

JOURNAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE

AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE

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- a. to encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the Maritime profession.
- b. to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and the Maritime profession.
- c. to publish a journal.

2. The Institute is self supporting and non-profit making. The aim is to encourage freedom of discussion, dissemination of information, comment and opinion and the advancement of professional knowledge concerning naval and maritime matters.

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5. Inquiries and application for membership should be directed to:—

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CONTRIBUTIONS

As the Australian Naval Institute exists for the promotion and advancement of knowledge relating to the Naval and maritime profession, all members are strongly encouraged to submit articles for publication. Only in this way will our aims be achieved.

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In writing for the Institute it must be borne in mind that the views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Department of Defence, the Chief of Naval Staff or the Institute.

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The front cover features a photograph of a Soviet *Kresta 1* Class CLGM.



CANBERRA CHAPTER

At a meeting on Monday 14 May, the Canberra Chapter heard Capt. B.D. MacLeod AM speak on 'The future of naval Service women — a personal view'. On this occasion 17 chapter members were joined by some representatives of the Canberra Naval Association.

In general, the question of whether women should or could, serve in sea-going ships dominated the discussion. There was support for a proposal that a fair trial of this proposition would probably be the only way to resolve the points of issue once and for all.

A joint meeting of the Chapter, together with the Royal Aeronautical Society, is to be held on **5 June at 1730 in the Academy of Science**. On this occasion LCDR M. Apps will speak on 'Air, surface and sub-surface mine warfare — past, present and future'.

MELBOURNE CHAPTER

The Melbourne Chapter of the ANI met at the RSL Club, Toorak, on Tuesday 20 March. Only 5 people turned up to be rewarded by a most interesting and informative presentation by Commander David York on the Modernisation Programme of *HMAS PARRAMATTA*. David went to considerable pains to produce a model of the 'new look' DE as well as providing many slides and diagrams to illustrate his talk. It was a very commendable effort which deserved a much wider audience.

It is realised that only 5-6 days notice was given but the total attendance was very disappointing, especially when it was noticed that one member had journeyed from Geelong to be present which says much for his keenness. I hope it is catching.



Correspondence

Dear Sir,

Most readers will be aware that Eldridge's book 'The History of the Royal Australian Naval College' covered the period from the College's inception until the end of the Second World War. The book was published in 1949. If a follow-on volume is not commenced soon then much of the first hand anecdotal material will be lost, as memories fade and individuals disperse to distant retirement locations, and the period to cover will become too great.

As a first step CRESWELL has been approached to see if the History Department will undertake the necessary task of making an inventory of source material that is available at the College. No doubt many readers will have information, both from vivid memories and ancient and not so ancient documents, as well as ideas and suggestions as to how the history should be written and then published.

This letter has the twofold task of firstly, soliciting for source material which may be of use in preparing the book and secondly, calling for entrepreneurial ideas regarding the management of the writing and publishing stages. All communications, addressed care of the Directorate of Naval Training, will be welcomed.

H.L. DAW

Dear Sir,

Comparison of the February '78 and February '79 Journals brings to light an interesting trend in the method of listing members of the ANI. In 1978 we drew distinctions of (*) and (+) to denote Foundation and Associate Members, yet in 1979 we have (f) and (+) with indeed an (h) added for the Honorary Life Members.

The Institute and the Journal have both proved themselves and come of age, so may I make a plea for normality and a little less self appreciation.

Simply sir, is there really any reason to make these distinctions, or should we just be shown as *Members*?

As a final point, was it really necessary to publish five and one half pages of *Members* complete with (h), (f) and (+) and then repeat the process with even more lists of Honorary and Foundation Members, this time with post nominals, yet again (Pages 51 through 57 of the February 1979 Journal).

Really sir, one would have thought that G. Cuff's quotation of Norman F. Dixon would have struck closer to home.

ROBIN PENNOCK

Dear Sir,

I was delighted to read DGNT's considered and courteous reply to my article in the February 1979 issue of the Journal. It answered many of my questions and settled some old worries. It was, for example, especially good to hear of the plans to build two 30 metre vessels specifically for the use of the Naval College.

I cannot, however, agree with DGNT's attitude either to the Arts degree or the Creswell Course. I was especially distressed by his declaration that: 'Compared with either the BE or BSc courses the BA is a soft option'. Certainly engineering is one long hard grind for four years, and certainly Arts is the easiest degree to pass, but this is an over-simple view. An officer can attend university, have a marvellous time, do as little work as possible and gain a BA; with very little more work he can do the same for a BSc — but are such officers the type that the Navy either wants or needs?

In fact, to obtain good results and get full value out of an Arts degree require quite as much effort as that needed for a BSc. It might be noted, since much of Arts' grading and marking is subjective, that 'x' amount of work on an essay might result only in a Credit, where the same 'x' expended on a Maths assignment will earn a High Distinction: $d/dy -2x = -2x + d/dy$ often being a little easier to clarify than 'The Implications of the 1975 Crisis for the Australian Constitutional System' (and the former subject is somewhat less likely to be coloured by prejudice on the part of the marker). Dare I suggest that officers with knowledge of both (preferably) or either subject will be of great value in the Navy of the future — and the present?

I am very glad that Captain Roskill's point about 'late developers' was well taken and I note that M.W.D. White echoed the cry in his most interesting letter when he wrote that:

'... the need is as equally urgent for career officers who are well past their tender years, as for those younger ones who are just completing their secondary education.'

But I fail to see what place the Creswell Course has in any 'flexible system', especially for the 'late developers'. It is a strange way to deal with 'late developers' if one forces them to spend two and a half years in the classroom (including Stage I professional courses) when their Degree contemporaries take only six months more. Would it not be far better to send these officers to sea as soon as possible — as they themselves want — and institute a short tertiary course for both S.L. and G.L. non-degree officers at the rank of Sub-Lieutenant? I continue to believe that the Creswell Course combines the worst of both worlds.

Yours faithfully,

MASTER NED

Dear Sir,

I have been following with interest the controversy over officer education that has occupied a good deal of the space in the past few issues of your Journal. The reply by DGNT to Master Ned's last article was especially interesting as it is one of the very few official descriptions of the planning going into officer training that I have seen.

But I must comment on DGNT's declaration that 'Compared with either the BE or BSc courses the BA is a soft option'. Although I myself studied Science, with varying degrees of success, I believe an Arts degree to be of quite as much value to the Service as Science. Naval officers are as much politico/social operators as technologists — even at junior and middle levels.

I studied both mathematics and oceanography. They were of great interest to me and I am sure that they will prove to be of great value in the years ahead. But what about an officer who has developed an extensive knowledge of, say, our Asian neighbours through the disciplines of history, geography and economics, to name only a few? Will he not be of service to the Navy? I know of some who took up the study of Asian languages — would these be of no use?

As one with a certain experience in the area of statistics and analysis, I doubt the necessity of a tertiary education for a comprehension of those 'analytical techniques in decision making' of which DGNT writes. Certainly, a proper mathematical education is required to devise such methods, but no more than Maths should ever be needed to employ them, as a need to deal with any of the more esoteric branches of the study could be dealt with — as long as the officer possesses a sound background in secondary maths — by short application courses.

A last point: I agree with all 'Master Ned' wrote decrying the move of the first year of the Arts degree to the Naval College. The acquisition of a 'major' — the discipline upon which each student chooses to base his degree — has been rendered very difficult. The 'Naval' Arts degree is no longer a proper Arts degree. Psychology, economics, politics — all suffer. It is ridiculous that in starting a BA, three out of four subjects are those found in a pure Science degree. It seems to me that the Navy paid far too heavy a price for what was only a dubious improvement in the standards of naval training — witness the failure rate among the class I BAs last year.

Yours faithfully,

G.L. KNOX

Acting Sub Lieutenant, RAN.

Dear Sir,

I have been following the controversy over the ADFA in the pages of your journal, but still I am unable to form a clear picture why anyone supports the project. So far, the basic concepts and ideals behind the project, seem to me, to be, educationally backward, politically naive, and economic nonsense.

The main educational aims of a Service Officers' Training Program are three: professional expertise, a broad general education, and development of basic maturity. The object of all training programs is simple, to take a young man of sixteen to eighteen years of age and turn him into a competent commander of men. Under professional training I would group those skills that are necessary for any officer to carry out his duties. Much of this training will be specialized, and directed to one or other of the Services, after all, the skills involved in being a patrol boat commander are somewhat different to that of a platoon commander. Therefore professional training would necessarily remain the province of the individual Service, and would not be greatly affected by ADFA.

This obviously does not exclude the large amount of inter-service cooperation in training programs that already exists, such as pilot training for aircraft, or staff work.

In the second area of educational aims, that of a broad general education, designed to broaden an officer's outlook and general personality, the ADFA excels. Obviously the opportunity for cross fertilization of ideas and differing views between the members of the different Services would be of great value. However, one is tempted to ask, would not still greater value be gained from students attending one of our numerous universities or CAEs. The input of diverse ideas would be even greater.

On the third area of educational aims, that of basic maturity, very little can be said. I doubt that any tertiary institution contributes to the growth in maturity of any of its students, and it's most unlikely that ADFA will be an exception to this generalization.

To call the ADFA project 'politically naive' is probably a little harsh. However, in this age where public concern is votes, and votes are money, no political stone should be left unturned. There is always a risk in large organizations of, what can best be termed, 'a hot box effect'. This refers merely to the members of an organization turning in on themselves, and cutting themselves off from the rest of society. This occurs principally in terms of thought patterns. If young officers were sent to normal universities they would be confronted with the need to defend their views, often against other students who work from a totally different frame of reference. It's true that some may leave the Service as a result of such experience, but it is better that they should leave rather than stay with ideals based on erroneous and half understood conceptions. The men who remain would

be stronger for the experience, and the Services would benefit correspondingly. Besides it seems useful to me that some Service officers be made aware that not all university students are "long haired pinko radicals" and some university students learn that not all Service officers are "fascist war mongers". After all the best publicity a Service could have is the presence of competent and pleasant young men amongst those who will become the educated and articulate classes of our society.

In the area of economics it seems even less justifiable to construct ADFA. In the final analysis it may be cheaper to run than it would be to continue with separate Service institutions. I have not seen the figures. But there is no possibility that ADFA would be cheaper than sending young officers to already established civil universities. It would cost the government considerably less, and has the added advantage to the Services that it does not come out of an already meagre Defence budget.

Where do all these observations lead? It seems that for broad educational purposes and many technical fields, the areas where ADFA is the more suitable than the present situation, it would be more advantageous for educational, political, and economic reasons, to send young officers to established universities or CAEs.

One other minor comparison, which was of interest to me personally. About twenty years ago various religious orders began to send students to secular universities, instead of running their own institutes, as they had done for the previous thousand years or so. It proved to be a very satisfactory alteration, and it got the young men of the orders involved in secular society. It seems that some men in the Defence Department are determined to do the reverse, to create some form of military, monastic elite, instead of a Defence Service whose members can easily take their place as part of Australian Society. Perhaps the new commandant ADFA should be a retired Lord Abbot.

From what I have read so far, it seems that little space has been devoted to the educational side of the project and a great deal to the organizational side. I feel that fundamental questions about the broader education of officers I have been either ignored or not considered to any degree. I would very much like to see a clear presentation of the educational and professional requirements of young officers today, followed by a study of how they can best be served, rather than a decision to build an ADFA and then to fit the requirements into it.

M.A. HEAD

(Brother)
Jesuit Theological College,
Parkville, Vic.

Dear Sir,

I read Commodore Robertson's article in the February 1979 issue of the Journal with great interest and am in almost complete agreement with all his arguments. It has been my experience that those pundits who declare that history neither repeats itself nor holds valuable lessons for the future are those who have read no history.

The coincidences are too many. What went on in Great Britain during the 'Twenty years Truce' bears too strong a resemblance to what is happening in Australia today. Very properly, Commodore Robertson eschewed polemics and concentrated upon a clear and precise argument that confined itself to the 1920s and '30s. It is my fear, however, that too many will dismiss the piece as 'historical irrelevance'. But can such as this be coolly dismissed as nonsense?

'This approach to a national military strategy would have provided a bedrock minimum on which to guide the Services' development. It would not necessarily have eliminated the ramshackle, interlocking and constipated defence decision making machinery, or got rid of out-moded political decisions, but at least the debate to define vital national interests might have encouraged a spirit of freer inquiry into what Britain's strategic objectives should have been.'

A familiar note? Perhaps, after all, the Minotaur is not slain. It is in my mind that if, in the very near future, we do not find enough men of the mettle of Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond to

lead us out of the wilderness, in fifty years time a traveller from Ireland.

'... shall, in the midst of a vast solitude, take his stand on a broken arch of King's Avenue Bridge to sketch the ruins of the Defence Department.'

We have even been struck down by a repetition of the 'Ten Years Rule'. It was quite astonishing to me how supposedly intelligent men could arrive at and accept such a declaration of 'no threat' and even — if possible — more astonishing that they should think of renewing it. Had they *never* read European history? Let us hope that the fate of the Iranian Monarchy will act as a timely warning.

Too much sloppy thinking, over-confidence, a preoccupation with technology, and, above all, a complete unwillingness to read a little more history than the sort of 'There were eight bells ringing, Temeraire, Temeraire'. It is a dismal picture.

'Si jeunesse savait; si vieillesse pouvait.'

Yours faithfully
JAMES GOLDRICK

Dear Sir,

As most ANI members are aware, the RAN Staff College was opened on 15 January 1979 by Rear Admiral G.R. Griffiths, DSO DSC and No. 1 Staff Course of 14 students started that day. The Staff College is very conveniently located at HMAS PENGUIN in a very well refurbished building equipped with all necessary facilities, including a library.

This library already features a good collection of books and this will be steadily built upon with time. One of the important parts of a staff college library is of course a collection of periodicals which report and comment upon international, national and other events which may bear on defence.

My purpose in writing is to suggest to members that some of those books or periodicals in their possession, which have been too good to throw out but perhaps are of no future use to them, could be made useful in the Staff College Library. The type of book useful to the Staff College would need no explanation, but I would be particularly grateful for back-copies of:

The United States Naval Institute Proceedings	Jan-Oct 1968 issues May-Jun 1969 issues August 1969 issue November 1971 issue May 1976 issue May 1977 issue All back copies
Adelphi Papers	
Australian Journal of Defence Studies	All back copies
Australian Quarterly	All back copies
Current Affairs Bulletin	All back copies
The Economist	All back copies
Far East and Australia	All back copies
Flight Deck	All back copies
International Defence Review	All back copies
Journal of Contemporary Asia	All back copies
Journal of International Affairs	All back copies
Journal of Strategic Studies	All back copies
Naval Review	All back copies
New Scientist	Last 12 months
New Statesman	Last 12 months
Round Table — C'wealth Journal of International Affairs	All back copies
RUSI Journal	All back copies
Survival	All back copies

Any assistance ANI members can provide in completing our sets of periodicals or adding to our book collection would be greatly appreciated.

Yours sincerely

N. RALPH
(Director, RAN Staff College)

FROM THE EDITOR

In this edition there is again a wide ranging series of articles. Professor Michael McGwire's article on the Development of Soviet Seapower, which was presented at SEALINK 78, SACLAN'S Triannual Symposium, is a fascinating explanation of the rationale for the development of Soviet Seapower; W.N. Swan gives an interesting account of a personal experience concerned with the Australian Army in World War II and that prolific writer, 'Master Ned', has produced two interesting articles, one on the attempts to censor the Naval Review and the other on a proposed RN sail training scheme.

A separate index to the journal has been included in this edition. It is intended to issue a complete up-to-date index every year in the February edition. Any suggestions with regard to improving the layout of the index, including categorisation of subjects, would be welcomed.

It is encouraging to see the increase in the number of letters to the Editor, covering a wide variety of subjects. One of particular interest is that from Brother M.A. Head concerning the ADFA. It is hoped that this trend in the correspondence column will continue.

This is the last journal with which I will be associated as, due to a posting, I am unable to continue as Editor. Commander W.S.G. Bateman will be holding the reins of office from now on.



FROM THE SECRETARY'S DESK

There are two recent changes approved by the Council in the management of the Institute's affairs and which need to be brought to the attention of members.

The first concerns the publication, in each journal, of a list of the newly joined members of the Institute together with their addresses. This will enable members to find out who the newly joined members are and will enable Chapter Convenors to maintain an up-to-date list of members in their area. Additionally the results of recruiting campaigns will be evident.

The second change concerns the procedures whereby annual subscriptions are renewed. There is a considerable workload on the Treasurer and Secretary each year in collecting renewals and our procedures, in the past, have not quite accorded with the by-laws and the constitution. Briefly, the institute's financial year is from 1 October to 30 September and renewals are due by 1 October for the next year. The by-laws allow three months grace in which to pay i.e. the final date for dues is 31 December. Unfortunately our reminder notices have always quoted a date of 31 December as the due date. As well the by-laws require that the Secretary must give two months notice of lapsed subscription before a member's name can be struck off the Register of Members.

In future, subscription renewal notices will be included with the August journal but due to be paid by 1 October. On 1 November the Secretary will advise in writing, members who have not paid, that their subscriptions are now due and that if payment is not made by 31 December action will be taken to remove a member's name from the Register of Members. A final reminder notice will be included in the November journal.

As a matter of interest, last year many members responded to calls for subscription renewals twice or more. To avoid over-subscription the Secretary will advise these members separately that they will not need to renew their subscriptions this year.

THE RATIONALE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET SEAPOWER

By Michael McGwire

This article was presented at SEALINK 78, SACLANT'S Triannual Symposium, held at Annapolis in June 1978 and is reproduced in the Journal by kind permission of the author.

