Australian and Canadian Naval policy and posture during the Cold War

THE LEGACY OF AN IMPERIAL TRADITION

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There is a connection, in how a nation-state responds to the need to defend itself, between national security policy, defence policy, military strategy, doctrine, and force posture. Strategy, the blueprint by which policy is implemented, fits into the process. In most western nations it is arrived at empirically over a long period of time and is largely determined by the type and capability of the military power in hand. Warships take a long time to build and are around for a long time after that — up to 30 to 40 years. Moreover, as Admiral Lord Cunningham remarked, "It takes a navy three years to build a ship. It would take 300 years to rebuild a tradition." How then, does naval policy and maritime strategy fit into the process of national security and what influences its nature and quality?

THE MAKING OF NAVAL POLICY: A VIEW THROUGH THE TELESCOPE

There are many ways in which to analyse behaviour and decision making. Foreign policy can be viewed through a number of telescopes. Each can be brought to bear on a different horizon: a view of the nation's leaders acting from rational choice; from the ethic or operational code of the political or military elites; from the bureaucratic accommodation of competing government departments; or as a derivative of the country's place in the international system. In reality all of these have a part to play. When dealing with defence policy, the principal relationship is between the senior military staff and their political leaders with considerable bureaucratic influence from the civil service and political pressures from legislatures and public interest groups. Earlier by the decisions of the government of the day based largely on the recommendations of the naval leadership which set the features of the fleet they thought was needed to meet "the threat".

Dr. Ken Booth describes threat analysis as best understood at two levels; one at the foreign policy level and the other at the level of contingency planning. The higher, or "statesman's" level is political and concerned with behaviour; i.e., the intentions of the other players. The lower or "colonel's" level of analysis is concerned with technical analysis or capabilities. In practice, this neat division of viewpoints between political leaders and their military advisors is blurred. In theory, it is the responsibility of political leaders to tell the military what they want the armed forces to do. This is unlikely to happen. Often the military leadership has a better long term understanding of the potential and limitations of military power than the politician. It is a two-way process in which the strategic culture of the senior military leadership exerts a strong influence on the policy decision. Neither group has that much time. As Booth points out: "Academic strategists, unlike their professional counterparts, have the opportunity to think in the longer term and take hold of problems which policy makers hardly have a chance to think about."

During the Cold War the security dimension of the international system was shaped primarily by East-West ideological and military competition. Now, when a change of the international system is underway, the relevance of the security policies, strategies and military force postures developed, by medium powers like Australia and Canada, to contribute to global and regional security as members of an alliance, is being re-evaluated. This is an important question for powers whose military forces were developed over forty years to fight in an alliance in the worst case contingency of high intensity global war. The Royal Australian Navy (R.A.N.) and Canada's maritime forces
are good examples. Each was shaped to a great degree to fit into or specialise in a broader maritime coalition led by the United States. Although this may be the most efficient way to contribute to an alliance strategy in major conflict, the question that is being addressed by both countries is, what is the best and most affordable policy, strategy and maritime capability to meet national interests at lower levels of conflict, particularly in situations where the assistance of the alliance's senior partners may not be forthcoming? As Rear-Admiral Richard Hill puts it: "If a medium power emphasises its alliance commitment to the extent of saying its forces are a 'contribution' and that only, it is very likely to get a force structure that is not suited to its national needs."6

It is the argument of this essay, based on a comparative assessment of Australian and Canadian naval policy, maritime strategy and force posture during the Cold War, that operational strategy and to a large extent naval policy itself is driven primarily by the fleet-in-being. Moreover, the function of that fleet, namely what it can do, is largely determined by the traditions, values and behaviour, in other words, the strategic perspective of the officer corps. Paradoxically, because both navies were built and trained to fight alongside the United States Navy in a major war, they have also served their national interests well in the diplomatic and policing roles.

