^eapow&r '79
AUSTRALIA AND SEAPOWER
AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE
FIRST NATIONAL SEMINAR 2nd — 3rd FEBRUARY 1979

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SEMINAR PAPERS

Publication ol these Proceedings has been sponsored by Fried Krupp GmbH Krupp Alias Elekuonik ol Bremen. Federal Republic ol Germany, suppliers ol advanced eleclronic systems lor manlime dolenco lo Ihe Royal Auslralian Navy and 17 omer navies ol me Western World

SEAPOWER 79 — SEMINAR PAPERS
Title	Page
Acknowledgements		2
Introduction to the Seminar — by Rear-Admiral
R.C. Swan, CBE, RAN —President of the Australian Naval Institute		3
Opening Address — by His Excellency. Sir Zelman Cowen. AK, GCMG. KStJ, AC — Governor General of the Commonwealth
of Austalia and Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Force		4
Australia's Dependence on Sea Transport — by The Honourable
P.J. Nixon. MP — Minister for Transport		8
Australia and Military Seapower — by Commodore
J.A. Robertson. RAN Rtd		11
Australia as a Regional Seapower — An External View — by
Professor Michael MccGwire—Dalhousie University, Canada		18
After Dinner Address— by The Honourable E.G. Whitlam. AC. QC — Visiting Fellow of the Australian National University
and former Prime Minister of Australia		35
Maritime Combat Technologies 1980-2000 — A Panel Presentation Introduction — by Major Peter Young — Editor and
Publisher of the Pacific Defence Reporter		41
Securing the Use of Australia's Sea Lanes and Vital
Sea Areas—by Mr Nat Gould— British Aerospace		42
Submarines and Underwater Weapons — by
CommanderTonyGrazebrookRANR		45
Anti-Shipping Technology 1985-2000 by
Wing Commander R.W. Howe RAAF Rtd		49
Money for Defence — by Dr Ian Story — Management
and Economics Consultant		54
Balancing Strategy. Technology and Resources — A Personal Experience — by Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. USN Rtd —
Chief of Naval Operations 1970-74		69
Closing Remarks — by Rear-Admiral N.C. Macdonald.AO. RAN		78
Seminar Papers — Ordering Additional Copies		82
Seminar Programme		83
Papers or condensations of papers are not to be reprinted or reproduced without the permission of the Institute and speaker. Extracts may be quoted for the purposes of research, review or comment provided the source is acknowledged.

Journal of the Australian Naval institute — Page   i

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Australian Naval Institute gratefully acknowledges the assistance given to SEA-POWER 79 by
Rolls-Royce of Australia Pty. Limited
The Ford Foundation
Ansett Airlines of Australia
Philips Industries (Holdings) Limited
Vickers Cockatoo Dockyard Pty. Limited
Avis Rent-a-Car System Pty. Ltd.
Sony (Australia) Pty. Ltd.
and
British Aerospace Australia Limited
Page  2 — Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

INTRODUCTION TO THE SEMINAR
President of the Australian Naval Institute, Rear-Admiral R.C. Swan, CBE, RAN.

Your Excellency, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen.
I have much pleasure in welcoming you here today for this the first public seminar of the Australian Naval Institute.
The Institute was founded a little over three years ago. Membership is open to all persons who have a special interest in naval and maritime affairs, and today stands at some 400 regular and associate members The objectives of the Institute are:
 —	'To encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the maritime professions; and
 —	To provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and the maritime professions.'
Since its inception the Naval Institute has endeavoured to achieve these objectives. Firstly, by the publication of a quarterly journal; and, secondly, by the holding of regular meetings of the various chapters of the Institute in most States.
Today the institute sees coming to fruition yet another initiative in the furtherance of its objectives, that is the holding of periodic seminars on issues relating to maritime affairs, as a contribution to debate.

As you are aware this Seapower 79 Seminar will be addressed by distinguished speakers, a number of whom has travelled many air miles to participate. Each of the speakers will imparl to us views on some important facet of the seapower scenario, and thus contribute significantly to debate in this country.
I recall that a noted Australian author on Australian defence matters. Professor Tom Millar had this to say in one of his books:
From our understanding of Australia's position and problem, let us select the good where we see it. adapting where we need to. Let us also challenge our own thinkers, both inside and outside the defence organisation, to put up original ideas and proposals. Let us develop our own operational techniques. Let us not be frightened to have a public discussion on defence. It is the public, after all. which seeks and needs to be defended." 0)
i need hardly stress the apparent relevance of this quotation to the aim and aspirations of this Seapower 79 Seminar which we hope will indicate to all. the Australian Naval Institute's desire to encourage debate on maritime affairs.
I now ask His Excellency The Governor-General and Commander in Chief of the Defence Force to open this seminar
(1) T B Millar — Australia s Defence. Firsl Edition

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute — Page  3

OPENING ADDRESS
His Excellency, Sir Zelman Cowen, AK, GCMG,
KStJ. QC — Governor-General of the
Commonwealth of Australia and
Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Force

I rise with some hesitation lo take even a modest part in a Symposium on Seapower My last involvement in such an event was disastrous. The date was in 1943. and as a very |unior naval officer and part of an operational team at General Headquarters. South West Pacific Area. I had the responsibility for presenting the day's sightings and intelligence to the assembled military — I use that word broadly — eminence. Shortly before I was due to appear, we received a signal from a single reconnaissance Liberator, reporting a massive concentration of Japanese shipping. We quickly plotted the position; it was Rabaul Harbour, and all our intelligence told us that there were only a few barges there. I was working at high speed, and I reported to the assembled might: "we have a sighting from a B 24 ol a large concentration of shipping in Rabaul Harbour' Then, with all the inexperience of youth, I stated a conclusion without assignment of reason. "He's wrong". The words were scarcely out when I heard the hard tones of General Kenney's voice — Commander of the Fifth Air Force. "Son", he said, and no word could give a better portent of impending execution, "have you been in Rabaul today?" then he proceeded to shred me Dumbly I knew that he was right, and that in another sense I was right. But what crawled upstairs was a badly bruised and effectively instructed very junior naval officer During the afternoon the pictures confirmed my judgment, whatever the point of that might be Next day I came to report with my pictures in hand The Admiral — Admiral Carp-ender — with a kindness I did not often then see in Admirals, put an arm around my shoulder and said. "Give it to him. son". But General Kenney did not come that day. So far as I know, I did no significant damage to our war effort, but I have never forgotten that early short lecture I gave on seapower.
I have listened with interest to Admiral Swan's introductory remarks. This Institute is young, but has obviously attracted a substantial membership with a lively interest in naval and maritime affairs, and with a deep concern for defence policies and for matters touching the secur-

ity and welfare of this nation This seminar on Seapower '79 will raise a vanety of questions affecting the public policy of Australia, and we shall have the benefit of the thinking of overseas guests of great experience. I believe that it is important that such a debate should be conducted in such a forum as this: it serves the public interest by drawing public attention to the issues and the concerns: it encourages public debate, and it provides decision makers with information and ideas, particularly, which should be a valuable input to the processes of policy formulation. If I may say so. I have been much impressed by the quality of the Journal which the Institute publishes The quality of the articles written locally and those taken from overseas writers is high. I was particularly interested in the issue on surveillance, published in 1978. which deals, in particular, with the formidable problems which arise out of enlarged responsibilities which will flow from the proclamation of the massive two hundred mile zone
To Australia, the sea is ol enormous importance. This seminar will be principally concerned with the interests and the policies of Australia emerging from that fact We have, and have had. a great dependence on sea transport; it has been so since the nation's beginnings with settlement 191 years ago. Our security is intimately bound up with the sea. It is a persisting theme in writings about Australia and Australian attitudes that for long we have, as a people, showed a seeming indifference to issues of foreign policy and national security. In his brilliant book. The Tyranny of Distance', which raises many issues relevant to the theme of this seminar. Professor Geoffrey Blarney says that during the first world war. to which Australia made a massive proportional contribution in manpower and in dead, Australia still acted on most issues as if it were the Isle of Wight It is still comparatively recently that long held assumptions about the commitment of others to our defence have been modified Blarney's final words in The Tyranny of Distance' are these:
"Much of Australia's history has been shaped by the contradiction that it depended intimately and comprehensively

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on a country which was further away than almost any other in the world. Now the dependence had slackened; the distance had diminished. The Antipodes were dotting, though where they were drifting no one knew."
The edition from which I quoted is dated 1966. and reprinted in 1977. and I do not know if he took into account the Guam declaration. In any event, the question of the course for the Antipodes will surely be debated in this seminar.
If I may digress and offer another personal note, I should tell you that I am a present beneficiary of historic changes in naval policy affecting Australia. When, after agreement with the British Government, Sydney became the principal naval depot for the Queen s ships on the Australian station, the New South Wales Government offered to provide and maintain a residence for the Naval Commander-in-Chief For our overseas visitors, who may not yet have an easy familiarity with Australian history, I should point out that before 1901. there was no Australian Government, but a number of Colonial, later State Governments, of which New South Wales was one. The residence assigned was Admiralty House, and the first occupant was Admiral Tryon, whose history and unfortunate loss in a tragic naval collison is recounted in Richard Hough's absorbing book. Admirals in Collision'. The Admirals present will know that it was literal' collision. When the Australian Commonwealth Government decided to establish an Australian fleet, it was agreed in 1909 that the British Government would transfer all its properties in Sydney used for naval purposes. The new assumption of responsibility took place in 1913, and the (British) Admiral then said that he would hand over Admiralty House to the Commonwealth. In that year the house was loaned to the Commonwealth as a residence for the Governor-General when he was in Sydney There were issues as to the ownership, and some nice federal questions arose about which I know rather more than about naval matters. I shall, however, exercise iron control, and report that the decision was in favour of New South Wales, but that in 1948 the Commonwealth acquired the property. I live in Admiralty House when I am in Sydney, and I do so with great pleasure, looking from time to time at the stained glass crests of former Admirals whose shades must deplore the fact that the splendid residence has passed out of naval hands.
I must return to business Let me state a tew propositions which are clearly set out in Dr T. B. Millar's recent book. 'Australia in Peace and

War'. A map of the world centred on Australia shows it to be the most isolated of the continents, almost surrounded by oceans and with only a thin, broken chain of islands to the Asian mainland, which is almost 3.000 kilometres distant. There are considerable difficulties in providing a comprehensive defence of Australia's territory. There are 20.000 kilometres of coastline, difficult even to keep under aerial surveillance, let alone protect by continuous defence It is also the case that the sea has been a protection against invasion, but. as Dr Millar notes. Australia is no longer remote from world conflicts; for twenty-three of the thirty years between Pearl Harbour and the withdrawal from Vietnam. Australia has been directly involved in military activities in its region. We live close to heavy and growing centres of population in Asia, all of these (actors bear upon the themes of Seapower '79.
There is. further, the obvious importance of the sea to Australia as the "open highway" of her international commerce. Only a few days ago, near here in Canberra, there was a seminar on 'Oil and Australia's Future' which I opened. A point made there was that Australia s oil supplies are at present dependent to the extent of 30% on seaborne imports, and. failing substantial discoveries of indigenous oil. that dependence will grow during the 1980s. That makes for dependence on assured seaways, as does the movement of exports and imports by which Australia lives. Australia has a great dependence upon ships and shipping; geography dictates that, and I shall be followed by the first principal speaker in this seminar. Mr Peter Nixon. Minister for Transport, who will address himself to this matter Captain Stephen Roskill. the distinguished naval writer and historian, whom I had the pleasure of meeting some years ago. puts the matter quite plainly for a country in the position of Australia, when he says that "as long as the mercantile and military traffic of a nation is chiefly seaborne, the stoppage of that traffic will be a strategic requirement of great importance" Certainly our trade. and any possible military movement of persons and material, depend critically on seapower, on our capacity to keep the sealanes open for the traffic of trading and transport ships
There are important problems associated with the proclamation of the exclusive economic zone. Australia's action makes for a vastly expanded area of responsibility, touching the protection and policing of fisheries zones and the implementation of migration policies, which is a matter of special current concern. The role of the Services, particularly the Navy and Airforce. in surveillance and associated activity, is substantial. As was pointed out in the recent issue of the Institute's Journal on Surveillance, to which I

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute — Page  5

have already referred, an unlawful intrusion into our air or sea space is by definition a breach of our security, and it follows from that that surveillance is an appropriate task for these naval and air services. Having regard to the area to be covered, the strain on limited resources is very great. and of course it goes beyond immigration, drug and fishing issues into the area of military defence.
The programme of the seminar is wide ranging; it will obviously take account of matters concerned with technology. To have come so far in a speech on Seapower without reference to Admiral Mahan is at least surprising, but I am there now. In the Influence of Sea Power Upon History', he said that:
"the seaman who carefully studies the causes of success or failure .... will observe that changes of tactics have not only taken place after changes in weapons which necessarily is the case, but that the interval between such changes has been unduly long. This doubtless arises from the fact that an improvement in weapons is due to the energy of one or two men while changes in tactics have to overcome the inertia of a conservative class; but it is a great evil."

the U.S Navy is that the strategy of the United States depends on its technological leadership in the world; this in turn depends on a continuing research and development push into the broad spectrum of all of the sciences. In the specific context of seapower. he observes that "the power to use the sea is now and will be in the future dependent on our technology and our use of it in modern weapons systems at sea" That holds good for Australia as for the United States; our problem in the acquisition of the technology is a rather different one. having regard to our resource. The costs involved in the acquisition of the technology are formidable.
There are distinguished participants in this seminar, drawn from abroad and at home. I am pleased that they are here to make their valued contributions to the debate. The name of Admiral Zumwalt is well-known to all of us. and I welcome him as one Zed or Zee to another Professor MccGwire comes from Dalhousie University in Canada. I remember it for more snow than I ever want to see again, in January 1964, when, as a Visitor to the Law School over a week. I was worked and entertained very hard. I mention these two because of my tenuous links with them. To all of the visitors and speakers. I extend a welcome and an expression of gratitude for their participation in this seminar.

Mahan died in the year in which the first world war broke out, and the language is somewhat antique English, but it makes a very modern point and one of enduring significance; people are slow to change tools and tactics, even though technical progress makes it possible to make such changes as would improve their chance of strategic success. In a recent issue of the Institute Journal, there is an interesting article on 'The Impact of Technology on Strategy' by Admiral Hay-ward. U.S.N. His argument, particularly related to

The prospectus lor this seminar states that Australia "is a child of seapower. born, protected and sustained by it to this day and for the foreseeable future", and Seapower '79 is designed primarily to explore the implications of that. I conclude as I began, by saying that I hope that it will make a useful and substantial contribution to the identification and clarification of important issues of public policy, and I have pleasure in declaring it open.

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AUSTRALIA'S DEPENDENCE ON SEA TRANSPORT
The Honourable P.J. Nixon. MP — Minister for Transport

I welcome the opportunity to address you today and offer my congratulations to the Australian Naval Institute on the holding of their first national seminar.
Australia is a major trading nation, ranking seventeenth in the world in terms of value and therefore depends upon sea transport for the carriage of virtually all her exports and imports. International air freight movement, although growing rapidly during the current decade, is small relative to the total transport task

and is worth over twenty billion dollars accounting for around twenty seven per cent of our Gross Domestic Product. We are the world's largest exporter of iron ore and a major exporter of bauxite, alumina, coal, other minerals, grains, sugar, wool and meat. Despite domestic petroleum production, we import around twenty one million tonnes per annum of crude oil and petroleum products which represent around thirty per cent of domestic oil requirements. We also import producer materials, capital goods, and finished consumer products.

The prosperity of this country is vitally linked to our trading performance. Our manufacturing and service industries could very quickly grind to a stop if sea lines were closed These facts are self-evident. In this speech I will attempt to flesh out in some detail our dependence on sea transport and government shipping policies that provide the guidelines under which sea transport operates. At the same time I shall point to some of the implications of these facts for the formulation of strategic plans.
Before considering the supply of merchant shipping services on our coast it is important to gain an appreciation of the demand for those services. The total tonnage requirement for domestic freight carried by sea was less than fifty million tonnes in 1975/76 as compared with eight hundred million tonnes by road and over two hundred million tonnes by rail. However, sea is the preferred mode of transport for the movement of bulk cargoes over medium to long distances The average trip length is over two thousand kilometres compared to around two hundred and sixty kilometres for rail and thirty five kilometres for road.

The overseas shipping task has been not only important in terms of its size, but it has also experienced substantial growth, particularly in our bulk exports over the past ten years In 1966/ 67. some twenty eight million tonnes of bulk cargo was exported from Australia. By 1976/77. this figure had risen dramatically to some one hundred and sixty million tonnes.
As well as there having been changes in the size and content of Australia's overseas trade, there have also been significant changes in direction. The past decade has witnessed a con-
THE SPEAKER
Trie Honourable P J Nixon is a member ol the National Country Party and entered the Federal Parliament in 1961 as the representative ol Gippsland, Victoria He was appointed Minister ol the Interior in 1967 and con-linued in lhat position until 1971. when he was appointed Minister for Shipping and Transport Alter a period in Opposition (1972-751. he was appointed lo his piesenl posilion ol Minister ol Transport in 1975

The size of Australia's overseas trade is approaching two hundred million tonnes annually

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute — Page   7

siderable decline in Australia's exports to Europe, particularly to the U.K.. and a dramatic rise in our exports to Asian countries. Japan has now emerged as our major trading partner, both in terms of value and volume.
Many of our industries are dependent on supplies from overseas just as overseas industries and countries rely on us for their raw material and foodstuffs. Given the statistics I've mentioned, it's not difficult to envisage many industries being forced to close down in a very short time if our trading routes are cut. or significant delays occur
In 1976/77. Australia's seaborne cargo was earned by about six thousand vessels which called at Australian ports in the overseas trades and by a coastal fleet of approximately one hundred vessels.
Bulk and tramp shipping performs by tar the largest transport task in both our overseas and coastal trades and accounts for over ninety per cent of total tonnage handled Bulk shipping in general serves the carriage of low value high volume homogeneous cargoes, which move m large quantities, usually in full shiploads, and often between single ports
The other major type of shipping, liner services, caters mainly for general cargo Liner vessels operate usually on a regular timetable, stop at scheduled ports and accept cargo in small or large consignments at established rates of freight
Most of Australia's overseas liner cargoes are lifted by vessels operating within the framework of shipping conferences A shipping conference may be defined as a group ol two or more vessel-operating carriers which provide international liner services for the carriage of cargo on a particular route or routes, and who have an agreement to operate under common freight rates.
There are sixteen conferences operating from Australia to such areas as UK/Europe. Japan/Korea/East Asia and North America. Conferences may be either 'open or 'closed'. An 'open' conference imposes no restrictions on entry so long as a potential member agrees to charge published freight rates and observe conference rules.
Closed' conference means that new members can join only with the consent of existing members.
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The only open conferences operating in the Australian trades are in the trades to North America as the maritime laws of the United States presently prohibit 'closed' conferences.
It is important to note that Australia is geographically isolated from its main markets and suppliers, and is not located astride major shipping routes of the world
Despite the distance. Australian liner shippers enjoy, in such trades as UK/Europe and Japan, a frequency of sailings even/ three to four days. The frequency of sailings and the diversity of destinations indicates the difficulty our defence forces would have in protecting ships and their cargoes.
Most of you will be aware that substantial changes have occurred in ship technology in recent years. The aim of these changes has been to improve the efficiency of operations and reduce the impact of the escalating cost of shipping.
The spectacular increase in the size of bulk vessels in recent years reflects a desire to exploit potential economies of scale. Because of their size and cost large modem bulk carriers are often designed to perform a specific task and designated to a specific route for the whole of their economic life, for example, the bulk carriers built especially for the Australian/Japanese iron ore trade.
In the liner trades, contamerisation has been the major technological change. Its main advantages are a reduction in vessel port turn-around times and handling costs as compared with conventional shipping.
Furthermore, there are various types of modern vessels, such as cellular containerships, Ro-Ro vessels and hybrid vessels, which now carry about two-thirds of the general cargo moving through Australian ports.
These changes in ship technology have in turn resulted in revolutionary changes in the character of many Australian ports and m the development of specialised terminals and specialised handling equipment.
Therefore, specialised types of vessel are not easy to adapt to a different role, for example, for defence purposes. Cellular container ships in particular are inflexible as they normally are not self-geared bul depend upon sophisticated shore facilities for the loading and discharging operations.
When container ships were introduced, the number of port calls was reduced This obviously

has brought about a concentration of shipping and capital intensive facilities in the major ports, particularly for liner cargoes, which could suggest a vulnerability to attack. The smaller regional ports would have great difficulty in handling specialised vessels if they had to be diverted.
With respect to future developments in both shipping and ports. I would like lo make a couple of points for your consideration. As the trend to larger more economic ships continues and the cost of port dredging and construction to take such vessels becomes prohibitive, alternatives will be sought. An example is the loading of ores and other minerals in slurry form via long offshore pipelines, in a similar way that the very largest oil tankers are on and off loaded. Such ship/ shore contact points will be difficult to protect. Similarly the likely use of LPG tankers, costing up to one hundred million dollars each, to ship gas from the NW Shelf to USA or Japan has a great potential for vulnerability.
Shipbuilding and ship repair facilities available in Australia must be important factors in any strategic plan.
The construction of ships in Australia today is confined to vessels up to about twenty one thousand gross registered tonnes. Construction of vessels in the medium range, i.e. up to six thousand gross registered tonnes seems to be active and competitive with overseas yards, given generous financial assistance, provided by the Government in the form of a subsidy on each approved vessel built. The shipyards capable of building larger vessels have ceased shipbuilding following an IAC report on the industry and Government decision at that time not to increase the level of subsidy above forty five per cent.
The government is presently considering a draft IAC report which indicates that there is adequate dry dock capacity in Australia for commercial vessels up to eighty five thousand tonnes deadweight, and demand is such that it is unlikely that any significant new commercial ship repair facilities would be provided in Australia in the foreseeable future.
The Government's shipbuilding arrangements ensure that Australian shipyards are given equal opportunity to compete with overseas yards for new buildings. The Government is expecting a report from the IAC early this year on the small ship industry. This sector of industry, of course, has particular defence significance.
An integral part of any strategic plan would be an appreciation of the vessels Australia presently owns in the overseas and coastal trades. In overseas trades Australia currently has eleven

modem ships operating regularly providing liner and bulk services. These vessels carried over one million tonnes of import and over two million tonnes of export cargo in 1976/77, representing about three point seven per cent of total imports and one point three per cent of total exports.
There has been a steady increase in Australian involvement in overseas trades, since the A.N.L. first entered overseas operations in 1969.
In coastal trades we have ninety four vessels of one point three million tonnes serving our requirements. Thirty nine of these are bulk carriers principally used to meet the needs of the base metal industries. Australian coastal movements of crude oil and petroleum products are earned between sixteen tankers. These two categories of ships represent over half of our fleet (sixty per cent of gross tonnage) and between them carry over eighty per cent of our total sea domestic traffic.
The rest of the fleet constitutes roll-on roll-off vessels operated in servicing Tasmania and North Queensland, and specialist vessels used for industry and in serving isolated communities.
Despite current Australian flag participation in our overseas trades, Australia continues to be heavily dependent on foreign vessels to cany its exports and imports. The principal foreign flag carriers in 1976/77 were Japan carrying thirty nine per cent of the total trade, Liberia seventeen per cent, the United Kingdom ten per cent and Norway six per cent.
The Commonwealth Government's policy is to develop and maintain an efficient transport system. With respect to sea transport, the policy is to encourage maximum utilisation and flexibility in the provision of coastal services and ensure that efficient and economic transport is available in support of Australia's overseas trading effort.
However, we draw a clear distinction between coastal and overseas shipping.
The Australian coasting trade has traditionally been reserved for licensed vessels under the provisions of the Navigation Act. In effect vessels participating in the coasting trades on a regular basis are required to be Australian manned with Australian wages and conditions. This does not apply to the overseas trades.
The maritime unions have been seeking an increased share for Australian manned vessels in our overseas trades, particularly in the oil and coal area.

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute — Page   9

The Government will encourage and support the use of Australian flag ships in overseas trades where their operation is economic and efficient. However, we are not prepared to subsidise the costs of operating Australian vessels in overseas trades, nor is the Government prepared to interfere with normal commercial contracting arrangements.
The fact that Australian vessels are operating commercially in selected overses trades suggests to me that government intervention or reservation is not necessary.
At the same time we recognise a growing protectionism among developing nations for a greater share in the carriage of trade. In 1974 a United Nations Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences was agreed which goes into the complex issues of cargo sharing and protection of shipper interests The Convention has not yet entered into force but an increasing interest has recently been shown in the Convention because of the growing bilateral arrangements concerning the sharing of the carriage of the trade between two countries, the increasing resort to reserving cargoes for the national flag and lastly the competition posed by the rapid growth of Eastern Bloc carriers. We are currently examining the implications for our shipping policies and laws, should a decision be made to ac-ced to the Code. The Government recognises the important contribution shipping conferences can make to the provision of efficient shipping services. Conferences facilitate economies of scale in vessels, deter uneconomic competition which could lead to a breakdown of scheduled services and generally provide a reliable service.
You will be aware of the anti-restrictive philosophy contained in the Trade Practices Act. The overseas cargo shipping provisions of that act. Part X, were formulated more than a decade ago
A departmental study group to review Australia s overseas cargo shipping legislation was set up in March 1977. It has proposed measures to strengthen Part X. and provide powers for possible use against state controlled shipping, if our trades are disrupted. The Government will shortly be considering an interdepartmental committee report on this subject
The Government has received a number of representations from the shipowners of the major Western maritime powers concerning the activities of the Soviet Far Eastern Shipping Company.

or FESCO, that competition from this line was not commercially based.
Soviet flag vessels carried in 1976/77 about one and three quarters million tonnes or less than one per cent of our trade. We are monitoring the activities of FESCO but taking into account our trading interests we have adopted an even-handed policy. As I mentioned before, the report reviewing our overseas cargo shipping legislation recommends countervailing legislation to be employed should the competition from state owned lines seriously disrupt our existing shipping services. In the meantime. I want to ensure Australian shippers have access to the most economical shipping arrangements.
Australia is indeed dependent on sea transport, and I have tried to indicate to you today the extent of that dependence and the Government policies within which the current regimes operate. Any strategic plan to meet contingencies in an emergency situation will need to take account of these facts and the problems of vulnerability that they raise. The Government of a continent that has only a small population must maximise the use of the limited resources available to it. I consider that as a trading nation our first concern must be with the efficiency of shipping operations in order that we may remain competitive in our overseas markets. A strong viable economy is better placed to meet our defence expenditure requirements than heavily investing for strategic purposes to increase the share of Australian flag participation in our merchant shipping. So we are heavily dependent on traditional world shipping to service our needs. At the same time I am proud that under this Government a viable Australian presence has been achieved in selected overseas services and I am confident it will grow.
The changes to greater size, greater sophistication — and therefore greater capital costs — and more specialised roles, both for the ships and our major ports, inevitably results in less flexibility viewed from a defence standpoint.
At the same time we do have a sizeable Australian fleet of diversified types of vessels and there is a viable small-ship building capacity and adequate repair capability, all encouraged and supported by Government policies.
I leave you to think about some of the strategic problems I have raised
Thank you

Page 10 — Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

AUSTRALIA AND MILITARY SEAPOWER
By Commander J.A  Robertson. RAN Rtd.