My task is to explain the rationale for the development of Soviet seapower; to focus on the why of current developments rather than the what. This distinction is important, since it leads one to emphasise a different range of factors, each relevant to different levels of threat analysis.

The what of Soviet seapower provides the basis for contingency planning, where we focus on enemy capabilities and our own requirements, and the aim is to identify the most dangerous course of Soviet action, rather than the most likely. This is the military/tactical level of analysis.

By contrast, analysis at the politico/strategic level is primarily concerned to identify the most likely courses of Soviet action. This means we focus primarily on the why of Soviet policy and, by identifying the rationale behind past developments, we gain some understanding of the objectives and the constraints which will shape policy in the future. This requires us to look at Soviet interests, and while it's hard to be certain of what they see as being in their interests, it is much easier to identify what is against their interests. We also have to consider intentions which, given continuity of government, tend to be remarkably stable at the politico-strategic level. But probably the most important step is to assess Soviet capabilities in terms of the requirements they are designed to meet, and decide whether there is a surplus or shortfall of capabilities over these requirements.

A major difference between the two levels of analysis is the stance of the analyst. At the military/tactical contingency-planning level, he is looking at the situation primarily from the West's point of view and focusing on Western threat perceptions and vulnerabilities. At the politico/strategic level, the analyst is looking at it from the Russians' point of view and focusing on Soviet threat perceptions and vulnerabilities, before considering the range of opportunities that are open to them.

Obviously these different viewpoints yield very different pictures, and the level of analysis explains much of the apparent divergence of views concerning the Soviet threat. Both levels of analysis are essential, since they provide the two

THE SPEAKER

Professor Michael McGwire served in the Royal Navy during World War II and then undertook Russian language training. He did exchange service with the RAN in the late 1940s and on return to the UK pursued a normal Service Officer's career, making use of his Russian interpretership qualification. He served as Assistant Naval Attaché, Moscow and his last appointment was in the Directorate of Naval Intelligence as a Commander. On retirement he took an economic's degree and has pursued an academic career ever since. He is now Professor of Defence Studies in the Political Science Faculty at Dalhousie University, Nova Scotia. He is well known and well respected as a writer and lecturer of seapower matters, particularly those concerned with Russian seapower.

components of the threat equation: the type of enemy action which could take place; and the likelihood that such action will take place. The operational commander is required to focus on the first component, but higher level policy-making in peacetime requires the judicious balancing of both. I am going to give you my understanding of the second.

I am going to focus on the naval element of seapower, although towards the end I will touch briefly on other aspects of Soviet ocean policy. I will concentrate mainly on the last seventeen years, because contemporary naval policy, and indeed Soviet defence policy as a whole, stems from 1961; that is, the year before Cuba. But to understand this policy we must reach much further back in time, not least because most of the warships now in service stem from design decisions taken before that date.

For evidence, I draw on what the Soviets say and what they do. But I pay particular attention to their warship building programmes, because these reflect high level decisions about the allocation of scarce resources. Detailed analysis of these programmes allows one to identify the timing and the substance of past policy decisions and of subsequent shifts in policy, reflecting changes in Soviet perceptions of the threat, and the evolution of their naval requirements.

Let me start by reminding you that for the last 200 years or so, Russia's navy has generally been the third or fourth largest in the world, although its effectiveness fluctuated widely. Russia used naval forces in the eighteenth century to gain control of her Baltic and Black Sea coasts and, four times between 1768 and 1827, she deployed sizeable squadrons to the Mediterranean for a year or more. For three of these deployments ships were drawn from the Baltic Fleet and were used in operations against the southern side of the Black Sea exits during the wars with Turkey.

But increasingly thereafter, Russia found herself confronting predominantly maritime powers. In the Black Sea, Britain used her naval strength to prevent Russian gains at the expense of the failing Ottoman Empire; Britain intervened directly in what we call the Crimean War, extending her naval operations against Russia to the Baltic, White Sea, and Pacific, and the subsequent peace treaty forbade Russia a Black Sea Fleet. Twenty years later in the eighth Russo-Turkish War, British pressure ensured that Russia did not gain control of the Straits. In the Far East, Russo-Japanese rivalry culminated in the disastrous war of 1904/5, and the loss of two Russian Fleets. In consequence, Russia's naval policy was increasingly dominated by the requirement to defend four, widely separated fleet areas

against maritime powers who could concentrate their forces at will.

It is therefore wrong to suggest that Russia has only recently awoken to the significance of seapower. She used it in the past to her own advantage, but more often has seen its long arm used against her. Over the years she committed very substantial resources to naval construction, and the major warship building programme which was initiated after the Second World War, was the fourth attempt in 65 years to build up a strong Russian fleet: 1880; 1910; 1928; and 1945. But national strategy involves setting priorities and balancing competing claims for scarce resources. Russia was predominantly a land power; the only threats to her territorial existence had come by land; the army was the basis of security at home, and of influence beyond her borders.

Substantial naval forces were indeed required to defend against assault from the sea, and to thwart attempts by maritime powers to dictate the outcome of events in areas adjoining Russia. But these forces were seen as an expensive necessity, rather than as a preferred instrument of overseas policy. One of the questions I will address at the end is the extent to which this attitude persists today.

These perceptions of Russia's naval requirements were reinforced during the inter-war years. Between 1918 and 1921, Western navies provided vital support to the forces of counter-revolution. And then a naval arms race built up during the thirties. With traditional enmities now reinforced by a deep ideological cleavage, the Soviet Union was a beleaguered state and had to take account of Japan in the Pacific, the Germans in the Baltic, and the possibility of the Italians joining the Turks in the Black Sea; plus, of course, the world-wide capabilities of the American, British and the French navies.

During the thirties the Soviet Union devoted substantial resources both to warship construction and to improving its naval capabilities: by linking the three western areas by inland waterway; by upgrading existing shipyards; and by building major new ones, safe from coastal assault, in the North, in the Pacific and on the Volga. Throughout most of the thirties the Soviets only had the industrial capacity to build smaller units, and they concentrated mainly on submarines, torpedo boats and naval aircraft. But by the end of the Third Five Year Plan in 1943 they planned to have a navy of 19 battleship/battlecruisers, 20 cruisers, 160 destroyers, over 1,500 naval aircraft, and no less than 340 submarines.

This sounds a substantial force, but in fact it would have been no larger than the Japanese Navy was in 1941, and much less powerful. And,

of course, this force had to be shared between four fleet areas. In June 1941 the Soviets had the most numerous submarine force in the world, but the great majority of these units had been designed to defend the home fleet areas against naval incursions.

The second world war confirmed Russia's belief that ground forces were the basis of her national security. However, at the end of the war her most likely opponents were now the traditional maritime powers, who had not only been responsible for the capitalist intervention during the Revolution, but had recently demonstrated their capacity to project continental scale armies over vast distances of sea, and to support their operations ashore. The likelihood of maritime invasion of the Baltic and Black Sea coasts was considered substantial. The Baltic gave access to the lines of communication with the Western front; the Black Sea would allow the invaders to bypass Russia's traditional defence in depth; and the rivers, instead of serving as defensive barriers, would provide the invaders with easy access to Russia's industrial heartlands. In enemy hands, the Black Sea became a grenade in Russia's gut.

In 1945, Russia had a powerful army but lacked a battle-worthy fleet, and the navy therefore received relatively high priority in the rebuilding process, with force requirements largely carried over from before the war. The new, twenty-year naval construction programme planned to build no less than 1,200 submarines. We know that for certain, and I reckon that they also planned to build some 200 escorts, 200 destroyers, about 36 cruisers, 4 battlecruisers and 4 aircraft carriers during this period, plus a mass of torpedo boats, gun boats and subchasers, and some 5,000 aircraft in the naval airforce. Large numbers, but of course nothing compared to the size of the combined Western navies at the end of the war, and even the submarines fall into perspective when divided between the four fleet areas. The pre-war concept of defence in depth and coordinated attacks by air, submarine and surface units were carried over. About 1,000 of the 1,200 submarines were intended for the defence of the home fleet areas, and the carriers were probably intended to extend fighter cover in the North and the Pacific.

However, in 1954, as a consequence of the post-Stalin policy review, the Soviet leadership downgraded the threat of seaborne invasion and gave first priority to the dangers of a surprise nuclear attack by strategic bombers. The naval threat from the West was seen in more limited terms of nuclear strikes by carrier-borne aircraft, primarily against naval base areas. This engendered a radical reappraisal of naval requirements and the decision to place primary reliance on long

range cruise missiles, which would be carried by small to medium surface ships, diesel submarines and aircraft. The operational concept relied on the reach, the payload and the accuracy of these weapons as a substitute for large numbers of weapon platforms. However, the missile system had yet to be developed.

Khrushchev brought 45 year-old Gorshkov to Moscow to implement these decisions. The building of cruisers was checked in mid-course; the mass-production of medium-type submarines, then building at 72 units a year, was sharply tapered to a halt; and while the destroyer, escort and sub-chaser programmes ran their full course, their successor classes were put back four years. This represented a sixty per cent cut in annual production tonnage, enabling substantial resources to be released from warship construction to the domestic economy, and seven of the thirteen largest building ways were reassigned to the construction of fish factory and merchant ships. This shift of resources from naval to commercial construction was an important indication of Soviet priorities in the use of the sea.

The new concept of operations was predicated on engaging enemy carrier groups within the range of shore-based air cover. It envisaged co-ordinated missile attacks by strike aircraft, diesel submarine and large destroyers. These newly-designed units, the Badger C strike aircraft, the Juliet and Longbin missile submarines, and the Kynda missile ship, were planned to begin entering service in 1962.

However, by 1958 the key premise, that shore-based air cover would be available over the encounter zone, had been falsified by increases in the range of carrier-borne aircraft. This allowed U.S. carriers to strike at Russia with nuclear weapons from the Eastern Mediterranean and the South Norwegian Sea. To meet this threat from distant sea areas it was decided to place primary emphasis on nuclear submarines, which would be able to outflank the West's surface and air superiority. Plans were therefore put in hand to double nuclear submarine production to 10 boats a year, with deliveries to begin in 1968. The recently authorised diesel submarine programmes were cancelled and as an expedient, their long-range missile systems were used to reconfigure nuclear hull/propulsion units as SSGN, the Echo classes. Meanwhile, the development of a horizon-range submarine missile with organic target location was put in hand.

At this same period in 1957/58, a requirement to extend the range of ASW coverage provided by shore-based helicopters was identified, particularly in Northern waters. This generated the requirement for the Moskva class of anti-submarine helicopter carriers.

So far, I have only talked of those forces directly involved in the defence of the home fleet areas, and I must now back-track to pick up the task of strategic delivery. At the end of the war, the diesel submarine/torpedo was the only weapon system available to the Soviets which had the range and payload to bring atomic weapons to bear on North America. This, combined with the navy's traditional emphasis on long-range interdiction, led to the navy being given the task of strategic delivery. A nuclear warhead for a torpedo was probably developed by 1954 and a ballistic missile was fired from a submarine in 1955. This led to a family of four classes of strategic delivery submarine which began delivery in 1958; two diesel, the Foxtrot and Golf, and two nuclear, the November and Hotel, one of each armed only with torpedoes, and the other carrying missiles. However, technological inadequacies, coupled with advances in American anti-submarine capabilities meant that at least three of these four classes were unable to meet planned operational requirements. The torpedo-armed units were therefore re-tasked, the role of the missile-armed units was curtailed, plans for the navy's future contribution to strategic delivery were cancelled and, as we have seen, the second half-generation of nuclear hull/propulsion units were reconfigured for the anti-carrier role.

This brings us up to the crucial year of 1961, but before moving forward let me summarise what I have said. During its first forty years, Soviet naval policy and the allocation of resources to naval construction reflected their perceptions of the threat of assault on Russia from the sea. After World War II we see first the mass-construction programmes designed to meet a misperceived threat, which was incorrectly inferred from the capitalists' war-inflated navies and from a Marxist prognosis of history. This is followed by savage cuts in shipyard allocations when the likelihood of seaborne invasion was realised to be low. And then we have the heavy investment in nuclear submarine construction facilities, responding to the new and correctly-perceived threat from carrier-borne strike aircraft, and to the need to oppose them in Western-dominated waters.

Meanwhile, Soviet efforts to develop a counter to the maritime capability of the West were continually thwarted by technological advances, which rendered programme after programme obsolescent before the units had even entered service. Of the 23 classes whose construction was decided on in the late 40s, only five of the earlier surface types ran to schedule. By the middle 50s, all programmes had been radically altered. Nor did the decisions taken in the



KYNDA CLASS CLGN

1954 and 1957/58 periods fare any better, and we have a continuing picture of cancellations, adaptations and expedients. These facts are important to current Western assessments since, in crude terms, some 80% of the Soviet Navy's distant water surface units and over 70% of their submarines stem from design decisions taken during these years.

As we move into the current period, we must broaden our perspective and I want to focus briefly on a significant double shift (or wiggle) in Soviet defence policy during a twenty month period in 1960/61. In January 1960, Khrushchev announced the result of what appears to have been a thorough-going defence review, which included the formation of the Strategic Rocket Force, its designation as the primary arm of the nation's defence, a substantial reorganisation of military research and development, and the cutting back of conventional ground forces. Given Khrushchev's faith in nuclear missiles and his belief that nuclear war would be suicidal, the new policy could only indicate a shift in emphasis towards the Western concept of nuclear deterrence, and away from the traditional reliance on balanced forces and a war-fighting capability. But by October 1961 the shift had been reversed and at the 22nd Party Congress, Marshall Malinovsky's speech clearly indicated a return to the traditional military values. Meanwhile, a thorough-going reappraisal of what was involved in war fighting with nuclear weapons and the development of a whole series of consequential policies appears to have been put in hand.

What caused this reversal, which was clearly a blow to Khrushchev's policies and vindicated those who argued that professional military opinion should prevail in matters of national defence? Bureaucratic politics is too facile an explanation and there must have been some significant change in what Soviets call the "objective factors" to have tilted a recently achieved balance of opinion within the leadership, back to earlier policies. By far the most plausible would be a change in threat perceptions and the only new development in this period which could both have engendered such a re-evaluation of threat, and prompted the various new measures which can be dated to this period, was the range of defence policy decisions announced by President Kennedy shortly after taking office in January 1961. These included a very sharp acceleration of the Polaris programme and a doubling of the planned production rate of solid-fuel ICBM, which would be deployed in underground silos remote from existing centres of population. Perhaps equally important in terms of Soviet threat perceptions was the crusading rhetoric of the new administration, with its willingness to go any place, pay any price, and the detached logic of the tough-minded academic strategists who were thinking the

unthinkable, and developing theories of limited nuclear war. In the circumstances it is perhaps not surprising that the Soviet leadership decided that they could not rely on nuclear deterrence, despite its obvious economic attractions, and applied themselves instead to the problems of fighting and winning a nuclear war, the likelihood of which appeared to have increased.

To understand the cluster of decisions which were taken in 1961, four related points concerning Soviet military doctrine must be borne in mind. First, Marxism sees international relations as conflictual, and the Soviet Union has always taken the possibility of major war very seriously. While its assessments as to the likelihood of war with the West have varied over the years, the Soviet leadership has never wavered in its belief that a strong military capability is the best way of making it less likely.

Which leads to the second point. Soviet military doctrine does not separate out the idea of "nuclear deterrence" from the general concept of defence. Defence of the Soviet Union depends on the capability to repel, or at least absorb any attack, and then go on to win the subsequent war. The Soviets obviously hope that their defence capability will be sufficient to dissuade an aggressor, which is of course deterrence in its traditional sense. But the crucial distinction between this and the Western concept of "nuclear deterrence" is implicit in the comment that "if the deterrent has to be used, it will have failed". The Soviets do not entertain such ideas. Should war come, their defence will only have failed if their armed forces are unable to recover and go on to final victory. This emphasis on defence through war fighting is central to Soviet military doctrine. While Western theory saw nuclear weapons as a means of threatening "unacceptable damage" to Russia, the Soviet Union saw them as adjuncts to its war fighting capability. Where the West thought in terms of credibility, argued about the arcane merits of counterforce and countervalue, or worried about stabilising and destabilising developments, the Soviets focused on achieving victory in war. It is true that Khrushchev, and Malenkov before him, expressed the opinion that there could be no winners in nuclear war, and as we have seen, advocated some form of deterrence policy, partly as a means of reducing expenditure on defence. But in the final analysis, neither was successful, because the security-conscious collective leadership was unwilling to base the defence on the homeland on an untested theoretical construct.

Which leads to the third point. This readiness to think through the implications of the nuclear arms race does not imply that the Soviet Union would willingly embark on nuclear war with the West. Marxist-Leninist theory lays down that the



SOVIET AIRCRAFT CARRIER KIEV

initiation of war as a deliberate act of policy can only be justified if (a) victory is virtually certain, and (b) the gains clearly outweigh the costs. Neither of these criteria can be met since by definition such a war would be a world war and again by definition, world war involves a fight to the finish between the two social systems. Defeat would be synonymous with extinction and victory with survival. It is this catastrophic consequence of defeat which explains why, despite the admittedly low probability of such a war occurring at the present time, preparations to fight and win one continue to be given such high priority within the Soviet Union.

Which brings us to the fourth point. Plans to cover the contingency of world war must provide for two equally important sets of objectives. The first focuses on *extirpating the capitalist system*, by such means as destroying its forces in being, its war making potential and its structure of government. The second set focuses on *preserving the socialist system* which, besides protecting the structure of government and ensuring the survival of some proportion of the working population and industrial base, must also aim to secure an alternative economic base which can contribute to the rebuilding of a socialist society. The implications of these dual sets of objectives

are fairly self-evident, particularly in regard to the requirements for effective civil defence, the priority in locating ABM sites, the preferred size of missile inventories, and the importance of NATO Europe as an alternative economic base.