Seapower and a Maritime Tradition: The Case of Australia and Canada

The British Empire and the United States entered the Twentieth Century as maritime powers, one on the decline, the other in ascendancy. Australia and Canada were linked politically to the Empire and were protected by the Royal Navy (R.N.). For the first fifty years, Britain and America maintained ocean-going fleets with world-wide reach to ensure access and influence and established alliances to maintain the rough balance of naval power. Australia and Canada used their armed forces as political instruments to achieve independence from the Mother Country as much as to contribute to collective defence.7

Because of geography, immense size and vast ocean approaches, both countries developed ocean-going fleets for the sound political purpose of protecting their coastal and offshore interests and the equally sensible military one of contributing to collective defence. These were the "political" justifications for the benefit of their publics and guardians. But the capability of these fleets, whether for offensive operations, the escort of merchant shipping, or coastal defence, originated in the "blue water" tradition and outlook of the naval leadership. The principles of strategy that imbued the naval rearmament and fleet modernisation programmes in Canada and Australia in the 1950s and 1960s were those of historians, scholars and sailors of the school of Mahan, Corbett, Richmond, Brodie, Marder, Roskill and Morison. Australian and Canadian naval officers were trained in the Royal Navy and later in their own countries along the same lines. The primacy of seapower and the cultivation of "the fighting spirit", initiative and offensive action was the operational ethic that permeated the education of the officers of the United States Navy (U.S.N.), the RN and the "Old Dominions" navies.8 In the Second World War, the RAN fought in the Indian Ocean and alongside the USN in offensive operations in the South West Pacific in the Islands campaign. The Royal Canadian Navy (R.C.N.) came of age in the Battle of the Atlantic, but convoy escort fell largely to the "hostilities only" officers and men of the Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (RCNVR).9 The strategic culture of the career R.C.N officer sought offensive action in destroyer gun-fights in the English Channel and elsewhere.

In a corporate sense the naval leadership in the Dominions took for granted that their navies should be maintained to fight alongside the Royal Navy in a cold war. The fall of Singapore in 1942 put the coup de grace on the Australian reliance on the Royal Navy for its forward defence but the USN was there to fill the guardian's shoes. Canada initially shared the burden of the convoy escort in the North Atlantic with the Royal Navy, eventually assuming almost the entire mission. The RCN operated as part of the Royal Navy in the destroyer sweeps in the English Channel, at Normandy and with Coastal Forces in the Channel and Mediterranean.10 As late as the Korean War (1950 to 1953), the RAN and the RCN were comfortably integrated under the operational control of the Royal Navy in the Yellow Sea or in Task Force 77, under the USN in the Sea of Japan.11

The United States Navy, the Royal Navy, the Royal Australian Navy, and the Royal Canadian Navy, share a common strategic culture which has affected fundamentally the values and behaviour of their naval leaders. They possess a transnational "operational ethic" transcending national norms. Seafarers generally are a brotherhood, naval men even more so. It is the sailor-scholar or seaman-tactician's view of the horizon, all looking at the same point, that has fashioned the naval forces of these countries and will likely continue to do so.

Three other features of the naval operational ethic are germane to this analysis: conservatism or vested interest in the status quo; the long lead times and lives of naval forces from acquisition to disposal; and the growth of new strategic concepts into doctrine, usually measured in terms of a generation. This is admirably summed up by Richard Hegmann: "Changes in force structure will not occur quickly, however, for reasons that go beyond the simple one of decades long ship lives. More permanent perhaps than the steel of
ships are their institutional souls, and history shows that organisational beliefs are not easily changed. Little wonder that there is rarely a precise alignment between the current objectives of foreign policy and the capabilities of a fleet-in-being. It is in the nature of navies in foreign policy that the "statesmen" and "colonels" rarely look at the same point on the horizon. As Dr. Denis Stairs has noted in the context of the Canadian 1971 Defence White Paper: "The evidence suggests that alterations in doctrine tended to follow rather than precede the making of specific decisions regarding the deployment of forces and the procurement of hardware. Although the bane of politicians and even soldiers and airmen, there is good reason for the sailor's creed of "a general purpose fleet-in-being."

**National Security Perspectives and Australian and Canadian Naval Policy During the Cold War**

During the Cold War, both countries shared security policy perspectives in which maritime power was salient. They were collective defence, continental defence, strategic deterrence, regional security and maritime sovereignty.

For the first twenty years of the Cold War collective defence, manifested in ANZUS and NATO, was the dominant national security theme in the foreign policies of Australia and Canada. Australia was also concerned with regional security problems in Malaya, Indonesia and Vietnam but faced them collectively alongside the United Kingdom or with the United States in the name of containment. Canada was also involved in the air and naval defence of North America in the context of collective defence and central deterrence. Nevertheless the chief security concern of the four states was communist expansionism and growing Soviet nuclear power. Collective security and strategic deterrence was the agreed response. From the 1950s to the early 1970s, the respective Australian and Canadian security and defence policies lined up. By and large their naval force postures were in harmony too.

