

Opening Address

*Rear Admiral Rowan Moffitt, AM RAN**

I am delighted to welcome you all to this thirtieth anniversary seminar of the Australian Naval Institute. Our intent today is not only to reflect on the history of the ANI and what it has achieved over the last three decades, but also to do some thinking about what lies ahead and to try to set a course for the future of the Institute that will at the one time be both practical and effective.

That intent should come as no surprise to you. It is what the ANI has always been about and it is reflected in the audience that has gathered here today. By my reckoning, some 66 years of the Australian Navy's history - well over half the period it has been in existence - is spanned in the personal experience of the membership here today.

I am particularly pleased and honoured to welcome amongst that membership one of the two officers who provided the inspiration for creation of the Institute - Commodore 'Rocker' Robertson. I am also delighted to welcome others of the original founding membership, and many of our thirty-year members, as well as such distinguished senior officers as Admiral Chris Barrie, Vice Admiral Ian MacDougall and Vice Admiral David Shackleton. Last night of course, we honoured the memory of the other officer of our founding pair, the late Commodore Vernon Parker, and I would like to take this opportunity to thank Ian MacDougall for delivering the Vernon Parker Oration in his memory.

I should add that we have had many apologies and well wishes from those who cannot be with us today. They include Ian Knox, John Stevens, Mike Rayment, Ken Grierson and Geoff Cutts - the latter two in particular were amongst the mainstays of the organisation of the Institute in its first decade.

I would like to recognise and welcome our sponsors too - Mark Proctor from SAAB, John Lord and John Connor from P&O, Bob Willis from the Australian Defence Credit Union and Steve Youll of LOPAC. I am also delighted to see Geoff Walpole from Booz Allen Hamilton Australia is here - BAH are the major sponsors of our new Maritime Australia Award

And I know that the Midshipmen with us today will understand if I extend a special welcome to one longstanding member in particular. Even as a Rear Admiral of a few years' seniority, it is a daunting prospect to speak to an audience which includes the

highly respected Executive Officer of one's first days at the Royal Australian Naval College, now Commodore Jim Dickson. It does not seem like nearly thirty two years have passed!

And I guess that's really the point. If we do not consciously move with the times and seek to make organisations like the Institute more relevant in today's society and through that approach more effective, they very quickly become moribund. In a very real sense, the future of the Institute is in this room, as well as its past and present.

I took over the Presidency of the ANI from Rear Admiral Brian Adams who had guided the Institute out of some shoal waters. For Brian and his Council the focus was quite simply avoiding insolvency; a task they did extremely well. With our finances on a firmer footing my aim was to give the Institute a more contemporary look and feel so that it could move with the times.

There have been a number of achievements in this area, principally through the Institute's new branding which will be unveiled later this morning the development of an integrated strategic plan to guide and focus Council business and the inclusion of some talented young Midshipmen in Council, which of course is nothing new for the Institute. They have brought with them a unique perspective and ensured that our future membership base is always considered in Council deliberations.

So let me suggest some of the questions that we need to consider as we trace the record of the Institute. I particularly look to the younger generation to help answer some of those questions.

The overarching question is, how do we better achieve the two objectives of the ANI?

- To encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the maritime profession; and
- To provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and the maritime profession?

Those objectives are practically interchangeable if we assume that our intent in both is positive - that we seek to improve and extend the condition of our Service and of the maritime profession. Remember that it is implicit in this that the Institute does not itself have a position on any subject; its intent is rather to encourage and foster debate.

So, just how do we encourage and foster such

* Retiring ANI President.

debate? A potential constraint in generating robust debate today is the perception by some that debate actually equals dissent. It is interesting that Sam Bateman addressed this very issue in a lengthy letter to the editor in the 2nd edition of the Journal in 1975 where he eloquently made the point that robust debate does not equate to criticism of the Navy's senior leadership nor of Government policy.

He said in part 'The division between bona fide professional comment and non-objective biased policy criticism should not be hard to draw, and indeed it must be drawn if the ANI is to survive to work toward its objectives'. In my view Sam's observation holds true today and I do not believe we are constrained in our ability to make bona-fide comments on our profession.

What mechanisms then are likely to be effective in the future? We have the Journal and its maintenance over thirty years is most definitely one of the achievements of the Institute and one greatly to the credit of a succession of hard working volunteer editors. I'd like here to pay a particular tribute to the present Editor, Andrew Forbes, whose membership of the Institute as a public servant indicates that the ANI is not and should never be an institution confined to those in naval uniform. But is the Journal enough? We are working on our website which incidentally, is being redesigned by two Midshipmen here at the Academy as part of their Computer Science academic program. This first step begs the question what more can and should be done electronically to connect up an increasingly networked and well-connected younger generation?

And are electronics really the answer? My sense - and I would be particularly interested to hear opinion on this - is that personal contact between ranks and generations is even more valued than it used to be. What opportunities for such contact, for personal interaction and formal and informal debate should the Institute offer, if at all? How should we do it?

Some of the Institute's greatest innovations, such as the Sea Power Conferences of the 1970s and 1980s have now moved within the domain of the Navy's Sea Power Centre, which also has a substantial and highly effective publishing and lecturing program. That is not a matter of regret to me, but it does mean that we need to be looking to new frontiers - to boldly go where the Sea Power Centre cannot.

And to do this, how do we increase our size to the point that we can move on in a substantial way? It is a fact that the Institute has always suffered from a lack of scale. This is a chicken and egg problem - it is difficult to increase the membership without offering clear benefits to would-be joiners,

it is even more difficult to offer such benefits while constrained by very limited resources. Our sponsors make a huge difference in this regard and we are very grateful - we could not have got this far without you, but we do need to develop other mechanisms for building up our strength, both in membership and financial power. We need to do so in a tax environment which is not very encouraging of not for profit organisations like ours.

I don't think that we will necessarily get many clear answers today. But I do want to inspire all existing and future members to start thinking, start talking and start telling us where we should go.

I believe I am handing over to Commodore James Goldrick the Presidency of an Institute that is in reasonable shape but with a great deal more that can be and should be done. In James we have a long standing and passionate advocate who has been instrumental in tackling some of the ANI's most significant challenges in recent years. He will no doubt continue to strengthen the Institute and I look forward to his leadership in the years ahead.

I'll conclude at that with repeating my welcome to you all and formally declaring open the thirtieth anniversary seminar of the Australian Naval Institute.



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Australian Naval Institute - the first thirty years

Dr David Stevens*

Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. When I found out I was doing this presentation I have to admit that, 'why me?' was the first thing that came to mind. I was certain that there were many others far better qualified. Moreover, the Australian Naval Institute began in 1975. I didn't join until almost 10 years later, and it was 1990 before I first submitted an article to the Journal.

But when I thought about it, I recalled that the ANI is run by volunteers. For more than three decades its councillors have worked out of hours to 'advance professional knowledge with respect to maritime affairs'.¹ More than a dozen editors have produced and distributed almost 120 copies of the journal in their own time and at considerable personal cost. These men and women have devoted their time and energy because they sincerely believed that it would benefit the security and welfare of all Australians. So, perhaps a few extra hours from me might not be too much to ask.

I also realised that I do have a couple of early connections with the ANI. I had always known that my father was one of the 57 foundation members, and an original Councillor, but in researching this presentation I discovered that he was actually one of the 16 officers, who in 1974 had first met - at 1630 on a Friday afternoon no less - because they were interested in forming a 'Naval Society'.

August 1978

My other small claim to early links with the ANI came in August 1978, when I was quoted in an article titled '*ADFA - Recipe for Disaster?*'.² I recommend it to the younger members of this audience as a fine example of ironic justice. I think the author of the article made up the quote, but it was mildly subversive and did sound like something I might say. For a very junior naval officer it was also somewhat exciting to think that the piece was going to be read by Admirals. At least I could rest easy knowing that our true identities had been hidden.

So what can I usefully tell this audience about the first 30 years of the ANI? Well there are obviously persons in the audience who will add more detail in question time, but the bare bones of the Institute's foundation are fairly easily revealed. Late one night in October 1973 Captains Vernon Parker and Alan 'Rocker' Robertson, were having a

discussion, probably over a drink or two. As Vernon Parker later wrote, it was one of those times 'when usually the most eloquent arguments are propounded, the clearest statements made, and the Navy is put to rights'.³ They had joined the RANC together in 1940, and so had known each other for a long time. Together they came to the conclusion that Australia needed a Naval Society. For a variety of reasons they took the United States Naval Institute as their model, and over the next few months bounced the idea around the halls of Navy Office.

The meeting of 16 officers at Russell on that Friday afternoon in July 1974 represented the fruits of these efforts. Although I am reliably informed that not all those assembled were exactly volunteers - several for example were Vernon Parker's subordinate staff - all nevertheless agreed to the need for a Naval Society. The broad aims of this society would be to encourage and promote 'the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the maritime profession and provide a forum for the exchange of ideas'.⁴ The meeting also agreed to the formation of a steering committee of seven officers to examine the legalities, produce a draft constitution, and recommend a name.

The choice of name came down to either the 'Naval Institute of Australia' or the 'Australian Naval Institute', with the latter immediately preferred by the steering committee. The proposal to form the Institute received appropriate support from the Naval Board, while the Minister allowed the use of the word 'Naval' in the title.

Despite this support, there were some delays with the legal aspects, and the first meeting of the Institute actually took place before the Attorney General gave his consent to incorporation. Nevertheless, on 4 April 1975 a Special General Meeting elected an interim council, appointed an auditor, and 35 members listened to a presentation by Commodore Kenneth Gray on '*Law of the Sea-Defence Implication*'. Two months later, on 10 June 1975, the ANI was formally incorporated at which time membership stood at 68. The first President was the now Commodore Vernon Parker, who was apparently quite fond of noting that the founder of the US Naval Institute had also been a Commodore Parker.

This story, however, does not give us the flavour

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of those times. As a novelist once said, 'The past is a foreign country: they do things differently there'. Looking back across the decades it is probably hard for many in this audience to visualise the Australian Navy of the mid-1970s, or appreciate the context in which it operated. This was a Navy where women had yet to go to sea, smoking was not an unsociable habit, and flares and sideburns were in fashion. I might add that both Commodore Goldrick and Rear Admiral Moffitt were teenage cadet midshipmen.

