

AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE

The Australian Naval Institute was formed as a self-supporting and non-profit making organisation; incorporated in the Australian Capital Territory in 1975. The main objectives of the Institute are:

- to encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the maritime profession; and
- to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and the maritime profession.

Membership subscription rates are located on the inside back cover of the *Journal*. Further information can be obtained from the Business Manager, Australian Naval Institute, PO Box 29, Red Hill ACT 2603, ph +61 2 62950056, fax +61 2 62953367, email: a_n_i@bigpond.com, or via the website at www.navalinstitute.com.au.

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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

The *Journal* is published four times a year: at the end of January, April, July and October.

The Editorial Board seeks letters and articles on naval or maritime issues. Articles concerning operations or administration/policy are of particular interest but we will consider papers on any relevant topic. As much of the RAN's operational and administrative history is poorly recorded, the recollections of members (and others) on these topics are keenly sought.

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Style Guide. Articles and correspondence should be submitted electronically in Microsoft Word, with limited formatting. Relevant pictures or maps can be submitted electronically (if under 1 MB); otherwise they should be provided on CD.

Articles should ideally range in size from 3000-7000 words pages, but smaller articles will be considered, as will the occasional larger piece of work. Submissions should be sent to the Editor in the first instance. Articles much larger than would normally be published by the Institute should be submitted to the Sea Power Centre-Australia for possible publication as a Working Paper (seapower.centre@defence.gov.au).

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As a self-funding organisation the Institute relies on membership subscriptions and sponsorship to maintain its activities. Financial donations and/or bequests are welcome and will assist the ANI in undertaking its activities.

Seapower Centre Research Collection

In 2004 the ANI donated its library to the Royal Australian Navy where it has been incorporated into the Sea Power Centre Research Collection. ANI members continue to have access to this unrivalled and often unique selection of research material. The library is normally available for use 0900-1630 each weekday, but please ring to confirm this, particularly if visiting from outside Canberra. As this is a reference collection, it is not possible to borrow the books.

The Institute/Sea Power Centre-Australia will gladly accept book donations on naval and maritime matters (where they will either be added to the collection or traded for difficult to obtain books). The point of contact for access to the collection, or to make arrangements for book/journal donations is Dr David Stevens on (02) 61276503, email david.stevens3@defence.gov.au.

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Front Cover: Ships in close formation after completion of Officer of the Watch manoeuvres during Exercise *Kakadu VII* (RAN).

Back Cover: HMAS *Warrnambool* during Exercise *Kakadu VII* (RAN).

President's Column

I am honoured to be contributing my first column as President of the Australian Naval Institute. My first duty is to thank Rowan Moffitt on behalf of the Institute for his service as President and the impetus which he gave to bringing the ANI up to date and giving it a clear direction. It was fitting that his last official duty as President was to open the 30th Anniversary Seminar at ADFA on 16 September. That gathering proved a great success and it was a particular pleasure to welcome a number of the founders of the ANI, most notably Commodore Alan 'Rocker' Robertson. The seminar looked back at the activities and the achievements of the Institute, but it also looked forward and it was great that some of the Midshipmen provided a 'Young Turks' presentation to give their ideas about the shape of the navy of the future.

Rocker Robertson and a number of other founders and thirty year members who were present were accorded special honorary membership. It is the intent of the Council to extend this progressively to all members with thirty years' membership to their credit and I will be writing to those concerned over the next few months.

The night before the seminar, Vice-Admiral Ian MacDougall gave a typically thought provoking presentation under the auspices of the Vernon Parker Oration. You can read this speech in this issue of the Journal. The dinner in the ADFA Officers' Mess which followed the Oration was equally successful and a clear reminder to us all that one of the key benefits of Institute membership is the opportunity that it gives for generations and ranks to interact in an informal but professionally focused environment.

Amongst the more obvious measures is the new ANI logo, which was adopted after much consideration and debate. We believe that is a crisper and clearer image for the Institute and one that will 'wear well'. The old crest of the ANI has not been abandoned. It remains our official seal and will be utilised for formal occasions.

The ANI Journal will be retitled *Headmark* and the next issue will use the new title and logo and include general revision of format to mark the changes (a copy of the new logo is shown below). We are also in the later stages of developing a new ANI website which will provide many more services for members than have been possible before. This website is the product of an academic project of some of the ADFA Midshipmen and is a very impressive piece of work. Amongst the features with the greatest potential are the ability to have bulletin boards and discussion.

These steps will not themselves be enough. The Council are working to develop further a campaign to increase our membership and also extend the activities of the Institute in ways that benefit members. Amongst these measures, we will try to stage more, short seminars and have a reasonable geographic distribution of such events - Canberra cannot be the only location for such activities. A range of other initiatives are being considered and we will keep you informed of our efforts in future issues of *Headmark*.

Finally, the ANI will be involved in the RAN Sea Power Conference in January and February with a 'Young Turks' panel on 2 February. I hope to see you there - details of the conference are available on the RAN's Sea Power Centre website.

Australian Naval Institute



The Past

From the President

It gives me great pleasure to write this first message to members of the Australian Naval Institute. In the years to come many people will write for the Journal and so it is with this certainty and also the belief that the Institute will grow and go from strength to strength, that prompts me to say that at last, we people devoted to the advancement of professional knowledge with respect to maritime affairs from an Australian stand point, have a forum dedicated to expressing such views. We should be proud to belong to the Institute and having got off to such an auspicious start we can be quite confident about the future. I would like to express my appreciation of the hard work carried out by the Steering Committee and others for the honour of electing me the first President.

Vernon Parker

The Australian Naval Institute - how it began

In October 1973, late one night, when usually the most eloquent arguments are propounded, the clearest statements made, and the Navy put to rights Captains VA Parker and JA Robertson came to the not original conclusion that what is needed is a Naval Society. During the following few months the idea was discussed with various people to gain some indication of support. Thus it was on 12 July 1974, 16 officers met in the Conference Room of Navy Building 2, Russell Offices, Canberra to more formally discuss the proposal. At this meeting the formation of a Naval Society, with the broad aims of encouraging and promoting the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the maritime profession and to provide a forum for an exchange of ideas related to the naval profession, received encouraging support. A Steering Committee was formed consisting of VA Parker, AJ Robertson, LG Fox, WB Loftus, AMF Summers, NE McDonald and KW Grierson. Several meetings of the Steering Committee then followed, under the chairmanship of WB Loftus and drafted a constitution for consideration by the Registrar of Companies for incorporation in the ACT. It was decided that the Society should be called the Australian Naval Institute and on 2 October 1974 a letter was forwarded to the Minister of Defence requesting approval to use the word 'Naval' this being a specified word for the purposes of the Defence (Prohibited Words and Letters) Regulations. The proposal received out of session Naval Board support. Notwithstanding, it was not until 15 January 1975 that the Minister's approval dated 7 January 1975 was received. Meanwhile membership was slowly increasing and reached 30 by 21 January 1975.

With Ministerial approval to use the word 'Naval' our Honorary Solicitors were instructed on 21 January 1975 to formally seek incorporation. A most extraordinary series of events then followed. At first the Registrar did not like our objectives. Then he thought the use of the word Naval should be referred to the Attorney-General. When it was pointed out that the Minister for Defence had approved this the Registrar then demanded to see the original of the approval and not to receive it through the Officers of the Institute but directly from the Department of Defence. You may draw your own conclusions from this stipulation. In any event the Registrar referred the whole question of incorporation to the Attorney-General in early March 1975. In early April the Attorney-General queried whether the Australian Naval Institute was associated with the Navy League or Navy Association, which at that time, you may recall, were issuing statements to the press on naval policy. The Attorney-General was informed that we had no association with those two bodies and for that matter with any other organisation. Frustrated by these delays and in expectation of an earlier consent to our application a Special General Meeting had been set down for 4 April 1975. This was duly held and an interim Council elected, an Auditor appointed and a paper *Law of the Sea-Defence Implication* was delivered by Commodore KD Gray, DFC ADC RAN, an historic first. On the books at that date were 57 foundation members.

