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REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES

Maritime security and international cooperation

*Joshua Ho**

The strategic sea lanes in Southeast Asia are constricted at key straits such as the Malacca and Singapore Straits, the Sunda Straits and the Lombok Straits. The Straits of Malacca is the main corridor between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea and is the major sea-lane used by tankers from the Middle East. In terms of total volume, more than 200 vessels pass through the Straits of Malacca on a daily basis, or about 60,000 (more than half the world's merchant fleet capacity) on an annual basis, carrying 80% of the oil transported to Northeast Asia as well as one-third of the world's trade. The resources carried through the Malacca Straits amount to a total of US$390b, making it the busiest Straits in the world currently.

The Lombok Straits is wider, deeper and less congested than the Straits of Malacca. As a result, it is considered the safest route for supertankers and the bigger of these eastbound ships sometimes transit this channel. Most ships transiting the Lombok Straits also pass through the Makassar Straits. About 3,900 ships transit the Lombok Straits annually, with this waterway carrying a total of US$40b worth of resources on an annual basis.

The Sunda Straits is the last of the strategic waterways in Southeast Asia, and is another alternative to the Malacca Straits. However, because of its strong currents and limited depth, deep draught ships of over 100,000 deadweight tonnes do not transit the strait and it is not as heavily used. About 3,500 ships transit the Sunda Straits annually, providing the Straits with US$5b in resources annually.

Besides the transportation of oil and iron ore to the major economies in Northeast Asia like China, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, the Malacca Straits and the Sunda Straits also carry a significant amount of container traffic given that four of the world's top 30 container ports sit astride both these sea lanes.

Because the Malacca, Lombok and Sunda Straits are so important to the transportation of oil and raw material, like iron ore, as well as for the conveyance of container traffic, the free and safe navigation of commercial vessels in these sea lanes become important issues. In this respect piracy and terrorism are major threats to the security of shipping in the sea lanes of Southeast Asia.

Piracy

Despite the drop in worldwide pirate attacks, attacks in the Malacca and Singapore Straits continued unabated. However, for the first four months of 2005, the number of actual and attempted incidents dropped by two-thirds and ten% respectively, which may be attributed to the presence of foreign troops in the region as part of the post-tsunami relief effort. The number of incidents is expected to rise as the foreign troops depart Aceh. Already, the number of attempted acts in April has increased two-fold over the same period last year.

The emphasis on combating piracy is important, as sea piracy has been linked to the threat of maritime terrorist attacks since the events of 11 September 2001. Although it has been widely recognised that the motivations of the terrorist and that of the pirate are fundamentally different, the possibility of an overlap between piracy and maritime terrorism cannot be ignored. This is simply because the manner of operations are similar and it is difficult to distinguish between the two when an incident is unfolding.

Maritime Terrorism

Today, ports have evolved from being traditional interfaces between sea and land to providers of complete logistics networks brought about chiefly by containerisation. Containerisation has made it possible for the carriers to shift from a port-to-port focus to a door-to-door focus. This process has also benefited from 'intermodalism', or the interchangeability of the various modes of transporting the container by road, rail, or sea. Intermodalism has made it possible for goods to move from the point of production, without being opened, until they reach the point of sale or final destination. As a result of ports being providers of complete logistics networks, high-volume, mainline trade will focus on just a few mega ports, making these ports the critical nodes of global seaborne trade.

So important are hub ports in the global trading system that it has been estimated that the global economic impact from a closure of the hub port of Singapore alone could easily exceed US$200b per year from disruptions to inventory and production cycles. Hub ports therefore are potential lucrative targets for the terrorist and the three important ports of Port Klang, the port of Singapore, and Tanjong Priok sit astride the main waterways of Southeast Asia.

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Besides attacks on hub ports, attacks on shipping can also be an attractive option for maritime terrorists. If attacks on shipping become severe, it is possible that ships may choose to divert from the current sea lanes to a safer route. The diversion could also impose costs to industry. A study done by the US National Defence University has concluded that if the Malacca, Sunda, Lombok and Makassar Straits were blocked, the extra steaming costs would account for US$8b dollars a year based on 1993 trade flows.

Coping with the Threat

In view of these threats, Singapore has implemented a range of measures to step up maritime security. These include an integrated surveillance and information network for tracking and investigating suspicious movements; intensified navy and coastguard patrols; random escorts of high-value merchant vessels plying the Singapore Straits and adjacent waters; and the re-designation of shipping routes to minimise the convergence of small craft with high-risk merchant vessels. Singapore will also be putting up radiation detectors at its ports to scan containers for nuclear and radioactive material under the US Megaports Initiative. The Republic of Singapore Navy has also formed the Accompanying Sea Security Teams (ASSeT), akin to armed marshals, to board selected merchant ships proceeding into and out of harbour to prevent the possibility of a ship being hijacked by terrorists.

Besides individual measures, there have been efforts at bilateral cooperation based on a web approach. Indonesia and Singapore agreed in 1992 to establish the Indonesia-Singapore Coordinated Patrols in the Singapore Straits. This has involved the setting up of direct communication links between their navies and the organisation of coordinated patrols every three months in the Singapore Straits. Indonesia and Malaysia also decided in 1992 to establish a Maritime Operation Planning Team to coordinate patrols in the Straits of Malacca. The Malaysia-Indonesia Coordinated Patrols are done four times a year, and so is the Malaysia-Indonesia Maritime Operational Coordinated Patrol, which is conducted together with other maritime institutions from the two countries, such as customs, search and rescue and police.

Besides the three littoral states, other countries are also beginning to get involved in the security of the Malacca Straits. For example, India has begun talks with Indonesia on how to improve maritime security in the northern part of the Malacca Straits. Thailand has recently expressed interest in contributing to the security of the Malacca Straits, especially in terms of capacity building. However, in both these cases concrete measures have yet to materialise. China has also recently signed a strategic partnership agreement with Indonesia and one of the items is increased maritime cooperation that could include joint efforts to combat smuggling and piracy. At a more concrete level, the US has also conducted anti-piracy exercises with Indonesia which has involved the boarding and inspection of shipping.

Towards a Stable Maritime Environment

The Asia-Pacific century looks set to be established with China, India and Japan leading the pack. Fuelling Asia-Pacific growth will be the continued economic dynamism of China, India, Japan, and the US. Because of regional economic growth, trade flows into and within the Asia-Pacific and the demand for energy in the region will increase, both of which mean an increasing reliance on the sea as a mode of transport.

This surge in the use of the sea a mode of transport means that the security and the safeguarding of the sea lanes will become more crucial than ever. Hence, besides individual measures, there is a need to move towards a more cooperative regime between both the littoral states as well as other stakeholders to enhance the security of the sea lanes as the threats are transnational in nature.

In this respect, the creation of a stable maritime environment needs to remain high on the regional political agenda. Moreover, the three broad principles espoused by Singapore's Defence Minister at a recent ASEAN Regional Forum conference remains pertinent: first, littoral states have the primary role in addressing maritime security issues; second, other stakeholders have important roles to play; and finally, both consultation and respect for international law should be observed in the implementation of any new initiatives.

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A case for armed guards on ships

Graham Gerard Ong[*]

For several maritime piracy watchdogs, the worst of their fears has materialised: increased incidences of piracy has forced some commercial shipping companies to use armed guards or escorts for their vessels, especially those plying the waters of the strategic Malacca Strait. For littoral states such as Malaysia, the concern is that some of these armed

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guards or escorts are supplied by private companies.

Following news about maritime armed escorts, the United Nations' International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and several Malaysian officials have expressed reservations - for different reasons - about weapon-wielding guards on board commercial vessels - with armour-plated speed boats strapped alongside the assigned ships in some cases.

The IMO's position against armed escorts is in common with that of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), a leading authority in countering piracy. They share an anti-piracy philosophy that places primacy on the safety and welfare of commercial seafarers. Consequently, they fear that radical measures might spark a backlash from piracy syndicates.

The use of armed escorts - whether private or from state militaries - contravenes their prudential approach. First, they consider the use of arms on board a vessel an aggressive move that can instigate an 'arms race', compelling pirates to counter this by employing heavier weapons. Second, an on-board shoot-out between the ship's defenders and pirates may risk incurring high casualties among the ship's crew.

Bodies like the IMO and the IMB have attempted to focus the private sector instead on more benign means of protection, such as using new technology. The IMB, for instance, has supported the use of a Dutch-designed electrified fence system covering the perimeter of a ship's deck to deter pirates from boarding.

In contrast, most regional states concerned with the threat of maritime piracy (as well as terrorism) do not in principle object to the role of armed escorts. Singapore and Malaysia's recent decision to provide armed escort services indicates that regional governments are willing to take some risks in using such personnel.

The real issue for countries such as Malaysia is the use of private armed guards. This hinges on the prevailing paradigm of international law relating to the innocent passage of vessels through a state's territorial waters. As the convention on state sovereignty dictates, the legitimate monopoly over the use of force in matters of security lies with the state and not with vessels seeking passage.

While state-sponsored armed escorts are in line with a country's legal hold over the use of force, the supply of such services by private companies can be viewed as prejudicial to innocent passage. This helps explain the Malaysian authorities' response in the form of a directive to its marine police. Vessels providing armed escort services to merchant shipping could be considered a terrorist threat and their crew could be arrested if they encroached on Malaysian waters, according to a Bernama news agency report on April 26.

One official was quoted by Bernama as saying that hired armed escorts were 'mercenaries being paid for performing specific tasks' and could not be allowed into Malaysian territory without a permit from the host government.

Indeed, the presence of armed escorts with a ship entering the waters of a state raises certain legal questions.

First, international maritime law makes a sharp distinction between the manner in which merchant and naval vessels are authorised to enter the territorial waters of a state. To facilitate international maritime commerce, nations can grant foreign merchant vessels standing permission to enter their waters, in the absence of notice to the contrary. Naval vessels and their 'auxiliaries' - a word that used to be synonymous with 'mercenary' - on the other hand, require specific and advanced permission for entry, unless other bilateral or multilateral arrangements have been concluded.

It stands to reason that merchant vessels accompanied by private escorts should be considered under a category similar to naval vessels. This is because armed escorts actually add an auxiliary function.

Second, a private security company receiving a licence to base its operations in one country, and which is contracted by a shipping line to escort its vessels, may not have the authorisation to carry out its full scope of activities at sea when it sails into the sovereign jurisdiction of another state. Unless the host country recognises these licences and contracts through some prior arrangement, the laws of the land (and the sea) determine that private escorts do not have any sanctioned powers to pull the trigger on an approaching pirate.

Third, the issue over licences raises questions of whether private security companies are competent enough to handle and store firearms. It also raises issues of accountability. It is clear who navies and maritime law enforcement outfits are accountable to, but not entirely so in the case of private armed guards.

Yet despite the kind of problems that private security companies create, more states and international organisations are turning to the private sector as a means of procuring services that were once the exclusive preserve of the military.

Similarly, in a region facing a maritime deficiency in resources, manpower and equipment in securing about 960km of waterway through which 50,000 vessels pass annually, private security companies can play a vital role in improving the security of commercial vessels plying the strait.

As a result, the time may have come for private armed escorts to be viewed as another addition to the array of counter-measures against piracy.

Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar's subsequent proposal last week, that the region should set guidelines for the kinds of weapons that vessels are allowed and the manner they are allowed to carry them, indicates that greater consideration could be given to the provision of private armed escorts. His suggestion of a meeting on the matter in Batam next month also reflects Malaysia's commitment to follow the issue through in consultation with its neighbours.

Indeed, in the face of the piracy threat, there is an immediate need to work out the necessary maritime legislation and multilateral coordination that will facilitate the operations of private armed escorts. Also, a regional licensing regime must be established in order to distinguish between reputable private security companies and those with a more mercenary inclination.

And strict industry and safety standards must also be set up in close consultation with military and law enforcement agencies to ensure that these security services deter and suppress piracy rather than attract it, as well as to prevent operational mishaps during a voyage. Clear boundaries must also be created to determine what private armed escorts can and cannot do in relation to the functions played by navies and law enforcement agencies.

So, in light of the possibility that ships with armed escorts may be unwittingly encouraging pirates to prey on vessels that do not have such facilities, alternative security provisions - such as broader naval patrols or the extension of state-sponsored armed escorts to more ships - must be present to offset the possible negative externalities that private armed escorts create for ship owners who do not hire such services.

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Security in maritime Southeast Asia: private solutions to public problems

Morten Hansen[*]

The Straits Times recently carried a report on the role of private armed escorts in the Malacca Straits and South China Sea. According to the report, the Singapore-based company, Background Asia Risk Solutions (BARS), has effectively responded to the international shipping industry's concerns regarding the safe passage through maritime Southeast Asia by offering to conduct armed escorts to shipping vessels. The newspaper report suggests that the shipping industry will no longer rely exclusively on the security efforts of the littoral states Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore to prevent piracy and terrorist attacks. Since that report, a second Singapore-based company, Glenn Defense Marine and its affiliate, Malacca Straits Maritime Security, is said to offer similar services. This 'healthy' competition from the private sector will have important consequences not only for security in maritime Southeast Asia but also for the relationship between the public and private sectors as security providers.

Private security companies in maritime Southeast Asia

While many initiatives are being taken by the littoral states to secure safe passage through the South China Sea and the Malacca Straits, an increasing number of shipping companies seem to think that security is best obtained by taking matters into their own hands. International legal frameworks, information centres such as the International Maritime Bureau's Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur, regional cooperation such as the coordinated patrols between Malaysian, Indonesian and Singaporean coast guards or technological innovations such as the 'Secure-Ship System' do not appear to have a sufficient deterrent effect on pirates. As such, private security companies are receiving requests to rid shipping companies of the nuisance of maritime piracy as well as the fear of larger scale terrorist attacks.

Private security companies operating in maritime Southeast Asia provide a wide array of services spanning from purely advisory roles to protective services. These companies occupy a unique space in the regional arena which gives them an edge over states. Interstate relations in Southeast Asia are by and large governed by the principles of non-interference and non-intervention. For this reason, territorial and jurisdictional disputes, such as those between Indonesia and Malaysia, continue to dominate politics. As the territorial integrity of states remains the primary concern, this severely constrains cooperative security measures between and among the states. The private sector, on the other hand, is able to operate across borders without posing a threat to the territorial integrity of the littoral states. Moreover, private companies are inherently more flexible and innovative in their modus operandi. Whereas states are always constrained by the need to be mindful of each other's political sensitivities, private companies are functionally driven; they are focused on a given mission which they pursue with greater flexibility.

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Public versus private security provision

Many analysts however have criticised the private sector's involvement in security provision. Common arguments include the private sector's ethical and moral deficiencies, its tendency to over-bill as well as its unreliability as a security provider when an assignment becomes either financially unviable or simply too dangerous. However, recent developments would suggest that this is an unfair portrayal of contemporary private security companies. The Brookings Institution's Peter Singer, an expert on the privatisation of military and security affairs, notes that a corporatisation of private security and military companies have rendered these actors more transparent and accountable. Strict corporate codes of conduct and rules of engagement have ensured that most private security companies will abide by the same high levels of discipline as observed by their public counterparts. While many private security companies have adopted their own codes of conduct, there have also been efforts by the non-governmental organisation, International Peace Operations Association, to promote this through industry-wide standards.

In the case of Southeast Asia, a country like Singapore must be applauded for its significant efforts to put an end to insecurity in its waters. However, with other states in the region failing to be equally effective, opening the dialogue with private companies seems to be an option worth pursuing. Such dialogue will also permit states to adopt regulatory frameworks to ensure that the rotten apples of the private security industry are kept out.

So far, states, regional organisations as well as the United Nations have been unwilling to acknowledge any legitimate role for private security companies. The approach taken by the United Nations to the issue has however been inconsistent. While the UN conceptually disregards the private sector's role, it continues to outsource many security-related operations to private companies. Malaysia's Director of Internal Security and Public Order, Datuk Othman Talib, has branded armed escorts as mercenary and even suggested that armed guards on such craft could be considered terrorists. According to *The Straits Times* on 28 April 2005, he also noted that Malaysian Marine Police boats had been ordered to arrest private armed security operators that encroach into Malaysian waters. These approaches are hardly appreciative of the complexity of the private security industry.

Conclusion

For the private security companies, perception is key. These companies challenge a monopoly on security that states have enjoyed for centuries. For this reason it is paramount that private security companies be perceived as a legitimate actor. This acknowledgement would arguably only emerge if the private sector is perceived as a supplement and not an alternative to security provision. Private security companies have urged government and law enforcement agencies to propose regulatory frameworks for their operations. Regulation would afford companies a legitimate role in the security sphere as well as acknowledge their efforts and contribution to the overall security of maritime Southeast Asia. Furthermore, regulation will allow states to engage with this industry through cooperation and control.

In maritime Southeast Asia such a framework is most effectively implemented through ASEAN. Regional standards are necessary for two reasons: firstly, only regional cooperation will effectively address security concerns in an atmosphere where territorial boundaries are such a major obstacle to the security measures of states. Secondly, it is precisely this gap in interstate relations in Southeast Asia which pirates and terrorists have shown themselves very capable of exploiting. As such, closing this gap is essential to effectively dealing with piracy and the threat of terrorism in maritime Southeast Asia.

What is required is room for manoeuvre for the private security industry. This will enable a burden-sharing of security provision between the private and public sector. It will also provide the international shipping industry with an immediate response to the nuisance of piracy which continues to dominate maritime Southeast Asia, and possibly even result in the deterrence of terrorists operating in these waters.

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Gwadar: China's eye on the Indian Ocean?

Nathan Nankivell[*]

In November 2001, Pakistan and China agreed to jointly develop a deep-sea port at the tiny Pakistani fishing village of Gwadar. Located some 70km from the Iranian border, the soon-to-be free trade area was instantly the subject of accolades: supporters argued that the new port would be the next Dubai, providing a much-needed commercial route to landlocked South Asia and western China. However, hawkish observers in Washington and Delhi were far less

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enthusiastic. Within days, alarm bells sounded in both capitals, warning of China's potential military plans for the port. As concern grew, reports quickly circulated alleging that Gwadar would evolve into a proxy Chinese naval base.

Now, some three years after construction began and despite the litany of ominous warnings, little Chinese naval presence has been reported in the area. Meanwhile, Pakistan remains intent on focusing upon the economic benefits of the project raising the question, what is the future of Gwadar? Will hawkish predictions come to pass or will Gwadar develop primarily as an economic hub? With the first phase of the project complete and the official opening just a few months away, this article will examine the development of Gwadar and its role in South Asia's maritime security dialogue.

History

Originally purchased from Oman in 1958, the port of Gwadar first received attention as a potential maritime outpost following the 1971 Indian-Pakistani war. During the conflict, Indian forces were able to blockade Pakistan's major port of Karachi, cutting off the flow to Pakistan's main trading artery: 90% of nation's sea-borne trade originates in Karachi. Following the cessation of fighting, talk of developing the port virtually disappeared. However renewed interest was stimulated by further conflict with India in 1999, when the Kargil crisis prompted rumours of an Indian naval blockade of Karachi to again circulate through the region.

Following the painful remainder of Karachi's strategic vulnerability to the Indian Navy, Islamabad began actively shopping its plans to develop Gwadar to international partners; international support was seen as crucial to ensuring financing and the project's overall success. But, relatively low oil prices and the questionable status of the Musharraf government stonewalled any true interest.

All of this would change with the events of 9/11 and Washington's new vastly expanded military footprint in South Asia. Seemingly surrounded by the US military, China turned track and hastily moved to pursue the development of Gwadar in November 2001. By 16 March 2002, the two sides signed an agreement for the port's development and the project was fast-tracked to ensure timely completion.

Funded primarily by China to the tune of US$190m with an additional US$50m raised by Pakistan, Beijing's interest in the port was undeniable. China would go on to invest another US$200m to develop roadways connecting Gwadar to the rest of the country, which before had only been accessible by air, and would additionally supply technical and material expertise as well as 500 Chinese engineers.

By March 2005, Gwadar was equipped with three functioning berths and a quickly evolving service economy to support its activities. Now already operational, the port is waiting for its official opening in the next couple of months. In the meantime, work on the second phase is already underway, and once completed, Gwadar will be equipped as a regional hub featuring 12 berths, including two dedicated solely to maritime energy shipments.

Gwadar as an economic hub

Despite charges that Gwadar has a more sinister military purpose, most Pakistanis remain focused on the economic aspects of the project. Profits from ship visits, refuelling, manufacturing, the energy trade, and the expansion of the tiny city that once numbered 160,000 people are already accruing. In the meantime, Islamabad continues to market Gwadar as the new 'safe' gateway to the land-locked energy rich nations of Central Asia and as a competitive regional port.

There can be little argument that the economic benefits and geographic advantages touted by Pakistan are in fact real. Gwadar is strategically positioned to take advantage of several key factors. Its location just outside the Straight of Hormuz, where some 40% of world maritime energy shipments pass through, affords the port an almost unparalleled strategic advantage. Meanwhile, Gwadar also promises stable, safe energy shipments from the Caucuses, western Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Iran and Turkmenistan without the security concerns implicit in transiting Afghanistan. Finally, the port is attractive to shippers keen on saving money by shifting their operations from the relatively more expensive port of Dubai.

Equally as important as its prime location is Gwadar's connectivity to China's autonomous Xinjiang region, one of the fastest growing export regions in the country. A network of highways and roads will soon fluidly connect the port to western China, further increasing trade between the two allies and building upon their recent preferential trade agreement. Already, Pakistan accounts for 20% of China's South Asian trade: Chinese companies make up 12% of Pakistan's foreign enterprises and have provided more than US$4b in investments, a figure that increased by 30% last year. Gwadar's future status as a free trade zone will also allow Chinese companies to construct facilities for processing and assembling goods for export so that they will no longer have to be shipped to the east coast where infrastructure is already overtaxed.

