations have little training in the skilful use of deterrent diplomacy. This applies equally to strategists and planners.

The consequences of not correcting these deficiencies are the serious threat of escalation to conflict in delicate situations and the engagement
of unprepared forces in dangerous bluff or brinkmanship of their own ignorant accord.

**Force Deployment Strategy**

The maritime strategy required to support a policy of deterrence differs from that required of a defensive posture. Elements of the maritime force must be used to effectively demonstrate the national will to protect Australia’s sovereignty and resources.

Australia’s strategy must therefore move away from its traditional ties to its super-power allies and exert a more independent influence on the area of strategic interest. This area includes the Australian EEZ and the waters of the South-West Pacific area, the Indian Ocean and South-East Asia.

Australia should be more evident in her defence ties, particularly maritime ties with our neighbours. This includes increasing our maritime exercising with ASEAN countries, Papua New Guinea and New Zealand forces and the deployment of major fleet units and elements of the RAAF more frequently to our areas of interest.

The consequence of our continuous close alliance with ‘all things American’ might be a growing disenchantment of neighbouring countries with Australia over the sincerity of our wishes for regional harmony and stability.

Nothing is stable in the world of national security issues and international relationships. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 is stark testimony that concepts of strategy can be valid today and be the 'lessons learnt' of tomorrow.

Australia is faced with changing strategic assessments of a scale more frequent than has been reckoned. In the future, the concept of deterrence as a principal security strategy might be replaced by one which returns the country to the super-power fold. While deterrence is the primary concern, the duty of the nation is to fully support that policy.

This philosophy is valid provided the theories, principles or concepts of deterrence are understood. There is little evidence to suggest that this is the case. Our pre-occupation with the material and operational aspects of maritime warfare has left a void in the thinking patterns of strategists, politicians and military planners alike.

Deterrence, in the national mind, is nothing more than the cost and composition of the force-in-being and the force-to-come.

This essay has attempted to show some of the additional elements which comprise a deterrent strategy. Without the additional concepts of credibility, preparedness, national will, publicity, controllability, uncertainty, negotiation
and flexibility that have been discussed, then force structure as a principal deterrent could be meaningless.

The essential concepts are those of credibility and national will. Without these concepts deterrence is a false goal.

National will results from an identification and vindication of Government policies by the people. This is only achievable by frank discussion of the vital issues — our strategic aims. Flexibility, which is inherited through a basic understanding of the ground rules, can only be achieved in the maritime force if the concept of deterrence is understood and instilled in maritime decision makers.

A deterrent strategy is not the panacea for Australia's security problem. It is the watch-dog for peace, but it must grow teeth should peace be forfeited. The delicate balance between these extremes can be tipped either way by the employment of deterrent concepts. Correctly used, these concepts may win reprieve from a war we may not yet be ready to fight.

Acknowledgements and Notes
2. Ibid, p. 78
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During the war I, at various times, served in ships working with units of the American, Dutch and Free French navies. Ships I have been in have been in company with ships of these nations on numerous occasions, patrolling, fighting, escorting and exercising. We have conveyed American, Dutch and Free French ships. In our wardrooms we have entertained as our guests Officers of the three navies, and ashore our ratings have mixed with theirs in a great spirit of friendship. Yet the fondest memories I, and my shipmates, cherish are those relating to our association with the United States Navy.

When the story of American naval activities in Australasian waters is finally written it will occupy several volumes at least. I can only brush the surface of the subject, and talk about my own contacts with our 'cousins' from across the Pacific. My first meeting with them was in February, 1942, when we made a rendezvous with the cruiser PHOENIX somewhere south of the Fiji Islands. I worked intermittently with U.S. ships until February 1943 when I joined the 7th Amphibious Force, which was under the operational orders of an American Rear-Admiral. For the next 2½ years I served in ships of the Amphibious Force, which was ninety five per cent American. We got on extremely well with the Yanks, particularly with the naval men. They were invariably our friends in an incredibly short space of time.

I do not think that the navies of two great powers have ever worked in such close unison. We would help each other in every way, and invite each other over regularly. The Americans used to shower us with invitations to the movies aboard their ships. It was not uncommon to anchor in Milne Bay, or off Buna, and immediately receive invitations to attend the movies from at least three ships. Officers and Petty Officers from the various ships would lend each other equipment, stores, in fact anything that was needed. Workshops aboard our ships would turn out jobs for the Americans, and the next day they would help us out. The First Lieutenant of a destroyer would send a magazine valve over to be ground by our Engineers. Then perhaps one of our Officers would take a U.S. confident book across to the destroyer to correct it up to date. I have never heard of a refusal on either side. If it was humanly possible, the job was done. Such complete cooperation as this has to be seen to be believed.

We were out to help each other do anything except the miraculous.

Naval men are rather hesitant, as a rule, about going aboard ships of another country without an invitation. But Americans would wander aboard our ships whenever they felt like it, and we would do the same to them. Quite early in 1942, orders were issued to the effect that U.S. ships and personnel were to be treated like our own. We were to consider ourselves as parts of one big navy for the duration. In the British navy, foreign Officers are 'piped over the side' day and night by traditional custom. This was waived in the case of U.S.N. Officers, this meaning that they were no longer to be treated as foreigners. The U.S. navy issued similar orders. Soon strong friendships sprang up, and in all large ships flying the Stars and Stripes you were bound to know at least one person. The bigger RAN ships carried liaison Officers as observers, and these Officers did much to foster friendly relations. They would advise the RAN Officers on all technical and social matters, and generally act as a medium between the ship they were living in and all US ships. Their primary duty, however, was 'communications'. For some time at first, each navy had great difficulty in understanding and using the other's complicated cyphers and codes which were trustingly inter-changed. Sophisticated British Signal and Cypher Officer, who thought they had nothing more to learn, would suddenly be confronted with a huge pile of publications and machines from Washington about which they knew absolutely nothing. I can speak at first hand about this as I was the custodian of confidential books in WESTRALIA when we received our pile, which was over three feet high. I shall never forget the look of amazement on the Captain's face when I staggered into his cabin with this bundle, the greater part of which was as clear to me as Egyptian hieroglyphics. Corresponding American Officers experienced the same alarm when they received similar bundles from Melbourne. Originally, the Officers rushed across to each other's ships; but the appointment of liaison Officers made this unnecessary.

On the question of supply, both navies benefitted by any facilities at hand. U.S. ships would take on fruit, vegetables, tinned juices so dearly loved by Americans, and other foodstuffs at Australian ports. Yet many a time, north of New Guinea, we were saved from a diet of dehydrated...
potatoes and bully beef by the timely appearance of a U.S. supply ship with fresh meat and vegetables in her refrigerated chambers. About April, 1942, whilst in the cruiser ADELAIDE at Suva, we met the U.S. Naval supply ship BRIDGE. She was a 5,000 ton ship and nearly thirty years old. Her supply Officer came aboard to see us, and a very interesting person he proved to be. When he told us he had visited Australia in 1908 with the Great White Fleet, we realised how long he had served his country. We asked him to dinner, and in return he wanted to give us many thousands of cigarettes. "Lease, lend", he said, smiling. It was only with great difficulty that we persuaded him to let us pay for the cigarettes. Always the story was the same. Let's know what you want, and we'll do our best to let you have it, was the attitude. Wire, rope, paint, blocks and other store items that we ran short of around New Guinea were practically non-existent as the northward progress of the war was too fast for us. The Americans did not hand out their stores to all comers, though. You had to prove that you really needed them, and that it was impossible for you to get them elsewhere. We were helped in this regard by the fact that we were in a U.S. Task Force, and under the orders of an American Admiral.

The men who manned the U.S. submarines based on Fremantle in 1942 were a happy-go-lucky crowd. Submariners are different to other naval men. Some are quiet, reserved. The majority of them demand a great deal from life, as indeed they are entitled to. These boys really enjoyed themselves whilst ashore. They rented some of the best flats and hotel rooms in Perth, and would throw the most hilarious parties. I am not saying that our own people were not generous with stores, because they were. But you can't give what you haven't got. At this time, store facilities for RAN ships operating around New Guinea were practically non-existent as the northward progress of the war was too fast for us. The Americans did not hand out their stores to all comers, though. You had to prove that you really needed them, and that it was impossible for you to get them elsewhere. We were helped in this regard by the fact that we were in a U.S. Task Force, and under the orders of an American Admiral.

The emblem of the U.S. submarine service is two porpoises with their heads meeting in the centre. It looks very like a pair of wings, such as the RAAF wear. It was because of this that I made a great bloom. When first introduced to some submarine Officers at a party, I shook hands with them and said something about always being happy to meet fliers. There followed a deathly silence, during which the Officers concerned glared at me with mingled hate and pity. The submariner looks down on the flier. In my innocence, I could not have said anything more provocative. Another Australian Officer nudged me and whispered, They aren't wings, you dope. They're porpoises. I apologised, and the matter seemed cleared up. But for the remainder of the evening the undersea Officers regarded me as you might a fly which has landed in your soup. Throughout the U.S. services I noticed that each branch was intensely proud, and conscious of their particular job.

The U.S. destroyer men were grand fellows. I have memories of pleasant associations with the DRAYTON, HENLEY and numerous other destroyers. Early in 1942 we had a few laughs at signals exchanged between our ships and U.S. ships. I remember whilst in the ADELAIDE, a U.S. destroyer rendered us some assistance by signal. Our Captain signalled back Thank you. Immediately, the destroyer flashed back, 'Thank you for thanking me'. I think her Captain must have thought we British excessively polite. On another occasion we were in company with other Australian cruisers, with U.S. destroyers screening us, and we were all carrying out zig-zag number 14. One destroyer happened to be near the flagship, and several times when the flagship did not zig right on time the destroyer had to do some quick manoeuvring to get back into station. Normally, when ships are zig-zagging they alter course together and thus maintain their correct station relative to each other without any unnecessary manoeuvring. This destroyer was unlucky. However, she had no intention of putting up with it for long, and signalled to the flagship, Are you carrying out zig-zag number 14? We held our breaths. None of us would have dared make such a signal to the flagship.

Some time previous to this we were in company with a large U.S. ship whose Captain was Senior Officer of the convoy escort. At dusk on the first night out of port we were awaiting the usual night intentions signal, when the Senior Officer sent us a message the first words of which were, 'The following doctrine prescribed . . .'. We stared at this for some time, not knowing what to think. The signal was pinned up inside the chart house, and as each Officer came up to the bridge he looked at it and walked away looking a trifle mystified. These were trivial things, however. There was complete accord between the two navies from the outset. Each in its own way admired the other, which was a good thing for everybody.