The Attorney-General gave his consent in April 1975. The Registrar approved the publication of an advertisement in the Canberra Times on 24 April 1975 giving notice of the intention to form the Australian Naval Institute. The ANI was formally incorporated on 10 June 1975, at which time the membership stood at 68. In all, twenty months from conception to realisation.

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Vol 1, No. 1, Aug 1975, p. 3.



Vernon Parker



JA Robertson

A Naval Society

1. A meeting of officers interested in forming a 'Naval Society' convened at 1630 Friday 12 July 1974 in Conference Room 2, Navy Office, Canberra. Captain VA Parker took the chair and opened the discussion. It was observed that several attempts had been made in the past to start a Journal on naval matters but these had failed for various reasons and was rather like putting the cart before the horse. In the view of some officers who had been discussing the problem the need was for a highly professional group interested in naval/maritime affairs. This body should be a self-supporting, non-profit organisation to promote the advancement and spreading within the Service of knowledge relevant to the higher aspects of the naval profession. If this then came into being a Journal could well follow. A number of officers then spoke on the subject and related matters. It was pointed out that the USI would weaken that body. Additionally other groups and persons produced naval flavoured periodicals. It seemed to the majority present that none of these really fulfilled the need for a professional 'Naval Society'.

2. The following members then present resolved to form a 'Naval Society' and become foundation members:

- Captains NE McDonald, DHD Smyth, JD Stevens, VA Parker, IH Nicholson, EV Stevens, WR Sharp, LG Fox, NBB Berlyn
- Commanders IB James, JL Curtis, WB Loftus, MW Varley
- Lieutenant Commanders AMF Summers, G Cutts
- Lieutenant KW Grierson

Commodore RC Swan and Captain JA Robertson who had taken part in earlier discussions and Commander BG Gibbs who had pledged support were also entered as Foundation Members.

3. A Steering Committee was formed consisting of VA Parker, AJ Robertson, LG Fox, WB Loftus, AMF Summers, NE McDonald and KW Grierson was then nominated by the members to produce a draft constitution, examine the legal aspects and recommend a name. A meeting of all members would then be called to consider the Steering Committee's recommendations.

4. The meeting closed at 1720.

Russell Hill
12 July 1974

VA Parker
Chairman Pro Tempore

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Vol 10, No. 3, August 1984, p. 4.

ANI First Anniversary

The Australian Naval Institute was officially formed on the 4th April, 1975, with the objects of encouraging and promoting the advancement of the naval and maritime professions and also providing a forum for the exchange of ideas on related subjects. The foundation membership consisted of 57 Regular and Associate Members and after the first year this total has increased to over 200.

As could be expected, the majority of the ANI members have qualified to join by virtue of their RAN, RANR or WRAN service, but there is also a reassuring number of interested civilian and foreign naval applications. This indicates that the Institute is becoming more widely known and that the future is full of promise.

Admiral Sir Victor Smith, AC KBE CB DSO; Vice Admiral HD Stevenson AC CBE; and His Honour, Judge Trevor Rapke QC BA LLB have graciously accepted the Council's invitation to become Honorary Life Members.

Chapters of the Institute have been formed in Sydney and Canberra and both groups have convened on a number of occasions during the past year. The papers delivered at these meetings have covered a wide range of interesting and thought provoking topics and these are now permanently recorded in the first three issues of our Journal.

That the Institute has published three Journal issues within the first year of operation is a source of pride and is also testimony to the hard work and splendid organisation of the Editorial Sub-Committee. In addition to being distributed to each member, the Journal will be available to students at various Staff Colleges in Australia and also at a number of important libraries.

Valuable publicity has been accorded the Australian Naval Institute in the prestigious Proceedings of the United States Institute and it is hoped that the future exchanges of information will be a source of satisfaction and mutual benefit to both organisations.

A competition was recently held for the purpose of establishing a design for the Institute's crest. Mr C Clarke of Navy Office was the successful entrant. The crest which is reproduced on page 20 will be featured in future issues of the Journal.

With the passing of the first anniversary the Council believes that the Institute is now firmly established and that, in fulfilling the objectives drafted by the foundation members, it will grow in numbers and stature to become an important link in the propagation of naval and maritime knowledge in Australia.

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Vol 2, No. 2, May 1976, p. 3.

The needs of the RAN 1985 to 2000

Young Turks

In June of 1976 a group of officers was invited to present to the Navy Symposium their ideas of the needs of the RAN for the period 1985 to 2000. The 'Young Turks' as they were dubbed (with considerable adjectival licence), decided that in the time available for their presentation it would be impracticable to address such topics as types and numbers of ships, weaponry, size of the Service and like subjects. Therefore certain broad topics were selected and it is our deliberations on these which we lay before you.

Introduction

Our syndicate addresses the needs of the Royal Australian Navy in and for the period 1985 to 2000 that is from nine to twenty years hence. This timescale provides time for formulation and implementation of policies to fulfil the needs. You will note we have omitted all reference to the Seaborne Air Platform - a subject already receiving much attention.

Before describing the likely roles of the RAN in the period understudy, the major influences on the functions of the RAN will be discussed.

Firstly, geopolitical influences. The likelihood of direct invasion is generally accepted as low, and indeed may well be the lowest possibility of all. Nevertheless, shifts in the power balances anywhere in the area of Australia's interests have effects that are felt throughout and can include expansion affecting Australia even though not caused by Australia.

On the other hand major nations, especially Japan, are becoming more and more resource hungry. As the unexplored areas dwindle the competition will become more fierce. The arbitrary interference by governments or trade unions in the trading of raw materials will only amplify this ferocity. We have assumed that the 200km resource zone will be adopted by all countries even if unilaterally - these influences will result in a much greater requirement for offshore surveillance than at present.

Changes in political attitudes in neighbouring countries allied with increasing activism in minority groups within Australia will lead to increasing import of subversive material and ideas. As fishing grounds become depleted the fishing fleets from other nations will range further afield and will take even more liberties with national boundaries.

Greatest of all the influences however will be the ever increasing world trade carried on or over the seas. There is every sign that the already interlocking world economy will become more interdependent. Even now the closure of the major straits through the archipelagic countries would have serious consequences for countries like Japan and Australia.

The high level of seaborne trade is itself worthy of closer study - the trends in levels on various routes and the content of the trade goods carried thereon are just as important as knowledge of military capability.

Secondly, technology factors. Of these we must first address the submarine. We do so because of its overriding influence on seapower. Notwithstanding any other technological innovation, the foreseeable strength of Russian seapower will rest heavily on the vast radius of action and on the invulnerability of submarines. This is one technological area we do not expect to change greatly. No amount of opposing technology, whether increased capability of sonars, vast passive acoustic arrays, laser underwater sensors, nuclear depth bombs or anything else is going to remove the high vulnerability of merchant shipping to attack by submarine. Probably the best defence is to multiply the numbers of hulls (that is less eggs in each basket) - a suggestion quite contrary to present trends for bigger and bigger ships, or to make merchant ships less sinkable. We argue that whatever else may change, the offensive capability of the submarine will continue largely unchanged. However the concentration, until recently, of many of our resources into anti-submarine forces may well be misguided.