Domestically, Gwadar will diversify many aspects of Pakistan's economy. Its location in Balochistan, one of the poorest and least developed parts of Pakistan, promises jobs for locals as well as the development of huge tracks of uninhabited waterfront property located along the new scenic highway connecting the port to Karachi. Comparative advantages derived from relatively cheap labour and low levels of regulation will further transform the area as it develops as a special economic zone. Meanwhile, Pakistanis will be able to establish and acquire expertise in a host of new industries, including fish and food processing, oil refinement, dry storage, and refitting, while local entrepreneurs will be offered a chance to profit from the myriad of tertiary industries required by any major international hub. Finally, Gwadar will encourage Pakistan's land-locked neighbours to strike beneficial trade agreements giving Islamabad access to less developed but potentially profitable markets.

These forms of economic development are key to integrating Pakistan with the global economy. Gwadar will facilitate foreign trade, develop profitable industries, secure regional economic cooperation and develop a strategically key province of the country. Once successful, Gwadar will create jobs in an area known for underemployment and Islamist militancy, offering an alternative developmental vision to the one forwarded by local *ulemas*. For a country trying desperately to modernise and shed its label as a sponsor of militant Islam, these factors are of critical importance. They will be doubly important if Pakistan is to compete with India economically in years ahead.

Gwadar as a strategic maritime outpost

While the economic upside of Gwadar is massive, so much of the port's value can be summed up by the classic real estate adage, 'location, location, location'. Gwadar's proximity to the Middle East's maritime energy trade, its key vantage point near US and Indian naval fleets, and its location far from the choke points of Southeast Asia, are just some of its primary attributes. While huge advantages for Pakistan, these same qualities coupled with Chinese involvement in Gwadar, have led hawks in both India and the US to suspect a much darker military purpose lurking behind the port's rapid development.

Without question, the key force driving critics in both India and the US to warn of the Gwadar's military potential for China is the port's proximity to the energy trade flows. Known as the 'String of Pearls', hawkish thinkers describe the port as a key naval outpost or surveillance point in China's developing maritime strategy. The theory is predicated on two key points: that China (as a net energy importer) is dependent upon Middle Eastern oil to fuel its expanding economy, and that the People's Liberation Army Navy's lack of a true blue water capability makes it difficult to protect key sea lanes of communication (SLOC) by which energy shipments transit from the Middle East to North Asia. Thus, to ensure and protect energy shipments, the theory argues that China is actively creating a network of bases, the 'String of Pearls', by which the PLAN might operate to protect energy shipments in the event of conflict or a larger global competition for energy resources.

The fact that China has already invested millions to support and defend its maritime energy shipments and SLOCs supports this view. Beijing has obtained a listening post from Burma on the Coco islands, provided aid to Bangladesh to develop Chittagong port, spent millions on a feasibility study looking at a possible canal through Thailand that would avoid the Malacca Straight, and worked out a recent security arrangement with Cambodia. In all cases, China is actively working to strengthen its ability to monitor and protect sealanes while simultaneously establishing a network of ports amenable to Chinese vessels, both commercial and military.

But beyond being just a naval base or surveillance post, Gwadar also affords China another key advantage: virtually guaranteed access to energy supplies. Once the second phase of the port is complete and an energy pipeline is laid from Turkmenistan to Gwadar, China will be able to import energy to its western hinterlands. The route will save some 13,500km of travel, two to three months of maritime transit and all of the associated expenses including fuel, crews, duties and port fees that come with the maritime shipments that now service China through Shanghai. Moreover, in the event of tensions between China and the US or some other power, Beijing will still be able to truck oil from Gwadar, preventing the US from totally starving the country by blocking the approaches to the Malacca Straight.

Pakistan will also benefit from the port's location and its supporting infrastructure. Beyond maritime dimensions, the evolution of Gwadar's airport will provide a perfect maritime air base for Pakistani fighters and surveillance aircraft. Even more importantly, China's involvement will make it extremely difficult for the Indian Navy to enact a nation-wide maritime blockade without cooling ties with its largest regional competitor. Meanwhile, the port is also well positioned to encourage further naval cooperation between Pakistan and China: the two countries held their first joint naval exercise in 2003 off of Chinese shores and other exercises seems sure to follow. As such, Gwadar provides a prefect venue for a follow-up, one that allows

Chinese ships to test the 'String of Pearls' and regional surveillance capabilities along the way.

Additionally, the port may appeal to other western navies presenting Pakistan with potential engagement opportunities. Located less than 100km from the Iranian border, Gwadar may be appeal to the US and other Iran-suspicious forces interested in surveillance opportunities. Meanwhile, the port is so far free of sectarian violence that continues to plague Karachi and has no discernable ghettos. Both qualities position it well to become a first class port of call, one that does not leave young sailors mortified by ubiquitous poverty and fear. Finally and more of a side note, Gwadar may in time minimise the importance of the Indian supported Iranian port of Chabahar, something that would be of immense symbolic value to Pakistan's national pride.

In sum: doves and hawks

While there is merit in both the dovish and hawkish view of the new port at Gwadar, it will still be some years before the true face of the port is revealed. Economic growth in the region will take time. In order for the port to be truly successful, Islamabad will have to diffuse local anger: local Islamist leaders accuse the Musharraf government of stealing the province's wealth and failing to provide promised jobs. Moreover, local governments will also have to keep a keen eye on maintaining and protecting the infrastructure that connects Gwadar to its key markets of Karachi, China and Central Asia. Already, portions of the new highway were washed away by rain, and militants have begun attacking key infrastructure points in Balochistan over the past 12 months in protest. All the while, development of the port will also have to continue at a frenzied but organised pace, supported both financially and politically by China and Pakistan. In the meantime, if market speculation and the ongoing increase in property prices near Gwadar is any indication, many investors seem quite sure that the port will be an economic success in the years to come.

On the other hand the evolution of Gwadar as a new Chinese naval base seems even further away. Rapprochement efforts of late between India and Pakistan and India and China portend a movement towards cooperation rather than conflict in the region. All three nations are seemingly beginning to realize that massive military spending is not producing the kinds of gains most desired by local citizens. Moreover, the problems that would be created by China's basing of true naval assets such as submarines or other offensive platforms at Gwadar are more likely to prompt a naval blockade of energy shipments by India than to protect them.

That said, it seems very safe to assume that China and Pakistan will use the port to its fullest advantage. There can be almost no doubt that surveillance and monitoring equipment is already in place and functioning. To not do so would be irresponsible by both militaries considering the importance of the nearby Straight of Hormuz to global trade and economic health. Gwadar will also serve a great warm water-training base for both nations and will facilitate engagement opportunities with regional partners in maritime exercises and friendship-building activities. Moreover, Gwadar is a symbol of Chinese foreign investment and will provide international prestige as China joins the ranks of powers with port rights in a foreign nation. Finally, in the extreme, China will be able to extend its naval patrols and power to the Indian Ocean. This will meet Beijing's naval objectives and expand its defences beyond the 'third island principle', creating a temporary remedy for the nation's lack of aircraft carriers.

In sum, it seems unlikely that China will significantly expand its naval presence by basing assets in the Indian Ocean any time in the near future. However, the volatile nature of energy shipments coupled with the security situation in the Arabian Gulf makes ruling out the possibility next to impossible. In the meantime, Gwadar promises to remain a key point of interest for maritime security observers, while also providing a new avenue for developing and bringing international investment to South Asia.

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India's Energy Diplomacy

Acting Sub-Lieutenant Michael Toppozini[*]

India's Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas Mani Shankar Aiyar has been a very busy man. Mr. Aiyar has quietly visited no less than eight countries over the past six months in a deeply important campaign to ensure India's future energy needs. And while China's 'energy diplomacy' continues to garner the media's focus, the emergence of India and its future energy requirements is no less pressing. In this article we will look at India's recent energy deals and the implications that they portend for Delhi's bilateral and multilateral relations in the Indo-Pacific region.

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At present India is a net importer of petroleum and natural gas, a position that is expected to increase as consumption expands by 4-5% over the next two decades. In 2004-05 the country's oil import bill was US$27b while its earnings from exports only amounted to US$6.5b. As troubling to Mr. Aiyar, India consumed more than double the amount of natural gas than it produced domestically. And while these numbers pale in comparison to energy dependency seen in other nations, India's desired growth rate of between 7-8% will hinge inextricably on the nation's ability to ensure continued energy imports.

To relieve this pressure Mr. Aiyar is looking to natural gas and has launched an aggressive campaign of energy diplomacy, stating that, 'gas is increasingly the fuel of the 21st century'. He envisions India increasing gas imports to 100 million standard cubic metres per day within the next five years, with the figure doubling to 200 million over the next decade. However, the problem facing Mr. Aiyar is how best to secure access to these desperately needed gas reserves.

The grandest of them all: the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline

On 4 June Mr. Aiyar arrived in Islamabad for a historic visit concerning the creation of a gas pipeline running from Iran, through Pakistan to India. Despite a number of challenges, all three sides were keen to push ahead. Once operational, the 2,600km pipeline, estimated to cost US$4b, will transport gas from Iran's massive North Pars field in the Persian Gulf through southern Pakistan (including the restive Baluchistan province), then onto India, however the exact routing for the project has still not been finalised.

Despite obvious challenges, US pressure, and historical animosities, Mr. Aiyar's June visit produced an agreement to form a joint working group to discuss the technical issues related to the massive project and explore how best to implement them. The first phase of the pipeline, securing the actual gas to be transported, was completed almost two weeks later following another visit by the oil minister, this time to Iran, where both countries signed a US$20b natural gas deal. The agreement will see the first shipments, which will total five million tons per year, begin in 2009 and last for the next two and half decades.

Of all India's attempts to secure energy resources, this deal is the most ambitious and promises far-reaching effects for the region, especially in terms of Pakistan and India rapprochement. Building on other confidence building initiatives between the two countries, the pipeline would serve as yet another conduit for cooperation and normalising relations. Economic linkages, security cooperation, and technical and scientific collaboration are only some of the possible consequences that could result from the project's completion.

However, the pipeline is not without its share of obstacles. While regional tensions are obvious, trans-regional tensions, specifically between the US and Iran, are perhaps the largest impediment. Media outlets in India and Pakistan report that the US has threatened both India and Pakistan with sanctions if the deal goes through. Officials argue that the proposed pipeline violates the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) which states that any international company that invests more than US$20m a year in Iran's energy sector is liable to face punitive measures by the US. And while Iran and India appear the most involved, it's Pakistan, the integral piece to the project that will face the most pressure from the US; Washington's leverage will most likely be its US$1b in aid to Pakistan.

If a deal can be finessed, it promises change in the region. Though remote, observers opine that the pipeline could be a catalyst in normalising relations between Iran and the US. Most analysts agree that in order for the pipeline to become a reality, foreign companies will have to be involved in Iran's side of the construction; the country has neither the capital nor the expertise to build the pipeline. By allowing US companies to work hand-in-hand with their Iranian counterparts, a potential olive branch could be extended to Tehran, as the first step of reconciliation and the starting point for dialogue between the two nations.

Another possible benefit is closer ties between China and India. While some analysts maintain that China and India's search for foreign sources of energy could lead to tensions, others argue that this could be a positive first step towards energy cooperation. Relations between the two regional powers have made slow and steady progress culminating in the creation of a 'strategic partnership for peace and prosperity' in April 2005. Further, Minister Aiyar has stated on several occasions that he would like to bring China into the pipeline project and is planning to visit Beijing in November to discuss such a move.