They were all our friends. The cruisers PHOENIX and CHICAGO and their sisters, the submarine depot ships HOLLAND and FULTON, the gunboat TULSA, the Amphibious flagship

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BLUE RIDGE, the landing ships HENRY T. ALLEN and ALGORAB and many others. I think we all realise the debt we owe them.

We met Americans from all over the States. From the mountains, the cities and the plains. Some amazing coincidences occurred too. I was once talking to a New Yorker, and told him that I was in New York in 1938 and had stayed at the Hotel Taft. 'That's funny,' he said. 'My father used to manage the Taft.'

In Milne Bay in December 1943 I met a U.S. naval Lieutenant who had taken part in commando raids on New Britain. PT boats would take him and his party most of the way, and they would make the remainder of the journey in rubber boats. He told us that on one occasion when he was approaching a Jap camp through the jungle, a Jap sentry only three feet away from him lit a cigarette. That match probably saved his life, as he had not previously seen the sentry. Men like this did invaluable intelligence work for us.

While WESTRALIA was part of the 7th Amphibious Force we had crowds of Americans aboard almost continually. Navy, Army and Marines. At times we had as many as eighty U.S. Officers living in our mess. Now and again we heartily cursed them, and they us. But the atmosphere in general was one of great cordiality. During training periods, with over one thousand troops on board, we often became very exasperated when things did not go just as we wished. Yet everything always turned out very successfully in the end. They approached many things in a different way to us. We soon learnt this, and met them half way. There was no blustering, or losing of tempers. When our tempers frayed a little, so did theirs. In which case, both parties would calm down and thrash out the question in hand logically. I was glad that I had met practically the first U.S. troops to come to Australia, early in 1942. I was not quite so glad, though, to help to take the last units out in 1944. They had been two years with us, the navy considerably longer. It was only when the threat of invasion was removed from Australia that the 'doughboys' moved north to staging points along the New Guinea coast. The navy remained until long after this, and we actually operated with them until the enemy's capitulation.

Yes, they were grand comrades in arms. Those 'cousins' of ours from across the Pacific. We, and they, now have memories stored away which not even time can take from us.
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The announcement by the Minister for Defence, Mr Killen, that the Government has decided to purchase *HMS INVINCIBLE* from the United Kingdom highlights the emphasis placed on a maritime strategy for Australia's defence. The decision will be a major influence on the structure and operating principles of our Navy.

In an article of this type it is clearly impossible to cover all aspects of national defence, but a discussion of some of the important maritime considerations may help a better understanding of the way in which an aircraft carrier contributes to the Navy's ability to play its part in maritime warfare in the defence of Australia and Australian interests.

**Strategic Considerations**

The Government's policy of increased self-reliance in defence matters recognizes that in any future conflict short of global war, Australia may have to rely, at least initially, on its own resources. This requires a Defence Force which:

- serves to deter potential aggressors from actions which threaten our national interests;
- has the ability to cope with those lower level threats and contingencies which may arise with little warning; and
- can expand in time to handle those situations which might develop more slowly.

Geography, and our reliance on seaborne trade dictate a special need for strong maritime forces to protect Australian interests. Our country is an island continent with an extensive maritime resource area. We have no land frontiers. Except in the Torres Strait area, any approach to our continent would involve a transit over the open ocean, by sea or air. We have offshore island territories and lay claim to part of the Antarctic continent.

 Virtually all our overseas trade and much of our interstate trade is carried in ships. Without the free and uninterrupted passage of shipping our trade dependent economy would quickly be disrupted. In any defence contingency, the Australian Defence Force will be heavily dependent upon imported goods, both for essential defence requirements and for use in Australian defence manufacturing industry. Significant interference with our overseas trade could seriously affect the Defence Force's ability to continue operating.

Our maritime forces must therefore be structured with a view to:

- defending our vital trade, both overseas and coastal;
- controlling the sea approaches to Australia; and
- contributing to deterring aggression and maintaining stability within our region.

In stressing the need for strong maritime forces, I am referring to both naval and air forces while acknowledging the importance in our overall defence strategy for appropriately equipped land forces for ground defence and enhanced deterrence.

The naval force component, as part of the maritime component needs a mix of capabilities, many of them complementary, to meet the requirements I have outlined.

Before considering those capabilities and the methods of employing them in the defence of our national interests, it is important to consider where our maritime forces should be able to operate and why. Clearly, operations will be necessary in Australia's sea approaches and coastal waters. What is sometimes forgotten, or not understood, is the requirement which could arise for our forces to operate beyond the immediate surrounds of our mainland either in defence of our island territories, in protection of our overseas trade, or in support of our regional allies.

Ninety-eight per cent of our overseas trade is carried in foreign vessels and any disruption to that trade by an aggressor may involve third party nations, either the Flag nations of the foreign vessels or Australia's trading partners. It is sometimes argued that this fact will in itself protect our trade from interference. I am not convinced and point out that foreign flags did not prevent 'neutral' shipping from attack in the Shatt-el-Arab in 1980, nor did it in World Wars I and II or in the Arab/Israeli, Vietnam and Indo-Pakistan wars or a number of other lesser conflicts during the last thirty years. I consider that the minimum requirement is a capability to protect incoming cargoes of military equipment and supplies including certain grades of crude oil. If foreign ships are threatened...
they simply will not come unless they can be protected.

Rather than deploy his forces close to Australia where they would be exposed to the full range of our defence capabilities, an enemy may choose to deploy his surface ships and submarines further out into the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Australia’s maritime forces must be ready to provide protection in these more distant areas. Again, it is sometimes argued that our geography allows the option for substantial diversion of shipping away from areas where they may be threatened, but I point out that this valid tactic has limitations in application. Evasive routing, as it is called, imposes additional time at sea (increasing the time vulnerable to threat) and thus reduces the frequency with which ships arrive. This has the same nett effect for the enemy as sinking a number of ships. It can also add considerably to the cost of each item imported.

Evasive routing is not the panacea to protecting trade it may appear. Furthermore its effectiveness is short lived.

In time of peace, or in the absence of major conflict, military power can be used in various ways to advance national political objectives: by supporting friends and allies, by coercing enemies, by neutralizing similar activities by other powers, by exerting a more diffuse influence in politically ambiguous situations in which even one’s own objectives may be uncertain, or merely by advertising one’s presence or ‘showing the flag’.

The Government of the day may wish to employ military force to further its aims of contributing to stability in our region and naval forces offer a valuable option in such circumstances. They provide a flexible method of signalling Australian interest or presence in the region without taxing the resources of the nation.
concerned and avoid the need to station forces in-country to support our friends and allies should they seek military assistance. Following the invasion of Afghanistan, naval forces were deployed in the Indian Ocean and the Minister for Defence, when announcing the RAN Carrier Task Group deployment, made the clear point that Australian naval operations, while co-ordinated with those of the United States, would be independent.

Tactical Considerations
Discussion of strategic factors which influence the composition of the RAN should logically be followed by discussion of the equally important tactical factors. These centre on the capabilities which influence the employment of units in combat.

Tactically, no single capability can be seen in isolation. This applies whether we are talking about a ship, a submarine, an aircraft or the weapon systems operated by these platforms. All capabilities are to some extent complementary and the need for one depends on a judgement of whether or not there is sufficient of another available. For example, the successful defence of a convoy at sea against aircraft or missile attack requires capabilities for early warning of the attack, fighter/strike aircraft to attack the enemy before he can launch his weapons and ship mounted surface to air missile and gun systems to provide the last ring of defence. The level of sufficiency in any one of these capabilities can determine the level which can be accepted in another, but an element of each should be available to provide the necessary defence in depth.

Tactical air support is an important ingredient of this mix of capabilities. It is as important in maritime warfare as it is for the land battle. Its applications include:
- anti-submarine warfare;
- tactical reconnaissance to find out what lies ahead in the area about to be entered;
- air defence against enemy aircraft and missiles; and
- maritime strike against enemy surface units.

Land-based aircraft can on occasion play an important part in providing tactical air support, but the quick reaction so necessary in modern maritime warfare cannot be provided by land-based air alone. This has been acknowledged by United Kingdom Defence Authorities and was substantiated in Exercise Kangaroo 81. This is especially so in Australia's situation because of the size of our ocean approaches and the total air power likely to be available to us. The three fundamental properties of carried based air support which combine to give it a unique quality are particularly important. These are base mobility, proximity and the organic nature of the air support.

Modern aircraft can be deployed quickly from one area to another, but the new base from which
they are to operate must be equipped with internal and external communications, command and control arrangements, accommodation, self-defence facilities, workshops, ammunition stocks, fuel stocks, spare parts and stores and a logistic organization to support them. An aircraft carrier is such a base and has the advantage of being mobile. It can quickly change the focus of air operations to where it is most needed.

The need for proximity of the tactical air base to the area of operations is not peculiar to maritime operations. Availability of aircraft depends not only on the numbers of aircraft which can be provided, but also on the distance of the air base from the scene of action. With carrier-borne aircraft, the transit time is minimised. Further, whilst in flight refuelling can extend the range of land based aircraft they cannot be rearmed in the air.

The organic nature of carrier based air support allows it to be closely integrated into the tactical organization of the force. The prime benefit is rapid reaction — a crucial factor for success in modern warfare. Whilst the Government will not make a decision on the STOVL aircraft requirement before 1983 HMS INVINCIBLE has the proven capability to operate this type of aircraft.

The RAN’s Aircraft Carrier

The RAN has long recognized the value of carrier-borne aircraft. An aircraft carrier has been central to the Navy’s operational concepts since 1949. The life of HMAS MELBOURNE has been extended well beyond her planned service life to ensure that carrier-borne aircraft could continue to contribute to Australia’s defence capabilities.
into the 1980's, pending a decision on replacement.

On 9th September 1980, the Minister for Defence announced in Parliament that:

'The Government has decided to replace HMAS MELBOURNE with a purpose-designed ship to be equipped with helicopters for anti-submarine warfare, but with a potential for operating also short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft. The Government will not make a decision on the actual acquisition of STOVL aircraft until 1983.'

Following Government's decision, funded studies were undertaken of two options:

- a variant of the USN LPH class; and
- a RAN configured US Sea Control Ship.

During the earlier evaluation of possible contenders the Royal Navy's INVINCIBLE class had been considered, but had been eliminated because at that stage the cost was significantly higher than other options. The ship's capability was assessed as marginally inferior to that of the modified LPH and its equipment lacked commonality with that fitted in other Australian ships.

On 25 June 1981, the Right Honorable John Nott, MP, the UK Minister for Defence, announced in the House of Commons that:

'. . . while we shall complete the new carrier ARK ROYAL, we intend to keep in service in the longer term only two of the ships of this class . . .' 