The other technological influence on the roles is the increasing number of smart weapons. These arms are now increasingly sold to countries with little or no industrial or technological basis of their own. Of more significance however is the decreasing cost, and the increased reliability, simplicity of operations and comparative invulnerability to countermeasures of these weapons. These are the great levellers of all - the tiniest nation can fit them to fishing boats and produce a credible threat at low cost, a threat whose greatest asset is *our* difficulty of identifying which are the enemy. That these forces are vulnerable to air attack is not the point - the cost of the boats and missiles is vastly less than the loss of just one bulk

carrier and its cargo.

Functions

We believe the common functions for the Australian armed forces are satisfactory and we consider the single Service functions are adequate with the exception that the RAN single Service function should be re-stated as follows:

The conduct of operations at AND OVER the sea for the defence of Australia and Australian interests.

This would not in our opinion degrade the function of the RAAF but would be a realistic statement of the requirement for the RAN to conduct air operations as an integral part of naval operations. We do not believe that maritime operations can be divided into distinct air and surface segments with both the RAN and RAAF holding separate responsibilities. The present functions inadequately recognise the requirements of naval aviation and tend to reinforce the general inefficiency and difficulties that have occurred in maritime operations for many years. We believe that the present system whereby sea surveillance is largely the prerogative of the RAAF is wrong and that the RAN is the appropriate Service to be the prime mover in this activity.

Roles

First let us consider the single Service function of the conduct of operations at and over the sea for defence of Australia and Australian interests. We could speculate that the maritime situations that could occur may be one or more of the following:

- a. as a minor ally of a number of non-communist nations, probably including the USA, in a struggle for survival with the USSR and Warsaw Pact countries, our commitment probably forced upon us by membership of ANZUS
- b. involvement in a regional war as a result of deliberate actions taken against Australian nationals by a foreign government. A situation where the government is forced to intervene, because public opinion demands intervention to stop the killing of Australians and the less important but nevertheless significant destruction or confiscation of Australian owned assets. We believe that the prospects for involvement in this type of maritime action is fairly remote but could occur with devastating suddenness
- c. defence of Australian trade carried on the high seas against military sanctions imposed by a nation determined to influence our government policies. Interference with Australian maritime trade could occur at great distances from Australia and could occur separately or as an adjunct to the two maritime situations already

mentioned

- d. action to prevent the plundering of national resources by industrial resource-hungry nations
- e. actions to suppress political blackmail or acts of political terrorism. The type and rationale for this activity is limitless and could occur without warning
- f. a fish war or similar, resulting from the necessity to enforce the national claim to an economic zone as established by international law but not recognised by a country which does not ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty
- g. participation in peacetime operations designed to save life and/or property
- h. participation in projects for the advancement of knowledge and the good of mankind

To be able to meet these situations we believe the RAN requires the following roles:

- a. to organise, train and equip naval forces for sustained combat operations
- b. to project sea power in order to deter the aggressor against Australian persons, property or interests at sea
- c. to react effectively to meet sudden situations where maritime intervention is desirable to support national interests
- d. to maintain tactical superiority in any areas necessary for naval operations including the defence of maritime trade
- e. to conduct maritime surveillance
- f. to conduct oceanographic and hydrographic surveys to meet national needs and as a contribution to the advancement of knowledge
- h. to provide military sea transport to meet national requirements

We believe the roles we have postulated would meet the Navy's needs to achieve its proper Service function.

Let us now consider the four common functions of the Australian Services. The roles we have suggested should adequately meet the requirement of the following functions:

- a. to deter aggression, as far as a single nation defence posture will deter the aggressor
- b. uphold and protect Australia's national interests by military means
- c. contribute to United Nations supervisory or peacekeeping forces

However we are conscious that the fourth function - 'to ensure the security of Australia and its territories' - may prove to be beyond the resources of Australia in circumstances where a major aggressor with vast resources of manpower and material could overwhelm the nation. We believe that a navy could not be developed by a nation of our population and resources to meet this eventuality. We would need support from powerful

friends.

Technology, research and development

The critical path in readying the RAN for 1985 will be the acquisition of hardware, due to the gestation period involved. Naturally, purchasing hardware off-the-shelf reduces the period but this introduces unwanted side-effects, all of which undermine Australia's strategic self-reliance.

There is a general need for Australian research, development and industrial capability to be expanded to match the pace of advance of other national objectives in order to provide that stand-alone factor in providing for national security.

Shipbuilding

In addition to the current need to revitalise the shipbuilding industry in general, there is an urgent requirement to have in Australia the capability to build, to maintain, but most of all, to design warships in order to provide the independent capability to expand our forces in time of need - a time when our allies may not find it convenient to replace or augment our ship forces. The proper means to achieve both viability of the shipbuilding industry and strategic independence we need is to provide long-term building programmes to the shipyards that include the construction of warships.

Smart weapons implications

The major implication of smart weapons we believe is that warships, as presently conceived, present too valuable and attractive a target to hazard in the face of a sampan/SSM threat. At the same time the much increased surveillance requirements demand many more hulls. For both these reasons there is a clear need for many small and powerful units - but with emphasis on the small. Involvement of the Australian shipbuilding industry at this level is an obvious place to start; even better if weaponry such as Harpoon can be built here also. The design capability must be seen as a total package with a lead contractor coordinating a range of government and private activities.

Nuclear technology

It is only a matter of time before we are forced into nuclear technology, firstly for ship propulsion because other energy sources will become prohibitively expensive. The size and relative cost of nuclear powerpacks will fall. The present popular reaction to nuclear powered ships resembles scenes from the beginning of the Industrial Revolution and shows clearly that the Federal Government must lead in educating the population of Australia to live with nuclear power. Further, the Defence Department must lead within

government, lobbying all other areas to accept the necessity of nuclear power particularly for ship propulsion.

Secondly, the club of nuclear powers is growing steadily. No one has yet postulated a non-nuclear deterrent to nuclear arms. We would probably have to develop a nuclear deterrent on our own. The development time is long (albeit decreasing) and it is too late when a neighbouring country, with outside assistance, detonates their first warhead.

At this moment we should know precisely how many years hence we could have such weapons and this assessment should be updated continuously. Further to this, as the time approaches for their introduction, the Services should begin to practice their use. If the threat level we intend to combat includes nuclear weapons in limited numbers then it follows we should have them too. We should not rely on the USA to equalise the balance, or to provide the nuclear umbrella.

Satellites

The use of space vehicles as an alternative method of accomplishing our maritime surveillance role must be recognised as an option. Systems analysis of the whole surveillance task is needed urgently to determine the proper place of space, air and seaborne vehicles. Such analysis must also take account of the increased effectiveness of all arms of defence due to the availability of more up-to-date intelligence from satellites.

The purchase of launch-vehicles to be operated from Woomera is probably the best means of deployment. However the manufacture of satellites themselves is surely within Australian capability in 10 years time, even if perhaps the design is not.

Control of technology

So far we have covered a few very important but very innovative areas of technology. We hasten to correct any impression that 'only the latest is good enough' by sounding a cautionary note. We have for many years indulged ourselves in purchasing, overseas, hardware embodying the latest in technology. We have also acquired two undesirable attributes of this indulgence. Firstly, the maintenance of such hardware requires ever increasing levels of maintenance expertise with all the attendant costs of further training etc. However, far more disturbingly we have inherited all the logistic problems as well. What does it matter if the Mean Time Between Failures of an equipment is hundreds of hours if the replacement spare takes 18 months to obtain from the USA - a not atypical figure. We take too much notice of usage in our stocking of key spares and not enough of lead-times.

Use and development of existing R&D capability

There is existing a large R&D capability in Australia. With forward-thinking policy and guidelines that are *maintained* throughout the years there is no reason to prevent Australia being at the optimum technological level in 1985. There *is* a need for greater awareness of the present R&D capability. Far too few of us know of the capabilities of WRE and ARL for example, let alone RANRL. This may be a problem more applicable to the Navy than the other Services.

