The 1990 Gulf War was the first conflict involving the RAN in a generation. As such its effects rippled through the service in terms of equipment, training and attitudes. On 16 May 1991 the ANI held the seminar “Maritime Power and its Place in the New World Order at HMAS Watson to help capture and disseminate some of the learnings from the war. In the May 1991 edition of the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute published two presentations from the seminar. These will be republished in successive weeks. The first, is by Captain (later Vice Admiral) Russ Shalders, which covers the lead-up to the war – Operation Desert Shield. Next week the paper covering the RAN’s participation in Operation Desert Storm by Commodore (later Rear Admiral Chris Oxenbould will be reprinted.
The Enforcement Of Sanctions By The Multi-National Naval Force — An RAN Perspective
Introduction
Thank you for your kind introduction and to the Australian Naval Institute for the opportunity to address such an important group. I will start by limiting the scope of my presentation.
Firstly, let me say that while I intend to give an RAN perspective of the sanction enforcement process, the views I will express are mine alone. The detailed analysis of our involvement in Gulf operations is a major and ongoing process. The lessons learned will be some time in being fully assembled and what I will offer today is a purely personal view based on my involvement as Captain of one to the ships deployed to the Gulf.
Secondly, I will confine myself to the position of the first RAN deployment – essentially the period from mid-August 1990 when Darwin, Adelaide and Success departed Sydney, to 3 December 1990 when the FFGs were relieved by Brisbane and Sydney.
You will remember that it was on on 3 December that the 15 January deadline was set. My focus will therefore be purely on the maritime interception force operations – Commodore Oxenbould will discuss the RAN’s involvement in the war and subsequent operations during his presentation.
Structure
The structure of my talk will he loosely chronological. By way of background. I’ll address deployment preparations, workup activities and then lead into the concept of operations which developed. I will conclude with a summary of how boarding activities were conducted. The major themes which I hope to draw out arc:
- Firstly, that the enforcement of sanctions was successful – trade to and from Kuwait was effectively halted. After 28 October, the occasion of the boarding of the Iraqi tanker Amuriyah Iraqi merchant traffic was laid up in various ports. After that date, with the exception of two incidents which Commodore Oxenbould will address, no further shipping ever attempted to transit to or from Iraq.
- The second theme I’d like to address relates to interoperability. The uncertainties evident at the start of the operation were quickly resolved. The Multi-National Maritime Force (MNNF) was able to overcome initial interoperability difficulties and the concept of ‘loose association’ became effective and workable. Considering the diversity of forces and differing national interests involved, this was a remarkable feat.
- The third and perhaps most telling factor I’ll try to draw out is that the RAN can be very satisfied with the way our units operated. Our men responded magnificently and rose to every challenge offered. Our ships performed reliably over prolonged periods of intense activity. As a test of the RAN’s operational readiness, the Gulf was a most successful operation.
Deployment
It is fair to say that the first Gulf task group were not fully prepared to go in harm’s way when the decision was first announced that the RAN would contribute forces in support of Kuwait. All three ships had recently participated in the RIMPAC exercise but, in our current parlance, all three were, at best, at the Minimum Level of Operational Capability or MLOC. In fact, on that Friday morning, Darwin was in the midst of a major maintenance period and had just started an engine changeout. Success was on passage to Melbourne and looking forward to a weekend in the southern city. Adelaide was at sea conducting routine exercises in the Eastern Australia Exercise Area (EAXA).
The frantic activity which ensued between the announcement on Friday morning and the FFGs departure on Monday is testament to the remarkable efforts of many to get the ships ready. We all have special memories of that 72 hours and I don’t wish to dwell on it other than to say that everyone involved worked with a will and resolve that I’d never experienced before. From my perspective as a CO, it was a very positive start to what turned out to be a very successful logistic enterprise – more of that aspect later.
If I could return now to the uncertainly which was a hallmark of the first deployment. When we left Australia our role and mission were by no means well defined. Our Foreign Minister spoke of our ships as ‘steaming around bristling’. In those early days our stated mission was a very constrained ‘Identification, Contact, Interrogation and Warning’. No-one had time to think beyond the warning stage. What might we do if our warnings were to be disregarded? Fortunately we had a long three week transit to the area of operations before those sorts of difficult decisions had to be confronted.
