

JOURNAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE

VOLUME 7 NOVEMBER 1981 NUMBER 4

AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE

1. The Australian Naval Institute has been formed and incorporated in the Australian Capital Territory. The main objects of the Institute are:—

a. to encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the Maritime profession.

b. to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and the Maritime profession.

c. to publish a journal.

2. The Institute is self supporting and non-profit making. The aim is to encourage discussion, dissemination of information, comment and opinion and the advancement of professional knowledge concerning naval and maritime matters.

3. Membership of the Institute is open to —

a. Regular members — Members of the Permanent Naval Forces of Australia.

b. Associate Members — (1) Members of the Reserve Naval Forces of Australia.
(2) Members of the Australian Military Forces and the Royal Australian Air Force both permanent and reserve.
(3) Ex-members of the Australian Defence Forces, both permanent and reserve components, provided that they have been honourably discharged from that force.
(4) Other persons having and professing a special interest in naval and maritime affairs.

c. Honorary Members — A person who has made a distinguished contribution to the Naval or maritime profession or who has rendered distinguished service to the Institute may be elected by the Council to Honorary Membership.

4. Joining fee for Regular and Associate members is $5. Annual Subscription for both is $15.

5. Inquiries and application for membership should be directed to:-

The Secretary,
Australian Naval Institute,
P.O. Box 18,
DEAKIN, A.C.T. 2600

CONTRIBUTIONS

As the Australian Naval Institute exists for the promotion and advancement of knowledge relating to the Naval and maritime profession, all members are strongly encouraged to submit articles for publication. Only in this way will our aims be achieved.

DISCLAIMER

In writing for the Institute it must be borne in mind that the views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Department of Defence, the Chief of Naval Staff or the Institute.

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JOURNAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE (INC.)

CONTENTS

The front cover shows the Australian War Memorial and the surrounding Canberra area at the time of its opening in November 1941.

— Australian War Memorial



CHAPTER NEWS

To allow members to take advantage of the various chapter meetings held in their areas, the names and addresses of the relevant Conveners will be published at regular intervals

Sydney Chapter — Captain P.H. James RAN,
Director,
RAN Staff College
HMAS *PENGUIN*
Balmoral NSW 2891

Melbourne Chapter — Commodore V.A. Parker RAN Retd
456 Balcombe Rd.,
Beaumaris VIC 3193
(Ph. 992 731)

Canberra Chapter — Captain L.G. Fox RAN Retd
7 Pope St,
Hughes ACT 2605

Correspondence

HMAS COOK

Dear Sir,

The statement under the photograph of HMAS *COOK* on page 5 of the August 1981 Journal is incorrect.

Being one of the commissioning crew of HMAS *COOK*, the ship commissioned on the 28th October 1980 at Williamstown.

Yours faithfully
Brian Gorringe
LCDR, RAN

HMAS *BRISBANE*
at Sydney

NOM DE PLUMES

Sir,

I was interested in the comments made by Commander Bassett in the November and May journals and would like to take issue with him.

First the *Pacific Defence Reporter* and the *Naval Review* both use pseudonyms. The latter publication was founded in October 1912 'to promote the advancement and spreading within the Service of knowledge relevant to the higher aspects of the Naval Profession': an aim not dissimilar to our own. The *Naval Review* is now in its 69th Edition and like our own journal is run by an independent group of members. This is in contrast to the US Naval Institute which has the Chief of Naval Operations as President. The *Review* is rather refreshing in that, to steal a line from one of its own book reviews, it does not have a 'call a wood a tree' complex. Though the *Review* is fairly moderate now, it has been involved in severe controversy and at times been nearly banned for presenting contrary views to the establishment. The influence of this journal in the twenties and thirties was probably far more than all of those mentioned by Commander Bassett.

My second issue is Commander Bassett's need to know 'Master Ned's' authority. What for? The logic of an argument is independent of the authority presenting it. A midshipman can state 1+1=2 with the same authority as an admiral (probably more so as the midshipman is more likely to be exposed to advanced number theory). Authority is required if the argument is supposed to be an insider's view, or depends for its force on facts, statements or events not generally available. If generally available information is constructed into an argument then logic determines whether the argument stands or falls on its own merits. This is the reason Peter Mitchell Essays and university examinations are marked without the author's identity being known. Content counts, the author doesn't. If 'Master Ned's' identity is needed to substantiate his argument then perhaps the *ANI Journal* has outlived its usefullness. If the argument is fallacious, attack the argument.

In so far as the use of pseudonyms is concerned there are at least two valid reasons why a member may wish to remain anonymous. The most obvious is the fear of professional prejudice. Although one hopes we have come further than the RN had when the *Naval Review* was formed, some authors may feel that to express their differing opinions in some sensitive issues could single them out for official sanction. This sanction may be administered quite unconsciously by their superiors in that it may build up a feeling of resentment against the opinionated junior. Whether this happens is a matter of debate but if it inhibits people expressing their opinions then it inhibits open discussion which is after all one of the aims of the institute. In the case of junior officers and sailors the use of pseudonyms also allows them to express their opinion and force the rebuttal to be based on the arguments presented rather than being dismissed on the grounds of 'midshipmen don't know anything'. This certainly seemed to happen in the 'Master Ned' ADFA articles. If anyone doubts that this form of dismissing junior officer contributions does not happen in professional journals, I refer him to page 82 of the January Edition of the *USNI Proceedings*. Admiral Rickover dismisses the Journal's contributions on leadership (including the Astor Memorial Essay) as sophomoric drivel. A quick check of the *USNI Proceedings* over the last few years indicates that a fair number of these sophomores are in the Lieutenant Commander to Captain category.

A further point is that there is, I believe, a certian anti-intellectualism in the lower deck and amongst the junior officers. The young writer may expose himself to more ragging from his peers than he would every expect to suffer from officialdom.

While I have never felt the need to use a pseudonym, I can understand why some would prefer to do so. If that is what is necessary to contribute to the debate then so be it. We may be better off knowing what opinions and ideas are around than who holds them.

HMAS MORESBY
C/- GPO Perth

S.P. LEMON
Lieutenant RAN

COALBURNING SHIPS

Dear Sir,

In his article *Coalburning Bulkcarriers for Australia* (Vol. 7, No. 2 of May 1981) Captain John Noble made a statement which I question. Namely:

"King Coal will soon make his first trip to sea under the Australian Flag".

Whilst not wishing to cloud the issue (no pun intended) or detract from Captain Noble's article, may I point out that the BHP Co. Ltd. operated many of its fleet as coalburners into the late 1950's. They were only one of the many coastal companies that operated coal burning ships.

BHP built many of its ships as coalburners and operated them as such. Apart from their *E Class* (purchased from outside sources) their *Chieftain Class (IRON MONARCH, DUKE, KING* and *BARON)* and their *Yampi Class (IRON YAMPI, KIMBERLEY, DERBY* and *WYNDHAM)* were built and operated as coalburners.

If I recall correctly the *Chieftain's* were built in the mid 1940's and the *Yampi's* in the early 50's. My recollections of three years service with BHP (1954 through 1956) is that all their 12 ships were coalburners. *IRON KNIGHT*, purchased from the Canadian National Railways in approximately 1954, was their first oil burner.

Further recollections are that the *Chieftain* class were hand fired coalburners and the *Yampi* class were chain grate coal fired.

ROBIN PENNOCK
Commander RAN

FROM THE EDITOR

The Special General Meeting of the Institute held prior to the Annual General Meeting on Friday, 20 November 1981, passed an Amendment to the Constitution which established the Journal Editor as an office-bearer of the Institute. During the subsequent Council elections, a frequent contributor to the Journal, Commander Robin Pennock, was elected unopposed to the position of Editor. The need for an election for this position provided an appropriate time to handover editorial duties.

These duties have not been as hard as they could have been during the past two and a half years due both to a reasonable supply of contributions for the Journal and to the enthusiastic band of volunteers working in support of the Journal. Members outside of Canberra may not be aware that we undertake the tasks of sub-editing, proof-reading and making up the dummy (the 'cut and paste') of each journal ourselves. Then there are other onerous duties, such as drumming up advertising, finding photographs and other illustrations, and the mailing and distribution of each edition. Thank you to the members of the Editorial Sub-Committee and the other workers who have helped with these tasks during my period as Editor.

The work with the production of the Journal is becoming more demanding as its size and distribution grows. It is to be hoped that there is always a ready supply of volunteers from the ranks of the ANI members in Canberra to undertake the work required.

Major articles in this Journal include one dealing with the problems of operating helicopters from small ships, the Chief of Naval Personnel's talk to the Canberra Chapter earlier this year and some edited reminiscence by an RN loan officer of the early days of the RAN's major training establishment, HMAS *CERBERUS*. Tony Grazebrook reviews the careers of the so-called 'Young Turks' who established the *Naval Review* in the UK. We are also pleased to be able to mark the 40th anniversary of the Australian War Memorial by publication of an article dealing with the origins and history of an institution so well known to the Australian public.

Finally, this Journal has a good number of minor articles covering a wide range of subjects. The attention of readers is drawn particularly to the Book Review columns where there are reviews of several recent publications which should be of interest to ANI members.

FROM THE SECRETARY'S DESK

Subscriptions are now due and I hope that all members will pay their $15 promptly. It seems to take me all year to collect the money and there are always members who will only pay after receiving two reminder notices. So please, if you read this and haven't yet paid your dues please do so now. This way you will save me a good deal of time and the Institute a large sum of money.

The Council has asked me to seek suggestions from members as to an appropriate design for an ANI tie. If you have any thoughts please let me know. We are limited to two or three colours for cost reasons.

Regular members should have received of now, a letter setting out further proposed amendments to our Constitution. I hope that these members will consider the issues raised in the letter as they will certainly affect the direction of the Institute in the coming years. If you cannot attend the Special General Meeting on 19 February 1982 you may inform me of your views and I will pass them on to the Council.



Kamarkazie — *sketch by Geoff Volmer*

The original has recently been presented to the Chief Petty Officer's Mess, HMAS CERBERUS, Victoria.

1980/1981
PRESIDENT'S REPORT

Delivered at the Annual General Meeting of the Australian Naval Institute held on Friday, 20 November 1981 at Canberra, A.C.T.

This last year 1980/81 has again been one of progress for the Australian Naval Institute; our financial position is sound, membership has continued to grow, and the Institute has continued to receive wider recognition.

There can be little doubt that this healthy situation is due in large part to the outstanding success of 'Seapower 81' held in April and opened by our Patron, His Excellency, the Right Honourable Sir Zelman Cowen AK, GCMG, GCVO, KStJ, QC, Governor General of the Commonwealth of Australia and Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Force. Eminent speakers, such as Admiral of the Fleet, the Lord Hill-Norton, Sir Arthur Tange, Admiral Sir Anthony Griffin, and Sir Ronald Swayne, guaranteed interest from members while the theme of the Seminar and the number of distinguished speakers from industry ensured both strong support from industry and pleasing publicity. The Seminar also attracted many new members.

As I predicted last year in my Report, 'Seapower 81' was an important milestone in the history of the Insitute. The success of the Seminar was due, in large part, to the work of many, but the efforts of Commodore Berlyn and Captain Cooper deserve special mention. I might add that the comprehensive Seminar report which they have prepared will ensure that the lessons learned from 'Seapower 81' will not be forgotten and that those directing the next seminar will have a reliable guide to success.

While the Seminar dominated the Council's activities throughout the year, the Journal and its financing have been closely monitored. Increasing costs for printing and postage have been matters of concern but every effort has been made to contain costs while, at the same time, maintaining the high standard of the Journal which continues to promote the Institute both within and without the RAN. The Institute is very grateful to the editor, Captain Bateman, for the time and effort he and his assistants have put into production.

I would like to take the opportunity to encourage members to submit articles to the Journal so that the high standard already set and the variety of articles might be maintained. There is a wealth of knowledge and experience amongst members of the Institute and I would like to see this shared between members — the Journal to members may not be avoidable unless members advise without delay their change of address.

As I mentioned earlier, our membership has continued to grow steadily; we have at present over 560 financial members. There is nevertheless scope for further considerable increase in our membership. By the late 1980s, membership could be in excess of 1000. This, and other factors, has again led the Council to place considerable emphasis during the year on addressing the longer term aspects of management and the need to develop policy objectives to safeguard the future. Preliminary consideration has been given to a number of matters relating to administrative capacity. The Council has concluded that, providing there is some restructuring and a greater spread of duties between Councillors and that the voluntary self-help measures, which have been characteristic of the Institute to date, continue, there should be no need in the immediate future to introduce new measures to cope with administration. Should the time come that it is judged such measures are essential for the continued survival of the Institute, it will be inevitable that substantial increases in subscription rates will need to be considered.

The careful management of our financial resources will become more important as more demands are placed on them. Throughout this year, the Financial Sub-Committee has considered a wide range of matters including the preservation of our investment reserves against inflation, the finances of the Journal, reprinting of Volume 1 Number 1 of the Journal, and financial assistance to our Chapters.

The various Chapters have not been as active during 1980-81 as your Council would have hoped but there are understandable reasons, not the least of which was the timing and scope of the Seminar in which the Canberra Chapter was very much involved. In August, the Chief of Naval Personnel, Rear Admiral D.W. Leach, addressed the Canberra Chapter on the subject of 'Naval Manpower in the 1980s'. A copy of his address has been forwarded to the Journal Editor in the hope that members may have the beneift of reading its content.

During the year, a proposal was placed before your council to extend 'Regular Membership' to include members of the Citizen Naval Forces/Australian Naval Reserve engaged in full-time service

and members of the active elements of the RAN Reserve. Details of the proposal have been circulated recently to all regular members and a Special General meeting will be held on 19 February 1982 to consider the proposed necessary amendments to the Constitution. At the conclusion of this report, I will read brief outlines of considerations for and against the proposal. They will be printed in the November Journal along with this Report.

Before concluding, it would be appropriate to mention that the ANI silver medal was presented to Lieutenant Commander Philip McGuire and Lieutenant Paul Johnson, students of the RAN Staff College, for the best essay on maritime strategy. Also, there have been suggestions in recent years that an ANI tie should be added to the insignia available for purchase by members. In the Journal, the Secretary has called for suggested designs.

In summary, 1980-81 has been another year of good progess for the Institute highlighted by the Seminar 'Seapower 81'. May I in conclusion express, on my own behalf and on behalf of the members, sincere appreciation to all councillors for their valuable contribution and time given to the well-being and advancement of the Institute. May I also express your council's appreciation for the valuable and increasing support of all members which continues to auger well for the future.

ANI — PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

Salient factors for and against the proposal to extend 'Regular Membership' to members of the Citizen Naval Forces/Australian Naval Reserve engaged in full-time service and members of the active elements of the RAN Reserve are seen to be:

For:

- — the inclusion of active Reservists as full members would be consistent with the main objectives of the ANI listed in its Constitution;
- — the scope for ANI membership development would be widened;
- — access to a wider range of beneficial skills and resources through widened membership and potential for council membership would be facilitated;
- — any suggestion that ANI membership rules are discriminatory, or that Reserve Personnel are less able to support the objectives of the Institute would be dispelled;
- — the potential for the Institute to be identified as a PNF lobby group would be reduced;
- — it would obviate the need for a change of membership status for serving PNF personnel when they leave the Service; and
- — the present anormaly whereby Reserve personnel carrying out full-time service in the RAN are not granted the same membership status as their PNF counterpart would be overcome.

Against:

- — it would change the basic features of the Institute that make it uniquely different from other bodies with related interests, by which:
  - the founders intended to preserve the basic character of the Institute and its currency of association with the contemporary navy.
  - the Institute's administration is assured of continuous rejuvenation (due to the posting process); and when
- — the growth and achievement of the Institute to date have clearly indicated the policies and judgement of its founders;
- — it would not substantially increase the ability of non Regular members to enhance the Institute, its proceedings and administration;
- — it would merely remove one form of discrimination which favours members of the Permanent Naval Forces and replace it with another;
- — it would establish a precedent facilitating further changes to the Institute, the effects of which cannot be foreseen.

FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE
AUDITED ACCOUNTS
FOR THE 12 MONTHS ENDED 30 SEPTEMBER 1981

BALANCE SHEET
AS AT 30 SEPTEMBER 1981

ACCUMULATED FUNDS		ASSETS	
Balance as at 1.10.80	5,059.81	Sundry Debtors	2,054.20
Add Surplus (Deficiency) for the Year	6,544.47	Commonwealth Bonds	4,500.00
	11,604.28	Cash at Bank	6,713.66
		Stock on Hand	
LIABILITIES		Insignia	1,064.50
		Medals	339.44
Subscriptions in Advance		Medal Die	1.00
1980/1981	—	Advance — See Power 81	—
1981/1982	604.00		
1982/1983	45.00		
1983/1984	15.00		
After 1984	75.00		
Sundry Creditors	2,329.52		
	$14,672.80		$14,672.80

NOTE: $5,500.00 of the Cash at Bank as at 30 September, 1981 was invested in Commonwealth Bonds Series 19 on 20 October, 1981.

INSIGNIA AND MEDAL TRADING ACCOUNT

INSIGNIA

Stock on Hand at 1 October, 1980	284.00	*Sales*	749.80
Purchases	1,415.00	Stock on Hand at 30.9.81	1,064.50
Profit	115.30		
	$1,814.30		$1,814.30

MEDALS

Stock on Hand 30.9.80	386.07	Presentations	46.63
Purchases	—	Stock on Hand 30.9.81	339.44
	$386.07		$386.07

JOURNAL OPERATING ACCOUNT

EXPENDITURE		INCOME	
Printing November, 1980	1,577.00	Journal Sales	268.70
Printing February, 1981	1,707.00	Journal Subscriptions	717.47
Printing May, 1981	1,770.00	Advertising	2,350.14
Printing August, 1981	1,833.00		
War Memorial Photos	18.00		
Cartoon	23.13	Net Operating cost	
Postage	340.00	Transferred to Income	
Prizes	95.00	and Expenditure Account	4,362.82
Reprint Vol 1 No.1	336.00		
	$7,699.13		$7.699.13

INCOME AND EXPENDITURE ACCOUNT

EXPENDITURE		INCOME	
Journal Costs	4,362.82	Seapower 81 Surplus	5,865.46
Postage	178.49	Insignia Trading	115.30
Audit Fee	90.00	Joining Fees	460.00
Company Fee	4.00	Subscriptions	5,469.85
Donation to Legacy	100.00	Interest	437.35
Advertising	21.85	Donation	5.05
Stationery	554.48	Speaker costs — Reimbursement	—
Engraving	8.95		
Expenses Chapter Speakers	—		
Library Additions	5.00		
Bank charges	44.52		
Depreciation	391.80		
Presentation Medals	46.63		
	$5,808.54		
Surplus/(Deficiency) to Accumulated Funds	6,544.47		
	$12.353.01		$12,353.01

SEAPOWER 81 ACCOUNT

EXPENDITURE		INCOME	
Advertising	143.20	Subscriptions — Members	5,568.00
Postage	243.11	— Industry	11,870.00
Theatre Setups	209.85	— Private	3,972.00
Stationery	1,776.15	Donations	620.42
Theatre Hire	407.00	Meals	82.00
Fares	6.221.90	Proceedings Sales	425.00
Bank/Bankcard charges	39.49	Proceedings Advertising	4,970.00
Telephone Calls	76.58	Interest	144.82
Entertainment	352.85	Excess cash taken by Insignia Seller	1.00
Catering	6,304.60	Refund of stamp duty on unused cheque	.05
Proceedings printing	5,642.20		
Proceedings Distribution	201.90		
Presentations	109.00		
Surplus Transferred to Income & Expenditure Account	5,865.46		
	$27,653.29		$27,653.29

AUDITORS REPORT

6th November, 1981

The President,
The Australian Naval Institute Inc.,
P.O. Box 18,
DEAKIN. A.C.T. 2600

Dear Sir,

Please find attached an Income and Expenditure Account, Statement of Receipts and Payments and Balance Sheet of the Institute which related to the twelve months ended 30th September, 1981.

In my opinion the attached accounts are properly drawn up so as to give a true and fair view of the state of affairs of the Institute.

The rules relating to the administration of the funds of the Institute have been observed.

All information required by me has been obtained.