Realism in R&D

A related feature of R&D is the need for greater realism in its management. We have now conducted enough projects of our own to realise that using optimistic figures in the original estimates is foolhardy. The practice of under-estimating R&D costs of a project to get it approved is an overall waste of resources far beyond the direct costs involved because of the impact on other areas.

Enlightened extension of role of R&D

Finally we believe the whole field of R&D suffers from a traditional myopia. Broadening the field is desirable and should include such areas as:

- a. management information systems for command and control
 - b. behavioural science aspects of service motivation
 - c. political science studies of the credibility of a deterrent force
 - d. marketing aspects of maintenance of volunteer forces
 - e. studies of the construction of merchant shipping and offshore structures to render them less vulnerable to deliberate attack
 - f. economic studies of the strategic importance of trade commodities
- to name a few.

Operations and tactics

We feel that there are changes needed to our present approach to operational and tactical matters. At the coal face we feel our maritime strategy is hidden in documents which are not readily available to the junior members of the Service. The vast majority of the officer corps look forward to service in a fleet but feel the concept of operations is vague. We believe there is a need to spell out in more detail our maritime strategy and our concepts of operation so that all personnel have a greater appreciation of what they are trying to achieve.

As a Service we exist on the fringe of both NATO and the USN, conditioned to looking to these organisations for tactical doctrine. As a result

we have tended to lack some original thought in tactical matters and at present we have inadequate manpower or time devoted only to the development of tactics and their testing in realistic exercises. We believe there is a need to analyse carefully the capabilities of potential opponents and to develop viable tactics to counter them. This requires an effective tactical 'think tank', realistic tactical exercises and full and rapid analysis of these exercises.

While we rely heavily on NATO and USN tactical publications for our operations we have no access to their preparation. It has therefore become necessary to supplement NATO and USN doctrine with our own resulting in the present large number of procedures. There is a need to rationalise our publications, to reduce their number and to firmly establish what are RAN procedures and tactics and what are not. Once this has been accomplished, we require an adequately staffed book writing organisation with access to Navy Office and the fleet staff, backed with adequate typing and printing facilities to meet its needs.

We shall now turn to the fleet, its organisation, and its method of operating. It is our contention that having reached a laudable level of professionalism the RAN in the post-Vietnam period has allowed its professionalism to decline to a point where our present standards in basics such as seamanship are below those taken for granted in the 1950's and early 1960's, because the emphasis has shifted elsewhere.

A ship lives a hand-to-mouth existence during its refit period at a time when basic procedures are being established to ensure safety and efficiency in the commission ahead. Its ship's company tries vainly to cope with a backlog of ship husbandry tasks, while simultaneously providing personnel for courses, exercise staffs, courts martial, boards of inquiry, ship riding duties; in between taking major leave.

The ship enters refit with an apparently inflexible date to be met in the future, knowing full well that any slippage in the refit programme arising from industrial disturbances or any other cause may be counterbalanced by a reduction or general degradation of the forthcoming SQT and workup periods. The ship's company takes its ship through refit, SQT and workup, striving to achieve the teamwork essential to the management of a modern man-of-war, only to see the key personnel posted out just when the light begins to shine at the end of the tunnel. These postings, of course, result from the need to honour the sea-shore roster.

Ships are organised into squadrons composed of same type units, squadrons which rarely if ever work together and whose commanders apparently

have no other function than to act as branch post offices for type correspondence.

Finally, while some ships appear to spend a good proportion of their 'commissions' undertaking foreign cruises and participating in multinational exercises, some less fortunate sisters seem banished to the Sydney-Jervis Bay racetrack from where after a trying season of contesting maiden welter events, they are occasionally released for a spell in the agistment paddocks of Newcastle or Port Kembla.

The syndicate understands the problems which confronts posters and the planners, the need to retain flexibility; the need to meet routine commitments. But notwithstanding these constraints we feel that there must be a more efficient and satisfying way of running the stable which will ensure that all the entrants will be properly trained before working their way up through the maiden, novice and encourage events, eventually taking a crack at the classics and major handicaps. We acknowledge that fundamental changes will need fundamental policy reversals to support them.

We will place one idea before you without claiming it to be the panacea; an idea which has as its major purpose the stimulation of discussion. We concern ourselves solely with a core force of escorts and submarines for 1986 which corresponds to that at present in existence, namely 3 DDGs, 3 DD/FFG, 6 DEs and 6SS.

The core force is organised into three Task Groups each comprising 1 DDG, 1 DD/FFG, 2 DEs and 2 SS and we feel that the Task Group Commander should also command the DDG. All ships would operate on a three year cycle regardless of type and all postings of officers and sailors to seagoing units would be of three years duration. Type posting should continue throughout a sailor's career particularly for technical and weapons sailors once they have reached the rank of Leading Seaman. We realise that the foregoing constitutes one of the fundamental changes to existing posting policy foreshadowed but it is intrinsic to the success of the scheme.

Year One would see all vessels of a Task Group going into dockyard hands at their type dockyards (DDG/DD/FFG - Garden Island; SS - Cockatoo Island; DEs - Williamstown). Key personnel from the previous commission, having prepared the defect list, would spend one month onboard with the new crew handing over in detail. Where possible new-to-type personnel would ride Year Two and Year Three units for familiarisation. PCTs for all units should be run separately and specific and detailed attention should be paid to the training of the new commanding officers. By year's end all

units should have satisfactorily completed SATS, shakedown and SQTs, with SATS carried out mainly in waters adjacent to refit ports.

At the beginning of Year Two all units would carry out individual workups and, once a satisfactory standard has been achieved, all units combine for squadron CTT and a squadron tactical period. We would expect that, after a further period at sea devoted to a coordinated tactical workup, a squadron ORE and a JUC, basic training would be completed and for the remainder of the year the Task Group would operate as an entity on what is presently known as the Australia Station, ending the year with a mid-cycle docking and leave period.

Year Three would commence with a short squadron shakedown and workup followed by the Task Group participating in all multinational exercises and undertaking at least one lengthy foreign cruise/deployment.

In addition to the present infrastructure, or in some instances instead of it, we see the need for type cells in RANTAU, type cells in each dockyard in the form of specialised fleet maintenance units, and type expertise and equipment available in all specialist schools. Personnel for these billets should be posted direct from completion of their three year sea cycle.

Finally we must state that, if the fleet at sea is going to be maned to ensure maximum efficiency, then for officers of Commander's rank and above there must be a formalised wet and dry list.

Infrastructure

Regardless of how efficient individual sea and airborne units become, their optimum employment is largely dependent upon the infrastructure which supports and guides them. It is in this particular hydronic body we see the need for considerable change. Oversimplifying, we can regard the infrastructure as a large body supporting the following: the head political, the head managerial, the head logistic.

The head political

While appreciating Machiavelli's dictum that '...success in war is determined by the political advantages gained, not victorious battles...', and while sometimes echoing, silently of course, Von Moltke's wish 'the politician should fall silent the moment mobilisation begins, and not resume his precedence until the strategist has informed the King, after the total defeat of the enemy, that he has completed his task'. The uninformed pragmatist would do well to learn from the late Chairman Mao who said 'there are some militarists who say *we are not interested in politics but only in the profession of arms*. It is vital that the simple minded militarists

be made to realise the relationship which exists between politics and military affairs. Military action is a method used to attain a political goal. While military affairs and political affairs are not identical, it is impossible to isolate one from the other.'

We agree with the late Chairman Mao and see an urgent and ongoing need for the naval officer to understand the political mind and equally, if not more important, for the politician to understand the naval mind. To achieve this there must be frequent opportunities to talk freely in informal circumstances. While recognising the need for some measure of constraint, we decry the muzzle at present placed upon the tongues of uniformed officers when addressed by politicians. Under the present rules the politician, hearing the same stereotyped evasive answers to his question, must begin to wonder if the military mind is capable of any original thought at all; the naval officer, entrusted with the lives of hundreds of men and millions of dollars worth of equipment, must begin to wonder whether he will ever be trusted to act without rigid guidelines to direct him.