At the outset I believe it would be as well to define the term military seapower'. as I mean to use it. For those who believe that seapower is only concerned with armed forces the adjective military' may appear tautological, let me make it plain, then, that the definition of 'seapower. as I understand it, embraces all the means to secure, or to prevent, the use of the sea. On this basis, and to make a distinction from the merchant shipping element of seapower which Mr Nixon has just been talking about, the term military seapower' has been deliberately chosen to indicate the armed lorces and weapon systems employed in support of the maritime component of a national strategy. Here again, though, one could expect there will be some people present who would not necessarily agree with my view that any military weapon system used to secure the use of the sea. or to prevent its use by an enemy, is an element of military seapower. Thus, while it might be agreed that a landbased anti-ship coastal defence missile system would be part of a nation's military seapower, if one were to say that a military aircraft engaged in a maritime task was acting as an element of military seapower. it could be expected that there would be a number of people who would assert that it was. on the contrary, an element of air power.1 If there are any here today who would hold such a view we can perhaps discuss our disagreement afterwards, but I must say now that I would have to ask you exactly what you mean by air power'?
I suggest, your definition would most probably be on the lines of a widely held misconception that, if a vehicle is military, and it flies, it is. therefore, an element of airpower In terms of philosophies of military strategy I am bound to say that I believe that is quite wrong and worse, it leads to an equally distorted complementary opinion that military seapower is only concerned with the surface and subsurface of the sea. Unfortunately these misconceptions are shared by a lot of people, including quite a number of senior people both, military and civilian in our Defence Department. Experience of the existence of such misunderstanding is. of course, one of the main reasons for holding this seminar But I believe it is important to air these matters, to throw them

open for discussion, and see what they mean (or Australia.
What I intend discussing, then, are Australian attitudes as I have observed them, about the use of military forces for preventing the use ol the sea by an enemy, real or potential, and for securing the use of the sea. where that might be a national requirement.
I think it is true to say that the level ot understanding of the nature of seapower by most Australians is. generally, poor. and. to judge by what is written in newspapers, magazines and books today, our public attitudes seem to have become frozen at the position expressed in the House of Representatives by Mr Green, the member for Kalgoorlie, as long ago as 1923 — over half a century ago I will return to Mr Green later; in the meantime it may help to explain how we got into this state of arrested development if we take a look at some aspects of our history Most nations are imprisoned in their history, and Australia is no exception.
THE SPEAKER
Commodore John Alan Robertson graduated Irom Ihe RAN College in 1943 and saw service in Ine Royal Navy on lire East Indies Station and in Ihe English Channel Atler the war, he took pad in the mine clearances ol Ihe earner Reef and New Guinea Islands areas. He specialised in Communications in 1952 and after RN exchange joined HMAS MELBOURNE (CVS-21) lor her commissioning in 1955 As a Communicator, he has also been variously Fleet Communications Officer. Officer-in-Charge NAVCOMSTA Darwin, and Director ot Naval Commurxctions After passing Ihe RN Staff Course in 1963. he had a lurlher two years ex change service in Singapore as a Joint Planner on trie staff of the C-m-C Far East Subsequently, he was posted as Executive Officer HMAS MELBOURNE Me has commanded HMAS DUCHESS (DD-154). HMAS HOBAHT(DDG-39). andHMAS SrA(.WAR7(AD-215) He was serving as Director-General of Naval Policy and Plans before his retirement from the RAN on 1st February. 1979 Commodore Robertson is a co-founder ol Ihe Australian Naval Instilule and was Us President 1977 78

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute — Page 11

It is. of course, well known that the individual Australian colonies acquired naval delence forces and set up coastal defence forts and batteries during the Russian invasion scares of the nineteenth century Thus, from our earliest days, the settlers attitudes were what might be called the Alfred-the-Great approach to military sea-power The idea was to resist an invader at sea where it is generally easier to deal with him rather than after he has landed. In today s maritime strategy terminology the Colonies were concerned with sea denial forces. And that was fair enough too. for their times and their circumstances. In the event, of course, the feared invasions never occurred, and, when the Colonies became the new Commonwealth in 1901, their separate naval forces were amalgamated into a single force
My impression of the history of the era between Federation in 1901 and up to 1914. is one of unbound confidence in the future of the new nation, tinged with a faintly anti-British spirit of independence In turn, this was reflected in the attitude towards Defence, there was. it seems, a most laudable intention to be as self-reliant as possible Australia s plan for the acquisition of a national maritime delence force did not please London very much at first, and there was some determined resistance to these proposals
Australia, however, continued to press, and in a deteriorating international situation in Europe, agreement was finally reached in 1909 for the formation of an Australian Navy It was to be Of some ambitious proportion for a small nation 1 battle cruiser. 3 cruisers. 6 destroyers and 3 submarines As part of the price of London's agreement, though, it was agreed that, in the event of war. this Australian squadron would come under the operational command of the Admiralty; the E mpire s naval resources were to be centrally directed from London, which took upon itself the responsibility for the maritime defence of the whole Empire, a policy of Imperial Defence which was to be continued long past the time it was practicable, and which was to be one of the causes, in the end. of the loss of the Empire
As 1914 approached the sometimes anti-British sentiments of the early 1900 s became muted and Empire fervour reached such a pitch that Andrew Fisher became Prime Minister in 1914. the year in which he promised that Australia would assist the Mother Country to the last man and the last shilling. And so. on the outbreak of the war. the Navy disappeared into the Royal Navy, hardly to be seen or heard of again by most Australians — except for the SYDNEY'S victory over the German cruiser EMDEN in November 1914. As an aside here, it is perhaps symptomatic of Australian attitudes to military seapower that, in 1964. Dr Tom Millar could describe the

Australian Navy s reflected glory from this successful action as "not wholly deserved since it was a most unequal contest" 2 Yet no one in Australia seems to feel compelled to comment on the battle of El Alamein, for example, in a similar vein. One may note, a little wryly, that in this celebrated battle Rommel was outnumbered almost 2 to 1 in men. 2 to 1 in tanks, and over 10 to 1 in artillery, but I have yet to hear of it described as a most unequal contest'. I mention this, not in any spirit of rancour, nor to detract in any way from the desert victory, but merely to illustrate the sort of comment which apparently is acceptable to Australians in maritime affairs, but which, in another context, could be expected to draw some fire. But perhaps you do not find it as curiously ambivalent as I do.
Since Australian forces in World War I were mostly employed in the European and Middle Eastern theatres as Imperial units, their history is that of the Empire's forces directed from London And. of course, the great event of 1915 was Gal-lipoli. By any objective view of military history u was a thoroughly mismanaged and badly executed operation ending in an unqualified defeat, and yet it became the operation which passed into our national defence mythology as the prime example of Australians at war It was. I believe, one of the few ideas of any strategic merit in all the long grinding man-killing years of a continental war ol attrition in Western Europe, and the gallantry and panache ot the Anzacs set an outstanding example for all Australians — but the price was high for a small nation Together with the remaining years of the war in France. Australia had nearly a quarter of a million casualties, and many families were affected directly. With the RSL. Legacy and Anzac Day to remind us regularly of the price we had paid for our so-called coming ol age in World War I. an important, and perhaps the single most important element in Australian attitudes to defence matters was created
The Imperial Navies did not emerge Irom the war with quite the same remembered warmth Sea warfare was remote and foreign The value of the slow stranglehold of blockade on Germany did not become evident until the war was over, and by then it had no impact. The inconclusive nature of the Battle ot Jutland added to the feel-of disappointment of the century old glamour of Trafalger in which the Empire s Navies had basked was gone.
At the time there was a leeling ot revulsion against the slaughter in France, and Britain was determined never to become involved in land warfare in Europe again Liddell Hart wrote his appeal for a return to what he called The British Way of Warfare", the pre-1914 maritime strategy of the Napoleonic wars But that was Europe As

Page 12 — Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

far as Australia was concerned we had decided that Japan was the threat and. like the Russians in the 19th century, would try to invade us So. together with New Zealand, we enouraged the Admiralty in its plans to develop Singapore as the base from which a British main fleet would sally forth to defend the South Pacific Dominions.
In hindsight the thinking behind this plan is a bit hard to follow As Colin Clark, the Australian economist, has pointed out. a Japanese invasion fleet did not have to steam within 4000 miles of Singapore to attack Australia 3 And those who suggested that the place for a Fleet to be based to defend Australia was Australia itself, were disregarded. In any case. I do not.think it is unfair to say that, between 1914 and 1921. Australia had regressed lo the outlook of a sell-governing colony. As Geoffrey Blarney has observed, although nominally independent, in international affairs between the wars Australia behaved on most issues as if it were the Isle of Wright" * Having abdicated responsibility for our own foreign affairs in any practical terms, and having insured with London over defence matters we merely paid the premiums by allocating the largest part of our small defence vote to the Navy as part of the pattern of Imperial Defence In terms of observable results we then forgot about the matter and thought of more important things, football, bodyline bowling, and of course, the Depression
This is not to say there was no public discussion of Defence, and Mr Green made his contribution to some of the debate, such as it was. But before we hear what he said there is one very important matter which needs to be understood Despite Julian Corbetts refinements of Mahan; despite the formation of a Naval Staff at the Admiralty and the introduction of the Royal Naval Staff Course; despite the effect of German submarines in 1917: despite all these important matters, the available evidence indicates that the Admiralty had misread the essential basis of the very seapower it so publicly expressed its faith in. incredible as that now seems. The trouble began when the RN, wittingly or unwittingly, took Clausewitz to sea and became obsessed with the idea of the Big Batlle to sweep the enemy navy from the sea.
No doubt a hundred years of Pax Britannica and memories of the consequences of the Armada. Trafalgar, and more recently the Battle of Tsushima in 1905 had influenced the Royal Navy; Churchill, you will recall, had described Jelhcoe during World War I as "the only man on either side who could lose the war in an afternoon". That sort of approach exercised the greatest influence on most naval thinking for nearly all of the twenty years between the wars — and so. most nations, not just Britain, built battleships, so

as to win the Big Battle that they believed would decide the outcome of the war at sea They thought, apparently, that the battleship was seapower incarnate — and a lot of people believed them Reinforcing this misleading deviation in the Royal Navy was an introspective obsession with the Battle of Jutland s The lail-ure to obtain a conclusive result was studied and restudied. there was to be no failure on a future occasion It was. as Roskill says, a period of tactical sterility A and rigid fighting instructions were developed with a view to fighting a maior Fleet action Cruisers were acquired and trained for the protection of trade against surface raiders, but the fact that it was the German submarine in 1917 which had almost put Britain out ol the war was almost completely overlooked Sonar (or ASDIC, as it was called then) was marginally improved, and put into destroyers to detect submarines but then the destroyers were to be formed in screens to protect the battle fleet
This is not to say that there were no critics of the battleship, many of them in fact were well respected naval officers Jackie Fisher. Sir Percy Scott, Mark Kerr and Lord Wemyss in Britain. Sims. Fulham and Fiske in America, and Scheer in Germany Such naval critics advocated the aircraft and the submarine as the means of sinking other warships. But even they appeared to see military sea power only in terms of sea denial In fact, they were not arguing about the strategic concept but about the technology by which it was to be effected Apart from the cruiser defence of trade mentioned earlier little thought was given to the need to secure the use of the sea. or. in today's terminology, to conduct sea assertion operations In all the 20 years between 1919 and 1939 the RN did not hold one single slow mercantile convoy exercise.7 It is astonishing but it is true Admiral Tom Phillips who was the DCNS at the Admiralty in 1939. has been described as one of the leaders of school in the RN to which when asked how Britain would secure its vital Atlantic life line replied on the lines "We did it before We'll do it again "and dismissed the problem 8 Britain s Coastal Command, which tor no clear military reason, remained with the RAF after the return of the Fleet Air Arm to the Admiralty in 1937. had never exercised with or against a submarine, and itsaircraft and weapons in 1939 were simply inadequate In the RAF. as David Divine has said. Coastal Command was the runt of the litter' 9 As war drew closer the Admiralty began to consider the need to protect merchant ships against submarines and it recalled the value of convoys in World War I: but the Air Mm istry asserted that convoys would make such easy targets for bombers that they would simply not be practicable ,0 And there the matter rested until the ATHENIA was torpedoed the day the war broke out

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute — Paoe 11

It is against this background of an almost universal misunderstanding of the true purposes of seapower. that Mr Green delivered himself ot his view of Australias military seapower requirements If all the experts seemed to think principally m terms of sea denial, and its combat technology, who else would put him right9 On the 17th July 1923 Mr Green said this in the House. "The future of Australia must look black if we are to spend the greater part ol our revenue in the purchase ol battleships, when a modern battleship costs no less than £7M A modern battle-plane is estimated to cost £2500. so that, for the cost of one battleship Australia might have 2800 modern battle-planes. Judging by what I have read. it is clear that for the expenditure of a comparative ly small amount of money Australia might be made immune trom attack by even the most powerful naval force in the world  H
Since Mr Green had taken his views from some quite distinguished naval authorities his attitude was perhaps understandable What is less easy to comprehend is why this very limited view of Australia's need for military seapower is so deeply entrenched in Australian attitudes to this very day Dr McCarthy s book Australia and Imperial Defence 1918-1939 which is subtitled A Study m Air and Sea Power is a recent example And to any student of seapower Dr McCarthy suggests the limits of his own understanding by not detining seapower any more precisely than the doctrines of Admiral Marian' l9 His understanding ot air power doctrine is better, but he then goes on to acknowledge that, in the 1920s, the European theories of air power as expounded by Douhet and Trenchard had no application to Australia. Australia was too remote to be able to bomb anyone else s country, and for the same reason we had no need to worry about an enemy's landbased bombers In acknowledging the fact that European theories ot air power did not apply to Australia, the author then says. But the writings of the American Brigadier General William Mitchell did' ,3 In his comments Dr McCarthy makes it quite clear that he believes, like Mr Green, that Australia s main requirement between the wars was an air force designed, m seapower terms, lor sea denial, and us principal task would have been to repulse an enemy invading force. This retrospective suggestion for the adaption of Mitchell's ideas from America to Australia is questionable on two grounds The first is that the RAAF s source of aircraft and doctrine in those days was the Royal Air Force, and that Service's dismal performance m sinking ships even as late as 1941. suggests that there would have been little inspiration or useful equipment from Britain, even if the RAAF had been allotted the whole of the defence vote before 1939 M The second ground is the belief that invasion was the
Page 14 — Journal ot the Australian Naval Institute

one threat to worry about In writing of a similar concern in the United States in the 1930s Theodore Ropp has since described it as an esssentially bogus threat l5 It would seem that Dr McCarthy would not agree with that comment as far as Australia is concerned We shall see. but before we do so. it is necessary to briefly return to further aspects of British strategic thinking between the wars, since it was to have such an important bearing on Australia's situation
In the late 1920s Britain could see no threat, the 10 year rule was enshrined, and there was no central strategic policy, so the Services fell back on their individual doctrines of warfare As one writer has said The absence of a generally accepted and coherent national strategic doctrine forced all three Services into an internecine struggle in which the object apart from mere survival, was never very clear."'* (I wonder if any serving officers here today find that comment strikes some response in them?)
The Royal Navy, as we have seen, chose Japanl7 as its threat and combined with its deviant view of the nature of seapower went one way. The Army chose Russia.18 and to fight a large land battle in Afghanistan to defend India with cavalry, infantry and World War I artillery. Since it was generally accepted that Britain would never willingly fight in a land war in Europe again they had to find a locale for a land battle somewhere, and who needed tanks for instance, in Afghanistan? The Royal Air Force chose France19 as its enemy to bomb into submission Bombing would win the next war they said, and they convinced a lot of people particularly politicians There was some interest in air defence but since it was believed that the bomber would always get through it was not pursued with much vigour. Army co-operation was almost non-existent and. as I have indicated earlier, Coastal Command came a bad last.
This divided defence establishment was then confronted in the 30's with a combination of Hitler, Mussolini, and Japan's adventurism m the Far East — and. not surpnzingly, it was neither prepared, nor able to cope Furthermore British politicians had continued to offer defence guarantees to the dispersed Empire, and we know what that meant for Australia. By 1938 the Empires leaders in London could still not decide the main thrust of their strategy. Should it be Home Defence, Imperial Defence or Balance of Power in Europe?90 Poor Neville Chamberlain, universally reviled ever since, was stuck with a situation close to home in Europe, and a military establishment totally unable to do anything effective about it The more I read of Munich the more I feel

for him. In one sense, at least, he was the victim of (he preceding years of defence force development which began with the premise that there was no threat, and therefore it was believed there could be no clear, coherent central strategic policy. We might do worse in Australia than to ponder Britain's dilemma then, and see if we might learn from it for ourselves today. At all events, international politics forced Britain into trying first the Balance of Power strategy, and then, when that failed, she was left with no alternative but Home Defence. As things were in Europe. Imperial Defence had to be relegated to the too hard basket. And, in any case, unless Britain herself survived there was no hope of helping the Empire.
Australia sent off its forces to the northern hemisphere, and Britain struggled through the first two years of World War II in Europe and Africa. The Australian Navy and the rapidly expanding RAAF disappeared into their parent British arms while the Australian army maintained more of its national identity in its divisions. Our news was dominated by the progress of land warfare in North Africa, Greece. Crete and Russia, the Battle of Britain and. less dramatically, the never-ending Battle of the Atlantic. In 1 his not-too-promising situation the Pacific War preliminaries warmed up and the Australian government called on Britain to honour its promises about Imperial Defence. Churchill responded by sending a so-called Main Fleet to Singapore — but continued to send his best air defence aircraft, Hurricanes, for example, to Russia. On December 9th 1941 the Prince of Wales and the Repulse were attacked by Japanese naval aircraft and soon sunk, as we all know, and Billy Mitchell's followers considered his assertions proved beyond doubt. What is often omitted in their version is that the ships were sunk, not by bombs, but, essentially, by torpedoes. It is an important difference. One other small aspect of this flow to Imperial Defence, and one which drew no particular attention at the time, nor has it since to my knowledge, was the death in action of an 18 year old Australian Midshipman, Mr Davies. Bob Davies was in charge of a light anti aircraft gun in the Repulse. When the order to abaondon ship was given it is reported that he remained at his post, and single-handed, continued to shoot at the attacking aircraft.22 It was also reported that he shot down several enemy aircraft before he finally perished with the ship. Mr Davies, among others, is not well known as one of Australia's more gallent servicemen, but I suspect that is the Navy s fault more than anything else. The tradition of silence has not really helped in the formation of Australian attitudes towards seapower.
So Singapore fell, the disastrous battles of the Java Sea. the loss of the Philippines and what

is now Indonesia followed quickly, and before we could think about it. it seemed. Japan s ribbon defence concept embraced all the islands to our north except New Guinea Here, for the first time, the Japanese Army did not achieve a quick victory Australian soldiers fought a dour delaying battle with their backs to Port Moresby, and the Japanese decided that the solution lay in an amphibious hook to take Port Moresby from the sea And this brought about the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942. As we know. the Japanese amphibious force was turned back and New Guinea did not fall In military seapower terms it was a successful sea denial action and it was. by any strategic standards, a clear victory for United States and. in its modest contribution. Australian military seapower. Yet, once again, doubts have been cast on the importance of this action, even to the extent of querying whether it was a victory at all because of a comparison of tonnages of ships lost on either side. I believe such negative opinions provide commentary on Australian attitudes to   seapower
It has since been suggested that the saving of New Guinea prevented a Japanese invasion of Australia. Certainly we thought so at the time, but the historical evidence available now won't support such a speculation because the fact is that Japan's policy then was to bluff Australia out of the war with propaganda.23 and failing that, to cut our sea lines of communication to the United States and let us wither on the vine By early 1942 any Japanese ideas of invading Australia had been shelved So. for Dr McCarthy to write that, "the fact that Australia was not invaded by Japan owed nothing to British and Australian defence policies between the wars".24 is true as far as it goes, but since Japan did not have a plan to invade Australia it seems to me to be an irrelevant comment on the value of the policies concerned Furthermore, because Dr McCarthy's book goes beyond 1939 to discuss some aspects of World War II, I consider his apparent unwillingness to record the success of Allied military sea power in the Pacific, and at Coral Sea in particular, is significant in a book purporting to discuss and compare the history of the strategic merits of air and sea power for Australia.
By any objective global view, the Pacific War was essentially maritime There was not the same continental warfare aspect necessary for final victory, as in Europe25 Nor will the evidence support a view that it was nuclear weapons which brought about the victory. Those terrible weapons merely advanced the already fast ap-roaching end. Since the major Australian contribution was in land forces and land based air it is perhaps not surprising that Australian public interest at the time, and since, has been directed to

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute — Page r 5

those activities, but this popular view distorts the real strategic issues. The war in the Pacific was a classic example of the use of all three apsects of military seapower, sea denial, sea assertion and power projection — and of course, given the geography of the area, it could not be anything else
So. in its own way World War II reinforced Australia's continental approach to military strategy, that is. that it was principally about the clash of land forces, including keeping potential invaders well away from Australia. Imperial Defence had died effectively at Singapore but we had reinsured with Washington. The essence of our policy after the war continued the colonial theme of providing contributions of forces to our major allies, and. distinct from the pre-1939 policies, the maintenance of a standing Army, to this end of Forward Defence we sent forces to Korea, to Confrontation and to Vietnam With this outlook a pattern for the Defence Force structure was established and developed in the 50 s and 60 s. and it remains substantially unaltered to the present day. This structure confirmed our public statements about our strategic intentions and the great and powerful friends who would be our protectors in a dangerous world. In hindsight of course, it looks very much like a variant of the Imperial Defence ideas of the 20 s and 30 s. But in the early 70s and. in the wake of the Vietnam war and the Guam doctrine, we repudiated Forward Defence, and from at least 4 years ago we began to speak of self-reliance, and the defence of Australia and its interests. It is all good brave stuff but it has not. I observe, resulted in any stated intention to alter the partem of our force structure An outside observer might deduce then, that the official view is that the force structure to support a more independent strategy of self-reliance and Home Defence is apparently much the same as that required for Forward Defence. I cannot help feeling it is a very convenient coincidence. It is not for me to try and preempt what Dr Story will say tomorrow about resources, and how they might be allocated, but it is simple and indisputable fact that since 1948 we have continued to allocate roughly 70% of our Defence resources to land and air warfare capabilities for thirty years and less than 25% to maritime warfare capabilities. 26 Translated back into strategic intentions in 1979 this could be crudely described as a Fortress Australia stance. In terms of maritime strategy we appear to understand, accept and encourage the need for sea denial capabilities — but we jib at the idea of the requirement for sea assertion capabilities in our national military seapower.
There are I suggest, several reasons for the attitudes we publicly exhibit. First there are the ingrained habits of thought derived from our brief history, our experience of these matters is princi-

pally in land based warfare, and there is the long standing fear of invasion extending back to the early settlers In this latter connection we might note that there are only two countries which I believe could mount a conventional amphibious invasion of Australia today One is the United States and the other is Russia. For anyone else to undertake a major operation of this nature, it would require quite a long time to acquire all the equipment and skills, and it would become pretty obvious. In any case sea denial capabilities to oppose such a threat are generally of much shorter lead time, cheaper and easier to acquire than sea assertion capabilities. The second is the trivial level of sensationalism in which public discussion of Defence matters continually locusses on the capital costs of equipment, and of naval forces fn particular, while conveniently ignoring the fact that we spend far and away the greater part of our money on people; and in this current financial year, and for many years past. 15% or less on equipment;27 no doubt sensationalism sells newspapers but it does not reflect much balanced consideration of these important issues Thirdly, there is ANZUS I have no doubts at all about its importance, or the genuineness ot Americas intentions to honour its obligations But the United States has a lot of other commitments, and it is just conceivable that it could become involved in a crisis elsewhere, and simply not have the resources to bail us out as we seem to expect, despite the warning implied by the Guam Doctrine. There is. as I have suggested, an uncomfortable sinmilanty with our expectations of Imperial Defence Associaled with that sort of thinking is that, while there is an acknowledgement of our dependence on seaborne trade, to the extent that, not being self sufficient,28 Fortress Australia is. in fact, not a practicable strategy option, we are offered the opinion that because most of our external trade is earned in other nations merchant ships, the world's maritime community would not tolerate interference.29 It's a nice pious hope to set against the consequences of it not being realized, as Britain found out in 1940. as Israel found recently in 1977. To take only a single example, from the mid 80's onwards we can expect to need to import about 70% of our oil. and it has been reported that we have only three to four weeks supply in the country. I consider this a strategic weakness of very considerable importance and. if we are not prepared to maintain a representative range ot sea assertion capabilities as a peacetime deterrent to interference with our vital trade we ought to be cementing up old coal mines and stockpiling oil in them, as fast as we can, and I mean now. As Dr Carol Bell recently observed. Australia is at the end of a long watery limb.30
Finally, there is no perceived threat to Australia, and by implication therefore there is no

Page 16 — Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

basis for a more precise strategic posture. I don't believe that is necessarily true. In the absence of a threat I offer the view that the prudent course would be to consider our vital national interests and to try to be able to deter threats to those interests. No doubt the selection of our vital national interests could make for a heated debate, and even then we would still have to consider the sorts of threats which could arise, but I believe it would focus our thinking on the sort o( self-reliance in defence matters that we really need. (If Professor Gelber is here no doubt he'll want to take me to task for that suggestion )
I am not in favour of narrow parallels drawn from history, but harking back to Britain's unfortunate experiences in the 20s and 30 s. we might draw some conclusions which could be applicable to Australia today. In Britain.
 —	The absence of a perceived threat resulted in no clear coherent central strategic policy
 —	In turn this lead to inappropriate force structure development.
 —	Even when strategic circumstances became clearer, the past structure and tactical doctrines took years to change: many changes in fact, were onty forced on the Services after the war began.
 —	Decisions made ten years or more before severely constrained the military options available to the Government of the day — as Chamberlain found out to his cost in 1938.
In Australia I believe our public attitudes to military seapower have derived very largely from our historical experience, with all its mystiques and superficial impressions, and today they are not substantially different from the views expressed by Mr Green in 1923. We resist the need for our military strategy to include a national sea assertion capability and we claim strategic justification — there's no threat, and if a threat requiring sea assertion does arise, someone else will ball us out: we claim it on technological grounds — we alone in the world appear to believe we can do it all with land-based aeroplanes or missiles or both, and finally, we claim it on the grounds of resources, we say we can't afford it

because maritime weapon systems are too expensive. Sooner or later I believe, we will have to come to terms with our ideas of what seapower is. and what it should mean to us. not out of our past habits of thought, but out of the enduring facts of our strategic situation. I can only hope it will come sooner than later.
This has necessarily been a fairly brief and selective run over the course of the formation of our national attitudes to military seapower as I see them: and since, in the process. I have also managed to attack nearly every long cherished idea in our national defence mythology. I probably have no friends left, but that is perhaps of less importance than if what I have said provokes some lively discussion ol military seapower, and its place in Australia's national strategy
FOOTNOTES
 1	This misconception probably arises from one of Tren-chard s polemics known as Ihe Unity ol the Air
 2	TB Millar Australia s Defence
 3	C Clark Australia's Hopes and Fears
 4	G Blarney The Tyranny ol Distance
 5	See S W Roskill Naval Policy Between the Wars
 6	Roskill The Strategy of Sea Power
 7	Roskill The Strategy of Sea Power
 8	A J Marder From the Dardanelles to Oran
 9	D  Divine The Blunted Sword
 10	Roskill The Strategy ol Sea Power
f t   Ouoted by Gill, official history of the RAN in WWII Vol I
 12	McCarthy Australia and Imperial Defence
 13	McCarthy Australia and Imperial Defence
 14	Divine The Broken Wing is worth quoting in full about RAF bombing raids on Schamhorst and Gniesnau immobile in a French port 11941) 1.875 aircraft in all were used in the raids 1 962 ions of explosives were dropped Ten hits were acknowledged, two of them duds Those who had accepted General Billy Mitchell s bomb in Ihe apple barrel claim of the 1920s, those who remembered Ihe bomb down Ihe funnel guarantees of his supporters had reason to ponder
 15	T  Ropp War in the Modern World
 16	B D Hunt — paper Smaller Navies and Disarmament
 17	M Howard The Continental Commitment
 18	M Howard The Continental Commitment
 19	M Howard The Continental Commitment
 20	M  Howard the Continental Commitment
 21	R Grenlell Main Fleet to Singapore
22	Eldridge History ol the RAN College
22   B Millot The Battle ol Ihe Coral Sea
 24	McCarthy  Ibid
 25	Corllll Barnett Britain and Her Army, makes some interesting objective observations
 26	Taken from Annual Detence Reports
 27	Defence Report 1978.
 28	See, among others. Corbett Energy tor Australia.
 29	P Hastings, article. Sydney Mormng Herald 1978
 30	Or Carol Bell. Review ol Ihe Strategic Balance. Age 1978

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute — Page 17

AUSTRALIA
AS A
REGIONAL SEAPOWER
By
Professor Michael MccGwire —
Dalhousie University. Canada

The purpose of "Seapower 79" Is to consider the role of maritime forces in protecting and promoting Australia's national interests, and my task is to provide an outsider's viewpoint. I have therefore added a question mark to the tile I was given, and ask "Should Australia be a Regional Seapower?"
The term "regional seapower" implies the capacity to influence the outcome of events in distant parts of adjacent regions by bringing military force (latent or applied) to bear by sea. For most of the last twenty five years Australia has been such a power It has had a well-balanced fleet, with a true distant water capability which could operate in a hostile maritime environment on its own, or as a component of a large allied force.

The question of whether or not Australia should aspire to be a regional seapower in the years ahead, must therefore be addressed in two stages. First, we have to identify the essential requirements for maritime defence in terms of geographic scope and the structure of forces And then we need to consider what additional capability would be required for Australia to play the role of a seapower in other parts of adjacent regions. But before addressing the question of future requirements, it is useful to recall the circumstances in which the present naval capability evolved, and the context in which future policies must operate
BACKGROUND
At the end of World War II, the West possessed a cooperative monopoly of seapower. which

However, the fleet was only one side of the equation, and the capacity to be a regional seapower depends on the balance of capabilities in the regions concerned It also presupposes a surplus of capabilities over the essential requirements for maritime defence. There has been progressive change in both these factors. The general proliferation of weapons among developing nations now makes it more difficult to bring preponderant power to bear, and the spread of sophisticated maritime systems has increased the capacity of coastal states to prevent the use of the sea in their vicinity. Meanwhile, the growing pressure on world resources, coupled with the exponential growth of population throughout most of Asia, means that Australia is acquinng a potential attractiveness to other states in the region and, as temptation increases, so to must the defences against them.
Page 18 — Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

THE SPEAKER
Professor Michael MccGwtre served in the Royal Navy during Work) War II and then undertook Russian language training He did exchange service with ihe RAN in the late 1940s and on return lo the UK pursued a normal Service Officers career, making use of his Russian mlerpretership qualification He served as Assistant Naval Attache. Moscow and his last appoint mem was in the Directorate ol Naval Intelligence as a Commander On retiremenl he look an economics degree and has pursued an academic career ever since. He is now Professor ol Defence Studies in the Political Science Faculty al Dalhousie University. Nova Scotia He is well known and well respected as a wntor and lecturer of seapower mailers, particularly those concerned with Russian seapower

ensured world-wide maritime domination and allowed the projection of Western military force to all parts of the globe. Before the habits of wartime cooperation had time to erode, the Korean War raised the spectre of global communist aggression and evoked a network of alliances encircling the Sino-Soviet bloc, with Western navies as an essential component of the containing forces. In the event, containment was not their primary role, and the first 25 years after World War II probably saw a greater use of navies as instruments of overseas policy than any previous period in history. Meanwhile, despite the progressive withdrawal from empire, British commitments east of Suez remained substantial and its navy was the dominant maritime force in the Indian Ocean region.
These were the general circumstances in which Australia decided on the basic shape of its navy, and then participated in the general build-up of Western forces which was accelerated by the Korean War. World War II had highlighted the central importance of aircraft carriers, surplus units were available at comparatively low cost, and Australia therefore acquired a small but effective distant-water fleet, built around the carrier. As if to confirm the wisdom of this choice, the arming of Indonesia by the Soviet Union brought a substantial (if rather old fashioned) naval capability to Australia's doorstep in the late fifties.
We all know that circumstances are now changed, and I won't run through these differences since they have provided the substance of the debate on Australian foreign policy and defence during the last ten years and are therefore well known There are. however, certain points which are not always mentioned in this context but are relevant to the role and structure of maritime forces. First, the proliferation of nation states and the emergence of a Third World voice in the United Nations and regional organisations, has progressively circumscribed the political utility and the military feasibility of overseas intervention by the Western maritime powers. Second, there has been a massive increase in the world's dependence on international seaborne trade and in the number of national shipping fleets, which has brought about a measure of interdependance at sea. Third, the sea is no longer the sole means of gaining access to distant areas, and airflight vehicles now have a substantial (although specialised) capacity in this respect. And fourth, development in weapons and sensors allow land-based systems to make an increasingly important contribution to maritime warfare. In common parlance, maritime weapons systems now encompass those which can be

brought to bear at sea (whether from land, sea or space), as well as those which can be brought to bear against land from the sea.
What is the requirement for maritime forces in the future? A logical approach requires us to review the likely situation in the years ahead; derive policy objectives from the review; determine the role of armed forces in pursuit of these objectives; and establish the maritime component of such a force. Unfortunately, life isn't logical. Not only do we have difficulty in predicting the course of international affairs, but national policy is subject to the vagianes of domestic politics. In other words, objectives may change over a relatively short period, while costly items of military hardware such as maior warships can last for 20-30 years The problem is therefore to build a navy for all seasons. Obviously we cannot ignore current objectives or future prognoses, but we must pay particular attention to such permanently operating factors as geostrategic location, the principles of war and the certainty of unpredictability
THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
I will not review the international context in which future policies must operate, except to note where I disagree with certain viewpoints expressed during the ongoing defence debate. First, I think that some analysts exaggerate the implications of the Guam Declaration in terms of US policy towards Australia. The section on 'Self Reliance' in the 1976 Defence White Paper sums up the present situation admirably, namely that the USA would respond to a fundamental threat to Australia's security, but that the threshold of direct US combat involvement might be quite high. It is not clear that, in practical terms, this represents any substantial change from the past. On the other hand. I am not persuaded by those who argue that because such a fundamental threat could only emerge in circumstances of global conflict. America would be unable to spare resources for Australia at such a time. This argument applies equally to those countries capable of posing this kind of a fundamental threat, while it ignores the importance of Australia in Western contingency plans for world war.
I am sceptical that a military posture of 'self reliance' will be any more or less effective in securinq US support for Australian policies, than the former posture of faithful ally' As in the past. America will continue to pursue its own interests (which it identifies with those of the broader world community), even when they conflict with particular Australian concerns, such as Indonesia.