Yours faithfully,

P.O. REIS AASA

THE INTEGRATION OF HELICOPTERS INTO RAN AIR-CAPABLE SHIPS

By Commander I.M. McIntyre RAN

For many years now the Royal Australian Navy has successfully operated various helicopter types from the carriers *SYDNEY* and *MELBOURNE*, on both an embarked squadron and deployed flight basis. More recently, Bell 206B Helicopters have been operating from HMAS *MORESBY* in support of survey tasks, and utility helicopter operations have been carried out from HMAS *STALWART*, albeit in a very ad-hoc fashion relative to maintenance and logistic support.



RAN Air-capable ships 1980

We have now entered an era of increasing deployed helicopter activity in the Fleet. We are planning to embark utility helicopters in HMAS *TOBRUK* to assist in the ship-to-shore movement task; utility helos will provide the Vertrep facility in SUCCESS and eventually the second AOR; helicopters with a unique weapon and sensor equipment fit will embark in the four FFGs, and ultimately in the Follow-on Destroyers. It may be that we have also to plan for RAN helicopters to emark in the Australian Antartic ship. Therefore, we will be expanding the deployed helicopter concept in ships, other than the carrier, from two vessels at present to eight in 1985, and sixteen in the 1990s.

It is a relatively simple matter to appreciate the increase in ship/helicopter combinations which I've described. What is *not* generally appreciated by personnel outside the immediate sphere of Fleet Air Arm activity, however, is the vast amount of forward planning required to successfully integrate helicopters into ships. The helicopter should not be seen as a totally separate entity (or worse, an encumbrance) on the aft deck of a ship, capable of moving on and off at short notice, and requiring only extra fuel to keep it going. The modern helicopter is an extremely complex and sensitive machine, requiring much detailed and well-planned support. On a small ship, with a very confined and moving flight deck, with limited servicing and maintenance facilities, and the hazards of winds, seas and spray, it is operating in the harshest and most inherently dangerous environment that it possibly can. Thus the interface between aircraft and ship must be fully planned for, and the combination carefully tested so that safe operating limits can be determined, and any deficiencies in the interface rectified before service use of the helicopter is commenced.

The RAN is only now beginning to also appreciate that a lot of careful design must go into even the simplest of the aviation facilities in an air-capable ship. For instance, a major flight deck repair to *STALWART* had to be carried out recently, following the discovery of damage

THE AUTHOR

CMDR Ian McIntyre joined the Navy as a Cadet Midshipman in 1954, and subsequently specialized as an Air Engineer Officer and Pilot. Between 1968 and 1972, he further qualified as a Flying Instructor and Engineering Test Pilot. He has served in HMAS *MELBOURNE*, and at the Naval Air Station, Nowra. Other postings have included the RAN Aircraft Maintenance & Flight Trials Unit and the Australian Embassy in Washington, as well as service with the RAAF and USN. He is currently working in Navy Office Canberra as the Director of Naval Aircraft Engineering.

This article is reprinted with the permission of the Editor of the *Fleet Maintenance Bulletin*.

caused by the high wheel loads of Wessex and Sea King helicopters. Flight decks in themselves are relatively simple structures. However, ship-borne helicopters of the Seahawk size may weigh as much as 9000 kg. This load can be multiplied several times due to ship heave, and even more for the dynamic landing case. Most of the load is distributed through two main wheels, and thus point or footprint loads on the plating as well as distributed loads between supporting beams are extremely high, therefore adequate design is essential. The matter of adequate dimensional clearances must be addressed early in the ship/helicopter compatability study, both on the flight deck for the rotors engaged and flying cases, and for movement into and securing within the hangar. Clearance criteria have been established through trials and much operational experience, in the USN and RN.

In the case of the USN, such criteria are promulgated together with minimum physical standards for all the aviation facilities required on air-capable ships in the Naval Air Systems Command 'Helicopter Facilities Bulletin No.1.D'. Features and facilities such as firefighting and fuel systems, tie-down fittings, maintenance facilities, deck markings, power supplies, lights, safety nets, hangar drainage and sealing provisions are only a very few of those specified in the Bulletin. As the RAN did not have a similar specification, was purchasing American air-capable ships and because current Defence guidance indicates that we should pursue interoperability with the USN as a prime requirement in any system developed to support operation of helicopters from our ships, it was decided earlier this year that we would adopt the Bulletin as a base-line document for our own use. The RAN ship aviation facilities certification authority will of course be able to provide waivers where the facilities in existing ships or those of a non-USN design do not meet the specification but are considered safe or suitable after full objective assessment. The long-term aim, however, is to standardise markings, lighting and other aids and facilities to provide the greatest degree of operating safety and to enhance cross-operating capabilities with the USN.

An interface aspect of particular significance in the case of fighting ships (rather than support ships such as *MORESBY, STALWART* or *SUCCESS*) is the capability for the helicopter to be rapidly secured on touchdown, and moved into and out of the hangar under moderate or high ship motion conditions. The FFG helo will be an integral part of the ships' weapon system and must therefore be capable of being launched and recovered during the 'heat of the battle'. Helicopter launch and recovery requirements must *not* preclude ship manoeuvering which may be essential in the operational situation, and weather conditions and sea states (other than the extreme) must not inhibit use of such an important element of the overall ship weapon system. In this regard, the British and French have developed a deck grid locking facility called Harpoon, which physically holds the aircraft to the grid after the probe under the aircraft is lowered. The Americans, on the other hand, are developing the Canadian Beartrap design for use on the *LAMPS*



RAN Air-capable ships, 1985.

/// helicopter (the Seahawk); this facility is called RAST (Recovery Assist, Secure and Traverse) which will guide the helicopter to the deck, positively lock it down, and finally traverse the aircraft in a rail system into the hangar. The system has been designed to allow safe Seahawk operations in a small ship such as the FFG-7 class, in up to sea state 5.

A major decision in regard to RAST fitting must of made by the RAN in the near future. The system is extremely expensive, and there are no provisions for it in the first three of the our FFGs. It is tailor-made for the Seahawk airframe, and thus adoption of the system for the RAN is contingent on selection of the Seahawk for the FFG helo mission. It has been suggested that a much cheaper alternative would be fitment of a Harpoon deck grid and a cable traversing system. It must, however, be appreciated that integration of a harpoon system into a helicopter not initially designed for such would involve an extremely expensive and lengthy research and development programme; the central fuselage structure would require re-design so that heavy lateral and longitudinal loads could be diffused, and hydraulic and electrical subsystems would have to be installed. So in effect we have got to bear a massive cost in retrofit of RAST if indeed the Seahawk *is* selected as the FFG helo, or accept a much lower operating capability due to the degraded deck interface.

The importance of particular helicopter characteristics and equipment required for small ship operation has also become more obvious to RAN authorities in recent years. Commonality for basic helicopter types to carry out separate missions for both Navy and Air Force has become an important issue in current defence planning. In this respect, unique Navy requirements for small ship operation may become over-riding considerations in a common type selection. For instance, a helicopter expected to operate successfully from an air-capable warship should incorporate features such as rapid control response (dictating an articulated or rigid rotor system), wheeled undercarriage, rotor brake, blade droop stops (the latter two being used to minimise rotor control problems and blade sailing under high wind conditions), blade folding for containment in small hangars), strengthened tie-down fittings, clear downward vision and windscreen wipers, minimal use of highly corrosive material, marinised engines, a hold-down facility if possible, flotation equipment and so forth. It could be argued that the Bell-206B, without most of these features (particularly with a low response teetering rotor head and skids) would be a very poor performer on an air-capable ship, when in fact it is used quite successfully on MORESBY.

The truth is that many of MORESBY's operations are tailored to ensure complete safety of the aircraft for launch and recovery; if conditions are not close to perfect, the ship may for example proceed to the lee of land to find ideal sea and wind conditions. This would most definitely not be the case for fighting ship helicopter operations, and this must be borne in mind at the outset when planning for aircraft type selection.



RAST system layout.

Another of the important aspects of successful integration of helicopters into air-capable ships is the carrying out of comprehensive flight trials prior to full service deployment of a ship's helicopter flight. The problems of flying a helicopter from a small ship are a direct result of:

a. the small and confined area available for take-off and land;
b. turbulence caused by the ship's superstructure;
   and
c. a moving landing platform due to ship motion.

In order that safe, repeatable operations can be carried out, ship movement limits and a wind limit envelope must be defined. This is achieved through carefully planned build-up flight trials; the helicopter is flown by a test pilot with experience in establishment of such limits and comprehensive instrumentation is used. Combinations of windspeed and direction, ship movement and aircraft weight are progressively increased during many landings, until limit points based on the following four criteria are reached:

a. any aircraft control margin (for cyclic, collective and pedal controls) is reduced to 10% remaining;
b. A 10% power margin remains for night landings or 5% for day landings;
c. Pilot workload becomes excessive;
   or
d. an aircraft structural limit is approached.

Thus both the aircraft and the ship have to be instrumented to provide such parameters as separate helo flight control positions, tail rotor pitch, engine torque, normal acceleration of aircraft and touch-down rate; on the ship side, heavy and sway; relative windspeed and direction; and pilot's qualitative comments. This in turn requires that the sensors and data recorders are installed in both the aircraft and the ship, and operated on a commontime base. Hundreds of landings are made, and a lot of data analysis is then required to establish the final ship/helicopter type operating limitations. Of course, the quantitative data must be continually matched against the test pilot's qualitative assessments, the latter being based on a standard pilot rating scale. All these techniques and procedures have been developed by the RN and USN, and have now been adopted by the cognizant RAN agency, which is the Aircraft Maintenance and Flight Trials Unit (or AMAFTU) at Nowra.

It is the intention that at least one fully qualified rotary wing test pilot capable of running an interface trial as described will always be posted to the Trials Unit. At this time, specialised test equipment is being assembled and tested at AMAFTU in preparation for the next RAN First of Class helo interface trials to be progressed (ie a number of helicopter types to be cleared from TOBRUK). It should be borne in mind, of course, that the ship's aviation facilities are also fully tested, and checked against minimum prescribed standards, during First of Class trials.

Any large or medium-sized helicopter is a maintenance-intensive vehicle and it should be appreciated that this maintenance must be carried out under generally cramped and difficult conditions. Hence there is the need for a lot of detailed forward planning to ensure that best use is made of the limited space available. Stowage of ground support equipment, tools, publications etc. on the deck, in dedicated storages and on bulkheads has got to be planned in line-out drawings, and proved through actual configuration trials; space for administration of tool control, maintenance scheduling and documentation control must also be planned for. Although helicopters are normally serviced and maintained onboard small ships to organisational level only, with repair by replacement, space for simple mechanical workbenches and avionic equipment test benches has also to be provided. Some servicing and maintenance activities must be carried out under conditions unique to small ship operations — heavy components may have to be changed under ship motion situations; maintenance operations such as borescope inspections, vibration measurement and analysis and so forth are complicated by restricted space conditions and generally poor light in the hangar and maintenance spaces. Inspection and control of corrosion assumes particular significance in the salt — laden environment of a small ship at sea. Corrosion prevention and rectification is time-consuming, making further demands on the overall maintenance effort.

An embarked helicopter logistic support policy is also currently being progressed. With limited aircraft support equipment and spares assets, and the ever-present limitations to spares funding, the RAN can not hope to stock each air-capable ship with a full range of helicopter equipment and spares, regardless of whether the aircraft is embarked or not, as is done in the RN. Thus effort is now being put into the devising of portable 'Pack-up' support kits, tailored to an overall logistic support requirement in turn based on number of aircraft embarked; expected days away from port; and flying rate of effort.

Such a system is currently used by the USN, where the number of air-capable ships is far in excess of the number of detached flights embarked at any one time. Storage is based on a number of modular cabinets which may be air-or ground-transportable, and can be arranged by drawer size to provide maximum spares storage density, thus minimising overall space requirements once placed in the ship. Again, long-range planning is necessary to ensure that adequate space for the pack-ups close to or in the hangar is allocated; much effort is required in establishing



Floating Flight Deck Training Aid (FFDTA) of the Royal Navy.

the Outfit Allowance Lists for each individual pack-up requirement. Finally, pack-up configuration trials are necessary prior to service use to devise the minimum-sized pack-up unit.

As I intimated earlier, small ship helicopter operations are probably the most inherently dangerous aircraft operations taking place today. To minimise the potential for catastrophic accidents involving both aircraft and parent ship, aircrew and flight deck personnel must be trained to exceptional skill levels in as realistic an environment as possible.

A shore dummy deck can be used to work up crews during initial training, but such a facility has limitations, and a natural progression of this concept is a floating flight deck training aid (FFDTA). Some years ago, the RN converted a large aircraft lighter into such an aid, and have realised enormous benefits in use of the facility. It is planned that the converted lighter be replaced with a purpose-built vessel in the near future.

It has been assessed that a slightly less sophisticated but similar facility for our navy is now justified, and a Naval Staff Requirement is currently being raised. The FFDTA is going to be built in Australia, and will provide all the training facilities of a representative ship's flight deck. It is planned that it be moored in Jervis Bay close to RANC, and capable of being swung to provide variable wind direction conditions. The low swells in the bay will cause some deck movement which will provide added realism. The facility will be used to work up flight deck crews in aircraft handling, lashing and unlashing, firefighting, helicopter directing, vertrep and refuelling practice, weapon loading drills etc, by day and night. It will *also* of course, provide a realistic environment for pilot flight deck familiarisation and currency training at a fraction of the cost which would be incurred were actual air-capable ships to be used on a dedicated basis for basic training.

Other aspects of training for our air-capable ships expansion are being addressed.

A Flight Deck Training Officer's billet has just been established at the Training School at NAS NOWRA; the Flight Deck Officers' training syllabus is being upgraded whilst sailor trade cross-conversion courses will be established.

It has got to be appreciated that air technical sailor shortages exist and that accommodation space for detached flight personnel on small ships is limited. Thus it is necessary that sailor trade skills and capabilities are broadened within the total numbers constraint for any one ship's flight. For instance, air technical personnel other than weapons specialists will have to form the quick-reaction weapons loading team; sailors of the ATWL (or air electrical) category may be required to carry out organisational level maintenance on avionic equipment normally under ATC (or radio) category cognizance.

Action is being taken to upgrade other aspects of the infra-structure required to support the air-capable ship aviation effort.

An aircraft/ship integration planning cell is being established within Navy Office. The team will consist of five personnel initially, possess both operational and technical expertise, and be responsible to the Director of Naval Aircraft

Engineering. As well as planning for all aspects of small ship helicopter operations, it will have functional responsibilities for integration of aircraft into the replacement carrier.

A small group of qualified personnel will also be required to carry out periodic inspections on ships to ensure that both operational and maintenance standards and practices are being observed by detached flights.

Similarly, a parent squadron organisation to cater for the unique needs of a number of detached flights has been set up at NAS Nowra.

Action is also underway to produce a dedicated publication which will reflect all the standards and requirements of air-capable ship helicopter operations, both from a day-to-day operating viewpoint and also a forward planning basis.

A basic requirement to have RAN aircrew and air technical officers serve on foreign air-capable ships for exchange postings has been recognised so that expertise in the area is imported as quickly as possible into our Navy. Another aim is to have rotary-wing test pilots who train at the US Naval Test Pilot School carry out a period of ship interface testing OJT prior to their servicing at AMAFTU.

To summarise, we have already begun to expand the RAN air-capable ship helicopter operation. An awareness of all the problems associated with successfully integrating a helicopter into a ship is required at all levels and across the whole range of personnel specialisation and not just within the Fleet Air Arm. Much long-range planning is necessary to ensure that the helicopter facility on a ship, whether it be there to provide a utility capability of a warship, can operate in a timely and efficient manner when required.



RAN Air-capable ships 1990 (projected).

NAVAL MANPOWER IN THE 1980s

Lecture to the Canberra Chapter of the Australian Naval Institute 18 August, 1981

by Rear Admiral D.W. Leach AO CBE MVO RAN

Most of you will be aware that in line with the greater emphasis in Australia on a maritime strategy and the requirement for increased defence self reliance, the government has announced:

- steps towards the acquisition of a replacement aircraft carrier,
- Building two more destroyers to follow the four guided missile frigates commissioned or building in the United States,
- a second underway replenishment ship to follow the one already building at Vickers Cockatoo in Sydney,
- ten patrol boats to follow the 15 that are being progressively commissioned in North Queensland

and, added to this, HMAS *TOBRUK*, commissioned in April, and new weapons — torpedoes for our modernised Oberon submarines and Harpoon missles that can be fired from our destroyers, submarines and maritime aircraft, are being obtained, and as HMAS *CANBERRA* demonstrated very recently, they are remarkably accurate.

So, the equipment and the force structure for the future looks good — but there are constraints to our development and the biggest one is manpower — getting and keeping the good people we need.

Present position

First of all I would like to give you a feel for the present. We reached our authorised numbers for uniformed personnel on the 30 June 1981 — 17,300 — the highest since World War II, but this doesn't give a true picture, because such a big proportion of these are under training — 1,300 at HMAS *CERBERUS*, and we have nearly 400 midshipmen under training at the Naval College at Jervis Bay, at the University of NSW and in the fleet.

About 5% of our numbers are women, who now get equal pay and increasingly they are moving into new activities — the only areas that are not open to them are sea postings, or the particular types of warfare training, tactics, etc., that would prepare them for a combat role. This practice is common to all three services. Here I must say that the USN and the American Services generally are employing women to a much greater extent in ships and supporting roles, mainly because they are short of men. We are moving carefully and deliberately to get things right. The Services Personnel Policy Committee have recently discussed the question of women joining military bands. The Navy has just opened its doors to women engineers. This liberalisation seems likely to continue especially in view of our officer shortages.

Recruiting — recruiting is good — and the quality is high. We have waiting lists for our adult recruits, junior recruits at HMAS *LEEUWIN* in WA, our apprentice entry at HMAS *NIRIMBA* near Sydney, and for our women. Officer applications are also good, aided by the new $400 12th year scholarship scheme.

THE SPEAKER

Rear Admiral Leach was born on 17 July 1928, in Perth, Western Australia. He entered the Royal Australian Naval College in 1942 and graduated in 1945. During his training he was Chief Cadet Captain and was awarded the Kings Medal. He was promoted Commander in 1961, Captain in 1966, Commodore in 1975 and Rear Admiral in 1978.

In 1946-47 he served in Her Majesty's Ships of the British Pacific Fleet and in 1948 he completed his Sub Lieutenant courses in the United Kingdom, gaining an 'A' Flying Licence. When he returned to Australia he served in Her Majesty's Australian Ships *AUSTRALIA*, *MURCHISON* and *ARUNTA*. He also played Rugby for Victoria. In 1960-61, after qualifying as a gunnery specialist, he served in HMAS *MELBOURNE* as Fleet Gunnery Officer.

Rear Admiral Leach commanded HMAS *VENDETTA* (1964-66) in the Strategic Reserve during Confrontation and later HMAS *PERTH* (1968-69) during the Vietnam conflict. Important shore appointments held by Admiral Leach include Director of Naval Plans, Australian Naval Representative in the United Kingdom (1971-74), Director of Naval Operational Requirements (1975-76), Royal College of Defence Studies (1977), Chief of Naval Materiel (1979-80). His present appointment is as Chief of Naval Personnel.

We recently stopped the officer junior entry (15-17), so now there is an all matriculation entry into the Naval College — some do a diploma course and some degree training — arts, science, survey, commerce, engineering (electrical or mechanical). We even have a food scientist. We also take direct entry, doctors, dentists, engineers and instructors. We are now moving towards the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA), which will open its doors in 1986.

This will mean that HMAS *CRESWELL* will no longer be responsible for the first year degree studies of newly entered general list midshipmen. Studies at ADFA will be in three faculties — engineering, science and arts and we anticipate the graduates will be the prime source of degree personnel in the future. Personnel will continue to be educated in other institutions such as the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology.

Engagements for sailors are now six or nine years, but there are optional discharge points during initial recruit training at the end of sixty days and subsequently after four and a half years, when eighteen months notice may be given. A pension is available after 20 years — 15 years for the later starters.

The problems

Technology. Together with RAAF we are more an equipment orientated service than is the Army. Our technology level is high and the rate of change very rapid.