Whitlam

The general election of December 1972, brought to power a federal Labor Government for the first time in twenty-three years, and the new Whitlam administration arrived with a perceived mandate to implement rapid and far-reaching reform. One such area was the Defence organisation and, following the Tange Review, the new integrated Department of Defence was established at the end of 1973. Initially, the most critical change for the RAN was the loss of the Navy Minister and hence the loss of a dedicated advocate in government. However, further upheavals were already in train, and together these markedly increased the influence on non-uniformed personnel over matters of force development.

The RAN in the 1970s was primarily designed for Cold War anti-submarine operations, but recognised that the world was not that simple. Naval planners sought, as they had always done, a flexible and balanced fleet. Unfortunately, they tended to base too much of their case on assumed common ground. The Navy had a tradition of being the 'Silent Service', it didn't like explaining how it worked, and some fundamental issues, such as survivability and warfighting concepts, were not justified to the Defence bureaucracy in sufficiently compelling terms. Insufficient advocacy, even by those in higher naval staff positions too often stymied the RAN's plans. Australia was a child of seapower - born, protected and sustained by it, but many naval officers felt that the nation had turned its eyes from the sea. They grew increasingly frustrated with the poor comprehension of seapower displayed by those outside the Service.

Having said all that, the ANI was not founded as a naval lobby group. Both the Navy League and the Naval Association already filled that role; these two organisations produced naval flavoured periodicals, and were comfortable issuing statements to the press on naval policy. So how was the ANI going to be different? The founders recognised that it needed to maintain an apolitical stance, remaining an unofficial forum dedicated to the education and sharing of experience of naval operations. Through a regular Journal and eventually a seminar series,

the ANI's members would raise the level of debate within the profession. And thereby improve the more general understanding of maritime affairs from an Australian stand point.

As one writer, calling himself Slingshot, said in the second edition of the journal:

*The birth of the Australian Naval Institute, and of this Journal, come at very appropriate time. ... if we are to be of any value to our society, nobody will ever realise it until we understand thoroughly ourselves and our chosen way of life. Our corporate strength derives from our own teamwork and mutual respect. I hope we can all see what a significant role the Institute and its Journal have to play in fostering and nourishing our professionalism; should they founder it may only be because we just aren't good enough.*⁵

Indeed, because the ANI was to be a professional organisation the founders wanted to ensure that it remained out of the hands of anyone who might have their own personal axe to grind. Hence, full membership was available only to those belonging to the Permanent Naval Forces. It didn't matter whether they were male or female, officer or sailor, but regular members would have to be full-time Service personnel. This meant that the reserve forces, the other two Services, and interested civilians, could only be entered as associate members, who could neither vote nor hold office. Not everyone agreed with this restriction, but as the second President, Commodore Robertson, reiterated in his own farewell message in 1978:

*... you will know that I am not standing for the Council again because, on the 2nd February next year I will no longer be eligible for regular membership. Our rule about serving members only being eligible for regular membership still bothers quite a number of people but I am sure it is absolutely right and I would recommend to you that you never change it.*⁶

This audience will undoubtedly have their own opinion, but the departure of both founders within three years, and the rapid turnover of president must have had some effect on the ANI's growth and stability. As it turned out, although everyone paid the same joining fee and annual subscription, it was not until 1988 that members of the ANR were permitted to become regular members. It then took until 2003 before the distinction between regular and associate members was finally removed.

And so the ANI was formed. I should mention at this point one thing that the ANI was not designed to achieve, and that was to advance individual careers. The first members seem to have represented a reasonable cross-section of naval society. Not all were high achievers, and membership of the ANI certainly did not guarantee promotion. Vernon Parker was still an acting Commodore when he left the RAN in 1977, and of those 56 founding members, none became Chief of

Navy.

So what has the ANI achieved in its 30 years? Well in today's Defence bureaucracy we often hear about providing quantifiable results, but rather than embark on a search for suitable indicators, I am going to take the easy path, and give you a quick run down memory lane.

August 1975

The Journal has always been the most visible of the ANI's efforts, and the first edition appeared in August 1975. Syd Lemon who was Secretary to Commodore Robertson, found himself the editor, but my father found himself volunteered for production duties. The cover came from a painting belonging to a Mr Stephen, who just happened to be the father of Lieutenant Commander K Stephen, who just happened to be working for my father at the time.

The three major articles included both the 1973 and 1974 Peter Mitchell Essay winners, and the paper presented by Commodore Gray in April. The topics: Law of the Sea, Manpower Management and Seaborne Aircraft Platforms, already reveal that some issues just never go away. Regular features introduced included 'Classic Signals' and 'Ship Handling Corner'. Later editions would include 'Technical Topics', 'Nobody asked me, but' and 'I was there when ...'. There was also a competition to design a crest for the Institute, with the winner awarded a three-year subscription. Not surprisingly, the advertisements closely followed the trends expected in Defence procurement. The carrier debate was progressing steadily and British Aerospace began advertising the Sea Harrier in 1978.

At the end of 1975, the President provided his first report. There were 91 regular members, 61 associate members and three honorary members on the books. Chapters were operating in Canberra and Sydney and the second edition of the Journal was about to go to print. I think one of the most interesting projects undertaken by the Council was an investigation into the building of a National Headquarters in Deakin. Acknowledging that such a venture was beyond the ANI, letters seeking interest had been written to the Naval Association, the Navy League, the Naval Historical Society, and even the Canberra Naval Wives' Association - now there is an organisation whose influence on the RAN deserves further study.

By the end of its first year ANI membership had reached 200, the competition for the design of the Institute's crest had been won - by a naval civilian - and subsequently replaced the ocean painting on the cover. Another 40 members had joined by the time of the President's second annual report, but he

expressed disappointment that few seemed willing to contribute letters or comments.

This would be a common refrain. Indeed, from a look at the index, it would seem that the foundation members were not exactly eager to be heard. Less than ten ever put pen to paper, and even then they each only submitted a single item. The sole exception was Commodore Robertson who in the first few years contributed five provocative articles and several letters. Despite the lack of original copy, the Journal was already being highly praised for its content.

This did not mean that editorial lapses did not occur. Despite the recognition it was receiving, the Journal was plagued by numerous small typographical errors, many caused by the pressure of production timelines.

August 1977

In fact it was not until August 1977 that the editor was happy with the production, remarking:

I hope you will notice that in this edition the majority of articles are well-illustrated with appropriate photographs and impressions. This is entirely due to the fact that, for the first time since the inception of the Journal, we received copy well in advance of printing deadlines.⁷

Coincidentally this was the first Journal produced after Commodore Robertson replaced Commodore Parker as President.

By the end of 1977, the Institute had more than 300 members and a Chapter had begun in Fremantle. The ANI's financial position was such that it could afford to award prizes. The best major article would receive \$75, the best minor article \$10, with two runners up prizes of \$5. The first prize went to a paper on 'Training the General List Officer' by Master Ned, who would go on to be one of the most prolific of the ANI's contributors, with some 10 articles by 1980.

May 1978

May 1978 saw the first edition devoted to a single subject. In this case 'Surveillance', with six major articles covering the views of the RAN, RAAF, other government departments and civilians. This is a good example of how the ANI attempted to lead the debate in Australia on maritime issues. But how successful it was may be best judged from the Seapower '79 Symposium.

Seapower '79

Originally planned for 1978, the seminar had to be postponed until February the following year. The two day seminar was ably directed by Adrian Cummins, and attracted some quite eminent personalities. These included the Governor General, Sir Zelman Cowan, the former Prime Minister,

Gough Whitlam, and a former US Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt.

Sir Zelman's opening remarks referred to the importance of the ANI in encouraging debate and providing decision makers with information and ideas. However, it was the after dinner speaker, Gough Whitlam, who probably better understood the system. He noted that in 1979 the Australian public was better educated and more sceptical than at any time in the past. Naval spectacles, such as Fleet Reviews and ceremonial entries might have engendered their fascination and attention previously, but the public now needed to be persuaded before taking an interest.

Whitlam did not talk of major threats, but he mentioned the rise of an Islamic consciousness, and listed refugees, smuggling, fisheries and law of the sea issues, as reasons why the maritime environment was becoming more important to Australia. He felt that that an institution was needed to let the public know about the implications and placed that burden squarely on the ANI. His concluding remarks are particularly interesting and should still sound an echo with us today:

*I know that the RAN, and the RN whose traditions it has inherited, are by contrast to the US Navy a silent Service. I also know that academics in this field are usually silent, and the ones that are least silent are the ones that should be most. The important matter is that there are very real issues which are of increasing concern to Australia in maritime affairs, in commerce and in the protection of it. I welcome the creation of this Institution.*⁸

The ANI would run other major seminars in 1981, 1984 and 1987 and these would also attract important speakers and great interest.

Cufflinks

Establishing a separate identity was clearly important, and August 1980 saw the Institute begin offering cuff links, and mounted crests to members. These had been largely organised by David Campbell. I have no idea how many of these items were ever sold, but I still have the last two crests in captivity in my office.

The subjects covered in the Journal remained eclectic, although the education of naval officers seems to have been a perennial favourite.

May 1985

May 1985 saw the 10th anniversary of the ANI, and probably its peak strength. At the 10 year mark there were functioning Chapters in Sydney, Melbourne, Perth and Canberra, with active efforts to achieve functioning chapters in the other states. In the anniversary Journal issue the then President, Commodore James, reflected on the high standing and growing influence of the ANI. He also noted

that the strength of the Institute was in its membership - 'a membership dedicated to the advancement of knowledge and understanding of naval and maritime affairs.'⁹

The Editor, however, remarked that this membership was largely passive:

Now is a good time for us to reflect that the Australian Naval Institute is not a retirement home for the brass hats, but is a collection of individuals, Service and civilian, senior and junior, who wish to show an interest in, and promote matters relating to maritime affairs. Unfortunately we have fewer than 5% of our members who are in the category of these three; perhaps the other 95%, and the revitalised Chapters in particular, can try to redress the balance?