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There would, however, seem to have been two new developments In this area. First, the reorientation of Auslralia's foreign policy away from the global bi-polar model towards a more complex concern for the Indo-Asian region will mean that perceptions of interest are likely to diverge more frequently with the USA. although they will continue to be congruent over vital interests. And second. Australia is becoming increasingly important to America in geo-strategic terms. The uncertain future of Taiwan and the perennial problems in the Philippines have increased the significance of Australia's position at the southern end of the US island-defence perimeter, which is so important to American influence in the Asian-Pacific region. The west coast of Australia allows direct access to the Indian Ocean, and the Cocos Islands provide a valuable staging post The various US facilities in Australia, such as naval communications, space tracking and seis-mographic installations are seen as bearing directly on the Soviet/American strategic balance. And it may be relevant that the most suitable great circle route between the Indian Ocean and the Trident base on the US Pacific Coast, passes close south of Australia. Although we should not exaggerate this geo-strategic importance, it is reinforced by the advantages of a stable democratic political structure, and a common language and cultural heritage. The absence of these factors elsewhere in Asia was partly responsible for the Guam Declaration.

along a 4500 mile frontier, its hostile influence spreading along Russia's southern flank, through Pakistan and perhaps Iran. Meanwhile the Soviet economy is slowing down and they are running into serious bottlenecks for investment funds and key resources, while they continue to lag in applied technology and managerial skills. And as if this were not enough, the problem of national minorities will not go away and they have yet to demonstrate that they have solved the question of orderly political succession.
This Western preoccupation with the military aspects of Russia's capability to the exclusion of Other factors, has the effect of reinforcing the more paranoic elements within the Soviet Union and weakening those forces within the national interest. During 1960-61. the rhetoric of the Western defence debate, coupled with the upsurge in US procurement of strategic weapons, prompted a reversal of Khrushchev's new defence policy, with its reduction in ground forces and a shift in strategic policy towards Western-style deterrence That reversal did not serve Western interests, military or political Nor would a reversal of Brezhnev's moves towards arms limitation and detente. Yet that is the most likely effect of indiscriminate anti-Sovietism Meanwhile, in terms of Australian foreign policy, such typecasting of the Soviet Union unnecessarily restricts the range of available options.

My second disagreement concerns the over-preoccupation in some quarters with the Soviet threat, both in global terms and as it affects Australia directly I will address the latter when considering naval requirements, but the former is more serious since it distorts the broader reaches of Australian foreign policy. This undue emphasis on the Soviet threat ignores relative capabilities and confuses what the Soviets might like to happen, other things being equal, with what it is possible for Ihem to achieve. Other things are not equal and the Soviety Union finds itself in an extremely disadvantageous position within the international system. The four other power-centres of the world are aligned against Russia and it no longer has a favoured position vis-3-vis developing nations, which see it as just another neo-imperialist power with a very restricted capacity for economic aid. Although the Soviet Union has achieved nuclear parity with the USA and retains an adequate grip on the European satellites, its broader foreign policy has had more setbacks than successes and many of the latter stem from Western ineptness rather than premeditated Soviet planning. China presents a double threat to Russia, with its ideological claim to leadership of the world communist movement, and its physical presence

This leads directly to my third point, which concerns China and Japan The euphoria over the recent rapproachements with the USA and Japan, which served to consolidate China's anti-Soviet stance, has somewhat obscured the fact that any long-range assessment of potential threats to Australian interests would have to place China high Up the list, while a Sino-Japan-ese condominium would be particularly worrying For the time-being China welcomes the American presence in the Asian-Pacific as a counter-poise to the Soviet Union, but in due course she expects to resume her natural role as paramount power in the region, and meanwhile remains a self-confessed revolutionary state. In contrast, the Soviet Union's centre of gravity lies well to the west of the Urals, and in many respects its access to Pacific-Asia is worse than America's. Furthermore. Russia is disadvantageous^ located within the region. Its territory lies at the far end of the important north/south axis of movement, which passes through waters which could be controlled by the other three powers.
This will not prevent the Soviet Union from being involved in South East Asia, as it attempts to contain the spread of Chinese influence. While it might be preferable if neither of the communist

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powers dabbled in the region, this is not an option. It is therefore best to have both there, since this shifts their primary emphasis away from supporting subversive revolutionary movements towards competing for the approval of the governments in power, as we have seen recently in ASEAN. A pre-determined anti-Soviet stance denies Australia this opportunity to influence policy in the region, while doing nothing to enhance the nation's security.
OBJECTIVES
It is hard to quarrel with the objectives set out in the Defence White Paper. They are to defend Australia's interests against military attack or harrassment, and to influence those developments in the area, which could affect Australia's long-term security. What we may want to question is whether the area of concern reflects the full scope of Australia's maritime interests. The White Paper defines this zone as extending from South East Asian to the South West Pacific countries and terntories. with particular reference to adjacent maritime areas. Papua New Guinea and Indonesia. This covers about a quarter of a million square miles and in certain directions, extends 2000 miles from the Australian coast.
These objectives generate two main types of requirement, which can be labelled defensive and assertive. These break down as follows: Defensive .. prevent attacks on Australian territory .. secure maritime communications Assertive   .. regulate the offshore zone
.. project military force ashore in parts of the area.
Past experience suggests that it would be wise to cover against a third type of requirement, which is to contribute to a larger allied capability And a fourth type of requirement, which is very important but will not be discussed further here, is the provision of military aid to other states in the area in the form of training, advisory services and the supply of weapons and equipment. The political effectiveness of this policy instrument derives largely from Australia's geographical location, which legitimises its military involvement in the area.
In many circumstances the same forces will have to meet the different requirements, but at this stage of the analysis it is useful to distinguish

between the two main types, since they stem from different determinants. The type of forces needed to meet the defensive requirements are determined by the scale and nature of the threat, whereas the choice of forces to meet the assertive requirement will reflect cost/benefit considerations.
When using threat as a determinant of force structure, military planners in a country with Australia's history and geography have to guard against two types of public reaction, both perfectly justified. One is that the postulated threat is so remote that one doesn't really have to bother about it. The other is that the problem of defending Australia is so vast as to be beyond the country's capability. The correct answer lies somewhere between these two extremes and relies heavily on the insurance analogy, where money spent on premiums reflects a judgment concerning the scale of possible calamities and the likelihood of their occurrence. Of course Defence insurance is unique, in that the probability of occurrence decreases as the size of the premium rises. The proper size of premium remains a political judgment, balancing costs, risks and consequences.
How best to invest the defence premium is complicated by the fact that perceptions of threat, and the political and budgetary responses they evoke can change very rapidly (as we saw at the time of Korea), whereas the reorientation and build-up of a military capability is a much more complex process. The problem is how to formulate a politically persuasive defence policy in a period of low-threat perception, which will also be fully effective at a time of high-threat perception and high political commitment to defence. Such a policy must provide the political justification for a stable defence posture dunng a period of low-threat perception and constricted budgets such as the present, and at the same time provide for a rapid and effective response to any sudden increase in the allocation of resources to defence.
Two different approaches to this problem are to provide a framework (cadre) into which the enlarged force expands, or a core around which expansion takes place. For the same investment, a core force will have a greater current capbility, while a cadre force will provide a greater future capability. The concept of a core is more appropriate when the length of politico-strategic warning could be short, or where it takes a long time to develop the necessary operational capability. The cadre approach is preferable in the opposite circumstances. In practice one usually needs a mixture of both, but Australia's circumstances suggest that there should be a bias

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute — Page 21

towards cadre One of the problems with the core approach is that it introduces strong pressures within each Service to emulate its international peer groups in these different types of warfare, rather than concentrating on what is appropriate to Australia's special circumstances. Similarly, it encourages a state of the art" approach to all weapons and equipment, rather than emphasising "appropriate technology" and cost-effectiveness, whereby state-of-the-art technology is used to solve scenario-specific problems.
There is never going to be "enough" money for defence, and a measure of ingenuity is needed to cover current requirements as well as future contingencies. One way is to apply the cadre principle to weapons platforms, as for example, by building ships which are fitted for. but not with their full weapon outfits, which escape the design penalties of peacetime habi-tability. while providing more ships at sea. Another approach is to exploit Australia s geography Its vast size offers the advantages of internal lines of communications, which can be used by contemporary aircraft The concentration of population in the south-eastern comer allows the bulk of the continent to act as a shield for oceanic communications, Australia's geopolitical remoteness allows warning time to be built into various operational and mobilisation plans.
The problem can also be tackled from the other end by focusing on vulnerabilities and having defence considerations play a greater pari in economic policy. Dependence on overseas oil can be reduced by providing the commercial incentives to discover and exploit Australian resources, including alternative types of energy. Coastal shipping becomes less vital if there are alternative means of land transportation. The concept of actively linking defence and development would seem particularly appropriate to the north-western coastal region, where the defence factor might be sufficient to tip the balance in favour of positive action. But the same considerations would seem to apply to the transportation infrastructure throughout much of the country. A related approach is to adopt immigration policies and incentives designed to encourage the development of under-populated areas, which would also increase the tax base and hence the size of the defence budget.
Cost-effectiveness requires innovative thinking, and there are two sure ways of fostering that precious commodity. The first is to adopt a combined arms or inter-Service approacn to all military problems. And the second is to recognise that the best is almost always the enemy of "good enough"

REQUIREMENTS
The Australian defence debate reflects considerable disagreement about the plausibility of different threats, and in formulating force requirements, the various protagonists tend to focus on one threat to the neglect of the others. A more fruitful approach is to consider all four main requirements and to see where Ihey reinforce or compete with each other, and to what extent the preferred capabilities are mutually exclusive.
In this context we must avoid confusing what is "nice to have" with what we "need to have". Military planners sometimes claim that their task is to specify what capability is required to discharge a certain mission, after which it is up to the political leadership to decide what the nation can afford. This implies that formulating force requirements is a precise science, whereas in practice it involves a complex process of balancing priorities, which recognises that there is no such thing as total security, that defence involves deterrance as much as combat, and that war is about attrition as much as battle The purist approach to force requirements is akin to an architect who insists on designing an ideal' house, irrespective of his client's bank balance The building analogy can be extended. When money is short, the design of one's house (structure of one's forces) is closely tied to the prevailing climate (the geopolitical environment) and local materials (the geostrategic circumstances), and the design of rich men's residences (major powers' forces) is only partially relevant to one's essential requirements
In the discussion which follows, I have therefore borne in mind the current level ol defence expenditure and the type of increases which might be possible if a requirement could be clearly demonstrated. I have focused on the four main requirements and taken account ol warning time and the varying capacity for a rapid build-up of capability in the different fields Two of the requirements, "preventing attacks on Australian territory" and "regulating the offshore zone", overlap in geographical scope but not in time, hence they are mutually reinforcing. "Securing the passage of coastal shipping" also comes within this geographical scope: but it could overlap in time with "preventing attacks on Australia", and hence compete for resources.
Any discussion of maritime requirements should flow from a broader defence analysis, but time precludes such a survey It is. however, implicit in many of the proposals which follow, and the postulated concepts of operation assume a range of appropriate developments in all three Services,

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PREVENTING ATTACKS ON AUSTRALIAN TERRITORY
This represents a very broad spectrum of threat and I will only consider two of the many possibilities, namely a seaborne invasion, and a seabased strike against military and industrial targets.
In discussing invasion I focus on the well-protected assault force and assume two possible types of motivation behind such an operation. The less implausible is a resource grab at some time in the future, and this would tend to locate the assault area on the north west coast. In today's circumstances, the type of politico-economic pressures required to prompt such an adventure, and the capabilities needed to carry it out are of a kind which should provide at least two years' warning. A more implausible (but still conceivable) motivation is a Soviet requirement to exploit Australia's industrial capacity in the post-exchange phase of a nuclear war, which they define as a fight to the finish between two social systems. There would be little warning of such a war. since it would be the result of miscalculations.
How best to defend against a resource grab? As important as anything is the self-evident capability to prevent the resources from being exploited, even should a lodgement be achieved, since this will tilt the balance of costs and benefits against initiating such an operation. This requires a substantial capability for destruction at long range, and this same capability can be used to prevent the establishment of enemy airfields and air defence facilities in the lodgement area. Land-based forces (ground and air) are best qualified for this task.
The navy's primary role is to deal with seaborne invasion. It is sometimes argued that maritime forces should attack the invading force at the maximum distance from the shore. There are two flaws with this arg ument. First, the enemy force is most vulnerable when it shifts from passage to assault formation as it nears the beach-head. Second, the further from Australian territory the engagement takes place, the less support will be available from shore-based weapon and sensor systems.
The aim is to prevent the assault force from putting troops ashore. The principle of concentration argues that the main emphasis should be on combined attacks on the enemy when he is at his most vulnerable, when the maximum number and types of Australian weapons can be brought to

bear, and when our own forces enjoy all the advantages of working off one's own coastline. Planners must assume that the enemy would be able to cover the invasion force with a battle fleet more powerful than the strongest naval force Australia can muster, and in such circumstances an engagement in the open ocean should be avoided rather than sought out. Obviously, this does not exclude attacks by submarines, unless there are likely to be problems in gaining contact. Long range air strike may also be appropriate, although the air defences of the invading forces will be at their strongest when on ocean passage and consequential losses may unduly weaken the vital combined attacks close to shore.
Similar considerations apply to the Soviet threat in a world war scenario, except that there would be limited warning time. In compensation, the threat would be against a relatively densely settled part of the country, with an infrastructure in place which would enable rapid redeployment and concentration of forces.
One prerequisite for such an anti-invasion concept is a long-range warning system of the kind which will allow sufficient time to concentrate forces in the threatened area. This can be provided by the type of OTH-B radar now being developed at Jindalee. Another prerequisite is to be able to redeploy land and air forces rapidly to different parts of trie coastal perimeter. Irrespective of the amount of strategic warning, this will have to depend in large part on unimproved airstrips. The primary target will be soft-skinned assault ships with limited point-defence, and the most appropriate weapons will be PGM earned by aircraft and relatively small naval units, while helicopter gun ships will be useful against enemy assault craft and helicopters making to the shore. Command of the air will be important but, given the advantages of operating from land, there seems no reason why this cannot be ensured. However, the need to exploit unimproved airfields, coupled with the specific anti-surtace ship role suggests that the emphasis should be on the design of stand-off weapons, rather than aircraft performance.
This general concept of operations can be adapted to deal with lesser types of threat. The range of possibilities argues that emphasis should be placed on comparatively simple vehicles (submarine, surface and air) which can be used in a variety of roles, their weapon suits being changed to reflect changes in requirements over time.

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute — Page 23

Turning next to the threat of sea-based strike against military and industrial targets, this raises the requirement to counter the enemy force before it launches its weapons, and we must distinguish between submarines and surface ships. To detect a submarine prior to missile launch requires some type of area surveillance system such as SOSUS and. given reaction time and the sea areas involved, this would only offer a measure of defence against submarines armed with medium-range missiles
Initial target location should not be a problem with an enemy earner strike force. Since one has to allow that such a force would be more powerful than the Australian surface fleet, defence would be based on coordinated missile attacks launched by submarine and aircraft, using the well-proven Soviet concept. However, unlike the Soviets. Australian forces would be operating off their own coastline, within range of shore-based systems. This will be particularly advantageous to the submarine component, allowing greater flexibility of operation (including initial high speed deployment with surface escort) and reducing design requirements for size and endurance Attack on the surface strike force would be only one part of the total response, and land-based air defence forces would engage aircraft and cruise missiles as they neared the Australian coast.
To sum up Large surface units are not essential to the defence of Australia against seaborne attack. It must be assumed that an enemy who is set on such a course ol action will be able to achieve a concentration of naval force, including seabased air. which is sufficient to ensure superiority at sea The classic arguments about the role of navies in defence against seaborne assault took place before the advent of long-range surveillance systems, air transportation, and the homing weapons which give coastal craft the punch of a battleship. Present-day circumstances allow one to exploit the advantages of operating close to one s own coastline. with land-based weapons (air and ground) playing a major, perhaps predominant role Local command of the air is essential and requires the capability to concentrate forces at relatively short notice along selected parts of the coastal perimeter The aircraft carrier is not critical to this requirement, and it can be argued that it is more flexible and more cost-effective to redeploy the aircraft and then support systems, rather than the airfield. The submarine has a role to play, but the circumstances suggest that money would be better spent on a larger number of smaller units rather than  a lesser number of larger ones

REGULATING THE OFFSHORE ZONE
It is often said that because Australia now has a 200 mile economic zone (EEZ) it must be enforced. In facf the majority of countries in the world have no capability to enforce their 200 mile zones, and while it is true that the Law ot the Sea (LOS) negotiating articles place an obligation on the coastal state to manage its offshore resources, the onerousness of this task will depend on the level of exploitation. Regulating the offshore zone is therefore largely a matter of choice, and the level ot regulation will be based on calculations of cost and benefit The costs are clear enough The benefits are more complex and may range from intangibles like national sovereignty, to social factors like drug abuse and uncontrolled immigration, to concrete economic benefits such as custom revenues, pollution avoidance and resources preserved tor Australian exploitation
Few of the problems in the oftshore zone are new, but several of them have intensified over the last ten years, particularly drug running, illegal immigration, marine pollution and the foreign exploitation of living resources i.e.. the benefits to be gained from effective regulation have risen Furthermore, the LOS negotiations have simplified the problem of regulation by de facto extending the Territorial Sea by rather more than 9 miles, while simplifying its alignment; by extending the Contiguous Zone to 24 miles (lor immigration, health and customs control); and by introducing a new type of limited jurisdiction over the water column out to 200 miles (the EEZ) which, among other Ihings. has the effect ot closing off the Gulf of Carpentaria
The EEZ also provides a source of income fo help pay for the regulation of the whole offshore zone. The coastal state has sovereign rights over the resources in the EEZ and. while it is required to ensure full utilisation ol these resources by allowing other nations to harvest surplus stocks, it can decide who has access for what purposes. and has the right to charge for such access through licensing fees, which are negotiated on a bilateral basis. Taking all these factors together, the question of regulating the offshore zone is different to hiterto. although it is still a matter ot balancing costs and benefits. Within those Denetits we can count the potential spinoff to territorial defence. But regulation remains a policing problem.
The effectiveness of a policing policy will depend on (1) the detection rate and (2) the type of sanctions applied to the transgressor. In respect to resource management, the coastal

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state now has a very powerful sanction at its disposal, since it can deny entry to its fishery, either to individual offenders or to a whole national fleet. Controlled entry also limits the detection problem by establishing through bilateral negotiations the fishing strategy of each national fleet in terms of quota, effort and general location. This simplifies the three elements of crime detection, namely, surveillance, search and arrest. To facilitate surveillance, foreign vessels can be required to report entry and departure from the area, as well as daily positions. The requirement for search (or inspection) can be reduced by placing observers aboard a proportion of these vessels, Australia picking the ships at random and the flag-state paying all the costs involved. This policy has been adopted successfully by Canada. The problem of actually arresting a transgressor is partly circumvented since the coastal state can call vessels into port for spot checking, under threat of losing their licenses if they don't comply.
A key aspect of this approach to regulation is that a substantial part of the onus for enforcement is shifted to the flag-state. The success of such a policy will of course depend on the extent to which the flag-state does or can control its fishing vessels, but even here the coastal state has the lever of refusing to negotiate a bilateral agreement unless the flag-state initiates a satisfactory system. This approach to regulation is particularly effective with the distant water fleets, which are of course the most important ones in terms of resource depletion It may be necessary to accept a fairly high level of petty pilfering by the smaller craft operating from the Indonesian archipelago, although the general upgrading of surveillance should improve the average detection rate.
This partial overview of the problem suggests that the balance of costs and benefits has tilted sharply in favour of a comprehensive (but selective) system for regulating the Australian offshore zone, and raises the question of how this can best be achieved. While recognising the theoretical appeal of handing over the whole task to the armed forces, or of establishing a special coastguard service, I would argue that a cooperative approach to the problem is preferable, both for a range of political reasons, domestic and foreign and because it is more efficient, even though it lacks administrative tidiness.
Regulation is an instrument of government and different departments have developed special skills which are relevant to both land and sea environments. The problem of frontier control (smuggling, illegal entry) is a three dimensional

one, stretching from the offshore zone to far inland, and it relies heavily on a common intelligence system which has international links. Offshore oil and gas is an extension of the land-based industry, and comes under the same general kind of rules and regulations. The management of fishenes (which covers both salt and fresh water species), cannot be divorced from regulation, and success depends on contin-unity of effort. If the task of regulating the offshore zone were handed over completely to the armed services, there would be severe penalties from loss of special expertise and lack of continuity. On the other hand, it a coastguard service were established, it would have to subspecialise to be effective, and it would still have the physical and bureaucratic problems of linking into the broader land-based picture. Meanwhile, a coastguard service would deny the armed forces the advantage to be gained from a cooperative arrangement, in terms of acquiring knowledge of a potential combat environment, and of improving training and morale.
Obviously, there would need to be unified command and control and there would be several advantages in locating the national coordination system within the defence operations structure. Nevertheless, it is in the interests of national security to stress the cooperative nature of the enterprise, since the dividing line between regulation and territorial defence is blurred. This cooperative approach will involve a wide range of individuals and authorities in the general problem and faciliate shifts in emphasis as external circumstances require. For similar reasons, the "all methods" approach to surveillance should be encouraged, rather than emphasising the use of single-purpose units and equipment. It would seem particularly important to involve the local population in the problem, and exploiting the part-time availability of vessels and aircraft from the private sector brings specialised knowledge of the geographical areas, as well as being cost-effective. There is. however, the danger that a cooperative approach will lapse into pure ad hocery'. If the system is to work efficiently in peacetime and have the capacity to respond effectively to changes in external threat, it must be served by a fully integrated operational infrastructure, designed to develop long term procedures as well as to handle current problems
It is clear that a comprehensive system of regulating the off-shore zone will contribute to the territorial integrity of Australia, inhibit lodgments on offshore islands and underpin the military capability needed to deter or repel a seaborne assault. But it can also make a more concrete contribution by increasing the number of ships and aircraft which can be made available for

Journal of the Australian Naval institute — Page 25

military tasks, either immediately or after limited conversion. We have seen that regulation should be self-financing, either in terms of monies saved or dues received, and a share of these funds can be claimed by defence, to cover the cost of its contribution in terms of hardware or manpower. These, and perhaps additional funds should be used to maximise the armed forces' surge capacity, which can be achieved in several ways Special fittings such as bed plates and load-bearing frames can be incorporated into the design of civilian ships and aircraft, to allow weapons and sensors to be fitted. Vessel construction can be subsidised to embody desirable military features such as better sea-keeping qualities or non-magnetic materials. And the military can procure additional vehicles for the regulating role, whose primary characteristics reflect wider military requirements.
Among this last category, consideration might be given to small airships and helicopters. The airship is ideal for monitoring large numbers of small vessels and has a demonstrated but untapped potential in coastal ASW. The helicopter is an immensely versatile vehicle of which one can never have enough. As a means of transportation it can be used on land and at sea. and between the two. As a combat vehicle it can be used against surface vessels and submarines. and against other helicopters and troops on the ground. It also lends itself to modular conversion. In regulating the offshore zone the helicopter (operating from shore) can be used for search and arrest on its own. or in conjunction with patrol vessels. It can carry its own boarding party and sling the type of inflatable craft normally used by surface ships. If required, it can be fitted with stand-off enforcement weapons
SECURING SEA COMMUNICATIONS
Sea communications involve three types of shipping: import, export and coastal. In the discussion which follows, the needs of New Zealand and other S.W. Pacific countnes will be ignored, but the same general principles apply.
It is hard to develop plausible scenarios for sustained attacks on shipping outside the circumstances of major international conflict, and I therefore postulate four sets of circumstances without trying to justify them. The frist involves an attempt to halt the flow of oil from the Middle East. The second involves general war. where Australian shipping would share the submarine threat to the West. The third involves a major power (Russia. China. Japan) attacking Australian shipping as a means of applying pressure. And the fourth involves conflict with a regional power, such as Indonesia.

The first scenario differs from the rest in that it raises the question of whether there is a specific requirement for Australian ASW forces to be capable of sustained operations 4-5000 miles from their home base, either in the close escort or distant support role. We will set this question aside until we have identified the requirements generated by the other scenarios.
Although the general war scenano presents the greatest threat to Western shipping worldwide, Australia's location distances her from the main axes of the battle for sea communications. During the initial stages of such a war. the majority of Soviet general purpose submarines will be committed to attacking Western striking forces and defending the ocean bastions where the SSBN components of the national strategic reserve are deployed. As the war progresses, submarines will become available to other tasks, but by then the Soviet force should have suffered substantial attrition. We are therefore talking of a limited submarine threat, unless the Soviets decided to take over part of Australia, in which case submarines would accompany the invasion force.
The third scenano. involving a concentrated attack by a major power, poses the greatest theoretical threat but is also the least plausible. Commerce war relies on attrition and. as an instrument of coercive diplomacy, it has all the drawbacks of being uncertain in its timing and its effects. Because of the general interest in safe passage, there could be little confidence that the conflict would remain limited. The attacking power would therefore have to hold back the majority of its forces to cover their primary missions.
The last scenario involving conflict with another power in the region is the most plausible. and Indonesia is located closest to Australia and lies across the sealanes between Australia and East Asia. The scale of submarine threat will however remain limited for several years to come, even if there is a shift in political alignment and a build up of naval armaments.
In formulating a collective threat from these scenarios, we see that they all originate to the north of Australia, that the closest lies over 2000 miles from the Australian Bight, and that the others originate between 3500-6000 miles away. These latter distances imply a very high proportion of time spent in transit to the operating area, and diesel submarines would need to replenish en-route if they were to spend a useful time on station.

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The submarine problem can be tackled from two directions. By reducing the threat and by improving the defence One way of reducing the threat is to attack at source. Given the distances and the relative capabilities involved, this would only be practical against Indonesia and perhaps India. The success record of air attacks against submarine facilities is not high, and a surface strike force would be hard put to survive attacks from land and sea-based forces as it closed its target. Submarine mine-laying is a practical option, although uncertain in its effect.
A more certain way of reducing the threat is to route shipping as far from enemy bases and as close to one's own as possible. A sure way of strengthening the defence is by concentration of force. This argues for a single shipping route to and from Australia. In face of a threat from East Asia, this defended approach would run south from Spencer Gulf or Port Phillip to about latitude 50 degrees. If Indonesia or India were the enemy, the route would run south-east from Sydney. In both cases, maritime forces operating out of Tasmania could cover the outer reaches of the route. Merchants ships would make tor the southern end of the defended approach by a circuitous route, maintaining the maximum distance between themselves and enemy submarine bases.
In considering the effectiveness of such a system, we start from the fact that no group of countries has the resources to provide continuous protection to all its shipping, and only in the North Atlantic does the scale of threat and concentration of Western forces allow a trans-oceanic convoy system to be contemplated. Elsewhere, ships are escorted to and from the focal area, beyond which they seek safety in dispersion. To argue that we have to protect peacetime shipping routes between the Persian Gulf and Cape Leeuwm is to ignore the advantages to be derived from evasive routing and the concentration of force.
However, the concealment formerly provided by the ocean expanses has been breached by satellite surveillance and the availability of such intelligence to the enemy would be a factor in deciding on the type of convoy policy to adopt beyond the defended approach route. A second factor would be the presence or absence of nuclear submarines in the opposing force. A nuclear submarine, vectored onto an undefended convoy with satellite intelligence, would be limited only by the number and reliability of the weapons it carried. Better to have the submarine scour the oceans for its prey, and delay forming a convoy until within range of ASW forces. Appropriately enough, the process of bringing

ships together in the lower fourties would be reminiscent of mustering tree-ranging sheep or cattle for droving, and would require similar capabilities, with ships and aircraft acting as the dogs It would also imply the existence of a control-of-shipping network in Pacific and Indian Ocean ports, whereby ships would be routed to converge at about the same place and time, although the accumulating convoy could cruise in the lower forties, adding ships to its company. The weather would mostly be atrocious, and while professional opinion differs as to whether this would affect a torpedo-attack submarine as much as the ASW forces, the advantage of distance lies with the defencj.
This system would be suitable for all import shipping and most export shipping, but what of the mineral resources being shipped direct from ports on the north west coast, at present mainly to Japan? If the threat came from Indonesia, one can envisage Japan joining forces with Australia to fight a series of convoys through the archipelago, but given the type of Indonesian capability which underlies this scenario, this is not a very realistic option. Attrition among merchant ships and escorts would be high as they sailed through narrow and often shallow waters, attacked by land and sea-based weapon systems operating from the shelter of the islands. It would be safer and less costly to accept diversion and sail these ships in coastal convoy, south about, to join an ocean convoy departing by the protected route. These coastal convoys would comprise the regular coastal shipping, plus the import and export cargoes which cannot be moved to and from the ocean convoy terminals by land transportation About 80% of coastal cargoes comprise bulk products (about half petroleum, half minerals) and by tonnage, roughly half the movement is concentrated between Newcastle and Spencer Gulf.
Turning to the protection of this shipping, the importance of a properly thought-out stockpiling policy is hard to exagerate. In the initial stages of a conflict it provides time to organise the defences and convert ships and aircraft for ASW. while shipping is held back in safety and enemy submarines use up patrol time. During the course of the conflict it provides the buffer stocks which allow convoys to be organised to meet the requrements for effective defence rather than the demands of the economy. With limited ASW forces and an unpredictable scale of enemy attack, convoy schedules need to be organised to achieve the necessary concentration of force, rather than an even flow of supplies.
The most extreme example of the principle would be to allow only one convoy at sea at a time. In practice, the requirements for defending

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute — Page 27

the ocean and coastal convoys are likely to be sufficiently distinct for them not to detract from each other's protection. Arriving and departing ocean convoys can be scheduled so that only one is at sea at a time, escort forces working a shuttle, with no dead time in transit. For example. one 60-ship convoy every 10 days, inwards and outwards, would represent over 20% of individual ship-arrivals in peacetime, and a much higher proportion of import tonnage. This is probably an over-generous target for short term austerity conditions.
The scheduling of coastal convoys is less critical, since protection requirements (including minesweeping) can be met with extemporary measures covered by the surge capability. Besides fitting ASW equipment to the ships and aircraft used in regulating the offshore zone, helicopter pads can be added to the tankers and bulk carriers which ply the coastal trade, and maximum use would be made of shore-based support In addition, suitable ships in the convoy can be issued with weapon kits, which are transferred to other ships on reaching port, the kits being designed to add to the convoys' ASW capability. Of particular relevance is the ARAPAHO concept, which uses specially fitted standard containers to provide loaded container ships with tne capability to carry and operate ASW helicopters. Other examples include towed sonar arrays and homing torpedoes.
In Australia's case, the ARAPAHO concept cannot be used for ocean convoys, and the requirements for open ocean ASW limits the opportunities for extemporary measures. However, the use of a single defended approach-rdute tailors these requirements to acceptable dimensions. It also raises the question of whether to install a fixed surveillance system (such as SOSUS) to cover this approach quadrant, which would also be relevant to the threat of submarine-missile attack against south eastern Australia. The costs are however prohibitive, although there might be a case for the large tug-towed passive arrays which the Americans are now introducing. Long range maritime patrol aircraft would be a key element of the ocean ASW effort and could be reinforced by converted civilian airliners whose primary role would be to lay and monitor very large sonobuoy fields. Although the alignment of the approach and the location of the gathering/dispersal zone would change continually, it would always be within range of sustained shore-based air support.
Surface ASW forces are equally essential, and the need for helicopter-carrying escorts, capable of operating effectively in these stormy seas is self evident. Less certain in terms of cost/ effectiveness, is the requirement for a larger, air

capable ship, and the relative importance of its contribution must depend on the level of shore-based air support which can be ensured. There would seem to be no essential requirement for sea-based fixed-wing air in this geographical scenario, and the need, if any. is to reinforce the ASW helicopter capability of the escort force
We can now return to the first scenario of a threat to the flow of Middle East oil. and whether this contingency should be covered in naval requirements. There are several reasons against this. The flow of Middle East oil is most likely to be interrupted by internal political disruption or military action by land-based forces, and the only way to guard against this possibility is to diversify the sources of supply. Meanwhile. Australian shipments are very small compared to the oil going to North America. Europe and Japan, and the main responsibility and response must lie with them. But the most important reason is that if Australian maritime forces are to be able to handle the broader range of threats closer to home, they must be optimised to exploit the unique geographical scenario which provides them with the chance of success. Australia may wish to contribute to an international force in the Arabian Sea. but this possibility should not influence the basic design of its ships and aircraft.
PROJECTING MILITARY FORCE ASHORE
The purpose of projecting force ashore in peacetime can be (1) to support a state against an external military threat. (2) to coerce a state or regime, (3) to affect the balance of an internal struggle for power, or (4) to secure the safety of Australian interests and properly. These purposes generate different types of military requirement, the mapr distinction lying between supportive and coercive intervention.
In the case of supportive intervention, a measure of cooperation by the country being supported can be assumed, and the requirement is to deliver some additional capability as necessary to redress the military balance. Coercive intervention (actual or latent) requires the capability to deliver preponderent military force, the scale of which will differ within three main categones. At the bottom of the scale is the short. sharp rectifying operation, or coup-de-main. In the middle comes coercion by the threat (or application) of punishment, such as a punitive expedition or an air strike. And at the high end of the scale is coercion by military takeover or occupation.

