(A

JOURNAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE

VOLUME 5

NOVEMBER 1979

NUMBER 4

AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE
1 The Australian Naval Institute has been formed and incorporated iff the Australian Capital Terntory The main ob|ects of the Institute are —
a.	to encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the
Maritime profession
b.	to provide a forum lor the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and
the Maritime profession
c to publish a journal.
2. The Institute is self supporting and non-profit making. The aim is to encourage freedom of discussion, dissemination of information, comment and opinion and the advancement of professional knowledge concerning naval and maritime matters.
3   Membership of the Institute is open to —
a. Regular    members    —    Members    of    the    Permanent    Naval    Forces    of    Australia
b  Associate Members — (1) Members of the Reserve Naval Forces of Australia
 (2)	Members of the Australian Military Forces and the Royal Australian Air Force both permanent and reserve
 (3)	Ex-members of the Australian Defence Forces, both permanent and reserve components, provided that they have been honourably discharged from that force.
 (4)	Other persons having and professing a special interest in naval and maritime affairs.
c Honorary Members — A person who has made a distinguished contribution to the Naval or maritime profession or who has rendered distinguished service to the Institute may be elected by the Council to Honorary Membership
4. Joining fee for Regular and Associate members is $5. Annual Subscription for both is $10
5  Inquiries and application fcr membership should be directed to -
The Secretary, Australian Naval Institute. P.O  Box 18. DEAKIN. ACT  2600
CONTRIBUTIONS As the Australian Naval Institute exists for the promotion and advancement of knowledge relating to the  Naval and maritime profession,  all members are strongly encouraged to submit articles for publication    Only in this way will our aims be achieved.
DISCLAIMER
In writing tor the institute it must be borne in mind thai Ihe views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Department of Defence, the Chief of Naval Staff or the Institute
Registered for Posting as a Publication — Category B
ISSN 0312-5807

JOURNAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE (INC)
CONTENTS
Title	Page
Correspondence	 2
From the Secretary's Desk	 3
From the Editor	 4
1978/79 President's Report	 5
Financial Statements	 7
New Members	   8
HMAS HUON — Australian's first locally constructed destroyer
—	by Mr John Mortimer	10
KORTENAER — The International Frigate
 I.	Concept and Characteristics — by Ross Gillett	23
 II.	Some Thoughts for Australia — by Hal Thomsett	27
The Protection of Shipping — What some Strategists Think
—	by Lieutenant Commander C. A. Barne RAN	34
Journal Binders	39
Destroyers — System Characteristics and Task Ability
—	by Mr K.J. Hope	40
Nobody Asked Me But	57
Shiphandling Corner	60
Book Reviews	61
Journal Back Issues	62
Australian Naval Institute Library	63
Application for Membership	64
Articles or condensations of articles are not to be repnnted or repi oduced without the permission of the Institute. Extracts may be quoted for the purposes of research, review or comment provided the source is acknowledged.
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute — Page   I

Correspondence

CHAPLAINS

I was sorry to read the article entitled Chaplains by Judas in the May number ol your otherwise excellent journal Though it is to some extent counter-balanced by 'he article Who can lell which side HE is on by A Chaplain I think lhal Judas shows remarkably little knowledge about or insight into the work done by Our naval Chaplains tor centuries, and especially during the two world wars Not only has Judas obviously had no expen ence ol their work but I very much doubt whether he has read Gordon Taylor s admirable history The Sea Chaplains lOxlord Illustrated Press 1978) I would strongly recommend him to do so — it he is able to approach the subiect without the preiudice which is so evident in his article It was Admiral ol Ihe Fleet Sir John De Robeck who once remarked thai As long as a ship has a good commandei and a good Chaplain there is nothing to worry about. and in my view that still holds good The expeds (presumably social workers! to whom Judas relers may De complementary lo Chaplains Out can never be substitutes tor them — especially in time ol war As a temporary Anyac (Commander and Captain ol HMNZS U ANDER 1941 -441,1 can speak with some authority about the importance ol the Chaplain s work in Ihe warships of the antipodean countries ol the Commonwealth — which incidentally are recounted in Gordon Taylors book already men loned Finally, is noi Judas s choice ol pseudonym in dubious taste - unless he wishes to identity himself with the archtype ol the betrayer ?
Yours faithfully
Captain S W Roskill CBti DSC LittID FBA RN
Churchill College Cambridge CB3 ODS

In conclusion I cannot resist a quiet dig at your reviewer II is several years since AKUNAII was berthed al Williamstown She was recently reported as rescuing boal people from the South China Sea — still under Ihe name AKUNA The ship at Gem Pier Williamstown, is HMAS CASTLEMAINE. a sistership ol HMAS GLADSTONE (which was renamed AKUNA il\
Yours taitntully
Captain J Nook'
8 Agnes Avenue. North Balwyn 3104
I thank Captain Noble lor his interest and sympathise with him that the review ol his book in the last purnal adopted an anecdotal approach Nevertheless, that is a valid approach, particularly when the reviewer has Some relevant recollections ol an interesting predominantly historical sub/eel
The Editor
THE CONVOY SYSTEM
Dear Sir.
I wish to take issue with some ol the points made m the Peter Mitchell Trust Essay Competition pnre winning essay by Lieutenant Commander in C H G Wheeler RN. The Euture ol the Convoy System lor Merchant Shipping, published in Ihe lasl journal The essay appears lo have been |udged lor its literary merit rather than its content where the conclusions are based on instinct rather than research and reasoning

PORT PHILLIP: PILOTS AND DEFENCES
Dear Sir
Your August issue contained some excellent reading but you will understand why I select the book review tor comment After reading six paragraphs ol the review ot Port Phillip Pilots and Detences. I came to the conclusion that the title had been misplaced The seventh paragraph proved this conclusion incorrect the book was under review
My experience with editors, learned the hard way with more rejections than acceptances, has taught me to be concise not to write anything that did not have an interest lor Ihe reader on the subject concerned Thrs appears to be your reviewer s criticism the account was too concise Furthermore, the section I considered to be ol particular interest to the Royal Australian Navy Port Phillip Detences. your reviewer re ecled with the comment that it appeared to have been induced as latlening tor an otherwise thin book'
Reternng to the lasl paragraph ol the I eview Port Phillip Bay is incorrect In fact I wrote to the Royal Hislorcal Society of Victoria on this subiect in 1972 criticising their use ot these words in their publication Admiralty charts always named it Port Phillip, as do the charts ot the RAN Hydrography Office During my lifetime at sea I have learned to regard these as reliable authonties on correct nomenclature

The author advocates independent merchant ship sailings, basing his argument on six (actors which he claims have changed lo such an extent as to make the convoy system obsolete These I actors are narrowly defined with a heavy bias making them lit the appieciation A quick look at the tactors shows that
 •	The author implies that Ihe better submarine to ship speed I alio allows the submarine lo run rings around the convoy and attack al will Howevei use of such speed increases the likelihood ol detection, negating the submarines major advaniages ot invisibility and surprise A nuclear submarine sitting below a convoy further reduces its natural advantages and must therefore be considered a most suspect tactic
 •	The author sees the convoy as a sitting duck. helpless against the modern weapon systems earned by air. surface and subsurface forces However, he neglects to point out that defending lorces have equally improved weapon systems and il mighl be argued that today s ASW weapons have improved comparably more lhan Ihe submarine s since World War II He further mentions the nuclear option as though it were only available to the enemy The suggestion that a percentage ol ships attacked with neutron bombs would be available for enemy use within a tew days shows a clear misunderstanding ol enhanced radiation weapons (ERW) To achieve only neutron radiation damage on a convoy ship would require the ERW to be targeted lo accurately miss the target and even then it is highly unlikely

Page   2 — Journal ol the Australian Nt val Institute

Ihal all personnel onboard would be killed Such an attack could not be guaranteed to achieve its aim ol stopping cat go delivery and is therefore illogical
 •	The aulhor states thai the present lack of escods makes ihe convoy system unattractive Vet in both previous wars there was a similar lack ol sudace escorts The largest single factor today in Ihe number ol escods is Ihe massive increase in the availability ol aircraft and the escod submarine Taking these units into consideration we have today more available escoding forces than in the past
 •	The question ol mining as presented by the author affects both convoys and independent ships similarly and is hardly a factor in arguing Ihe ments ol a convoy It is of interest that mines sank fewer convoyed ships than independent ships during both world wars
 •	The aulhor postulates that the ability of modern reconnais sance is such as to make detection, location and identification ot a convoy inevitable He neglects to discuss two major considerations Firstly better reconnaissance on the enemy and secondly Ihe better command, control and convoy organisation that results trom modern C This tarter laclor is most impodanl when it is considered thai 63°o ol shipping losses in World War II were the direct result ol wrong start decisions based on inadequate intelligence
 •	The claim Ihal Ihe handling characlerishcs ol 200 000 Ion ships and their physical size condemns the convoy system is laughable The majority ol modern ships are tar better suited lor convoy duties than in previous conflicts They are fasten more manoeuvrable have better cargo delivery rates and better communrcalions thereby making many ol them much more suitable lor convoy work
The narrow scenarios that Ihe author uses to apply these lactors do not lake into account such considerations as geographical areas and coincident environment, graduated responses, composition ol convoys and nature ot Ihe conflict The aulhor tries to lustily omission ot statistics and analysis ol Ihe pasl by slaling the above laclors have changed These are grave omissions and it is dangerous to base future decisions on one sided thinking
At Ihe end ol his essay. Lieutenant Commander Wheelei asks eight questions that should be considered to decide whether a convoy system is leasible None ot these questions even addresses the aim ol Ihe mission which must be Ihe delivery rate ol cargo lo a destination   The questions lit his

desired answer It would be prelerable 10 base one s questions on the principles ol war and Ihe recognised slalt college lormat ol appreciations
The question ot whether a convoy system should be used is thoroughly analysed and numerically assessed by D W Walrus in his article The Science ol Admiralty Naval Review October 1963 who concludes his article, by saying
Indissoluably linked with numerical thinking are systematised strategy, intelligence and laches In this article il has been suggested Ihal weapon launching and weapon-carrying developments have not invalidated the operational laws which have governed Ihe success and failure ol pasl maritime operations The orderly evidence abstracted trom the chaos ol immediate operational experience suggests that by institution ol an integrated system of anti-submarine, anti-mine, anti-air land antr surface vessel) convoy based upon ihe probable para meters ot our and enemy ships and torces performance and numbers, it is practicable to seize Ihe initiative horn the stad ol operations and lo dictate to the enemy where, when and how actions are lo be (ought and with what success The importance ol Ihe convoy system is that it lesolves the complexities ol maritime warfare into a rational pattern ol orderly shipping and anti-submarine (and anh-air mine and surface vessel) activity ol measurable efficiency and reduces to a minimum Ihe penumbra ol uncertainty that surrounds all operations ol war For the enemy it makes ships harder to find and. it found, harder to sink but his forces easier lo Imd and easier to destroy
I commend Waters article to all readers and consider it should be compulsory reading lor start olticers deciding whether or not to implement a convoy system Using numerical thinking to analyse decades ol research, he devises a formula lor decision making and evolves the tollowing doctrine — when enemy forces are attempting commerce destruction, merchant ships are used most efficiently when sailed in convoy a.nd our detendmg forces are used most efficiently deployed tactically wilh threatened convoys
Yours lailhlully,
R M Jessurun Commander RAN
Navy Office Canbena

From the Secretary's Desk
It is Annual Subscription time again with payments due for the year 79/80. Some 135 subscriptions are still outstanding and as you will appreciate, the Institute runs on a very tight budget. Please give this matter your earliest attention.
I have been receiving letters recently containing complaints that Journals have not been received. Please let me know if you change yout postal address so that we can amend the mailing list thereby ensuring that all members do receive their Journal on time.
Journal ol Ihe Australian Naval Institute — Page   3

FROM THE EDITOR
Destroyers provide a timely theme for this issue of the Journal. The average age of the present ships of the destroyer force of the Royal Australian Navy is now about fifteen years Their replacement is likely to absorb a laige part of defence capital equipment expenditure over the next two decades
Among the major articles on destroyers in this journal is the first instalment of what will be a two-part contribution addressing the problems experienced by ship designers in endeavouring to incorporate the operators capability requirements in a relatively small hull, whilst also allowing a reasonable margin for stability and survivability This makes for important reading for all who profess a special interest in naval and maritime affairs The second part of this article should be published in the next issue of the Journal
Another major article in this journal gives a history of HMAS HUON — Australia s first locally constructed destroyer Invidious comparisons can be drawn between the lead time to acquire that ship and the likely lead times for the acquisition of the RAN s projected tollow-on-destroyers
An important role of the? destroyer in the past has been that of an escod vessel protecting merchant ships in convoy The last journal, however, contained an article which threw considerable doubt on the efficacy of the convoy system, and hence on the requirement for destroyers in this particular role My intention now is to go on placing further views on the subject before readers
This journal contains a letter to the Editor specifically attacking the recent convoy system article, as well as a major article giving the views of some well-known maritime strategists on the subject. The next Journal is planned to contain an adicle which considers the impact of technology on the convoy system
The prime advantage of destroyers is said to lie in their utility and flexibility for a wide range ol naval tasks but is this still so7 Have they become merely attractive high value targets whose role in the Australian situation could be carried out equally well by greater numbers of less expensive ships and aircraft9 The Journal dorrs not seek to provide the answers to these contentious questions bul rather to add fuel to the lire of debate Members, and other readers, are invited to air their views on this important and very topical subject through the pages of the Journal.

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HMS BROADSWORD — completed late 1978 (3 500 tonnes, 430 feet overall, two Lynx helicopters, two Sea Wolf SAM systems, two 40mm guns, six ASW torpedo launchers)
— by courtesy Qt James Goss
Page   4 — Journal ol ihe Australian Hav.rt Institute

1978/79 PRESIDENT'S REPORT
Delivered at the Annual General Meeting ot the Australian Naval Institute, held on Friday, 26 October. 1979. in Canberra ACT
This last year has been one of considerable importance for the Institute.
At last year's Annual General Meeting you heard a report on the lead up to Seapower 79 — our first national seminar Those of you who attended it on 2/3 February will know it was quite an historic occasion, not only for the Institute but also for Australia. His Excellency, the Governor General opened the proceedings of the Seminar and one and a half days ot presentations and debate followed. This culminated in the final direct and interesting presentation by Admiral Elmo Zumwalt
The media coverage that resulted from Admiral Zumwalt s visit will not have escaped your attention. This served to highlight our most outstanding achievement to date. There are two aspects of the Seminar that should be mentioned Firstly, we had planned it as a non-profit making venture but, due to some careful financial management, it returned a profit ot $643 00 to the Institute's main funds and secondly, about 50 new members were recruited into the Institute.
I would like to thank all those who were involved in the organisation of the Seminar: it was a job well done.
There has been a steady improvement in the quality of our Journal Your Council believes that the Journal is the principle activity of the Institute and therefore makes every effort to improve the finished product.
Other important facets of the Institute s life are the proceedings of the various Chapters This last year saw the establishment of an infant Melbourne Chapter, under the guidance of its convenor. Commodore Parker, and we wish it luck in the future Last November, a panel discussion was led by Commander Michael Dowsett on Trends in Training in Australia and then, in March, Commander David York addressed the Chapter on the Modernisation ot HMAS PARRAMATTA'.
In the aftermath of the Seminar, the Canberra Chapter has conducted a busy and interesting year of presentations. A feature of the program has been the number of joint meetings held with other professional associations
Lectures at the end of 1978 were given by Captain Les Fox on the Garden Island Modernisation', and also by Professor Ulrich Gabler, of Germany on Trends in Modern Conventional Submarines'.
Early in May. Captain Barbara Macleod spoke on The Role of Women in the Navy , Later a visiting American political scientist. Professor Henry Albinski presented his views on ANZUS in the 1980s'
The first joint meeting of 1979 was held together with the Royal Aeronautical Society when Lieutenant Commander Michael Apps spoke on Aerial. Surface and Sub-Surface Mining — Past, Present and Future' A second joint meeting with the Centre for Maritime Studies and the Naval Historical Society heard Professor Arthur Marder speak on An American Historian's Love Affair with the Royal Navy' Altogether the Canberra Chapter has been most active and the general level of support from members has been gratifying
Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute — Page   i

In early 1979, the Sydney Chapter, Convenor Captain Ralph, was addressed, in a combined meeting with the Naval Staff College, by Admiral Zumwalt A second presentation on Australian ship building had to be deferred but a presentation on Economic and Manpower Forces in Defence is to be given this month by Dr Glen Withers Though it has been a quiet period tor the Chapter, next year promises to be much better for members living in the Sydney area
In Western Australia, the convenors position is held by Lieutenant Commander Frank Whittaker of HMAS LEEUWIN It is hoped that a program of presentations etc.. will be formulated soon
Some Chapters have been more active than others Your Council would like all Chapters to be active The difficulty of obtaining good speakers and attracting members to attend is recognised bui it is hoped that progress will continue to be made The council has been discussing informally methods whereby the chapters can be continually stimulated
The Council is trying to consolidate the gams made by the Seminar by recognising that the creation of a library is a worthwhile aim for the Institute Work has begun on collecting papers, magazines and books tor the Australian Naval Institute Collection under the firm hand ol Commodore Ian Nicholson I would like to express my appreciation and that of the council to all who have contributed to the Collection
Also, this year we received approval from the Chief of Naval Staff to award a prize to each Naval Staff College course The award, in the form of an Australian Naval Institute Silver Medal is being given to the student who in the opinion of the Director, writes the best paper on maritime strategy The Council was most concerned that the prize should be given for performance in a field related to our objectives and I believe this has been achieved
During the course of the year your Council has been discussing a number of matters which could require changes to the current constitution In particular, the status of regular and associate members has been under review as well as whether or not the Journal Editor should become an office bearer
The resolution of these matters in the interests of members can only be reached after proper consideration The incoming Council will need to continue to keep them under review in the interest ol members
The Council has also teen concerned that our annual subscription may not be sufficient to cover costs in the years ahead
This year, a profit was made and further investment of funds approved by the Council The present subscription rate of $10 has not changed since the Institutes inception and you will appreciate that rising costs could eventually force us to raise it By good management, increasing membership and a flow on from economies of scale, we have been able to remain inside the budget. During this next year the Council will need to look very carefully ai whether a subscription increase Should be recommended to I he Annual General Meeting in 1980. or a special meeting
Before concluding I would like to mention that on 30 January, 1980. the Institute had hoped to have the pleasure of hosting a |omt meeting with the USI of the ACT at the Academy of Science The speaker was to have been the current Royal Navy's Commander-in-Chief Fleet. Admiral Sir James Eberle KCB, but his visit to Australia has had to be postponed Such events as this, give some measure of the professional esteem which our Institute has accrued in the few years of its history
In summary, the year has been an important milestone in the history ol the Institute, marked by
 —	the Seapower Seminar,
 —	a steady increase in membership,
 —	continuing enhancement of the quality of the Journal.
 —	the creation of a library as an aim of the Institute, and
 —	the creation of a prize for each RAN Staff College Course
Page   6 — Journal ol the Australian Nazal Institute

Before concluding I would like, as your President to express my appreciation for the dedication and time given by the Councillors, all of whom undertake their duties on a voluntary basis and to express my appreciation for the continuing support of all members. I feel it would be remiss of me not to make special mention of the valued contribution of your retiring Secretary and Treasurer, Lieutenant Commanders Chris Barrie and David Campbell I feel confident that the Institute will be indebted to them for many years to come.
Thank you.
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE
AUDITED ACCOUNTS
FOR THE 12 MONTHS ENDED 30 SEPTEMBER 1979
INCOME AND EXPENDITURE ACCOUNT

EXPENDITURE
Audit Fees
Poslage
Advertising
Stationery and punting
Prizes
Bank Charges
Library Additions
Lodgement Fees
Commission
Presentations
Net Surplus lor the year

INCOME

40 00	Advertising	929 46	
440 00	Joining Fees	490 00	
48 00	Subscriptions	4.004 62	
5 440 20	Journal Subscriptions	735 24	
95 00	Journal Sales	45250	
34 89	Inleiest Received	195 00	
32 35	Donations Received	5 95	
36 00	Rebate opn Stationery	1725	
750	Surplus Seapower 79	643 32	
26 90	Gross Proln Insignia Trading	116 89	
1,389 39			
$7 590 23		$7 590 23	

Slock on Hand 1/10/78
Purchases
Gross Profit Transferred

INSIGNIA TRADING ACCOUNT
47212	Sales
958 63	Presentations
116 89	Slock on Hand30/9/79
$1547 65

929 35
26 90 59140
$1.547 65

RECEIPTS

STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS AND PAYMENTS
PAYMENTS

Cash at Bank 1/10/78	1.007 79	Audil Fees	40 00	
Joining Fees	490 00	Postage	440 00	
Annual Subscriptions	3.249 22	Advertising	48 00	
Journal Subscriptions	715 24	Stationery and Pnnling	5.440 20	
Advertising	1.696 96	Insignia Purchases	958 63	
Insignia Sales	929 35	Prizes	95 00	
Journal Sales	452 50	Bank Charges	34 89	
Interest Received	195 00	Library Additions	32 35	
Subscnplions in Advance	1.190 00	Transfer lo Savings Account	500 00	
Donation	5 95	Commonwealth Bonds	1.000 00	
Rebate on Stationery	17 25	Lodgement Fees	36 00	
Transfer Irom Sea Power 79 Ac	64332	Cash at Bank 30/9/79	1.967 51	
	$10 592 58		$10,592 58	
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute — Paqe    f

BANK RECONCILIATION AS AT 30TH SEPTEMBER, 1979

Bank Balance as per Bank Statement LESS UnpresentBd Cheque no 469747

299421 1 026 70
$1 96751

BALANCE SHEET AS AT 30TH SEPTEMBER 1979

ACCUMULATED FUNDS
Balance as at 1/10/79 ADD Net Surplus tor the year
LIABILITIES Subscriptions in AoVance

ASSETS

3 704 92	Sundry Debtors	
1389 39	Subscriptions in Arrears	
	Commonwealth Bonds	
5.094 31	Savings Investments Account	
	Cash at Bank	
1 190 00	Stock on Hand lat cost)	
■6.284 31		

170 00
55 40
3.000 00
500 00 1 967 51
591 40
$6.264 31

RECEIPTS

SEAPOWER 79
STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS AND PAYMENTS FOR THE PERIOD 6TH JULY, 1978 TO 20TH SEPTEMBER, 1979
PAYMENTS

Regislralidn Fees	8.965 00	Bank/Bankcard Charges		133 95	
Bank Interest	5591	Catenng		3.637 94	
Advertising & Contributions	4 400 00	Postage Telephone			
Sale of Proceedings	536 00	Telegrams & Ireighl
Presentations
Hall Hire & Costs
Travel
Accommodation
Printing		336 54
172 10 603 40
3.048 14 585 10
4 696 42	
		Balance iransleneO to A N 1 Account	643 32	
	$13.856 91			$13656 91	
G P MANN. REIS & ASSOCIATES				DJ CAMPBELL	
Public Accounlants			Lieutenant Commander RAN	
Auditor				i re 11	 :	
NEW MEMBERS

MIDN N S Kerr RAN HMAS Derwenl
CPOL J Stracban HMAS Supply
SCHAPW Wheetcton HMAS Melbourne
LCDHJE Gray RAN A 1-06 Russell ACT
CMDR R A Osoorn RAN Rid 68 Chelmsford Ave UndtieW NSW 2070