Subsequently, in September 1981 a UK team visited Australia and provided information about price, availability and relevant updated technical and performance documentation. In the light of the cost information and technical and performance data provided, it was decided to expand the carrier source selection evaluation, which had already commenced, to include consideration of acquiring a ship of the INVINCIBLE class.

The evaluation of the three contending ships was conducted in parallel and was thorough and complete. Each of the ships was compared initially against minimum RAN capability requirements and evaluated further for growth potential, support, manpower demands, delivery, risk, Australian Industry Participation, and initial and thorough life costs. The evaluation process was conducted by five teams of Defence and Navy personnel and their findings were reviewed by senior Defence committees. The evaluation concluded that HMS INVINCIBLE be acquired in 1983 on the principal grounds that:

- while HMS INVINCIBLE offers less capability than the LPH design it meets the requirements of the RAN;
- although HMS INVINCIBLE lacks commonality with other ships of the RAN, some benefits will accrue from its commonality with the other ships of the INVINCIBLE class;
- the early delivery date of HMS INVINCIBLE would save money and resources otherwise necessary to keep HMAS MELBOURNE operational;
- there is considerably less risk, both technical and cost, associated with the purchase of an in-service ship; and
- the total project cost and through life costs are significantly less than other designs.

The UK offer is at a firm price for the ship of 175 million pounds sterling ($285m). The total project cost is estimated at $A478m at August 1981 prices. This includes provision for spares, test and training equipment, essential RAN changes and
other support, but excludes the cost of missiles.
There has been some criticism in the media and elsewhere over the selection of **HMS INVINCIBLE** as the RAN’s new aircraft carrier. It has been alleged at one time or another that the ship:
- has insufficient speed;
- has insufficient range;
- requires a very large complement;
- suffers from extreme vibration;
- lacks suitable air conditioning;
- has inadequate accommodation;
- is a ‘British discard’; and
- will require very expensive modifications.

The RAN requires a top speed of about 24 knots in the new carrier and a range at 18 knots, with 30% fuel remaining, and allowing 550 tonnes of fuel for escorts, of 5000 nautical miles (nm). By comparison, **HMAS MELBOURNE** has a range of less than 5000 nm at 18 knots with no allowance for escort fuel. **HMS INVINCIBLE** has a top speed of about 31 knots and her present range is about 4000 nm at 18 knots with 30% fuel remaining (this range excludes using the 550 tons of fuel for escorts) but this can easily be increased to 5000 nm with minor changes to existing spaces at very little cost. Some vibration has been experienced during sea trials of **INVINCIBLE** within a very narrow band of her speed profile and more severe vibration at about 30 knots, but this is not a significant factor.

The complement of **INVINCIBLE** is similar to that of the **LPH** for the same mix of aircraft and is significantly less than **HMAS MELBOURNE**.

Navy requires accommodation of a given standard to be provided for 996 officers and crew for wartime operations and to allow trainees to be embarked in peacetime. **INVINCIBLE** exceeds the requirement for both accommodation and habitability. The full requirement for air conditioning is not met, but space and weight exists to increase air conditioning capacity should this prove necessary and at little cost. The
assessed cost of initial modifications required for
INVINCIBLE to meet RAN requirements is about
$5M.

The Royal Navy clearly wishes to retain HMS
INVINCIBLE and they are most satisfied with her
operational performance. I sympathise with their
loss, but I am most grateful that the British
Government decided to give the RAN the first
opportunity to acquire her.

It has also been suggested that HMS
INVINCIBLE was designed for operations in the
North Atlantic and therefore is unsuitable for
operation in the Australian environment. One
does not necessarily follow the other.
INVINCIBLE was selected because she is the
most cost effective of the contenders for the RAN
aircraft carrier. She will provide an efficient
platform for operating the required numbers of
anti-submarine helicopters at sea remote from
major bases. She has a demonstrated capability
for STOVL aircraft operations as she currently
operates Sea Harriers in addition to anti-
submarine helicopters. Acquiring STOVL aircraft
of the Sea Harrier/AV8B type would further
enhance the effectiveness of RAN carrier task
group operations by providing a quick reaction
capability at sea for:

- tactical maritime reconnaissance;
- maritime strike;
- counter-air reconnaissance; and
- air defence

Some Common Misconceptions

It is ironic that the role of the aircraft carrier in
modern naval warfare should be called into
question in Australia at a time when other
countries such as the US, USSR, UK, France,
Spain and Italy have so recently reaffirmed the
need for seaborne air power and made commit-
ments to new aircraft carriers and other large
ships from which to operate organic naval aircraft.

They have all concluded that larger ships
such as aircraft carriers are the most cost-
effective means of providing the required
capability. With the exception of the USSR, all
these countries have long recognized the
importance of maritime affairs in their economy
and way of life. The USSR came to the realisation
of the importance of seaborne trade and the utility
of seapower only comparatively recently, but
there is no doubt they have now made a firm
commitment to their naval strength and well
understand the importance of seaborne air
power. Despite the origin of our birth and early
history, Australia does not have a maritime
tradition. Perhaps it is because most Australians
remain unaware of the importance of the seas in
world affairs and our own reliance upon seaborne
trade, that the need for the RAN to have an
organic air capability is being questioned now.

A common misconception centres around
the contention that a carrier is excessively
vulnerable and therefore we should not 'put all our
eggs in one basket'. The facts do not support such
a contention. No aircraft carrier has been
damaged by enemy action since 1945 despite
being engaged in virtually every incident of
hostility since then (Korea, Suez, Lebanon,
Vietnam, Aden, Cuba and Iran). In the Korean war
at one stage, every allied air base in Korea was
overrun. More aircraft were lost on the ground
from enemy action than in the air in Vietnam. In
1969, after a fire and explosion of 9 tons of bombs
on the flight deck (equivalent to multiple hits from
modern guided missiles), the USS ENTERPRISE
was fully operational within two hours. To gain a
hit with a weapon on any ship, an enemy first has
to locate either the ship or the force of which it is
part. Even with modern satellite surveillance
systems this is no easy task. If he locates the
force, he must first identify his target, then
marshall his own units and evade the defensive
capabilities of the task group to reach a position to
launch his weapon.

Another misconception is that an aircraft
carrier always requires a protective screen of
escorts. There are occasions when this is so, but
the main purpose of operating ships in task
groups is to maximise the offensive and defensive capability of all units by bringing a wide range of sensors and weapons to bear in the one area against a broad range of threats.

It is sometimes suggested that a larger submarine force would be an effective alternative to a carrier for the RAN. The unique qualities of submarines are a vital element of a balanced navy, but they cannot protect sea trade, nor can they cope with the full range of threats which can be countered by a task group of surface ships. They are excellent vehicles for denying an opponent the use of the sea — but they are of little use in asserting control over the sea. They are unsuitable for use in situations where Government may wish to demonstrate a physical and visible military presence. Employment of submarines in maritime warfare is generally regarded as escalatory.

The question is sometimes posed of 'What good is one carrier? Will it be available when needed or will it be in dockyard hands?' There is no doubt I would prefer to have at least two carriers, because of the vast extent of the two oceans surrounding our shores and the requirement for the RAN to operate in both. One carrier will, however, allow the skills we have gradually developed over the years to be maintained and will provide for peacetime tasks and the shorter warning time contingencies. Provided we have these relevant skills available in the force, we have the capability to expand them to operate a second carrier or to make use of modified merchant ships for convoy protection in an emergency.

HMAS MELBOURNE’s deployment to Darwin after Cyclone TRACY illustrates how quickly a carrier can be made available when it is in dockyard hands. MELBOURNE was conducting a maintenance and leave period in Sydney when TRACY struck Darwin on Xmas morning 1974. The ship sailed for Darwin on Boxing Day evening stored with relief equipment and with 70% of her crew on board. Refit cycles and routine maintenance in peacetime are aimed at achieving high ship reliability so that there is a reserve of availability for use in emergencies and should not be taken as indicative of a carrier’s availability for operations in such emergencies.

Summary

In this short article I have addressed some of those matters which have been considered at length in the searching examination which properly preceded Government’s decisions to replace HMAS MELBOURNE and to purchase HMS INVINCIBLE. This examination, and the public debate accompanying it, has now spanned three decades. It seems to me that the essential ingredients of Government’s decisions are:

- a clear understanding of Australia’s dependence on the unimpeded flow of its seaborne trade and the potential vulnerability of that trade. Interfering with our seaborne trade could be an attractive option for an enemy, potentially less demanding on his resources than attacks on Australian territory;
- the need for the RAN to be capable of operating beyond our immediate continental surrounds, both in a trade protection role and in pursuit of other Government policies;
- the essentiality of organic naval air power to modern maritime warfare and the mobility and proximity provided by an aircraft carrier;
- recognition that while more than one aircraft carrier might be required in some scales of conflict, a single carrier is suited to our present strategic situation;
- the need to maintain essential skills so as to be capable of expanding the RAN in an emergency; and
- the utility of sea power at all levels of conflict affecting Australia.

Carrier borne air support forms a fundamental part of the Navy of our oceanic island nation. A ship of the INVINCIBLE class will be an important component of the RAN and will, I am sure prove suitable and adequate for the task.
This topic is one which has attracted a reasonable amount of attention over the past few months, and that in itself is a healthy sign. In particular it seems very relevant to the purposes of this Institute that the subject has been addressed both in forums which have been sponsored by the Institute and by members in forums external to the Institute.

I have deliberately chosen to use the word 'vessel' in the title because it encompasses not only the larger units of the RAN, but also the host of support craft which are an essential feature in the operation of the Navy.

THE SPEAKER

Commodore Ron Calder joined the RAN in 1949 and obtained his Bachelor of Engineering from Adelaide University in 1950. Since that time the author has served in a variety of appointments associated with weapons engineering, including quite a considerable association with the DDG building programme in the USA in the sixties. Since 1972 he has served twice in the Naval Production Branch in Navy Office including his current appointment as Director General to which he was appointed in October 1979.
Underway replenishment ship

Probably most, if not all, of tonight’s audience were present at SEAPOWER 81 on 10th and 11th April this year — I will endeavour in the course of my remarks tonight not simply to reiterate statements made by many of the distinguished speakers on that occasion, but there were several points made there which are most relevant now and for the future. It is a matter of personal regret that I was unable to attend that most successful seminar — however I was engaged in a particularly pertinent activity. My pleasant task that weekend was to represent the Chief of Naval Technical Services at the final inspection and handover of the largest vessel built and delivered from an Australian shipyard to the RAN in 1981 — HMAS TOBRUK. (What better place to take delivery of a ship than adjacent to the Hunter Valley). 1980 and 1981 have been particularly busy years for the RAN in so far as ship deliveries are concerned — one patrol boat in U.K., two FFG’s in the U.S.A., one oceanographic ship, one amphibious landing ship, three patrol boats and four 34ft survey motor boats in Australia is not insignificant I believe. In addition, one destroyer escort has been delivered after the most extensive surface ship modernization undertaken in Australia — certainly in recent years.

