



JOURNAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE

AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE

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- b. to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and the Maritime profession.
- c. to publish a journal.

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
JOURNAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE (INC)

Title	<u>CONTENTS</u>	Page
Chapter News		2
Correspondence		2
Naval Institute Seminar		3
The Late Judge Trevor George Rapke, QC		3
Ourselfs As Others See Us – The Australian Navy 5 Years Hence – –By Major A.A. Kustia (Indonesian Navy)		4
Law Of The Sea–Political, Economic and Strategic Implications– –By Captain I.W. Knox RAN		9
Australian Naval Institute Prizes – 1977		14
The Doctrine of Dwi Fungsi In the Indonesian Armed Forces – –By LCDR L.D. Watson RAN		15
The Peoples' Republic Of China–Political Perception and the Institutionalisation of Party and Government –By 'Gig'		21
Ships And The Sea		24
I Was There When		25
Thoughts On What Might Have Been–The Royal Navy, The Far Eastern Question And The Fleet Air Arm–By 'Master Ned'		26
Nobody Asked Me But		32
Book Review		34
ANI Crests and Cuff Links		35
Council and Institute Membership List		36

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OUR COVER

The front cover is a map of the Indonesian Archipelago and Australia's near north.



CANBERRA CHAPTER REPORT

The first meeting of the year was held on Wednesday, 15th February when Captain B.G. Gibbs addressed a small group of eighteen on 'Naval Law in the 1980s.' His talk covered the historical development of the legal branch; the implications of developing legal requirements in the next decade and possible measures which would help the Navy to cope with these new demands.

In the question time following the talk it was apparent that many in the audience had gained value from having their knowledge on these matters increased.

Correspondence

Dear Sir,

4th February, 1978

I was glad to see DJC's plea in the August 1977 edition to abolish those shoddy little abbreviations currently in use for officers' ranks—particularly the awful LEUT. The original explanation that the lordly computer could only understand 4 letter words didn't ever ring true, as indicated by the fact that it was able to digest CPOCOX's and ABQMG's without blowing a fuse. But even if we accept that the Mighty Machines do prefer only four letters in their alphabet soup at feeding time, which is doubtful to say the least, that still doesn't excuse the proliferation of the ugly epithets.

Leuts, Sblts . . . even Radms are finding their way onto personal envelopes, are stuck on office doors, are worn proudly on name tallies on bemedalled chests, and have actually appeared on the pages of this Journal. I have even seen abominations like First Leut (presumably a misprint for 'Fist', 'Firt' or 'Frst Leut') and Flag Leut—Ugh! I wonder if official invitations are sent to Radm and Madm?

I support DJC's suggestion to go back to the Concise Oxford Dictionary for a list of acceptable, respectable abbreviations which have stood the test of time. In the meantime if anyone sees one of those odious, stubby contractions popping up anywhere other than in a computer input or output, I suggest he treads on it quickly before it gives offence to those who care about literacy and tradition.

Yours faithfully,

D.J. MARTIN

The Editor,
Journal of the ANI

26th January, 1978

Dear Sir,

Let me congratulate LCDR Alan Brecht for his informative article "A Path to Survival in Sedentary Naval Life" (Vol 3 No 4).

Let me also point out that there is nothing so enthusiastic than a convert. As one of the statistical
Page 2 — *Journal of the Australian Naval Institute*

60% smokers and 75% drinkers in the RAN, Alan's article has raised many points to ponder upon.

Whilst quoting DI(N)PERS 31-2 and other wonderful sources of knowledge and statistics the author would appear to have opened up a chink in his righteous armour and shown something of the (old) naval mind at work. Let me quote part of his article—"The system encounters difficulty for what happens to those who fail? Are they fined? Is their leave stopped?"—perhaps the statement should continue with "what encouragement is given to keep fit? What opportunities are given to help keep fit?"

Presently there are varying standards for the encouragement of sport and fitness within the RAN. These vary from "blanket approval" in some ships and establishments through "requests" for specific sport to a direct 'No' in others. If the CO, XO or Head of Department is a keen sportsman then perhaps the remainder have a chance!

Obviously one part of the Service can set the rules without having to justify their reasons too much, and much less to explain how the goal is to be achieved. Especially amongst those personnel that the service puts into sedentary desk jobs!

One of my greatest hopes is that LCDR Brecht's article will help stir some of the lethargy that abounds and that explanatory articles will appear from some of the following "experts":

1. the medical policy makers—let's have some of the ideas to encourage servicemen to achieve medical and personnel fitness;
2. the Coordinator of Naval Safety, who can expound on how much money sporting injuries cost the Navy; and
3. the higher management who can possibly explain why such varying standards exist on attitudes towards sport and fitness.

Finally, the point was well made that "The Man" is still the Navy's greatest asset providing that he is fit. Perhaps the sadly emasculated sports afternoon (from lifting 7oz weights to self destruction) would be a better incentive, and certainly more cost effective, than fitness by fear of fines, lost leave and medical categorization.

Yours faithfully,

Joseph Porter

2nd February, 1978

Dear Sir,

I would like to comment on the book review of "The Bells of Sunda Strait" in the previous issue of the Journal, in which LJS writes that "thus the bell remains in the wreck" (i.e. of *HMAS Perth*).

In fact the bell now rests in the Australian War Memorial in Canberra.

As I remember the story, one of Dave Burchell's contacts in Indonesia told him that the bell had been recovered from the wreck and was in Djakarta. Mr. Burchell promptly bought himself an air ticket from Adelaide to Indonesia and set out to find the precious relic, then succeeded in having it released and sent back to Australia. This was a formidable task which required a lot of initiative, determination, persuasiveness and a refusal to take no for an answer. I think the country and the RAN have a lot to thank him for. Perhaps he could be prevailed upon to do an article on the subject for the Journal?

Yours sincerely,

D.J. MARTIN

The Editor,
ANI Journal

28th January, 1978

Dear Sir,

I enjoyed the Amphibious Battalion (November, 1977) but on second reading was somewhat disturbed when I realised that this was not a humorous feature but a serious article.

The author has not justified the formation of an RAN Amphibious Battalion, has postulated no credible role or task for one, and has displayed not the faintest concept of the realities of amphibious warfare. The Navy's most pressing need—manpower—is merely glossed over. To take this last issue alone, the annual manpower bill for such a battalion would be in the region of \$7 million. Further, the 382 men required exceed the complement of our entire submarine force, or our entire patrol boat and landing craft complements combined. In exchange for an outlay of this magnitude, we are offered a rather woolly idea about job opportunities for unemployed gunners.

The author ascribes wonderful virtues of flexibility and adaptability to sailors, and yet dismisses the Australian Army as a bunch of precious but useless barrack stanchions, although he does begrudge them a training role for the fledgeling Naval battalion. I think he has got his history out of context: "A soldiery dull and lazy, and corrupted by the circus and the theatre" (Tacitus), and "Sailors, with their built-in sense of order, service, and discipline, should really be running the world" (Nicholas Monsarrat).

Contrary to the author's view, sailors do not make super-soldiers. His World War I Royal Naval Division was a collection of conscripts just like their fellows in khaki, and were massacred in their droves with the rest of the benighted fools. Even troops of the calibre of the US Marines do not necessarily make good soldiers. The Vietnam debacle where the Marines were rarely used as amphibious assault troops but rather as conventional soldiers has proved to be a sobering and salutary experience in that regard.

The article is poorly argued, so much so that to refute each point would require a response of similar length. Instead, let me pose a few questions. Why have an amphibious battalion barracks 800 kilometres from the amphibious ship base? Why counter a brush-fire disturbance in Australia with anti-tank weapons? How is the battalion to be landed from fleet units other than specialist landing ships? Just what sort of conflict is envisaged where a rifle battalion is capable of containing outbreaks of hostilities?

As a student of Gallipoli, the author should remember the words of Sir Ian Hamilton in his Gallipoli Diary: "The question of landing in the face of an enemy is the most complicated and difficult in war." This very question is going to occupy a lot of the Navy's and Army's best talent for a long time once the LSH starts operating, and at the moment they can't even agree whether the Amphibious Beach mob is to be termed a Team or a Unit. But despite that, the answer is not to be found in the Formation of an RAN Amphibious Battalion.

Yours faithfully,

Pongo

NAVAL INSTITUTE SEMINAR

Due for unforeseen changes in the movements of some of the principal speakers the Council has reluctantly decided it would be better to postpone the seminar provisionally scheduled to be held in Canberra on 5th & 6th May, to a later date. The Council is currently investigating the most suitable dates for re-scheduling the seminar.

DEATH OF THE FORMER JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY

The former Judge Advocate General of the Navy, Judge Trevor George Rapke, QC died on 21 January 1978, aged 68.

Judge Rapke was born in Windsor, Victoria and was educated at Wesley College and the University of Melbourne where he took degrees in Arts and Law. He was admitted to the Bar in 1935. During the war Judge Rapke served as Lieutenant RANVR and served as secretary to Rear Admiral H.B. Farncomb. In 1958 Judge Rapke became a Victorian County Court Judge. In 1964 he became the Navy's first Judge Advocate General, a post which he held until ill-health forced him to resign in 1977. In 1965 he was appointed Honorary Professor of Law in the US Naval Justice School at Rhode Island.

Throughout his period as Judge Advocate General Judge Rapke remained dedicated to the Navy and contributed markedly to the maintenance of a high standard of justice in the Service. His death is a great loss to the Navy.

Judge Rapke is survived by his wife, Betty and six children.

Ourselves as Others See Us

The Australian Navy 5 Years Hence

BY MAJOR (NAVY) A.A. KUSTIA (Indonesian Navy)

The article below was first printed in the October 1977 edition of the Indonesian naval magazine 'Perspektiva Angkatan Laut' (Naval Perspective), a magazine of entirely technical content printed by the Information Department of the Indonesian Navy under the auspices of the Chief of Naval Staff. The contributors are all serving members. The article is reproduced by kind permission of Captain Tumengkol, the Indonesian Naval Attache.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The role of Britain in the establishment of Australia does not concern us any longer nor does the role of Britain as the protector of Australia during the period which followed.

But as history is always undergoing change, so it is with Australia. When the shadow of the danger of war haunted Europe and Asia in the thirties the traditional British role as protector of Australia was regarded as unsatisfactory by Australia, although Australia never rejected the role of the British and certainly British leadership was still needed particularly in European affairs.

On 26th April 1936 Prime Minister Robert Menzies stated that in the Pacific, Australia regarded herself as playing a primary role and that she now has to obtain the information she needs, as well as protecting her diplomatic connection with foreign countries herself. Apart from that, there certainly was a different view point and this was principally in the problem of the Pacific, which was regarded by the British as the Far East and in fact was the Near North for Australia. This was proved when Japan attacked the Near North and became an invasion threat to Australia so that the policy of depending upon the strength of the British Fleet was regarded as not being at all suitable. What resulted was that after World War II Australia swung towards the United States of America in line with what had been said by another Prime Minister of Australia, John Curtin, in the Melbourne Herald on 27th December 1941, which in the main was as follows:

"Without any hesitation whatever Australia looks to the U.S.A. without any feeling of disappointment and Australia also understands the difficulties which Britain faces. But Australia is also aware that her story could end while Britain still lived on. Because of that, to keep on living, Australia has to direct all her strength to the formation of a plan with the U.S.A. as the foundation stone."

From this declaration we can see that Australian strategy has undergone a change.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF AUSTRALIAN STRATEGY

We can observe the change in Australian strategy in the period which followed, in that although there was a change of Australian Government the role of the U.S.A. as the foundation stone of the Australian defence programme and policy was still very definite.

Australia, which later joined with N.Z. and U.S.A. in the ANZUS defence treaty, regarded these last two countries as being very important to Australia.

Certainly the Australian defence crisis had already occurred when John Gorton appeared as Prime Minister in 1968 and was, it seems, more inclined towards the formation of a "Fortress Australia" strategy. Apparently here he wanted to indicate to U.S.A. that he was not of the same opinion as the Prime Minister he replaced, Harold Holt, who had the slogan "All the way with LBJ", so this could possibly have been understood to mean that in the future ANZUS had to be carefully defined with specific conditions not as it

had been defined in the past, totally without conditions.

