


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JOURNAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE



AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE

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- a. to encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the Maritime profession.
- b. to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and the Maritime profession.
- c. to publish a journal.

2. The Institute is self supporting and non-profit making. The aim is to encourage freedom of discussion, dissemination of information, comment and opinion and the advancement of professional knowledge concerning naval and maritime matters.

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OUR COVER

Our cover now features the crest of the Australian Naval Institute.



CHAPTER NEWS

Canberra

The final meeting in 1976 was held on 30th November when Commander A.R. Cummins, RAN addressed the Canberra Chapter on the subject of "Operational Training Projections for the 1980's". This was an excellent and stimulating presentation which will be published in the next edition of the Journal.

Unfortunately the meeting, chaired by the Convenor, Captain L. G. Fox, RAN, was very poorly attended with some seven members present. Despite this, however, a very lively discussion ensued which was finally terminated by the Chairman at a somewhat late hour.

The next meeting will be held at 7.30 p.m. on Tuesday, 5th April in the RSL National Headquarters when Captain P. G. N. Kennedy, RAN and Commander O. R. Cooper, RAN will give a presentation on "Automated Command and Control Systems - Current and Future".

Sydney

The last meeting of the Sydney Chapter was held on Wednesday the 9th February in the Dockyard Officers Club at Garden Island. The meeting was very well attended with 44 people being present. This meeting was also the first convened by the new Convenor, Commander K. C. Stephen, RAN.

The presentation given was a paper on "The Needs Of The RAN - 1985 to 2000". This paper was originally presented at the recent Naval Symposium by a syndicate calling themselves the "Young Turks". This paper caused considerable comment and was of such general interest that the Young Turks were invited to represent the paper at the Chapter meeting. Three of the original five members were available and they were Captain E.E. Johnston, Captain M. B. Rayment and Lieutenant Commander C. J. Skinner.

In the time available it was impossible to cover every aspect but those covered included Functions and Roles, Technology and Research and Development, Operations and Tactics and Infrastructure. The Surface Air Platform was deliberately excluded as the syndicate considered that sufficient attention had been paid to that item in other presentations and in the press. The other major omission, again deliberate, was the question of the actual forces required as the syndicate felt that for every listener there would be a different interpretation and people would tend to concentrate on the deficiencies they saw rather than on the many other equally important aspects. The policy paid off and the whole range of topics was discussed and the aircraft carrier did not dominate discussion as it normally does. The probable roles of the navy were defined and potential influences on our policy were discussed. A great stress was placed on the need to develop an adequate Australian based infrastructure and defence industry suitable to the navy's needs. Ideas for the reorganisation of the fleet were floated to promote discussion and the needs of the personnel in the Navy were also discussed.

The success of the presentation can be measured by the fact that discussion had to be terminated due to time

constraints after one and a half hours devoted to questions and answers. Clearance has been requested from Canberra to allow the publication of the paper in the Journal and it is expected that this will be received after slight editing. Considerable thanks are due to members of the Young Turks all who had particularly heavy demands on their time during the week of this presentation.

The next meeting is expected to be at the end of April or early May.

Correspondence

39 Godfrey Street,
Campbell, A.C.T. 2601

2 February 1977

Dear Sir,

I hope the paper 'Objectivity in Ship Procurement' provoked lively discussion when it was presented to the Sydney Chapter, not only because of the intrinsic importance of the subject and its treatment, but also some of the assumptions, and particularly the proposition expanded under equation 12, deserve attention.

In seeking a constructive way in which to frame the difficulties I have experienced with this part of the paper, I was struck by the quotation attributed to Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, Sergei G. Gorshkov, which was used in another excellent article published in the same ANI Journal by Lieutenant Lemon. The quotation reads "We have had to cease comparing the number of warships of one type or another and their total displacement (or the number of guns in a salvo, or the weight of this salvo), and turn to a more complex but also more correct appraisal of the striking and defensive power of ships, based on mathematical analysis of their capabilities and qualitative characteristics". In this context I find the assumption of a simple relationship between combat effectiveness, range and displacement very hard to accept. To illustrate the point, the range of some SSMs easily exceeds the detection range of shipborne search radars. Thus, the striking capability of a ship which carries SSMs can be dramatically enhanced by adding a long range reconnaissance capability by shipborne helicopters or RPVs. This increase has a rather tenuous relationship with displacement and is probably disproportionate.

No doubt the author had something of the sort in mind when he pointed out in his conclusion "the pronounced preference of the result for smaller ships was quite unintentional and is only as relevant as are the formulation of the problem and the constraints and assumptions". To be fair, his stated purpose was to demonstrate potential uses for a powerful analytical tool, and for my part I believe he has done us a service in opening up a subject of such interest.

I suggest that the aims of our Institute would be furthered by sponsoring serious debate on the many aspects of our general problem which might be simply stated as "how to deduce what types and numbers of ships we need, and then how to identify the best buy from those available". I would be happy to contribute a paper as part of this debate.

N.R.B. BERLYN
Captain, RAN

Dear Sir,

Having recently read the November '76 issue of the Journal, I must ask whether other readers have noticed the obviously humorous composition of that last issue. I refer of course to the articles "Officer Development", "Training the General List Officer" and, to complete the trilogy "Noah's Way". Was this symbolic or just a slip of the paste and scissors?

Whilst I enjoyed the article from the younger set and the possibilities that Master Ned outlined in his "Training the General List Officer" may I throw open two points for discussion amongst your readers:

ONE - To me the Junior Entry at HMAS CRESWELL still shows merit, for it is here that we have the opportunity to cream off many of the young men of the country before other outside influences are brought to bear. Surely, at the age Master Ned feels that we should retreat to, many other influences are being brought to bear on what must be a limited labour market. Not only the other services

but industry in general all want their share of a limited labour field. If the privilege system at CRESWELL is of such importance as Master Ned would have us believe, then it is an in-house problem with an in-house solution.

TWO - I can do no more than agree and support the comments on the lack of sea training facilities. Perhaps "the fleet" should examine more closely their requirements of what they want in Midshipmen and the amount of knowledge they require, and then have the training procedures altered to suit. Did this not occur in those by-gone days of common sea training? In all fairness can it not be summed up with the old conundrum of what came first, the chicken or the egg?

Many navies are now re-thinking their sea training attitudes, and whilst I would not wholeheartedly advocate the introduction of sail training perhaps it is time for all of us to rethink the problem of training the younger officer in both the academic and the basic professional skills.

JOSEPH PORTER

Not a slip of the paste and scissors but intentional.

-Ed.

The State of the Art

By LCDR D. A. SMITH R.D., F.A.I.N., RANR.

The mid-sixties saw the first concentrated effort by nautical and maritime professional groups to have a National Nautical Academy established in Australia for the training of officer personnel in the Australian Merchant Navy. Most previous proposals called for the co-operation and expenditure by shipowners who already had "in house" training schemes for their own cadets. Both the New South Wales and Victorian State Education Departments presently conduct small and inadequate classes operating under a trade training environment, but unable to cater for modern demands of the profession and industry.

Plans by the professional groups led by the Master Mariners Association of Tasmania reached fruition on 11 June 1976 when Commonwealth Parliamentary, enabling legislation, was enacted to pave the way for the "AUSTRALIAN MARITIME COLLEGE".

Following on from a considerable amount of background work by a number of inter-departmental committees, and after extensive discussions with professional groups, industry and the maritime unions concerned, the Australian Minister for Education, Senator Carrick, announced on 22 October 1976, the appointment of a 13 man Interim Council of the Australian Maritime College.

A former Chairman of the Commission on Advanced Education, and former deputy Chairman

and Managing Director of ICIANZ Ltd., Mr. T. B. Swanson, has been appointed Chairman of the Interim Council of the College.

The Interim Council will be responsible for the initial development of the College, including recommendations on a site in the Launceston area, and preparations for legislation to establish the College. The Council is fairly representative of a number of interested parties and will be the forerunner of the Governing Council of the College.

Commissioner M. Summers in his report on training of Australian Merchant Navy and Fishing Fleet personnel made a number of recommendations, many of which will, no doubt, be adopted by the College.

Commissioner Summers recommended that the College be established at, or near, a major city where certain waterfront facilities could be provided. The Tasmanian Government subsequently established a top-level "Task Force" to draw up a case for presentation to the Commonwealth Government to have the College established in Tasmania.

THE AUTHOR

LCDR SMITH. A Merchant Navy Officer who has commanded a number of Merchant ships. Founder Member of Master Mariners Association. Nautical Assessor. Member Company of Master Mariners. LCDR Smith has served in H.M.A. Ships QUICKMATCH, QUEENBOROUGH, SYDNEY, SUPPLY and STALWART. He attended the 1975 R.A.N. Tactical Course and holds a Full Naval Watchkeeping Certificate.

Other State Governments showed less interest than Tasmania, with the result that Launceston was legislated for, as the site of the College. As funding for the College will be through the Australian Department of Education, the financial fill up will be warmly welcomed in the Island State.

The range of courses that will be available at the College is within the province of the Interim Council to determine and will be influenced by I.M.C.O. and Australian Statutory requirements and industry needs. It may be envisaged, however, in general terms that the higher level, or professional courses, and courses of a specialised nature, will be conducted at the College, whereas the lower level courses will be conducted at the regional technical colleges in the various states to suit local requirements. One of the principal sites considered for the College is in the historic Launceston suburb of Newnham on the Eastern bank of the Tamar River and within walking distance of Launceston. Situated adjacent to the Tasmanina College of Advanced Education, the site has extensive water frontages, with adequate development facilities already available. The Tasmanian Government has offered to grant the land to the College to facilitate early construction.

The College will be a "national" College with considerable autonomy and will be operated on the basis of a College of Advanced Education. The Australian Department of Transport remains the authority to set minimum regulatory standards for the operation of commercial shipping and will maintain a close liaison with the College in setting competency and licencing standards. Initial attendance figures are expected to reach 300 students with an eventual maximum of up to 600.

Professional interests have already canvassed the idea of selected Seamen Officers of the R.A.N., undertaking the degree course in Nautical Science, to give them a civil qualification directly applicable to their sea-going employment and professional background. With less than 1% of Merchant Navy Officers as members of the R.A.N.R., suggestions have already been made to include the subject, "Naval Training", as part of the general curriculum.

Draft proposals for a wholesale re-structuring of the Certification and Licensing of Merchant Navy Officers have been prepared by the Australian Department of Transport to meet current I.M.C.O. requirements and to keep pace with trends in some of the more advanced maritime countries. This is not to say that the present standard of competency in Australian manned ships is lacking; in fact most Australian Officers hold certificates of a higher grade than the capacity in which they are serving.

With Australia now slowly entering the stage of becoming a minor world maritime power we are fortunate in being able to draw on the experience of already established training colleges in other countries.

Traditionally the bulk of Australian Merchant Navy Officers have been recruited from Britain, but with changing economic and social patterns and a greater desire for national achievement, the pattern now swings to one of self support. The result is that no longer does Australia have to rely for a steady intake from overseas to bolster its Merchant Navy.

The social and professional advantages of higher academic training must bear some relationship to the actual work in which the Officer is employed, and it is for this reason, that the idea of the degree in Nautical Science was formulated in Britain.

British graduates are already filtering into the Australian industry and the British standards appear to be the most likely to be accepted in Australia. The more august and professional bodies, like the Company of Master Mariners and the Master Mariners Association, will be closely watching the standards set by the College, although at this juncture the purely professional groups are not directly represented on the Interim Council.

The availability of the B. Sc. (Naut.) has allowed many former Merchant Navy Officers to graduate into the upper echelons of the Public Service, formerly considered the exclusive preserve of graduates in other disciplines. It is now only a matter of time before a degree in Nautical Science will be the standard criteria for employment in many senior positions within Government and Industry.

The academic and professional standing of the Australian Maritime College will only be as good as the end product and the broad spectrum of the industries it helps to sustain. Judging by the enthusiasm with which the Australian Government is supporting the proponents of the College, the Australian Shipping Industry can look forward to increasingly higher standards in the operation of the Australian Merchant Navy.

Professional interests have already canvassed the idea of selected Seamen Officers of the R.A.N., undertaking the degree course in Nautical Science, to give them a civil qualification directly applicable to their sea-going employment and professional background. With less than 1% of Merchant Navy Officers as members of the R.A.N.R., suggestions have already been made to include the subject, "Naval Training", as part of the general curriculum.