In the absence of clear guidance, and in the best traditions of the military, we in the task group prepared for the worst case scenario – one of all-out conflict. The transit to WA and beyond as far as Cocos Island was a masterpiece of operational intensity. In my experience it was the most demanding and professionally stimulating period of naval activity I’m ever likely lo be involved in. The focus was very clearly on anti-air warfare and on damage control. The RAAF provided the loyal opposition at a level of intensity I’d not have thought possible. With the exception of an 18-hour period in the middle of the Bight, the task group were hounded relentlessly and our procedures for dealing with the resulting damage were rigorously evaluated and honed by the ‘wreckers’, also known as the Sea Training Group’. Many of these skills were being re-learned or teamwork was being sharpened. The one area we were all rusty in was chemical defence. All ships brushed off the cobwebs and developed appropriate routines to deal with the expected chemical threat.
Without going into too much more detail, let me summarise by saying that, by the time we arrived at Diego Garcia, all ships were assessed to be at the Operational Level Of Capability (OLOC). In my assessment we were ready to go in harm’s way, I believed than and still believe now that we were as well prepared as any task group ever to leave Australia’s shores. With hindsight, and in particular with the knowledge of what was to happen during the ensuing three months, we were probably too well prepared. We were brilliant at maintaining an accurate air picture and in challenging any unidentified air contacts within our surveillance range. We were good at dealing with all forms of engineering casually, personnel casually and action damage. In fact we could do all those things in CB suits and with our protective masks on. The things we’d not had time to practice and develop were routine surface surveillance and boarding activity. Both of these endeavours were to occupy our time almost exclusively for the next three months.
Concept of Operations
On arrival in the AO on 3 September the RAN task group were still constrained to only ‘identify, contact, interrogate and warn’ relevant vessels. Our mission was clearly stated as being to ‘prevent the import or export of all commodities and products to or from Iraq or Kuwait’. At that stage there was no clear multi-national organisation or concept of operations in force. The first meeting of the MNNF was held on 5/6 September with the result that a number of patrol areas were agreed.
The RAN task group were allocated the Alpha areas in the Gulf of Oman (GOO), astride the major shipping routes leading to Khawr Fakkan in the United Arab Emirates and to the Straits of Hormuz. As events were to show, these patrol areas were to become the scene of the most action in terms of enforcing the UN sanctions in the area. All the time the USN CVGB were working in the outer Gulf of Oman with the US amphibious group in the Masirah area. The WEU nations were allocated the Bravo areas and the USN and subsequently the Canadians were given the Persian Gulf Charlie areas. The Royal Navy (RN) tended to try to locate themselves wherever the action was likely to be most interesting.
It was agreed at the MNNF conference that all units would work in ‘loose association’ which is a command and control doctrine not clearly elucidated in the text books. What it means is that all ships would remain under national control and that tactical and operational control would be retained by on-scene CTGs. As events would subsequently show, it was a remarkably effective form of C2. Communications links were quickly established, including a very complex LINK 11 architecture. This allowed the CTGs to consult and advise each other and we all got on with the business of ensuring that all maritime trade was ‘identified, contacted, interrogated and warned’. It is worthwhile at this point to illustrate the density of traffic in the area. Remembering that it was a period of tension and consequently all air tracks were potentially hostile, it was necessary that everything that flew was correctly detected, tracked, interrogated and identified.
The facility of a LINK 11 which worked beautifully, with up to 16 participating units, allowed for this task to be completed very effectively. It was not uncommon for the 2-3 members of an FFG Air Picture Compilation Team to be confidently keeping tabs on up to 100 tracks. These included the international carriers (who appeared to be very keen to keep to designated air lanes and squawk the correct IFF codes), the intensive carrier traffic (initially from USS Independence and subsequently from USS Midway) and other local civil traffic. The air teams also had to contend with the daily Iranian P3 maritime patrol who generally flew to within metres of the designated five mile ‘clear zone’ established by the MNNF units. The air situation certainly was never dull and, while it became routine, the danger of an Iraqi ‘leaker’ such as an Exocet-fitted Falcon 50 flying in civil air routes, was never far from our minds.