In the early post-war years, Australia's defence policy was integrated with Empire defence and subsequently, from 1950, with the United States in the ANZUS pact. Australia's aim was to keep the threat of Communist unrest and expansion distant from its shores. During the Korean War the RAN fought alongside the Royal Navy although Australia's political target was the United States. In 1952, the Cold War in the Far East intensified and Australian defence policy became aligned with that of the United States. In Australia's region, Indochina was held to be the key to the defence of South-East Asia and Australia's security. This remained the Australian policy for the next twenty years.

The story of Canada's security policy and defence posture in the 1950s and the 1960s is similar to Australia's. At the foreign policy level, Canada also sought security, through NATO, in an alliance with a major power. Its political motives for fighting in Korea were also similar to Australia's. It too adopted the principle that the defence of Canada was best achieved as far away from its shores as possible. The stationing of troops abroad, in Europe, for the first time in Canada's peacetime history not only made an important defence contribution but provided political leverage within the alliance.

During this period, the RAN, institutionally, was closer to the RN and the USN than its sister services were to their allied counterparts or, for that matter, its own government. The Australian government left the navy to its own devices to the extent that the navy's operational functions could only be deduced. The naval force posture however, although fashioned by tradition and custom on that of the RN, happily coincided with Australia's policy of forward defence and collective security. The RAN was designed to work primarily in conjunction with other, larger navies. Its composition was built around a few large ships as part of an integrated force with the Royal Navy a long way from Australia. Its main task was primarily the protection of shipping to be achieved tactically, by a Carrier Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) task group and close escorts. Thus its mission was sea control, as part of a larger allied offensive naval strategy, and its primary task was the defence of shipping against submarine attack in a world war.

At the start of the Cold War, the situation in Canada was similar. In the early 1950s the Canadian government left the decision on the type of navy needed in the hands of the senior naval staff. From the diplomatic perspective, some sort of naval contribution to the NATO alliance was needed but it didn't seem to matter what. The RCN chose to specialise in the protection of shipping in the same way as the RAN; tactical ASW in the Atlantic built around a Carrier ASW task group and close escorts. In Australia and Canada during the 1950s and the 1960s, naval policy and strategy were determined by the naval leaderships whose outlooks, assumptions and judgements were identical to their brothers in the RN and the USN. The naval strategy of the Dominion navies was Allied strategy, primarily the USN's. The political leadership in Australia and Canada seemed to have very little interest in the matter. As often happens in naval affairs, the tactical and the technical determined the policy. The strategy was someone else's.

In the 1970s and 1980s the international system began to change. The Cold War thawed during Detente in the late 1960s before collapsing in the mid-1970s...
due to the Soviet military build-up, the invasion of Afghanistan and assertive Soviet diplomacy in the Middle East, South-West Asia and Africa. The process of de-colonisation was almost complete. A large number of new nation-states in the United Nations sought access and influence, particularly through participation in the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea from 1971 to 1982.

In the last twenty years of the Cold War, Australian security policy moved towards creating and sustaining a positive security environment in its regions. A rigorous intellectual debate on defence and security policy amongst Australian historians, strategists, economists, political scientists, serving and retired military officers, and foreign policy experts took place in universities and service institutes in the 1970s and 1980s. The importance of economic and other non-military strategies in ensuring stability in its regions was recognised. What has evolved, and is articulated in Senator Gareth Evans statement in 1989 on Australia’s regional security, is a “grand strategy” which takes into account military, economic, social, environmental and cultural trends affecting Australia in its regional areas of immediate strategic interest in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Regional stability has become the dominant national security theme.

Australia’s defence policy has changed in step with its security policy. The “Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities” by Mr. Paul Dibb is the culmination of the debate which resulted in the policy information paper on the Defence of Australia in 1987. The concept of “Self-Reliance” is developed into a set of national military objectives and a related strategy, doctrine and force posture for the Australian Defence Force. Priority is given to building a balanced defence force, capable of meeting, independently, credible lower level contingencies in the context of a “defence-in-depth” strategy. The emphasis of the 1987 Australian White Paper is maritime defence: “By its very nature the defence of Australia and its territories emphasises maritime warfare capabilities. A “two ocean navy” policy is announced and priority placed on control of the sea-air gap in the north.