International Political Relations The Peoples Republic of China

By GIG

Summary

A study of this topic inevitably leads to the formation of a chronological sequence with clear periodization in which Chinese foreign policy has always been fundamentally shaped by relations with the US and the USSR combined with a vacillating conception of her own relative strength.

1. Pre/Post Liberation Period 1945-1950

Overall this period saw the foundations of antagonism firmly laid with the US. Although the US claimed to be neutral the defeat of Japan had left a power vacuum and to fill this the US chose to directly and indirectly assist the Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek. This support included 50,000 marines guarding key areas and lines of communications from the communists, an airlift of ½ million KMT troops to the seaboard to relieve the marines, \$US 2½ billion in aid from 1946-1949 with \$US 2 billion being in direct military aid and also the MAGIC advisors.

So even before Liberation an antagonistic framework had been laid. Perceiving their country's weakness immediately after the revolution the communist leadership stated their desire for good diplomatic and trade relations with all countries but the US refused to recognise the People's Republic because of debts accumulated by Chiang and because of China's relations with the USSR. In Peking there had been foreign military compounds since the Boxer Rebellion but only the US refused to give up this presence and had their compound occupied by force. The US also caused Britain to stop the return of the civil aviation fleet in Hong Kong and refused to return Chinese deposits in US banks. US loans were not forthcoming and the US led a successful attempt for a common trade embargo all of which effectively isolated China from the western political and economic spheres.

China additionally felt threatened by the force of occupation in Japan and was fearful of direct action by the US military with its warnings that if China took any action in Taiwan or Korea the US would come to the aid of these countries.

Just as relations with the US were receiving their imprint of hatred the foundations of the split to come were also laid with the USSR. The Russians had not wanted to fully support the Chinese Communists until they were certain of victory so as to prevent an antagonistic country on their border. Accordingly, after the defeat of Japan the Russians recognised the KMT as the legitimate rulers of China and signed the surrender document with them. In 1946 they even negotiated with Chiang and offered to support him against the ChiComs if he repudiated his ties with the US.

Although Russia had only declared war on Japan several days before the end they claimed recompense, occupied Manchuria, one of the most industrialized areas and removed large amounts of military and industrial equipment. Throughout the military campaign against the KMT the USSR gave virtually no support to the communists and even when they were in sight of victory urged them to stop and sign a treaty with Chiang.

The US response was understandable since at this time China's posture was fervently revolutionary with fiery support for armed struggle. Also, up till 1950, they gave material assistance, arms, equipment and training to the Indo-Chinese revolutionary movements. Most revolutionary groups however only received verbal support of a very vituperative kind as China set itself up as a model for other underdeveloped countries. All of this tended to reinforce US cold war fears and irritated the USSR which had always been the natural communist leader.

After liberation China realized its weak international position while it was occupied in internal programs and with a choice of US hostility or USSR obstructionism chose the USSR as the best ally available. In 1949 Mao went to Moscow for two months and got an alliance guaranteeing military support in case of invasion. This was grudgingly given with only a small amount of aid but it promised security at a vulnerable time.

2. Korean War Period 1949-1953

China does not appear to have encouraged the invasion of South Korea by the North since it was still involved in the problems of reconstruction and industrialization. It was an independent action by North Korea with the US immediately committing troops to Korea and the 7th Fleet was ordered to the Formosa Strait. Once the UN troops crossed the 38th parallel and headed north the Chinese pondered the high risks and unwillingly went to war to maintain national integrity with a high level of material and manpower commitment. The traumatic events that followed for the US military established the US view of China as a threat to world peace and this view was mooted by the US for a long period to prevent countries establishing relations.

3. Bandung Period 1954-1957

This was generally a period of great moderation by a China concerned primarily with the interrupted social and economic development under Russian guidance.

China attempted to present a peaceful front to the world but US hostility did not lessen. The Fleet was kept patrolling the Straits and bilateral agreements, including SEATO, were signed with many countries to achieve a network of alliances and US bases to surround China.

There was also the strengthening of cold war rhetoric by US political leaders with calls to drop the bomb on 7 occasions and the 1956 announcement of a proposal to build nuclear missile sites on Taiwan was a culmination of this rhetoric. China, again realizing her vulnerability was desperate to soften relations and proposed an end of the trade embargo as well as an exchange of journalists but this was ignored.

China's overall strategy was to try to pursue a peaceful policy to extricate it from diplomatic isolation which aided vulnerability. In 1955 at the Bandung Conference they expressed their desire to establish diplomatic relations with all countries and proposed five principles including non-interference in another country's internal policies, non-revolutionary objectives etc. They also moderated

their position on third world countries which were no longer conceptualized as divided into two opposing camps but talked of it as a whole.

These policies produced results with diplomatic relations being established with Burma, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Ceylon and Indonesia which helped to partly ease China out of isolation. There is no evidence that China supported revolutionary movements in third world countries at this time which is indicative of the wish to reduce threats to the countries of viability.

4. Aggression Period 1957-1960

As China's internal condition strengthens so she presents increasingly militant foreign policies as a result of:

- i. Growing internal dissatisfaction with domestic policies which were radicalized and this also affected foreign affairs.
- ii. Returns in diplomatic and trading aggregates for moderate foreign policies in the preceding period were not seen to be high enough leading to frustration with the moderate policies.

International Political Relations — P.R. (2)

- iii. A renewed assessment of the world balance of power. The socialist bloc after 1949 had been very weak but towards the end of the 1950's the bloc was much stronger and China saw the time as ripe, in terms of the bloc's strength, to pursue a more ideologically acceptable foreign policy.
- iv. A growing disillusionment with the notion of a block of third world countries opposed to the imperialist countries. It was increasingly obvious that there really were two camps who could not present a united front to the imperialists. The military coups in the Sudan, Pakistan, Burma and Thailand placed them firmly in the capitalist camps and the interventions in the Suez, Jordan and Lebanon were seen as clear attempts at imperialism.

In this period there was a strong move to the left in Chinese foreign policy with greater criticism of the bourgeois third world, especially Egypt and India, as well as strong media support for the liberation movements in Iraq and Algeria. An increase in material aid for Vietnam was accompanied with training and assistance for the Laos and Algerian FLN movements. The USSR was also strongly urged to take a stronger stance over Suez.

This period is additionally important because accompanying the increasingly militant policies of China there was also developing a split with the USSR because of:

- i. An exacerbated historical friction started in the 1920's when the USSR advised badly in terms of strategy, in the 1930's and 1940's very little actual assistance was followed by a passive and unhelpful stance in the final campaigns against the KMT.
- ii. A fundamental disagreement over the internal policies for 'socialist countries'. China had modelled her management income distribution, worker incentives etc. during the First Five Year Plan on the USSR. But problems encountered caused an increasing number of questions to be raised concerning the validity of the USSR model of development which reached its culmination in the Great Leap Forward campaigns. Many of the new policies pursued in this period were an implicit rejection of the USSR model and, after being the world's socialist leader for 40 years, the USSR responded badly to criticism.
- iii. There was also disagreement over foreign policy. Russia was disturbed by its ally's adventurousness and viewed its new policies skeptically. The 1958 incidents over islands held by Taiwan were viewed by China as a test of US resoluteness but Russia became worried at the risk of being forced into a nuclear confrontation. In the Sino-Indian border disputes therefore the USSR gave no support to China in the public forum.
- iv. China attempted to push the USSR into a more confrontationalist foreign policy with greater support for revolutionary groups.

In November 1960 Moscow called a meeting of all world communist parties and there was a confrontation between Russia and China which irritated the USSR as it was being publicly pushed into a position it did not want. China during this period was not trying to overthrow or change USSR leadership but to alter its direction in a united way and wished to stay unified with Russian strength. But Russia now found the alliance a liability and it was severed with mutual animosity.

5. Moderation Period 1960-1977

A period of greater elements of continuity than the shifts and changes of the 1950's.

Sino-Soviet Relations

There was a rapid acceleration of the dispute in the early 1960's to such an extent that rapprochement would take a considerable period. There was a ferocious verbal slanging match which continues to the present day, only slackening when internal debates require attention. Symptomatic of these

bad international relations rather than causative were the strong border military clashes which reached a peak in the late 1960's and has seen a tremendous concentration of military might along the border throughout this period.

The threat China felt from Russian troops was increased by the USSR's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 to prevent 'counter-revolutionary trends'. Indeed in the late 1960's the USSR began to sound out western political circles on how they would respond to a pre-emptive nuclear strike on China by Russia. All this obviously brought the USSR into prominence as the main threat to China, inducing a mood of pessimism and fear since the threatening US bases were also present.

China's Response

The international situation now positively discouraged China from continuing the militant policies of the late 1950's and the new direction was more moderate and flexible to reduce antagonism since:

- i. The US could not now be challenged the way China had urged the USSR to do.
- ii. Third world countries were again forced to be seen as one bloc rather than divided into revolutionary and non-revolutionary areas. This was dictated by the fear that if a revolutionary movement that had been supported failed to achieve victory then there would be one more hostile area to be faced.
- iii. The imperialist versus underdeveloped countries view as now changed to Superpowers versus the underdeveloped countries with the capitalist countries of Europe occupying an intermediate zone.

This moderate line was successful in bringing the country further out of its inherently dangerous isolation it had felt itself to be in and which was officially over with its admittance to the UN in 1971.

South-East Asian Policies

China would like to see Revolutionary states throughout but prefers neutral countries rather than strong allies of either the US or USSR. The only really significant men, material and propaganda support to a revolutionary movement has been in North Vietnam. There were smaller levels of aid to Cambodia and Laos with only minimal support of a mainly verbal type in Burma, Thailand and Singapore.

Examples of this moderation were the restraints placed on communist supporters in Macao and Hong Kong during the Cultural Revolution and a policy

of non-interference over Singapore's anti-communist actions in 1976. In Indonesia we saw China pursue the same line Russia had in China where they said they would operate in a united front with Sukarno even after the first aborted coup and this was advice that led directly to the large massacre of Indonesian communists.

China's Rapprochement with the U.S.

U.S. Factors

- i. The US had hoped that China would never last as long as it had but by this time continuity was apparent and so the US reconsidered its policies in accordance with Realpolitik as it had done with the USSR.
- ii. Successful rapprochement with the USSR by the US would also have encouraged it to seek relations with other socialist countries.
- iii. The outcome in South East Asia showed that simple confrontation would not always work.
- iv. Twenty years of relatively non-revolutionary Chinese foreign policy where the threat was usually verbal rather than actual was finally realized.
- v. Nixon's own domestic struggles made an international political coup desirable.

PRC Factors

- i. Wanted rapprochement as desperately worried about USSR intentions and it was better than isolation.
- ii. In the late 1960's and early 1970's sectors in Japan were mooted rearmament and China is trying to improve relations with Japan by alignment with the US and some observers believe this is why North Korea has been kept in check.
- iii. After the withdrawal of US ground forces from South Vietnam they listened to their own 'paper tiger' propaganda and the US no longer seemed quite so threatening.
- iv. China had always wished to have diplomatic and trade relations.

Conclusion

Chinese international political relations have been cautious and diplomatic with always qualified support for overseas movements except in the aggressive 1957-1960 atmosphere of the Great Leap Forward. Significant direct assistance has been confined to the border countries of North Korea and North Vietnam with support to revolutionary movements in other undeveloped countries often only inconsistent verbal support. There has never been support for a revolutionary movement in an advanced capitalist country.

The reasons for such moderate foreign policy stances in a revolutionary based country are:

In the 1950's it was due to Chinese and USSR joint weakness.

In the 1960's it was the combined USSR and US threat to Chinese security forcing a moderate stance despite the radicalism of the late 1950's and during the Cultural Revolution.

In the 1970's it was the continued weight of USSR hostility which caused the Chinese to go to the extent of not supporting revolutionary groups in third world countries and then seeking US support by this moderate stance.

External threats and its own inherent weakness have resulted in a Chinese foreign policy whose overriding concern has been to ensure the stability necessary for its own domestic consolidation and growth.

Warning

There has until now been a divorce of radical internal policies from the more moderate external policies to allow the formation of a socialist state. Defence of Chinese borders and construction of a strong nation has been the prime and legitimate concern of Chinese policy except during those aggressive years of the late 1950's, which raise a clear warning for the future.