In the early part of September, whilst the French carrier Clemenceau was on station in the GOO, our resolve was often sorely tested and we were privy to some interesting calls and challenges on international distress frequencies. One French pilot was invited to ‘break left immediately sir, my standard is en route to your cockpit in five seconds’. The Frenchman quickly executed a hard left turn! The surface picture was no less complex. At any one time, within a surveillance range of 100 miles, the ships were tracking up to 200 contacts. In addition, computerised tactical systems embarked specifically for the operation were keeping near real time labs on many more surface contacts. In our three months on station, Darwin processed over 76,000 surface tracks through this system. To put that in some sort of context, off the east coast on a busy day the average FFG surface operator may have responsibility for perhaps 10-15 tracks. Whilst in the GOO, two such operators maintained real time track of 60+ vessels and the JOTS operator handles up to 300 more ‘interest tracks’ outside the range of organic sensors.
Patrol Cycles
Having agreed the areas of responsibility, ships of the MNNF then had to actually start enforcing the sanctions. For the RAN Task Group this evolved into a patrol pattern of roughly three weeks at sea followed by a three-day port visit for rest, maintenance and resupply. The FFGs operated together for the first two such cycles which allowed for a comprehensive training program to he maintained – the PEEP or ‘Persian Excursion Exercise Program’ provided the framework for daily activities.
Subsequently, Darwin and Adelaide worked less closely together and generally rotated through the busy Straits of Hormuz patrol box every 24 hours. The ‘off watch’ FFG would be responsible for intercepting merchant traffic further east.
Whilst the FFGs were deployed in the Alpha areas. Success maintained a patrol line well clear of potential attack in die vicinity of Ras el Hadd. The USN CVBG and the attendant fleet supply train were also working in these outer areas. Success initially made forays into the inner GOO every 2-3 days to keep the FFGs topped up using the ‘delivery boy’ mode of replenishment. This subsequently became less frequent and Success combined fuelling runs with a resupply visit to Fujarah where fresh fruit and vegetables were embarked at anchor for subsequent delivery to the FFGs.
With FFG and Success port visits staggered over a three-week cycle and a regular weekly helicopter pickup at Seeb airfield near Muscat, logistic supply was good. Mail and urgent stores were able to be delivered in reasonable time (14-20 days ex Sydney).
Throughout this period, the FFGs remained in the second degree of readiness with all weapons and sensors manned. The crews worked a defence watch routine of four hours on and four hours off. For those not actively involved in the surveillance activity, routine DC exercises (were conducted and all weapons were regularly cycled and proven. Opportunity was also taken to work with other units of the MNNF transiting through our areas. A number of PASSEX were completed with USN, RN, RNLN and RFA ships.
Whilst hindsight reveals that the maritime interception phase of the Gulf War was conducted in a benign environment, to those of us on station at the time, the threat was very real. The uncertainties of the area of operation were uppermost in our minds and therefore ship readiness was maintained at the highest possible level at all times.
I should note at this point that we found individual performance began to degrade after about 20-25 days of a defence watch routine. The crews remained alert and interested while on patrol but it became obvious that they had their limits. The second task group had considerably more ‘pucker factor’ to contend with after war broke out on 17 January. This may have assisted in maintaining their edge – particularly during the lengthy period following the outbreak of hostilities where, I understand, Sydney and Brisbane had in excess of 35 days at sea.
As a final point on patrol cycles, the RAN was second only to the USN in operational tempo. The first task group achieved a ratio approaching 90% of time at sea. Other MNNF forces aimed for a much reduced tempo of around 50%.
Surveillance
I’ve discussed the density of shipping traffic and the difficulty of maintaining an accurate plot. Amidst all this traffic of course the vast majority were innocent vessels going about their normal business. While all had to be challenged and their innocence verified, this quickly became a routine task and arrangements were made to share the information gained. This sharing of data for innocent traffic was never fully resolved and it became apparent that many of the vessels became very used to responding to MIF challenges. VHF Channel 16 was the source of much intelligence and it became quite a game for OOWs to piece together the puzzle of which ship of the 30 or 40 on the bridge PPI was responding to which VHF challenge. Surface plot/OOW liaison was never better effected.
We generally had very good intelligence on high interest tracks or ‘contacts of interest’ (COI). By about late September all Iraqi merchant vessels had been positively located and we had good information on their potential movements. Sitting astride the only route to and from Iraq, the RAN ships were in a position to respond to both inbound and outbound Iraqi traffic.