2NDOSM BARNES D 4 16 Russell ACT
SURG LCDR K L Collins RANR
PO B0X146
Double Bay NSW 2028
CAPT T W Nielsen MN 2 Kirkwood Ave Mount Isa Old 4825
LCDRJS Hill RAN 13 Links Drive Raymond Terrace NSW

LIEUT BM Dowsing RAN HMAS MoAssby
SMN ATWL N A Holmes C/ 724 Squadron HMAS Albatross
Mr B E Parr 26 Hughes St Hermil Park Ok)
CAPTC TakeToeJMSDF 3 Galway Place Deakin ACT 2600

Page   8 — journal of tne Australian Na ral Institute

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Using Chukar II. Northrop provides aerial target system service at NATO Missile Firing Installation (NAMFI) on the island of Crete. Since program began in 1971, Northrop has launched more than 500 Chukar flights. All NAMFI program requirements for cost, schedule and performance have been met.
Since 1938 more than 76,000 unmanned aerial target vehicles designed and built by Northrop for U.S. armed services and 20 other nations. All delivered on time, oncost, performance as promised.
Aircraft, Electronics, Communications. Construction, Services. Northrop Corporation. 1800 Century Park East. Los Angeles. California 90067, U.S.A.
NORTHROP
Making advainvd tivhnulrtKy wnrk.
Journal of the Australian Naval institute — Page   9

HMAS HUON — AUSTRALIA'S
FIRST LOCALLY CONSTRUCTED DESTROYER
By Mr John Mortimer

On 1 March 1901, the Australian State Governments transferred control of their respective naval forces to the Commonwealth Government As there was no appropriate Federal legislation, the torces remained under the administration of State Acts and Regulations until 1 March 1904 when the Commonwealth Defence Act (1903) came into force. The ships transferred to Commonwealth control, with the exception of the cruiser PROTECTOR, were essentially coastal crafl designed specifically for coastal and port defence Some details of these ships are shown in Table 1.
The limited capabilities of these vessels and their general obsolescence were recognised and several schemes were developed between 1902 and 1909 for the provision of a naval defence force more akin to the needs of a newly independent nation Most schemes included destroyer type vessels which ranged in displacement from coastal destroyers of 550 tons, through vessels of 800 and 1300 tons to a cruiser destroyer of 3.000 tons. Earlier local schemes tenced to concentrate on coastal naval forces with occasional emphasis on increased endurance and s.eakeeping capabilities necessary for operations at more extended distances from bases lhan had t>een generally the practice in the past The main schemes are show in Table 2
It was not until the Imperial Conference ol 1909 that any serious consideration was given to establishment of a truly ocean going Australian Navy At this conference the British Admirality tabled a paper on 20 July 1909 which detailed their views on the form in which the various Dominion Governments could best participate in Imperial Defence. This paper suggested that any Dominion Governmenl wishing to create a navy should aim at forming a dislinc' fleet unit consisting of at least the following:
1    Armoured   cruiser   (Indomitable   class)
17.250 tons,
3 Second class protected cruisers (Bristol
class) 4.800 tons:
6 Destroyers (improved River class) 700
tons

3 Submarines (C class) 313 tons, and necessary auxiliaries such as depot and store ships
In relation to coastal defence forces the Admiralty stated that
Under certain conditions the establishment of local defence flotillas, consisting of torpedo craft and submarines, might be of assistance in time of war to the operations of the fleet, but such flotillas cannot co-operate on the high seas in the wider duties of protection of trade and preventing attacks from hostile cruisers and squadrons The operations of destroyers and torpedo boats are necessarily limited to the waters near the coast or to a radius of action not far distant from a base A scheme limited to torpedo craft would not in itsell, moreover, be a good means ol gradually developing a self-contained fleet capable of both offence and defence Unless a naval force — whatever its size - complies with this condition, it can never take its proper place in the organisation of an Imperial Navy distributed strategically over the whole area of British interests.
This concept of the Fleet Unit' formulated by the British Admirality in the context of Imperial Defence provided the basis tor development of the Royal Australian Navy and has survived virtually unchallenged from 1909 to the present Its rationale resided in the premise that such a force could provide a capability both in relation to coastal defence and defence of sea lines of
THE AUTHOR
John Mortimer graduated B A from Ihe University ot NSW in 1968 and |oined Ihe Commonwealth Public Service in March 1969 He served initially in Ihe Naval Stall Secretarial ol the Department ol Navy before moving to the Department ol Prime Minister and Cabinet in 1972 He returned to the Defence arena in 1974. serving tor a year in the Resources Planning Branch Navy Office, before joining the Strategic and Inter national Policy Division ol the Department ol Defence He later moved to the Force Development and Analysis Division where he is currently Ihe Chief Executive Officer Maritime Warfare John Mortimer is a regular contributor to Jane s Fighting Ships

Page W — Journal ol Ihe Australian Naval Institute

TABLE 1

STATE/SHIP

TYPE

DISPLACEMENT    COMPLETED

New South Wales
AVERNUS ACHERON
Victoria
CERBERUS
COUNTESS OF
HOPETOUN
CHILDERS
NEPEAN
LONSDALE
GORDON
Queensland
GAYUNDAH PALUMA MOSQUITO MIDGE
South Australia
PROTECTOR
Tasmania
TB No. 1

Second class torpedo boat Second class torpedo boat
(these two ships were disposed ot in 1902)
Armoured turret ship
First class torpedo boat First class torpedo boat Second class torpedo boat Second class torpedo boat Torpedo launch
Gunboat
Gunboat
Second class torpedo boat
Torpedo launch
Cruiser (later reclassified as a gunboat)
Second class torpedo boat

16 tons	1879	
16 tons	1879	
3340 tons	1870	
75 tons	1891	
47 tons	1883	
12 tons	1884	
12 tons	1884	
12 tons	1885	
360 tons	1884	
360 tons	1884	
12 tons	1884	
12 tons	1887	
960 tons	1884	
1884
12 tons

communication. It fails, however, to recognise that such a force is not necessarily optimised tor both tasks and consequently may not represent the most efficient utilisation of naval resources.
In July 1907 the Australian Government commenced investigations into the acquisition of torpedo boat destroyers. A document was circulated to a number of British shipbuilders specifying "Requirements to be fulfilled in each of the vessels". The destroyer foreshadowed by the Australian Government was a development of the British River design modified to suit Australian conditions. It was envisaged as having a displacement of about 700 tons, and a radius of action of 3,500 nautical miles at 10 knots. The vessels were also planned to have better seakeeping, speed and hull strength than their British counterparts and their boilers were to be oil rather than coal fired as was the case with the British River Class ships.
Shipbuilders proposals were received in August 1907. however, no substantive action was taken until 5 February 1909 when the Fisher Government approved the acquisition of 3 torpedo boat destroyers Subsequent to the Cabinet meeting the Minister for Defence, Senator Pearce announced: "The Government has decided to at once order

two Torpedo Boat Destroyers of the River Class of the latest approved type, which were considered the best adapted for service on the Australian Coast by naval authorities. These boats — the first ot their kind to be obtained by Australia — will serve as models for the future construction ot other vessels of the same type which the Government intends shall be built in Australia.
To that end a sum has been allotted to establish a Government building yard in Australia, where the first work undertaken will be the completion of another Destroyer — the prepared material for which is to be included in the contract.
It is the intention of the Government to send to England skilled operatives to be employed by the successful tenderer on the work of the construction of these vessels in order that they may gain expenence in this highly specialised class of ship construction.
These men will be engaged on the understanding that, on the completion of the contract, they will return to Australia and be engaged in building the further vessels required.
This expenditure will be carried out with the monies provided and appropriated by Parliament in the Coast Defence Appropriation Act. 1908,

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute - Pago 11

	TABLE 2		
PROPONENT	TYPE	DISPLACEMENT	
Captain Creswell. 1902.	4 Cruisers	3,000 tons	
Captain Creswell, 1905	3 Cruiser destroyers 16 Torpedo boat destroyers 5 First class torpedo boats 8 Second class torpedo boats	3.000 tons
550 tons
205 Ions
7 tons	
Captain Creswell, 1906	3 Ocean destroyers
16 Destroyers (River class)
5 First class torpedo boats	800 tons 550 tons 200 tons	

Commonwealth Naval Officers Committee. 1906
MrDeakin. 1906 (with further phases foreshadowed but not defined)
MrDeakin. 1907
Mr Fisher. March 1909

 3	Ocean going destroyers	1.300 tons 1 Ocean going destroyer	800 tons 16 Coastal destroyers	550 tons
 4	First class torpedo boats	157 tons
8 coastal destroyers (Teviot class)	550 tons
4 First class torpedo boats	157 tons
6 Destroyers (River class)	550 tons
9 Submarines (C class)	313 tons
2 Depot ships	—
4 ocean destroyers	1.300 tons
19 destroyers (improved River class — this	700 tons
included the 3 ships already approved i.e. HMA
Ships PARRAMAT7A, WARREGO and YARRA)
1 Vessel armed for police duties	2 to 3.000 Ions

which it purpose
is estimated will be sufficient tor the
It is not anticipated that the maintenance or manning of these vessels will cause any increase in the annual naval vote as the men now engaged on obsolete and out-of-date vessels will be transferred to the new boats It is expected that the boats will take about 12 months to construct Being efficient sea vessels they will be brought out under their own steam and will have no difficulty in making the passage.
The following description o' the vessels was also made public by the Minister for Defence: Torpedo Boat Destroyer — River Class Displacement 650 — 700 tons Length overall 230 feet Breadth 23 feet 6 inches Draught — maximum 8 feet 9 inches Speed 26 knots Indicated Horse Power 9,210 Fuel Oil - 150 tons
Steaming radius 2.500 m les at 14 knots, over 3.000 miles at 10 knots. Armament 1 -4 inch quick firing gun
3-12 pounder quick firing guns
Page 12 — Journal ol the Australian Naval institute

3 torpedo tubes discharging 18 inch torpedoes Complement 50 officers and men
On the same day as the Cabinet decision, a telegram was sent by the Acting Secretary. Department of Defence, to the Officer in Charge. Commonwealth Offices. London advising him of the decision and requesting that he obtain from firms who previously tendered, quotations and the time required for delivery of two boats, together with a separate quotation for the destroyer to be assembled in Australia To take account ot developments which had occurred since their original tender, the tenderers were invited to review their earlier proposals One particular concern in this regard was the endurance of 2,500 miles at 14 knots and the top speed requirement ol 26 knots. The endurance requirement had been based on the possible need for ships to transit from Sydney to Fremantle During the official trials of the British Tribal Class in 1907-08 it was proven that under certain circumstances a much greater speed could be obtained by running these vessels over a measured mile in shallow water, than could be reached in actual service in deep water It was subsequently decided that destroyers should undertake their trials on a deep

water measured mile Under these conditions it was found that either the power required to drive them at a specified speed must be increased, or the load to be carried upon the trials must be reduced. The increase in power for full speed entailed larger dimensions to carry it. while a reduction of load entailed a curtailment of the radius of action.
When tenders were invited in 1907. the minimum radius of action at economical speed was stated as 2.500 miles and to obtain this radius it was calculated that 150 tons of oil fuel would have to be carried. From data collected on a shallow measured mile (Maplin) it was calculated that a vessel of 230 feet in length, 23 feet 6 inches beam and 14 feet deep would carry power for 26 knots with a fuel load ol 150 tons in addition to the specified armament. In the light of later experience it was clear that this estimate would not be sufficient to provide the required speed on the Australian coast and as the radius of action could not be lowered it was evident that the dimensions of the vessel would have to be increased
To assist in the evaluation of tenders and to oversee construction in England, a naval architect, Professor J.H. Biles was employed to act as a consultant to the Commonwealth Government.
Tenders were received, together with plans from Palmers Shipbuilding Co.; Cammell Laird & Co.; Hawthorn Leslie & Co.; J. S. White & Co.; Thames  Ironworks Co.; and a consortium of

Denny Bros, and Fairfield Shipbuilding Co. The tenders are summarised in table 3.
Evaluation of tenders was undertaken in March 1909 It was noted in comparison with earlier proposals that tenderers had either suggested larger vessels, or a reduction in the trial load Another interesting feature noted in evaluation was that the extra beam and length did not appear to make any difference in cost. In fact the longest and strongest vessel was proposed by the lowest tenderer.
The evaluation concluded that the Denny/ Fairfield proposal was superior to all others. The price quoted for the 3 vessels, together with armament was the lowest and their gun arrangement was considered the best, with the two midships guns having a broadside fire of nearly 40 degrees on both broadsides and the bow gun offered a depression of 5 degrees. This proposal also suggested a measure of certainty that the speed and endurance requirements would be achieved. Structurally this ship was the strongest and in particular the midship section showed a heavier scantling than those submitted by any other tenderer. In addition the proposed delivery schedule was less than any of the other tenders
On 13 March 1909 the Minister for Defence authorised the acceptance of the Denny/Fairfield tender for two Torpedo Boat Destroyers at a cost of £81.500 each to be built in Britain and one further vessel at a cost of £72,500 to be erected in

DERWENT (later to become HMAS HUON) at Cockatoo Island two weeks before launching.
— By courtesy ot Naval Historical Society Journal ot the Australian Naval Institute — Page 13

TABLE 3
Delivery
Tenderer*	Total price lo vessels and armament (C	1st
ship	(months) 2nd      3rd ship     ship	Tons
ololl
caniad	Radius of action at 14 knots     Length	Dimensions Breadth      Depth	Draurj	
Denny & Fairfield	235 500	14	15	12	150	2 500 nrn 245 It	24H3in	14 ft 9 in	-	
Cammell Laird A B	235610 265610	Hi Hi	17 17	13 13	60 150	800 ran 230 It 1660nm255lt	23119 in 2611	14h 1511	7	IT 9 in
8	It 6 in	
Thornycrolt	236 500	16	16	14	150	2500nm 243h	24116 in	15 19 in	8116 in	
Palmers	242100	15	17	17	150	2 500 nm 24011	24 tt	14tl8in	-	
White	246 840	20	24	20	150	2500nm 235tt	23M6in	14 ft 10 in	8 116 in	
Hawthorn Leslie	252300	15	16	12	80	1 350 nm 230 ft	23116 in	14 n	7116in	
Thames Ironworks 265 423	21	22	16	150	2 500 nm 23511	23 n 6 in	1511	Bit3 m	
Armstrong Whirworth	321220HI	21	23	15	150	2 500 nm 240 ft	2316 m	1411		
Note 11) does nol include Ireigni lo Australia on third vessel

Britain, taken to pieces and sh pped to Australia where rt would be assembled. Conditions of the conlracf were authorised by the Commonwealth solicitor in London on 20 April 1909 The contract stipulated that the first boat be delivered by 14 June 1910. second by 14 July 1910 and that the boat to be assembled in Australia be ready for shipment on 1 July 1910 Progress payments commenced with the laying of keels and provision was included for the employment of Australian tradesmen in the shipyards to enable them to acquire the skills necessary for local construction The contract also stipulated that plans and detailed drawings necessary (or construction m Australia would be provided by the contractors. It also imposed damage claims for any deficiency in speed, or tuel capacity and any delay in delivery These claims were substantial and implied compliance with the specifications sought In relation to fuel capacity a sum of £70 could be claimed for each ton of the deficiency of Ihe capacity of the oil fuel tanks A sum of £20 for a part or whole of the first quarter of a knol which the speed of the compleled vessel is below 26 knots was also payable This sum increased by a further £10 for each subsequent quarter knot until 25 knots, when a fee of £60 was payable for each additional quarter knot Delay in delivery involved a payment of £1 lor each day late.
Acquisition ol Australia s first batch ot Torpedo Boat Destroyers represented a remarkable achievement tor a countrv with little experience in the definition ol naval requirements or warship acquisition procedures In commenting on the Australian program in 1910 Professor Biles observed

Since our vessels were designed the Admiralty has produced vessels ol about the dimensions of ours one thing is certain we have produced a ship which is 20°<> less cost and we believe that in no respect speed, strength, radius ot action or seaworthiness is she interior to the vessels produced by the Admiralty The cost is reduced by saving weight in the hull and power in the machinery due to this saving ot weight. The time is reduced by settling details on the spot and by losing no time in sending detailed drawings lo lie in London Perhaps one of the valuable lessons which the Australian Government are helping to give in imperial matters may be this one of prompt decision and rapid completion
These vessels were approved in February
 1909	Tenders were called, received and evalu ated by mid March The contract and specifications were agreed and signed by the middle ot April 1909 Keels were laid lor all three vessels in Ihe beginning ol June and Ihe lead vessel. PARR AM A TTA was launched without machinery on 9 February 1910. Fitting out and trials ot PARR AM ATT A  had been compleled by June
 1910	and the vessel was finally accepted tor service some 16 months after the initial approval to her purchase was made
Shortly after the Australian Government announced its intention to acquire three torpedo boat destroyers, Mr Cutter, the Superintendent ot the State Dockyard. Cockatoo Island. NSW called on the Minister for Defence, to inform him ol the NSW Governments willingness to undertake construction of the ships During these discussions,   the   Minister   lor  Defence  outlined  the

Page 14     Journal ot tne Australian Na ral Institute

Australian Government's intention to undertake an extensive building program and stated that it was intended that later units would be built in Australia. Local construction was not considered to be viable tor the initial ships because of the urgent need for these vessels to enter service; plans for the destroyers were not then available in Australia; nor were the necessary skilled key personnel for local construction, Mr Cutler confirmed that it would be some 12 to 15 months before the State Dockyard would be in a position to commence construction It was subsequently agreed that the original intentions for construction of the three initial torpedo boat destroyers would remain.
Work on WARREGO was completed by Fairfields' in mid 1910 and she was shipped to Australia in pieces. Re-assembly was undertaken at Cockatoo Island where WARREGO was launched on 4 April 1911 She commissioned tor service on 1 June 1912 WARREGO's reconstruction in Australia was not entirely without incident and took, some 6 months longer to re-assemble than was agreed between the Commonwealth and State Governments. A number of deficiencies were discovered during reconstruction. The most important being the omission of rivets from an elbow which supported one of the propellor shafts. Had this not been discovered serious damage could have occurred
The next major step towards local construction of the Australian fleet unit was taken on 27 March 1911,  when the Prime Minister wrote to the

Premier of NSW seeking his advice on whether his Government would be prepared to undertake construction of a second class cruiser and 3 torpedo boat destroyers, and. if so, on what terms. The Acting Premier responded on 30 March 1911 indicating his Government's willingness to construct these vessels
Basic considerations relating to the provision of plans and working drawings, ordering of materials, costs and other contract and general conditions were largely resolved during 1911 -12. Although a formal agreement was not signed by the Minister for Defence and NSW Minister fot Public Works until 18 June 1912, the initial order for all hull material was placed by NSW authorities on 10 October 1911. The contract specified that:
 •	the Commonwealth would provide the principal building plans and specifications.
 •	the NSW Government would provide buildings and workshops necessary for construction;
 •	the destroyers would be completed within 26 months from a date to be agreed upon when sufficient matenal was available to enable construction to commence.
 •	damages of £300 per week were to be payable tor each weeks delay in delivery which were attributable to the NSW Government; and
 •	the Commonwealth would pay for all material, labour, general charges and dockyard running expenses related to construction, together with an 8% loading based on the actual cost of construction.

Tmi

DERWENT at launching 19 December 1914.
— by courtesy ot Naval Historical Society Journal ot the Australian Naval Institute — Page 15

A commencement date of 1 August 1911 for construction of the three torpedo boat destroyers was subsequently agreed.
The keels of the torpedo boat destroyers DERWENT and TORRENS were laid down on 25 January 1913 in a ceremony by Senator Pearce. Minister for Defence, however their sister ship SWAN was not laid down until 25 January 1915 Work on DERWENT and TORRENS continued at a hesurely pace until commencement of the First World War In response to the worsening situation in Europe, the General Manager of the Commonwealth Naval Dockyard, Cockatoo Island on 6 August 1914 outlined the exisnng situation and proposals for expediting completion of DERWENT and TORRENS as follows:
 •	Hull and Electrical Fittings — everything was available for the hull and electrical fittings or sufficiently suitable substitutes could be obtained or made locally The principal items not to hand were anchors and cables, compasses, searchlights, switchboards, sounding machine and wireless telegraphy
 •	Machinery — an man and auxiliary machinery was available or on hand The principal items not available were the propeller shafting and steam pipes It was proposed that materials for the cruiser BRISBANE, which was also building at Cockatoo Island would be utilised as far as possible and the remainder to be made up by local supplies In some cases, to shorten time it was suggested that gunmetal be substituted for cast steel
 •	Boilers — it was proposed to fit BRISBANE'S boilers which would need modification to take oil fuel These boilers were not as large as the destroyer boilers and a loss of power of nominally 2,00X3 horse power was anticipated
 •	Armament — No guns had been received and it was proposed to utilise 4.7 inch guns held in reserve for fitting to troopships. It was envisaged that two of these guns be fitted to each destroyer
• Torpedo Tubes — No torpedo tubes had been received and it was proposed to manufacture these locally at Cockatoo Island

Discussion of this proposal was undertaken in September 1914 between the General Manager. Cockatoo Island and the Engineering Construction Branch. Navy Office These discussions indicated that by adopting the proposal which included omission of cruising turbines. DERWENT could be commissioned by about March 1915. however, the second vessel. TORRENS, would not be completed tor at least a further two months. Installation ol the ships designed propulsion machinery, including cruising turbines, was estimated to involve a completion date of about September 1915 lor both DERWENT and TORRENS It was estimated that the maximum service speed obtainable with the reduced boiler power would be about 24 knots, compared to the design speed of 26 knots and the radius of action at economical cruising speed would be about halved
The General Manager estimated that forging ol one set of shafting could be undertaken at Cockatoo Island and completed in about two weeks This was viewed with some scepticism as the time taken in Great Britain for forging shafts ordered lor these vessels was three months per set for each vessel Work of this type was entirely new to Australian industry and Cockatoo Island did not have the necessary machinery and plant to bore the shafts Consequently it was proposed that the shafts remain solid This was of some concern to Navy Office as the boring of shafts in addition to reducing weight, was also a valuable means of discovering otherwise hidden defects Doubts were also expressed about the capacity of local industry to manufacture all the necessary equipment and stores, and in particular it was assessed that searchlights could not be manufactured by local industry
A revision of the armament was undertaken following an assessment of the availability of guns. Although doubts were expressed about whether the destroyers as designed could carry the 4 7 inch gun. it was suggested that the first vessel could be armed with one 4 inch gun forward, two 12 pounder guns and a 4 7 inch gun aft, while the second ship would have a gun armament of only two 4 7 inch mounts Only one spare torpedo tube was held in store at Garden island and it was suggested that this be copied to provide tubes for all destroyers
A Naval Board meeting was convened on 28 September 1914 to consider expediting completion of the two torpedo boat destroyers then building at Cockatoo Island The Naval Board consisted of Senator, the Hon G.F Pearce, Minister for Defence, Rear Admiral Sir William Creswell. Captain A. Gordon Smith and Engineer Captain Clarkson  Also present at this meeting