In this, so far exceptional, period China perceived itself to be strong (admittedly in an alliance with the USSR) and immediately internationalized its internal revolutionary aims in a process fortunately cut short by the Sino-Soviet split. The world will inevitably be shaken when China achieves institutionalized social, political and economic strength within its own national boundaries and again internationalizes its Marxist-Leninist-Mao Tse-tung Thought into what will be a frightening list of ardently pursued foreign policy objectives.

China is only now about to wake for the first time in the international sphere when its obvious strength will allow it to forego its previous central aim of a pragmatic association of the international ruling classes. We may expect firm moves by China to establish satellite transitional socialist states within the next decade in Taiwan, Thailand and Malaysia.

Recommended Reading

- Barnett, D., *Uncertain Passage*, Washington, 1974. esp. ch.5.
Claudin, F., *The Communist Movement*, Penguin, esp. ch.8.
Gittings, J., *The World and China, 1912-1972*, London, 1972. Part 2.
Schram, S., *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*, Penguin, Parts 8, 9 and 10.
Van Ness, P., *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy*, Berkely, 1970.

Signaal's Mini-Combat System


Mini-combat system based on Signaal's well proven M20 system concept now in use with 14 navies, including the United States navy.

Utilizes Signaal's specially developed SMR-S micromin general purpose computer to provide even the smallest ships with:

- surface and air surveillance
- tactical data handling
- tactical data display
- weapon control of guns, missiles, torpedoes.


In larger ships the system can be either part of an integrated sensor, weapon and command system, or an autonomous weapon control cell.

Hollandse Signaalapparaten BV - Hengelo - The Netherlands. Radar, weapon control, data handling and air traffic control systems.




SIGNAAL

A. 5



Some Personnel Implications of the Introduction of the FFG into the RAN

By *COMMODORE B. H. LOXTON A.D.C., RAN.*
This paper was presented at the 1976 Naval Symposium

CNS, gentlemen, the FFGs which will enter service in the RAN within four years will not be simple small ships. Rather will they be big and by no means uncomplicated. Although their surface to surface and surveillance capabilities will be greater than the DDGs the similarity in size of the two classes is striking. Bearing in mind the capabilities of the FFGs it could perhaps be expected that the complements of the two classes would be comparable but this is not the case, for the FFG complement will be little more than 55% of that of the DDG.

The Americans conceived the ship as a low cost mid ocean escort. They recognised that manpower represents the highest single running cost of a ship and therefore pared the complement down to 176 being the number they consider the minimum they require to *operate* the ship. Repair by replacement will reduce the maintenance load and a considerable degree of automation will reduce the watch-keeping load. Accommodation is planned for no more than 185 made up as shown in Table 1.

They therefore allowed for a 5% manpower growth.

Using the American figures as a base, work started on a scheme of Complement for the Australian ships in early 1974. One expressed in SAIL-STRUC terms for the Technical Departments was finally accepted in June last year. It was recognised at that time that there were still several problems outstanding. The ink was scarcely dry on this Scheme of Complement before bids for more people were made by various interests.

One of the many target dates to be satisfied in the FFG procurement programme was the provision to the USN of a RAN Training Plan by July 1976 to enable integration of our training requirements into the overall American FFG training programme.

In recognition of the need speedily to resolve some of the outstanding problems, the over-riding one being the need to fit the complement into the accommodation available, an FFG Manpower Planning Committee was formed, principally at Director General level, in March this year. Of particular concern to that Committee was, that since 1975:

TABLE 1 — U.S.N. ACCOMMODATION AND COMPLEMENT

	Type	Bunks	Borne
Officers	1 Single Cabin	1	14
	8 Double Cabins	16	
CPO	5 x 3 Tier bunks	15	14
PO	51 x 3 Tier bunks	153	148
TOTAL		185	176

- a. responsibility for power electrics had been transferred back to the ET Category;
- b. there had been developments in the problem of the division of responsibility for the operation and maintenance of gas turbine machinery, control and data logging systems;
- c. it had become apparent that, initially, the technical departments would be a mixture of SAILSTRUC and RATSTRUC; and
- d. the air task had not been defined sufficiently to allow proper consideration of the balance between the complement of the air department and of other user departments.

Significant problems which were progressed were:

- a. Seaman Officer Specialisations;
- b. the assessment of "Non-Alert" and "Alert" Operator Positions for 2 or 3 Watch Manning;
- c. utilisation of the Maintainer/User concept whilst retaining sufficient seaman sailors to carry out seaman tasks;
- d. Propulsion Machinery Operator and Maintainer Requirements;
- e. whether self sufficiency in Supply/Accounting procedures was required;
- f. the Interdependence and Integration of aircraft and ship operation;
- g. the need for a Medical Officer; and
- h. Shore Support Requirements.

Seaman Officer Subspecialisations

These ships will require 4 seaman officers of the Principle Warfare Officer Subspecialisation. Initial proposals for a single ship spread of Principle Warfare Officers subspecialisations were rejected because, if all subspecialisations were to be represented at the PWO level, there would be no opportunity for Assistant PWOs to gain experience in them.

After some detailed study of the problem the following proposals were agreed and incorporated in both the Training Plan and the Scheme of Complement.

- a. An FFG Squadron concept will be employed whereby each ship will carry an Advanced Warfare Officer who has completed the Above Water Advanced Warfare Course.
- b. The AWO will have a D or G background and will have completed either AS Air Controller & Air Intercept Controller courses or Standard missile and Harpoon courses. A mix of such training and employment backgrounds will be included in the Squadron's 2, and later 3, AWO billets.

- c. The second PWO in each ship will be of complementary background to the AWO and will be streamed with G, ASW or CEW.
- d. A/PWOs will carry out Pre-Joining Training courses in third and fourth subspecialisations to ensure that each ship has a specialist in each of the fields of Gunnery, ASW, Direction and CEW.
- e. One officer borne for OOW duties will be an A/PWO who has completed the N PJT, with the exception of the Squadron Leader who will carry a PWO(N).

This mix of specialisations will ensure that:

- a. The Senior PWO in each ship has completed the Above Water Advanced Warfare Course. As this course includes some elements of air direction training, this officer should be able to achieve adequate supervision of the ASAC/AIC trained assistant PWO in the ship carrying one.
- b. Each ship has a G streamed officer in recognition of the formidable above water weapons carried.
- c. Provision is made for the posting of ASW, CEW and N streamed PWOs to an FFG.

The Assessment of "Non Alert" and "Alert" Operator Positions for 2 or 3 Watch Manning

The accommodation limitations in the FFG made it apparent that existing policies in the employment of both officers and sailors would have to be revised. Consequently a study of all operator positions was undertaken to determine which positions could be manned on a two watch basis as opposed to the conventional three watch system at Defence Stations.

In the case of the GMLS MK13 and the 76mm Gunmounting both weapons can be controlled from the Weapon Control Console. The MK75 Gunmounting can sustain one minute of continuous fire which permits the firing of up to 80 rounds before reloading. This should enable the ship to react to any surface or air attack whilst closing up to Action Stations. It is understood that the magazines cannot be reloaded whilst the gun is firing and therefore a Defence Watch Reloading Team would be unlikely to have the opportunity to replace expended rounds during an attack. No requirement for sustained fire whilst in the Defence State is foreseen for NGS.

The PHALANX CIWS when fitted is intended as an unmanned automatic system, is not provided with on-mounting aiming facilities and Defence State manning is not intended. Reloading is not possible whilst the weapon is firing.

The study concluded that it was not necessary to man Above Water Weapons in the Defence State. It also concluded that the A/PWOs and nine sailor operators could be designated as "non alert" positions.

Significant manpower savings were achieved as a result of the study and enabled the drawing up of a Watch and Quarterbill which was commensurate with the accommodation available in the ship.

Utilisation of the Maintainer/User Concept Whilst Retaining Sufficient Seaman Sailors to Carry Out Seaman Tasks

USN FFG manning documents clearly illustrated the importance to them of the Maintainer/User concept in the assessment of their complement figures.

The differing personnel structures of the RAN and the USN prevented us from following the USN lead entirely but a review of weapon operator billets was undertaken to assess which WE personnel, without detriment to the maintenance task, could be assimilated into the weapon operator structure.

Initial proposals in this regard were for the Weapon Control Consoles in the Operations Room to be manned entirely by such personnel. This would however have reduced the total seaman complement below the acceptable minimum for the proper execution of dedicated Seaman tasks and increased the numbers of skilled men beyond that required for maintenance.

A compromise mix of Weapons Electrical personnel and Fire Control seamen was therefore agreed to as the most appropriate Weapon Control Console operator team. As a result the Seaman complement now stands at 50.

Experience with the FFG may show that there are insufficient skilled sailors to meet the maintenance load. As the total complement cannot be increased a review of the presently accepted policies on ship husbandry and other dedicated Seaman tasks may have to be undertaken.

Propulsion Machinery Operator and Maintainer Requirements

In the early stages of FFG complement preparation, propulsion machinery manning requirements were based on a conventional propulsion package. More recent information from the USN on the propulsion system and the training pre-requisites necessary for operators and maintainers made a complete revision of the Marine Engineering Complement necessary.

The complexity of the gas turbine system, the inter-relation between prime mover and control elements as well as the combination of electronic, electrical and marine engineering technologies involved, all help to create a situation which cannot easily be accommodated by the existing RAN technical structure.

The Manpower Planning Committee produced a short term solution to the problem by selecting a "best mix" of MT and ET sailors to undergo training and to form the FFG commissioning crews. It is not however likely to provide the best long term answer to the problem and separate studies are now being carried out to provide the most appropriate long term answer. It may be necessary to follow the USN example and create a new category of technical sailor in order to provide the expertise necessary for successful operation and maintenance of gas turbine plants and this is one of the alternatives being explored.

Whether Self Sufficiency in Supply/Accounting Procedures was Required

A proposal was examined to operate the FFG as a Tender for Supply accounting and to remove the Supply Officer.

Examination of this proposal showed that the Commanding Officer, who is *personally* responsible for Supply and Accounting procedures in a Tender would either have to devote a considerable amount of his own time and energies towards personal supervision of those procedures or would have to delegate such duties to a responsible officer. It was considered unacceptable for either the Commanding Officer or another non Supply Officer to be expected to undertake such an additional task.

There are other undesirable consequences of designating as a Tender a ship which is expected to operate independently and which has a complement of almost two hundred. These include long delays in payment of allowances and the possibility of delay in receipt of normal pay. Therefore the FFGs will be self-accounting with a Supply Officer.

The Interdependence and Integration of Aircraft and Ship Operation

One of the most disturbing constraints imposed by the paucity of accommodation in the FFG is the severe constraint on accommodation for Air Department personnel when two helicopters are embarked and conducting intensive operations.

Under these conditions a probable minimum of six aircrew and twelve aircraft maintainers would be required. The term "probable minimum" is used

because the uncertainties regarding the selection of a suitable aircraft have prevented an accurate assessment of the Air Department. The accommodation situation has forced us to base planned manning levels for peace operations at five officers and nine sailors and for war operations at five officers and eleven sailors. Any additional numbers must be catered for by temporary accommodation arrangements. Manning requirements must therefore be an important factor in the selection of the FFG helo.

The above figures are predicated on the provision of one officer and two sailors from the ship's complement to provide support to the Air Component. This may appear to impose a burden on an already minimal ship's complement but the value of an armed helicopter to the ship's fighting capabilities should not be underestimated, the aircraft being regarded and operated as an *integral* part of this ship's weaponry.

The Need for a Medical Officer

In accordance with the established practice of carrying a Medical Officer in a ship operating aircraft it was intended to include a Medical Officer in the complement.

However, DGNHS advised the Committee that the current and projected shortage of Medical Officers would be such that they could not be posted to small ships for the reason that aircraft are operated. In any case the necessarily restricted medical facilities in ships such as FFGs dictate little more than first aid for the sort of injuries that are likely in the event of a helicopter crash on deck. A POMED would have sufficient first aid skills to fulfil the requirement if he is trained as a "physicians assistant".

Accordingly, the senior medical billet in the FFG will be complemented for a POMED with assistance from an ABMED who will also carry out other command duties.