As events unfolded there was never any attempt by Iraqi ships to break out of the Persian Gulf. That’s not to say it was never a possibility and there were several speculative assessments of a supposed ‘breakout’. Whenever this occurred there was a flurry of activity on both sides of the Straits of Hormuz as units relocated to be in position. These regular occurrences became known as ‘Hittin breakouts’ in reference to an Iraqi supertanker which was assessed to be leading a trio of rampant tankers.
Inbound traffic was a very different matter and our major interception involvements centred on ships attempting to transit to the Iraqi port of Umm Qasar or to Kuwait. Most of these ships came from either the anchorage at Aden or from other Red Sea ports. As ships left the anchorage, their movement would be reported and surveillance aircraft would be tasked to relocate and track the COIs. USN P3Cs and RAF Nimrods performed the long range surveillance and alerted the waiting MNNF forces of traffic or ‘trade’ as the ships became known. Organic air, represented in our case by Seahawk or Squirrel then took over the hunt.
Aviation
It is appropriate at this point to diverge just a little to discuss the roles and capabilities of the aircraft embarked in the first task group. In my estimation, aviation was one of the success stories of the first deployment -certainly we could not have achieved the results we did without the sterling contributions of the embarked helicopters.
Each of the FFGs had one Seahawk and one Squirrel, while Success has a lone Squirrel. The rate of effort available from this asset base was never fully utilised because it soon became apparent that the surveillance capability of the S70B2 was far in excess of what was required. For an aircraft that was literally rushed into operational service, the Seahawk soon became our major surveillance sensor. In the constrained waters of the inner GOO the Seahawk proved its worth. In general terms, whilst on patrol we were able to effectively cover our allotted areas with two three-hour S70B2 sorties a day – usually conducted at dawn to refine the surface picture generated overnight and then again at dusk to identify contacts before night closed in. The subsequent acquisition of FLIR for the Seahawk, in advance of projected installation later in the life of the project, will of course mean that the natural phenomenon of darkness will become somewhat immaterial.
Both FFGs carried two crews for each S70B3 and the aircraft were therefore capable of flying for many more hours than was necessary in the surface surveillance role. In fact, each ship was capable of supporting up to 16 hours per day airborne if required. The aircraft proved up to the task and reliability and maintainability were excellent. Major servicings were conducted onboard over very short timeframes when in more routine circumstances the aircraft would have been taken down for maintenance for some days. In many ways, having the Seahawk was like having your own P3C parked down the back.
While I’ve extolled the virtues of Seahawk we should not forget or underestimate the contribution of the ‘flying budgie’ or A5350B Squirrel. I’m a great fan of the ‘stealth helicopter’ as the USN came In name our intrepid trio. Because of the aircraft’s low radar signature (many knew it as the ‘plastic fantastic’) and in view of the itchy trigger fingers evident during the early days on patrol, it was essential that IFF transponders were functioning correctly before the Squirrel set off on such tasks. There were many occasions when low and (relatively) fast radar contacts appeared at close range on consorts’ radars only to be subsequently identified as errant Squirrels. I do the aircrew an injustice there as they were thoroughly professional in everything they did – including their right of self-preservation which included ensuring IFF systems were operational and an absolute refusal to close any military contact within five nautical miles unless positive approval was obtained to enter ‘the zone’.
Both Squirrel and Seahawk were fundamental to our surveillance activity. When the situation dictated a more active role such as when mother’ was tasked to locate and track a ‘contact of interest’, both aircraft contributed greatly to our success. On one occasion I recall despatching the Seahawk to the limit of endurance (in fact halfway to Karachi) to relocate a COI heading our way. With Darwin following at 30 knots, the intrepid aviators headed east to maximum endurance, detected our COI at maximum radar range, closed to investigate, identify and interrogate and were able to return to mother to guide the ship to the intercept. On another occasion when Seahawk was temporarily incapacitated. Squirrel look great delight in achieving the same result, but at night. Both aircraft were absolutely invaluable.
Boarding Operations
To return to our primary mission. I’d like to discuss one of the more interesting and certainly more exciting aspects of the interdiction mission.