The fleet in the year 2000 will have incorporated many major changes —

- steam will have given way to gas turbine propulsion,
- tactical data systems will be fitted in all major and some minor fleet units,
- New generations of submarines, MCMVs and patrols craft will be in service,
- hopefully, we will be operating *STOVL* aircraft from carriers and advanced armed helicopters from our destroyers,
- new command and control systems will be in service to provide information in real time to cope with the speed of modern warfare, and the highly accurate and very destructive modern weapons.

This technology brings one of our biggest problems: keeping the technicians who are in great demand outside the service and also the engineer officers, when there is a national and international shortage.

Social attitudes. If the differences in service and civilian life styles increase to such an extent to make voluntary military service unattractive to the general cross section of society, we will have problems. Much is said about changes in social attitudes and expectations. We in the Navy must expect the attitudes of our people to change also. I must say that the quality of our young men and women is at least as high as it has ever been and they still come to us for the best reasons.

The incidence of working wives has increased significantly over the past years and, when married to naval personnel, this acts againsts posting mobility. An increasing number of naval wives are in the navy themselves, and this of course poses posting problems.

Marital relationships have become more complex — higher divorce rates. People are wanting more leisure time and these factors tend to exacerbate Navy's separation problem.

Young people do not seem to want to make a life-time career commitment as readily as the service enjoyed in the past. They want more variety and don't want to be pinned down.

Service constraints. There are some constraints on our freedom to solve our own problems. Because the Defence Force is an instrument of the Federal Government and conditions of service involving financial expenditure are allied to the public service, we are not able to make any fast changes or have too many unique solutions.

Secondly, the Defence Force cannot escape the necessity to maintain a consistent and comparatively rigid disciplinary system, commensurate with the ultimate role of combat.

Thirdly, unlike most civilian employers, the Defence Force must rely on its own resources to develop personnel to meet the requirements of commissioned and non commissioned rank. The universities can recruit a professor, a firm can get an executive and Qantas can recruit a senior avionics technician, but the Navy can hardly advertise for a qualified destroyer captain.



Civilian manpower. Navy is more dependent on civilian manpower than the other services — in our dockyards, in our supply organisation, naval technical services. We have about 10,500 and the recent cuts are making life very difficult for us.

So much for the problems and I have only named a few. It follows that if we are getting sufficient numbers coming forward to join the Navy, then the answer must be that we have to work harder at keeping them in.

Each year about 2,000 male sailors leave the RAN and this places a big strain on our training resources. The overall re-engagement rate is 50%.

At 30 June 81	• Our ceiling was	17300
	• Personnel borne	17298
Shortfalls	• Officers — required	2238
	— borne	1998
	— shortfall	240
	• Sailors — required	13504
	— borne	13131
	— shortfall	373
Officer Wastage		
	• Male officers	6.7%
	• WRANS officers	27%
	• Total officer wastage	7.8%

We have done a number of studies to find the reasons for people leaving — a questionnaire before departure for officers is one of them. Doing what is seen to be a worthwhile job is the most quoted important reason for remaining in the RAN, with the opposite — a perceived poor posting, allied with an unwillingness to change location (for wife's job or wife's or children's education) the big disincentives. Recognition in terms of pay of course comes across as important, particularly when some calculations are done on 'overtime' and compared with civilians. The reasons are complex and sometimes I suspect we don't hear the real ones — a bad household move for example — and I know the loss of mail concessions (fortunately temporary) had an effect quite disproportionate to its financial value.

The strong points are that the DFRDB pension scheme is seen to be a very good one and the leave provisions are regarded as fair.

Action being taken

Well, what are we doing about all this? — Let us look first at the financial area.

Last July the government gave Mr Justice Coldham a reference to look at the adequacy of Defence Force remuneration. This was primarily in the area of work value as no such assessment had been done since the Kerr/Woodward work in 1972. The Coldham review has resulted in an interim pay increase of approximately 4% in defence salaries last December and we are looking forward to what is hoped will be the 'second leg of the double' when the enquiry completes.

The work value aspects of the review are now finalised and in for printing. Justice Coldham has said his report will be made public during the third or fourth week of this month (August 1981). Of course his work on associated allowances is still to come.

There are now annual reviews of all allowances that complement salary such as submarine pay, seagoing pay, flying pay, hard lying pay etc. and uniform maintenance.

Recent approval was given to the payment of a remote locality allowance and this, it is hoped, will be extended.

Greater assistance to alleviate rental payments in posting localities where rents are high has been given.

The committee of reference has been asked to give a view of the re-introduction of a re-engagement incentive scheme. A re-engagement bounty was introduced in 1973 for the payment of $1000 (tax free) for those who re-engaged to serve three years beyond an initial six year engagement. This was removed in the 1978-79 budget. The question being asked of the committee — is such a bounty justified? Should it be a fixed sum or should it be selective (ie., only given to those categories where retention is low). The Army for instance argue that this could be divisive and they don't have the same problems mentioned previously as navy or air in the technical specialisations.

One area we are looking at is employment beyond the 20 year mark. The present retirement scheme (DFRDB) makes important provision for a lump sum payment at this stage, and a pension, but if our people do take this option, we do not normally bring them back, under the present regulations.

Approval has been given for the re-imbursement of legal and estate agent fees associated with the sale of a primary residence on posting to a new locality. (This now brings the services in line with the public service.)

In the non financial area

Housing

There has been an increase in the money allocated to buying more married quarters where the rents are high (Sydney, Cairns) or where there is an unsatisfactory rental market (Darwin).

Also an improvement programme has begun on disposing of sub-standard housing and improving others.

This improvement in habitability is also being extended to accommodation and amenities at sea and also ashore.

We have recently had ministerial approval to lease the Highway Motel in Darwin for use as the interim Coonawarra wardroom. We hope that similar arrangements will soon be approved in Sydney for our submariners.

We are working to slow down posting changes — and to give as much notice as possible — this is not aways easy, especially when there are shortages both in numbers and special categories. The pierhead jump is still with us.

Personal care

Few other organisations offer their employees full medical and dental care and, additionally, in Naval Health Benefits Society, naval members have a comprehensive means of covering family needs at a very competitive premium. I expect this will become more important as the new government health scheme takes effect.

The RAN central canteens fund assists with projects to improve amenities in ships and bases — TV hire, film subsidies etc. and we have recently purchased a caravan park in WA to add to the two we own at Forster and Lake Burrill in NSW. These provide cheaper holidays for naval families. The fund is also able to lend money at low interest rates to service groups such as the RAN Ski Club and RAN Sailing Association.

The RAN Relief Trust Fund (funded from the Central Canteens Fund) also provides small but useful low interest loans for housing and furniture, assistance and grants for emergency housekeeping, and $500 is sent immediately to the widow of any serving member.

Defence review

Another recent government announcement that I believe could have an important effect on morale and retention is the decision to review the defence organisation.

The present organisation came into effect in 1975 and has been running now for six years. You will remember the changes effected were the abolition of separate Navy, Army and Air Ministers and the Service Boards. In its place was created a much stronger central defence organisation, with expanded divisions (covering strategic and international policy, force development, establishments, procurement) and the creation of the Post of Chief of Defence Force Staff.

This led to a greater number of officers being required in the central divisions and to some extent distorted our officer structure with the requirement for relativity between public service grades and service ranks, where there was mixed staffing.

There have been many expressions that the organisation is ponderous, with an over abundance of committees, and the Katter Committee remarked on the complicated and time consuming procedures for getting weapon and service equipment. One of the terms of reference is for the reviewing committee to look at how the department is organised to go to war.

This review I believe has the potential to give more purpose to some service people who feel that they are not fully in the decision-making chain.

Reserves

No discussion on manpower, however brief, would be complete without a mention of the Reserves.

Here, unlike Army, Navy has not got a large requirement for Reserves. Our strength is, at the moment —

RANR TRAINING LISTS	1024		
RANR NON-TRG LISTS	612	Incl.	13 fts.
RANEM	549	Incl.	92 fts.
RAFR	819	Incl.	4 fts.
WRANSR	341	Inc.	20 fts.
TOTALS	3345	Inc.	129 fts.

On 1 Aug. 81 changes to the RANR administrative procedures were approved.

The previous system of 12 RANR lists (with varying levels of training commitment), have been condensed into four major groups.

Group 1. Active Attached Reserve — personnel attached to one of the six port divisions who train on a regular weekly basis.

Group 2. Active Unattached Reserve — Personnel not attached to a port division and not required to train on a weekly basis, but who undertake training on a biennial or "as required" basis — this includes merchant marine, legal panel, survey branch etc.

Group 3. Inactive Reserve — Personnel who have no training commitment and comprise:

(a) Officers reaching 55 years
(b) Officers and senior sailors below retiring age who are transferred administratively or voluntarily.

Group 4. Retired Reserve. Officers and sailors who reach the compulsory retiring ages of 55 years and 60 years respectively.

We have reserve personnel in the legal, medical, seaman, engineer, intelligence and naval control of shipping, and we could not operate effectively in any emergency without them.

Recently, a decision has been made to give each State Capital Reserve Division an attack class patrol boat of its own, which will ensure their continuing proficiency, and I know has had a great effect on their morale. For the first time in many years, we are increasing our Reserve numbers.

The future

Well, I have told you about the present. The problems and some of the measures we are taking to improve matters, and so *what of the future?*

A survey commissioned in 1980 on community attitudes to defence, indicates a healthy interest among the under 25 year old to joining the Services. This survey suggests that 65% of the population considers there could be an outside threat to Australia, and about 50% of parents were in favour of their sons joining the Defence Force. I believe that any "Vietnam" hang-ups are largely gone.

I think perhaps that we moved too rapidly to accommodate what we perceived as contemporary standards — the very liberal recognition of "De facto" wives was one expression of this, which has been recently corrected to what I believe is a more sensible stance.

The young people coming into the Navy today, I believe, are coming not because they see it as just another job — they want adventure, challenge, a measure of security and they see the protection of Australia as worthwhile and necessary. They are more intelligent and they are looking for leadership.

They must see that defence policies are sustained — there is nothing more discouraging than changes of direction, or cut backs that affect operational efficiency or spares to keep equipment serviceable.

I believe we are reaching more consensus in Australia on defence, I know we have good people coming forward, and so I am very optimistic about the future.

Manpower means to us individual people and not just numbers.

In society of changing values, where costs of technology and wages are increasing rapidly, Navy is facing up to a stimulating challenge for the protection of Australia.

A MUSEUM AS A MEMORIAL

The Australian War Memorial celebrated the 40th Anniversary of its opening on Remembrance Day, 11 November 1981. This article on the building's origin and history was prepared by Margaret Browne and Jeffrey Williams of the History and Publications Section, Australian War Memorial.

In November 1941, while Australian servicemen and women were fighting in Europe and North Africa, preparations were being made in Canberra for the opening of a memorial to those who had fought and died in the first world war. Seats for official guests were being placed in front of a huge sandstone structure in the then lakeless Australian capital. Canberra hotels were booked to capacity for the Remembrance Day opening of the newly completed War Memorial. A colonel had been seconded by the Department of the Army to ensure that the opening of the Memorial ran as if it were a military operation. The Minutes of the then Board of Management record:

> so perfectly had the ceremony been timed, and so smoothly did it run according to the schedule, that within three seconds of the final note of the "Last Post" the chimes of the G.P.O. striking the eleventh hour in Sydney came in with dramatic effect.[1]

Officers of the Prime Minister's Department hastily sought a copy of the arrangements to be used as a future blueprint for similar opening ceremonies.[2]

The actual building of the Memorial had not, however, run so smoothly to plan. It had been twenty four years since the government of William Morris Hughes made the decision to establish a war museum under the direction of the Department of Defence.

The original idea for the museum had come from C.E.W. Bean, Australian's official war correspondent and, later, official historian of the first world war. As a child in the 1890s, Bean had been fascinated by visits to the Waterloo battlefield and to the Hotel du Musee which housed relics of that campaign:

> For us youngsters the Museum was fascinating — even far more so than the lunch, which is saying a great deal. In the half hour before lunch, and in stolen minutes after it, we used to steep ourselves in the contents of the glass cases and shakos or helmets and tunics of the Old Guard or the British infantry, some with the marks of battle on them — indeed there were a few skulls with holes from round shot or bullets and clear sabre-chips...[3]

At Gallipoli in 1915, Bean observed many Australian soldiers gathering items such as shell caps, shrapnel, bullets and rifle cartridge cases for souvenirs. He assumed that there would be a museum established in Australian after the war to house these relics, perhaps as the British had housed similar souvenirs at Whitehall. Early in 1916 Bean learned that the Canadian Max Aitken (later Lord Beaverbrook) had succeeded in obtaining the war diaries of Canadian units from the War Office where, as the result of previous arrangements, all records of Dominion forces were sent. During 1916 Bean gave a good deal of thought to the future of records and memorabilia relating to the war, often sharing his ideas with Arthur Bazley, his batman, after the two had tramped the Pozieres battlefield visiting units in the line, aid posts and casualty clearing stations.[4]

Early in 1917, Bean submitted to Generals White and Birdwood a paper suggesting the establishment of a national museum. Birdwood recommended the proposal to the Australian government and in May received a telegram supporting the idea. At the same time the Australian government discussed with the British government the question of A.I.F. records being transferred from the War Office to A.I.F. headquarters in London. The War Office readily agreed to this suggestion, provided that copies of the diaries and appendices were made by the Australian authorities and handed over to the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence.[5] A War Records Section of the A.I.F. was established in London, under the energetic and industrious Lieutenant J.L. Treloar, to take care of these records and to supervise the collection of future war diaries and correspondence.

Birdwood also instructed corps commanders to co-operate in the collection of relics. All manner of souvenirs poured into the collecting depot: cartridge cases, machine guns, small arms, artillery pieces, graveyard memorabilia, a painting or two cut from their frames in French chateaux[6] and wooden carvings which had been torn from buildings by diggers enthusiastic to obey orders. Even German prisoners had been labelled: 'Captured to be consigned to the Australian War Museum'.[7] Some of the more spectacular souvenirs were the Amiens gun, a German tank,

and the Shellal Mosaic which was torn up and packed into boxes in the space of two months. There was some disagreement between the War Trophies Committee in London, the War Office and A.I.F. headquarters as to the future of the Mosaic but on 6 June 1918 permission was given to the Australian government to ship one of its most valuable war souvenirs home.[8] Bean noted that at the time:

> ...the notion of its (the Shellal Mosaic) being shipped to Australia was strongly resisted by some British antiquarians who argued it should be left where it was, and that in any case it would be tragic for such a relic to be shipped to the antipodes. The issue seemed doubtful, but Treloar and I sat up one night concocting a letter with a pungent reference to the Elgin marbles from the Parthenon at Athens which had now for over 100 years been a treasure of the British Museum.[9]

Pictorial records — film, paintings and photographs — were not neglected. Will Dyson, Daryl Lindsay, George Lambert, Arthur Streeton, Fred Leist, C. Web Giblert, H. Steptimus Power, Louis McCubbin, Will Longstaff, George Bell, Frank Crozier and James Scott all turned their talents to capturing the experiences of Australians engaged on the battlefront. Bean also recruited Frank Hurley and Captain H. (later Sir Hubert) Wilkins to produce films of the activities of Australian soldiers. After a discussion in Bean's billet, one night in May 1918, it was decided that picture models or dioramas, executed by first class artists and sculptors, would be an ideal means of capturing the scenario and conditions of life on the battlefront. Bean marked on maps of the various campaigns the precise vista to be covered in each of the picture models (except those of Palestine, which Gullett was to choose). Web Gilbert, the sculptor, was set to study the ground and observe the troops and, after the signing of the Armstice, Bean, with Lambert and Wilkins, visited Gallipoli to inspect the field of battle and collect relics.[10]

On the return journey to Australia Bean, with the help of Bazley and John Balfour, put into written form his plans for the museum: for the preservation of records, relics, pictures and photographs and for their administration. On 31 July 1919 he presented an outline of his scheme to the Australian War Museum Committee which had been established by the government a year earlier. Bean envisaged the Australian War Museum as having two functions:

(1) it has to receive, classify, describe and allocate to the different states or districts (and certain institutions, eg. RMC Duntroon and RAN College Jervis Bay) and to the Commonwealth collection of trophies and relics which is in the course of transport from England; and

(2) it has to establish (from a selection of (a) the Commonwealth's share of the trophies and relics (b) the battle models (c) the official pictures and photographs and (d) the historic documents, maps and airphotos (that) the 'Commonwealth War Museum will be Australia's National Memorial to the Australians who fell in the war'.[11]

Bean's idea that the museum should also be a memorial was reflected in his conception of the building, with its Roll of Honour:

> My conception was that the Museum should be a classical building, something in the style of the Lincoln Memorial. A great hall in the centre would be panelled with the inscribed names of all Australians who fell in that war. On each side of the hall would be a wing, the one to hold the relics and pictures, the other the written records. I strongly felt that in the great hall surrounded by the 80,000 names, Australians would feel almost the presence of their fallen...[12]

The Committee approved Bean's conception of a museum as a memorial and in February 1922 Major General (later Sir William) Glasgow reported to the Committee that he had had an interview with the Treasurer (Earle Page) who would raise at the next Cabinet meeting 'the question of the War Museum as the National War Museum', and that the Committee's views would be placed before the Prime Minister (S.M. Bruce) prior to the Cabinet meeting. The Committee began for the first time to use the title (Australian) National War Memorial rather than Australian War Museum, primarily to give impetus to the idea that the national war memorial, as opposed to various state and local war memorials and shrines of remembrance, was to be located in Canberra, in the form of a museum — the permanent home of the national collections.[13] Bean drafted the statement on the nature of the memorial for Cabinet:

> The Australian National War Memorial, comprising a monumental building containing the whole of the war record of the Australian Forces — archives, pictures and relics and the engraved names of every Australian who fell during the war, thus dedicating to their memory a temple to which for all time students and the people generally will resort in order to have knowledge of their deeds.[14]

Thus the function of the Australian War Memorial was to be twofold: to commemorate the fallen and to house and exhibit the national collection.

The Committee had hoped that Bean would become the first director of the Memorial as well as official historian, but it was evident to Bean that he could not undertake both tasks. Gullett was therefore asked to be Director, and Treloar

Early days, the Australian War Memorial under construction (circa 1930).

— *Australian War Memorial*

became his head of staff. When Gullett left to become Director of Immigration in 1920, Treloar took over as Director, a position which he held until his death in 1952, with the exception of the period he spent as Secretary to the Department of Information during the 1939-45 war. Gullett remained associated with the Memorial as a member of the Board of Management and, as Bean himself observed:

> until Harry's (Gullett's) death, he, Treloar and myself formed virtually the triumvirate which mainly moulded the future of the Memorial. We worked in very close consultation.[15]

Pending the provision of a permanent home, the collections were exhibited in temporary accommodation at the Exhibition Building in Melbourne, from 1922-4, and in Sydney from early in 1925. The Melbourne exhibition was opened on Anzac Day 1922, and when it closed in 1924, 776,810 visitors had passed through the turnstiles, including one woman

> ...who stared for some time at a naval torpedo, and then tried to ascertain how the men got inside it before it was fired.[16]

The Sydney exhibition in Prince Alfred Park was opened on 3 April 1925 by the Governor-General, Lord Forster. Visitors were

> ...surprised to find in an inconspicuous corner a stall devoted to the sale of ornaments, ash-trays, sugar basins, and other souvenirs, made from German shell cases salved on the battlefields of France and Belgium.
>
> From the small 77mm vase or sugar bowl, to the large 8 in howitzer case, converted into a handsome jardiniere, or the pedestal made from a combination of 5.9-inch gun shell case, with the 8-inch howitzer case a splendid array of beautiful and useful articles is presented.[17]

The exhibition continued to be popular. By June 1927 one million visitors had passed through the turnstiles and, by July 1932, the number had risen to two million. The Sydney exhibition was closed on 31 January 1935 and the exhibits moved to Canberra.