Politicians should be encouraged to visit ships and establishments and to talk freely with their uniformed fellow citizens. Short term (three month?) postings to ministerial staffs and other departments such as Foreign Affairs would do much to dispel any thoughts of mysticism which may dwell within the serviceman's mind.

The head managerial

It is to this head that all middle-ranked officers belong; and to the higher levels we aspire. It would seem to us that our training at present is insular and largely by example and experience within the ambit of naval duties, occasionally enriched by staff courses and postings which impinge upon other spheres. But do we keep pace with modern managerial theories and practices? Are we given sufficient responsibility at an early age to fit us for higher managerial tasks? Do we have modern management aids and services to assist us in performing our duties? The syndicate's answer to all three questions is an unqualified NO.

To overcome these serious deficiencies in our daily lives, we see the need for the following to have been implemented by 1986:

- a. an active short term exchange system between industry, commerce and government at all levels on the one hand and the Service on the other
- b. financial responsibility channelled further down the chain of command
- c. decentralisation of some directorates with cells established in areas such as Sydney and Perth and the north of Australia

- d. a maritime operations room established to control the management of all surveillance operations
- e. land-based Task Group offices handling the bulk of the paperwork which at present clogs the lives of seagoing personnel
- f. stenographic facilities readily available to ships alongside in dockyard ports to handle the paperwork which must come to the ship
- g. modern management aids installed in directorates and establishments, with initial and running costs more than offset by the man-hours saved
- h. a vastly improved intra-Australian communications network including such items as secure person-to-person telex, conference telephone links and secure telephones, all leading to considerable savings in man-hours and service costs
- i. correspondence stowage problems alleviated by computer stowage in ships and shore establishments and simple information retrieval services

The head logistic

Even with the politician and the serviceman understanding each other and our management modernised in thinking and assisted by modern aids, the body hydradic will cease to function unless supported by a well oiled logistic machine, adequately primed and refuelled.

In this regard we see the centralisation of stores in the Sydney area under the control of FOCEA as the first in a series of significant steps, leading to the formation of a Support Command controlling not only stores but also military transport. As a natural extension of this concept we see increased use of military transport for leave and duty travel and the rapid movement of stores and equipment.

The stores demand and supply system, although greatly streamlined over the past decade, needs further streamlining in order to expedite the movement of articles from store to user. Here we feel that the potential available in modern computers has barely been tapped.

We see the need for the establishment of new bases, particularly in the north and north-west of Australia. Floating docks should be deployed and utilised in peacetime. When assistance is needed and no base exists, Mobile Technical Units should be available to deploy rapidly for trouble shooting.

Finally we see the need for all civilians employed by the Department of Defence to be amalgamated into one Defence Support Union.

Personnel

We now examine the needs of the *officers* who will

man the Navy of the future.

Identity

Although a generalisation, it is true to say that naval officers adopt a low profile in the community. Continuity of civic activity is inhibited by posting turbulence, and the constraints on wearing uniform in public places breeds an attitude of anonymity. Both syndromes are less pronounced in isolated communities but do prevail in the large cities.

Peacetime incidents which involve the Navy are generally pitched in matter of fact terms devoid of human interest. By comparison, other professions enjoy large media exposure albeit often coloured by fictional plots.

We feel that there is a need for a radical overhaul of our attitudes to projecting our image to the public. As one of the first steps a budgetary allocation should be made for the professional production of a series of semi-documentary television dramas featuring the Navy's past, current and possible future services, laced with human interest.

Recruiting

If we are to compete with the other professions for our share of school leavers we need to project in forceful terms the purpose and rewards of service as an officer in the RAN. Infrequent quarter page newspaper spreads and kaleidoscopic television commercials lack sufficient substance and inducement to compete with the magnets of civilian professions. We see a need for the acquisition of civilian expertise in the marketing and advertising fields in order to modernise our approach to projecting our product.

Education

There is an ever increasing mutual interdependence of uniformed and civilian officers in the Navy. Increases in the cost of military hardware are rapid, and this creates a critical need for close cooperation and concerted endeavour between the research, design, production, user and analyser inputs if procurement is to be cost effective and totally suited to its intended tasks.

The Australian Defence Force Academy will not ensure that sufficient naval officers are adequately equipped academically until about the turn of the century. In the meantime essential user experience will be inserted in the equation but not necessarily collated by disciplined thought process.

We see a need to commence now a programme in which a number of selected officers in the ranks of senior Lieutenant, Lieutenant Commander, and junior Commander are allocated for full time tertiary or post graduate study in order to cover the academic gap. If this means a temporary under-

bearing at the coal face, the sacrifice is warranted in the short term for the long term advantages.

One of the greatest potential forums for the debate of defence matters is the universities, and if it can be established in those institutions, the incumbents will spread it to the Australian public at large. Currently the one place where our advertising and search for publicity is not directed is into the universities.

The spin off in this regard forms the education programme described above which would enable the Navy to project:

- a. the importance of strong maritime forces for Australia
 - b. the professionalism of the Navy's personnel
- We do not see ADFA in the long term as a total answer. In order to satisfy the needs of the Service and the individual we envisage an educational pattern which meets the following criteria:
- a. a sound basic education to the level required by the community for an important profession (ie ADFA)
 - b. further studies at career break points in order to meet personal needs for advanced education unhindered by trying to conduct two jobs simultaneously
 - c. training in the community to fit officers for postings in the higher echelon of the defence force
 - d. manpower levels to cope with the allocation of appropriately qualified officers not only to in-service hardware oriented billets but also to research and development

Training

Training is considered separately from education and is examined in the context of an educational process or acquisition of skills for short term benefits. The Navy tends towards a philosophy that no officer is experienced until he has gained practical experience in a wide range of billets. In point of fact, a significant proportion of the tasks in each succeeding billet are repetitious.

We consider that the level and nature of professional skills necessary for an officer to perform the tasks required of him at each stage of his career should be clearly defined. Any training superfluous to the requirement should be deleted. Inevitably this will produce more specialised but also more professional officers.

To make our Navy one where lack of resources is counterbalanced by superior performance we must be prepared to invest a higher percentage of our manpower and money to improve training - not the administration of training but training itself. To this end we consider a need:

- a. for a manpower level to allow personnel to be

borne in the training and educational environment without detriment to operational commitments

- b. for facilities to enable meaningful training in the shore environment in order to reduce as far as possible the need for operational units to conduct basic training on board
- c. to train personnel in our national industries in what we need in terms of equipment and expose them to our problem areas

Employment

The small specialised arms of the Navy such as Aviation, Submarines and Hydrography seem able to offer a more measured trend to officers' careers than general service. As a result an officer within these arms derives:

- a. encouragement from an easily recognisable career pattern and progression
- b. motivation to master the clearly defined skills required at each stage
- c. stability in his personal life because of the planning he can pursue with knowledge of his career patterns

As impartial observers often assess the level of performance within the specialised arms as very professional, we consider that the reasons should be identified and adopted where practicable in general service.

Industry recognises with concern a syndrome called 'mid career crisis' in which many middle level managers in their late 30's realise that they have reached their final level in the pyramid. A significant proportion opt out for the challenge of a second career. The resultant loss of expertise to the original career is a waste. Whether we realise it or not, the same situation arises in the Navy but currently it is too easily camouflaged by the supposed attractions of a commuted pension.

Flattening the pyramid's peak is no solution for either industry or the Navy but we cannot afford any unnecessary premature loss of expertise. This

syndicate does not see a need for the Navy, like industry, to pursue urgently a means of coping with the crisis.