The 10th anniversary edition was also a highlight, and contained a bumper crop of articles on such subjects as: the rise and fall of the RAN carrier project; the widening role of destroyers and frigates; the naval PSO: do we need it; expert systems; the Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft; the spirit of the Navy; and an anniversary crossword. Not all contributors were members, but they included officers and sailors, and even a member of the RAAF. An article on naval history at the Australian War Memorial was one of many to be written by the then Sub-Lieutenant Tom Frame, now the Anglican Bishop of the ADF and a respected historian.

Speaking of Chaplains, an index at the half way point in May 1990 shows that they had been a popular topic, with the Journal publishing more articles on Chaplains than it had on such professional topics as the Law of the Sea, Air Defence, or even leadership. I should add that not all of these were written by Tom. Despite this statistic, the most popular subject areas tended to be Australian Defence, Aircraft Carriers, Force Structure, Maritime Strategy and Naval History.

May 1990

Notwithstanding this wide coverage, the Journal's hard won status, and the fact that by May 1990 even I had started contributing articles, a storm was brewing. The ANI was falling on hard times financially, and in danger of losing credibility. Enter the 'Friends of the Naval Institute', who at that time were: Thompson Sintra Pacific, Australian Defence Industries, GEC Marconi, Jueman Schneider, Scientific Management Associates, Krupp Atlas, Computer Sciences Australia, Avco Consultants, Blohm and Voss, Scientific Electronics, Rockwell Ship Systems, Westinghouse Electric and Pacific Dunlop Batteries. At the ANI Dinner held at HMAS Harman on 11 May 1990 the President made known his appreciation:

With their help, the Institute can re-establish itself as

*a credible forum for the exchange of ideas concerning the maritime defence of Australia. Please bid them welcome.*¹⁰

The Friends of the ANI continue to keep the Institute afloat, but there remained other hurdles to overcome.

Publications

Just two years later, the then President, Commodore Don Chalmers wrote in his annual report:

1992 has been a year of essential housekeeping for the Institute. Before we could attack the vision of a future strong quality debate, the Council had to deal with a falling and ageing membership, a lack of a firm understanding of the financial state of the membership and a Journal which to my mind at least needed reinvigorating.

As shown by the Seapower Seminar series, the ANI had always tried to do more than just publish a Journal. Another avenue attempted was book publishing. Soon after its formation the ANI gained the rights to republish Admiral Wylie's 1967 book on *Military Strategy*.¹¹ After a break, in 1990 the ANI assisted Tom Frame with publication of his history of Garden Island. Then, in 1992, the ANI self-published a book on Admiral Sir Victor Smith. These were undoubtedly brave attempts but, without a proper distribution network, the ANI always found difficulty in shifting stock.

Recognising the potential pitfalls of such ventures, Commodore Chalmers ensured that the Council concentrated its efforts on the Journal.

February 1993

The result was the appearance in February 1993 of the first of the new style Journals, more akin to the dimensions of other military type publications such as *Proceedings* of the United States Naval Institute. A team - including Jason Sears, Di Devereaux and Richard McMillan, worked for several months with the editor, Dick Sherwood, to shape the final product. Since then the internal format has continued to change, but the size has remained the same.

May 1995

In 1995 the ANI turned 20. The separate State Chapters had by this time fallen away, but there was a very active New Zealand Chapter. I regret to say that this too folded a few years back. The President at this point was Commodore Chris Oxenbould, and his annual report noted that the ANI had established a strategic alliance with the Navy's Maritime Studies Program, now the Sea Power Centre-Australia. The link was not surprising, the objectives were similar and many of the same people were involved. The difference, of

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course, was that the ANI was free to express opinions and did not have to agree to the party line.

This alliance was probably the most significant development in the ANI's recent history and it allowed the two organisations to assist each other in many ways. For example, by jointly hosting seminars and conferences the ANI was not only able to get back into this game, but also able to reach a far wider audience. In turn the Sea Power Centre has used the Journal to increase the spread of its own maritime message.

The 'Special 20th anniversary of the Journal' came out under the editorship of Alan Hinge, another prolific contributor. The Journal included for the first time a 'no holds barred' column called 'Illumination Rounds', which in this issue discussed the Navy's inability to compete with the image experts in the Army and Air Force. Other articles included contributions by the then Commander Allan du Toit, 'Have Surface Combatants Had It' and Lieutenant Alastair Cooper, 'Jutland Revisited', both of whom are here today. A particularly important article, in the context of my presentation today, was by Rick Leahy titled 'The penetrating Insight of Hindsight - A brief look at twenty years of JANI'.¹² Rick did an excellent job in covering issues both large and small, and I recommend you have a look at his work. He concluded that the ANI had been a success, but that it lacked the wider debate and synergy encouraged by Chapter meetings across the country.

May 2005

So where do we stand ten years later? Well luckily I don't have to tell you because that is what the rest of today is about. But having run through three decades of history there are a few questions that I think should be asked of this audience. None, I should add, are original.

First, the ANI depends on its membership. An ageing and failing membership is not a new problem and almost every Council has dealt with it at some stage. But how should the ANI attract the young and vibrant members of this audience?

Second, the Journal needs contributors. In the words of one learned gentleman 'publish, publish, publish...It doesn't matter if the writers make fools of themselves ...Every decade has to produce its own generation of 'Young Turks'.' The younger members of this audience can write, how can the ANI get you to put your ideas down?

Third, the ANI thrives on debate. As one of the first editors used to regularly highlight 'There is no party line'. And it doesn't have to be the big issues. Controversy in the letters pages of the Journal has ranged from the use of abbreviations for officers'

ranks in correspondence, through to the carrying of silk handkerchiefs by communicators, and even the advantages of the Navy allowing its members to grow a moustache. What wrongs does this audience think need righting?

To conclude my remarks, I think it worth considering how the ANI is perceived by those outside its membership. In the filmed version of 'The Hunt for Red October', the movie makers set up the background of the main character, by panning over a magazine in his briefcase. It was a copy of the US Naval Institute's *Proceedings*, and in less than a second the audience knew that the hero was a naval professional. Not necessarily a warfighter, but definitely someone who could think. That kind of brand recognition is not easy to achieve, and starring roles for heroic RAN officers are rare in Australian drama. But I understand that the ABC is about to start work on a new series of 'Patrol Boat'. Perhaps the Council might like to offer the producers some back copies of the Journal for use as props.

Thank you.

¹ V. Parker, 'From the President' xx 1975, p. 3.

² Master Ned, 'ADFA Recipe for Disaster',

³ V. Parker, 'The Australian Naval Institute - How It Began', xx 1975, p. 3.

⁴ *ibid*

⁵ Slingshot, 'Professionalism and the Naval Institute', May 1976, p. 5.

⁶ Presidents Report, November 1978, p. 4.

⁷ 'From the Editor', August 1977, p. 14.

⁸ G. Whitlam, *Seapower '79*, Seminar Papers, p. 40.

⁹ I.B. James, Message from the President, May 1985, p. 4.

¹⁰ I. Callaway 'ANI Dinner HMAS Harman 11 May 1990, Presidents Address', p. 13.

¹¹ Funded by Commodore Robertson.

¹² R. Leahy, 'The Penetrating Insight of Hindsight- A brief look at twenty years of JANI', Jan-Feb 1995, pp. 9-12.

Review of the 1976 Young Turks - Vision for the Navy 1985-2000

Captain Martin Brooker, CSC RAN

If you can look into the seeds of time, and say which grain will grow and which will not, speak then to me.

Shakespeare (MACBETH)

Shakespeare, I believe, captured in Macbeth's tragedy the very necessary and human endeavour to consider the future. For our profession, our consideration of future needs is to ensure that we have planned for in the abstract can be brought to bear in the specific through military effects.

Introduction

In June 1976 at the Navy Symposium - almost 30 years ago - a group of officers, then Captain Eric Johnstone, Commander Mike Rayment, Commander Ian MacDougall, Commander Nigel Stoker and Lieutenant Commander Chris Skinner presented their thoughts on the Needs of the Royal Australian Navy for the period 1985 to 2000.

The RAN of our 1976 Young Turks was quite different in many ways to the one we know today, in others it was very similar.

My aim today is to not to provide you with a scorecard of the original Young Turks fine work; that would surely be inappropriate. Rather I believe a review of their work with hindsight is an opportunity to learn from this time capsule, the opportunity for insight into the past and the opportunity for our generation to identify some of the immutable facts of the RAN in particular those relevant to planning for our future needs.

It is fair to say that the view one has of the future can be influenced by your experiences and specialisation. For example the differential military theory applied upon encountering a sea snake:

- *The Observer:* Works Global Positioning Satellite and Inertial Navigation System to put in the coordinates to find snake. Can't find snake. Returns to mother for refuel and crew rest.
- *The Pilot:* Finds snake visually on fourth pass after snake lets off smoke to mark position. Rotor wash blows snake away from datum.
- *The Diver:* Plays with snake, then eats it.
- *The Doctor:* Wounds snake in initial encounter as he looks for the 'bursting appendix', then works feverishly to save snake's life.
- *The Gunnery Officer:* Kills snake with massive Time On Target Fire for Effect. Kills several hundred civilians as unavoidable collateral damage. The Mission is considered a success and all participants (ie cooks, mechanics and

clerks) are awarded gongs.

- *The DSTO Scientist:* Studies snake. Prepares in-depth doctrinal and technical thesis in obscure 5-series report about how to defeat snake. Assesses that ASW forces don't understand how to properly conduct counter-snake ops.
- *The TASO:* Fires off 50 torpedos, kills snake and makes presentation to Capability Development Committee on how ASW forces are the most cost-effective means of anti-snake force projection.
- *The Supply Officer:* Provides non availability notice: your anti-snake equipment is not available through stores we will have to order it from DNSDC.
- *The Intelligence officer:* Asks Snake? What snake? Only 4 of 35 indicators of snake activity are currently active. We assess the potential for snake activity as LOW.
- *The Legal Officer:* Snake declines to bite, citing grounds of professional courtesy.
- *The Naval Police Coxswain:* Gave snake a sobriety test for not moving in a straight line.
- *The Communicator:* Broadcasts 200,000+ watt transmissions in support of anti-snake missions; accidentally electrocuted snake in the process.
- *The Direction Officer:* While attempting to establish link connectivity by shaking hands with snake, gets bitten by snake.
- *The Submariner:* Makes contact with snake, ignores all Maritime Commander directives and Rules of Engagement by building rapport with snake and winning its heart and mind. Trains it to kill other snakes. Has Submarine FEG file enormous capability proposal for essential equipment upgrade upon return to homeport.