Progress in Canberra towards erecting a permanent building for the collection had been slow. In spite of the enthusiasm of Bean and the rest of the Committee, the government did not pass the *Australian War Memorial Act* until 1925. In a spirit of optimism an international competition was then lauched to find a design but the result was disappointing. All of the sixty-nine designs submitted were held by the judges to have failed to carry out one or more of the conditions considered to be essential. However, some of the designs were of great beauty and, as Bean commented,

> ...one competitor had substituted for the great hall an open courtyard surrounded by cloisters in which the names would be inscribed, with a hall or shrine at the end. It was a more beautiful conception than mine...[18]

This design which the adjudicators thought "...a very excellent and beautiful conception, embodying as it does Australian sentiment for gardens and sunlight"[19] was the work of a Sydney architect, John Crust. He was asked to collaborate with another competitor, Emil Sodersteen, also of Sydney, who had produced a beautiful, striking Byzantine design.

On 16 February 1928, after allegations by Gullett that the government intended to postpone the building of the Memorial indefinitely, and in spite of complaints from some competitors that only two of the architects had been given a chance to amend their designs, Bruce announced that Cabinet had decided to commission the architects Sodersteen and Crust to prepare working drawings to submit to the Public Works Committee. Debate in the press indicated overwhelming support for building the Memorial, but poignant comments such as that of D.C. McGrath, M.P. for Ballarat, were indications of a changing mood. He believed that

> if the money was to be spent it should be spent on living soldiers who were out of work, and who could not get homes[20]

The foundation stone was finally unveiled in Canberra on Anzac Day 1929 and it must have seemed to those eager to see the Memorial built that their dreams would soon be realised. But economic conditions were to dictate otherwise. After a heated debate in the House of Representatives later in the year, the government decided to abandon building for the present. Prime Minister Scullin outlined his reasons in a letter to Mr G.J.C. Dyett, Federal President of the Returned Sailors and Soldiers' Imperial League:

> ...the present Government has no intention whatever of departing from the decision of Federal Parliament to erect a war memorial at the national capital but...we are faced with financial disabilities of a serious character.
>
> ...Before we make a start on a work of this kind, we want to feel assured that it can be completed...During the next financial year prospects may be brighter and we may feel justified in recommending that the work be commenced.[21]

Scullin had clearly underestimated the severity of the financial and economic depression which had engulfed Australia and the rest of the world. The next few years saw little progress; it was a time for tightening of belts. Bean, who had insisted that his salary be cut to conform with the reductions placed on other public servants, battled on in Sydney with the official history. And, while the construction site at the foot of Mt Ainslie remained deserted, ex-solders on the dole who chanced to visit Sydney's Prince Alfred Park dawdled past the relics of campaigns they had fought in almost twenty years before.

As the country began to emerge from the forlorn 'soup kitchen' days prospects for the building of the Memorial improved. On 1 June 1933 the Lyons Cabinet approved a proposal by the Minister of the Interior, J.A. Perkins, for the immediate erection of the first half of the Australian War Memorial. As the Prime Minister commented,

> The undertaking of this work, which will cost about £80,000, has been made possible largely by the decision of the War Memorial Board to advance for the purpose the £24,000 contained in the War Memorial Trust Fund, the proceeds of the exhibition of A.I.F. Cinema Films, and the sale of A.I.F. publications.[22]

Later, on 13 August 1936, the Lyons government approved expenditure of £160,000 for completion of the Memorial. This entailed the erection of the Hall of Memory, Cloisters to contain the Roll of Honour, and the facing of the whole building with stone

When the Memorial was finally opened on Armistice Day 1941, the world had been at war again for two years. Cabinet had decided in February that this second world war should also be represented in the Memorial and Treloar had gone off to the Middle East to arrange for the systematic collection of records and memorabilia. He persuaded General Blamey that a Military History and Information Section should be formed to supervise the work of 'field teams' attached to each division. The Section eventually established itself in Queens Road, Melbourne and from there directed the activities of its field teams and received the monthly war diaries which all units were obliged to submit. In July 1946 these records were transferred to the Memorial.

The next two decades were a period of consolidation for the memorial. Much time was spent in the enormous tasks of organising the records, arranging and cataloguing the collections and adding to the thousands of names on the Roll of Honour. These tasks were made more onerous by the broadening of the provisions of the *War Memorial Act* in 1952 to include all wars in which Australian servicemen and women had participated, from the Sudan War in 1885 to the contemporary involvement in conflicts in south-east Asia. In 1973 a further broadening of the ACT allowed the commemoration of Australians who had died as a result of war, although not serving as members of the forces. Extensions to the building, originally authorised by Cabinet in 1947 in recognition of the need for the Memorial to commemorate the second world war as well as the first, were finally started in 1968. One wry observer commented:

> Even with current delivery delays these extensions will hardly be in time to fulfil their purpose — to provide room to

house at least one of the F-111 aircraft now on order from the USA.[23]

When the extensions were opened on 31 March 1971 the need for further space was already being felt.

In 1936, the Director, J.L. Treloar, had hastened to correct journalists who used to word 'museum' to describe the War Memorial. It might, he suggested, have been appropriate for the old corrugated iron building in Sydney, but was a misnomer when used in connection with the new Canberra building.[24] The 1970s, however, saw a new emphasis on the Memorial's museum function. The engagement of professional staff, the upgrading of galleries and exhibitions and the improvement of conservation and storage facilities represented a more professional approach to the museum aspects of the Memorial.

The proclamation of the *Australian War Memorial Act* 1980 represented a watershed in the Memorial's history. It left unaltered the primary purpose of the Memorial, which is to preserve the memory of Australian servicemen and women who have died on or as a result of active service, but the Council, which replaced the Board of Trustees, was charged with additional responsibilities: to develop and maintain a national collection of historical material, to encourage exhibition of historical material, to conduct and assist research into matters pertaining to Australian military history and to disseminate information about military history, the Memorial, its collection and its functions.

The Act allows the Memorial to collect and display material on events leading up to conflicts, their aftermath and the effects of war on the home front providing a wider understanding of the involvement of the nation as a whole. The Memorial is committed to further research and to disseminate information relating to Australian military history and to encourage the already considerable interest envinced by scholars and researchers in this subject.

For some time the Council has recognised the need to expand the role of the Memorial in education as it is the repository of a significant part of Australia's history. The number of Australians who have no direct experience of the nation's involvement in military conflicts will continue to grow, and it is essential that all should be aware of the nature of that involvement. The new Act gives the Council more specific powers in the field of education and the Memorial's Education Section has developed a programme of in-depth studies which involves teachers in classroom preparation and follow-up exercises after a visit to the Memorial. These studies and tours are designed to make each visit a worthwhile learning experience rather than a jumble of confused impressions. The greater emphasis on the educative role of the memorial reflects Bean's original conception of a place where children and adults unfamiliar with the reality of war might learn through observation something of the experience of earlier generations of Australians.

FOOTNOTES

1. Agenda and Minutes, *Thirtieth Meeting of Board of Management: Australian War Memorial*, 24 April 1942, p.5.
2. *ibid.*, p.6.
3. C.E.W. Bean, "The Beginnings of the Australian War Memorial", unpublished paper, p.6 (Annotated by A.W. Bazley).
4. A.W. Bazley, "The Early Story of the Australian War Memorial," unpublished paper, pp.1-2.
5. C.F. Coady, "The Written Records of Australia at War", unpublished paper, p.1.
6. Bean, *op. cit.*, p.9.
7. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 23 May 1928.
8. See A.D. Trendall, *The Shellal Mosaic and Other Classical Antiquities in the Australian War Memorial Canberra*, fourth edition, Canberra, 1973, pp.11-12.
9. Bean, *op. cit.*, p.11.
10. Bazley, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-13 and K.S. Inglis, *C.E.W. Bean Australian Historian*, (John Murtagh Macrossan Lecture, 1969), UQP, 1970, p.19.
11. Agenda and Minutes, *Australian War Museum Committee*, 31 July 1919.
12. Bean, *op.cit.*, p.15. See also Agenda and Minutes, *Australian War Museum Committee*, 31 July 1919, Appendix D.
13. See Agenda and Minutes, *Australian War Museum Committee*, 28 February 1922.
14. *ibid.*
15. Bean, *op. cit.*, p.17A.
16. *Herald*, (Melbourne), 16 December 1924.
17. *Evening News* (Sydney), 9 April 1925.
18. Bean, *op. cit.*, p.18.
19. *SMH*, 3 March 1927.
20. *Daily Telegraph* (Brisbane), 22 March 1928.
21. Quoted in *Brisbane Mail*, 31 December 1929.
22. *Argus* (Melbourne), 2 June 1933.

The Australian War Memorial Fund was started with monies accumulated from the sale of war photographs during and after the 1914-18 war. It was formalised in the *Australian War Memorial Act* 1925. Its main sources of revenue are donations and the sale of such items as photographs and publications. The fund is used for the purchase of items for display in the galleries and for other purposes associated with the role of the Memorial such as publications and a research grant scheme.

23. *Australian*, 1 November 1968.
24. *Canberra Times*, 3 February 1936.

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE

(Extracts from an article in *The Naval Annual 1890*)

In recent years the Australian Colonies have made patriotic efforts to protect their harbours and coasts. Beginning with the mounting of a few guns, the defences of the capitals of the colonies have been gradually strengthened. Victoria has taken the lead. Port Philip, according to the statement of Admiral Fairfax, is rapidly becoming one of the best fortified places in the Empire. New South Wales has constructed considerable works for the defence of Sydney, although in armament the preparation is less complete than at Melbourne. The defences of Adelaide are not in a satisfactory condition. An enemy would experience no difficulty in effecting a landing south of Fort Glanville. A hostile man-of-war could bombard Adelaide from Holdfast Bay. Brisbane, from its inland situation at some distance up a narrow river of difficult navigation, is easily defended, and some fortifications have been constructed. The rapidly-rising coast towns of Northern Queensland, as, for example, Townsville and Cairns, have no defences.

If there is any risk to the Australian ports it must be from bombardment from the light long-range guns of some hostile cruiser. To any attempts on the part of an enemy to inflict injury by this means, the guns now mounted at Port Philip and Sydney would return an effective answer. The completion of the necessary defences elsewhere is certain to be taken in hand ere long.

A considerable flotilla for harbour defence, including an ironclad and several gunboats and torpedo-boats, has been created at Melbourne. Adelaide has a powerful coast defence vessel. Brisbane has two efficient gunboats. A Naval Brigade as well as Naval Artillery Volunteers has been organised both in Victoria and New South Wales.

Having made the ports secure, the Australasian Federation will doubtless devote serious efforts to the creation of a Navy prepared to act, and that not ineffectively, with the Imperial Navy in the common cause. Under a recent arrangement, for which the administration of Lord Salisbury is entitled to public acknowledgment, and which has received the approval of the legislatures — Imperial and Colonial — a special squadron of highly efficient cruisers has been built for the defence of the trade in Australian waters and on the coasts of New Zealand.

In former numbers of the Naval Annual, the establishment of a naval school for the colonies on the model of the Britannia has been strongly recommended. Many Australian young gentlemen would gladly enter the Navy, if facilities for their education could be provided within easy access from the Colony to which they belong.

The progress which has been made in the defences of the great Australian ports is an ample vindication of the policy which England has pursued of encouraging the Colonies to undertake their own defence. As it has been well put by Lieutenant-Colonel Carre, R.A., "England like a wise parent teaches her colonies to walk alone, lending them her trained naval and military officers as instructors, with promises of further advice and help, should they require or desire it. Whilst undertaking herself to defence of the seas, she entrusted them with the care of their own shores, and withdrew the last of her troops some years ago. By this arrangement the Colonies were relieved from the necessity of maintaining ships of war on the high seas, and they undertook to provide defences that were well within their means."

Sir William Jervois said lately, "The whole question of the defences of Australasia is a naval one. The land force is really for the purpose of manning the works necessary for the protection of the ports, and for the defence of these works. There is a tendency to create new forces which really are not necessary for the protection of these countries. Forces are established in the interior which could not come into play for the purposes which we are now discussing. Of all places in Australia, South Australia depends upon naval defence the most. It is very important that King George's Sound should be properly protected. There should be guns mounted in the best positions, and there ought to be a separate and efficient garrison provided at the Sound. If not so defended it affords an admirable point whence any hostile naval force could operate against your commerce. Thursday Island should be fortified in a manner similar to King George's Sound, in order that we might secure that end of the continent. In this way you would have the approach to Australia from the south-west and north-east and east secured by means of points from whence the naval squadron could act for the general protection of the colonies. Port Darwin, however strongly defended, would not influence the defence of Torres Straits directly. But at Thursday Island you could absolutely secure the channel against the passage of a hostile ship."

After considerable negotiation it has been decided that Thursday Island and King George's Sound shall be fortified with assistance from the Imperial Government. Garrisons of Marines were originally proposed. It is now the wish of the Australian Colonies to furnish garrisons from their permanent forces.

It has been officially communicated by Lord Knutsford to the Government of South Australia that it is not considered necessary to fortify Port Darwin. As the landing-place of the cable by which Australia is placed in telegraphic communications with the rest of the world the position is important, and when the railway projected to connect it with Adelaide is completed the position will acquire additional importance. It may be presumed that the Local Government will undertake the responsibility for the construction of defences for Port Darwin.

NOTICE OF SPECIAL GENERAL MEETING

The Council of the Australian Naval Institute, by the authority granted to it under Article 13(1) of the Rules, has convened a special general meeting of the members. The meeting will be held at 1930 on Friday 19 February 1982 at Legacy House, Allara Street, Canberra ACT.

The business to be transacted involves a proposal to extend the present terms of eligibility for Regular Membership of the Institute and to change the constitution accordingly.

The questions to be put are:

QUESTION A. In addition to members of the PNF of Australia, should Regular Membership of the Institute be granted to Members of the Citzens Naval Forces/Australian Naval Reserve engaged in full-time service and Members of the Active elements of the RAN Reserve; and

QUESTION B. If regular membership is granted as above, should that status be retained by the individual for as long as he or she shall continue without break to belong to the Institute.

If the answers to either or both of the questions is YES, then constitutional amendments will be proposed in regard to RULE 2(1) and 2(1)c respectively.

Honorary Secretary

SAILORS AND WRANS

(Extract from a recent Chief of Naval Personnel Newsletter).

The major aim of the Directorate of Sailors Postings for 1981 is to stablilise postings to stop posting turbulence. This may mean that some bunks are left empty for a while, deliberately, in order that sailors and Wrans may have time to arrange their affairs before taking up a posting.



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

Royal Australian Navy
Fremantle Class Patrol Boat.

THE YOUNG TURKS

By Commander A.W. Grazebrook RANR

In the first edition of this journal, the then President of the Australian Naval Institute, Commodore V.A. Parker RAN, referred to the founders of the British professional naval journal, the *Naval Review,* and passed favourable comment on the determination and innovative ability of the group of relatively young officers responsible for its founding. Their officers were known in the Royal Navy as 'The Young Turks' after the group of reforming nationalists (Enver Pasha, Talal Bey and others) who sought to rouse and reform the Ottoman Empire from the state of decadent torpor to which it had sunk by the first decade of this century.

The Royal Navy's Young Turks undoubtedly had intellect, knowledge of their profession and drive. To a man, they were aggressive in temperament. This showed in their attitude to tactics and strategy and, unhappily, in the way at least some of them put their ideas to their contemporaries and superiors. Some historians contend that it was because of this inability to get their superiors to accept their innovative ideas that the Young Turks failed to get the Service to accept their reforms. Furthermore, none of the Young Turks reached the pinnacles of their profession — First Sea Lord and the Commander-in-Chief of one of the major Fleets.

Objectives of the *Naval Review*

Before considering the problems the Young Turks had in getting their innovations accepted by the Royal Navy, let us look at their professed objective in setting up *The Naval Review*. These were:

'To Promote the Advancement and spreading within the Service of Knowledge. Relevant to the Higher Aspects of the Navy Profession.'

The founding group was comprised of seven serving officers:

Captain Herbert William Richmond (who orginated the idea)[1]
Commander K.G.B. Dewar
Commander the Hon R.A.R. Plunkett (who later lengthened his name)
Lieutenant R.M. Bellairs
Lieutenant T. Fisher
Lieutenant H.G. Thursfield
Captain E.W. Harding, RMA

Admiral W.H. Henderson, a retired Officer, was appointed Honorary Editor of *The Naval Review*.

The Young Turks

The Young Turks were not a formal grouping. There were others who where sympathetic but were not founding members of *The Naval Review*. However, the founders provide the illustrations this writer is seeking and are representative of the more energetic middle ranking reformers in the Royal Navy of that period.

The foremost amongst them was H.W. Richmond. Widely regarded as an expert on training, tactics and strategy, he studied these subjects with great emphasis on the lessons to be learned from history.

Richmond

In common with others of his generation, Richmond was articulate in diary and correspondence, much of which has been published[2]. This shows Richmond to have held extremely strong opinions on many and diverse aspects of strategy, tactics, personnel administration and training and, to a lesser extent, materiel. Whilst history has since proven a number of his ideas to have been sound (and a number have been shown to be unsound), Richmond had grave difficulty in getting his ideas accepted.

This difficulty was not due solely to the view (then alleged to be prevailing amongst the RN's

THE AUTHOR

Commander Tony Grazebrook, RD, RANR was born in Britain in 1935. Educated in the US and Great Britain, he made his career in the marketing of synthetic rubber. Activities in this field have included travel in the Middle East, Eastern Europe and South America and a period of five years' residence in Switzerland. He is now marketing manager, Australian Synthetic Rubber Co., Ltd., and lives in North Balwyn, Victoria. He completed two years' National Service in the RN, including service at a Naval Air Station, in minesweepers and submarines. He is now Senior Officer, Naval Control of Shipping in HMAS *LONSDALE*.

Tony Grazebrook has written extensively on naval and defence journals both in Australia and overseas. He is Naval Editor of the *Pacific Defence Reporter* and Federal Vice President of the Naval League.

Flag officers) that the views of (relatively) junior officers were not worthy of attention. His own correspondence, not to speak of the views of his peers, show that Richmond had great difficulty in expressing his views and putting his ideas in a manner acceptable to his superiors.

In Richmond's view, many of his superiors were incompetent and/or unintelligent and said so in very blunt terms in his correspondence. Such phrases as 'ought to have been court-martialled and put ashore for his bungling'[3] are not uncommon. In Richmond's view, anyone who could not recognise that Richmond's views were wholly and completely correct was a fool. But Richmond's prime difficulty was that he had a way of letting his superiors know that he thought they were fools

In short, Richmond was incapable of "selling" his ideas to his superiors — he could not tactfully persuade his superiors and peers. He could only tell them what should be done, frequently in a manner which no self respecting senior officer could accept. This, many of Richmond's ideas were rejected and, on several occasions, he himself was posted elsewhere to get him out of the way.

Nevertheless, some of the more perceptive Admirals did recognise his outstanding strategic and tactical abilities. He was posted to be Liaison Officer with the Italian Fleet to try and engender some much needed activity in that orgnaisation. When he could not get his ideas acted upon, Richmond gave up and asked to be relieved.

Thereupon, he was rusticated to command of the elderly battleship, HMS *COMMONWEALTH* (away from the Grand Fleet). There Richmond remained, in a position without influence, restless and agitating, and vociferously critical of the lack of perception and ability of his Admiral and brother Captains in command of obsolete ships.

When Beatty became Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, he arranged for Richmond's appointment in command of the 'Dreadnought' HMS *CONQUEROR* where he, Beatty, would have Richmond ready to hand to draw upon his advice. Richmond respected Beatty, who in turn was prepared to accept Richmond's tactless methods as part of the price of having Richmond's advice available. Beatty recognised that Richmond's ideas regarding training — the need to develop officers for service in Flag Appointments before, and not after, they hoisted their flags — were badly needed in the Admiraltiy. Upon Beatty's recommendation, Richmond was appointed Director of the Training and Staff Duties Division of the Admiralty Naval Staff.

The terms of reference of his new position limited Richmond to recommendations and proposals. He was quickly at loggerheads with those responsible for pronouncing on his recommendations and implementing those that were accepted. Richmond lasted eight months and was fortunate to get another battleship command.

However, Beatty's appointment as First Sea Lord enabled him to see that Richmond's abilities were not lost to the Service. Richmond became President of the Naval War College at Greenwich and, later conjointly President of the Royal Naval College Greenwich.

Near to London, Richmond was able to speak frequently with those in power in the Admiralty. He was free to develop his ideas of changes in naval warfare, and to apply his ideas on the training of senior officers.