We do however, consider that insufficient attention is given to management of officers in whom large investments in terms of finance and training are made. One means of improving this situation would be increased accessibility of DNOP staff officers to those officers not within convenient striking distance of head offices. This is now done occasionally.

Motivation

Despite the nebulous nature of preparation for a non-identifiable military threat, some of the aspects of military service which motivates are:

- a. job satisfaction
- b. participation
- c. ambition


Industry is able to measure productivity and, in so doing, motivate their people to achieve targets or results. The Navy's product cannot of course be easily quantified but we feel that the Service could work harder at developing methods of measuring and promulgating the results of endeavour.

In order to ensure that a suitable officer applicant, once properly educated, trained and retrained as appropriate to his career level, has sufficient motivation we see the need for:

- a. accentuated measurement techniques for the promulgation of job performance hence satisfaction for the individual stemming from the knowledge that results and goals are being achieved. Conversely, protection for the system when poor performance is recognised and can be corrected
- b. greater emphasis on the satisfaction of successful group activity. Too often officers at all levels who have participated in an exercise have little or no awareness of whether the aims were achieved and what contribution their own unit made

Officers must feel that their job is worthwhile, interesting and itself giving them status. When serving at sea they must be involved in operational tasks and not continuously training for trainings sake. This problem was addressed in the operational segment of this paper.

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With the gift of hindsight...

*Vice Admiral Ian MacDougall, AC AFSM RAN (Rtd)**

Thank you for asking me to deliver the Vernon Parker Oration this year. I remember Commodore Parker with great respect. During the time he served, and beyond, he was one of Navy's foremost strategic thinkers.

It is 50 years since my cohort graduated from the Naval College, 11 since I hauled down my flag. Nonetheless, I have watched the Navy no less closely and with no less love and occasional concern since my formal involvement ended.

Over the past decade I have been privileged to be invited to many naval occasions - in recent times the handover ceremony for the last Maritime Commander but one, and to my term reunion at HMAS *Creswell* which coincided with the last class graduation addressed by Admiral Ritchie.

While it is always a great pleasure on such occasions to meet old friends again, I have found myself, in these gatherings, increasingly curious about and drawn to the young officers who make up the majority of those present.

It is never clearer than when one has retired that while the present of the Navy is in the hands of middle and senior officers, the future, belongs to the young. Their values, their commitment, their dedication will, in fact, decide whether there will be a navy as we know it thirty years from now.

And they are a different breed. Some might say a dangerously different breed . . .

Some time ago, in conversation with a well loved and respected Chief of Navy, I postulated the theory that every CN, no matter how good, is going to have one ghastly, intractable problem to deal with, whether it be revelations of sexual harassment, death on his watch, or decisions to be made with such huge political ramifications that the future of the Navy itself may well be at stake. He said glumly 'yes, and mine is that I can't keep officers beyond the age of 28'.

Doesn't sound too bad in the scale of things? Think again. 50 years ago the Navy recruited trainee officers who were little more than children. 13, 14, 15 year olds. The photos are fascinating. We were a thin, weedy, pop eyed lot - rabbits in headlights. We were judged to have the potential for leadership and command, on what seem with hindsight some fairly dubious criteria like the ability to tell a joke during the selection interview.

Nonetheless, the Navy made of us what it

wanted and many of us had long and deeply satisfying careers within the Service. Nowadays a whole lot less shaping goes on. Recruiting wants and chooses those who already show the values which the system inculcated in us. Nowadays simply to be accepted you have to be extremely fit, effectively educated, of a demonstrated high intellectual standard, a moral paragon, with a substantial record of charitable and public service work - at 17 - we ask a lot.

And we get it. Then we start piling it on. You have to get a degree, requiring full time study. Simultaneously, you train full time. You are required to remain bright, committed, ethical, well-mannered, patriotic and enthusiastic, not to mention clean, upright and mostly sober. Easy, isn't it? And then you go to the fleet. And just a few years later - around the age of 28 - a lot of you leave.

The *Strategic Review* published in December 1993 looked at Australia's commitment in support of global security and foresaw our continued involvement. It missed the magnitude of the coming rise in global terrorism and the stellar crises of New York 2001, Bali 2003, Madrid 2004 and London 2005, but so did everyone else.

The *Strategic Review* said little about ADF servicemen and women as a key strategic ingredient in our security. In one paragraph under 'Managing Defence' it did, however, acknowledge the importance of people in any organisation.

6.23 Personnel are an important element in any organisation and the Defence Organisation is no exception. In coping with the challenges of the next decade, Defence will need to attract quality staff through merit-based processes, improve the staff planning processes through better staffing support systems, extend multi-skilling within the organisation, enhance the training and development of its personnel, improve productivity, and provide sufficient incentives by maintaining pay and conditions for Defence personnel at competitive levels.

Dig your way through the terrible, glutinous management-speak of that quote, and you'll find mention of two eternal verities - pay and conditions.

However, at that time inflation, interest rates and unemployment were high. Recruitment to and retention in the Navy, whilst always a consideration was not the kind of problem I hear about today. Multi-skilling and improved productivity were not

* Chief of Naval Staff 1991-94 and Commissioner of the NSW Fire Brigades 1994-2003.

driven by the two Rs, - retention and recruitment - but rather were attempts to reduce the salary bill and hold the percentage of GDP spent on Defence at 2% or less, a modest figure by comparison with other developed nations.

Accordingly Navy managed its salary bill by bringing into service fleet units with complements about two thirds the size of earlier generations, ships with hardly any loss of, indeed in most cases, with enhanced capability. It also closed one in four of its shore establishments

The Navy also, lifting its head, looked around and finding itself - goodness me! - nearly at the end of the 20th century, decided to recruit women for seagoing jobs. To cover our blushes we mumbled a lot about no longer ignoring the talents of 52% of the population.

Since then the economy has improved and unemployment has fallen from 11% to the point where a rate of 4% is predicted.

Recruiting has fallen and retention has plummeted. I'd like to give you exact figures on both those claims; however those figures have been unavailable to me. In the absence of fact the rumour mill works overtime. It is widely said - although powerfully and authoritatively denied - that of a number of ADFA classes which graduated around a decade ago, no one was left in service to be promoted to Lieutenant Commander. Whether strictly true or not, the CN's lament of 'I can't keep them beyond 28' indicates that the problem is real.

We now read that the ADF is taking a number of measures to bring the best and the brightest to serve. A special consultant, an expert in Generation Y (that's you!) will be appointed.

There is also the standard talk of the solution lying in changing the 'image' of the ADF, neglecting the blindingly obvious fact that, while changing the image without changing the reality may well increase recruiting, it will inevitably decrease retention when the truth sinks in for those who have been induced to join under the illusion that they are to be part of a soft edged social welfare organisation where enduring hardship and challenge, killing and dying are nowhere in the menu of scheduled activities.

Defence is also seeking to recruit 300 officers and enlisted personnel from overseas. We've done it before and it is never a comforting sign. Source countries mentioned so far include the UK, other Commonwealth countries and the Pacific nations. Will citizenship be part of the package? Should it? Could it be argued that we are on the verge of recruiting mercenaries? If so, is that a bad thing? The English poet, Houseman wrote of mercenaries

*Their shoulders held the sky suspended, they stood,
and earth's foundations stay.*

*What God abandoned, they defended, and saved the
sum of things - for pay*

On the other hand, is this the way we wish to see our country meet its obligations to its people and the world?

And thank God, fine young Australians with a taste for a life beyond that offered by the corporate world, still front up and commit a significant slice of their immediate future to challenging themselves to meet exceptional standards.