As the situation unfolded it became apparent that there was a need to develop a capability to board suspect vessels – to verify the presence or otherwise of prohibited cargo. In the lexicon of the period these operations were termed ‘visit and search’ rather than ‘boarding’. I’ll use the latter term for convenience.
Darwin was directly involved in five separate boardings. To illustrate the process I’ll describe the last and most complicated of these operations – the boarding of the tanker Amuriyah. This ship was boarded on 28 October, subsequently cleared and allowed to return to Kuwait. She was in ballast when boarded but was loaded with fuel oil on return to Iraq and subsequently became a casualty of war when bombed and sunk by USN A6 aircraft in the opening stages of Operation Desert Storm.
Each of the boardings in which we were involved was a multi-national and cooperative effort. In this particular example the Amuriyah was detected on departure from Aden, located by USN P3C and subsequently lost. She was reloaded late one evening by Darwin’s Squirrel and the ship closed in to take up a covert trail having previously developed a plan of attack in consultation with the designated Scene of Action commander (SAC) in USS Reasoner. USS Ogden, an LPD, had been detailed to support the operation and had on board a specialist SEAL/Marine unit. Darwin assumed a covert trail about midnight, the Squirrel having positively identified the tanker. The unsuspecting Iraqi had displaced himself some 50 miles to seaward of the normal shipping lanes and was apparently anticipating an uneventful transit. Overnight, the two American ships and a RN frigate converged to allow all ships to intercept Amuriyah at first light.
The technique involved in all hoardings began with a routine challenge on Channel 16. In this instance the USS Reasoner called Amuriyah and requested he stop to permit ‘visit and search ‘ under authority given to MNNF forces by UNSCR 661. Not unexpectedly, the Iraqi tanker failed to respond, despite the presence of an FFG 100 yards on his port beam and a Knox class frigate the same distance to starboard.
At this point it is worthwhile explaining that the progress of boarding operations were dictated to a very great extent by the rules of engagement in force. As already noted, the vast majority of boardings were multi-national, co-operative affairs and the pace and development of the incident was governed by compatible national ROE. It was essential that the initiative was gained early and retained throughout. It was necessary to generate a degree of momentum and to keep the opposition on the defensive. In one early operation where the SAC had less flexible ROE than the assisting forces it took 37 hours to gain effective control of the Iraqi vessel – this despite the fact that we had a combined USN/RAN boarding party embarked for over 24 hours. On that occasion the SAC had limited authority and almost every step of the process had to be cleared through higher command. I’m happy to say-that this was never a problem for the RAN Task Group where considerable authority had been delegated to the embarked CTG.
The rules under which we operated required a graduated and escalating response. In the case of Amuriyah, her master had obviously learned from the previous Iraqi boardings and he ensured every step of the process had to be used.
Having failed to respond to our challenge, both escorts then hoisted signal groups, attempted loud hailer communications and used sirens to attract attention. 140,000 tonnes of tanker sailed serenely towards the Gulf of Oman.
Throughout all this, VHF calls continued and naturally these were recorded. At each step of the escalating process, the target was given a specified time period within which to react or respond. It was essential dial the target not be allowed to seize the initiative for example, by being allowed to seek instruction from his higher authority.
Darwin‘s helicopter had been airborne throughout the incident and the next step was to buzz the tanker and hover adjacent to the bridge with a written Warning. Studied ignorance was the inevitable result.
Note that up to this point in the process all ships and helicopter weapon systems had not been used. On board the frigate’s guns were trained fore and aft, small arms were concealed and upper deck crews relaxed but ready at their stations. Naturally, being close aboard a potential threat, ammunition was provided, exposed personnel were dressed in flak jackets and steel helmets and Special sea dutymen were closed up.
On authority given by the SAC (and in our case by the embarked CTG) the next step was aggressive manoeuvre. On all occasions when this had been required, the Iraqi vessels had maintained a steady course and speed. While probably looking very spectacular, manoeuvres across the bow at speed were relatively straightforward and, up to this point had been effective in forcing the vessel to stop. But on this occasion the Iraqi master chose to not only decline to stop but to manoeuvre aggressively himself. As the intended target of his manoeuvring, it was comforting to have the responsiveness of two LM2500 gas turbines instantly available.