As an example of his foresight, in 1920 Richmond saw the number of battleships substantially reduced. He saw a 'core of heavy ship and.....a host of lesser vessels. Torpedo plans will play a part we have hardly thought of, submarines will have a more difficult role.[4]

Following the unusually long period of three years at Greenwich, Richmond was appointed in command of the East Indies squadron of some three cruisers and three sloops. He turned this post, often a flag showing activity, into one in which he could develop his tactical thinking. He gave his attention to combined operations.

Working with the Indian Army Staff College at Quetta, he used an island off Bombay to simulate a Japanese attack on Singapore. He "emphasised the need for preliminary beach reconnaissance and for troop ships to carry self-propelled landing craft at their davits. He foresaw the need for special vessels for Army motor transport able to moor with their sterns to the beach to enable vehicles to disembark dryshod.[5]

However, even Richmond did not perceive the full impact of airpower on combined operations as, following the Singapore simulation exercise, he asserted that the 'Japanese Force' spent too much time establishing air supremacy before the assault.

In spite of the fact that the East Indies Station was not a good posting for ambitious Officers, two members of Richmond's staff were to make valuable contributions to their profession in later years — one to combined operations and the other to naval aviation[6].

Beatty saw to it that, when Richmond's term in the East Indies expired, the first Commandant of the Imperial Defence College was H.W. Richmond. Here, as at Greenwich, Richmond had the opportunity to indulge his interest in strategy and the training of Senior Officers. He laid the foundations upon which the College (now known as the Royal College of Defence Studies) was to build its reputation and the respect that it enjoys fifty years later.

In his instruction, Richmond laid great emphasis on the lessons of history so far as the strategic level was concerned. As he grew older

he became more dogmatic and critical. His admirer Beatty became less enthusiastic and in due course, downright hostile as Richmond became more critical of the retention of the battleship as the Royal Navy's prime unit.

By the time Richmond's term at the Imperial Defence College had expired, Beatty had returned. Unable to get his battleship ideas accepted, Richmond resorted to writing letters to *The Times*. Using thinly disguised pseudonyms, Richmond advocated publicly the elimination of the battleship, with cruisers being the maximum size of ship built for the Royal Navy. By taking a public stance in opposition to the professional heads of his Service, Richmond forced the Board of Admiralty to adopt an even firmer position in favour of the battleship.

His ideas had an appeal to politicians, plagued as they were by econominc problems and (as they are today) only too ready to ignore facts in their search for funds.

Richmond's methods ensured not only that his ideas on battleships were not implemented but also that any other proposal he made was looked at askance.

Richmond had achieved the rank of full Admiral and, by most men's measure, had a successful career in the British Navy. He flew his flag afloat as a Commander-in-Chief (but of a relatively minor overseas station), and was created K.C.B. the fact that he did not reach the very pinnacle of his profession — Commander-in-Chief of one of the main fleets and Chief of the Naval Staff — was due not to lack of originality, ideas, ability or drive, but to his inability to sell his ideas to the decision makers.

A close friend of Richmond's was less successful, although he had many personal characteristics that were similar to those of Richmond.

Dewar

Dewar was a central figure in the well known *ROYAL OAK* Incident over which Dewar's prospects of promotion to flag rank (other than as a yellow Admiral) were effectively terminated.

Dewar had many of the faults possessed by Richmond, but lacked some of Richmond's strengths. Even more outspoken than Richmond, Dewar was Executive Officer of the elderly battleship HMS *PRINCE OF WALES* when that ship was mobilised at the outbreak of World War I. This position tied Dewar to his duties in a ship well out of the Grand Fleet — mainly on bombardment duties off the Dardanelles — where Dewar's natural interest in tactics and strategy were allowed no opportunity for application.

He agitated and fumed and eventually received an even less inspiring appointment as Commanding Officer of the Gunnery School at Devonport. Further agitation produced command of HMS *ROBERTS*, a monitor virtually permanently moored at Gorleston on coast defence duties.

This series of lessons in the potential counter-productivity of postering the Directorate of Naval Officers Postings was eventually followed by success. Dewar was appointed to the Operations Division of the Naval Staff, with the task of writing a weekly appreciation of the naval situation for the war cabinet.

Dewar has described how, upon arrival at the Admiralty, he was told of his new posting by the

— Australian War Memorial
(negative H 12122)

then First Sea Lord (Admiral Jellicoe) who 'told me that I had a reputation for independent opinions and it was evident from his tone that he did not count this unto me for righteousness'.[7]

Nevertheless, Dewar remained at the Admiralty for nearly three years, the last two of which were as Assistant Director of the Plans Division involving promotion to the rank of Captain. Dewar's description of the organisation and modi operandi are of interest.[8] These included the employment of senior officers on 'routine tasks, compiling reports and returns etc. which could have been done equally well by civilian clerks supervised by an Officer'. Dewar was closely involved in the formulation of convoy policy. He used his position to put his views which were not in accord with those of Admiral Jellicoe. Dewar was quickly replaced and received appointment in command of an elderly cruiser on the East Indies Station. Using personal contacts with the Prime Minister, Dewar had his appointment cancelled and he remained at the Admiralty.

After the War, Dewar was assigned the task of writing an account of the Battle of Jutland. This was a difficult assignment as Admiral Beatty, by then Chief of the Naval Staff, was known to want certain actions taken by himself to be described charitably. In this instance, Dewar survived, although not (in the view of some) with his intellectual honesty intact.

After a period afloat in command of cruisers in the West Indies, and two years' service as Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence, Dewar was appointed in command of the Mediterranean battle ship HMS *ROYAL OAK*. In this posting, a necessary pre-requisite for promotion to flag rank, Dewar found himself as Flag Captain to Rear Admiral B. StG. Collard who epitomised all that Dewar thought Flag Officers should not be.

After several incidents, Dewar could contain himself no longer. He lodged a formal complaint with the Vice Admiral of the Battle Squadron. The whole matter blew up in an explosion of press publicity, the immediate relief of the Flag Officer, Dewar himself, and his Executive Officer, and a court martial.

A book has been written on the subject[9]. So far as the incident is relevant to this article, it illustrates Dewar's inability to hide his feelings — he just could not "put up and shut up" for the few months necessary to qualify him for promotion to flag rank and, hopefully, a position where he would have a better opportuntiy to put his ideas into practice.

It is of further interest to note that, although the Board of Admiralty's subsequent action showed they felt Collard to have been in the wrong, and Dewar later commanded for short periods a battle cruiser and a battleship, Dewar's failings were his undoing and he was placed on the retired list the day after what amounted to an honorary promotion to the rank of Rear Admiral.

Whether Dewar would have been employed as Flag Officer, if it had not been for his dispute with Collard, will never be known. The fact is that Dewar's difficulty in getting on with others, perhaps of lesser intellect than his own, and who held opinions differing from his own, brought his career to a disastrous end. The Royal Navy was denied much of the benefit of Dewar's ability. He himself spent his retirement in disappointment and bitterness, erupting in his efforts to enter the Parliament as a Member of the Labor Party.

From the career of another of the Young Turks there are lessons of another type to be learned.

Bellairs

Roger Bellairs, a Commander at 31 and a Captain at 35, found himself at the outbreak of World War I as a war staff officer to the Commander in Chief Grand Fleet. Bellairs later became the Fleet Torpedo Officer, in which capacity he served at the Battle of Jutland, keeping Jellicoe's tactical plot. Bellairs was a graduate of the very first naval staff course.

Bellairs remained on the Grand Fleet's staff throughout World War I. Indeed, he served continuously in staff positions from January 1913 until October 1925. As a Commander, he held no "line" appointment on shore or at sea — he served neither in command nor as Executive Officer of any ship or establishment. In the whole of his career from his promotion to Lieutenant Commander in 1912 to his retirement in 1932, he served only just over three years afloat in non-staff positions.

Unhappily, when he assumed command of Britain's largest battleship HMS *RODNEY*, Bellairs lacked experience of command. When the mutiny erupted at Invergordon, Bellairs' ship was involved in some of the more serious trouble. He had not the experience to handle this and failed to achieve flag rank on the active list. However, his widely appreciated talents for staff work were not lost. After his retirement, he continued to serve the Royal Navy for seven years as British naval representative at the League of Nations.

Bellairs' correspondence shows him to have been both articulate and a shrewd judge of people. He has been described by Professor Marder as 'likeable, cheerful and brainy, immensely successful as a staff officer and diplomat — an invaluable combination of service officer and diplomat with the opportuntiy to use both qualities.'[10] Early in World War II, Bellairs was appointed to head the UK team for staff conversations with the United States' Naval Staff. In this post he was very successful, bringing both his naval staff and diplomatic experience to bear. He

has been described as 'wise, good-natured and cheerful' by a very senior Royal Air Force officer.[11]

Although Bellairs clearly had the ability to sell ideas to his superiors and his country's allies, it is difficult to identify any really significant ideas that were his own. Thus, in Bellairs' case, we apparently have an officer with the ability to "sell" but without the ability to originate really innovative ideas.

Apart from that, the requirement that a Captain must serve in command afloat to qualify for promotion to flag rank in the seaman branch must surely be questioned as a result of Bellair's career. His appointment in command of HMS *RODNEY* was both risky for the service (as shown at Invergordan) and immensely sad for Bellairs personally. Furthermore, the opportunity to use Bellairs' staff ability in senior positions was denied the service.

Plunkett

Probably alone amongst the Young Turks, Commander Reginald Plunkett had both the intellect, ideas and ability to get changes implemented.[12] As Flag Commander to Beatty, when that Admiral commanded the Battle Cruiser Squadron/Battle Cruiser Fleet, Plunkett analysed all the battle crusiers' tactical exercises and obtained Beatty's approval for his analyses, which therefore received careful attention from the recipient battle cruiser Captains.

Unlike Bellairs, Plunkett saw to it that he spent only some three years on the staff, and then served for two years afloat in command of cruisers. He was then appointed to set up the Royal Navy Staff College after World War I. Plunkett had sufficient perception to refuse Dewar as his Deputy, and went on to set the tone of the R.N.S.C.'s curriculum and establish the foundations of the respect in which the Staff College has been held for the subsequent 60 years or more.

Plunkett held that Ships' Captains should be concerned with tactics and strategy. Their Technical Officers were there to maintain the equipment and to advise on its use. He applied these views in practice himself.

Plunkett's period as Rear Admiral Second Battle Squadron gave him the opportunity to advance his views on night fighting by the Battle Fleet (of course, in the days before radar changed night fighting dramatically). Along with a number of officers who regretted the Grand Fleet's failure to engage the German High Seas Fleet on the night of the 31st of May — 1st June, 1916, Plunkett considered the Royal Navy should develop the tactics for battleship night fighting. The problem was one which received much attention from most thinking officers in both the Atlantic Fleet and the Mediterranean Fleet. Night fighting was tested in a major Atlantic Fleet/ Mediterranean Fleet joint exercise, followed by a "wash up" attended by all the participating senior officers. The friendly atmosphere of that wash up, in which Plunkett's chief opponent was another Flag Officer of immensely strong personality, and the fact that an highly controversial topic could be analysed without bitterness or animosity is a measure of Plunkett's ability with people.

As a full Admiral, Plunkett was appointed late in 1938 to head up a small special staff to review the basic concept of sending the British Fleet to Singapore in the event of a war with Japan. Plunkett concluded that this concept was unwise on the grounds that British naval strength should be concentrated firstly against European opponents. After these had been defeated at sea, the Fleet should move eastwards. In this instance Plunkett's salesmanship failed to prevail.[13].

In August 1939, Plunkett was selected to head a delegation to Moscow to conduct military staff talks with the Russians. His brief was 'to stall until political agreement was nearer'[14]. This was a difficult brief, when British diplomatic dithering was being pitched against Germany's decisive determination. Plunkett's appointment to the post was a marked compliment to the breadth of his ability — from tactical command afloat to an extremely delicate diplomatic task.

Plunkett went on to be Commander in Chief at the Nore, where he coped with the brunt of the magnetic mine, the first sharp lessons in the effectiveness of air power against merchant traffic, and a close involvement with the support of British forces in the May-June 1940 German attack upon France the low countries.

Plunkett was an immensely successful naval officer with the ability both to conceive innovative ideas and to gain their acceptance both by his superiors, his peers and his juniors. His combination of abilities is in sharp contrast to those of Richmond and Dewar. Both these officers were brilliantly innovative but failed to get most of their ideas accepted. In contrast again is the career of Bellairs — a successful "salesman" but without a balancing ability to generate ideas.

Clearly, the careers of these four Young Turks demonstrate the importance of a balance of abilities, both strictly professional and diplomatic, to a naval officer anxious to achieve success in his profession.

Notes

1. *The Navy from Within* by Vice Admiral K.G.B. Dewar, CBE, London 1939. page 155.
2. *Portrait of an Admiral*, by Arthur J. Marder, CBE, London 1952.
3. *ibid.*, p.315
4. *ibid.*, p.364.
5. *Naval Policy Between the Wars*, by Stephen Roskill, London 1968, p. 539.

6. Richmond's SO(O), Lt.Cdr L.E.H. Maund, subsequently held a series of combined operations posts in World War II as a Captain and Rear-Admiral, and commanded HMS *OAK ROYAL*. Richmond's Flag Captain and Chief of Staff, CAPT. N.F. Lawrence, later commanded the aircraft carrier HMS *EAGLE*, was Rear-Admiral Aircraft Carriers, and served in World War II at the Ministers of Aircraft Production.
7. *The Navy from Within* p.213.
8. *ibid.*, pp.214-264.
9. *The Royal Oak Incident* by Leslie Gardiner.
10. *From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow* Vol.4 p.33 by A.J. Marder.
11. *The Central Blue* by Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor.
12. Later to become Admiral the Hon. Sir Reginald Aylmer Ranfurly Plunkett-Ernle-Erle-Drax, KCB, and successively, Commander-in-Chief on the America and West Indies Station, of the Plymouth Command, and at The Nore.
13. *Britannia at Bay 1931-41* by Paul Haggie, Oxford, 1981, pp.139-141.
14. *Harold Nicholson's Diaries 1930-39*.



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SHIPS AND THE SEA

POPOFFKA'S

The mid to late nineteenth century saw an upsurge in ships which were of novel, and at times, bizarre designs. The majority of these were used as merchant ships of various types but one of the most freakish was for use as a warship. These were the circular ships of the Russian Naval Officer *Vice Admiral Popoff.*

Popoff was a man of considerable professional standing and ability but he had unorthodox views in the field of ship design. In essence his circular ship was to provide the Russian Navy with a stable, manoeuverable gun platform ideally suited for their conscript crews.

One can only imagine their unusual appearance — twin funnels, abreast, and armed with two 40 pounder guns. Powered by six compound engines driving six propellors they should have been highly manoeuverable, but in fact were almost uncontrollable. Designed output was 2,400 hp for the first of the class *NOVOGRAD,* but she required 3,000 hp to attain 7 knots.

The two ships I've managed to research had details as follows:

NOVOGRAD — diameter 101 ft, draft 13 ft 6 in. (all round) 2,490 tons displacement.
Armament 2 x 40 pdr. guns.

VICE ADMIRAL POPOFF — diameter 120 ft, draft 14 ft. (all round), 3,590 tons displacement.
Armament 2 x 40 pounder.

Bizarre as they may have been, the *Popoffka's* did have far reaching effects in the maritime world. *Clark and Sandfield* developed an offshoot of the basic floating dock, the *Depositing Dock* (1876), to handle these strange ironclads. The eventual development of this type of dock became the *Hydrolift* in use throughout the world.

A second benefit was that although these platforms were stable they were completely unwieldy. A better method of obtaining stability was developed as the *Bilge Keel.*

NOVOGRAD and *POPOFF* were failures. However the Russians looked to a derivative and thus *LIVADIA* came into existance. Build on the Clyde in 1880, *LIVADIA* was the Imperial Russian yacht. Nick-named the *Summer House on a Turbot LIVADIA* was 235 ft. long with a 135 ft. beam and powered by triple screws.

A better performer than her predecessors, *LIVADIA* achieved 16 knots during trials and was certainly stable in heavy weather. With her three funnels, abreast, she certainly must have presented a unique picture, Royal Yacht or not!

Eventually *LIVADIA* proved to be too uncomfortable for the Imperial family and she was handed over to the Russian Navy and scrapped in 1926.

ROBIN PENNOCK



Plan view of *NOVOGRAD.*

EARLY DAYS IN FLINDERS NAVAL DEPOT

by Captain S.B. de Courcy-Ireland RN (Rtd.)

Captain de Courcy-Ireland spent the years 1922 to 1924 on loan service in the RAN at Flinders Naval Depot and subsequently recorded his experiences of that period. This article presents an edited version of Captain de Courcy-Ireland's account of his FND days and also serves to mark HMAS CERBERUS' Diamond Jubilee Year.

On 9th April 1922 I arrived at Melbourne. There I was unexpectedly told to disembark and report at the Navy Office, while the others were to go on to Sydney. At the Navy Office I saw an RN Lieutenant called Paul Bush.
'You are to go to Flinders Naval Depot' he said.
'Where is that?' I asked.
'Well it's about thirty miles from here,' he replied, on an inlet off Western Port. I've never been there myself, but they say it's not a bad spot. There is a train, but it doesn't run at weekends so you'd better put up at a pub until Monday'.
'What on earth am I going to do there?' I asked.
'Haven't a clue old boy', he answered.

I Arrive At FND

The train on Monday morning was full of sailors and officers (in plain clothes) returning from weekend leave; plus some locals. It jerked its way along an uneven track stopping at well over a dozen halts; taking two and a half hours to cover the thirty miles. Clear of Melbourne and its suburbs the country was flat, with poor sandy soil; covered with scrub, heather, patches of gum and wattle, and rather miserable looking homesteads. The houses were little more than shacks and the 'roads' just dirt tracks. The 'road' to Flinders Naval Depot had not in fact reached nearer than 3 miles of the place: after which you either had to walk, ride, or drive, literally through the bush. It was not completed (as a dirt road) until I had been there a year. Hence the importance of the train (once daily except for weekends) as a link.

I was met at the station by a couple of sailors with a hand cart for my luggage and the one and only car the place then possessed — a tin lizzie called 'The Girl Annie'. Everybody else had to walk up to three quarters of a mile.

I was hardly impressed with my first sight of the place, and even less so when I ultimately reached my 'quarters' — a tent. The Wardroom Mess block it was explained, had not quite been completed: the cabins for example, were not finished. Nor for that matter had one of the barrack blocks and a number of other buildings.

Well nobody minds living in a tent provided one is outfitted and geared for the business. But it was not quite so funny when one had to keep all one's belongings — white and blue uniform, full dress, plain clothes — in fact, all one's possessions — in it; plus a camp bed and wash basin etc.

However more was in store. The next morning I dressed up in frock coat and sword and reported at 0900 to the Captain Superintendant, in the time honoured custom of an officer joining his ship. He was a senior RN Captain — S.R. Miller — and was pleasant and courteous. Welcomed me to FND, asked if I had had a good trip out, and then enquired:-
'How long ago did you do your Long Course?'
'Long Course, Sir; what for?' I enquired.
'Why, Gunnery of course,' he said.
'Gunnery,' I replied, 'I'm not a Gunnery Officer, Sir'.
'Good Heavens,' he said, 'haven't you seen your appointment?'
'No Sir, I was just told to report here. They told me in London that I would be appointed first lieutenant of a destroyer out here. I am a Destroyer Officer'.
He laughed. 'Well you'd better forget that', he said. 'Out here they think you are a Gunnery Officer. And you are appointed Gunnery Officer of Flinders Naval Depot'.

THE AUTHOR

Captain de Courcy — Ireland was born on 5 May 1900. He went to sea in January 1916 and saw action at Jutland in HMS *BELLEROPHON*. He served in three destroyers during the rest of the war and in the Baltic and after courses was second Lieutenant in the *VENOMOUS* September 1920 — January 1922.

Whilst in the *VENOMOUS*, he volunteered for loan service in Australia. The story takes on from there, after he reached Melbourne.

After returning from Australia and further sea service in the *FROBISHER*, he trained as an observer and served in most of the carriers and on the staff of Admiral Alexander Ramsay in the Med. He was Commander of *NEWCASTLE* for the first 18 months of the second World War, and Commanded *AJAX* in the Med after the war. He retired as a Captain in 1952, and now lives in retirement in Painswick, Gloucester.