Page re - journal ot the Australian Naval Institute

were Mr Jensen, Assistant Minister and Mr J.J. King Salter, General Manager Cockatoo Island Dockyard. The meeting decided to
 •	proceed with the project ot completing the two vessels urgently;
 •	send a cable to the High Commissioner in London asking him to invite Messrs Denny and the Fairfield Shipbuilding Company to quote a price for and the earliest date of shipment of boiler ends for the vessels;
 •	send a cable from the Government through the Secretary of State for the Colonies hastening the armament le. guns, mountings, torpedoes and torpedo tubes.
The above cables were sent respectively on 2nd and 3rd October 1914. Tenders were received from Denny Bros and Fairfields on 9 October for the provision of boilers and some four days later the Third Naval Member recommended acceptance of the Denny tender The first set of boilers was shipped from Tilbury Docks aboard the mail steamer MALOJA on 14 November and a second set followed on 4 December 1914
It was proposed by the Third Naval Member that the third set of boilers be produced locally at the Eveleigh Railway Workshops. Sydney This was later established as being feasible and subsequently arranged through the New South Wales Government who controlled the workshops.
Tenders for the provision of the gunnery equipment were accepted on 24 October 1914 by the High Commissioner in London. The tenders were placed with Coventry Ordinance Works and provided for acquisition of 4 inch Mark VIII breech loading guns at a cost of £795 Sterling each and 12 pounder quick firing guns at a cost of £518 Sterling each. Contract time for the delivery of the guns was specified as nine months. This delivery schedule was viewed with some concern by the General Manager of Cockatoo Island who estimated that the vessels could be completed by May 1915 if the armament was available Based on the tender provision, however, he estimated that the first vessel could not be completed until October 1915
DERWENT was launched at Cockatoo Island on 19 December 1914 by Mrs J. A. Jensen, wife of the Assistant Minister for Defence. The launching ceremony passed off successfully, although it was not marked by much display considering that DERWENT was the first modern warship to be built completely in Australia. Prior to her completion DERWENTS name was changed. This change of name was announced by the Minister

for Defence on 16 October 1915 who explained that representations had been received from the Admiralty expressing concern that confusion would arise between the destroyer DERWENT already in commission in the Royal Navy and the Australian ship. As the name TAMAR was also in Royal Naval use, it was decided that the ship be named HUON after the Tasmanian River
At launch the steelwork was almost complete and the bridge structure had been erected, however, the seats for armament and weather deck fittings had not been included. No masts, rigging or armament were fitted. About 14 tons ot machinery had been placed on board but no shafting or propellors were fitted. The displacement at launch consisted of:
Tons
196 14 22
1 4 1 2
Total 240 tons
Item
Weight of hull at launch
Machinery
Ballast, men. plant
Temporary chain and anchor
Internal shoring
Temporary fittings, staging etc

Bouyancy of bilge ways
Onboard HMAS PARRAMATTA (1) looking aft.
— by courtesy ot Australian War Memorial (negative no J320I)

Journal ot the Australian Naval Institute — Page 17

Construction continued throughout 1915 and contractors full power trials were carried out on 9 December 1915 oft Maroubra Bay. Sydney The mam propulsion machinery consisted of Parsons Reaction Turbines, with five ahead and two astern turbines. Three Yarrow Small Tube Water boilers were fitted Details of the full power trial which was of eight hours duration are as follows:
Beginning of trial End of trial
 •	Draught of water forward 7 ft 7 in       7 ft 6V2 in
 •	Draught of water aft        7 ft 6'/2 in     7 ft 1V* in
 •	Temperature of sea water 66.8°F
 •	Mean revolutions on all shafts 807 7
 •	Average horsepower — starboard shaft 3 482

 —	centre shaft 3 883
 —	port shaft 3 440

 •	Total horsepower 10 805
 •	Average speed 25 775 knots
 •	Total consumption of oil fuel 44 83 tons
 •	Distance run per ton of fuel 4 6 nautical miles
 •	State of sea — calm slight swell
 •	State of ships bottom — clean
 •	last undecked 23 November 1915
HMAS HUON commissioned at Sydney on 14 December 1915 but did not complete until 2 February 1916.
Armament consisted ot 4 inch Mark VIII gun on a P.V Mark F mounting situated on the forecastle deck Three 12 pounder 12 cwt quick firing guns on P Mark V mountings and one 303 Maxim gun were situated on the upper deck. Three single 18 inch torpedo tubes were also fitted on the upper deck. The ships normal outfit of ammunition consisted of:
 •	4  inch  ammunition  —  95  Lyddite.  65 Common, 14 Practice
 •	12 pounder ammunition — 195 Common, 105 Armour Piercing. 30 Practice,
 •	.303 Maxim — 4 boxes of belts, and
 •	Torpedoes —4 18 inch
Gunnery trials were carried out off Sydney on Monday 13 December 1915 and were recorded as being satisfactory The fourth round of 4 inch was fired on extreme after training starboard to ascertain the effect of blast on ships fittings. This resulted in a glass port and door of the chartroom being broken. The problem was rectified by closing the glass port and opening the door when firing at this extreme bearing. The trials report also recorded that guard stanchions and rails were required on the outside gun platforms of the midships 12 pounder guns for safety of gun crews when firing across deck As the position of midship 12 pounder guns did not allow the loading crew to stand on the deck level with the gun, it was recommended that these guns be shifted closer to the ship's side   It was believed this could be

accomplished without affecting the structural strength ot the ship and would be an advantage in loading operations
Training arcs of the guns were
 •	4 inch -146° starboard to 146° port.
 •	12 pounder starboard gun - 9° starboard to 156° starboard and 70° port to 110° port
 •	12 pounder port gun -10  port to 155  port and 65° starboard to 104° starboard. and
•  12 pounder after gun - 38° starboard to 30° port.
Inclining experiments were carried out on HUON on 2 February 1916 to establish meta centric heights and stability The following metacentric heights were recorded
 •	Condition A — The ship when fully equipped with reserve feed tanks empty, no oil in peace tanks, and 79 tons of oil in war tanks (each tank about half full) has a draft of 7 feet 1 inch and a metacentric height of 1 43 feet,
 •	Condition B — The ship when fully equipped with fresh wafer, reserve leed and all oil tanks full, le with 174 tons of oil on board has a mean draught of 7 feet 11 inches and a metacentric height of 2.12 feet; and
 •	Condition C — The ship with all oil reserve feed water, fresh water, and provisions and half the warrant officers stores consumed, the draft becomes 6 feel 4 inches and the metacentric height is 1 66 feet.
The angles at which the ship reaches her maximum stability was 45° in condition A, 48° in condition B and 47° in condition C The angles at which the stability entirely vanishes was 73° in condition A. 78° in condition B and 69° in condition C
As completed HUON carried one motor pinnace with a length of 21 feet 9 inches and a breadth of 6 feet 3 inches, a whaler with a length of 25 feet 2 inches, and a 13 foot 8 inch dinghy
HUON cost £148.315 ($296,630) and hei principle charactenstics as completed were:
Displacement:
Sea going displacement
•	with oil tanks full, deep load draught 750
tons
•	including oil fuel at load draught 700 tons
Numbers of tons necessary to increase draught
by 1 inch at load draught 10.6.
Dimensions:
length between perpendiculars 245 feet length overall 250 feet 10 inches Breadth extreme 24 feet 34* inches

Page 18 — Journal ot the Australian Naval Institute

Accommodation:
Number required for   Numbers provided for Supernumeraries that
approved complement	in the ship	can be berthed

Captain	1	
Wardroom officers	2	
Warrant officers	1	
Chief petty officers	12	
Sailors	55	
71
Total

1
3
1
13
60
78

1 5

Dimensions (continued):
Draught — deep load forward 7 feet 11 inches
 —	deep load aft 7 feet 11 inches
 —	load forward 7 feet 6 inches
 —	load aft 7 feet 6 inches Draught moulded 14 feet 9V« inches
Total length of engine rooms 43 feet 9V?
inches
Total length of boiler rooms 57 feet 8%»
inches
HUON continued working up off the New South Wales coast until 19 June 1916 when she sailed from Sydney to Borneo to enter service as a unit of the British Far East Patrol. Based initially on Sandakan and later Singapore. HUON patrolled the Philippines. Dutch East Indies and Malayan areas until May 1917. This activity consisted of seemingly endless patrolling, intermingled with exercises and the visit and search of vessels plying Far Eastern waters
The six Australian torpedo boat destroyers were divided into two divisions. In mid 1917 the first division of PARRAMATTA. WARREGO and

YARRA were patrolling in South East Australian waters, while the second division consisting of HUON, SWAN and TORRENS were in the Singapore area.
On 9 May 1917 the British Government sought Australian agreement to deploy the first division to the Mediterranean to meet the growing submarine threat In response the Australian Government agreed to this request and indicated its willingness for the second division also to be deployed to the Mediterranean The second division sailed from Singapore to Cocos Island arriving on 7 July 1917 and rendezvoused with the first division. Commander Warren of HMAS PARRAMATTA took command of the flotilla After fuelling the flotilla departed for Diego Garcia to search for survivors of the Bntish merchant ships JUMNA and WORDSWORTH which had been lost earlier in the year. No trace of survivors was found and the flotilla sailed for the Mediterranean via the Seychelles and Port Said. Admiralty orders were received in Port Said that HUON, PARRAMATTA, TORRENS and YARRA were to escort a convoy from Port Said to Malta This task

HMAS HUON with observation balloon in Mediterranean 1918.
— by courtesy ot Australian War memorial fPhoto No EN2B3I Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute — Page 19

provided the escorts with the first of many sub-manne engagements they were o have whilst in the Mediterranean.
HUON refitted at Malta between 20 August and 20 September 1917 During this refit she was fitted with four depth charge chutes, pipes and connections for emitting smoke screens and percussion firing gear to the 12 pounder gun mountings
From 24 to 27 September HUON, PARR AM ATT A and TORRENS participated in gunnery and torpedo exercises off Corfu. On 6 to 9 October 1917 the flotilla carried out combined exercises mainly to trial a new torpedo which had just been received
From October 1917 the destroyers were based at Brindisi, Italy to patrol ai the mouth of the Adriatic Sea This patrol was aimed at preventing Austrian submarines based at Pola from reaching the Mediterranean Patrols were undertaken on the basis of each division operating four days on patrol and four in port Ol the three destroyers in harbour two were always at hah an hours notice for sea. Daylight patrol was usually undertaken with the three destroyers steaming in line abreast and about a mile apart At night ships steamed in line ahead usually two or three cables apart.
During the initial stages of the deployment, submarine activity was intense and engagements were frequent Later the Austrian submarine campaign declined and the patrols became more routine HUON continued on these patrols until April 1918 when she sailed for Malta to undergo a refit. This refit commenced en 17 April and completed on 16 May 1918 A number of modifications were undertaken durng this refit to enhance HUON'S capabiliies These included the fitting of:
 •	two depth charge throwe's;
 •	hydrophone suspension gear and a directional hydrophone,
 •	a spray shield to the 4 inch gun,
 •	percussion   firing   gear   to   the  4   inch mounting;
 •	training index racers to 4 inch and 12 pounder mountings, and
 •	an observation balloon.
In addition the after torpedo tube was removed and the main mast was moved forward to accommodate the observation balloon.
PARRAMATTA and YARRA were also fitted with observation balloons. These balloons were flown from ships and earned an observer who was intended to detect submarines and direct the

accompanying ships into a position for a successful attack on the submarine
After her refit HUON returned to Brindisi On 9 August 1918 HMA ships HUON and YARRA collided in the Straits of Otranto Both ships received structural damage HUON'S stem was knocked over to starboard and the stem piece was fractured below the waterline HUON proceeded to Jenoa dockyard for repairs where she remained until 10 November 1918
The following month HUON rendezvoused with PARRAMATTA. SWAN and YARRA in the Sea of Marmora. They then proceeded to Plymouth with TORRENS joining at Malta and WARREGO at Gibraltar. En route the flotilla encountered a severe storm off Cape Finisterre during which HUON and PARRAMATTA were damaged and sought refuge at Ferrol, Spain.
HUON arrived at Plymouth on 14 January 1919 and two days later commenced a refit at Devonport Dockyard. During this refit which completed on 28 February 1919, the two foremost depth charge chutes were removed and an additional plate was fitted to the forward funnel
The destroyer flotilla reassembled at Malta and on 17 March 1919 sailed for Australia in company with the cruiser HMAS MELBOURNE. The ships reached Sydney on 21 May 1919.
In October to November, 1919, HUON took part in the annual fleet spnng cruise to Queensland waters. The following January she sailed with other units of the fleet tor a Tasmaman cruise On 26 May. 1920 HUON. with some 25 other ships and 6 submarines of the RAN assembled in Port Phillip Bay for the arrival of HRH the Prince of Wales in the battle cruiser. HMS RENOWN. In July. HUON was one of the escorts of RENOWN for the Prince s visit to South Australia.
On 25 July 1920, HUON returned to Sydney where she paid off into Reserve on 9 August 1920. HUON recommissioned on 22 April 1921 for further service on the Australia station While lying off Yellow Bluff on 9 February 1922 with engines stopped, HUON was struck by HMA submarine J4 on the starboard side at No. 1 bulkhead. The submannes port planeguard penetrated HUON'S hull about two feet below the waterline The hole was immediately plugged with waste and a collision mat inserted to stop the flow of water. HUON later returned to Sydney where she paid off into Reserve on 2 June 1922
From 22 September 1924 to 26 May 1928 HUON was based at Hobart for reserve training

Page 20 — Journal ot the Australian Wa> at Institute

HMAS HUON — post World War I (note funnel cap)
— by courtesy of Australian War Memorial (Negative No H1752I)

On 28 May 1928 she returned to Sydney and paid off into Reserve there on 7 June 1928.
HUON was stripped of most of her armament and equipment at Cockatoo Island dockyard and on 10 April 1931 she was towed out of Sydney Harbour by the tug HEROIC. Some 20 miles off

Sydney Heads HUON was used as a target by the cruisers AUSTRALIA and CANBERRA, the destroyer leader ANZAC and the seaplane carrier ALBATROSS. Following target practice a demolition crew from AUSTRALIA laid charges in HUON. The ship was broken In two by these charges and sank.

REFERENCES:

 1	Ships Book - HMAS HUON
 2	Navy Office file 11/3652 Torpedo Boat Destroyers for Australian Navy (3 No ) File No 1 — Acceptance ol Tenders Correspondence February — March 1909
 3	Navy Office file 11/3653 TB Destroyers. (River Classl Construction of Yarra. Parramatta — File No. 2 Correspondence Apnl 1909 — October 1910
 4	Navy Office file 12/6923 HMAS BRISBANE and HMATBD TORRENS. SWAN and DERWENT later HUON Contract for Construction ol
 5	Navy Office tile 15/2247 HMATBD s 4.5 and 6 Expediting Completion Consequent on Outbreak of War. August 1914
 6	Diary of Stoker. Petty Officer E N Morris (DSM) HMAS HI ION 26 January 1916 to 14 January 1919 held by Australian War Memonal Library. Canberra

7      Naval Histoncal Section. Department of Defence. HMAS
HUON — Ships History 6.      Commonwealth ol Australia Hansard —  Senate and
House ol Representatives, various dates
 9	AW Jose Official History, ol Australia in the War ol 1914-ffl Volume IX— The Royal Australian Navy. Angus and Robertson Sydney. 1943
 10	G L Macandie The Genesis ol the Royal Australian Navy. Government Pnnler. Sydney, 1949
 11	RG Parker Cockafoo Island. Thomas Nelson Singapore 1977
 12	The Melbourne Argus, 27 January 1913 21 December 1914 and 160ctober 1915
 13	The Sydney Morning Herald. 13 April 1931

Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute — Page 21

SEAKEEPING

HMA3H0BART     TASMAN SEA     WINTER 1979
Page 2? — Journal ot the Australian Naval Institute

KORTENAER
— THE INTERNATIONAL FRIGATE
I. CONCEPT AND CHARACTERISTICS
By Ross Gillett

HNMS KORTENAER, leadship of the Royal Netherlands Navy s new Standard type frigate, recently visited Fremantle, Western Australia, as part of a Dutch task group to celebrate the 150th anniversary of the state. Accompanying KORTENAER were the guided missile destroyer TROMP, the twenty-two year old Freisland class destroyer DRENTHE, and the fast combat support ship POOLSTER.
KORTENAER was onginally designed upon similar lines to the TROMP as a general purpose frigate, but unlike the latter, lacks command and area-defence capabilities A modern warship built for deep water operations, she is intended to participate in stand-off battles against surface, air and under-water targets. Twelve of the class have now been ordered and a projected thirteenth, intended to act as a flagship and armed with a long-range anti-air defence weapon, has been deferred. Orders for a further dozen are reported to have been placed by the Imperial Iranian Navy. However, these may have now been cancelled due to the present political climate in that country.
The KORTENAER class of frigates are intended to become the backbone of the Dutch Navy into the 1980s and beyond. Present indications forsee a force comprising three main task groups. Central air defence and the command element for escort groups is provided by two TROMP class vessels commissioned in 1975 and 1976 respectively Mid-lite modernisation is set down for the 1984-88 period. In addition, a command frigate has been planned for some time to follow the last of the standard frigates. Although now deleted from the new construction programme, the vessel was to have operated as the central element for its escort group. Considering numbers only, the one dozen standard frigates form the principal construction project of the present day navy.

All KORTENAER class ships will receive their mid-life modernisation beginning around 1988 The six ship VAN SPEIJK class of frigates are in the process of modernisation, with the last ship programmed to rejoin the fleet in 1982 The work will involve a new weapon and command system, almost identical with that of the Standard type frigate. The present force of six WOLF class covettes or small frigates will be replaced by four new helicopter variants in the early 1980s Additional submarines are envisaged for the period 1982-86 as replacements for the four DOLFIJIN class. The two ZWAARDVIS class are scheduled for mid-life modernisation between 1979-84
A tripartite arrangement between France, Belgium and The Netherlands is progressing with the construction of 45 minehunters. including 15 for the Netherlands The first Dutch ship will commission in 1981, the last in 1986 As well as ships, shore-based aircraft squadrons are receiving new Lynx helicopters, and a new maritime patrol aircraft to replace the obsolescent P2V7 has been chosen.
Origin of the Standard Frigate
Born out of a naval requirement to successfully fulfil eight separate tasks, the initial planning for KORTENAER dates back to 1969 when the need for follow-on ships to replace the HOLLAND
THE AUTHOR
Ross Gillett is a public servant employed in the NSW Department ot Education He is the author ot the Warships ol Australia and is al present Ihe Secretary of the Naval Historical Society Together with Hal Thomsett, the author ol Ihe second part ol this article he was invited by a consortium ot Dutch shipbuilders and delence equipment manufacturers to represent Ihe Australian Naval Institute clunng the visit to Fremantle by the Royal Netherlands Navy squadron in May. 1979

Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute — Page 23

tSba^J i—l   u—l—,—

- ."i_j.«.

HNMS KORTENAER 5 June 1979
- by courtesy ot Chrts Gee

and FRIESLAND classes in the 1980s became increasingly apparent As a res jit ol initial studies, the first design emerged from tne drawing boards in 1970, primarily an enlarged, broad-beamed LEANDER type, but with improvements in the ship-borne armament. Called the Frigate 75 she was to displace approximately 3.000 tons, with a speed ot 28 knots and a ship s complement of 225 all ranks
Discussions with British authorities as to the feasibility of a combined Anglo-Dutch effort to produce a new frigate for both navies was commenced after cancellation ol Frigate 75', but eventually these attempts were also abandoned The Anglo-Dutch or AD trigate programme loresaw a 3,600 ton ship with the same speed as frigate 75 . but with a reduced complement ol 215 officers and men.
Other designs offered to the Royal Netherlands Navy were the American Patrol Frigate (FFG 7 class), and the French GEORGE LEYGUES type, of which the lead ship was completed in 1978 In late 1970 a further design, designated the D-lngate was considered as was also the Royal Navys Type 22. or BROADSWORD class Four more years elapsed before the final S class design was approved, with contracts for the first four ships being awarded in October, 1974, to the Royal Scheldt Yard A second batch ol foui was ordered the ensuing month, with the sane builders being selected A third batch was later ordered.
t>age 24 — Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute

As previously mentioned, the new S' class legates were designed to successtully fulfil eight requirements, these being a maximum speed ot 30 knots with a normal range of 4.000 miles at a cruising speed ot 20 knots; an ability to successfully operate in the North Atlantic Ocean against surface, air and sub-surface threats; the ability to operate a helicopter with its own submarine detection facilities; a reduction of manpower requirements to be achieved through automation, a balanced armament against missiles, surface, air and sub-surface targets; standardisation ol equipment with NATO and existing ships, sufficient space for subsequent improvements and installation of additional equipment, and the possibility ol equipping the ship with different types of armament.
Operational experience has shown that all ol these eight requirements have been met successfully In respect ot the final point, the second 76 mm Oto fvtelara gun mounted on top of the helicopter hangar is shortly to be replaced by a quick-firing close-in weapons system, and although not included in original plans, eight Harpoon canisters have been mounted amidships, behind the bridge superstructure Standardisation with other NATO countries has been achieved via a Canadian bow-mounted sonar, Italian guns, American torpedoes and Harpoon missiles, NATO Sea Sparrow anti-aircrafl missiles and, lastly, the British Westland Lynx helicoter Fully integrated with Dutch electronic equipment from Phillips and finally Rolls Royce

Olympus    and     Tyne    gas    turbines,    the KORTENAER is a truly international warship
KORTENAER'S principal role with her eleven sister ships will be to form part of an overall task group, comprising a flagship of the TROMP class, six fngates and a fast combat support ship, backed up by patrol squadrons of the Netherlands Fleet Air Arm.
Characteristics
KORTENAER displaces about 3.500 tons and measures — length (overall) x beam x draught — 419.8 x 47.2 x 14.3 feet With both Rolls Royce Olympus gas turbines producing 50,000 shp KORTENAER'S top speed is slightly greater than 30 knots. Endurance has been set at 4.000 miles on the Tyne cruising turbines (8.000 shp). A total crew of only 185 officers and men can operate KORTENAER. although accommodation is provided for a total of 200, (18 officers, 35 CPOs and 147 other ranks)
The Dutch rightly claim KORTENAER is an integrated system, a result of compromise between a set budget and envisaged performance Automation is applied wherever possible and a maximum simplification of maintenance work governs the layout of the ship. KORTENAER has been designed to accept replenishment at sea, thus sustaining prolonged operations
Weapon Systems
The frigate boasts five separate weapon systems:
 •	two single mounts for the Oto Melara 76 mm gun
 •	one launcher for NATO Sea Sparrow anti-air missile system
 •	two quadruple  launchers for Harpoon surface to surface missiles
 •	two triple banks for Mk46 lorpedoes
 •	two Westland Lynx helicopters.
As originally built, KORTENAER has carried a single 76mm gun in A' position and another atop the helicopter hangar. The gun has a rate of fire of 120 rounds per minute and is effective against air targets, and. to a lesser degree, surface objects. The gun currently mounted aft. atop the hangar, will eventually be replaced by a rapid-firing close-in weapons system, with a 35mm mount being the current contender. The Oto Melara gun is unmanned and can be completely replaced within a very short period of time.
Immediately behind the forward 76 mm mount is an eight cell NATO Sea Sparrow launcher. The missile serves both anti-air and anti missile roles and has a maximum range of ■ 12 miles. Reloads are provided