In the light of these four points, let us now consider the impact of the Kennedy decisions on Soviet naval developments. Acceleration of the Polaris programme highlighted a trend which has been alluded to repeatedly in Soviet pronouncements, namely the shift in emphasis from land to sea-based nuclear delivery systems, which the Soviets claimed constituted one-third of the U.S. inventory in 1966, rising to one-half in 1970. What underlay this shift in emphasis? When Polaris first became operational, its most vaunted characteristic was its invulnerability, which, to Western deterrence theory, provided an "assured response". But from the Soviet point of view, the more important implication of this invulnerability was that these missiles could be held back from the initial nuclear exchange, with the fair certainty that they would remain available for use at a subsequent stage of the war. So, too, could carrier-based nuclear strike aircraft.

The capacity of sea-based systems to survive the initial exchange impacted on two aspects

of Soviet military doctrine. First strategic reserves. Largely ignored by nuclear deterrence theory, the requirement for strategic reserves is integral to the concept of warfighting with nuclear weapons. Soviet strategy must assume that the availability of nuclear weapons may be critical at certain stages of a world war, and that sole possession of a substantial capability is likely to determine the final outcome of the war and the political structure of the post-war period. Since the West was acquiring sea-based systems which could be withheld from the initial exchange, the Soviet Union had at least to match this capability for deferred strikes. But the military planners had also to provide against the emergence of capitalist power-bases outside the NATO area. And then of course, there was always the question mark over China.

The second aspect was the potential availability of NATO Europe as an alternative base from which to help rebuild the socialist system. Of course this meant that Western Europe must be occupied rather than ravaged, and required a concept of political and military operations that limited battle damage to the minimum. But the importance of Europe in this role was increased by the fact that America had no comparable option, since potential areas like Canada were targetted by Russia. However, this advantage would be lost if, after the occupation of Europe, Western sea-based strategic systems could deny Russia its use.

Of the problems which faced the Soviets in 1961, the simplest was to provide the sea-based systems to serve as the national strategic reserve. Although the navy had previously been relieved of its strategic strike role, the Soviets were already committed to increasing nuclear submarine construction from 5 to 10 units a year, with deliveries starting in 1968. It was therefore possible to change the planned configuration-mix of this second full generation, so as to provide 6 ballistic missile units a year for the 10-years production run 1968-77. This did however cause major disruption to shipyard assembly facilities, the SSBN being almost twice as large as the attack submarines which had originally been projected.

Given their problems with the West's anti-submarine capability, it seems likely that the 1,600-mile SS-N-6 carried by the Yankee was an interim solution, with the 4,200-mile SS-N-6, which could be fired from home waters, as their final objective.

In contrast, the problem of providing a counter to Western sea-based systems was immensely complex. However, the triple potential of

these systems, as part of the initial exchange, as the core of the strategic reserve, and as the means of preventing Soviet use of NATO Europe, meant they ranked high among the various threats to Russia. And paradoxically, the most important objective, that of denying the West the option of withholding nuclear weapons for use at a later stage of the war, would be somewhat simpler to achieve than the less critical aim of limiting damage during the initial exchange. To achieve the first objective, it should only be necessary to pose a threat to sea-based systems that was sufficient to persuade the West to use those weapons while it could. This required that U.S. weapon platforms be attacked at the very onset of war and meant that Soviet forces would have to be within weapon-range contact at the vital moment. In the case of ships and submarines, they must already be deployed in the sea areas of threat.

Herein lies the genesis of the Soviet Navy's shift to forward deployment and, as I bring the story through to the present, let me emphasise that for the time being I will continue to focus exclusively on the navy's war-related mission. I will come back to the emergence of the peacetime role later on, but on the basis of a fair amount of evidence I remain convinced that strategic imperatives of the kind I outlined provided both necessary and sufficient causes for the decision that, despite its manifest inadequacies, the Soviet Navy should be required to move forward in strategic defence.

The shift to forward deployment appears to have been decided in principle by the end of 1961, but the debate about means continued until 1963/64 and, as Gorshkov has said, the new requirements demanded "the organic restructuring of the fleet and the reorientation of traditional naval policy and operational habits". The policy that finally emerged was shaped by several persistent tendencies. First, we have the spirit of technical and conceptual innovation and a readiness to adopt new but unproven technological advances. Second, a keen awareness that the best is the enemy of the good and, particularly where defensive responses are involved, a willingness to invest in ten-percent solutions, rather than wait until the complete answer is found. Third, a belief in the progressive application of new concepts and capabilities, as they become available; there are often discrete phases of Initial, Interim, and Final Application. In part, this is the "Don't just sit there, DO something" syndrome, but it is also a conscious form of operational evaluation and development. Fourth, they are prepared to take a very long-term view, and to persist with a problem until some type of solution is achieved.

Fifth, we have ground-force domination of military strategy and military policy which has, at times, required the navy to undertake tasks which violated traditional naval assumptions and has forced the development of radical concepts. Sixth, the heavy emphasis on a combined arms approach to military problems. This has had an invigorating effect on the development of Soviet naval doctrine, which has come to incorporate what are essentially ground-force concepts. It has also ensured that the resources of *all* relevant branches are deployed to meet any serious threat to the homeland, including those which come from the sea. And seventh, there is the concept of area defence, which is fundamental to Soviet naval strategy, and is worth elaborating.

The concept of area defence is based on two main zones: an inner one, where local superiority of force allows command of the sea to be secured; and an outer zone, where command of the sea is actively contested. The greater part of Soviet naval policy and procurement since the 1920s can be explained in terms of their attempts to extend their maritime defence perimeter and, within it, the zone of effective command.

As you know, the Soviet Navy is split between four widely separated areas. If these individual fleets are to be ensured the superiority of force necessary to establish command in their respective areas, they must be able to deny the en-

emy the opportunity to concentrate their forces against any one fleet. This is most economically achieved by denying him physical access to the fleet areas. In this particular respect, Russia is favoured by her geography. Three of her main fleet areas comprise semi-enclosed seas, and access to the Northern Fleet is canalised by ice during much of the year. Only Petropavlosk lacks any geographical advantage of this kind.

Until 1961 the navy's primary concern was therefore to extend the inner zone of effective command to these natural defensive barriers, which would be seized by Soviet forces in the event of war. The outer zones did not reach far beyond these geographic constrictions and were primarily seen as areas where the reinforcement of the enemy forces defending these barriers could be interdicted. It was therefore natural that part of the Soviet response to the threat from Western sea-based strategic systems was to extend their outer defence zone, but this could only provide a partial solution. A comprehensive answer to the problem required some means of knowing continuously the world-wide location of strategic delivery units, and the capability to strike them on command. This would be hard enough to achieve against carrier task forces; against ballistic missile submarines the problem was truly daunting. The Soviets nevertheless embarked on this difficult and expensive road and their incremental approach to the problem was typical. First, do what you can, with what is available. Meanwhile, put in hand a series of projects, ranging from the short to the very long term, each aimed at progressively improving that capability and ultimately achieving an acceptable solution.

The Soviet response involved two overlapping concepts, area defence and long-range interdiction and in terms of operational deployment, the ordering of priorities was fairly clear. Set at 1500 miles (the range of the Polaris A-2 missile) and centred on Moscow, the arc of threat took in the Norwegian Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, areas where Western strike forces were already operating. Extended to 2500 miles (the range of the A-3 missile) the arc cut across the Atlantic from beyond Greenland to the African coast abreast the Canaries and then crossed the Arabian Sea between the Horn of Africa and Bombay.

The first requirement was to extend the limits of the outer defence zone to the 1500 mile arc of threat and then progressively develop the capability to contest, and perhaps ultimately to deny, the use of these areas by Western strategic systems. Initially, this would involve an increasingly active naval presence, backed by shorebased missiles and aircraft. But new systems would be



USS JOHN MARSHALL (SSBN)

— USN Official photograph

required to counter the submarine threat in these areas.

The second requirement was to acquire the capability for naval and air operations beyond this outer defence zone, in order to develop a counter to the longer-range Polaris A-3 system and its successors, and also to cover carrier deployments from American bases. In the short term these distant operations might have to depend on the availability of naval shore facilities in forward areas. But in the longer term it was hoped to develop autonomous systems which would not have to rely on the good will of foreign rulers and would provide a truly world-wide response to the threat of strikes from the sea.

Such a policy is easy enough to describe, but besides the intrinsic difficulties of target location and kill, we must recall some of the prevailing circumstances. First, the Soviet Navy was at a low ebb in 1961, as a result of the cut-backs in naval construction which stemmed from the 1954 decisions, and the further disruptions arising from the reversal of plans in 1957/58. All the existing surface force and many of the submarines had been designed to operate within shorebased air cover, most of the current building programmes were configured against the carrier threat, and 60% of their future nuclear submarine construction was reserved for strategic strike.

Second, the Soviet Navy was being required to move forward into sea areas where the West enjoyed overwhelming maritime preponderance. The concept of relying on the freedom of the seas and the "protection of peace" to safeguard the deployment of ill-armed ships (particularly in the Mediterranean) was a daring concept, given the general tenor of the Western strategic debate at that time, which included maritime countermeasures against Soviet pressure on Berlin.

And third, the army-dominated Soviet leadership was sceptical of surface ships, and even when they conceded a requirement for such forces it had to be met from within the navy's ship-building allocation.

The surface ship programmes give a good indication of the new priorities and during the 1960s we see a shift from anti-surface to anti-submarine systems and an increased emphasis on survivability. As an interim measure, the ASW and SAM systems from the Kynda and Kresta programmes were used to convert Kotlin and Krupny into anti-submarine ships. The Kynda, which Khrushchev described as a "floating coffin" at its commissioning ceremony, was cancelled at four ships, the yard facilities being used to build four extra Kashin. The Moskva programme was cancelled at two units and its ASW and SAM sys-

tems were applied to the Krestas, changing their primary configuration from anti-surface to anti-submarine. The Moskva would not be cost/effective for distant-water operations, and it was therefore replaced by the Kiev, with over twice the aircraft capacity and a better defence capability. The Moskva weapon-systems were reassigned to the Kresta programme.

Looking ahead to the end of the Kashin programme, its success or Krivak would be specialised for ASW, as would a new cruiser-size ship the Kara. However, to build both Kara and Krivak and complete the Kresta II programme it would be necessary to drop the escort-sized ship from the inventory and not provide a replacement for Petya. The effect of these decisions was to introduce a growing distinction in characteristics and capabilities between ship-types intended primarily for distant deployments, and those designed to operate within range of shore-based air cover and other forms of support. Meanwhile, no provision was made for an increase in afloat support.

In relation to the new requirements being levied on the navy, this allocation of resources to shipbuilding was niggardly, the more so when we consider the scale of naval construction which had been authorised in the West at this time. And we can say with some certainty that in the first half of the sixties, the navy was still seen as an expensive necessity, rather than as a useful instrument of overseas policy.

The first phase of the shift to forward deployment, involving the progressive extension of the outer defence zone, lasted through 1967. In the Norwegian Sea it was not all that difficult to increase the range of Northern and Baltic Fleet operations and it became standard practice for Northern Fleet units to deploy whenever significant Western forces operated in the area, carriers being targetted by Soviet surface, air and submarine missile systems.

In the Mediterranean, where the Sixth Fleet was permanently deployed, and Russia had just been evicted from its Albanian base, the problem was immeasurably greater. A sustained presence was not attempted until 1964 and, in the absence of shore support facilities, operational activity remained low and intermittent. The main emphasis was on trailing the strike carriers when they operated in the Eastern Mediterranean and, since missile carrying units were only sometimes present, it can be assumed that this target location data was for use by shore-based systems such as ballistic missiles and strike aircraft based in South West Russia. The Soviets did not begin to achieve an effective naval capability in the Mediterranean until they gained access to Egyptian port facilities and airfields as the



SOVIET JULIET CLASS SUBMARINE (SSG)

result of the 1967 war. Thereafter we see a progressive improvement in terms of numbers and combat effectiveness until about 1972, when the trend levels off. By then, both in the Norwegian Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, the Soviet Navy could deploy an effective challenge to the strike carrier. There was however no comparable capability against the Polaris submarine in these areas, despite the steadily increasing emphasis on ASW.

The second phase of the shift to forward deployment began in 1967. This took in the 2,500 mile circle of threat and also addressed the problem of the fleet bases in North America and their transit routes across the Atlantic. After testing and rejecting the feasibility of providing mid-ocean support we see the search for shore facilities with Cienfuegos in Cuba, Conakry in Guinea and Berbera in Somalia as the chosen hosts. A Cuban base would reduce submarine time-in-transit to the attachment area off America's eastern seaboard from 20 days to about four. West Africa, or better still the Cape Verde Islands, gave access to the Cape Verde Basin, straddling the Mediterranean approaches. Somalia provided a point d'appui in the north-west quadrant of the Indian Ocean. This latter is often misread as the Soviets rushing in to fill a vacuum left by the British, but the hydrographic precursors to the Soviet deployment were active in the area during 1967, at a time when the British defence policy was still firmly committed to its role east of Suez. Meanwhile, the Arabian Sea provides better target coverage of Russia and China than any other sea area. Long-standing Soviet suspicions about its use as a launch area for Polaris and Poseidon had been fuelled by the 1963 agreement to build a U.S. Navy VLF communications station at

North West Cape in Australia, and then reinforced by the 1966 agreement on the combined UK/US use of Diego Garcia, with America paying the costs of developing the base.

By 1971, the pattern of deployment was clearly established, and by 1972/73 the progressive build-up had levelled off. There is little doubt that during the later stages of this extended process some of the original reasons for the shift to forward deployment would have been eroded and overlaid with new ones, including the navy's emerging peacetime role. Nevertheless, we should not underestimate the persistence of the original rationale, which stemmed from the Soviet emphasis on contingency planning for world war. And while a fuller realisation of the problems in countering Polaris may have cast doubt on the value of these interim measures, this would have been balanced by the chastening discovery during the first phase of just how long it took their navy to develop any effective operational capability in distant sea areas.

The decisions taken between 1961 and 1964 go a long way towards explaining the present structure of the Soviet navy and a substantial part of its operational practices and patterns of deployment. But of course policies evolve and new requirements emerge, and towards the end of the sixties a cluster of developments combined to have an effect on the navy's war-related priorities.

Probably the most significant were the reports in 1967/68 that the U.S. Navy was intending to develop two new classes of submarine for service in 1973/74, one very fast and the other very silent, the latter being specifically designed to operate against Soviet SSBN. This, of course

had major implications in terms of the Soviet decision to embody a substantial part of the nation's strategic reserve in ballistic missile submarines. It highlighted the requirement to defend the new Soviet SSBN force, just then beginning to enter service, against U.S. incursions.

Meanwhile, as more anti-submarine systems became available, mounted in surface ships, submarines and aircraft, it must have become increasingly clear that however innovative, these traditional ASW methods had inherent limitations and an effective solution to the Polaris/Poseidon problem would have to wait on the results of research and development still in progress.

Taken together, these two developments engendered a shift in operational emphasis away from developing a conventional ASW capability in the outer defence zones (including the Eastern Mediterranean), to extending the inner defence zones in the Northern fleet area and in the Pacific off Kamchatka, and providing them with water-tight ASW defences. Because ASW forces can be brushed aside by superior force, it would be necessary to maintain command of these two sea areas and since shore-based air was unlikely to be available after the initial exchange, sea-based air would be needed to deal with enemy airborne ASW systems.

Quite separate to these problems with the West, developments during 1969 meant that the possibility of war with China increased, and with it the requirement to supply the Far Eastern Front. It had to be assumed that the Trans-Siberian railway would be cut and, since the arrival of supplies by sea would be time-critical, the Soviets might well want to ship down through the Persian Gulf, using the route the Allies used during the two World Wars. Be that or not, the serious possibility of war with China increased the strategic significance of the north west Indian Ocean to Soviet defence interests, and the importance of having a base in the area.

This brings the Soviets war-related role through to the present but before moving on, let me touch briefly on specific wartime missions. Bear in mind the two fundamental concepts of area defence and long range interdiction. And remember what I said about the reality of world war in Soviet contingency planning and accept that, irrespective of argument about the nature of nuclear war and its possible length, the Soviet planner must think not only of a post-exchange phase, but of subsequent phases through to its resolution. This emphasis on war fighting, which must allow for the disruption of supply systems and base facilities, has major implications for the employment or withholding of forces in the initial state of a war. It also heightens the awareness

that war is in large part a matter of attrition and that victory goes to the side that gives up last. This awareness leads to the principle of never allowing an enemy weapon or force a free ride and to the continuing use of sub-optimal and obsolescent weapons in order to complicate the enemy's problems.

The navy's most important mission is its contribution to the Soviet strategic strike capability. I won't run through the possible permutations of how and when SSBN could be used in the event of war, but let me reemphasise that their role in the nation's strategic reserve places a premium on ensuring their safety, not least by extending and consolidating the inner defence zones and securing them against Western incursions, a force-consuming requirement.

The Soviets attach equal importance to the mission of countering Western sea-based strategic systems. This is only common-sense, given the concept of war fighting and strategic reserves, and the mission provides the bonus of damage limitation. However, we must distinguish between the priority the Soviets accord the mission, and their present capability to discharge it, particularly as concerns the problem of countering Polaris, Poseidon and in due course Trident. Despite the resources which have been devoted to solving the problem, the Soviets have yet to deploy an effective counter, although we can be reasonably certain that they are persisting in their efforts. We know they are working on non-acoustic methods of detecting submarines and emphasise active over passive sonar, both ways of outflanking the Western advantage in silencing. They are developing new types of platform such as the wing-in-ground (WIG) surface-effects vehicle, new types of propulsion such as magnetohydrodynamic systems and they are mounting a wide variety of sensors in their satellites. No one system is likely to provide a breakthrough but the cumulation of probabilities may yield appreciable chances of success. And remember, they don't require 100% results to justify their efforts.