The system then faces its own challenge in keeping them. Denial of the problem is no solution. It is known at all levels - perhaps interestingly, least well among those very junior officers here today. You are perhaps still too busy surviving your initial brush with the system to have considered what lies down the track. But you will. And however vigorously the broom of wishful thinking is wielded, the problem still leaves an ugly bump under the wardroom carpet. As WO R Reid wrote, in a recent article in the *Journal of the Australian Naval Institute*, the problems must be addressed if the Navy is to retain the officers who actually want to be there.

Over the past 3 years, I have been privileged to speak with many young officers in the training pipeline and beyond at various celebratory occasions; most recently at the NEOC 32 graduation at Creswell in July. Whilst young officers at the outset of their careers lack much of the particular experience required to form mature opinions, they are well educated, perceptive and candid about their experiences under training. They are proud to serve the Navy and the nation.

On the other hand they are frustrated and bemused by some elements of their early service.

What do they want? Put simply, three things. They want to be treated like the intelligent adults they are. They want recognition for their skills, acquired and innate. And they want to be paid well enough for it to be possible for them to remain in their Navy and support their families as well as they could if they took their formidable skills elsewhere.

They evince little distress about their first few months, accepting that all who take up the profession of arms begin in boot camp. It has long been an essential process for initial recruit training for military and para-military institutions. Fundamentally, it denies individuality, promotes interdependence and inculcates discipline, hard work and physical toughness. Few enjoy it; indeed you would have to wonder about those who do. Some can't hack it and fortunately find early that their careers should take place elsewhere. Most jump through the hoops with good grace and at the end look back, if not fondly, with a sense of justifiable achievement.

Following boot camp the real business of gaining academic and military skills begins, taking up to six years of dedicated toil. However, what appears to aggravate these young officers with whom I have spoken, is a continuing atmosphere of instruction by bluster, of what would you know, what do you contribute, keep your mouth shut, your opinions to yourself and do as I say.

Leading a bunch of several hundred talented but unseasoned representatives of Generation Y is no easy task. There are always good and not-so-good administrators and instructors charged with responsibility of nurturing a highly valuable resource for the future - prolonged exposure to the not-so-good sows the seeds of future discontent.

I can remember standing at the podium at a Naval Symposium when I was a pretty new CN. Most of us wearing significant amounts of gold braid could barely spell 'chip'. I put the question to the floor 'does anybody present have a degree in IT?' One hand went up, a Midshipman. I asked him how he was being employed and he said 'I do the photocopying'. I wonder if he is still serving or took his doctorate in photocopying to some other employer.

Once boot camp has achieved its essential purpose, its values and practices are anathema to well educated, talented young people with a demonstrated willingness to learn. Organisations and systems can no longer treat their young, the way we old ones were treated. It makes no sense, economically, strategically or morally, to recruit the best, educate and train the living daylights out of them and then treat them like fools or criminals.

And it is dangerous. Some of the learning about leading people is by osmosis. Pliny, a Roman military tribune, expressed it well in 88AD. He wrote

In older times there was a custom by which we acquired knowledge not just by listening to our elders but also by watching their conduct. . . .men were immersed in military service at an early age and learnt how to give orders by obeying them, how to be a commander by following others.

The astute and mature student patterns on the good and rejects the examples of the not so good. But if the not so good examples are pervasive and powerful over a protracted period there is a risk that those who experience them may come to believe there is no other way. Others, who don't wish to become bullies, decide that when their Return of Service Obligation is fulfilled they will take their skills elsewhere. They may be disappointed.

The culture I am describing is, of course, not unique to Navy. In the *Sydney Morning Herald* on 11 June this year, a Year 9 student wrote 'nobody listens when I try to have my say about the way I am taught, the material I am taught or the quality of

teachers by whom I am taught'. Her expectation is that she should be listened to. In the *Australian Financial Review* of 24 June 2005, it was alleged that young lawyers in large law firms find bullying and harassment to be rife, and they are not prepared to do menial work. They leave in search of a better working environment.

Many senior officers are irritated, even enraged by what they see as youthful arrogance and self-importance. And they have a point. The Navy must find and reach the middle ground between degenerating into an organisation which eats its young and becoming one where the young petulantly refuse to accept that there are times when they dearly deserve a substantial bite on the leg.

Like me you will have noted media coverage in recent times pointing to inadequacies in the military justice system in dealing with bullying and harassment. One wonders how many female air cadets will be signing up in Tasmania in the foreseeable future.

The problems cannot be shrugged off as media sensationalism. (I observe that our cultural reflex of shooting the messenger rolls on undiminished). Bullying and harassment in whatever form is illegal under military and common law codes. And when the culture of any organisation forgets the principles of fairness and just treatment, it loses its soul. Recognition of true worth matters both morally and practically. Those who find the lack of due recognition untenable will walk. Do we wish to depend on those who do not?

Quiet recognition of skills and abilities requires cultural change. We who are old may all apparently enjoy comparing horror stories of our captains who decades ago felt the appropriate response to an error by a Midshipman or Sub-Lieutenant was to throw a chair at them or beat them with a steel ruler. Truth be told, it is no more amusing in retrospect than it was at the time.

Yet cultural change is not something the Navy need fear. In the last ten years it has survived a massive readjustment, that is the participation in operational areas of women. The early days were not a shining success. We underestimated the size and nature of the challenge. We believed that reasonable men would have no problem - indeed would sensibly welcome - the integration of talented women, to enrich and enhance the capability of our ships at sea. In that we were right - but there were a lot fewer sensible men around than we thought. It has been said that we were fools to expect men who had controlled a hundred percent of the toys a hundred percent of the time to be willing to share. To this day memories of the appalling treatment of two female junior sailors by a senior sailor in HMAS *Swan* causes me sleepless

nights.

Most of the spearhead women were exceptional. It showed in the small things. I remember the long haired female engineer posted to a DDG who was offered the substantial privilege of a three minute, rather than a two minute, shower so she could wash it - she declined. Those exceptional women sought equality of opportunity. They did not cry out for affirmative action - favourable treatment because they were women entering a man's world. Human nature being what it is that reared its head later.

The initial excuses were largely physiological. It is unarguable fact that women's' bodies are different. They are generally smaller and weaker. That was addressed by applying different fitness standards. It is no myth that ADFA classes have graduated with a majority of women.

On occasion, women inclined to swing the lead cited normal female biological process which the men were too embarrassed to discuss. Initially, in some cases, it worked. Subsequently the problems became more subtle. As awareness of the factors governing successful integration rose, and the career-killing consequences of ignoring them became apparent, the Navy faced the problem of knowing where to stop the pendulum.

Is it in the centre now? I suspect not. On one hand there are men so bemused and thrilled to see women in the operational Navy at all, or so frightened for their careers, that their ecstatic approval of simple competence is as demeaning to the women as it is irritating to the men. In some cases the protégée factor comes into play. The number of men who will claim credit for the appointment of the first female CN doesn't bear thinking about. I prefer to believe she'll be there on the basis of her own ability.

Structuring the postings of talented females 'so she has time to have children' while undoubtedly well-meant, is, perhaps excessive, unless those doing the structuring have personal knowledge of a woman's desire to do so and the state of her and her partner's fertility. Those women talented enough to be worth keeping are probably capable of requesting appropriate postings for themselves.

On the other hand, sadly, there are women who reckon they're owed affirmative action. Ultimately the solution - centring the pendulum - lies with the women. I commend to you the memory of the long haired engineer.

I am relieved to hear that the system is now focusing less on gender difference and more on merit; a highly desirable development. Due recognition comes in many forms: 'well done' or even 'that's better' will put a smile in the soul which will last for a long time. Field Marshall Montgomery, in his *Concise History of Warfare*,

expressed it well, and I paraphrase only slightly:

While operational problems will tend to be the main preoccupation of a commander he and she must never forget that the raw material of the trade is men and women and that command, basically, is a human problem. The commander who looks after his people, and cares for their lives will have their confidence. Speak to them whether in large or small numbers. It is the spoken word above all which counts in leadership.