But this crisis was overcome when Gorton visited the U.S.A. in May 1969 and held talks with Nixon. Later we see that Australian defence policy did not undergo many meaningful changes.

But with the number of "obligations" and interests that the U.S.A. had Australia herself seems to have become very cautious, and she then realised that her destiny would be determined by herself alone.

Another matter connected with Britain which pushed Australia in this direction was the fact that Britain had concentrated her attention and strategy in Europe and the North Atlantic, particularly during the last ten years, so that Australia decided that direct British military participation and assistance could not possibly be expected any longer.

Other influential factors were:

- a. The existence of new nations which had participated in forming a new world order.
- b. The emergence of communist China in the international arena which influenced the path of history.
- c. ASEAN and its role.
- d. The fall of South Vietnam which gave birth to a unified Vietnam under a communist government as is the case with Laos and Cambodia.
- e. The withdrawal of United States troops from South East Asia.
- f. The intensification of the struggle for influence between the super powers in the Indian Ocean.
- g. The end of colonisation in the South East Pacific which had given birth to new nations with limited natural resources; and
- h. The massive build up of weapons, both nuclear and conventional, by Russia.

It is these conditions which have led Australia to certain conclusions which have coloured the characteristics of Australia's strategy in connection with her defence needs in the next 5 years.

We can see for ourselves the geographic and strategic position of Australia. It is natural for her to be very interested in the possibility of a threat from the sea, but this does not mean that Australia is not building up forces other than her Navy.

In the following discussion we will view the Australian defence programme during the next five years, paying particular attention to her Navy.

OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Recently the Australian Parliament agreed to a defence budget of \$US 120,000 million for the budget period 1976/77 - 1980/81.

In this programme it was emphasised that the plan was not a static one, and that it should be understood that it was only a basic framework which should always be adapted to conform with change, so that it would always be necessary to study all worthwhile development; technological development, operational concept, doctrine, production realities, and economic and industrial activity in Australia.

In this section we will explain operational planning and support capability which covers:

1. Intelligence

The intelligence development programme is primarily aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the system.

This is principally because of a defence policy which depends to a great extent on monitoring of intelligence by following every event and international tendency, with all their changes, quickly and exactly.

Apart from that, with this increase of effectiveness it is expected that intelligence apparatus will be capable of monitoring military capability, specific tendencies, and the distribution of forces by other nations which could constitute pressures and threats against the peace and interests of Australia.

This up-grading is being carried out in relation to both civil intelligence and military intelligence so that the future National Intelligence Body which is alert in processing intelligence data in the strategic, military, political, economic and scientific fields will form an absolutely necessary component in a modern government structure.

To achieve this aim, what has to be done is:

- investment in existing sources to make possible the use of technological advances to develop modern intelligence data collection methods

- the development of the skill and experience of intelligence personnel
- the increase of co-ordination between various intelligence bodies.

As far as changes in methods of implementation and organisation of intelligence overseas are concerned these will be carried out after the Australian Government has received the report of the Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security.

2. Maritime Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Coastal Patrol

The physical area of Australia largely determines the importance of maritime surveillance, reconnaissance and patrolling of the coast including guarding of the sovereignty of Australia waters and the protection of the natural resources of the sea. With the extension of the natural resources

zone an increasing need is felt for more of the sea surveillance carried out by civil bodies and to fulfil this need the Australian Navy also is ready to provide units which can be placed at the disposal of the authorities.

Several units will be strengthened and their ability to carry out this programme improved, although the units will continue to be trained for military needs.

To fulfil these needs Long Range Maritime Patrol (LRMP) aircraft are very necessary to cope with the increase in ocean reconnaissance tasks and the gathering of information for the early detection of all forms of threat. Australia now has LRMP consisting of 10 P3B Orion aircraft based at Edinburgh and 13 Neptunes based at Townsville.

There are plans to replace the Neptune aircraft with P3C-Orions because in 1978 the Neptunes will have reached end of life.

For this replacement the Australian Government has already agreed to buy 8 to 10 P3C Orions which will be stationed at Edinburgh and Edinburgh will become the reconnaissance aircraft base. To cope with this, base facilities and technical facilities will be upgraded also. These new aircraft will have better speed, range and endurance than the Neptune. The Orion has a range of greater than 2,000 miles and in one sortie can sweep an area as large as 300,000 square miles and can detect all targets of above 2,000 tons. For a task in an area 500 miles from base the aircraft can be there in two hours and can remain on station for eight hours.

For these operation needs some of these aircraft will be on standby at their bases and others will be temporarily assigned for a certain time to a number of Air Force bases such as Pearce, Learmonth, Darwin and Townsville.

To upgrade the capability of these aircraft it is planned to fit them with submarine detecting equipment, ie, the BARRA sonobuoy, which has been designed and developed in Australia, and with equipments from the United Kingdom. For present coastal patrol needs, Australia has 12 patrol boats based in Cairns and Darwin and there are plans to add 15 new patrol boats to replace the Attack class boats which will begin to pay off around 1982. The new boats will be procured and begin to be activated in 1979 to 1984 and will be built in Australia except for two which will be built overseas.

To upgrade the patrol capability the procurement of short and medium range patrol aircraft, which can also work with patrol boats, is being considered. At the same time the benefit to the fishing fleet will be increased, particularly in certain areas.

3. Strike Power, Deterrence & Reconnaissance

Australia has now built up her strike capability with the 24 F111C aircraft which she already owns and to improve this unit there are plans to have four of these aircraft fitted with a sensor system in conformity with the latest technological development. This will be effected in 1980 so that the aircraft can operate in all weathers and carry out their long range reconnaissance tasks.

To upgrade the present weapons system all sorts of guided missile systems are being considered, including electro-optical guided missiles and bombs. The development of a bad weather target acquisition system is also being undertaken in order to upgrade the target destruction capability, the Electronic Warfare Counter-measures system is also being improved. Other steps which are being taken to upgrade the ability of this strike unit are by means of equipping surface vessels with guided missiles developed and constructed outside Australia, i.e., the Exocet from



Artists's impression of FPB 420

—Defence Public Relations



Skyhawk and Macchi Aircraft of the RAN

—Defence Public Relations

France, Otomat from Italy and Harpoon from the United States. At the beginning of this year Australia ordered two new Guided Missile Frigates, complete with Harpoon.

Another type of aircraft is the Skyhawk which can operate both from an aircraft carrier and from land bases.

STRENGTH OF THE AUSTRALIAN NAVY

1. Principal Surface Units

The principal units of the surface warships of the Australian Navy are 11 destroyers consisting of:

- 2 Daring Class
- 6 destroyer escorts (River Class)
- 3 guided missile destroyers (Charles F. Adams Class)

The two Daring Class destroyers will begin to reach their end of life around 1982/1983 and at that time also, two new Guided Missile Frigates will come into service.

These frigates will each be equipped with two helicopters and their arrival will open up a new dimension in the operation of a destroyer unit.

The helicopters will be capable of carrying out reconnaissance tasks and attacks enabling the ships to make optimum use of all their weapons systems.

To build up the operational capability of the destroyer escorts, in 1981 three of the ships will be modernized and another will be refitted.

while the remaining two will be modernized around 1981/1983.

At the present time, complete refits of the Guided Missile Destroyers are being carried out, particularly modernisation of their weapons and electronic systems, including the fitting of "Standard" surface to air guided missiles.

Modernisation of combat data processing systems is also being carried out. These ships are expected to last till the nineties. To strengthen this unit, at the beginning of the eighties there will eventually be a total of 12 destroyers, while the procurement of the third Guided Missile Frigate is being considered. In the plan to maintain this unit after 1987, when the Destroyer Escorts will have begun to pay off, the Australian Government is studying the possibility of building their replacements in Australia. Also included in this plan is the building of fast guided missile ships. The increase in the number of destroyers in the long term, however, depends to a great extent on the fate of the aircraft carrier *HMAS Melbourne*, that is whether it will be replaced or not. Other classes of ships which it is planned to buy from other countries, or perhaps build in Australia, are a cadet training ship which is less complicated but more effective than the present training ship *HMAS Duchess*.

2. Naval Aviation

In this matter Australia emphasises that the aircraft carrier with its air group consisting of selected aircraft will be a high performance unit which also can provide high performance strike



HMAS Melbourne with HMAS Brisbane and HMNZS Canterbury in company.

—Defence Public Relations

power against all threats both from the sea and the ground. The same goes for reconnaissance, surveillance and anti-submarine tasks.

The Australian Fleet Air Arm consists of 16 A4G and TA4G Skyhawk aircraft for strike forces, air defence and for ground target attack, 13 S2E Tracker for reconnaissance and anti-submarine work, and 9 Seaking anti-submarine helicopters. To build up the strength of this unit it is planned to increase it by 6 S2E Tracker aircraft (not new).

Other aircraft which also add to the strength of the Air Arm are the Macchi Trainer, Wessex helicopter and an HS748 which is used as a support aircraft.

3. Submarine Unit

The submarine is a type of weapon important in anti-submarine and anti-surface vessel warfare. Other tasks which can be carried out by submarines are reconnaissance, surveillance, patrolling, clandestine operations and mining operations. At this time Australia has 4 conventional diesel electric powered submarines of the Oberon class and 2 more will begin operating in 1978.

All these submarines were built in Greenock, Scotland. The submarines which Australia already has are *HMAS Oxley*, *Otway*, *Ovens* and *Onslow* and the new ones will later be given the names *Orion* and *Otama*.

The building of *HMAS Orion* was begun in April 1972 and that of *Otama* was commenced eight months later.

In fact, *Orion* was almost finished two years ago but then apparently an error was discovered in the main cable channels and almost all of the cabling had to be taken out again and the construction begun once more. Now *Orion* is undergoing sea trials.

To up-grade the capability of the submarines the fire control and the combat data processing systems will be renewed this year. Apart from that, Attack/Intercept Sonar and long range anti-submarine torpedos will be fitted. Investigations are also underway concerning the possibility of fitting long distance guided missiles which could be launched from below the surface. A submarine base planned for 1979 will be centred in Cockburn Sound.

4. Anti-submarine Unit

The principal strength of the Australian Navy's anti-submarine unit at this time lies in 10 P3B Orion aircraft, 12 Neptune (LRMP) which will be replaced by P3C Orions and 13 S2E Trackers (more will be added) 9 Sea King helicopters, 11 destroyers and the submarines.

The Tracker aircraft and Sea Kings can operate both from an aircraft carrier and from land bases. To upgrade the capability of the Sea King helicopters, the equipping of the aircraft with BARRA and other sonobuoys is being studied. It is expected that this will be carried out in the 1980s.

5. Support Units

Modern logistic support ships for refuelling and re-ammunitioning at sea, etc., are very necessary to enable the operation of other units for longer periods and at greater distances.

The procurement programme for a logistic refuelling ship to replace *HMAS Supply* will be put into effect in 1980, the year in which *Supply* is due to be paid off. To increase the tasking capacity, it is planned to build a second ship of the same type so that effective operations at sea to the west and east of Australia can be carried out as well as guaranteeing repair plans without interruption to the smooth flow of operations. For repair facilities at sea the Australian Navy will still depend upon *HMAS Stalwart* at least until 1980.

6. Mine Unit

The Australian Navy mine unit consists of two types of mine hunter and one type of mine sweeper, all of the Ton class.

The Australian Navy now is examining a new concept in mine vessels which is more flexible and effective. The new vessels will be designed in Australia and built of fibre glass complete with modern mine warfare equipment and these new ships are expected to be in operation in the eighties.

Law of the Sea

Political, Economic and Strategic Implications

BY CAPTAIN I.W. KNOX, RAN

This paper was presented at the Canberra Chapter meeting on Friday, 28 October, 1977.