Once they can locate the submarine, the problem of bringing weapons to bear is less demanding and it seems likely that the Soviets intend to use ballistic missiles for this task. This highlights the combined arms approach to the SSBN problem, which involves 4 of the 5 branches of the Armed Forces.

Turning to the carrier threat, although it took them the best part of twenty years to do so, the Soviets now appear to have developed a reasonably effective range of responses, the requirements for target location and for strike being handled somewhat differently in each of the three main types of scenario. You are all thoroughly

familiar with the meeting engagement or encounter, which applies in the Norwegian Sea and Pacific and involves defence in depth with co-ordinated attacks. In the Mediterranean the continuous company scenario presents the Sixth Fleet with a difficult problem and I suspect the evolution of this successful concept was no more foreseen by the Soviets than by us. A couple of points. The need for an instantaneous strike capability places a premium on deployed forces, particularly the missile submarines, and it seems likely that shore based aircraft will only have a follow-up role. I would however expect the Sixth Fleet to be targetted by IR and MRBM emplaced in S.W. Russia. Second, the shift in priority for conventional ASW to securing the SSBN bastions in the North and Pacific suggests that the primary role of ASW forces in the Mediterranean is now to protect anti-surface missile units from preemptive attack.

The distant targetting scenario covers those carriers which do not immediately threaten Russia, but if not disposed of would contribute to the West's strategic reserve and here, target location is provided by air and satellite reconnaissance, by surface and submarine pickets, and sometimes by trailing. It seems likely that it was originally hoped that the kill-on-command component of the anti-Carrier and anti-Polaris missions would be met by a common strike system. Two methods were probably envisaged, both relying on terminally guided ballistic missiles: land-

based ICBM and IRBM; and shorter range sea-based systems carried by submarines, strategically deployed in the world ocean. The present status of the concept is not clear. The Soviets explicitly claimed a land-based capability against surface forces in 1972 and at this same period they were actively developing a tactical submarine-launched ballistic missile, but the latter system appears to have been shelved in 1973. Quite apart from any technical difficulties, the Soviets may well have run into problems with SALT. If, as seems quite likely, it had been decided in the sixties to push ahead with the tactical application of sea-based ballistic missile, the SALT limits may well have stifled the development just as it was reaching fruition and this would have created serious problems for the navy.

These, then, are the two main maritime missions: contributing to Soviet strategic strike and countering the West's sea-based strike capacity. Of the other missions, I will only mention the interdiction of Western sea communications. There is some argument in the West as to the priority the Soviets accord this mission, and whether priority will be given to terminals or transit. This obscures the point that, irrespective of the significance the Soviets attach to Western sea communications, they are virtually certain to be attacked at the outbreak of war as a means of pinning down Western forces and, more important, of diverting them from assaulting the Northern Fleet's inner defence zone and attacking the SSBN.



SOVIET KRIVAK CLASS DESTROYER (DDGSP)

Finally, let me reemphasise how important the underlying concept of area defence is to so many of the navy's tasks, whether it be supporting military operations ashore, countering the projection of tactical military forces, or protecting coastal communications. Particularly in the inner defence zone, we are talking of establishing command of the sea and it is relevant that there is a new emphasis on the importance of this traditional concept in recent writings. In his book, Gorchikov stressed the advantages of controlling the adjacent land areas. One's mind immediately leaps to the Norwegian Sea and the advantages which would accrue to the Soviets from seizing key islands and stretches of coast, particularly in terms of increasing the security of their SSBN force.

We can now go back to pick up the navy's peacetime role. Just as the wartime role can only be understood within the broader context of Soviet military doctrine, so must the peacetime mission be placed within the context of Soviet foreign policy and the role of military force within the policy. Let me remind you of their primary foreign policy objectives in order of priority. First, to avoid world war, but win if it is inevitable. Second, to ensure the Communist Party's retention of power in Russia. And third, to increase the Soviet Union's share of world influence vis-a-vis the West and of course China. More than for most states, these objectives involve inherent contradictions, as for example between defence costs and the party's acceptability, detente and ideological control, the dangers of escalation and the need for confrontation, and the ideological struggle with capitalism and the domestic requirement to upgrade technology and productivity. For over twenty years, the long term strategy has been peaceful coexistence, a formula which rules out resort to interstate war, but accepts other forms of international competition as legitimate and indeed inevitable. The term implies a mixture of competition, restraint and cooperation with the capitalist bloc in general and the United States in particular. It is a multi-level relationship, part competition, part cooperation, and the interactions on the various planes often move in different and apparently contradictory directions. The West has difficulty with this concept, mainly because it believes normality in international relations to be the absence of conflict, and this despite its own record of the last 500 years. The Soviets have no such illusions. They see the status quo as a dynamic historical process of change and have always been quite explicit that the ideological struggle (i.e. for world influence) would continue, detente being aimed at the dangers of world war.

In considering the role of the military instrument in this struggle, it is useful to distinguish between military power and the use of military force. While the Soviets consider that military power is something you really can't have enough of, they have been very circumspect about the use of force outside their national security zone. They believe that history is going their way and while happy to give it a nudge, it does not justify taking risks. In the past, the most useful approach was to frustrate Western efforts to interfere with this process, by strengthening the forces of world revolution through the supply of weapons, training and equipment. On occasion this would also serve the more central objective of enhancing Soviet security as in the cases of Indonesia, Algeria, and of Egypt prior to 1972.

From 1961, onwards a series of coincidental trends combined to progressively favour a more active overseas policy. I list them in no particular order. First, the USA placed new emphasis on counter-insurgency operations and supportive intervention, which led finally to half a million men in Vietnam. Second, there was growing Sino-Soviet competition for leadership of the World Communist movement accompanied by Chinese accusations that Russia was less than wholehearted in countering imperialist aggression. Third, we have the post-colonial era, with the diffusion of power and the prolonged sorting-out process which follows a breakdown of structure. Fourth, we have the gradual maturation of Soviet policy towards the Third World, moving from ideological determinants to national interests concerning access to markets and certain raw materials. Fifth, as a by-product of decisions concerning the security of the Russian homeland, we have the emergence of a capability to project force overseas, the build-up of a long-range lift for the airborne forces and the navy's shift to forward deployment. And sixth, the renewed emphasis within the Soviet military on contingency planning for world war, highlighted the requirements for a world-wide infrastructure.

These were all enabling factors, but it seems that Soviet ideas about a more assertive use of the military instrument began to be shaped by various developments between 1967 and 1972. Achieving strategic parity increased Soviet self-confidence, while a series of events caused them to downgrade the dangers that confrontation with the West would escalate to nuclear war. Among the latter, I would list the Czech crisis in 1968, the 1967 Arab/Israeli war and the Jordanian crisis in 1970; but probably the more important was the SALT negotiation process, which led to a greater certainty of U.S. restraint. Meanwhile, the Western media's exaggerated response to the Soviet Navy's impotent involvement in the 1967 crisis

highlighted the political potential of this instrument. Then the Egyptian war of attrition and the Israeli deep penetration raids, forced them to a decision of direct involvement in Egypt, with substantial air defence forces. And finally, the evidence of Vietnam, backed by the Nixon doctrine suggested that the risks of direct confrontation with US forces was on the wane.

Given this situation of increased opportunities and lowered risks, the role of what they call a "Soviet military presence" appears to have been a major element in the sustained debate on defence and foreign policy which rumbled on from 1969-73. The policy which seems to have emerged was that, anyway for the time being, direct Soviet involvement overseas would be limited to advisers, weapons and strategic logistic support, including the provision of adequate military supplies in the course of the battle. The combat role could be delegated to the Soviet equipped forces of revolutionary states such as North Korea, Vietnam and Cuba. This allowed the Soviet Union the best of both worlds; to affect the outcome of an overseas conflict with direct battlefield support while ensuring that political commitment and liability remained strictly limited.

What we see, then is a progressive shift in overseas policy towards an increasing readiness to use a "Soviet military presence" in support of foreign policy objectives. In assessing this development and the navy's role in particular, I find it useful to distinguish between four types of objectives which underlie this peacetime employment of military forces, because each type involves a different level of risk and degree of political commitment.

At the low end of the scale of political commitment, we have "Protecting Soviet lives and property". This objective is referred to, but has received little priority to date. At the high end we have "Establishing the strategic infrastructure to support war-related missions". This objective is not referred to directly, but can be inferred from the pattern of overseas military involvement during the last 20 years, and is implied in some of their more recent writings. Such an infrastructure can also serve peacetime policies, and the pattern suggests a readiness to incur high political and economic costs in pursuit of this objective. However, so far the Soviets have not used military force to maintain their position when the host country has withdrawn its agreement to their presence, although on at least two occasions they have sought to engineer a coup to bring a more sympathetic regime to power.

In between these extremes we have the general objective of "Increasing Soviet prestige and influence". In naval terms this encompasses

a wide span of activities ranging from showing the flag, port clearance and minesweeping, to providing support for revolutionary forces or to regimes threatened by secessionist elements. They are prepared to commit substantial resources to this objective but, although the propensity for risk-taking has risen steadily, the underlying political commitment remains strictly limited.

Overlapping this general objective is the more restricted one of "Countering imperialist aggression", which is of particular interest since it suggests direct confrontation with the West. However, despite much bombast in talking of this task, I believe that in those terms, Soviet political commitment is low. As examples in the naval field we have the deployments to the Bay of Bengal in 1971, to the South China Sea in 1972 and to Angola in 1975, as well as the three Middle East crises in 1967, '70 and '73. The latter series did show a shift from a narrow concern with the strike carriers towards a more general concern for the overall capability of the Sixth Fleet. But none of these examples provide evidence of Soviet readiness to actually engage Western naval forces, in order to prevent them from intervening against a Soviet client state.

However, what we do see is progressively greater involvement by the Soviet navy in the provision of logistic support both prior to and during third party conflicts. In 1973, Soviet landing ships carried Moroccan troops to Syria, with convoy escort. Landing ships were also used during the subsequent war to ferry military supplies from Black Sea ports to Syria. More significantly, SAM-armed naval units were stationed under the final approaches to the main resupply airfields in Syria and Egypt, as if to cover against Israeli air attack. And most recently, we have the escorting of military supplies being ferried from Aden to Ethiopia.

The evidence suggests a policy of incrementalism, which explores opportunities as they occur or are created, a policy of probing Western responses and establishing precedents. The role of a "Soviet military presence" in support of overseas objectives will therefore be shaped by the scale and style of the Western response to the various Soviet initiatives. In this context the distinction I have just drawn between the employment of Soviet naval forces to secure the safe arrival of logistic support, and their employment to prevent Western intervention against a client state is important. So too is the distinction between the Soviet Union's willingness to risk hostilities with a third party state, and their continuing reluctance to engage U.S. naval forces. Meanwhile we should bear in mind that the Soviet navy's role in this more assertive overseas policy is secondary. The primary instruments are arms supply, military advice and training; the transport

of men, munitions and equipment by merchant ship and long-range air; and direct participation by the combat troops of revolutionary states. The primary role of the navy is to provide protection and support and to serve as an earnest of Soviet commitment.

This brings us to the question of whether there is some Soviet grand design driving a co-ordinated oceans policy in support of overseas objectives. I think the short answer is no, but we must distinguish here between the operational aspects and the setting of objectives. The military style organisation of the merchant, fishing and research fleets means that it is relatively simple to make use of their ships in peacetime for naval support tasks such as replenishment and forward picketing, and they all make some contribution to the generalised requirement for world-wide intelligence and information gathering. There are also the geostrategic advantages to be gained in terms of a world-wide infrastructure, actual or potential. The latter includes the provision of improved harbour facilities in locations which would assume great strategic significance for Russia in the event of world war, as for example the fishing port at Gwardar in Baluchistan.

But when we turn to objectives, we see that the long term interests of the three main fleets often diverge. The build-up of the fishing fleet stemmed from a decision in the late forties that fishery was a more cost-effective source of protein than collective farming. The build-up of the merchant fleet reflected the post-Stalin shift in the middle fifties towards trade, aid and arms supply, and the consequential requirement to earn hard currency and avoid dependence on foreign bottoms. The navy's shift to forward deployment reflected the qualitatively new threat to the Soviet homeland from distant sea areas. Inevitably there is some conflict between these divergent trends and at the Law of the Sea negotiations, the narrow domestic concerns of the Soviet fishing industry ran counter to the foreign policy objective of increasing Soviet influence. Similarly, national security concerns and the concept of strategic infrastructure have led the Soviet Union into political entanglements which would seem to be against its broader interests. Only the merchant fleet consistently serves these more general foreign policy goals, and I see it as the principal maritime instrument of Soviet overseas policy.

Of course these judgments are based on past evidence and we cannot be sure how things will develop in the future. And this brings us back to the question of whether the Soviet Navy is still seen as an expensive necessity, whose forces are procured exclusively for war-related tasks, or whether it is coming to be seen as a preferred in-

strument of policy for pursuing overseas objectives in peacetime. This is hard to answer, not least because the Soviets do not seem to have made up their own minds on the matter. Gorshkov was certainly arguing the case in his 1972 articles, but the style and content of his presentation implied powerful opposing opinions, whose existence was confirmed by other evidence. There were substantial differences between these relatively informal articles and the "fully authorised" book which appeared three years later, among the more significant being the new emphasis on other ocean users, most notably the merchant fleet. In the book, Gorshkov reiterates his criticisms of the army-dominated leadership for its failure to understand the navy's importance in war and potential in peace and the persistence of this criticism suggests that Gorshkov does not stand alone on this issue. But important interests appear to be aligned against him. These probably include those in the military who have always argued that too much is spent on the navy since many of its tasks can be better done by other branches of service; the merchant fleet, where professional jealousy sharpens the competition for shipbuilding resources; and the many domestic interests who give priority to building up the home economy over adventures abroad.

It is clear that the Soviets have progressively evolved a policy towards the employment of naval forces in peacetime, but in looking to the future the derivation of that policy becomes important. It stemmed from the availability in distant sea areas of naval forces which had been deployed forward in strategic defence. The presence of these forces was progressively exploited for political purposes and with changes in threat perception, risks and opportunities, the peacetime political role became increasingly important. Nevertheless, only a small proportion of the Soviet fleet is deployed forward and the continuing lack of effective afloat support to sustain such operations is notable. Meanwhile, there is still no evidence that ships are being procured primarily for the projection of force in peacetime, and while the Kiev and the new LPD will increase the navy's potential capability in this direction, there is a clearly defined requirement for both types in the outer defence zone.

This presents a very different picture to the traditional British/American approach, where the navy serves as a primary instrument of foreign policy (as in *Pax Britannica* or the Nixon doctrine), and where this peacetime role is an important determinant of the navy's size and shape. On the evidence to hand, it does not appear that the Soviet leadership attaches a comparable importance to their navy's peacetime role. While they will continue to exploit its exist-

ence when possible, it does not appear that the navy is being specifically developed as a primary instrument of overseas policy.

So much for the rationale underlying the development of Soviet seapower, but in closing let me stress the importance towards understanding Soviet policy, of their concept of deterrence through war fighting, their doctrine concerning the nature of world war, and their willingness to think through the implications of a fight to the finish and to plan on such a basis.

In conclusion, I will touch on certain implications for Western policy. First, the Norwegian Sea. Because of the SSBN's role as strategic reserve, this area has acquired a qualitatively new strategic significance as the outer defence zone of the Barents Sea. This means that the struggle for command of the Norwegian Sea will be tough and crucial, and that the Soviet threat to Norway throughout most of its length is greatly increased.

Second, the Soviet requirement to protect their SSBN force and establish command of the outer defence zones ties down a very large number of forces. NATO should ensure that this situation is maintained by sustaining a sufficient level of explicit threat in those directions. This same principle applies more generally. Soviet naval requirements have been determined by specific threats from the West, such as a certain number of strike carriers. As the West reduces the number of such units, this will create a surplus of Soviet capability over their essential requirements, which will allow them increased flexibility of employment, particularly in peacetime.

Third, when devising new ways to discomfort the Soviets in war, or to deter them from attacking us in peacetime, attention should be given to how these will affect their peacetime posture. For example, it is questionable whether the hypothetical security provided by the Polaris system compensates for the practical disadvantages arising from the Soviet Navy's shift to forward deployment. Similarly, emplacing Trident missiles in wide-ranging deep-diving submarines is already prompting a Soviet search for a world-wide response. Perhaps we would be better advised to disperse these long-range missiles in small diesel submarines designed to operate

close to the USA within the protection of offshore ASW defences and obscuring traffic patterns.

Fourth, in responding to the peacetime activities of Soviet naval forces, the most difficult problem facing the West is that of incrementalism. This can only be dealt with on the basis of prior consideration, but it would seem that the contingency planning process starts too high up the crisis scale to cover the problem. We need to fill this gap between the Soviet Navy's routine activities and the scenarios underlying our contingency plans, by developing a schedule of conceivable initiatives through a process of radial extrapolation. Besides allowing us to work out appropriate responses ahead of time, this would highlight the longer-term consequences of allowing Soviet naval forces to establish apparently innocuous precedents.

Finally, we should bear in mind that the peacetime role of Soviet naval forces is still in its formative stages, and seek to exploit the fact that there is a continuing debate in Moscow on its proper size and function and that the nature of the Western response will be a factor in the outcome of the argument. Our aim should be to reinforce those who claim that for the Soviet Union, naval forces are not the most cost-effective instrument of overseas policy; while disproving those who argue that such forces are essential to the normal pursuit of overseas objectives. Unquestionably, this will be hard to achieve, but there are two things which we must certainly avoid. We must not allow the employment of Western forces to be inhibited by a Soviet naval presence, indeed, we should go out of our way to demonstrate the opposite whenever possible. And second, we must not exaggerate the scale and nature of the Soviet's peacetime capability, indeed, we should actively publicise their operational inadequacies and materiel failures, and highlight their limited commitment to clients' interests and their narrow national security concerns. Alarmist assessments may increase the size of our defence budgets, but they will also undermine political resolution in the West while encouraging Soviet naval initiatives. The Soviets appreciate that the West's interest in the use of the sea is of a different order to their own. They are very conscious of our world-wide maritime preponderance. They also understand toughness. The question is, when and where we choose to draw the line.