Medals are important. I remember meeting a DDG returning to Australia from Gulf War 1. For the troops stepping ashore in those days, wearing a white ceremonial uniform was an anathema. That day they did it of their own volition because they had a medal to display, which recognised their and their ship's successes.

Certificates of appreciation, commendations, efficiency awards, promotions, and honours - all long practised institutions in the Navy are greatly treasured. Campaign ribbons, the visible, if coded, record of an officer's service and experience, matter. Few would wish us to accord decorations the reverence that saw a very senior officer in another navy killing himself when found to be knowingly wearing an award to which he was not entitled. However there is a great deal to be said for acknowledgement, of places been and tasks completed.

And while the Americans are often mocked - have you heard of the cook, awarded a decoration for making the most hamburgers during the first Gulf War? - on reflection, where is the harm or fault in recognising somehow the dedicated work of a soldier under difficult conditions whose commitment to his work sustained the warriors who now sneer? Cooks matter too and those who forget it deserve to go hungry.

Recognition pays a handsome dividend. Recognition denied brings with it a heavy price however measured and certainly with retention. One form of recognition is money. Midshipmen and Sub-Lieutenants are well paid in comparison with the civilian world. Lieutenants, less outstandingly so. Above that, the lines begin to cross. Families enter the equation, with their need for accommodation, education, and reward for the loneliness and dislocation which is an inevitable part of a military marriage.

A few years ago the catchcry was 'All of One Company'. It helped promote a good ethos and engendered a binding and effective team spirit ashore and afloat. However, in terms of pay there were a few anomalies. A Lieutenant Pilot or Surgeon enjoyed much the same salary as the Commander of the frigate in which they served. But by and large remuneration was geared to rank not skill; the theory and hope was that demonstrated

skills generally lead to promotion, hence a higher salary.

As I understand it today the trend is towards fiscal recognition of skills not necessarily geared to rank. This would seem sensible if Navy is to compete with the private sector to attract and keep good people. It is sometimes suggested that comprehensively grasping the nettle of competency based pay would be divisive and thus destroy the 'All of One Company' ethos; I think not.

I am not an economist but I suggest a cost benefit analysis comparing the very high training cost of replacing those who depart the Service, at say age 28, before they have paid for the investment, with a serious approach to competency based salaries. Salary is not the whole story. Allowances for being at sea are not as substantial as are those for deployment to an operational area but they go some way towards recognising that cramped quarters in a harsh environment with lengthy family separations thrown in, particularly in a high tempo environment even if you're not actually being shot at, is not the easiest lifestyle on offer.

Well and good for those at sea. But even in times of high retention there are never enough outstandingly good people to go round. Which is why when Chiefs of Navy face the policy question of 'do we keep our best at sea or bring them ashore to teach the future generations?' the standard response is to hold your breath, cross your fingers, pray a war doesn't start and try to do both.

But how do you persuade the best and brightest, those with most to give, to take a pay cut and serve as a trainer at ADFA or RANC or elsewhere, to move ashore into a materiel, personnel or acquisition position? These billets are vital to the present and future good health of the organisation and indeed may increase individual well being and family happiness but nonetheless they cost the individual money.

A rewards system for a naval officer has never and will never be simply about dollars and cents. There are the intrinsic satisfactions of serving the people of Australia in providing maritime security which is vital to community well being in what seems to be increasing global insecurity.

Rising to the challenges of a charge position in a warship at sea, where danger is a constant companion, has its own rewards for those who sign up, stick around and wear the uniform with pride. These rewards are no less for those ashore who sustain the warfighting capability now and into the future but why should they have to pay for the privilege?

That said, the reality is that it is a job for some and a career for others. Both categories are vital

and the motivation to stay in the business needs to be nurtured. As the war at sea becomes more technologically complex, continuation training and experience in simulators and on the job become more important.

Will an initial tertiary qualification suffice for the following ten or twenty years? - probably not. Amongst the competing demands of acquiring professional skills there has to be an argument for time out to update by way of a Masters, or perhaps even a Doctorate. Keeping the business going will mean that such 'sabbaticals' will no doubt have to be selective.

For the organisation, the benefits will be obvious. A sabbatical might also include a secondment to the private sector, perhaps in industry, ideally in a line management position. The risk is, of course, that the returning officer might bring back to the cocoon fresh ideas for process improvement. There is a risk, too, that the secondee might succumb to a 'better' offer. It is, perhaps, a risk worth taking if, in the absence of such initiatives, good officers elect to leave anyway at about age 28.

This proposal begs the question - are naval officers now to be both leaders and managers, in a business sense? Ideally, yes. Leadership skills for war can hardly be honed in some other environment. As Marshall Suvarov said 'train hard, fight easy'. When the chips are down, winning the war is about skilled military leadership not smart business management.

On the other hand, Navy's management of resources (capital and recurrent expenditure) can only benefit from exposure to best practice in other fields not the least in the private sector. Every CN has a hard road fighting for Navy's budget. Any measure that avoids the injudicious use of that budget means more spent on the bottom line which is well trained people, using smart weapon systems, to put more rounds on the target, to defeat the enemy.

What about recruiting, at a senior level, from the world of commerce, to help with management issues? Sadly, lateral entry from other organisations is not a total solution. The war at sea today, and perhaps on land and in the air, is advancing at such a technological rate that high level command can only be exercised by those from within the regular Service. Reservists and citizen soldiers have played an important role in our military past and will have an important role in our future; but not at the strategic warmaking level.

It would be absurd to suggest commercialisation of the Navy into Maritime Security Inc. Defending the nation is a highly specialised business not a shop front selling brand name security. I do,

however, believe that there can be benefits in looking outside the tent in order to adopt better processes where applicable.

I speak finally to the young - your aspirations and needs have my sympathy and support. However, the Navy is not a game - it is a dangerous, demanding, business with the death of the enemy as its ultimate goal. It is not a debating society, an ethics forum, a meat market or a crèche.

On operations lawful orders must be followed, even if they are not completely understood, extensively discussed or presented for your approval beforehand. Respect is due to those who wear and have earned the rank, who bear the cost of decisions that are still beyond your wildest imaginings.

When you feel that not enough senior officers are paying nearly enough attention to your advice and opinion, spare a moment's thought for the situation faced by the CO of HMAS *Kanimbla* early this year. Given the dreadful news of the loss of one helicopter and most of those on board, he had the courage to despatch the second helicopter. He found the words his ship's company needed to hear 'we are going to get our family'. He found - in an instant - the space between command and compassion, as only an experienced leader, of innate decency could have done. He held his people together through the dreadful days that followed

and brought them home. Reckon you can match that right now - or even over the next few years?

If you elect to remain in the Navy, you will face loneliness, grinding hard physical work and very real danger to life and limb. Your character, willpower, wisdom, abilities and courage will be tested to the highest level. It is not for everyone. If you feel you will face more attractive and surmountable challenges with IBM or Woolworths than the captain of *Kanimbla* did, I suggest you go with our blessing. Speak kindly of us if you can.

I apologise if you find what I have said presumptuous, coming as it does from one who had his time on watch and the opportunity to make things better.

Observing media coverage of the Navy at work today, I note with pleasure an increasing public recognition. The issue of rewards is no longer my business. It is yours.

If there has been any criticism, it is born of a continuing love for the Navy which every day for forty years provided me, as I am sure it does you, with adventure, comradeship and a deep seated feeling that what I was doing, well or not so well, mattered. There can be few pursuits that are more important than guarding this nation's interests. It is a privilege and a joy.

Thank you.

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