As recent talks have shown, both governments seem to have embraced the idea that cooperation is both preferable and more profitable than conflict. Moreover, Delhi has expressed interest in the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline which began construction in 2004. The 980km pipeline from the Caspian Sea in northwestern Kazakhstan, to China's northwestern Xinjiang region is expected to be completed by the end of the year and will carry up to 50 million tons of oil annually. If jointly developed, the chances for greater collaboration not just on energy projects could be unlimited.

The Caspian Sea: numerous possibilities

Between his visits to Islamabad and Tehran in June, Minister Aiyar stopped in Azerbaijan to discuss the possibility of securing oil from the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. With Azerbaijan's oil reserves exceeding an estimated 7 billion barrels alone, and the entire Caspian Region possessing between 17 and 33 billion barrels, there is the potential for India to secure large quantities of oil to meet its needs. Mr. Aiyar's visit produced a positive response from Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev, who welcomed India's involvement, not only in purchasing oil, but also from Delhi's offers to upgrade the country's refineries and to assist in further exploration. The result was an agreement to establish a joint working group to identify and analyse areas of bilateral cooperation.

The interest in Azerbaijan is part of a larger interest in the region given the large amounts of proven oil reserves. The Blue Stream pipeline completed by Russia in 2002 runs from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea, through Turkey and onto the Mediterranean. It is expected to transport up to 16 billion cubic metres of natural gas by 2007. Closer to India is a prospective natural gas pipeline stretching from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and into Pakistan. The project, 1,600km in length, would transport up to 30 billion cubic metres of natural gas annually from the Dauletabad fields in South East Turkmenistan. Officials say that the final cost would be between US$2-2.5b and take about three years to complete. The possibility of the pipeline reaching India has been suggested by Mr. Aiyar and like the Iran-Pakistan-India project, Delhi's participation in any of these pipelines would only serve to improve its relations with nations throughout the region.

Closer to home: Burma and Bangladesh

In January 2005, Minister Aiyar visited Bangladesh and Burma to discuss the possibility of a pipeline shipping natural gas from Burma's Shwe offshore gas field, through Bangladesh to India. To date, Indian officials have proposed eight routes, including three underwater pipelines to expedite the idea. Mr. Aiyar has indicated that he prefers the overland routes, calling them a win-win situation for Bangladesh. According to the oil minister, the pipeline would give Dhaka the opportunity to transport gas from its own fields in the east to the west where demand is higher; plus, Bangladesh would receive US$125m a year in transit fees.

From such an arrangement relations between Delhi and Dhaka stand to profit the most. As recently as last year, Bangladeshi Prime Minister Begum Zia flatly rejected any designs for the construction of Indian roads, waterways or pipelines through her country. But Bangladesh's economic needs may override this decision in the near future.

With regards to Burma, India is willing to deal with Yangon despite the worldwide condemnation the repressive regime faces. Nevertheless, the possibility remains that with closer bilateral ties, India may gain more influence with the ruling military junta and press for more changes concerning human rights issues, democratic reform and border security improvements to combat militant groups using Burma as a base and logistical supply hub. As well, such a lucrative deal could pay off by allowing India to one day supplant China as the major player in Burma's energy market.

And finally: the Qatar-South Asia pipeline

A final country that India has approached is Qatar. Although India already imports natural gas from the small Persian Gulf nation, Delhi has expressed interest in the possibility of yet another pipeline running through Pakistan. Following a two-day visit to Qatar by Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, both sides agreed to establish a working group to explore the idea in greater detail. In a recent letter to Qatar's energy minister Abdullah bin Hamad Al-Attiyeh, Mr. Aiyar made a formal request to join the Qatar-South Asia pipeline saying: 'The Pakistani leaders conveyed to me that they would have no objection to India participation in the project. I am aware that the proposal is at a preliminary stage at present. However, given India's energy security interests, we would be happy to associate ourselves with this project and to examine with Qatari and Pakistani authorities, the technical and commercial feasibility of the proposal.' He also suggested sending an official delegation to Doha to discuss the matter in the near future.

Expanding influence?

India's influence in the region stands to expand a great deal if any or all of its proposed deals come to fruition. India's indisputable future as an economic giant will serve to draw the region's poorer nations towards Delhi. Moreover, its established rule of law makes it an ideal country to pursue trade agreements with. Meanwhile, all of India's attempts, even if unsuccessful, represent a meaningful engagement in the region.

For now, relations with Pakistan appear to be improving. Though historical tensions threaten the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline, Pakistan and India are increasingly working together to repair their severed ties. If concluded, the Musharraf government will have a sincere financial interest in protecting the pipeline and cracking down on the countless Islamist groups who would make the pipeline a target. Any Pakistani action aimed at controlling militants will only serve to improve ties.

Meanwhile, India and Iran are already natural allies because of Pakistan and Afghanistan's historical Sunni animosity towards Shia Iran which has led Delhi and Tehran to cooperate against a common enemy. Both India and Iran have worked together to prevent the reemergence of militant Wahabbi Islam taking hold in the region and have jointly worked on port development at Chahbaha. Beyond regional concerns, bilateral relations could further be enhanced through the pipeline thanks to India's well-educated Muslim population. This asset positions Delhi as an ideal partner, capable of providing Tehran with expertise and training as Iran develops. Moreover, Iran could also become an ideal site of future Indian foreign direct investment.

Farther from home, Qatar and Azerbaijan represent concerted Indian moves to extend regional influence. Qatar, a former British colony, is a natural ally and trade partner. Around 20% of the country's population consists of non-resident Indians, leading India's commerce minister to lobby harder for greater participation from Indian companies in the Gulf state. Moreover if a deal can be reached, it would provide India with a justified reason to patrol the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan could link India into other regional pipelines allowing for greater regional and economic integration.

In sum, as Mr. Aiyar's hydrocarbon diplomacy gains momentum, India will develop its regional ties and be presented with an opportunity to soothe past differences with symbiotic economic progress. The benefits from mutual collaborations on massive projects such as the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline cannot help but improve relations between India and its neighbours. These initiatives show that India is a conscious and freewheeling broker, no longer shackled by its once controlled economy. Much like China, planners are shrugging-off the weight of historical difference in favour of future progress, economic growth, and development. Once seemingly unsolvable differences are now quickly dissolving leaving Delhi in a position to redefine its relations with its South Asian neighbours and secure its economic future through guaranteed energy supplies



HMAS *Anzac* off Christmas Island (RAN)

SEMAPHORE

The RAN in the Gulf - two years on

(Issue 3/2005)

On 17 March 2003 some 40 cargo dhows sailed from the Khawr Abd Allah (KAA) waterway and entered the Northern Arabian Gulf (NAG). Here awaited the pre-positioned ships of the Maritime Interception Force (MIF); a multi-national flotilla tasked with preventing both the entry of prohibited goods into Iraq and the conduct of any illegal export trade. The MIF had dealt with many similar incidents over previous months. Upwards of 300 vessels of all types were bottled up in the KAA, most of which carried high-value but illicit cargoes. In an attempt to overwhelm the waiting patrols, the latest smuggler tactic was to orchestrate a mass breakout during darkness. On this occasion, though, the dhows were leaving in the early afternoon. Many were displaying white flags and their crews even offered to dump their cargoes should this be ordered. Reacting to media reports on the imminent start of hostilities, they had decided that the possible profit no longer justified the risk. To the surprise of the smugglers, however, the MIF seemed no longer concerned with commercial contraband. After a thorough inspection to ensure they posed no threat to Coalition forces, each dhow was ordered to clear the area.

The exodus marked a watershed in nearly thirteen years of maritime interception operations. Since August 1990, when the United Nations first imposed economic sanctions following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, a multi-national naval force had conducted one of the longest maritime enforcement operations in history. By itself the embargo could not force Iraq to comply with the directions of the UN Security Council but, in addition to hampering Iraq's efforts to reacquire a credible military capability, it also served as a continuing demonstration of international resolve and a highly visible deterrent to any Iraqi response. Moreover, by using surface warships the operation allowed individual nations to make a finely tuned contribution; one which could be matched exactly to their changing objectives and interests. With the move towards conflict in March 2003 the mission was about to change yet again.

The United States Navy (USN) ran the overall maritime campaign, but throughout the embargo's evolution the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) played far more than a token role. Under the codename Operation *Damask* the RAN provided a three-ship task group in September 1990 and, building on a common doctrine and many years of combined exercises, found it relatively easy to operate within an *ad hoc* coalition. RAN units later provided escort and logistic support during the combat operations to liberate Kuwait and then maintained a regular single-ship presence with the MIF in either the Arabian Gulf or the Red Sea. Over the years the manner in which the MIF conducted interceptions and boardings changed markedly, but Australian sailors proved highly adaptable and ever ready to innovate. HMAS *Anzac*, for example, began the tenth and last *Damask* deployment in mid-2001 and was instrumental in bringing about a more aggressive approach to interception operations. Her skilled boarding parties demonstrated the advantages of a close and unremitting presence in Iraqi coastal waters. Over the course of *Anzac*'s deployment the MIF's success rate against illegal traders increased from just 20% to more than 80%.[1]

Changes in the international security situation following the dramatic events of 11 September 2001 resulted in Australia increasing its contribution in the Middle East. As part of Operation *Slipper* another three-ship task group arrived in the Gulf in December 2001 and never less than two ships were maintained by regular rotation until mid-2003. With USN forces also needing to accommodate new tasks in Afghanistan, command of the MIF passed routinely to the Australian task group commander. It was a unique combined operational responsibility and the successful results did much to enhance Australia's international standing. Despite innovative tactics by the smugglers, including the use of ever more elaborate means to obstruct boardings, the MIF maintained the initiative and kept the illegal trade unprofitable. Taking place at a distance and out of sight, these activities seldom made the news, but were nonetheless essential to the military campaign which followed. By preserving a sustained presence within Iraqi territorial waters, successive RAN commanders built up not only valuable skills within the force, but also a detailed picture of local military and civil activities. Effective exploitation of this knowledge advantage was the significant feature of the RAN's contribution throughout these years.

On 18 March 2003 the RAN task group transitioned to Operation *Falconer*, and the conduct of combat operations against the regime of Saddam Hussein. Also under Australian tactical command were ships from the USN, US Coast Guard, Royal Navy and Poland. The primary naval task in the NAG was to reopen the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr to allow the entry of humanitarian aid as quickly as possible. This task also meant supporting the British Royal Marines in their land assault and ensuring that the KAA remained clear of Iraqi forces. Each Australian ship in the force had an essential and multi-faceted part to play: the amphibious transport *Kanimbla* acted as a command platform and mother ship for coalition patrol craft and boarding parties; *Anzac* provided highly responsive naval gunfire support; while *Darwin* first acted as scene of action commander during the dhow exodus from the KAA, then offered surface and anti-air protection to high value Coalition units. The capture of three Iraqi minelaying tugs, a suicide boat and a variety of hidden weapons caches illustrated the potential threat, but their rapid discovery and neutralisation also demonstrated how completely the Coalition had established sea control. Just ten days into the campaign, the first humanitarian assistance cargo arrived at Umm Qasr, a testament to the quality of the pre-combat planning and the professionalism of the forces involved.