NAVAL REVIEW CONTROVERSY

By 'Master Ned'

'I wonder what the authorities will say when it reaches their ears?'(1)

One might expect, in the year of grace 1912, that when such a remark was made of the Admiralty that the author might be some erring junior officer apprehensively contemplating the consequences of some youthful folly, such as denting his torpedo boat or placing a White Ensign on top of Kensington Barracks.

But it is indicative of the state of the Royal Navy in that time that the remark was made — in all seriousness — by a senior and distinguished post-Captain regarding the reaction of the administration to the formation of a Naval Society, which had as its object the publication of a journal to provide 'a vehicle for the expression of personal opinions on matters of naval interest ... aiming to stimulate thought and discussion on such matters'. (2) The circulation would be limited and the press excluded so that the journal could not arouse public controversy. Nonetheless, Captain Herbert Richmond was not being alarmist in expecting some reprisal from the Board of Admiralty; in the event, his forebodings were to be completely justified.

The idea of the Naval Society had come from a discussion between Richmond and a

like-minded officer, Commander K.G.B. Dewar, on Southsea Common in mid-1912. They agreed that there was an utter lack of comprehension in the Service 'of what Kempenfelt called the "sublime" parts of our work — strategy, tactics, principles' (3) and that too many in the Navy were concerning themselves with the development of weapons and ships without the slightest conception of how they were to be employed, or even of the very basis of seapower itself.

Richmond and Dewar considered that an intra-Service journal, free from restriction or bias, save that articles were to be in 'good taste', and financed by subscriptions from interested officers was the only answer. Richmond was anxious that personalities and rank be avoided entirely, that all contributors write under pseudonyms in order that all could put forward opinions and proposals and engage in controversy without the fear that they were offending a senior officer, or that they could be ignored or ridiculed merely because they were junior — it was by no means unknown for a young officer to have his proposals dismissed with such gems as:

'On what authority does this lieutenant put forward such a proposal?'(4)

Furthermore, Richmond and Dewar were well aware that the historical school was in very bad odour in the Navy of 1912. Determinist history, that is, seeking to use the past as a guide to future development, is a very risky business since historical lessons can be very easily misapplied. Alfred Thayer Mahan's *Influence of Seapower* series had had a tremendous impact upon naval thinking, and there had been other successful interpreters — such as Sir Julian Corbett, the Colomb brothers and even Richmond himself. However, many historians had lately become involved in the 'moderate dimensions' controversy. Led by Mahan, they had argued that battleships were growing too large and that attempts should be made to reduce or limit their size. Whether or not they were correct — and the controversy has not to this day been completely resolved — the arms race was against them and the few attempts to produce battleships of 'moderate dimensions' had only resulted in vessels that were misfits in the line and incapable of facing foreign contemporaries. With the Royal Navy engrossed in 'super-DREADNOUGHTS' and the tremendous advance of naval gunnery, this only resulted in the almost complete discrediting of the historians.

History did not receive serious consideration. Naval history was studied by cadets and midshipmen, but it was a naval history pre-occupied with dates and the minutiae of naval engagements, not with the events that had brought those battles about, nor the strategy and principles of seapower. History was a series of tags like 'England expects...' and 'No Captain can go far wrong...'. Few seriously thought that valuable lessons could be learnt from the Navy's history; too many considered that the march of technology had rendered the study of history quite useless. The coming war would disillusion them.

This was precisely the attitude that Richmond and Dewar wanted to destroy. On the 27th October, 1912, a meeting of six officers from the RN and one from the Royal Marine Artillery was held in Richmond's house. All but one of those from the Navy would retire as flag officer.⁽⁵⁾ They resolved to assemble articles, attach an introduction by Richmond and:

'... take the lot to (Admiral Sir Reginald) Custance and get him to extend his patronage to the movement and act as Secretary, get them printed and send them out, so many copies to each member, which he will distribute to his friends and try to rope in new recruits...among the younger men, to get them to join in large quantities and make the thing self-supporting on a small subscription.'⁽⁶⁾

Perhaps fortunately for the Society, Reginald Custance did not agree to Richmond's request without attaching too many conditions — conditions which Richmond could not accept. Custance, though a very considerable intellect and a well-known historian, had been left behind by the march of technology and his much publicized theories and his attempts to influence policy had neither sat well with the Board of Admiralty nor much impressed the young officers in the Fleet.

Richmond went to sea at the end of the year, leaving the matter of the Naval Society still up in the air, but over the winter months of 1912-13, the energetic Dewar, with his shore post at the embryonic War College, was able to rouse out support. Writing to more than fifty officers, he asked them to agree to underwrite the first number of the journal, which was to be printed and christened *The Naval Review*. All but four agreed.

Dewar's second step was to ask Lieutenant Reginald Henderson⁽⁷⁾ to inquire of his uncle, the retired Admiral William Henderson, as to whether the latter would be willing to act as the editor and secretary. It was an admirable choice. Henderson was regarded with great affection in the Navy at large, both as a seaman and leader and as a noted naval educationalist. What was quite as important, in view of what was to ensue, was that Henderson had very strong links with the Liberal Government of Mr Asquith, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer David Lloyd George being not the least of his close acquaintances. If political aid were to be needed, Henderson would know what to do.

Word spread fast about the institution of the *Naval Review*. Opinion was divided as to its merit among those in the senior ranks, and it was an unfortunate fact that whilst many flag officers were at first willing to join and give lip service to the ideals of free discussion uninhibited by considerations of rank and official secrecy, they would not be there to give support when the *Naval Review's* policy came under official attack.

In the first year of its existence, however, all went well for the *Naval Review*, although Richmond was to remark, in annoyance over criticism from various quarters that the *Naval Review* was dangerous because of its unofficial and uncontrolled status, that they should:

'Hang these fellows with their whine for official sanctions. What some of them will do in a war when they have to disobey orders, I don't know.'⁽⁸⁾

The principal reason for this cheerful beginning was that the *Review* enjoyed the warm support of both the First Lord, Winston Churchill, and the First Sea Lord, Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg. Since Churchill had been sent to the Ad-

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
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miralty with the specific mission of re-organizing the Admiralty's staff structure and introducing some form of higher education in the Navy comparable with the Army's Staff Courses, he was delighted with the development and he and Battenberg even went so far as to suggest some form of financial support, though this was politely refused.

Nonetheless, Dewar was well aware of the ephemeral nature of each Board of Admiralty and he knew full well that there were few others on the flag list with either Battenberg's intellect, or his breadth of mind and desire to encourage discussion amongst his juniors. A successor — any successor — was unlikely to be as sympathetic. As far as Dewar could determine, the legality of the *National Review* was in doubt under the terms of Article 14 of KR & AI which forbade:

'...all persons belonging to the fleet to write for publication or publish or cause to be published either directly or indirectly any matter or information relating to the naval service unless the permission of the Admiralty has first been obtained.'

The legal advice that Dewar received was that a journal circulated only amongst its subscribers — whether in the Service or not — was not 'surrendered...for public use' and that 'circulation...is not publication'. Thus, all seemed well, but, as Dewar sadly remarked, '...the Admiralty has a habit of twisting regulations to suit its own prejudices.' (9)

There was little opposition to the *Naval Review* in the remaining days of peace, and the membership grew rapidly. Henderson was a splendid editor and under his guidance the journal began to develop a very high standard of writing and discussion. He, Richmond and Dewar began to congratulate each other on the success of the scheme. They would be 'much less optimistic' within a few months.

For, at the start of the First World War, a passion for secrecy spread throughout the nation and the Navy. To illustrate to just what a ridiculous extent this tendency went, the editor of *Jane's Fighting Ships* was forced to delete every photograph of every British and Commonwealth ship from every war-time edition — even pre-war photographs which had not been published in Britain but reproduced in the German press!

It took until May 1915 for the first blow to be struck against the *Naval Review* — the date being notable, since Battenberg had resigned six months before and the departure of Churchill was imminent. The Secretary of the Admiralty wrote to Henderson complaining that the May number had contained information which should not have

been published and that all future articles were to be submitted for censorship before they appeared in the *Review*. Henderson was furious at the petty nature of the complaints, since the information in question concerned ships' movements nearly twelve months old and could not possibly be of help to the enemy. Furthermore, it displayed a singularly tactless disregard of Henderson's own good judgement. Still, as an innovator and a man known to be 'crazed' on free discussion, the Admiralty was not likely to hold the Hon. Editor in high regard.

Succeeding issues underwent some censorship. Henderson was to publish the excisions after the war under the title of 'A Simple Lesson in Censorship'. Even in this too-secretive day and age, it is astonishing that the Naval Chief Censor, Captain Sir Douglas Brownrigg, Bt, thought fit to delete them.

The basis of the attack was extraordinary. An article describing the Battles of Coronel and Falklands had been found objectionable by the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, because it read, concerning Admiral Cradock's ill-trained and ill-armed squadron that was to meet destruction at the hands of von Spee:

'That the squadron felt themselves to be no match for the enemy and had a foreboding that it was doomed to be borne out by remarks made by the officers to the residents of Port Stanley before they sailed.' (10)

Considering, first, that the battles had occurred a year before and that the major newspapers of the day had not hesitated on receiving news of Coronel to label Cradock's force the 'doomed squadron' and publish lurid stories of the ships' age and weak armaments and the forebodings of their crews and, second, that the Governor of the Falkland Islands was in England and expressing the same sentiments, the complaint seems quite incredible.

But the Admiralty were to act upon it. They next asked at the beginning of July that the *Review* not be circulated to officers serving abroad, lest it fall into enemy hands, and Henderson was forced to agree to laying aside copies for such subscribers until the war ended, or they returned to home waters — though in his appeal against the decision Henderson very reasonably pointed out that the risk of copies going astray in such a fashion was no more than for those in home waters.

Then, two weeks later, on the 14th July 1915, the Secretary wrote to say that the new First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, had ordered that the *Review* be suppressed 'for the

duration'. Battenberg had supported the journal; his successor, the mercurial Lord Fisher, had had other matters on his mind and had in fact paid little or no attention to the *Review*. It was thus perhaps inevitable that when the clever, though lacklustre, Jackson came to the post there should be a change of attitude. Jackson was as chronic an over-centralizer as any in the Navy, and, though he was well known to be 'brainy' in a technical way, he had a congenital inability to delegate authority and he was not one to accept the opinions of his juniors — still less when they were working outside official guidelines and anonymously in 'blatant' disregard of rank and authority.

An acid correspondence ensued between Henderson and the Admiralty over the succeeding months. Henderson reported of the *Review* that he was:

'...quite unable to trace any matter in it which could assist the enemy, or prejudice our own operations.' (11)

Knowing that with the censorship already in force, for the August issue had already appeared, the onus was on the Admiralty to prove its case, Henderson inquired just what the particular objections were. The reply from Jackson was evasive and unsatisfactory. Though a subscriber and an 'admirer' of the *Review*, he declared that:

'I am not going to write down the exact sentences I objected to, and in fact could not quote them from memory, and am away from London for a few days rest; but one was a most indiscreet thing to have inserted.' (12)

Not surprisingly, Henderson was not satisfied with this answer and declared that the objectionable material had to be in the May number, since the August issue had been passed by the Censor. The First Sea Lord replied that only someone fully conversant with the RN's dispositions and plans could judge what was and what was not satisfactory and that he was:

'...on public grounds not disposed to alter my decision.' (13)

And that, for the time, seemed that. Henderson was allowed to send out the November issue, but he had to be content with the promise that the *Review* could be revived after the war and he was persuaded by Parliamentary friends that he should, in the circumstances, let the matter rest. The *Review* was 'admirable', but it was considered generally that the prosecution of the war was rather more important.

Henderson commented sadly:

'...whatever it was and whoever was the moving spirit in the matter, I con-

sider there was a want of openness and a fear of the truth in the methods employed. I was not considered or consulted; at least I might have been told what was thought wrong.' (14)

Perhaps it was Richmond's declaration concerning the activities of many senior officers at sea that could best be applied to the situation,

'Good Lord, what fools are bred up by our system of so-called education!' (15)

The end of the First World War meant the revival of the *Naval Review*, but it was only a few months before the Admiralty arraigned the journal on a charge of 'lese majeste'. The attack was triggered off by an account of the escape of the *GOEBEN* and *BRESLAU* in 1914 which was critical of both the Admiralty and the then Commander-in-Chief, Sir Archibald Berkeley-Milne. The affair had been so badly managed that any factual account could not fail to be scathing, whether incidentally or by design, of the authorities concerned, but guilt had never been admitted by either Admiralty or Commander-in-Chief and it was unfortunate that Berkeley-Milne was in the midst of a campaign of self-justification.

The author had remarked upon the fatal signal which had ordered the battle cruisers *INDOMITABLE* and *INDEFATIGABLE* and the light cruiser *DUBLIN* to break off shadowing the *GOEBEN* as she moved east to Messina and turn west. He wrote:

'One could not but think that the Commander-in-Chief must have had some orders from the Admiralty which clashed with the circumstances of the case or position of affairs on the night of 4th of August...It struck us at the time that someone must have forgotten the rule of going for your enemy's position.' (16)

In fact, there were other references far more critical of the C-in-C than this, but Milne cunningly fastened upon this paragraph because the villain in the particular piece had been the Admiralty. In the spring of 1919, he made an official complaint.

The information contained in the article, as well as its personal aspects, made it quite obvious on reflection that the author had to have been a captain of one of the heavy ships in the Mediterranean at the time. The Admiralty suspected Rear Admiral Francis Kennedy, who had been in command of the *INDOMITABLE*, but they

had no proof, and at least one of the other officers, the formidable Captain Howard Kelly of the *GLOUCESTER*, was quite as capable of writing such an article as Kennedy.

The Admiralty then wrote to Admiral Henderson in March, taking 'fearful exception to the article'. (17) Again they labelled the *Review* as a 'publication' and demanded of the Editor the name of the author. As a very senior retired Admiral, Henderson was not frightened, and, as Richmond wrote,

'He politely requested them to accept his regrets that he could not give a name which was given him in confidence.' (18)

While the Admiralty digested this rebuff, Henderson wrote around to Richmond, Dewar, Plunkett and other influential members of the Society, to inform them of the threat, as well as warning Kennedy, who was indeed the author, that it could not be long before the Admiralty instituted measures against him.

In fact, their next step was to direct a letter to Kennedy, inquiring as to whether he could 'furnish information as to how secret signals came to be disclosed'. As an officer on the active list, even though on half pay, Kennedy was in a cleft stick, since to either admit to authorship, or to deny any knowledge of the matter, could be construed as court martial offences.

Very bravely, Kennedy decided to 'admit he wrote it'. By doing so, he blasted any chance of obtaining employment afloat again, which was something of a tragedy, since he had amassed a fine record during the war, and had several times during his command of the *INDOMITABLE* distinguished himself as one of the few officers of the day capable of exercising his initiative. But, as a flag officer, with an impeccable background, he had far less to lose than any more junior officer and would, were the Admiralty to attempt to make an example of him 'pour encourager les autres', be a far more formidable proposition.

With the authorship of the offending article known, the Admiralty struck, and they issued AWO1663/19 which forbade any officer on the Active List from contributing articles to the *Naval Review* without first obtaining permission from the Board. As Richmond wrote gloomily, 'This kills the *Review*'. The intention of the Society had always been to provide a forum for active discussion amongst serving officers; if the contributors were to be effectively restricted to those outside the Service, either retired or civilian, then the *Review* was likely to degenerate rapidly. Kennedy received 'Their Lordships' severe displeasure. He was not to receive another appointment.

Henderson and Richmond did not waste time. After informing the Admiralty of the inevitable consequences of their decision, the Editor began to lobby Parliament and Cabinet in an attempt to enlist support from those in Government who had already shown themselves to be sympathetic to the creation of a Naval staff and other improvements in the standard of naval education. With his many contacts in the triumphant Government of Lloyd George, Henderson had every hope of success. Haldane, Sydenham, Bellairs, Curzon, Lloyd George and a dozen others would be susceptible to persuasion.

Richmond, too, was busy. He, Dewar and Plunkett were enlisting support from senior officers, both active and retired. The prospect was not at first sight as cheerful as Henderson's, for many of the flag officers were bitterly opposed to what some of the more extreme among them described as the 'seditious' *Naval Review*, but the Cabal had one priceless ally. Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty had been nominated to succeed Sir Rosslyn Wester-Wemyss as First Sea Lord. Beatty held Richmond in high regard, as he did Plunkett, who had served on Beatty's staff for almost the entire war. The new Board could be relied upon to be more sympathetic to the aspirations of the Naval Society, though the matter would have to wait, since Beatty would not become First Sea Lord until November.

The present Board at first refused to alter their decision, but the lobbying began to pay off. The point that Richmond and Henderson were careful to make was that the *Naval Review* would continue to be issued to subscribers only; it was not, and never would be, a public journal and thus did not constitute a 'publication'. This would ease any withdrawal by the Admiralty, since Article 14 would thus not need to be altered.

At the urging of the First Lord, now Walter Long, the Board finally agreed to lift Admiralty censorship. On the 20th August, the Secretary of the Admiralty informed Admiral Henderson that AWO3937/19 would shortly be promulgated creating arrangements,

'...whereby the responsibility for securing the necessary permission for publication...is assumed by the Editor of the Review.'