By this phase of the operation it was quite obvious that sterner measures were required. Weapon systems were trained on Amuriyah and the intention to fire warning shots was advised. Darwin fired 50 calibre rounds, initially at 300 metres then 100 metres ahead of the tanker. Apart from an assertion that our second series of warning shots had struck the tanker, notable because this was the first radio response, the Amuriyah continued at speed. Reasoner then opened out and after appropriate VMF radio warnings, two rounds of five-inch were accurately laid across the bows. By this stage, two-way communications had been established and all on the net were treated to some Iraqi accented invective.
The alert SUCAP consisting of one FA-18 and one F-14 had meantime been launched. Whilst both frigates took station close abeam, the aircraft made a series of very low passes overhead. It became obvious that the master had no intention of responding to anything less than direct action. Had it been required, ROE were available to take the ship under direct fire or to foul his screw. Neither course of action was necessary as it had been agreed earlier that, on reaching this sort of impasse, a boarding party would by inserted by helicopter. Accordingly two UH-1 Iroquois look station as top cover’ while two CH-46 Sea Stallions inserted 30+ troups onto the foredeck using a fast roping technique. Even at this point, Amuriyah was not going to succumb easily. The master had ordered water cannon to be activated and the decks were awash in an effort to frustrate the embarking Marines.
Having taken control of the ship, the search which followed was essentially similar load previous boardings. While the crew of Amuriyah attempted to frustrate search parties there was limited overt aggression once all onboard had been mustered and documentation examined.
For members of the boarding party on this and other occasions there were a number of new techniques and methods to be learned. While the RAN had developed some expertise in investigative boardings of FF’Vs, it has been many years since we had been involved in searching and verifying the cargo of such large vessels. We came to learn that good portable communications were vital, as was teamwork and maintaining the initiative. To effectively search a large vessel takes a minimum of 3-4 hours with up to three separate teams. Backup support and technical assistance should be available if needed, for example, shipwright expertise was necessary on one occasion to examine tank welds. Arrangements need to be in place to provide a steaming crew if diversion was required. These and many other aspects of the ‘visit and search’ role were learned through experience and by drawing upon the expertise of the USCG LEDET teams who had a vast amount of experience in enforcing anti-drug -smuggling operations.
Conclusion
In attempting to summarise the maritime interdiction mission I hope I’ve given you a general understanding of how we went about our task. To put that into some sort of perspective, you may be interested to hear a few statistics. During Operation Desert Shield there were:
- 26,300 recorded challenges;
- 996 MNNF boardings (the vast majority in the vicinity of the Jordanian port of Aqaba;
- the RAN boarded four supertankers, one small tanker, one fishing factors vessel and the so-called ‘peace ship Ibn Khaldoon;
- we assisted in boarding operations on two other Iraqi vessels; and
- warning shots were fired on three occasions.
At the start of my presentation I indicated that I would be attempting to draw out three major themes. Firstly I hope I’ve convinced you that the enforcement of sanctions was successful. To the extent that maritime trade was effectively halted, I believe we were very successful.
Secondly, while the political situation remained unchanged throughout the period, no such uncertainty was evident in the way MNNF units were able to operate together. Interoperability was as much a hallmark of the first deployment as was the constant uncertainly of what might happen next.
Finally, and most importantly in my view, the performance of both man and machine throughout the period was nothing short of outstanding. The calibre and professionalism of our sailors was second to none. The readiness and reliability of our ships and men over prolonged periods of intense operational activity give cause for considerable pride and satisfaction in a job well done.
About the Author
Vice Admiral Russ Shalders AO CSC RAN joined the Royal Australian Naval College in 1967. His sea appointments included executive officer of the patrol boat HMAS Ardent and destroyer HMAS Hobart and command of the PNG patrol boat HMPNGS Samarai and the frigates HMA Ships Sydney and Darwin and finally the destroyer HMAS Perth. Later he served as Commodore Flotillas. Notably he was awarded the Conspicuous Service Cross (CSC) in recognition of his command of Darwin, which he took command of at very short notice.
Russ Shalders’ senior shore appointments included Director General Naval Policy and Warfare, serving as the inaugural Director General Coastwatch, Head Defence Personnel Executive, Vice Chief of the Defence Force and finally Chief of Navy. He retired from the Navy on 4 July 2008.