Despite their rapid and unquestioned success, Coalition naval operations in the Gulf were far from over. Operation *Catalyst* - Australia's commitment to multi-national efforts to develop a secure and stable environment in post-Saddam Iraq - began on 16 July 2003. Since then the RAN has separately deployed the frigates *Newcastle, Melbourne, Stuart, Adelaide* and *Darwin* to the region for periods of up to six months. Still heavily involved in interception operations, the crews of these ships have conducted hundreds of boardings, resulting in several discoveries of cash, hidden tanks of oil and other smuggled goods.

In addition to the boarding of selected vessels to ensure that contraband and weapons are not smuggled into Iraq, there is a more general requirement to keep watch on all maritime traffic entering and leaving the country, and also to provide protection for Iraq's primary oil terminals and shipping lanes. These tasks require a ship's company to remain at a high state of alert, maintaining constant visual and electronic surveillance in conditions which range from extreme heat in summer through to extreme winter cold.

On the eve of Anzac Day 2004 the ongoing threat was re-emphasised when insurgents carried out a well organised attack against the Iraqi oil terminals of Al Bakr and Khawr Al Amaya. Hundreds of fishermen use the surrounding area and Coalition forces routinely warn off dhows at risk of entering the established security zone. In closing to intercept and interrogate the latest incursion, three members of a US patrol boat's boarding party were killed when the dhow's occupants detonated an explosive charge. The on-scene maritime security operations commander, HMAS *Stuart*, immediately closed to render assistance and began to coordinate the rescue effort. Within minutes, two further attacks against the terminals were thwarted by Iraqi security detachments and it became clear that the initial incursion was part of a coordinated action. Under *Stuart's* direction Coalition forces rapidly secured the area, and Coalition plans were adjusted to counter any further threat.

In addition to the deployment of major fleet units, RAN personnel have contributed to the redevelopment of Iraq in many other ways. Clearance Diving Team 3 was instrumental in securing Iraqi port facilities during the hostilities in March 2003, and then performed a variety of ordnance disposal tasks in the surrounding region. In late 2004 the RAN members of the Iraqi Coastal Defence Training Team returned to Australia following a lengthy deployment during which they helped set up the new Iraqi Navy. Other personnel have fulfilled administrative and command roles within the wider ADF presence. Most recently, Commodore Steve Gilmore, CSC RAN, has been appointed to command all coalition maritime operations in the northern part of the Gulf, as well as providing maritime security for Iraqi oil platforms and shipping connections in and out of Kuwait, from late April 2005.

The operational environment in the Arabian Gulf is constantly changing, and many of the operational activities that were foreign to the RAN a little over a decade ago are now common practice. Nevertheless, the Gulf remains a dangerous and unpredictable area. International boundaries are often disputed and there is an ever-present requirement for diplomacy and good judgement. Critical to the RAN's success and confidence has been the possession of effective self-protective measures, both at sea and during brief visits to select foreign ports.

The lessons arising from fifteen years of Arabian Gulf operations are many and varied. But perhaps the most important for Australian planners is the utility, flexibility and responsiveness of maritime forces, especially the surface combatant force. Although acquired essentially for the defence of Australia these ships have consistently demonstrated their ability to rapidly self-deploy and then project national power and influence many thousands of miles from home. And they have done so without requiring a significant personnel presence on foreign soil. A warship is a mobile community of highly trained specialists, one which offers exceptional versatility across a broad spectrum of operations. In the Arabian Gulf, RAN units have performed tasks ranging from peacetime surveillance, patrol and boarding operations through to high intensity combat involving air, surface, mine and asymmetric threats.

In assessing the need for transformation in the conduct of Australian security, the requirement to maintain a balance in our force structure must receive at least equal attention. We live, as we have always done, with an uncertain future. In August 1990, no one in Australia expected an operational deployment to free Kuwait. Similarly, in September 2001, few would have predicted the path which led to combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The outstanding performance of RAN warships in recent years has come not through accurate forecasts of Australia's strategic future, but because they possessed the materiel and human flexibility to constantly adapt their roles and tactics to reflect changing and unexpected circumstances and missions.

Gallipoli as a joint maritime campaign

(Issue 4/2005)

The 1915 Gallipoli campaign holds a unique fascination for Australians. The story of the first Anzacs and their selfless sacrifice on a distant shore has assumed myth-like status. Ninety years later Gallipoli still provides a well-thumbed guide to our national identity and the supposedly innate qualities of Australian military personnel. In the words of an earlier historian: 'Volunteer forces, largely officered by amateur soldiers…demonstrated the effects of pioneering, of country life, of sport and of democratic freedom'.[2]

Today's Australian Defence Force (ADF) still finds value in the Anzac tradition, but the wider tendency towards uncritical glorification of the people and events of the campaign hides some significant deficiencies. More considered studies, such as those by Eric Andrews and Jeffery Grey, have pointed to fundamental weaknesses in a variety of areas including doctrine, training, logistics and strategy.[3] Hence the popular perception of the first Anzacs as inspired amateurs and uniformed larrikins only serves to detract from the very real, very necessary, and thoroughly professional improvements that were thereafter introduced into the Australian Imperial Force (AIF).

To its credit, the Anzac legend has forged an emotional bond between the Australian military and the public which other nations might envy, but its conceptual limitations mean that the ongoing tendency to link 'Anzac' with a uniquely Australian approach to warfare must be treated with caution. If, as Michael Evans has suggested, a way of warfare should be seen as 'a military operational manifestation of a society's values and deepest beliefs about how it should defend itself',[4] then in terms of future security planning much of the legend has outlived its usefulness. The complexity of modern warfare has long since outpaced the concept of creating a soldier by simply putting a rifle in the hands of a bushman.

An aspect of the Gallipoli campaign that clearly demands better understanding is the part played by maritime forces. The campaign was conducted on both a joint and a combined basis, and at its peak directly involved more than 250 French and British warships. In addition to the troops of the AIF Australia had a naval presence, with the submarine HMAS *AE2* taking an active and important role at the outset of the campaign, and the later commitment of the RAN Bridging Train in support of engineering operations on the Gallipoli Peninsula.

The campaign was first planned as a purely naval effort, but the failure by the combined fleet to force a passage through Turkey's Dardanelles defences in March 1915 required a reassessment of this strategy. The Allies still considered that their warships would have to penetrate into the Sea of Marmara and bombard Constantinople in order to compel Turkey to surrender. To enable this to be accomplished, their next plan was to secure the Gallipoli peninsula through amphibious assault. Success ashore would then allow the minefields to be cleared without interference from Turkish shore emplacements and field artillery, and permit the passage of the fleet to Constantinople.

Only because of allied naval supremacy could this expedition be contemplated, and after the landings the navies focussed on the direct support of troops ashore and ensuring that the flow of reinforcements and stores exceeded that of the enemy. Sea-based forces mounted a complex and continuing series of operations which involved not only the obvious tasks of fire support and the ferrying of troops and supplies, but also interdiction at sea and ashore, naval air support, and blockade enforcement.

While seldom recalled today, the level of Army and Navy cooperation eventually attained at Gallipoli was far ahead of anything contemplated before the war. Continuously tailored to meet developing circumstances, the inherent flexibility of the fleet ensured that support for the troops never faltered during the eight months of the campaign.

Like many aspects of military operations during World War I the combatants at Gallipoli encountered a novel situation. New and unproven technologies proliferated. Planning for the close integration of land, sea and air assets in the littoral had not been undertaken before, and original solutions even included the first steps towards force networking, as illustrated in the fire support plan for the landings at Gaba Tepe:



Fire support plan for the initial ANZAC landings at Gaba Tepe on 25 April 1915. (AWM 2S 367/26)

Without common and well-understood doctrine, however, such innovations meant that allied forces had to not only learn new techniques, but also overcome unexpected problems. For example, the use of gunnery spotters in naval balloons and aircraft promised highly accurate and responsive fire to commanders ashore. However, the geography of the peninsula posed difficulties. Often only the outer edges of a Turkish position were exposed to direct fire, and as the campaign wore on, ever deeper and more elaborate fortifications made the low angle fire of naval guns less effective. Communications between the different elements were also poor with the problems compounded by lack of joint training, equipment shortages, unreliable aircraft, and the delicate nature of existing wireless sets.

Due to the slow production of guns, spares and particularly shells, and with troops on the Western Front receiving priority for equipment, the Dardanelles expedition was always seriously lacking in artillery, placing greater reliance on the guns of battleships and cruisers. Practical experience led to improved methods and greatly increased the power of ships to find and target the enemy ashore. Even when naval gunfire could not penetrate Turkish trenches, it suppressed their fire, lowered their troops' morale, disrupted resupply, and kept their heavy guns engaged. A battleship's 15-inch shrapnel shell contained 15,000 bullets, and after the devastating fire they received during their early counter-attacks the Turks made no further attempts to attack by daylight over ground that was in direct view of the covering naval force. The battleships were also instrumental in preventing the Turkish Navy from supporting their own troops. Using aerial spotting to fire over the peninsula, just one or two salvoes were generally all that was necessary to induce enemy warships to withdraw.

As in every amphibious operation, control of the sea remained critical throughout the campaign, allowing the allied force to use the sea for its own purposes, while preventing the Turkish force doing the same. Everything came and went by sea; the men, mules, guns and ammunition, the wire and timber supports for the construction of fortifications and trenches and of course the water and provisions. Most importantly, because it could rely on sea control the allied command always retained the option of evacuating the force.

Simultaneously, Allied sea power acted to disrupt Turkish communications and hamstrung their efforts to dislodge the Allies. There was no railway to Gallipoli and the nearest station was 50 miles from the northern end of the isthmus. Allied battleships and monitors shelled the main road and single access bridge to disrupt Turkish transport arrangements, while naval aircraft demonstrated their reach by attacking the enemy's railhead. Meanwhile the exploits of Allied submarines - a classic case of sea denial and one of the few undisputed successes of the campaign - practically stopped sea communications between Constantinople and Gallipoli. By July 1915 the Turks had abandoned the sea route for the transport of troops, while by the end of December only one large steamer was left operating in the Sea of Marmara. The lack of alternative routes forced the Turks to bring almost everything into Gallipoli by land at night; troops on foot and supplies by camels and ox carts. Farther afield allied destroyers maintained patrols to prevent contraband reaching Turkey through Greek or Bulgarian ports. Other warships escorted friendly transports, hunted for enemy submarines in the lower Aegean and blocked the passage into the Sea of Crete. Rather than taking place on a small Turkish peninsula, from the joint perspective the campaign is better understood by looking at the entire Eastern Mediterranean.