Launchers for Harpoon surface to surface missiles are located port and starboard abaft the bridge structure. Each missile is fired across the beam, to allow the exhaust to fall clear of the ship No reloads are carried for the 60 mile range missile, nor is there provision for mid-course alterations to the flight path Final plans call for two quadruple launchers, but only three missile tubes are currently borne
Anti-submarine defence is provided via the two banks of triple Mk32 fixed torpedo tubes firing Mk46 torpedoes. Each weapon is reloaded inside the after deckhouse
The two embarked Westland Lynx helicop ters provide KORTENAER with the mobile platform required to successfully wage long-range anti-submarine warfare. Normally each Lynx carries two torpedoes or missiles within a maximum mission radius of 154 nautical miles. Normal cruising speed of the aircraft is 148 knots Initially. 16 Lynx have been ordered
Mechanical Aspects
Principal power for KORTENAER is via a COGOG arrangement consisting of Rolls Royce Olympus and Tyne gas turbines. In the forward engine room, are the two Olympus TM3B main turbines, while the two Tyne RMIC cruising turbines are located immediately aft in the second engine room. As well. Iifteen distinct auxiliary machinery systems are installed, powering a lolal of thirty-eight generators, stabilisers, pumps, compressors and the like
Electrical power is produced by the four diesel generators housed in the forward and after compartments, which in turn are separated by the engine rooms. The entire machinery system, propulsion, power generation and ancillanes. is manned by only four crew members. (Chief of the Watch, two for the engine-room panel and one for the electrical panel)
Construction
Each Standard class frigate was builf on an under-cover slipway and beneath a covered construction dock. The slipway roof has sufficient room only for the height of the hull to be constructed, and after launching is moved into the dock for the superstructure to be added. The initial eight ships of the class are being built by the Royal Scheldt Company, Fleeslmg. the ninth and tenth by Wilton-Fyenoord at Schiedom and the eleventh and twelth also by Royal Schedlt company at Flushing
Climatic conditions have proved the main reasoning behind under-cover construction The size of the slipway allows building of one complete

Journal ot the Australian Naval Institute — Page 25

hull to be performed as well as the midship section of a second. After the official launching the smaller midship section is then moved to its correct position, thus allowing work to commence on the forward and stern parts. A lurther midship section is then laid down
KORTENAER'S Predecessors
The present fngate is the eighth ship in the Royal Netherlands Navy to bear the name The first, built in Rotterdam for the Admiralty in 1780. was a 68 gun ship of the line In 1795 she was replaced by the second KORTENAER.
The third was constructed in the year 1819 and mounted 80 guns of various calibre. A 74 gun ship was the fourth KORTENAER. She was built in Amsterdam in 1825 and sen/ed with the naval

HNMS KORTENAER alongside in Fremantle May 1979
— by courtesy ot ftoss Gillett
Page 26 — Journal ot the Australian Naval Institute

forces between 1833 and 1879 The first iron-clad to bear the name was the fifth KORTENAER This vessel was launched in 1894 and carried a main armament comprising 3 x 8 2 inch, 35 calibre. 2 x 6 inch. 6 x 12 pdr and 6 x 1 pdr guns. Two torpedo tubes were also mounted With a speed of 16 knots (4.800 ihp) she remained in use until the First World War
The sixth vessel to bear the name was a 1,640 ton destroyer built during 1926-27 While in service in the Dutch East Indies, she was torpedoed by Japanese destroyers 43 miles south-west of Bawean Island on 27th February. 1942. The immediate predecessor to the current ship was an S class destroyer transferred from the Royal Navy in 1942 as a replacement lor her lost namesake In 1945 she was purchased outright and commissioned into the RNN on 1st October. During 1957-58 she was rebuilt into a fast fngate with the addition of a helicopter platform aft between the funnel and X turret As converted, the ship recommissioned on 15th October, 1959 By 1963. age was beginning to show and the seventh KORTENAER was deleted from the navy list Fifteen years were to elapse before the commissioning of the eighth and present KORTENAER.
Conclusion
No one can nghly deny the progress made by the Dutch during the production of their frigate From the approval to begin in December. 1973. some one dozen ships are now planned to comprise three distinct task groups, two to be headed by TROMP class frigates The keel for the first ship was laid on 8th April 1975, with launching on 18th December. 1976 Sea trials followed in April, 1978. and commissioning later the same year Table 1 illustrates the current fngate construction programme
As a result of Dutch progress, the Federal German Navy chose as a basis for their Fregatte F-122 proiect, the Netherlands S class Many similarities between the two designs are quite evident. The Type 122 frigate will boast the same hull lines as its Dutch counterpart, although displacing some 300 tons more Length and beam remain almost identical, but draught increases from 14.3 to 19.7 feet Basically, the same armament will be carried but with the addition of two missile launchers for close-in defence The type of helicopter for the German ship has also not been determined.
Much of the KORTENAER'S equipment, described earlier, is currently in use with NATO navies. The propulsion system is common with the TROMP class as well as being used by France, Belgium and the Royal Navy NATO Sea Sparrow is now in use with some six NATO forces and the OTO Melara gun has been purchased by

five navies including the Netherlands Harpoon. Mk46 torpedoes and the Lynx hehcophter are entering service world wide.
The provision of space for continuous updating of weapons, sensors and other equipment onboard KORTENAER will ensure her viability as an effective fighting unit well into the twenty-first century. In the short time since her commissioning KORTENAER has proved a successful addition to the Royal Netherlands Navy and has

evoked quite a deal of interest in her design from abroad.
When the entire class is commissioned, the Dutch will possess a fleet of ocean-going general-purpose warships, designed tor world-wide operations. Despite being in a considerable state of flux with new construction and modernisations, the Dutch naval force is endeavouring to improve its long-term capabilities to successfully meet all operational requirements Finally, in these days of ugly ship designs, the Dutch can rightly claim pride with their latest effort

Table 1

Name
KORTENAER CALLENBURGH VAN KINSBERGEN BANCKERT PIETER FLORISZ WITTEDEWITH ABRAHAM CRIJNSSEN PHILLIPS VAN ALMONDE WILLEM VAN DER ZAAN BLOIS VAN TRESLONG JAN VAN BRAKEL

•(F)	Laid Down	Completion	
807	8/ 4/75	1978	
808	30/ 6/75	1979	
809	2/ 9/75	1980	
810	25/ 2/76	1981	
812	1/  7/77	1982	
813	1978	1983	
816	1979	1984	
823	3/10/77	1981	
824	1979		
825		1984	
826		1984	

II. SOME THOUGHTS FOR AUSTRALIA
By Hal Thomsett

Lasl May I was privileged to be invited to inspect HNMS KORTENAER when Admiral Scheuer brought his Royal Netherlands Navy Task Group to Perth. This frigate is the first of the new Dutch Standard Frigates, a class of ship which is a contender for our next ship purchase after the FFG There were two features of the ship which I consider warrant special attention in the Australian context. When our Navy goes shopping for a new destroyer and should this ship be one o\ those considered, each of these features could influence the final choice. I refer to the reserves of capacity designed into the ship and the fact that the ship could, to a considerable degree, be manufactured in Australia.
After I have addressed these points I will air my thoughts or the impact that future ship designs may have upon our present ship maintenance and ship manning policies. My views on these subjects were re-affirmed by my visit to the KORTENAER

Reserve of Capacity
The reserve electrical power capacity of the KORTENAER is impressive. The ship has four 750 kw. diesel generators while I understand its designed peak working load is less than 1500 kw To support this claim the ship s officers stated that only two generators are put on-line at action stations.
The manufacturers of the ship claim that Adequate reserve buoyancy and stability have
THE AUTHOR
Hal Thomsett was a Commander GLENWE when he resigned Irom the Navy in February 197B Dura iu the lasl 10 years ol his career, he served lor periods ol two and a hart years each in HMAS BRISBANE, in HMAS HOBART and on exchange in the U.S.N, he also had brief tours ot duly wilh RANTAU and in Canberra In 1971 he was Mentioned-in-Dispalches lor service in HMAS BRISBANE during her lasl deployment in Vietnam He now works for Plessey Australia Pty Ltd , as the Production Manager (electronics) ol their Telecommunications Division at Meadowbank. Sydney

Journal ol me Australian Naval Institute — Page 27

been incorporated m the design allowing for future improvements or modernisation. The extent to which these claims can be justified will be established only after close scrutiny by our naval architects; however the ship does have a ballast tank forward which. I was advised, holds 60 tonnes of seawater ballast This tank is situated below the forward gun and immediately abaft the sonar transducer, and should provide al least some scope lor in-life weapon and transducer up-dates As one walks through the ship one gains the impression that it is quite spacious Indeed the ship appears to have considerable reserves of space and because ol its design it should be able to accommodate future equipment changes without ma|or structural alterations
Both the DDGs and FFGs were ships designed specifically tor use by the US navy which offered little opportunity, without considerable expense, for us to modify them to our own particular needs or wants Toe KORTENAER class gives the impression ol a ship which, like the Holden car. is designed to accept a wide variety ot customer options
Australian Industry Participation (AIP)
The AIP legislation requires the suppliers of equipment purchased overseas to arrange tor a significant proportion of the manufacturing costs of that equipment to be expended in Australia. One of the purposes ol the legislation is to ensure that Australian industry retains and continues to develop the capability to supoort our defence forces Additionally it represents an attempt to minimise the adverse effect of major government purchases overseas upon our balance of payments.
The concept of local industrial participation is not uniquely Australian It is already being implemented successfully in Canada and in a number of European countries Some ma|or defence equipment suppliers in America and Europe are now meeting these parochial requirements of customer countries I believe that the more progressive international industrial conglomerates accept the inevitability ot this trend towards local industrial participation and are organising their subsidiaries accordingly
To date, as was the case with the purchase of the FFGs. our three defence departments have often sought and been granted exemptions from the AIP provisions Grounds tor these exemptions have included -
 •	The refusal of the supplier to even contemplate AIP knowing he is the sole source of supply to a captive market
 •	The punitive additional costs of estab

lishing facilities in Australia for production of equipment already in production overseas
 •	The unacceptably long lead times required by Australian industry to tool up for production
 •	The claimed inability of our industries to do the job because we have already fallen behind technologically and no longer have the required expertise
There are many other sound reasons why the concept of local industrial participation has not yet matured into meaningful reality in Australia However, if anyone considers that major exemptions will be readily forthcoming in the future he should reflect upon the problem currently confronting the RAAF The Air Force is attempting to prune its shopping list for the next generation fighter down to a short list of two aircraft One of the factors frustrating and interfering with their decision is the government s insistence that the AIP requirements be met It is quite conceivable that the choice of the next generation ship will be influenced more by AIP considerations than by such factors as what the RAN needs
While I am not competent to foresee what the Navy might want in its next generation ship. I have little doubt that the KORTENAER class frigate is one ship the purchase conditions of which can be arranged to meet our AIP requirements For instance, Hollandse Signaalapparaten B V a Philips company, supplied most ot the electronics in this ship. The Philips subsidiaries in Australia such as PHILIPS-TMC of Moorebank. Sydney, have the expertise and. with the support of their sister companies overseas, they could manufacture nearly all of the fire control and electronic systems in this country at quite short notice
Personnel Costs
While looking over KORTENAER I began to wonder how we would man such a ship I have given much thought to this subject and have reached the conclusion, perhaps impertinently, that we should review thoroughly our current policies of shipboard maintenance and personnel employment. I must stress that I have no know ledge ol current plans concerning future trends in these areas and apologise if. to some extent. I preach to the converted
By far the largest expenditure category in the Navy s recent budgets has been the cost of personnel. It has become the major overriding constraint influencing all capital spend decisions At the moment, any decision about future pur chases of ships is governed more by considerations ot how much money will be left over after we have paid the personnel bill, than by factors

Page 78 - Journal ol me Australian Na*al Insliluto

such as equipment obsolescence and strategic need. If we can assume that defence spending ceilings will continue to limit the funds available to the RAN. I suggest that we should concentrate our planning efforts upon attempts to get optimum value from the personnel dollar, thus we can release as much money as possible for capital expenditure.
In the two matters discussed below I propose, among other things, ways by which we can better utilise our personnel.
Maintenance of Future Electronic and Weapon Systems
Before the turn of the century, there will be warships at sea with maintenance-free electronic and weapon systems. (By maintenance-free I mean not requiring maintenance by skilled tradesmen) These systems will be so designed that preventive maintenance will take the form of system performance and self-calibration checks, and corrective maintenance will use the technique of repair by replacement
Within the next decade the micro-miniatuns-ation of electronic circuitry will have developed to the point where a system can be programmed to diagnose its own faults. Further more, provided components are burned-in, which is now a standard military requirement, modern solid state circuitry rarely fails in use
These advances have come too late to affect significantly   our   next   generation   of   ships;

however they can have a profound effect on the subsequent generation which is now in the conceptual stage. If we are prepared to make the design effort and to pay the higher initial policy which allowed all corrective maintenance in the fleet to be pedormed by unskilled personnel repairing by replacement at the circuit board or sub-module level I suggest that the subsequent generation of ships will need to earn/ a very small number of skilled tradesmen who will be the user/ maintainers of a few mechanical, electromechanical and electrical machines and weapons.
With this prospect in sight we should be planning now to phase out the Navy's uniformed electronic tradesmen.
The next ships we buy will help us to move towards this ultimate goal The state of the art has already advanced sufficiently to enable us to adopt a maintenance policy for these ships which would have most fundamental in-circuit fault correction performed ashore. The ships will need to carry a large inventory of spare plug-in modules and of course they will also need to carry some. but a reduced number, of tradesmen. World trends in ships and system design are in this direction and if we intend to buy rather than build we may be forced, whether we want it or not, to adopt this "shore support" philosophy of fleet maintenance.
If the Navy moves positively in this direction and plans the maximum possible use of shore-based maintenance tor the next generation ships, a really significant cost saving could result. When

pU,#i

■

HNMS CALLENBURGH undergoing sea trials 1979
— by courtesy ot James Goss Journal ot the Australian Naval Institute — Page 29

a company embarks-upon the manufacture of a new electronic product which is not destined for mass production the high ccst of production tooling and product-dedicated testing and burn-in facilities invariably exceeds the combined costs of material, components and labour It, during the initial ship purchase negotiations, contracts for in-service maintenance were also considered the high set-up costs of the production test/repair facility could be amortised over the life of the ship Additionally, if such maintenance contracts were let. we could avoid the big expense of establishing duplicated and potentially superfluous test and repair facilities in ships and docxyards
Personnel Structure and Manning
The General List System of officer employment and the departmental organisation of sailors that stems from it have served us well to date However, trends in modern warship design and naval warfare have rendered our personnel structures inefficient and wasteful and could, if retained, cause us to be unable to cope with likely future developments.
Our Navy acquitted itself very well during gunline operations in the Vietnam War when, except for one tour of duty by HMAS VENDETTA, we were represented by DDGs The reason we did so well was the way we manned these American ships. Originally designed for the US Navy which employs the user/naintainer concept extensively, they were spacious enough to take an Australian crew of 330 oeople organised around the General List philosophy of separating users from maintainers Our success stemmed from our being able to man these ships with user specialists and maintenance specialists each one of whom was considerably more qualified and experienced in his field than his counterpart filling a similr- hillel in the USN ships.
it 'a sad that the DDG is the last class of ship that our Navy will use which permits us the luxury of having all key billets filled with officers and men who are highly and narrowly trained specialists in each billet role The DDL experience is proof of the fact that our nation is not big enough for us to have the pnvilege of being aole to design and build a ship tailored to the manning policies of other nations While we put 330 people into a DDG, we must now plan to nan ships no less complex and no smaller with less than 200 men (note the KORTENAERS complement of 185 officers and men) If we are to hold our place in the hierarchy of naval powers, we must accept the inevitable and move towards a new manning policy which allows fewer people to be borne in ships but which attempts to minimise the adverse effects of a reduction in the level of specialisation of our ship-borne personnel.

We must tailor our manning and training policies to suit the new breed of ship, which is typified by a vessel such as the KORTENAER
In respect of the sailors, we have already been forced to make one break from tradition in the DDGs by staffing the weapon systems with user/maintainers. This compromise worked, why not develop the trend further91 believe the correct course to follow would be to develop the user/ maintainer concept as broadly and fully as possible and extend it to include the eventual amalgamation of the GLEX and GLENWE streams of offficers
The officer manning constraints imposed upon us by the new ships should force us to question the wisdom of retaining the division between the GLEX and GLENWE streams Recent trends in the training of GLEX officers and in the employment in OPS Rooms ot GLENWE officers have brought the two categories much closer together than they were in the past Indeed we now have the situation in DDGs where the officers who know most about the characteristics, capabilities, limitations and operational use of weapon systems are engineers. Is it not wasteful that many ot these officers are removed from the fleet, never to return to sea. after one charge |ob as a junior Commander9 These same engineers, because ol their involvement in routine and action OPS Room procedures and because of the sure ot their divisions, also acquire a good knowledge of all aspects of running and fighting a ship
We should be developing an officer structure which combines the two categories to utilise fully these wasted talents Not only would it enable us to man the new breed of ships more efficiently, it would also ensure that our commanding officers continue to have a thorough empathy with the weapons systems placed at their disposal The longer the two categories remain separated the more likely it is that one day we may have commanding officers who do not understand their ships sufficiently to fight them wisely or effectively
While it may take ten years to buy or build a new ship it is likely to take twice as long to change the Navy s manning philosophies and reorganise the personnel infrastructure so that we are equipped to man the new ships most efficiently However in the short term there is a way that benefits can be obtained from the continued use in the fleet of GLENWE officers who have had charge jobs in DDGs and FFGs. Those officers who have the aptitude, and who wish it, could be given the opportunity to obtain Bridge Watch-keeping Certificates so that they can be included in the pool of officers from which sea command /obs are tilled

Page 30 - Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute

SIXTY YEARS OF AUSTRALIAN DESTROYERS

HMAS YARRA (1) (commissioned 1910. dismantled 1929)
— by courtesy ot Australian War Memorial (Negative NO H17519J

HMAS QUIBERON (commissioned 1942. converted to ASW Frigate 1957. scrapped 1972)
— by courtesy ol Australian War Memorial (Negative No  107173)

ffci*

HMAS SWAN (3) (commissioned 1969)
— by courtesy ot John Mortimer
Journal ot the Australian Naval Institute — Page 31

a.
I
2
0)

THE PROTECTION OF SHIPPING — What Some Strategists Think
By Lieutenant Commander C.A. Barrie RAN
'Notwithstanding all the familiar and unfamiliar dangers of the sea. both tiavei and traffic by water have always been easier and cheaper than by land
— Mahan
As long as the mercantile and military traffic of a nation is chiefly seaborne, the stoppage of that traffic will be a strategic requirement of great importance '
- Roskill
He that commands the sea is at great liberty and may take as much, and as little, of the war as he will
— Francis Bacon 1561 1626 AD

Many present day technologists consider that the convoying of ships could become a disaster, in their view, the lessons of history count for nothing They argue that the great advances made in platforms and weapons since the end of World War II have rendered invalid all previous concepts for defending shipping. Before we hasten to accept these views, it might be worthwhile to stop and consider how some well-known maritime strategists have viewed the requirement and concepts for the protection of shipping
In a widely publicised series of articles written in 1972 and 1973, Admiral S G Gorshkov of the Soviet Union wrote that a nation s sea power is determined not only by the weapons and armed forces with which it can affect events at sea but also by its merchant marine, its fishing and oceanographic fleets, its maritime outlook and tradition (1) Then, Gorshkov was well placed to greatly influence his country s perceptions of the way to use the sea
Over the last twenty years, the Soviet Union has extended and intensified its use of the sea. not only in naval operations but in commercial activities also It has transformed the merchant fleet from that insignificant, coastal oriented fleet to rank first in the world in numbers of ships, and sixth in terms of deadweight (carrying) tonnage (2) At present, the Soviet merchant marine operates on some sixty different trade routes and because it is regulated carefully by the State, it is

capable of performing either as a viable peace time commercial organisation or in wartime in a military logistics role
The great American strategist. Mahan, postulated that it was the commercial and military use of the sea which had made Britain so powerful He deduced from this that navies had two purposes The first was to protect commerce and ensure that trade routes across the seas are available for use as required, the second purpose was to use naval forces to acquire trade, colonies and bases in distant lands (3) Today, this second purpose needs adjustment; nations do not seize colonies etc, any more but rather they use their seaborne forces to bring power to bear in distant regions in suppod of allies, or to coerce enemies, or simply to prevent another power trom acting in the area
THE AUTHOR
Lieutenanl Commander Barne graduated Irrjm me RANC in 1964 In his early career he was in Ihe commissioning crew of HMAS BRISBANE, served in Vietnam and commanded HMAS BUCCANEER Sub sequently he specialized in navigation and after serving in HMAS EASTBOURNE and HMAS PERTH he qualified on the last dagger N course In 1976 he served in HMAS DUCHESS and Wen giadu.n-.l ' Australian Army Staff College of Quoensr-litt in 1977 Since Ihen he has been serving m the Plans an Branch at Navy Office

;.     r	■ -no Australian Nnvii inslitulv

But while protection of commerce in peace and war is a basic requirement we should add that in wartime a navy must protect the sea lines of communication so they can be used for other purposes than just trade. This widens the scope of Mahan's hypothesis to incorporate the notion of military sea transport
Fundamentals ot Seapower
Modern strategists differ widely in their use of words to describe the fundamentals ot the theory of seapower In a recent article, Commodore J.A Robertson summed them up in this way
Maritime strategy is concerned principally with two aspects One is to prevent the enemy, real or potential, from using the sea for his purposes; the other is to be able to use that part, or parts of it, which you need for your own purposes (4).
This author goes on to show that a nation not only needs combal forces to exercise its control over the sea but a powerful merchant fleet as well. simply because today nations require cargoes ot raw materials, oil. heavy industrial machinery. food, weapons etc. to survive The economic growth of most countries is increasingly dependent upon the international decision of labour and specialisation in productive processes.
Robertson points also to the fact that the lessons of history show that certain operations were vitally affected by shortages ot shipping Therefore, he concludes that a national merchant fleet, or access to a friendly nation s merchant fleet is an important element of the seapower a nation can command' (5).
This view is supported by Rear Admiral Chase who draws out a fine dividing line between maritime nations and island nations. He proposes that the term island nation applies to any nation which is absolutely dependent upon maritime ties for the very preservation of its society Further, he observes that since World War II the United States has changed from being a maritime nation to being an island nation, because sixty-nine out of seventy-one critical strategic materials and a high proportion of her oil requirements are imported using the sea lines of communication (6)
Now, apart from using the sea to secure its commercial needs, a nation may also require it for strategic mobility. For example, even though he had the scenario of reinforcing NATO in Europe in mind, Bruce Palmer in his strategic guidelines for 1980s notes that:
Sea transport is indispensible not only for moving forces in reinforcement role but also

for resupplying forces, a critical mission In tact, over the long term. 90 to 95 percent of overall military requirements must be handled by sea The art of strategic military movement lies, therefore, in the optimum combination of air and sea transport for any given operation (7)
Expansion of Soviet merchant fleet
While Western nations have been involved in the successful use of the sea for many years, assessments as to why the Soviet Union has become a maior maritime power are not in accord One credible reason why this expansion has occurred in recent years is the lesson in seapower the United States provided for the Soviets during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962
There is no doubt, however, that this expansion of the Soviet capability is a grave cause for concern to Western strategists, in particular to those in the United States In a survey covering the strategic power of Soviet shipping, J Fullerton reports that while the USSR itself generates only 1.6% of international trade, the Soviet merchant fleet could carry 9% of world trade, enabling the Soviets to increase Western dependency of Soviet ships' (8) Central to this concern is the perception that seapower is more important to the United States today than at any time throughout ... history is not yet generally understood or accepted' (9)
The US Position
In the 1977 Round Up of The Year At Sea Desmond Wettern reported that:
Speaking in the summer to the annual meeting of the US Naval Institute at Norfolk, Virginia, the Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral James L Holloway III. warned that even the US Navy, in the event of a war at sea with Russia, could not do more than guard those interests of particularly vital importance, such as the North Atlantic shipping routes. The movement of mercant shipping between Hawaii and Japan, for example, could probably not be safeguarded, he said (10)
As well, the capacity ol the United States to meet possible demands for merchant shipping is questionable. Chase notes, for example, that With mobilisation, the entire US-flag merchant fleet is sub|ect to requisition by the Secretary of Commerce. A considerable number of analyses have been made of the wartime   requirements   for   ships   in   this
situation	All   indicate   that   the   US-flag
merchant marine has at best marginal capability to meet military needs and most

Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute — Page 35

show an inadequate capability without sizeable reliance upon NATO shipping (11) In juxtaposition the United States and Soviet merchant fleets are opposites. the Soviets have many ships but not much need for them; the United States has only just enough ships to carry out some tasks but probably not all
Need for Ship Protection
In ail Chase summarizes the factors well 'In considering the wartime carriage of material, the question of attrition is central From the standpoint of reducing attrition, there is value to a larger number of ships even if for a total given carriage the ships are individually less productive. Commercially, of course, fewer but larger and more productive ships make sense As we have seen, the trend in most merchant marines is toward bigger and faster ships The Soviets, however, have the military advantage that most of their merchant tonnage is in a large number of small ships
With the reduction in number but expansion of productivity characteristics of most countries shipping, the protection ol each ship becomes more important (12)
Thus while eminent strategists agree that seapower includes the assessment of national merchant shipping, as well as naval forces, the Soviets and the United States (and other Western nations) face a future with differently loaded dice The question of how Western nations intend to protect their merchant ships to minimize their losses, while still effectively using them could be fundamental to survival in a future war In previous wars, methods were developed to minimize the risks to each merchantship and today's version is known gerencally as the convoy system
The Convoy System
Historically the convoy system has consistently proved successful in prolecting merchant ships.
In English history the convoy system first appeared in the early thirteenth century After King John lost his foothold on the continent in 1204. British ships plying the trade routes to Bordeaux and Bayonne were attacked and as a result these ships were ordered to sail in groups and provided with armed escorts the results were most satisfactory
By 1336, however, greedy shipowners attempted the passage independently in order to achieve commercial advantage by arriving in the trading ports before the convoys Losses became

so great that Edward III made the sailing of ships in convoy compulsory
Later, in the Anglo-Dutch wars and in the French wars convoys were generally used because Lloyd s insurance premiums for mde-pedently sailed ships were so steep These convoys were provided with armed escorts After the Napoleonic wars, however, a long period ol peace ensued during which serious study of maritime tactics and strategies was neglected except for such notables as Mahan
As Vice-Admiral Gretton explains The lessons of the past were forgotten and a host of new and quite unsound theories were evolved
(13)
World War I
During World War I, by the end of February 1917 and after one month of unrestricted U-boat warfare 1,504 merchant ships had been lost, merchant ships were sailed independently al the same time and these losses occurred in spite of patrolling and hunting forces Many reasons were proffered to counter the introduction of convoys, there were not enough escorts, convoys would be easy targets for attack, manoeuvring a convoy was too difficult, and so on.
Despite these objections, the introduction of convoys in June 1917 achieved almost instantaneous success, by December that year, losses were reduced from a high of 10 6 merchant ships sinkings per U-boat to 0 2 Whenever indepen dently sailed shipping was permitted, however. losses were twelve times as great Towards the end of the war. some aircraft were used to counter enemy submarine activities as well
After the First World War finished, there was a great reluctance to look at the actions of the war and to learn from experiences gained, in fact. A J Maarder devotes a whole chapter in his book From the Dardenelees to Oran' to this abber-ation. In particular. Marder says
there was little attempt by these (Admiralty) committees to study the larger problems and lessons of the war The results of this neglect were most serious in the field of trade defence One would have thought that the entire Service knew that the most important lesson of the First War was that the U-boat attack on the merchant fleet was Britain's most serious danger, and that it was the introduction of convoy in 1917 that had saved the day. During the tnterwar years consequently, the convoy system was understood imperfectly at best (14)

Page 36 — Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute

Further it seems that although some convoy exercises were conducted, they were infrequent and even then they exercised such concepts as fighting a convoy through against surface and air attacks and tactics used in escorting battle fleets. etc. Finally, the Navy s attitude was summarised best by Admiral ol the Fleet. Sir Caspar John, who states: that convoy protection was regarded with martial antipathy by the Navy — it was too defensive in outlook for peace-time training (15)
Interestingly the immediate post WWI plans of the Admiralty envisaged attacking U-boats with hunting groups until convoys became necessary, naturally such thinking also led to a failure fo develop escort ships in sufficient numbers
World War II
At the outbreak of World War II in 1939 it is probable that a similar story to that in World War I would have been enacted; it was fortunate for the Allies that the A THENIA was sunk without warning on 3/4 September because this brought about the early introduction of the convoy system which then remained at the core of British maritime strategy throughout the war. Many mistakes occurred, of course, and the example of convoy PQ17 illustrates that while the ships were kept together losses were negligible but after being scattered, ships were destroyed one by one
Convoy system studies became outstanding examples of the effects and application of operations  research, convoys and air escorts for merchant ships were innovations of World War I but further developments were required in World War II to counter the massed submarine attacks which occurred.  In his book. Studies ol War, Professor P. MS Blacken" enunciates operations research theories as applied to the study of convoy problems, in turn variables such as the number of escorts, sizes of convoy, speed of convoy and amount of air cover provided were examined (16) Some interesting results were: Though the value of escorts, speed and air cover has always been appreciated, till this analysis was made there appears to have been  little quantative  knowledge of their value. The very value of speed and air cover under at any rate the special conditions of the North Atlantic convoys, was somewhat of a surprise. It is interesting to note that, previous to this analysis, even the qualitative advantage of large convoys (le. a few large convoys in comparison with more small convoys) has not been generally recognised   In fact the general view had been that large convoys were more dangerous than small' (17)
Similar results were obtained when arguments over using long range aircraft for anti-

submarine work rather than bombing took place in 1942/43 In the six months following the transfer of the aircraft, the U-boat menace was defeated and while the RAF was being convinced of this need, the Admiralty introduced large convoys in place of small ones
Convoys offered protection against threats other than U-boats. Independently routed ships could not be defended against air attack — whereas eventually escort aircraft carriers sailed with convoys; a similar logic prevailed on the surface because raiders were unwilling to risk being damaged in attacks on protected convoys In fact, one surface raider attack did occur and the JERVIS BAY was that convoy s sole protector, even then thirty-two out of thirty-seven ships arrived at the destination safely
Lessons of History
All these lessons of history on the effects of convoys are best summarized by Roskill as follows:
Not the least important lesson to be learned from a study of the early months of the U-boat war is that the enemy would be most easily found in the vicinity of the quarry which he was seeking, that his purpose could be frustrated by protecting the quarry as strongly as possible, and that escorting convoys would therefore produce abundant opportunities (or a vigorous tactical offensive against the enemy - once he had shown himself (18)
From this line of argument. Roskill deduces that a convoy of merchant shipping is defined to include two necessary ingredients, firstly, a coordinated, disciplined movement of merchantmen acting purposively and in concert, and. secondly an escort of military units of more than nominal effectiveness (19) Further, when these elements existed during World War II and especially if the escorts were reasonably large in number, and worked up, and air cover was provided, the submariner was thwarted
Since the end ot World War II, most nations have been anxious not to repeat the expensive lessons of the past; convoy and naval routing exercises have been conducted regularly so this expertise is maintained.
So far, then, the convoy system has been the most successful method devised to minimize losses of merchant ships while they still plyed the trade routes.
The Technological Revolution
Since the end of the Second World War a technological revolution has transformed the capabilities of weapons, weapon platforms and

Journal ot the Australian Naval Institute — Page 37

even merchant ships. For example, nuclear technology has had a profound effect on most aspects of warfare and strategy, and wheras in earlier days convoys were limited in speed to |ust under ten Knots on average, today it is likely that convoy speeds may be in excess ot twenty knots.
Vice-Admiral J T Hayward USN Hetd assesses the impact ot technology this way
Technology also permits the opposing submarine to launch a missile from a distance ot a couple of hundred miles What would a DE with any kind of power plant do against this threat9 Even if the missiles were shot from only 15 miles away9 This means that, in order to protect a cainer or a convoy, the air must be controlled ou at least as far as the enemy can fire a missile, so that the enemy submarine cannot surface to launch her weapon. Techology has obsoleted the old escort of convoy as we knew it in World War II A submarine can shoot missiles at a convoy at up to at least 150 miles away What would a modern DE do against this threat9 IR homing and semi-active radar guidance make this a relatively easy problem The impact is to accentuate the control of the air within the missile radius of the convoy II is already unnecessary tor ■ submarine to surface and shoot its missiles. An air weapon system is the only counter to this dire threat Modern sensor technology will open the seas to the enemy Satellites today and in the future will be able to spot la ge convoys and task forces almost by the minute (20)
The point about Hayward's analysis is that, in the future, attacks on ships will probably be launched from much longer ranges than ever before and we must move away f rom thinking only of submarines attacking ships, the likelihood of a submarine, for example, penetrating an escort screen to fire torpedoes is fairly remote Because of this, and associated improvrnents in air and surface launched missiles, the control of the airspace around merchant ships will be paramount so the success rate of such weapons can be reduced.
A Vital Choice
Despite these technological advances, a basic choice between convoying and independent routing will have to be made if the strategic need 1o maintain vital supplies is accepted The penalty lor making the wrong decision could be defeat and this could come quickly
At present attempts are oeng made to test concepts Of serf defence for merchant ships but the results will not be available for some time yet The reason for testing such concepts is that

independent routing of ships is being considered actively by defence planners although their reasons for this are traditional anti-convoys, high speeds of certain ships and vulnerability of large concentrations of ships in convoy to nuclear weapons, satellite surveillance and other detection and targetting techniques
Lindsey puts the dilemma this way A key decision in the protection of shipping is that of forming the merchant ships into convoys. The chief advantage is that escort ships (and aircraft) can be concentrated, and thus extend their protection to many merchant ships Disadvantages are that all must advance at the speed of the slowest member, and that there are delays on departure and congestion at the port ot arrival A conventionally powered submarine has a poor chance of torpedoing a lone ship faster than its attacker, so that it was the policy to sail fast ships independently in World War II But the new developments ot fast submarines, submarines with missiles, and long range maritime attack aircraft with anti-shipping missiles, all make concentration of shipping desirable, in order that anti-air and anti submarine defence can be afforded to the maximum number of ships (21)
There is no doubt in the minds of many writers that the future ot the convoy system for the protection of merchant shipping in hostilities is assured.
Perhaps the most penetrating question that can be asked at this stage is nol do we need the convoy system but rather what platforms and weapons systems should be used in providing convoy protection in the future 9 Hayward, as we have seen, alludes to this problem by asserting that control over the airspace out to possible enemy missile launch ranges be maintained at all times.
A Change in Direction
In an article titled Is it Time to Sink the Surface Navy . William S Lind proposes that:
real mission requirements and the current state of ASW technology seem to suggest disinvestment in cruisers, destroyers, and frigates in favour ot other systems These other systems should include new types of surface ships designed primarily to carry aircraft Land-based aircraft suffer two serious weaknesses slow response time and poor initial detection capability Small aircraft carriers overcome both these weaknesses by carrying sensor systems for submarine detection and by providing a local
air' base for quick reaction aircraft' (22)

Page 38 - Jaurnaloltho Australian Naval Institute

In all Lind argues cogently that existing forces should be restructured using Harrier carriers as the basic building block since these would seem to be better future investments for defending amphibious warfare and replenishment groups or convoys against air attacks (23)
Thus, while the future need for different types of forces to the ones we currently operate may not be apparent, this question of how we are going to protect vital shipping provides food for thought. To return to where we started, the writings of these experts and maritime strategists should not be set aside too readily despite technological advances and changes in the characteristics of merchant ships.
NOTES
111 See S G Gorshkov Navies in War and Peace a series ol articles in US Naval Insr/fure Proceedings, January to November 1974
(2)	See p 51 of Understanding Soviet Naval Developments
published by US Department of the Navy, January 1978
(3)	See Chapter t of A T Marian s The Influence of Seapower
Upon History (4|    See article The Fundamentals ol Maritime Strategy by J A   Robertson, Journal ol Australian Naval Institute. November 1978

Ibid
(5) (6)
Rear Admiral J D Chase USN, US Merchant Marine For Commerce and Defence. US Naval Institute proceedings. May. 1976
(7) See article by Bruce Palmer Jr tilled Strategic Guidelines lor 1980s and published in Grand Strategy lor the 1980s by American Enterprise Institute Studies in Delence Policy
(6| John Fullerton. The Strategic power ol Soviet Shipping. Delence and Foreign Attain Digest. Vol VI. No 6
(9)    See note 6
(10| Desmond Wettern The Year at Sea Navy international, February t978
 (11)	See note 6
 (12)	See note 6
 (13)	Seep 197 ol Convoy Escort Commander try Vice Admiral
Sir Peter Gretton KCB. DSO, OBE. DSC
 (14)	See p 38 ol From the Dardanelles to Oran by A J Marder
 (15)	See p 41 ol From the Dardanelles to Oran
 (16)	See pp 192/3 ol Studies ot War by P M S Blacked
 (17)	Ibid p 194
 (18)	See p 135 ol The War At Sea. Vol 1 by S W Roskill
 (19)	See p 106 ol The Attack submarine — A Study in Strategy
by Robert E Kuenne
(20)	Vice Admiral J T   Hayward USN Reld.  The Impact ol
Technology on Strategy   Journal ot Australian Naval Institute. November 1978
(21)	Ray GR  Lindsey,  Protection ol Shipping in the 1980s,
Canadian Delence Quarterly. Winter 1977/78
(22)	William S Lind. Is II Time lo Sink the Surface Navy   US
Naval Institute Proceedings. March 1978, p 64
(23)	Ibid, p 65

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Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute — Pago 39

DESTROYERS — SYSTEM
CHARACTERISTICS AND
TASK ABILITY
By Mr K J Hope

Introduction
Destroyers are a subject of unending absorption to authors in the military literature. Partly this is so because the destroyer 'ype has lost its onetime meaning of a particular :onfiguration and increasingly is coming to mean any small warship Capital cost is making the large warship increasingly rare Thus destroyer' selection is tending to become a synonym for naval fleet selection Papers proliferate whi;h purport to deal with the problem of identification of the ideal destroyer or its substitute (3) (8) (10) 114). Other papers treat the optimisation of particular aspects of the destroyer configuration (4) (17) (19) (22)
What seems lacking are points ol significant relationship between the two For lack of any apparent sound basis in technology, the fleet selection articles regularly become essays in wishful thinking; statements of what should be if only technology would shape itself to that end. At the same time, the limited scope of treatments of destroyer technology offers no overall solution to the questions about technical feasibility implicit in the optimal fleet essays
There is an outstanding need for an examination of the connections between ship technology and mission needs, to assist at an early stage the identification of feasible technical solutions to specified tasks, equally to aid a manager such as a project officer in amending task ambitions in the light of technological constraints or a staff officer in correct perception of task ability of technical systems This paper addresses that methodological need, attempting only a clarification of the state of knowledge, not a complete solution
An attitude basic to the development of this paper is that all human modes of assessment of issues are based on comparative analysis between alternatives, no matter how imperfectly comprehended they may be Choice of a policy

always amounts to a process of search Irom some existing or conceived base, where the central problems are efficiency of search methodology and criteria for ending the search.
So the concern herein will be with the system impact of changes in warship configuration Ship optimisation is seen as an incremental search process, not one of seizing upon a solution in one step Equally, identification of the mission poten tial of an optimal destroyer designs involves progressive assessment of hierarchical levels in the warship system, building up from a multiplicity of interacting technical details to an overall military value estimate Particularly in this age of complex technology, small obsure details can control important system aspects. These effects must be directly treated
These two activities contribute to a higher process of assessment of competing material type options, utilising feedback information on technical constraints affecting military value and on the resources demands of certain types of
THE AUTHOR
Kenneth J Hope was bom in 1936 |oined CocKaloo Island dockyard Sydney in ISS6 as an apprentice ship draftsman and studied naval architec lure part-time at Sydney Technical College and University ot New South Wales graduating with a diploma in 1960 Alter a year with ihe Alan Payne design learn on 12 metre Gfff TEL I. he fumed the Oepanmenl ot the Navy in 1962. serving with Naval Technical Services until 1975 He was much involved in hydro dynamics, computing and basic ship design ol STALWART, ATTACK, COOK and early ODl design studies After a period of nearty three years with ANPUK as Construction Liaison Officer posted at DCS Bath and specialist training at AUWE Portland he returned as Naval Architect Class 3 in the forward Design Directorate. NTS. Canberra and in 1975 ho transferred to force Development and Analysis Divsision. Defence Central He is currently a Chief Executive Officer in the Force Analysis Branch He is a member ol R1NA and SNAME and has been a contributor to RINA ICanberra Section) and its Chairman in 1977 and 1978

Page 40 — Journal ol me Australian Naval Institute

configuration, to convey insights into alternative ways of handling the mission problems to the extent necessary
As a basis for approaching some principles of destroyer military worth assessment, the important elements of destroyer design and configuration must be exposed
The Mechanics of Warship System Design
Assume that a particular set of major mission functions or major equipments have been specified in a tentative way and that a question of configuration has been posed to a ship design team.
Ship design/selection can be approached from several viewpoints, but most commonly, the problem is viewed as a nesting' task under performance constraints Nesting' means the packing of spaces into a least volume. The word 'least' does not subsume minimal'; the notion is one of efficiency in space usage, elinination of what appears to be waste, not just the shrinking of all spaces to some physical minimum
The problems met during the nesting process of ship design can be more easily appreciated by a three-way categorisation of ship compartments:
• monolithic' spaces, not able to be subdivided or separated in any way (e.g. propulsion machinery compartments, main magazine);

 •	'connected' spaces, open to subdivision as long as the elements remain adjacent (e.g. food storerooms, crew living spaces, some minor machinery spaces such as for ventilation equipment).
 •	'amorphous' spaces, by the nature of the contents open to subdivision and location in odd positions throughout the ship (e.g. liquid fuel tanks)
It is very common for naval architects to commence a ship design process by arranging monoliths' in a manner both likely to be functionally satisfactory and to blend with prevailing environmental and technical constraints The process of configuration design then consists of repeated amendments to this group of nested' spaces as penalties from infringing certain technical and resources constraints dictate. Cost is further used to define the direction of the design trend, the perceived least cost amendment option being selected where all other aspects are equal. The constant systemic judgements and alternate intuitive/deductive thought processes required will be apparent. The design process ends when a balance is struck between penalties from spatial separations, technical constrains, resources utilised in the design and available time. Pertinent references are (11) (12).
Dominant Spaces
Monolithic' spaces exert a driving force on warship design trends, due to their own genuine impact, but due also to some designers allowing the initial trends of a design process to continue in

HMAS ANZAC (II) (commissioned 1951. sold 1975)
- by courtesy of S Given Journal of the Australian Naval Institute — Page 41

an automatic way with insufficient critical examination
Of all the monolithic spaces, the propulsion machinery spaces exact a domi mating influence in degree not changed over seventy years of technological development. Table 1 shows proportions of hull internal soace devoted to functional aspects of ship operations tor several classes ol destroyers The size of the hull volume fraction devoted to propulsion machinery is important
The dominance becomes even more clear when mass is also considered Table 2 shows %

weights for main functions in several destroyers Hull matenal and propulsion machinery together make up two-thirds of the light ship (i.e as-built without fuel, stores or crew) weight Clearly as an envelope, the hull steel only slightly affects the spatial design. But the concentration of the machinery weight in a single zone within the ship exerts fundamental effects on displacement ship configuration Some indicative weights of propul sion machinery items are given in Table 4, to indicate the sources of the Table 2 totals

Ship class

TABLE 1
DESTROYER TYPE VOLUMETRIC PERCENTAGE ESTIMATES
Accom     Workshops,
Weapons.	Offices,        Lobbies,
Sensors     Propulsion    Auxiliaries	Tanks etc.

