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JOURNAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE

VOLUMES

AUGUST 1979

NUMBER 3

AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE
1. The Australian Naval Institute has been formed and incorporated in the Australian Capital Territory The main ob|ects of the Institute are —
a. to encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the Maritime profession.
b to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and the Maritime profession
c. to publish a journal.
2 The Institute is self supporting and non-profit making The aim is to encourage freedom of discussion, dissemination of information, comment and opinion and the advancement of professional knowledge concerning naval and maritime matters a  Regular    members    —    Members    of    the    Permanent    Naval    Forces    of    Australia.
b Associate Members — (1) Members of the Reserve Naval Forces of Australia
 (2)	Members of the Australian Military Forces and the Royal Australian Air Force both permanent and reserve
 (3)	Ex-members of the Australian Defence Forces, both permanent and reserve components, provided that they have been honourably discharged from that force
 (4)	Other persons having and professing a special interest in naval and maritime affairs
c. Honorary Members — A person who has made a distinguished contribution to the Naval or maritime prolession or who has rendered distinguished service to the Institute may be elected by the Council to Honorary Membership.
 4.	Joining fee for Regular and Associate member is $5. Annual Subscription for both is $10
 5.	Inquiries and application fo' membership should be directed to -
The Secretary. Australian Naval Institute, P O Box 18, DEAKIN, ACT 2600
CONTRIBUTIONS
As the Australian Naval Institute exists for the promotion and advancement of knowledge relating to the Naval and maritime profession, all members are strongly encouraged to submit articles for publication   Only in this way will our aims be achieved.
DISCLAIMER
In writing for the institute I must be borne in mind that the views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of Ihe Department ol Defence, the Chief of Naval Staff or the Institute
Registered for Posting as a Publication — Category B

JOURNAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE (INC)
CONTENTS
Title	Page
Chapter News ..            		2
Correspondence	2
From the Editor		3
Maritime Strategy in the Support ot Foreign Policy
 —	by Lieutenant Commander P L Clark DFC RAN	4 Steaming into the Twenty-First Century?
 —	by Lieutenant Commander M.K Gahan RAN           		8
The Future of the Convoy System for Merchant Shipping
—	by Lieutenant Commander C.H G.Wheeler RN	13
Journal Binders	21
The Defence of Japan — Some Thoughts on the 1978 White Paper
—	by Commander W.S.G Bateman RAN		24
An Australian Centre for Maritime Studies		30
Notice ol Annual General Meeting	                 		35
I was There When	36
Ships and the Sea                                                                         		38
New Members		39
Nobody Asked Me. But		40
Journal Back Issues	             		41
Book Reviews	                    		42
Naval Institute Insignia		44
Articles or condensations of articles are not to be reprinted or reproduced without the permission of the Institute Extracts may be quoted for the purposes of research, review or comment provided the source is acknowledged
The front cover features a photograph of the Japanese destroyer TAKATSUKI in Sydney Harbour during a visit to Australia in 1977. The TAKATSUKI was commissioned in 1967. displaces 3100 tonnes, carries one helicopter, has a maximum speed of 32 knots and is armed with two 5 inch guns. ASROC and two triple ASW torpedo launchers
— photo by courtesy ot John Mortimer Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute — Page I

CHAPTER NEWS
Canberra Chapter
A |Oint meeting with the Royal Aeronautical Society was held on 6th June 1979 at the Academy ol Science The speaker was LCDR Mike Apps who delivered a most interesting address on Air, Surface and Sub-Surface Mine Warfare — Past. Present and Future The paper was illustrated by a number ot slides and a short documentary turn The meeting was attended by ovei one hundred members ol both organisations and then guests
The all loo frequently lorgotten potential ol mine warfare and the problems associated with mine clearance were brought into tocus It is hoped to publish this paper in the Journal
Slop Press John Hazell will address Ihe chapter after the Annual General Meeting on Industrial Suppon loi Maritime Power

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Correspondence

Dear Sir
I received my copy ol the Seapowe r 79 Seminar Papers on Ihe 6th ot June last
I have spent much time studying tnem, and I would like lo offer my congratulations and thanks, it I may. to all Ihe speakers lor their time and thought spent in researching, preparing and proot reading of their excellent papers before they were presented at the Seminar

reminded ol how Hue are the words ol Ihe Bnlish Amcles ot War   in relation to Australia
II is upon Ihe Navy, that under trio good providence ot God the wealth prosperity and peace ot these islands, and Ihe Commonwealth do mainly depend (sic>
Vours l.lltiltully
Eric Jehan

I thought Ihey were all excellent patiers, and I derived much information on all the subiects dealt with Much ol the intor mation I had not heard ot before They are all very tar reaching subjects They gave me much lood lor nought
When we consider that we have 20 000 kilometres ol coast line, we could do with some patrol boats ol the design ot the Royal Navy s latest ottshoro type HMS ALDERNEY was recently launched and some have already been commissioned, including HMS ships GUERNSEY ana JERSEY
Alter reading ihe article by Ihe Hon PJ Nikon Minister lor Transport   Auslralias Dependence on Sea Transport   I am

Dear Sir.
When I can read my title clear To mansions in the skies, I bid farewell to every fear. And wipe my weeping eyes
Leaving aside the verse ot Isaac Watts, may I say that I am delighted to see the continuing rise in professional standards ol the Journal and its editorial committee May I also say how absolutely shattered I was to see their continuing use ot initials and blanks as a way ol reducing ihe literacy and continuing the misuse ol the once revered English language

Page 2 — Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute

To include a lis! of new members in fhe |Ournal is a welcome change, the sponsor of such a radical move is to be congralu-lated What a pity though the editorial committee had lo lake Ihe backward step ol reducing all and sundry lo the common mechanical, computerised denominator Recall it you will. Ihe plea ol DJC and (Commodore) David Martin on Ihe use ot ugly epithets in lieu ol recognised ranks brought about in some lemming like rush towards Ihe brink
In Ihe latest copy ol Ihe lournal (May 79) we had me utmost manners and respect to lis! (hose erslwnile stalwarts (on tee lasl page) with their titles, in lull and wilh post nommals. yet we ignored the same courtesies towards our latest members Let me list some ol the more glaring examples
One would imagine thai First Officers Baker and Downes would much prefer to be shown as such, rather than what must appear to The non-service reader to be some sort ot anagram I would like to tnmk that chivalry is not quite dead (yet) and that by conceding equality to the ladies ot the service we do not force sameness upon them
Two Senior Sailors are shown in (he new members fist, great news and welcome lo both ol them Bui CMTH3 would <i

not be better lo list tnem as Chiel Petty Officer jnd Warrant Officer as behoves their status7
Sir, you presume too much Call one ot our company by his surname and like Pavlov s canines we respond In all fairness though please do not attempt Ihe same thing with any civiltan. much less a new member ot the Institute Perhaps the use of old world courtesy titles such as (and I abbreviate) Mr Mrs, Miss Master, Ms or even Esquire would be more lifting for use in a professional journal We lake the lime and ellort lo show a retired Naval Officer by his rank, (hen please allow the civilian his dignity and use Ihe lltle he or she is entitled to
Finally, il there are worries aboul using bin Concise Oxford Dictionary abbreviations perhaps the journal s own disclaimer will sel lo rest Ihe Puttering feathers and hypertensions It however, the reticence in using the same accepted titles is one ot monetary consideration let us nol leave Ihe Devil unpayed just because someone lorgol. or could nol attord. to heat Ihe pilch
Robin Pennock Commander RAN

FROM THE EDITOR

This edition of the Journal contains two prize-winning essays. These essays are specifically subject to Ihe disclaimer that the views expressed are those of the authors and are not to be construed as being the views of either the Australian Government, the Department of Defence, the Chief of Naval Staff or the Australian Naval Institute
The first essay is by Lieutenant Commander PL. Clark DFC RAN who received the inaugural award of the Australian Naval Institute Silver Medal at the RAN Staff College. This is a prize which will be awarded by the Institute to the author of the best essay on maritime strategy produced during each course at the Staff College.
The second essay published in this Journal won first prize in the officers' section of the 1978 Peter Mitchell Trust Essay Competition The topic of the essay is The Future of the Convoy System for Merchant Shipping and I am sure readers will find the approach adopted by its author to be both original and stimulating. The topic involves an

important issue of relevance to the contemporary force structure of (he RAN — but one must ponder whether the conclusions reached by this particular author are fully applicable in the Australian context.
The other major articles comprise a topical review of the RAN's approach to ship main propulsion systems (or as the author of this article calls it. Steaming into the 21 st Century), some thoughts on Japan's defence policies and their possible importance for Australia, and a proposal for the establishment of an Australian Centre tor Maritime Studies to facilitate knowledge relating to Australia's maritime interests and environment
One last note... about postage of the journal Journals are distributed to members overseas at surface rates of postage. Airmail rates would cost over $A2 per journal The Institute cannot afford these higher rates but seeks the views of members concerned — anyone wishing to pay a higher subscription to cater for faster postage should communicate with the Secretary or myself

Journal ot the Australian Naval Institute — Rage 3

Australian Naval Institute Silver Medal Essay
MARITIME STRATEGY IN THE SUPPORT OF FOREIGN POLICY
By Lieutenant Commander PL Clark DFC RAN

There is a mass of historical data which argues the relationship tetween maritime strategy and the support of foreign policy The clearest and most persuasive examples, which date back to the days of Ancient Greece and Rome, are those applicable lo the major world powers of the particular era in question Whether the relationship is pertinent to minor world powers has not been convincingly evicent
Any consideration of the impact of maritime strategy on foreign policy, with regard to present day Australia la minor world power), is therefore dependent upon appropriate interpretation of history Nowadays, such a discussion is likely to be confused by the terms contained in the vocabulary of the modern-day strategist These include sea denial, sea assertion, sea control, maritime strategy, national stialegy, sea power, core force, and force-in-being
Even the simple term strategy has many interpretations. All these terms may be open to interpretation and an author should clearly define his own interpretation of the terms he wishes to use Continual reference to the intended meaning of these simple words is important to keep the reader on course with the theme.

maritime strategy The relationship between the military and political functions will be summarised to suggest how we in Australia perceive and apply the relationship between foreign policy and maritime strategy
The very concept of maritime strategy in support of foreign policy implies that the ulility of such a relationship can only exist during times of peace In effect, the relationship ceases to exist the moment (major) conflict breaks out with the consequent severing of diplomatic relations Clearly then, the prime objective ot this concept can be seen as the avoidance of war through the influence of maritime power on the political decisions of another nation
The United States
The capability to influence favourably the political decisions of another nation is one ot the major roles attributed to the navies of today. This role, more commonly termed Naval Presence' is one of the tour major roles of the US Navy These are: Strategic Nuclear Deterrence, Sea Control, Projection of National Power, and Naval Presence
This role of Naval Presence is still held to be valid today in the United States Why should this be so7 Recent history shows how the United

To examine the subject in an Australian context one must assemble and interpret the pieces of this dislocated puzzle with minimal reference to the catchwords of the present day strategist
The purpose of this essay is firstly to examine developments in the relationsnip between maritime strategy and foreign policy to establish whether such a relationship exists today. Secondly to discuss in the Australian context the factors contributing both to the formulation of our foreign   policy   and   the   determination   of  our

THE AUTHOR
LCDR PL Clark DFC |oined the RAN as SL Aircrew entry in 1966 and underlooK tnghi training with the USN at Pensacola, Florida Having gained his wings initial postings in the RAN were to 725 and 723 squadrons as a helicopter pilot Following servn i wHti trie RANHFV (69 70) he then pined VC 724 squadron for Macchi and Skyhawk conversions Sen/ice in the iel community has included tours on VF 805 and VC 724 squadrons, specialisalion as an Air Warfare inslruclor and later as NAS Nowra s Station Air Warfare IrrttucIOf Prior to commencing the lirst RAN stalt course. LCDR Clark was serving in Ihe Naval Materiel Division at Navy Office

Page 4 — Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

States used its maritime power to exert influence in: Lebanon, the Cuban missile crisis, the Indian Ocean, and in a less traditional sense, in Vietnam.
Of the above, the Cuban missile crisis appears to have had the greatest impact Not only did it raise the threat ol a major nuclear exchange, thereby heightening global speculation, but it also demonstrated the determination ol the United States to exert military influence to achieve the political aim Perhaps of greater importance is the fact that this event occurred in the lifetime of most, if not all, current military and political leaders in the United States and would have made an impact on them The favourable result undoubtedly imparted a clear understanding of the use of maritime power as a valuable tool of diplomacy
Diplomatic Influence
Before referring to Soviet attitudes it is relevant to consider two more general points which also indicate the influence of maritime power
Firstly, the diplomatic significance of navies is attested by the tact that the peace treaties concluded after the two World Wars paid particular attention to limiting the size and capability of the naval forces ot the defeated nations Moreover, large portions of their battle fleets were either destroyed or divided amongst the dominant nations,
Secondly, the ability of armed forces to influence the attainment ot national political objectives largely rests with the maritime component of such forces. Despite the technology ot todays armies and air forces, they are not capable ot exerting the subtle pressure ot their maritime partners Instead, any use of the tormer elements to exert any pressure would involve a massing of forces near the desired point of influence and this is likely to develop an escalator/ Situation which cannot be controlled Under circumstances which call for military influence, navies have proved to be the preferred political instrument of a nation during peace Not only is their power wielded indirectly, but also, they enable the political leaders to exercise a great deal more effective and timely control than is possible with the other elements of the armed forces.
The Soviet Union
There is little reason to doubt that the Soviet Union also implements this relationship to achieve its own objectives. One aspect is clearly explained by Admiral Gorshkov With the emergence of the Soviet Navy onto the ocean expanses, our warships are calling with contin-

ually greater frequency at foreign ports, fulfilling the role of plenipotentiaries" (official envoys) of the socialist countries. In the last three years alone, some 1000 Soviet combatants and auxiliaries have visited the ports of 60 countries in Europe. Asia, Africa and Latin America More than 200,000 of our officers and rated and non rated men have visited the shores of foreign states
Furthermore, the emergence of the Soviet fleet onto the world's oceans is not only an indicator o! the strength of her economy and technology, but also emphasises her recognition of the importance of maritime power
Since the Soviet Union is significantly less dependent on international trade than the United States, the tremendous growth of her maritime power is an expression of some other objective than protection of trade Whatever her motives may have been, the Soviet challenge to the United States mastery of the oceans has been effective The extent and effectiveness ol this challenge is aptly described by Admiral Zumwalt . as of 1 July 1970 the US had a 55 percent chance of winning a major conventional war at sea (with Russia) and was heading towards a 45 percent chance as of 1 July 1971. and a considerably smaller one than that by 1 July 1972
Naval Presence
The t.vo most powerful navies of today acknowledge and apply the principle ot Naval Presence to support foreign policy and other political and national objectives
Despite this and the events ot recent history such as the Cuban missile crisis, which overtly proved that a nation's determination can be convincingly expressed through its maritime forces, the Naval Presence mission does not attract the detailed analysis and discussion which are frequently directed at the more accepted role of a navy
This is not to suggest that Naval Presence is a power unto itself, but rather that it is inextricably linked with the potential of a navy for war This capacity for war is amply demonstrated by today's technology; a capacity to strike with unprecedented accuracy and destructive power The selective control of such awesome power transforms Naval Presence into the most subtle art of the military profession While it enables a nation s capacity for war to be assessed objectively by any potential opponent, its existence and/or proximity may be said to imply nothing more It generates a subjective response since the potential opponent

Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute     Paoa 9

is forced to interpret the intrinsic subtlety of Naval Presence
The Future of Naval Presence
Although I have only jus' touched on a few examples, (at least, in the context of history) hopefully the reader perceives that the relationship between maritime strategy and foreign policy survives, at least in the eye:; of the two ma|or world powers.
Some would argue the importance ol the Naval Presence mission has declined because of the continued developments n nuclear strategy Since these weapons reflect ooth the ultimate in military technology and capacity for war, they tend to overshadow the capabilities of conventional military forces in the context of a major global war Yet as much as they are the ultimate expression of a nation's capacity for wai. they are also the servant of peace between the two major world powers It is considered highly unlikely that the United States and the Soviet Union will again engage in an exercise of delicate nuclear bargaining as they did over Cuba
Under these circumstances, the Naval Presence mission assumes major significance should the maior world powers continue to compete for the attainment of political objectives, particularly in the Third World Despite their acknowledgement of the importance of Naval Presence, there is much to suggest that little is likely to be achieved so long as they retain overall nuclear parity and a balance of the more conventional military power in the |)articular region in question
Since such a balance of power has a neutral ising effect, the United States and Soviet Union are likely to continue to direct major efforts towards maintaining such an environment in key areas. However, the period in which the majority of nations were polarised either towards the Americans or Soviets, appears to be drawing to a close as nations, such as Indonesia and Egypt, strive for true independence Such a loosening of traditional alliances suggests that the super powers will be less automatically committed to an opposing point of view.
THE AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT
Historical Perspective
Since the end of World War It there has been a fundamental change in the concept of and the relationship between maritme strategy and foreign policy In the preceding years, up to and including World War II. Australia reacted predictably to the call of England and the Commonwealth   Gradually this emphasis began to shift

away from England towards a responsiveness to the United Stales While the lies with the United States continued to evolve. Australia also began to develop her own political interpretations and reactions based on the broader international issues
During this evolutionary period Australian military involvement in Malaysia and Vietnam occurred Yet our committal to both conflicts was still influenced by the policies and attitudes of external governments Although the end of the Malaysia conflict heralded the end of an era of political and economic reliance on the United Kingdom. Vietnam marked a peak in political allegiance to the United States.
Throughout this century our armed forces have operated as an extension of the military forces of another nation Although independent command has been frequently exercised, command aspects of greater strategic importance have eluded the grasp of our military and political leaders Despite having been proved in a tactical sense, Austrahas armed forces have yet to be tested as the sword of an ultimate expression of an independent Australian foreign policy
Public Attitudes
It follows that if Australia has only ever contributed colonial forces in response to the call of others, then undoubtedly this would have conditioned attitudes of society towards the government, the military and ultimately. Australian foreign policy.
Accordingly, the following is a reasonably accurate assessment of Australian public expectations of future military (combat) involvement.
 •	In the case of a major threat towards either our traditional or major allies, colonial armies would be contributed in response to a call for assistance
 •	Since Australia has pulled her weight internationally in the past, it is reasonable to expect that our major allies will come to our assistance in time of need
 •	It is almost unthinkable that the Australian Government should contemplate any totally independent military involvement, unless the country was under a direct and overt threat
The point I wish to make is that the attitudes of this nation are still geared towards that colonial' type of response and a feeling that our allies owe us protection I believe that it would be highly unlikely that the majority of the public would support a Government decision to intervene in the affairs of another nation in our region, even as a pre-emptive strike in response to a direct threat to us.

Page 6 — Journal ol the Australian Haval Institute

The growing determination of the Government to express independent attitudes and influence, particularly in our region, is held in check by the populations lack of resolve and understanding of the implications of our new political ideals.
Economic and Political Issues
The termination of our involvement in Vietnam signified the resumption of the earlier trends towards a new style of Australian international politics Our present policies reveal a determination for expression of independent thought on both regional and global issues. Current expression is heavily biased towards economic issues with the aim of achieving favourable overseas markets and a healthy internal economy
As our foreign policy is therefore woven inextricably with these economic issues, international politics, particularly in our region, are moving towards a peak.
ASEAN, our nearest economic community, is developing as a determined political body with economic issues overshadowing the internal turmoil ol the individual members The archipelagic nature of ASEAN (excluding Thailand) coupled with the probability of respective 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) provides this economic community with a powerful political weapon which may not only be directed at Australia, but perhaps more importantly. Japan. Such an influence on Japan would have obvious implications for the Australian economy
The ever increasing demand for food, energy and industrial raw materials has heightened global interest in ocean resources As technological developments continue to improve the feasibility and efficiency of removing such resources from the sea. there is a sense of urgency attached lo the manner in which nations are staking their claims for EEZs.
Since there is considerable potential for conflict over ocean resources, particularly in regions of competing and overlapping claims, the importance of maritime power is developing a new dimension and meaning even for small nations. Hence the foundations are set for a new era as nations seek to exercise political influence through their maritime forces, either in support or protection of their claims for rights to ocean resources.
Not only will Australia be faced with competing demands in our region, but in addition will have to  accept  the political  implications and

responsibilities if a 200 mile EEZ is to be claimed in Antarctica.
Thus the purpose of Australian foreign policy in the region not only must involve the broad economic issues but also must ensure regional stability For it is only during a period of such stability that our own trade policies can be vigor ously pursued. Therefore the desire to seek both regional stability and the preservation of our claims to ocean resources begs the question of what the Australian Government may be willing to do in applying Naval Presence or a military dimension in Foreign Policy, or the application of military force should any national claim be contested
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, history has demonstrated that the relationship between maritime strategy and foreign policy has enabled political objectives to be attained without recourse to war Although both the Soviet Union and the United States continue to be firmly committed to this concept, many smaller nations will be forced to make their own stance on this issue, should they desire to protect or enforce their claims for ocean resources, or seek to exploit new opportunities to exert influence on other countries.
The importance of ocean resources is drawing many small nations, including Australia, independently into a political arena where scope for future conflict abounds Under such circumstances the question arises as to what extent the Australian Government of the day is willing to employ maritime strategy in influencing the region or in the support of her ocean claims
Under circumstances of potential conflict, the maritime forces of a nation have and will continue to demonstrate that they have a valuable contribution to make to foreign policy Regardless of whether the political or military leaders understand the concept of Naval Presence, the understanding and will of the Australian population do not appear to have kept abreast of changing political circumstances Consequently, a disparity between the population and their elected political representatives may serve to dislocate the political and military functions Without cohesion between these two basic components, the principles of Naval Presence can be neither properly nor effectively utilised.
FOOTNOTES:
 1	Gorshkov Sergei G Red star Rising al Sea United Stales Naval Inslitile Press, p 119
 2	Zumwall. Elmo R On Watch United Stales Naval Insiilulo Press

Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute     Page 7

STEAMING INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY?
Ely Lieutenant Commander M K Gahan RAN
Their Lordships feel il their bounden duty upon national and professional grounds to discourage to the utmost of their ability the employment of steam vessels as they consider the introduction of steam is calculated to strike a tatal blow at the Naval supremacy ol the Empire
Lord Melville. First Lord of the Admiralty. 1828

In a century of rapid charge, the RAN may well see the birth, the maturity, and the death of steam as the prime means ol propulsion in ships The pressure of change has so dominated this century that decisions to accept change often appear to have been made without due consideration of what was being left behind
The value index
The military are constantly reminded, quite justifiably, that the value ot a system/ship/ component is its basic function divided by its through-life cost This value index must be a maximum, and is the basis of all procurement considerations Given this definition, we attempt to define the basic function (which itself is a (unction varying with time. such as a change in the political climate), and througn-hfe cost (which varies with technological change and the economic climate) Whatever the variables, however, the value index must remain a maximum i.e. to perform the function at the minimum cost
If this is all too general, lei me be specific A breed is dying, right before our eyes, and no one will weep or mourn its passing, or. apparently, defend its virtues A recent, excellent paper on nuclear propulsion by Lieutenant Commander Purcell in the November 1978 number of this lournal was concerned primarily with the energy problem, and its conclusions must be seriously considered in the long term It is merely coincidental that this article also referred to steam as the medium for propulsion I am referring specifically to steam as the propellant. with, in the short term, fossil fuel as the heat source, and in the long term, nuclear fuel

Suggested trend of propulsive horsepower
The accompanying graph represents total shaft horsepower of the RAN from its birth, in 1911. to the present, and developed in a personal prediction to complete the century, to 2011 Historians speak of tonnage, but for the purpose of this exercise. I have opted for shaft horsepower, as it is slightly more interesting, and is the only way of leading the gentle reader to my conclusions
The last (and it may well be) steamship built for the RAN was HMAS TORRENS, commis sioned in January 1971 It will probably be out lived by one of the American built DDGs, the RAN versions of which must phase out early in the next century, and certainly before 2011, the RAN s centenary year We are still, nevertheless, a very steam oriented and conscious Navy, as the graph indicates Why should I be so certain, therefore, and so concerned, that steam will be phased out, perhaps never to be replaced'''
THE AUTHOR
Ueutenaril Commander Gahan joined the HAN College Jervis Bay in January 1964 and graduated as
'ing Communications Otticer Helttlfil r Irom the RN Engineering College. Manadon n-B Sc en Marine Engineering in 1971 and served "> HMS CAPRICE in 1972 Following a year ol service in HMAS SYDNEY, tie spent three years as a project plann''' ■" Garden Island Dockyard then two years as the mam propulsion engineer in HMAS MELBOURNE during which time the strip panicipated m the Spithead Review al Ponsmoulh in 1977 Then luiiowed a year as Deputy MEO HMAS PERTH, and he is now on the stilt nt trio Director ot Fleet Maintenance M Navy I Mi

Page «     loutnalal ine Australian Nuv m msiiti/n>

TOTAL    PROPULSIVE    SHAFT     HORSEPOWER    IN    THF    RAN
1911  -   2011

The alternatives and current trends
To answer the first question why so certain?', one must be aware of the alternative means of propulsion, in the light of basic ship function and cost Firstly basic function; in military terms, this is appropriately re-defined as the primary role for which the ship was built. The primary role also determines the maximum speed, range and endurance required to perform the role. This then determines the type of propulsion required, which is subordinate but necessary to the primary role. Until the mid-sixties, steam was still the prime medium giving the flexibility and power to drive larger war ships in excess of thirty knots, and still retain a margin of endurance. Marine gas turbine applications were certainly at sea, in fast patrol boats, as boost propulsion in DLGs, and main propulsion in frigates of the Royal Navy, but they were certainly subordinate to steam Two pressures emerged which forced change; one was the concept of the efficient, powerful, aircraft gas turbine being placed in a ship's hull virtually without modification, driving a free power turbine connected to a variable pitch propeller, and the other was the economic pressure of the most expensive resource, manpower Gas was obviously a saver of weight, space, maintenance, and labour Fewer people meant fewer bunks, recreation space, victualling, stores etc., and a bonus compensatory increase of weapons, thus maximising the basic function. The value index was certainly looking good, and a conscious decision was therefore made which ended steam propulsion (except in nuclear submarines) in the Royal Navy. Thus it was that a technological change, coupled with an economic

change, forced a significant decision, with lew misgivings
The thinking was similar in nearly all mapr Navies in the world, and has resulted in new generations of very large to very small warships with gas as the sole medium for propulsion. The USN, however, could not make a conscious decision to phase out steam. Aircraft carriers with fixed wing aircraft require a steam catapult for launching their aircraft. It does not necessarily follow that steam is to be retained for main propulsion, since an auxiliary boiler plant can provide steam for the catapult independent of the propulsion plant. If the fuel is nuclear, however, the medium is steam, and it logically serves both requirements. If the fuel is fossil, the option for the propulsion plant medium remains at gas or steam The decision so far has been to retain steam in specific applications, and as long as this direction is retained, development of the fossil fuelled boiler will continue.
The RAN alternative
Which way for the RAN9 As we are not in the game of developing propulsion systems, we are guided by what we can afford. We do not have to follow the RN lead by phasing out steam Our maturity in the operation of steam plants surpasses the vast experience of the Royal Navy, with the advent of the American DDG 1275 psig plant, and perhaps even surpasses the experience of the USN in this particular plant, by virtue of the significant difference in philosophy of our training. The combination of advanced engineering and broader training has produced a formid-

Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute — Page 9

able and reliable propulsion plant These valuable commodities, experience and expertise, unfortunately cannot be costed. and in any event the cost to attain it, plus the cost to maintain and operate it. makes the value index look pretty small, and the justification to retain it when offered the gas alternative, almost non-existent Hence the answer to why so certain-7
Gas versus steam
The answer to the seconc question why so concerned-7, does not stem f'om any romantic notion that steam plant operators have a masochistic pleasure in working in a hot, dirty, and noisy environment Possibly the most overlooked aspect in favour of the steam medium is its use for other purposes besides propulsion The boiler generates steam for pre pulsion, certainly, but its base load is more often devoted to electrical power generation, water production, and domestic hea'ing and cleaning than it is to propulsion A gas turbine on the other hand, in a propulsion role, can only be used for propulsion, since waste heat utilisation severely increases the back pressure and reduces the power of the engine Therefore, electrical power generation must be provided by an auxiliary gas turbine, or more commonly, a diesel. and his must run at all times Additionally, back-up electrical generators must be installed, one for stand-by. and one for redundancy in the event of failure In other words.

a gas turbine ship with, say, one shaft, still requires an engine room, one or more electrical power generation rooms, and an auxiliary machinery room, for such things as air conditioning units, fresh water distilling plants and refrigeration machinery A steam ship, on the other hand, needs a boiler room, an engine room which doubles as the electrical power generation room, and an auxiliary machinery room The actual volume required is the same in both cases, and may even be more in a gas turbine ship if more than one electrical power generation room is required The steam ship will need a small emergency diesel or gas generator, but otherwise will be essentially all steam and electric The gas turbine ship will be all gas and electric, or, more commonly, gas, diesel and electric The maintenance load is not therefore quite as attractive as it at first appears, and the reduction in complement of the gas turbine ship must be compensated for by an increased ashore support facility
The gas turbine is compact, robust, sophisticated, clean and efficient, and it must be protected and maintained, even replaced, when its sen/ice hours are up II rotates in one direction only, and must be coupled to a sophisticated variable pitch propeller in order to achieve astern power It is sensitive to ambient conditions and suffers loss of power in tropical climes It is noisy due to the large ingestion of air through enormous air ducts at inlet and exhaust, not to mention the

USS BROOKE— FFG2 (1966 THIRD GENERATION STEAM)
- by courtesy o! Janes Fighting Ships
Page 10 — Journal ol the Australian Naaal Institute

constant hammering of the diesel generators The steam turbine by comparison, is compact, robust, and basic, but requires a large number of supporting ancillaries. It needs little maintenance, little inspection, and normally outlives the lite of the hull. It rotates in both directions, and is not sensitive to ambient conditions It is quiet and relatively slow revving at all powers. The same description applies to steam turbine electrical generators, except that they run at greater speeds At last we come to the heart of the problem; that enormous, fiery, mis-understood, labour intensive beast, the boiler