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Relative military capabilities in S.E. Asia mean that except for the coup-de-main, coercive intervention is not a practical option against states in the area, nor would it have political utility. Supportive interevention. meanwhile, presents few military problems in terms of delivering the additional capability, and if there is a requirement for a rapid response, this is best met by air. Attention is therefore focused on the possible requirement for coercive intervention in the islands and territories in the South West Pacific and in Papua New Guinea.
Australia might consider it essential to intervene in Papua New Guinea, if the government offered an unfriendly major power extensive rights and facilities within its borders. Power disparities are so great, and PNG lies so close. that an Australian military take-over could be mounted without much difficulty. This could rely primarily on airborne assault, with merchant ships providing the lift for succeeding echelons. While participation by carrier-borne dxed wing aircraft would be useful, comparable support can be provided by other means.
There would be similar grounds for concern if an unfriendly major power sought to establish itself on one of the islands in the S.W. Pacific, but this poses a different type of problem in terms of access and speedy response. These states and territories lie 700-2000 miles from the Australian coast and, although the main islands boast an airfield, access to most of them is normally by sea. Where reaction time is critical, an airborne response may still be necessary, but there is clearly a requirement for a long-range seaborne intervention capability.
Before considering what that implies in terms of ship characteristics, we need to survey the record of military intervention since the war Supportive intervention has a good record on the whole, and is still considered to have political utility as an instrument of overseas policy. So too does coercive intervention by coup-de-main, and also by military takeover, except where it involves a long drawn out struggle. In the case of the islands in the South West Pacific, the capabilities required for a coup-de-main and a military takeover shade into each other, and they are also similar to those required for supportive intervention
The capabilities required for coercive intervention by punishment are different, and there are considerable doubts about the continuing value of this type of intervention, particularly when air strike is the chosen means. It may damage and frighten, but it also forges political opposition and the individual's will to resist.

We can therefore exclude from our requirements the need for a fixed-wing strike capability in this context. Can we also exclude the fixed-wing air superiority aircraft? I would argue yes. One must assume that ANZUS will not allow command of the air in the S.W. Pacific to pass to an unfriendly power, and the distance between islands will allow a measure of conventional shore-based fighter cover, should it be required. There is also the "Big Momma" concept, where air cover is provided by a converted Jumbo Jet carrying intercept radar and air-supremacy stand-off weapons, such as Phoenix. Meanwhile. surface ships can be fitted with SAM. and it is relevant that Soviet units rely on this approach in areas of high air threat like the Eastern Mediterranean.
A long-range intervention capability can be provided by several smaller ships, or a few larger ones. The balance of advantage lies with the larger unit, not least because of its potential in other roles. Large ships can carry helicopters as well as landing craft, and be fitted with self-defence systems and a range of sensors. Bearing in mind :hat at worst, landings will only be lightly opposed, the attractions of a dock type hull must be weighed against the loss of usable space which may be critical to other roles.
PEACETIME FORCE STRUCTURE
Drawing together the four separate analyses, we see a fairly sharp distinction between the type of forces required for distant-water operations (ocean ASW and the projection of force ashore), and those which take place within the offshore zone (regulation, coastal convoy and defence against sea-borne assault). We also notice that, in the main, the latter involve comparatively simple vehicles, whose ASW and/or anti-invasion potential can be increased relatively rapidly should either such threat develop. This surge capability builds on existing peacetime requirements for coastal shipping and regulating the offshore zone, and would expand into a pre-existing military cadre, configured for war. The resultant fighting posture would rely heavily on shore-based weapon and sensor systems.
The distant water forces pose a more difficult problem. First, the requirement to operate in distant waters places higher demands in terms of vehicle design and performance. Second, there are inherent limits to the contribution which land-based units can make. And. third, ocean ASW involves an extremely sophisticated type of warfare, demanding integrated systems, teamwork, and a high level of training and prac-

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute — Page 29

tice. None of these requirements lends itsell to extemporary response, and this argues for a core force. However, in defining the characteristics of this force we face the complication that its two primary missions are radically different. ASW operations against a sophisticated enemy; and projecting force ashore in the face of relatively slight opposition.
The requirement for continuous training in ASW severely limits the extent to which interchangeable modular design can provide a solution. Unless we are willing to totally discount the submarine threat, a substantial proportion, perhaps all. of the distant water surface units need a sophisticated ASW capability, and there is a similar requirement for dedicated long range air. However, on the favourable side of the account, there is no requirement for a sophisticated force projection capability. Furthermore, there is no air or surface threat in the ASW scenario, nor is there in the force projection scenario, anyway at present However, worst case assumptions about the latter would have to allow for the future emergence of a low intensity threat from missile and torpedo armed coastal craft, and of a strictly limited threat from manned aircraft.
The analysis also leads to the conclusions that there is no essential requirement for sea based tixed-wing air in the ASW, strike, reconnaissance or air defence roles, although ot course it would be nice to have. The future possibility of a low intensity threat from manned aircraft in the South West Pacific can be adequately covered by shore-based air cover and point defence systems. There remains, however, a cluster of requirements which can best be met by a helicopter carrier, with an amphibious assault capability. These requirements are protecting force ashore, countering patrol craft, and escorting ocean convoys.
We now have a feasible structure for Australia's maritime forces in peacetime, based on cadre and core components, an organising concept which reflects time responsiveness as opposed to the Hi-Lo mix. which reflects threat intensity. I will not attempt to fill in the details or to review all the different aspects of maritime warfare, such as the use of mines in thwarting seaborne attacks on Australia or in securing the passage of ocean shipping. I must, however, touch briefly on the main component of the core force. It would seem sensible to think in terms of two task groups, each comprising one small helicopter carrier and 4-5 distant water ASW ships; two task groups provide an important element of flexibility in peacetime, and allow for continuous operations (such as convoy work) in war. The helicopter carrier, which might displace

12-15,000 tons, would be primarily configured for ASW. including VDS and other hull mounted systems. It would be designed to carry a dual-purpose missle launcher (ASW or SAM) and perhaps a number of point-defence weapons, but there is no reason to fit these systems until the threat of submarine or aircraft attack becomes more real. A strictly limited weapons fit will allow the incorporation of a through-deck, which facilitates the recovery of remotely piloted vehicles (RPV) and the use of STOL aircraft for trucking functions, including sowing sonobuoy fields. The ship would be designed to carry landing craft when required, and in this mode it would embark a smaller number of helicopters, to allow space for troops and their equipment. As a design determinant, the capability to project force ashore would oe secondary, since there is no requirement to assault heavily defended areas
What difference would it make to the essential characteristics of the core force if we added the requirement to be able to operate as a component of a large allied force, when the threat could be more varied and intense than in the geographically-protected Australian and S W Pacific scenarios? The difference in characteristics is less than might be expected. Australian units will already be optimised for ASW. they can be covered by the main force's long range air defences, and the long range surface-to-surface capability can lie elsewhere in the force. The one serious deficiency would be point air-defence, and maximum flexibility would be achieved if all the distant water ASW ships had a modest anti-air capability. However, a word of warning, since it is at this staae that the pressures towards peer group emulation become strongest Unless the Australian Navy is seen to have a key role in alliance diplomacy, there is no intrinsic reason why the force should be designed to meet requirements other than those which stem from Australia's geo-strategic circumstances, except when operational flexibility can be added at relatively little cost in terms of alternative capabilities foregone or additional expenditures.
A major difference between the foregoing proposals and present capabilities and procurement priorities, is the absence of seabased fixed-wing air. This partly reflects the geographical focus, but it also reflects the diminishing utility of this particular capability. Until about fifteen years ago, only a small proportion ot a carrier's aircraft had to be devoted to force defence, the remainder being available for such tasks as reconnaissance or strike. The steady proliferation of sophisticated weapon systems among newly independant states is altering relative power gradients radically and. when operating within range of hostile shore based systems, a carrier force now has to devote a dis-

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proportionate share of its resources to remaining afloat. A small to medium sized carrier could be totally preoccupied with this requirement, which places a lower limit on useful size and, for a country like Australia, virtually dictates that it can only afford a single unit, with all that implies in loss of flexibility. Meanwhile, an increasing number of the tasks which were formerly discharged by fixed-wing carrier aircraft, can now be carried out by various types of RPV or missile, whose full potential has yet to be assessed.
Another difference concerns the role of strike aircraft against major surface units, which provides part of the fixed-wing carrier's traditional justification. Given the nature of the threat (including Soviet naval forces). I just do not understand the present emphasis on the long range-anti-surface strike role, nor does this seem a serious problem in the future. The value of anti-shipping missiles launched by land-baled aircraft in the counter invasion role has already been acknowledged but. given the politico-strategic warning involved, it should only be necessary to maintain a very limited capability in the current inventory.
I have not discussed the submarine force which, besides having a potential role in ASW and in countering assaults on Australia, can carry out interdiction operations in waters where control of the surface and air is in the hands of the enemy. Even though there is no immediate requirement for the latter capability, it provides an important element of flexibility at relatively little cost. Whether the Oberon class is best suited to Australia's particular circumstances is another matter. It can be argued that the full span of requirements would be better covered by a boat whose design has been optimised for operations in the Mediterranean rather than the Atlantic Ocean.
As a final point, let me emphasise the importance to the cadre concept of good intelligence and an effective naval reserve structure. The cadre approach makes it easier to achieve the latter, because of heightened relevance and interest, while mobile simulators allow the reserve to be organised on a territonal basis and facilitate their training. Good intelligence has to rely heavily on contnbutions by friendly countries, particularly the USA, and this requires that Australia have something to offer in exchange, such as the location of U.S. facilities on Australian soil.
REGIONAL MARITIME CAPABILITIES
We can now turn to the matter of Australia as a regional seapower. Judgements about the type of   regional   policies  which  will  best  serve

Australia's interests are separate from those concerning the utility or the cost-effectiveness of maritime forces as instruments of such policies, and this discussion focuses on the latter.
Within the context of a regional policy, maritime forces have two main roles. They can secure the passage of shipping throughout the region against attempts to prevent such use. And they can bring military power (latent or applied) to bear in distant sea areas. In considering the latter role, we must distinguish between coercive and supportive intervention and recognise that the latter implies the availability of friendly facilities ashore. In the latter circumstances, the attack carrier has the attraction of bringing pre-packaged firepower to bear, but it is not necessarily (or even usually) the most appropriate form of support. Land based forces can provide a much broader spectrum of response and can be tailored to meet specific requirements. They can be brought to the area by sea or by air, but naval involvement only becomes necessary if attempts are made to prevent the passage of such ships.
THE INDIAN OCEAN
The geography of the Indian Ocean means that it cannot be considered as a single region, and it is best thought of in terms of the main axes of movement and groups of littoral states. There are three clusters of naval power in the region: the main one, located in the north west quadrant and extending from Somalia to India; the Republic of South Africa: and Australia. South Africa is linked to the north west quadrant by the major axis of oil shipments, but Australia is so far removed from these areas of activity (some 4-5000 miles), that it is effectively in another ocean.
Australia depends on imports from many parts of the globe and perforce, has to rely on the common interest in the safe passage of shipping in those distant waters to secure her supplies There is no good reason why the Arabian Sea should be treated as an exception and. in any case, the necessary independant capability is well beyond Australia's income.
Similar arguments apply to bringing force to bear in distant parts of the region. Australia is not in a position to compete with the emergence of India as a dominant maritime power in the northern part of the region. Attempts to do so would invite a naval arms race, and the purposeful extensions of India's intiuence into the southern part of the region. As for the limited Soviet naval presence in the north west quadrant.

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute ~~ Page 31

Australian maritime forces could probably match their capability, but Australia lacks the substantive power for such a deployment to provide any kind of political counterpoise in the area.
It would therefore seem to be in Australia's best interests to limit her concerns in the Indian Ocean to the south eastern sector, and leave the rest of this vast region (or others to worry about

nuclear zone should be welcomed. The boundaries of such a region are a matter for discussion, and it would obviously be simplest if the Australian mainland was not included. If. however, this were not possible, the effected territory could be limited to the area east of (say) 150 degrees, and need not affect existing bilateral arrangements in other parts of Australia.
ANTARCTICA

SOUTH EAST ASIA
Although this is an area of immediate concern to Australia, the scope for maritime forces to influence developments in the region is very limited. The size of the various national forces means that Australian capability for coercive intervention in the region is negligible. even if it were thought to have political utility. Maritime forces might be required to secure the shipment of military support to a friendly state in the region, but this would mean that Australia was taking sides in an intraregional conflict, and the need for maritime escort implies that Indonesia would be on the other side.
I ndividual military convoys could probably be fought through, if one allowed that attacks on the territory of the opposing coastal states were politically acceptable. However. Australia would not have (and could not develop) the capability to secure the use of the narrow and frequently shallow waters in this region for the uninterrupted flow of commerce against sustained opposition. If local states sought to prevent such use the most cost-effective response is to accept the diversion of transit shipping, and seek to resolve the problem by means other than military.
THE SOUTH WEST PACIFIC
A very small quotient of military power has immense leverage in this scattered region. Australia and New Zealand are seen as the natural leaders of a co-operative protectorate, their role being accepted as legitimate and beneficial by the majority of the micro-states in the area. The institution of the South West Pacific Forum was a fruitful development, which served to distance the region from great power preoccupations and this general trend should be encouraged.
It is clearly in Australia's interest to exclude China and Russia from this region, but tor this to be possible, it will also be necessary to exclude the USA. Australia should therefore seek U.S. acceptance of any ANZAC version of the Monroe Doctnne in the South West Pacific, and the proposal that the region be declared a non-

Australia has territorial claims in Antarctica, which lies some 1300 n.m. south of Tasmania, and the region could assume importance in the future as a source of raw materials. By virtue of its relative proximity, Australia is in a better position than most countries to bring force to bear in the region, if need be. These factors are not, however, of sufficient importance to influence the characteristics of the distant water forces. The concept of Australia waging maior war to secure the use of these resource is not realistic in present-day circumstances and presupposes a radical shift in national attitudes and in the world resource situation. Even then, such a concept would still have lo face the problem that it is relatively easy to prevent the extraction of resources, particularly in areas such as the Antarctic, and extremely difficult to exploit such resources in the face of opposition. Despite the complexity of the issues involved, some form of negotiated settlement still seems the most likely outcome.
Australian activities in Antarctica require seaborne logistic support, but there is no intrinsic reason why this should be seen as a military commitment. It is however possible that if this special requirement were added to existing naval requirements for afloat support, the procurement of an additional underway replenishment vessel could be justified. This would of course provide greater flexibility in response to all distant water missions.
CONCLUSIONS
The first conclusion to be drawn from this brief survey is that Australia's defence requirements are manageable. Its geographical loction. Ihe scale and nature of possible threats, and the availability of politico-strategic warning, combine to produce a situation which is potentially more secure than that of most comparable states. However, to ensure that potential security requires a defence policy tailored lo Australia's special circumstances, rather than one based on general purpose forces.
Neither of Ihe two main threats, seizure of Australian territory and attacks on Australian sea

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lines of communication, is very likely at this time. Both are conceivable in the future. Of the two, the resource grab is the more plausible, since it offers the assailant some concrete benefits, whereas the attacks on shipping provide no direct returns. However, the disruption of sea communications is more difficult to prevent and in the long term could be more lethal. Therefore both threats demand equal attention.
An assault on Australian territory could come by air and/or sea, the airborne mode being the most likely for the initial echelons of a major attempt at invasion. The basic requirement for a rapidly redeployable air-defence capability is therefore clear, as is the requirement to be able to wreak destruction at long range against successful lodgements, and although these are best handled by land-based forces, they provide an important backdrop to maritime operations
The fact that the latter take place relatively close to shore, in order to achieve maximum concentration of force, has important implications in terms of naval force requirements for this mission, since they can build on the resources required to regulate the offshore zone. Regulating the offshore zone and rebuffing an assault on Australian territory lie at opposite ends of the same spectrum and. if the armed forces are to be able to exploit this potential in time of rising threat, it is essential that they participate actively in a collective approach to regulating the offshore zone in peacetime. This new requirement should be seen as an opportunity and not an incubus, since skilful bilateral negotiations can use the 200 n.m. EEZ to enhance Australia's territorial integrity at little or no extra cost.
The maritime defence against seaborne assault and the protection of coastal shipping rely on the existance of cadre forces in peacetime. By contrast, the protection of ocean shipping requires the existence of a core force, not because the battle will be more intense (probably the reverse), but because of the time it takes to develop an effective anti-submarine capability. This specialised requirement, which l» deliberately tailored to a favourable geographical scenario south of Australia and does not envisage an air or surface threat, provides the primary justification for distant water surface forces in peacetime. The secondary justification is the requirement to project force ashore in the South West Pacific against limited opposition (which may include a low intensity surface and air threat), as a means of exercising Australian influence and/or denying access to the region by unfriendly powers.

The analysis suggests that such a core force would best be structured around two task groups, each centred on a relatively small through-deck helicopter carrier. The latter would be designed primarily for ASW. but would be capable of amphibious assault and operations against missile and patrol craft. Although optimised for operations within range of shore-based air support, these task groups would have an oraanic ASW capability and be able to operate independently in the face of a low intensity air and surface threat. They would also be able to operate as effective components of an allied force operating in the face of a high intensity threat, assuming that organic air defence is available.
This is a very respectable naval capability, which would allow Australia to play the role of a regional seapower in the South West Pacilic and in the south eastern sector of the Indian Ocean, and to act with its allies in more distant areas But what of the South East Asian region? The area is of such immediate importance that it is natural to think of using Australian military force to affect the outcome of events in the region. However, as we discovered earlier in this paper, the concept becomes increasingly unattractive as one thinks through the full implications. In respect to naval operations, the geography of the area favours the coastal states, and the continued proliferation of sophisticated weapon systems means that this unfavourable bias can only increase. The capability to project maritime power in the region will therefore become increasingly costly. This is not to deny the importance to Australia of developments in Papua New Guinea and the nearer Indonesian islands, but the military problem must be seen in its full In-service dimensions, including the role of deference II is true that a fixed-wing carrier would increase the Navy's capacity to operate in the area, but the distances involved mean that such a capability comes within the category of "nice to have" rather than necessity The advantages it would bring in this limited scenario are certainly not sufficient to justify skewing the more fundamental requirements for distant water surface forces, and forefeiting the flexibility provided by a two task-group fleet structure.
Finally, we should note that the concept of Australia as a regional seapower is deleterious, since it focuses attention on one branch of Service to the exclusion of the others. We should instead, talk of Australia's capability to bring military force to bear in adjacent regions by whatever means are appropriate. In the South West Pacific the Navy can certainly play a predominant role, but in Papua New Guinea and In-

Joumal of the Australian Naval Institute — Page 33

donesia, it is likely to take second place to Army and Air components
By making the best use o( each Service's attributes and by exploiting Australia's geographical circumstances, we can have more military capability al less cost, both for use as an instrument of policy in peacetime and to defend Australia in war tying these capabilities to a specific (if extensive) geographic scenario, implies a national loss of flexibility to discharge hypothetical "general purpose" missions elsewhere in the world Bui that capability is a great power luxury, which Australia neither needs nor can afford, and its absence would be more than compensated for by the improved capability to meet more tangible requirements. These are of two kinds. In the short term, Australia must be able to project force against limited opposition in

adjacent regions, as necessary to prevent developments which could Ihreaten its vital interests. In the longer term. Australia must be able to build up its forces at short notice, as necessary to defend against a range of possible threats which may emerge in the future.
This requires the correct balance between current and future requirements, between investment in cadre and core components. In the case of maritime forces, the intelligent use of geography, combined with the concept of a cadre force for the offshore zone and a core force for distant water operations, would provide considerable flexibility and allow Australia to cover a wide range of current requirements and future contingencies. It would also provide an effective naval force in being, optimised for operations in the waters of greatest concern to Australia.

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AFTER DINNER ADDRESS
By The Honourable EG. Whitlam. AC. QC

Mr Chairman, Your Excellency, ladies and gentlemen:
It has been made easier for me by being introduced to you as a writer. Whereas at the time last July when I was invited to address you after dinner I was accustomed to giving speeches, I've now become more accustomed to writing books I applaud you for having mounted this seminar and I'm happy to participate in it. I have to acknowledge right at the outset that I would probably know less about the techniques of the subiect than anybody here. You would all think that I knew less than any of you Obviously as an Australian I have to acknowledge that we live on an island, the biggest in the world: I also have to observe that we have the longest coastline navigable throughout the year of all the nations in the world; I have to acknowledge also fhat our trade except what can be earned by Qantas or other national airlines has to be by sea. Above all I have to acknowledge that more and more the significance of the sea is impinging on our consciousness in other ways: now we hear as we would never have heard back in the 60s or 50s about smuggling, drug running, refugees and quarantine and with the development of the law of the sea we are becoming more and more aware that all our communications even by air have to take place through or over the most extensive, the most numerous achipelagos in the world. So all these things should bring home to Australians the fact that sea power, maritime commerce and protection of it are quite basic to all our concerns.

were in government was that people who were usually branded as the most militant and pacifist and unpatriotic of union leaders were the ones that were most insistent that we would keep (he plant going, and we did. The present government has disposed of it. Again, from time lo time there is interest in weapons such as the Ikara, or sonar buoys. To what extent can we afford to devote resources to developing very sophisticated weapons instead of just buying them from others? Are they a chauvinist indulgence? The argument is that we could, if we set our minds to it. building Boeing 707s or 747s in Australia (I admire these economy-minded regimes which criticise those who charter an occasional 707 and then buy two themselves.) The important point I want to make is this. In all these things I've mentioned we are, in the first instance, increasingly becoming aware of new aspects of sea power and. in the second instance, we do from time to time show an interest in shipbuilding, weapons, components.
I propose in general to raise with you some of the difficulties which you have as an Institute in promoting a constant and informed attitude towards affairs of the sea. On occasions like this a layman must produce his credentials: so let me say forthwith that for a quarter of a century I represented more servicemen in the National Parliament than any other member because I had the Holsworthy army establishment throughout those years and the Inglebum one for nearly

Particularly as a former member of Parliament I would realise that from time to time— and I emphasise that it is only spasmodically or even superficially — there is some public interest in industries based upon our maritime commerce or its protection. What is the significance of shipbuilding in Australia? What is the significance in Australia of some of the equipment for ships, such as marine engines? There used to be a government engine plant. One of the ironies when we

THE SPEAKER
Tne Honourable E G Whitlam. AC. QC. served in the RAAF on air-crew duties during World War II. reaching the rank of Flight-Lieutenant and, in 1947 was admitted to the NSW and Federal Bar He entered the Federal Parliament in 1952 as Hie Australian Labor Parly member lor Werrlwa. NSW He was Deputy Leader ol the Federal Labor Party in 1960 67 and Federal Leader in the period 1967-75 He led his parly to power in 1972 and served as Prime Minister until 1975 Mr Whitlam is a well known writer on political affairs and is a Visiting Fellow ol the Australian National University

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute — Page 35

eleven years. My Navy responsibilities were limited to the married quarters at East Hills. I recall one domestic problem I had there. There were among the tenants, residents, inhabitants, however they are descnbed. 17 ratings who had contracted tuberculosis through, they alleged, sleeping together in one wardroom in an ex-RN ship in the tropics for which RN ships are notoriously ill-adapted. Those who administered the Commonwealth Employees' Compensation asserted that their disease bore no connection with their service: it was just an unhappy coincidence I merely mention that as the only parliamentary experience I ve had with Naval ratings: there were no brass living in my electorate Not that one gets any gratitude for remedying such injustices I early learnt that the Services vote Liberal. There used to be a Military Corrective Establishment in my electorate The pnsoners and the guards had a polling booth to themselves. The Liberals always got a majority. Now f give my credentials as a practising politician Perhaps I will be pardoned for saying that during the period I was head of government that I did derive a great deal of national satisfaction from some association with the Navy. I quote a few instances. There was a meeting of the South Pacific Commission, the first attended by the Australian head of government, in Vila in April 1973 We had an RAN ship for communications. The ship and its hospitality made a very good impression Again in September 1975 there were the Independence celebrations in Port Moresby One of the most beautiful nights in my memory was when the RAN ships in the harbour at midnight put on a splendid display. The weather was perfect, everything went beautifully Also, not everyone will approve of this, but I still think it was satisfactory that we were able to be co-operative with HMNZS Canterbury, which didn't have much range, in monitoring the French nuclear tests in Tahiti An abiding recollection of gratitude that I have for the Navy from the time when I was head of government is the association with Al Smith, truly a gentleman and a scholar, an ornament to his own Service and to the Services which he headed. Al Smith is one of the most competent and honourable people with whom I had the pnvilege to work in public life.
Having tendered the necessary personal references I might be able to be of use to you in describing some public attitudes as I see them There has been a very great change of attitude among the Australian population since we first had our own Navy or since the RN was first stationed here. I wouldn't expect that we shall ever recapture the public fascination and enthusiasm which attended the arrival of the great White Fleet from the United States, or our First Squadron headed by the first HMAS Australia. Nowadays

the public is much more sceptical Some people say it is better educated and therefore less patriotic. It's not instinctively inclined to heed calls, such as people did in such amazing numbers, speed and enthusiasm in Australia in. say. World War I. It is extraordinary that so huge a percentage of our population volunteered to serve on the other side of the world You wouldn t get that readily now. The public needs to be persuaded
However much we may be convinced that Australia does need good mantime communications and needs to be able to guarantee them, however much we may believe that Australia should own her own merchant ships or own her own tankers, we need to be aware of the very great scepticism in the community about some of the things which are said on defence. The way it works is this. If the newspapers or the radio — TVs not so interested — want a story on defence they immediately go to the RSL. which is in the same category as the Housewives Association or the Dean of Sydney. They can rely on the response. Everyone knows what they II say I'm not suggesting that the people in this Institute are responsible for such responses. The whole defence debate in Australia is made ridiculous in the eyes of most readers and listeners by the views which are sought and published from those guaranteed sources.
On the other hand there has been in the last couple of years an admirably expert journal as far as I am able to check it The Pacific Defence Reporter. Nevertheless even their readers react to welt-informed, topical articles by cynically saying: "Look at the advertisers, they're the people who want the contracts from the Services". There is also a certain cynicism among politicians because the Services — and probably this applies to the Navy even more than to the Air Force — are thought to want to be too much in the big time. Few would now expect our Navy to be integrated in the RN as it was automatically in World War I and initially in World War II or be an auxiliary to the United States Navy as in the latter part of World War II and more recently It is still sometimes said about some top Naval men tnai they have been mesmerised by RN traditions and by US equipment If I may repeat, without offence I hope, it is claimed that there are top people in the Navy who would rather be two foot up a great power's six foot dung hill than on top of a two foot dung hill of our own
When I was first in public life it used to be said that the top men had only known one occu-

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pation, man and boy. that they had never lived outside the RAN There was a certain stratification in the Navy, particularly on the big ships, which made them less effective in lobbying with public servants or with politicians than, say. the Army or the Air Force.
Now that no longer applies but there is a new ground of scepticism about the Navy. It may be a factor of the scepticism on all public issues and about all public men. Everybody in government or in Parliament or in private management or in the Services now lacks credibility to some extent I must illustrate and not generalise. Congressional inquiries into the Tonkin Gulf episode of 14 years ago have made people not only in America very sceptical about reports from the Navy or about reports which governments assert they get from the Navy. Again there are the recent revelations about the British blockade of Beira; I must confess I don't feel particularly pleased about this, because I feel I was conned occasionally. Governments Irom both sides of politics in Britain were using the RN for the blockade of Mozambique and they were not telling the truth; the blockade was not effective, not because of the Navy but because of what governments knew was happening and allowed to happen elsewhere The intervention in Vietnam has alienated the whole generation which would have to participate in any war. The new fighting between Vietnam and Kampuchea and between China and Vietnam make nonsense of the arguments which were used not so long ago My immediate predecessor once warned of the red lava flowing down over Vietnam, down our way. His contemporary on the other side of politics then warned of the spread of Chinese communism down between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Now we seem to support the Chinese. When the Americans asked the Vietnamese to invade Cambodia in 1970. that presumably was good. Now that the Russians have asked Vietnam to invade Cambodia, that's bad. The Americans have been too heavy-handed; in 1971. when Bangladesh was being born, they sent the ENTERPRISE, not just a gunboat, into the Bay of Bengal and in September 1973. during the Middle East war. North West Cape was put on full alert without consulting Australia. Such things do grate a bit, and I think we all have to learn from them. We're not always as frank as we should be. our allies with us or maybe we with our allies. For the last halt dozen years Diego Garcia has been quite a controversial issue. Few realise why America suddenly became interested in Diego Garcia. Such outposts have various purposes and uses but the main one there has been an air one, not a Navy one, and it has not been to combat the Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean but to provide a secure revictuallinq

point or resupplying point for Israel in case of another war there. It was found in 1973 that America couldn't supply Israel through the NATO countries. Even the Azores were not available So the "west about route was developed for the future. Diego Garcia was accepted for that purpose, but there was little explanation of that reason . With the change of government in Iran it may at least acquire a predominant naval purpose
The scepticism on defence is however not just the fault of the Americans. The Australian government has exploited and diminished the RAN. There have been Royal Commissions which have held our Navy up to a certain amount of ridicule. There was an inquiry in the Philippines where our allies were allowed to overbear us Thank God it didn't happen in our time; we would never have heard the end of it. I have mentioned those matters to you because il you want to get across your story to the public, to the taxpayer, to the recruit, you ve got to face up to the fact that the public is better educated, if you like to put it that way. It is much more sceptical. You ve got to make out a rational case tor any form of expenditure on any activity or any quipment. No poltician or former politician is helping you if he overlooks that fact. If there was to be another war. a case would have to be made out for our participation much more convincingly than it has ever been made out in the World Wars I and II. or Korea or Vietnam. Above all. we must learn to put arguments on defence and foreign affairs in a calm, consistent, factual, rational way. I don't say you can only put arguments which are unanswerable; then everybody would say, yes of course that's true, we knew that. People don't follow all the developments and it's very difficult to find out about them from the newspapers. Most people might 15 years ago. even 10 years ago. have perceived Vietnam as a threat to Australia. They dont believe it now. The only country which it is easy to depict as a threat is Indonesia, and there our media have done a thoroughly inadequate and. I think, irresponsible job. It's not easy to find out the facts and it's not made any easier because the media have not undertaken the expense of the responsibility which they should undertake of having professional journalists regularly stationed in those places. The ABC can no longer afford them — and the others never tried to. If the newspapers tried to do it in any country they could do it; it's not good enough relying on stories on West Irian or Fast Timor from adventurous stringers or freelances; you ve got to have professionals on the |ob. such as the women the Sydney Morning Herald has sent to China. II is possible to inform the Australian public if you commit yourself todoing it consistently, and regularly, and competently. I suppose there is still a

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute— Page37

tendency in Australia to fall into the polarisation between the US and the USSR; not as easy as it used to be. You couldn't believe what it was like in the early 50s Some of the Admirals might remember but most of this audience would not believe the garbage which was accepted in those days I still see some signs of it now. You get this same phobia about Soviet bases and pacts. Just because the British last century and the Americans after World War II decided that they needed bases and because our allies had such a mania tor having pacts all round the world, some people still accept that the Soviet Union is going to be seeking bases and pacts. The Americans don't bother about them now. I'm not passing any assertions or answers on ANZUS but the prudent course is to let sleeping dogs lie. If conservatives now tried to raise a political issue about that, who would be at risk? If you are going to have pacts, you must keep them as non-political as you can. Once a pact becomes a matter of political controversy it is doomed. Once any institution becomes a subject upon which political parties are polarised in Australia, it loses its usefulness
I specify in particular two pieces of speculation which are still read and heard. One is that the Soviet Union will be getting a base in Taiwan, another that it will be getting a base in Cam Ranh Bay. I would think both are extremely unlikely. Whatever attitude one might have had towards the regimes in Peking and Taipei, one must acknowledge that each has been insistent that it alone is the sole legitimate government of all China, including the province of Taiwan It is quite inconceivable that Taiwan would accept Soviet installations or the Soviet seek them.
I suppose if China were to invade Vietnam, then Vietnam would accept assistance from the Soviet including, say, bases in Cam Ranh Bay But a country which for not just the last 20 years against the Americans, or for the previous 80 years against the French, or for some centuries before against the Chinese suzerainty has fought for its own identity and independence to my mind is in the highest degree unlikely to accept bases from any other country, including the Soviet Union. I know we're doing our best officially in Australia now to ensure that the only friend Vietnam should have in the world should be the Soviet Union. If you only have one friend, you become more dependent on that friend. That is just one of the follies of thinking you can just snub people and ignore them and bring them to heel. It is not as easy as that It's counterproductive.
When I come now to what I think are some of the issues which will arise in our part of the world.