The specific wording continued the Admiralty's right to enforce censorship when necessary, but, practically, from then on the decision as to what was and what was not acceptable would be left to the Editor. Wisely, the Editor was always to be a senior Admiral on the retired list, ranging from Admiral Sir William Henderson (he

was knighted in 1924), who would die in harness in 1931, to the present Hon. Editor, Vice Admiral Sir Ian McGeoch, KCB, DSO, DSC. In the Golden Jubilee edition of the *Naval Review*, there appeared a summary of the thinking of Sir Herbert Richmond on the subject, thinking which dealt with the entire matter of censorship:

'...it is much better that a possible enemy should have an inkling of the ideas current in the navy than that the navy should not know its own ideas.' (19)

FOOTNOTES

- (1) *Portrait of an Admiral*. The Life and Papers of Sir Herbert Richmond. Professor A.J. Marder, Jonathan Cape, London, 1952. p.89.
- (2) *Charter of The Naval Review*.
- (3) Richmond *Op Cit.* p.89.
- (4) *From Dreadnought to Scapa Flow*. Vol I *The Road to War 1904-14*. Professor A.J. Marder, Oxford Univ. Press, 1961. p.11.

- (5) Captain (later Admiral Sir) Herbert Richmond
Commander (later Vice Admiral) K.G.B. Dewar
Commander (later Admiral Sir) R.A. Ernie-Erie-Plunkett-Drax
R.A.R. Plunkett
Lieut. (later Rear Admiral) H.G. Thursfield
Lieut. (later Rear Admiral) R.M. Bellairs
Lieut. T. Fisher
Captain E.W. Harding R.M.A.
- (6) Richmond *Op Cit.* p. 89.
- (7) 'A Note on the First Fifty Years of The Naval Review' *The Naval Review* 'AGAG' January 1963 Vol L No 1, p. 9.
- (8) *The Navy From Within*, Vice Admiral K.G.B. Dewar CBE Gollancz, London, 1939. pp.155-156.
- (9) *Ibid.* p.156.
- (10) *The Naval Review* Vol III No. 2, May 1915.
- (11) AGAG' *Op Cit.* p.13.
- (12) *Ibid.*
- (13) *Ibid.*
- (14) *Ibid.* pp.13-14.
- (15) Richmond *Op Cit.* p.166.
- (16) 'The Chase of the *GOEBEN*' Rear Admiral F.W. Kennedy. *The Naval Review*. Vol VII No 1 February 1919. See also Dewar p.263.
- (17) Richmond *Op Cit.* p.342.
- (18) *Ibid.*
- (19) Quoted in *The Naval Review* Vol L No 1, January 1963. p.21

WHO CAN TELL WHICH SIDE HE IS ON?

This question has often been asked, although not usually in such simple terms, of Chaplains and others involved in the sphere of human conflict. Of course the question refers to God (the big 'HE', not to be confused with the nebulous 'THEY').

One way to answer the question is to look at a very traditional and historical flag, or more properly, a pennant, which is fast disappearing from use in the RAN. The pennant I refer to is the Church Pennant.

This flag is a combination of two Naval Ensigns and dates from the time of the Dutch Wars of two hundred years ago. There was still some chivalry around then and wars were fought with certain 'gentlemen's agreements'. One example was the principle that one never fired on one's own flag. Another was that you did not haul down your flag except in surrender. The Church Pennant developed as the combination of the English Ensign (Cross of St. George), at the hoist, and the Dutch Ensign (the lateral tricolour), at the fly. When a ship decided to perform its religious duties, the pennant was hoisted as a sign to other ships that this Ship's Company was 'at Church' and therefore requesting amnesty while these duties were being performed.

These men had no concept of God being on any specific 'side' exclusively, but rather expressed the truth that God belongs to all men at all times and no matter how much either side ignored, or interpreted, HIS counsel to their own advantage, HE did not disown them. Both sides could then pray to the same God, for success and victory, for protection and deliverance, for honour and even vindication, but always on the clear understanding that their conflict was of their own, and not God's making. God had not yet been 'humanised' to the extent of people imposing human limitations of nationality or even a particular social philosophy, to make HIM 'their' God.

The first official mention we have of the use of the Church Pennant occurs in 'Additional Instruction' to the Fleet Battle orders, number 10. These instructions are dated 1779, but it is thought that the Church Pennant was in use 'de facto' before that year. It is a great pity to see this highly significant (if not symbolic) and traditional flag disappear. Maybe a spare one could be presented to the National War Museum or perhaps placed on Spectacle Island, before they all fade into the haze of antiquity as 'rags old'.

A. CHAPLAIN

THE AUSTRALIAN SOLDIER

By Lieutenant Commander W.N. Swan RAN (Retd)

The 'retired Australian sailor', LCDR W.N. Swan, describes here some of his experiences with the army in the Second World War, and pays tribute to the Australian Soldier.

Much to the great joy of all concerned, the bonds of friendship between the Royal Australian Navy and the Australian Commonwealth Military Forces became stronger than ever during the Second World War. The relationship between the two Services is now one of mutual respect and admiration. They have been 'through the fire' together and emerged as lifelong friends.

If only because of the Tobruk 'ferry', and the evacuation from Greece and Crete, the AMF is in debt to the RAN. Yet I doubt if it is as great as the debt we owe the Army. Most of us were associated with the Army at one time or another during the war; somewhat naturally those connected with combined operations more so than others. The first shoots of friendship sprang up in the Mediterranean, and burst into full bloom in the western Pacific. Actually, the RAN personnel closest to the Army were the Naval Beach Commandos, who lived with the troops, and the staffs of the Port Directorates in the forward areas, who lived next to them. The next closest were we of the Amphibious (Combined Operations) Force, and it is about this association that I shall deal here.

As it happened, in *HMAS WESTRALIA*, our first four operations with the Seventh Amphibious

Force were carried out with troops of the American Sixth Army. It was not until May 1945 that we commenced to see action with the First Australian Army. Despite this, however, we were always contacting the 'Diggers' in one way or another. Between operations, we carried them all over the south west Pacific area, and in port we visited their camps whenever we could. We were never far from the front line as it moved forward. When we arrived in the Finschafen area in January 1944, the AIF Ninth Division was fighting the Japs on the Huon Peninsula only 25 miles away. And it was a grim, jungle war they were fighting.

The Huon Gulf became a familiar 'stamping ground' for us, from our first visit there at the close of 1943. We trained for the invasion of Hollandia off Finschafen, and it was during the course of one day of this period that I gained an excellent insight into the job the AMF was doing in the wilds of New Guinea. It was Sunday, 16th April, 1944. *WESTRALIA* was anchored off Cape Cretin, just south of Finschafen. After church, I landed at 1000 with Colonel Hodgson, AMF, who had just been chosen to command the Second Australian Beach Group then training in Cairns. Colonel Hodgson was coming with us to Hollandia as an observer.



HMAS WESTRALIA as an armed merchant cruiser.

By courtesy of the Naval Historian.

We obtained a jeep from the Army and headed for Finschafen. The whole base had grown considerably since I had last passed through it, three months previously. The front line was now about 50 miles away. On either side of us during the 15 mile journey from Alamo to Finschafen were huge camps, and dumps of war material. The peninsula was developing into a colossal Allied staging point, and the American Army alone was preparing to receive 120,000 troops in the area. As the troops arrived, so the jungle went. All growth vanished before the assault of bulldozers, tractors and graders. No wonder a Jap prisoner of war, when asked by Allied Officers who were the best jungle fighters, replied, 'Australians are best jungle fighters; but the Americans — they remove the jungle.' The Yankee SEABEES were certainly equipped to do just that.

As we passed through these heartening signs of Allied power, I wondered what the enemy would think of his chances of victory if he saw them. It did not seem possible that any nation *could* amass more strength in one place. After a

visit to the Australian Base Sub Area at Finschafen, we had lunch at the Headquarters of the First Australian Corps, on the Satelberg road. We were guests of the AQMG, Lieutenant-Colonel Winchester, and Major Hughes of the staff. The Air Liaison Officer, Major Balfour-Ogilvie, late of the 2nd/18th Battalion and a Tobruk 'Rat', also joined us. After lunch we drove along the coast road, past the famous Scarlet Beach where the original Allied landing had taken place the previous September, and where the enemy later made an unsuccessful counter-attack. A Jap landing barge was still grounded in the sand, and white troops and natives were enjoying a swim.

The work of opening up the country around here had been well carried out, and the road along which we drove was in itself no mean achievement. This part of the coast of New Guinea is very beautiful, surprisingly so to people who imagined the island as all ugly jungle. The terrain slopes gradually down from the towering mountain ranges to the sea, and is crossed by numerous river beds. When not admiring the view to seaward, we admired the sweep of the country

inland. The stretch of country adjacent to the fore-shore was for the most part devoid of jungle, and covered with long grass. Everything looked lush and green after the recent rains, which also helped to keep the dust down for us. In New Guinea there are two kinds of weather — dusty and muddy.

We were very interested in the battle signs which had been erected every few miles, and which gave the history of each locality in the recent campaign. Rough though the country was, the Japanese had been pushed a long way inland in the previous four months. Only four months ago, the Australians held the coast as far west as Finschafen. Now we occupied it as far as Bogadjim. The speed of our jeep prevented us reading all the signs; but we were able to visualise how the enemy was driven westward. A typical sign read: 'Here a fierce battle raged, fighting proceeding from 5th December 1943 to 14th December 1943. Eighty Japs were killed. Matilda tanks were used for the first time in New Guinea. The enemy was cleared out, and many mortars and rifles captured.'

We thought these signs an excellent scheme for impressing on us who came after, the deeds of those in the van. Indeed I hope they are left up for all time, although the jungle will no doubt envelop them. Passing through Gusika, which was captured late in 1943, we eventually stopped at the Headquarters of the Australian Fifth Division at Kiligra. Here Major Marks of the Ordnance Corps kindly gave us afternoon tea. Whilst having tea, we met Major-General Ramsay, the Divisional Commander, who had served in the Ninth Division at El Alamein. Around the camp were many marked, and unmarked graves of Japanese and natives. The country here was quite virgin, and rather desolate.

All the Officers at this headquarters expressed their envy at our coming operation. They all wanted to come with us. It was expected they would move further west in the near future. We were soon on our return journey eastward, and as we drove slowly along, scores of bombers flew over us as they returned independently from bombing our objective in Dutch New Guinea.

We returned to Corps Headquarters at 1800. As Colonel Hodgson had been asked to dine with seven Generals, and I was only equal in rank to a Captain, I elected to eat in 'B' mess where Majors Hughes and Johnson looked after me very well. 'B' mess was nothing more than a tent on a hill-ock. Insects buzzed everywhere, and worms wriggled in the earth floor. A wireless played American jazz music. The sides of the tent were open, and far away on the blue expanse of the

Bismarck Sea we saw a US Navy PT boat churning the water into white foam as it sped west on patrol. These night strafing missions of the PT boats contributed greatly to the Allied victory in New Guinea.

Very slowly over the sea winged a Navy Catalina, so slowly that it seemed to be hovering in the still air. Below us, in a hollow, some soldiers were erecting a stage for a concert to be held that night. A bugler sounded colours, and we all stood at attention as the flag was hauled down on the central flagstaff for sunset. Two more staff Majors came in and started a game of chess. Although only 25 miles from my ship I was in a different world — the world of the Army.

At 1915, we reluctantly climbed into our jeep and commenced the return journey to Alamo in the dark. The whole countryside was lit up. There was no semblance of a blackout. It was like passing through a large city in peace time. Langemak Bay, just south of Finschafen, looked like Sydney Harbour. We returned aboard at 2120 hours, after having travelled 32 miles inland. We covered over 66 miles during the day, surprising for a country that three years before had no roads. Everywhere we were received with the greatest kindness, as was the case all over New Guinea. One man we saw that day typified, I think, the spirit of the AMF. We found him in an Australian War Cemetery outside Finschafen digging graves. There he was, a tall rangy Aussie wielding a long handled shovel, with the perspiration pouring off him and the cruel tropical sun pouring down on him. His skin was the colour of copper. Hearing us approach, he looked up and his glistening face broke into a smile.

'A hot job,' I remarked, rather inanely.

'Too right,' he replied. Then gesturing towards Sio and the front line, 'We're expecting some more in a few days.'

I always remembered this 'Digger'. Despite the rotten job he had, he could still smile.

I had no dealings with our Eighth Division; but I was associated with various units of the Third, Fourth, Fifth and Six Divisions at different times, and saw action with the Seventh and Ninth. You will often hear people say, 'Oh, the Ninth is Australia's greatest Division', or 'There's no Division with a war record like the Seventh's', or 'It's all so silly, the Sixth is our finest Division'. It is very difficult to say which of these three Divisions is Australia's finest. AIF officers and men no doubt have very definite ideas on the matter. Devotees of the Sixth would say, 'Look at their campaigns in the Western Desert, Greece, Crete and

New Guinea. Why, they saved the war'. Yet 'fans' of the Seventh (of which I am one) could say, 'If the Seventh had not pushed the Japs back over the Owen Stanley Range, where would Australia be today? And who entered Lae first? Then do not forget Syria and Balikpapan'. Then up would spring lovers of the Ninth, whose names are legion to say, 'Ah, that's all very well. Yet if the Ninth had not held Tobruk in 1941 what would Rommel have done? Also, did not the Ninth save the Suez Canal and the war by hurling back the Hun at El Alamein? Montgomery gave them the toughest sector. Then what about Finschafen, Sattelberg, Tarakan and Brunei?' The answer, of course, is that all three are great Divisions and played equally important roles in winning the war. Each has a unique record, some of their achievements being unknown outside the Services. For instance, how many people know that when elements of the Seventh parachuted into the Markham Valley in New Guinea in 1943, they were the first airborne troops of the United Nations to go into action, and some of them were jumping for the first time?

We invaded Tarakan Island and Brunei Bay, in Borneo, with troops of the Ninth on board our ship, and we landed the Seventh at Balikpapan. They were all first class fighting men, always cheerful and well disciplined, with a high degree of individual initiative. They would laugh and chatter among themselves all day, and go into action with a song on their lips. I shall never forget watching a barge load of 'Diggers' leaving our ship's side bound for the beach on a Borneo 'D' Day. Every man in that boat was singing 'The Wizard of Oz'. Some people have since doubted the truth of this story. I can vouch for its authenticity. Knowing the 'Diggers' as I do, I think they are justified in their claim to being the finest shock troops in the world.

Going into action with American troops we found to be like participating in an escapade with a good friend up the street. Seeing action with Australian troops was like indulging in an adventure with your own brother.



HMAS WESTRALIA after conversion to an LSI

By courtesy of S. Goven

The Australian soldier gives of his best in battle; his heart becomes cold steel. As Shakespeare's Henry V prayed on the morning of Agincourt, 'O God of Battles, steel my soldiers' hearts'.



PROPOSED RN SAIL TRAINING SCHEME

By 'Master Ned'

A cynic once remarked of the British publication *The Naval Review* that half the articles within its covers were about officer training and that the other half were about officer training. In more recent years, it can be seen that the output on this subject has included a vast number of articles on sail training, ranging from pleas for the construction of sail training vessels for the RN along the lines of the magnificent ships operated by various South American and European Navies to elderly authors' descriptions of their experiences 'before the mast' while taking passage between the China Station and Great Britain.

Perhaps oddly, this pre-occupation has spread to the RAN and the enthusiasm has several times surfaced in the pages of this journal. It would thus perhaps be of interest to many members to learn that the Royal Navy once came very close not only to the construction of a sail training vessel, but of an entire squadron — and even more interesting to learn in precisely what fashion, and by whom, the scheme was defeated.

For what is particularly remarkable is that the proposal was quashed, not by technically minded junior officers with a reputation for innovative thinking, but by very senior Admirals with actual experience as officers, even commanders, in sail.

The first suggestion for sail training on a large scale came in September 1930, when Vice Admiral Roger Backhouse, the Controller of the Navy, inspected the Greek training vessel *ARES* when that ship visited Portsmouth. He was enthusiastic about the standard of training onboard and he minuted the other members of the Board of Admiralty, describing his observations.

His suggestion was that all initial sea training of both cadets and seamen should be undertaken in sail. His colleagues considered the suggestion and expressed some interest in the idea, but a rapid calculation showed that a very large number of ships would be needed to handle the numbers and, in the penny-pinching days of the Great Depression, such money could not be spared.

But a year later there occurred the very serious disturbances in ships of the Home Fleet that became known as the Invergordon Mutiny. The events of those days indicated to a badly frightened Board of Admiralty that disturbing gaps might have opened up between the wardroom and the lower deck and between senior sailors and junior sailors. In fact, the Board's mishandling of the pay cuts made in 1931 and the lack of warning given to the Fleet had been the major cause of the affair, but, consciously or unconsciously, the

Board was attempting to place the blame on someone or something else.

The Admiralty decided that sail training was the answer. Since it was not practicable to conduct it on a universal basis, it was to be worked on two levels. The first was sail training for cadets before they joined the Fleet as Midshipmen. This would involve one sailing vessel, whilst four more were to be employed training Leading Seamen in sail as part of their qualification for the rank of Petty Officer. The First Lord, Sir Bolton Monsell, announced the plan to the House of Commons in 1932, declaring with no little enthusiasm that the first ship was to be named WANDERER in honour of the Poet Laureate, Sir John Masefield.

In the same year, however, a new First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Ernle Chatfield (later Admiral of the Fleet Lord Chatfield) was appointed. Unlike his predecessor, Admiral Sir Frederick Field, Chatfield viewed the entire scheme with grave disquiet. Up to this time, there had been a deal of enthusiasm for the scheme, both in the Navy and in the press and public at large and very little opposition had been expressed. Nonetheless, Chatfield very soon found that matters had not been properly thought through.