The lasting legacy of Gallipoli should not be seen in terms of the slaughter in the trenches. Though ultimately a failure, the campaign provided a wealth of shared experience. Joint operations techniques and procedures, ranging from improved command and control through to common terminology were learned the hard way in 1915. But the campaign paved the way for the succession of amphibious assaults that brought victory in 1945. The lessons of both success and failure in the campaign informed the development of amphibious tactics and equipment between the wars. The fundamentals of modern maritime power projection were established. 'We are far from being beaten', wrote the naval commander, Admiral John de Roebeck, after the evacuation, '...in fact we have learned a great deal and will know what to do in the future'.[5]

Air warfare destroyers and combat operations from the sea

(Issue 5/2005)

Several *Semaphore* newsletters in 2003 discussed Australia's needs for major surface combatants and an area air warfare capability.[6] A further review of the ADF's rationale for and expectations of the planned Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD) is warranted given the planned selection of a preferred design in mid-2005 and recent public debate for and against this planned combination of capabilities. This newsletter will review the AWD's employment in combat operations from the sea, and particularly in amphibious operations, support to operations on land, and land strike.[7]

Recent Defence policy statements have focused on the uncertain and unstable global strategic environment and the likelihood that Australia's national interests could be affected by events far from our homeland, which has led to a renewed emphasis on meeting trouble before it reaches our shores. Forces that are not prepared for the most difficult of circumstances cannot defend against modern, high technology weapons and the ADF must therefore be able to prevail in complex, high intensity operations. The most recent capability decisions for the RAN have primarily focused on the acquisition of medium sized aviation capable amphibious ships and very highly capable AWDs. The Australian Government has decided firmly in favour of these amphibious and combatant capabilities, which will allow the ADF to use the sea as the highway that it properly is, rather than the moat that some would perhaps prefer.

These capabilities implement the doctrinal concept of sea control, or the ability to gain and use freedom of action in an area of the sea for one's own purposes, and, if required, to deny the use of that area to an adversary.[8] In today's environment, this requires one to control activities on the sea surface, in the water mass and on the sea bed, in the airspace above the sea, across the electro-magnetic spectrum, and over and on nearby coastal land.

The ability to exert sea control was critical to the ADF's success in leading the multi-national force in East Timor. As the then Major General Peter Cosgrove said shortly after the operation:

> *'Another military blinding glimpse of the obvious is the utility of sea power in the East Timor operation. The persuasive, intimidatory or deterrent nature of major warships was not to me as the combined joint force commander an incidental, nice to have "add on" but an important indicator of national and international resolve and most reassuring to all of us who relied on sea lifelines.*[9]

Lessons learned in recent joint amphibious operations such as in East Timor and the Solomon Islands, together with a comprehensive experimentation and analysis program, have allowed the ADF to develop a very clear picture of future circumstances that will require the exercise of sea control to enable combat operations from the sea. At its maximum, Australia will require the ability to lift, to lodge, to sustain and to withdraw a combined arms battle group consisting of an embarked force of about 2000 personnel, and their vehicles and equipment, wherever the Government determines. The initial lodgement of this force requires a company-strength component to be lifted and landed simultaneously from helicopters, in addition to personnel and equipment landed from amphibious watercraft.

These requirements demand what will be, in global terms, medium-sized but very sophisticated amphibious ships, and an ability independently to protect the substantial embarked force both in transit and in theatre. While it is disembarked, the RAN must also provide fire support, facilities and logistics support to reduce the size of the land force's footprint ashore.

The Defence Capability Plan[10] will provide a balanced ADF force structure of complementary capabilities designed to operate seamlessly as a single force. In combat operations from the sea the AWDs will thus work closely with the RAN's amphibious, hydrographic and mine warfare forces, Army land and aviation forces, and with Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft, Over the Horizon Radar, tactical and wide-area uninhabited aerial surveillance vehicles, ground-based air defence systems, the planned Joint Strike Fighters, and air to air refuelling aircraft. A combination of these capabilities will provide a continuous, comprehensive and layered air, surface, subsurface and missile defence umbrella around a deployed force.

Last year, the Minister for Defence announced that the AWDs would be fitted with a variant of the US Aegis air warfare system.[11] Not only will this system increase interoperability with our closest ally, but it will also provide the ADF with a sophisticated air defence system able to deal with all projected threats. The Aegis system and its associated weapons and sensors will allow the AWDs to remain well beyond the range of most anti-ship missiles, yet be able to detect and destroy hostile aircraft with no advanced warning to those aircraft that they are being engaged. This makes the AWDs the ideal platform to maintain the continuous sea control necessary to protect the planned amphibious forces and to permit the land forces to achieve their tasks, be they in the approaches to our continent, in our immediate neighbourhood, or in contributions to alliance operations further afield.

Recent criticism of the AWDs has emphasised the role of fighter aircraft in providing maritime air defence. These comments fail to recognise the complexity of area air defence, and the broad range of environmental, geographic and threat circumstances which make it difficult, if not foolish, to rely on any single defensive solution.

There is no doubt that fighter aircraft play a fundamental role in air defence; for example, they are extremely valuable as the outer defensive layer of a maritime force. However, they have relatively short endurance and, depending on where the ADF is called to combat, fighter aircraft may not be available when needed or if air bases are denied in the forward operating area. The inherent characteristics of maritime forces permit sustained operations at considerable distances from home. In the absence of the necessary land-based infrastructure to support fighters, the AWDs must be able to provide high-level autonomous air defence for protracted periods through their own long-range air surveillance radars, multi-channel fire control radars and air interceptors, and their closer-range self-defence weapons and counter measures systems.

Where fighter aircraft are available to participate in a joint force, the challenge of countering multiple attacks reinforces the folly of relying on a single solution. Aircraft may not be optimised to defend against particular threats - such as long-range cruise missiles launched from ashore, from ships, submarines and aircraft - and their weapons capacity is limited in comparison to that of ships. Even where both these limitations can be overcome, there is no guarantee that sufficient aircraft would be available to provide the required level of protection - they may well be needed for other tasks, or assigned aircraft may be off-station refuelling or defending against one part of a multiple attack. In these cases, the AWDs must provide an autonomous defensive capability. Where range considerations permit surveillance aircraft such as the AEW&C to operate with the maritime force, they will be an integral part of that force with or without fighter cover. This is because the AEW&C can operate inside the AWDs' area air defence umbrella whenever a threat to that aircraft is detected.

The other main criticism of the AWDs is that they are bigger and more powerful than the ships they are to replace - the guided missile destroyers (DDGs) and frigates. Bigger they indeed will be, but this is also a positive which goes beyond the unworthy imputation of Service pomp and pride implied in some criticism. The larger AWDs offer significant advantages over their predecessors: greater range, flexibility, endurance, sea keeping qualities, survivability, and adaptability through modification or upgrade in response to new technology and threats.

The last DDG was decommissioned in 2001. And, while the RAN's frigates have given great service over many years, ships of this size and capability simply cannot provide the sustained area air defence that the ADF now requires. The *Anzac* class frigates fitted with the Evolved Sea Sparrow missile are capable of self defence against most missile threats, and can defend other ships in very close proximity. However, they do not provide an adequate area air defence umbrella that can protect other high value assets such as amphibious ships, their aircraft and deployed forces, or AEW&C. Four of our *Adelaide* class Guided Missile Frigates (FFGs) are being upgraded with the SM-2 missile to provide an interim solution to the existing air warfare capability gap. However, even with this enhanced capability, the FFGs are only able to engage two air targets simultaneously, whereas the capability to mount simultaneous multiple aircraft and missile attacks and overwhelm currently available defences has been widely developed. In any case, these ships are aging - the first of the class, HMAS *Adelaide*, was commissioned in 1980, and they must be replaced over time.

The AWDs will serve Australia for at least three decades, and they will be big and adaptable enough to be modified or upgraded during their service. While an anti-ballistic missile capability is not a current requirement, recent discussion of the AWD's potential in this role is one measure of the adaptability of the overall ship design.

The ubiquity of the AWD's planned capabilities is apparent from this review of its employment in combat operations from the sea. A review of combat operations at sea - such as intelligence collection and surveillance, cover, interdiction of commercial shipping and sealift, maritime strike and interdiction of adversary forces[12] - would demonstrate similarly extensive capabilities essential to a balanced ADF force structure.

Despite the combat power offered by the AWDs, their utility would not be limited exclusively to warfighting. Maintaining a military capability edge also enables the ADF to conduct the more frequent constabulary and diplomatic tasks of potentially lower intensity.[13] Unlike some non-maritime defence systems, naval vessels are also fundamentally flexible in their employment of force, and are able to change roles rapidly across the conflict spectrum, as the operational situation requires. From naval diplomacy to peacetime constabulary duties, to high intensity operations and power projection, the AWD will offer further improvement to the already extensive mission versatility of the current RAN fleet.

This is based on elements of the Creswell Oration given on the 104th Anniversary of the foundation of the Australian Navy, 1 March 2005, by the Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral C.A. Ritchie, AO RAN.

Indonesian archipelagic sea lanes

(Issue 6/2005)

Indonesia is, both geographically and legally, an archipelagic nation. The concept that the nation is a single entity comprised of the entirety of the archipelagoes, their individual islands and surrounding waters, is a core Indonesian belief, known as *Wawasan Nusantara* (archipelagic outlook).[14] With this fundamental belief rooted in its national psyche, Indonesia was one of several states that successfully advocated special recognition for archipelagic states during a series of international negotiations, which culminated in the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC). Indonesia was the first archipelagic nation to take advantage of the archipelagic regime provided by LOSC. Accordingly, Indonesia's initial proposal to designate *archipelagic sea lanes* (ASL) compelled the international community to consider how the theoretically derived legal provisions of the Convention were to be implemented.

LOSC represents a compromise between the growing jurisdiction of coastal states over their adjoining waters and the desire of other states to retain their historical freedom of the seas. This compromise is neatly illustrated in Part IV of LOSC, which deals with archipelagic states. It recognises the archipelagic state's sovereignty over its archipelagic waters, but requires that this sovereignty be subject to the regime of *archipelagic sea lanes passage*. For an archipelagic state to benefit from the regime in Part IV, it must meet two criteria. Firstly, it must satisfy the definition of an archipelagic state, and secondly it must draw its baselines in accordance with the LOSC provisions.

Article 46 of LOSC defines an archipelagic state as one that is 'constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos' and which may include other islands. An archipelago means a group of islands and other natural features which 'are so closely interrelated that such islands, waters and other natural features form an intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity, or which historically have been regarded as such.' In many respects, this definition embodies the *Wawasan Nusantara* concept.

An archipelagic state may draw straight baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs. The baselines must enclose the main islands of the archipelago, and the enclosed water to land ratio must be between 1:1 and 9:1. This requirement prevents island countries such as New Zealand or the United Kingdom, which are made up of a few dominant islands, from claiming archipelagic status. It also ensures that states with widely dispersed archipelagoes such as Kiribati and Tuvalu cannot draw baselines around small distant islands.[15] The waters within the straight baselines are called *archipelagic waters*. Each straight baseline must be less than 100nm in length but up to 3% of the total number of baselines can be up to a maximum length of 125nm. This rather complex formula was designed with Indonesia's circumstances in mind, as Indonesia's longest straight baseline is 124nm.

An archipelagic state enjoys sovereignty over its archipelagic waters, and two passage regimes apply in all archipelagic waters: those of *innocent passage* and *archipelagic sea lanes passage*.

All vessels, including warships, enjoy the right of *innocent passage* through archipelagic waters, but the archipelagic state may temporarily suspend innocent passage, on a non-discriminatory basis, through specified areas when the suspension is essential for the protection of the state's security. Innocent passage requires a vessel to conduct continuous and expeditious transit in a manner that is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the archipelagic state.