I'm not being parochial or merely regional. I do mention them because I think it is unlikely that you will ever again see. say. RAN ships fighting in the North Atlantic or the Mediterranean. I mentioned Vietnam. One of the issues there is refugees. There are in fact more refugees who have gone into Vietnam in the last year or couple of years than have come out of Vietnam You'd never believe that, but it is a fact. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross.will both tell you that there have been about a third of a million refugees into Vietnam, much more than have come out of it I suggest that when one looks at that question, one should recall that there has been quite a number of national minorities established in the Indian and South Pacific Oceans and on the shores thereon by European imperialists. The British took Indians to East Africa, including the Republic of South Africa, and they took Indians to Fiji; the French took Vietnamese to New Caledonia and to Tahiti: and Chinese were attracted to peninsular Malaya, Borneo and Singapore under the British, to Rabaul and Kavieng under the Germans and to Indonesia under the Dutch They have mostly gone there in the last hundred years. I would expect that many of those ethnic minorities in our region will now want to go home to the lands of their ancestors They may want to go to some other countries in the meantime. You will note that I've not mentioned the Chinese in Manila or Bangkok. They've been there much longer and there's very little tension between people of Chinese origin and people of longer local origin in places like Bangkok and Manila. Actually all the important people of both places have Chinese ancestors among others The Indians, the Vietnamese and the other Chinese that have gone abroad one could expect to go back whence their grandfathers or greatgrandfathers came. (The same will happen in Rhodesia. Most of the Europeans in Rhodesia have gone there since U.D.I. This is a political issue which has not caused trouble in my party but causes heartburning amongst our opponents.) Refugees are not going to be a temporary problem and not going to concern one country alone For the rest of this century I would guess there will be a repatriation, more or less harmoniously, of ethnic minorities to the lands of their ancestors.
I mentioned Korea also Things are moving in the north-west Pacific much more rapidly than anyone would have dreamt a little while ago. On some issues like Korea we m Australia |ust give no attention at all. America and China are now quite enthusiastically talking to each other. Only about three months ago China and Japan made a pact. These are momentous events — and yet on Korea Australians still go on as we have since the

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war there. Australia did not have a massive role in Korea but we did in fact participate there. We still have some official responsibilities and locus standi there. Over a couple of months ago if anybody was asked what he thought was the biggest, most likely flashpoint in the world, he would have said "Korea". For the first time in history all the neighbouring countries are significant military powers, the United States, Soviet Union, China and Japan. (I'm not suggesting Japan could wage an aggressive war. but she could look after herself pretty well.) This absurd situation has gone on for thirty years now in Korea. You might say that in Germany there was a history of division: the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs were still there in 1918 and there were lesser monarchies too throughout the old German Empire. You might say that it was not historically inevitable that all German-speaking people should be in the one country. In Vietnam and Korea, however, there was no basis for having a separate north and south. The people of Korea historically were always one people. We did it. They didn't ask for it. We collaborated in it. At least one ought to take what opportunities there are to gel them talking together. It looks as if they may be doing so at last. At the last U.N. General Assembly Mr Gromyko omitted his ritual condemnation of the south. Mr Deng Xiaoping a few months ago visited Mr Kim II Sung and his visits usually have some emolient effect on those he visits, whatever he may say about the Russians while he is there. You've now got the situation where China which talks only to one Korea and Japan and America which only talk to the other Korea, are now having very good relations with each other. I heard to my astonishment, at the University where I am at the moment, one of the respected academics — admittedly he is as old as I am. so I suppose you can make some allowances — say: "Isn't it to our advantage that Korea should remain divided7" Who's going to sell that idea? The Koreans won't sell it. I'm not so sure that the Japanese or the Chinese or the Americans will sell it very much longer. The American forces are still there under the guise which we know to be spurious that they're representing the UN. The UN would never endorse their presence there now We must now ask the basic question: to whose advantage is it that Korea should be divided?
Iran is one of the clearest examples we have ever seen of how we just haven't examined our basic assumptions. Everybody's been caught by surprise. The Shah was far from being the least enlightened autocrat in the world but everything crumbled under him. Two aspects at least were overlooked: of all the oil-producing countries in the Moslem world, Iran was the only one which was prepared to supply oil to Israel, and of all the developing countries Iran was the only one which

had trade relations with South Africa The Shah had had until quite recently good relations with the successive heads, specifically the Labor Prime Ministers, in Israel. Because his father was hijacked by the British during World War II and died in Johannesburg the Shah has been sympathetic to South Africa. One cannot defy national sentiment in that way. The PLO got into the oil fields and Savak didn't The strike on the oil fields just crippled the country Iran had by far the biggest and best equipped army and navy in the extraordinarily important region of the Gulf. The Straits of Hormuz are the most significant cul-de-sac in the world, much more important than the Makassar Straits or the Straits of Gibraltar or the Panama Canal have ever been. Now everything is adrift, how many of the Arab dynasties are safe? Whether we Christians like it or not. there is and for a millenium and a half has been a strong Moslem consciousness. There may be still remnants of it on the northern border of Iran in Uzbekistan: these things don't cut one way only. Some people in this country might have thought that the Ayatollah Khomeyni was some sort of B.A. Santamaria; he was at least a St Thomas a Becket.
The South Pacific Ocean is going to be even more in the minds of Australians than the Indian Ocean. The Latin American idea of a 200 nautical miles exclusive economic zone has swept across the Pacific. Neither the Soviets nor the United States liked it but they've accepted it, they've adopted it. The two biggest fishing countries in the world, the Soviet Union and Japan, don't like it but they've accepted it. The South Pacific will, with very few interstices, be completely covered by such zones around all its archipelagos. Look at a map of the South Pacific and note that there are very few islands which are not within 400 miles of the next one This has very serious consequences. Naval historians will remember how important the freedom of the seas has been for naval powers, Bntian first of all when our ancestors ruled the seas and the Americans who ruled the seas more recently and still do largely The high seas were a highway Everybody could use them and if you had the biggest fleet you ruled them. You will remember disputes between Britain and America during the Civil War over the hijacking of Confederate envoys and again in World War I. All that has now gone into discard Even the most miniscule ministate can rule as big a part of the sea as the largest power Tonga will have as big a sea domain as Japan.
I conclude with the French possessions in the South Pacific. In Australia we never worry about such matters until a crisis is upon us. If one thing is certain it is that New Caledonia and the

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute — Page 39

New Hebrides — which is virtually a French possession since the British have dropped their bundle — and the Society Islands (Tahiti, etc.) will be seeking independence. There is also no doubt that there will be some tension or even turmoil in the process. The same sort of thing could happen in Bougainville.
In our own vicinity as a result of the 200 nautical miles exclusive economic zones, the inevitable movement to independence in the French possessions, and such mundane occurrences as refugees and smuggling and drug running, there is going to be a great deal of interest in what happens in our seas. Much as it may hurt the pride of our Navy, there is going to be an increasing demand for some sort of coastguard force in Australia. Due to our coastline, our location and the problems m our area, our people will want to see that our seas and the approaches to our island continent are adequately policed That really will have to be done by ships, not just by air. That will require, the public will believe, activity by the RAN. Many people in the Navy will regard it as a terrible comedown. I do put it to you very seriously that it is one of the facts which one has to recognise The public needs to be persuaded of the usefulness of the things which it pays for The public will expect some governmental service to do these |obs and I would guess that the RAN is the one which they would expect to do them. I dont say that this looks chauvinistic but it does look panochial.
Inevitably in the Services, and In the diplomatic services as well as the armed services, there is a preoccupation with the super powers It is. however, not going too far to say — I might have been wary of saying it len years ago or even five years ago. but not now — that the US alliance with Australia is |ust as valuable for the protection ot tne US as it is for the protection of Australia and involves more risks for Australia than for the US. I put it furthermore to you that many people fear that the US can no longer have her way everywhere as she was able to do even twenty years ago. I recognise that. They also should recognise

that the USSR can no longer have her way anywhere either Imagine what the position of the USSR Pacific provinces would be — they have a European population the same as Australia s — in the case of a world war The communications between them and Russia's industrial and military heart in the west in Europe would be horrific
I put to this gathering that the sea is going to become much more important in the eyes of Australians, even if not all the time and not always at the top of their consciousness. It is going to be the sub|ect of increasing interest. The interest will be of a different kind to what it was before World War I when the British looked after us. or after World War II when the Americans looked after us. Unavoidable issues will arise, such as refugees and smuggling and independence movements and fisheries and peaceful transits through and over archipelagos. The public will become interested in them. We shall have to tackle these issues very much more ourselves An Institute like this can play a very significant role in letting the public know the implications in no alarmist way I don t think the public these days get very readily alarmed about military things They don t really think that others are going to attack us The misunderstandings with Indonesia were the making of the Dutch and the British and the Portugese rather than the Indonesians: with that exception I don't believe it will be easy to arouse people to a great expenditure on the Services. You won t get governments now feeling that they're at risk In keeping financial commitments for Services within modest limits. I can now say these things because I no longer have responsibility for them I know that the RAN and the RN whose traditions it has inherited are by contrast to the US Navy a silent Service I also know that academics in this field are usually silent and the ones that are least silent are the ones that should be most The important matter is that there are very real issues which are of increasing concern to Australia in maritime affairs, in commerce and in the protection of it. I welcome the creation of this Institution I'm very happy as a layman to have had the opportunity to participate in its first seminar.

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MARITIME COMBAT
TECHNOLOGIES
1980 — 2000
A PANEL PRESENTATION

INTRODUCTION
by Major Peter Young
As an ardent follower of the Australian and Pacific Defence scene, I firmly believe that the priority lies with naval power. Whatever form of Navy eventuates however, it will be forced to operate in a completely different environment to that of the past.
Previously, naval units enjoyed a relatively guaranteed masthead line-of-sight security. This was vastly expanded by the range of search aircraft and security was further limited by the emergence of radio intercept. All of these means, however, paled into insignificance in the vast reaches of the major oceans when allied to weather and radio silence.
The navies of the future however must operate in a changed environment, where surveillance might be constant by virtue of satellite cover and where weaponry could well come from over the horizon with unerring accuracy. Already, modern vessels carry vast arrays of antennae both to detect opposing ships and to detect and protect against incoming weaponry. Given the vast increase in the means at the disposal of the weapons officers of the future and the advent of mobile over the honzon radar, we could have the Navy operating in the most hostile and most vulnerable electronic warfare environment of any Service.
It was against this background that I was asked to select three areas which would best represent the threats posed by the new technologies and those technologies which would have the most impact.
I have chosen three. They are the advent of the VSTOL aircraft, which is currently holding out

the prospect of a vast increase in the scope and reach of seaborne airpower, the cruise missile and fire control systems, and finally underwater weaponry, including that always forgotten threat, mine warfare.
Time prevents our speakers doing full justice to their individual subjects. Their competence and experience in their areas however, will, I am sure, provide enough of an idea of the reach of the new technologies to promote the discussion that is the main aim of this seminar.
One final point I would make however, is that this area of technology is ever changing — almost on a daily basis and they foreshadow changes that could one day strip away at one throw of a switch the invisibility that has made the submarine the Queen of the oceans, and already, we are presented with the possibility of ships presenting open and guaranteed targets from a variety of weaponry to such an extent as would preclude vessels of any size ever putting to sea.
In the new technologies of the immediate future, nothing is beyond belief, and whilst the three main areas I have chosen and about which
THE SPEAKER
Major Peler Young served as a Regular Officer in the SAS and Military Intelligence seeing exlensive service in Indo-Chma He resigned in 1969 to stand tor Federal Parliament on the issue of Defence Following a very narrow defeat he emerged as a writer of Defence Affairs He was the founding editor and publisher of the inter national |ournal. Pacific Defence Reporter

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute — Page 41

you are to be introduced are of current importance, the technologies o( the future could well render them as outdated as the Dreadnought. It is an area which begs detailed study

and the maximum attention from smaller countries who can gain by selecting those advances which could, to a large extent, militate against the larger powers in the short term.

SECURING THE USE
OF AUSTRALIA'S SEA
LANES AND VITAL
SEA AREAS
By
Mr  Nat Gould

I start with this premise: without adequate sea power, in the mix of Australia's defence forces, the very survival of the nation will be at risk in any future conflict.
Conversely: the existence of a properly equipped and highly visible Australian Navy will provide the most effective deterrent to any would-be aggressor.
The deployment of sea power to prevent the interdiction of Australia's supply routes at points well beyond the reach of land-based aircraft or missile systems and to secure vital sea areas is. in our technical jargon, the 'sea assertion mission'. It aims to establish naval superiority in areas well beyond our coastal waters: and it allows the secure provision of military transport of our Defence Forces. With limited national resources we must choose from the available warship types and systems, the correct mix to provide optimum-sea assertion capability.
This Seminar provides a welcome forum where, no doubt, diffenng views will be heard. My own view is this:
'When considering the vast areas and distances involved for the maritime defence of our large continent, it is self-evident that our Navy could not carry out its basic mission without the possession of naval air power.'
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Why, though, naval air power? A series of exercises in UK waters over a number of years has led to the conclusion that land-based air forces cannot properly support naval units at distances beyond about 400 miles from airfields. (Note: airfields, NOT the nearest point on the coast). Even at these short distances the numbers of tactical and tanker aircraft required to sustain any continuous effort were high. Further, the practical problems of briefing the land-based air force crews involved on rapidly changing tactical situations were considerable, particularly in an electronic silence environment. I suggest moreover that land based airforces would be heavily committed to their own dedicated roles during hostilities, and would find it difficult to allot
THE SPEAKER
Nat Gould served as a fignter pilot in me RAF RANVR RN and RAN Deiween the years 1940 lo 1965 when he retired as a Commander He Hew a large variety ol aircraft ranging from Hurricanes through Sea Furies to Venoms and helicopters He served in various theatres including Europe, the Pacific and Korea, and attended a number of joint land/air warfare and amphibious courses in UK and the USA He was the Delence Sales representative lor Hawker de Havilland (Australia) from 1965 to 1977 when he joined British Aerospace (Australia) as a Director

the right aircraft at the right time for maritime tasks. As a direct consequence of these UK exercises, it was decided that the Royal Navy should retain its fixed-wing capability.
This is the position accepted by the RN and the RAF. what is the Australian context? It is this: not only are there far fewer tactical aircraft available to the RAAF. but a glance at the map highlights the scarcity of suitable airfields around our long coastline. These two factors, coupled with the vast ocean areas to be guarded, make the argument for any land-based support effort for shipping or naval forces even more untenable for Australia. The case for provision of naval air power based in ships under the control of the RAN is compelling. Naval air power is the only really visible deterrent to a potential enemy contemplating the disruption of our sea lines of communication, or the overwater invasion of our continent.
Naval air power at sea can be provided by fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft. Helicopters have a most useful contribution to make, especially in the anti-submarine role. Their slow speed, limited range and vulnerability, however, restrict their usefulness in the total sea assertion mission. Modern, high speed, fixed wing aircraft are necessary to carry out the roles concerned with sea assertion The three major roles for the fixed wing aircraft in the assertion mission are reconnaissance, shipping strike, and air defence of the force or convoy.
It is essential that the task force commander is aware of what is happening in the area surrounding his ships; he needs the means to attack any located hostile units before they can close to missile firing range; he also needs to destroy or drive off the shadowing aircraft that may be acting as the guidance link for missile firing ships or sites over the horizon. Although not strictly within the terms of the assertion mission, the provision of close air support to our troops engaged in the land battle may be necessary. Carrier-based fixed-wing aircraft have a proven capability in this role. History has shown that this often has been the only air support readily available.
Although few navies would disagree with the contention that fixed wing aircraft are a necessary element of any credible maritime force, the growing complexity and cost of suitable conventional naval aeroplanes and the consequent need for larger and more expensive ships, has caused all but the most powerful and wealthy nations to ponder the future. I n 1947, the RAN's first aircraft carrier cost about six to seven million dollars and the Sea Fury aircraft about seventy three thousand dollars each. The Fury

was replaced by the Sea Venom at around two hundred thousand dollars per copy and the Venom's successor, the A4 Skyhawk. cost about one million dollars per aircraft. The cost of a conventional aircraft to replace the A4 would be at least ten million dollars and the minimum ship, complete with catapults and arrestor gear would leave little change. I suggest, from five hundred million dollars.
The super powers, because of past policy decision and building programmes, are locked into this super-expensive fixed wing naval aviation But radically cheaper and more flexible options have emerged to keep naval air power within the means of smaller nations The advent of operational VSTOL has made it possible for smaller navies, such as the RAN. to replace or acquire a fixed wing capability at an acceptable cost.
How effective are these new aircraft? What do they offer today? Now flying, and soon to go into service with the Royal Navy, is the Sea Harrier which will be the first VSTOL fixed wing aircraft, specifically designed for the role, to become operational at sea. Its roles and capabilities, therefore, are worth stating as I believe they are of relevance to the RAN's requirements.
Reconnaissance — search out to four hundred and seventy plus nautical mile radius. An electronic and visual surveillance of some twenty thousand square miles in one hour's flying.
Strike — armed with two Harpoon type missiles mount a strike at two hundred and sixty plus nautical miles and, of course. Sea Harrier can fire a wide range of conventional bombs and rockets. Some eight thousand pounds of warload stores can be carried.
Air Defence — armed with air-to-air missiles and cannon an interception at four hundred plus nautical mile radius from the ship can be achieved or Sea Harrier can remain on combat air patrol for one and a half hours at one hundred plus nautical miles.
The critics may be surpnsed to note that the above performance figures (which I assure you are conservative), are at least equal to. and in some cases better than, those achieved by the RAN's A4 Skyhawks presently working off HMAS Melbourne. Sea Harrier will also have a potential in anti-submarine warfare. I don't suggest that the aircraft will lake over from the helicopter I don't

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute— Page 43

see it coming to the hover and dunking. It can, however, be used to lay sonobuoy screens or carry torpedoes to a contact point designated by other means and with a quicker reaction time than that of the helicopter.

will be effected in fuel burnt and in wear and tear on a VSTOL ship as compared with a conventional carrier which often has to steam into wind at high speeds regardless of sea states in order to launch and recover.

My paper is not about Sea Harrier, but I mention it to illustrate the current stale-of-the-VSTOL-art. I will say in passing that if the RAN did opt for Sea Harrier, they would not be going backwards in fixed wing capability.
I would now like to discuss some of the advantages of VSTOL operations as compared with those of conventional naval aircraft. These are many and varied and time will allow oni-mention of the more significant benefits:
Operational Flexibility — VSTOL aircraft are less dependent on wind speed and direction for both launch and recover than are conventional naval aircraft. The ship or task force commander thus has greater freedom of manoeuvre which in most tactical situations or in restricted waters is of real value. Aircraft can be operated even at anchor or alongside should the need arise.
Reliability — VSTOL aircraft do not require elaborate catapults nr arrestor wires with their demanding maintenance workload. A carrier committed to these systems is completely dependent on their serviceability. Should any system fail — the ship cannot fight
Manpower — The systems mentioned above need a lot of sailors to operate and maintain them It is estimated that a ship's complement could be reduced by thirty to forty hands if they were eliminated, not to mention the savings in dockyard personnel
Costs — Shipbuilding costs are basically proportional to tonnage and length As the demands for take off and landing distances are of an order less for VSTOL aircraft than for conventional aircraft, it follows that a much smaller ship can be accepted. Further. as wind speed over the deck requirements for operating VSTOL are quite moderate, a maximum ship speed of twenty five or twenty six knots is adequate and hence main propulsion machinery can be relatively simple. Perhaps the most significant savings

Having spent some time arguing the merits of VSTOL as it stands today, I would like to spend a few minutes on the future.
Australian planners in considering the implications of replacing HMAS Melbourne and her present contribution to the defence force structure as a whole, will strive to look some thirty or forty years ahead. It is a fact of naval life that an aircraft carrier experiences at least two generations of aircraft on her decks dunng her career If. therefore, a ship is chosen now which is capable of operating the presently available VSTOL's as represented by Sea Harrier, what of the future? Will there be a VSTOL successor? How big and how heavy? Or is Sea Harrier the first and last of the VSTOL breed? Why haven't the Americans produced an operational VSTOL fixed wing? What way is US naval aviation going? These are important questions Will the RAN, in twenty years' time, be left with a carrier and no fixed wing aeroplanes?
The Harrier has shown there is nothing magical in designing and building an operational VSTOL weapon system. In the immediate future we can look foward to steadily increasing improvements to this basic design. The AV8S with a new wing, new nozzles and lift improvement devices will have twice the radius of the existing Harrier while carrying the same pay-load. In the UK similar projects are in hand and can be retrofittable to existing Harriers and Sea Harriers. Designers are confident that the know-how exists to producing faster, longer range VSTOL's to follow the Harrier
The USN has not gone VSTOL. I suggest the reasons are quite simple. That Navy has in service enormous carriers with many squadrons of conventional aircraft such as the F14 and FA18 which will be around until the end of this century. Such an investment could not be lightly put aside. But — the USN is looking to the future as witness studies on the practicability of advanced STOL aircraft such as type TV and Type 'B'. I predict that the benefits and capabilities inherent in the VSTOL concept for navies are so obvious that to quote John Fozard, Mr VSTOL himself. Sea Harrier (is) the first of the new wave'.

Page 44 — Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

SUBMARINES AND
UNDERWATER
WEAPONS
By Commander Tony Grazebrook RANR

Gentlemen, having been asked to describe submarines and underwater weapons together with the advantages they may offer both Australia and her potential enemies, I will start with reviewing the primary underwater vehicle for weapons systems — the submarine.
As we all well know, there are two basic types of submarine in service today — nuclear powered and diesei electrically driven Whilst both have similar basic characteristics and they can both operate underwater for prolonged periods, they differ very significantly in a number of ways, as shown in Exhibits 1 and 2. In my view, the difference in speeds is most important. Exhibit 3 shows a breakdown of ranges at given speeds for the Italian Sauro class submarines — a new design, the first unit of which has only just entered service
As we can see. the diesei electric submarine can operate at its maximum speed underwater for relatively short periods That maximum speed is itself some ten knots slower than the sustained speed of even the older US and British nuclear submarines
The second aspect of submarines which merits further discussion is that of identification The different sound patterns of various submarines make it possible to identify the class of a submarine operating underwater However, identical classes of submarines are operated by a number of different maritime powers. For example, the Hussian-designed Whiskey class is operated by Russia, Indonesia, China. North Korea, Egypt and others. It is very difficult to identify the nation operating a Whiskey when that submarine is underwater. The German-built type 209. and the British-built Oberon are in very similar positions Many nations operate these types. Thus a Whiskey, or an Oberon. or a type 209. can commit a hostile act without opposing forces identifying the nationality of the submarine

History gives us the example of the British and French dilemma in the Spanish Civil War History shows further that the Western democracies are much more reluctant than their enemies to shoot first — our governments require positive identification before retaliatory or even defensive action can be taken Totalitarian powers tend to be much less reluctant. Thus, the difficulty in identifying submarines is an asset to our potential enemies without being much of an asset to ourselves
We should now consider whether or not the nuclear powered boat would be a wise choice for Australia. Undoubtedly, the SSN is a very powerful vehicle with great potential which, in the opinion of some powers, is cost effective
However, I think we all understand our community well enough to know for certain that a serious proposal for Australia to acquire nuclear powered submarines would trigger a national debate both of unprecedented emotion and singular lack of logic That debate would be prolonged if not endless Whilst we debated whether or not to buy SSNs. we would get nothing
THE SPEAKER
Commander AW Grazebrook. RANR. was born «i Britain in 1935 Educated in Ihe United Slates and Great Britain, he has made his career m Ihe marketing ol synthetic rubber Activities in this held have included extensive travelling m the Middle East. Eastern Europe and North America, and a period ol five years residence in Switzerland He is now Marketing Manager. Australian Synthetic Rubber Co Ltd . and lives with his wife and two children in North Barwyn. Victoria Two years National Service In the Royal Navy, tollowed by service in Ihe RNVR and RNR preceded his transfer to the RANR as a Lieutenant Commander He is also Federal Vice-Presidenl ol the Navy League and Past President. Victorian Chapter. Naval Historical Society of Australia

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute — Page 4$

Exhibit 1

PATROL SUBMARINES AND AUSTRALIA	
PROs	LONG RANGE	
	TACTICAL MANOEVRABILIIY UNDER WATER	
	QUIET UNDER WATER	
	RANGE OF WEAPONS	
	LOW CAPITAL COST	
	OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE TECHNOLOGY HERE	
	IDENTIFICATION DIFFICULTIES	
CONs	SLOWER UNDER WATER THAN WAR VESSELS	
	ASW ROLE LIMITED BY SPEED	
	CANNOT PROVIDE PROTECTION AGAINST AIR ATTACK	
Exhibit 2
SSNs AND AUSTRALIA
PROs    SUSTAINED HI6H UNDERWATER SPEED
FASTER THAN MANY SURFACE WAR VESSELS
NO NEED TO REFUEL
RANGE LIMITED BY STORES AND PEOPLE ONLY
FASTER THAN ALL MERCHANTMEN
RANGE OF WEAPONS
IDENTIFICATION DIFFICULTIES
CONs    HIGH CAPITAL COST
TOTALLY NEW PROPULSION TECHNOLOGY
NOISY UNDERWATER
POSSIBLE PUBLIC OPPOSITION
AVAILABILITY UNDER NON PROLIFERATION
CANNOT PROVIDE PROTECTION AGAINST AIR ATTACK
Exhibit 3
PATROL SUBMARINES
RANGE AND SPEED RELATIONSHIP ITALIAN  SAURO  CLASS

TOOO	nm	_	surfaced	
12500	nm	__	snorting al 12 Knots	
400	nm			dived at 4 knots	
20	nm			dived at 20 knots	
Page 46 — Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

Quite apart from the furore, there is the question of whether our allies would supply us with SSNs. In these circumstances, I subscribe to the view that, whether or not we should have nuclear powered submarines, in the event we will have diesel electric submarines in the RAN for many years to come.
One of the major advantages of submarines, including diesel electric submarines, is their very long range. To illustrate this in the context of some of our regional distances I have prepared two exhibits. As we can see. from Exhibit 4, our Oberons can operate throughout the Indian Ocean and northwards to Eastern and South Eastern Asian waters. Similarly, Exhibit 5 shows that diesel electric submarines can operate against us from bases on the mainland of Asia, not to speak of from islands to our north and north east
In summary, the submarine offers Australia a relatively cheap long range offensive capability for blockade of an enemy s ports or naval bases, for destruction or inhibition of his seaborne trade, for sustained long range reconnaissance and for anti-submarine warfare against other diesel electric boats. Whilst submarines are a major asset to Australia, they are not the only answer Their relatively low sustained speed underwater limits their ASW capability and they can provide no protection of other vessels against attack.
Furthermore, and most significantly, just those strengths of the submarine that are attractive to Australia could be used more effectively against us Submarines are relatively cheap for an enemy to buy. A few deployed against our absolutely vital coastal and overseas seaborne trade could force us to deploy virtually all our forces in defence of that trade.
Now we will consider the diversity of weapons systems that can be fitted to diesel electric submarines:
 •	Torpedoes — both anti-submarine and anti-surface target
 •	Mines — for laying offensively, perhaps off an enemy's naval bases or in his focal seaborne trade areas.
 •	Missiles, such as Harpoon, for launch underwater against surface targets
In addition to these, missile systems for use by submarines against aircraft are available but. as yet, have not attracted many buyers. Israel is the only one I have identified.
Let s look first at torpedoes As we all know. these have developed rapidly in the last decade or so.

The Mark 48 dual purpose torpedo, now being acquired for the RAN. has a published range of over twenty nautical miles, a published speed of fifty knots, free running or wire guided runout, active, passive or active/passive homing and a multiple re-attack capability. Whilst the Mark 48 may be the best torpedo available in the Western world, there are a number of other and very effective types available with wire guidance and/or sonar homing systems.
Undoubtedly, the torpedo is a very effective weapon indeed and. whilst unit costs are very high, guidance systems are accurate enough to obviate the need for firing spreads ol six or so torpedoes to ensure a hit. Furthermore, although the range of torpedoes is less than newer surface-to-surface guided weapons, it is well to remember that it is far easier to sink a ship by letting water in through the hull than it is by letting air through the superstructure Talking of surface-to-surface guided weapons, these are being fitted to an incresing extent to SSNs. However, leaving aside ballistic missiles, so far as I can ascertain, our own plan to fit Harpoon to our Oberons would be one of the first instances of a western diesel electric submarine being fitted with surface-to-surface guided weapons. It is perhaps significant that, although the Russians fitted SS-N-3 to their Whiskey Long Bin type some years ago. apparently they have not pushed the idea of SSGW in diesel electric submarines since that time.
However, the basic concept of firing an encapsulated missile from a submarine's torpedo tubes, with the missile discarding its encapsulation as it reaches the surface and heads for its target, is attractive, although whether the use of space for Harpoon is preferable to using that same space for. say. additional Mark 48 torpedoes is a matter for judgement.
To turn to mines, most ot us know there are contact mines, magnetic mines, influence mines, acoustic mines and controlled minefields. The basic characteristics of each type are known to most of us, and time does not permit a review Mines offer an offensive capability when laid by our Oberon class submarines or. perhaps, by long range aircraft. Undoubtedly attractive to Australia is the defensive capability of mines to protet the approaches to our ports, off-shore resources and focal areas not only against hostile surface craft but particularly against hostile submarines. In this role, the new American system Captor may well be of interest. Captor is an antisubmarine torpedo encapsulated in a mine and discharged automatically upon receipt of a sonar alarm signal. Mines offer to Australia, in their newer forms particularly, a defence for focal trade areas, port approaches and offshore resources.

Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute — Page 47

Exhibit 4		
DISTANCES     [IN NAUTICAL MILES!		
COLOMBO - FREMANTLE	3100	
SYDNEY - SINGAPORE	5000	
COLOMBO - SYDNEY	5400	
SYDNEY - FREMANTLE	2140	
DJAKARTA - NORTH WEST CAPE	1000	
Exhibit5

REGIONAL POWERS' PATROL SUBMARINES	
	RANGES		
TYPE	ORIGIN	RANGE |nn)	
FOXTROT	USSR	20.000 surfaced	
TYPE 209	FGR	12.000 surfaced	
ROMEO	PRC
NORTH KOREA
USSR	13.000 surfaced	
WHISKEY	USSR PRC	13.000 surfaced	
06ER0N	UK	12.000 surlaced	
Page AS — Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

If and when an amphibious threat to a particular area is defined, mines could be a last ditch defence of beaches.
On the otner hand, and as with any other nation dependent upon seaborne trade, mines are a very real threat to us. Their cheapness, ease ol laying, and simplicity would have to be countered by expensive clearance activities There are extensive mineable waters around Australia — our vulnerability is manifest. We should bear in mind that there is doubt about whether some of the latest types of mine are sweepable
No paper on underwater weapons, and their potential for and against Australia, would be complete without reference to SOSUS. or towed arrays of which we heard yesterday, the underwater moored sonar system now in use in the North Atlantic area. The concept involves mooring listening devices in areas through which submarines and surface craft may pass The fact that they have passed, together with details of the sound patterns of the craft involved, are passed back to headquarters to keep the West informed of how many craft, and of which type, pass through a key area. In parts of our region, such information would be both inclusive and invaluable It would permit us to deploy our forces in areas we knew to be under threat, and minimise the need to keep forces in an area on the chance that it is under

threat. It would be interesting to hear an authoritative view on its cost effectiveness in Australian circumstances
However, like other forms of surveillance. SOSUS simply informs us that a possible enemy land we must not forget my earlier remarks about identification) is in our operational area We would still need the teeth to take advantage of the information
I would like to close by re-emphasising one important aspect of underwater warfare. A certain amount is published on the number of submarines in the service of a given nation Often we know type etc at least maximum speeds, number of torpedo tubes However, very little is published on other vitally important factors—diving depths, types of torpedo, mine, missile, or sonar carried We know very little of these vitally important aspects of the submarines in the service of India, Russia. Japan China. Korea. Indonesia and other countries
In these circumstances we must be prepared for surprises in the event of hostilities History shows that with mines and torpedoes, the surprises are nearly always unpleasant and the Long Lance and the magnetic mine are but a couple of examples.

ANTI-SHIPPING TECHNOLOGY
1985 — 2000
By Wing Commander R.W Howe RAAF (Ret'd)

Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. I wish to stress at the outset that the views to follow are expressions of my personal opinion and in no way may be construed as reflecting the policy of any organisation. private or government. I have chosen, because of time constraints, to limit my brief presentation to some observations on anti-shipping technology over the time frame 1985 to the year 2000. and further to confine the discussion to surface and above-surface technology, with which I have some familiarity. This does not imply that underwater operations will not play a significant role in future anti-shipping endeavours — they could well be the dominant element. Suffice to say, I have left this aspect to others better qualified to comment than I.

Likewise, in this short span of time. I could not hope to cover with any sufficiency the total spectrum of anti-ship weaponry and fire conirol systems for the period under review in all possible global and regional scenarios. Consequently, I have chosen two areas on which to focus, and these I consider are of major significance in terms of this seminar:
Firstly, the short term realities. In other words, what in the way of anti-shipping technology is to influence our region in the 1980's and how cost-effective will it be? Secondly, looking at the longer term, what range of technological options might be available to us towards the turn of the

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute — Page 4y

century and how relevant will they be for Australia's defence?
What then are some ol the short term realities? The tirst is that Australia's anti-shipping capabilities are in somewhat of a parlous state at this point of time. For example, our only airborne weapon capable of being used against hostile vessels is the conventional bomb with its inherently short ballistic trajectory, which causes the launching aircraft to approach well within the lethal defensive envelope of modern-day ships, Furthermore, our naval ships do not have any stand-off missile launching capability against other surface ships.
The second point to note is, that Australia, which has often regarded itself as being in the forefront of weapons technology amongst its regional neighbours, no longer holds this position in relation to anti-shipping technology, In fact, several countries to the north have already acquired stand-off anti-shipping missiles for their surface fleets. They are thus able to extend their defence capabilities considerably beyond conventionally armed navies dependent on the traditional four or five inch guns.
It will be a short time yet before we join the club and begin to redress this technological imbalance. I emphasise balance as the Harpoon's overall features fall into the same broad category of anti-ship-missile that our neighbours already have. That is. they have a propulsion range when launched from the air of some 50 to 100 km (or a surface-to-surface range of 25 to 60 km); they cruise at high subsonic speeds; they can skim the sea down to between 5 and 50 metres above the surface; they weigh between 500 and 1000 kg; they carry warheads weighing between 150 and 200 kg; they can be steered to their destination by simple on-board gyro-based navigation equipment and each type of missile carries in its nose a small radar transmitter which it uses to detect its intended victim.
Although this technological balance may be achieved upon acquisition of the Harpoon, it would appear that the operational scales might be tipped in favour of Australia, as one distinct advantage of the Harpoon is its potential compatibility with a wide variety of launch platforms. By the mid-1980s we might witness Harpoons being carried on Oberon class submannes, me Navy s FFGS. Air Force P3 Orions and F111CS. not to forget the replacement for our Mirage fighter aircraft, and possibly other vessels, including patrol boats.

Thus, while we may presently lag behind our neighbours in acquiring anti-ship missile technology, we could well be in an excellent position, through this diversity of platforms, to consolidate a flexible and formidable anti-shipping force by the late 1980s.
If is also reasonable to assume that these weapons would achieve at least a ten year m-service life, and it becomes then a fair bet that this type of first generation anti-shipping sea skimmer will still be in service with the RAAF and RAN by the turn of the century.
Perhaps you can see why I have chosen to discuss the realities of such imminent procurements. Lead times are such (hat today's decisions will govern our operational capabilities throughout the time frame under consideration at this seminar. I must hasten to add at this stage that the arrival of this relatively high level of weapons technology in our country brings with it a number of major challenges, some of which will not be resolved overnight. To illustrate this, I shall now briefly refer to some of the doubts which spring to mind.
First off — how do we best integrate oui variety of missile-carrying platforms into a cohesive operational system? Fundamental to this question is the need to establish a flexible and efficient command and control network and apart from the obvious necessity of qualified professionals, the crux of this network will be a wide range communications system capable of conveying an enormous amount of information in a very short time span, at the same time being immune to outside interference. It is no use procuring a variety of weapons systems if they can't be linked with each other — the digital data link must be seen to play an essential part
The other equally important component ot such a command and control system is highlighted by the likely diversity of possible elements within the anti-ship missile force, each producing a large amount of information requiring rapid interpretation. The flow of data within the
THE SPEAKER
Wing Commander Robert W Howe. RAAF iRtdi. is an RAAF Academy graduate wno served liisi as Tactical Co-oidmaior on Neptune ana-submarine aircraft (torn Townsville. and then as Bombing leaflet in Vietnam with No 2 Squadron He then served as a Sys-lems Training Officer al Amberley belore being posted as Staff Officer Navigation. Office of the Air Attache m Washington Back in Australia, he was posted to Aircraft Requirements (Weapons). Air Force Office in Canberra, after which he underwent a Royal Art Force Aero Systems Course in the UK Wing Commander Howe holds a Master ot Science Degree m Administration (MSA), and was Mentioned in Despatches lor services in Vietnam

Page 50 — Journal ot the Australian Naval Institute

command and control network will undoubtedly be beyond the capacity of human beings to process unaided. Heavy reliance will therefore have to be placed upon the computer, initially to carry out the mundane clerical tasks of collecting and collating the information, but also processing it into hierarchies of priorities based on known and estimated probabilities. The computer is of additional advantage in enabling the simulation of alternative tactics, so that commanders may obtain an idea of which of the many alternative courses of action might be employed.
Whether or not these vital processing capabilities should be permitted to remain in possession of those on the spot is a moot point. Rapid and secure data transfer facilities will enhance the application of more remote mobile command posts such as airborne warning and control platforms of the E2C Hawkeye type. Satellites will no doubt also play an increasingly important role in future command and control networks.
Having structured our anti-shipping force and given it basic communication and data processing capabilities, the next question we must ask is how do we ensure that positive detection, location and identification of hostile or potentially hostile targets is achieved, at ranges beyond the horizon and/or the lethal perimeter of the enemy's defensive system?
Past experience has shown that the same sensors used to detect a target may not necessarily be capable of further locating and identifying it. Indeed, each sensor operates in a specific part of the electro-magnetic spectrum and consequently has strengths and weaknesses. For instance, some radars operate much more effectively over the sea than the land. Television and infra-red sensors are constrained by atmospheric conditions and day/night differences. Even under-water sonars are affected by the thermal composition of the water.
Commanders must therefore resort to using a number of different sensors to build up as complete a picture as possible of the area of operations. In addition to this range of basic sensors, the processing problem Is exacerbated by the variety within each sensor group. In the one local area, for example, over a dozen different types and models of radars may be in operation, each with its own peculiar operating characteristics. In particular, each device has a unique probability range of detecting, locating or identifying targets.
One must not forget also that a radar mounted on a ship cannot see as far as one in a high flying aircraft: however it may have greater

power and be able to discnminate in better detail between targets. In other words, both the sensor and it's platform are together critical to the success of the mission. The maritime warfare environment of the 1980's will no doubt contain a complex mixture of both. Remotely-piloted vehicles (RPVS) and helicopter and balloon-mounted radars are additional examples of sensor/platform combinations likely to complement current systems, not to forget the ubiquitous satellite. Assuming that we have managed to overcome the daunting tasks ol linking the diverse elements of our system and actually deciding who is good and is bad.
The next and most important question is who fires what at whom?
As various writers have pointed out over the past few years, the precision guided missile now guarantees an order of guaranteed destruction never before achieved — instead of kill probabilities around the 0.1 to 0 2 mark, they are up into the high sixty percentiles or more.
This combination of long-range and high accuracy was highlighted recently in air combat simulations in the United States when it occurred, hypothetically of course, that two combatants simultaneously shot each other out of the sky at stand-off distances — he who fires first might only achieve a pyrrhic victory. The same can happen in anti-ship warfare. The task then of the modem fire control system is to rapidly process ever-changing information to come up with the right answers. The commander's most critical task is how to kill and not be killed.
The essence of what I have been saying so far in these examples is that one cannot isolate a single element of a very complex and dynamic system, such as an anti-snip missile, and examine its unique operational characteristics to derive its expected performance when integrated into the whole. One must always consider the entire pattern of inter-relationships amongst each, as well as determining the holistic nature of the altered system. To extend the argument further, you cannot ignore the overlap between other major systems such as anti-submarine, air-to-air or air-to-ground. A brief illustration of the interaction between major systems is evident in the dilemma which might face the RAAF if it decided to fit Harpoon to its F111 s for this missile is more or less incomoatible with overland strike operations against airfields, SAM sites and the like. Does Australia therefore have to invest in two sets of weapons for the Ft 11 in the 1980s to cover separate tasks of anti-shipping strike and counter air strike? The increasing number of weapon alternatives open to fit on this aircraft might at first glance appear to be a blessing, but if each weapon demands individally specialised
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute — Page 5!

controls and displays, trade-offs might be necessary in view of the aircraft's relatively small cockpit and surrounding airframe. To instal one set of equipment might mean that in the future the installation of another, perhaps better one. may not be possible, without considerable costs.
I think I have adequately brought out the point that modem high level missile technology equates to complexity and correspondingly higher costs. The general lack of publicly available information on the financial breakdown of specific procurements tends to lead people to conclude that the cost of a weapon equipment acquisition program is merely a multiple of individual weapon costs plus a little extra for support systems. Not so — in fact the operational aspect is only the tip of the fiscal iceberg. For a start, it is quite conceivable that initial acquisition costs of the capital equipment may be as low as 20% of total life-cycle costs, the remainder being taken up with operating and maintaining the weapon in service.
In relation to maintenance, modern weapons are tending towards the "Artillery round concept"; all one has to do these days is to unload the missile from its crate, attach it to its parent launch platform, check it out with a Go/No Go' press button, and the missile is then ready for launching. Although this might achieve the utmost in operational flexibility, my guess is that some of the burden has been transferred up the line to the depot, which is responsible for certifying the complex missilery and fixing its defects. Certainly such depots take up their share of total weapon system costs. Talking about depots, let me illustrate a typical dilemma facing countries without their own major defence industry. One problem which could face purchasers of modern high level weapons is determining how best to maintain an operation caoability once a weapon enters service.
Let us assume that a nation is determined to assert its self-sufficiency in the field of anti-ship missiles and decides to establish a depot facility to provide the requisite maintenance and servicing for its missiles In a peace time situation, however, it may also decide that it cannot afford to buy large numbers of missiles. The question is — should this nation construct the depot facility to cater lor a hypothetical peak wartime throughput? If it does so. and it is blessed with many subsequent years of freedom from conflict, the country is forced to pay for the depot's under-utilization.
The opposite side of the coin is — does one forego the establishment of such a facility to rely on an extended overseas logistics pipeline? In

this case, of course, there is a considerable risk that the desired weapons might not be available at the right time and place, if at all. There are inherent costs involved in these decisions, and each requires careful analysis. I might add that even the pros and cons of siting our operational bases have considerable cost impact.
So much for some realities of the present and near future. As well as requiring the nght technology one requires the correct methods and procedures of costing it — i.e. you have to put together operational effectiveness and the costs, fixed and variable, obvious and hidden. I emphasise here that euphoric predictions heralding the advent of new weapons must be qualified by a sound assessment of both the advantages and disadvantages of modern technology. Before I move to the latter part of the time frame under focus, may I apologise to those whose interest and expertise lies in different areas for my apparent undue concentration on anti-ship missile technology. Certainly there might be other, no doubt equally significant, procurements under way to build up our system elements — shipboard fire control systems, airborne PGMS other than specialised anti-ship missiles, electronic warfare suites etc. all these serve to emphasise the point that the complexity of future operational systems is escalating It is essential to be capable of filtering out critical factors from the plethora of permutations and combinations.
Having set the scene somewhat for the short term, what about the longer term? For ease of discussion I would like to arbitrarily divide future technology into three categories, namely:
Evolutionary changes to existing equipments Big league versus little league, and Revolutionary changes or technological breakthroughs.
Firstly, evolutionary changes. To continue with my selected example — that of the anti-ship missile. Second generation missiles are already under development to replace those either in service or about to enter service. This indicates one problem inherent in having extended lead times for procurement projects— one can always hang oft Until something better comes along. Dut at some point one has to put one's foot down and make a decision — otherwise one gets nothing at all, losing any chance of an operational capability and eroding the store of these rare skills required to maintain and operate modern weapons. Back to the missiles The trend in this area seems to be towards supersonic flight and greater flexibiity in component selection in the operational theatre. Even these developments have their detractions — for instance, to achieve supersonic flight at low level requires rocket power rather than jet engines. So what might be gained on the swings in terms of reduced target

Page 52 — journal ol the Australian Naval Institute

warning time, might be forfeited on the roundabouts of constraining any increase in stand-off range. There's not much room in the relatively small anti-ship missile to fit more rocket fuel to provide that necessary added endurance.
In relation to componentry, operational flexibility would be greatly enhanced through being able to select an appropriate missile configuration optimised against the target that is in one's sights. The flexibility inherent in having on the spot, better packaged and readily interchangeable target seekers, warheads and anti-jamming aids as well as being able to vary inflight and terminal homing profiles is obvious — these are examples of evolutionary changes which might enter service in the mid-to-late eighties, if not before. Hopefully Australia will benefit from such advances. Another evolutionary development of relevance is the anti-radar missile which homes in on actively transmitting radars. Nowadays it is referred to more as an anti-radiation missile as efforts are made to extend its capability outside specialised radar frequencies. This was as a result of many misses in Vietnam when radars were turned off to confuse the incoming missile. While radar energy isn't being transmitted, other forms of energy are being radiated even though the radar has been switched off. i.e. a ship could well be vulnerable to this weapon irrespective of its radar being turned on or not. One advantage the anti-radiation missile has over most early generation anti-ship missiles is that the former is covert — by passively homing on its unsuspecting target, it degrades very much the amount of warning time left to the target to take corrective action. Active radars give the game away, of course, when they begin to transmit. Other areas of evolutionary interest include computer technology, as antiquated hard-wired analogue systems are replaced by software-based digital processors. As well as impacting considerably in the command and control and communications fields, electronic warfar will most certainly benefit from these advances.
Moving on to the next category ol big league versus little league. Quite obviously, nuclear weapons, strategic missiles in underground silos, nuclear powered and armed submarines and the like are constrained to major nations at this stage and most probably in the period under review. It is not so clearcut in all cases though. The advent of the longer range (500 km plus) cruise missile, which may or may not be carrying nuclear warheads, has focussed attention on the increasingly blurred distinction between major and minor countries in terms of some forms of military technology.

Presently. Australia sits squarely in the little league ball park. What happens, however, in the early eighties, when having attained a temporary degree of technological equality in the anti-shipping field, we begin to identify further gaps in our defensive systems in the light of changing technology around us? One is likely to look further afield for appropriate weapons to meet operational needs. To go up the technological ladder implies getting closer to critical thresholds which currently divide big and little leaguers. Probably the two major factors governing this threshold are international politics and economics. Certainly the efforts being made by some major powers to restnct the spread of high level weapons technology and the escalating cost of cruise missiles, up to a million dollars apiece, not to forget extensive maintenance and ligistics backup, exemplify such restrictions,
Finally, to the revolutionary or science fiction side of the picture. I could easily duck out of this one by saying that this area covers inventions and discoveries yet to be made, so I needn't discuss it at all. But there are examples of weapons which may possibly enter military service overseas in the 1990's and the best example which comes to mind is the high powered laser. Scientists assure us that the barriers to developing a compact lightweight high energy laser ray gun effective in the lower altitudes of our earth's atmosohere are prodigious. However, breakthroughs could occur. I sometimes think of a crude analogy — the inertial navigation system — it began life about the size of a large building and can now fit in the palm of your hand — so why not a laser? However, unless Australia can afford to develop and manufacture the products of maior breakthroughs by itself, our reliance on overseas procurements could place us in the little liague arena in this category also.
My aim has been to present some thought provoking considerations about technology in general and anti-ship missiles in particular. If I have injected some small contribution into a very complex subject which has to be faced objectively, then I will feel well rewarded. One last thought. If Australia is reaching practical limits ol high technology in certain areas of defence procurement then we may have no alternative but to try and approach the desired cost-effective point from another direction. Our salvation might well be in developing our own weapon systems in this country by applying our indigenous imagination and skills to the lower rungs of the technological ladder and deriving alternative paths. Perhaps its about time that we recognised the challenge and set our minds to the task — there may be no other answer short of eroding our defence preparedness.

Journal of the Australian Na val Institute — Page 53

MONEY FOR DEFENCE
By
Dr Ian Story

I am not a practitioner in the defence arena and feel a little apprehensive in addressing such an august body of defence specialists. I will therefore confine my talk to general remarks on Defence Policy and the main points I intend to cover are:
1     The US and Soviet balance of power;
 2.	The changed strategic situation.
 3.	The high cost of maintaining a standing army: and
 4.	Enhancing Australia s Maritime Defence through boosting expenditure on the Navy and Air
The Australian Government's financial committment to the defence of this country is necessarily a function of the perceived level of the threat Therefore it is necessary to put our budgetary spending into context with the current strategic situation.
US AND SOVIET DEFENCE EXPENDITURE
The Carter Administration s election commitments include a promise to cut defence expenditures. President Carter has reduced the 1978 US Defence budget by US $5 Billion. The principal casualties were programs directly related to US combat potential i e Strategic Forces (cancellation of the B-l manned bomber in favour of air-launched cruise missiles) and programs related to General Purpose Forces (5.2% reduction overall including the cancellation of many new missile programs)
The US has thus withdrawn from its 1975 policy of restoring real growth of defence expenditures sufficient to maintain the balance of forces with the Soviet Union in the 1980s (See Exhibit D-
President Carter has also announced his Five Year Defence Program (FYDP). The FYDP
Page 54 — Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

includes cancellation of ma)or procurement programs such as the USAF STOL Transport Aircraft. Prototype Cargo Aircraft, the Naval shipbuilding program as well as the B-l bomber The Carter Administration s view reflects the expectation that US Forces are not likely to be deployed against the Soviet at a time when negotiations are underway to limit both Strategic and General Purpose Forces. Hence, (the argument goesi defence forces can safely be trimmed
In comparison with U S Defence Expenditure, the CIA estimates that the Soviet Union spends between 12% and 14% ol GDP on Defence programs i e approximately US Si70 billion compared with President Carter s US S118 billion for 1978 The Soviet decision to bear this very substantial defence burden, despite the SALT talks to reduce tensions, underscores the high priority that the Soviet Leadership attaches to Military Power
According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies the Soviets are currently spending at least 25% more on Defence than the US This gap will increase at approximately 2% per annum for the next five years US Defence expenditures (excluding the Vietnam War) have been lower than the Soviet Union for a lull decade Serious relative deficiencies have now developed in the military capabilities of the two nations
THE SPEAKER
Dr Ian Story is a graduate ol the University o' Queensland where he capped an outstanding aca demic career Oy obtaining a PhD m 1970 He subso quently studied al Ihe Havard School ol Business Administration, was awarded a Fullboghl Scholarship in 1971 and maiored in Business and Government Beta tions He has already attained wide ranging experience in international banking, was lor a short time private secretary 10 Ihe former Minister lor Defence Mr Bill Morrison, and is currently working as a Management Consultant in Sydney, specialising in business and governmenl

Let us take a brief look at the Strategic Situa-
tion.
STRATEGIC SITUATION
China is the key to the destiny ol Southeasi Asia and any strategic assessment must be heavily weighted by our understanding of her motives, attitudes and goals, and her potential military capabilities China s concerns now are internal development and conflict with Russia, but these preoccupations have not limited her involvement in Indochina World revolution and the establishment of communism are still declared ob|ectives despite the apparent rapprochement between Premier Deng Xiaoping and President Carter Once again, uncertainty intrudes into any discussion of China s future actions. So far as military capability is concerned. China will shortly |oin the USA. Russia and the European community as a maxi-power She is already a nuclear power and soon will have an ICBM capability Her Fleet, small by great power standards, is by far the largest in Asia and consists of some 30 destroyers and frigates. 60 submarines and a large amphibious force The whole Fleet is manned by some 200.000 officers and sailors.
Recent events have profoundly affected the disposition of power in the region Australians feel increasingly isolated since the United States withdrawal from Southeast Asia and the expansion of China's sphere of influence. Free world countries in the Western Pacific are concerned that America will enter a new era of isolationism and wonder if the experience of Vietnam has weakened her resolve to come to the aid of her friends. Russia has moved steadily to lake advantage of the changing strategic situation and fill the maritime power vacuum in the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean is important to the Soviets for many reasons. It is the access to the belly of Russia and with the Suez Canal reopened it is the highway between their Atlantic. Mediterranean and Pacific fleets It seems inevitable that Russia will one day exert pressure on Australia, by external and internal political agitation, and by its naval presence, to remove strategically vital US installations from NW Cape and Pine Gap At the same time they will attempt to weaken the ANZUS Alliance.
What ought Australians to conclude from these developments? The first conclusion should be that the military posture of today will not be adequate for tomorrow. The world scene does not change in an orderly, progressive fashion and there are a great many reasons why we may witness dramatic changes Deterioration of the world economic situation, shortages ol resources, the Asian population explosion, the com-

munications revolution and the popular demand for a higher standard of living are but a few
THE NEED FOR A STRONG MARITIME FORCE
To give realistic effect to a defence effort. Australia needs firstly to know that a real threat exists, and secondly we have to be able to react quickly and decisively to that threat To do that we need reconnaissance aircraft patrolling the approaches to Australia These aircraft need to patrol the northern part of the continent Naturally these aircraft need to be equipped with the necessary avionics systems; they also need a limited strike capacity of their own. In turn, these reconnaissance aircraft need to be backed up by attack aircraft capable of launching air to air missiles, air to surface and air to sub-surface weapons There is also a need to expand our surveillance radar systems In addition we need some capacity in anti-missile systems
We are likely to have some advance warning of a threat, provided the level of surveillance forces is sufficient. Any invasion or landing threat has to be sea-borne. In such case our Navy needs to be able to effect interception and lake preventive action. We therefore require at least one attack flotilla centred around an attack aircraft carrier. We also need to maintain our guided missile destroyers and increase them to six. Our submarine force also needs expansion, up to eight and possibly ten, In addition our Navy needs supply vessels, minesweepers and fast patrol vessels lightly armed to protect the sovereignty of our waters from intrusion
The third element in Australia s defence forces is the Army. In peace time it is more important to maintain levels of equipment thar levels of manpower. Manpower levels may be expanded when the need arises In a defence emergency we can probably field up to one full infantry division within twelve weeks This is a lonq time in the days of ICBM s and electronic warfare. Within nine months we could have three full divisions in the field By this time the next war would be well and truly over. In realistic terms the size of the standing army is not nearly as critical as (he readiness of air and naval forces The manpower level of the standing army has traditionally been the subject of much emotional argument without reference to any defined objective solution to Australia's unique defence problem
Australia currently spend 2.7% of its GDP on defence, which is quite low by international standards. (Exhibits 2 and 3 ) The USA spends 6% of its GDP on Defence and the Soviet Union some 12-14%. Sweden spends 3.4% and Western European countries typically 3'?% of GDP

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute — Page 55

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE EXPENDITURE
Traditionally. Australian Defence Expenditure has been determined by three competing influences:
a     Historical Experience.
b.    Bureaucratic and Political Restraints, and
c     Economic Limitations
HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE
This century Australia has been involved in two world wars plus Korea and Vietnam Each time Australia has contributed conventional forces to the battlegrounds in Europe, the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Current obligations under ANZUS and SEATO call lor contributions from all three Services. This experience does not directly lend itself towards the defence of Australia s immense coastline and the construction of a Deterrent Force. Clearly, our historical experience tends to emphasise the role of the Army
BUREAUCRATIC AND POLITICAL INFLUENCES
Each Service currently estimates force requirements based on the current strategic assessment Thereafter, a bargaining process ensues with each Service attempting to maximise its share of the total Defence Budget. Differences in bargaining power often exist between the Services and personalities are inevitably involved By the time the estimates reach the Defence Minister, the expenditure is already apportioned between the Services and it would be folly for the Minister to attempt any significant re-apportion-mg of these allocations.
The Minister then presents his department's estimates to the House Committee on Defence and Foreign Affairs, by which time the estimates have already been agreed to by the Treasury Officials who have incorporated the figures into an overall fiscal and monetary strategy which is necessary to satisfy the Government's overriding economic goals such as inflation control and unemployment reduction
In practice there is little room for manoeuver even by senior Defence Department officials, because to a very large degree, the estimates are already determined by the FYDP and existing procurement commitments. These on-going commitments are modulated by the Governments national economic goals, such as the recently announced modifications to the Five Year Defence program as announced in the White Paper.
Page S6 — Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

The Cabinet Budget Session is generally a formality The real hatchet work is completed by a very small group of key Ministers prior to the fin-alisation of the Cabinet submission With the exception of the Prime Minister and Treasurer. Cabinet members are generally un-bnefed. and the Treasury and Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet have by now agreed on the correct expenditure levels
Thus the resultant Defence Budget is a compromise. Financial resources are allocated to each service on the basis of relative bargaining power and the result is the maintenance of Balanced Forces'. The political process itself tends to reinforce the concept of balanced forces because the Minister can then publicly demonstrate an all round capability The tact that the strategic situation has changed or that new technology has altered the relative effectiveness of our Armed Forces is generally not taken into account.
Australia's defence problem in the 1980s is a quite different one to that faced during the 1960 s. because of the rapid developments"in our strategic situation and in defence technology and communications. Our methodology of determining relative force structures has not kept up with these recent developments. Consequently, the relative composition of our Defence Forces does not represent the most cost-effective method of dealing with the task of defending our island continent
ECONOMIC LIMITATIONS
Politicians naturally tend to translate low threat strategic basis assessments into minimal defence expenditures, and defence budgets are usually first hit in times of national economic hardship. In fact, there has been a drop m defence expenditure in real terms of 9°° between 1968 and 1978. (Exhibit 4)
Australian defence outlay in 1968 was S1.073M compared with a 1978 budget of S2.50M or S975M expressed in constant 1968 prices. While it is true that 1968 Defence expenditures reflected an involvement in the Vietnam War. the fact is that real Defence expenditures have been static for the last fifteen years
Mr Killen has recently announced a backing away from the November 1976 White Paper which promised a 5% increase per annum in real terms. If it is assumed that we will experience a 3% real increase in Defence expenditures for the next three years, then it will be 1981 before real Defence expenditure approaches the level experienced In 1968

The inescapable fact is that the economic recession of the seventies has resulted in a severe curtailment of Defence expenditures
The bulk of the decline in real Defence spen -ding occurred under the Liberal Government between 1968 and 1972. (9.3% drop in real terms.) In 1972 Defence expenditure was 2.9% of GDP The Australian Labor Party platform for the December 1972 Federal Election was to increase Defence spending to 3.5% of GDP. Instead the Labor Government ran into economic difficulties and Defence expenditure was reduced to 2.7% of GDP in 1974/75 and to 2.6% in 1975/76 Since then, the Liberal Government has maintained the level of spending at 2.6% of GDP (Exhibit 5)
Measured as a fraction of total Government expenditure. Defence expenditure has dropped even more markedly In 1972 Defence accounted for 12% of total Government expenditure and this had dropped to just 8.7% in 1978/79. Part of the reason for this marked decline is simply due to the fact that Government outlays on Health. Education and Welfare have grown dramatically resulting in the Government share of GDP increasing from 25% to 50% over the same period. Against this backdrop the decline would appear to be partly cosmetic, but. it is true that there has been no real increase in overall Defence spending from 1972 to 1978.
If we look at the composition of Defence expenditure, we find that manpower costs have been accounting for an increasing share of the total Defence cake. (Exhibits 6. 7 and 8) In 1969/ 70 manpower costs represented just 40% of Defence expenditure and this rose to 61 % following the wages explosion in 1973/74. Manpower costs rose so rapidly that the target level for the Army was reduced from 34,000 down to 31.500.
Running costs have fallen from 35% in 1969 to 27% of total expenditure in 1978/79. Capital equipment fell from 17% in 1969 to 6% of total expenditure in 1974 and has since risen to 14% in 1978/79 However the long lead times involved in procurement, and the dearth of new purchases during the 1973/75 period, will result in a reduction of new capital equipment deliveries for the remainder of this decade.
In this highly technological age. Australia cannot allow herself to fall behind in know-how and operational skills concerning the very latest equipment types. This is particularly true in the areas of aerial and maritime detection and in the ability to effectively counter incoming electronically guided weapons