In the first place, the scheme was not cheap. Had the original plan been carried out, some 14 vessels would have been required, and even with the reduced plan five had to be built. The first was scheduled to cost £85,000, with an annual maintenance of £22,500. The four ships of the second stage would have cost £270,000 and added £67,000 to running expenses. Thus, the establishment of the squadron would cost over £350,000 and the annual operation of £100,000. Chatfield, however, had extensive experience in sail himself and from his knowledge of the costs of sailing ship operation he

'... had serious doubts whether the estimate of maintenance costs was likely to be sufficient. Allowance ought to be made ... for a very much larger expenditure of fuel for their engines and the replacement of sails and spars which would be carried away in bad weather.'(1)

For the cost of the five sailing vessels, two first class sloops could be built and maintained — and it would be quite possible to make such vessels training platforms as well as fighting machines.



INDONESIAN SAIL TRAINING SHIP *DEWARUCI* ENTERING SYDNEY HARBOUR IN 1970.

By courtesy of John Mortimer

Chatfield's second concern was with the experience of the personnel involved. Though 'it was pleasant to read that a number of officers had volunteered to serve in these ships,' (2) he had serious doubts as to their capacity to manage such large sailing vessels. As First Sea Lord and a senior Admiral, Chatfield possessed a watch-keeping ticket in sail; there were other officers on the Navy List who were also qualified, but the most junior of these were Captains so senior as to be on the verge of flag rank — manifestly too senior to command in the training squadron.

For the rest of it, though the personnel involved were very keen and enthusiastic, 'most had only yachting experience'. (3) The navies which operated sailing ships either did it on a very small scale or else had been continually running such vessels and thus had not lost their expertise. The Royal Navy, on the other hand, had not had a large sailing vessel in commission for over twenty years. It was a very long jump from operating yachts, even ocean-going yachts, to commanding large sail training ships with young and inexperienced crews. Chatfield 'felt that the whole proposal was playing 'with fire', for he was terrified of:

'... sending these barques ... with their considerable sail area, with the dangers that attend the inefficient, or inexperienced handling of square-rigged ships, into the Atlantic throughout the year, to face the storms and the heavy seas that we had entirely forgotten how to meet in such vessels.' (4)

Captain (afterwards Admiral of the Fleet Viscount) Cunningham was later to note of the First Sea Lord that

'No doubt he was thinking of the EURYDICE, which capsized and sank off Dunnose, Isle of Wight, in a sudden squall in March, 1878 with a loss of about 300 lives, and the ATLANTA, which was lost during a hurricane in the West Indies in February, 1880, with a death roll of 280. Both of these vessels were training ships commanded and officered by men

experienced in the art of sail.' (5)

In a more recent disaster, the German merchant training vessel PAMIR, a four masted 3,103 ton barque, foundered in a hurricane off the Azores with the loss of 80 lives. (6)

What was more, the RN already 'had to scrape and contrive to man or recommission a

ship.' (7) It was quite possible that the manning of five large training ships would force the paying-off of front line warships. The Navy was already so weak that the returns on such a sacrifice would have to be clearly demonstrated before any reduction in fighting strength could be countenanced.

Chatfield, despite all this, would have been prepared to bear the risks and annoyances had he felt that there was any real value in such training. The elephant has a long memory and so does a flag officer. In this case it was justified. Chatfield remembered from his service at sea in the 1890s that

'It was well known by those who served in the Channel Squadron at that time that the ordinary seamen who came to the Battleships from the Training Squadron were a continual source of trouble. The hardships in bad weather, the day and night exertion, and the lack of conviction as to the necessity for the considerable hardships they underwent, filled them with a longing to leave the Training Squadron for the quieter life in the steamships, where they looked forward to having an easy time. They came to the Channel Squadron in the wrong spirit, and were definitely inferior, in nearly every respect, to the boys and ordinary seamen who had avoided the Training Squadron and come to us direct.' (8)

Having thus disposed of any idea of using the sailing ships for basic seaman training — a proposal which had, as has been noted, been regretfully abandoned by Field and Monsell on the grounds of its prohibitive cost — Chatfield then went on to demolish the scheme of employing the squadron as a proving ground for candidates for the rank of Petty Officer.

He did not consider that the Invergordon incident had revealed any critical deficiencies. Chatfield was more inclined to believe that many big ships were over-manned with officers and that senior sailors were not being given any opportunities to exercise their authority. Proper use was not being made of Chiefs and Petty Officers as the middle men in the divisional system as officers were becoming too keen on dealing with everything themselves. Not surprisingly, the senior sailors had become disillusioned and apathetic. Alarming though the situation had been, steps had already been taken to rectify matters and the ultimate solution obviously lay with the Fleet and not with a mammoth revision of training patterns.



ARGENTINIAN SAIL TRAINING SHIP *LIBERTAD* DEPARTING SYDNEY HARBOUR IN 1970.

By courtesy of John Mortimer.

The point was, as Chatfield explained, that sail training on such a scale would have little relevance to any other aspect of a sailor's career. For it was proposed

'... to take men who had been some years in the Service, who had been brought up in a steamship groove, who had had their minds attuned to modern weapons, modern equipment and power handling, and say to them: "If you want to pass for petty officer you must start a new subject. You must go to sea in a sailing ship, not only to be instructed in sailing ways and skill and risks, but to be there selected for your future fitness as a petty officer in the fighting Fleet". It did not seem to me that this attitude would appeal to the personnel as a whole.'(9)

Chatfield realised that he had to act. Knowing that some of the junior Sea Lords were in favour of the scheme and that the enthusiastic Monsell might be able to claim from this that the idea was worth trying, the First Sea Lord asked senior officers, both active and retired, to send in their

opinions. His gamble was justified. Four Admirals of the Fleet, including Earl Beatty, Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt and Sir Roger Keyes, as well as a host of more junior flag and post officers and both the Commanders-in-Chief of the two major fleets wrote to express their support for Chatfield.

It was an interesting phenomenon that officers who had qualified as watchkeepers in sail, such as Beatty, Chatfield and Keyes, were those most against the proposal. Vice Admiral K.G.B. Dewar wrote of his sojourn as a Midshipman in a sail training ship,

'... I thoroughly enjoyed my time in the Training Squadron ... (but) Personally, I look back on my nine months in the VOLAGE as waste of time and believe that a few weeks as Officer of the Watch on the bridge of a destroyer would have been more valuable training.'(10)

Cunningham, in his memoirs *A Sailor's Odyssey*, was quite as scathing:

'It struck me as being on a par with a suggestion that before driving a taxi-cab a man should first learn to ride a horse.'(11)

In the face of such opposition, Monsell finally agreed to cancel the scheme. Chatfield was pained to have had to fight the First Lord in such a manner, but Monsell took it all very well, despite the fact that sail training had been his pet project. Chatfield noted '... no one could have been kinder or more understanding of my attitude.' (12)

It must be stressed that Chatfield was, and would always remain, a great advocate of small boat sailing. Indeed, as Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean Fleet he had been remarkable for winning several of the major races in the Fleet regatta (in the days when the Mediterranean Fleet was a Fleet). This applied as much for Cunningham and almost every other of the faction. All went out of their way to encourage officers and men under their command to get out into small boats to sail.

But yacht and dinghy sailing are not the same thing as the operation of major sailing vessels. Chatfield summed up the real, the last reason, why he was so much against the proposal when he wrote:

'I realised all that the sponsors of the idea felt, I knew all the merits of their case. But we had to rebuild the Navy, to use every penny for fighting efficiency. The day when the Navy could indulge in such things as luxury had gone. Every pound must go towards the vital material we so greatly needed. The personality, or character, of naval personnel, could be raised to any height by suitable steps in the Fleet as it was. Men must be trained

in the atmosphere of the weapons with which they were to fight and such methods must be developed. There is a modern seamanship as well as an old.' (13)

As Captain S.W. Roskill remarked in his *Naval Policy Between the Wars*:

'In retrospect it seems clear that Chatfield was right.' (14)

FOOTNOTES

- (1) *It Might Happen Again*. Volume II of *The Navy and Defence*. The Autobiography of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Chatfield PC, GCB, OM, GCVO, KCMG, DSO. Heinemann, London, 1947. p.55
- (2) *Ibid.* p.57.
- (3) *Ibid.*
- (4) *Ibid.*
- (5) *A Sailor's Odyssey*. The Autobiography of Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Cunningham KT, GCB, OM, DSO. Hutchinson & Co., London, 1951. p.154.
- (6) *The Period of Reluctant Rearmament 1930-39*. Vol II of *Naval Policy Between the Wars*. Captain S.W. Roskill, CBE, DSC. Collins, London, 1976. Footnote pp189-190.
- (7) Cunningham *Op Cit* p.153.
- (8) Chatfield *Op Cit* p.56.
- (9) *Ibid.* pp56-57.
- (10) *The Navy From Within*. Vice Admiral K.G.B. Dewar, CBE. Gollancz, London, 1939. p.40.
- (11) Cunningham *Op Cit* p.153. **
- (12) Chatfield *Op Cit* p.59.
- (13) *Obid.*
- (14) Roskill *Op Cit*. p.190.

**It is interesting to note that Cunningham makes this remark in his 1951 memoirs. Dewar's work was published in 1939 and reads, on page 38, "One might as well argue that taxi-drivers could be inoculated against strikes by a six months' training in hansom-cabs." Unconscious plagiarism by Cunningham, or was the remark a 1932 catch-cry for those who followed Chatfield?

AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE PRIZES — 1978

The ANI Council is pleased to award the following prizes for articles printed in the Journal editions in 1978:

The Best Major Article

\$75 to Commander L.M. Sulman RAN for his article *HMA Airships?* in Volume 4, No.3 (August 1978).

The Best Minor Articles

\$10 to DJC for his book review *On Wallpaper* in Volume 4, No.2 (May 1978).

\$5 to NEL for his 'I was there when' article on Korea in Volume 4, No.1 (February 1978)

\$5 to WOC for his *Nobody asked me, but* article on Furlough in Volume 4, No.1 (February 1978).

The Council congratulates the winners.

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Nobody asked me, but...



COD

I think the time has arrived for COD to 'come out'. This term is not inappropriate, for it relates to homosexuals declaring their preferences in public: for years, COD (pronounced as a word, not as initials) has been treated like VD or alcoholism (or homosexuality) — known about, discussed in whispers, tacitly acknowledged. But the RAN is now taking the great leap forward into the twentieth century, at least as far as social diseases are concerned, and so COD can at last be discussed openly, if unapprovingly.

Indeed, it should be discussed openly in the RAN, for although it is rampant at the present moment in time, and perhaps even on an upsurge, its sufferers must be seen as victims rather than criminals. For too long have the evils of this disease gone unrecognised; for too long have its victims been forced to suffer in silence, unable to call for help, even when they realised the unimaginable depths to which they had sunk. Therein lies the feature of this disease most likely to tear the heartcords of the innocent, the naive, the wives and partners of the sufferers — the paradox that the more advanced the disease, the less the victim is likely to recognise it, nay, the more he is likely to deny all knowledge of it and attempts to relieve him and his dear ones of their suffering.

Let not this introduction fool you, kind reader, into assuming that the author intends to treat his subject lightly. Rather, the style of Victoria is adopted because COD is a remnant of a bygone age, a parasitic growth which feeds and grows on

its host whilst sapping his life force, humanity and individuality: an anomaly in a Service which allegedly encourages initiative and independence.

In fact, there are remarkable similarities between naval attitudes to alcoholism, VD and COD, in that none is given official recognition, but all three tend to be encouraged by the customs and traditions of the Service. But I wander into byways not fruitful to my present discussion — I leave such readers as may to ponder and possibly enlarge upon these sinister innuendoes.

Forbearing upon your patience for an instant longer, suffice it to say that it is important that it be said that the time is ripe for COD to be brought out into the open, for it is an insidious disease that eats at the very fabric of our Service, and even extends its tentacles towards our loved ones outside the Service. Many a naval wife has languished alongside a COD-ridden husband, bearing her suffering nobly and in silence, because she knew that he could not help himself, and any thought of discussing his problem with him would be in vain.

Reader, be brave! If, after reading this article, you consider *you* are free from COD, at least let your wife and/or other partner(s) give you the benefit of their advice. By all means, treat The Editor as your friend, and write to him if you have any doubts about you and COD — only by bringing COD into the open can we hope to stamp it out for all time and make our Service a happy, care-free place for all naval persons, young and old.

The exposition that follows is given in the form of a medical analysis, but big words are avoided, whenever possible, for obvious reasons. The ideas presented are only representative of the initial stage of research and readers

should appreciate that much more work needs to be done — hopefully, some of you will feel the call to take up the reins. Grateful acknowledgement is made to WSGB and wife for helping to bring to fruition some of the thoughts that have been abudding for many years.

Name

COD is the term for ovumcraniumitis, also known as Commanding Officers' Disease.

Cause

The cause, or causes, of COD are not yet established, because the nature of the disease itself has not yet been delineated. For example, some naval persons have been described as 'a bit of a COD', whereas others have been said to be 'real CODs', implying either a more advanced form of the same disease or a different variety entirely. In other cases, the author has heard such expressions as 'there's a lot of COD about today' or 'COD's all over the place today' or even 'another victory for COD' implying that COD can be in the air generally, or worse on one day than another. Although COD seems to affect individuals particularly, and usually permanently, there is evidence that it can strike a group of people in one place or engaged on one project, temporarily. Whether or not there are any lasting effects from such temporary associations is not yet known, so all readers should be on their guards whenever they hear the term 'COD' used.

Spread and Incidence

COD is spread mainly through contamination of books, briefings, memos, seminars, conversations at the bar, friendly words of advice and so on. Carriers excrete the foul organisms in words, both written and spoken, and in their general attitudes. Its spread is encouraged when young officers are spoilt from an early age and led to expect that the world is their oyster. For this reason, the disease is particularly likely to occur in general list seaman officers, but can also be found throughout the community — COD is prevalent not only amongst Commanding Officers themselves, but also amongst hopeful, passed-over, ex, potential and pseudo Commanding Officers, of all ages, lists and branches. COD respects no one, and the author has even heard that there are signs of its presence in fighter pilots in the RAAF, but this is without substantiation.

Incubation Period

The incubation period is usually very short — no more than a couple of hours after donning a uniform for the first time. Further study is needed in this area, for there is an implied note that some naval persons might have been suffering from an initial and relatively mild form of COD long before

they joined the RAN. This could, of course, affect compensation claims in later life, and the DFRDB Authority may care to subsidise subsequent research. Norman F. Dixon (*On the Psychology of Military Incompetence* p310-12) also noted, in what may be related cases, early attitudes in life surfacing later on:

'.....for it could well be that strict toilet-training, with bowel activity restricted to a particular time of day, forces the child to acquire not only a rigid sense of timing but also the tendency to equate orderliness with temporal regularity.'

Well does the author remember hearing a Commanding Officer of an aircraft carrier giving wise advice to a midshipman: 'Always have a "George" first thing in the morning before the ship's program starts — then you won't be embarrassed having to explain the the court-martial where you were when the collision occurred'

Symptoms and Signs

One of the few elements of hope for COD sufferers is that there are so many signs and symptoms, that few observers will be able to detect at least some of them. As my collaborator WSGB remarked: 'There's none so blind as them what won't see' — even sufferers of COD should be able to find at least one sign if they are really to look at themselves sincerely and honestly. To this end, the 10 commonest signs and symptoms so far discovered, have been listed heretofore below in the form of a questionnaire. If you, your spouse, or any of the people with whom you share your life answer in the affirmative (and 'don't knows', 'maybe-s' and 'sometimes' are all affirmatives) then rest assured that you suffer from COD to some degree or other:

1. Do you suffer from selective hearing, eg, do not always listen to what others are saying to you, because you are 'busy' or just not interested?
2. Do you suffer from selective reading, ie, want only the 'good stuff' to be put in front of you as you have no time to spare to read the rest?
3. Do you ask for other people's opinions because that's what a good man manager does, and then do what you want to do?
4. Do you say 'I think you're right, but' 'You have a good point, there, but' 'Fine, fine. Now, what I want you to do' or words to that effect?

5. Do you often assume you have a personal Secretary who exists to make life easier for you?
6. Do you decide: when its time to go home, stop drinking, go back to work, end the discussion, have a cup of tea, start work, get on with it, stop all this nonsense etc etc without consulting anyone, even the Secretary?
7. Are your principle characteristics hard work, honesty, reliability, generosity, kindness, sense of humour, patience, understanding, flexibility, wisdom, natural leadership and an ability to get on well with others?
8. Are the people around you mostly poor, misguided fools who probably mean well but don't have the benefit of your experience(s)?
9. Do you have a royal complex, ie, believe people should recognise your true worth?
10. Is it true that you do have faults and can be mistaken — but only minor ones and not often?

Types

As with influenza, there are undoubtedly many different types of COD, but research is lacking in this area. One can imagine that the Classic, or Seaman, COD may well be different to Supply COD or even Padre COD; there may be different strains to be identified as RAAF COD or ARMY COD, maybe even Publicservice COD. Clearly established so far, are the four levels or stages of COD — primary, secondary, advanced and hopeless. The primary stage, which may develop at any age or rank, is exemplified, inter alia, by a marked tendency to recognise simple facts, eg, 'It is raining.' (Aye, Aye, Sir.) The secondary stage is marked by an inclination to offer opinions, eg, 'I think it might rain tomorrow'. (I'm sure you're right, Sir.) The advanced stage indicates that there is little hope of recovery; the victim is often heard prognosticating, eg, 'It will rain tomorrow'. (No doubt about it, Sir. We'll cancel the). As for the hopeless cases, one can only duck for cover: 'It had better bloodywell rain tomorrow, Number One, or else'. (Aye, Aye, Sir, I'll pass that on to the).