Introduction

The United Nations is now engaged in what is probably its most comprehensive and important Conference since its foundation of the Third Conference on Law of the Sea. The Conference is charged with the revision of the rules of international law covering all the uses of the sea and the exploitation of the resources of the sea and the seabed. Its problems include one significant question which has emerged to prominence within only the last ten years or so, namely the question of harvesting the vast mineral resources of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction. In addition, new concepts regarding the traditional uses of the sea and the exploitation of its resources have emerged. Coastal States, which for the most part are developing countries, are seeking much greater rights to control activities in the sea in large areas adjacent to their coasts, arguing that traditional law gives advantage to the maritime powers. Also the developing countries see the negotiations in the light of their aspirations for a new international economic order.

Concerns with the sea are diverse and in many respects conflicting. Some of the many interests in the negotiations which are difficult to reconcile are: the coastal interests, the island interests, archipelago interests, straits interests, the interests of the landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States (LLGDS) (countries with no coast or countries situated geographically so that only small maritime zones could be claimed —eg., Austria, Singapore), the interests of the distant water fishing States, the interest of those who favour a 200 mile* exclusive economic

zone (EEZ) and those who do not, the interests of those who favour a 200 mile territorial sea and those who do not, those with wide continental shelves and those with a narrow or no continental shelf, maritime powers, super powers, major powers, small powers, mini States, new States, old States, those who are economically advanced and those who are developing, the West, the East, the Third World and the other regional groupings.

The changing perceptions of national interest also need consideration. Both the US and the USSR, for example, currently share a basic interest in the maintenance of the mobility of their naval forces and this has largely been reflected in their attitude towards issues such as passage through straits and the archipelagic concept at the current Conference on Law of the Sea. Yet

THE AUTHOR

Captain I.W. Knox RAN graduated from the RAN College in 1950 and after training and service in the UK and Australia he specialised in Torpedo & Anti-Submarine Warfare in 1957. From 1960-62 he was the ASW Project Officer at the Aeronautical Research Laboratories during the initial development of Ikara and served as TAS Officer of HMAS Stuart during the early Ikara sea trials. He was Executive Officer of HMAS Perth from 1966-68 which included Perth's first deployment to Vietnam. He has had two postings to Navy Office on the Naval Staff and has commanded HMAS Torrens & HMAS Hobart. He attended the US Naval War College in 1972/73 and had just completed three years in the Strategic and International Policy Division of the Department of Defence. During that time he was the Defence representative on the Australian Delegation to the Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Sessions of the Law of the Sea Conference.

barely 3 decades ago, the US vigorously opposed the right of innocent passage for warships in its territorial sea; less than 2 decades ago at the 1958 Geneva Conference, the Soviet Union was mainly instrumental in blocking Western efforts to secure this right explicitly in the text of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. As China's naval capacity grows it may also begin to be less forthright in its support for the interests of weaker coastal States and achieving political mileage at the expense of the super powers. Likewise, Japan may come under increasing pressure to re-think its naval strategy.

We are witnessing the final colonial period of our planet—the division of 70% of its surface into various forms of national and multi-national jurisdiction over certain activities (eg., pollution control and scientific research); areas of the sea to be preserved for common use and areas of the seabed to be reserved for “the common heritage of mankind”—to be exploited for the benefit of all but with particular emphasis on the developing countries. Within areas of coastal State jurisdiction certain rights of other States must be preserved.

It is not only world order at sea that is at stake but also the continued political viability of the UN as a multi-national negotiating forum; the strategic concerns of the major powers; the security interests of most coastal States; access to millions of tons of living resources; access to billions of dollars worth of petroleum and hard minerals; the freedom to conduct scientific research in large areas of ocean; and possibly the survival of the ocean eco-system.

If the conference were to break down the international law governing the uses of the sea and title to the resources of the sea and the seabed would be thrown into uncertainty. Countries would act unilaterally to protect their interests and in many cases this would not be in the interest of the international community. The breakdown of the Conference would be accompanied by a breakdown in trust which would lead to a deterioration of the atmosphere in the North/South dialogue, and in discussions in forums such as the Conference on International Economic Co-operation, the UN Conference on Trade and Development and the Multilateral Trade Negotiations.

Organisation of the Conference

The Conference is organised into three Committees. The First Committee deals with the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction, which is termed “the Area”. The Second Committee is concerned with preparing treaty articles governing the uses of the sea and that part of the seabed which is subject to national jurisdiction. As part of this task the Committee has responsibility for deciding the limits of national jurisdiction. The

Third Committee has the responsibility of dealing with questions of preservation of the marine environment, marine scientific research and transfer of marine technology. The question of Dispute Settlement is being considered in the Plenary of the Conference.

As with all UN organisations the power structure in the Law of the Sea Conference is divided between the regional groupings. The President of the Conference is from Asia, the Chairman of the First Committee is from Africa, the Chairman of the Second Committee is from Latin America and the Chairman of the Third Committee is from the Eastern Bloc. This creates political difficulties within the Conference as it is hard to imagine them not being influenced by the ideology of their regional groups. For example, the Chairman of the Second Committee is responsible, amongst other things, for producing treaty articles defining the legal status of the 200 nautical mile EEZ and the Latin American concept of wide territorial seas naturally had a significant impact on the early versions of the text concerning the EEZ.

The process of negotiation in a Conference involving 150-odd nations is difficult and time consuming. It is almost impossible to conduct meaningful negotiations with the necessary compromises being reached in committees of that size and procedures must be found whereby negotiations can be conducted in smaller groups. However, delegations are reluctant to permit their vital interests to be represented by other delegations and it is therefore difficult to arrive at procedures under which important issues can be considered in the small groups which are conducive to candour in discussion and speed of work.

Another factor which makes for slow progress is that the negotiations have been conducted on the assumption that the results will be a “package deal”. Thus, no final decision on any issue will be taken until all parts of the treaty are acceptable to the Conference by consensus or, if necessary, by an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the representatives present and voting. The decision to seek a consensus is a wise one because premature voting might destroy the Conference. If, for example, an adverse vote were recorded on an issue which a group of States, whose co-operation was needed for the success of the Conference, regarded as essential, they might withdraw from the work of the Conference or be forced to vote against other provisions which other delegations regarded as essential.

Given the importance of the matters before the Conference, and the need to ensure that what is being propounded in one Committee does not cut across what is being done in another Committee, it is understandable that delegations are cautious to commit themselves until all the

elements in a package which will have such far reaching implications are clear.

Critical Issues

However, despite all these factors considerable progress has been made in the search for a comprehensive Law of the Sea Convention. At the Sixth Session of the Conference, held in New York in mid 1977, negotiations focused on a four-part document, entitled the "Revised Single Negotiating Text" (RSNT), which is basically a draft Convention, containing some 400 draft articles plus several Annexes which represented the tangible product of the previous years of negotiations. The vast majority of these articles were acceptable to a consensus of the Conference as they reflected, as might be expected, a great many trade-offs and informal and tacit understandings and commitments. But the Conference was deadlocked on three critical issues: the legal status of the agreed 200 mile EEZ (this involves a complex of issues including the rights of coastal States and of other States in the EEZ, the definition of the high seas, conditions governing the conduct of marine scientific research in the EEZ and the question of peaceful settlement of disputes relating to coastal State jurisdiction with regard to marine scientific research and fisheries); a regime for exploiting the resources of the deep seabed; and the rights of the landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States (LLGDS). The achievement of a Convention hinges upon the resolution of these three issues.

Within the EEZ, which extends beyond the territorial sea to a distance of 200 miles from the territorial sea baselines, it has been agreed that the coastal State has sovereign rights over the resources of the sea and seabed and certain functional rights relating to the preservation of the marine environment and to the conduct of scientific research. The critical unresolved issue at the start of the Sixth Session, concerned the legal status, or scope of "national jurisdiction", in the zone. Should the EEZ be part of the high seas where the coastal State enjoys certain preferential rights over resources, or should it be virtually an extension of the territorial sea, or what balance should be struck between these two extremes? The RSNT adopted what might be described as a "left of centre position". It classified the area as *sui generis*, neither high seas nor territorial sea, subject to national jurisdiction but with certain freedoms being guaranteed to the international community. The freedoms relating to navigation and communication were somewhat less than the high seas freedoms relating to these issues and put at risk traditional military uses of the ocean and seabed within the EEZ, and introduced some degree of uncertainty into the continued freedom of commercial sea and air transport in the EEZ.

EEZ's of coastal States will occupy about one third of the ocean which had previously been recognised as high seas and will cover many strategically important areas.

The RSNT articles on this issue were unacceptable to the maritime powers and many of the LLGDS, and during the Sixth Session an informal group of key delegations working outside the framework of the Conference produced draft articles covering Parts II, III and IV of the RSNT which reflected a better balance in the legal status of the EEZ. The Chairman of the Second Committee included these articles in the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT) which was produced at the end of the last Session. These articles preserve the essential *high seas freedoms* of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines and other internationally lawful uses of the seas related to these freedoms within the EEZ. If this "mini package", can be consolidated at the next Session, and there is every prospect that it should be, then this critical issue will have been solved.

The second major deadlocking issue, on a legal regime for the deep seabed, concerns potential riches and firmly held principles. The latter may be the more important.

In "the Area", the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, (about one half of the earth's surface) by far the major resource no known consists of billions of tons of potato-sized manganese nodules located on the abyssal plain of the ocean. These nodules contain large amounts of manganese, copper, cobalt and nickel, and although neither commercial production nor full scale prototype mining has yet taken place, and it is not clear whether the cost of deep seabed mining will be competitive with land based production, large companies are investing enormous sums of money to develop the technology and the developing world expects to get a large share of the riches of the ocean.

The UN has passed a series of resolutions declaring the resources of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction to be "the common heritage of mankind" and specifying that a new legal regime must be established before they may be developed. The advanced developed countries, with the United States in the lead, are seeking assurances that their state and private companies will have a long term opportunity to mine the modules profitably while the developing countries wish to obtain a substantial share of the benefits of deep-sea mining as well as greater control over international economic decision-making in a potentially important and precedent-setting area. Additionally, the land-based producers of these metals, which are mostly developing countries, seek to avoid costly competition.

It was clear at the end of the Fifth Session that unless there was some movement, a change in political stance by either one or both groups towards a compromise—there could be no settlement in the First Committee and the Conference as a whole could be jeopardised.

Fortunately, the will to seek a compromise emerged at informal intersessional meetings early in 1977 chaired by Minister Evensen of Norway. Most of the work of the First Committee in the Sixth Session was conducted in a Negotiating Group chaired by Evensen. These negotiations and the texts formulated by Evensen offered real prospect that the impasse on seabed mining issues could be resolved on terms acceptable to both the developed and developing nations.

Regretably, the ICNT does not reflect accurately the Evensen texts in some critical areas (the Chairman of the First Committee, in preparing the ICNT, has tilted some articles towards the position of the developing countries). This has brought a strongly hostile reaction from the USA.

The ICNT contains very detailed provisions for the structure of an international "Authority" which would provide the legal framework for mining of the Area. Although certain points concerning these organs are still a matter of dispute, the Text provides for an Assembly (in which every country would be entitled to be a member and have one vote and would equate to the Board of Directors of a company), a Council (with limited membership based on various geographical areas and interest groups and with the major executive powers), a Dispute Settlement Tribunal, important functional Commissions and a Secretariat. An organ of the Authority called "the Enterprise" would have independent power to exploit the seabed itself.

Although great progress has been made on these issues there is still much work to be done. On the central question of access the major problem concerns different ideologies and political views of "the common heritage of mankind" but there are also strategic, as well as economic, factors involved in the question of access to vital raw materials. If a procedure can be found to negotiate from the Evensen texts rather than the ICNT then it is probable that a compromise can be reached involving a "parallel access system", (when applying for a licence to exploit a section of the seabed the Authority would divide the section into two halves and select one half to be reserved for the Enterprise and the company could exploit the remaining half).

The third critical issue still requiring solution is the question of the right of landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states to participate in the exploitation of the living resources of the EEZ. At the final stages of the Sixth

Session there were attempts to formulate more acceptable texts than the RSNT but owing to limited time available they were not successful. The failure to resolve this issue affected negotiations on other subjects and the Conference could fail unless a satisfactory solution is found.