Australia should now adopt a strategy of developing a Deterrent Force'. This strategy is the most effective for defending a large geographical area with a very small population. Obviously this small population must depend upon sophisticated technology and complex weapons systems to the greatest possible extent. In this technological age. the efficacy of defending this giant island continent has very little to do with the size of the standing army. It is much more closely connected with the introduction and deployment of sophisticated weapons and detection systems Hence a capital equipment component of 15% -20% would reflect a more objective Defence structure than the one which we have been accustomed to in the past. (Exhibit 9)
THE HIGH COST OF MAINTAINING A STANDING ARMY
The Army is currently the most expensive of the three Services to maintain This is principally due to the large manpower component Ground forces account for approximately 24% of total defence expenditure, compared with 20% for air defence and 19% for maritime defence.
This rate of expenditure in favour of the Army is in marked contrast with the relative importances of the three Services in our changed environment. With the declaration of the 200 mile limit and the withdrawal of the US from South East Asia. Australia should be striving to become a strong sea-power with a credible maritime deterrent force This cannot be done while real expenditure on Defence has decreased by 10% over the last decade, but more importantly, there needs to be a greater emphasis on procurement ot Naval equipment items to yield the most cost-effective solution to the Defence problem.
The US has recently reduced its army strength from 3.3 million to about 2.5 million men. Other Western nations have abolished conscription and moved towards a smaller army.
It is impossible to estimate accurately the cost of increasing or decreasing the size of the Army, but an order of magnitude estimate may be obtained from the work of Withers in 1971' He estimates that the cost of expanding an all volunteer army to 45.000 over five years would cost an additional $130 million per annum, or an additional $650 million per annum over five years expressed in 1978 dollars. Similarly the cost saving in reducing the size of the Army from 32.000 down to 25.000 would be approximately $300 million per annum (on a conservative estimate).
The cost saving of some $200 million per annum in reducing the size of the standing Army

Journal or the Australian Naval Institute — Page 57

could better be spent on enhancing our maritime defence The new balance of military expenditure would hypothetically be as follows for 1978/79 (Exhibit 10)

Defence will only become a maior issue in our hip-pocket economy when people realise that the manner m which our tax dollars are spent can result in a decrease in taxation

78/79 Expenditure
S450M S678M S510M S863M
16
27 21 34
Ground forces and support Maritime defence Air defence Administrative support
TOTAL
S2501M        100
The real costs of maintaining a large standing Army is the output of civilian goods sacrificed by diverting people from civil to military employment. It is necessary to recognise the distinction between budget expenditure and real cost to the community A large army will not only cost more in terms of direct Government expenditure but will also reduce the output of private sector goods and services and thus result in a higher cost structure within our economy. This burden is ev-venlually born by the consumer in terms of higher taxation levels and a reduced standard of living
On the other hand, increased emphasis on maritime defence will result m increased orders (or our local defence industry This capital intensive expenditure will have a stimulatory effect upon the private sector and will steadily create new employment opportunities
The net effect of reallocating Defence funds m this manner will be a stimulus to the economy through the multiplier effect on capital works spending which will eventually result in lower rates ol taxation as the tax base is increased

CONCLUSION
The current allocation of Defence funds between the three Services does not represent the optimal solution to Australia s defence problem in todays changed technological and different strategic environment A fully self sufficent defence capacity is not economically feasible and it is beyond the willingness of the public to pay. There are quite distinct limits to the level of taxation which the Australian community is willing to bear However, we should aim to increase our Defence spending to the vicinity of 3% of GDP or by some S300M per annum This could be achieved by a 2% reduction in government spending on Health. Education and Welfare and would be consistent with a continuing adherence to the FYDP in the White Paper.
The threat to Australia is of a long term nature, and the probability of a maior ground involvement in Asia in the next couple of years is extremely remote. In this case it is more prudent to trade-off current capability, for long term defence assets and equipments The lead time for the development of maritime forces is longer than that required by the Army A credible maritime force will offer a much stronger deterrent to a potential aggressor who must arrive at our shores either on the water or over vts surface This is the moment of vulnerability — not when they are safely landed and secured on our shores Thus the trade-oft would involve a reduction in Army resources in favour of maritime forces
1     Withers, G A . The cost ol replacing conscription with an all-volunteer Army, economic Record. 1976

Page 58 — Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

Exhibit 1
US AND SOVIET DEFENCE PROGRAM TRENDS (IN CONSTANT 1978 DOLLARS)

USSR [JAN 77 ESTIMATES) ...■■"
PROJECTIONS
76
78       80
I
?
^
I
I

J BILLIONS
1801	
170 160
INCREMENTAL ^-^^
COSTS OF WAR IN Si. ASIA
150-140-130 120-
.*•■• ■
110-
100
64        66	68        70       72	74
FISCAL YEAR

82

f
!

Exhibit 2
DEFENCE SPENDINGS IN COMPARISON WITH 1975 GNP AND 1976 GOVERNMENT OUTLAY

20:				
MNP	■ IRAN	4 22.8
Iegtpi	f 35.9
1 ISRAEL	
15 -<			USSR ■	
I0:,	S..OI            ■"""'			
	-""".«!.«	■ YUGOSLAVIA		
5:,	-GDR            -R OF S AF          -US
CZITCH    ■t"B
" -HOLLAND      ,Me    .FRANCE POL     ■sifflfi
'     ■  -BE     UN                        ■" ""
■BRAZIL   " lM|   ■Sil" "JAPAN               '"'"
■"        i   ~         i              i              i	r ■           i		OF KOREA		

5	10	15
GOVERNMENT OUTLAY

20	25	30

35

40	45	50	55        UNKNOWN

Exhibit 3

3 5

	COMPARISONS OF DEFENCE EXPENDITURES 1977-78			
COUNTRY	S  MILLION	S PER HEAO	% GOVERNMENT SPENDING	% OF	GNP	

	1977	1978	1977	1978	1977	1976	1976	1977	
SOVIET UNION	133,000	140.000	508	520	NA	NA	12	14	
BRITAIN	12.103	13,579	214	239	12.7	11.2	5.2	5.0	
CANAOA	3.348	3,635	144	153	8.8	8.9	1.8	1.8	
FRANCE	13.666	17,518	254	325	19.2	20.3	3.7	3.6	
GERMANY	17.130	21,355	271	337	23.9	22.9	3.5	3.4	
UNITEO STATES	104,250	113,000	480	517	22.7	23.0	5.4	6.0	
SWEOEN	2,833	2,946	343	355	11.6	11.7	3.4	3.4	
SWITZERLAND	1.153	1.547	172	240	18.3	18.0	20	1.9	
EGYPT	NA	NA	112	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	
IRAN	7.B94	9.942	224	273	23.5	23.8	12,0	10.9	
ISRAEL	4.259	3,310	1.176	887	32.4	30.4	36.3	29.9	
SAUOI ARABIA	7.539	13,170	1.005	1,704	24.0	35.1	17.7	13.6	
AUSTRALIA	2.678	NA	191	190	9.1	HA	2.7	2.7	
CHINA	29.750	34,380	32	36	NA	HA	10.0	8.5	
IAPAH	6.135	8,567	54	74	5.9	6.2	0.9	0.9	
SOURCE:    'THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUOIES' PUBLICATION   THE MILITARY BALANCE 19781979

2000 H
OUTLAY S MILLIONS
1600
B
-
■■■; '■-

i

3200
2800
1200 -
1073
2400

Exhibit 4 OEFENCE BUDGET CURRENT AND CONSTANT [1968| PRICES
NET
	 CURRENT PRICES
388    975   'gTir-rr
932
925
916
	 CONSTANT PRICES

3709

1050

400

PSOIECTIBRS IRSEB BR » )     REM IHCIEiSE  PER IRRIH 4FIES 1)78 79

00

68

69  70  71  72

73  M  75 BUDGET YEAR

76  77  7B  79  80  81

-:
13

Exhibit 5
EXPENDITURE ON DEFENCE BY FUNCTION

CATEGORY	FINANCIA 1972 73	. YEAR 197374	1974/75	1975/76	1976/77	1977,78	ESTIMATED
1978.79	
CAPITAL EQUIPMENT	11.9% [152M]	7.3% [I02M]	5.7% [ID2M)	8.3% [I62M|	12.8% |289M|	13.2%
[326M|	14.2%
[370M]	
DEFENCE FACILITIES	4.9% (63M|	4.0% (56M)	7.1% (I27MJ	6.2% I120M]	5,6% I126M)	4.9% [I20M]	3.9%
[I60M|	
MANPOWER COSTS	52.1%
(684M|	60.7% [854M)	57.8% (1030MJ	57.6% I1120MJ	54.6% [1232M]	54.3% (1343M)	53.9% [I399M]	
OTHER RUNNING COSTS	31.3% (395M)	27.3% |3B4M|	24.7% (442M)	25.8% (502M)	25.9% (584M)	26.5% (656M)	27.1% (704M]	
TOTAL OUTLAY ON OEFENCE	SI234M	S1326M	S1628M	SI853M	S2I82M	S2377M	S2501M	
% OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE	12.0%	10.8%	9.1%	8.5%	9.0%	8.9%	8.7%	
3 OF GDP	2.9%	2.8%	2.7%	2.6%	2.6%	2.6%	2.6%	

OTHER
RUNNING
COSTS
DEFENCE FACILITIES
CAPITAL EQUIPMEN
MANPOWER COSTS

100 90
70 60 50 40 30 20 10-1

Exhibit 6
EXPENDITURE BY CATEGORY
TOTAL EXPENDITURE ON DEFENCE FUNCTION = 100%
35%   35%    33%   31%    28%   25%    26%   26%   26.5%  27%
40%   47%    50%   52%    61%   58%   58%   55.5% 54.5% 54%

FINANCIAL  69"      70      71      72     73      74     75      76      77      78    ~79 YEAR

Exhibit 7

r

73        74 BUDGET YEAR

Exhibit 8
AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE EXPENDITURE BY CATEGDRY

I
E

SI083M    1	II29N	112066	SI234	4	11326	4    S1628	4	11853	4    S2I82M   S23T7M	S2501M	
100 90
80
10 60
SO
40 30 20 10 0	IS		35		33   :		31 3"		4";		28 1-		?s 8.		75 3. SS:		25 5' 8 1		77 I-. 3 1;	

	i	
	S-.	
	5°	
	i 9 II.J:;	
	7.3\		7  I":
57 .	
	5 ?'. 83 .	
	72 8";		13? .	
	18 2-	

	17	
	IT.	
	12'	

	51 7	

	

	

	

	

	

	

	
	5) 5	
	S? 5	

	

	

	

	
	
	5? 1-	

	

	
	58 6'	
	51.J	
	53 9	

	

	SO	

	

	

	

	

	
	
	17 .	

	

	

	

	

	

	<3	

	

	

	

	

	

	
69    TO    T!
75    76    77    78
T2    73    74 8U0GEI YEAR

RUNNING COSTS
OEFENCE
INSTALL
NEW
CAPITAL EQUIPMENT
MANPOWER COSTS

Exhibit 9
DEFENCE BUDGET BY SERVICES

1978/79 (ESTIMATED)

?
-

Exhibit 10
DEFENCE EXPENDITURE BY FUNCTION 1978/79

	MANPOWER COSTS	EQUIP, STORES AND FACIL	TOTAL	% OF TOTAL	PROPOSEO FORCE STRUCTURE BASEO ON 25,888 MEN ARMY AND ENHANCEO MARITIME CAPABILITY	
GROUND FORCES AND SUPPORT	$411	$186	$597	24%	$458	18%	
MARITIME DEFENCE	$207	$271	$478	19%	$678	27%	
AIR OEFEHCE	$284	$226	$510	20%	$510	21%	
ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT R&O ANO GENERAL ACTIVITIES	$423	$493	$916	37%	$863	34%	
TOTAL	$1325	$1176	$2501	100%	$2501	100%	

SOURCE: 1978 DEFENCE REPORT   PAGE 48

BALANCING STRATEGY,
TECHNOLOGY AND
RESOURCES —
A PERSONAL
EXPERIENCE
By Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr USN (Rtd)

Ladies and Gentlemen.
It is a great thrill for me to be here Perhaps the most significant thing which can be said about that story just read, is to give the reason that I knew what Kissinger said when the door closed. I had taken the precaution ol recommending to be his assistant my former special assistant who had just left the Navy
It is an honour to be listed m the same category as a man of the professional competence ot Admiral Gorshkov. I request that Tass. who is here to report everything else I say inaccurately, relay to him my professional respect.
Those references to Kissinger and Gorshkov are in reply to comments made by Dr R.J O'Neit. m his introductory remarks before Admiral Zumwalt took the rostrum — Editor"

fought in World War II. in Pacific destroyers, lob-served our alliance fight battles in two oceans, to regain the control of the seas, which we had lost I watched Hitler's Armies overrun Europe, and observed him as he looked west and then east, poised, and made his grand strategic error of invading Russia. This made it feasible for the Anglo-American alliance to embark upon its strategy of saving England — for itself — and to serve as a linch pin for our regaining of control of the Atlantic. In the Pacific. I observed Japan make its great strategic error at the outset by its sneak attack on Pearl Harbour, which so rallied the diverse US public opinion that it was possible for us to gird our muscles for war And I observed ttiat. as in the case of England, it became critical to the United States, with its early losses, to secure the Hawaiian-Australian line As an aside, in connection with the exchange in the newspapers of the last

I bring to you, as a former President of the US Naval Institute, the greetings of that Naval Institute at their request I express for them their admiration at this Seminar.
I would like my comments to be considered a tribute to a professional colleague. Admiral Peter Peek, whom I would gladly follow into any battle
I came to the job of Chief of Naval Operations on 1st July, 1970 (to begin a four year term which, under the law, could not be extended) after 31 years as sailor, midshipman and officer. That service began as I witnessed and

THE SPEAKER
The Naval career ol Admiral Elmo R Zumwalt, Jr. spans the years from 1939 to 1974 He saw combat service in World War II (in me Pacilic Theatre), in the Korean War and the Vietnam War. in which he held the post ot Commander. United Slates Naval Forces. Vietnam, from 1969-70 In 1962 he played a significant role in helping to shape US policy during the Cuoan Missile Cnsis In 1970. at the early age ol 49 he was appointed as Chief ol Naval Operations, which position he hold until rellremenl in 1974 Alter retirement. Admiral Zumwalt wrote his book On Watch. which won the Book ol the Month award in 1976 He is the author ol numerous articles and commentaries and ran as the Democratic candidate tw the US Senate m Virginia m 1976

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute — Page 69

two days. I might note that our declaratory policy was to preserve the Philippines. And we gave them up Our declaratory policy was to preserve Australia, and had we lost the battle of Coral Sea you would have been on your own These strategies gave us time for the United States to organise the brute force effort back home that made it possible to build up the sea. land and air forces, with which to seize the key islands. Iceland in the Atlantic and the Central and Southern Pacific Islands We moved our forces across those oceans, where the Armies delivered the coup de grace in Europe, and where Air and Naval forces strangled Japan without invasion Now the net assessment was a real-life bottom-line, in World War II (something very difficult (or us military men to get in peace time). We know what happened. The outcome was: Axis fleets destroyed; the Soviets remaining with only a meagre coastal defence; Anglo-American forces in total control of Japan and the islands intervening, and of Western Europe and of the interconnecting oceans; and with a modest fission monopoly
I fought in the Korean War as the skipper of a destroyer escort and the navigator of a battleship I observed there, that we came to that war as a result of demobilisation overnight after World War 11, demobilisation of our forces, which turned us rapidly from number one to number two on land. I watched our Air and Naval forces cut back, remaining only slightly superior to those of the Soviet Union. I saw Stalin failing to demobilise and over running Eastern Europe. I observed the first impressures on Turkey and the insurgency in Greece We knew long after the fact through Milo van Agilas book 'Conversations with Stalin' thai Stalin   never   believed   the  Anglo-American powers would suffer their sea lines of communi cation to be severed in Greece But never-the less, like some Machiavellian mother whose chil dren were spawned by the devil, he permitted them to play with it until we look our stand watched President Truman have the courage unique for a politician in 1947. to report the facts of Stalin's mischief to the public, and saw in 13 dramatic weeks the way in which our people turned the situation around:
 •	through their elected representatives, they created the National Security Act of 1947, which established the Central Intelligence Agency, a Policy Planning Council in State, a Defence Department — mechanisms for dealing with the Soviet aggressive strategy
 •	the enabling legislation to the Truman Doctrine which liquidated the pressures on Turkey and together with Tito's defection eliminated the insurgency in Greece.
 •	the enabling legislation for the Marshall Plan which recreated the war-time economies of

Europe and made possible the NATO alliance which saved the rest of Europe
I observed the formulation of the NSC 68 document which told President Truman shortly before the Korean War that the Allies were on the brink of disaster. I read, heartbroken. Achesons statement that Korea was not within our strategic perimeter, whereupon Stalin struck by proxy Within a few weeks our Air Forces were overrun on the Korean Peninsula — only the Pusan perimeter remained I observed Naval carriers save the Pusan perimeter and Naval forces and Marines go in at Inchon to turn that war around and. notwithstanding the temporary setback in the Chinese invasion, to maintain the logistics which won the War. And again at the end of that War. I had a real-life bottom line net assessment The US and her Allies had demonstrated that they could win a limited war. But in a sense we got a free ride; our nuclear stock-pile was still very modest President Eisenhower was able to use it to threaten the Chinese and force a truce, but we'd have run out relatively rapidly We got a free ride because we were able to retneve the ships and tanks and Reserves of World War II. and bring them back and make it look like we could do it on the cheap'. And we didn t take account, in our net assessment at that time, of the importance of the discontent among our populace for a war that had run that long with limited aims, and no sure, visible victory
The period from the Korean War to the Cuban Missile Crisis (during which I commanded a World War 11 destroyer and the first of our Guided Missile Frigates and attended the National War College), were interesting to me as I observed Admiral Radford, our first Navy JCS Chairman, persuade President Eisenhower to build a carrier a year and to make huge investments in the strategic fleet, which has been so critical to the deterrence over the years. I observed President Kennedy come into office, winning in part on the alleqation of a Missile Gap. and then promptly, after looking at the facts, dismissing that gap and calling General Taylor to organise the counter-insurgency effort and to build up the Army and Air conventional forces.
I observed that team increase greatly the speed with which the Polaris Fleet could be delivered And as a result I saw the decline in expenditures for our conventional fleet I observed Soviet Maritime capabilities surging. They had come from nothing to a submarine fleet three times the size of ours. They overtook us with nuclear-propelled submarines and then dropped modestly to a two-and-a-half-fold advantage in submarines. I saw them conclude that they could not match us in carrier air, and therefore develop twenty years before we did. the pilotless aircraft, competent to operate from air. sea and land plai-

Page 70 — Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

forms and sub-surface I saw them build a surface fleet, with heavy arms and short legs, expendable, with cruise missiles ready for the first conventional strike against us and a long-range land-based Naval Air Arm to give them the capacity which they demonstrated in Exercise Okean 70 to attack large numbers of task forces around the globe.
In the Cuban Missile Crisis I served as a member of the staff of a member of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council I observed the Soviet design in seeking to preserve a client communist state in Cuba and to double the mega-tonnage and cut in half the warning time that we would have, in a desperate effort to try to overcome our nuclear advantage I had there my third real-life bottom line net assessment — ihe first true nuclear confrontation I had the opportunity to observe days on the part of all the members of our National Security Council, who set everything else aside to focus exclusively on this problem. I saw the impact on them of my relaying to them the information that we had reckoned there would be ten times as many Soviet dead as American dead in the event of a strategic nuclear exchange. I saw the confidence with which President Kennedy concluded, after examining the Naval ability to defeat them in Cuba, and to deal with options in Europe, that he could deliver the ultimatum to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union saw it the same way. Mikoyan. in his final remarks after the secret negotiations, made it clear that the Soviet Union would never jump us again without having an advantage.
They initiated three impressive actions
 •	the largest strategic program in history, continuing unchecked to this hour (it has been a fraud on the American people to say that SALT I stopped it).
 •	the largest maritime expansion in history except for our own World War II growth;
 •	the detente of that decade (they have practiced it in each) — the Test Ban negotiations
They invented soon thereafter, out of fear of strategic nuclear confrontation, the Khrushchev Doctrine of Wars of National Liberation. The major test of the Soviet Theory of Wars of National Liberation was fortuitously selected by them and unfortuitously by us. President Kennedy's build-up of conventional forces made it feasible to send forces to Vietnam His counter-insurgency philosophy made it seem important to do so In my judgement two grand strategic errors occurred at that point, which I argued against at the time. The first was that we got in In the first place.

that was not the place to do it. And the second was that having gotten in, we never should have fought the finger-tips in the |ungtes. but rather should have gone out after the heart, with air and sea strikes againsi Hanoi, as we did ten years later when we got a truce in ten days I observed President Johnson decide that he would fight that war on a guns and butter' basis. Therefore the hidden tax on the Navy was to be the foregoing of another generation of replacement of its ships I observed, as you saw on the chart earlier today, the Soviet Union drive us. with the expenditure of only one billion dollars of aid on its own part, to spend thirty billion dollars per year, in bombs, bullets, attrition aircraft and spare parts, wasted in the jungles in a foolish strategy. And the fourth real-life bottom line net assessment ot my career then, was that there are wars of national liberation in which the United States dare not get involved because we do not have the patience as a people to fight them in the way we were required to do at that time. We need to take a different approach.
I observed in this same time Irame the change in the strategic balance, from the Cuban Missile Crisis until 1970 when I came to office In the aftermath of that crisis. President Kennedy and Secretary McNamara concluded that the time had come to permit the Soviet Union to |om us at a higher level of force in a mutual deterrent relationship In their policy statements they marie it clear that we were going to stop at the then prescribed force levels building and build nothing more. We dropped our strategic expenditures to one third of the level of the average of the previous ten years and have continued at lhat level ever since The Soviet Union raced ahead with hugely increased expenditures It has proceeded to build an asymmetncal advantage in every one of the areas of suggested constraint
So the situation when I came to office on 1st July, 1970. was one in which the strategic advantage was going to shift to the Soviet Union during my four years It was one in which the conventional advantage was going to shift to the Soviet Union during my four years If was one in which the Soviet Union s strategy had driven us to convert from a counter-insurgency effod to a conventional war effort, in Vietnam with all the wrong constraints, with discontent rising in the United Stales, with Richard Nixon just elected on the premise that he would end the war where the country was. as we say in our Navy, sullen, but not yet mutinous' It was a country thai would have the draft come to an end within a year or three, we knew not which. We had a Navy in which, because of all these factors that I have summarised, our average age for 967 ships was 19 years — technologically obsolescent, obviously half of it older than that figure. Our Defence

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute — Paue 71

Department was only spending two-thirds of the Russian sum for research and development Navy research was skewed badly, in favour of heavy, nuclear ships and sophisticated jet aircraft, and badly under-funded with regard to surface ships. ASW. C3. ECM. counter-mining and so forth. My estimate of the situation I gave during my interview for appointment to the job (indeed some 13 or 15 of us were so interviewed). I said what I have said here about what I had seen in my career. I gave some suggestions for the future — I was picked So for those of you who do not like what I did you should blame civilian authority. I was selected from among the alternatives because the Secretary of Defence. Melvin Laird, believed that that was the particular package he wanted. He could have picked another person
What I said in that appointment interview about the strategic situation I visualised for the seventies. I can summarise briefly. With regard to the geopolitical situation, I said that the Soviet Union was undoubtedly going to continue its strategic force momentum to obtain superiority I saw that we had to strive mightily and quickly to get a fair and balanced SALT 1 because the longer we waited the worse it would be I said that we had to worry about Soviet conventional force momentum We needed to get stability— a stable situation — as quickly as possible in South East Asia, so that we could get out of that trap of thirty times the expenditure that the Soviets were making in those jungles. I said that I believed the Soviet Union was. and proclaimed to be. an offensive alliance dedicated to our long term disadvantage I saw that we and our allies had to assume that we would continue to be a defensive alliance and that we therefore had to take the long term view of a competition that would go on for generations and be preoared to stay the course I believed that the Soviet Union was moving towards a Blitzkrieg capability in Europe; that it aspired to control Africa through the assumption of a series of strategic bases: that it schemed for position in the Middle East that would give it control of the oil; and the opportunity to extend, there and through the Indian sub-continent and around South East Asia, the containment of China whom it feared.
With regard to technology. I had the following to say:
 •	that the US forces were obsolete and their technology was obsolete:
 •	that the Soviets were outspending us. doing three projects tor every two of ours in the research field:
 •	that the boundaries between air. sea and land warfare were becoming fuzzier as one examined the future in which satellites were

available to control and to surveil and to guide and in which missiles were very long range and could be fired from shore or in the air as well as ships — in which accuracies were becoming very accurate indeed — and in which conventional explosives were becoming so powerful that together with those accuracies in many situations strategic nuclear war-heads would no longer be needed:
•	I felt that mmiturisation was making tt quite
possible with these other developments for
us to think in terms of a large number of more
numerous ships and to avoid the very costly,
very large nuclear propelled ships in such
numbers:
9 I saw that we should think in terms of using all our national assets (rather than just armed forces) tied together, merchant marine, commercial aircraft and so forth.
 •	I talked about the very special place that I saw for energy, with the United States already then being dependent on overseas supply for a third of its oil. now over fifty per cent.
 •	I reported that I believed there were three separate delicate decisions that had to be made. I said given the present levels that you. Mr Secretary, and the President, are telling me we can have. I've got to do it myself. I've got to reduce current capabilities in order to deal with this long haul effort with the Soviet Union. I've got to eliminate ships and aircraft and men. and put the money saved into capital investment And I ve got to reduce the probability of victory from 55% to below 50% in the first year of my tenure You must understand that such cuts are necessary in order to have the possibility (after dropping to one chance in three of victory) that we can recover one chance in two by 1970:
 •	I suggested that we must have a high/low mix, about which you're well informed;
9 I said that we had to worry about the allocation between our strategic requirements and conventional, and that in either category inadequate funds could leave us in a very bad way
They liked these ideas I decided to come back within 60 days with what I called Project 60, a project that I promptly assigned to two Navy geniuses both of whom have subsequently become four star officers — one later a Vice CNO and the other Director of the Central Intelligence Agency I gave them the requirement to have back in my possession a paper that would go to

Page 72 — Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

Melvin Laird 60 days from the day I took over, outlining our strategic concept I asked that It deal with personnel as well as forces and technology.
With regard to personnel there were a number of driving factors that caused us great concern. The anti-war mood of the country made our sailors the pariah of their peers, as were our soldiers, airmen and marines. We had sailors that had been on sea duty for twelve to fifteen years They were spending 85% of that time at sea (most of it overseas) because of the war They were undersupported (you heard today that comment made about Australian Forces, we still have not replaced all of the items that we gave to Israel in the Yom Kippur War. six years later). These sailors were required to live a life style completely different from that of their peers. Re-enlistment rates were at an historic Navy low. 9.5%. We were a racist organisation. The Navy had defied President Truman s orders to integrate, while the other Services had done so a generation earlier. Less than 1% of our officer corps were black, instead of 11%, and less than 5% of our sailors. And the draft pressure which had made three of the Services volunteer Ser-qices, was about to expire. So it was mandatory that we take these actions which I will just bnefly categorise in three sub-sets:
 •	First there were those that had what I would call home and mother' connotations They had to do with providing greater shore duty opportunity, taking it out of our hide', reduced readiness by reduced m-port watches and that kind of thing. None of this category was subject to much criticism.
 •	The second category had to do with lifestyle changes: the authorisation for our Petty Officers to have beer in the barracks, a heinous crime to some old salts: an authorisation to have hard rock music in the clubs (I can't stand the stuff, but my four children love it and they're all square) The authorisation to wear hair more like the life styles from which they came. (Every one of my peers came in to remonstrate with me on that one. I heard them out and then took them out to introduce them to the portraits of our mutual predecessors, all of whom had beards and long sideburns, and suggested that we were just returning to the conservative standards of our grandfathers).
 •	The third category of change had to do with the provision of equal opportunity for all. regardless of race or sex. And these were a series of highly controversial changes which some of our retired community worked very hard to unhorse.