In an endeavour to constrain the extent of my presentation I will confine my remarks to vessel construction during the last 15 years with a brief look at approved programmes for the future. I will further divide my topic into activities which take place in the commercial world and those in government shipyards. I also wish to place some emphasis on a theme which came up frequently during SEAPOWER 81 — that there is the need to improve the relationships involving all the people associated with the complex process of selecting, specifying, ordering, building and completing naval vessels. In a paper presented on the 2nd November 1981 to the Australian Symposium on Ship Technology — Sea Transport Technology 1981 — The Chief of Naval Materiel, Rear Admiral Rourke, had the following to say:

'It seems necessary to me that all of us associated with ships and shipbuilding accept that we must demonstrate an ability to compete on the world market and that this is not an impossible challenge. We have shown ourselves capable of good design, sound construction, and efficient operation ... some of the time. We need efficient and aggressive management, and a good partnership between management and labour. Just to accept the idea that it is a partnership, and not a contest, would be a substantial step forward.

We need to understand the problems of our maritime industries . . .'

In my view, Admiral Rourke’s comments on ‘management’ should not be thought to be constrained to the local management within the shipyard but must be recognised to include as well the customer’s management, the contract authorities’ management and the equipment suppliers’ management. In a modern warship more money will be spent on equipment than on the hull and installation.

Turning now to more solid things and considering the size of the vessel construction industry in Australia, it should be noted — and indeed was made much of at SEAPOWER 81 — that at least some areas of the industry are much smaller than in previous years. During World War II seven Australian shipyards built more than 70 ships of minesweeper size or larger — since World War II eleven destroyers have been built, but the last one (HMAS TORRENS) was laid down 16 years ago and was accepted into service about 11 years ago. Thus in the last decade this shipbuilding work (particularly for larger vessels)
has dropped dramatically although reviving somewhat in the last 3-4 years. The effects of this near cessation in shipbuilding have been significant in those industries associated with shipbuilding, i.e., heavy engineering, marine propulsion and electronics. As you will recall, the then managing director of Vickers Cockatoo Dockyard informed the SEAPower 81 audience that shortly after 1973 his dockyard ran down to its lowest level of activity since the 1930's, whilst Mr. Neil Stevens reminded us of Australian industry's considerable gaps in capability in the marine propulsion and electronics fields.

Before I convince you that there are nothing but problems with the construction of naval vessels in Australia, let me address for a few minutes some of the more positive achievements. Two commercial and one government shipyard have a current building programme, at least 6 other commercial enterprises have recently been, are or are about to be in contract for support craft for the navy and tenders have been called for the construction of two prototype minehunter catamarans and two commercial tugs. Amongst the smaller vessels there are several more projects in an advanced stage of approval which should lead to contracts with commercial shipbuilders for vessels ranging in size from 12ft to 44 metres. Of course the numbers of any particular type are small because the Navy's needs are small — however it is a conscious policy of the Navy to make use of vessels available in commercial production wherever and whenever it is possible, so that economies of scale may become effective. Thus it seems in at least one area of naval vessel construction in Australia, the situation and the prospects are not too bad.

With respect to medium sized vessels, the current 14 vessel contract for patrol boats has several more years to run (average delivery rate is three per year) and a further 5 vessels of the same type have been approved, although the ordering arrangements are yet to be finalised. Given that the prototype catamarans are successful, a follow on order of production vessels is proposed for the mid 80's. These catamarans are not simple vessels, and to a greater extent than the Fremantle class, will involve other industries. Unfortunately, as for the Fremantle class, very little of the major equipment or systems will be constructed in Australia, but its installation and particularly ongoing support is intended to give opportunities for Australian industry. As was so clearly expounded at SEAPower 81, the construction and introduction into service of naval vessels (other than perhaps the simplest support craft) requires an industrial infrastructure which currently is deficient in several areas. The need for these capabilities has withered, amongst other
reasons, because of the low level of shipbuilding, and its revitalisation will not be easy. To quote Mr Stevens:

'There is presently a shortage of skilled personnel throughout industry . . . the skills range from tradesmen to middle management professionals; the geologists; the chemists; the engineers; virtually the whole range. It is a shortage on a national scale and it is worsening . . .'

This capability gap, and the situation so graphically described by Mr Stevens, give rise to even greater problems when one considers the construction of larger naval vessels in Australia. The two most important (perhaps glamorous) projects for new ships to be commissioned into the RAN during the next decade are of course the aircraft carrier replacement and the follow on destroyers. Whilst it has not been generally discussed, three of the remaining commercial shipbuilders in Australia have been approved to determine their interest in the local construction of a carrier if an approved design was selected. They have each indicated that they are not interested for a variety of reasons such as:

- The 'one-off' nature of the order
- Insufficient skilled manpower available or potentially available for the construction task.

In my view it is very probable that each of the builders approached was also acutely aware of the continuing deficiencies in the national engineering infrastructure and this knowledge substantially influenced their decision.

What of the follow on destroyers? As is well known, the government has announced its intention to build vessels of the FFG Class in Australia, at Williamstown Naval Dockyard, providing certain productivity problems can be solved. A decision in the first half of 1982 is anticipated and approval has been given to order long lead items for the first vessel. The production problems cover a wide spectrum of matters, and several of these have been reviewed and reported upon to enable the government to reach a decision. The reviews have covered, inter alia, industrial relations, management procedures and practices and the administrative processes attached to building complex naval vessels in government shipyards. As was consistently identified by many speakers at SEAPOWER 81 the problems implicit in these matters relate to:

- Continuity of workload
- Industrial infrastructure

Artists impression of the RAN Minehunting Catamarans.
— Defence Public Relations
• Small volume of orders
• Technical control and management within the navy
• Australian Government procurement procedures

To illustrate the significance of these matters allow me to quote from 6 separate speakers:

Mr R.J.L. Hawke
The problem at Cockatoo is on the shipbuilding side and it is a direct result of a most familiar complaint in the industry: the lack of a continuous workload.

Mr R. Humbley
Nevertheless (post WWII Destroyer building programmes) achieved the objective of securing the ways and means to build warships, and kept the people and skills in practice, even though, with wisdom and hindsight it should be admitted that the exercise was not quite as efficient as it might have been.

Professor W. Kasper
A . . . precondition for sound defence is a versatile, flexible and modern industrial infrastructure . . .

Mr N. Stevens
(Australian naval shipbuilding) projects place greater pressure on the service technical areas in project control, design and management but the end result is . . . much more beneficial than direct overseas purchases.

Mr P. Scott-Maxwell
. . . The working relationship . . . between private enterprise, the customer and his contracting cum procurement agency, leaves a lot to be desired.

Mr R. Hawke (again)
What is required . . . is a new partnership between government, management and workers — a triad of forces . . .

Admiral W. Rourke (again)
Just to accept the idea that it is a partnership . . . would be a substantial step forward.

In summary, the question of whether or not we can or should build sophisticated warships such as destroyers in Australia is one which should attract the attention of every member of this Institute. For reasons beyond our control, the practices and skills of building destroyers have lapsed in the shipyards, associated industry and in our own Service — if the capability is to be regained we must tailor our demands to essentials and particularly pay heed to the words of Sir David Zeidler:

'It is important, however, that the Defence Department, the Services themselves and industry develop a good understanding of the sorts of things which could be needed under an emergency.'

To further this understanding in some small way, it is worth talking about some recently completed shipbuilding projects — two in a government yard and one in a commercial yard. The latter is of course HMAS TOBRUK.

This vessel is basically an overseas design although some changes were made to satisfy specific RAN operational requirements and others to take account of updated practices and technology. The shipbuilder certainly employed, probably to a greater extent than previously done in Australia, the unit construction method and I invite you to look at the manner at which units were successively consolidated on the slipway during the vessel's quite short building time. Similar techniques are in progress at the builder's yard for AOR-01 — HMAS SUCCESS. However, although TOBRUK's building time was short, the difficulties arose and delays occurred when the fitting out of the ship was undertaken. Local labour was used as far as possible to undertake the wiring and installation of the not particularly large range of electronics equipments, but for a variety of reasons, it proved necessary to employ teams of specialists from Garden Island Dockyard to set the equipments to work and offer them for test and trial. Thus Departmental (trials units), Naval (dockyard personnel), the shipbuilder and his subcontractors were all involved in bringing into service one relatively unsophisticated vessel — certainly a much simpler vessel than a F.O.D.

The other two projects I would like to briefly address are HMAS COOK and HMAS PARRA-MATTA, both undertaken by Williamstown Naval Dockyard, one as a new construction task and the
HMAS SUCCESS under construction.

other as a modernization. This is not the forum to
delve into all of the reasons why both projects
have taken much longer than planned — other
areas such as the Auditor General's office and the
various Williamstown reviews have already dug
deep in those areas (!) — but perhaps a few words
will show how complex the vessel and the tasks
are —

HMAS COOK was purpose designed as a
vessel which would act as a platform for
sophisticated oceanographic sensors and the
scientific/naval specialist staff to make use of
them. She is operated with a relatively small
number of ship's company and certainly the
intention was and is, as it is in TOBRUK and the
FFG's, to reduce the number of watchkeepers to
steam the ship. Much of her equipment is up to
date by any standards and includes —

- A bow thruster
- A stabilized narrow beam echo sounder
  (one of very few in the world)
- An active rudder
- Controllable pitch propellers
- Large hydraulic winches
- A machinery control and surveillance
  system
- A central data logger system.

Regrettably almost all of these equipments
are supplied and supported from overseas, and
even in those areas where Australian companies
tendered for the system integration and engineer-
ing tasks, the paucity of Australia's infrastructure
has been sadly demonstrated.

The manoeuvring propulsion system fitted in
HMAS COOK comprises a bow thruster and an
active rudder unit, complete with switchgear,
control equipment and control units to give
complete control of either or both units at all times.
The installed system provides a highly
flexible system with each unit producing the
following thrusts:

- Bow thruster — Maximum thrust of 12,125
  lbs through 360° of rotation
- Active rudder — Maximum thrust of 8,600
  lbs through 180° inclusive
  rudder angle.

The system provides the following opera-
tional performance:
a) Holds the ship on station against pre-
vailing wind and tide, within the limits of
the specified thrust.
b) Propels the ship on a precise course at
slow speed whilst undertaking oceano-
graphic work.
c) Allows the ship to manoeuvre safely in
restricted waters.