Pressure fired boiler — superheater
— by courtesy ol Graeme Vagg
The steam contender
A giant leap forward in boiler technology was the dramatic increase in steam pressure and temperature permitted by the increased knowledge of materials technology. The advantage of increased pressure and temperature is of course the significant gain in the energy per pound of steam, plus the reduced volume, hence mass, of the boiler and associated pipework. Additionally, the improvement in burner design permitted total automatic control using a basic, robust, pneumatic control system. All these features have been incorporated in the DDG. and they work. What is not widely recognised, however, is that boiler technology has already advanced a whole generation beyond the DDG plant, and any new procurement would be practically unrecognizable as a steam plant. The essential difference is that, whereas the high pressure, second generation boiler (DDG type), is provided with combustion air by a conventional steam driven blower, which audibly winds up' as steam demand increases, the high pressure, third generation boiler uses an auxiliary gas turbine to provide a constant high pressure of combustion air in the furnace. The principle is the same as a supercharger on an internal  combustion  engine;  to  provide  more

oxygen in a smaller combustion chamber (or furnace), thereby improving combustion efficiency. At lower powers, the gas turbine provides the high pressure air, but at high power, the waste heat from the furnace drives a free turbine which drives the gas turbine compressor, and the air cycle is self-sustaining. This boiler is the pressure-fired boiler' It is cylindrical, small, fully automatic, and at sea in sixteen ships of the USN The last of these, of the Garcia class, was commissioned in October 1968 The plant fell out of favour due to a series of operational lailures. plus the concurrent success of the gas turbine installation with its immediate apparent advantages However, it exists; its problems have been entirely eliminated, and it must be the only viable contender in the propulsion race The plant lends itself to remote operation of the boiler room, and even bridge control of the main engines, if so desired. The noise level and underwater signature is low at all powers, and it does not require diesel generators to run constantly.
The ultimate cost of gas
Therein lies one case for concern; it is possible that a realistic contender is already dead and buried. There is no reason to suppose that the RAN could not operate the compact pressure fired boiler plant better than the USN, and thus retain all the existing skills and tools of boiler-making and fitting capacity in Australian dockyards It. as the graphical trend suggests, the MELBOURNE replacement is gas turbine propelled, and if. as the graph further suggests, the follow-on-destroyer is also gas turbine propelled, the next quarter century will see a major industrial upheaval. The labour capacity allocated to steam machinery will fall to zero, on gas turbine and related electronic and hydraulic control systems it

Pressure fired boiler — Supercharger (showing from front to rear — electric drive coupling, waste heat turbine, compressor stage, steam turbine)
— by courtesy ol Graeme Vagg

Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute — Page 11

Hull No 04 — HMAS REVENGE (FFG67I — 1994 — Third Generation Steam-?

will rise to an unpredictably hgh level, and on diesel engines to an unprecedented high level, not forgetting that the graph does not include diesel generator horsepower, which is automatically increasing with gas turbire horsepower In terms of defensive logistic supoort. the industrial capacity to survive the upheaval may be limited The retention of an existing propulsion technology, on the other hand, all of which can be maintained in-country by any number of dockyards with existing skills and 'anilities, must be considered an economic and defensive advantage. Does the through-life cost still look quite so attractive with the gas turbine? Does the basic ship function suffer with retention of an advanced steam plant? Is it enhanced? suggest that the value index, when considering the choice of propulsion tor the follow-on-destroyer, will take little cognizance of the steam alternative, nor the industrial ramifications of the gas turbine when it wins the race The choice, as usual, will amount to what can be afforded with the available funds

In the long term, the nuclear propulsion choice will come under closer scrutiny. As Lieutenant Commander Purcell has suggested in his recent article, medium — power status will require that the evolution to nuclear propulsion has commenced by then (the twenty-first century), and that consideration must be given to upgrading existing dockyards to ensure that they can meet the required standards of nuclear work The de-escalation of steam technology, as the graph suggests, will be counter-productive, and may require a complete build-up after a complete run-down, if the nuclear option becomes a reality, as it should The through-life cost to consider would not then include only the initial large capital outlay tor the ship, but also the almost prohibitive cost to tool up and buy back the basic skills and experience required of steam technology An apparently attractive decision now may close the doors to an essential option later, and the RAN must therefore consider its options in a unique and isolated way.

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Hull No 08 — HMAS PERTH (FFG200) — 2011 — Second Generation Nuclear"? Page 12 — Journal ot trie Australian Nai at Institute

This paper by Lieutenant Commander C.H.G WHEELER RN, won first prize in the Officer Section of the 1978 Peter Mitchell Trust Essay Competition and is reproduced here by permission of the Chief of Naval Staff The views expressed by the author are his own and not necessarily those of the Australian Government, the Department of Defence, the Chief of Naval Staff or the Australian Naval Institute
THE FUTURE OF THE CONVOY SYSTEM FOR MERCHANT SHIPPING
By Lieutenant Commander C H G Wheeler RN

The purpose of this essay is to highlight the factors affecting the decision whether or not to use a merchant ship convoy system in time of a future war
The Greek philosophers (Socrates, Aristotle and others) were often at pains to point out that philosophy was more concerned with choosing which questions to ask than finding the answers to those questions. It is intended, in this essay, to pose several questions rather than to pretend that one mind can postulate all the answers
I do not propose to produce lists ol statistics to support the arguments that follow, nor will reference be made to any books or documents Instead, an assumption will be stated at the outset (where necessary) of each argument, and the argument will then proceed on that basis. Thus the whole essay will stand or fall on the logic of its arguments — always provided the assumptions are agreed in the first place.

a to facilitate the protection of merchant shipping passing through a threatened area,
b to reduce the number of attack opportunities offered to enemy forces, and
c to enable merchant ships to give each other a measure of mutual assistance in the event ot damage or sinking
Here an analogy may be useful Imagine the beginning of a game of British Bulldog In the midde of the hall stands one person, the predator, and at one end a crowd of people, whose aim is to get to the other end of the hall without being caught and overpowered by the predator They rush across in a crowd. The "bulldog" in the middle has time only to attack one person The essential features of their defence are therefore SPEED and NUMBERS If they filed slowly past the predator, one by one, he would have a very much better chance of overpowering a number of them This was the lesson learnt and re-learnt in the First and Second World Wars

What is a convoy system ior'?
Quite enough has already been written about the history of convoys and the lessons learnt therefrom. I think it reasonable to state, without having to back up my statement with a lengthy historical treatise, that the desired functions of a convoy system are:

THE AUTHOR
Lieulenanl Commander Wheeler untied the Royal Navy in 1954 and latei qualified OS a pflOtln ItM Fleet An Arm He has served in a wide variety ot appointments and ship types, including HMS EAGLE, as an operational pilot on AEW GANNETS HMS ASHTON. in command, and HMS YARMOUIH as lirst lieutenant Al the time ol writing he is serving on the start ol the Commander Iberian Atlantic Area, as advisor on Naval Control ol Shipping matters He is married with two children and his main interests are reading, writing and walking his dog

Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute — Page 13

It would be easy. now. to bring out all the old arguments and to label the case against the convoy system as heresy But I intend to produce such a case, and will risk the label of heretic
My reason for challenging the concept of the convoy system is simple It is that I believe that several factors upon which tne validity of convoying is based have radically changed since 1945 These are as follows:
a	the merchant ship/submarine speed ratio,
b	the kill capacity of modern weapons,
c.	the availability of anti-submarine escorts,
d	developments in mining techniques.
e	developments in reconnaissance and com
munications,
I	the size of merchant ships, and
g.	anti-convoy tactics
Let us examine these factors one by one in order to find out how they have changed
The merchant ship to submarine speed ratio has changed radically in favour of the submarine since the convoys of the early forties In those days, submarines could not maintain more than about half the speed of the average convoy for any length of time a fairly typical ratio to quote might be the ten knot convoy challenged by a submarine with a submerged speed of seven knots. Further, the submarine n those days could not stay submerged indefinitely. It was forced to surface from time to time in order to recharge batteries
It is accepted that there are still many submarines in sen/ice which have to snort in order to charge batteries, but we would be deluding ourselves to concentrate on tne threat from that type of submarine and ignoie the much more serious threat from the nuclea' submarine When the capabilities of the latter are considered, the implications are sobering.
Consider a modern nuclear submarine, capable of about twenty-eight knots, submerged, indefinitely For a convoy of merchant ships to have the same speed advantage over it as did our ten knot convoy example, a convoy speed of forty knots would be required This ratio does not exist and will not exist until, perhaps, the hovercraft is developed to the very limits of imaginable likelihood
What this change of speed ratio means is that the nuclear submarine can keep pace with - and in many cases outpace — even the fastest convoys. The intense engine and propeller noise of the convoy will be heard from great distances, and will serve as a beacon to the grateful submarine commander There will be nc struggle to gain a

tiring position, or at least the struggle will be considerably eased There will be no limiting lines of approach to trouble the mind once the convoy has been found, the SSN commander will be able to intercept it — regardless of zig-zags and diversions All he needs is sea room and sufficient depth of water in which to operate And once he has closed the convoy, one of his best defences is to sit beneath the largest and noisiest merchant ship, loitering along at eighteen or twenty knots, awaiting his best opportunity to attack
The modern capability ot anti-ship weapons has also changed Without divulging any secrets, it is now well known that submarines can fire cruise missiles from a range of fifteen or twenty miles and from under the surface Further torpedoes can now be regarded as underwater guided missiles no longer does the submarine commander have to fire a pattern of them in order to ensure a reasonable chance of a hit And the advent of over-the-honzon targetting now means that surface ships can fire surface missiles from ranges of more than a hundred miles and expect a good success rate Anti-ship missiles launched by aircraft have been developed to pinpoint accuracy they can be fired from long range and approach their targets at speeds and angles of elevation that are difficult to combat
Thus the capabilities of individual weapons have increased. But that is not all We cannot afford to ignore the nuclear option
A large, valuable convoy presents an ideal target for a tactical nuclear weapon The user ot such a weapon can reasonably claim that it is used for the sole purpose of neutralising a force overtly engaged in warlike activities Civilians go unharmed and private property uncontaminated The use — or the threat of the use — ot a tactical nuclear weapon would be particularly appropriate against a reinforcement or resupply convoy to Europe. In the eyes of the non-aligned world, such a convoy has an obviously belligerent intent The case for using a tactical nuclear weapon against it could be persuasively argued
Worse consider the use of a neutron bomb against such a convoy Within a few days, a fair percentage of the ships so attacked would be available for the enemy to use
We should remember, too. that nuclear weapons need worthwhile targets. Assembling ships into convoys increases the attractiveness of the tactical nuclear option
The availability of anti-submarine escorts for convoy work is one more factor that has changed radically since Churchill, in his radio broadcast, said to President Roosevelt.  Give us the tools

Page 14 — Journal ol me Australian Naval Institute

and we will finish the |ob The brutal truth now is that we do not have the tools to do the job of escorting convoys Furthermore, the tools are now so complex and sophisticated that they cannot be turned off the lathe' by cheerful women war-workers with their hair tied up in scarves
It might be said that any escort is better than none. But this is a dangerous line to take There comes a time when the allocation of a pathetically inadequate anti-submarine escort force plays into the submarine s hands. There is a temptation for instance to think that four frigates in company with thirty merchant ships constitutes a protected convoy. I disagree The disparity between the ability of a surface vessel to detect and destroy the submarine, and the submarine s ability to evade is now so great that an inadequately protected convoy sailing at the speed of the slowest ship presents more attack opportunities than a dispersed collection of independents Indeed, spreading anti-submarine forces so thinly contravenes the principle of concentration ol force, and it was upon this very principle that the convoy system itself was founded.
Developments in mining techniques, coupled with the acute shortage of mine counter-measures vessels available to the West, present one more serious threat to the convoy, whether it is already at sea or awaiting the order to sail For we are faced with a potential enemy who now has the ability to lay mines from merchant ships, fishing boats, submarines and aircraft — an ability supported by a very considerable stockpile of mines
Perhaps the use of mine warfare might be an even more attractive option should we decide to start a convoy system. It has been pointed out elsewhere that there is little point in shepherding massive reinforcement convoys across the oceans only to discover that the estuaries and harbour approaches where they must pass are blocked by enemy minefields The problem would not be so serious if the western allies possessed a credible minesweeping capability But we do not
The technical developments in mining are highly classifed, and I shall not discuss them here Suffice it to say that mines can now be virtually tailor made' to suit targets, and the convoy would make the cost and planning of a mining campaign more worthwhile Under a convoy system, harbours fill up with vessels awaiting sailing orders, and a full harbour is jusl the sort of target a mining planning expert likes to choose There is also the well known tactic of what might be known as the I've spat in your beer' concept. It only takes the whisper from intelligence that mines are present, or possibly the fortuitous discovery of a

drifting mine outside a harbour to delay the sailing of a convoy until a swept channel can be established. Such a tactic is particularly useful in a time of rising tension, it is a delicate lever in the escalatory machine which can be used with great subtlety And it is a particularly good answer, at about the same level, to the activation of a convoy system
Developments in reconnaissance and communications since World War II mean that the measure of secrecy of a convoy's whereabouts is now largely lost. Infra-red devices can reveal that a convoy is preparing to sail, and satellite or aircraft reconnaissance will enable the enemy to plot the progress of the convoy as it plods across the ocean at fifteen, twenty or even twenty five knots The information will be passed into an efficient command and control system and broadcast to submarines. Such facilities were not available to the Germans in World War II The U boat commander could be fooled by a judicious diversion of a convoy, and sailing under cover of darkness achieved a useful measure of secrecy Not so today: the convoy is thus more vulnerable
The size of merchant ships today militates further against the decision to convoy Consider, for instance, the problems of manoeuvering a convoy which includes 200,000 ton tankers through the Malacca Strait or the English Channel The difficulties are enormous and include:
a     large stopping distances/turning circles, b     avoidance of independent ships in the area.
c.	avoidance of navigational hazards, and
d.	the  passing of manoeuvering  instructions
(imagine fog!).
The sheer size of such vessels alone makes each individual hull an attractive target Place several of them in convoy, and a concentrated attack becomes an even more attractive and worthwhile option.
The last of my list of factors which have changed in recent decades is one which is not always remembered. This concerns the development of anti-convoy strategy
Studies have shown that had the U boat command during World War II concentrated upon attacking escorts instead of merchant ships, it seems likely that the Battle of the Atlantic would have had a different outcome There is no reason to suppose that our potential enemies have (ailed to learn this lesson So the question that must be asked is, would they be able to attack escorts more effectively if a convoy system were in use?

Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute  - Page IS

The answer. I believe, is yes Because ot the acute shortage of anti-submarine escods and forces, convoys could not be given adequate protection This means, in turn, that antisubmarine vessels would be spread in penny numbers about the oceans of the world I think it has been accepted now that the only way to combat the modern submarine is by using the full range of anti-submarine techniques in coordination Because of our lack of assets, we would be forced to ignore this c rinciple if we chose to start a convoy system And if the enemy submarine chose to attack our escorting ships, those escorts would find themselves at a disadvantage a percentage of them would be sunk and the situation would deteriorate further If. however anti-submarine forces were allowed to operate in properly co-ordinated groups, the submarines task would be considerably complicated the initiative would be ours — he would be the hunted and we the hunters But when anti-submarine forces operate in support of a convoy, they lose much of the flexibility of operation they so desperately need they lose freedom to choose their area of operations, their weapon arcs are reduced, and the underwater noise of the convoy gives away their position Thus the convoy itself detracts from the effectiveness of anti-submarine forces
The changes that have taken place since the forties reveal a sad picture, bjt I fear I have not been over-pessimistic Seve-al of the lactors. taken individually, more or less tip the balance in favour of the submarine against the convoy Taken together, I believe these factors virtually gift wrap the merchant ship convoy for the attacking SSN
In deciding whether or not to use a convoy system, there are other factors that should be considered, some of which have already been touched upon but which. I think, should be more fully emphasised
First of all. perhaps, we should make a positive effort to look at the bright side For instance, has our ability to seek out. detect and destroy the submarine improved7 At first glance, the answer must be affirmative Sonar techniques, weapon ranges, weapon homing devices, helicopters and maritime patrol aircraft have all been vastly improved and developed Also, important emphasis has been placed upon the use ol the submarine itself as an anti-submarine agent But as has been said before, these resources are only properly effective when they are concentrated and co-ordinated And because each weapon, vessel, aircraft and system is immeasurably more expensive than the comparatively agricultural counterparts of the 1940s. we cannot afford (or do not wish to afford) as many as we need

In this essay, we are considering the future of the convoy system for merchant shipping, and I take the word system to imply the regular use of convoys rather than the use of one major convoy for a very specific purpose So although our antisubmarine forces are greatly improved, and although we might postulate that they are as able individually to cope with the present submarine threat as were the corvettes and destroyers ot the 40s able to cope with the U boat, we must face up to the uncomfortable fact that in order to provide a similar level of protection to a convoy system we would need something in the region of five or six times the number of ASW vehicles that are at present available, plus a credible mine counter-measures fleet
I said earlier that I would not use statistics I am not a statistician, and I regard impressive figures with suspicion But consider: a convoy system implies convoys wherever a threat exists — convoys in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the North Sea. convoys down the west coast ot Africa and round the Cape, convoys to and from the Far East. Japan, Australasia Each convoy, to have the very minimum level of protection, would require about four frigates, one guided missile destroyer, one ASW helicopter platform (to provide at least two helicopters continually on task) and one maritime patrol aircraft in support
Even with an escort ol this size, the convoy might still present a worthwhile and comparatively easy target to a nuclear submarine commander with a full weapon load Imagine his thought processes: he says to himself. I know where they are, and I have plenty of time I will position mysell just outside the sonar range of the helicopters, in the trail of the convoy I will first sink the helicopter carrier with a cruise missile Then, immediately. I will increase speed and take station underneath the main body of the convoy While the escorts detach to search tor me. I shall be in a good position to fire homing torpedoes either at them, if the opportunity offers, or at the prime targets in the convoy
Now imagine the problems ol the Officer in Tactical Command (providing his ship is not the first to be sunk by cruise missile) He has responsibility for a convoy of leviathans, probably steaming at eighteen or twenty knots Each ship has minimal visual signalling facilities (an art that is tending to die out in many shipping companies) Certain of his anti-submarine weapons are severely limited because of the very presence ol the convoy he is trying to protect Propeller and engine noise from the merchant ships make sonar operations a nightmare And further — a factor that is frequently forgotten — although convoys

Page 16 — Journal of tne Australian H& yal Institute

can steam faster, escorts can't: their traditional role of greyhounds of the sea has been lost Some of the escorts may even have lower top speeds than the merchantmen they have in their charge.
There is a further point that must be considered The presence of a convoy cannot disguise one thing: the ships in that convoy are sailing for the benefit of Western nations They are identified to the enemy as hostile ships, whether mercantile or military. In gathering them together we say, in effect, These are our ships'. This is valuable information. In the cluttered sea lanes ot the world, and in the age of flags of convenience, one of the most difficult tasks facing a submarine captain is to decide which ship is sailing where and for the benefit of whom. The convoy presents this information to him on a plate. He no longer has to decide whether or not a ship is a target
I used the expression gift wrapped earlier, and I think it is a valid description for the thinly protected convoy. For there must come a stage when our adversary is glad that we are using a convoy system. He is glad for the following reasons:
a He does not have to face up to a concentrated, co-ordinated anti-submarine force
b Propaganda can be made from the fact that we are engaging in a hostile act (ie. if convoys are initiated before hostilities commence).
c. We identify for the enemy which nations are prepared to sail their ships under our protection. This provides a useful option: a powerful enemy could punish a small nation tor allowing ships sailing under its flag to proceed in convoy with ships of the western alliance.
d We are forced to spread our anti-submarine effort thinly — so thinly that not only is then value disproportionately reduced but also that their ability to render mutual protection is also affected
e. We provide the submarine captain with a beacon on which to home
Let us assume for a moment however, that just one convoy is assembled and granted good protection. By good protection I mean something in the region of eight frigates, two guided missile destroyers, two helicopter platforms, two maritime patrol aircraft on task. Once this sort ot support force has been assembled, it becomes wasteful to send only a small convoy Indeed, what started out as a convoy begins to grow into something more akin to an armada. We reach the stage where the escort forces are so valuable that they

also need forces to protect them The OTC will want fighter cover, airborne early warning and. if one is available, an aircraft carrier in support And now we must think of logistics. We shall need store ships, ammunition ships, refuelling tankers They must be added: we cannot operate without them Their presence in a convoy makes that convoy an even more attractive target.
Our convoy puts to sea. a total, probably, of seventy or more ships proceeding at about eighteen knots
One single well placed nuclear mine or nuclear depth charge could disable ninety percent, it not all of these ships The device could be exploded many miles from any nation s territorial waters A carefully organised news service and propaganda programme would lead the rest of the world either to shrug its shoulders and say, Wei) — they got what they deserved or to decide, finally, which side they were on
Are we going to ignore the option of the tactical nuclear weapon? Are we going to pretend that our potential enemy would not dare to use it? Can we afford for one moment to overlook the fact that the use of tactical nuclear weapons at sea is probably the most attractive nuclear option on the market?
And if. for instance, the Soviet Union made a solemn declaration that if our heavily defended convoy crossed a certain parallel of longitude it would not hesitate to take any action that might be necessary to prevent it reaching its destination' — how ready would any politician be to give the order to press on-' How willing would any merchant ship master be to continue?
Now let us look briefly at the organisation that is required to initiate a convoy system.
At the end of hostilities in 1945, Great Britain and her allies had developed a remarkably efficient organisation for the protection and control of merchant shipping But with the end of the war, the people who knew most about this system (who were mostly well over age for military service) were only too glad to destroy the last ot the classified waste, lock their offices for the last time and go home to a well deserved retirement For a decade or more, the intricate organisation that had been evolved was allowed to be for gotten, and many of the documents and books appertaining to the subject were destroyed NATO ran complex anti-submarine exercises, year after year, involving the ring of escorts round

Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute     Page t?

the aircraft earner, and the problems ot fulfilling the primary role ot most navies, namely the protection of merchant shippirg, were conveniently shelved So when the subject of Naval Control of Shipping (NCS) refjrned once more into the limelight, it was found that many of the techniques had been lost or forgotten
At the same time, shipping companies were, and still are, largely content to leave the business of war to warships, without i^aying too much attention to the uncomfortable possibility that their vessels may one day be threatened once again by marauding submarines or surface raiders
The art of NCS is now being laboriously re-learnt, and those who are relearning it are only too aware of the difficulties that would be encountered it the decision to mount a convoy system were taken
But these difficulties do not arise simply because we have forgotten past lessons They arise because of certain changes that have taken place since 1945 These changes are
a     Ihe advent ot specialised loading and unloading techniques;
b     the advent of jumbo tankers,
c     the vast increase in flags ot convenience;
d    the reduction in port-of-call facilities available to ships of the western alliance, and
e    the advent of sophisticated electronic warfare techniques, and in particular, jamming
Before I discuss how these changes aflect the problems of starting a convoy system, let us very briefly look at the prime 'unctions of NCS They are the
 —	sailing
 —	routing
 —	repoding and diverting
of merchant shipping These functions are earned out by shipping companies in t'me of peace, and must be handed over to naval authorities before NCS can function The decisior to effect this hand over would be taken at the highest level, and would be no easy one it would constitute a major step towards putting a nation on a war footing Thus it seems reasonable to assume that all the ships flying flags of convenience (eg. Greek, Libenan, Panamanian) might not be available for NCS. as their governments would be reluctant to declare their hands so overtly
In order to fulfil its functions, the NCS organisation, once activated, relies heavily on a series of signals These signals are required to assign

ships for various uses, to report them as ready lor sailing, to sail them, dived them, and repod their arrival — to quote only a few examples The signal load is such thai it has been found necessary to use computers to store all the information that is exchanged And because computers are used, each signal has to be very precisely drafted in a cedain format if if is to be accepted by the computer This imposes a very heavy work load upon the NCS staff, who are almost exclusively reserve officers and ratings Suffice it to say thai a very large number of signals is required
In addition, even/ merchant ship master taken under NCS has to be briefed and provided with cedain information and materials in order lo be able to sail his ship in convoy with others This job of briefing and distributing would in itself constitute a mammoth task
But let us suppose that the NCS organisation could cope with these tasks and NCS is introduced. How will the changes that have taken place in the merchant shipping world aflect the convoy system?
The advent of specialised loading and unloading techniques now means that there are cedain ships which have only a limited number 01 pods in which they can load and unload. This means an increase in the number of leaver and joiner convoys or independents This complicates the task of routing and means simply thai the ships concerned waste valuable time making rendezvous, when they could be making best speed towards their destinations These loading and off-loading techniques also mean that it is difficult to assemble ships in the pod concerned the peacetime system is geared to rapid turn round and immediate sailing, and often does not provide for waiting room anchorages
The advent of the '/umbo tanker has already been touched upon These vessels also require specialised loading and off-loading techniques and bedhs. If several were to arrive at a pod at once, considerable problems would arise In addition, the presence of a very large ship in a convoy draws attention to that convoy and makes it more vulnerable
The vast increase in flags ot convenience will pose considerable political difficulties which have already been mentioned The western alliance relies heavily upon the cargoes carried by these ships, but. I believe, could not rely upon the nations whose flags they fly agreeing to their sailing in convoy On Ihe other hand, if they sailed independently, a potential adversary would have to think twice before attacking one of them, for in doing so he would leave himself open to international condemnation for his acl of aggression against a non-aligned nation

Page TH - Journal ot the Australian Naval Institute

The reduction in the number ot ports ol call and, for that matter in military bases, exacerbates the problem of assembling convoys, briefing them and protecting them
Lastly, me advent ol sophisticated jamming techniques could mean that the flood of signals required to sail, route, divert and protect a convoy is disrupted by electronic intervention on the part of our adversary This could be done without even firing a shot
Now let us superimpose a scenario of nuclear weapons being threatened or used If this were the case, ports would have to be evacuated very quickly, and convoying would be sent to remote areas, and the problems of then assembling them and organising them into convoys would probably prove insurmountable: it seems probable, too. that merchant ship crews would refuse to sail if they knew that nuclear weapons might be used against the convoy The only hope of getting them to sail at all would then be as independents: the submarine threat would then be regarded as the lesser of two evils
It has been said that convoys will be necessary in the post nuclear phase' I believe this concept is invalid. Thanks to the vast arsenals of nuclear weapons now available. I do not believe there is such a thing as a post nuclear phase' If the western alliance still retains the will and ability to organise convoys after a nuclear exchange, it seems to me likely that the Soviet Union would still retain the will and ability to use tactical nuclear weapons against those convoys In short, the only post nuclear phase' that can take place would occur when hostilities cease altogether
But this does not mean that we should disband the NCS system What it does mean. I believe, is that the NCS experts should now start looking at other ways of routing and sailing ships in order to give them the best chance of survival
I used, earlier, the simile of the game of British Bulldog . in which a crowd of people rush from one end of a hall to the other while a single person tries to overcome one or more of them I likened this to the World War II convoy, with its advantages ol speed and numbers over the U boat and I have tried to show that the desired functions of the convoy system have been largely lost because of advances and changes that have occurred since convoys last sailed across the Atlantic I have shown, I hope, that a future convoy system will not necessarily facilitate the protection of merchant shipping passing through a threa-

tened area, and that it will not necessarily reduce the number of attack opportunities offered to enemy forces. Indeed. I have suggested that in many ways a convoy system will make the enemy s task all the easier The only desirable function that a convoy can fulfil is that of providing mutual assistance to ships that have been damaged or sunk. Laudable and comforting though this may be. it cannot be used as an argument to use a convoy system.
What then are the alternatives? Let us take our British Bulldog simile a little further Let us suppose that this same crowd of people is taken outside and placed at one end of a football pitch We shall space them out along the base line and tell each to run as fast as he possibly can when we give the word. But before we give the word, we shall put a group of individuals to harrass the predator in the centre and. if possible, limit his radius of action. When we are ready, we shall blow the whistle and each man, running independently, will head for the lar base line.
The simile has been stretched far enough, but I hope my point is clear what is important is to concentrate the anti-submarine forces at our disposal in order to force the submarine into an evasion situation. Once we have him on the run, his task is very much more difficult And having established where the danger areas are. we must organise co-ordinated dashes across the ocean by large numbers of merchant ships, separated by the greatest possible distances and sailing at the highesl possible speeds.
By following this policy, all we are doing is reducing the enemy's attack opportunities to a minimum: exactly the same principle as was used to argue the case for the conventional convoy But instead of collecting our ships into one area in order to avoid the submarine, we are collecting them into one lime bracket, spreading them out over a wide area in order lo make the use of tactical nuclear weapons less attractive and less practicable.
What would be the affects of such a policy on the enemy's anti-shipping problem? I suggest they would be as follows
a.	His command and control problem would be
increased he would have to give very specific
instructions on which ships to attack.
b.	Any attack on a single ship would be seen by
the non-aligned world as an unwarranted act
of aggression (particularly true at the
beginning of hostilities)
c.	Every successful attack would announce the
position of one of his submarines, so he would

Journal ot the Australian Naval Institute — Pane 19

have to make sure that ever/ attack was really worth his while

force constitute a worthwhile target tor a tactical nuclear weapon''

d His tactical nuclear option would be greatly reduced
e His reconnaissance problem would be vastly increased
I His submarines would find themselves, from lime to time, under attack by strong, coordinated hunter-killer ASW groups and submarines, with much greater freedom to use the whole arsenal of anti-submarine weapons, including nuclear depth charges
g He would be subject to more intensive operations by maritime patrol aircraft, which would be available in greater numbers
On the other hand, many Of the complexities associated with planning, sailing and routing convoys would disappear anc leave our naval forces and NCS organisation free to concentrate more effectively on more useful aspects of their task For instance, independent ships can be routed where convoys cannot go they can transit narrow channels, pass close inshore, or make use of shallow water They can lake advantage of weather condtions and be more readily diverted They can hide in small anchorages until a submarine threat passes by, ano even indulge in subterfuge, flying misleading Hags or company names And no ship will ever have to slow down because of another ship every single independent can make full use of its turn of speed

2. Can we safely assume that our adversary will neither use nor threaten to use a tactical nuclear weapon against if
 3	Are we confident that the convoy will be able to evade the threat from nuclear submarines9
 4	Do we have minesweeping assets available at the destination port or ports, in case the enemy decides to use or threaten to use mine warfare9
 5	Do we accept that the convoy s position will probably be known and plotted along its route as a result of satellite or air reconnaissance9
 6	Do we have enough anti-submarine escorts to protect all convoys envisaged9
 7	If we need to divert the convoy, are we confident that we can do so. via the NCS system, promptly and without danger of our signal being |ammed?
 8	It we had to make this sea crossing, how would we rather make if In convoy, at a speed somewhat less than the maximum speed of our ship, or as one of many inde-penents. widely spaced out and steaming at top speed?