So a Gunnery Officer I became so far as the RAN were concerned, and as they paid me specialist pay for it I had no objection.

Flinders Naval Depot

This is as good a point as any to describe the origin, set up and surroundings of FND; together with the far from ordinary situation — to an RN Officer anyway — into which I had been plunged.

When the Australian Commonwealth was set up in 1900, each State had its own 'Naval Militia'. State rivalry had been very intense in many spheres, and they delighted in being 'different' from each other. The classic example was of course the railways; no two adjoining States had the same gauge. Thus you had to get out of one train and into another when you travelled from one State to the next one. So far as the RAN was concerned, the only relic left in my day was the right of ex Naval Militia Officers from, I think it was, South Australia, to continue to wear moustaches, which they had sported in the past so as to be different from the others. I remember my astonishment when I met one old lieutenant (ex warrant officer) at FND wearing a moustache.

The decision had been taken to set up a Naval Depot, comprising Barracks, Gunnery, Torpedo, Signal and Engineering Schools. The site selected was at the head of an inlet called Hanns Inlet, which led into Western Port, south of Port Phillip. Western Port was a very big bay, most of which was occupied by two large islands; Phillip Island across most of the entrance, and inside that French Island. There was a deep water channel between Phillip Island and the north shore, and a few miles along it was Hanns Inlet.

It was not a prepossessing spot. The islands and mainland were low lying; covered with bush and scrub, and where the shore was muddy and shallow, mangrove swamps. There were a few scattered settlements and homesteads, but most had been abandoned — the soil was too poor.

It was said that the Federal Government paid £105,000 for the 7000 acres plus that was 'included' in the purchase of the site. The actual area covered by the Depot was about 100 acres. The centre piece was a very large parade ground, which had been levelled and grassed. On the north side of this were two barrack blocks with a third under construction, a laundry, Petty Officer's Block etc. On the west side was the Wardroom Block with the Sick Bay, Signal School and Torpedo School to the South West. On the south side were the Drill Hall, Gunnery School and Administrative Offices; while bordering the top of Hanns Inlet behind them were the Engineering Section, Power House etc. The Warrant Officer's Block was on the east side; and finally a road led away in the south east corner past the Guard House and Married Quarters to the railway station. Very simple really.

As for Hanns Inlet; well there were grandiose plans for dredging out a straight channel leading to a large basin, with even a picture of a cruiser lying alongside a quay. They got as far as building embankments along one side of the creek and dredging about 100 yards of channel; and then the whole scheme collapsed. It was even argued that there was no point in dredging a straight channel, because an enemy would be able to fire a torpedo up it against any ship lying alongside; so why not make it crooked!

In the end, Hanns Inlet remained much as it had been; a fine stretch of water at high tide, a muddy creek at low water; with a shallow channel meandering down to the sea, bordered by salt marsh, crumbling embankments, and a large

Flinders Naval Depot 1921. These workers living huts were located behind the present Victualling Store from 1912 to 1922 when up to 800 workers were employed on building the establishment.

— HMAS Cerberus Museum

mangrove swamp on one side of the entrance. The basin at the top end had been dredged out to allow a small ship to lie alongside the quay, and other small craft to have moorings; thereby disturbing an oyster bed and annoying the locals, and a flock of about 2000 black swans who inhabited the mangrove swamp and took a dim view of the proceedings.

The rest of the 7000 acres consisted of marsh, ti-tree scrub, thick bush and poor pasture. One of the first acts was to establish the boundary. This was done by a character called Mick Hurley, who lived locally; supplied the Depot with firewood and owned a team of 18 oxen. Mick Hurley's contract was to plough 3 furrows right around the landward perimeter, through bush, scrub, swamp and what have you. It took him three months, dragging out trees, and ploughing his furrows with the most enormous plough I have ever seen. The strength of those oxen had to be seen to be believed, as did the strength and skill of the man himself. There was no one else in the whole district who could crack his great hide whip, let alone do it exactly above the back of any animal that wasn't pulling its weight. It sounded like a pistol shot and was always followed by a volley of Irish oaths. From which you could judge his whereabouts.

The Buildings

The design of the buildings was unimaginative, but in general they served their purpose. Proper 'Works and Bricks' staff and they hardly vary throughout the world. There was however, one extraordinary feature which was pure 'Australian'. It was said that the architect came from Aberdeen in Scotland, where you are taught to put your water and sewer pipes deep enough to be clear of possible damage from frost. Without giving a thought to the Australian climate he put them at the bottom of 6 foot trenches. Apart from the labour involved it was not a success; there was something in the subsoil that corroded the pipes. They all had to be replaced. Stung by caustic comments the architect then proceeded — believe it or not — to place them 6 foot in the air on trestles. Under the hot Australian sun they buckled and sprang leaks in every direction. It was months before things were put right.

Personnel

It would be fair to say that the RAN in 1922 was made up of a very varied assortment of officers and men. The officers were made up of a few relics of the old State Naval Militia, a considerable number of ex RN or RNR officers and warrant officers (most of whom had been given a step in rank or in the latter case commissions), an equal number of RN officers like myself who had volunteered for service out there or were on exchange, and finally the output from the Naval College at Jervis Bay. The senior of the latter were about my seniority; after graduating from College they served their midshipman, sub lieutenant and specialist training in the RN. There were also various Reserves known as Citizen Naval Forces, Sea-going and non Sea-going. I have a Royal Australian Navy List of October 1922 which makes quite interesting reading.

As for the ratings, the majority of the senior rates were ex RN pensioners, or on loan; and with very few exceptions fine chaps and the backbone of the Service. The men themselves were very mixed. Some were of good material, intelligent, keen, and as one might expect produced some first class 'sportsmen'. But many had only joined up because they were out of work, were lazy or misfits, or were wanted by the Police. It could hardly be expected that many young men would want to join up when the minimum weekly wage ashore was by law £5; unless they were extremely dedicated or were out of a job etc. Those that did, generally deserted as soon as they had saved up a bit of pay. There was nothing to stop them; they only had to walk off into the bush and make their way up to Melbourne. At the beginning of my time at FND the CID used to come down from Melbourne periodically; we would line up the 'new entries' and they would pick out wanted men. The desertion rate was 86% in the first year of service; after a year we got it down to 17%. But the deserters' troubles only really began after desertion. The Police got a bounty of £5 for each deserter recovered. If they got on to one — and often it was women that gave them away — they would take no action provided the man paid them hush money. If the man refused, or couldn't pay through being out of work, or couldn't keep up the payment, they roped him in and collected the bounty.

Actually we had our own Police Force at FND; a sergeant and two constables. They had originally been posted there to keep order among the workmen building the place; and then forgotten. Or maybe it was that no one wanted them back. I forget the sergeant's name, but the constables were called MacCarthy and MacSweeney; both huge Irishmen. They spent most of their time drinking, arguing and being separated by the sergeant.

Discipline

I think I have already indicated that this was, at any rate to begin with, a problem. Some of the Australian rates saw no reason why they should salute an officer, call him 'Sir' or in fact carry out an order if they didn't fancy. The Depot had also been run on the principle that cum Friday, everyone who wanted to, shoved off on weekend leave, returning by the Monday train.

I realised almost at once why I had been sent, together with another RN lieutenant John Cobby. John was an ex lowerdeck chap, who had worked his way up to Warrant Officer and been promoted

to lieutenant for gallantry at Zeebrugge. A wonderful chap who became one of my great friends.

Over us was the First Lieutenant who was also Drafting Officer and utterly useless at both; and temporarily, a Commander called Blackwood.

Maurice Baldwin Blackwood came of a great naval family, born into the tradition of the Service. His father had been a Captain, his grandfather a Rear Admiral and his great grandfather an Admiral who had served with distinction under Nelson as Captain of a frigate at Trafalgar.

Blackwood was small, tough and a disciplinarian; 'If a man is brought before me charged with an offence', he announced, 'I will find him guilty or not guilty. If there is any doubt at all the case will be dismissed: if it is proven, the minimum sentence will be 14 days extra work and drill. Dismiss the Ship's Company Mr Ireland'.

There was a rating who decided to challenge this ruling. He waylaid the Commander behind a building. There was no witness and a minute later Blackwood emerged, stopped another rating and remarked 'There is a rating behind that block who requires medical attention; see to it'. They found him flat on his back and right out. The word got round and there were no further challengers. The effect on discipline was remarkable.

General Duties

Now for my general duties. John Cobby and I were the only Divisional Officers permanently borne for general duties, though we were both down as Gunnery Officers and John was supposed to be in the Gunnery School. The Specialist Schools of course had their own Officers and Instructors and were responsible for their own buildings, workshops, material, programme of instruction, courses, etc. In other words they ran their own show for which they were responsibile for the general administration of the barracks, discipline and welfare of between 1000 and 1500 men, the routine and co-ordination of work and a thousand other things; working directly under the Commander. In addition we were responsible for the initial training of New Entries. John concentrated on Parade Ground work, squad drill, kit, seamanship etc., while I gave a series of lectures on the RAN, the object of discipline, esprit de corps, leadership, morale etc. and dealt with orders, regulations, advancement, personal matters etc. I was also in general charge of the training and advancement of Officers Stewards and Cooks and Ships Cooks; with an ex Corporal of Royal Marines for the Stewards and a Warrant Instructor in cookery (aptly called Mr Honeybun) to give the expert instruction.

I had no staff training or experience, and had literally to start from scratch writing my own lectures. I had no text books to refer to and just had to rely upon my own training and experience. I still have the precis of those lectures, and looking through them I think I can claim that for a young lieutenant of 22 years of age they are not bad.

One of my major tasks however, was to compile the Depots Standing Orders. Orders on every subject had just been written on odd bits of paper and stuck on a notice board. There they remained until they fell off, blew off, or were taken down to make room for another order. They were then stuck in a scrap book, or just stuffed in a drawer, or thrown away. It took me four months hard work to compile the book and get it printed. I began to feel that we were getting somewhere.



Flinders Naval Depot 1922 showing the workshops, powerhouse and stays of the 250ft high wireless mast.

— HMAS Cerberus Museum

Personalia

Under this heading I would like to list a few of the characters that helped to make my time at FND such a memorable experience.

(i) Sefton. A Stoker 2nd class who had joined the RAN for no reason that either he or anyone else was ever able to explain. He had a rich uncle who owned a chain of cinemas in Sydney and Melbourne; and had not only trained him as a projectionist but supplied him with a projector etc. and all the films he wanted.

Sefton travelled up to Melbourne once a week, collected his films, brought them back and gave a show every night in the Drill Hall. All we paid were his travelling expenses. He was also a 'conjuror' and once or twice a year would put on a remarkably good turn for the local children. There was a major crisis when the authorities reluctantly decided that Sefton must go to a seagoing ship for a spell and to pass for Stoker 1st Class. But we got him back after six months, and he continued as before. During my time at FND I saw all the Charlie Chaplin films then current.

(ii) Stewart. Another Stoker 2nd Class. We had made a 9 hole golf course just outside the Depot and at the head of Hanns Inlet. This chap came up to me one day and asked my permission to play on it. 'Of course,' I said, 'get your clubs and I'll take you round'. We fixed a day, and when we arrived at the first tee I said, 'On you go'. His drive was 283 yards — I measured it afterwards. When — somewhat shattered — I asked him where he had learnt his golf, he replied that he had picked it up from his brother, who was Open Champion of Australia. We put him in charge of the golf course.

(iii) Corporal Bayliss. Strictly speaking he was a Petty Officer Steward, but 22 years in the RMLI had stamped him as a Royal Marine to the end of his days. And to show it he insisted on retaining his moustache. He was Instructor in charge of the training of Officers Stewards; a marvellous character of the old style. When he overheard a young RAN lieutenant remarking at dinner one night, 'Why do we have to pass the port clockwise; this is the southern hemisphere and this is Australia. Why must we do as the Pommies do?', he was so outraged that he marched all the stewards out of the Mess and refused to allow them back until an apology had been made for the insult to His Majesty.

(iv) Prideaux. The ordinance lieutenant (ex ordinance artificer). A marvellous gardener who created the Wardroom gardens with the help of a civilian gardener; and his roses and chrysanthemums won many prizes in Melbourne. A keen sea fisherman too.

(vi) Huckstip and mate. Huckstip was the bricklayer on the Works staff. He lived in a shack made out of old packing cases and flattened petrol tins. A character who was also a keen sea fisherman. We always took him out fishing with us as he knew every good fishing ground in Western Port. His mate had been a jockey, but had been banned for life for taking bribes.

There were of course many others I could mention, but I think the above section is enough.

Fun and Games

There was plenty to occupy oneself with. Tennis on the Mess hard courts, golf on our 9 hole course, and cricket (to watch): the Depot First XI could have matched many English counties. And for those who kept horses — riding.

The local country race meetings were great occasions and everyone turned up. The racing was as crook as could be and most races were fixed beforehand. Some of the fiddles that took place were almost unbelievable. I remember one meeting where a well known flat-winner from Melbourne was introduced under another name, and having been dyed black over its chestnut coat. Unfortunately a heavy shower of rain before the race it had been entered for, gave the show away. At another meeting to which we had received an official invitiation, we were given three winners by the stewards, two by the starter and fiver fixed the last race. We only put on small stakes but I cleared £13. Hospitality at its best.

I helped Prideaux and the civilian gardeners — we had two during my time — with the Wardroom garden. We had to build a strong ti tree fence round it to keep out the bush cattle and brumbies (wild horses) during the dry season. We had to do a lot of watering, and animals can smell water miles off when it is scarce. We had great trouble with the herd bull. The herd remained in the thick bush during the day, and only came out at night. Then he would load them up very quietly, smash through the fence, and havoc would be let loose. I volunteered to sit up and deal with him. I took most of the shot out of some twelve gauge cartridges, filled them up again with salt petre and sat up on the verandah one night. He was so quiet that he was in the garden before I realised it. I could just make out his outline in the dark and getting behind him let him have both barrels in the backside. The result was quite shattering; I would not have believed one animal could make so much noise. He went down the garden steps, and through the cast iron gates at the bottom as if they were paper; and set off across the Parade Ground bellowing fit to waken the dead, with the herd following behind. The din woke up half the Depot, and for some reason that he was unable to explain satisfactorily afterwards, the Quarter Master sounded off Fire Stations. All he could say was 'I didn't know what else to do'.

It was said that the bull ran twelve miles non stop, and was found next morning by the Police at Dandenong, surrounded by his ladies and still very angry and sore. Salt petre propelled into your behind (and elsewhere) by pellets can be very

irritating I was told. The Police had the uneviable task of impounding him and the herd. Of course the story grew into quite improbable proportions in more ways than one; but I felt that I had made my mark locally. Anyway we had no further trouble from intruders.

I spent many hours on my own exploring the thousands of acres of bush belonging to the Depot. There were a few wallaby and bandicoots, many birds of every kind, koala bears, big lizzards, snakes etc.; and of course rabbits everywhere. At some time foxes had been introduced to dry and keep down the rabbits, and the foxes had become almost as big a nuisance. It never does to introduce non indigenous animals or birds to a country; they upset the balance. Snakes were a menance. There were various sorts; but brown, black and death adders were the really dangerous ones. The latter were said to be the worst; they were small, apt to sun themselves on a path and didn't move or get out of your way. We always wore trousers and gaiters in the bush, and carried a snake outfit. I use to watch the kookaburras killing and eating snakes. They would seize a snake behind the head, fly up and drop it from a height and continue until it was stunned or dead. Then they would eat it.

We caught a koala bear, by cutting down the gum tree it was up, and kept it as a pet for six months. It was a funny little thing, quite tame, and lived in a disused laundry building with a good supply of gum branches of the particular sort whose leaves were its sole diet. We never house trained it, but if it wet you and you smacked its bottom, it would cry like a child, tears running down its face. Folk said that they never lived in captivity but ours appeared to thrive. When we decided to release it in the bush, it cried the place down for an hour or so. After that it turned to the task of eating and soon settled down.

Fishing was good sport. The best eating fish were flatheads, the best fighters schnappers, which were also very good eating. And of course there were sharks and barracuda etc. I had a scar on my finger for years when a schnapper I was hauling in was taken by a shark. I had taken a turn of the thick line round my finger while I got out the gaff, and before I could flick it off the shark took over and his pull cut the line into my finger. There were also big stinger rays in the creek, as I learnt one day when we caught one in a seine net. It lashed out with its deadly spiked tail and nearly got me in the leg. I was more careful after that.

Bush Fires

During the dry season the threat of bush fires was never far from the surface of one's mind. It is difficult to imagine the havoc and the devastation, often over vast areas, that bush and grass fires in Australian can cause, until one has seen and experienced them for oneself. The misery and hopelessness left behind when years of struggle and hardship go up in flames and smoke; and all that is left is a black and charred landscape, the smouldering remains of homesteads, the gaunt skeletons of trees, the burnt corpses of livestock, and the terrible toll of wildlife and birds. Drought and bush fires — those twin afflictions always present or threatening in some part of that vast continent — the former part of the inscrutable laws of nature; the latter alas, often, though by no means always, started by mans carelessness or lack of thought.

We had two minor fires at FND in 1922; one caused by stupidity and the other a controlled outbreak that got out of hand. In the first incident an RN lieutenant newly appointed to the Gunnery School decided to burn off the long grass on the Parade Ground. He lined up a squad of recruits, issued them with torches and started to burn off the grass from up wind. It was all over in a few minutes; a grass fire moves at an incredible speed. The fire roared across the Parade Ground and in a minute or two the Clerk of Works wooden-frame house was a mass of flame. His wife saw it coming and got out in time, but she was lucky. I got there just in time to see the whole place go up like a rocket. The house was built on stilts (to avoid white ants) and apart from a chicken house, there was obviously a store of petrol underneath (illegal I suspect).

It exploded and half a dozen hens were propelled into the air, blazing like fireworks poor things, to fall to earth as black lumps as their feathers burnt off. So far as the Clerk of Works was concerned no one was all that sorry; we had suspected him of fiddling for some time. Luckily, the fire stopped at the road and no further damage was done.

The second incident resulted from a praise worthy attempt by John Cobby to burn out a patch of bush the opposite side of the road from the married quarters, and bordered on the far side by Hanns Inlet. This patch harboured snakes which used to come out on to the road at times. John was frightened that some of the children might get bitten playing on the road. What none of us realised was that a bed of brown coal came to the surface in the middle of this bush. This caught alight and burnt and smouldered on the surfaced and underground for nearly 3 months. It was impossible to put it out and we had to wait for the rains to do the job. In the mean time when the wind blew their way, the married quarters lived under a pall of smoke.

But the dry season at the end of 1923 and beginning of 1924 was the worst. For weeks the whole countryside was covered by a great pall of smoke. It was almost impossible to tell where the fires were and as fast as we got one under control, others would break out. At the peak I had a hundred men under me and a lorry to move them around. We tried to co-ordinate with the civilian

Flinders Naval Depot 1921 with the Gunnery School in the foreground. The Victualling and Naval Stores buildings and 2 cottages near the ornamental lake have all gone.

— HMAS Cerberus Museum

fire fighters and had a man with each group who knew the country, but communications were continually being cut. There was always a danger of being cut off. We were at times half blinded and choked, scorched and dehydrated. Once we were forced into the sea. Another time we cleared the contents of a farm house which was in the path of a fire and heaped the furniture etc. the other side of fire break we had made. There was a sudden shift of wind, the house was left intact and all the contents reduced to ash.

The women were wonderful. Through all the dangers and discomforts, the struggles and the heartbreaks, they supplied us with tea and food, guarded the younger children and kept the livestock fed. We must have consumed gallons upon gallons of tea to keep ourselves going. And sweated gallons.

Of course once a fire got into thick bush there was nothing one could do. It generated its own wind, and the heat was so fierce that trees up to 100 yards ahead of the main fire would suddenly burst into flames, going up like gigantic Roman candles.

How I remember the day when standing in a group of men who had succeeded in beating out a new outbreak and were watching to see it didn't start up again, we felt a change in the air. The smoke had thinned but the sky was if anything darker. And then we were breathing fresh air, air from the sea, and there was suddenly a terrific clap of thunder and the sky was lit up. There was a ragged cheer; but it was drowned by the elements. Nature had at last relented.