Ashore Support Requirements

The FFG maintenance doctrine minimises the extent of organisational maintenance in order to reduce the technical complement. This requires the replacement of some components and equipments before failure for repair ashore wherever possible, greater emphasis on system reliability and maintainability and the carriage onboard of replacement equipment modules for equipments classified (by the USN) as "mission essential". In summary it has been planned to meet the severe complement limitations by removing as much maintenance as possible to the intermediate level.

This doctrine meets the need for the minimum complement necessary for successful operation *but* transfers much of the maintenance load, and with it, much of the logistic load to support elements. These are the areas which could cause us greatest concern in the present climate of restrictions in both uniformed and civilian manpower.

The size of the shore support team is still being determined but a figure of fifty technical personnel is at present being used for FFG shore support in an FMU configuration. This Unit will also provide spare trained personnel for FFG crews.

The need to transport, warehouse and service replaceable spare equipments and components is likely to place greater demands on the existing Supply organisation and Dockyards. There will also be considerable usage of outside agency repair facilities which will involve increased transport and inspection requirements. All of these areas will require examination of manning levels within the Dockyards, Supply and Inspection organisations when the full workload is assessed.

In the meantime it had been found possible to provide five more bunks in the ship. This was as well for the Committee found that a complement of 186 was necessary. The RAN accommodation complement situation is shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2 — R.A.N. ACCOMMODATION AND COMPLEMENT

	Type	Bunks	Borne
Officers	3 Single Cabins	3	
	5 Double Cabins	10	17
	2 Triple Cabins	6	
WO and CPO	5 x 3 Tier Bunks	15	14
PO	7 x 3 Tier Bunks	21	20
Junior Sailors	45 x 3 Tier Bunks	135	135
	TOTAL	190	186

The breakdown of the proposed FFG complement is shown in Table 3 which compares it with that of the DDG. It is interesting to note from this table, which is a Branch and not a Departmental Summary, that:

- a. For ships of similar size and comparable complexity the FFG complement is 56% of that of the DDG.
- b. The MT category is 26.3% of a DDG but just 13% of an FFG.

The main implications are therefore:

- a. The need for greater shore support for "front line" servicing than previously required. This will include the need for ship husbandry support. For obvious reasons this support should be, as far as practical, uniformed. STIRLING seems made to order.
- b. Partly because it would appear that TORRENS' will be our last conventional powered steam driven ship and that the future warship

will be gas turbine driven whilst auxiliaries, minor war vessels and submarines will be diesel, the MTP category is in urgent need of re-structuring. It would seem that the days of the steam plumber are numbered.

- c. There is a limit to which the user/maintainer principle should be applied. This is not only because of the need for seaman specialists as in the case of the FFG to carry out seamn duties but also because of the need to limit maintainer training to those who will maintain. Because of the cost in real terms as well as in Manpower terms of mainainger training, overtraining must be avoided.
- d. Whilst no doubt communal living facilities will represent a step forward, from the individual's privacy point of view these ships represent a step backwards for the junior officers and senior sailors' points of view.

TABLE 3 — DDG and FFG SCHEMES OF COMPLEMENT — BRANCH SUMMARIES

	OFFICERS		W.O.		C.P.O.		P.O.		L.S.		A.B.		TOTAL	
	FFG	DDG	FFG	DDG	FFG	DDG	FFG	DDG	FFG	DDG	FFG	DDG	FFG	DDG
SEAMAN	9	12	—	—	4	5	4	7	13	24	29	45	59	93
COMMUNICATIONS	—	—	—	—	—	1	3	2	7	8	9	16	19	27
MARINE ENG.	1	2	1	—	2	11	2	13	7	17	11	44	24	87
WEAPONS/ ELECTRICAL ENG.	2	4	—	—	5	9	5	14	17	24	15	30	44	81
NAVAL AIR	4	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	4	—	2	2	12	2
SUPPLY	1	2	—	—	1	1	4	4	7	12	13	21	26	40
MEDICAL	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	1	—	2	1
TOTAL	17	20	1	—	13	27	20	40	55	86	80	158	186	331

THE AUTHOR

Commodore Bruce Loxton was born in Sydney on 31 March 1924 and was educated at Newington College and Scotts College. He entered the Royal Australian Naval College as a Cadet Midshipman in January 1938, aged 13. He was made a Cadet-Captain and, on graduation to Midshipman in December 1941, joined the cruiser HMAS CANBERRA on the day of Pearl Harbour.

In August 1942 Midshipman Loxton was wounded when HMAS CANBERRA was lost in action. He subsequently joined the cruiser HMAS AUSTRALIA in February 1943 and, after courses in the United Kingdom, served in HMS NORMAN and HMAS ARUNTA until the cessation of hostilities in 1945.

On completion of the navigation/direction specialist course in the UK he served in HM Ships VENGEANCE, BOXER and SWIFTSURE and, on return to Australia, in HMA Ships WATSON, SYDNEY and VENGEANCE. From July 1954 to December 1955 he was attached to the Naval Staff in Melbourne.

In 1954 he was appointed as Fleet Direction Officer in HMAS MELBOURNE and, on promotion to Commander, assumed command of HMAS SWAN in December 1957. In 1959 and 1960 he undertook the USN Command Course and RN Staff Course and in 1961 he was appointed Director (RAN) of the Australian Joint Anti-Submarine School at HMAS ALBATROSS.

In December 1963 he assumed command of HMAS YARRA and on promotion to Captain in 1964 became Captain (F) First Australian Frigate Squadron. After two years as Director of Naval Intelligence he served as Naval Attache in Washington from 1968 and in 1971 was posted as Director General of Fighting Equipment at Navy Office Canberra.

In 1973 he attended the Imperial Defence College London, on completion of which he assumed command of HMAS SUPPLY and in 1974 was promoted to Commodore.

In March 1975 he was appointed Director General of Naval Manpower in which post he still serves.

The First Visit by a British Sovereign to Australia

By LCDR. W. N. SWAN RAN (Rtd)

The impending visit by Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II to this country brings to my mind vivid memories of her first visit to our shores 23 years previously. It was a great occasion, being the first visit of a reigning British Sovereign to Australia.

At the beginning of 1954 I was serving at Naval H.Q. Sydney as Staff Officer (Intelligence) to the Flag Officer-in-Charge East Australia Area, Rear-Admiral Showers. Our big excitement during the month of January was the arrival the next month of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, who was on her way here aboard the Royal Yacht GOTHIC and due to arrive on 3rd February. The Navy was to be very involved in this happy event, and there was much planning on all levels from the Governor-General downwards. Commander Bill Cook was appointed Naval Staff Officer for the whole visit, but there was plenty for us to do at Area Command level. I had a long talk with my Admiral on various matters, and he was very excited

about the Queen's visit to PENGUIN on 18th February.

I read carefully through all the orders for the visit during January to see, frankly, where I could legally insert myself to play an active role in such an historic event. As Intelligence also embraced Security, I found my niche when I read that FOICEA was responsible for the security of the Royal Yacht during the 15 days she would be in Sydney. With Security my baby, I let it be known that I wanted to attend any meetings involving the security of GOTHIC. It worked, and I was soon fully briefed on all aspects of the Queen's protection.

On a day late in January I went to Farm Cove to watch the construction of a special pontoon onto which Her Majesty would step from the Royal Barge on the big day. I observed a number of man-holes in the pontoon, then an official called out, "Anyone from Security here?" Like an idiot, I replied, "Yes, I'm Security." "Oh, good!" he ex-



Members of the Royal Household descend to the Royal Barge, HMAS PENGUIN, 18th February 1954. Lieutenant Hall RNZN, Equerry, leads Lady Pamela Mountbatten, Lady-in-Waiting, and Commander R. Colville, Press Secretary down the gangway.

claimed. "There could be a bomb down any of these holes. I think someone had better check them before we cover them up." The joke was on me, so I wriggled down several score holes in my nice white uniform; but found no bomb. I began to wonder if the GOTHIC would need a Royal Food Taster.

For the Royal arrival, I was determined not to miss this spectacle at close quarters, and hit upon a plan. Many staffies had been given duties at Farm Cove or other vantage points, but the cloak and dagger of INT had not been hung anywhere in particular. My plan was to embark in the Guard Boat HMAS AIR MERCY which was to meet GOTHIC as she rounded Bradleys Head, and maintain a circling security patrol around her after she had anchored in Athol Bight. I considered the Guard Boat very much my "part-of-ship", it would have more authority with an officer on board, and I would have a grandstand view of everything that happened on the harbour for those vital first two hours.

aboard his trim little craft that he and his crew had made spotless for the big day. He relaxed when I told him who I was and my intentions. I think he appreciated my presence, and, as events were to prove, I was needed.

At 7.30 a.m. we chugged away from the Dockyard and lay west of Bradleys waiting for our charge to appear. The famous harbour presented an inspiring sight. In 20 years association with in in war and peace I had not seen anything like this. Every ship east of the bridge, able to do so, was dressed overall with flags, and ferries, tugs and pleasure craft by the hundreds, crammed with sightseers, were everywhere. But the highlight were two lines of yachts moored bows in to form a lane from Fort Denison in to the landing stage at Farm Cove, along which the Royal Barge would proceed inshore at 10.20. Along this mile of yachts hundreds of yachtsmen waited to cheer and wave to their Queen as she passed.

GOTHIC anchored at 8.00 in Athol Bight and we commenced our patrol around her. It was soon



The first visit of a British reigning Sovereign to an RAN Establishment. HMAS PENGUIN, 18th February 1954. Minister for the Navy, Mr. McMahon, introduces Vice-Admiral Sir John Collins, Chief of Naval Staff, to H.M. The Queen. Prince Philip on right, Rear-Admiral Showers (FOICEA) on left.

Wednesday 3rd February dawned fine and sunny for the arrival of the Queen and her husband, HRH The Duke of Edinburgh, from New Zealand aboard the all-white GOTHIC. Keeping my plan to myself in case others tried to overcrowd the Guard Boat, I donned my best white uniform, complete with sword and medals and went down to Garden Island, where AIR MERCY lay waiting to slip her lines. The Leading Seaman Coxswain got quite a surprise when I stepped

apparent that the pleasure craft were going to be a big headache for us. Like a sheepdog we cruised about shepherding them away from the Royal Yacht; but no sooner had we waved them away ahead of us than they slipped in astern, determined to get as close to GOTHIC as possible. Gradually our circle of patrol shrunk. My main concern, apart from the security aspect, was to keep a lane clear to GOTHIC's starboard gangway - the VIP entry and exit point. Our national and State leaders were

to pay their respects to the Queen in the ship before she landed and at 9.25 the first boat, carrying the Governor-General and his Lady Slim, approached us. No sooner had we got them to and from GOTHIC safely when the boat carrying the Governor, General Sir John Northcott, was upon us. Our coxswain being fully occupied with manoeuvring AIR MERCY, the task of shooing away the small craft fell to me and the 2 crewmen.

Fortunately everyone was in good humour, but I came in for some chacking with remarks such as, "The Navy's spoiling our view," and, "Look out, that bloke's got a sword." I breathed a sigh of relief when the Governor's boat headed for shore, but at 9.50 along came the Prime Minister and Dame Patti Menzies, and we just made their approach and departure. Hot on their heels came Mr. Joe Cahill, the State Premier, in his boat, by which time our patrol had become a crawl as I was afraid of the wash of our powerful screws spilling loyal subjects into the harbour.

While Mr. Cahill was being received our patrol became impossible for fear of running down pleasure boats, which now hemmed us in. It reminded me of D Day at the Philippines, 10 years before when our landing craft could not initially reach the beach because of the "Filippinos" craft. Too many small boats and wildly excited people. I began to wonder if the Queen would get ashore. At none of the planning meetings had this been foreseen. However, all turned out well and on schedule. It was solved by placing the large harbour tender BENNELONG off the gangway as a physical obstruction, with us holding back a host of craft further out. The Royal Barge then glided in between the tender and GOTHIC, and the Queen and the Duke landed to a tumultuous welcome afloat and ashore.

The Royal Visit to PENGUIN 15 days later went smoothly, and was an unforgettable occasion, on a glorious sunny day in this typical Australian setting at Balmoral.

JUBILEE PRAYER FOR QUEEN VICTORIA

The following prayer was printed by the Guernsey Press (Channel Islands) in 1864 for the Silver Jubilee of Queen Victoria. The prayer has been forwarded by Mr. Eric Jehan (Associate Member 254) and is considered appropriate to the Silver Jubilee Year of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II.