The system is designed for use:
a) Without main engines, as single units, or
combined.
b) With main engines, as single units, or
combined.

The bow thruster is of the retractable type
and is installed into a watertight compartment.
The active rudder is incorporated into a
spade type rudder. Each unit is fitted with a Kort
type nozzle and controllable pitch propellers,
capable of producing maximum thrust in either direction, with fine adjustment of pitch at any setting.

Each unit is driven by a constant speed electric drive to deliver maximum possible static thrust.

The complete system is controlled from the bridge (port and starboard) and from the after conning position of the ship.

Both the bow thruster and active rudder were purchased from Pleuger, West Germany.

_HMAS PARRAMATTA_ was built in Australia in the 1950s (she is one of the 11 Australian built destroyers referred to earlier) and during the early 70's it was decided to carry out a complete modernisation of her particular class of vessels. At that time 'half life modernizations' were more favourably regarded in international and local naval circles than perhaps they are today. The complete ship redesign, using wherever possible proven equipments and techniques, was undertaken in Australia and included the propulsion system, the airconditioning system, ship's habitability and weight saving measures as well as the communications and weapon systems. The process of completing the ship, setting it to work and testing all systems has been, and continues to be, lengthy. In my view certain factors have made this task more difficult:

- Approx 5 years elapsed between the time the last warship designed and built in Australia (_HMAS TORRENS_) was completed and the detailed design for the _PARRAMATTA_ commenced.
- Many years elapsed between the time regular major refits of steam propulsion machinery vessels were undertaken at WND and the time when Parramatta's upgraded system needed to be set to work by WND.
- The trials facilities for demonstration, and final acceptance, of most of the communications and weapons systems is only available near Sydney, ie, an impractical distance from the shipbuilder.

Looking back over the various matters I have touched on, it may be worth highlighting the main ones:

- Naval vessels is taken to include small craft (down to 12ft) up to 4,000 plus ton destroyers and beyond.
- Construction takes place in commercial shipbuilding and boat building activities as well as government yards.
- The relationship of people whether managers, designers, procurers or physical workers is of paramount importance.
A fall off in major naval vessel shipbuilding in Australia occurred in the 70s.
A reasonable number of support craft projects are currently underway and yet to commence.
There is a relatively sizeable workload in medium vessel construction.
There is a lack of an Australian industry infrastructure to support construction of naval vessels.
There is a need for understanding between Defence, Navy and industry.

The effects of the current situation on TOBRUK, COOK and PARRAMATTA.
From this list it could be inferred that there is a real risk in proceeding with a naval vessel construction programme in Australia, certainly in so far as major war vessels are concerned. We could settle for, and have become practically self sufficient in, an industry which builds small to medium hulls from various materials and outfits them almost entirely from imported equipments and systems. It is not, I believe, for me to say whether such an approach is adequate or in the nation's best interests. Clearly there would need to be a massive, and perhaps impossible, turn-around of policies and practices for Australia to become totally self sufficient and independent from all outside suppliers. However, surely it is a matter of concern for members of the Institute, and it certainly is a matter of concern for me as an individual that we have got so close to the low end of the totem pole.

If the future of naval vessel construction in Australia is to change from the present heavy bias towards small, semi-commercial type non-combatants (which is in the main what we have shown ourselves capable of, with the possible exception of HMAS COOK) then much thinking and planning needs to be done.

The Navy has to critically examine its demands (not necessarily reduce standards, but certainly look at solutions which are not at the extreme edge of sophistication and technology).

The government departments concerned, the Services and all elements of industry and labour which are, or should be, involved must develop a better mutual understanding of the complexity of naval vessel construction.

An acceptance of the need to rebuild and reacquire lost skills in major war vessel construction, and a concomitant acceptance of the time it takes to rebuild these skills, must come.

A return perhaps to the post World War II situation and the avoidance of invalid
comparisons between the time and cost taken to build one or two off of a class of vessel being made with 'production run' vessels.

- A need exists to review and rationalise the number of authorities with a direct involvement in naval vessel construction and to determine whether their geographical location and organisation arrangements are effective.

None of the above should be taken to indicate that I believe naval vessel construction should proceed regardless of time and/or cost involved. I am firmly convinced that good contracts can be, and have been, placed which satisfy the customer and leave the builder content. These are however exceptions, and will continue to be so, until a thorough understanding of all the problems associated with this activity is gained by all participants.
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The Soviet Sailor

by Lieutenant Commander J. de B. Whittaker RAN

There is nothing new in the size of the Soviet Navy; it has been the third or fourth largest in the world for the last 200 years. It has not always been an effective Navy but it has been large. What makes it quite different is the fact that it has been almost totally destroyed four times in that period: at the Crimea, at the Battle of Tsushima, the 1917 Revolution, and during World War II in, as the Soviet preferred to call it, The Great Patriotic War.

Its latest restoration is the almost single handed achievement of one of the most remarkable naval men of this century — Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei Georgiyevich Gorshkov. He has been in his present post since 5 January 1956 and holds the only 6 star rank in any of the world’s armed forces.

The role of the Navy has never previously been very high, consisting as it did, mainly of coastal defence and gunfire support. It is now an ocean going force of considerable potential although it would appear to rate only fourth in seniority out of the five branches of the Soviet armed forces.

Soviet naval equipment is sophisticated and there is a large quantity of it but the single most important factor is still the man. The aim of this essay is to discuss his background, his pressures, and his problems.

Prior to Enlistment

The life of the ordinary Soviet citizen is by Western standards, bleak and is under government control and surveillance throughout. Consumer goods are shoddy and the worker reaps less for his toil than the worker of any other advanced nation. Government control starts at his birth which is reported to the KGB by the UPRAVDOM (Director of House) a person quite unlike any to be found in the Western world. He acts as a warden of all the occupants in the building and reports routinely to the militia on all movements in his house (birth, marriage, deaths etc) including the late arrival in the early hours of some happy reveller. If this latter does not happen, the offender is liable to KGB interrogation during which he will be required to explain why he was out so late, who he was with, and where.

Whilst still at school he must complete between 100 and 140 hours of military instruction. At the age of 16 he is issued with an internal passport without which he cannot travel, much less move permanently. It must be shown when seeking accommodation and it must be registered with the local militia when staying in an area for longer than 72 hours. Areas restricted to the passport holder may be entered in the book so that the KGB can, in effect, put a citizen anywhere they want in the USSR and can keep him there. As an example of this the rural worker is rarely issued with a passport at all so he must remain on the land. On the other hand he may be issued with one if the state wants rural workers in a certain area (like Siberia). To establish residence in a major city he must prove that he has a job there — to get a job he must prove he has accommodation and to get accommodation he must prove he has a job! The only way out of the vicious circle is to know a member of the KGB personally. The KGB can organise a job and accommodation simultaneously.

When he obtains his first job he is issued with a work book in which his employer lists all details of his job performance and skills. Reprimands are also recorded. The KGB have access to this book and an adverse comment entered by them means the employer will almost certainly dismiss the employee. When the latter looks for another job his prospective employer will want to see his work book and as soon as he sees the comment, will cease to be interested in employing him. There is a law in the Soviet Union which labels any person unemployed for 30 days a ‘parasite’ and as such liable to internment in a labor camp.

Now the young citizen gets his call up papers and appears in front of a local draft board which has a military member attached. These boards meet in May-June and Nov-Dec and provide the 120,000 conscripts annually required by the Navy.

Training

The training given is in a specialist field and generally no course training is given. On joining his first (and last) ship a sailor is given one month to gain ship knowledge and is trained to fill one action station by his predecessor who is not
relieved until this training has been completed. He may be rotated but will get no advanced training unless and until he extends and becomes a senior NCO.

Much training appears to be theoretical with few opportunities for live weapon practices. Ships' companies are constantly encouraged to compete in what are referred to as 'socialist competitions'. Good or excellent marks in these competitions result in a rating of OTLICHNIKI (Excellent One) and these results are published in the local press. Actually only the more politically minded sailors take part.

Officers spend their first five years of service training ashore and then stay in their first ship through several promotions, in some cases ending up in command of the vessel they joined as a junior officer. They are given little room for initiative even up to a quite high rank.

**Conditions of Service**

His enlistment is for three years as opposed to two for the Army and four for submariners and for the vast majority is regarded as an unpopular period. Mess decks at sea are drab and cramped by comparison with western Navy counterparts and are decorated with political slogans and the inevitable photograph of Lenin. He may also be required to take part in any political rallies that may be held locally.

**Leave**

Short leave is generally only given on three days per week and expires at 2359 on Saturday and 2330 on Wednesdays and Sundays. A Kashin on a recent Indian Ocean cruise only had two days leave in six months. He can expect no long leave for eighteen months and in the remaining eighteen months will get two ten day leaves with warrants. When overseas, shore leave is never given individually — always under the escort of a CPO or Michman.

**Pay**

On completion of basic training the junior seaman gets about $4 per month whilst his civilian opposite number can expect about $100. By the end of his conscription he should be rated Petty Officer 1st class and would receive about $80. This, and the fact that all libertymen are escorted ashore is why Soviet sailors are well behaved on leave. In their home ports the situation is different and drunken sailors are much in evidence. The USSR has the highest consumption rate of hard liquor in the world and the sailor in his home land obviously sees no reason why he should be different.

**Promotion**

If the sailor extends (or re-engage) he is almost certainly promoted to CPO but very few in fact do extend. After a further extension of three years he may be rated Warrant Officer or Michman (Praporshchik, if ashore). The Michman on transferring to the reserve can be expected to be commissioned as Lieutenant.

**Language**

According to the 1970 census the population of the Soviet Union can be split up by nationality as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainan</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbek</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussian</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatars</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazahs</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijain</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgian</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (28)</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Soviet ECHO-II class submarine.
In order to minimise the possibility of a disturbance on ethnic lines in the services the nationalities are split up right down to section level (Army). One submarine had 11 nationalities from 22 republics — an artillery battery had 24 different nationalities. The big problem is that 29% of the Soviet Union cannot understand Russian and this is the language of the Army and Navy. In fact it is estimated that the Russians will be in the minority by 1980 or possibly in 1985. Moslems have increased by 44% in the 19 years from 1959.

Political Indoctrination

The sailor will normally receive two, two hour lectures on Marxist/Leninist theory and one hour lecture on the Marxist interpretation of current affairs. Officers do a seven day annual course during which they receive such instruction as 'How To Engender Hatred of the Imperialists in your Sailors'.

They also receive a slightly twisted version of how World War II was won. As an example the Red Navy, as it then was, claims to have sunk over twelve hundred German warships. The German Order of Battle in 1940 listed three hundred and twenty one vessels. And this achievement incidentally, was after 400,000 Soviet sailors were transferred to fighting the land battle.