Strategic context

'There is no reason anyone would want a computer in their home'. Ken Olson, president of Digital Equipment Corp. 1977

Ken Olson's concept is of course absolutely foreign to our way of thinking today...while some of this audience were serving in the Navy in 1976, albeit as Cadet Midshipman, others were at high school with a lot darker and much longer hair, others were a twinkle in their parent's eye and some not even that.

Let me provide you with a couple of snippets that might provide a window back to 1976 and the

context for our older Young Turks as they prepared there paper.

Strategically, the mid 1970's saw Australia's immediate region with some significant changes from our present perspective as powerful allies Britain and the United States withdrew. The intentions of communist players in the region - the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and North Vietnam - were unpredictable. The problems of many developing nations in Southeast Asia provided opportunities for communist insurgency.ⁱ Of equal interest were the shifts in the balance of power on the Indian subcontinent and the emerging strategic relationship between India and the Soviet Union. The Reds were truly under our beds and the Indian Ocean had an emerging focus.

The 1976 Defence White Paper concluded that Australia was a difficult country to invade, conquer or occupy and was a power of sufficient substance to discourage any low level pressure.ⁱⁱ Notwithstanding, the review placed great emphasis on a core force structure to defend the continent rather than an expeditionary capability, any capacity in this area would be a bonus. As Commodore Peter Jones observed in his chapter on this period in the Centenary History of the RAN 'the lack of motive or capability resident in regional powers made the defence manageable and the conviction grew that a self reliant policy was most appropriate in the coming era.'ⁱⁱⁱ

Operationally, the RAN was on the back end of a significant commitment to the Vietnam War with a wide range of contributions across the Navy. The contribution clearly had had a positive impact on the Navy's operational effectiveness with seasoned experienced men, the most senior of who had served in numerous major conflicts over the preceding 30 years.^{iv}

Centrepiece of the RAN was the aircraft carrier HMAS *Melbourne* and the Fleet Air Arm including A4 Skyhawks, S-2 Trackers, Wessex and the new Sea King helicopters. Three destroyer squadrons divided by class of ship, *Charles F Adams*, *Darings* and *River* Escorts, four *Oberon* class submarines with two more to be delivered, 3 diving teams, Minesweepers/Hunters and 20 *Attack* class patrol boats

The RAN leadership of the time was also coming to terms with the establishment of an integrated Department of Defence with centralisation of the Departments of Navy, Army and Air. Along with this move was the concentration of Strategic Policy and Force Development Organisation with Defence Central.^v

On top of all this Government had directed in the 1973-74 budget manpower economies of 25% in the Fleet Air Arm, 20% less in fleet steaming

time, and cuts of 1100 uniformed personnel and 880 civilian positions, of note this was still a uniformed strength of 16784.^{vi}

Influences

In identifying the future needs for the RAN, the Young Turks began as you would expect with an analysis of the key geopolitical influences to set the context for the challenges of their Navy of 1985-2000:

- direct invasion was generally accepted as low and shifts in the power balances in the area of Australia's interest had the potential to require military response from the Navy
- the competition for resources as unexplored areas dwindle would become fierce and result in the requirement for much greater offshore surveillance than the past
- depletion of fish stocks world wide would see fishing fleets take even more liberties with national boundaries
- the ever-increasing world trade carried on the or over the seas
- they concluded in this area was worthy of closer study the trends in levels on the various routes and the content of that trade goods carried there on are just as important as knowledge of military capability

Many of those factors the Young Turks considered are not dissimilar to our own strategic context today

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and consistent with many of the key outlined in the current *Plan Blue*.

Technology

Today in capability development the ADF's ability to maintain the technology edge is becoming more difficult.^{vii}

Rapid improvements in computing power and communications ability, improved ability to integrate sensors to weapons, nano- and bio-technologies with potential for military applications and uninhabited autonomous vehicles are a few of the technologies that we are coming to grips with. While the Young Turks of 1976 faced some different technology influences for their time they were just as big as the elephants that we are grappling with in terms of complexity. Others were the very same ones.

The Young Turks immediate focus was the submarine's overriding influence on seapower. They predicted that this was *not expected to change* and they were right. From their perspective no amount of technological improvements in sonars, passive arrays laser underwater sensors, nuclear depth bombs or anything else would diminish the high vulnerability of shipping to attack from submarines and that the concentration of many resources into anti-submarine forces may well be misguided.

The trend at the time was for bigger and bigger ships but our original Young Turks felt that probably the best defence was to increase the numbers of hulls (less eggs in each basket) and the RAN Research Laboratory study had shown the need for a destroyer force of about 17. It is interesting to note that the ADF is again revisiting the ASW concept of operations and looking to describe the technology options available to improve our capability in this area of warfare. Notwithstanding the 1976 Young Turks cautions, ASW remains integral to our ability to exercise sea control. The philosophy of 'fighting at arms length' acting outside the submarines weapons engagement range is still at the forefront of our thinking.

Another key technology influence in the Young Turks consideration was the ever increasing number of smart weapons being sold to countries with little or no industrial or technological basis of their own. The ever decreasing costs, increasing reliability, simplicity of operations and comparative invulnerability to countermeasures of these weapons were considered to be the greatest levellers of all. The ability for the tiniest nations to fit them to fishing boats and produce a credible threat at low cost and more importantly the difficulty of identifying which are the enemy and which are not. This is not too far from our own

situation in current operations where the need to deal with the identification problem is a real issue with an asymmetric threat that has the ability to deploy a missile threat in a speed boat among other small contacts.

Having considered the geopolitical and technology influences the Young Turks took time to analyse the function and roles of the RAN. It is clear that the division between Air Force and Navy responsibilities was in the forefront of their mind and I can imagine this would have provided frank and open discussion around the Captain of *Perth's* dinner table over a couple of bottles of red wine. Discussions of two carriers I am sure featured strongly.

Function and roles

The next phase of the Young Turks analysis was a review of the RAN's function and roles. They proposed a slight amendment with the Navy's function being 'the conduct of operations at *and over* the sea for the defence of Australia and Australian Interests'. The key roles to support this function were:

- to organise, train and equip naval forces for sustained combat operations
- to project seapower in order to deter the aggressor against Australian persons, property or interests at sea
- to react effectively to meet sudden situations where maritime intervention is desirable to support national interests
- to maintain tactical superiority in any areas necessary for naval operations including defence of maritime trade
- to conduct maritime surveillance
- to conduct oceanographic and hydrographic surveys to meet national needs and as a contribution to the advancement of knowledge
- to provide military sea transport to meet the national requirements

Remembering that the Services were only just being brought to together for joint operations there were also four common functions for all of the Australian Services:

- to deter aggression as far as a single nation defence postures will deter the aggressor
- uphold and protect Australia's National interests by military means
- contribute to United Nations supervisory or peacekeeping forces
- to ensure the security of Australia and its territories

Looking back from where we have been over the last 30 years there is not much that this articulation of functions and roles hasn't covered.

Capability development

With strategic considerations completed the Young Turks moved on to set out their vision for Navy's capability development.

Key in their consideration of how best to ready the future Navy was the gestation period required to deliver a new ship and the need to acquire the hardware due; a reality for all of us that is also unlikely to change although I am pleased to say planning for future growth is high in the minds of our current Maritime Development staff.

The focus on strategic self reliance was again omnipresent as the Young Turks identified an urgent requirement for Australia to have an independent defence industry capability

- to build, maintain but most of importantly design warships in order to provide the independent capability to expand the navy in times of need
- the ability to design and build smart weapons
- the development of nuclear technology in order to provide an ability to develop a nuclear deterrent on its own citing that Australia should not rely on the USA to equalise the balance or to provide a nuclear umbrella

They also foresaw an urgent need to consider a systems analysis of the whole surveillance task to determine the proper place of space, air and seaborne vehicles; again, an area of capability development that we continue to consider on a regular basis.

While the Young Turks were focused on the innovative elements of technology of their time they cautioned that a focus on the latest technology brought some risks - the need to provide the attendant maintenance expertise associated with the technology and the overheads of providing the requisite training and more importantly the logistics base to support the replacement of parts.

Fundamental to looking at technology was a need for greater awareness among the Defence community of Australia's R&D capability within the various Research Establishments and Laboratories (now DSTO); a sentiment that I would endorse. They also proposed a broadening of research areas to include softer areas of interest to ensure that the Navy might have a better understanding of the personnel issues such as:

- management information systems for command and control
- behavioural science aspects including those that might help Navy understand the issues behind retention and maintaining a viable reserve force

I believe that a lot of their requirements in this area have been borne out in the much improved engagement of those research laboratories

successors in DSTO across all the fundamental inputs to capability although we can always do more.

Operations and tactics

Let us now consider our Young Turks outlook on operations and tactics; *again self reliance was a big driver*. It is clear from their paper that the Young Turks were concerned that there was a lack of common understanding of Australia's maritime strategy and concepts of operation were buried or lacked detail. At a tactical level the RAN was on the fringe of NATO and the US Navy in doctrine development and needed to generate some original thought in tactical matters in order to develop organic tactics to counter the capabilities of potential opponents.

As the more senior members of the audience would be aware, some intimately, the RAN has taken those steps to address this issue. At a tactical level there is a much improved focus on developing and maintaining our own tactics. At a strategic level Australia's key concepts and themes for maritime power were laid out in our own publication of *Australian Maritime Doctrine* in the year 2000 under Chief of Navy Shackleton and penned, with some help from his friends, by the Commandant.^{viii}

Despite the long term involvement of the RAN in real world operations, our Young Turks of 1976 assessed that the professionalism of the RAN had reached a laudable level in the post-Vietnam period because the emphasis had shifted elsewhere. In their paper they allude to the challenge of developing a core team in a ship as it transitions through major maintenance periods and then the ensuing trials and workup only to have key personnel post off at the end of the workup. I dare say a problem not lost on those here who have served at sea over the last 30 years.