In the 1970s the Canadian view of the international system underwent a change as well. Although not as fundamental a change as that of Australia’s, Prime Minister Trudeau’s “Foreign Policy for Canadians” marked a departure from the internationalism of Pearsonian foreign policy. Mr. Trudeau’s stamp was distinctly “Canada first”. In the 1971 Defence White Paper, the protection of Canadian sovereignty became the first priority of Canadian defence policy, ahead of North American defence, NATO or international peacekeeping.

In Canada’s case, however, the defence policy priorities in the early 1970s were not transformed into national doctrine or force posture. NATO’s doctrine of flexible response placed a renewed emphasis on the protection of the sea lines of communication in the Atlantic. With the eclipse of detente in the mid 1970s and the need to encourage European economic links, the 1974 Defence Structure Review resulted in the long overdue but slow naval ship and maritime air replacement and modernisation programmes which continue today. Naval force posture and the new ships and aircraft continued to be shaped to fit NATO’s maritime strategy in the traditional Canadian maritime tasks of strategic ASW surveillance and the escort of shipping in the North Atlantic. Collective security returned to centre stage in the beliefs of the Canadian foreign policy establishment.

By the end of the Cold War Australian and Canadian national security perspectives had diverged with each state according a different importance and emphasis on collective defence, continental defence, regional security and strategic deterrence. Maritime sovereignty and the protection of resources and coastal zones has emerged as a security concern that each country has in common since both are the beneficiaries of enormous wealth.

In Australia today, security and defence policies focus on the direct defence of Australia against low level threats and contributing to stable international relations with the states in South-East Asia and the South Pacific. ANZUS remains important but no longer as a collective security commitment. Its value is strategic and operational, tying Australia to the alliance as an integral part of the global strategic warning system and a contributor to the regional balance in the South Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Naval policy is given a relatively high priority in Australia’s defence and security (and in public acceptance), given the essentially maritime features of its geopolitical setting. Its strategy is sea control described as “...a complex interdependency of geographical, economic, technical and human factors as well as military capabilities.” Its operational missions go beyond maritime surveillance, patrol and response to include the protection of shipping and offshore territories and strategic strike.

Canada on the other hand remains in the fold of collective and continental defence tied to central deterrence. Its contribution to regional stability, through United Nations peacekeeping, has more to do with foreign policy objectives than defence or national security. Canada’s defence policy continues to be based directly on “two military alliances: NATO and NORAD.” Today its declared defence priorities are defence, sovereignty and civil responsibilities in Canada, collective defence arrangements through NATO and the continental partnership with the United States, and international peace and security through stability and peacekeeping operations, arms control verification and humanitarian assistance.
tal defence is described in terms of collective defence while regional security could be anywhere in the world where Canada's collective defence or security interests are perceived to be affected.

**Australian and Canadian Maritime Strategies and Naval Force Postures during the Cold War**

What is interesting about the two navies today is their similar force postures. Although one is based on twenty years of planning and operations for the direct defence of Australia and the other is a response to NATO's requirement to protect allied shipping in the North Atlantic, both will now comprise balanced, air, surface and sub-surface components capable of ocean and coastal defence operations. Although Canada's maritime forces do not have or need a strike capability or the same shore support potential as the R.A.N., the operational missions of each fleet are similar; e.g., surveillance, patrol and response. Both are essentially ocean-going "sea control" navies with some "power projection" capability in Australia's case. The case to be made here is that the principal reasons for this similarity, in spite of quite different geopolitical circumstances and national security perspectives, lie in their geography and a common institutional belief in seapower held by their naval leaders.

In the first twenty years of the Cold War the R.A.N. and the R.C.N. were essentially ocean-going navies whose missions were the protection of allied merchant or naval shipping principally against Soviet submarines. Their fleets were based on the aircraft carrier with embarked ASW aircraft or helicopters supported by destroyers, frigates, and supply ships. The R.A.N. acquired its fleet from the R.N. and the R.C.N. constructed its own. In the 1960s the R.C.N. specialised further in offensive ASW against ballistic missile-firing submarines. Coastal defence, minesweeping and Arctic operations virtually disappeared. The R.C.N. became a one-tier, one ocean fleet specialising in anti-submarine warfare following NATO or CANUS operational doctrine. The R.A.N., faced with the "wars of diplomacy" in Malaya and Indonesia, expanded its roles in the 1960s to include shore support and coastal defence operations as well as rounding out its ASW capability. Significantly, aircraft, ships and equipment were acquired from the United States and the R.A.N. adopted U.S.N. warfare doctrine.