Six weeks later the land was clothed in young green shoots, and, though the scars would remain, the healing process had begun.

Here and there

Life at FND was inevitably somewhat constricted. We were an isolated community in a sparsely populated area, and although we generated our own amusements, a weekend in Melbourne was a welcome break. There were parties, private dances and Government House functions and balls. I had written my name in the Governor General's and State Governor's books and so was on the official list. I am not being snobbish when I say that in those days RN officers were in far greater demand than the locals.

Melbourne was not lacking in culture and amenities. Collins Street had the atmosphere of Princess Street, Edinburgh. There were three 5-star hotels, theatres, one or two good restaurants and of course beautiful botanical and other gardens, sports grounds etc. I heard Melba sing (though she had 'retired'); saw Pavlova dance; and generally had a good time within my limited financial resources.

Melbourne Police Strike

I also had some pretty odd experiences. There was the Melbourne Police Strike for example, when the entire uniformed force went on strike for better pay and for pensions. They chose Melbourne Cup week as being the worst time for the authorities. The standard of law and order in Australia was, and probably still is, more on American lines than British. The Australian likes to think himself as a big pioneer type, a tough he man, aggressive and always ready for a fight. He speaks of 'Pommies' with genial contempt, though in many cases he started as one himself or his parents did. There is a very militant, noisy and articulate minority who run the Trade Unions, use strong arm methods, and are too often corrupt. They live in the big cities, and with a coterie of labour politicians and a hooligan fringe, stir up trouble from time to time. The 'real' Australians, the outback and country folk; and the bulk of urban population are straight forward easy going and friendly. And very hospitable.

Anyway the Police Strike in Melbourne in 1923 caused serious problems. The Government introduced a state of emergency and asked Sir John Monash — one of the Wartime Generals of the AIF to raise a force to restore law and order. He called upon the old soldiers, and they responded. They were sworn in, issued with arm bands and coshes, formed into squads under leaders and patrolled specified areas. Anyone caught looting, breaking the law etc. was arrested and handed over to other squads, who took them before special courts which had been set up with emergency powers. Most of those arrested were given 3 months hard work without any option. Before they got organised, nearly all the shops in Colins Street had been looted. It took over a fortnight to restore full order. Every policeman who went on strike was dismissed and the whole force rebuilt from scratch. It was most effective. Our role was to guard the banks and public buildings for a few days until Sir John Monash's boys took over. They didn't trust the Regular Army. We had no trouble or opposition. I remember talking to one CID plain clothes man — they didn't go on strike. 'You must be having a hell of a time,' I said. 'Lord no,' he replied, 'I've had the time of me life. I got a copy of wanted men's photographs (the rogues gallery), went out, and when I saw one of them, coshed them. I've settled quite a few scores'.

A Little Brush Over Tax

I always felt very sorry for the RAN Officers. They had no pension in those days, but just a gratuity on retirement based on rank and length of service. When I say that a lieutenant commander would only get about £900 after twenty years service, it spoke for itself. It was some years later that they finally brought in a pension.

However this little tale is about income tax. We paid both State Income Tax and Federal Income Tax. It occurred to someone that FND was federal territory and therefore we should not be liable for State Tax. The same applied, we reckoned, to all naval establishments. We raised the matter and were turned down. So we all paid in 10/-, hired a barrister, took the case it wasn't much, but for some of the Australians it amounted to a considerable amount. But perhaps the most interesting thing which came out of the case was that 'Garden Island' in Sydney Harbour, on which was situated the Naval Dockyard, didn't belong to Australia. It was still a British Colony. Someone had forgotten to turn it over to the Commonwealth. Consternation. It was solved by an Order in Council, signed by the King in Privy Council.

Return to England

Towards the end of April 1924 I sailed for England in the Blue Funnel liner *Aeneas*. Some of my friends had already gone: others remained including of course, all the Australian friends I had made. But I was ready to leave. It had been a great and unusual experience; but I had been away from the 'proper' Navy long enough.

WASHINGTON NOTES

MILITARY MANPOWER

Playing 'catch-up' is a hard and frustrating game. On a national scale, as when a nation races to rebuild its defenses, it can be grossly wasteful and dangerous.

The United States is engaged in one of the biggest games of 'catch-up' in national defense the world has ever known. On the theory that deprivation of funds caused the decay of our armed services, we are now engaged in the time-honored American custom of throwingmoney at a problem in the hopes it will be solved.

The worst thing about playing 'catch-up' is that it frequently repairs the edifice while letting the foundation crumble. The foundation of any military service is its manpower and the manpower problems of the American armed forces are in a critical state. The time has come to institute a form of universal military service (UMS).

Conscription has had a checkered history in the United States. Several of the colonies required men to train each year to protect western outposts from Indian attacks. During the Revolution, some attempts were made to conscript soldiers for the Continental Army (an unpopular duty for an unpopular war) but those efforts met with little or no success. Our lack of a strong national government to pass and enforce draft legislation was one of the primary reasons for this failure. James Madison seriously considered proposing a draft bill during the War of 1812 because there were not enough volunteers to fill the needs of the Army.

Our first major experience with the effects of conscription occurred in the American Civil War. Both sides were forced to pass conscription legislation but civil disturbances erupted in several cities when it was enforced. The Federal statute was full of loopholes, the most notorious of which allowed the hiring of a substitute by a draftee. Even President Grover Cleveland made use of this provision to buy himself out of service.

During World War I, it was immediately evident to our military planners that conscription would be necessary if we were to build the massive armies required on the Western Front. Over considerable opposition, a conscription bill was passed. Its enforcement, however, was surprisingly easy, considering the vociferous anti-war movement that existed prior to our entry into the war and the large number of immigrants and descendents of immigrants who had come to this country from the nations making up the Central Powers.

The first peacetime military draft was passed in 1940 but only after fierce debates on the floor of Congress and throughout the nation. One year later the draft was renewed in the House of Representatives, but only by a *one* vote margin. Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, however, ended all debate on the matter of conscription. The tide of patriotism rose to full crest and many men, like my father, found the Selective Service System too slow in calling them to the colors, so they volunteered.

Although the draft ended after World War II, the Cold War brought a renewal which lasted until the early 1970's. Twice during this time-frame the United States entered major wars without a specific congressional declaration mandated by the Constitution. These two conflicts, Korea and Vietnam, were neither temporary interventions nor "police actions". They were full-fledged wars which demanded the treasure and human resources of the country. What the Founding Fathers had sought to prevent had come to pass; the president on his own authority had taken the nation to war.

The drafting of men to fight in these conflicts met with increasing opposition. Many felt that undeclared wars were a danger to the security of our form of constitutional government. President Nixon's shift to an All Volunteer Force (AVF) was one of his most popular acts; liberals opposed the draft for they believed it provided the manpower to enter undeclared wars and conservatives favoured the promise of a more highly trained and

motivated professional force. But the plan is not working.

Some see the establishment of a large professional military force as contrary to the traditions of English-speaking peoples dating from the time of Charles I. Certainly the Congress had never seen fit to maintain a professional army in excess of 100,000 men prior to the last decade.

As has been discussed repeatedly of late, the quality of many of our troops is doubtful at best. It is enough to quote West German Foreign Minister Hans Mathoefer's observations of American and German forces, "At least our soldiers do not use drugs and can read and write". There are, however, encouraging signs regarding these serious problems.

The American high command is taking strong steps to curb drug abuse in the services. Enlishment of high school graduates sharply increased last year. Retention problems are easing because of the large pay increases voted by Congress over the last two years. The weakness of the civilian economy is playing a major role in persuading those in uniform to stay in the service as well as bring in new recruits.

Overall enlistments are up. In the first nine months of 1981, every branch of service met its recruitment goal except the Army which was only 2% short. Thus, it is not inconceivable that the estimation of an additional 300,000 active troops needed by the armed forces in the next five years can be met with volunteers.

Why then broach such a potentially decisive question as UMS now? First, because of the status of our reserves. Second, for the moral well-being of the nation.

Early in 1981 the *Economist* observed that America was fit to fight, but not for long. Many experts, headed by the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Maxwell D. Taylor, agree. General Taylor has pointed out that regular divisions are scheduled to receive battalion-size artillary, engineer, signal, transport and medical units on mobilization without which they cannot function properly. The Individual Ready Reserve is down from 900,000 during the draft to 200,000 today and is unable to support the number of active divisions we have in Europe and Korea.

National Guard Forces are showing a corresponding decline in manpower which is hampering their role as reserve troops and also as quasi-police units commanded by the governments of the individual states in time of natural disasters and other emergencies. To put it simply, the lack of proper reserves can obviate any improvements made in the active forces.

Finally, it is in the national self-interest to promote UMS. This could take the form of solely military service or could include a civilian service option. It should include women but the needs of the military are so pressing that this question could be set aside, at least for awhile, to avoid the defeat of a military program.

During our Revolution, we criticized Britain for sending Hessians to fight us because they had no interest in the struggle. We have taken a dim view of mercenary troops ever since. But statistics show that many of our troops are drawn from the lower strata of American society. Are we not, therefore, hiring a Praetorian or Swiss Guard that has little at stake in our society? How long can the middle and upper income groups cling to the motto, 'Billions for defense, but not one of my kids?'

Richard Cohen, a respected columnist, has said, "Any war worth fighting is worth fighting as a nation. And any large army worth maintaining is worth maintaining with conscripts. We can't pick a fight and then pay someone else to do the fighting for us (as) we tried to do in the beginning in Vietnam — and no one wants to go through that experience again."

Times are changing. A recent opinion poll shows 71% of those surveyed in favour of all men giving one year of service to the nation, either in the military or in nonmilitary work, at home or abroad. It will take political courage to propose a resumption of conscription but the time has come when it is a necessity. We must catch-up militarily with our potential foes.

Harry S. Truman, in a message to Congress, stated the case for UMS in his usual succinct manner: "The backbone of our military force should be the trained citizen who is first and foremost a civilian, and who becomes a soldier or a sailor only in time of danger — and *only* when the Congress considers it necessary — In such a system, however, the citizen reserve must be a trained reserve. We can meet the need for a trained reserve in only one way — by universal training."

TOM A. FRIEDMANN

Nobody asked me, but...

THE PRESS GANG CIRCA 1981

The arrival of a nervous, mostly long haired group of youths at the Adult Recruit School can, if witnessed, lead to the conclusion that the demise of the Australian nation is nigh. It can also lead to the conclusion that the current Press Gang staff is deficient of at least two of the five senses normally issued to home sapiens.

Not all of these youths will survive the recruit course but all will, by now, have survived a fairly comprehensive selection procedure. It is obvious, of course, that the recruiting staff are not infallible but the Navy can rest assured that a 120 cm Mongolian camel coxswain with 3 legs and one eye in the centre of his forehead will *not* be admitted. Apart from his other attributes he would not meet the nationality requirements; even if he does support the V.F.L.

The current selection procedure can unintentionally cheer up the staff no end.

The young hopeful submits his Defence Force Application Form, and this is then checked prior to allocating a test date. It provides some interesting information. One applicant who worked in a candle-making factory gave as his reason for leaving "factory burned down", while another stated "My boss was homosexual and took a liking to me". A question requesting next-of-kin details also requested the relationship of the name entered and the answer to this was "Good". One applicant who had trouble with both his reading and spelling said his hair was blue and his eyes were "Black".

Test day can be traumatic for both staff and the candidates. The latter are required to do a simple maths and english test and a test in logic and the results are a telling indictment of the modern education system. Over sixty-five per cent of all applicants fail the maths test.

The worried survivors of this mental torture are then interviewed by the psychologist who provides the Senior Naval Recruiting Officer with a recommendation to accept or reject. The SNRO will normally follow this advice but may, and occasionally does, take the opposite view.

The SNRO was perusing the Application Form and invited the applicant to sit down. On looking up he found himself gazing with interest at a large, square pallid face with one earring suspended from one side, two form the other, and a meat pie fitted securely into the forward section. Not a pretty sight!

The doctors are kept entertained too; one applicant, on being told to stand on his toes, placed one foot on top of the other!

Police and security checks are of course, part of the procedure and these also provide a means of enlivening an otherwise dull day. One police check merely read "attempted extortion" and further queries disclosed the fact that the applicant had wired four sticks of gelignite to the male heads at a Supermarket in C..... and displaying a form of sexual discrimnination, six sticks to the female heads. This was the gentleman known as the "C..... bomber". In case Divisional staff are now looking at the latest intake with a more penetrating gaze than usual he was invited to offer his considerable talents to some other less demanding employer.

Naval Security recently returned a request for a security check from an Irish citizen (what else?) who gave his sister's name as Moyle, his father's as Foyle, and his mother's name as Doyle. Only the first letter has been changed to protect the innocent.

It may be difficult to comprehend but for every sterling representative of Australian youth who enters the Royal Australian Navy there are seven to eight who are advised they are below the standards required. The latter sometimes fail to accurately inform their parents of the reason for their failure and the staff occasionally receive acrimonious telephone calls which tend to lower the normal level of hilarity in the office.

To paraphrase Thucydides ("An interview with an angry parent can ruin your entire day".

JOHN WHITTAKER

A NAVAL REVIEW?

.....Why don't we have a Naval Review during the Bi-Centenary in 1988? We seem on past occasions to have been willing to put on the odd Fleet entry, together with a few ships dressed alongside and one or two foreign visitors. But we have yet to emulate other countries — notably Britain — by putting the whole Fleet together for a few days to show the Navy off to the world.

Since Sydney Harbour does not have the anchorages of Spithead, we would probably have to have a moving feast, with the ships entering harbour, steaming around the navigable channels and then dispersing around the various dockyards and bases.

We should be able to assemble a reasonable collection of warships, even without going to the length the British do of dragging out the reserve ships. (As if we had any, anyway.) On the other hand, we should go to every length to ensure that the entire *active* Fleet is present.

With proper planning and publicity we could arouse enormous popular interest and probably get Sydney Harbour and its foreshores packed with spectators. By my reckoning, we would have over 20 major fleet units, including the submarines, and 30 minor war vessels. I am sure that we could also invite the British (perhaps HMS *SIRIUS*?), the New Zealanders (two or more), the Canadians, the Yanks and the French, to name but the more important. We might also have the "Tall Ships" out.

The fact is that a Review of this size would emphasise the importance of the Navy and the part which it played in the foundation of Australia. The affair would not cost inordinately much and might very well serve to convince the Great Australian Public that the RAN consists of a little more than two patrol boats and an enraged LCH. Who knows, it might convince the politicians that we deserve the second carrier.

Mind you, we had better make sure that the Yanks don't bring the NIMITZ!

'AGAMEMNON'

BOOK REVIEWS

WHO SANK THE SYDNEY? by Michael Montgomery. Cassell Australia Limited. 242pp, illustrated. $15.95.

HMAS *SYDNEY* and her entire complement of 645 disappeared almost without trace on 19 November 1941. I will assume that readers are familiar with the official account of her loss, pieced together by Naval Intelligence after interrogation of survivors from the German raider *KORMORAN*. Michael Montgomery, the son of *SYDNEY's* navigating officer, was not satisfied by this account, as given in Hermon Gill's "*Royal Australian Navy 1939-1942*". He began the research which led to this book soon after the release of documents in 1976 under the 30 year rule and went on to interview *KORMORAN* survivors and others involved.

Assimilation and evaluation of the enormous quantity of information must have been a daunting task, particularly as many of the German survivors had apparently been instructed by their officers to give incorrect answers under interrogation, but Montgomery's personal interest doubtless helped him carry it through. He highlights the many discrepancies and inconsistencies in the official account and I think it unlikely that anybody who reads his book carefully will remain satisfied with the official account, even if they do not accept the alternative version postulated by Montgomery.

The most convincing of his arguments involve the location of the action, the disguise worn by *KORMORAN*, the purpose of the Q signal sent by the latter, and the likelihood that *SYDNEY* had accepted the disguise as genuine and reverted to cruising stations. There appears to be considerable merit in the suggestion that she was to lower a boat to provide assistance in response to a false SOS from *KORMORAN*.

Montgomery also speculates that a Japanese submarine may have been involved, as part of an ambush intended to capture the transport *AQUITANIA*, and that *SYDNEY* survivors may have been machine-gunned in the water. At first sight both ideas may seem far-fetched, but there is some evidence to support both and such possibilities should not be discarded lightly, particularly as they fit in well with the remainder of the scenario painted by the author.

It would seem that there are good reasons for alleging a cover-up by the Navy, although the possible causes for such a cover-up appear rather inadequate. Certainly there are indications that Naval Intelligence may have fabricated some evidence to bolster the official account at its weakest points.

The book is somewhat disorganised, in that it is often difficult to re-locate previous pertinant evidence, but to some extent this is offset by an excellent reference list and bibliography, which should ease the task of checking sources.

Once or twice Montgomery has tried a little too hard to support his hypothesis, notably in the map showing the positions at which *KORMORAN* survivors were picked up, several of which should be shown some 30 miles further west, and in the cartoon from *SALT* magazine which, he claims, lists only RAN ships sunk by the Japanese, but includes *WATERHEN* and *NESTOR*, both sunk in the Mediterranean. However, I think that this represents an excess of enthusiasm for his subject rather than any serious attempt to mislead the reader. It is also most tantalising that he did not complete the passage: "Navy Office records show that three of the persons whose names appeared on the list supplied by you were serving in HMAS *SYDNEY* when that ship was lost during action on November 20th, 1941 (sic). Able Seaman Cecil John Anderson and Able Seaman Herbert Herrett lost their lives when HMAS *SYDNEY* was sunk; but Able Seaman Colin Frederick Stevens was a survivor..." which appears in the Epilogue. One wonders just how such a remarkable sentence could be completed, even if it was a clerical error!

Montgomery does not claim to have found all the answers, and I think, he will be well pleased if his book rekindles interest in finding the truth behind "this most curious incident of the seas", and there are indications that he has succeeded in doing just that. A book well worth reading, despite its faults, and one which I believe does the Australian public a great service.

To add a few thoughts of my own, I believe that the present day Navy could assist in unravelling this mystery, because I suspect that the action may have taken place even closer to the coast than the position proposed by Montgomery, perhaps within 15 miles of Dirk Hartog Island. The wreckage of *SYDNEY* AND *KORMORAN* could be inside the 100 fathom line. The area is not very well charted and maybe a survey by HMAS *MORESBY* could be combined with a search by a couple of MAD equipped Trackers. If the wreckage could be found, a careful evaluation of location and damage would answer a lot of questions about the action. The big question is: if there has been a cover-up, could the Navy be trusted to fully and honestly report any findings?

F.A.H. KING

A SENSE OF HONOR by James Webb, Prentice Hall. $US10.35.

'Correction does much, but encouragement does more. Encouragement after censure is as the sun after a shower'. The essence of Goethe's definition of leadership shines brilliantly through James Webb's new novel, *A Sense of Honor*, the story of men ensnarled by changing values at the US Naval Academy.

Webb, the critically acclaimed author of *Fields of Fire*, is superbly qualified to discuss the quality and type of education provided at Annapolis. A 1968 graduate, he went on to become a highly decorated Marine officer in Vietnam. Webb recently left his position as minority counsel to the House Veterans Affairs

Committee to write full time. He turned down overtures to head the Veterans Administration because he was unable to secure free access to President Reagan to argue on behalf of that troubled agency.

It is interesting that the book was banned by the Naval Academy after the original consignment was sold. Banning a book for any reason is questionable at best. The cause for such an action regarding *A Sense of Honor* escapes the perceptive reader.

That Webb cares deeply for the Naval Academy, the Marine Corps and his country is obvious on every page of the book. Those in charge at Annapolis could not have read Lucian K. Truscott IV's damning indictment of West Point and the Army in *Dress Gray* or they would not have been so injudicious.

Webb has methodically constructed a tight, swiftly paced novel, engrossing from first page to last. Part of the swift pacing stems from the fact that the story takes place over the five days that coincide with the height of the Tet Offensive of February 1968.

The story centres on two midshipmen caught between the Navy's need for combat officers and brains for the nuclear navy. John Dean is a brilliant 'plebe' who has not integrated into the system during his first year, failing in military indoctrination as spectacularly, as he is excelling in academics.