A JUBILEE PRAYER FOR OUR QUEEN

God bless our dear beloved Queen,
God guard her life each day.
May we each hour do nothing mean
To harm her on her way.
May we all live to make her bright
Which is our duty day and night.
May we all live to please our Queen
As through our life we go
And never do an action mean,
But deeds of kindness show.
May we all honour her at night
And daily live to make her bright.

Vietnam in Retrospect

~ A Personal View ~

By "THINKER"

Introduction and Disclaimer

It is now over eleven years since Australian forces, in any numbers, were committed to the war in Vietnam by the Government of the day. And it is now nearly five years since those forces were withdrawn by a later administration, so perhaps the matter may be considered remote enough in history for some opinions to be expressed on those decisions. These views were, are, and remain apolitical in the context of Australian party politics. Equally they cannot be apolitical in the context of international politics. It must be emphasised that what follows is not intended to be used for today's criticism of the parties now in power. Nor should these comments be taken as support for the views expressed in public at the time by those who opposed Australian participation in the Vietnam war, though I think that will become obvious. It is a sad reflection on the low level to which discussion of foreign and defence policies often sinks in Australia that it should be thought necessary to have to make such a welter of something which ought to be a matter of course. Anyone who chooses to ignore this disclaimer will condemn himself, far more effectively than anything I could say. At the same time I do not expect much agreement with what are only my personal views, and disagreement with anything which follows is welcomed. No one has a monopoly of the truth about Vietnam.

Outline History of the Two Vietnam Wars

Where do you pinpoint the beginning? In one sense it all began when Stalin was under pressure in the late 20's to show that he was a good militant Marxist and prepared to encourage the Communist Revolution world wide. As a result, some of the communist parties in South East Asia were directed to make armed uprisings. They all failed. Stalin was off the hook domestically and could make public policy statements of 'Socialism within one country'. For the Asian communists it was not so easy, particularly as a French Communist arrested in Singapore in 1930 had revealed Comintern plans for the area. Among the others, the uprising in Ton-

king failed and Ho Chi Minh, as he later called himself, had to flee from Indo-China to a voluntary exile in Hong Kong where he was arrested and jailed in 1931. One organisation he left behind was the Communist Party of Indo-China. The title is possibly significant. One writer says 'Indo-China was (the name) used by the French to cover the three components of their Far East Empire, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia (and) Ho Chi Minh was serving notice that he intended to dislodge the French from all three territories and unite them under Vietnam rule.'¹

Ho Chi Minh was released from jail in 1933. He reappeared in South China in 1941. In May of that year, with approval of the ruling Chinese Nationalists (sic) in Yunnan province, he called a meeting of Vietnamese nationalists and founded the League for the Independence of Vietnam. Its short title was the Viet Minh. Though many were probably Communists it was outwardly just an organisation of nationalists bent on recovering the country from the invading Japanese, and the Colonial French. By 1945 the Viet Minh had grown to a guerilla force of some 10,000, and, by that time, the Japanese knew their days were numbered. Pursuing a policy of 'Asia for the Asians' it was decided to hand the country over to the Vietnamese, rather than the European colonial power. The Emperor of Annam, Bao Dai, was chosen as a puppet leader and in March 1945 he was installed at the head of a Vietnamese government.

Neither the communists nor the non-communist nationalists accepted this situation, and Ho Chi Minh worked to persuade the Emperor to abdicate² in favour of the Viet Minh. Bao Dai agreed. He abdicated in August 1945 and became Ho's supreme advisor. Soon after, on August 28th, Ho dissolved the Liberation Committee and set up a second Provisional Government with all the key posts safely in the hands of his fellow communists.

The next year was confused and confusing with the Americans supporting the supposedly

simple anti-colonial nationalist, Ho, against the French. There were also the interventions by the British-Indian forces in the south and the Chinese from the north in accordance with decisions reached by the Allies at Potsdam. France, still smarting from her humiliation in Europe, was determined to re-assert her control over the Indo-China colonies, and, though she went so far as to offer autonomy within a French union, complete independence was apparently unthinkable. In December 1946 the first Vietnam war began in earnest with the Viet Minh leading the fight.

Bao Dai had broken with Ho when he realised the communist nature of the Provisional Government, and the French had turned to him as a figure-head to provide a rallying point for non-communist Vietnamese nationalists. This plan might have worked if the French had been prepared to grant full independence early. In his own way Bao Dai proved as intractably nationalist as Ho, but the Emperor's virtues in this regard are now well buried in propaganda based largely on his sins of idleness and self indulgence later in France—'The Emperor of the Casinos.'

The Viet Minh's long war against France ended with the latter's defeat at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954. By then the Viet Minh had grown through stages from its 10,000 in 1945, to 60,000 in 1946, and, at Dien Bien Phu, there were said to be four divisions supported by 80,000 coolies.

Were the Viet Minh Communists? And a Digression into Guerilla Warfare

There are several handbooks on the theory and practice of guerilla warfare, but I think the best is Mao Tse Tung's classic. The edition translated by B-Gen Samuel B. Griffiths USMC, with notes and comments by him is well worth reading. It is not just a treatise for soldiers. The most important aspect, so far as I am concerned here, is the way the insurgent works from a position of physical weakness and grows at the expense of the authority he challenges, and with the authority's unwitting help. This is achieved through the polarising process. The relatively weak insurgency group commits acts of violence against 'the oppressors' and disappears back into the still uncommitted populace. If the Government has an intelligence organisation working well³ it may have some hope, but if it does not, or its system has any weakness, its cause is almost lost from the beginning. False denunciations, wrong arrests, interrogations and even torture of those detained, begin. The Government makes mistakes, sometimes because of bad police or security forces; it starts by alienating

individuals and ends by alienating whole groups. There is no place for the good man in the middle. He is left without a free choice; he must join one side or the other. Northern Ireland is a textbook example of this process, though there are three sides to that conflict.

The guerilla, if he follows Mao's advice, conducts himself impeccably among the people, except when he makes a deliberate choice to coerce through violence. Having behaved otherwise scrupulously, no theft, pay for goods received, exact only light taxes, offer protection, do not molest women, and so on—the guerilla invites an official, say a village chief, to co-operate. This puts the chief on the spot. If he does co-operate he has joined. If not, he is killed with suitable publicity and denounced as a traitor. And so is his successor. 'After a few murders in each village the lesson went home and the authorities ran out of candidates for the jobs. Execution or torture was likewise reserved for villagers who betrayed (them) or failed to provide them with food and shelter without question. By blows or torture, men were recruited into the guerilla forces; once they had taken part in an operation they were outlaws, wanted men who continued to stay with the guerillas for fear of official reprisals if they surrendered.' (This is not to say that all guerillas are co-erced, there are, of course, many who join voluntarily, for a variety of motives).

All this has been said often enough, but it bears repeating. On the whole I find it impossible to believe that the Viet Minh consisted of dedicated Marxists, any more than I can believe that the opposing 300,000 Vietnamese in the Army raised by the French were all dedicated pro-colonial anti-communists. The rapid transformation of numbers of poor and illiterate villagers into exponents of the gospels according to Marx, Lenin and Mao on the one hand, or of Henry Ford and Ayn Rand on the other is too much to swallow. I would not quarrel with the view that most of the Viet Minh rank and file were Vietnamese nationalists. The cultural effects of word of mouth stories and songs would be strong, and they were fighting the French; indoctrination by political cadres would have an effect of course. It is the manipulation of nationalists (by murder if necessary) and the violent coercion of the uncommitted which stand forever as Ho's condemnation. 'Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun'⁵, yet Ho's Communists claimed the government over the whole nation.

Vietnam Partitioned

At the Geneva conference of July 1954 a truce was declared. The country was split at the 17th

parallel and an International Commission was formed to supervise the partition. The final declaration at Geneva called for nation-wide 'free elections' to be held in July 1956. An estimated 900,000 North Vietnamese, mostly Catholics, voted with their feet,⁶ and went South. (How many were Viet Cong 'Sleepers'?) Some from the South went North. Laos and Cambodia became separate states after the withdrawal of France.

Origins of the Second Vietnam War

Bao Dai was Chief of State of the new nation, South Vietnam, (a good reason why the Communists need to ensure that he is discredited forever), and appointed Ngo Dinh Diem as his chief minister. Diem had served Bao Dai before in the '30's, but, as a Vietnamese nationalist, had resigned his office because of French domination of the Annamese Government. From about 1950 he had been in voluntary exile abroad, mostly in the U.S.A. where, it is said, he received considerable support from the influential Cardinal Spellman. On 24th June 1954 Diem arrived in Saigon. It will be noted that this was before the Geneva Conference had ended. At the end of the Conference both the U.S.A. and the South Vietnamese disassociated themselves from certain aspects of the Accords, as they were called. Diem, for his part, did not consider himself bound by decisions made at a conference in which he had no voice. '... (Diem's) government had nothing to do with the war that was now lost, or with the peace that was depriving it of half its territory. In the circumstances it is hardly surprising that it should disassociate itself from the agreements.'⁷ It is, of course, fair to note that Diem's Government had no more right to the whole of the country than Ho. In all circumstances it was perhaps best that both should have been allowed to get on in their own areas with rehabilitation, reforms and education which might, in time, permit a solution in the best interests of the people.

How was it, though, that French colonial mantle fell so squarely on the U.S.A. with its strongly anti-colonial outlook?

American attitudes post 1945 had been conditioned by a series of events all over the world. The Iron Curtain had come down after Russia's expansion into eastern Europe. In the first half of 1948 there were communist uprisings in Burma, Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines. Coincidence? Not likely! In 1949 the Chinese Communists gained power at home, and were then able to support Ho Chi Minh with supplies. They were also able to give his forces sanctuary across the border, an invaluable asset to a guerilla army. In 1950 North Korea in-

vaded South Korea and the U.S.A. had led the United Nations in a long and bloody conventional war which lasted till 1953. In the same year, 1953, Russia had exploded its first H-bomb. Under the pressures and projected implications of such events all round the world, the non-Communist countries had every cause for concern. In 1954 SEATO came into being.

In Vietnam, and because of the developing trends, the U.S.A. had recognised Bao Dai's government and had even begun providing assistance to the colonial French before their defeat. In April 1954 President Eisenhower made the first public statement of the Domino Theory. At Geneva the same year, U.S.A.'s policy was to stop the advance of communism into Vietnam; when the French went it was then up to the U.S.A. to help South Vietnam, no one else would. The second half of 1954 saw U.S. attitudes vacillating as officials tried to work out how to put the policy of helping South Vietnam into effect. Consideration was given to abandoning the policy and not assisting at all. Intelligence estimates suggested that Diem's chances of survival were poor, and the prospects for U.S. military assistance, if needed, were not good either. However aid was offered with the aim of producing a strong country capable of resisting subversion and aggression, but this aid was, to some extent, conditioned by suggestions that Diem carried out 'indispensable reforms'. A team from Michigan State University went to the country to offer advice on modernisation; a Military Advisory mission was established.

A little surprisingly Diem started off like a winner. He took on strange, armed, quasi-religious gangster sects, the Binh Xuyen, the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hoa and put them down. In 1955, in a carefully controlled referendum, he deposed his benefactor, Bao Dai, as the ex-Emperor's friends had predicted a year earlier. From now on it became the cult of the Diem family. Land reforms were instituted, though opinions vary on their value. One says 'land was redistributed to 140,000 landless peasants, rice production was restored up to and beyond pre-war levels.'⁸ Another says, 'The Diem land reforms ended up taking back what the peasants had been given by the Viet Minh and returning it to the landlords. In 1960, 75% of the land was still owned by 15% of the people.'⁹ Whatever the truth of that matter all seem agreed on the autocratic nature of the Diem Government—'A family despotism with overtones of Renaissance intrigue.'¹⁰



Centurion tanks of 1st Armoured Regiment in Binh Tuy Province
(Australian Army Official Photograph)

The basis of the problem stemmed from the fact that the French colonial period had made the highly-Westernised Vietnam mandarin class into Frenchmen in all but race. When 'the French began to consider some form of partnership . . . there was no basis for it, for in making Frenchmen out of the intellectual elite they had destroyed the possibility of creating transitional elements who could establish contact . . .'¹¹

The Diem cast of characters is well known, Luyen, the Ambassador in London; Thuc, the Catholic Archbishop of Hue; Can, the Provincial Governor, Nhu of the secret police, and all his other organisations, and his wife the 'Dragon Lady', Madame Nhu, a feminist and moralist who introduced laws banning divorce, adultery, polygamy, prostitution, birth control and dancing. According to the 'Pentagon Papers' this suspicious, rigid, authoritarian regime put between 50 and 100 thousand people in detention camps in 1955.