At the mid-point of the Cold War, in the early 1970s, Canada's maritime forces were reaching obsolescence but its missions remained protection of shipping in NATO and area ASW surveillance under Canada-United States (CANUS) defence arrangements. The Australian fleet was relatively new. It was becoming an ocean and coastal navy (a two-tier fleet) capable of protecting shipping, shore support and limited strike operations. The leadership in both navies continued to see their fleets as part of a greater armada alongside the USN and the R.N., preparing for the diminishing eventuality of a global war. Their naval forces were acquired and trained for "worst case" contingencies including major regional conflict with members of the Communist bloc. These expectations were realised by the R.A.N. and the R.C.N. in limited wars and crises alongside the U.S.N. and the R.N. in the first half of the Cold War. The Korean War, the Cuban Missile crisis and Vietnam are examples.

In the late 1960s, both navies fitted Rear-Admiral Hill's cautionary observation about the risk to a medium power of considering its forces as a contribution to an alliance and that only. In Canada, national defence meant collective defence in NATO and NORAD. In Australia national defence was beginning to adjust to the changing geopolitics of its region. For Canada the American alliance was the determining basis for defence. In Australia the alliance was becoming less important but remained an enabling factor. Regardless of diversification of their fleets, both navies shared similar ocean-going force postures highly suited to integrated maritime warfare with the major Western naval powers, particularly the USN.

In the 1970s and the early 1980s, the strategic rationales for fleet replacement and modernisation in the two navies continued along parallel lines. The Canadian maritime forces remained an ocean-going, specialised force for the protection of shipping and area surveillance. The R.A.N. proceeded along the track, started in the 1960s, of an ocean-going and coastal, general-purpose fleet for the protection of shipping, area surveillance, shore support and limited strike missions. Force structure determined the missions and roles, bearing out Denis Stairs' observation that alterations in doctrine tend to follow the deployment of forces and the procurement of hardware.

By the mid-1980s the second post-war naval programmes were underway in both countries. In Canada the Canadian Patrol Frigate and Tribal Class Update and Modernisation Programmes (TRUMP) were approved. Plans were made to replace the OBERON class submarines. The coastal defence mission was restated and minesweeping forces were approved in principle in a new class of maritime coastal defence vessels. Most of these replacement and modernisation programmes were a response to SACLANT's force requirements but they also provided a national capability in the Western Atlantic, the North-East Pacific and Canadian Arctic waters. The TRUMP class restored an area air defence and command and control capability that was lost with HMCS Bonaventure in 1970. The navy re-established the Canadian task group concept in 1986 and with the transfer of HMCS Huron, a TRIBAL class destroyer, to the West Coast in 1987, signalled its return to a two coast operational force for the first time in thirty years.
The R.A.N.'s second post-war fleet replacement programme was also underway at the time of the 1987 Defence of Australia policy information paper. The Perth class, guided-missile destroyers (DDG) were undergoing extensive modernisation, two additional guided-missile frigates (FFG7) were building in Australian yards, the ANZAC class frigates and the Collins class submarines were approved in principle and the fleet acquired two support ships HMAS Success, an underway replenishment ship, and HMAS Westralia, an oiler, acquired from the United Kingdom's Royal Fleet Auxiliary. In addition, Seahawk helicopters were ordered to replace the Sea Kings. A number of options and prototypes were underway to renew the fleet's mine countermeasures capability. Strategically the R.A.N. moved towards a two ocean fleet with the commissioning of HMAS Stirling near Fremantle, Western Australia in 1978.30

The combat doctrines and operating procedures of the R.A.N. and the Canadian navy became integrated with the U.S.N.'s in the last two decades of the Cold War. Both navies passed the test of interoperability with distinction in the Gulf crisis and war which occurred with the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on 2 August 1990. The Australian navy, a general purpose force with a capability for power projection and sea control, provided a modern and effective naval instrument in distant operations. The Canadian navy, a surveillance and anti-submarine warfare force, provided older warships, augmented with modern air defence and communications and control equipment, much of it earmarked for the new Canadian Patrol Frigates. Its contribution was more effective than Australia's in terms of alliance diplomacy, because it stayed together as a task group under Canadian operational command.

Two deductions may be drawn from this analysis of the naval policies, maritime strategies, and force postures of the two navies during the Cold War. The first is that building and maintaining a balanced, ocean-going fleet takes decades, during which time a country's national security priorities may change. The second is that a navy built primarily to meet the needs of an alliance can also meet its country's national needs.