RN BLACK SWAN	14	21	3	28	13	22	
(1940)							
RNTypeBKSS)	16	22	6	30	11	15	
RN Type 12	20	20	4	29	11	16	
RN Type 41/61	16	27	4	29	10	14	
(diesel)							
FFG (SS)	23	12'	15'	21	16	13	
TOBRUK	15	33	5	33	7	7	
DARING	18	30	5	30	11	6	
DDG	18	30	7	28	11	6	
RN Type 42	17	28	5	23	11	16	
RN County	21	25	5	22	10	17	
Notes   1    ' Gas turbine single screw, some auxiiianes used in propulsion
 2.	Mam sources Purvis (18) Oakley (15).
 3.	Differences withn2% not significant

Battle Cruiser SMS GOEBEN undergoing trials 1912
- by courtesy ol Biohm ana Voss
Page 42 — Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute
FIGURE 1

Speed and Hull Space
Why does propulsion machinery weight and volume possess such a biassing effect? As a ship sub-system, propulsion machinery exists only to serve mission needs, which clearly are the speeds demanded from the bridge. In the design stage these forecast demands are reflected and condensed into the speed specifications, often expressed only as maximum sprint and cruise speeds. The large weight/space values tabled for actual ships built and designed in detail really reflect the gross consequences of speed specification in the vicinity ol 30 knots for 110-130m ships (7)
The classical shapes of the ship, fast vessels tapering at the ends, yet slow ones being more globular in shape, are no accidents ol design of arbitrary choice to accommodate bulky equipment. The shapes reflect the existence of compelling physical laws and identification by designers, often over many years, of ways to avoid the worst consequences of those laws.
The most obvious fullness changes, from blunt-ended tubbiness in slow vessels to fine-ended slenderness in fast ones, follow from certain basic physics of hull drag due to skin friction and wavemaking, whose effect on hull resistance can be conceived of as a difference between pressure forces on the fore and after bodies of a hull form, with an added fnctional value increasing with speed and hull area and decreasing somewhat with hull length.
A ship hull at speed generates a wave system at every point of distinct geometric change around the load waterline The most prominent is at the bow, next al the stern with lesser wave groups at the fore and after shoulders' of the hull

form. The two latter groups are usually minor in a warship hull of fairly regular curvature, on the other hand, the very motion and system demands which led to adoption of that shapely hull result in very prominent bow and stern wave systems (Fig 1)-
Like any set of waves in nature, those generated by the ship interact The resultant wave amplitude at a point in the sea around the ship becomes the sum of all the wave components at that point, up to a height at which the wave becomes so steep as to be unstable and collapses back to a stable height, releasing a burst of energy in the breaking wave crest. The importance of this process ol wave groups combining is that energy in a sea wave is proportional to either wavelength or speed and to the square ol wave amplitude; this energy is necessarily acquired from the ship, as the generator of the whole moving wave system The energy levels are very high indeed.
As an example, a single wave 2 m high and the length of a 124 m ship travelling at 27 knots would represent an input ol about 600 w of power per metre extent of crest. Thus a destroyer at that speed could be losing up to 4 kw of power in just one wave system alone. The potential benefit from reduction of wave group heights and from ensuring minimal interaction ot crests will be evident. It is the attempt to realise this benefit which from the outset of the design directs the naval architect towards precise shaping of the warship hull and towards selecting those discrete values of waterline length which result in wave group systems ot least interference
The naval architect expresses this speed/ power penalising interaction in terms of a fundamental hydrodynamic parameter, Froude Number (Fn - v/(gL)1/i), of a vessel of waterline

TABLE 2
DESTROYER TYPE GROUP WEIGHT ESTIMATES (as % Lightship Weight)

		Propulsion	Aux.		Armament,	
Ship Class	Structure	& Electric	Systems	Outfit	Electronics	
DDG	38	30	11	7	14	
Type 12	40	29	8	11	12	
TOBRUK	37	36	5	10	12	
DARING	37	35	6	9	13	
FFG	46	18"	17-	11	8	
Notes; 1.  "Gas turbine single screw; some auxiliaries used in propulsion
 2.	Main sources Purvis (18), Oakley (15). Mansour/Faulkner (13)
 3.	Differences within 2% not significant.
Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute — Page 43

TABLE 3

Fn

DESTROYER POWER-SPEED DATA (for USCGC HAMILTON, 107m/2760t, SNAME 1966 p.49)
13	.19	26	30	33	38	43

48

V(kt) PE(kw) R(tons) Ps(kw)
u k
kw/knot (%)
PEkw/100t
Trade-off. tonnes/ knot
knots/IOOt

8	12	16	19	21	24	27	30	
186	685	1715	2910	4040	7420	13200	19500	
5	11	21	30	38	60	95	127	
350	1100	2800	4750	6500	12000	22000	33000	
308	308	308	4.31	431	431	4.31	4 31
.32	.32	.32	0085	0085	.0085	0085	0085
75	170	315	630	880	1370	2025	2870
.51    .61    90    98   103   1 12   1 12 3    13    40   100   150   280   550   800 2500  1300   790   630   5B5   490   370   360
3	6	11	22	31	48	71	100
17
27
28
04
.08
16
20
13
.51

Notes.  (1) Power-speed modelled asPE--k.Vu(W2/W-|)n. Win tonnes

length L at speed v, gravity acceleration g, by saying that the effect of the propulsion machinery sub-system is dominant for all vessels required to operate at Fn above a value of 0.4; there can be significant effects down to Fn ■ 0.2 The Fn parameter is used because a wide scatter of drag/speed data for different ships reduces into order when plotted in that form, which embodies the main parameters of an observable physical prime effect. Reference to Fn more correctly and usefully delineates a ship's speed/power category than does speed alone.
Because of the physical effects reflected in Froude number, length is so important in ship design that its prior specification by a client is most unwise and fraught with potential drag penalties which stay with the ship for all of its life
Table 3 lists some drag values for a typical destroyer type. In the slow speed (low Fn) range, drag values (Pe or R) are quite moderate and typically would require only a 3000 kw power installation for a 3000 tonne 15 knot ship

At higher liner-type speeds, Fn 0.25 to 0 30, skin friction is less dominant and hull form selection becomes quite tricky. Distinct waves form at the bow. yet ship speed is not so great that the bow wave crest reaches the stern, so on average the stern pressure resistance is rather steady, with peaks which fluctuate as wave crests combine, then separate. In consequence, net drag both increases in mean level and fluctuates dramatically about that level as the forebody and afterbody pressure difference vanes.
In general in this speed range, while skin friction still contributes 50% to 70% of total resistance very precise and particular shaping of hull form and bow fineness is required for each speed increment if drag is to be moderate Slightly hollow bow lines forward and full midship sections are beneficial. Typical drag values (Table 3) would require only about a 7000 kw power instal lation for the 3000 tonne ship.
At destroyer speeds. Fn 0.3 to 0 5, skin friction is the minor component of ship resistance and wavemaking is well-established The wave formed at the bow extends over the whole length of hull with a crest near or even a little abaft the

Page 44 — Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

stern. Any subsidiary waves formed can hold appreciable energy; change of hull trim as the main crest passes the stern will so distort the form of hull seen' by the water flow that all the wave penalising effects will be exacerbated. Filling out the stern to lorm a transom controls this trimming tendency and. despite the drag due to turbulence behind the transom, returns a net reduction in hull resistance.
The hull shaping problem is simplified by the wave dominance in this speed zone. The finest tapering entrance to the bow form, avoiding local hollows or fulness yet consistent with low stern form wavemaking, low transom eddy-making drag and no exessive skin friction (which means hull area), is optimal Penalties for divergence from that optimum are usually severe. These specifications result in the universal destroyer hull form which has existed for almost seventy years, since the days when invention of the economical steam turbine made possible speeds around Fn 0.5.
Speed and Ship Propulsion
The systemic effect of a speed demand on hull drag has been explained But this is not the end; the next essential step is the way drag relates to installed power This introduces the vital but ill-understood role and process of ship propulsion (16).

Speed demands from the ship s bridge are answered by thrust increases from the propeller to first accelerate the hull and then at the demanded speed, exactly balance the increased hull drag. The marine propeller is the device used, for excellent reasons; it is one of the most efficient mechanisms available for marine propulsion, due largely to the fortuitous density and incompres-sibility of water But this high efficiency imposes shape and dimensional system pressures on the whole rear end of the ship, and on the geometry of the propeller(s).
The considerable thrusts/shaft required tor a large destroyer at high speeds are indicated in Table 3.
Propeller performance constants are displayed in Figure 2 The relationships between the four parameters are given in the diagram Particularly to be noted is the great influence of diameter on torque and thrust. Performance constants are conventionally plotted against parameter J, which is related to angle of attack of an aerofoil. This is not coincidental; the modern theory of the action of propellers, applying equally to marine and aircraft types, models thrust and torque as resulting from angle of attack of propeller blade sections, generated by simultaneous rotation of each blade and its axial advance through the water.

TABLE 4
MARINE MACHINERY-TYPICAL WEIGHTS & SIZES

ITEM
Diesel 19000 kw, slow rpm Diesel 5500kw. slow rpm Diesel 5500kw. medium rpm Gas Turbine 20000kw Steam Boiler for 11000kw Steam Turbine Set. 110OOkw Main Gearing Set. 11000 kw Steam Condenser 110OOkw Propeller, 11000kw

TONNES	ENVELOPE LxV	
870	18	x4V?x12	
210	12	x3   x   6	
71	8	x3Vzx   3Vz	
21	8	x3   x   3	
45	4	x5   x   5	
15	3	x2   x   1V?	
17	3Vzx3   x   2	
6	2'/jx2   x   1	
13	3.7 dia, x9sq m	

Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute — Page 4h

The marine situation differs significantly from the aeronautical wing or the aeronautical propeller case. The wing angle of attack is directly under the pilot's control through the tailplane control surfaces, equally he can set the pilch of adjustable propellers as he judges fit. But the effects of marine propeller pitch ratio appear automatically as the flow conditions (i.e. ship speed and shaft rpm) alter Controllable pitch (CP) marine propellers offer no solution The cavitation (boiling) phenomenon can so easily result in catastrophic erosion of the highly-stressed propeller blade roots, that CP propellers must be operated as fixed-pitch propellers, except for short manoeuvring periods Moreover the CP characteristic always degrades efficiency
In generating thrust, the marine propeller, necessarily consumes torque (turning moment, energy) it is the total task of propulsion machinery to provide this torque at a value of rpm which matches the demands of the optimal propeller
Propeller efficiency relates propulsive thrust to the torque at the propeller required to achieve that thrust, scaled by the ratio of the propeller s speed of advance va to its rotational speed Typical full speed values of efficiency under test for various categories of pro|jeller designs are 75% (maximum conceivable, any practical circumstances), 72% (cargo liner excellent design). 66% (destroyer, optimal fixed pitch designs), 64% (destroyer, optimal CP design). 61% (destroyer, restricted diameter and/or high rpm or cavitation optimal design), 55% (very constrained propeller design, eg LST or average small craft). 45% (indifferent propeller design, very restricted diameter and high rpm, eg. landing craft)
Some important considerations for the project designer arise from the trends of curves in Fig. 2. If ship speed vanes in step with propeller diameter or rpm or the product of both, then parameter J' will remain roughly constant with little effect on thrust, torque or efficiency. This is what happens when ship speed is adjusted by rpm changes But when any event mainly aftecs just one of the J-parameters such that the J value of the pro-pellerjs) alters distinctly, then the shape and slopes of the efficiency curve in Fig. 2 show that a significant drop in efficiency away from the original peak design value must occur The loss can be partly recovered by a change in pitch ratio (movement to another propeller efficiency curve) but it is in just the type of pro|ect situation where decisions are made which have the effect of degrading the J value, that changes in propeller geometry are not allowed

J is a parameter very sensitive to office polities', because its three performance elements of speed of advance of the propeller, shaft rpm and propeller diameter are open to mvidious influence by persons who entertain particular views about one or another parameter
For instance, a hull designer can so easily overlook the fact that his decision about hull draft amidships amounts in practice to a fait accompli about maximum possible propeller diameter A project manager s perspective can so easily focus on the cost and lead time advantages of a stan dardised shaft gearing module rather than a special-to-type unit giving optimal efficiency rpm A naval staff officer can so easily insist, for ostensible good reasons, on a ship speed change specification at an advanced design stage when shaft rpm and ship draft are fixed.
The concluding advice must be that marine propulsion is as sensitive to changes in propeller system environment (the va. n and D parameters as well as the flow field) as hull drag is unstable, that propulsive efficiency losses rather than gams should be anticipated as a ship design develops and that interactions between drag and propeller efficiency can be quite significant.
The current tendency to discuss mission speed performance in terms of installed power is to be deplored, since it assumes an aspect which is important enough to deserve specific investigation, namely, that a usefully high fraction of that installed power will indeed be transferred through and transformed by the propeller system into useful thrust It very often is not so. a matter easily overlooked because of the obscurity of the system elements underwater How many ships officers who can cite their vessels main stability values are equally conversant with overall propulsive efficiency quantities7
Speed and Machinery Power
Next comes the question of the demands placed on the propulsion system by speed specifications. Two aspects arise the asbsolute values of power associated with the speeds specified and the incremental changes in power due to variations around a target' value of speed Table 3 shows typical resistance (Pg) and installed power (Po) values for a destroyer hull of size as indicated The values of drag force give a good idea of the power-law rise in drag and power with speed and the moderate penalties associated with tonnage
The approximate rates of change of drag force with speed and with tonnage were derived. Table 3 shows values of effective power per knot for

Pago <6 — Journal ol too Australian Na rai Institute

Tribal Class destroyer HMAS WARRAMUNGA at speed.
— by courtesy ot Australian War Memonal I Negative No 42861)

successive speeds, particularly the high penalty paid for a knot of speed around 30 knots Table 3 also shows typical values of change in drag force per unit increase in ship displacement and the corresponding approximate trade-off rates befweeen speed and tonnage. The total demand on power from an increase in speed is the joint effect of the drags arising from the speed change and any associated ship weight change.
Since displacement ships are the most efficient devices known for transportation of masses, the speed-tonnage trade-off rates in Table 3 should come as no surprise. Around 27-30 knots in a destroyer, about 360 tonnes increase would be needed to decrease speed one knot At around 20 knots, that same tonnage increase would cost only about 0.6 knot. These figures strengthen the questions in (7) about the modern value of speed and relate to later questions in this paper about the cost effectiveness of lightweight structural practices in modern destroyer design.
Propulsion and Configuration
Propeller diameter has been identified above as the major system parameter affecting propulsive efficiency, Ep. Not only does Ep increase with diameter towards a practical maximum of about 70%, albeit at an ever-decreasing rate, but design problems local to

propellers   in   practice   become   progressively easier as diameter constraints relax.
Casting and machining require certain minimum thicknesses of matehal. Cavitation dictates a minimum blade area. Interference turbulence which degrades theoretic efficiency generates an upper limit to blade overlap (about 20% but very dependent on pitch), maximum area is thus defined for any specified diameter Blade outlines should be shaped to minimise those tip pressure pulses which initiate hull vibration.
In practice diameter provides a means to meet all these constraints. Adequate diameter allows cavitation-free blade area without distortion of either blade outlines or aerofoil section shapes. It is indeed a rare design situation which can accommodate a diameter of propeller so large that blade widths become unduly narrow and sections excessively thick (greater than 15% say).
Propeller diameter directly interacts with ship dimensions particularly draft. A necessary allowance for tip submergence when the ship is moving in a seaway (30% draft say) and a typical 20% diameter tip clearance from hull to minimise hull vibration effectively defines the positions of shaft centres at the stern. Further considerations of allowable shaft rake and shafting spans between   supports   plus  gland   and  gearcase

Journal ot the Australian Naval Institute — Page 4 7

dimensions dictate quite closely the positions ot main machinery items and overall, the location in the ship of the main machinery space
So the naval architect must consider propeller geometry and thrust power values from the earliest dimensional stages of a ship design, especially in destroyer types when Fn exceeds about 0 3 Main propulsion machinen/ in last ships such as destroyers is not located amidships through designer s preference or only because a ship trims more satisfactorily w th heavy weights in that position Rather, a concurrence of system engineering constraints acts tc make any other configuration infeasible. Effors to break this nexus fail against one or another constraint of
 •	hull resistance changes as hull form alters to accept a new position of the machinery monolith, changes of a magnitude which unduly erode propulsive efficiency and mission speed performance;
 •	insufficient beam and draft at a new location in a tapering low-drag hull form to accept dimensions of high power machin ery monoliths, made up of units with typical dimensions as in Table A,
 •	serious degradation of propulsive efficiency and vibration levels as the machinery monolith position is altered, due to shaft rake and propeller inclination changes vertically and laterally.
The significance of the monolithic character of propulsion machinery systems will be apparent One potential way to evade the system constraints on ship configuration is to break up the monolith; dissociate machinery sub-systems spatially Such associated' spaces cannot be achieved where those sub-systems are mechanically linked, as with diesel or gas turbine drive propulsion systems Steam turoine systems are almost as much constrained by the thermodynamic link between boilers and turbines to minimise heat losses.
Steam-electric plants are intrinsically less monolithic in character, although in practice constraint b. above, concerning hull dimensional limitations, continues to apply. But still the designer does have increased configurations open to him by being able to separately position turbogenerators and electric propulsion motors, even if only by one twelve-metre compartment. It may have been in part this greater configuration freedom which induced the US Navy to predominantly use steam electric machinery for its larger ships for over thirty years to the end of WW2
Gas turbine-electric marine propulsion appears   to   have   the   greatest   potential   for

lessening the system impact on ship configuration if only technicalities of losses in connecting circuits and of system control between constant speed turbines and variable speed propellers can be overcome. The compactness ot the prime mover permits its location high in the ship where problems with performance-sensitive intake and exhaust ducting are minimised
If the treatment of the mechanics of ship design affecting system configuration has thus far appeared to dwell heavily on only hydrodynamic and marine engineering aspects, it is because of the unchanging nature of the physics of the fluid on and in which ships operate, and propulsion technology which gives them the motion to attempt missions The rare occasions on which these factors have been explained even to audiences of technotogists justifies exposition, in these times of ma|or and rapid change of naval warfare material, to a naval officer audience who are centrally involved in those changes. But certainly there is another system aspect, strength and safety, whose import to the ship configuration and to mission capability is not widely comprehended
Structure, Strength and Configuration
The exposition thus far passed over the major ship weight component of hull structure (Table 2) to examine propulsion, because of that components monolithic volume character with its dominating effect on overall ship configuration Hull structure is not monolithic in character, quite the reverse, but some systemic effects deserve exposure In particular, the rare occurrence of serious structural failures in warships, which encourages disregard of the subject of structural effectiveness, should not lead a naval materiel manager to believe that structure is simple, well-understood and insensitive to design decisions On the contrary, much is still not known about structural responses to sitations, structural system design principles are still strongly debated and precepts from long experience still play a major part in the specification of a sale long-life structure.
The technical elements of ship structural function and arrangement are accessible in many texts, such as (21) In essence, structure exists to keep seawater out and the hull intact and acceptably rigid against the lorces imposed by the uncalm sea.
Excluding seawater from the hull is no mean teat even if mundane; a destroyer moored in harbour still endures static loads on the bottom plating of about 41 kPa (0.4 tons sq. ft) or over the whole underwater hull, a total compression load

PageAB — Journal ot the Australian Natal Institute

of more than 42MN (4.000 tons), one and a half times the ship's displacement This explains why hull structure is vertically assymmetric, being much more concentrated below the waterline than above There are consequences for survivability after damage.
This massive compression load immediately explains a good part of the hull weight fraction in Table 2. The plating on which this pressure acts must itself be thick enough to allow each panel to resist as a beam without appreciable deflection of "dishing". All the frames and girders can do is provide global points or lines of support to limit plating span.
The more global task of ship's structure is to maintain integrity and rigidity. In essence, certain external forces act on the hull and are resisted and balanced by a myriad of molecular forces in the hull steel material As a working hypothesis, the structural designer aggregate these material in the structure and relates structural behaviour to various levels of stress known from experience to be critical.
In still water, the main external forces are the net differences between hull material and equipment weights acting downwards under gravity and buoyancy forces acting upwards. Hulls tapering smoothly to bow and stern automatically generate a regular disposition of buoyancy along the hull, rising to a peak value near amidships But interior weights opposing that buoyancy are essentially discontinuous in their distribution, the ship weight curve graphs as a quite lagged histogram. The difference between the weight and buoyancy distributions, the load curve' for a hull at a particular draft and trim, necessarily becomes a histogram From Archimedes principle, the net overall load on the ship must be zero; yet nonetheless quite appreciable local load forces act at particular locations along the hull. The magnitudes increase as weight concentrations, typically from liquids tanks and heavy machinery items, are allowed to exist as consequences of a chosen ship configuration
A destroyer's length is typically nine times its beam and twenty-five times its draft, this asymmetry imposed by hydrodynamics results in the load curve of a ship primarily bending the hull in still water. At the same time, appreciable shearing stresses exist in the side plating at each zone of discontinuity in the load curve. The mapr resisting forces in the hull steel then become tensile and compressive in the plane of the deck, bottom and side plating and their supporting longitudinal girders, with additional shear (orces in the side plating The bending of the hull, as an enormous    girder    itself,   characteristically   is

upwards amidships (hogging) in vessels like destroyers, having as an outcome of their configuration more buoyancy amidships than weight Such hogging reveals itself as a typical 75 mm upwards deflection ot amidships hull datum marks relative to those at bow and stem. It might appear that hogging in ships is helpful because the heavier bottom hull structure is more suited to resist the buckling tendency associated only with compression But other aspects intervene
The structural properties of the RN Type 12 frigate hull have been described (13) At 3.66 m draft for 2845 t displacement with an appropriate distribution of interior weights, this hull experiences a hogging still water bending moment of about 21.5 MNm (7000 ft tons) amidships causing the deflection noted above and nominal compressive stress of 15 to 20 MPa (1 to 1 v? tons/sq in) in the bottom plating; perhaps only about 10% of the effective structural failure levels
However the seaway introduces effects which dominate the still water levels ot stress The wave profiles generate buoyancy changes around the hull and consequent wave' bending moments and shear forces additional to the still water values, in both vertical and lateral planes Passage of the waves causes the ship to alternately hog and sag so that deck and bottom plating is alternately in tension and compression Torsional shearing stresses are induced Added to all these are wave impact and slamming vibration loadings. Clearly the levels depend on sea state; a statistical approach to structural integrity and ship safety must be adopted.
A number of experiments have been carried out on naval and merchant ships, some to destruction to confirm design criteria and failure modes, others to acquire statistics of stresses in a seaway. From such tests, wave-induced vertical moments and stresses typically are six times the still water levels, lateral stresses might be about 20% of the vertical It is these cyclic wave stress levels which establish the quantity and disposition of material in ships structures, with the weight consequences revealed in Table 2.
The destruction tests showed that gross hull failure arises from buckling instability of plating and girders in compression and typically is encouraged by local stress peaks or load transfers between structural members associated with even slight cracks in material or poor alignments This compression failure tendency was long thought to give destroyer hulls additional strength because of the hogging characteristic which placed the more lightly stiffened upper deck in tension a good deal ot the time. However in practice, deck stresses exceed bottom plating

Journal ot the Australian Naval Institute — Page *9

stresses |ust due to the effects of mass of metal in the bottom structure and in a seaway the deck is under compression whenever there is a wave trough amidships For this and other more complex reasons, it has recently (13)(5) been suggested that destroyers in fact have much less reserve of hull strength than merchant vessels and that the good safety recotd of naval vessels may be due more to usage and prudent handling rather than innate safe design
Hather than breaking in two sections, gross hull failure typically would involve a jackknifing with crumpling and tearing of plating at the hinge location; subsequently as a result of that weakening, the hull may indeed separate.
One important physical fact leads to jack-knifing' . ship quality low carbon mild steel is very ductile and under load always yields plastically before it breaks Not all materials behave so. Because of this ductility, modem analysis of ship structure ultimate strength is greatly concerned with the formation at heavily-loaded points in the structure of pastic hinges', i e. small areas of material which appear intact and yet have yielded to shed part of that load on to adjacent structural members. In moderation the effect can be beneficial to safety, stress peaks generated during the construction process evening themselves out during the early part of a ship s life. But care must be taken during design that under conditions ot heavy loading when numerous hinges may form locally, the remaining structure is indeed adequate to accept the additional loading and that plastic hinges formation cannot progress towards catastrophe
These matters affect the question of the use of high tensile (HT) steel in modem destroyers Quite apart from whether the weight saved in the structure (20-50 tonnes say) yields any real military benefit at the increased cost, HT steel is less ductile than mild steel and tiecause it can be thinner in situ, possesses no better buckling behaviour It can be argued that the destroyer case differs distinctly from tha; of the cargo ship, which having thicker scantlings and a characteristic tendency to sag and place bottom structure in tension, may well experience benefit from introduction of HT material into its structure
But as well, ductility, buckling and residual structure impact on the problem of strength reserve after damage Unlike merchant ships, warships need a formal ability to withstand damage, as a logical corollary to the combat situations wherein their weapons would find use. The gun-fired projectiles of Weld War 2 tended to

puncture hull structure with numerous fairly small holes which affected hull strength largely by their local stress amplifying effects But such weapons appear obsolete; the weapon most likely to impact a modern destroyer is a missile warhead ot high explosive charge mass certain to effectively destroy large sections of plated structure, most probably above the waterlme and. by either deliberate programming of the weapon guidance syslem or that systems tendency to average random errors, amidships where hull bending stresses are greatest and reserve of structural strength least.
From what has already been said, the consequences of extensive plating damage depend on the prevailing sea state's wave actions on the hull, but optimism would appear to be warranted only for quite large cruiser-sized hulls where extent of damage from a given weapon might be relatively moderate and reserve of ultimate hull girder strength less eroded
This writer has computed tor the Type 12 110 m frigate (18) some damaged-structure conditions using published data (13) In that vessel in standard condition, destruction of hull side structure between 1 and 2 Decks and 1 Deck structure between deck edge and 5 m inboard (i.e. 40"fc beam), 2 Deck remaining essentially intact, would cause the hull to jackknife when the standard design sagging bending moment of 120 3 MNm (39600 tons ft) applied. In still water that frigate could probably remain at least intact after loss of all 1 Deck (but not 2 Deck) However there would be no reserve of strength to resist the etfects of even slight waves.
These estimates are optimistic. Some flooding of the hull with increased sagging bending moment could be expected to accompany such severe damage. No 2 Deck could hardly escape unscathed. Lastly, stress concentrations at the cracked edges of the extent of 1 Deck damage would tend to generate failure of 1 Deck during a wave-induced tension cycle
It is important to note that even this degree of frigate damage endurance depends on the existence of a second load-carrying deck as a fallback option of sorts Not all destroyer second decks are arranged to contribute to longitudinal strength; it may not be dimensionally feasible to fit a second deck in smaller destroyers or larger vessels with bulky power plants (18)
The weakness of damaged destroyer hulls is a direct and logical consequence of choice of design stress levels within a philosophy of reduction of hull strength reserve to a non-combat minimum, apparently to gain the last fraction ot