The solution lay in the Young Turks proposal for three dedicated Task Groups to be formed comprised of a DDG, a destroyer or FFG, 2 escorts and 2 submarines all operating on 3-year cycle regardless of type. All postings would also be of three years duration.

The first year would see the key personnel from the previous commission having prepared the ship for maintenance handing over to the new crew in detail over a month with new to type personnel joining for familiarisation. Shore based pre-workup training would be completed for all units with detailed attention being given to the training of the new commanding officers.

On completion of the maintenance activity ships would conduct trials and workups such that by years end the group would be ready for collective task group training both ashore in tactical trainers

and at sea in tactical periods with formal assessment of the group in an Operational Readiness Evaluation. The remainder of the year would be spent operating as a task group on the Australian Station. Year Three would of course see the group participating in all multinational exercises and undertaking at least one lengthy deployment overseas

It was pleasing to see that the Young Turks had some consideration for the Fleet Planners and having been that planner in late 2000, I am pleased to report that many of those concepts were absolutely necessary for meeting the various commitments of the Navy in the war against terror and protection of our borders although the opportunity for overseas trips other than for operations were scarce.

Infrastructure

No matter the strategic influences, capability development needs and operations the optimum employment of maritime forces is largely dependent upon the infrastructure which supports and guides them.

For the Young Turks of 1976 there was need for considerable change characterising the infrastructure as a hydradic body with three heads -

the political, the managerial and the logistic. You wondered what the snake was all about!

The head political

At the strategic level they identified an urgent and ongoing need for the naval officer to understand the political mind and equally important for the politician to understand the naval mind. A sentiment that I am sure our former Chief of the Defence Force, Chiefs of Navy and other senior officers would endorse wholeheartedly.

The head managerial

At the middle level of the Navy the Young Turks were concerned that the training was insular and largely by example and experience within the ambit of naval duties. Their concern - the relevance of modern management theories and practices to Navy and whether sufficient opportunities are provided at an early stage of ones career that will contribute to make us fit for higher management roles later in our careers.

The Young Turks proposed that by 1986 the following systems should be implemented to improve management experience and systems in the Navy:

- active short term exchanges with industry,



commerce and government at all levels

- financial responsibility channelled further down the chain of command
- decentralisation of some directorates with cells established in Sydney, Perth and Northern Australia
- a maritime operations room to control the management of all surveillance operations
- land-based Task Group offices handling the bulk of paperwork which clogs the lives of seagoing personnel
- stenographic facilities readily available to ships alongside in dockyards to help handle the paperwork
- modern management aids installed in directorates and establishments offset by man-hour savings
- improved intra Australian communications networks that could improve productivity and save man-hours
- correspondence in the form of computer stowage facilities in ships and establishments and simple information retrieval services

Many of those opportunities for management experience and systems have been provided in various forms over the years although I fear that many of the modern management aids while improving some aspects of productivity are increasing man hours and we still have some room for improvement.

The head logistic

The Young Turks were in no doubt of the need for a well-oiled logistic machine adequate to the needs of their vision for the RAN in the coming years. For their purposes the centralisation of stores in Sydney and the formation of a Support Command controlling not only stores but also the military transport required to deliver rapidly to ships and squadrons was essential in order streamline the supply chain. The potential of modern computers had been barely tapped from a logistics point of view and was considered critical to improving logistics support to the Navy.

New bases in north and north-west Australia with docking facilities and mobile technical units to deploy rapidly were also proposed to ensure the quick turn around of defective equipment.

While there is probably some room for more tapping of those modern computers and the automation of the ADF logistics system is a work in progress the Young Turks vision is very consistent with the very significant evolution and sometimes even revolution of our logistics and sustainment organisation over the last 30 years.

Personnel

Let me now turn to the last section of the Young Turks of 1976 vision for the future Navy by examining their view of personnel. It would be fair to say that the personnel perspective is a reality of every generation and the class of 1976 was no different.

On the back of the Vietnam War our Young Turks were as much concerned about the need for the Navy to compete in the employment market for its fair share of talented people as we are today by ensuring that the public could easily identify with what their Australian Navy was really all about.

The traditional advertising of kaleidoscope commercials did not impress this group and the use of civilian expertise in the marketing of the Navy as a career choice was proposed. Although the jingle of 'you'll be wet, tired, homesick and frightened and the pride of the fleet will be you' rings loud and clear in many of the older generations ears for the right and the wrong reasons. Based upon some of the discussion last night with the younger members of the audience there is still a need to provide a more accurate public image of what the Navy is and what is not.

Education

The decision to create this very establishment we sit in today was fresh in our Young Turks minds and their consideration of officer educational needs was extensive beyond initial training.

Not surprisingly the 1976 Young Turks did not see the Defence Academy as the total answer to the future education needs of the Navy and proposed an education program based upon the following:

- a sound basic education to the level consistent with community standards
- further studies at career break points in order to meet the personal needs for advanced education unhindered by trying to conduct two jobs simultaneously
- training in the community to fit officers for postings in the higher echelon of the defence force
- manpower levels to cope with the allocation of appropriately qualified officers not only to in-service hardware orientated billets but also to research and development

Training

Separate from education our Young Turks of 1976 asked that the professional skills required at each stage of a career should be clearly defined and any training superfluous to the requirement deleted.

To improve professional performance through training, the Young Turks proposed the investment of a higher percentage of manpower and money to

improve training not just the administration. Similarly they suggested that the strong need for facilities that enable meaningful training in the shore environment that in turn reduce as far as possible the need for operational units to conduct basic training onboard.

Employment

While I made light of the different tribes that make up the Navy earlier, at the end of the day there is much to learn from different sub-cultures some good and bad. The 1976 Young Turks were no different and perceived some advantages to benchmarking the manner in which specialised arms of the Navy's employment are managed.

The mid career crisis which Admiral MacDougall alluded to last night or perhaps the 28 year old syndrome was a concern to him then as much as it was today. The syndicate did not propose the need for specific measures other than to improve the management of officer's careers in whom large investments have already been made. Improving the accessibility of DNOP desk officers to those not within convenient distance of head office. As you heard last night a sense of job satisfaction, participation and meeting ambition where key issues around motivation for the Young Turks of 1976.

They saw the need for accentuated measurement techniques for the promulgation of job performance, hence satisfaction for the individual stemming from the knowledge that results and goals are being achieved. Conversely protection for the system when poor performance is recognised and can be corrected.

A need for greater feedback on performance in exercises both collectively and individually. Too often officers at the levels who participated in an exercise have little or no awareness of whether the aims were achieved and what contribution their own unit made.

Officers and sailors must feel that their job is worthwhile, interesting and itself contributing to how they are assessed professionally. Similarly when serving at sea they must be involved in operational tasks and not continuously training for trainings sake.

Conclusions

Reading the work of the original RAN 'self confessed not so Young Turks' of 1976 provides an incredible insight into the influences affecting the Royal Australian Navy at that time and equally the world scene.

For these officers their vision for the future was borne in a time when perhaps self-reliance was more of an imperative than it is today although

probably a matter of degrees.

As Alfred Mahan tells strategists in his introduction to *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History* 'While many of the conditions of war vary from age to age with the progress of weapons, there are certain teachings in the school of history which remain constant...' He goes on to say 'It is wise to observe things that are alike, it is also wise to look for things that differ.'

While technology and the geopolitical issues are constantly changing there are some immutables for the Navy in its thinking about the future. Many of the 1976 Navy's issues are now our issues albeit perhaps in different forms. The conduct of operations, the Fleet Schedule, tactics, doctrine, education, individual and collective training, maintaining capability, logistics, personnel recruitment and retention are all part of our business if our Navy is to realise its current mission to fight and win at sea.

For the next generation of Young Turks and all that are here serving in the RAN let's make sure that document retrieval system does work....when we are asked to contemplate our future - let's not forget to review the previous documentation, our corporate experience and observe the things that are alike and the things that are different.

ⁱ Peter Jones, '1972-1983: Towards Self Reliance, in D Stevens (ed) *The Royal Australian Navy, The Australian Centenary History of Defence: Volume III*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, Australia 2001, p. 211.

ⁱⁱ *ibid*, p. 214.

ⁱⁱⁱ *ibid*

^{iv} *ibid*, p. 211.

^v *ibid*, p. 214.

^{vi} *ibid*, p. 223.

^{vii} Royal Australian Navy, *Plan Blue: Headmark 2025*, Canberra, 2005, p. 6.

^{viii} Commodore James Goldrick, AM CSC RAN, Commandant Australian Defence Force Academy.

Young Turks II - Where we see the Navy in the next 20 years

Midshipmen Alisha Withers and Joshua Reilly

The Navy's mission is *'to fight and win in the maritime environment as an element of a joint or combined force, to assist in maintaining Australian's sovereignty and to contribute to the security of our nation.'* This mission encompasses our duty not only to Australia, but as a member of a region, as well as recognising that we are a part of the wider ADF and must operate as such.

Roles

The Navy has responsibilities that can be categorised into three main areas: warfighting roles; essential non-warlike roles; and adaptive non-warlike roles. Warfighting roles can be broken up into conventional and unconventional warfighting. Essentially non-warlike roles are things such as peacekeeping, search and rescue, enforcement of economic sanctions or arms embargoes etc. Adaptive non-warlike roles include natural disaster relief and protection of critical infrastructure.

Geopolitical influences

It is safe to assume that the likelihood of a direct invasion on mainland Australia is very low; however, in today's world political climate; there is an increasing threat of terrorist attacks and the use of weapons of mass destruction. Other issues that directly affect Australia are illegal fishing and people smuggling. This has increased the need for offshore surveillance and the patrol boats in their constabulary duties deny access to such offenders.

Australia's alliance with the United States has a stabilising effect in a region of great instability due to economical, political and social challenges.

Technology, research and development

The Navy is about to enter a period which is unlike anything previously experienced. With the expansion of both threats and operations, and whilst maintaining a capability that allows for traditional roles to be filled, it will require careful monitoring. Australia has planned for an increase in both size and capability of ships that will replace the current fleet. As was the case when last this brief was given, Australia will need to choose between the lesser technological risks of off-the-shelf systems with the custom built but often troublesome purpose-built systems. These new ships and systems, more complex than those we have now, will create a need for industry as well as research and development organisations to expand to meet the task ahead of

offering Australia both self reliance and interoperability with allied nations.