Of course there will be losses, and survivors will be left in the water unrescued But survival and lifesavmg techniques have improved and can be imporved further: homing devices and air dropped survival packs could be used to make up much of the advantage of mutual assistance lost in sailing ships independently
I mentioned at the beginning of this essay that I intended to pose questions rather than pretend I could give all the answers Let us suppose, therefore, that we are members of a committee, formed to decide whether or not to use a convoy system Here. I believe, are the questions we should be asking ourselves.
1     Does a convoy of valuable merchant ships, escorted by a sophisticated anti-submarine

An essay should be shaped like a ship s lifeboat: it should be broad in the beam and pointed at both ends I shall therefore keep my conclusions short I believe that the advent of the fast submarine with almost indefinite sub-surface endurance and the ability to kill a collection of ships with a single weapon should cause us to take a long, hard look at the concept of the merchant ship convoy Even if massive increases in antisubmarine forces could be achieved, there is doubt in my mind as to the wisdom of sending valuable ships in company across the oceans and so inviting the use of tactical nuclear weapons. I have difficulty also, in believing that the concept of the convoy reduces the number of attack opportunities for an SSN armed with non-nuclear weapons Further more. I have reservations about the willingness of nations to agree to their ships being convoyed under NCS and the ability of the

Page 20 - Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute

NCS system to organise the convoys efficiently — especially in a scenario of electronic warfare and port sabotage
We are faced, therefore, with looking for other tactics. I believe that we shall make the enemy's task more difficult by sailing merchant ships independently, but grouping them in time brackets We must tell them, in effect, to rush across the football pitch' so that the submarine is forced to react very rapidly and must travel the maximum distance after one successful attack in order to make another We must release our antisubmarine forces from escort duty and the long periods of boredom' so often referred to

in World War II annals, and task them with actively hunting the enemy submarine We must use every ruse, every dodge and tactic and subterfuge at our disposal to confuse the enemy and his intelligence picture, and we must strike, over and over again, at his lines of communication But above all. we must never, ever hand him a target, gift wrapped or on a plate.
Is there a future for the merchant ship convoy system?
I leave you to consider the logic of my arguments and to decide, finally, for yourself

JOURNAL BINDERS

Journal binders are available (as illustrated) from the Treasurer, price $5 00 each including postage. Coloured blue, with gold lettering and ANI crest, each binder will hold 12 copies of the journal (3 years supply) by means of a metal rod which is inserted simply through the middle page ot the journal and held firmly at top and bottom of the binder Plastic envelopes on the bottom of the spine enable volume numbers or years to be inserted
Journal ot the Australian Naval Institute — Page ? I

SEA HARRIER CARR
Steaming into wind in heavy seas punishes the conventional carrier. Achieving wind-over-deck torn// launches and all recoveries stresses hull, men, and machinery. And in calm conditions fuel consumed to provide deckwind is daunting      less than a wicket length per gallon of fuel burned.
Page 22 — Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute
Sea 1 larrier with Ski-jump changes all that. VTO and VL are independent of wind STO from a ramp needs only modest deckwind, and only lor the heaviest launch weights. Sea I larrier carriers ran he smaller

ERS LAST LONGER

ships, [essexpensive to procure and more economical to operate: longer lasting ships.
Sea Harrier jet VSTOLwill take seaborne tactical airpower into the 21st Century. Developments now in train will ensure a growing capability to stay competitive.

HARRIER
So navies like the K.A.N, can count on full productive operational lives from Sea Harrier carriers. Effective, flexible, economic. Better able to protect Australia's maritime interests and vital sea lanes.

Kingston Brough Division Kingston upon Thames. Fnglnito
fht tr:t'n[fU Dv
BRITISH AEROSPACE AUSTRALIA LIMITED
61-69 Macquane Slreet. Sydney. NSW
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute — Page 23

THE DEFENCE OF JAPAN
Some thoughts on the 1978 White Paper
By Commander W.S G Baleman RAN

Very few nations can equal Japan with regard to the oppohunity afforded for the public discussion of national defence policies Japan achieves this primarily by the annual publication of a Defence White Paper which has the aim of informing a maximum number of readers, both in Japan and overseas, of the mapr facts essential to the study of Japan s defence policies
A Japanese Defence White Paper may be likened, m Australian terms, to the publication each year of a combined Defence Report and Parliamentary White Paper, with a full coverage of the most contentious defence issues of the day The Japanese publication is certainly an impres sive document Comprehensive explanations are given of the consequences fcr defence policy of such matters as international strategic developments, and changes in the domestic, political and social environment
The 1978 White Paper pays particular attention to two recent, major, capital equipment decisions (the planned acquisition of the F-15 and P-3C aircraft) It also considers the present situation of the US forces in Japan, especially with regard to the problems with bases and the level of financial assistance provided by Japan These controversial issues are aired in full and there appears to have been no holding-back on the arguments for and against the decisions made

This open approach of the Japanese Defense Agency is not hard to understand Despite increasing Soviet air and naval activity in the vicinity of Japan, there remains a strong psychological commitment among large sections of the Japanese people against any form of military activity
In recent years, the Japanese Defense (sic) Agency has conducted a variety of public relations activities designed to win national understanding of. and arouse national interest in. the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) and defence issues generally The 1978 White Paper summarises the results of a national opinion poll conducted among citizens from all walks of life on their impressions, evaluations and concepts of the SDF  and defence matters   The extent of the
THE AUTHOR
Commander Sam Bateman is now serving in Navy OTMcC in the Dnectorale ot Naval Plans and recently became the Editor ot this Journal He visiled Japan m HMA ships in 1958 1962 and 1971 and in May. 1977 was a member ot Ihe Australian Joml Service SlaM College course which visited Ihe Japanese I Agency in Tokyo and mililary installations in and BRUM "J Tokyo (including Ihe MSDF Flee! HQ al Yokosuk.u and Fukuoka in Kyushu ThesevisitsloJapannvtn thwveoi have provided the opportunity ol unserving al lust hand the progressive, qualitalive and quantitative improvement in Ihe eapabilihes ul the .Japanese Sell Oelense Forces

Page 24 — Journal ol the Australian Nival Institute

problems involved is suggested by one result which showed that, regarding the direction efforts to preserve Japan s security should take. 34 per cent of respondents offered no opinion and 30 per cent refused to indicate their concern should Japan be invaded.
Despite this lethargic public interest in defence matters, the defence debate in Japan has advanced to the stage where it is no longer over whether or not Japan should have armed forces, but more towards to what extent such forces should be expanded and improved The major factor producing this change has been the increasing national awareness of the Soviet Union s military build-up in northeast Asia
Japan's Strategic Assessments
Japan s strategic assessments are dictated by three key factors
 •	her perception of continuing regional instability in northeast Asia.
 •	her     heavy    dependence    on    overseas resources, and
 •	the Japan — United States Security Treaty

Her defence policies appear to be based on a generally pessimistic view of international relations, particularly in the regional theatre ot northeast Asia. Compared to Europe s. Japan s military environment is not perceived as altogether stable because of the complex mixture of rivalry and confrontation in northeast Asia
Whilst the basic structure of international relations in Europe is a bipolar confrontation between the NATO and Warsaw Pacts, the struc ture in northeast Asia is a tn-polar one. comprising the United States, the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, confronting each other with huge military potential. The actions of these three nations in the region are understandably deliberate, since each must consider the reactions of the other two to any shift in military emphasis in the region As a result, any confrontation in this area is not likely to develop to a decisive point as it might in Europe.
Article 5 of the United States — Japanese Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security stipulates that both nations will act in accordance with their constitutional regulations and procedures to

*

The DDH HIEI (4750 tonnes. 32 knots, two 5 inch guns. ASROC. two triple ASW torpedo launchers, three helicopters) refuelling from the fleet oiler HAMANA
Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute — Page ?5

* ^-T^iV

	■■*n...j.

The JMSDF training ship KATORI (4000 tonnes. 25 knots, tour 3 inch guns, one helicopter)
.   i mrtesy ol Chns Gee

cope with armed attack against either of the parties on territory under Japanese administration, after first recognising that such attack threatens the peace and security of both nations
Indirectly, Australia could become involved with the defence of Japan as a consequence of the ANZUS Treaty Australia and Japan share the United States as a common alliance partner Paradoxically, the possibility of a new militant Japan was part of the threat which led to the signing of the ANZUS Treaty In September 1951 The US forces in Japan are specifically mentioned in the preamble to the ANZUS Treaty, whilst Article V of the Treaty deems that armed attacks include attack on a party s armed lorces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific'
Despite the Japan — US security relationship, there is a national tendency in Japan against defence cooperation and a cedain preference for unilateral action. This is the Japanese tradition of
jishu boei (self-reliant national detence) which is now reinforced by the Guam Doctrine of the United States   Provided the strategic deterrent
umbrella of the US remains, the gradual withdrawal of US forces from the Far East, and the need to share more of the detence burden, is not viewed with any particular concern in Japan
Japans heavy dependence on overseas resources, such as energy and foods, makes international peace and cooperation an essential

condition for her survival and progress With one hundred per cent dependence on oil imports, and a figure approaching that for most other mineral resources, economic factors dominate the whole political decision-making process in Japan, as far as international relations are concerned
Japan's Self-Defence Forces
The SDF, comprising the Ground. Maritime and Air Self-Defence Forces (GSDF. MSDF and ASDF), have been developed gradually to become an efficient power capable of effectively dealing with aggression on a scale up to localized conventional war Under Article 9 of Japans Constitution, the nation s defence capability must be strictly limited to purely defensive purposes A narrow interpretation of this Article is recognised in Japan as too idealistic for the real world of international politics and the basic concept of defence activities is now one of no invasion of foreign territory/no invasion by foreign power
Ultimate command and control over the SDF resides in the person of the Prime Minister, representing the Japanese Cabinet The Director General of the Defense Agency (a Cabinet Minister), under the command and control of the Prime Minister, exercises immediate direction over SDF activities He is assisted in this task by three organs:
1 The Internal Bureaus — composed of civilian officials who advise the Director General on basic management and operations policy tor

Page 26 — Journal ol the Australian Naval I'

An UZUSHIO — Class submarine Six ol these teardrop hull form submarines (1.850 tonnes, maximum submerged speed — 20 knots) are currently in service

the    SDF    and    outline    required    future measures
 2.	The Ground. Maritime and Air Staff Offices — headed by the respective Chiefs of Staff (Self Defense personnel), who advise the Director General on technical matters related to respective Service activities. Such advice is subject to Internal Bureau adjustment, on the principle of civilian control Each Chief of Staff also executes the orders of the Director General within his Service.
 3.	The Joint Staff Council — which advises the Director General concerning overall defence planning, etc Such advice is also subject to Internal Bureau adjustment, on the principle of civilian control (The Joint Staff Council Chairman is the highest-ranking Self-Del ense officer).
The primary rote of the SDF is the defence of Japan through the maintenance of a full surveillance posture in peacetime and the ability to cope effectively with situations up to the point of limited and small-scale aggression'.1 Other SDF missions are a reactive capability against intense domestic insurgency (known in Japan as indirect aggression) and search and rescue and disaster relief operations.
With regard to the first role, the Soviet Union is clearly perceived as the major threat to Japan s security. This is reflected in the deployment of the SDF Four out of the 13 GSDF divisions are based in Hokkaido (the closest island to the Soviet

Union) in a state of readiness to repel any attack from the North. Radar installations and air and maritime forces are located throughout Japan and Okinawa so that any Soviet forces approaching Japanese territory can be kept under continuous surveillance The Soviet forces frequently do so and when they do. additional Japanese forces are scrambled' to maintain close surveillance and marking Some indication of the extent of this activity is provided by the fact that there were 528 scramble activities for the SDF in 1976
Although the second mission of the SDF — internal security — is played down somewhat in the 1978 White Paper, from other indications considerable importance is clearly still attached to this mission. Historically, it was an important consideration which led to the establishment of the SDF. Now. whilst four of the 13 GSDF divisions are in Hokkaido, the remainder are deployed in the heavily populated areas of the other islands, close to major cities and industrial complexes where they can best counter any internal (or external) threat — or be available tor disaster relief operations (earthquake or typhoon), this being in line with the third major mission of the SDF
The fundamental point about the functions and organisation of the SDF which cannot be stressed too strongly is that much more than lip service is paid to the concept that the SDF are not military forces in the conventional sense. This of course is essential if the constitutional legality of the SDF is to be maintained

Journal o! the Australian Naval Institute — Page 27

Constitutional limitations are most apparent on the personnel side of the E.DF Recruiting and maintenance of the required manpower levels are not easy because of the residual psychological commitment among large sections of the Japanese community to the renunciation of militarism The basic engagement period for SDF other ranks is 2-3 years, a though a required number of volunteers are additionally recruited each year into extended service programmes, such as NCO candidates and youth cadets
Since the SDF are technically not an army, navy and air force in the legal sense, they hold no punitive or coercive power over their members There are no military offences and no courts-martial in the SDF The civil courts attend to all infringements of law by SDF members.
The SDF must achieve community acceptance without the background of military tradition and support normally available from veterans associations Constitutional considerations and the desired posture of Japan as a peace-loving nation deny the SDF any inheritance of military traditions from the Imperial Army and Navy Rather the SDF must toster their image as an arm of government fully attuned to the ideals and values of modern Japan, and firmly under civilian control.

Japan's Maritime Defence
The MSDF has an authorised strength of approximately 42,000 personnel and comprises the following major elements:
 •	a fleet escort force of 32 destroyers (DD. DDG and DDH) and 15 destroyer escorts organised into escort groups, each of which in the longer term will include two DDHs;
 •	a submarine force of 17 patrol submarines,
 •	a mine countermeasures force of two minesweeper support ships and 35 minesweepers;
 •	a patrol force of 26 patrol craft,
 •	an amphibious warfare force of six LSTs;
 •	fixed and rotary wing ASW aircraft for surveillance and patrol of focal areas and maritime approaches and tor surface ship protection: and
 •	a service force of support ships, training ships, surveying ships and tenders
Assuming that all planned shipbuilding programmes are approved, the MSDF fleet in 1983 will comprise 60 DDs and DEs. 18 submarines, 40-45 minesweeping vessels, 45 other vessels and 220 aircraft.