Other Issues

There are a number of other issues of interest to the navy which have largely been solved. Although some States may have problems with certain of these issues, which may be vital to them (i.e. recognition of their "historic waters"), their continued opposition and non-notification of a Convention would not prejudice the success of the Convention. Briefly these issues are:

a. Territorial Sea

This will be limited to a maximum breadth of 12 miles. The sovereignty of a coastal State extends throughout its territorial sea (and the airspace above it) except that other States shall enjoy the right of innocent passage through, but not overflight over, the territorial sea. Passage is defined as innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State. Submarines must travel on the surface.

b. Straits used for International Navigation

The extension of the territorial sea to 12 miles would subject many important straits used for international navigation to the regime of innocent passage unless a special regime of passage through such straits were provided. Currently the maritime powers would argue that customary international law does not recognise territorial seas wider than three miles so that a high seas route exists through straits more than 6 miles in width. The ICNT provides for a right of transit passage through and over sealanes through straits—this equates to a high seas route except that no activities can be undertaken other than those incident to normal modes of continuous and expeditious transit in that part of the strait covered by territorial waters. Freedoms of the transit (surfaced and submerged) and overflight are thus preserved.

c. Archipelagos

The archipelagic concept, which allows archipelagic States to enclose their archipelago with territorial sea baselines and measure the territorial sea and EEZ outwards from the baselines, has now been accepted in the Conference. However, basic high seas freedoms of transit through the archipelago will be preserved in sealanes similar to those through straits. The width of sealanes in archipelagos will be 50 miles or 80% of the distance between islands.

The Indonesian Archipelago



d. Continental Shelf

Although there is still considerable opposition to the continental shelf extending beyond 200 miles (ie., it should be subsumed within the EEZ) it is likely that the coastal State will have sovereign rights over the resources of the seabed to the outer edge of the continental margin (which includes the geomorphological continental shelf, slope and rise). If the continental shelf is defined to extend to the margin then the coastal State will have to share the revenue from the resources of the seabed beyond 200 miles with the international community. All offshore oil and gas is contained within the outer edge of the continental margin and in some areas of the north-west and west, south of Tasmania and in the north-east, Australia's margin extends beyond 200 miles from the mainland.

e. High Seas

The area of the high seas will be reduced by about one third by EEZ's but most current rules governing the high seas will continue to apply.

f. Preservation of the Marine Environment

Strict standards will be applied to control pollution of the world's oceans and coastal States will be given powers to make and enforce regulations in their territorial sea and EEZ.

g. Scientific Research

Coastal States will have control over the conduct of scientific research in their territorial sea and EEZ.

h. Islands

All islands will generate full maritime zones except that rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no EEZ or continental shelf.

i. Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries

Precise rules governing delimitation of the sea and seabed between opposite or adjacent states are difficult to agree as many different interests are involved (Australian islands in Torres Strait, Greek islands in the Aegean).

j. Disputes Settlement

It is now generally accepted that an eventual Convention will contain a system for the peaceful settlement of disputes and there are only a few outstanding issues to be resolved.

Summary

As indicated above a lot of progress has been made in the search for a consensus on the myriad of diverse issues facing the international community in its endeavour to establish an international legal system to govern seventy percent of the earth's surface. New concepts have been developed—the common heritage of mankind for developing the deep seabed, the exclusive econ-

omic zone, archipelagic concept, transit passage through straits and archipelagos, a system for the peaceful settlement of disputes; old concepts have been expanded and clarified; critical issues on which agreement must be reached before a Convention can be agreed have been exposed and possible compromise solutions identified. The cards are all on the table but a major effort of political will is still required by some countries to make the necessary compromises to reach agreement on the critical issues.

There is so much at stake, not only in world order at sea, but in wider political and economic issues, that I believe countries will be prepared to make the necessary compromises to secure a "package" which will be acceptable to an overwhelming majority of countries.

*NOTE: "mile" refers to "nautical mile" throughout the article.

AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE PRIZES – 1977

The ANI Council is pleased to award the following prizes for articles printed in the Journal editions in 1977:

The Best Major Article,

\$75 to—

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER A.W. GRAZEBROOK, RANR, for his article "Weapons Change, Strategic Concepts Stay" in Vol. 3, No. 3.
Master Ned is commended for his articles on "The Impact of Technology".

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COMMANDER A.L. BEAUMONT for his letter in Vol. 3, No. 4 concerning the purchase of the FFG.

And also to—

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER D.J. CAMPBELL for his article 'I Was There When . . . The Great Broccoli Myth . . .' in Vol. 3, No. 3.

The Council congratulates the winners and hopes that the judges' task will be even harder in 1978.

The Doctrine of Dwi Fungsi in the Indonesian Armed Forces

BY LIEUTENANT COMMANDER L.D. WATSON, RAN

SYNOPSIS

The evolution of Dwi Fungsi as part of the doctrine of the Armed Forces of Indonesia is an extremely complicated social, political, and military phenomenon, and it would be impossible to analyse it deeply in a Journal article. The author has therefore attempted to paint only a broad-brush picture of this doctrine, and those who follow events in Indonesia closely should therefore not be too critical if they encounter omissions or generalities. The intention is to provide those who have little knowledge of Indonesian affairs with a basic idea of how the armed forces of that country fit into its political structure and how they arrived there.

DWI FUNGSI

The Republic of Indonesia is a bare thirty-two years old, born out of the war- and revolution-torn Dutch East Indies. During its brief life, it has been subjected to enormous internal pressures which have on occasions threatened to destroy national unity, and politically fragment the archipelago. The wide diversity of languages, religious cultures and regional aspirations in Indonesia has manifested itself in armed insurrection and rebellion against the authority of the central government, and such threats have necessarily employed not only conventional arms, but also social, ideological and political methods. The government of Indonesia very quickly learned that to counter threats of this nature, it must develop effective counter measures of its own and train its Armed Forces to be at least as familiar with ideological and political weapons as they were with military hardware. Consequently, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (or ABRI as it is normally called), have evolved a unique "dual role" concept called Dwi Fungsi.

Dwi Fungsi (pronounced Dwee Foongsy)¹ has developed into a national doctrine, and within its concept, it gives ABRI two distinct roles or functions in the State organisation, and they are respectively:

- (a) ABRI as an instrument of national defence; and
- (b) ABRI as a social weapon in the national struggle.

Before World War II the Dutch allowed the natives of the (then) Netherlands East Indies very little participation in the administration or defence of the colony; when the Japanese occupied the islands, they formed a local armed force known as PETA which was charged with the defence of the archipelago, allowing a degree of experience to be developed by native officers and troops during the war. As a result, when the Japanese surrendered there were perhaps 10,000 natives of the Indies under arms using captured Japanese weapons. Soekarno proclaimed the establishment of the Republic of Indonesia on 17th August, 1945, and PETA became the armed forces of the new nation which immediately embarked upon a five year struggle against Dutch attempts to re-establish sovereignty over the islands. As this

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newly-born ABRI conducted chiefly a guerilla campaign, it had to rely heavily on popular support in most of its activities and from the very outset it was established as a people's armed force, involved not only in fighting the Dutch, but also in educating the largely illiterate and rural population in the benefits of independence and in the aims and aspirations of the revolution.

Indonesian political history, and with it the development of ABRI and ultimately of Dwi Fungs, may be divided into the following broad historical periods:

- a. 1945-49. The Revolution—from the proclamation of independence until the granting of sovereignty by the Dutch.
- b. 1949-59. Liberal Democracy, and Indonesia's only flirtation with Western-style government.
- c. 1959-65. Guided Democracy.
- d. 1965-present. The New Order.

A brief glimpse at each of these periods may help to outline the trend towards the establishment of Dwi Fungs in the contemporary state structure and its evident acceptance by the people as a whole.

1945-49 The Revolution

As earlier stated, ABRI was initially formed as a people's army, and to retain its popular support during the period of rebellion against Dutch authority it had to become closely involved in the affairs of the people; as the only large, organised, and disciplined group. This involvement necessarily went beyond village education programmes, and in fact included all aspects of planning for the creation of a new state. During those five years ABRI carried out constant guerilla warfare against the Dutch, helped to form a people's representative body, drummed up international support for the revolution and inflamed the populace with revolutionary zeal. ABRI also played a large role in the drawing-up of a constitution for the new nation, known as the 1945 Constitution, and which, in the eyes of the revolutionary government, became the legal basis for Indonesia from the day of the Proclamation of Independence. By 1949 it was apparent to the Dutch that they could not regain control of the East Indies and sovereignty was formally handed over to the Indonesian Government in that year.

1949-59 Liberal Democracy

A new liberal-democratic constitution was enacted at the beginning of 1950 in which ABRI, having been the chief instrument of the revolution, found activities outside purely defence roles curtailed by the politicians, and its involvement in civil affairs, particularly politics, unconstitutional. During this period ABRI was required to suppress four major and a number of minor politi-

cal or religious inspired attempts to overthrow the authority of the central government; the opportunities provided were used initially to establish military administrations in the troubled areas to preserve order, and later to persuade the President to enact a bill enabling these administrations to be directly represented in the National Planning Body, a political decision-making organisation set up in 1958. ABRI used its increasing influence in this body to help erode popular faith in the 1950 constitution, and to urge the government to take steps to "overcome the dangerous internal situation by acting positively in the military, social, and economic fields, and to restore national unity". Finally in 1959 the liberal democratic constitution was abolished by presidential decree and a return to the 1945 constitution, thereby nullifying the unconstitutionality of Dwi Fungs. The first targets of ABRI in its new, legalised, civil role were foreign firms and plantations in Indonesia, which were taken over by military representatives as part of a nationalisation programme. The abandonment of the liberal democratic constitution was a declaration of the unsuitability of Western-style democracy for Indonesia and recognition that firm central leadership was necessary to maintain order in the nation.

1959-65 Guided Democracy

Guided Democracy saw the gradual abandonment of many of the provisions and social safeguards of even the 1945 constitution, which nevertheless remained valid, and the emergence of a dictatorship and personality cult centred upon President Soekarno. ABRI used this period to consolidate its political power and influence in numerous non-military organisations by arranging for its representatives in the parliament (although this body met infrequently and became virtually powerless) and the government. ABRI's most important action was sponsoring the formation of an organisation called GOLKAR (Functional Group) which united the power of all non-party, politically-oriented groups, without actually forming a new political party. At the time there were no fewer than 16 parties, mostly fairly small, but over-shadowed by the huge (two million member) Communist Party which like the ABRI was also actively securing for itself positions of influence and power, both within and outside the government. The birth of GOLKAR marked an important stage in the polarisation of political thought and activity into Communist and anti-Communist camps, which culminated in the attempted Communist coup of 30th September, 1965. The coup failed and its supporters, together with all confirmed and suspected communists, were ruthlessly hunted down. The real authority of President Soekarno was stripped from him, although he remained figure-head President for two more years, and the New Order was ushered in, led by General Soeharto.



President and Mrs. Soeharto

—By courtesy of the Indonesian Embassy

1965-Present The New Order

GOLKAR emerged from the chaos of the attempted coup as the victorious force in Indonesian politics, and all political parties and groups whose aims did not coincide with those of GOLKAR were banned. The many communists and their sympathisers who had been occupying influential positions in government, industry, and commerce, before the coup, were replaced with GOLKAR appointees, so the coup provided Dwi Fungsi with enormous impetus. Special parliamentary sittings were held in 1965 and 1968 under the auspices of GOLKAR and future parliamentary representation, most importantly the representations of ABRI was formally established. During the twelve years of the New Order the idea and reality of Dwi Fungsi have become institutionalised and the knowledge that members of ABRI occupy many non-military positions is accepted, and indeed, given the nature of ABRI's roots, expected by the bulk of the people. However, political stability has not yet been achieved in this polyglot nation, so that Dwi Fungsi is essential to central government control over the numerous ethnic, cultural, and religious groups. ABRI is actively involved in, and has its members established in, every facet of Indonesian political, cultural, economic and social life; those not actually occupying purely defence positions do not wear uniform nor do they use their military

ranks in forms of address in order to present a military profile as low as possible. Nevertheless their numbers are great and one of the three sub-departments of the integrated Defence Department is concerned solely with the organisation and administration of the non-military aspects of Dwi Fungsi. The other two sub-departments are Operations and Administration. The three sub-departmental heads are responsible to the Minister of Defence, thence to the President.