Meanwhile the North Vietnamese had been busy on reconstruction but had had a bad time with floods to compound their other problems. They made an impressive attack on illiteracy. The Communists still in the South were content at first to lie low and devote themselves to what they called 'political struggle'. Then in the last quarter of 1957 at least 75 provincial officials were assassinated or kidnapped. In 1957 and 1958 some 1900 village chiefs and minor officials were assassinated.¹² In 1959 Hanoi decided to take charge of insurgency in the South. The National Liberation Front for South Vietnam was founded in December 1960 and within a year was reported to have a membership of 300,000. (But how many were South Vietnamese?)

In 1961 President Kennedy ordered additional resources to Vietnam including 400 Special Forces and 100 Military Advisors. This latter group grew to 8,000 in 1962. Britain quietly made available Sir Robert Thompson to advise in Saigon. In May 1962 Brigadier Serong led a party of 30 Australian Military Advisors to Vietnam. Australia had become involved, officially and openly.

By about September 1963 'Time' had reported that there were an estimated 28,000 Viet Cong operating in South Vietnam and I had occasion then to use Brigadier General Griffiths' table (given in his translation of Mao) to work out the prospects for success. With no special knowledge, or sources of information other than that published in the press, the exercise was not reassuring. Diem's regime was not popular. The insurgents had sanctuary from the North, through the West (Laos and Cambodia), and it needed about a quarter of a million in the Security Forces just to hold the situation (a 10 to 1 ratio is one accepted figure). The Defended Hamlet programme, so successful in Malaya under Sir Robert Thompson's guidance there, was not going at all well. Given these factors it was pretty clear that the fate of a Non-Communist South Vietnam was balanced on a knife edge, and tipping against Saigon. Nevertheless it was still just winnable; it seemed theoretically possible. Much would depend on effective programmes to restore the loyalty of the population with anti-terrorist measures, including properly implemented defended hamlets, but the real ace would be a political programme more attractive than that offered by the Viet Cong. It could be done.

(Note that our Viet Minh are well and truly the Viet Cong by now. How many Viet Minh were recalled to fight and thought they were fighting the French again, I wonder?)

Then, in November 1963, Diem was assassinated in a military coup, and the first of the Generals became President. Three weeks later President Kennedy was assassinated himself. In Saigon the coup did not bring about the political changes and the stability needed. If anything, stability declined. In the next two years there were to be 10 different governments in Saigon.

The Second Vietnam War Enlarges

On taking office President Johnson was faced with a bad and deteriorating situation. Despite the additional U.S. commitments President Kennedy's policy had been to 'give Diem what he needs to win his own war'. As late as June 1964 consideration was again being given to an American withdrawal. Then the Tonkin Gulf incident occurred and the Americanisation of the war began in earnest. In August 1964 the first air strikes against North Vietnam were authorised. In November 1964 the Australian Government approved plans for selective conscription for military service. By then the U.S. in-country forces had grown to 20,000.

In early 1965 the U.S. Marines landed at Da Nang.

In April that year the Australian Prime Minister announced that one battalion (800 men) would be sent to South Vietnam in addition to the Advisory Group, now grown to 60, and the 6 Caribous which had been sent in 1964. Before the first battalion left it was increased to about 1,000 to include support elements. Our principal Army ground force subsequently grew to about 4,500, while at the same time the American in-country forces grew to over one hundred times that number; figures of between 400,000 and 500,000 have been quoted. The RAAF element was increased with helicopters and Canberras, and in 1967 Navy surface units, Mine Clearance Diving Teams and helicopter crews were committed.

The rest is well known and hardly needs retelling here, except for two things. The Viet Cong/North Vietnamese nearly lost in 1968 and again in 1972. The Tet offensive of 1968 did a lot of psychological damage outside the immediate war theatre but the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese overreached themselves and suffered heavy losses. Within South Vietnam there was a brief chance for improvement. A successful military counter-offensive was mounted, and President Thieu, with very

considerable U.S. assistance, began some productive programmes. Hanoi held on stubbornly, and in 1972 launched a conventional assault with North Vietnamese regulars. This also took a beating. But by then South Vietnam's external supporters were either withdrawing or wanted to withdraw. At this point North Vietnam agreed to peace talks. The opposing sides' different approaches to strategy, become evident in hindsight, and the North Vietnamese used the more effective one to go on to achieve their aim. We will return to that aspect later.

So, we get to the point.

Did Australia have a legitimate interest in South Vietnam? Why did we participate? What was our aim?

Did Australia have a legitimate interest in Vietnam?

Of course it did. Australia had a very proper strategic interest in Vietnam. If we wanted to assist South Vietnam (disregarding for the moment the nature of the regime in power) there was no reason why we should not. All non-Communist countries had every right to feel threatened by Communist Imperialism in light of post-1945 developments, and every reason to help the non-Communists in Vietnam who had no wish to live under the dictatorship of the proletariat—which in practice meant the dictatorship of Hanoi. Free elections in Vietnam? How could anyone be so naive? Even Diem's inefficient regime could rig an election, how much more effective would Ho's political Mafia have been? Despite everything that has been said about the Viet Minh's ability to win an election, it seems to me that the truth is more nearly that at least half, and quite possibly much more of the population had no burning desire to be under Communist rule, which is what nation-wide elections would have meant in practice. Ho had no more scruples than Machiavelli in his dealings with the non-communist members of the Viet Minh.

One writer¹³ has suggested that our real interest was to fight a war by proxy for our own long term security, that this was essentially selfish and at the cost of the people of Vietnam. There is no doubt that there was self interest, but what ought to be remembered is that memories of the failure of appeasement in the 1930's were still strong, and even stronger was the memory of the more conventional Communist aggression in Korea. We meant well, I believe, despite a measure of self-interest.

But were we right to support Authoritarian Regimes in Saigon?

This question raises the most common debating point about the Vietnam war, the morality or otherwise of the side people supported or opposed. To



RAN pilots (HFV) operating in a pick-up zone in Vietnam.

(RAN Official Photograph)

judge between the moral qualities of the regimes in Hanoi and Saigon seems to me to have about as much point as medieval theologians discussing the numbers of angels which could be accommodated on a pinhead. Both sides had many undesirable features. Ho was more efficient. Communist totalitarian regimes have a good track record for keeping control once it is gained. Remember Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic States. Non-Communist authoritarian regimes have proved much more susceptible to change. If we assisted Saigon at least we had some right to be heard, to recommend changes and possibly a lever to bring about some improvements. Perhaps we could not do much in a country at war, but if a reasonably stable situation could have been reached, that is, freedom from external attacks and effective control of insurgency within, then we could have done some good. Maybe not a great deal, we were only a very minor partner in the group. But the general answer to the question in 'Yes', qualified, that our assistance should have had a supporting aim of getting Saigon to adopt programmes to gain more popular support, which was the first essential to an effective counter-insurgency programme anyway.

Was there nothing wrong at all with what we did?

This is a different question altogether. There was nothing legally or morally wrong in supporting Saigon in my opinion; it was the why and how we went about it which showed weaknesses. For those who will feel offended and think that this implies some criticism of the military skill, the gal-

lanty and sacrifices of those who fought there, I can only say that I do not mean that at all. It was the absence of strategic thought underlying our decision, and then the manner of implementing it that seems to me to have been wrong. We had a valid interest in Vietnam, but it was not vital; the survival of Australia was not at stake in the short term. It was at least arguable whether we were threatened in the long term; we took the view that we were, but that still made it less than vital. Our reasons for taking part in the war appear to me to have been (in no particular order):

- To help the non-Communists of South Vietnam from being taken over by Hanoi;
- To take our part in a stand against Communist aggression generally; and
- To show ourselves to be good allies of the U.S.A. and thereby gain credit in Washington against our possible future need to call for assistance under ANZUS.

How much importance we actually attached to each element is impossible to say without access to official records but it was the 'Good Ally' approach, which appeared to have the support of the majority, initially at least. "I would hate to be the head of a government which had to say to the United States on an occasion like this; 'Sorry we can do nothing about it. We will help you debate it in the United Nations. We will offer some fine words and some good sentiments. But as for practical action, no; that is for you. American soldiers from the Middle West can go and fight and die in South Vietnam,

but that is not for us' ", the Prime Ministers said in Parliament, and, viewed against our colonially-dependent outlook in external affairs for so many years, it possibly was the main reason. If so, it must be said that emotionally grandstanding of this nature is a poor basis for a national strategic decision of such importance. This is not to say there is never any reason for a gallant commitment which may be doomed, but strategic decisions, even in countries of Australia's limited capacities, ought to be subjected to a pretty searching cost-benefit analysis before they are taken.

All sorts of people are fond of misquoting Briand (or Clemenceau) as having said, 'War is too important to be left to the Generals'. A better, and more realistic approach, is President Kennedy's view that there are no longer any major strategic decisions which are wholly political or wholly military but that each decision has in it variable levels of its politics and its military aspects. As an extreme illustration, Field Marshal Montgomery once said that Eden had consulted him about the British intervention at Suez in 1956, and the soldier asked what the Government's political aim was. Eden replied that it was to 'knock Nasser off his perch'. Montgomery said that he then told the P.M. that his reason was not good enough and that, if he had been invited to command the military operation, he would have declined on those grounds. This line of thinking is not meant to advocate any weakening the all important control of the military by the democratically elected government, rather it is intended to point out that those who practice the profession of arms cannot abdicate their responsibilities for understanding the politics involved, and speaking out if they consider the political authority to be wrong. It may be that objections were raised in Canberra, and overruled. One can only hope so, because we ought to have known better.

Mao's and General Nasution's books on guerilla warfare were freely available and President Sukarno was demonstrating considerable skill in extracting the maximum political advantage from a very low level of military activity in Confrontation, at the time. We had taken part in the Malaysian Emergency and had seen President Magsaysay's successful campaign against the Huks. The Army's level of professional expertise in the tactics of counter-insurgency operations was high and they knew and practised the all-important supporting 'hearts and minds' programmes, but that is many rungs below the level at which the big decision was to be taken. We had been following the course of the war for years and it was obvious by 1963 that 'our' side was losing. If we had been doing our

homework properly we should have known why, and advised our American friends and allies of our conclusions. Perhaps we felt unable to do anything other than what we did. The 'Pentagon Papers' indicate that U.S. involvement in Indo-China was consciously undertaken with the ultimate protection of Australia and New Zealand in mind among other things, and Denis Warner says, 'there is every reason to believe that Australians will be found to have gone to great lengths to encourage the U.S. to take a stand in South East Asia (in the 1950's)'.¹⁴ But encouraging the U.S. to stay in the 1950's did not mean that we should have not continued to pay attention to what was happening, and above all, thinking about it. When the situation was getting steadily worse from 1959 onwards should we not have come up with something more, a choice of options, rather than the fatalistic slow drift into massive military support? It was not, as we appear to have thought, simply a replay of the Korean War in a new location.

In the event, by 1965 the U.S. probably had no other choice but to enlarge the conflict. And Australia sent its token; it could not, in view of the numbers of RVN/US forces involved, have any appreciable effect on the political or military outcome. The best we could hope for, then, was a special place in Washington's regard and the right to make suggestions. The bottom fell out of that fairly quickly as Presidential announcements caught a succession of Australian Prime Ministers by surprise. It was clear that they had not been given even five minutes warning of what had already been released to the press in Washington. Senator Fulbright of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, made a number of well-publicised critical statements about the size of Australia's contributions. So much for those hopes.

Within the country selective conscription turned mothers of all political persuasions against Australia's military involvement. It might not have been so bad if only the Regular Forces had been sent but when the mothers in the more well to do suburbs began to sound like members of the Vietnam National Liberation Front our lack of strategic thought and our way of implementing the military consequences was becoming embarrassing. What we did played right into the hands of the hard eyed manipulators of the idealistic young, (and old for that matter), and those consequences have not been fully worked out.