The P-2J Anti-Submarine 3atrol Aircraft The P-2J is a Japanese version of the P2V-7 they entered service in the MSDF in 1969 and are to be replaced by P-3C aircraft.
Pago 28 — Journal of trie Australian Naval Institute

One underway replenishment ship, and a second on order, give the MSDF some capability to conduct independent operations away from the mainland of Japan, but such a requirement does not appear to be a significant force structure consideration The MSDF remains primarily an ASW force which would operate in the maritime approaches and focal areas near to Japan, under the assured protection of land-based air power There is only a token air defence capability in the force provided by three area air defence SAM-fitted DDGs.
Japan s interest in world, maritime order is clear, since safe maritime transportation is the vital lifeline of such an island trading nation The 1978 White Paper notes that naturally Japan cannot guarantee safe maritime transportation in a broad area by itself, but must secure the cooperation of other nations'?'* In the first instance this would mean cooperation with the United States, but as Denis Warner recently pointed out. Japan sees the USN in the Western Pacific as a powerful striking force, not well adapted to protecting the sea lanes .. indispens-ible to Japan s economic survival'.3
There must be increasing likelihood, therefore, of Japanese cooperation with potential, regional defence associates — notably the ASEAN countries and Australia. Joint studies for the naval control of shipping, surveillance, and research and development proiects could well be the tentative first steps in this regard, not necessarily subject to constitutional restriction The defence of Japan s national interests would now include the protection of vital trade routes Nevertheless, historically, Japan has not taken readily to a reliance on allies and the principle of jishu boei' will remain a fundamental consideration

Conclusion
The strategic realities of northeast Asia, together with the practical problems of neutrality, leave a stronger defence posture for Japan as the only meaningful choice open to her The reader of the 1978 White Paper can only be struck by the inherent pragmatism of Japan s defence policies.
There is not one good reason to believe that Japan's evolving defence policies are based on resurgent militarism. Her defence spending is quite modest in relative terms, and the public attitudes reported in the 1978 White Paper show that there is still wide distaste for policies with aggressive military overtones.
The SDF is likely to remain relatively low key. operating below the authorised manpower strength (which incidentally has only been in creased by about five per cent since 1957) Rather than a core force around which expansion could take place (ie. the Australian model), the SDF should be seen as a framework or cadre into which an enlarged force expands.
From the maritime defence viewpoint. Japan looms large on the Australian scene Even setting aside ANZUS considerations, our trading relationship and economic interdependence with Japan give a clear indication that any increased level of threat to Japan's national interests must have ramifications for Australia which we could not ignore
FOOTNOTES
t      Delense ol Japan   1978 Delence White Paper p 68
 2	Ibid  D 94
 3	Pacific Detence Reporter Vol VI, No 1. July. 1979. p 9

The destroyer AOKUMO (2200 tonnes, speed 27 knots. ASROC. four 3 inch guns) completed in 1972
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute - Page 29

AN AUSTRALIAN CENTRE
FOR MARITIME STUDIES
A PROPOSAL FOR A BODY TO DISSEMINATE INFORMATION AND TO FACILITATE RESEARCH ON MARITIME AFFAIRS
This paper has been received from the Committee tor the Establishment of an Australian Centre for Maritime Studies It is reproduced in lull for the information of members of the Australian Naval Institute. Any comments on the proposal should be addressed to the Committee's Chairman. PO Box 20. Canberra. ACT. 2600

Australia has scant knowledge of its maritime resources and interests Awareness of the utility of the sea is generally lacking within the community
This paper highlights the vital need to disseminate information about Australia's maritime interests and environment, not only to specialists and decision-makers, but also to the community at large who ultimately will determine the extent to which resources are devoted to develop and manage our maritime interests
The paper also emphasises the need to
 •	develop the overall peispective in which specialist research and development progresses.
 •	facilitate existing research and development in maritime affairs: and
Page 30 — Journal ol the Australian f aval Institute

•   stimulate research in areas not presently receiving attention
An interdisciplinary and independent Centre for Maritime Studies which spans the gamut of Australia's maritime affairs is proposed as the most effective means of meeting these needs
Situation
Australia is an island continent, possessed ol diverse and important maritime resources and interests.
Australia is a mapr international trading nation We rank seventeenth in the world in value terms. We are dependent upon the sea for movement of virtually all our exports and imports which are approaching 200000000 tonnes annually, are worth over $27,000,000,000 and

account for roughly 27 percent of Gross Domestic Product. Our coastal trade is also important Some six thousand vessels call at Australian ports each year and the technology of both ships and the port facilities to handle them is undergoing rapid change Our ports and our seaways are important elements of our economic system
Extensive natural resources of huge commercial value exist about our 20.000 kilometres of coastline and in the present territorial waters, the underlying seabed and contiguous areas. Most of Australia's oil production, which amounts to about two thirds of total consumption, is located offshore The remaining third of consumption is imported by sea Our fisheries, though only partly explored, show promise of significant economic potential. If maritime jurisdiction over Antarctica is enforced this potential is increased markedly The major world fishing nations are all taking an interest in Australian maritime resources.
Australia's population is heavily concentrated upon the seaboard. Most of Australia s economic activity takes place in the coastal zone Our waterways, beaches, islands and coastal lands contain our homes and jobs, and are our maior recreational facility Our seas and their surrounds have many unique and aesthetically appealing features which are valuable in their own right
Our defence is strongly oriented towards the sea
However, the Australian community has historically had little direct involvement in and thereby awareness of the utility of the sea except for leisure purposes. Our traditions and culture have developed with an inland perspective while our maritime activity has been undertaken, in the main, by overseas interests. Australia s financial involvement in the utility of the sea is mostly indirect. For example, less than one percent of the shipping serving the Australian coast is Australian owned.
Our fishing fleets are small and our knowledge is limited. Other nations fishing our offshore waters probably know more about our living maritime resources than we do. Our education systems teach little about the sea and the public information media has only minimal coverage ol maritime affairs
Overseas, in developed economies where utilization of the sea is traditional, community awareness of maritime affairs is high, decision makers and their advisers are generally better informed,   private  enterprise  and  government

instrumentalities are more widely involved in maritime enterprise, and the extent of research and development is greater, both into current issues and future potential.
Potential
The prospects for utilizing the sea to meet needs for the future are seen, internationally, to be increasing rather than diminishing In particular, resource scarcities have caused increasing attention to be focussed on resources found in and under the sea.
The potential of Australias maritime resources is prodigious. The prospects for future development of oil and gas production are almost entirely offshore; Australia's fisheries have considerable long-term economic scope: the sea offers important prospects for Australian industry as it restructures and seeks new avenues of development in the face of regional competition, and. if current strategies for strengthening the economy by improvement of export performance are implemented, maritime trade could increase substantially. Moreover, exploitation of our maritime potential involving high technology and massive investment will provide important spinoff for the economy as a whole
This rich potential poses many problems ot utilization and management The size of the maritime area and the diversity of maritime interests require coordination and consistency of approach. Entrepreneurial energies, capital and skills need to be stimulated, marshalled and encouraged towards commercial development il largely unexploited economic potential is to be realised. Yet. natural resources need to be utilised prudently The unique and beautiful features of the sea and its environs need to be preserved
Requirement
Pre-requisites crucial to both development and management are adequate knowledge of the potential and a perspective which encompasses the gamut of the interests involved
There has been movement in Australia in recent times towards greater knowledge and utilisation of the sea. Government departments have long been involved, of course, with the utility of the sea for strategic, fisheries, transport and other purposes. Bodies such as the CSIRO. Bureau of Mineral Resources, government departments of fisheries and wildlife, some university departments, other scientific bodies and the oil industry are now working in the field of maritime resources. Some of the work is in the forefront of world development in the lield

Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute — Page .11

Nevertheless, when viewed against the potential, present research is disparate and covers only limited aspects of our overall marine environment and interests. Australia lags behind most developed countries in the extent of research into the maritime environment and is being overtaken by some of the developing countries There is a requirement for greatly increased resources for research into maritime affairs
An adequate perspective of our maritime affairs has not yet evolved Development of such a perspective is a specialist task in its own right It is difficult to quantify the importance of an adequate overall perspective compared with specific research which has more immediately visible and direct results In more established fields of knowledge where a developed perspective exists it is easy to take ts importance for granted Nevertheless, an adequate overall perspective is a vital pad of both specialist research and decision-making Given Australia s lack of such a perspective ir maritime affairs, attention to generating one is of prime impor tance This requires development of an intellectual framework which provides for awareness of each element against the wide diversity of our maritime affairs. A list illustrating the diversity of subiects and disciplines involved in such a perspective is provided at Annex A
Active dissemination of knowledge and perspective is also crucial In a democratic, free enterprise system effective decision-making and the direction of energies towards development and management of any resojrce or interest is dependent upon broadly based community support Active dissemination is required to generate such support and is also a specialist task
Priority
The matter is becoming urgent Australia is no longer able to proceed at leisure with the development of maritime interests Developments overseas have already propelled us into wider consequences of the util zation of maritime resources The momentum of these developments is increasing
The imminent extension o' maritime jurisdiction will add some 2.500,000 square miles of sea and seabed, with all its potential, to Australian control This is an area almost as large as the continent itself Extension of control will also cause greatly increased involvement with other countries in maritime issues It is the most significant single development in maritime affairs in our history

Whether the Australian community (including government) continues with a basically responsive posture or moves to take the initiative in management of its maritime resources and interests, the utility of the sea will assume progressively more importance in both the public and private sectors While an informed leadership and community may emerge with the passage of time, the rapidity of foreseeable developments in utilization of the sea. and the wealth and diversify of Austrahas maritime resources and interests, require urgent and concerted action if our maritime potential is to be realised and wisely managed
Concept
An Australian Centre for Maritime Studies is proposed to
 •	disseminate information at all levels within the community to heighten awareness of mar ilime affairs and provide for increased funding ol research and development pro|ects.
 •	develop the intellectual framework necessary to provide the overall perspective for maritime affairs within which specialist work is set and from which concerted decisionmaking can proceed:
 •	complement existing research and development by providing for greater contact between disciplines and between the various government and private agencies working in the field.
 •	facilitate existing research by providing an information centre and. later, specialist library facilities covering reports, papers, research results and published material on all aspects of mantime affairs from national, regional and international sources;
 •	provide a point ot contact with relevant bodies overseas;
 •	engage in selected research and consultancy work in areas not requiring laboratory or field equipments such as economics, industrial relations, law, history, international relations and other social sciences, and
 •	stimulate other institutions to engage in research and development work not presently receiving attention
This concept is not unique Overseas, many bodies for the study of marine sub)ects have been established These tend to be oriented toward specialist research, as the general perspective ol maritime affairs is sufficiently well developed and appreciated not to need such specific toslenng

Page 3? — Journal ol the Australian Ni iral Institute

Within Australia, some of the functions proposed above have been considered and some have already been effected in specialist areas. This lends support to the propositions of this paper However, there is a serious need to widen the scope of consideration from specialist areas to encompass the whole gamut of maritime affairs In other fields of research, broad-ranging interdisciplinary study has already demonstrated the importance and practical value of this approach as an element of overall development in a field
It is not envisaged that the Centre should have official powers lo coordinate, manage or control research and development work apart from that undertaken under its own auspicies. Rather, it is envisaged that the Centres wide-ranging perspective and contacts would place it in a position to facilitate communication and voluntary coordination. Nor is it envisaged that the Centre would compete with existing institutions.
While the orientation of this paper is toward Australian interests, that does not preclude the possibility of the Centre also having considerable regional value
Utility
Private enterprise would be able to use the Centre for specific consultancy work; as a point ot contact with the range of participants in maritime activity, including research and development bodies and governments: for information retrieval; and for selected longer-term research projects. The Centre's role in fostering awareness of the utility of the sea would also be of material long-term benefit to companies with maritime interests.
Government agencies could use the Centre as a source of alternative assessment and independent advice in the mode of private research institutes in the United States and Europe The Centre would provide a forum for the exploration of concepts and ideas and it would provide government with an important link with private enterprise, research organisations, academia and the media. It would also provide for government-sponsored research in special proiects separated from the demands of ongoing administration.
Research workers would be able to use to use the Centre in the various functions outlined above In addition a journal and extracts of work under way or completed in the field should be published to disseminate information and encourage informed debate.

Implementation
This paper concentrates upon the concept ol a Centre for Maritime Studies and does not address implementation and physical structure in any detail Details of implementation should be resolved subsequent to agreement on the concept. The following paragraphs do, however, provide a brief outline of the structure of the Centre, based upon considerable deliberation ol how it might be established
To be effective in the roles specified above, the Centre would have to be. and be clearly seen to be, private, non-profit and independent of undue sectoral influence. This would be achieved primarily by ensuring that adequate financial support came from a diversity of sources through long-term funding, grants, supporl tor specific projects and consultancy work. The Centre's publishing programme and information services should also provide financial support
The Centre should be managed by a Director, responsible to a Board of Governors representative of a cross section of interests in maritime affairs from both public ard private sectors Staff should be appointed ' a mixture of permanent posts and fellowships for specific periods of research work Visiting fellows funded by other sources should also be provided for
The location of the Centre is a vexed problem. To centralize in one location would prejudice immediacy of contact with diverse maritime interests. To diversify to several localities to gain such contact would increase overhead costs
The ideal means of establishment would be to develop the Centre in its own right Other alternatives exist such as development from beginnings as a voluntary, part-time interest group or development within an established institution such as a university
Conclusion
The field of maritime affairs is so diverse, the interrelationships between the various disciplines are so complex and work in the field is so relatively young that establishment of an organization with a broad-ranging approach to take an active part in dissemination of information, generation of an overall perspective, and specific research work is necessary as an integral and important part of overall development in the field A Centre for Maritime Studies is proposed to lultil that role. It would contribute to effective, balanced development and would have considerable economic and national benefit

Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute — Page 33

ANNEX A
SUBJECTS INVOLVED WITH AUSTRALIAN MARITIME AFFAIRS

Sciences
Marine Biology
Marine Physiology
Marine Chemistry
Marine Ecology
Marine Zoology
Oceangraphy/Oceanographic Sciences
Ocean Engineering
Ocean Meteorlogy
Navigation
Hydrography
Legal
International Law Law of the Sea Maritime Law Constitutional Law Commonwealth/State Relations

Environmental
Coastal Zone Management Marine Pollution Inter-use Management
International Relations
Relations with maritime resource and lood
importers
Relations with maior fishing nations
Foreign aid
Antarctica
Strategic and Defence
Protection of maritime interests Maintenance of sovereignity Search and rescue obligations

Economics/Commerce
Energy Issues
Mining
Transport (Shipping) Economics
Maritime Transportation Studies
Fisheries
Mercantile Marine Management
Ports and Terminals Administration
Industrial Relations
Overseas Trade
Effects of Industrial Restructuring

History
Nautical/Marine Archaeology
Maritime History
Naval History
Socio/economic development of Australia
Technology
Effects of technological advances Research and Development policy

NOTE: This list is not exhaustive. It is intended as an indication of the diversity ot subjects and disciplines which are involved in maritime affairs It coes not include training for and advancement of the various skills and techniques used in par ticular maritime activities
Page 34 — Journal ol the Australian N aval Institute

NOTICE OF ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING
The Annual General meeting will be held at 1930 on Friday. 26 October 1979. at the R.S.L National Headquarters, Constitution Avenue. Canberra. AC T
AGENDA
1	Confirmation of minutes of the Annual General Meeting held on 27 October. 1978
 2.	Business arising from the minutes
 3.	President's Report

 4	Auditor's Report
 5	Election of the Officers of the Institute and the Ordinary Councillors
 6	Appoint an Auditor and fix his remuneration
 7	Other business.
ELECTIONS Office Bearers:
The Office Bearers of the Institute are
a.	President	d    Treasurer
b.	Senior Vice President	e    Secretary
c.	Junior Vice President
Council
The Council of the Institute consists of.
a.	The Office Bearers
b.	Ten regular members known as Ordinary Councillors
Qualifications
Only regular members may hold office.
Nominations
Nominations of candidates for election are to be signed by two members (regular or associate) of the Institute and forwarded to reach the Secretary no later than 12 October 1979 A nomination form is enclosed.
Voting
Only regular members may vote and voting must be in person at the Annual General Meeting proxies are not allowed.
Journal ol me Australian Naval Institute - Page 35

Iff :M-r-*~. m
& s

NAVY OFFICE MOVED NORTH

Excluding the nine wars in which Australia has participated, the move of the lour Departments of the Defence group ta Canberra, which commenced in 1959. was probably the most important Defence development to take place in this country The planning and preparations necessary to achieve this were detailed and complex, and the ramifications were manifold The story of this transfer from 124-years-old Melbourne. 412 miles north east, to the46-years-old national capital has never been told and. as an officer in the first wave. I describe here this historic occasion as I saw my segment of it
When the six Australian States federated to form the Commonwealth of Australia in January 1901. a Navy Office was lormed within the Department of Defence at Victoria Barracks. St Kilda Road. Melbourne. Victoria On the creation of the Royal Australian Navy In 1911. Navy Office was established on 11 th April, in Lonsdale Street By 1922. when Navy Office was moved back into the Barracks, it occupied the following city locations
ROSETELLA, 460 Lonsdale Street. LONSDALE HOUSE. 470 Lonsdale Street. Rodgers premises, 458 Lonsdale Street. NORMANBYChambers, Chancery Lane. LIVERPOOL Buildings. William Street. DOMINION Chambers. William Street, Old Exchange. Wills Street
All the above offices, indicative of the growth of the young country s navy, were re-located back into Victoria Barracks between 22nd May and 17th August 1922 This was an economy measure resulting from the first World War and its aftermath It was there that I found Navy Office when reporting for duty on my return from abroad in 1939

Late in 1940, Navy Office moved once again into the new Coventry Street building, the adjacent C Block and the old Armoury, all ol which were pari of the Defence complex that comprised Victoria Barracks The next (second last) move was to be to the national capital, which had been established in Canberra under Prime Minister Andrew Fisher on 12th March 1913
In charge of our move to Canberra in 1959 under Defence Secretary. Sir Edwin Hicks, was Captain A E Buchanan, a retired officer with over 30 years service in the RAN Captain Buchanan, a senior civil officer in the Department, won a DSO at the Battle of Sungao Strait in 1944 when m command of HMAS ARUNTA. The organisation for the move was considerable, for not only had all personnel and the records of four Departments to be transported over 400 miles across two States to the ACT. but personnel had to be allotted accommodation in Canberra, married or single, the day they arrived This meant houses and flats or hostel rooms, hundreds of them, had to be available in several days to cope with anything from a large family to a bachelor or spinster
It was a removalist s business dream come true, for tons of furniture and effects had to be despatched up the Hume Highway by pantechnicon, to arrive at the right addresses on the right day The Departments paperwork was also on the move, which meant rigid security for whereas in some Departments, such as Primary Industry and Customs, an employee might not see a classified document for months, almost every second paper in the Defence group had a security marking and required safeguarding accordingly No risks could be taken with a country s Defence secrets.