An archipelagic state may designate ASL, and corresponding air routes, which are suitable for continuous and expeditious passage through the archipelago. Article 53(9) of LOSC requires a cooperative approach between the archipelagic state and the international community before ASLs can be formally promulgated. If it wishes to designate ASLs, the archipelagic state must refer the proposal to the 'competent international organisation' with a view to their adoption. That organisation may only adopt such ASLs as may be agreed with the archipelagic state, after which the archipelagic state may designate them.

The phrase 'competent international organisation' is not explained in the text of LOSC but in 1994 the UN Division of Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea published a list of UN bodies expert in particular subject areas. The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) was acknowledged as the relevant competent organisation for the purposes of LOSC Article 53. The IMO was created by international convention to assist states in adopting 'the highest practicable standards in matters concerning maritime safety, efficiency of navigation and prevention and control of marine pollution from ships'.[16] The IMO provides guidance on ships routing systems, which includes guidance on the adoption, designation and substitution of ASL.

An archipelagic state does not have to designate ASL, but if it does, LOSC Article 53(4) requires that the designation include all normal passage routes used for international navigation. It is this requirement to designate all routes that came under special scrutiny in light of Indonesia's proposal.

The passage regime that applies in ASLs - archipelagic sea lanes passage (ASLP) - permits transiting vessels to operate in their *normal mode*. Normal mode is a more lenient regime than innocent passage. For example, a submarine can transit submerged through an ASL but must transit on the surface while undertaking innocent passage, and a ship may launch and recover aircraft in an ASL but may not do so on innocent passage. Importantly, while an archipelagic state may suspend innocent passage on a temporary basis for security reasons, it cannot suspend ASLP under any circumstances.

Until an archipelagic state has completely designated its ASLs, vessels can exercise ASLP through all routes normally used for international navigation. Once a complete ASL designation has been made, vessels are restricted to exercising the right of ASLP through those lanes, and can only conduct innocent passage through the remaining archipelagic waters.

Indonesia is the first and, to date, only archipelagic state to seek to designate its ASLs. Indonesia formally submitted its ASL proposal to the 67th session of the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) of the IMO in May 1996. It worked closely with the US and Australia, representing all user states, in formulating this proposal for three north-south ASLs through the archipelago.[17] Because key routes such as an east-west passage were not included, Indonesia's approach was not entirely consistent with the requirement of Article 53(4) to propose 'all normal routes used for international navigation.' Nonetheless, the IMO accepted that the proposal would be a partial designation only and that, until such time as Indonesia had designated all normal routes as ASL, the right to ASLP would continue to apply in the remaining non-designated routes. In 1998, the IMO formally adopted this partial system of ASL in Indonesian waters,[18] thus demonstrating its willingness to accommodate individual cases within the apparent confines of the LOSC.

Indonesia proclaimed the three north-south ASLs in Government Regulation No. 37 of 2002. Article 15 of this Regulation states that foreign ships and aircraft may *only* exercise the right of ASLP through the routes designated in that Regulation. Article 3 paragraph 2 states 'the right of archipelagic sea lane passage in other parts of Indonesian waters can be conducted *after* such a sea lane has been designated in those waters for the purpose of this transit.'[19] This implied that ships transiting through other routes would be limited to innocent passage. This view appeared to be supported by the 'elucidation' of Regulation 37 annexed to the IMO's Safety of Navigation Circular, which stated 'foreign ships planning to navigate [through the archipelago] may do so with the exercise of the right of innocent passage in the Indonesian waters equally within the archipelagic sea lanes or beyond the archipelagic sea lanes.'[20]

The implications for maritime states' merchant and military fleets caused some concern and several nations raised the issue through diplomatic channels. During the MSC meeting in June 2003, the Indonesian delegate read from a prepared statement confirming that the nature of the Indonesian designation was a partial one and that Indonesia had confirmed this on repeated occasions in various IMO fora.[21] The delegate noted Indonesia's responsibility for the safety of shipping transiting its waters and stated that much more technical and hydrographic work needed to be done before the designation of all normal routes of passage as ASLs could be completed. However, the delegate did refer to the 'basic problem' of identifying what constitutes a normal route.

In the international arena, Indonesia maintains that its ASL designation is only partial and accepts the right of ASLP is available to transiting vessels that navigate through normal routes used for international navigation. However, documents such as Regulation 37 and notices to mariners[22] take a clearly contrary view: Indonesian law states that the only right of passage outside the three designated ASLs is that of innocent passage. This disparity between Indonesia's international and domestic position poses a difficulty for transiting vessels.

The MSC has stated that the 'IMO shall retain continuing jurisdiction over the process of adopting archipelagic sea lanes until such time that sea lanes including all normal passage routes have been adopted.'[23] Where a partial designation has been adopted, the archipelagic state is obliged to periodically advise on its plans for conducting further surveys and 'is ultimately required to propose for adoption archipelagic sea lanes including all normal passage routes and navigational channels'. No time frame is given for this to occur.

It is in Indonesia's interests to designate all normal routes as ASLs. Once it has fully designated its ASLs, transiting vessels will be restricted to exercising ASLP only in those ASLs, and will be limited to innocent passage through the rest of the archipelago. Until this is completed, Indonesia will have difficulty in enforcing its domestic law against transiting vessels.

Further work on the designation of its ASLs would reassure the user states that Indonesia is moving to resolve the differences between its international obligations and its domestic law.

The naval contribution to joint operations

(Issue 7/2005)

There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies and statistics

Benjamin Disraeli

The ADF strives to be a seamless joint force, one in which the integration of individual Service capabilities is recognised as a key warfare concept.[24] Within this context it has seldom been more important to ensure that those making or influencing Australian defence policy understand the contribution these Service capabilities bring to the joint ADF effort. Unfortunately, some lobbyists all too often view events through a single-Service lens. The distortion inherent in such perspectives usually results in arguments that are misleading, if not fundamentally flawed. To take but one example, a review of the 2000 Defence White Paper assured readers that '…20 of the 22 operations that the ADF has taken part in over the last decade have overwhelmingly involved land forces'.[25] The author's contention, based on the experience of East Timor, Cambodia, Bougainville, Somalia and Vietnam, was that land forces - including certain undefined air and naval elements - represented almost the entire requirement for such operations.

The source for the 20/22 statistic was seemingly a map and table in the 2000 White Paper labelled 'ADF Involvement in Overseas Humanitarian Relief, Evacuations, Peacekeeping and Peace-Enforcement Operations 1990-present', which listed the 22 operations reproduced opposite.[26] The map made no claim to be comprehensive, and included no reference to relative levels of service participation, but it has nonetheless been regarded as authoritative. Certainly, the '20/22' interpretation has become widely accepted, and has since appeared regularly in officially sponsored publications.[27] The usual aim is to illustrate a perceived paradox between peacetime strategic theory and actual operational practice. Land forces, it is argued, have traditionally 'predominated' in Australia's offshore operations, yet a persistently larger proportion of the ADF's equipment vote and strategic intellectual capital has gone to its naval and air capabilities. The clear, and sometimes stated, implication is that these high technology assets have fallen far short of the land force contribution to making 'Australian policy both credible and effective'.[28]

The resources allocated under Australia's defence policy are beyond the scope of this newsletter, but it behoves those offering advice and analysis to use the best possible data. To anyone familiar with the tempo and scope of joint maritime operations over the last 15 years, the 20/22 statistic and similarly themed statements of relative usefulness make little sense. Not because the ADF's land forces have been under-engaged, but rather because Australia's maritime forces have proven at least equally effective as diplomatic and military tools and, at the unit level, have generally offered more flexible options during crisis planning and decision making.

There is no official list of all ADF operations, offshore or otherwise, but by comparing the table below with the SPC-A's database[29] several features become clear.

ADF Involvement in multinational peace operations	
Operation	**Naval Contribution**
1. UNTSO - Lebanon/Syria, 1956-	None known
2. MFO - Sinai, 1993-	None known
3. UNIIMOG - Iran/Iraq, 1988-90	None known
4. UNTAG - Namibia, 1989-90	None known
5. MIF - Persian Gulf, 1990-2000	13 x MFU & personnel
6. DESERT STORM/POLLARD – Kuwait, 1991, 1999	4 x MFU & personnel
7. MINURSO - W. Sahara, 1991-94	None known
8. UNAMC/UNTAC - Cambodia, 1991-93	Personnel
9. UNOSOM (I&II) / UNITAF - Somalia, 1992-94	2 x MFU & personnel
10. UNAMIR - Rwanda, 1994-95	Personnel
11. SPPKF - Bougainville, 1994	3 x MFU & personnel
12. TMG/PMG - Bougainville, 1997-	Various units & personnel
13. INTERFET/ UNTAET - East Timor, 1999-	Various units & personnel
14. IPMT - Solomons, 2000-	Various units & personnel
Humanitarian relief and evacuation of civilians	
15. UNMCTT - Afghanistan/Pakistan, 1983-93	None known
16. CMAC - Cambodia, 1992-99	None known
17. MCO – Mozambique, 1992-2002	None known
18. Drought/Tsunami relief - PNG, 1997-98	3 x LCH & personnel
19. Drought relief - Irian Jaya, 1998	Various units & personnel
20. Evacuation of civilians – Cambodia, 1997	1 x MFU
21. Evacuation of civilians - Solomons, 2000	1 X MFU
22. Periodic disaster relief and other assistance in the South Pacific	Various units & personnel

First is the crucial nature of each naval component deployed, given that only eight of the operations listed did not include a naval contribution, either in the form of specialist staff or ships. This contribution was often of significant size and in the case of seagoing units invariably critical to operational success. In East Timor, for example, the first ADF assets in theatre in strength were from the RAN. At its peak the INTERFET naval component included 20 warships and 5000 personnel, briefly outnumbering even the land forces.[30] As well as ensuring a secure environment for the insertion phase, the naval component provided continuing protection, surveillance and logistic sustainment for follow-on forces. In sum, more than 90% of the cargo entering the theatre moved by sea, while **all** personnel and equipment movement within the theatre ultimately depended either on amphibious vessels or the ground and aviation fuel provided by naval tankers. To suggest, as one narrative history has done, that other Service support to the land forces was 'fairly minimal', has little in common with operational reality.[31]

Similar assessments may be made about the naval and air contributions to peace missions in Somalia, Bougainville and the Solomons. RAAF aircraft and RAN ships first brought the joint force to the theatre then, in addition to patrol and response tasks, deployed ships offered a tailored combination of local mobility, afloat command & control, and communications, intelligence, aviation, medical, catering and even recreational support. By projecting power into remote and otherwise inaccessible locations naval units ensured presence over a far larger area than could otherwise have been achieved. The ADF's disaster relief operations, as the most recent events in Indonesia have highlighted, likewise included a large maritime component; simply because mobility in mass can be achieved no other way, and only ships possess the unique capabilities needed when infrastructure either does not exist or has been rendered inoperable. Just as vital, by minimising or removing the need for a footprint ashore naval capabilities place minimal stress on scarce local resources. In view of all these factors, the relevance of emotionally loaded terms such as 'overwhelmingly' and 'predominated' to the joint operational environment is questionable.