The KGB and the Serviceman

The KGB is operationally divided into four chief directorates and 5 directorates and one of these, the Third, ensures a firm hold on the Services. The sailor will not know who the KGB personnel are as the latter may wear any uniform of any arm, at any time. They have their chain of command and are exempt from military orders when they choose.

Much of their time is spent in looking for and eradicating real or imagined anti-Soviet activity and this includes poor training, slovenly appearance, negligence, waste, and shortages. Colonel Reitz, US Army Intelligence cites the case of a pilot who ejected from his aircraft and then was subject to interminable gruelling to prove himself not guilty of sabotage. The sailor is therefore very aware that someone from the KGB is never very far away. In 1969, 3 naval officers were found with a copy of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights in their possession; one got 6 years in a labour camp, one got two years, and the third was sent to a KGB mental hospital — which is probably the worst punishment of all. In the same year, 31 naval officers were arrested in Estonia for criticizing the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Ruthlessness of the System

Maxim Gorky said 'Innate cruelty is the most prominent feature of the Russian character' and it is certainly true no other country has for so many centuries been subjected to the tyranny of a Secret Service.

The ruthlessness is always present and two examples will suffice. In 1937 Stalin began to fear the Armed Forces and commenced his infamous purge. Marshau Tukhachevsky only recently promoted was accused of being, first a British spy, and then a German. The eight man tribunal sentenced him to death and was then itself dismissed. Six of the eight members were subsequently tried and executed. Altogether the 1937 purge had the following result:
3 Marshals out of 5 shot
14 Army Commanders out of 16 shot
8 Admirals out of 8 shot
60 Corp Commanders out of 67 shot
136 Div Commanders out of 199 shot
221 Bde Commanders out of 397 shot
11 Vice Commissars of Defence out of 11 shot
75 Supreme Mil Soviet out of 80 shot
Total of all ranks shot 35,000.

Even Stalin’s friend, Marshal Yegorov, of pre Civil War and Civil War days was executed. He had been offered Tukhachevsky’s villa but had refused the offer. That was enough for Stalin, who had him shot. Marshal Blyukheï or Blucher as he sometimes spelled his name was in command in the Far East and was untouched because of Japanese threat. He was then recalled to Moscow to serve in Tukhachevsky’s tribunal. He returned to the Far East where his Senior NKVD officer defected to the Japanese and his staff was then purged. The Japanese attacked and the purge ceased with Blyukheï himself next on the list. He halted the Japanese offensive and was recalled to Moscow where instead of congratulations on his victory, he was reprimanded. His new staff won many awards and he was then arrested and a month later was dead. There is evidence to suggest that Stalin was preparing for another purge when he died in 1953.

The second incident occurred last year when a Krivak destroyer mutinied and sailed for Scandinavia. They were turned back and later it is believed 82 of the ship’s company were shot.

Political Commissar

The political commissar has been a part of the Soviet military scene since 1919 and a decree of that year stated that a commissar who fails to prevent the desertion of a commander will have to answer for his negligence with his own life. Prior to 1937 the commissar was junior to his military commander; after the 1937 he was equalled in authority and at the beginning of World War II was senior. Now he ranks third; for example in a destroyer he follows the Executive Officer. The commissar or glavpur as he is now called is responsible for strict maintenance of the party line. Meetings are held during which junior seamen are encouraged to criticise their officers who are present. This, while it may make the sailors’ day, cannot do much for the officer.

The commissar’s recommendations could often make or break the career of his military counterpart who, at best, stood junior to him in the party.

CHANGED YOUR ADDRESS?

Did your last Journal turn up late, or come via another ship or establishment? If it did, then perhaps you have moved and forgotten to tell us. Similarly, if the rank was wrong then perhaps you may have forgotten to amend that too.

During the rush to distribute the Journal to members, a great number of the distribution team make comment on the obvious incorrect addresses that they are aware of, but in their efforts to get the job done they do not have the time to alter the address labels.

If you have changed your address, or rank, or intend to do one or the other, or both, before the next edition please let us know. Just drop a note to the Membership Secretary and advise him of:
your name;
membership number (top right hand corner of the address label);
new address (or new title)

The Editor
On passage from Buenos Aires to Sydney the barque *FARSUND* was driven onto Vansittant Shoal by a south-easterly gale. After her crew had safely reached shore a second gale drove her further onto the shoal where she remains.

The chartlet shows the wrecks' position off Flinders Island, whilst the recent photograph illustrates how well the hulk has withstood the weather.

For some reason *FARSUND* is not shown on current charts but although located incorrectly, she is shown on the Shell roadmap of Tasmania.

Lt Cdr R.M. Jones

Editors Note:— Colour photographs contained in 'Dire Strait — A History of Bass Strait' indicate that *FARSUND* is in poor condition due to the effects of wind and weather.
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THE IMPORTANCE OF CIVIL AND MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN THE EIGHTIES

by Commander A.J.T. Bennett R.D., RAN

In recent years, much has been written on leadership, and related topics, such as motivation planning, communication, authority supervision and co-operation.

A need has been created for effective leadership training to ascertain what is to be taught and to decide what training is necessary to meet the needs of leadership concepts of these times.

Leadership implies occupancy of a status and the active performance of a role that motivates effort towards the attainment of shared goals and objectives. A leader requires intelligence, judgement, determination, insight, imagination, a balanced personality, a sense of humour, and a sense of justice.

Authority and Supervision

The concept of leadership overlaps that of authority. To understand authority, one must understand leadership in order to learn why people accept authority in some instances and not in others. Authority involves the responsibility for decision making and, therefore, the necessity to give orders in the reasonable expectation that they will be obeyed. However, in almost all areas of management and the Navy, there must be some delegation of authority. The hierarchy of command cannot do all the work itself. By delegation an obligation is created on the part of junior staff to have work completed or duties carried out. It is most important that this obligation be created, otherwise the line of authority falls apart. The person accountable for the operation of a task, or duty, must still be responsible even though some duties have been delegated. Therefore, a person in charge must use authority effectively to supervise the delegated tasks.

Both in civilian management, and in the Services authority arises from the position or the rank held. Managers and Officers need to be decisive if they are to be successful leaders. Personal qualities are also important, in that some people who possess charisma will possess great qualities of leadership potential.

The key point is 'acceptance of authority through understanding.'

In order to accept authority, a subordinate needs to understand what he is being told to do and the decisions that will have to be taken by him.

Motivation

A sense of accomplishment is desired by men and women at all levels. Without a recognised goal or objective, there is little incentive to put in effort. It is important that supervisors not only give clear instructions as to what has to be done, but also why it is being done. It is most important to motivate people to more readily accept their given task.

There are many facets involved in guiding and motivating staff. Plans need to be communicated meaningfully with an explanation of the reasons behind particular actions. To assist the subordinate to comprehend instructions and motivate enthusiasm, those instructions must be very clear. Even the best plans on paper need effective guidance for them to become meaningful when put into operation.

The Leader and the Led

Leaders in any area of life need to be able to convert ideas into results. The skill with which this is done vitally affects the efficiency of the Defence Forces and nearly all sections of the civilian work force.

A leader must cultivate a personality that will inspire respect and, therefore, acceptance of

THE AUTHOR

Commander BENNETT joined the RANR, on completion of his National Service in HMAS VENGEANCE in 1954. He was promoted to leading rank in 1957 and commissioned later that year. He became the commanding officer Reserve of the Adelaide Port Division mid 1980. He has done several extended terms of service with the RAN in various ships carrying out local and overseas deployments and visits.

In 1952 Commander Bennett joined the ANZ Bank. He was appointed Branch accountant in 1962 and reached management status in 1966. In 1974 he was appointed the Personnel Manager for SA & the NT in the ANZ Bank. He became manager of the Bank's Norwood Branch in 1979.
decisions and orders. The ingredients are: a calm demeanor; a voice and temper under control; a firm conviction of the correctness of orders; and a fixed determination to see them carried out.

In the Navy, an officer must remember that he is by no means his own master and that everything he does reflects upon his service and his country. To quote Lord Nelson, 'Duty is the great business of a sea officer; all private considerations must give way to it, however painful it may be.'

With intelligence and training, a man may achieve mechanical skills. Human relations, however, involve interpersonal situations and attitudes requiring wisdom, experience, and intelligence of the highest order. A manager and an officer are as responsible for a man's response as a man is for a machine's performance. Human response should be studied just as carefully as a machine's performance. Managers and Officers should undertake a human relationship with the firm belief that the men they are given to control and lead can be made or marred by their individual efforts, their observations, their foresight, and their intelligence. This produces a 'Tuned' relationship:

An order should never be given that cannot be enforced;
A leader should be able to say 'no', and have the guts to say it;
Managers and Officers should let no man leave an interview with a feeling of resentment;
An officer should not nag, neglect, or coddle.

Planning Commitment

By getting staff to participate in planning some facets of the work they have been delegated to do, a wider understanding of their objectives can be realised. Involvement in planning also generates a commitment to those plans by the participants.

Communication

Another major component of successful leadership is the awareness of the operating problems of the organisation and the personal feelings of the people in it. This aspect is frequently overlooked by over-emphasis of the one-way, downward flow of orders. An upward flow of information is essential. By personal interaction, a leader can learn much which will be involved and necessarily taken into account in future decision making processes.

Co-operation

Through personal contact, managers and officers may more easily select staff and men for their tasks. Such contact also makes the subordinate feel an important part of his organisation or service. A willing, enthusiastic response from subordinates is essential to a vigorous organisation or service; and the voluntary co-operation amongst these subordinates must be heavily relied on. Authoritarian power alone is not enough. A spirit of co-operation is necessary, resulting from the manner in which communication is established between manager and officers and their subordinates. This co-operation is the essential ingredient for a successful action.

Leadership Training

In recent years, there has been difficulty in reconciling the Navy with trends in the behaviour of the community. During the same time, answers have been sought by the industrial society to find the best way of effectively training their own leaders.

It is usually agreed that the most productive approach to leadership training lays emphasis on what a leader needed to do in order to gain people's co-operation. It was assessed that there was a need to delegate and gain co-operation by telling individuals why the job is important. It is considered necessary to instruct a leader in why he should do it, in order to make him act effectively.

The leadership training by 'doing' was developed by John Adair at Sandhurst in the early 1960's. Dr. Adair and other people studied leaders of the past and also observed teams of the present in action. One day one of his associates said, 'I can't work out so-and-so's qualities until he actually does something.' This statement precipitated the idea that the leader had involvement in three major areas. Those areas are to achieve the task, build the teams, and develop the individual.