As Dean's development reaches its nadir, Bill Fogarty is nearing graduation. A high-ranking officer in the Brigade of Midshipmen and a representative to the Honor Committee, Fogarty is coping with the surprising depth of his emotions over the death of his best friend in Vietnam. Fogarty, considered 'crazy as hell' because he 'cares,' assumes the responsibility of bringing Dean into line.

And bring Dean into line he does — to the gratification of the characters and reader. But Fogarty's methods include hazing, a known violation of Academy rules. Hazing worked well on him, he reasons. Why not Dean? The author's glossing over of the potential dangers of hazing is the great weakness of the book.

Fogarty lectures, pushes and prods Dean to achieve goals beyond the plebe's preconceived limitations. He sets an example of courage and tenacity as the pair runs an icy sea wall. Dean learns rapidly and basks in the pride of his accomplishments and in the praise he receives from all sides. But the success is tempered as the consequences of Fogarty's violation of the regulations collapse on all concerned.

One morning, as Fogarty and Dean jog through the darkness. Fogarty observes that while the number of lives given to our country has increased over its history, there has been a corresponding decrease in the recognition that each of those lives was a precious gift. With men like Fogarty, like Webb, leading the services, perhaps fewer such gifts will need to be made in the future.

As America embarks on a massive rearmament program, we would do well to consider what is expected of our officer corps. Fogarty's splendid final gesture crystalizes the problem: Do we need a leader of men or a corporate executive? Pose this question to yourself: If you knew there was an enemy force over the horizon waiting to destroy you, which would you want to follow?

TOM A FRIEDMANN

AUSTRALIA AT WAR 1939-1942 by John Robertson, Heinemann, 1981, 269pp, with maps and index, price $ . . Review copy supplied by the publishers.

Professor Robertson's book is the first major reassessment of Australian strategy, diplomacy, policy, and, to some extent, society, in the 1939-45 War since Gavin Long's *The Six Years War*. It is less detailed than Long's skilful condensation of the official histories, but while covering a surprising amount of narrative manages to say something sensible on most important issues in the study of the nation's wartime experience. The questions of Australia's relations with the United States and Britain, the adequacy of the war effort, government policy of the early war years, the competence of Australia's commanders and the influence of MacArthur, for example, are treated clearly and concisely within the framework of the course of the war.

A good example of the contribution Professor Robertson has made to the study of Australia's military history can be found in Chapter Six, 'Australians in the Royal Air Force', where he discusses the 'disaster' of the Empire Air Training Scheme. The bomber offensive, he argues, was Australia's 'most single costly campaign of the war...a controversial strategy in whose planning Australia was completely ignored'. In a short but well argued chapter, he convincingly shows how 'Australia provided thousands of airmen to fight battles but no policy makers to help decide what battles would be fought'; yet over 5000 young men died in the air war against Germany.

Robertson's discussion of such areas makes it clear that he has surpassed Long's work as a stimulus to future scholarly debate, partly, of course because Long's years of endeavour produced an excellent background for the discursive work which will (I hope) follow Robertson's lead. Robertson's impact is also felt because he has obviously grounded his conclusions on long hours of research in Britain, Australia and the United States, and perhaps even longer hours over the relevant secondary sources. The amount of secondary material used is necessary in a synthetic work such as this, though I would have preferred as full a list of the archival sources as of the secondary works quoted.

Professor Robertson writes for the informed general reader with clarity, though sometimes the clarity turns into banality; in describing Menzies he clumsily begins four consecutive sentences with 'he'. The book's strength, however, is Robertson's ability to effectively relate discussions of strategy and war policy to the conduct of the war on the ground, at sea and in the air. In the chapter 'Unnecessary Battles?', for example, he turns without strain from the considerations of LHQ and Curtin's cabinet to the feelings of the families of men killed in the campaigns of 1945.

Naval readers may be disappointed with Professor Robertson's treatment of the RAN's contribution to victory. As he points out in the last chapter, the RAN lost ten ships, from corvettes to cruisers, and 2000 men while sinking few enemy surface vessels only one of which, the *Kormoran*, was not Italian. However galling this appreciation may appear — and he balances it with an appreciation of the Navy's work in convoy, patrol and support work — it demonstrates his concern for honesty in analysis and with the experience of the nation as a whole, but especially its strategic aspects. This emphasis sometimes results in the neglect of some areas, such as in Chapter 12, 'Invasion Threat', which covers the politics and strategy of the apparently impending invasion but barely touches the social consequences of its perception. This is partly the result of the dearth of detailed research on Australian society in 1942.

The book itself is not well produced. The review copy has what appears to be a misplaced galley proof of a pages of explanatory notes printed on page 260, while the maps are — surprisingly — disappointing. Ms Wendy Gorton, the cartographer who has produced excellent maps for both volumes of the official history of Australia in the Korean War, has fallen below the superb standard she has set herself. The lettering is far too small and is blurred by the badly applied toning.

Despite these technical defects, Professor Robertson's *Australia at War 1939-1945* is a stimulating synthesis based on wide research and deep thought. I hope it will stimulate a renewed interest in the Second World War in Australia and perhaps contribute, by its perceptive observations on the relationship with the United States, to an intelligent debate on similar circumstances in Australia's strategic dilemmas in the 1980's.

PETER STANLEY

A HISTORY OF AUSTRALIA, VOLUME 5, THE PEOPLE MAKE LAWS by C.M.H. Clark. Melbourne University Press. 1981

In the present resurgence of interest in Australiana, the publication of a new and widely anticipated history of Australia is entirely appropriate. This is not to say that perfectly satisfactory histories of this country do not exist already — clearly they do; but the publication of one written by an historian of Manning Clark's stature is something to be anticipated with enthusiasm.

Volume 5 of his 6 volume work covers the period 1888-1915 and is sub-titled 'The People Make Laws'. The period is, of course, one of the most important in Australian history commencing as it does with the events leading to Federation and concluding with the Pyrrhic demonstration of Australia's maturity in the Gallipoli campaign.

This is no history book for those searching for lists of facts, figures and dates. The details are all there, and in plenty, but the Manning Clark style is to surround his facts with much personal opinion which seems, at times, to verge on speculation. Events are seen through the eyes of Henry Lawson, Alfred Deakin and others whom Clark has used as narrators. The result is a history which almost reads as a diary. The technique of writing through the medium of a narrator allows the author to reflect contemporary thoughts and feelings but whether those thoughts and feelings are the objective or subjective results of the considerable research that has obviously been carried out, is a moot point.

The reader must be prepared to do battle with the complexities of the author's English. Not for Manning Clark a simple word when a cliche, euphemism or enigmatic statement can be used instead. Joseph Furphy, for example, was not 'gifted' he was 'one of those men singled out to inherit heaven's graces'. Arthur Streeton was not born but 'saw the light of day for the first time'. Nellie Melba did not have 'determination', she had a 'mightly spirit encased within her clay'.

Some may say that, because the history is written as seen through the eyes of contemporary figures, the prolixities of construction are an acceptable, even necessary, reflection of the style of the times. Others may argue that, as a modern history, its core should be clearly evident to modern readers. I include to the latter view and found the style convoluted and obscure. The work is not easy reading and extraction of the salient points is often difficult. Depending on the literary predilections of the reader, the digestion of this book of 400 plus pages could be more an exercise in stamina and determination than one of recreation and enlightenment.

Pervading the early part of the work is an almost vitriolic 'anti-Britishness' attributed to the 'working classes', and a contrasting sycophancy attributed to the bourgeoisie. This may well reflect contemporary feelings but the edge of this anti-Britishness is so keen and its expression so vituperative that one cannot help the feeling that the author has allowed his own views to colour the matter. Similarly the bible lavished upon those who cleaved to the 'old country' — the perceived sycophants — is almost too bitter to be easily accepted. Thus we read that the young Henry Lawson was 'maddened again by the spectacle of men in high places flopping down on all fours to lick the hand of royalty'. Doubtless Henry Lawson felt strongly about the matter but the description is better suited to a political tract of the kind that depends for its effect on emotion rather than reason.

There is, of course, very much more to the book than the complexities of the author's style and philosophy. The history is there and it is precise but not necessarily obvious. In fairness to the author, it was probably never supposed to be obvious. As his publishers said about an earlier volume of this series, 'This is not a general Australian history.....and it is not a definitive or quantitative analysis. It is a work of art.' As a work of art, the author must be allowed his individuality — which need not appeal to all.

One of the main themes of the book is the emergence of an idealistic Labour movement which moved gradually towards pragmatism and the Right until it became racist and almost conservative. Its high hopes of a new start for humanity in 'Australia Felix' were dashed firstly by those who were overly impatient for power and money and finally by the outbreak of war.

Volume 5 of the history is a work in itself and a knowledge of previous volumes, while desirable in preparing the reader for the Manning Clark style is not essential by any means.

The author's style and apparent political leanings did not appeal to this reader because they call the objectivity of the historical analysis into question. Nonetheless the work can be recommended to the determined scholar of Australian history if only because it is the view of one of Australia's most eminent historians. The casual reader must accept that the historical core is well hidden in the strands of Manning Clark's prolix English and the unravelling of those strands will take determination and patience. Once bared, the core can be seen as a very personal opinion of the events of the past.

Borrow the book from your library before rushing out to buy a copy.

A.H. CRAIG

AUSTRALIA'S NEXT WAR? By Ray Sunderland. Working Paper No.34, The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, June 1981, 24 pp. $1.50 plus 50 cents postage.

This monograph is the published version of a paper presented by Brigadier Sunderland at the United Services Institution of the A.C.T. on 8 May 1981. In publication, it has become a pithy and very readable, original contribution to the strategic debate in Australia.

General Beaufre's classic work, *Strategy for Tomorrow*, is acknowledged as the major source of inspiration for the scenarios developed in *Australia's Next War?* but there is only luke warm support for the relevance of Beaufre's *fait accompli* strategy. The Israeli Six-Day War is a prime example of the use of this strategy which requires short, intense operations fought until one or both opponents have exhausted their military resources. It is not to be preferred as a stand alone strategy in the Australian situation mainly because of the great distances involved in mounting the required operations.

Brigadier Sunderland suggests that Beaufre's other strategy, the strategy of persuasion, provides the more plausible scenario for Australia's next war. The campaign could be prolonged with the adversary utilising progressively a full range of political, economic, psychological and military weapons to weaken Australia's position and enhance its own; the key requirement being to produce disproportionate response from Australia. As the campaign entered the ultimate military phase, the enemy would launch attacks over a wide geographic area against unprotected or lightly protected targets with no clear pattern of events. At this stage, but only at this stage, it may be possible for the enemy to shift into the *fait accompli* strategy.

Australia's best counter-strategy, according to Brigadier Sunderland, would lie in a strategy of assertion. Put most simply, this means that Australia should be able to demonstrate the will and capability to assert ourselves, be it in the economic, diplomatic or military fields.

Rightly in the opinion of this reviewer, the brigadier has detected a recent shift in Australia's strategic philosophy away from a fascination with the Australian land mass. Concurrently, there has been a swing in defence policy away from the core force concept. These changes are demonstrated by the creation of NORFORCE and the Operational Deployment Force and by the increased level of operations in the Indian Ocean.

A strategy of assertion extends well beyond our shores and in peacetime, is directed towards co-operation with our allies and contributions towards regional stability. Deterrence, including the demonstration of our ability to deploy and maintain forces in both the maritime approaches and the more remote areas of Australia, is central to the military part of this strategy.

Brigadier Sunderland strongly pushes the point that 'to be effective our strategy must go well beyond our shores'. Needless to say, it is pleasing to see an Army strategist clearly rejecting the insular policy of 'continental defence' and the related, single-minded fascination with lodgement and counter-lodgement operations.

Australia's Next War? may be obtained by writing to the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre. Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University, PO Box 4, Canberra, ACT 2600

W.S.G.B

BLUE WATER RATIONALE. THE NAVAL DEFENCE OF NEW ZEALAND 1914-1942 by I.C. McGibbon Historical Publications Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, New Zealand, 1981. Price: 45 Dollars (New Zealand).

The study of naval policy and the Far Eastern question between 1919 and 1939 is a pursuit which has occupied a great deal of the time and energy of historians in America, Britain and Australia. *Blue Water Rationale* comes as the first substantial New Zealand contribution to the matter and it is a work notable both for thorough research and shrewd judgement of the major issues.

One of the accusations made in the wake of the Singapore debacle was that, despite every indication of the dangers of the strategic situation, the political and defence authorities of Australia and New Zealand supinely and uncritically accepted the unsound and over confident British judgement. Revisionist historians have frequently chastised the Dominion Governments for their unthinking dependence upon the United Kingdom.

Dependent upon the British the New Zealand Government may have been, but unthinking its politicians certainly were not. On the contrary, Ian McGibbon's work reveals that the New Zealanders possessed a generally clear and unsentimental view of the situation. The New Zealand problem was rather that the country was too small to do anything practical by itself. Even with the British behaviour, the closest possible co-operation with the United Kingdom seemed the only acceptable course of action and the New Zealand Government insisted that the British Empire present as united a front to the world as possible. At every Imperial Conference, the New Zealanders urged the British to greater action in the Far East and pointed out the dangers of half-measures when dealing with Japan — but they would not voice their fears outside the conference rooms. It is essential to realise, as *Blue Water Rationale* emphasises, that the isolationist policies of the United States and its differing strategic requirements made it, at best, an unreliable replacement for the United Kingdom. Even in the worst situation the British were morally and legally bound to lend the Dominions support; America was not.

Ian McGibbon's work details the many other problems of the inter-war period, including the repeated New Zealand proposals for expansion of the NZ Division of the Royal Navy; proposals which were generally damped by an Admiralty still hankering for an Imperial Navy. Another failure was the inability of Australia and New Zealand to institute any effective degree of defence co-operation between the wars. Apathy, rivalry and political differences combined to prevent greater unity.

Blue Water Rationale avoids taking a stand on the much vexed issue of airpower versus seapower, but concentrates instead on attempting to appreciate the technological uncertainty which permeated any attempts to plan the defence of New Zealand.

In its precision and shrewdness, Ian McGibbon's book is very much in the style of *Naval Policy Between the Wars*. Indeed, *Blue Water Rationale* can be considered as an adjunct and complement to Captain Roskill's two volumes. The book is in the best tradition of official history, avoiding sensation, but nevertheless thorough and unabashed in its judgements.

Blue Water Rationale is available from the New Zealand Government Printer, c/- Private Bag, G.P.O. Wellington 1, New Zealand.

J.V.P. GOLDRICK

SEAPOWER 81 — PROCEEDINGS. Australian Naval Institute. 1981. 128 pages. $12.00

The needs of Australia in maritime defence and the relationship of Industry is a theme which presents two stark and often opposing realities:

a. the oft held belief that we can achieve better defence by bigger spending, and
b. the need to develop this country's resources instead of spending on defence.

In Seapower 81, a series of experienced protagonists, some with interests in one or the other camp; others with a foot in both, discuss this theme. The stimulus for this discussion being the seminar organized by the Australian Naval Institute and held in Canberra in April of this year. Following a persuasive opening address by the Governor General the learned series of players, presented, from a somewhat subjective foundation, descriptive, widely varied and often argumentative papers associated with the theme. These have been edited and are included in the journal under review. In that the articles cover a broad spectrum of areas of interest — to both those with a specialist interest in maritime defence, and those with a marginal interest in specialized 'maritime defence' considerations but a more generalized interest in national strategy — the publication has wide appeal. The dominant ideas or sub-themes are obvious in the presentations and the discussion which followed each:

The first and certainly the most common thread, related a need for an articulated strategic direction for Australia. The point was raised by Sir Arthur Tange and subsequently mentioned by Griffith, Hawke, Zeidler and Kasper. With the exception of Hawke and Kasper the message was consistent. Develop a maritime strategy and explain its reasoning to both defence and industry to allow appropriate time for analysis of that policy and its effects in both a Federal and State context. On respondent suggested production of a 'shopping list' based on a long-term corporate defence plan. Kasper's appeal was for that strategy to take account of the new economic circumstances into which Australia had been delivered — possible through fate which endowed this nation with abundant natural resources. His argument that a strong economic base with rapid and assured growth will ensure that there is no shortage of funds for expenditure on defence, especially as the government has mentioned growth at 7% until 3% of GDP is reached. The bigger the cake the larger portion that can be spared. Hawke's appeal for guidance from government, was straight forward and easily understood, to establish a basis for better planning within the economy. The tangible result would be a more stable employment base and in the long run avoidance of some unnecessary industrial disputation (we could hopefully avoid the "iron lung" syndrome). If Mr Killen's knowledge of horse racing and its history is reliable, then it seems that the journal articles and these authors would seek to develop a longevity in Australia's strategic posture as happened in the weight for age scale devised by Admiral Rouse. It, like that scale, might remain unchanged for 150 years. The world situation is such that all reasonable men will accept that any government under present global conditions must continue to 'walk on quicksand' when it comes to strategic guidance. Despite the unwelcome but positive reality that neither Defence (and especially the Navy with long lead times and capital equipment procurement) nor the industrial sector cannot quickly absorb radical changes in strategic direction.

The second, and one wonders if this was not the intention of the seminar, is an affirmation that economic survival of the free world depends 'absolutely' on the continued freedom of seaborne trade. Sir Arthur Tange highlights the need in establishing the legitimacy of a maritime capability for an island continent in our environment. He is supported by Swayne's explanation of the likely effect on international trade, and specifically our economy, should the Russian Navy, be it the fighting or merchant fleets, achieve domination. Hill-Norton, in analyzing the new American Administration's attitude of expecting 'political quo for the economic quid' from third world sovereign states adds further weight to the somewhat cliched argument for greater spending on naval hardware. It is interesting that a common sub-theme that becomes apparent to the inexpect observer is that the 'attitude of offence' which we need to develop, to either control or deny the seaborne lines of communication in our region could manifest itself in the purchase of, and develpment of, a formidable submarine capacity. This would be using the Soviet navy's greatest maritime weakness, in the area of anti-submarine warfare, when the west still has significant superiority. This sub-theme is supported by Hawke. The concept is apparently not completely accepted as other presenters, e.g., Griffiths spend time projecting a responsibility for sea denial operations at ranges of from 2000 to 5000 nautical

miles from Australia. One is left wondering whether Australia can or should afford a diplomatic projection of national power in a traditional 'gun-boat diplomacy' role, as is apparently accepted by the navy of the United Kingdom. Notwithstanding this it is apparent that not all the gentlemen present feel that maritime warfare is necessarily an air defence problem — especially if we reduce our area of influence to our national waters and our most important sealanes, for which the submarine seems ideally suited.

The third major idea is the debatable question of 'self-reliance' and exactly what this means. Despite the relatively clear statement made by the minister in the government's response to a report of the joint committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence in November 1978, the seminar pursues arguments for both greater and more radical concepts and planning the percept that there is a point beyond which the cost of defence to a peacetime economy is not acceptable. Especially in that defence is a non-wealth producing investment which 'obsolesces at a breathtaking rate'. The main elements of the self-reliance argument appear as a need for a domestique merchant navy; that industry should have a broader base than just building warships; and the need for diversification of our energy base away from oil. Many of these are already subject to government direction, despite the apparent wishes of the large British (multinational?) influence. Basic requirements such as a repair and replacement capability for equipment lost in battle does not mean, according to Sir Arthur Tange the Australian production should be 'looked to'. Despite a relatively bad situation in this respect Hawke assures us that the skills and resources exist and because of the lack of an enunciated maritime strategy, the concept of how to put that resource to work is lacking. It is on this note that we return to our original discussion point and O'Neill's summing up more than adequately highlights the more interesting aspect of the journal articles.

The journal is well planned, logically organized, documented and easy to read. The content is plausible. I strongly recommend that any person with an interest in the needs of Defence (and particularly the Navy) in its relationship with the economy will benefit by reading the journal. For those with more specific interests, some excellent articles cover specialized topics associated with the main theme. A publication which formalizes again the need for a national strategy — I was convinced.

MAJOR R.C. BEATTIE,
BEcon, AMBSC, AACS

Editor's note —

The reviewer is a Major RAAOC whose last posting was as a lecturer in management economics in the Faculty of Military Studies, University of New South Wales, RMC Duntroon. He has recently taken up a posting in command of the Support Company for the Army's Operational Deployment Force based in Townsville.

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

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