The second noteworthy feature is that the listed operations vary markedly in scope, complexity and significance. The land force contributions to the various UN missions in the Middle East involved contingents ranging from to 8-15 military observers in UNIIMOG, to 13 in Lebanon, and a 45-strong force communications unit in the Western Sahara. The teams deployed for mine clearance were still

HMAS Anzac at FlyingFish Cove, Christmas Island (RAN) smaller, with just two military members serving on rotation in Mozambique and 6-9 in Pakistan/Afghanistan.[32] These activities were undoubtedly important, but they were also operationally constrained and, as peacekeeping missions, cannot be considered force structure determinants. It further stretches credibility to equate each with the naval contribution made to the Maritime Interception Force in the Persian Gulf. To 2000, this commitment had involved 13 major fleet unit (MFU) deployments and several thousand naval personnel, and has since seen another 21 MFU deployments and two major conflicts. Important in assessing the inherent versatility of naval forces is an understanding that the tasks undertaken in the Gulf regularly changed and ranged right across the spectrum of operations between the diplomatic, constabulary and military dimensions.[33]

A third feature is that the Table reflects only a selection of the ADF's recent offshore operations. Among those missing are: UNSCOM in Iraq (1991-2000); the Cambodian Maritime Assistance Project (1993-97); the Stabilisation Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1997-2004); and at least one disaster relief mission in South East Asia (1991). The first three included specialist naval personnel, while the last involved the crews of two MFUs providing aid after a volcanic eruption in the Philippines. Also absent are at least four operations planned to evacuate Australian nationals during regional civil disturbances, including Bougainville (1990) and Indonesia (1998). Although not always executed, the maritime option was available if needed, and Australia placed up to four major surface combatants and supporting units on high alert for each contingency. Australia has also undertaken a range of long-term maritime surveillance operations in the region, notably *Gateway* (1981-) and *Solania* (1988-), that are widely recognised as contributing to the security of our immediate neighbourhood. Although these operations are largely dependent on maritime patrol aircraft, they have made regular use of sophisticated naval capabilities. While their absence from the original listing is understandable, this reinforces the White Paper table's limitations as an authoritative reference.

Finally, in assessing the wider dimensions of Australia's security the role of warships in shaping our strategic environment should not be underestimated. Ignoring the argument that every naval deployment is an 'offshore operation', there has been a long-standing Government policy to use the RAN to maintain and enhance regional engagement. Thus major surface combatants, amphibious and logistic units, submarines, patrol boats and hydrographic vessels have kept up a series of rolling deployments in East Asia and the South Pacific. In addition to preserving an almost continuous high-profile presence and providing a practical demonstration of Australian interest in the region, there have been many secondary benefits. The late Admiral Michael Hudson, when Chief of Naval Staff, put it well when he wrote:

> *The skills our sailors take with them are highly regarded...and the Navy has been able to provide a great deal of assistance to local communities throughout the region. This aid scheme, often provided by the voluntary efforts of people in the Fleet, is a source of pride and fosters goodwill which could never be achieved through any amount of diplomacy or aid dollars.*[34]

Implementation of Australia's joint strategic vision deserves better than flawed statistics and divisive debate. An assessment of our responses to recent crises might accurately remark: 'Over the past 15 years the ADF has used its diverse and highly versatile naval assets as either the lead units or essential enablers in every major and most smaller offshore operations.' The ADF's professional credibility demands that this contribution is both understood and publicly acknowledged.

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[1] Captain N.S. Coates, RAN, in *The RAN in the Gulf 1990-2005*, SPC-A, forthcoming.

2 A Grenfell Price, *Australia Comes of Age*, Georgian House, Melbourne, 1945, p. 76.

3 See E Andrews, *The Anzac Illusion*, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 1993 & J Grey, *The Australian Army*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2001.

4 M Evans, 'Strategic Culture and the Australian way of warfare: Perspectives', in D Stevens & J Reeve (Eds), *Southern Trident: Strategy, History, and the rise of Australian Naval Power*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2001, p. 90.

5 Letter, de Roebeck to General Birdwood, 3 February 1916, AWM 3DRL 3376, Item 8 A.

[6] Sea Power Centre - Australia; *Sea Control and Surface Combatants*, Semaphore issue 1, March 2003; *Why the ADF needs Major Surface Combatants*, Semaphore issue 9, September 2003; *Australia's needs for Maritime Area Air Defence*, Semaphore issue 14, November 2003.

[7] Royal Australian Navy, *Australian Maritime Doctrine*, Defence Publishing Service, Canberra, 2000, pp. 61-4.

[8] Royal Australian Navy, *Australian Maritime Doctrine*, p. 39.

[9] MAJGEN P.J. Cosgrove, AC, MC, 'The ANZAC lecture at Georgetown University, Tuesday 4 April 2000,' *Journal of the Australian Naval Institute*, Vol. 26, No. 2, April/June 2000, p. 9.

[10] Department of Defence, *Defence Capability Plan 2004-2014*, Defence Publishing Service, Canberra, November 2003.

[11] Senator Robert Hill, *Aegis Combat System for Air Warfare Destroyers*, Media Release 158/04, 11 August 2004, online

http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/Hilltpl.cfm?CurrentId=4111 (24 March 2005).
[12] Royal Australian Navy, *Australian Maritime Doctrine*, pp. 56-61.
[13] For example, see MAJGEN P.J. Cosgrove, 'The ANZAC lecture,' *Journal of the Australian Naval Institute*, Vol. 26, No. 2, p. 9.
[14] Adhuri, Dedi Supriadi, 'Does the Sea Divide or Unite Indonesians? Ethnicity and Regionalism from a Maritime Perspective', *Resource Management in Asia-Pacific*, Working Paper No. 48, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, 2003, p. 4.
[15] R.R. Churchill & A.V. Lowe, *The Law of the Sea - 3rd edition*, Manchester University Press, 1999, p. 123.
[16] *Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation*, 1948, Article 1(a). The Organisation became the International Maritime Organisation in 1982.
[17] The first north-south ASL runs from the South China Sea or Singapore Strait through the Natuna Sea, Karimata Strait, the western Java Sea and Sunda Strait; the second, from the Sulawesi and Celebes Seas through the Makassar Strait, Flores Sea and Lombok Strait; the third through the Molucca, Ceram and Banda Seas with spurs to the Savu, Timor and Arafura Seas.
[18] Resolution MSC 72(69), *Adoption, Designation and Substitution of Archipelagic Sea Lanes*, adopted 19 May 1998.
[19] *Indonesian Government Regulation No. 37 of 2002*, as annexed to IMO Memo SN/Circ.200/Add.1, 3 July 2003 (emphasis added).
[20] 'Elucidation of Regulation Number 37', *Official State Gazette of The Republic of Indonesia*, No. 4210, as annexed to IMO SN/Circ.200/Add.1, 3 July 2003.
[21] *Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Seventy-seventh Session*, MSC 77/26 dated 10 June 2003, para. 28.40, p. 128, and Annex 27.
[22] For example, para 2 of Indonesian Notice to Mariners No 08/2003 states 'Foreign ships and airplanes which pass through Indonesian waters must utilize the Archipelagic Sea Lanes as established.'
[23] Resolution MSC 71(69), *Adoption of Amendments to the General Provisions on Ships' Routeing*, adopted 19 May 1998.
[24] *The Australian Approach to Warfare*, ADDP-D.1, Defence Publishing Service, Canberra, 2003, p. 6-1.
[25] J Hartley, 'A Review of the White Paper', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, February 2001, p. 29.
[26] *Defence 2000, Our Future Defence Force*, Commonwealth of Australia, 2000, p. 11.
[27] See M Evans, *From Deakin to Dibb: The Army and the making of Australian Strategy in the 20th Century*, Land Warfare Studies Centre (LWSC) Working Paper No. 113, Canberra, 2001, p. 41; and *The Tyranny of Dissonance: Australia's Strategic Culture and Way of War 1901-2005*, LWSC Study Paper No. 306, Canberra, 2005, p. 75: 'Between 1989 and 1999, of twenty-two offshore operations that the ADF undertook, the Army—the Cinderella service since the end of the Vietnam War—predominated in twenty of them'.
[28] J Grey, *The Australian Army*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2001, pp. 257-8.
[29] *Database of Royal Australian Navy Operations 1990-2005*, SPC-A Working Paper, forthcoming.
[30] P. Kinghorne, 'OPERATION STABILISE - Naval Participation in East Timor', *Naval Supply Newsletter*, June 2000, pp. 25-6.
[31] Grey, *The Australian Army*, p. 256.
[32] N.F. James, 'A Brief History of Australian Peacekeeping', *Australian Defence Force Journal*, No. 104, January/February 1994, pp. 3-18.
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BOOK REVIEWS

U.S. SUBS DOWN UNDER: Brisbane, 1942-45

David Jones and Peter Nunan
US Naval Institute Press, 2005
320 pages, 39 photos, 6 maps
ISBN: 1-59114-644-5
List price US$34..95

The title of this book gives an accurate description of its contents. Although the time-frame may suggest that the book has limited subject matter or is only of interest to submariners, nothing could be further from the truth. There is very little published on this aspect of WWII history. Other than staunch naval historians, most people immediately assume that the Pacific campaigns fought by US submarines were staged from the US mainland, Hawaii or Western Australia. As a submariner and a Brisbane boy I was, therefore, compelled to read more.

This book does tell the story of US submarine operations between 1942 and 1945. However, rather than re-write the already much-published war patrols of famous submarines and their captains, the authors' focus is on the period when Brisbane became the home base for part of the 7th fleet submarine flotilla. We read how the Australian city supported the submarine campaign and what it meant to the US Pacific Submarine Force as a whole.

The authors initially provide a strategic overview to establish why Brisbane became a submarine operating base for the US Navy. This is followed by a well balanced account of the next three years of operations. Naval characters like Lockwood, Christie and Fife, who were influential during the campaign, are introduced in an objective manner and the authors sensibly refrain from making judgements as to their effectiveness.

Importantly, the reader can develop an understanding of the leadership styles of these officers, know what was important to them, and appreciate how they were able to influence the outcome of the war. The book provides an excellent account of the officers' personalities, explores their strengths, and compares their differences - all of which had an impact on the outcome of the war.

The reader gains an understanding of the issues affecting prolonged submarine campaigns and, in this case, how important it was to the morale and professionalism of the submariners to operate from a friendly and hospitable base. The submarine crews made the Australian town their home, which obviously had a profound effect on their performance. To support the war effort, Brisbane had to develop overnight from being a small capital city to a fully operational 'naval base'.

The book is extremely well researched, and although the authors do not delve too deeply into specific submarine actions the reader gets an appreciation of the life the submariners endured during their years of relentless campaigning. The discussion of submarine 'special operations' conducted during the latter stage of the war is an interesting account. Although not popular with the submariners, this role was strongly supported by the higher command and proved extremely important to the overall success of the theatre strategy in the western Pacific.

The authors conclude on the developments and improvements made in submarine warfare, demonstrate the versatility of the submarine force, and subtly indicate how important Australia was to the Allied efforts. Today the US and Australian submarine forces share a very strong relationship. This friendship obviously grew out of that time and place in history which the authors explore. *US Subs Down Under* is an essential part of naval history that will appeal to a wide-cross section of readers. It is well recommended.

Reviewed by Commander Timothy Brown, RAN, Fleet Submarine Operations Officer.

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