This interaction of interrelations can be illustrated with a simple model:
These three overlapping areas indicate that a leader cannot deal with one area without the other two areas being affected. For example, it is necessary for a team's morale and an individual's satisfaction to be high before a task can be satisfactorily achieved. Conversely, a task will not be well achieved if there is internal dissent causing individual satisfactions to suffer.

It is incumbent upon a leader to see that all three areas of need are satisfied. However, it may not always be possible for the leader to pay equal attention to all three at the same time. A good leader must be aware of his omissions and be prepared to take early corrective action.

Nine factors that relate to the model would be:

1. Set the task enthusiastically and remind the team of it often.
2. Make leaders accountable for groups of up to 15 people and explain to those leaders the meaning of the three areas of interaction and interrelation.
3. Design the task and check its progress with a view to promoting the commitment of both the individuals and the team.
4. Set objectives after discussion with individuals in the team and update regularly with progress reports.
5. Determine the effect of each decision on individuals.
6. Regularly communicate, explain, and brief members of each team on the importance of their task.
7. Instruct and develop members of each team, gain their support, and set an example.
8. Show concern for the well-being, safety and working conditions of members of the team. Deal with grievances promptly.
9. Monitor work, learn from successes and mistakes and physically visit each job in hand, observe, listen and praise.

Although the solution to effective leadership training is to learn by experience, much assistance can be gained by consideration of the preceding nine points.

Conclusion

There are several bases for leadership, and an effective leader recognises which are operative in any situation. Not only must a manager and an officer correctly identify the kind of authority that can be used but they should also acknowledge the proper basis of authority which others have, including their subordinates and they should not feel threatened by allowing their subordinates to exercise that authority which has been delegated.

Our Armed Services are dependent on effective leadership at all levels. However, if leaders are to operate at their fullest potential and get others to give of their best, then we must continually remind ourselves — and others — of the importance of the interpersonal situations which are involved.

The key to effective leadership training is to learn by doing, to build a team, and to develop individuals.

The relationship between a leader or supervisor and a subordinate should create lines of communication which provide for free interaction between the two levels. The relationship should be subject to continual adjustment, as conditions change. Delegation should be modified as the work to be done and the people who do it change. Motivation should be adjusted where necessary. The major part of the relationship should, however, remain unchanged as the subordinate learns what to expect of his leader and the leader learns how much he can depend on his subordinate. The patterns of expectations are essential for the successful operation of a business and all elements of the Armed Services.

In dealing with people, it must be remembered that there are narrow limits in our ability to change them. Best results in changing behaviour will be achieved by creating situations that enable people to give their best in situations which impose as little stress as possible. Such considerations will enable us to lead people to apply their energies constructively, enthusiastically, and with dedication.

(Throughout this paper, the terms 'officers' and 'leaders' includes commissioned and non-commissioned officers).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Harpoons can be launched from existing ASROC, Tartar or pylon launch systems; from simple, low-cost canister clusters; or from buoyant capsules.

The Ubiquitous Harpoon Missile

The Harpoon missile has so distinguished itself in the U.S. Navy that it has become a "round of ammunition." It is demonstrating flight reliability of greater than 90%. The missile requires no maintenance, no additional crew and little specialized training. Yet a single Harpoon-equipped ship, plane, or sub can defend over 8,000 square miles of ocean against hostile ships.

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DOUGLAS

Harpoons for all missions flow efficiently along a single production line.
Originally designed and laid down as a steamship the three-masted full-rigged ship SOBRAON was one of the largest composite vessels ever built. Launched from Hall and Company's Aberdeen yards for Lowther Moxton and Co in 1866, SOBRAON was too late for the tea trade but was to make her mark as a wool clipper.

The term composite in ship-building describes the method of construction — timber over iron frames and beams. At 2,131 tons SOBRAON was often described as the Mighty Sobraon.

Sold to Devitt and Moore in 1873 she became a regular visitor to Australia in the wool and passenger trade. Because of her size and reliability SOBRAON became a favourite amongst passengers and crew alike. Reputed to be well found and (possibly more importantly) well fed, she left the UK in September and arrived in Sydney the following February, making one round trip per year. Vital statistics were:

- Length: 317 ft
- Displacement: 2,131 tons
- Cargo: 100 tons
- Crew: 69
- Passengers: 90 as first class, 60 as second class

Her sailing days came to an end in 1881. Arriving in Melbourne SOBRAON was bought by the NSW Government for £11,500 and sailed to Sydney to become a school ship for delinquent boys, replacing the old VERNON. Continuing in

— Australian War Memorial (Negative A2605)
this role until 1911 SOBRAON changed owners again, this time being purchased by the Commonwealth Government on behalf of the RAN for use as a training ship.

As part of the sale SOBRAON, then 45 years old, was dry docked for survey. A tribute to the builders was that her hull was described as 'sound as a bell' by the surveyors.

For her role as an RAN training ship SOBRAON was renamed TINGIRA and commissioned on 25 April 1912. Until she paid off on 25 June 1927 some 3,158 boys are believed to have been trained for Naval service.

On being paid off, TINGIRA was laid up in Berry's Bay and sold to a Mr W.M. Ford on 3 November 1927. She was re-sold to a Mr S. Friere in 1935. Slowly deteriorating, plans were afoot (1937) to refit the old ship, fit an auxiliary engine and use her for coastal cruising. These plans eventually came to nothing and the once proud and well loved ship was eventually towed to Kerosene Bay to be broken up (1940). She was then 75 years old.

With plenty of hindsight it seems a pity that not one person or organisation appeared to have been progressive enough to buy TINGIRA (ex SOBRAON) and keep her for posterity. Had that happened, then perhaps the RAN would have a visible reminder of its history and a real start for the Naval Museum.

Robin Pennock

-- Australian War Memorial (Negative A2547)
In seeking concrete examples of the effect of Sea Power in World War II, there can be no better starting point than the Battle of the Atlantic, where Sea Power had its longest, most gruelling test. To the historians goes the task of assessing just when and where the war was lost and won; but the Germans themselves would be the last to deny that a major turning-point was at Dunkirk and the Battle for Britain, and in Germany’s inability to prevent Britain becoming the spring-board for the invasion of Europe.

By 1943, the arm-chair strategists, pessimists of 1940 and 1941, had decided that the Allies had won the war. They were incredulous, and perhaps shocked, when Allied leaders warned them that the Battle of the Atlantic still hung in the balance, and that Hitler would strive to win that battle as the one hope of a compromise peace.

What were the stakes in this gamble to which the enemy pinned such high hopes? The stakes were that ‘bridge of ships’ with which the Allies spanned the Atlantic to bring men, munitions, equipment and food to reinforce Britain for her drive against the Reich. Britain, standing alone, had already withstood the threat of invasion; but if the ‘bridge’ could be smashed, a stalemate might bring a negotiated settlement.

Statistics sometimes make dull reading, but here they tell the magnificent story of the trans-Atlantic life-line. As that life-line was opened as soon as the war began, and kept open when Britain had only her Dominions with her in the fight, the significant figures really date from September 3, 1939.

In five years and eight months of war, 75,000 merchant ships sailed in or across the Atlantic under Naval escort. The number of Atlantic convoys totalled 2,200, the largest of which comprised 167 ships.

On some days as many as 700 cargo ships were at sea in the Atlantic, with 100 escorting warships.

Of those 75,000 merchant ships, 574 were lost. In other words, out of every 131 ships which sailed, 130 got through.

Warships made 13,200 separate escort voyages of many days’ duration, in convoying those 75,000 merchant ships. The merchantmen themselves sailed more than 200,000,000 miles in convoy in the Atlantic.

As the war progressed, the Fleet Air Arm, R.A.F. Fighter Command, catapult-equipped merchant ships and long-range aircraft, gave the ships, in ever-increasing measure, that air support which is now so essential to Sea Power in its broad sense.

In the volume of ocean traffic, and in the infinitesimal proportion of losses, the Battle of the Atlantic made world history as an example of ‘ability to deny to the enemy the use of the seas, and to ensure its use for our own purpose’ — which is the basic meaning of Sea Power.
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Midshipman R.A. McMILLAN
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PULLING THE WOOL OVER OUR EYES

They say that clothes don't make the man — well, yes, but — in the case of the serviceman; clothes may not make him, but they certainly play a particularly significant role in his daily existence. From the day of the Roman soldier, uniform has protected the military man from the blows of the enemy or the inclemency of the climate, concealed him in his environment, and distinguished him from his inferiors and superiors in rank, thus fixing his place in the pecking hierarchy. But above all, uniform has distinguished him from the enemy and from other arms of the services and been a source of pride, identity and tradition; somehow expressing the essence of his national spirit and patriotism. Of course, uniform must not only perform its functions for the profession of arms, but be comfortable, convenient and smart to wear.

I came to the RAN after 35 years service in the RN, filled with all the restlessness of the male climactic — le mal du midi — wanting, metaphorically speaking, a new uniform to give form to a radical and much anticipated personal metamorphosis. I came, moreover, without a twinge of nostalgia, seeking renewal, not a sterile stroll down memory lane. Imagine how chagrined I was to find that all I had to do was to change my buttons and put up Australia shoulder flashes. I felt cheated, like a child who gets the same toy two Christmas's in succession. 'After all', I said to myself, 'the Dutch, with a population of 13 million, comparable to Australia's, design and build their own warships and do not wear Netherlands flashes on their naval uniforms'. Much the same could be said of the Scandinavian peoples, the Greeks, the Japanese and other nations one could mention. Why on earth do we have to be so bloody British? Why couldn't there be an Australian naval uniform, instantly recognisable as naval and instantly recognisable as Australian without those detestable flashes saying to the world; 'No, I am not quite British; I am a sort of British, called an Australian'? After due reflection, of course, one realises that, as always, the RAN uniform is an expression of tradition. The RAN sprang, like Dionysius from the thigh of Zeus, from the RN. The Australian naval man owes his allegiance to HM the Queen through HE the Governor General, and therefore shares common traditions and loyalties with the parent service which the RAN uniform indeed accurately symbolises. Thus, apart from occasional lapses into fervently wishing that infant Australia would, dingo-like, gnaw through the umbilical cord, I came to terms with ABR 81, the RAN Uniform Instructions and consoled myself by rejoicing from time to time during the antipodal summer when one can wear No 12W's which is the only truly Australian naval dress.