Complications

As not enough is yet known about the basic or elementary form of the disease, there is little point here in elaborating on any complications arising from the disease. Alienation, alcoholism, divorce, lockjaw, verbal abuse, battered head-syndrome, thick skin and water-off-a-duck's-back, not to mention no-skin-off-my-nose, are all

related in some way or another to COD. However, two forms of which readers may be aware already, have been substantially documented by other researchers and a passing mention only will suffice. The first is NOD (Navy Office Disease — 'Your letter of is receiving attention') and the second is GOD (Grandiose Officers Disease), a very advanced, complicated form of COD.

Treatment

Treatment can only begin when the patient can recognise his own symptoms. Unfortunately, one of the most horrific features of this disease is the inability of those who suffer its deleterious effects to see the signs *in themselves*. In addition, sufferers tend to be antagonistic and aggressive if one attempts even delicately to point the finger. As suggested previously, the society in which COD breeds, is one which unconsciously feeds it, at the same time often denying its presence. The more one advances up the tree, ie, the more often one commands more people and resources, the more one can become separated from 'lesser' mortals and the more one is encouraged in devious ways to expect greater obedience. Is there not a significance in the fact that separation of rank is clearly distinguished in the RAN, but one has to peer closely at the shoulders of Army and RAAF officers before deciding whether or not to call them 'Sir'? However, not all naval persons suffer from COD, and treatment may be afforded those who have reached no more than the earliest of advanced stages by:

- a. helping them, gently, to recognise their own symptoms; and
- b. helping them, gently, to cultivate less intolerant, egocentric habits.

Much more study needs to be done into those persons who have reached the dizzy heights without succumbing to COD, or those who have managed to shake off the tentacled monster somewhere along Life's Way. Naval spouses may have an important role to play in the field of treatment.

Convalescence

Once the patient is well on the road to recovery — and that is not for him or her to decide — then lots of TLC is required at home, and skilful manipulation at work. Another of the paradoxes of this disease is that ex CODs can always see the symptoms in others and may go overboard in their own dealings with persons around them, to the extent that they may contract craniumimbecilus. Nurses should be careful to foster those traits which are conducive to the making of a fine naval officer, whilst quashing any signs of recurring COD.

Preventive Treatment

Finally, a word on how to prevent COD in the first place. All members of our Service must be fully aware of all the symptoms of this dreaded disease and must guard against them. And we must administer large doses of wisdom, knowledge and tolerance, for as is written in the Tao Te Ching:

*'Knowing others is wisdom,
Knowing the self is enlightenment;
Mastering others requires force,
Mastering the self needs strength.'*

Above all, those who are blessedly free from COD must practise forbearance and fortitude with those who are more unfortunate:

*'under heaven all can see beauty as beauty,
only because there is ugliness.
All can know good as good,
only because there is evil.'*

G. CUTTS

(Postscriptum:

Uxor mea and several of my friends say I suffer from at least an advanced stage of COD. However, I am pleased to be able to inform my readers that this is definitely not so and this has been proved to my satisfaction. They were confused by the traits exhibited by one born under the sign of Leo: a natural leader of men, a born organiser, generous, kind and modest.)

CHAPLAINS

It is obvious that the RAN doesn't really need, or want, Chaplains. With the possible exception of ships at sea there is nothing that a Naval Chaplain does which could not be handled by local clergymen on a part-time basis, or better still, in their own time and for those few that want that sort of thing.

Gone are the days when Chaplains used to have some positive contribution to make to the Naval community. The 1912 list of Chaplains' Duties had to be changed because those duties, in the main, now appear on the Duty Statements of various SIOs. Until the RAN employed Social Workers, the Chaplains were able to make some contribution to the welfare of personnel in the Service, even though on the cheap, and no one would say that they didn't make a valuable contribution THEN. Let's face it, most of the Chaplains' former work is now being done by experts.

The recent Defence Instruction (Navy) on RAN Chaplaincy would go very close to being the best example of double standard presentation yet available in the Service. How many Commanding Officers are really concerned to provide for the spiritual and moral welfare of their ship's

companies? For example, the only time one runs a Sunday Routine at sea is when it is absolutely impossible to do anything else — the most important thing is that the ship use whatever time there is available to become efficient in its task. The old standards of Christian Faith & Worship, and Character and Morality have no real place in the efficient running of the ship as such — all the necessary standards are clearly laid down by the Navy in various DI(N)s, Standing Orders, etc.

I'm not against Chaplains as people; some of them are really nice and dedicated men, and because of that, I think the only decent thing to do is to say: 'Thanks Chaps (no pun), but that will be all'. It must be terribly demoralising for these men to be continuously confused with Warrant Officers (also hard on Warrant Officers). There are only 16 of them and when in summer uniform it takes a real feat of optical gymnastics to recognise a Chaplain as such from any angle. I'm sure that our policy and administration masters share my opinion; eg, it was suggested, after the uniform bods had taken away the singularity of the Chaplains' uniform, that maybe Chaplains could wear Bush Jackets and the answer came back — 'only Commanders and above' (we don't want to make this item of uniform too 'common' after all!). The DI(N) refers to them as being Heads of Department — I have never known of the Chaplains being present at Heads of Departments' meetings, etc., — their presence among HODs at Divisions is nothing short of embarrassing to both the HODs and the Chaplains. I have been part of many heated discussions about things like whether Chaplains should be saluted or not. Obviously the majority opinion expressed is that they shouldn't be saluted, and in practice, aren't — after all they are not really officers, and even officially the RAN doesn't really respect what they stand for. Of course one could really upset the system and give them gold lace, etc., but that would be simply avoiding the whole issue and substituting what was a good system for the past with a very false value today. If the Chaplain is a person who represents God in our midst (whatever that means), then what rank do we give God?

No, painful as it may be to some, we would be more honest and do better not to have:

- a) our CNS sign false documents of agreement;
- b) clergymen (who are people too) placed in embarrassing situations;
- c) our personnel being subjected to an unnecessary and confusing influence;
- d) finance being expended on something which is not part of essential equipment; and
- e) billets being allocated to such useless purposes in the RAN.

JUDAS

BOOK REVIEW



ROMANCE OF AUSTRALIAN Lighthouses

By Valmai Phillips, Rigby. Recommended price: \$12.95

To the seaman, this book on Australian lighthouses will provide much historical information on the more important lights encountered on passages around the Australian coast. Of course, this information is not intended to replace the standard navigational publications which are so indispensable.

The story of our lighthouses is closely associated with the history of the progressive settlement of the continent by intrepid seamen and adventurers of the past, Australia's continuing dependence on the sea for transport routes and commerce also emerges indirectly.

The book opens with the establishment of navigation marks and lights on South Head and then it proceeds in a State-by-State circumnavigation of Australia and the off-shore islands to finish up on Boobie Island. The style of writing is very readable and easy going although the more fastidious mariner will object to some of the expressions and poor explanations used. In all, this book will appeal to a wide cross-section of people.

I enjoyed particularly the detail provided on most of the East Coast lights; the ones I had grown so used to seeing that I really had not thought too much about their past history and the tales of ship wrecks etc. which accompany it. For example, the story attached to Seal Rocks off Sugarloaf Point leaves little to the imagination when on a night in July, 1876 three schooners—*Acme*, *Whooit* and *Flirt* sheltered in the lee to ride out a storm; then the rum began to flow and Big Black Harry, the skipper of the *Acme*, had difficulty restraining the crew even by force until in the end the three crews took the boats. They almost drowned the Captain's girlfriend and there was an all-in brawl on the beach on their arrival ashore, when the locals dealt out rough justice for their treatment of the girlfriend. To top off the story the wreckage of all three ships was scattered along the beaches the following day!

In addition to the recording of the contribution made by famous personalities, this book also refers quite often to famous ships of the past. In particular, *INVESTIGATOR* and *LADY NELSON* are ships' names that crop up frequently.

But Valmai Phillips really dedicates this book to the lighthouse keepers, past and present. As she writes on the closing page 'In 1897 the Captain of a Royal Mail Steamer recorded in his log his appreciation of the work of the lighthouse keepers ... In the best Service tradition the job still goes on.'

At the rear of the book there is a select bibliography which can be used for further research for those really interested.

In all I would recommend this book as a useful work to have while at sea either for one's own interest or for the purposes of informing others.

C.A. Barrie

LEADERS AND LEADERSHIP by W.J. Byrt, Melbourne, Sun Books, 1978. (The author is a reader in the Graduate School of Business Administration at Melbourne University).

This paperback of 194 pages comprises a lucid account of the state of leadership theory today. It begins with a summary of the 'conventional wisdom' — leadership consists of influence of some kind over others, leaders have special characteristics — and then proceeds to destroy it, erecting a new approach in its place.

A review of 20 different studies on the characteristics of people regarded as leaders found 79 different traits mentioned. Only one trait, intelligence, was included in as many as 10 of the 20 lists. It is absurd to insist that leaders must be well-balanced, have a sense of humour, believe in justice etc., when there are examples of leaders who have been insane, neurotic, unjust, or authoritarian: Hitler, Napoleon, Cromwell, to name three.

Unfortunately, although modern management theory rejects the importance of character/personality traits in isolation, practical men of affairs, and especially those in the Services, are still strongly influenced by such factors in their decisions regarding promotion, development, usage and rewarding of subordinates.

People who have demonstrated successful leadership in their early life (eg. at school) are likely to be successful again — if they meet similar situations. But there has been little success in trying to train people in general leadership skills, only in specific areas (eg. how to improve their interaction with others). Leaders who are successful in one situation may be abysmal failures in another. Byrt quotes the example of the discarding of Menzies in humiliating circumstances at the end of his first Prime Ministership.

Leadership, according to Byrt, involves a working relationship between members of a group. 'It is a process whereby the behaviour of the led is influenced by a leader or leaders. The process depends on the leader being able, or being perceived to be able, to assist the led in achieving the satisfaction of certain needs within certain situations' (p175).

Leadership styles will vary according to the nature of the leader, the situation, the objectives, and the group. No one method, and no leader can be successful in all situations, with all groups, if he is inflexible. Again, unfortunately in the Services, some people are endowed with leadership status, yet many appointed leaders would never be selected by their peers, and leadership 'qualities' should not be considered in isolation from the situation nor the follower-group.

In relation to the latter, Byrt points out the significance of the relationship between leader and led by saying that many followers reflect the image of their leader and act as they think appropriate. If they see him as imbued with a great deal of authority, they assume that they have a great deal of responsibility, and resent having to spend time on mundane matters — Captain's Secretary take note?

The functions of leaders are seen to be in two groups: work tasks (helping to get the job done by planning, administration etc) and maintenance tasks (meeting the emotional needs of the group, ensuring co-operation, teamwork etc). He stresses that leaders are not God — they are part of the organisation they are leading, and are subject to the same human frailties as all its members.

A large section of the book (80 pages) is devoted to an analysis of Australian people who have achieved leadership positions in politics, business and administration. Such men as Mr Fraser, Mr Hawke and Sir Henry Bland are looked at from the points of view of abilities, personality, bases of power and influence, leadership role, and tactics; finally, an assessment is made of each individual as a leader.

The book is fairly short and very readable. There is an absence of jargon and detailed statistics, though there is a list of references at the end of each chapter for those who wish to check or read further. There is also a brief but satisfactory index. Recommended reading for all who aspire or presume to lead.

G. CUTTS

CIVIL DEFENCE AND DEFENCE SCIENCE

A REVIEW OF TWO RECENT DEFENCE FELLOWSHIP PAPERS

The Australian Defence Fellowship Scheme was first announced in 1977. This scheme is similar to one in the United Kingdom and is open to uniformed officers of the three Australian Services and to civilian officers from the Department of Defence.

Successful Defence Fellows undertake a programme of full-time study at an Australian tertiary institution to research and write a paper on a subject relevant to the defence of Australia. Thus a defence topic is studied in a hopefully objective academic environment free of the inhibitions of the departmental scene. A real departmental requirement must be established for the study and it is not a matter of academic benefit for the Defence Fellow, although inevitably, there can be spin-offs.

The first four Australian Defence Fellowships were awarded in March 1978. The successful officers and their topics were:

- | | |
|----------------------------------|---|
| Colonel D.K. Baker | — 'Requirements for Civil Defence as an Integral part of the National Defence Posture' (Australian National University) |
| Lieutenant Colonel S.N. Gower | — 'Some Options for a Defence Technological Strategy' (Australian National University) |
| Squadron Leader P.R.M. Rasmussen | — 'The Effects of Change of School on the Secondary Education of Servicemen's Children' (Monash University) |
| Squadron Leader M.J. Rawlinson | — 'Labour Turnover in the Musterings of the RAAF — An Economic Analysis' (University of Melbourne) |

The papers by Colonels Baker and Gower have now been published and are available through any Defence Library. They are both comprehensive studies, giving a good review of two relatively dormant, but nonetheless important, aspects of Australia's defence. Debate these days can be easily stirred over subjects such as a replacement aircraft carrier or the tactical fighter force, but all too little interest is shown in Australian civil defence and defence science and technology. The two colonels thus fill a gap, at least in unclassified publications, by putting on the map, so to speak, two, rather less talked about, components of an indigenous Australian defence posture.

As a basis for his defence technological strategy, Colonel Gower discusses three different approaches to Australian defence planning — the 'contingency probability', 'terminal force' and 'deterrent' approaches. He prefers a 'two-tier deterrent force', involving a 'high-low' mix of technology, since 'Australia with its limited defence resources, would be unwise to concentrate too much of its defence capacity within a limited number of high cost, but potentially vulnerable equipments'. (p.209).

There is something inherently pragmatic about the Gower approach. We heard at the recent ANI Seminar the old catch-phrase that 'the best is the enemy of the good' and the colonel re-inforces it in the Australian context. There are practical 'low' options for an Australian defence technological strategy. He rightly rejects the idea that there need be some inverse relationship between manpower requirement and level of technology (ie. low technology equipment must be labour-intensive) and warns of the consequences of concentrating too much force in a single location — either as a fixed installation or as a mobile weapon platform. Most importantly however, he recognises the emergence in Australia in recent years of several economic and social trends which throw some doubt on our continuing ability to support a defence effort at the level defence planners may all too happily assume.

There is a timely warning that 'defence technology is in a state of conflict at present' (Gower, p.214). The problem is expanding at both ends. Whilst budget constraints are becoming harsher, technology is developing at a rate which necessitates much effort and resource expenditure if there is to be continuity of involvement of Australian defence science and technology, particularly in the high technology areas. Colonel Gower discusses at length the consequent options for Australian defence industry and the possible need for some re-organisation of the Defence Science and Technology Organisation. All his arguments show evidence of balanced objective thought, and his work, being largely unique in its field, should receive the notice which it deserves. It is a well written, balanced report.

Colonel Baker is also concerned with trends, notably in his work, that towards a heavy emphasis on natural disasters rather than civil defence. The early baptism of fire for the Natural Disasters Organisation (NDO) with Cyclone Tracy is largely responsible for this emphasis, but there are other factors, not least of all political ones, which play a part. There is a need for a distinction between the two basic requirements (ie, civil defence and natural disasters) since the division of responsibilities and authority between Federal and State governments, within each, are very different, because of constitutional limitations. Civil defence is clearly a Federal responsibility but the basic organisation required is at a State and local government level. Disaster relief operations bring votes for both State and Federal governments. For State governments, the disaster relief operations also offer the chance of access to additional Federal funds. Unfortunately, civil defence offers few such benefits.

The basic principle in civil defence is maximum self-sufficiency and the decentralization of resources and responsibility. However the paradox is present that too much reliance should not come to be placed on the manpower and material resources of the Defence Force since these resources may not be available in time of national defence emergency. The volunteers who man the state emergency services may also be members of the military reserve forces. Especially during a period of minimal threat, the public comes to have little appreciation of the totality of the defence requirement. Need Israel be mentioned!

These considerations point to 'a requirement for a substantial geographically structured military organisation, available for developing plans and establishing arrangements with the various State and local government authorities' (Baker, p.213). Apart from the somewhat sterile Joint Service Local Planning Committees (JSLPCs), there is not much defence planning on a geographic or regional basis at present. Relevant defence organisation and perceptive long-range planning are often not recognised as vital components of an effective defence posture. In this regard, Colonel Baker's comments on civil defence requirements have wider relevance.

Colonels Baker and Gower are to be congratulated for providing tangible proof that the Defence Fellowship Scheme does have something to offer, not only to the individual Defence Fellows, but also through their scholarly contributions to the defence debate. There is satisfying evidence in these two papers of genuine objective study, free of the incestuous subjectivism which is often evident in departmental papers. If this continues to be so, then the Defence Fellowship Scheme will be serving the public well.

Unfortunately only one defence fellowship was awarded for 1979. This was granted to Mr J.C. King, formerly of the Force Development and Analysis Division of the Department of Defence, who will be studying 'Australia's Defence Administration Requirements in Time of Conflict' at the Australian National University. Several uniformed officers applied for fellowships but apparently the current tight manpower situation militated against their success. Hopefully this will only be a temporary situation, since it will be a great pity, if the Defence Fellowship Scheme, after its initial success, stagnates through the inability of the Services to make officers available. It is also a pity that a research topic has not been approved so far of more specific maritime importance.

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Fox, L.G.	McDonald, N.E.	Stevens, J.D.
George, J.	Macleod, B.D.	Summers, A.M.F.
Gibbs, B.G.	Natley, R.J.	Swan, R.C.
+ Goddard, F.C.	+ Nicholson, B.M.	+ Swan, W.N.
Grierson, K.W.	Nicholson, I.H.	Williams, K.A.
Hall, I.W.	Orr, D.J.	York, D.
+ Associate Member		