With regard to weapons modernisation. I concluded that the first thing we had to worry about was to make more of our new ships to replace our dwindling number of old ships. We were going to go down from about 967 to half that number We had to make more of them truly offensive. We had never had a surface ship missile I expedited the production of the Harpoon cruise missile so that we could get it to sea in as many ships as possible I sought to make as many ships as possible air-capable to give us reconnaissance and surveillance support With regard to our carriers, it was clear that we were dropping rapidly from the 24 of earlier years down to something that would fetch up to a total of 12, that we had to make them dual capable, not only attack, but also ASW-capable. and we had to make them individually more qualitatively capable. So we created the CV out of the separate CVA or CVS concepts — a single carrier having both strike and ASW capabilities We did everything we could to expedite the highly sophisticated jet aircraft that were already in the pipeline, the F14's, the S3's. the£2C's and the A6. all-weather strike aircraft. Air defence was a significant weakness We had one thing coming along very promptly, the F14 aircraft, which is the best air defence weapon we've got. and we put great effort in resources into getting it as fast as possible The Close In Weapons System, the Vulcan-Pha/anx was also a near-term solution. In the long term, we accelerated the sum being spent for research on the Aegis system. We tried to put much more than had been done in recent years in C3 and into mine counter-measures work
With regard to ASW. where we had another notable weakness, we speeded up the Mk 48 Torpedo and the P3C's. We tried to cover our blind areas in SOSUS. We accelerated the Captor mine which had not had a real sponsor Ditto with array systems and computer processing for all the ASW input With regard to ship modernisation. I sought to maintain a balance I fought hard for the fourth nuclear carrier on the theory that we had to have two in each ocean to give us the flexibility of rapid deployment But I specified to Congress that in my judgement we should never build a fifth: they were just too costly and we could have three fossil fuelled carriers for the price of two nuclear carriers, I stood by that and helped defeat the fifth nuclear carrier in the budget when the President vetoed it I supported that action in an exchange for the commitment that a smaller carrier would be in this year's budget, which it is. and for another commitment We speeded up the rate of production of nuclear submarines from 3 to 5 per year, in order that we could buy subs ahead, early, and leave an unused stream of expendi-

Journat of the Australian Naval Institute — Page 73

lures in later years available for some of the lower cost ships that would lake longer to develop
Among the low cost ships in the series, we invented the PHM, the hydrofoil craft, We now have five of those It took some Congressional action (to over-rule the Presidential decision) to save them, a year or so after I left office Another concept was the Sea Control Ship — that 17,000 ton flat top which could carry 17 aircraft, costing one seventh of the cost of a carrier It would have given us the capability to have platforms deployed in peacetime, toward, while the big carriers slayed well rearwards ready to come in shooting, to avoid their principle deficiency, the Soviet trailers who constantly have their missiles trained on them in deployed areas In war. there would be a reversal of positions, with the Sea Control Ship doing the guarding ot the central oceans As you know that concept was defeated However Spain is building one. you have one under consideration here (I hope it goes toward), the Russians are building them, and the United States Navy will one day come back to it through its VSS concept which is now beginning to gam some momentum A third ship in the low end ot the mix was the Surface Effect Ship, the ship that travels on the surface of the sea with an air cushion — 80 to 100 knots, therefore out-running a torpedo, making current torpedo systems obsolete. A demonstration of how long it takes to get the hardware is that in Proiect 60 we had Melvin Laird s approval for the whole bag within 60 days It took eight years to get SES through the R & D system Last year s budget had the first production money in it. The President had taken it out. we got Congress to restore it This year s second Presidential commitment was that it would be there He forgot that commitment Congress is going to have to restore it this year in order to complete the procurement lunds
I want to talk now a little bit about the problem of dealing with constituencies which one has. in seeking to maintain this balance among resources (within which I include personnel) and to conclude on what one can do in the area of strategy and technology
So. first with regard to constituencies There are about six of them One important one is uniformed personnel We are all aware of the things that are done to communicate, down, within the uniformed services. In the United States at least, the retired community is a very powertul one I found that I had to spend a certain amount ot time de-langing the more militant opposition within the retired community I never got it all de-fanged. but I managed to split them a bit As a result we lessened some of the opposition that they were giving us on Capitol Hill Another constituency is the Civil Servants. I didn't pay very much time
Page 74 — Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute

and attention to them. They seemed to go their way and I went mine Another is Civilian Authority. In my case the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of Defence and the President, the Commander-in-Chief. There s a very special feature of law relevant to the Chief ot Navy — not to the other Services — that the Chief ot Navy is the Naval Adviser to the President. That has never been subsumed by subsequent legislation which makes all the Joml Chiefs ot Staff advisers to the President via the Secretary ol Defence Therefore. I found myself having a set ol responsibilities to the Secretary of the Navy, different ones through my JCS hat to the Secretary ol Defence, and still different ones, through the statute, to the President himself The latter authority became very important to me in my last month in office, when Secretary Kissinger, who had seized power from Mr Nixon when the latter became a vegetable, ordered the Secretary ol Defence not to send any advice from the Joint Chiefs ol Staff to the President, prior to Mr Nixon s trip to Moscow to deal with SALT I Kissinger knew what he wanted to negotiate, he didn t want the military to harm that package deal Unable to get a decision from the Secretary of Defence to forward JCS views through JCS channels I quoted the law wrote a letter to the President, via the Secretary ot Defence as every seaman has the right to do. and sent an advance copy to the President. He therefore had it officially, and Kissinger knew he had it officially. They had to reckon that the Congress would hear that they had had such advice before considering a deal ai Moscow Perhaps ot even greater significance was that at the same moment Paul Nitze. a distinguished SALT I negotiator, resigned in protest at the lack of respect for the constitutional process and to the disastrous package Kissinger was proposing To his credit. Mr Nixon who was in deep trouble at home, tore-went the opportunity to achieve a diplomatic triumph and did not negotiate that very bad deal with Moscow
The Joint Chiefs ol Staff is itself a constituency with which one has to deal and we have the same kinds ot problems thai were discussed here among your Services. I won't go into them except to say that it always intrigues me that the media used to say that the Supreme Court deliberates, the Congress legislates, and the JCS bickers I found lhat they were all committees and had all the virtues and weaknesses thereof
I want to talk a little bit about the next two together The public and the media, which are very much a constituency with which a Service Chief and member of the Joint Chiefs ot Staff has to deal Because the anti-war sentiment in the country was so very strong, and because the disposition on the part of the Congress therefore,

was to cut. cut. cut defence budgets, it turned out to be very important to have some leverage different from the traditional military leverage. Quite by accident, not part of our original strategic concept, the changes that we were making with regard to personnel, turned out to have a tremendous boon for us in the Congress. I could go in and talk to the most liberal-hearted member of the Congress, and talk to him about what we were doing for minorities and women, and then just on leaving ask him please to vote for the F14 It was amazing how many votes one could gel because they thought you were right on certain issues. The treatment for our programs in the personnel field by the media, in my judgement, was probably more responsible than any other factor for the fact that we were able to increase the Naval slice of the budget by a percent a year for each of the four years that I was there — more than it did with the logic of any arguments I was making with the Joint Chiefs or the Secretary of Defence.
Let me talk now about some of the roadblocks we encountered. First were Unions. We all have them; we really need them and we need more of them But they re a problem The aviators want it all their way. the submariners want it all their way and the surface fellows want it all their way. They are a very powerful group each; they arc further complicated by Admiral Rickover as he sits off on the side. The problem of dealing with them is the following: Once you conclude, as a Service Chief of Staff, that one of their programs was a good idea, you could forget it because if it had been their program they would really run with it. But if you wanted to change a program, you'd better watch it very, very closely indeed. And if you wanted to invent a program, like the Captor Program (where there is not a Captain to command the bridge of the Captor, or to command a squadron of Captors) or in mine counter measures or the ECM field, you've got to create a little mini-union in order to get it supported. I frequently recall following Admiral Burke's advice to me when I first went to see him after my appointment. He said to me. After you've made a decision be sure you look up the Action Officer and convince him it's a good idea." Ive mentioned the Rickover phenomenon: there's a fascinating chapter in my book and if any of you haven't been able to get it. leave your names, and I'll send you a free copy.
Another maior complication was the Kissinger philosophy about which I wrote in that book. He was a man of Spenglesian philosophy, who believed privately and said so. amongst many of us in positions of authority, that the West was a civilisation which had passed its historic high point and was on the wane: that we were dealing with the rising Imperial Empire in the Soviet Union: that his job was to preside over the smooth transition, hopefully slowly, into inferiority; that

the American people lacked the will and the toughness to give him the necessary defensive strength and therefore he had to do the best he could. Now, some of us in office used to say to him that that was the worst immorality of all. believing that, not to report it and let it be debated, not to permit the public to understand what the facts were, and then decide whether it wanted to do more His answer to that used to be If I say it publicly. I lose my negotiating leverage."
But of all the road-blocks, the most driving and overriding was the disaster of Watergate, which came along some three years after our programs had been set in train, which led to the President's becoming literally a political vegetable for his last 6 to 8 months It led to a series of individual dukedoms being created around town, each seeking power in its own right, with Kissinger maintaining a kind of defacto Presidency for Defence and Foreign Policy. Perfectly good programs lost momentum as a result of that terrible crisis in our constitutional period
Let me speak briefly about the mechanisms for effecting change. First, internally, we tried very hard to use primarily line channels But we also found that we could head off an awful lot of the letters to Congress if we had a Flag Officer set up as an Ombudsman to whom anybody could report a complaint, giving him a chance to sort them out instead of having to explain to Congress what we had done about those complaints And because of the controlled revolution we were bringing about with regard to minorities we had to set up a system of special assistants for minority affairs in each Command, which we planned would phase out in about four years and which now has. I believe. We set up internally a new Deputy CNO for C3 kind of things For those special new areas where we didn't have strong unions. I would bring an individual into my mini-staff to monitor the programme until we got one started.
With regard to external relations, an important source of input to me was an organisation I set up called the CNO Executive Panel (CEP), which consisted of a wide mix of strategic analysts, scientists, and other types of defence experts who were able to survey the whole scene and come in and meet with me "cold turkey once a month They were very helpful to me in making sure that I went back and looked at places where I may have moved too quickly. They became very strong advocates for a strong Navy and were effective with their friends, present and future Secretarys of Defence, etc With regard to externals, one had to deal, as I have described, with Congress. I tried to visit every member of the Congress every year. I found they broke down fairly neatly into three categories   One third
Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute — Page 75

thought that Defence was irrelevant. Don t talk to me'. One third said "I'm as worried as you are. don't waste time on me. get out and get the others". And the middle third would say "I've got to worry about re-election. You give me a 30% pro-defence. 70% anti-defence record, so I can get re-elected, and I'll vote for anything you say We saved the Trident strategic submarine on a 49 to 47 vote by casting three senatorial proxies, keeping them within their batting average They didn't know what they were voting for, but we saved the Trident system
Another important device which I'm sure you can't use here, was that I had at least twice a week, lunches with individuals brought in from the press, and from industry, and Irom banking, and from government, and told them frankly what the situation was; I found that by keeping in touch with them (using a Staff Officer to do so). I could call them on the phone in time of need I d go see Senator X and give him a perfectly brilliant argument to support one of my systems and would get nowhere, and then Id call two of his major contributors and the next time I saw Senator X he was very impressed with my logic
The final device that I tried to use was a continuation of the net assessment which I had had the opportunity, as you all have had, to observe in the real life wars and confrontations. Without a war. the next best way to assess is a process of doing the analyses to try to understand what would probably happen in the event of a war It was those analyses that I had done as Director of Systems Analysis several years earlier and which I continued to sponsor and grapple with, that made it possible for me to make my judgement, after also taking account of readiness factors, intelligence, Fleet Commanders judgements etc. that we had a 55% probability of victory the day I took over, in a conventional war with the Soviet Union. It was 45% by the eno of the first year, and 35% by the end ot the second, third and fourth years I reported those each year to tne President and to the Congressional Committees The frankness of the report to Congress always earned a certain number of scars from the executive branch
Let me speak briefly now about the outcomes in this whole range of effort in trying to balance strategy, resources and technology With regard to personnel, the Navy ended up integrated We selected for the first time in history, a black Admiral, we now have three, the senior of these is a three-star Admiral, they are doing magnificently It is no longer an issue in the United States Navy. With regard to women, we did a pilot experiment on the hospital ship, SANCTUARY. They proved they could do the jobs of seagoing ratings. We put them through Naval Aviation training  They flew their weather

recce aircraft into the eyes of a storm We've selected at least three women Admirals. They're doing very well indeed But women are still very much an issue. Male chauvinism turns out to be stronger than racism. However Judge Sirica, the man who handled the Watergate Affair, has recently struck down as unconstitutional the law that prohibited the assignment of women to combat duties, and the Navy is now cranking up to take the benefit of lessons gained in the two experimental activities to implement Sirica's decision.
With regard to personnel overall, the bottom line is that re-enlistment rates quadrupled in that four year period of time.
In the field of ships
 •	we have the five PHM s.
 •	the Sea Control ship is dead in our Navy. but lives elsewhere,
 •	the Surface Effects Ships as Ive discussed. still live thanks to Congress overruling the President.
The mam program of the low end of the mix. the Patrol Frigate, now called FFG. which we originally conceived would be fifty in number, has been SO highly successful that the Navy now plans to build seventy. Recently you have read a piece of flak on the part of one of our less responsible critics. Senator Proxmire, (who, I have been told. was put up to it by Admiral Rickover. who fears this program because it is competition for his nuclear propulsion program). Vulnerabilities of the FFG were reported. They might have been discussing any warship because they all have simi-lair battle damage vulnerabilities They discussed some of the limitations. Those were limitations that we decided upon to keep the costs down The report of the Board of Inspection and Survey by that tough, old. irascible P.T. Boat' Buckley, who's been inspecting ships for ten years, gave the Perry Class the highest marks of any ship he's ever inspected And I think you re going to be very pleased with it in Australia
With regard to the Project 60 weapons, one can say that they re all coming along, notwithstanding the Watergate-inherited delays.
In the field of geopolitics. I would say that my forecasts at the 1970 period were wrong, because they have come about faster than I predicted as a result of the loss of our first war and the loss of our first President in political action
The geopolitical situation has hastened the Soviet advantage. We learned in Vietnam that neither our country, nor any democracy, is capable of a long protracted, meaningless, ill-defined war  We have therefore seen the Soviet Union

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move rapidly beyond its original concept of Wars of National Liberation, to exploit every opportunity in Angola, in Ethiopia, in Somalia initially (and then having given this country up. they're already organising the insurgency which will return Somalia to a client state, having used Ethiopia to overrun the Ogaden. Eritrea, and to build a Naval Base on the island off Ethiopia). They're already training the insurgents that they intend will bring the black radicals to power in Rhodesia, rather than the black moderates who are already striving for power. They are. I learned when I was in South Africa last year, already training the future revolutionaries for South Africa in the Soviet Union and elsewhere. Iran is an example of the way in which the Soviet Union has almost contemptuously speeded up the drive of their activity From over the border Soviet Radio has urged Iranians to burn, pillage, loot and to bring down the Shah and now Bakitiar. They of course fear this Moslem fanatic who will take over because of his effect on their own Moslems. But he intends, they know, to try to turn the country backwards. They know that that will not work. They're already in touch with the Marxist radicals whom they hope will take over from him. With regard to SALT negotiations, SALT I, as it was explained to Congress by the Nixon Administrtion. has been violated in a number of significant ways by the Soviet Union. Later strategic decisions have accelerated the rate of Soviet superiority. SALT II negotiations therefore have been much less fortuitous than the not very fortuitous SALT I negotiations. The SALT II treaty when it is announced shortly will, in my judgement, if it is ratified by the Senate, ensure strategic nuclear superiority for the Soviet Union. Indeed the United States juridically will forego the right to recover superiority in SALT II. This will be the lirst time in our history that we have accepted juridical inferiority. Numbers of us are working very hard to defeat that treaty. I believe that there is about a 50-50 chance that it can be done. I think that the debate will be very important in order to educate the public on what the situation is.
Let me talk last then about the technological situation. The Soviet Union continues to do three interesting research projects lor every two that we do because of their greater R&D budget. Before I left office, in my last posture statement before the Congress. I had analysed 15 of the areas of Naval War and reported to the Congress as I had to the President, that in my judgement the Soviet Union was ahead in 10 of the 15 areas technologically. I believe that that situation continues today. I believe that the Soviet Union is doing better lhan we are with regard to research in particle stream and laser work. I know that they have violated the ABM Treaty and are doing research and development, some of which is authorised, under the treaty, and that Ihey aspire to

have an ABM system which will make their homeland invulnerable, defeating what was supposed to be mutal deterrence. I think the hopelul field is in ASW. where the United States has made some significant improvements and I'm feeling better about that end of the business
My conclusions with regards to my assigned topic, are that'.
 •	it's very difficult to maintain a sensible balance of strategy, technology and resources while losing a war and losing a President; and
 •	that under the US system, not to comment on yours, it is very important for a Service Chief of Staff not only to work on the amount of his Services's allocation within the authorised Defence Pie', bul also to work very hard on the amount of dollars in the Total Pie', maintaining that posture which permits him to be in touch with our co-equal body, the Congress, directly and indirectly.
My conclusion is that if one is going to be successful with regard to winning the battle amongst Services, but far more importantly, if one is going to be successful together with the other Services, in increasing the total pie for the benefit of his country, it is critical that he maintain the most efficient possible administration, and that he maintain his Service relevant to the Nation which il represents. I believe that the answer to Peter Young, whom I consider a fine and impassioned young man. is that a Service Chief, rather than resign, should make the bastards fire him — and that he should continue to call them as he sees them and to report his concerns in the most public ways possible, and let the civilian authority fire him if they will My book reports that in my last month they tried once to fire, once to court martial, finally settled for not awarding any medals, and then Jim Schlesinger double-crossed them and awarded anyway. I believe that we are as a free world in a part of the normal democratic cyclic swing. As a result of our terrible domestic tragedies, the Western alliance is in great danger I believe that it is absolutely mandatory for those who have held high office to do their best to warn their own countries, and the countries of their allies about the seriousness of the situation, I believe that the theory that governments know best and that the public should be told what the government thinks it should be told, is a dangerous and pessimistic theory of the democratic system I, for one. believe that if the public understands the facts they will rally to make the necessary decisions, and that even in a democracy the necessary insurance policy will be forthcoming when people understand that their very survival rests on it.
Thank you

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute — Page 77

CLOSING REMARKS
By Rear Admiral N.C  Macdonald. AD. RAN

Your Excellencies. Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen
About three years ago I had the pleasure of attending the fourth Allen and Hansbury Post Graduate Oration at the University of Sydney. It was sponsored by the local Medical Post Graduate Committee, and while I wasn't surprised that the audience was predominantly medical I was intrigued tha the speaker, a professor from the Department of Surgical Studies, the Middlesex Hospital, London, had chosen as his subject "The Death of Nelson", I couldn't imagine him talking for long about the medical aspects of Nelson s passing and how the ball got from the left shoulder to a position 2" below the inferior angle of the right scapula. Thence to Greenwich Naval Museum or the Queen's Museum, I'm not sure, but knowing the interest some medical men have in naval history. I expected something different. I was not disappointed.
He began by posing the question of how it could come about that a visitor like himself, could travel 12.000 miles and find himself in a country which speaks the same language, addressing an audience comprising largely of people with the same names as those back in Great Britain, and practising medicine in essentially the same ethical and moral framework as in that country. I was delighted to see that he had deduced correctly that the answer lay firstly in the exploits of that remarkable seaman and navigator James Cook. particularly the voyage he made in the early months of 1770. and secondly in events thous ands of miles from Australia, which ensured tha the Australian language and culture had thei origins in Great Britain, rather than in Holland Portugal. France or Spain. In regard to the latter he had been referring to the Napoleonic wars dur ing which, to quote the American Naval Histor lan Alfred Mahan "Those far distant, storm batter ed ships upon which the grand army never look ed, stood between n and the dominion of the world" The Professor also concluded that it was the same ships, most of which never crossed the equator, which had determined the tuture course of countries in this part of the world; Australia for one. He then continued to give a very good talk on seapower' and the impact it could have on the lives of people, at the end of which he received very generous applause.
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The reaction of the audience and the subsequent discussions at supper confirmed an impression I had already formed during visits to various places in Sydney and NSW in the course of my official duties. This was that there was a great deal of public interest in maritime affairs, more than some may think, and I'm glad that Peter Young supported this today. All that was necessary was for those who are in. or associated with the Navy to cultivate it
I am therefore delighted to see the great strides which have been made by the Australian Naval Institute during the few years since it was formed, and I think that this particular occasion is a tribute to those who have worked so enthusiastically on its behalf. Gatherings such as this must promote better understanding of what sea power is all about.
During the symposium the Minister for Transport has told us how dependent Australia is on seaborne trade and how vulnerable we are as a consequence. Of the many points he discussed those which are of particular concern to the Navy are;
a.	The difficulties raised by the frequency of
sailings and diversity of destinations;
b.	The importance of the trade routes to South
East Asia;
c The short period for which industry could keep going if there were serious interference with our trade:
d.	The importance of local ship building and re
pair facilities (if we let them run down they
can I be replaced quickly): and finally
e.	The possible need to determine some sort of
priority for our sea routes. Obviously from the
point of view ot maritime defence, focal areas
would command much attention, and evas
ive routing would be considered.
Commodore Robertson in his address on Australia and Military Seapower provided us with a lucid and hardhitting interpretation of significant events in Australia's maritime history He then discussed the relevance of political and military actions taken by our friends and our enemies during two world wars to the development of a current strategy — mentioning the need for not only sea denial capabilities but also sea

assertion and power projection capability. One ot the means by which sea assertion can be carried out is of course with the carrier task group supported by the replenishment group. He also cast doubt on the practicability of the US meeting its ANZUS obligations. I personally don't doubt that the US will do what it can should the occasion arise.
It was pleasing to hear Senator Hamer support the need for a clear statement of our national objectives during question time. Mr. Booker also extended this today with the suggestion of a credible, politically acceptable strategic concept.
Professor Mccguire gave us plenty of food for thought! I was particularly interested in his view that flexibility is a Great Power luxury which we cannot afford. The RAN is fairly flexibile now and while we obviously can't keep up with the major powers I think that a good case can be made in some areas for maintaining technological parity, if not superiority, with countries in our immediate area of strategic interest
I agree with his view that the Soviet threat should be kept in perspective, but don't feel that we in the Navy are becoming too Indian Ocean oriented. In the South West Pacific I think we are doing reasonably well in supporting our foreign policy.
I wouldn't lose much sleep over whether or not invasion is easier to handle close to ones shores because I think that it is about the most unlikely Defence contingency A more immediate and disturbing problem is the handling of scores of refugee or illegal immigrant boats. Australia must appeal to many boat people seeking somewhere to live. Airships in sovereignty assertion seem worthy of further consideration
Finally it pleased me to hear him go for two carriers in his peace time force structure. One can argue about what they should carry but so long as they can project tactical Naval air power I shall be happy.
Mr. Whitlam certainly entertained us after dinner. Here again the suggestion of the Services trying to be too sophisticated arose. Significant in his remarks were to my mind:
a.	The changing attitude of the public and the
need for them to be convinced that large
sums should be spent on Defence. This is a
very real problem:
b.	The need to be able to guarantee sea com
munications (Navy needs no convincing of
this):

c.	The irresponsible attitude of some media re
presentatives to Indonesia. Perhaps we as a
nation need to try harder to get to know our
nearest neighbour better. As one who has
lived there this will take time, but it isn't im
possible:
d.	The rapidity of change in the North West Pa
cific area: and
e.	The possible greater involvement ot the
Navy in coastguard activities.
Maior Peter Young has added a fresh dimension to Defence debate in Australia. His publication, 'Pacific Defence Reporter', is widely read. We are grateful to receive, at first hand, his opinions, and those of his panel colleagues, on the various facets of maritime strategy. No discussion on seapower can be complete without mention of the materiel involved. His panel emphasised particularly the rapidity of change in weaponery due to changes in technology
The existence of a well equipped, brightly visible Navy was highlighted — a good point, because naval strategy is essentially one of deterrence.
The importance of tactical naval air power also surfaced again. Those who have ever had to operate without it in a hostile air and submarine environment will never need to be convinced of its necessity. The SEA HARRIER is clearly an aircraft which merits close examination, particularly if it can be fitted with a good air-air weapon
The need for anti ship missiles was emphasised — particularly Harpoon — also the necessity for efficient command and control systems, including satellite surveillance and means of identification of targets. The importance of local maintenance facilities came through strongly, together with the problems of extended lead times.
Should Australia acquire nuclear powered submarines? I agree with Commander Graze-brook — it's not on! The offensive/defensive capabilities of mines are something not to be taken lightly though, they are cheap and lead times to acquire them are short. The need for a good defence infrastructure put so forcibly by Peter Young posed the question, 'have we left our run too late?' I don't think so, but (eel that we should be getting the whip out.
Our speaker on Defence Economics. Dr. Ian Story, drew vivid comparisons between the extent of Australia's expenditure with that of other countries, of both major and minor influence in

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute — Page 79

military affairs, and related how our outlay had declined as a percentage of the public purse.
He followed this exposition with his views on the structure of Australia's Defence Forces, stressing the need to allocate our limited financial resources to the acquisition of hardware rather than on the upkeep of manpower. Manpower as everyone will know is one of the most expensive assets in the Defence Forces. An interesting extension to this proposition was his contention that such a change in direction of Defence Expenditure could result in an overall economic benefit to the community. While I agree with the need to acquire equipment or hardware rather then maintain manpower, I think that when the imposition of economies in personnel is severe and prolonged, care must be taken that additional commitments are not imposed on the Defence Force, as these can have an adverse effect on both retention and recruiting of personnel
I am sure that you will all agree that our final speaker. Admiral Zumwalt did indeed put it all together'.
As a former Chief of Naval Operations. United States Navy he has knowledge, second to none, of seapower and all of its ramifications.
Admiral Zumwalt's tenure of command embraced a period of great social and technological change; a time when politico military affairs were subjected to public scrutiny and debate, perhaps as never before. He touched upon many momentous events during his most interesting and amusing address, and I for one am glad that he has given us the privilege of listening to his personal experience — a fitting climax to this important seminar. Of the many points he dealt with I feel that two are of special significance to Australia's Naval Forces. Firstly the allocation between strategic and general purpose forces, and the supplementing of high performance ships with larger numbers of lower performance vessels. The high-low mix involves speeding up of sophisticated equipment, delicate decisions for any country, particularly with the high cost of sophisticated ships and equipment, and lead time involved Striking the right balance requires very sh rewd judgement and it is one which I think we in the Navy are going to have to consider very carefully in the future. The second point was the need lor good public relations and co-operation with the public and the media There is always a need to keep the public informed (within of course the bounds of security), because it is the public that we serve and they have a right to know, and. in

my view, this requires continuous and sympathetic two way co-operation between the Defence Force and the media. We could do with more seminars such as this with the media present.
In spite of nuclear weapons, satellites and intercontinental missiles. I believe that the effective use of maritime power in the future defence of this country will be just as important as it has been in the past The reasons for this are really very simple. Three-fifths of the earths surface are water covered and shipping will continue to constitute, in the foreseeable future, the main means of transport between the land masses. To deny an adversary the use of the sea and to ensure its use for ones own purpose is the essence of seapower. The weapons used such as ships and aircraft (including maritime aircraft), submarines and guided missiles, are obviously important, because they are the means by which seapower can be applied, but. one cannot escape the fact that they are becoming increasingly expensive.
There is no doubt that for Australia, seapower has a special significance. We are an island continent, luckily blessed with a water barrier, which an adversary must cross to reach us. This he cannot do while we, or our allies, control the seas around us. Australia is not sell sufficient, our steel industry depends upon sea transported ore. Oil and steel are vital to us and. deprived of them, we would soon be in a precarious position. We should look very carefully at our future energy sources now.
In spite of the fairly recent great advances, air transport cannot cope with movement of the vast cargoes needed to sustain Australia in peace and war. Control of the sea approaches and maritime environment must therefore continue to be a primary consideration in the defence of Australia. We Australians must realise that just as events thousands of miles away, over 170 years ago, had a profound influence on the destiny ol this country, so can happenings today, not only close to home but also distant from our shores. Maritime power alone can keep the sea lanes open. There is no substitute, but. for countries such as Australia, one of the greatest difficulties is to decide how far from our continent we should, or can become directly involved. I believe that we must not only be prepared to take our fair share of defending the sea lanes which are vital to us, but also be able to demonstrate the sincerity of our resolve to do this even tar afield. We must be strong enough to support our foreign policy and make potential opponents ponder the wisdom of taking offensive action against us. At the risk of being considered old fashioned I still think that

Page 80 — Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

the words of an ancient English king are axiomatic today as when he uttered them
'He who wants to be secure on land, must be supreme at sea'
It is a truth which most of the world's oppressors, fortunately, have failed to grasp.
Excellency. Distinguished Guests. Ladies

and Gentlemen, on behalf of the Naval Institute may I thank the organizers, the speakers (particularly those who have come from far afield), the firms who have supported us. and all other participants, who have either shown their interest in seapower by coming here, or contributed in the discussions. They have combined to produce what I think has been a useful, wide-ranging stimulating symposium. Ladies and Gentlemen I declare the symposium closed

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute — Page 81

^SeapoW&r '79
". . . . must be accounted one of the most important discussions ever mounted in this country."
The Canberra Timet. 7th February, 1979
Additional copies of these Proceedings are available at $10 each.
Please send your cheque (in Australian currency), payable to the Australian Naval Institute, to
The Treasurer, Australian Naval Institute, P.O. Box 18, OEAKIN.  A.C.T. 2600 Australia.
Page 82 — Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

SEAPOWER 79
SEMINAR PROGRAMME
Opening
Friday, 2nd February
1400	Introduction to the Seminar	President of Ihe Australian Naval Institute
1405-1420	Opening Address	His Excellency, Sir Zelman Cowen. AK, GCMG.
KSTJ. QC — Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia and Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Force
Strategic Factors
1430-1515	Australia's Dependence on Sea Transport       The Honourable P.J. Nixon. MP — Minister for
Transport
1530-1615	Australia and Military Seapower	Commodore J A. Robertson. RAN (Rtd.)
1630-1645	Tea/Coffee
1645-1730	Australia as a Regional Seapower — An	Professor Michaeil MccGwire — Dalhousie
External View	University. Canada
1830-2015	Buffet Dinner at the Academy of Science
2030-2115	After Dinner Address	The Honourable E.G. Whitlam. AC, QC — Visiting
Fellow of the Australian National University and former Pnme Minister of Australia
Maritime Combat Technologies 1980-2000 Saturday, 3rd February
0930-1030       Panel Presentation— Comparisons of Available   Major Peter Young— Editor and Publisher of the Maritime Combat Technologies and their Costs    Pacific Defence Reporter
 •	Securing the use ot Australia's sea lanes and       Mr Nat Gould — British Aerospace vital sea areas
 •	Submarines and Underwater Weapons	Commander Tony Grazebrook. RANR — Naval
Editor of the Pacific Defence Reporter
•	Anti-Shipping Technology 1985-2000	Wing Commander R. Howe. RAAF (Rtd.)
1030-1100	Discussion
1100-1115	Tea/Coffee
Resources
1120-1200	Money tor Defence	Or Ian Story—Management and
Economics Consultant
1230-1355	Buffet Luncheon at the Academy of Science
Putting It together
1400-1445      Balancing Strategy, Technology and Resources— Admiral Elmo R Zumwealt. Jr, USN (Ret.)
A Personal Expenence	— Chief of Naval Operations. 1970-74
1500-1510	Closing Address	Rear-Admiral N.C Macdonald, AD. RAN
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute — Page 83

COUNCIL OF THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE 1978-1979

OFFICEBEARERS
President
Rear-Admiral R.C. Swan CBE ADC Senior Vice President
Captain L G. Fox Junior Vice President
Captain D.J. Orr Secretary
Lieutenant Commander C.A Barrie Treasurer
Lieutenant Commander D.J. Campbell

COUNCILLORS
CommanderW.S G Bateman Captain A.R. Cummins AM Commander G Cutis Captain J S. Dickson MBE Commodore MW. Hudson Commander H G. Julian DSC Commander G Nekrasov Commander R.J Perryman Chief Officer N D UhlmannWRANS Commanders J Youll

PAST PRESIDENTS
1975-77 Commodore V.A. Parker 1977-78 Commodore J.A Robertson
HONORARY LIFE MEMBERS
Admiral Sir Victor Smith AC KBE CB DSC Vice Admiral Sir David Stevenson AC KBE Commodore V.A. Parker Vice Admiral Sir Anthony Synnot KBE AO
Public Officer: Commander D.R. Patierson RANEM

	FOUNDATION MEMBERS		
Bennett. G. A.	Hermann. B.J	Parker. V.A.	
Berlyn.N.R.B	Histed.G.	*   Patterson.DR.	
Bonnett. V.W.L.	James. IB.	Ralph. N.	
Brecht.A.H.R.	Jervis, G.E	Read. B.J.	
Broben. I.W.	Josselyn, l.K	t   Reynolds. 1.	
Calderwood, G.C.	Kemp.W.A	Robertson. J.A.	
Cole.S.E.W.	Knox. I.W.	+  Scott. B.P	
Cummins. A.R.	Lee. N.E.	Sharp, W.R	
Cutts. G.	Loftus.W.B.	Shearing, J.A.	
Dalrymple.H.H.G.	Loosli. R.G.	Smyth. D.H.D.	
Davidson, J.	Martin. D.J.	♦   Snell. K.E	
Dickie, D.D.	+   Martin. PCS.	Stephen, K.C	
Fisher.T R	i   Mayson.J.H.	Stevens. E.V.	
Fox. LG.	McDonald. N.E	Stevens. J.D	
George, J.	Macleod.B.D.	Summers. A.M.F	
Gibbs.B.G.	Nattey. R.J.	Swan. R.C.	
Goddard. F.C.	•   Nicholson, B.M	+ Swan. W.N.	
Gnerson. K.W.	Nicholson, I.H.	Williams. K.A.	
Hall. I.W.	Orr, D.J	York, D.	
Associate Member			
Page 84 — Journal of the Australian Naval Institute