The cost to America, and not just in dollars, does not bear thinking about; nor does the cost to the people of Vietnam, but that was due in a large

measure to Ho's decision to support and sustain a guerilla war in the South, to commit his regular forces there, (and in Laos) and deny their existence. (The issue of the 1956 elections, which was Ho's nominal excuse for inflicting such horrors on his countrymen, has already been covered).

The 1968 Tet Offensive and Hanoi's Conventional Offensive in 1972

Despite so many of our mistakes, Hanoi made mistakes too, notably in 1968 and 1972. But here they showed themselves to be strategists of the school of Leo the Wise of Byzantium, while our side played the part of the Franks.

'The Frank believes that a retreat under any circumstances must be dishonourable; hence he will fight whenever you choose to offer him battle. This you must not do until you have secured all possible advantages for yourself, as his cavalry, with their long lances and large shields charge with a tremendous impetus. You should deal with him by protracting the campaign, and if possible lead him into the hills, where his cavalry are less efficient than in the plain. After a few weeks without battle his troops, who are very susceptible to fatigue and weariness, will grow tired of the war, and ride home in great numbers'.¹⁵

'Of Chivalry there is not a spark in the Byzantine, though professional pride is abundantly shown . . . (Leo) has no respect for the warlike ardor which makes men eager to plunge into the fray; it is to him rather a characteristic of the ignorant barbarian, and an attitude fatal to anyone who makes any pretension to generalship'. 'For an officer who fights without having first secured all the advantages to his own side, he has the greatest contempt. It is with a kind of intellectual pride that he gives instructions how (emissaries) are to be sent to the enemy without any real object except that of spying out the number and efficiency of his forces. He gives, as a piece of the ordinary and moral advice, the line that a defeated general may often find time to execute a retreat by sending an emissary to propose a surrender (which he has no intention of carrying out) to the hostile commander'.¹⁶ For 'surrender' you could read 'Paris peace talks'.

Did nothing good at all come out of Vietnam?

On the face of it we lost outright, but perhaps that is not entirely true. The long painful war in Vietnam, for all its damaging effects in all the countries concerned, bought time for some of the countries of South East Asia to put their houses in order and may yet prevent the Domino Theory from becoming a reality. It showed would-be insurgents and their potential backers that national

'wars of liberation' are not necessarily cheap and easy, and the U.S., whatever else might be said, honoured its commitments to Vietnam in the face of tremendous difficulties, self imposed limitations and appalling costs in lives as well as material resources, year after year. But being on the losing side can have some beneficial results if you learn anything from it. For Australia, the experience will not have been all wasted if we look at the Vietnam war as objectively as we can, (and that is not easy because of the emotions roused, and the deliberate distortions) and try to learn. There is some evidence that we have learnt a little, but I wonder if we have seriously attempted a proper analysis of just where, how and why we made our mistakes over Vietnam.¹⁷ If we try and sweep it under the carpet and do not try to learn everything we can from it, then the lives and the resources will have been wasted entirely. One thing is certain, we must give up our Frankish attitudes forever; today's followers of Leo the Wise are still practicing his strategic methods, and our Australian predilection for mystiques and emotional self-deception could be our undoing in the future if we do not adapt. We ought to remember that, 'the first, the grandest, the most decisive act of judgement which the Statesman and General exercises is rightly to understand the War in which he engages, not to take it for something, to wish to make of it something, which by the nature of its relations it is impossible for it to be'.¹⁸

NOTES

1. Brian Crozier 'South East Asia in Turmoil'.
2. Culturally, by his title, Bao Dai possessed a considerable political advantage, and implied 'mandate of Heaven'.
3. See a paperback novel 'The K Factor' by a former British Colonial Police Officer for a clear insight into such work.
4. Brian Crozier. op. cit.
5. Mao Tse Tung.
6. 'The Pentagon Papers' suggest that this was largely due to CIA psywar pamphlets but maybe religion is a stronger force in Asia than we in the now frequently agnostic/atheistic West credit; Dennis Bloodworth has made some interesting observations on this point.
7. Brian Crozier. op. cit.
8. Brian Crozier. op. cit.
9. 'The Pentagon Papers'.
10. Brian Crozier. op. cit.
11. Michael Edwardes 'Asia in the Balance'.
12. Gerald Stone 'War Without Honour'.
13. Gerald Stone. op. cit.
14. Pacific Defence Reporter June 1976. 'The U.S., the Indian Ocean and us'.
15. Oman's 'Art of War in the Middle Ages'.
16. Oman. op. cit.
17. For one analysis of the various strategies and policies used in Vietnam see 'The Vietnam War: A case study in Grand Strategy' Chapter 29 of John M. Collins 'Grand Strategy' U.S. Naval Institute Press.
18. Clausewitz 'On War'.

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Ship Based VTOL Aircraft

By *LIEUTENANT COMMANDER R. JONES, RAN*

In the increasingly common speculation and discussion about a replacement for HMAS MELBOURNE the assumption that a Vertical Take-Off and Landing (VTOL) fighter/ground attack aircraft will be embarked is frequent. Undoubtedly a requirement exists for a Skyhawk replacement in the long term and present indications are that only a VTOL aircraft will be practicable. This article will outline the development of effective fixed wing VTOL aircraft now entering service which could replace the Skyhawk, and will touch on other interesting developments in VTOL aircraft which may have longer term influence.

Present VTOL fighter type aircraft originated about twenty years ago when, amid the exotic aircraft designs of the 1950s, the British aircraft industry produced two VTOL prototypes. The first (the Short SC 1) had five jet engines, four exhausting downward for vertical flight and the fifth for horizontal flight. The principle disadvantage of this aircraft layout is that while in conventional flight the lift engines are surplus; worse, they replace useful load such as fuel or ordnance. Other problems related to control of the vertical engines, especially if one fails, convinced British designers there was no future in this aircraft.

The second British design, the Hawker P 1127, did not suffer from the disadvantages of the SC 1 and introduced the first workable vectored or deflected thrust engine. In a deflected thrust engine, the engine is mounted conventionally in the fuselage but the direction of the exhaust (thrust) can be controlled by the pilot from horizontal to vertical. Provided engine thrust exceeds aircraft weight a vertical take-off is possible.

The P 1127 was intended primarily to allow industry and the Royal Air Force (RAF) to gather experience in the field of VTOL fixed wing aircraft; secondarily it would become a subsonic close support aircraft. First hovering flight took place in late 1960 and throughout 1961 and 1962 the company continued test flying with six P 1127 prototypes.

During 1961 NATO issued a design requirement for a supersonic VTOL air superiority fighter. In January 1962 Hawker responded with the P 1154 design which was also intended to be a Hunter replacement for the RAF and a Sea Vixen replacement for the Royal Navy (RN). Although the NATO requirement was soon cancelled Hawker persevered with the P 1154 design until February 1965 when the project was cancelled. By then the detail design stage had been reached and the role had altered to a high speed, VTOL, low-level strike-reconnaissance aircraft with good high altitude air defence capability. None had been ordered.

Although the existence of the P 1154 design had distracted potential purchasers from the lower performing (but actually flying) P 1127 some progress had been made with the latter type. In response to suggestions from the German and American governments a tri-partite evaluation squadron was formed in England in 1964. The main role of this unit was to evaluate the VTOL aircraft in a Service environment. A further nine aircraft were built especially for this squadron which had on strength pilots from five Services of the three countries involved. Unlike the six P 1127 prototypes which had incorporated various individual modifications, these nine extra aircraft were all built to a common standard and named Kestrel.

THE AUTHOR

Lieutenant Commander Raymond Jones was born in Melbourne in 1943. He entered the RAN in 1963 and trained as an Observer with the Royal Navy before serving in anti-submarine helicopters and all weather fighters at RAN Air Station Nowra and in HMAS MELBOURNE. Twelve months in Vietnam as a member of RANHFV was followed by a year as SO (Air) at Nowra. From 1969 to 1971 he served on exchange with the Royal Navy in anti-submarine and commando helicopter squadrons ashore and in HMS ALBION. After returning to Australia he served at HMAS CERBERUS and in HMAS BRISBANE. On promotion to Lieutenant Commander in 1974 he became Air Operations Officer at RANAS Nowra. In November 1975 he completed the RAAF Advanced Navigator course and assumed the duties of Senior Naval Officer at

By the end of 1965 the squadron task was complete and the unit disbanded. Six of the Kestrels were handed over to the United States Services and taken to America where Tri-Service (Navy, Marine, Air Force) assessment continued for three more years.

The demise of the P 1154 project allowed Hawker to concentrate on a further VTOL design incorporating experience gained with the P 1127 and Kestrel. This new aircraft bore the name Harrier; although externally similar to the earlier designs it was a 95% new design. The first development Harrier flew in August 1966 and the aircraft entered RAF service during 1969. The RAF use it as a close support aircraft which can be dispersed away from airfields and near the front line.

The Harrier has no fixed gun armament but can carry two 30mm cannon in pods under the fuselage; an additional photographic reconnaissance pod can be carried on the fuselage centre-line. Alternatively, a single 1000 pound bomb can be carried under the fuselage. Four under-wing stores stations are fitted (two per wing); inboard stations are stressed to 1500 pounds each, outboard to 750 pounds. The navigation-attack avionics system is based on an inertial platform with the main navigation display in the form of a projected moving map; a head-up display provides the pilot with his weapon release information while he is looking outside the cockpit. This system has proved effective for the ground attack role.

Three versions of single seat Harrier were successively introduced—the major difference was in increased engine power. For pilot conversion a two-seater was introduced in two versions also distinguished by engine power. Major external variation is the addition of a laser rangefinder in the nose of front-line Harriers, this will improve the ability of the aircraft to operate in support of ground forces.

An intensive overseas sales effort has been mounted by the manufacturers of Harrier. No air force has purchased the aircraft, for a variety of reasons, but much interest has been shown on the part of navies and the main thrust of the sales campaign has been to portray the Harrier as a ship-based aircraft. Many navies have expressed interest and numerous demonstration deck-landings have been performed.

Despite the wide interest, only two overseas sales have been made, both to maritime users. The major sale was to the United States Marine Corps (USMC), more likely as a result of the American Tri-Service assessment of the Kestrel than of any

British sales campaign. In 1969, the year Harrier entered RAF service, the USMC ordered a first batch of standard Harriers for delivery in late 1970. The first USMC squadron formed in April 1971. Marine Harriers are close support aircraft which will operate initially from ships but will be able to deploy ashore as the need arises and as the front-line progresses inland. A total of 110 Harriers (known as the AV-8A in US terminology) was bought by the USMC, delivery to be completed during 1976.

Deliveries to fill the other overseas sale were also expected to be completed during 1976; six single and two dual seater AV-8s were ordered by the Spanish Navy for operation from their aircraft carrier.

The AV-8A is very similar to the RAF Harrier Mk3 with the addition of Sidewinder air-to-air missile capability, thus providing limited air defence potential additional to the gun-packs. The USMC had no major problems successfully introducing this aircraft into squadron service ashore and afloat. Most interesting embarkation was of a six aircraft detachment in USS GUAM during 1974 as part of the Sea Control Ship concept trial. The Sea Control Ship has since faded from the USN but not because of any failure on the part of the Harrier. Even with ground attack navigation system and no radar the AV-8A served usefully in reconnaissance, strike and air defence roles.

Nevertheless, the Harrier is far from ideal as a maritime aircraft and could be improved as a ground attack vehicle. Before the last AV-8A had been delivered to the USMC talk of an Advanced Harrier had begun; this was to be a Harrier replacement for the RAF, a Skyhawk replacement for the USMC and a shipborne fighter for the USN and RN. The new design was to be known as the AV-16A and would be slightly larger than the Harrier with the same general construction but double the payload and radius of action with avionics to suit each of the four Services.

Plans for the AV-16 were submitted to the governments concerned in December 1973 but in mid-1974 the British Government withdrew completely claiming there was insufficient common ground for a joint project. At that time the RAF was not convinced of the need for a Harrier replacement and the RN already had firm plans for a naval version of the existing Harrier. Because of the lack of supersonic potential of the deflected thrust engine the USN has never been notably enthusiastic about the AV-8 or AV-16 and only the USMC was left. This Service remained keen to

have the Advanced Harrier and had already stated a requirement for over 300 but settled for a less extensive design alteration than the AV-16.