Page 50 — Journal o> the Australian Nt val institute

top speed by weight reduction (21). Design maximum stresses in merchant ships are by fiat 80-85% ot those in warships, one might correspondingly expect greater reserve ot strength in merchant ships and a line of proof has been advanced (13)(5) that it is indeed so Simple design measures which reduced design allowable stresses would, without change of techniques, lead to hull structures progressively more capable of enduring combat damage from a specified weapon warhead detonation There would of course be effects on ship dimensions and configuration
The relationships between structure and configuration mainly involve the incentive to the designer to locate large weights in such a pattern that large shear stresses are avoided amidships in the high bending stress zone, since the true stress level is the resultant of all the stresses acting at a point in the material, and the effect on stability and so dimensions of the mass and disposition of hull material. There is an impact on mission criteria, through the effect of hull weight on speed if high Fn has been specified. An unappreciated aspect is the link between mass of steel and seakeeping. As a dynamic system in a seaway, moment ot inertia parameters govern natural frequencies of motion of the ship system and through them, the amplitudes ot roll, pitch and heave As a major mass component most remote in space from the centre of gravity, hull material mass quite dominates the values ot inertia and natural periods Only masses ot liquids in wing and any double bottom tanks have a remotely comparable effect Equipment weights, being located towards the centre of the ship, play little pari by comparison.
Finally, although the hull weight traction is large, it is often not appreciated how that mass is largely dictated in one step by hydrostatic crushing loads and wave bending moments. Marginal weight rates due to changes in hull dimensions or scantlings can by comparison be quite moderate.
The Mission Aspect
The treatment ot many individual aspects ot technology inevitably conveys a disiomted impression. Missions as the progenitors of characteristics and configuration ought to be treated more holistically. avoiding that separate analysis of aspects which opens a way for intrusion of arbitrary preferences and attitudes.
An outstanding need is for a rationale for the relationship between missions and ship characteristics. A few papers in the literature have that orientation (2)(11)(12)(20). Of those rare attempts at such a unifying approach, Rawson's, developed in the RN setting, deserves more attention than it has received

"Concepts (of what needs to be done mih tarily) begin as Government policies and the naval Staff break down the Navy s role into specific tasks. It is at this stage that the materiel to meet the tasks is defined in general terms ... There is a growing awareness . that the existing relationship between concept and materiel is not a satisfactory one At present requirements are presented to the designer in terms which remove most of the options before he begins It is absolutely vital, if options are not to be too lightly discarded, that needs should be conveyed in conceptual form to the technologist who may then create and cost solutions for acceptance by the Naval Staff The form of this communication is of extreme importance. Equally so is the decision process which responds to it.  (20. p.44)
Rawsons concepts are worth developing, because of parallel developments in methods ot analysing linked concepts (1) which give hierarchical. Top-Down. (12)) thinking great potential and in Governmental unrelenting pressures for cost effectiveness' assessments of expensive defence materiel, inevitably meaning quantitative assessment.
Very highly integrated (dependent) technological systems with a main dominant function, such as military aircraft, or radar systems, lend themselves to assessment by single-valued descriptors. But there is a much larger class of weakly-dependent systems with multiple functions, whose members are much more difficult to assess, Individually or against each other, it only because the values of any particular system compenent (subsystem) are not always apparent, unique or constant from situation to situation In this present paper warships are seen as members of this class.
Capability Logic
The problem of quantitative assessment of increments of warship capability as characteristics alter is greatly assisted by Rawson s work, which starts from a definition of Effectiveness as the logical conjunction of Capability. Dependability and Military Worth Effectiveness is the measure ot the extent to which a system may be expected to actually achieve specific functions in a given environment Capability describes the potential performance of the system, alone or as a component in a larger system Dependability describes the ability to adopt a capability at any instant and to continue it in a specified time pattern; that is. the likelihood of arriving at an environment which permits a capability to be

Journal ol the Australian Naval institute - Pago SI

demonstrated Military worth is the return by which the value ot possession of capability is judged Rawson expresses some doubts about methodology of assessing these primal components, but not about the philosophy itself," if basic resources are constraired. there must be means of demonstrating that they are being deployed in the best interests ot the nation
We are concerned here with the notions of the interactions and tradeoffs between a client s concepts of tasks and a designer s potential with material, and with what is seei, vide Rawson, as the indissolubility between philosophy and methodology A philosophy lacking means of assessment is at best hollow, methodology without guiding philosophy is aimless and mechanistic
Rawson suggests that the functional abilities of the warships constitute an area of discussion common to those dealing with concepts and those dealing with materiel. He elected to categorise capabilities ot. for instance, a naval frigate under the headings
Command (of attached elements) Detection (of targets) Contusion (through modes of attack) Destruction (of targets attacked)
These categories are by no means rigid and can readily be changed, since it is easy and familiar to identify each with certain active weapons systems But from the data presented earlier, only a certain portion of the ship system, not more than one half, is thereby explained For instance, these Active categories do not explicitly include such main resource — consuming and mission-supporting elements of the warship as hull, habitability aspects and propulsion system
Rawson   penetrates   further   into   system
linkages to observe that	Capabilities are
effected (brought to fruition) by ship systems and by the passive qualities of the ship itself Passive   abilities   are   called    characteristics', typically in a frigate being:
Mobility     (flotation,    speed,    manoeuvre,
navigation)
Endurance (stores, maintainability, commis-
sanat)
Insurance, Availability (protection, survival.
camouflage)
Serviceability  (power,  fluid  systems,  ship
management)

He insists that by these eight features is the entire potential of the ship described If those features can be forecast in terms of situations in which they would be useful, their reliability, cost, vulnerability and manpower demands, form the required means ol communication between designer and customer".
Capability Formats
Choosing to proceed no deeper into analysis of characteristics, Rawson devised a warship effectiveness display matrix (Fig. 5, ref 20) which permitted, in principle and subject to development of decision analysis techniques for accurately quantifying effectiveness, exposure of "... what is being acquired, how effective it is and what has to be paid for each part of it Such a completed information matrix was seen to meet needs of both operational and materiel staffs by illustrating the capabilities, dependabilities and wodhs of a particular design and its concurrent resources costs. Operational staffs could coalesce matrices to assess the propedies of groups of ships. For the navy as a whole, resources could be genuinely allocated to categories providing overall balanced sets of fighting capabilities Correspondingly materiel staffs would be much less constrained by copist traditional pressures to repeat particular ship configuration aspects They would have an explicit rationale, which Rawson identified as increasingly being needed in our specialist technological society, to support any recommendations for innovative change or for maintaining the status quo
Rawson mentioned only in passing the need to identify effectiveness and cost differences between alternative materiel options That task is a major part of modern cost-effectiveness analysis and arguably precedes the higher level task of achieving an optimal balance in a fleet or whole Navy
He did however identify the impodanl point that access to complete data is by no means required to arrive at a satisfactory management investment decision It is one of the strengths of decision-analytic investment accounting methods (1) (9) that attention is ultimately directed towards a minimum set of critical parameters, differences between their single or combined values indicating a final choice by Bottom Upwards elimination of low ranking options The consequent logic is that data not relating to the few essential decision parameters ceases to be of interest and even need not be available if an acceptable consensus as lo its low relevance to the decision is agreed Even precise data for the essential decision parameters is not mandatory, if one

Page 52 — Journal of toe Australian Nnval Institute

decision option excels over another in a statistically significant sense. And the most clear-cut and confidence-inspiring of all selection problems is the 'data-free' one, where excellence is evident for all realistic values of data
Relevance Diagrams
Rawsons Active' and Passive' Qualities, each with four Capabilities and each in turn associated with several characteristics, technicalities and design details, can be depicted as in Figures 3 and 4. The system in this form is a stereotyped tree diagram' of the particular relevance tree' variety, This type of diagram has long been used as a qualitative aid in general industrial decision-making (1). helping identification of particular issues for investigation and serving as a check-list for all those aspects relevant to the decision.
But it is not well appreciated that relevance trees can be used in numerical analysis for decision-making Quantitative methods (9) and even a formal theory (6) have been developed to allow rigorous transfer of numeric values between levels of the tree diagram. These developments seem to provide great potential for a working method to reflect the incremental change, at any level in a warship relevance network, due to changes at any lower level The immediate application would be the assessment of net relative worth of variations in technical features. The method would specially assist the evaluation of the Passive' Attribute (Fig. 3) in two respects:
 •	changes in attribute value, relative to the overall military value', associated with proposed changes in ship platform features or equipment items in a trade-off selection situation,
 •	identification of platform design details and their levels of minimum performance needed to enable the full value of Active' features or systems to be realised.
In contrast to the Active' characteristics whose values have long been the subject of analysis by operational research methods, values and cost-benefit of Passive' characteristics still derive largely from subjective assessment by technologists. Apart from the incongruity of two parallel forms of decision assessment for each materiel system, one strongly influenced by modern analytic modelling and computation and the other hardly so influenced at all. subjective opinion (as very distinct from analysis with a certain subjective content) raises all the problems of whose opinion is to be adopted and whether those

judgements are based correctly on policy values of the organisation as well as latest technical methods and procedures.
Exposition of a ship system relevance assessment method properly belongs to another time and a more technical forum But in essence (9, pp 220-233), a relevance tree is first developed by application of ordinan/ logic of linkages and influences appropriate to the system in question. The higher the level in the hierarchy, the more attention will need to focus on mission-oriented value headings and the less on technical considerations. Branches of the tree need not be uniquely related to one stem; one of the important benefits of relevance algebra arises from transfer of values through cross-impact links.
Managerial criteria for assessing each level of the tree must be postulated; for instance, on what basis will comparitive value numbers be assigned to Mobility versus Endurance in Figure 3? These criteria can be weighted to give some flexibility with regard to overall function. There a considerable body of technique in the Held ot decision analysis available to assist at this stage
Significance numbers are assigned to each element at each level of the tree. A synthesis of expert judgement is usually required A local relevance number for each element on each level in the light of its appropriate cntena can then be computed. Finally, the total relevance value number of a particular decision issue or element on any level (the Mobility capability for instance) can be obtained by multiplying upwards (or downwards in certain applications) in the tree to the level in question, incorporating all cross-impact as well as direct influences from elements at other levels
Prior examples of relevance methodologies exist as a guide for warship assessment. The best-known is the Honeywell PATTERN (Planning Assistance Through Technical Evaluation of Relevance Numbers') computer-based scheme, developed in the 1960s for that firm's aeronautical and space activities. Using PATTERN, Honeywell were led to predict in 1962 the importance of STOL counter-insurgency aircraft. In another direction, a company policy favouring guidance systems precision was indicated to be non-optimal, lower prime cost being a more useful attribute in the overall context Analogous benefits should accrue from applications of the relevance technique in the warship assessment field in these times of dramatic technological and social change.

Journal ot the Australian Naval Institute — Page 53

FIGURE 2.  TYPICAL DESTROYER PROPELLER PERFORMA:.''K SERVES

SCALF FOR REAL SLIP RATIO  SR
20
I
.50
.40	JO
£0 _1_
.10	j
I     ..      I    .
Propeller TMB 2500. 4 blades
Pitch Ratio = 1."7 Blade Area Ratio = 1.1*7
Typical design point
02  03  04  05
Kf   =   T/(w/g)n2D4 <j/(w/g)n2D5 f}0 =    (KT/K0)(J/2IT)
0 9 v /nD
—a	
i o
I 2
i 3
06  07  0 a SCALE FOR J =

■
0 )9
OB

o
<
o
52
s

Conclusion
This paper has presented major system and technological pressures which give rise so regularly to the traditional configuration of the destroyer. The presentation has dealt only with global issues, not detailed design problems which, for all their real stringency, have repeatedly been analysed in the literature.
Given a base specification of destroyer-type missions, thereafter the dominant system pressure on configuration is the demand for high sprint speed, which immediately generates unavoidable needs for hull length (to avoid cross energy losses in wavemaking) and powerlul machinery (to overcome the high drag which still exists). The technological pressures relate to the bulk and weight ot propulsion machinery, the mechanical system constraints which make the plant monolithic and the hull form, shaped by hydrodynamics and the need to accommodate propellers of useful efficiency, which can accept the power plant only in the midportion of the hull.

That same hull length, its weight, hull buoyant forces (static and from waves) and the major weights of machinery and associated items generate forces which can be resisted only by structure of large mass The feedbacks from all these influences interact to make the destroyer configuration quite predictable and almost inescapable, regardless of client or designers wishes.
So to depart from the standard configuration necessitates some determined and perceptive changes in the warship system specification. In these times of critical management, there arises an immediate problem of assessing in a overt format the likely functional merit of the ship system resulting from the changes The same need for maximum objectivity exists if the naval staff opt for a traditional warship specification and configuration.
This paper suggests that the rationale ol warship value by Rawson (20) involving a hierarchy of value levels from national function

Page 54 — Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute

Level:

Capabilities Command
FIGURES RELEVANCE TREE FOR DESTROYER VALUE — CHARACTERISTICS
Military Value      Attributes
Characteristics
Data Support Data Display Communications
SSM
SSM
Destruct -
Torpedo
Active
Mine
Shells
Detect
Visual Electronic U/W I.R.
Combat Function,— Role
Electronic
Confuse-
Acoustic
Visual
Speed
Mobility-
Flotation, Heel Manoeuvre Navigation
Endurance
Passive -
Habitabihty Stores Maintenance Protection
Insurance-
Surviv.il
Camouflage
Service -
Ship Managemem Crew Skills Power Supply Spatiality Arrangement

through capabilities to technicalities and design details, at this time best meets the needs of an overt evaluation system for warships. That rationale can be extended into quantitative assessment by modern developments in technological forecasting and decision analytic techniques, whose elements have been noted in the text.
These concepts supported by a promising methodology appear well suited to the purposes and needs of navies facing major re-equipment

planning decisions in a lime of rapid and significant technical change, when it is not easy to be sure that evaluation attitudes founded in experience or history have continuing validity
But apart from this thrust in the direction of policy, it is to be hoped that the paper has conveyed to ship drivers' some insights of which they might have been unaware into the overall nature of the technical creature they both dominate and serve

REFERENCES

 1	Agnes, R V   Technological Forecasting and Long Range Planning  McGraw-Hill. 1969
 2	Booth. K   The Utility ol Navies Concept and Propositions. Naval Review. July 1976, pp 202-206
 3	Clarke, DG   Destroyers tor the 21 si Century   USNI March 1979, pp 25-33
 4	Daniel. R J   Warship Design — New Concepts and New Technology. North East Coast Institute ot Engineers
and Shipbuilders, UK (NECIES) 1976

 5	Faulkner. D and Sadden, J A Towards a Untied Approach to Ship Structural Safety.   Royal Institution of Naval Architects (RINAI. 1979 pp 1-28
 6	Fischer, M   Towards a Mathematical Theory ot Relevance Trees, Technological Forecasting. 2 (1970). pp381
389
7	Friedman N   Speed in Modern Warships, USNI. May 1979
P151-167
6   Grarebrook. AW  'Escorts in the Next Generation   Pacilic Defence Reporter. March 1976, pp 31-33

Journal of the Australian Naval In&litule — Page 55

9	Jantsch.   E    Technological  Foretasting  in  Perspective
OECD. Pans. 1967. pp 117 127.219232
 10	J H F E   The Naval Balance - Quality versus Quantity Naval Review October 1978 pp 285 288
 11	Leopold, R . Jons. P O and Drewry. J T  Design to Cost ot Naval Ships   Society ot Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, NY. (SNAME), 1974 pp 211 243
 12	Leopold. R. Svendsen. EC  and Kloehn, HG   Warship Design/Combat   Subsystem   Integration,   etc .   U S Naval Engineers Journals August 1972 pp 28-54
 13	Mansour A E  and Faulkner D   On applying the Statistical Approach   to   Extreme   Sea   Loads  and   Ship  Hull Strength , RINA 1972, pp 277-314
 14	Nekrasov, G   Quo Vadis   Small Naval Power?. USNI 70803317 1974.00 62437
 15	Oakley   OH    Size Determinants in Destroyer Design Manne Technology. October 1968, p 374
 16	OBnen     T     Design   ot   Manne   Screw   Propellers Hutchinson London. 1962

 17	Palmer. S J   Impact ol the Gas Turbine on the Design ot Major Surface Warships    RINA/I Mech   E   Parsons Memonal Lecture. 1973
 18	Purvis. MK    Post War RN   Frigate and GM Destioyer Design 1941437. RINA 1974
 19	Raper R C   Designing Ships lor a Cost Effective Lite.  I Mech E Parsons Memorial Lecutre. 1970
 20	Rawson, K   Towards Economic Warship Acquisition and Ownership   RINA 1972 pp 43 68
21	Rawson.   K    and   Topper.   E     Basic   Ship   Theory
Longmans, Green a Co  tgea
22	Robson B L   Warship Design in the Royal Australian Navy
— Some design aspects and a look to the future , RINA
(Australian Branch) 1973 and HMAS NIPIMBA Training
Note 8, Jan 1974
 23	Saunders. H E   Hydrodynamics in Ship Design  - Volume 2   SNAME. 1957. p 356
 24	Sims A J  Warships 1860 1960   RINA 1960 pp 613662

FIGURE 4
RELEVANCE TREE FOR DESTROYER CHARACTERISTICS — TECHNICALITIES (PASSIVE ATTRIBUTES. TYPICAL, PART ONLY)

Level:

Characteristics

Technicalities (part only)      Design Details

Mobility	
Endurance
Insurance —

Speed
Manoeuvre
Flotation, Heel
1	 Navigation
— Stores	
Mamlenance -
Habitabi ity
Protection-
Survival 	
Camouflage

H

Propulsive Efficiency
Hull Motions
Hull Resistance
Power	
FT
ZL
Course Stability
Turning	
Propulsive Thrust
Hull Stability	
Subdivision Ballasting
Freeboard	
Tophamper Facilities
Tankage 	
Stores Space
Machinery Type Spares
Ship Motions
Messing	
Recreation Environment Control -Decor Husbandry
Noise Reduction	
ECM Armour NBCD
Magazines Policy Structural Arrgt -
Hull Strength Reserve-Damaged Stability Fireproofing

Propeller Wake Flow Hull Form Dimensions Machinery Type Rudders
Hull Form Weights
Dimensions
Double Bottom
Galleys
Air Conditioning
Insulation
Machinery Type
Stabilisers
Machinery Mounts
Propeller Design
Deck Numbers Material Weights Layout Design Stress

Page 56 — Journal ol Vie Australian Nival Institute

Nobody asked me, but...

A NOOSE FOR JUDAS
The thoughful, rather provocative comments of Judas in your periodical (May 1979 Vol. 5 No 2) about chaplains in the RAN deserve some appraisal. While there is truth in some statements made, it must be said that other comments made (eg chaplains are not officers) are wide of the truth. As always, it is so easy to criticise: so common to fall into cynicism and hardness of heart.
Judas (what's in a name?!) argues that the )ob effectiveness of chaplains is questionable, their standing in a rank conscious system debatable. He suggests that part-time chaplains may be of more value than full-time serving men. This proposal is nothing new — it has been mooted time and time again especially by some civilian clergy who really know not what they say
A chaplain's duty is PEOPLE — the whole man, body and soul. Before he can tell the person about God (however He is understood, brass cap or not), a chaplain must have a rapport with that person and find out what makes him the sacred, unique being that he is. Grace does build on nature. So a chaplain needs to care, to dare and to be aware of what makes a person tick.
So he needs to be there where the action is, where people are, where they live and move and have their being. He needs to be in uniform, to be available, to be part of the system' in season and out of season IF he is to fulfil his duty, IF he is to bring the message of the Gospel to people
Much of a chaplain's work is done out ot hours (eg. counselling, marriage problems, notification of N.O.K., organising social functions for junior sailors). It is on these occasions, particularly, that relationships and contacts are formed which are of lasting benefit to personnel and, of course, to the betterment of the RAN It would be difficult for our colleagues in civilian parishes to cope adequately with the many, assorted matters arising'out of hours'.
In his opening gambit, Judas states that the RAN does not want or need chaplains. This is a sweeping statement that merits clarification If the Navy is thought of as people, the premise fails to

pass. The tradition, and the procedures of the RAN for many years and especially the personal experience of all chaplains count against it. In times of joy (eg. weddings, baptisms) and in times of sorrow (eg. deaths and problems), sailors derive strength from knowing that the Chaplain is there, available and willing to listen If the stat-ment of Judas is true, and I say it is not, then chaplains will console themselves to remember that Christ, their leader, was not wanted or needed by many in his time Yet. today. He lives on, alive and well, despite ridicule, persecution and even hatred.
Chaplains are almost as old as Christianity itself, but not in the form we know today. They are men serving with and working for personnel in a Service environment. They are only in that environment to identify themselves completely with the men and women who in God s name they strive to serve.
Maybe there are chaplains who have failed to live up to expectations; maybe things could be improved, but these things can be said of any human organisation. It is always better to be positive than negative (wh/ throw the baby out with the bathwater?); to build up rather than knock down. It is, in short, better to light a candle than curse the darkness.
K.J. Costigan, Chaplain (R.C.)
A TIRADE ON UNIFORMS
The Royal Australian Navy over the past few years appears to have lost that most important pride in uniform which has kept the Service distinguishable from the common run It is a malaise which has been creeping in from many directions and is now found at every level — among uncaring senior officers, lazy post officers and ignorant junior officers.
Item: A flag officer encased in an ice-cream suit so yellow that he might well be mistaken for Flag Quebec.
Item: A newly promoted captain, the stripes of whose uniform are so obviously of a different age that his arms look like tide-poles.