The Aims of Dwi Fungsi

The national aims of Indonesia are stated clearly in the opening of the 1945 Constitution. They are:

"To protect all the peoples of Indonesia and their territory and to advance their welfare and way of life . . . to take part in the development of a world order based on freedom, everlasting peace, and social justice".

These splendid national aims can be divided into two sub aims, one concerning domestic matters and the other concerning foreign policy matters. That portion pertaining to domestic policy can be sub-categorised into military aspirations, i.e., the physical defence of the people, and social aspirations, or the welfare of the people. As such it is tailor-made to suit Dwi Fungsi, and indeed Dwi Fungsi as a doctrine relies fully upon the constitution for its legality. In addition, specific bills clarifying, or updating, the meaning of Dwi Fungsi have been passed by the People's Representative Councils in three sittings since 1960, including two during the New Order.

Remembering the Republic's national aims, the state aims of ABRI in its two roles which have gradually developed over the years, and particularly the past twelve years are:

a. In the Military Field


1. To establish and develop national defence and security forces which are strong and able to face any threat to the continued existence of the State and Peoples of Indonesia.
2. To carry out both preventive and repressive activities in national defence and security by using both technological and social weapons.
3. To assist in the welfare of the people, and to develop the wealth of regions by using to maximum benefit the facilities and strength of ABRI which can be mobilised.
4. To carry out territorial operations and other activities associated with Territorial Management in order to increase social well-being and local capabilities for achieving high levels of mental, spiritual, physical and material stamina.

b. In the Social Field

1. The security and continued operation of the 1945 Constitution and the Pancasila (or 5 principles)² as bases for the defence and fulfilment of the Republic's Independence in accordance with the National Aims.
2. To safeguard and carry out national development.
3. To nurture and develop unity of the people and national stability.
4. To channel the ideas and aspirations of the people, to identify problems, and to create a democratic way of life.
5. To safeguard and ensure the success of general elections.

It can be seen that the dividing line between the military and non-military functions is blurred. To the traditional Western way of thinking such a heavy involvement by the Armed Forces in social matters would be termed Militarism. This expression, however is rejected by the Indonesians who point out, quite rightly, that unlike text book military dictatorships ABRI does not stress the importance of armaments or war preparations which are out of proportion to the national interest. Nor does it support a military dictator: on the contrary the leadership consists of a small

body of military men, former military men and civilians who determine policy matters through a peculiarly Indonesian system of mutual consultation. Adherents to the military government theory may point to the Indonesian parliament where since 1967, 40% of the lower house has consisted of military appointees, and 30% of the upper house. However, the 1945 constitution again is drawn upon to rationalise this situation. The constitution places the rights of every citizen on an equal footing before the law, and calls upon the citizens to exercise their rights and responsibilities to take part in the determination of matters important to the interests of the people. Civilian supremacy over the military establishment is therefore seen as a derogation of the rights of a large group of individuals, to wit the members of ABRI. The military is consequently elevated to a position where its political rights and responsibilities as a group are the same as other groups in society. The mode of operation may appear to outsiders as a case of some being more equal than others but it must be remembered that the military is the dominant group in GOLKAR which in turn controls all the reins of power. Unlike a number of true military dictatorships which profess to be democracies, Indonesia does not, and indeed its style of government is uniquely Indonesian.



President Soeharto inspecting cadets of the Indonesian Armed Forces Academy.

—By courtesy of the Indonesian Embassy



Temple scene in Bali.

—By courtesy of the Indonesian Embassy

The concept of civil-military relations in Dwi Fungsi is rejected as that idea implies the greater strength of one group relative to the other. On the one hand civil authority is seen to mean liberal democracy which has already proven itself unworkable in Indonesia: on the other hand military supremacy is seen to lead to dictatorship and that has also been tried and discarded. One of Dwi Fungsi's important aims therefore is to preserve the current GOLKAR dominated balance in which civilians and military men merge, so that the government's goals of political stability and peaceful development can be more easily achieved.

The career structure of a permanent member of ABRI and particularly officers, will almost certainly involve one or more postings in the non-military area. These could be as diverse as a Mayor of a town, an executive in a large business, a bank official, or even as a Member of Parliament. Normal postings are for two years but the organisation involved may request for an individual's tour of duty to be extended if he is performing particularly well.

Dwi Fungsi as a Government Policy

For Indonesia, which is still very much a developing country, Dwi Fungsi is an important tool for national construction. The government is able to call upon a large, disciplined, and well equipped body to carry out or assist in carrying out almost any development project and perhaps more importantly, can utilise directly the services of the officers. In general, the ABRI officers, are

better educated than the bulk of the people and many, if not most of Lt. Col. rank and above have received training abroad. They are therefore well-equipped to contribute to the development of their country and are called upon to do so. In times of defence emergency, members of ABRI employed in industry or commerce can be easily and quickly mobilised and fitted back into the purely military organisation.

The legal, political, economic and historical supports for Dwi Fungsi are myriad and one could be tempted to conclude that "the lady doth protest too much" in attempting to justify a state power structure where the armed forces play such a large role. However, Dwi Fungsi is a method of power-sharing between the military and non-military which amongst other things, is attempting to achieve political and economic stability in a nation where these ideals are still far from being realities. It appears to be working and if it seems to be an aid in the suppression of the Western-style liberties of those opposed to the government's aims and methods, then it must be remembered that nation building in the developing Third World countries is a hard business, where the end is considered to justify the means, and where civil liberties must often be amongst the first casualties.

1. Dwi Fungsi is a Sanskrit/Indonesian mix meaning two functions. It is not normally translated.
2. Pancasila is the State Philosophy, more venerable even than the constitution. The principles are: Belief in one God, Humanism, Welfare of the People, Social Justice and National Unity.



The Temple of Tanoh Sat, Kediri.

—By courtesy of the Indonesian Embassy

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The People's Republic of China

Political Perception and the Institutionalisation of Party and Government

BY 'GIG'

*This is the third and final article by 'Gig' on the People's Republic of China.
Previous articles appeared in Vol. 3 No. 1 and Vol. 3 No. 2.*

Marx held that capitalist industrialization would produce forces to form a transitional socialist society which would eventually result in communism. The revolution would come in countries with highly developed economies and would be initiated by the proletariat majority (wage workers) overthrowing the rule of the minority bourgeoisie class. The proletariat itself would evolve forms of organisation that would lead to their victory in a self organizing revolution by the masses. This revolution would be international in character advancing in a chain reaction process through other economically advanced countries.

Features of this transitional socialist phase would be the self organising majority exercising a dictatorship over the minority while there occurs further developments of the ideological and material prerequisites of communism. A major task would be to create material abundance to pave the way for a complete abundance of goods and services. Also the transitional phase would see the intellectual and cultural levels of the masses being raised to enable proper appreciation of their society.

After the class struggle is over and the material and intellectual standards have been raised there would be the achievement of a utopia in which:

- a. The means of production would be collectively owned.
- b. Collective control through democratic election (Lenin) to allow 'soviets' to oversee the masses.

These first two would ensure the cessation of class in society.

- c. Income would be distributed in accordance with need.
- d. The work process would not be a means to an end but would reflect the conscious desire of selfless motivation to allow the achievement of c.

But, as is generally known, Marx's vision did not occur. The ability of a capitalist society to work with the proletariat for mutual gain was underestimated and any moves towards a welfare state were usually far removed from socialism. The violent revolutions that have taken place in the twentieth century have usually been in poor and economically underdeveloped countries where, by definition, there has been a revolution by a minority, sometimes with the passive support of a majority, and where the intelligentsia have had a significant role.

These countries use the same rhetoric as Marx and see themselves as being in a transitional period but because there has been a political revolution in a poor backward country the problems encountered will be many and more specific than those envisaged by Marx for an advanced country.

And yet certain socialist forms have been established by the political revolution in China. These are:

- a. A system where the anarchy of the market is eliminated in favour of economic planning.
- b. Private property is 'eliminated', thereby lessening the basis for class differentiation.

Since the level of economic development is low the industrial proletariat is a minority with

low cultural and skill levels. There is a lack of democratic tradition and no history of independent work force organizations leading to contradictory features within the transitional society. This, of course, makes it more difficult for us to understand the dynamics moving these societies.

Marx, referring to an advanced capitalist society, saw the historical process as:

**CAPITALISM—SOCIALISM (higher stage)—
COMMUNISM**

But the third world countries, led by China, now see the process as:

**SEMI-FEUDAL/SEMI-CAPITALIST—LOWER
STAGE SOCIALISM—HIGHER STAGE SOCIAL-
ISM—COMMUNISM**

And China at present sees herself as occupying this two stage middle area as a transitional society.

What we must recognise is that there is no inevitability about the movement through all these stages to communism and that these transitional societies are vulnerable to revisionism. This since the revolution has happened in an area with a low material output level leading to more and greater pressures than otherwise. China is still trying to create the proper material forces.

The general problems which China is facing in its transitional period are:

a. Economism: defined as 'the primacy of the development of the productive forces over the transformation of the production relations'. This indicates the dominance of the pursuit of growth-manship over the pursuit of social equality and manifests itself:

- i. In respect to the division of labour in society.
- ii. By forms of remuneration and income distribution.

Such persistence in promoting the interests of economic growth has recently achieved greater prominence in China but for reasons which should leave us uneasy.

- b. State vs Masses conflict.
- c. Too great a dominance by THE PARTY.
- d. Forces of the market overpowering the forces of conscious planning.

So we get a general problem of 'ends and means' emerging where we see the Party trying to guide the country through the transitional period, but to achieve the necessary development it finds the requirement to build in social inequality. The means to achieve communism have become an end in themselves and this means that the potentiality for reaching the target goal of communism has lessened and should be encouraged by the western capitalist countries.

The next few decades should see one of the great turnarounds of the century as the transition-

al states organise their underdeveloped countries that had previously demonstrated resistance to modern economic methods. Once they are organized capitalism is then able to move into the more congenial post-revolutionary atmosphere. Such is now happening in Russia and in Vietnam for mutual advantage between the capitalist and revolutionary states.

Properly recognised and exploited this trend should work for the benefit of the advanced capitalist countries as they develop the material well being of people in areas previously unresponsive to modern economic and capitalist intensive methods. Such a process is helped by the new institutional structures in the revolutionary society allowing external access to the small and internally dominant ruling elite.

Nature of the Chinese Communist Party

In China the Party holds a monopoly of political power through the constitution and sees its central objective as being to guide the country through the transitional stage to full communism. Its right to do this is by virtue of it being the advance guard of the most advanced element in society. Party membership has never been above 2.5% of the population which is the lowest proportion of any communist country eg. 16% in North Korea, 4% in Russia. The party rules imply that this group is the most politically aware of the advance group of the proletariat.

Yet only 14% of Party members were industrial workers, the rest being: peasants 67%, intellectuals 15%, and others 5%. These figures only partly conform to the Marxian concept because:

- a. The ratio of membership to population is twice as high in the city as in the country.
- b. In some industrial enterprises membership approaches 20%.
- c. Only peasants who demonstrate proletarian elements are members.

The Party throughout China completely permeates the government and society. As Franz Schuman noted:

"The party stands in alter ego fashion alongside every organised unit of state and society. Wherever there is a factory, bureau, school, production brigade or military company there is also a unit of the Communist Party."

The Party tries not to lead by a simple dictatorial style but by the method of the 'Mass Line'. This maintains close ties with the masses and through self criticism, listening to the people and incorporating their views the Chinese Party is almost unique. But the mass line should not be confused with democracy since the jailor and the prisoner also maintain a close relationship.

Internally the Party suffers from the contradictions inherent in Democratic Centralism since they mean:

1. Democratic—listen to the masses, accept their supervision, criticism and proposals by all levels to all levels.
- b. Centralist—Party must observe unified discipline. The hierarchical, authoritative nature of the Party makes the individual fully subordinate.