Cage 36 — Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute

Final planning took place during 1958. and we staff officers were only involved towards the end, and where our particular sections were concerned Our official home was to be the Administration building in Parkes (temporarily), the largest office block in the southern hemisphere My small Trade Section, comprising myself, a clerk and an assistant, was no problem, but I also husbanded' the Ops Room, which necessitated a visit to Canberra in December to decide where to set it up (see p 73, photograph and text, of ANI Journal V4 No4 of November 1978). I also was committed to conducting a large international exercise. Sea Lanes, from Canberra in 1959; but I have described the vicissitudes of this project in a previous Journal

housing office in Civic Centre, where I signed the lease for the house and was pleased to note the reasonable rent, which would be deducted Irom my pay Clutching the children, keys, government pamphlets and our luggage, we arrived at 43 Chowne Street. Campbell, just after midday The furniture van was still with Jim Willis (now Vice-Admiral and Chief of Naval Staff) in Blarney Crescent, and when it arrived we were soon settling in We were satisfied with the house, although we would have preferred it to have been detached. Of course it was new, and the block undeveloped, so we would have to create lawns and gardens from hard, clayey ground However. Interior gave us trees, shrubs, paving blocks and sand

In December 1958. everyone in Navy Office who was going to Canberra received a numbered card telling him to be in a certain office at a specified date and time I was the 212th person to enter that office to be greeted by several officers from the Department of the Interior Covering one wall was a huge map of Canberra showing every suburb, street, building, house and block ol land
Ah, Swan said Interior No 1 Naval Staff Officer, married, wife, two young children How about suburb of Campbell. Chowne Street?'
Here we are said Interior No 2 pointing to the map. two-storey duplex house, lounge, dining-room, kitchen, etc 3 bedrooms, close shops, transport, schools..    Battle-axe block  I agreed
So. although something of Hobson s choice . our home for the next three years was decided in that number of minutes, and I was out in the corridor again, walking past the queue We had not done too badly
On 14th January 1959, a van stopped outside our house in St Kilda and our belongings were loaded into it It was a very busy time for us, packing everything, spring-cleaning the house (rented), coping with a daughter aged 2%* and a son aged 12 months, and preparing ourselves tor a new life in a strange area and home We chose train travel and as we left Melbourne in a heat wave, the journey was rather uncomfortable Our infant son was pretty thirsty by the time we reached Albury. so my wife asked a kindly porter for some boiled water for the baby . He returned after a spell with a steaming billy What s that? asked my wife Boiling water tor the baby' he announced proudly
Canberra turned on a lovely summer day lor our arrival, and a car took us straight to Interior s

The Navy occupied the third floor ol Ihe Admin pile, my office in Plans being shared with Donald Curtis-Otter, (Delensively Equipped Merchant Ships). I fully agreed with this, as Trade and DEMS must work closely in peace and are wedded in war Settling down in Navy Office took quite a while, with the unfamiliar set-up. documents in different stowages, and partitioning different to Melbourne This was no Barracks: departments other than Defence group were also in the building, and security had to be watched very closely. Officers double-checked their safes and cabinets before going home
When I started to convert the penthouse' on the roof into an Ops Room (it was meant to be an amenities centre), my security load was doubled as it quickly took shape, and access had to be very restncted. Of course we knew that our permanent home was to be on Russell Hill, across the valley (lake), but that was several years ahead and we could not wail that long to be in business. I deduced by this that no extra finance would be available for the Navy to spend on the Admin building; but help from an unexpected quarter allowed me to establish our room. It soon became a place for selected VIPs and senior officers, both from this country and overseas, to visit, including Royal Navy officers Irom Singapore. American Naval captains. Thai admirals. New Zealand Naval and Air Force officers and top civil officers from the Department of Shipping & Transport, as well as Service Attaches.
The Royal Australian Navy had definitely arrived in Canberra Navy Office had. however, one more move to make — which we made in December 1961 But that is another story
W N SWAN
Journal ol Ihe Australian Naval Institute — Page 37

SHIPS AND THE SEA
RAN FLEET REPLENISHMENT SHIPS

It is often thought, and sometimes written, that the present fleet oiler, HMAS SUPPLY, is in fact the RAN s first oiler Admittedly she was built for a specific purpose, that of underway replenishment , but let me assure the reader that SUPPL Y is not the RAN s first oiler, nor is she the first replenishment ship,
Not counting coal hulks, the Navy has had a number of (fuel) replenishment ships Perhaps the purists amongst us woulc not count colliers, but surely when coal was used as fuel they were just as important Who knows, with the mounting hysteria on the use of oil fuels we may. one day. see a return to coaling ship and real Stokers. Enough of conjecture and a return to history Here are six ships that I would place in the category to put to rest, once and for all. the myth of SUPPLY

HANKOW (collier) Purchased in July 1913 she served for a total ol 19 years and was sunk off Darwin when used as a target by HMAS ALBATROSS HANKOW spent a total 7 years service as a coal hulk in Thursday Island Unfor tunately little is known of her details
MALLINA (collier). Taken over by the RAN in August 1914 her service career was of only 6 months duration Again little is known of her details
KOOLONGA (collier) Also requisitioned in August 1914. KOOLONGA spent only 10 months in RAN service Like MALLINA her service career was short and her details lost, stolen or mislaid
ESTRURIA (oiler?) Hired by the RAN in September 1914, she served as an oil and stores

Page 38 — Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute

Fleet collier BILOELA

by courtesy of S Given

name	length (feet)	beam (feet)       draft (feet)     speed (knots)	displacement (tons)	
HANKOW		no details known		
1     MALLINA		no details except displacement known	3,400	
KOOLONGA		no details known		
ESTRURIA		no details except displacement known	2 143	
KURUMBA	378	45'?                   23                     10	7,806	
BILOELA	382	54                   22' c                   11	9.390	
SUPPLY	583	71                     32                   17'?	26,500	
?	516	70                     29                     19	17,800	

ship until 1917 Often referred to as a Destroyer Depot Ship. ESTRURIA was built as an oiler in 1910 She was transferred to the Royal Navy in 1917
KURUMBA (Fleet oiler). Transferred to the RAN in 1919. KURUMBA had served for 3 years with the Royal Navy Built by Swan Hunter at a cost of £141,000 she saw little real service with the RAN. Although on the official list for a total of 27 years. KURUMBA spent 11 of those years in reserve. Re-activated in late 1939 the rest of her sen/ice life was spent in the Australian. New Guinea and Philippines areas. Paid off in 1946 she served a further 18 years (1948 to 1966) under two different names until being scrapped in 1966
BILOELA (Fleet collier). BILOELA holds (or should) a distinctive place in both Australia s and the RAN's history She was the first ship designed in   Australia   and   built   of   purely   Australian

materials Launched at Cockatoo Island (NSW) BILOELA commissioned into the RAN in 1920 and served until 1927. Sold in 1931 she continued her life under 4 other names and finally finished her days when sunk by a submarine in late 1940 The building cost of BILOELA was £455,000 but her sale price in 1931 was £14,500
The table above gives the relevant dimensions of the ships described together with HMAS SUPPL Y. and what the crystal ball predicts is the possible replacement. The displacements quoted are at full load.
Perhaps, and I always live in hope, that our erstwhile planners receive some assistance from the listed names to help with their selection of a suitable name for the next generation of RAN oilers
ROBIN PENNOCK

NEW MEMBERS

Mr V B Jeflery 18 Pinlot! St DianollaWA6062

Mr D A Townsend 8 Rees Place Wanraassa ACT 2903

2nd OFF M A Dotrson WRANS
D-3-05
Russell ACT

MrOD Took PO Box 181 Carllon VIC 3053
AC M K Andre* RAAF Base Library RAAF Base Williamlown NSW 2314
LCDR M K Gahan RAN
CP1-3-21
Campbell Park ACT

LEUT LW GoodndgeRAN
HMAS Melbourne
Cr-GPO
Sydney NSW 2B90
CMDR M Parker RN Rid 1 /33 Albany Road Toorak VIC 3142
LCDR MB Edwards RAN
CP2-2-18
Campbell Park ACT

LEUTTC MussaredRAN 11 Childern Road Ingleside NSW 2101
POPR Sinlield
17?61 Preslon Pornl Road
East Fremantlo WA 6158
LCDR J F McCabeRAN Wardroom HMAS Leeuwin PO Box 58 Fremantle WAolbO

Journal or the Australian Naval Institute - Page J9

Nobody asked me, but...

AN OPEN LETTER TO JUDAS'
Dear Judas.
With just a few months to go before my retirement I was rather saddened to read your satirical article on Chaplains in the last Journal
My first reaction was to reach for a telephone
or make some effort to get in tauch, and this open
letter seemed a good  solution   I m in  HMAS
Melbourne and also have a home telephone 660
1687

As to the religious role of the Chaplain, things have changed Sundays used to be very different days, days in which ships didn t sail, at sea there was necessary work only, and church was the routine In spite of the DI(N). Sunday is now in many eyes another working day. nevertheless men still go to church Captains still request helo or seaboat transfer of Chaplains. Chnstian fellowships and the various spiritual exercises continue Numbers all small and it seems clear that, as in the civilian community, there has been a crystallizing out. as Christians en|oy the exercises of their faiths

At the end of my time I feel that I have been, and still am, usefully employee in the RAN One of the most valuable avenues of service has been to be available, always, to anyone Folk with a need, without a need, seeking advice or |ust wanting a neutral ear (with nothing recorded) The tact that a man or women knows that there is someone available and ernpalhetic is frequently enormously supportive and encouraging This role, the role of a friend, allows ready reference, if requested, to others, such as social workers, doctors etc — all members of the same team to which the Chaplain belongs
Your comments on unifoim made me smile. as I remembered a Chaplain being pulled up recently by a Lieutenant Commander. With a terse Don t Warrant Officers salute anymore? Minor modifications being considered will hopefully clear this up. but in the meantime I don t mind being mistaken for a WO (A noble breed, bringing back memories of the thin stripers with all their merits)

You ask what is meant by a Chaplain representing God in our midst and in answer I would suggesl St Pauls word ambassador' is most descriptive and helpful In this regard every Christian is required to represent God in our midst'. the Chaplain being team leader as all seek, by word of mouth and by way of life, to demonstrate that for them Jesus is Lord
Sorry Judas, but I see no likelihood of Chaplains Departments fading out This particular Chaplain has to do (he old soldier act and fade away , but in the Navy of today and tomorrow the Chaplain will remain an integral part of the team
Thank you tor your honest outpouring I hope we shall meet before long
Every sincere good wishes
Waller Wheeldon Senior Chaplain RAN

Concerning salutes. I have found that they tend to come as friendly gestures and if no salute with the hand is given there s instead a verbal greeting Our ranklessness, clearly defined for all to read, is a priceless possession and. God forbid that even an item of clothing, eg the bush jacket, should suggest rank
The HOD status has been no embarrassment to me but I recognise that others have found it a problem My experience has been to feel more part of the team than ever With technicalities predominating, it has been he pful to have an XO say Its all techo stuff this morning, so just come if you wish

UNIFORM
I think it's high time we took a good look at our 19th century uniform and then discarded it It s OK for the oldies and the staunch traditionalists, but officers No 5 uniform is really an 1870 blue serge suit, given brass buttons and (very expensive) gold rank badges The sailors equivalent is strictly HMS Pinafore stuff and utterly impractical
It will be anathema to some of you. but have you noticed what a practical outfit the RAAF has nowadays? It provides an all seasons rig at the

fe 40 — Journal at tne Australian Naval Institute

least expense, and still looks very smart The jacket can be taken off and the man is still in a recognisable uniform Really, is there any good reason why we can t adopt the same pattern, using a very dark blue cloth and a white shirt with black tie'' And for everyone — not only officers
The only major difference Id propose is that the rank badges for officers should not emulate the RAAF, where each stripe is a multi colour, multi strand affair and a group captain seems to have at least 12 stripes a side And I still cant be sure if he's not a wing commander or a squadron leader Lets stick to a neat but much narrower gold braid stripe on our shoulder straps, say 6 mm instead of 1.5 cm
But what are the advantages of the change, you say? Basically economy, without loss of smartness, and with greater efficiency, is my reply The same basic outfit can be used as a parade dress and a working rig. or worn with a bow tie as evening wear (not that I ever dress for dinner at home, and. I daresay, nor do you) With the jacket off and the tie removed, it is a good hot

weather rig. and would put an end to those b. awful whites which one can never get decently dhobeyed on board and which show every speck of tunnel fall-out
And the headgear1 Who the hell wears a hat nowadays, except us-' Both the sailors cap and the fore and after are laughable and useless at sea They blow off. get crumpled and scruffy, offer little protection against sunstroke or antarctic gales and really have no practical or redeeming feature — apart from being a place to stow one's paybook and ID card, which can then blow overboard with the hat What does a new commander s cap. with badge, cost nowadays9 Let's settle for the beret or the toldaway. if we have to wear hats at all
So let's hear it from you guys who want to bring back the sword, frockcoat. cocked hat. boat cloak and spurs, and want all your jolly tars to be hornpiping and holystoning the computer soft ware.
H G. Julian

JOURNAL BACK ISSUES
Stocks of the following back issues of the Journal are available

Vol 1 No2 November. 1975 Vol 2 No t February, 1976 Vol 2 No 2 May. 1976 Vol 2 No 3 August, 1976 Vol 2 No 4 November. 1976 Vol 3 No 2 May. 1977 Vol 3 No 3 August, 1977 Vol 3 No 4 November 1977