Journal of the Australian Naval institute - - Pag»f>7

Item: A sub lieutenant in s uniform that is not only badly cut and ill -fitting, but which parts at the seams when the slightest strain is applied.
This is not good enough' What makes the matter even worse is that those sartorial adventurers who of occasion modified the Uniform Regulations to their own entire satisfaction are no longer tolerated. Conformity is the catch-cry. and such a conformity A vista of ill-fitting jackets, caps which look as though they have been dragged through the double bottoms, ungainly and rumpled mess undress, whites bursting at even/ seam because their ageing owner has bothered neither 10 diet nor to have a uniform made since those glad days long ago when he was promoted lieutenant — the list is endless
Paradoxically, while we aie slack and sloppy ashore and in harbour, we appear to go to extensive lengths to maintain unnecessary and unpleasant formality at sea Way, for example, do we wear ties with sea-going ng in winter? What earthly use do they serve7 Why have we not adopted the smart and very comfortable woolly pully as an item of issue kit for all hands7
It is little wonder that cnes tor change can be heard The unfortunate fact is that any change in the basic uniform is unlikely lo be an improvement Who would call the new RAAF uniform a smart one7 It is utilitarian, admittedly, but it is also extremely unflattering — it is interesting to note that in a telecast of a ceremony involving a tn-Service guard, the cameras will go to great lengths lo avoid focusing on the Air Force (One press report, supposedly a misprint, called one of the first armed bodies to a|>pear in the new uniform a Guard of Horror ) We do not want our personnel to look like bus-conductors or policemen
The problem actually starts at the very beginning, with the first issue o' uniform Since the tailor who offers the lowest bid is always selected as the contractor, businesses are naturally going to lower their standards so as to lower their estimate Who suffers from such lowered standards7 In the end. the poor, newly joined, sack-clad officer and sailor
The Commonwealth Government Clothing Factory is not much better Unless Government is willing to enforce high standards, we are just not going to get them The legend has always been that Australian tailors do nol possess the skill or long experience in the production of naval uniforms that exists in England, but this is not entirely true Australian tailors do know their stuff

— as many who have had uniforms made privately will attest — but tailoring is not a produc tion line job and never will be
The general standard of dress could also be improved by the more senior officers setting a better example than they do The plea is always uniforms are too bloody expensive It might be noted, too. that a comparison between the uniform costs and wages ol the present day with those of the 1930s and 40s would show that the present day officer is far better ofl than his predecessors in this regard We are paid a Uniform Maintenance Allowance of $209 30 per annum To this can be added the lacing allowance payable on each promotion It must be admitted that these do nol cover the entire cost of the proper up-keep of kit. but not many professions receive clothing allowances of any kind What my plea comes to is this, let's have everybody showing a bit more pride in the uniform, before it is too late and we are reduced to overalls for every occasion.
Let me take a couple of examples of where we as a Service seem to be going badly astray in our thinking on uniforms. The first concerns the introduction of 12Ws. the summer rig for those more formal occasions when knees are not invited. The very sensible proposal was put forward that the wearing of the bush jacket be extended to all officers and that the 12W rig replace the ice-cream suit for all but the most formal or ceremonial of occasions. It was a sensible idea, the bush jacket is a very sman and very comfortable rig, yet it was knocked back Were the motives behind the decision completely pure, or was it considered that the |acket is earned along with the brass hat7 It is a great pity that the proposal was not allowed, because I have seem a number of civilians on different occasions mistake officers clad in 12Ws for male nurses
Name tags are another dubious addition to the uniform With the considerable attention paid to these items and the explosions of colour which now appear on the loathsome objects (ships crests. Australian White Ensigns and what have you) it is difficult to escape the impression that quite a few of the younger and not so young generations are seeking to compensate for the lack of meal ribbons on their virgin bosoms by the emplacement there of such a tag God knows that name tags are a splendid idea for just joining and cocktail parties, but do we need to make them into a way of life7 What besides, has happened to the old trick of leadership of learning the names of your subordinates7 It must be a depressing experience for a young sailor to see officers

Page 58 — Journal ol me Australian Nmai Institute

HMAS ANZAC (1) (completed 1917, transferred to RAN 1919, paid off 1933)
- by courtesy o! S Given

wandering around with their eyes fixed firmly at fifteen degrees below the horizon.
Caps are a third problem. The Commonwealth Government Clothing Factory seems to have built in an immediate obsolescence factor to the caps which it issues — they self-destruct five minutes after first being put on The public do expect a naval officer to look salty (what matter it if the badge is a little green), they do not expect to see him wandering about looking as though his cap has just collapsed like an unsuccessful souffle.
Nuff Sed.
ARGUS'
ON HANDKERCHIEFS AND COMMUNICATORS
Nobody asked me. but I do think it's time that our communicators sorted out |ust what are and what are not the privileges peculiar to their branch. I refer, of course, to the much vexed question of the handkerchief in the breast pocket

Let me make it quite clear that the single white linen handkerchief in the breast pocket is not and never has been the mark of the communicator. It is a symbol of general couth far older than the communications or signals specializations. Perusal of photographs of groups of naval officers in the Victorian and Edwardian eras will demonstrate what I mean Any and every officer is entitled to wear a handkerchief in his breast pocket — even the lowliest cadet-midshipman. The one restriction custom imposes upon this habit is that the only officer allowed to wear such a handkerchief on a parade or divisions is the inspecting officer
So where. I hear disgruntled communicators saying, does that leave us9' The privilege of the branch (if you want to call it that) is that such officers may wear two silk handkerchiefs, one in the breast pocket and one protruding from the coal sleeve (which sleeve is optional) The handkerchiefs must be silk and there must be two; one will not do.
The origins of the custom? It came. I believe, in the 1920s in the Mediterranean Fleet, when such officers as the late Lord Louis Mountbatten ruled the signals roost and set the fashions for all. The two handkerchiefs were designed to be useful for passing semaphore messages if every

Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute — Page 59

other means of communicaton failed Knowing the present success rate of communications officers I would suggest that there is still a need for such stand-bys
I hope that once this explanation of the true position with regard to handkerchiefs has percolated to the Fleet, we shall see no more of

communicators attempting to remove the breastpocket handerchiets of other officers My advice to any officer wearing a handkerchief who is approached by a communicator with suspicious intent is to tell him to get knotted (the hankerchief, I mean).
DIOGENES II

Shiphandling
Corner
A FEW STEAMING THOUGHTS
Ship handling is rightly an art which all seaman officers must constantly exercise to ensure retention and improvement ot their skills. As an engineer (steam type). I do not. and indeed should not or cannot make any |udgements on the exercise of this art by my seaman colleagues I have however given thanks many times for serving with competent captains, navigators and other seamen, who have avoided bending our ship on a wharf, rock, reef cr just the plain old putty In these following paragraphs. I wish to describe an experience and share some thoughts which have stood me in good stead
As a young engineer, an interesting experience was being in the forward engine room of a Daring Class destroyer (54,000 shp), both telegraphs full ahead, course about 185° in Wooloomooloo Bay. with the north end of the Fitting Out Wharf abeam To complete the scene, a very strong westerly wind was blowing (this wind was the major cause of this predicament). It was indeed a stimulating time, and when the expected full astern came, seemingly minutes later, but it really was much less, the adrenalin was really working

Eventually after a few more engine orders, the ship was manoeuvred safely out of the Bay into Port Jackson, and we thankfully turned east for the Heads
I use this example as background to discuss the role of the Marine Engineering watch below — the men who operate the machinery which moves the ship The watch below have an important role to play in shiphandling • for example, the skills of the Boiler Room and Engine Room Petty Officers are certainly complementary to the skills of the shiphandler on the upper deck Propulsive power must be delivered salely, in the right direction, in the nght quantity, for the required time
My experience with Captains has been one where considerable time and care was taken by them to ensure the watch below knew what they had in mind, particularly when sailing in confined waters. Machinery spaces staff knew exactly what the Old Man wanted to do and what he expected of them It was truly a team effort, and like all good team efforts, it gave a satisfying result My Captains expected similar informative action by all his seamen officers, and woe betide an OOW who did not tell the engine room team of any foreseen unusual manoeuvring requirements
My advice to those who drive our ships is that you must not forget the men who down below are tending the bike shop. they too have powerful reasons to ensure the safety of the ship whilst underway, just as those on the bridge have. Do not take them lor granted, keep them fully informed, give them your confidence and you will be well rewarded by good responses to your telegraphs. To engineers. I say that your men are an important part of the ship s team, whose mettle is tested from the first engine order to the last By the exercise of their skills and experience, they contribute to the safe operation of the ship, and the art of shiphandling.
Plumber

Page 60 — Journal ot the Australian Naval institute

BOOK REVIEWS

LONELY VIGIL — Coastwatchers of the Solomons By Walter Lord The Viking Press. 1977 322pp Recommended price $12.95
Many readers who have served at sea in Papua New Guinea, even as recently as during the past ten years or so. have had the rare pleasure, and greal honour, ot meeting in person some ol those remarkable individualists who operated deep behind Japanese lines in Ihe Solomon Islands during World War II Jack Read. Snowy Rhoades. Bill McCasker Sandy SandTord, and ol course, the legendary Paul Mason are the names which spring to mind Lonely Vigil is their story
Who could lorget Ihe greal hospitality ol Paul Mason, and his chamting wile, at Inus Plantation on Bougainville and Sandy Sandtord al Numa Numa Plantation a tew miles lo the Soulh of Inus A nun ashore at Numa Numa is not lor the laint-hearled advised the handover notes left behind by HMAS BANKS in 1967 lor the first PNG patrol boats Many ol the coastwatchers were still Ihere in the late 1960s some in the very spots where 25 years or so earlier they had written Iheir names indelibly on the history ot the Pacific War
Lonely Vigil is the lirst complele account ol the coast watchers ol the Solomons and is the result ol extensive travel and painstaking research by Walter Lord Lord has already gained a name lot himself as the authoi ol popular histories with woiks, such as A Night ro Remember (the sinking ol the TITANIC) and Day of Inlamy (Pearl Harbour) Lonely vigil is another well written book in similar style
Although somewhat anecdotal in approach, and not at all an academic historical record. Lonely Vigil is nevertheless lo be strongly recommended lo World War II bulls and old New Guinea hands alike II makes lor easy reading and I trunk Paul Mason (if he were still alive). Jack Read. Snowy Rhoades and company would be happy with this account ol Iheir personal exploits something which Ihey would have been loo unassuming to relate at length themselves
WSG BATEMAN
BASIC SHIP THEORY
Volumes t and 2
By   K.J.   Rawson   and   E.C.   Tupper    Longmans   1978.
Recommended price Vol.1 $17.35. Vol. 2 $21.00.
Basic Ship Theory is published in two soli cover volumes total ling 623 pages The book has been written primarily as a text lor Naval Architecture students and the authors have therefore assumed that the reader has little prior knowledge ol ship theory It is useful toi any technical or professional in Ihe maritime deld
In the early chapters ol the book, the authors present a good, step by step explanation ol Ihe lundamental aspects ol ship Union/ including flotation, trim and intact stability 'he features ol hydrostatic curves and cross curves ol stability are described and their use is discussed in detail

In subsequent chapters the reader is introduced to a number ol more sophisticated lopes which cover most fields within Ihe Naval Architecture discipline The mam topics covered are structural design, powering ol ships, ship motions In a seaway and manoeuvrability ol ships
Messrs Rawson and Tupper have both had extensive ship design experience and they have presented the theory with practical application to ship design in mind Where possible worked examples are used to illustrate the application ol the theory Al the end ol each chapter a number ot problems arc provided to test Ihe reader s understanding (answers given) and there is also a list ol references tor further reading
The only complaint that can be made ol Ihe book is that >" trying to cover such a large number ol topics. Ihe authors have occasionally given only a superficial presenlalion ol the theory, leaving the reader with little useful mloimation
However this fault is more than outweighed by the tact that Basic Ship Theory serves as a comprehensive inircduclion lo Naval Architecture withoul overburdening the reader with high powered theory
B A MORLEY
THE SOVIET WAR MACHINE
An  encyclopaedia  of  Russian   Military  Equipment and
Strategy.
Ray Bonds (Editor)   A Salamander book, published by
Hamlyn Group
New revised edition, published In 1977. Recommended
price $12.95
This is an impressive and sobering book, which lives up to its title A learn ot well qualified authors, which on the Naval side includesCapl JE Moore. RN. (Editor ol Janes Fighting Ships). have gathered a truly remarkable number ot photographs, line drawings, maps and statistical dala to produce a convincing document showing how Ihe Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries continue to strive relentlessly towards a supremacy in all aspects of warfare
The book is divided into several parts, each dealing with a separate aspect Naval readers will find the sections on the Soviet Navy to be absorbing reading, with the section on Soviet Warships (edited by Bill Gunston) listing all known classes ol Soviet Warships and research ships This pattern is repealed throughout the book Thus the section dealing with the Soviet Air Forces (by Air Marshal SW B Menaull is followed by Soviet Aircraft (again by Bill Gunston) These sections also deal wilh the Soviet seagoing and shore based maritime air power Other sections, not listed in the order in which Ihey are punted include Soviet Ground Forces, Soviet Missiles Air Defence ol the Homeland. Strategic Rocket Forces and Soviet Army Weapons (armour, artillery, small arms) The layout lollows closely the Soviel Military command structure, thus Air Dolonce

Journal ol Ihe Australian Naval Institute — Page 61

ol the Homeland (PVO Siranyl and Slrategic Rockel Forces being separate mapr commands, are covered by separate sections The linal section very bnetly summarises Warsaw Pad Forces and how they are designed to primarily serve Soviet military interests
All the above information is set in proper perspective by tbe opening sections ol the boo* The Roots ot Discord. History ol the Soviet Armed Forces and a veiy illuminating section on Cutrent Ob|ectives and political Slratagy by Brigadier Sheltord Bidweli These sections are probably the most disturbing ones lor they reveal how the all-permeating Marxist party ideology and party organisation sets the goals lor the Soviet Armed Forces and controls their day to day activities and thinking They also reveal how this party control, which is very much central ised is also a liability, as it deprives lower echelon commanders trom exercising (hen initiative Initiative which is perhaps taken (or granted in the West
An Appendix gives the current Soviet Army unilotms and insignia Untortunalely neither Navy nor me Warsaw Pact unitorms are included
Regrettably there is a scarcity gtl Russian names lor the various photographs ol Soviet Warshos. Isurely most must now be available >n the West) and an over-simplification by Captain Moore regarding the performance ot toe Russian Navy in World War I (however he was NOT writing a historical treatise i These are indeed small Haws in an excellently produced, informative book which should be regarded as a standard work ot relerence lor the general public, and ot great inleest to military personnel
The book gives frightening credence to Khrushchev s boast that We shall bury you and seriously tiegs Ihe question whether these torces are really only designed tor defence. This is a highly recommended book for both heme and library
G NEKRASOV
PAPERBACK OF THE QUARTER
SURVIVE THE SAVAGE SEA.
By Dougal Robertson
Penguin Books 1975. Pp 223 S2.20.
Fighter pilots have left an mdelibe impression in my mind That lesson is one ol knowing your emergency procedures so that they become automatic and a natural reaction when a crises

occurs It is this lesson that each and even/one ol us should heed and adapt to his environment The motor car driver his roadways, the sailor his sea
In Survive the Savage Sea. Dougal Robertson relates his ordeal ot surviving tor 38 days at sea after his yacht had been dramatically rammed and holed by killer whales 200 miles wesl ol the Galapagos Islands With him were his wile eldest son aged 18 two sons aged 11 and a 22 year old male passenger The yachl sank in a minute and a halt leaving them with an inflatable rah. a small dinghy and an odd assortment ot items thrown inlo the raft because they were at hand or plucked Irom the sea Drifting and sailing they made then way 700 miles to the northeast before being rescued by a Japanese tishing trawler
The book takes the lorm ot a diary describing on a daily basis the environment, events and me art ot survival Each day even small occurrences take on dramatic significance Such incidences as a day ol food and water or another day without a day ot calm or a nighl ol storm a day ot hope or a day ol despair all make their impact felt Although many days have much in common each has its unique message
Dougal Robertson relives his survival m a dry almost unemotional way presenting the reader with a virtual dos and don ts survival lext book II is as though be intends his story to be an indoctrination to others on the hazards confronting a shipwrecked mariner and his personal tned and successlul cure
Writing in Ihe Inst person, he gives glimpses into his own mind but only rarely describes ihe feelings ot his family and companions When he does, it is again with the lessons ol survival in mind showing the need tor mental activity the stories that were told, the songs that were sung and the imagination r_»f lavonte meals
In an epilogue he summarises lessons learned and makes recommendations He discusses survival controversies and the results ot his investigations which are naturally attected by his experiences Throughout the book are pen and ink illustrations ot the raft and dinghy which dramatise Ihe conditions expen enced, as well as sketches of animal and bud lite encountered
As a professional sailor, I tound the book somberly interesting and felt better tor reading il and refreshing my mind ol the dangers existing at sea To the recreational reader Ihe lack ol human emotion subtracts trom an otherwise enthralling story Yet I can fully recommend the book to both audiences and ensure them ol some profoundly thought provoking hours ol reading
R M JESSUHUN

JOURNAL BACK ISSUES
Stocks of the followirg back issues ol the Journal are available
Vol 1 NO2 November 1975	Vol 4 No 1 February. 1978
Vol 2 No 1 February 1976 Vol 2 No2 May 1976 Vol 2 No 3 August 1976 Vol 2 No4 November 1976 Vol 3 No 2 May 1977 I No 3 August 1977 INo4Noverrtbei 1977

Vol 4 No 2 May 1978 Vol 4 No 3 August, 1978 Vol 4 No 4 November 1978 Vol 5 No 1 February 1979 Vol 5 No 2 May, 1979 Vol 5 No 3 August, 1979

Vol 1 No 1 (Augusl 1975) and Vol 3 No 1 (February. 19771 ate out ot stock
Back copies may be purchased trom the Institute at $2 50 each which price includes postage Write to the Treasurer, Australian Naval Institute  PO Box 18. Deakin  ACT, 2600
Pago 62 — Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute

AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE LIBRARY
From time to time the Journal has published a list of current Institute library holdings — the last such list was in the November 1978 Journal. The holding of books and periodicals has continued to grow to the stage now where the regular publication of such a list is no longer feasible. Suffice to say that the library now comprises over thirty books on naval and maritime affairs and a substantial collection of periodicals, including the Naval Review and the United States Naval Institue Proceedings.
Since an Australian Naval Institute Library hitherto has not been a formally recognised Institute activity, the Council recently sought to clarify policy as to the way ahead for the present book collection. The following guidelines were endorsed by the Council
a.	The creation of an ANI Library is an approved Institute activity in furtherance of the Institute's
objectives.
b.	Materials will concentrate on RAN affairs, and the maritime profession in general, and will
constitute the ANI Collection pending the formal establishment of an ANI library
c.	Purchases for the collection will be undertaken in accordance with rules determined by the
Council from time to time.
Appropriate By-Law amendments along these lines will be promulgated in due course
The long-term future of the ANI Collection has not been considered in detail The broad goal is that the collection should be the basis of a library of importance in the naval and maritime field Should a national headquarters ever be established for the Australian Naval Institute then that would provide the appropriate location for the Library
Meanwhile a programme of slow but steady development of the ANI Collection is intended In this regard, any donations of relevant material would be much appreciated Out-of-print important publications, covering RAN and maritime affairs will be purchased if they become available in good condition (Hyslop s Australian Naval Administration 1900-1939 and Johnston's Grey Gladiator are recent acquisitions in accordance with this policy). It is anticipated that the Collection will be an appreciating asset of the Institute.
The Collection is stored at present within Navy Office It is not open to loans on a regular basis but special arrangements for borrowing can be made through Commodore Nicholson (phone Canberra 65 3358). Development of the Collection is now being monitored by Commodore Nicholson who has considerable knowledge of Australiana in the form of rare books and other publications on naval and maritime subjects.
HMAS SUCCESS (commissioned 1920. scrapped 1937)
— by courtesy ot Australian War Memonal {Negative NO H17S27) Journal ot the Australian Naval Institute — Page 6.1

AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP
1    I	-	
(Full name in block letters)
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apply to |Oin the Australian Naval Institute as a Regular/Associate' Member
2.    Membership of the Institute is open to
a.	Regular Members — Members of the Permanent Naval Forces of Australia
b.	Associate Members —(1) Members of the Reserve Naval Forces of Australia.
 (2)	Members of the Australian Military Forces and the Royal Royal Australian Air Force both permanent and reserve
 (3)	Ex-members of the Australian Defence Forces, both permanent and reserve components, provided that they have been honourably discharged from that force
 (4)	Other persons having and professing a special interesf in naval and maritime affairs
3     'My rank/former rank" is/was*		and bnef
details of my service/former service" are	
"I have a special interest in naval and maritime affairs because
 4.	I enclose my cheque tor $15 (being $5 joining tee and $10 annual subscription) payable to the Australian Naval Institute
 5.	My signature on this form indicates that, if accepted for membership, I agree to abide by the Constitution and By-laws of the Institute.
(Date)	Signed)
NB 1    "Delete items not applicable
2.  Return to the Secretary. Australian Naval Institute, P O Box 18. DEAKIN, ACT 2600
FOR INSTITUTE USE ONLY
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Page W — Journal ol the Austral/en Na /a! Institute

COUNCIL OF THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE 1979-1980

OFFICE BEARERS
President
Rear-Admiral R.C. Swan C3E Senior Vice President
Captain L.G. Fox Junior Vice President
Captain D.J. Orr Secretary
Lieutenant W.K Scott Treasurer
Lieutenant N.A. Reed

COUNCILLORS
Second Officer S.M. Barnes WRANS Commander W.S G. Bateman Commander A.H.R. Brecht Captain S.F. Comfort Captain OR. Cooper Captain J.S. Dickson MBE Commodore M W Hudson Comander R.M. Jessuron Commander G. Nekrasov Chief Officer NO. Uhlmann WRANS

PAST PRESIDENTS
1975-77 Commodore V.A  Parker 1977-78 Commodore J.A. Robertson
HONORARY LIFE MEMBERS
Admiral Sir Victor Smith AC KBE CB DSC Vice Admiral Sir David Stevenson AC KBE Commodore V A Parker Admiral Sir Anthony Synnot KBE AO Commodore J.A Robertson
Public officer    Commander DR  Patterson RAN EM

Bennett, G A Berlyn.N R B Bonnett. V W L Brecht. A H R Broben, I W Calderwood. G C Cole.SE W Cummins. A R Cults. G
Dalrymple. H H G Davidson. J Dickie. D D Fisher. T R Fox.LG George. J Gibbs. B G Goddard. F C Gnerson. K W Hall, I W Associate Member

FOUNDATION MEMBERS
Hermann, B.J.
Histed.G
James. I B
Jervis. G.E
Josselyn. IK
Kemp. W A
Knox. I W
Lee. N.E
Loftus.WB
Loosli.R.G
Martin, D J I   Martin.PCS t   Mayson.J.H
McDonald. N E
Macleod.B D
Nattey. R J •   Nicholson, BM
Nicholson. I H
Orr.DJ

Parker V A Patterson. D R Ralph. N Read. B.J Reynolds, I Robertson. J.A Scott. B P Sharp. W R Shearing. J A Smyth. D H D Snell.K.E Stephen. K.C Stevens, E V Stevens. J.D. Summers.AM E Swan. R C Swan. W N Williams, K A York, D

ERRATA

The captions on the photographs of HMAS RNZAC pages 41 and 59 have been interchanged.

sni (u)

on

wu

— a new word in anybody's language!
Vickers Cockatoo Dockyard is the main refitting base for the Navy's submarines.
Advanced technology in weapons, sensors, and fire control systems being installed at Cockatoo makes these fine Oberon class boats a very powerful and effective arm of Australia's defence.
'Submarine Wf,)i>uns Update Progfatiitnt
vicKers
VICKERS COCKATOO DOCKYARD PTY LIMITEO
a memOBt   '"..-.      .	.... .i- uw
.1 NSW ^000 •.
1 1201   I	   AA.'M • I

Printea by Canberra Publishing and Printing Co