Shipbuilding

Australia's shipbuilding industry has already earmarked both time and resources to the development of facilities to handle future needs. The building of the largest ships to enter service with the Navy, the LHD's, as well as AWD's and others will place new demands on industry. As has happened in the past, these huge surges in major shipbuilding projects will be followed by a period where the Navy's use of these facilities will decline. The Navy will need to insure that follow-on contracts provide sufficient work to maintain the companies whilst not losing capability by limiting our options. Although the facilities in Adelaide and Melbourne are undoubtedly of great importance to the Navy and future capability, these facilities are not without flaws. Both are a great distance from either fleet base creating issues for those officers and sailors posted to ships during trails and commissioning. Facilities at a ship's home port that cater fully for refit needs would offer both increased capability and security. Facilities such as Darwin Naval Base which is able to service fully, ships home ported can easily show the benefits to both ship and crew. Regardless of location, a strong shipbuilding industry is a strategic asset that would be of great importance to Australia should large scale conflict occur.

Smart weapons

The Navy continues to bring into service more and more capable weapons systems. Over the next twenty years the increase in the size of platforms will offer the Navy more options over the weapons systems fitted to those ships. The cost of these technologies will continue to limit the Navy's ability to conduct independent R&D into such technology. The Navy's current and planned capabilities in regards to smart weapons speak of increasing accuracy and effectiveness. While the Navy will update weapons to offer the greatest effectiveness, it will not likely develop the kinds of smart weapons at the level used by the US or other larger maritime powers. The Navy does not have the critical mass required to support the cost of development or implementation of these weapons. Within the likely scope of future operations, the Navy possesses or plans to develop weapons

capable of inflicting sufficient damage proportional to size. As technology improves and becomes cheaper, the Navy will again have to decide on the performance of smart weapons verses the cost of R&D, purchase and fitting as well as on-going costs involved. Combating these weapons will still pose an issue for the Navy. As smaller and more accurate weapons become ever more capable of inflicting crippling damage, systems to combat them will need to improve accordingly. R&D organisations within Australia will need to work closely in the future with both the Navy and allies to maintain the capability to protect high value assets from attack by smart weapons.

Nuclear technology

The Navy could, if not in the next twenty years, be forced to begin R&D into nuclear propulsion at some stage. The cost and access to conventional fuels will become restrictively expensive and limited access to heavy crude oil may limit Australia's maritime capability. The ships being brought into service in the next twenty years will undoubtedly remain conventional; however, their replacements should come at a time when alternate propulsion system will be smaller, more efficient and a possible necessity. A possible alternative to nuclear propulsion in the future may come in the form of fuel cells. Research into fuel cell technology continues to make advances and could soon offer a small sustainable and economical power source. These could easily be used to produce electricity for use on ship fitted with pod propulsion systems. In the next twenty years alternative power sources from the Navy should remain an issue for future generations of ships as the R&D into these systems could take decades.

Nuclear weapons will likely remain a capability that Australia does not possess in the future. While Australia may be forced into nuclear powered propulsion of ships, nuclear weapons will remain outside Australia's capability. The cost of developing this capability and the deterrence offered by the US makes nuclear weapons unnecessary for the ADF to invest time and money in.

Satellites

Australia should continue to develop satellite and other advance communication systems over the next twenty years. Combining satellite technology with new systems such as the RAAF's new AEW&C aircraft will allow the Navy to increase its effectiveness. Australia's allies, namely the US will offer the most to the Navy in access and effective use of these technologies and future Navy ships will have to be increasingly capable of integration

into allied task groups in the same way that the communication abilities of the LPA's were found to be of great use. UAV's or high altitude/stratospheric balloons fitted with surveillance or communication equipment could provide the Navy a cost effective means to overcome the problems faced by small-medium powers like ourselves. The Navy should focus on developing a robust strategic approach to accessing and using these types of equipment.

Control of technology

As has always been the situation and will continue to affect operations in the future, the Navy must find a way to balance money spent on stocked stores and the time taken to source un-stocked parts. With so many new systems coming into service within the next twenty years, and in relatively small numbers, the Navy will need to carefully manage maintenance costs and the new contracts involved. The phasing in of new systems will also be complemented with the paying off of old systems. The management of both during this period will be vitally important. Old systems must be kept operational and at sea until they are taken out of service without overstocking on parts that will soon be of no use. The new systems must be maintained and brought into fully operation standards as quickly as possible, so not to prolong any initial problems. As will be the case for almost everything the Navy is involved in, contract management with industry over maintenance of systems, both old and new, will need close scrutiny to insure the systems are available to complete operational requirements.

Existing R&D

Many organisations exist within Australia, both military and civilian that conduct important R&D. The Navy must continue to work closely with these groups to maximise their effectiveness. The Navy must set clear requirements which then allow R&D organisations to develop ways to meet future needs and overcome current problems.

Realism in R&D

Current contractual plans for the development and maintenance of future system will require extremely close management if they are to succeed. If it became evident that companies had under-bid in order to secure contracts, the effects would be on going. Not only will development and implementation run over cost, maintenance will also suffer. Operational requirements will strain equipment not only beyond levels tested in trials but for longer periods. Contracts may not factor in overseas or remote operations and with increases in range and endurance, the Navy could likely be operating at greater ranges for longer periods than

in recent decades. As has been the case for many decades before, the Navy has adapted to fill requirements for which ships were not originally designed. These changes to ship operations may be outside predicted work cycles and therefore affect ships maintenance. Changes in the role of military personnel who formally maintained equipment into operators only and the 'repair by replace' plans for new ships may leave the Navy unable to conduct maintenance at sea. Should the operational tempo continue at current levels, logistic systems in place with civilian companies may not meet Navy's needs.

Operations and tactics

With the development of documents such as *Australian Maritime Doctrine* 1 and 2 and their availability to the majority of members, the Navy has allowed access to concepts previously not understood or known. In the future, operations undertaken by the Navy will be used to measure the accuracy of doctrine. The Navy is bringing into service new and larger ships, while continuing to upgrade existing platforms and weapons systems. The effectiveness of old and new platforms operating together and separately to complete tasks will require careful management during the transition years.

The role of the Navy is and will remain: the ability to deny an opponent the use of our maritime approaches and allow Australia the freedom to operate at sea. This is critical to the defence of Australia and to our capacity to contribute effectively to the security of our immediate neighbours. Maintaining this capability and improving it will provide important options for the contribution of the Navy to coalitions in support of our national interests. The Government expects the Navy to maintain the ability to detect and attack any major surface ships, and to impose substantial constraints on hostile submarines operations, in our extended maritime approaches. The Navy must also be capable of providing the ability to maintain Australian forces deployed offshore, to contribute to maritime security in our wider region, to protect our sea lanes and ports from the threat of sea mines and to support civil law enforcement and coastal surveillance operations. The Navy must also maintain a capable major surface fleet able to operate in a wide range of circumstances throughout our maritime approaches and beyond.

Goals the future Navy must be capable and willing to meet in order to provide are:

- our ships must be able to operate effectively with those of the US whilst being able to contribute to regional coalition operations
- our submarines must be capable of operating

effectively in high capacity operational environments in the region and pose a threat to any hostile forces in our maritime approaches

- our patrol boats need to contribute a cost-effective and sustainable force to civil coastal enforcement and surveillance operations
- our new ships brought into service over the next twenty years must be able to effectively replace current ships without gaps in capability appearing whilst they enter full operation service

The future fleet structure aims to overcome the capability gaps currently experienced by the Navy. The AWD's should fill the important role of long range air defence for the fleet. Future support vessels, with increased size and capability, will allow the Navy to carry-out operations at a greater distance for longer periods without the need for secure ports or foreign support. This will give the Government greater options with respect to international operations in which the ADF will participate.

In recent years unconventional threats to Australia have emerged, while conventional threats remain, as do the non-warlike roles that the Navy conducts. The Navy's conventional war fighting capability will always be based around the concept 'to fight and win at sea'. While the strategic basis for this concept is known and understood, it is possibly beyond the capacity of the Navy. The Navy should consider in the next twenty years whether we are likely to participate in a decisive blue water battle as described by Mahan. The Navy is more likely to operate in the projection of force ashore through the littoral environment as described by Corbett. The Navy should consider both of these options against Navy and ADF capabilities and rethink the mission. Within the region, the Navy is amongst the most capable and is regarded highly by allied navies. The planned force structure and associated capability should help the Navy maintain this status; if the Navy wishes to improve its status, it would need to rely on both capable platforms and capable personnel management and planning.

In conventional warfighting the Navy should, over the next twenty years, overcome capability gaps and aging fleet units. The new capabilities set out for the LHD's, AWD's and other major fleet units (MFU's) should increase current levels of effectiveness beyond that which the Navy has possessed since World War II. Conflict on the scale of WWII is unlikely to ever occur again. However should large scale conflict occur, the intensity would be so great that the duration would be much shorter. Lower level conflicts and combat support roles similar those over the last few decades are quite possible. The future fleet will increase both

reach and endurance not only for the Navy but for those assets and personnel placed ashore. Greater joint operational capability with increased range and endurance could offer the Government options far beyond those the Navy and ADF can offer currently.

In the next two decades the operational tempo experienced by the Navy could increase. Once Australia withdraws troops from Iraq after it becomes fully independent, the Navy could remain behind in some capacity as it has since 1990. North Korea continues to raise concerns with her nuclear program. If the US were to consider North Korea a threat under the 'War on Terror' it could mean a return to the Korean Peninsular. Australia may well commit forces there in support of UN or coalition forces.

China continues to increase in military strength and Taiwan continues to be the thorn in her side. It seems only a matter of time before China reclaims Taiwan by force. The US has made it clear that they will react with force if China were to do this, which could bring Australia to the point of having to choose between the US alliance and Chinese trade. A difficult question and like much of this, purely speculative and open to many interpretations.

Closer to home, PNG could require attention from the Navy as part of the Government's assistance package. The level of involvement in PNG will depend on the Navy being either directly involved or in a support role to other agencies such as the Australian Federal Police. Australia will offer aid to PNG where and when needed and the Navy will continue to provide assistance as directed.