Australia's geopolitical situation during the Cold War was continually changing, quite unlike the Canadian experience which was locked in the middle of the East-West central balance and at the apex of tension in Western Europe. Australia's defence policy moved from collective defence to self-reliance and continental defence while Canada's remained collective. Nevertheless the R.A.N. and Canada's maritime forces were developed to integrate efficiently with the superior navies of the major powers in advanced maritime warfare. At the beginning of the Cold War the R.A.N. and the R.C.N. operated mostly with the R.N. in Korea. In the middle of the period each integrated their operations with the U.S.N. in the Cuban missile crisis and Vietnam. At its end each navy fell in with the U.S.N. in the Arabian Gulf.

Their navies are not so much the product of rational political choice and a subsequent matching strategy and force posture, as the consequence of institutional beliefs in seapower held by the naval leadership. The type of navy that Australia and Canada developed and maintained is the outcome of an officer class educated and trained in the anglo-american maritime tradition of naval mastery; i.e., an ocean-going fleet capable of fighting alongside the U.S.N. in a major war. Given the fundamental importance of the American alliance to their security during the Cold War this was a good thing.

Although both countries have different defence and security policies today, geography has also determined the composition of their fleets which are remarkably similar. Because of the size and reach of their coastal zones and oceanic approaches, both navies have sought to acquire maritime forces capable of establishing, in Admiral Eberle's words, "...control over one's own backyard," and the necessary seapower to provide, in those of Sir James Cable's, "...a plausible capability to employ force at sea for purposes regarded as nationally important."32

Has Australia taken note of Admiral Hill's cautionary dictum about medium powers and the naval contribution to their alliances and has Canada ignored it? To be sure, Australia's force structure for the 1990s is designed for the defence of Australia while Canada's was produced primarily to fit NATO's maritime strategy. Nevertheless Canada's maritime forces also meet the national need to protect its offshore estate while sharing, with the United State, in the seaward defence of the continent. Abroad, both navies are important diplomatic instruments of their country's foreign policy. Yet, ultimately, both have quite deliberately been built, educated and trained to fight alongside the U.S.N. and other naval powers in major conflicts on the world's seas.

CONCLUSION

In spite of changing government policies and significantly different strategic assessments, the navies of Australia and Canada emerged from the Cold War with the same force posture that they began with forty years earlier. Both are similar to each other. They are both small, ocean-going, balanced naval fleets, completely interoperable with the U.S.N. and built to fight in naval armadas in major wars. At the beginning of the Cold War the model for their navies was the R.N. By the end it was the U.S.N. The R.A.N. and Canada's maritime forces have been built and maintained to fight alongside the principal naval powers in a major war. They are "alliance" navies. Rather than this being a liability, the two fleets have served their national
interests well in both the diplomatic and policing roles.

By the beginning of the Twenty-First Century, the R.A.N. and the Canadian navy will be as close to being fleet units of the U.S.N. as the Admiralty wished the new Dominion navies to be at the beginning of the Twentieth. Although the international system has changed profoundly in the last one hundred years, and today Canada and Australia are independent medium maritime powers, their navies’ lineage and outlook are in the Imperial tradition of global seapower. Lord Jellicoe would approve.33

1 Ken Booth Navies and Foreign Policy (London, Croom Helm, 1977) p59
2 Denis Stairs The Diplomacy of Restraint (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1974) p297, Ch 9
4 Ken Booth Strategy and Ethnocentrism (London: Croom Helm, 1979) p 128
5 Ibid. p181
14 Geoffrey Till, “...constant failure to get current long-term political direction encourages the military planner to produce unspecified and general purpose forces ... the sailor’s... almost mystical faith in the capacity of a first-rate balanced fleet to cope with virtually anything, can be distinctly irritating to the unsympathetic.” Naval Historical Conference on Richmond and Corbett (Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, September/October 1992).
21 National Defence, Defence in the 70s Ottawa: Director of Supply and Services, 1971, p 16.
26 Department of National Defence, Defence 59 Ottawa: Queen’s Printer.
33 Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa, Naval Mission to the Dominion of Canada November-December 1919, pp 11, 13. In his report Admiral Jellicoe suggested two naval options for Canada: one for “Canada’s own requirement and Canada’s own safety” and the second, a more powerful “fleet-unit”, should Canada decide “to cooperate in the general naval needs of the empire”.

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