Structure of the Party

1. National Party Congress

By the rules it only meets once every five years in a formalistic role to ratify decisions and elect an already decided upon central committee. There is no ongoing debate and there have only been four Congresses since 1949.

2. Central Committee

Here the formal Party power resides in its approximately 300 members but there is still too great a number for ongoing debate and decision making. This body also only meets merely to ratify the decisions from above.

3. Politburo/Standing Committee

The Politburo meets once a week in an atmosphere of active ongoing debate and comprises about 25 members. The Standing Committee has only about 3 active members and the relationships between the Politburo and the Standing Committee are not known but the locus of power probably vacillates. But it is within these two bodies that the real focus of power in China resides.

4. Local Party Organs

These form a huge pyramid over the whole of China through the 25 Provinces and the autonomous regions which in turn operate through the 50–70 county and city units in each province. Each unit has its own congress and central committee which reflect the same structure as in Peking right down to the locus of power.

5. Primary Organisations

Permeates all the organised units of society. Factories, mines, schools, shops, hospitals, army units etc. all have active Communist Party members with power concentrated in committees.

Overall it seems as though the real decision making power at each level resides with a regularly meeting committee in which all important guidance and directives come from the Central Committee and are following assiduously. To what extent Peking makes these directives an assimilation of ideas from below is open to grave doubt.

Structure of the Government

The structure of the formal government is analogous to the pyramidal structure of the Party but has its own channels of command as a 'separate' body.

A State Council of approximately 40 members meets once a month and has wide powers given it by the Standing Committee. The National People's Congress meets once a year and is elected every five years with its main purpose being to ratify the composition of the Standing Committee. The County level is the lowest level and has universal suffrage with each level above it then having its own people's congress elected with each level voting for the next level up in an indirect voting pattern.

Relations Between the Party and the Government

In formal terms it is the government that controls all administrative matters while the Party determines all important policy decisions. Party members permeate the government structure at all levels and we get what has been called the 'Law of the Vanishing United Front'. This means that the higher we go in government the greater is the number of Party members. For example members form about 50% of the Standing Committee and 60% of the State Council. Within the State Council is probably an inner core of 12 people, 100% Party members, most probably also members of the Politburo.

This increasing intermeshing between the pyramids of power the higher we go is reflected in the constitution which awards the leading role in the State to the Party over the government and the National People's Congress is formally subservient to the Party.

So in China there exists a dual role with government departments at all levels subject to the corresponding department at the next higher level in Government and as well, having to obey the Party committee at the same level. In short, a two channel form of control over each government department, where government power is concentrated in small committees as are the Party organs, with the whole being subordinate to the Party and its Politburo.

A Brief Overview

These series of articles have outlined a Chinese state that must make us feel at the least, apprehensive. The State is the Party in China and as such is subject to the revolutionary and international foreign policy goals of Marxist–Leninist–Mao Tse Tung thought. This seeks limited regional war whenever the national integrity of the Middle Kingdom itself is not felt to be threatened. The first period was in the late 1950's, the second will be in the 1980's.

Response to these regional threats will require a totally military solution given the economic insularity and social unity which makes international economic and political sanctions a non-existent national security policy consideration. For the RAN then, we can envisage an environ-

ment in which there will be no allocation of priorities to maintain a level of desired sovereignty as the armed forces will only be required to assume a posture of pure FORCE.

Will we have the men and material to be successful in such a posture?

Recommended Reading

Rawlinson, J.L., *China's Struggle for Naval Development*, Cambridge, 1967.

Swanson, B., The PRC Navy—Coastal Defence Or Blue Water? in the *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, May 1976, Vol 102, No. 879.

Longhurst, A.H., The Navy of the PRC, 1976-1977, in the *Defence Force Journal*, May/June 1977, No. 4.

SHIPS AND THE SEA



SAILING VESSEL *PREUSSEN*

Built in 1902 the five masted full rigged ship *Preussen* is considered by many to be the ultimate in sailing ships, even the greatest ship ever built.

Preussen was owned and operated by the Laesz Flying "P" Line of Hamburg and employed mainly on the Iquique to Hamburg run with nitrate as the cargo.

The best speed recorded by *Preussen* was a shade over seventeen knots but her main feature was the fact that she could lift large tonnages of cargo at an average service speed of 6 to 8 knots.

Consider these statistics:

A steel built ship of length 407 ft 9 in (433 ft including the bowsprit) and a beam of 53 ft 7 in. Displacement was over 11,000 tons and cargo capacity 8,000 tons. Each of the five masts was some 200 ft tall with six square sails per mast. The total sail plan was 60,000 square feet of canvas made up of 30 square sails and up to 18 fore and aft sails. (Of note is the fact that the main yard was over 100 feet in length).

The end came to *Preussen* in November 1910 when she was involved in a collision with a steamship and subsequently wrecked on the South Foreland. Captain Alan Villiers described *Preussen's* end thus:

"Her career was brief, for a blundering steamer, unable to judge speeds or to comply with the International Rule of the Road, knocked her down at the Channel mouth when she was outward bound".

Finally, three more points to consider:

Firstly,—the total crew of *Preussen* was 47 Officers and men.

Secondly—Her best consistent sailing effort was during a voyage to the far east. 3020 nautical miles in eleven consecutive days. That's an average of almost 11½ knots!

Lastly—Tank tests conducted on a model of *Preussen* in later years showed that to achieve a speed of 17 knots her sails developed the equivalent of 6000 horsepower.

CMDR. R.J.R. Pennock





I was there when...

KOREA

It was during the Korean War. The young aviator was sitting in the Bridge Mess of *HMAS Sydney* telling his Air Group Commander (the late Vice Admiral Sir Michael Fell KBE DSO DSC) how the mission he had just flown had been a failure due to the lack of a gyro gun sight (GGS) picture. The SBLT explained how he had found after starting up that the GGS was not working and how he had checked all his switches and had even changed the bulb without success. As time did not permit the "Greenies" checking the system, he had decided to launch with the sight U/S. In any case it wasn't used for low-level bombing and they hadn't found much to strafe recently.

The SBLT went on to tell his Air Group Commander how it was just his luck that the Flight had come across some Chinese troops in the open "All I could do Sir, was to point the nose in their direction and spray—it's a pity my gun sight wasn't working—we will have to sharpen up the "Greenies" on their maintenance."

Just then there was a knock on the door and a Petty Officer "Greenie" enquired for the SBLT—"We found out what was wrong with your gun-sight Sir". The SBLT feeling that the Air Group Commander was giving him a sympathetic ear, gave the Petty Officer his views on the current maintenance standards and at the end enquired as to who had been responsible for his lack of a gunsight that morning.

The Petty Officer waited patiently until the SBLT had finished—"I don't know about all that Sir, I only came to tell you that the cockpit brilliance control was turned right down".

N.E.L.

VIETNAM

I was there on the bridge of *HMAS Sydney* in Vung Tau harbour, South Vietnam, with the ship about to leave on the return passage to Sydney; after what had become an almost routine operation, the dis-embarkation/embarkation of about 1000 troops and their equipment.

Throughout the 9 hour stay, the ship and the immediate vicinity had been a hive of activity, the large Chinook helos landed on and discharged their load of combat weary but happy soliders, and in a very short space of time were on the way back to shore with an equal number of fit but slightly apprehensive replacements.

The possibility of attack by under-water swimmers provided the main enemy threat and as a defensive measure the ship's force of swimmers carried out a constant surveillance whilst the trooping operations were being conducted from the flight deck.

With the ship about to weigh anchor and the last ship's swimmer on deck, a U.S. harbour patrol craft sped past broadcasting a loud hailer message to clear the harbour ASAP, because enemy swimmers were known to be in the area. The Captain's voice reflected the need for more urgent action by the ship's company as he gave the order to weigh. At almost the same moment, the bridge phone rang and the caller reported that the Engineer Officer of the Watch, in the midst of his rounds of the lower spaces, could hear a loud ticking just forward of mid-ships on the hull below the waterline.

Though of vintage years, the *Sydney*, commonly known as Port Jackson/Vung Tau ferry, was an attractive target and this was undoubtedly in the Captain's mind as he gave orders to prepare for a search of the ship's bottom.

In the process of quickly making my way aft to the chart house, I asked the Captain to stay his order to the ship's swimmers. After the Echo Sounder had been switched off, the EOOW was requested to check again for a ticking noise. Thankfully, that was the finish of the *Sydney's* "bomb scare", it being the first occasion that this particular EOOW had carried out rounds with the ship at special sea duty stations.

L.G.F.

Thoughts on What Might Have Been

The Royal Navy, The Far Eastern Question and The Fleet Air Arm 1919-1941

BY 'MASTER NED'

The process of conjecture, it is often said, is an unsatisfactory and unproductive pursuit for the student of history, especially military history. Yet, in a study of the Royal Navy in the Second World War, it is hard to do otherwise, to ask 'what if?' when one is faced by the complex problem of the Far Eastern question.

Two charges are continually being levelled at the Admiralty, and indeed their subsidiary, the Australian Naval Board. The first is that they failed to appreciate the realities of the world situation and failed to give study to the looming confrontation with Japan. Second, they are said to have ignored the realities of air power and neglected the Fleet Air Arm and invested their available funds in expensive and anachronistic battleships. On the Australian scene, Dr. John McCarthy's recent book, *Australia and Imperial Defence, 1918-1939*, denounces the policy of equipping the R.A.N., at considerable expense, with cruisers suitable to work as integral parts of R.N. units. He opines that this money would have been better spent on aircraft allocated for the defence of Australia rather than on ships to work with an Imperial force that never materialised.

The crux of these criticisms is the Royal Navy's supposed failure to provide aircraft-carriers, a failure amply demonstrated by the loss of the unaccompanied *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* to Japanese aircraft off Malaya on December 10th, 1941.

Yet, is this accusation fair? The building programmes of 1936, 1937 and 1938 made provision for 5 King George V class and 2 Lion class

battleships, with two more to follow under the 1939 programme. The programmes of the first three years mentioned the construction of six armoured deck fleet carriers, 4 Illustrious class and 2 Implacable class vessels.¹ Under the 1940 programme, it was planned that four more, even larger, carriers should be ordered.² Was this, then, a one-eyed view by the Admiralty? Or were they being eminently reasonable and spreading their bets?

To answer all these criticisms correctly, let us assume that the Second World War, as was predicted by the British staff, broke out at the end of 1940, rather than September 1939, and Japan joined the Axis immediately. Therefore, we would have the figures shown in the table opposite.

The Home and Mediterranean Fleets are of no concern in this discussion, save to point out that it was expected that the French Fleet would be able to do the bulk of the work in the Mediterranean. Had this been so, had France not been forced out prematurely by the German offensive, then the forces in the Far East could have been increased at least by a battleship and aircraft carrier more. The benefit of hindsight gives the knowledge that they managed to deal with the European Axis with even smaller forces than here allotted.