Vol 4 No 1 February. 1978 Vol 4 No 2 May 1978 Vol 4 No 3 August. 1978 Vol 4 No 4 November, 1978 Vol 5 No 1 February. 1979 Vol 5 No 2 May. 1979

Vol 1 No 1 (August. 1975) and Vol 3 No 1 (February. 1977) are out of stock
Back copies may be purchased from the Institute at $2 50 each, which price includes postage Write to the Treasurer. Australian Naval Institute. PO Box 18. Deakin. ACT. 2600
Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute — Page 41

BOOK REVIEWS

BOOK REVIEW
FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE By Andrew J. Goodpaster Lexington. Mass DC Heath & Co.. Lexington Books. 1977 Pp. X, 174. $14.95
The recent demand Dy the Prime Minister Mr Fraser lor a new strategic assessment crealed sicnilicanl public comment and media coverage This assessmeil will be considered by Cabinet and emerge as a governmen approved basis upon Which to formulate national aims Delence Force Struclure developers should then have an approved Government position Irom which they can shape our future Jetence system What is then needed, is a plan to use and to develop Ihis position into policies stralegy and torce structure
In For the Comrnon Defense. General Andrew J Goodpaster examines the security Ol the United Stales ot America using an academic analytic approach The analysis divides the world into three specific sections ma|Or enemies particularly the USSR, major allies, concentrating on NATO out including Japan and Korea and Ihe world beyond, including the sea Using this division and concentrating on military security the examination proceeds Irom an appreciation ot national interests, concentrating on emotional ones, to policies lo torce structure — including comparisons with Ihe USSR — lo mator weapon systems
The protection ot national values as they are laid down m the following excerpt Irom the Constituion ot Ihe USA is used as a basis tor the study
lo lorm a more perfect Union establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility provide tot the common Defence, promote the general Welfare and secure the Blessings ol Liberty lo ourselves and our posterity
The threat to these values and. therefore, lo security is examined closely The effect upon strategic security is summarized as a shift in power balance to the USSR a reliance by the USA tor raw materials from abroad and the unpredictable state ol world order Other security implications include ideology, nationalism regionalism wsrs ol liberation and Ihe imbalance ol national resources The hook asserts that once these values are identilied the will ol the people to deal with them and the impact that the people as a nation can effect ant require careful testing The first three chapters examine effective values using the aforementioned analytical approach
The analysis proceeds to give three policy pains la security These are delence deterrence and detente Each is examined in detail as lo its meaning, use and interrelationship The book then goes on to took at them in relation to Ihe military tools needed to maintain security These are given as strategic nuclear forces ma|or regional lorces and the forces needed to deal with Ihe problems ol the third wor d including tree and sate use ol Ihe sea A weakness in this approach is that looking ai miiilary policy paths in isolation ol poliHcal. economic and social policies may lead lo the wrong loots being assessed lor use in particular scenarios and therefore to an imbalance in Ihe military torce structure
Chapters 6 lo 8 follow on Irom the analysis lo develop lorce structures lor the three recommended tools The chapter on Strategic Nuclear Forces is possibly Ihe best in the book II Hows

on logically from the analysis in a clear manner thai gives a comprehensive appreciation ol Ihe need for and the effective ness and potential deployment ol these lorces Comparison is made ot US and USSR nuclear capability and the Gtujj & eludes with live specific recommendations lor strategic lorces to ensure their effectiveness, economy and public accoplability The author s intimate knowledge ol and association with these nuclear lorces is strongly evident and this chapter on its own given sufficient circulation, would assist greatly with Ihe public understanding and acceptability ol such lorces
Unfortunately the chapter on Regional Security Forces does not have the same impact or tangible comprehension this may be because it concentrates on NATO and is similar m content lo the great volume ot material that is being continually published in monthly and quarterly periodicals on the same subject Also Ihe subject is so vast thai J is ditlicull lo do il|usini< in one chapter Various aspects such as standardisation and Ihe navy are not given a balanced appreciation In looking ai NATO il examines stralegy objectives and torce structure today and in Ihe tuture with bnet specific exposes on army navy and air torce programs
The torce structure needed lor third world and maritime operations are considered already ample Wilhm Ihe discussion about these lorces. Ihe book shows Ihe change in balance ol maritime lorces and Ihe rapid rise ol Ihe Soviet Heel However Ihe most significant implication is Ihe lack ol nalional policy greatly influenced by Ihe Vietnam War towards third world powers and, therefore, a difficulty in grasping the issues that need 10 be examined to carry out the author s postulated analysis
This diHicully is part ot the many conflicts that the (htfhol raises in his concluding remarks Having ottered his analysis along with his personal views as a means ot assessing the mosl effective military force structure tor the USA he alludes to the many intangibles such as politics emotions, and Ihe unpredic table tuture both at home and abroad Despite all Ihese he remains firm, even it apologetically that this analytical approach gives the best chance and greatest flexibility m formulating a more tully evaluated and counter balanced lorce
The book provides a comprehensive insight into military aspects ot security in Ihe United Stales from an academic point ot view General Goodpaster s background automatically lends credibility lo bis bluepnni tor developing national interests into strategy and a lorce structure Australian lorce developers couki lake advantage ol this blueprint but would need lo exercise caution in following his development tor use in our own theatre
R M JESSURUN
PORT PHILLIP — PILOTS AND DEFENCES
By Captain J. Noble. The Hawthorn Press Pty  Ltd. 1973/
1979. 125 pp. Recommended price $12.95.
I spent my very junior yeais at Point Lonsdale long before it was developed as a summer holiday retreat lor Ihe masses Irom Melbourne As a young schoolboy I used lo walk Ihe beach Irom theQueensclitt tumofl where Ihe Primary School was. andslill is located along lo the Point Lonsdale Bay Beach, then to my home wilhin Ihe camping area behind Back Beach The tore-

Page 42 — Journal ot the Australian Haval Institute

shores were my playground I used lo tish Irom the ietty when the salmon and gar were running and catch mutton lish labatonel trom the piles 10 use as prime bail in my leather |acket hoop nel
I can clearly remember catching lobster in homemade pots laid at low tide Irom the reel |utting out Irom the point and roughly parallel to the jetty And those mournful days ol tog and ram when the horn trom the lighthouse used lo issue lorth with Us drawn out melancholy blasts We used lo catch rabbits there too in the dunes behind back beach but that became a challenge when the barbed wiredelences were placed coincident with the arrival ol the garrison As kids, we used to keep time by the tiring ol the 1 o clock gun
Bui what I remember most clearly were the storms when a southerly gale blew, coupled with a spring tide ebb the rip used lo turn to a boil and what a view one had from the cliff benealh the lighthouse, provided of course a boy my size could sland against the wind When a ship was m trouble, word would spread like fire, despite no telephones and only steam radio then almost the entire village population would turn out and some from Queensclitf, to walcn the drama There was always Ihe wreck of Ihe TIME, slill visible on the opposite store at Pi Nepean as a reminder ol previous groundings and the older folk used to talk then of the dramas Ihey had witnessed themselves in earlier days
I remember late one stormy afternoon seeing a yacht returning trom a Sydney Hobart Yacht Race soon alter war ended, stranded on Lonsdale Reel her crew and volunteer locals salvaging what Ihey could belore nightfall and Ihe incoming lide thai would inevitably spell total destruction Then next day. in Ihe calm, her masts only were visible, sunk about halfway between Shortland Blutt and Point Lonsdale jetty Imagine my schoolboy excilemeni al finding some ot her wreckage washed up on the Bay Beach
Since then, having opted lor a lite al sea, I have been through the Hip many limes and in all weathers The lirsl lime was in HMAS GLADSTONE, as a Special Sea Dulyman in Ihe tiller (lal. amid Ihe sleam and noise unique to steam powered steering systems The smell was enough, but Ihe dm didn t help Ihe inner ear either and seasickness invariably followed I teel sure thai very many RAN Cadel Midshipmen ol Ihe littles, now Captains and Commanders, remember Ihal aspect ol ihe Rip as vividly as I do. and in the very same vessel mat ultimately became AKUNA II and served as a reliable pilot vessel lor many years She slill lies alongside at Williamstown. |ust up trom the Dockyard, retired trom service and awaiting her late
More recently I did pre and post commissioning trials in HMAS FLINDERS and some ol tne Rip passages were exciting to say Ihe least and invariably spectacular After all. a steering failure in Ihe Rip and anolher shortly alter in Ihe conlines ot the West Channel is always exciting, particularly it you are sharing the channel wilh the BASS TRADER
That then is my impression ot Ihe area, but knowing that I can only admire Ihe skill, fortitude and bravery ol Ihe seamen and pilots ol Ihe past 100 or so years The pioneers must have been incredible men
To believe Ihal pilots were rowed through the Rip in all weathers is almost beyond one s imagination, and the rigours and privations ot maintaining station otishore. under sail in a 40 ton cutter, exposed to Bass Strait gales day alter day. nighl after night, must have demanded service ot only the toughest ol men
The lite and times ol Ihe Port Phillip Pilot Service torms a permanent part ol Victoria s history and certainly Ihis bonk, under review, deserves a place on Ihe shelves ot anyone interested in that era
But,  I wonder, it lor the most part, Captain Noble has succeeded in his aim When reading Ihe tew paragraphs on

page 30. one can easily imagine Ihe noise ol Ihe sea and furiously Happing Sails. Ihe orders clear and concise, but muHled above the wind, ultimate reliel when the vessel drew clear ol danger He describes Ihal procedure very well as a seaman should
But whilst the book is an interesting and well docurnenled history, il seems to lack substance and darts from one subject or event to another without an expected continuity I. as a reader. lound myselt frequently asking what was missing between paragraphs It almost seemed as though Captain Noble was writing up his log. giving but a precis ol the important events, sufficient perhaps lor students ol history but leaving a layman reader floundering For that reason. I do not believe he gave his lellow pilots or their predecessors Ihe total credit ihey so obviously deserved, and his chapters on Pon Phillip s defences, both Moating and standing, appear to have been written only as fattening lo an otherwise thin book
Captain Noble whom I have not had the pleasure ol meeting, and some ol his fellow pilots, t occasionally see at Cruises or the Custom s House, might well disagree with me, but the drama I remember seeing and hearing. I expected also lo lind in the book, but save tor all too briet snippets it wasn't there and I lei! let down Nonetheless. I enioyed reading the book indeed I read it twice as perhaps a reviewer should
Finally as a rider, I cannot resist, as a puritan Hydro grapher. a quiet dig I must ask it throughout the lext ihe correct lille. Port Phillip is used meticulously why then Port Phillip Bay . to show Ihe geographic picture on the front and rear maps9 Refer to Chart AUS 143
I.S. PULLER
DARWIN AND THE BEAGLE
By  Alan  Moorehesd.  Penguin Books.   1969/78   224  pp.
Recommended price $13.95.
Surely the best television in Australia so far this year lias been Ihe BBC s epic production. The Voyage ot Charles Darwin Members whose appetite tor Darwin was whetted by this programme should be pleased to know that a largo formal, paperbound edition ot Alan Moorehoad s work. Darwin and Ihe Beagle is currently available in Australian bookshops Although first published in 1969 this is a timeless book covering a five year voyage ot maritime exploration which was to have tar reaching consequences (or the extent ot man s knowledge ol himselt
Whilst Ihe television series gives no attention 10 the acliv Hies ol HMS BEAGLE aHer her departure trom Ihe Galapagos Islands Darwin and Ihe Beagle also covers Darwin s homeward voyage via Australia and New Zealand Australia is not Mattered by Darwin s rhetoric.
Farewell. Australia1 You are a rising child bul you are too great and ambitious for aHection yel no! great enough tor respect I leave your shores without sorrow or regret
Darwin and tne Beagle is profusely illustrated from contemporary sources including, needless to say. frequenl examples ol Ihe work ol Ihe arlisls ol Ihe SEAGLF - Conrad Martens and Augustus Earle The colour plates (including some by John Gould) are particularly noteworthy reproduction'. adding significantly to the value ol the book
Moorehead quotes Irequently trom the works ot Charle Darwin and by skilful use ot his own excellent prose style succeeds in bringing Charles Darwin alive to Ihe reader The completion ot Darwin and the Beagle leaves Ihe reader with a definite leeling ot having met — and known — me greai man himself
EDITOR

Journal ul the Australian Naval Institute — Page 43

NAVAL INSTITUTE INSIGNIA

The Council of The Australian Naval Institute advises that cuff-links and mounted crests featuring the badge ot tne Institute are now available lor purchase by Members
The cuff-links are robustly made and are attractively finished m gold and black They are epoxy-capped to ensure long life and are packaged in presentation boxes   The price is S5.95 a pair, which includes postage
The crests are meticulously hand-painted in full colour and are handsomely mounted on polished New Zealand timber They measure 175mm x 130mm (5 x7 )   The price is S10 95. which includes postage
Both items are obtainable from the Treasurer by completing the coupon below Should you not wish to sc-oil your journal, please give the details on a separate sheet of paper
Th,.   !-.
iban Naval Institute P O  Be  ih OF AKIN   ACT    2600
Please lorward
pairs ol cull links  |  S5 95	$
mounted crests I S1095	s
TOTAL	S
My 1 hOOjue  payade to Ihe Australian Naval Insldule is attached Name Address
Posl Code
(Overseas members      Australian currency, please)
Page aa — Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute

COUNCIL OF THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE 1978-1979

OFFICE BEARERS
President
Rear-Admiral R.C. Swan CBE Senior Vice President
Captain L.G. Fox Junior Vice President
Captain D.J. Orr Secretary
Lieutenant Commander C.A Barne Treasurer
Lieutenant Commander D.J. Campbell

COUNCILLORS
Commander W.S.G. Bateman Captain A.R. Cummins AM Commander G. Cutts Captain J.S. Dickson MBE Commodore M.W. Hudson Commander H.G. Julian DSC Commander G. Nekrasov Commander R.J. Perryman Chief Officer N.D. Uhlmann WRANS Commander S.J. Youll

PAST PRESIDENTS
1975-77 Commodore V A. Parker 1977-78 Commodore J A. Robertson
HONORARY LIFE MEMBERS
Admiral Sir Victor Smith AC KBE CB DSC Vice Admiral Sir David Stevenson AC KBE Commodore V.A Parker Admiral Sir Anthony Synnot KBE AO
Public officer    Commander D R  Patterson RANEM

Bennett. G A. Berlyn.N R B Bonnett. V W L Brecht.A.H.R. Broben, I W Calderwood.G.C Cole, SEW. Cummins. A R Cutts. G
Dalrymple, H.H G Davidson, J Dickie, DD. Fisher, TR Fox.LG George. J Gibbs. B G Goddard. F.C. Gnerson, K.W Hall, I.W. Associate Member

FOUNDATION MEMBERS
Hermann. B.J. Histed.G James. I B Jervis.G.E Josselyn.l.K. Kemp. W A Knox. I W Lee. N.E. Loftus.WB Loosli, R G Martin D.J
*	Martin.PCS
4   Mayson.JH
McDonald. N E Macleod.B D Nattey. R J
•	Nicholson. B M
Nicholson, I H
Orr. D J

Parker. V A Patterson. D R Ralph. N Read. B.J Reynolds. I Robertson, J A Scott. B.P Sharp. W R Shearing. J A Smyth. D H D Snell.K.E Stephen, K C Stevens, E.V Slevens. J.D Summers A M F Swan, R C Swan, W N Williams. K A York. D

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