This USMC aircraft is now described as the AV-8B; the designation AV-16 is no longer used. Instead of a new design, the -B is a refinement of the earlier model with an entirely new wing and minor alterations to the fuselage which have drastically improved performance. Major equipment changes are the introduction of a television/laser target seeker to the head-up display and installation of an additional (third) weapon station under each wing exclusively for Sidewinder; AV-8B will have potential for both air defence and ground attack tasks in one flight. Development of the AV-8B was approved by the US Department of Defence in July 1976; initially two AV-8As will be modified as prototypes; production will commence in 1982. With a planned production run of 336 aircraft, unit cost is US \$5 million.

The USMC and RAF are interested in the Harrier primarily as a close support aircraft and both Services have accordingly installed specialised avionics equipment not ideally suited to maritime operations. Fitting of Sidewinder missiles without associated radar provides air defence potential limited to daylight and good weather conditions. Suitability of the airframe and engine to operation from flight decks has been confirmed by the ship based demonstrations and embarkations; the aircraft is small enough not to need folding wings and the two trivial undercarriage modifications required for deck operations are well proven. Only an altered avionics fit is necessary to produce a truly maritime aircraft.

Such a modified avionics fit is being designed in the United Kingdom. Although the British Government withdrew from the AV-16 project work continued on a maritime version of the Harrier for the RN. This aircraft is generally a standard Harrier with naval avionics in a re-designed nose section. The new avionics will allow the Harrier to perform the tasks of fighter, reconnaissance and strike in the proportions of 50%-25%-25% and the designation of Sea Harrier FRS has been allocated.

Major changes are a nose mounted radar designated for both air-to-air and air-to-surface operations and the replacement of the RAF inertial navigation system with a less expensive composite Doppler/inertial system which will not involve the alignment problems of a ship-based pure inertial system. A radar altimeter is also added. This extra equipment occupies a greater volume than redundant RAF equipment and additional volume has been

introduced by raising the cockpit; a secondary bonus is improved pilot visibility. The navigation-attack system has been modified with a larger head-up display on which can be projected the radar picture of symbology representing a variety of navigational or flight data. This much improved avionics system should allow one man to perform all the duties which have hitherto required two man crews (at least in low to medium density threat environments).

Armament will be similar to that of RAF aircraft—two podded 30mm cannon under the fuselage with two weapon stations below each wing. One important difference will be that Sea Harrier will be able to carry Sidewinder on all four wing stations ensuring greater role flexibility. Sea Harrier, unlike the basic Harrier and AV-8A/B is equipped for maritime reconnaissance/strike and air defence tasks; the ground attack ability of the latter types is also retained.

The RN order, announced in May 1975, is for 24 Sea Harriers—the first to fly in July 1977. Now that development and modifications work is in hand other navies are sure to look more seriously at the VTOL fighter. Considerable experience in the ship-borne use of the Harrier has accumulated and practical operations are well documented.

Maximum payload (fuel or stores) is lifted when a short take-off is used; this necessitates the launching ship being into wind, as with a conventional catapult launch, and imparts no flexibility to ship operation. The aircraft accelerates along the deck with jet nozzles aft, when about to run off the forward end the nozzles are rotated downwards and the aircraft flies away. Some form of hold-back which allows the pilot to confirm maximum engine power before the take-off roll begins is thought desirable.

Vertical take-off has the major shiphandling and tactical advantage that the ship need not alter heading to launch aircraft which can take-off into the relative wind. An immediate notice fighter loaded relatively lightly with internal fuel and external missiles and guns could take off almost as soon as the engine could be run up and may be regarded as a low-level combat air patrol (CAP) with unlimited time on station.

Apart from the limitation imposed on VTO by maximum available engine thrust, interaction between jet exhaust and the ground beneath has been found to reduce the weight which can be lifted vertically. An open grid which supports the aircraft, but through which exhaust gases are vented, overcomes this problem admirably. An extension

of the hold-back which would hold the aircraft down until peak power was being developed would allow the Harrier to 'leap away' from the deck and avoid structural damage in a high sea.

Return to the ship is usually by vertical landing; short (rolling) landings are possible but experience has shown that, with about 600 feet of runway available, vertical landings can be made at higher weight than can be landed conventionally. Vertical landings have the same advantages as vertical take-offs — they are performed into the relative wind.

The Soviet Navy has also seen the advantages of VTOL aircraft and in 1976 first deployed the Yak-36 'Forger' embarked in KIEV. This aircraft has two engines mounted vertically behind the cockpit for vertical flight and one (possibly two) engines conventionally mounted in the fuselage but with swivelling exhaust nozzles. The delta wings are folded to fit the narrow aircraft lifts on KIEV. Forger has been observed at low supersonic speeds and is assessed as having a simple nose mounted radar and four wing stores stations.

To determine the role of Forger first requires definition of the role of KIEV and that is outside the scope of this article. Sufficient to say that the Yak-36 appears to be intended to operate against air and surface targets in defence of the carrier which will operate offensively with surface-to-surface missiles.

Analysis of Forger's configuration, especially exhaust nozzle positions, aircraft centre of gravity and overall length has led to the conclusion in some quarters that the aircraft can only take off vertically. This is inevitably a limitation on load carrying ability, but is confirmed by reports that, although KIEV's operations are carefully watched, Forgers have not been observed to perform other than vertical take-off. As well, transition from vertical to horizontal flight has been noted as consistently being performed very slowly and gently, taking so long that the Yak-36 could not be regarded as an on-deck CAP.

These two aircraft (the Harrier 'family' and Forger) are the two types of VTOL aircraft in service today or planned for the near future; they demonstrate the opposite approaches to the problem of VTOL flight (deflected thrust versus special engines for vertical flight). VTOL prototypes have been built in Germany and France but none have entered production; in fact, there appears to have been a reduction of interest in VTOL aircraft on the part of land-based operators. Naval interest has heightened.

Despite the intense activity displayed by the USMC in the VTOL area, the USN has not become heavily involved. This is not to say the USN is not interested; the contrary is true. The theoretical desirability of ship-based VTOL fighters has long been evident to that Service; during the late 1940s and early 1950s a variety of projects were encouraged but then existing technology was inadequate and no practical aircraft were built. Since those years the USN has been watching developments waiting the advent of an aircraft which would meet its requirements for a ship-based VTOL fighter. Neither Harrier nor Forger demonstrate the required ability.

Although a careful eye has been kept on the AV-8 programme by the USN in case nothing better is possible, the deflected thrust principle embodied in the Harrier is too limited to suit air superiority fighter requirements. Into the foreseeable future deflected thrust engines will be performance limited—they cannot realistically be fitted with afterburner to provide the high speed which the USN regards as essential in a naval fighter. The USN is keen to have VTOL fighters but is prepared to wait longer while alternative design principles are tested.

One idea being investigated involves a concept called Thrust Augmented Wing (TAW). Exhaust gas from a conventionally mounted jet engine is ducted to the wings and exhausted through spanwise slots mounted vertically in the wings. The shape of the slots is such that an appreciable amount of ambient air is drawn in by the engine exhaust and additional lift is generated. TAW configuration has major advantages; addition of afterburner is easy, providing jet performance, yet the large quantity of air moved during vertical operation will ensure downwash characteristics close to those of a large helicopter. Certainly the problem of high deck temperatures known to exist with the Harrier will not arise.

The TAW concept is being proven and has successfully produced adequate lift on a test rig. Construction of two prototypes is in progress and results should be announced this year (1977). Provided the theory can be transformed into a production aircraft the USN will be in a position to consider the introduction of a VTOL air superiority aircraft, with Mach 2 performance, which could operate from a helicopter size deck.

Introduction of such aircraft, and of other USN VTOL projects which are as yet design studies only, is years away. For the present the fixed wing

VTOL field is dominated by the deflected thrust principle embodied in the Harrier. The choice for a navy seeking VTOL aircraft in the near future is the AV-8B optimised for ground attack with a very limited air defence capability or the Sea Harrier with less load-lifting ability but equipped for maritime reconnaissance/strike and air defence with a moderate ground attack ability.

Maybe an aircraft combining the best features of both is the answer?

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SHIP WITH TWO CAPTAINS

HMS *Alaunia*, an ex-Cunarder built in 1925, became an Armed Merchant Cruiser in 1939. In 1944-45 she was converted to a heavy repair ship and allocated to the British Pacific Fleet. She was completed too late for the Japanese war and did not arrive at Singapore until Sunday, 11th November, 1945—a day I remember well as I sported a delicate shade of pink shorts at Divisions. My shorts had obviously got mixed up in the laundry with the hospital curtains.

Alaunia returned to Devonport after a few months alongside at the Naval Base and became a training establishment. The Captain, Executive Officer and First Lieutenant all belonged to the Engineering Branch. It seemed that *Alaunia* would never go to sea again.

But in 1953 the Commander-in-Chief, Plymouth suggested that she might be used as an accommodation

ship at the Coronation Review at Spithead. So a Sailing Master, a Captain was appointed with the Captain (E) retaining military command of the ship 'as an establishment'. Watchkeeping executive officer were appointed and the unfortunate Commander found himself serving two masters. No seamen however were appointed, so all Upper Deck duties were carried out by engineering ratings.

In his report the Sailing Master reported: "In conclusion I would like to mention the extreme courtesy and spirited efficiency in which everyone accepted the imposition of me personally, and conditions to which they were unaccustomed as a Branch: from the Captain (E), to whom my presence cannot have been palatable, down to the junior ratings of the ship, who gladly substituted a marlin spike for a wheel spanner and wielded it with equal ability when shown how.

Information from Journal of Naval Engineering, April, 1956.

BOOK REVIEW



'THE OXFORD COMPANION TO SHIPS AND THE SEA'

Oxford University Press
Recommended Price \$27.50

Edited by Peter Kemp

Peter Kemp presents some 3700 articles in this Companion which this reviewer found to be so fascinating that it was hard to put down or to concentrate on anything else.

At the heart of the book are biographies of the famous and infamous, whether navigators, painters, pirates or inventors who have left their mark on the ways of the sea and seafarers. Interspersed are accounts of sea battles, items of interest on the development of ships and equipment, descriptions of famous vessels, technical seamanship terms and probably most important the customs and lore of the sea.

The Companion is international in flavour, but as the editor points out so well in the preface that this subject is really without bounds. In fact Peter Kemp states that early in the planning stages of the book it became apparent that the subject was so vast that arbitrary limits had to be set.

Mr. Kemp has obtained the services of specialists in producing the word pictures and he has included with these photographs, drawings and diagrams to build up what must be one of the, if not the best reference book that I have seen on the subject of seamanship, ships and the sea.

There is little to criticize in this work, and the two points I mention can be well covered by Mr. Kemp's explanation in the preface. Firstly there is a paucity of items of antipodean nature or origin—true the Australian challenges for the America's Cup do rate a mention as do the major Australian sea-ports, but little else. Secondly in the biographies such men as Nelson, James Cook and Lord Fraser are afforded no less than 8 columns to each, but lesser (?) men in Isomard Brunel and Matthew Flinders are only given one column each at most. Perhaps Brunel was too far advanced and Flinders too far away for a Former Official Naval Historian!

In short, the Companion is a work for all bookshelves whether in private homes or places of learning. In professional places this work will do much to advance or remind students of the science of seamanship and the need to keep the lore of the sea alive.

L.J.S.

'AUSTRALIAN CONTINGENTS TO THE CHINA FIELD FORCE 1900-1901'

NSW Military Historical Society

By James J. Atkinson

James Atkinson presents a short history of Australia's participation in the Boxer Rebellion, and together with a selection of photographs he presents previously unpublished details of those who took part in that international police action.

Three alphabetical lists comprising of the New South Wales and Victorian Contingents and the Officers and Ships company of HMCS PROTECTOR enumerate the previous and subsequent careers (or otherwise) where known. Amongst the many names recorded are some quite memorable RAN personalities of those earlier years including Captain (later Vice Admiral) W. R. Creswell, Staff Engineer (later Engineer Vice Admiral) W. Clarkson and Midshipman (Later Rear Admiral) L. S. Bracegirdle.

The author, James Atkinson, is a serving member of the RAN and a keen medal collector. He is also a life member of the Naval Historical Society of Australia and of various overseas Orders and Medals Societies. Naturally he has included in his book brief histories of the China War Medal and of the American originated Military Order of the Dragon.

Our copy of 'Australian Contingents to the China Field Force 1900-1901' from the NSW Military Historical Society.

L.J.H.

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
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