The Far East Fleet is, however, a different matter. The Japanese possessed 10 battleships and 9 aircraft carriers with many more under construction. They could ordinarily put about 600 aircraft up from these carriers. The Royal Navy, on the other hand, could barely field 200 aircraft in this area.⁷

**Table of Relative Strengths on the Assumption that World War II
Broke Out at the end of 1940**

GREAT BRITAIN

OPPOSITION

(Note—the allocation of ships to each fleet is my own, not that of the 1939 Naval Staff)

HOME FLEET

KING GEORGE V	= BB
PRINCE OF WALES	= BB
DUKE OF YORK	= BB
NELSON	= BB
RODNEY	= BB
RESOLUTION*	= BB
REVENGE*	= BB
VICTORIOUS	= CVA
FURIOUS	= CVA
ARGUS	= CVL
ANSON & DUKE OF YORK	= BBs
to complete within the year	

MEDITERRANEAN FLEET

(Force H vessels marked)	
QUEEN ELIZABETH	= BB
MALAYA	= BB
BARHAM	= BB
ROYAL OAK	= BB
REPULSE (H.)	= CC
ARK ROYAL (H.)	= CVA
INDOMITABLE	= CVA
HERMES	= CVL

FAR EAST FLEET

HOOD	= CC
RENOWN	= CC
WARSPITE	= BB
VALIANT	= BB
ROYAL SOVEREIGN	= BB
RAMILLIES	= BB
ILLUSTRIOUS	= CVA
GLORIOUS	= CVA
COURAGEOUS	= CVA
EAGLE	= CV ³

GERMANY

BISMARCK	= BB
SCHARNHORST	= CC
GNEISNAU	= CC
ADMIRAL SCHEER	= CA
GRAF VON SPEE	= CA
DEUTSCHLAND	= CA
TIRPITZ,	= BB
to complete within the year ⁴	

ITALY

LITTORIO	= BB
VITTORIO VENETO	= BB
ANDREA DORIA	= BB
CAIO DULIO	= BB
CONTE DI CAVOUR	= BB
GIULIO CESARE	= BB ⁵

JAPAN

HARUNA	= CC
HIEI	= CC
KIRISHIMA	= CC
KONGO	= CC
FUSO	= BB
YAMASHIRO	= BB
HYUGA	= BB
ISE	= BB
MUTSU	= BB
NAGATO	= BB
KAGA	= CVA
AKAGI	= CVA
HOSHO	= CVL
RYUJO	= CVL
HIRYU	= CVA
SORYU	= CVA
SHOKAKU	= CVA
ZUIKAKU	= CVA
ZUIHO	= CV
YAMATO, MUSHASHI and at least	
5 aircraft carriers to complete	
within 18 months ⁶	

*the two vessels marked with an asterisk were not in particularly good condition, had received little modernization, and were fit for little else save convoy protection.

Yet, was this not sufficient? The enunciated concept of the Admiralty Staff was always that of the 'Fleet in being'. Such a force as here outlined, operating out of Singapore, would have been a thorn in the side of the Japanese. It must always be remembered that the Japanese were faced with war on two fronts. The United States Fleet, even though it could have been 'Pearl Harboured' with a vengeance, could at least field a fleet equal to the British from units maintained on the East and West coasts.⁸

The war in the East may have taken a very different turn for the Japanese. Though the British were poorly equipped with aircraft, in the Sea Hurricane they had an adequate interceptor. In the air, the Far East Fleet may have had little or no offensive capability with the Swordfish, the Albacore and the Skua against the guns of the Japanese fleet and the Zero fighter, but they could have at least maintained a protective air umbrella that would have forced the Japanese to seek a surface action.

It is fascinating to think what effect on the Japanese war effort that this 'fleet in being' could have had. The East Indies Fleet of 1942, under Admiral Somerville, was of little use because it was strangled by the lack of modern ships in every category and could not even face the Japanese KONGOs in a surface action.⁹ However, the presence of this hypothetical fleet in Singapore itself would have meant that it was possessed of a considerable strategic advantage over the Japanese because the entire aim of Japan was to secure a reliable oil supply, denied her by the U.S. embargo. If the British had been able to hold the region for more than six months by a policy of hit and run, well co-ordinated with the Americans, then the Japanese war machine would have ground to a halt much as it did in 1945 as her precious oil and petrol supplies were dissipated without hope of replenishment.

Japan's success in the war depended upon her capturing the oil fields of the Dutch East Indies without delay. Even a month would have had a disastrous effect upon her oil stocks. There is little doubt that a British Fleet which had not been depleted by two years of war in Europe could have achieved this delay, and stretched it out into a year or more. It is thus the more tragic to look at the military reasons behind the infamous policy of appeasement.

For appeasement was, in more ways than one, a result of the Naval and Air Staff's insistence upon their inability to fight a war in Europe while the menace loomed in the Far East. The British backed down from strong action against Italy over Abyssinia because the Admiralty feared that the losses of capital ships which would soon be needed in the Far East would be excessive. At it turned out, the Staff were at the same

time both correct and incorrect. They certainly pleaded with the Government over the inadequacy of the arrangements made:

Right up to the end of 1937, the British Government, while registering increasing anxiety about the international situation, remained of the opinion that financial stability was preferable to a strong right arm. The Admiralty, gravely disturbed by Japan's action in invading China in July of that year, had reiterated their demand for a return to the two power standard. Six capital ships, ten carriers, fifty cruisers... were requested, in addition to those already authorized. But the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence, Sir Thomas Inskip, refused to recommend any expenditure beyond the £1,500 million... over five years which the Treasury had decided was all the country could afford.¹⁰

The strength would have been sufficient, and the Staff thus mistaken, had the ships lost not been lost for the wrong reasons. *Royal Oak* was sunk in Scapa Flow because the strength of the anti-submarine defences had been vastly over-estimated and inadequate precautions taken.¹¹ *Courageous* was sunk while on anti-submarine operations with only a light screen in waters that were known to be infested with U-boats. *Glorious* was sunk because she had been sailed across the North Sea with only two destroyers for escort when the risk of a major German force being at sea was realised to be enormous. *Ark Royal*, most tragic of all, sank because the damage control precautions were inadequate and the training of the ship's company in this regard was insufficient.¹² *Hood's* loss may well have been avoided had her secondary magazines been given added protection (a process which occurred in all save a few of the other British battleships and battlecruisers.) *Indomitable*, the carrier intended to accompany *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* and whose aircraft may well have turned the scales, ran aground in the West Indies while working up.

It is possible to lay blame on the Admiralty for many of these incidents, notably a certain over-confidence as regards anti-submarine operations, but it is not possible to criticise their attitude to the Far East, nor for any failure in dealing with air power at sea. On the contrary, as Captain Roskill's history of naval policy in this era shows, they possessed a far more mature and complete understanding of the potential of the aircraft and its use in maritime operations than did the R.A.F. of the time. Within the constraints of a miserly budget allowed by successive Governments and the control of the Air Force over aircraft production, progress was steady. *Hermes* commissioned in 1924, as did *Eagle*, *Furious* in 1925, *Courageous* in 1928, *Glorious* in 1930 and *Ark Royal* in 1938.¹⁴ Given the Great Depression, was this not a satisfactory record?

THE ZERO FIGHTER



THE KONGO



First, it must always be remembered that in 1939 the aircraft had not yet proved itself as a weapon effective against armoured ships at sea. Second, every major naval power in the world was building battleships, thus Britain had to follow suit. Third, the aircraft was not yet an 'all-weather' weapon; it was eminently possible that in heavy weather or at night the carrier and her screen (which had the K.G.V.s not been built, could only have had one or more of the three battlecruisers as heavy support) could be surprised and destroyed by a superior enemy.¹⁵ This is precisely what happened to *Glorious*, when she was sunk without being able to launch even a single aircraft. Fourth, only with the belated transfer of the Fleet Air Arm round to full Naval control in 1937, had the demands for aircraft and personnel begun to be met. Throughout the 1930s, the aircraft carriers had operated with their air groups under strength by at least a third. The heavy aircraft and personnel losses in the Norwegian campaign aggravated this situation and *Ark Royal*, with a standard (as distinct from war where at least a third more aircraft would be taken) complement of 60 aircraft never carried near this many, even in her most desperate days in the Mediterranean.¹⁶

Simply put, the Fleet Air Arm, and indeed Coastal Command, were starved by the R.A.F. in favour of the fighters and bombers and there was little that the Navy could do. While the decision to go for fighters for the defence of Britain is universally seen to have been the correct decision, the energy expended by the Air Force upon strategic bombing is another matter. Those in the Navy who understood the efficacy of naval air power could only do so from theory, unlike their American and Japanese contemporaries who were able to test their far better equipped carriers to the limits of their capacity. Once deprived of the

Royal Naval Air Service in 1918, the R.N. lost its best airmen with all their expertise, many on the verge of flag-rank, who would otherwise have gone into the fleet and preached the gospel of air power into every nook and cranny.¹⁷ Given these grievous losses, it is all the more surprising that the Royal Navy did as well as it did. Thus, considering all the defects of the system and the hindrances that the Naval Staff had in their search for the key to air power, the accusation that they did not do enough to promote its development and encourage its potential is both unfair and invalid.

The final point is that concerning the role of the Australian Naval Board. Was their view of the situation and their resultant policy a mistake? The thesis is frequently propounded that the R.N. failed to help Australia as it should. This is unfair because it tars the Admiralty with the same brush that was quite properly applied to Churchill when he tried to prevent the removal of Australian troops from the Middle East. The R.N.'s behaviour was very different. Their actions in the 1930s have already been studied and, further, in 1939, when the possibility of building a fast battleship armed with the fifteen inch turrets left over from the conversions of the *Courageous* and *Glorious* was first mooted, the Director of Plans gave the ship's potential uses as the following:

- a. To detach in pursuit of Japanese 12-inch gunned cruisers raiding our Eastern trade routes.
- b. To counter Japanese 8-inch gunned cruisers in battle.
- c. To operate in Indian and Australian waters before the arrival of our Fleet in the Far East, *such a ship would be very appropriate for the Royal Australian Navy to take over.*¹⁸

HMS VANGUARD



—By courtesy of Jane's Fighting Ships

This ship was to become the *Vanguard* and, though her construction was over-taken by events, the intention was certainly there. For as well as this, as soon as the threat of war with Japan increased in early 1941, all the Australian ships, as well as the New Zealanders, were released from operations with the Royal Navy and returned to the Australian Station. The best fleet unit possible was scraped together, and it is worth detailing its main units, had the disaster of the *Indomitable* and the loss of the two capital ships not occurred. As well as the three big ships, this squadron would have consisted of: the heavy cruisers *Australia*, *Canberra*, *Dorsetshire* and *Exeter*, the light cruisers *Hobart*, *Perth*, *Leander*, *Mauritius*, *Emerald* and *Enterprise* and fourteen destroyers.¹⁹ This does not include various old 'D' class cruisers and those V & W and S & T class destroyers in the area, nor does it include those ships such as the carriers *Formidable* and *Illustrious* which could have joined by March 1942. It should have been more, indeed, but with all the losses that they had already suffered it was all that the Commonwealth Navies could put together that had the speed and range for the Far East. Britain's tragedy in the Far East thus stems from the un-necessary losses of the first two years of the War and not from a failure to appreciate a situation that had been building up for over twenty years.

FOOTNOTES

1. *Jane's Fighting Ships 1939*. Samson, Low, Marston & Co. London. British section, see also the allocation to builders.
2. S.W. Roskill, *Naval Policy Between the Wars*, Vol II. *The Reluctant Re-Armament*, Collins, London, 1976. See especially the last two chapters.
3. These figures are based on estimated completion dates, had war not been declared, notably for the King George V class ships, taken from *British Battleships of World War II* Alan Raven & John Roberts. Arms & Armour Press, London, 1976, pp 283 et seq. The rebuilding of *Queen Elizabeth* and *Valiant*, pp 236-240 in the same work and the completion of the *Victorious* and *Indomitable* from *Jane's Fighting Ships 1939*.
4. All actual or estimated completion dates from *German Warships of the Second World War* H.T. Lenton, MacDonald & Jane's, London, 1976.
5. *Italian Warships of World War II* Aldo Fraccaroli, London, Ian Allan, 1968.
6. H. Jentschura, D. Jung & P. Mickel, *Warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy 1869-1945* Arms & Armour Press, London, 1977. Trans: David Brown & Anthony Preston.
7. The Japanese figures are taken from the work quoted before the British ones are largely drawn

from the carriers' war experience and their official capacities as outlined in *Carrier Operations in World War II*, Vol I, *The Royal Navy*, David Brown, Ian Allan, London, Revised Ed. 1974.