The increase in prevalence of non-conventional operations has brought with it new requirements which could affect the Navy. In the event the Navy operates under the threat of non-conventional attack, the relative utility of some weapons systems could be questioned. The Navy may be forced to attack smaller targets that are currently indistinguishable by smart weapons. Increased human interface to insure the correct acquisition of targets would place new strains on the crew. The introduction of surveillance systems such as AWAC and MILSAT will increase effectiveness in these situations.

The Navy will continue, in the next twenty years, to be called on to participate in essential non-combat roles. The ongoing border protection and fisheries roles carried out by the *Fremantle* class patrol boats and eventually the *Armidale* class patrol boats (ACPBs) will remain one of the most important non-combat tasks undertaken by the Navy. The further development of facilities and the joint operational nature of this task will, under planned objectives, increase efficiency. The events of the last year in Indonesia highlighted possibly

the most important non-combat role the Navy could serve in the next twenty years. Disaster relief is a task not trained for, but which the Navy is undoubtedly suited. Future ships such as the LHD's will have an enhanced ability to deal with such events due to their range, endurance, lift and support capability. The Navy could begin to place larger ships into these roles during periods where their specific capability is not needed. Larger vessels such as the FFH, FFG or AWD could be involved in operations in the Southern Ocean where smaller vessels cannot safely operate but where the Navy's expertise is critical.

Peacekeeping and support to these operations will continue to be important. Anywhere Australia could increase the stability of another nation could only have positive flow-on effects, and both major and minor acquisition programs will provide capabilities that will enable these operations to continue. Increases in the speed, size and range of RHIB's and improvements in personal protective gear will improve the operational efficiency of roles such as those being carried out in the Gulf. Coalition interoperability should remain a focus over the next twenty years. With new vessels coming into service, the Navy will be able to fill a larger role in coalition forces. The Navy should work together with coalition partners during the design phase and when developing procedures for the operation of these new platforms.

Actual capability: current and planned

Currently the Navy is crossing a capability gap. Current ships, although very capable in their own right do not meet the full spectrum of the Navy's operational needs. The three AWD's should close some capability gaps. These ships will, as is currently the case, require support in order to operate outside of Australia's direct sphere of control. HMA Ships *Success* and *Westralia* are both limited in peacetime activities by international treaties. The replacement double hulled vessels will fill the same purpose but without the limitations set on current vessels. Upgrades to existing ships will insure their effectiveness over the coming twenty years and may extend their operational lives further. The new ACPBs have the potential to increase the number of patrol boat days at sea while decreasing individual strain on sailors.

Project Air 9000 promises the replacement of aging airframes like the Sea King helicopter; however, suitability of aircraft for use in the maritime environment must be considered. Land based aircraft could prove useful in supplementing naval aircraft for large operations but the Navy must be capable of providing airframes for continued use at sea.

Personnel

It is important to realise and remember that the people are central to the Navy's ability to fight and win at sea. Without the right people with the right skills, no amount of technology will secure operational success for the Navy.

Identity

Currently the Navy does not hold a prominent position in society; however, we hope to see a change in this in the coming years. The most effective way to do this would be to improve media relations. Whilst the media loves to print a story on sailors misbehaving, they rarely show the public the positive aspects of what we are doing. The problem is, it takes years to build a good reputation with the public and only seconds on prime time television to forge a bad one. With the media's help, we, the Navy and the wider ADF, will be able to establish our public identity and show ourselves for what we are; dedicated individuals striving to serve our country and uphold the values of honour, honesty, courage, integrity and loyalty.

Recruiting

It is a well known fact that the demographics of Australia are changing. We have a rapidly aging population and this will have an impact on the Navy's ability to recruit personnel. Recent television ads have increased public awareness about seaman officers in the Navy, showing it to be an exciting career prospect, but this is where it stops. These have been very beneficial for recruiting seaman officers, but the need is greater than this. We see the need for continued development of these ads in order to show the public that there are options; they can study for a degree or learn a trade; they can work with their hands, on the bridge of a ship, in an engine space or in an office. Today more than ever we are competing with the private sector and realistically, if we want to increase numbers, we need to target school leavers with information on all aspects of the Navy, not just on being a seaman officer. An increase in public interaction, such as in schools, shopping centres, anywhere young people who are faced with making career decisions are, will have a positive influence on recruiting.

The ADF's recent change to outsourced recruiting has had a negative impact on the recruiting process. The contact potential members have with military personnel has been severely limited. How can a teenager be expected to make a decision about joining an organisation when all they see are people of another organisation? Whilst recruiting videos are great to watch, without face to

face contact with real life officers, senior and junior sailors, a full appreciation of the situation cannot be gained. We see considerable benefits in reintroducing military personnel to the recruiting process.

Retention

Whilst a flow of people through the Navy is healthy, there is a greater need to retain skilled and experienced personnel. With the average age of the Australian workforce increasing and changing attitudes to families, ie women going back to work after having children, close attention needs to be paid to the conditions in which Navy personnel work. Higher morale, greater motivation and flexible employment options will all result in higher retention.

There are many factors to be considered when posting someone, and these include opportunities for spouses to gain employment, educational facilities for children and special needs requirements need to be fulfilled, as with the issue of back-to-back postings in order to gain some stability, especially for the children involved. Trying to obtain the most stable life as possible, especially for those members with families to consider, should continue to be looked at by the Navy. Improving these conditions will surely encourage personnel to stay with the Navy longer, rather than taking their skills and expertise to the private sector.

As more women today are choosing to return to work after having children, it is important that the Navy look at ways to encourage these women to stay. Limits, such as the age limit for sea command, need to be looked at, to take into consideration those women who take time out to have children. Childcare also needs to be more accessible, especially for those with several children, as the cost of putting them in day care full time is becoming increasingly expensive.

With a higher operational tempo at the moment, people are spending much more time at sea, away from the families and friends. People in this situation should be focused on and given more benefits to show appreciation for their hard work. Whilst it is recognised that it is often not possible to take leave, perhaps an option to 'cash out' their excess leave would be more viable.

Education

Education is a critical investment for the future of the Navy. People today want to spend more time studying and the Navy needs to provide options to make this possible. Such options should include the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA), civil schooling and distance education. We believe

personnel should be able to undertake continuing study in their primary qualification, as well as in functional qualifications such as human resource/project management. Sailors should also be offered a greater range of technical training courses to continue their professional development.

Having education more accessible and more flexible will also prove to be a great recruitment and retention tool.

Training

With the impending introduction of new fleet units, both major and minor, the Navy should continue to focus on training. It has become evident in the past that in order to increase the time on the job, training courses have been shortened. This has resulted in a great loss of knowledge at all levels. We see a need for the Navy to re-examine and redevelop training continuums so as to ensure that our crews are highly capable and have a great wealth of practical knowledge to see them perform well above the acceptable standard. One way to do this is the use of On Board Training Systems (OBTS). This system will allow for warfare training to be conducted at sea and ensure the highest standard possible throughout the fleet.

Another issue is accreditation and certification. Whilst sailors receive certification for their courses, the Navy should look closely at the certification of the officer branches. If the Navy were to focus on this issue, we believe they would see great benefit in the way of retention and job satisfaction.

Another issue the Navy will be faced with in the next twenty years is the increase in joint operations. In today's political climate and our 'unique strategic environment', joint operations will be seen much more often than single Service operations. As such, we see the need for the Navy to continue to adapt their training programs to take this into account.

Conclusion

During the next twenty years and beyond, technology will continue to evolve. Smarter more capable systems will come into service throughout the world. R&D into these technologies must continue if the Navy hopes to maintain any advantages currently enjoyed. The Navy has a responsibility to the ADF, the Government and the Australian public to stay abreast of these future technologies. Through careful and close work with R&D organisations, the Navy must make an effort to insure we have access to the most appropriate technologies. Although there will be many options available and on offer, the Navy must choose the system that is most suited to the task it will serve, not the system with the greatest number of features.

Operationally, the Navy should close current capability gaps. With these issues dealt with, the Navy can take advantage of the capability offered by new fleet units. MFU's will be capable of extended operational deployments and increased versatility. Greater range, endurance, lift and support capability will allow the Navy to take part in larger deployments with greater force for longer periods. During the next twenty years these new systems will be brought online and into operational service. Over this period, the Navy should expect to maintain current operational requirements. Operations in the Gulf or abroad in the same or similar capacity should be expected. Operations in support of our neighbours and within our region should continue to occupy the Navy. Protection of Australian waters by ACPBs and MFU's should continue in much the same way as it has over the past twenty years. Only in a worst case event should the Navy expect high intensity conflict. Although the likely operations the Navy will participate in may not vary greatly, a shuffle of which are the most important to Australia could. A change of Government or in public support for an operation could easily turn the Navy towards projection abroad or to purely regional issues.

The major issues we see the Navy facing over the next twenty years with respect to personnel are those of recruiting and retention. By the very nature of our job, recruiting will always be a struggle, and our ageing population and competition with the private sector are not going to make it any easier. The Navy has already begun to combat this with more media time but we see the need for a continued emphasis on this to continue high levels of recruitment. For retention, whilst it is easy to say we need to improve the working and living conditions for personnel in the Navy, we recognise that this is not so easily accomplished. We need to find a balance between the quality of life of Navy personnel and the operational requirements of our job. Everyone has different priorities in their life, whether it be having a family, continuing their education, freedom and independence or the simple pleasure of watching the sun set over the ocean; but whatever their priorities, if the Navy wants to retain their knowledge and experience, it will have to continue to adapt and move with the times.

Strategic Plan 2005-10

Overview

The Australian Naval Institute (ANI) is an independent not for profit organisation, incorporated in the Australian Capital Territory. It has been in existence since 1975 and its role in the Australian maritime environment is to:


- a. Encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the maritime profession.
- b. Provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and the maritime profession.

The purpose of this Plan is to outline the key strategic challenges facing the Institute between 2005-10 and to provide the basis to guide the Council in its efforts to meet these challenges in an effective way. Many of the challenges are not new but their coherent articulation in this form of document is. This Plan is intended for all members of the Institute so they can understand the challenges and the context within which the Council is operating.


Where are we now?