However, a recent rumour has re-opened the old sore. Well-substantiated gossip has it that the RAN is about to adopt that most impractical and inappropriate of garments, the 'woolly pully'. This uncomfortable piece of clothing was adopted by the RN long, long after the RAN had acquired a separate identity. It is not even a naval pullover, having been developed by the British Army to cope with the need for a warm, unconstructing bit of combat kit for commando-like operations in cold climates. Seen and envied when being worn by officers and men of the Royal Marines, it was marginally appropriate to the RN's new role of operating almost exclusively in the icy watery wastes of the North Atlantic and in Fisheries and Oil Rig protection. In fact, the RN already had a uniquely appropriate article of uniform for such activities, the submarine sweater. In Coastal Forces, in which I was privileged to serve in the early 1950's, we always wore this warm and comfortable polo-neck under an 'URSIE', a light, waterproof windcheater with masses of convenient slots and pouches. When the Board Lords, cavalierly discarding this practical combination, adapted the Woolly Pully for RN use, they, in their usual maddeningly conservative way, altered the army design. The Army Woolly Pully had lots of denim pockets with sewn seams for pencils, pistols, entrenching tools and all the other fascinating and useful paraphernalia associated with grunting. Their Boardships removed them all. Furthermore, the Army Woolly Pully is combat kit. Never for an instant was it
intended that a tie should be worn with it. The khaki shirt collar is worn outside the neck to protect the wearer from the chafing of the rough woollen material. Their Boardships decreed that it should be worn with a tie and that the shirt collar should be worn inside. Hence the agonised, constipated expression and bulging eyes of today’s RN officer, constantly suffering as he is from painful constriction and chafing of the neck area. The reason for Their Boardships seemingly mysterious and eccentric decision about the wearing of ties, was that the Woolly Pully was to be taken off and on frequently, as officers and petty officers moved in and out of the heated interior of the modern warship and they had, by gum, to be properly dressed underneath as well as on top. Unfortunately, the Board Lords forgot the narrow neck opening of the Woolly Pully, which, as it is drawn over the head, rips off everything in its path — noses, glasses, caps, hair, ears, binoculars, etcetera.

No, all in all, there can be no justification whatsoever for aping the sartorial folly of the British by donning this utterly unsuitable, uncomfortable and ugly garment in its present form. If we must have a woollen pullover or sweater of some sort, why not go for a version of something essentially Australian like a Woolly Skivvy? Or take a leaf out of someone else’s book? My good friend, Colonel the Count Albert Leveque d’Anvers, Belgian Cavalry, with whom I worked at the NATO Staff School at Oberammergau before coming to Australia, was always dressed, in or out of uniform, with that impeccability and lack of ostentation that only outrageous expense can bestow. Comfort and smartness were his bywords. I was particularly jealous of a dark khaki uniform sweater which he wore. Hanging comfortably without clining to his graceful and athletic frame, it has a vee-neck, which showed his hand-made shirt and knitted brown tie to perfection. It had pockets galore, including some very useful ones on the outer arm, and supremely ‘dernier cri’, a patch of khaki denim on the left breast which enabled him to display his innumerable campaign ribbons, order decorations, awards for gallantry, badges of rank, parachutist and marksman insignia and so on. Dyed dark blue and worn with a smart wind-cheater it would have made an ideal naval pullover. I asked him where he had acquired it as it was obviously not standard Belgian Army issue. ‘Ah, mon cher’, he replied, ‘A gift from the generous and grateful Pakistanis. I spent several years in Kashmir as a United Nations observer — together with a number of your future Australian compatriots — who, incidentally, also wore this elegant and practical addition to their military wardrobe — I could have accepted hundreds of them’, he added, under his breath, ‘but contented myself with a dozen or so — there is a code, you know!’

So there you are, officers of the FOD and Fremantle Force, Unite! Do not let those dastardly Poms pull the wool over your eyes! Protect yourself from the rigours of the Bass Strait patrol and preserve your legendary Aussie chic with something else but the Woolly Pully! Simply ask a friend in the RAR to slip you one of his many souvenirs of service in UNMOGIP!

Brasdacier

ADFA

Commander Daw’s article (May 1981) about ADFA came as a blast of very fresh air to this victim of the appalling education dished out by the Navy in my college days 1932-1935, and in subsequent subs courses 1938-1939, and Long T course 1942. What is so this writer a most significant point is the distinction made by Commander Daw between instruction and education.

My experience, admittedly limited, is that the Navy was pretty good at instruction, but very short on education, eg, we called them Instructor Officers, not like the Army who had Education Officers. So if the ADFA is to give a broad liberal education it will be fulfilling the major part of its purpose.

As for the military environment, all that is needed as far as the Navy is concerned are a few GIs to double them around the campus now and then to deflate their egos, and a few PTIs to cure them of round shoulders. (If these rates are now obsolete along with seamen, bosuns etc., the shades of the sailors’ Valhalla must be lined with many who would be coaxed back with a bit of encouragement. Where are you Wally Grigor, Teddy Millwood and Salty?)

In particular, as part of the broad liberal education I would make a very special plea for a generous ration of history for all, and for the Navy large doses of maritime/naval history. Henry Ford (and the gunnery officers who used to run the Navy) thought that history was bunk, and so it is if it is not presented correctly.

At RANG I was taught all about the Battle of Beachy Head, who was in command, and how it was fought, but nothing about why it was fought, and how it fitted in with the grand strategy of the day.

How can a naval officer who is ignorant of maritime history be expected to get the best out of a staff course or the more important RCDS? The
weapons may change, the ships are faster, but the basics remain the same, or put another way history has a nasty habit of repeating itself, eg, Duckworth Dardenelles. 1807 Gallipoli Campaign 1915 Dakar 1940 and the repetition is more often disastrous than successful.

This victim of naval instruction has tried since leaving the RAN in 1956 to make good the gap in his maritime history education.

In pursuit of this I collect books, logs and journals etc., and have been told that in the experience of booksellers etc., your typical naval officer is ignorant of, and not interested in history of any kind.

Apart from A.T. Mahan, and in our own day Stephen Roskill who else in the ranks of regular naval officers have made a real contribution to naval history? (Forget Colomb, Richmond, Bacon etc., all who had axes to grind.)

This was graphically illustrated when I took part in a Conference on Maritime History at Queen Mary College, London University held in September 1981. There were sixty odd participants in disciplines ranging from Economics, History, Archeology, Civil Engineering, Archivists, Computer Technology etc., but apart from your writer (a quarter of a century retired) there were no naval officers.

On the day that a paper was read on how the US Navy resisted the Convoy in 1917 in favour of Defended Lanes, but finally had to agree that convoy (the protection of ships not lanes) was the answer; NATO announced that exercise Ocean Safari was to test a completely new concept of protecting merchant ships in wartime — Defended Lanes. So ignorance of maritime history still exists high up in the ranks of the Western navies.

So planners of the curriculum of ADFA make sure that history plays a major part, and if you are seeking a native born maritime historian with a world wide reputation look around the campus of the University of Newcastle, New South Wales.

R.J. Bassett

JOURNAL BINDERS

Journal binders are available (as illustrated) from the Treasurer, price $6.00 each including postage. Coloured blue, with gold lettering and ANI crest, each binder will hold 12 copies of the journal (3 years' supply) by means of a metal rod which is inserted simply through the middle page of the journal and held firmly at top and bottom of the binder. Plastic envelopes on the bottom of the spine enable volume numbers or years to be inserted.
Montgomery, Michael "WHO SANK THE SYDNEY?"

The question of how the pride of the Royal Australian Navy, HMAS SYDNEY was sunk with all hands has been open since that fateful evening of 19 November, 1941. Undoubtedly, the KORMORAN, a German raider, exercised a successful ruse de guerre to lure the Australian cruiser very close and for the KORMORAN to fire the first salvo. The subsequent exchanges of fire, after the first shots had crippled the SYDNEY, finally resulted in the sinking of both ships.

Interrogation of the more than 303 German survivors threw very little light on the fate of HMAS SYDNEY, and all of its complement, after she had disappeared over the horizon, of Shark Bay, burning fiercely. Local station hands and residents of the sleepy northern town of Carnarvon can hardly be expected to carry out expert questioning of foreign witnesses and to enforce desirable isolation and segregation of respondents, even under the rigours of War. Hence much of the evidence of how the SYDNEY was sunk has unfortunately been collected in a haphazard and somewhat incompetent manner.

Montgomery, whose father was the navigator of the ill-fated SYDNEY, has undertaken some diligent research to produce a book on that encounter. He traces the cruises of both the SYDNEY and the KORMORAN prior to the engagement, outlines the War strategies of those times and sketches the characters of key Australian and German officers on board both warships. From these observations and various sketches, photographs and illustrations, the reader can obtain a vivid picture of the incident.

The author raises some questions of procedures and possible breaches of the rules of War, especially in relation to the timing of a supposed false distress call and the question of when the German flag was raised by the raider. He alludes to the possibility of a cover-up by the Navy Office when some documents become hard to trace. Slowly, he thus cleverly builds up a sinister picture of claims, counter claims, questions and part answers which his research indicates. It is against this background that he raises a question which has not been asked before — 'Who sank the SYDNEY?' Montgomery then appears to allow emotion to overshadow diligent research and loses his logic with his introduction of a possible Japanese submarine.

This hitherto unrecognized factor is introduced in a final stage of his book, together with rumours of a capture of the SYDNEY and her improbable appearance years later in a Japanese shipbreakers yard. Such mischievous fantasy can only be excused if they are based on sound documentary evidence which, unfortunately, is lacking in this part of Montgomery's book.

It is a very readable book, even though some minor points need correction. It is possible that more diligent attention to basic source documents, such as original ship's logs, more correct translations from the German and more professional analyses of ciphers and suggested shorthand could produce more credible evidence. The book will be recognised by history as another comment on the mysterious disappearance of a proud ship of the Royal Australian Navy, rather than raising another, tenuous question of who sank that ship. It will be remembered by naval tacticians as additional evidence on how the SYDNEY was sunk by the KORMORAN.

It could be noted here that another naval historian is preparing a treatise on the history of the KORMORAN. It could be expected that such a tome would provide yet more facts on the disappearance of HMAS SYDNEY. If the diligence of research and the formulating of conclusions is equal to and better than the work done by Montgomery.

Dr L.H. Pyke, RANR
Navy League of Australia (W.A. Division)

'We trained hard — but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams, we would be reorganised. I was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any new situation by reorganising, and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency and demoralisation.'

Attributed to Gaius Petronius (AD 66)
The Council of The Australian Naval Institute advises that cuff-links and mounted crests featuring the badge of the Institute are now available for purchase by Members.

The cuff-links are robustly made and are attractively finished in gold and black. They are epoxy-capped to ensure long life and are packaged in presentation boxes. The price is $7.00 a pair, which includes postage.

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SPECIAL GENERAL MEETING

At the Special General Meeting held on 19 February 1982, the motion to change the definition of 'Regular Members' was not carried by the necessary majority of members present.

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