8. For example, none of the U.S. Navy's aircraft carriers were at Pearl Harbour on 7th December, 1941, nor were the modern battleships *North Carolina* and *Washington* or the older *Colorado*, *New Mexico*, *Mississippi*, *Idaho*, *New York*, *Texas*, or *Arkansas*.
9. As demonstrated by the fact that Admiral Somerville did his best to keep his old 'R' class battleships as far away from the Japanese fleet as possible. They were vulnerable to air attack and were out-ranged by all the Japanese battleships.
10. B.B. Schofield, *British Sea Power*, Batsford, London, 1967. pp. 177-178.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 166.
12. Kenneth Poolman *Ark Royal*, William Kimber, London, 1956.
13. Alan Raven & John Roberts, op cit pp. 350-351.
14. *Jane's Fighting Ships 1939* op. cit. British section.
15. Alan Raven & John Roberts. op. cit. p. 408.
16. David Brown op. cit. p. 70.
17. S.W. Roskill *Naval Policy between the Wars Vol. I The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism 1919-29* Collins, London, 1968. Chapters VI, X, XIII and XV.
18. Quoted in Alan Raven & John Roberts. op. cit. p. 321. Director of Plans 3/3/39 ADM 1/10141. Design of 15 inch gunned battleship. See also A.W. Grazebrook, A Battleship for Australia, *Naval Historical Review*, June 1976.
19. This is estimation, based on British units in the area or ordered to join Phillip's squadron, as well as Australian and New Zealand ships available.

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Nobody asked me, but...



FURLOUGH!

NPI 1404.

1. Furlough. General Conditions.

(a) Length of Service.

On completion of 10 years service, a period of leave called "Furlough" may be granted to a member at the rate of 3/10 of a month on full pay or 3/5 of a month on half pay.

NPI 1406.

1. . . . the granting of furlough will be subject to the exigencies of the Service . . .

In the middle thirties there occurred a most remarkable event; an event which sent a major flutter through the dove-cotes of the RAN, which caused wise men to look grave and which sent tongues a-chattering: "Hoppy" Rednall insisted on taking his Governor-General's leave!

God Lord, did not the man realise that he could be spared only with the greatest difficulty and inconvenience? That once spared, however, here was clear evidence that he was not essential? This insistence on taking advantage of a quixotic aberration in the Naval Defence Act was eccentric and disturbing and doubtless would be interpreted as an indication of disloyalty and disinterest of a high order. Was there no way to bring the man to his senses?

"Hoppy's" many friends were aghast at this deliberate blighting of a promising career though some at the same time admired him for his daring and determination; doubtless his rivals were secretly delighted.

"Hoppy" was unmoved. Having achieved the rank of Instructor Commander and with the knowledge no establishment existed for an Instructor Captain in the RAN it seems unlikely that he felt his career would suffer unduly.

So "Hoppy" and his lady took a pleasant six month trip to Europe and the UK returning in good time before the outbreak of the Second War in which "Hoppy" served in his usual quiet efficient fashion. In due course, when the estab-

lishment was adjusted, "Hoppy" became our first serving Instructor Captain indicating complete forgiveness of his earlier transgression. This is the only case I know of furlough being taken in the RAN in accordance with the original intentions of the framers of the relevant regulations.

My memory of this event was revived by a wardroom conversation of a few weeks ago with a 17 year officer of (in my opinion) great potential. The conversation went something like this:

17YO: Don't spread it around, but I'm off next year.

Self: Oh. Posting to where?

17YO: Posting to nowhere, I am resigning.

Self: Good Lord, what are you planning to do?

17YO: I don't know really, I haven't given it much thought.

Self: For Goodness sake then why are you off? You spend 17 years learning your trade and no sooner do you become really useful you want to give it away and start at the bottom again in addition to which you are only three years short of pension. You are out of your mind!

17YO: I have to go. I've run out of steam. I'm not doing the job justice anymore. I've lost interest. I'm drawing my pay under false pretences.

Self: Dammitall, this is why furlough was invented. Take your furlough, forget the outfit, enjoy yourself and come back as good as new.

17YO: I put in for furlough but I was knocked back. I can't be spared.

Self: Wow. You'll be spared all right when you resign. Insist on taking your furlough as a right.

17YO: According to the regulations it is not a right though I suppose I could press it, but where would my career be then. I'd be suspect for the rest of my time.

Self: Don't you believe it. Times, and bosses, change. In a few years no one will remember.

So I told the tale of "Hoppy" and left my friend to think it over on the horns of a dilemma which should not exist.

Governor-General's leave, now called furlough, was instituted by our forbears who in their wisdom were aware that after a number of years of hard and demanding service, on a time scale according to temperament, people become stale and overwound and work suffers accordingly. The remedy is leave, and leave in a much longer single period than is practical in what might be termed annual maintenance leave. In a slightly different sense the Sabbatical of the academic establishment strives to achieve the same object.

Hence we have provisions for furlough written into our regulations which, sadly, are honoured exclusively in their breach. Invariably furlough takes the form of a welcome tax free lump sum paid out to a member on retirement. Whatever might be said in favour of this custom it cannot be denied that it is a clear flouting of the spirit and purpose of a wise regulation framed for the welfare of the individual and thus the good of the Service.

An argument might be developed whereby it could be shown that the Service would benefit if the taking of furlough as entitlement to it arose were made compulsory. Then not only would the burden of absence be anticipated and spread evenly but competitive young officers overwrought in their pursuit of promotion could derive full benefit from it tranquil in the knowledge that each rival would be similarly disadvantaged in his turn.

I suspect, however, that interesting debate though this might prove to be, changes in the current regulations would be called for whilst in the meantime there exists a much more urgent problem which might be relieved, at least in a small way, by the intelligent application of existing regulations unamended.

For some time concern has been expressed at the rate of officer resignations from all three Services. The introduction of the new and very generous pension scheme in 1972 doubtless inspired an exodus of the time serving type of officer but the fact that the rate of resignations has remained at a high level ever since poses the question as to why so many officers are being lost especially in the current climate of inflation and economic recession.

I am aware of no study in depth of this question but I would hazard that a not insignificant number of officers resign for similar reasons to those of my 17 year friend, the remedy for whom lies not in a permanent release from the Service but rather in the judicious application of sufficient furlough to unwind the springs and charge the batteries.

My friend has the perspicacity to see the problem clearly, however, in many cases his true motives for opting out remain unappreciated by the officer concerned who rationalises his decision by mesmerising himself with contemplation of the joys and satisfactions to be derived from whatever esoteric occupation his mind may have seized upon, be it raising chickens or selling real estate, the whole imaginary picture enhanced by the prospect of freedom from rules, regulations, cranky captains and unappreciative sailors.

After a few months experience in his chosen idyllic pursuit the scales tend to fall from his eyes and the disadvantages of the Service slowly sink to their correct insignificant proportions. Then is the time that our idealist would be delighted to find himself back in the Service where he belongs, but alas, in many cases it is too late; financial commitments, plain stubborn pride and even the provisions of the DFR & DB Act all conspire to prevent his return and so we are left with an unhappy officer and a Service one short of complement.

In an effort to try to prevent this situation from arising I submit that a policy should be implemented requiring that an officer, upon tendering his resignation, be informed that the matter will be considered only after his return from his current entitlement to furlough; the date of commencement to be subject to negotiation between him and a briefed and sympathetic posting authority. Thus he would be availed of a minimum of 3 months to review his decision in an atmosphere totally divorced from the Service.

As I see it the advantage of my suggestion is that in the event of total failure to achieve its objective in any or every case no harm would ensue, the status quo would remain. However, if the compulsory taking of furlough caused the withdrawal of even one resignation each year then the scheme would be showing a clear annual profit. I can foresee no difficulties in its implementation; the regulations already exist and I cannot believe their invocation would pose a serious problem to our posting authorities who would find themselves weighing a certain loss of services on one hand against the possibility of some months absence only on the other.

When the ship that is tired returneth,
With the signs of the sea showing plain,
Men place her in dock for a season,
And her speed she reneweth again.

So shalt thou, lest perchance, thou grow weary
In the uttermost parts of the sea,
Pray for leave, for the good of the Service
As much and as oft as may be.

"The Laws of the Navy"

Ronald A. Hopwood

WOC

SUBMARINE RESCUE VESSEL

With the forthcoming arrival of the RAN's fifth and sixth Oberon class submarines, *Orion* and *Otama*, it is now time to think seriously about improving submarine safety. Our submarine force is big enough to warrant the acquisition of two Submarine Rescue Ships (ASR). That is, one for the east coast and one based at HMAS Stirling.

These vessels need only be in the region of 1,300 to 1,800 tons, say a modern version of the US Chanticleer class (1943-47). Alternately, they could merchant conversions which would be no doubt be more economical. They should be equipped with suitable lifting gear, pumps, air compressors and a rescue chamber.

The Brazilian Navy obtained such a vessel, the *Gastao Moutinho* (ex-USS *Skylark*) in 1973 to service her then seven submarines. In contrast to such navies as the Canadian and the Danish, the RAN, like the Brazilian, cannot hope for the assistance of an ASR from a neighbouring navy. Nor can it turn to large salvage concerns as in the case of the Royal Netherlands Navy.

An ASR is an insurance policy, and indeed it is hoped that the RAN would never need one for its intended task. It would however, be criminal that lives were lost for the lack of foresight. As can be imagined such vessels would be handy ships able to perform a multitude of tasks. Such as acting as a diving tender, assisting in survey work, and would be particularly useful on the west coast by the mere fact of being another naval hull present. I cannot help but add that *United* and *Undaunted* sound rather suitable names.

PDJ

BOOK REVIEW



ALL MANNER OF WORD AND TONGUE

In endorsing an unfavourable report on Mahan in 1893, Admiral Ramsay observed that it is not the business of a naval officer to write books. Maybe not. But it is our business to read them, and if time is a constraint then a satisfactory compromise can sometimes be found in anthologies and collections of various sorts. Three such came my way recently.

The Flowers of the Sea, edited by Captain E.W. Bush DSO** DSC (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis; \$7.50) is an anthology of quotations, poems, and prose with reference to the sea and life upon it. Such anthologies are pretty commonplace but I guarantee you've never met one as beautifully presented as this. It differs also from other collections because of its formal structure by which it is divided into ten sections such as The Old Navy, Storm and Shipwreck, and World War II. The editor's comments, including some first-hand recollections from his own distinguished career, are excellent and bind to a beautiful whole the extracts from the works of Conrad and Nelson, Bacon and Churchill, and many others. It is well indexed and has a glossary of sea terms. (Did you know a "scend" is the vertical movement of a wave?) This is a truly delightful book—you can read it from cover to cover or merely select pieces at random and you will not be disappointed. The flowers are picked from the richest garden of English literature.

A collection of a different nature is a selection of readings on seapower and maritime affairs in the second edition of *To Use the Sea* (again from the Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, \$8.50). The papers gathered together in this volume were originally published in either the USN Institute Proceedings, the Naval Review, the Naval War College Review, or Sea Power, and so many readers

will have seen some of them before. Perhaps too much of the emphasis lies with the US-Soviet naval confrontation and the dependence of the US upon the sea for its survival, but then the original market for this book should be borne in mind. The changing of the USSR's reliance on Clausewitzian doctrine to a concept based on the theories of Mahan is well developed, and this is certainly a theme of universal interest and importance. There are 42 papers in the book, and the best, in my judgement, is Andrew Patterson's "Mining: A Naval Strategy" (definitely a way ahead for the RAN). For those attending the forthcoming Seapower Seminar in Canberra in May, the first section on seapower is recommended preparatory reading, and for those who aren't, the reading should be mandatory.

One of history's recurring conflicts is that between the pen and the sword, and a new collection of the works of their various practitioners is *The Sword and the Pen* (Crowell, New York; price unknown, as Santa Claus cut off the corner of the dust jacket, but about \$10). This is a superb collection of 77 of the world's greatest military writings, prepared by the late Sir Basil Liddell Hart and edited by his son Adrian Liddell Hart, and that alone means you should buy and read this fascinating and comprehensive volume. Father and son have got together the thoughts and strategies of history's great figures including Caesar, Clausewitz, and Churchill, Mao Tse-tung, Machiavelli, and MacArthur. It is the sort of fundamental text you digest and think to yourself: everybody should read this; and why don't they teach this at Creswell? There is a good bibliography for the more serious student. No-one could review all these writings unless it were Liddell Hart himself and do them justice, so get your own copy and work out your prejudices yourself. Highly recommended indeed.

DJC

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