Membership



The ANI currently has 263 individual members, 19 honorary members, 51 'institutional' members (libraries and other maritime organisations) and 203 memberships funded by the Sea Power Centre-Australia (for internal Navy/Defence distribution of the Journal). The ANI receives financial sponsorship in varying amounts from Raytheon Australia, LOPAC, SAAB Systems, Australian Defence Credit Union, P & O Maritime Services, Thales Underwater Systems and Jacobs Sverdrup. Since 1999, membership has been declining, but 2003 saw a welcome reversal of the downward trend.



The membership however continues to age and as Figure 2 indicates, less than 10% of members are under 40 while 40% are over 60.




There is a strong perception among serving personnel that the Institute is an organisation for senior officers. As Figure 3 clearly shows, the perception is reality. The ANI struggles for recognition amongst serving personnel below the rank of Commander and only 27% of the current membership are serving personnel (see Figure 4).



This equates to less than 1% of the serving officer corps and represents an even smaller percentage if the whole Navy is considered. While both figures 3 and 4 indicate a disturbing situation, it also represents two significant opportunities for the Institute in terms of marketing the membership of senior officers and decision makers to potential sponsors and focusing council on the untapped market potential of the pool of serving personnel.

Financial Position

The Institute's financial position has continued to improve over the last 3 years and is now the most comfortable as it has been in the last 5 years. The difficult trading conditions of 2000 and 2001 have been overcome through fiscal planning and budgeting, cost reductions in *Journal* production, the introduction of the Sea Power Centre 'sponsorship' and a focused approach to sponsorship generation and membership retention. Current revenue is evenly divided between individual membership, institutional membership and corporate sponsorship. At present Council has set no growth or retention targets for either individual memberships or corporate sponsorship, although Council does recognise the need to have individual membership as the primary source of revenue. This will take time and effort from both Council and all members. Council recently opened a Term Deposit of \$20,000 which will provide sufficient revenue to defray some fixed operating costs (eg, website). In addition to this Term Deposit, the bank account has sufficient cash to meet all outstanding liabilities (primarily paid subscriptions) up to end of 2008. Despite this strong position, the Institute remains vulnerable to a sudden decline in any one of the revenue sectors.



Activities

Our poor financial position a few years ago led to a curtailment of activities, with resources devoted to the production of the *Journal*. Over the past few years, the annual dinner combined with the Vernon Parker Oration has been reintroduced (usually in conjunction with Sea Power Centre-Australia activities) and an annual seminar for the Midshipmen at the Australian Defence Force Academy was introduced in 2004. Council recently agreed that its major activity for each year would be an evening dinner and oration followed the next day by the Midshipmen seminar. On an ad hoc basis, the ANI will conduct lectures depending on availability of appropriate personnel to give them, and the recent lecture (April 2005) by Rear Admiral Jeremy Larkin, RN on his experiences during the Falklands War was very well received.

Reciprocal Arrangements

During 2004 Council commenced a concerted push to link to regional think tanks, the basis of which would be the exchange of journals and provision of SPC-A publications. In addition to our long standing arrangements with the United States Naval Institute, the Naval Review, the Australian Defence Association and the Navy League of Australia, we now have arrangements with the Society for Indian Ocean Studies, the United Services Institute of India, the Institute for Defence Analyses (India), the Canadian Military Journal and the Canadian Naval Review.

Maritime Research Award

The Maritime Australia Award, funded by Booz Allen Hamilton (\$10,000) and the Centre for Maritime Policy (\$2,000) was announced at the Sea Power Conference 2004 and applications closed on 31 October 2005. The first recipient of the award is expected to be announced at the Sea Power Conference 2006.

Reputation

The ANI remains a respected organisation within the Australian maritime environment and continues to contribute to the maritime debate through the *Journal*, but is not well known elsewhere. The 2004 announcement of the BAH sponsored maritime research award is another significant development which will reinforce the reputation of the ANI within the domestic maritime environment. The RAN, however, remains one area where the ANI does not have the intuitive acceptance and recognition that one would expect. The participation rate by serving members is poor and reflects on the standing of the Institute in the Navy.

Financial pressures placed constraints upon the range of the Institute's activities during 2000-02. As a result the *Journal* has become the Institute's flagship activity and the major source of perceptions relating to the Institute's worth and reputation in a number of circles. Among younger serving members there is a perception that the *Journal* is stodgy, staid and increasingly a mouthpiece of the 'party line'.

The Institute's relationship with the RAN is unclear to many potential members and sponsors. It is paradoxical that the closeness of the relationship between the ANI and the RAN that appeals to sponsors may in fact turn off potential members who might be seeking an Institute with an independent voice and view.

The *Journal* is the only place for most potential members to see the independence of the Institute at work, principally through the robustness and openness of the debate. The current lack of debate is not due to any editorial policy but simply due to a lack of suitable copy. A robust debate should not be confused with a debate that is inherently critical of Government or Defence policy. Notwithstanding, the current regulations on public comment for serving civilian and defence personnel do limit the Institute's ability to achieve its aims. The 2004 Council agreement to publish articles submitted under a pen name is yet to bear fruit but has the potential to significantly mitigate this constraint, open up debate in the *Journal* and as a consequence change perceptions about the Institute itself.

In order to increase our public visibility, a website was developed with an article from each edition of the *Journal* available for download. In late 2003 the complete set of the *Journal* to date was electronically scanned and is now available as a 2 disc CD ROM set. While hopes that this would become a revenue stream have not eventuated, it is a permanent record of our contribution to the public debate and copies have been provided to our reciprocal partners.

Organisational Capabilities

The ANI membership consists of a healthy cross section of senior serving and retired leaders and decision-makers and influential Defence industry figures. The breadth of competencies and skill sets that council members bring with them should suit what is required to continue to develop the ANI. These include:

- a. strategic leadership and visioning,
- b. planning,
- c. financial management and budgeting,
- d. the ability to influence others, and
- e. producing results.

Despite these competencies, available time to commit to Institute activities remains a key constraint on the ability of Council members and to effect major reform. The need for urgent action outlined in this Plan must be balanced against

the realities of available time. Preparedness to commit must continue to be an explicit expectation of Council membership. Actual membership of the Council needs to be continually reviewed to ensure that its members have the right mix of skills and the ability to contribute. In order to better manage the increasing workload required to reinvigorate the Institute, Council sought and received agreement at the 2005 AGM to increase the size of the Council to 15 from 10.

Where are we going?

Vision

The vision for the ANI is for it to be the professional institute of choice for those interested in naval and maritime matters in Australia, New Zealand, and the Asia-Pacific.

Strategic Direction and Imperatives

Based on the survey of the Institute's current position and organisational capabilities there are a number of strategic imperatives that need to be seized to reposition the Institute.

Growing and maintaining a sustainable membership base. This is the most important strategic imperative to allow for the repositioning of the ANI. Council has debated an appropriate membership growth target and has decided that real growth of 55 members a year is achievable. Achieving increased levels of membership will allow sponsorship funds to be targeted for specific purposes rather than for general running of the Institute. The initial focus will be on attracting younger serving members of the RAN into the Institute to build a long-term membership pool to support the current base. Widening the membership base beyond Australia to the Asia-Pacific will not only add a greater potential membership pool but also provide greater diversity of content in the *Journal*.

Expanding ANI activities to increase its relevance and attractiveness to younger members. A focused membership drive for younger members can only be successful if the ANI is seen to be relevant and attractive to the target audience. A number of initiatives are planned including developing an understanding of key attractors, more contemporary branding, an increased range of the Institute's activities and more actively involving younger members in the affairs of the Institute. Council recently agreed to running at least one function in Sydney, the Jervis Bay area, Perth and Canberra from 2006.

Regional Engagement. Further efforts will be devoted to identifying and engaging regional think tanks on areas of mutual interest. At present, journals are exchanged with the copies provided to the Institute being placed in the SPC Research Collection.

Expanding the Institute's sponsorship base. The Institute will continue to nurture the valued sponsors it already has and pursue new sponsors who will complement the aims of the Institute. Additional sponsorship contributions will allow a wider range of activities to be undertaken thus enhancing the value of the relationship of all sponsors with the Institute. The drive towards increased membership numbers will make sponsorship more attractive and allow targeted use of sponsorship dollars for particular activities thus providing greater impact for each sponsor's dollar. A targeted sponsorship acquisition and retention plan will form the basis of this activity and will be developed during 2006.

Enhancing the effectiveness of corporate governance of the Institute. As part of the strategic planning process Council has developed an improved performance reporting regime, which will have specific linkages to the initiatives in this Plan.

Continuing to improve the financial state of the Institute. An important subset of enhanced corporate governance is financial governance. Council has focused much of its energy over the last four years on turning around the Institute's financial position. A balance now needs to be struck between ensuring financial survival and investing in activities that generate interest in the Institute and provide a return to its members.

The Council action plan for these imperatives and their associated strategic themes is articulated at Annex A (*held by Council members only*).

Review Requirements

The Plan will be formally reviewed and progress reported annually at the AGM. The Council action plan will be reviewed and revised as required at each meeting of the Council.

JVP GOLDRICK

President ANI

01 November 2005



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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute on CDROM

The Australian Naval Institute is pleased to announce that a complete set of the *Journal* (1975-2003) is now available on a 2 disc CD ROM for \$99. Sets can be ordered using the membership application form below.

MEMBERSHIP/SUBSCRIPTION RATES

Individual	1 Year	2 Years	3 Years
Undergraduate student rate*	\$30		
Australian/New Zealand*	\$45	\$85	\$125
Asia [†]	\$60	\$115	\$170
Rest of World [†]	\$67	\$129	\$191
Institutional			
Australian/New Zealand*	\$60	\$110	\$160
Asia [†]	\$75	\$140	\$205
Rest of World [†]	\$82	\$154	\$226

* Please note that no GST is payable in relation to ANI membership

[†] Includes air mail postage

Tax Invoice

I apply for membership of the ANI in the category of student/individual/institutional (select one).

Name: _____

Address: _____

Post Code: _____

1. A cheque made out to the Australian Naval Institute is enclosed, OR
2. Please debit my Bankcard/Mastercard/Visa for \$AUD _____ for a _____ year subscription
AND/OR \$AUD _____ for _____ sets of the *Journal of the Australian Naval Institute* on CD ROM.

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I agree to abide by the Constitution and by-laws of the Institute.

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